RMT

Transcription

RMT

Romanian
Military
Thinking
Military Theory and Science Journal
Edited by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff
3
July
September
2006
Founded in 1864 under the name
“Military Romania”
nd
~ English edition, 2
year ~
Authors assume full intellectual responsibility
for the articles submitted to the editorial staff
Romanian Military Thinking Journal
is recognised
by the National University Research Council
Contents
Editorial
The Strategy of Certitude
Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
9
College Interarmees de Defense
The Evidence of Fraternity
The Forehead and the Chin: Think and Act as a Genuine Officer
Lt Cdr Laurent SUDRAT
13
The Sword and the Spirit
Lt Col Thibault de BREBISSON
24
Pacification: the French School
Maj Philippe Savary de BEAUREGARD
35
Should We Let War Reporters “Slip into our Beds” ?
Maj Gilles JARON
45
Vo Nguyen Giap: a Gifted Strategist
and an Instrument of Vietnam Independence
Maj Dominique LUCHEZ
53
Strategic Divergences
Lt Cdr Charles-Edouard DARD
63
3
Romanian Military Thinking
~ 3/2006
Would There Be a War of the Nile ?
Maj Philippe CAVALIER
The USA Foreign Policy in the Light of its Domestic History
Maj Richard ZABOT
75
84
Opinions • Arguments
Certitudes • Perspectives
96
The End of Management ?
Cpt Doina ILIE
100
Global Politics
Corneliu POPESCU
Geopolitics • Geostrategy
International Security
Strategic Reflections: Policy of Force, Strategy on a Knife Edge
Brig (r) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD
107
Power and Its Role in Postmodern Geopolitics
Col Constantin HLIHOR, PhD, Professor
114
Political-Military Relations in the Wider Black Sea Area.
Manifestations and Tendencies
Capt Ion STAN
124
The War in Afghanistan in the Context
of Wiping Out World Terrorism
Lt Col Vasile VREME, PhD
135
RMT
Dialogues
Interview with Brigadier Niculae TABARCIA, Chief of the Doctrine
and Training Directorate within the General Staff
4
141
Contents
RMT
Debates
“Air Power in the Paradigm of Globalisation”. Guests: Air
Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD, Deputy Director, The
Partnership Coordination Cell ~ PCC, Mons, Belgium, Colonel
Florian R@PAN, PhD, Deputy Commandant of the National Defence
University “Carol I”, Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor,
Head (Dean) of the Faculty of Command and Staff, the National Defence
University “Carol I” and Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University
Reader, Head of the Air and Naval Forces Department, the National
Defence University “Carol I”
156
Military Publications Universe
183
Editorial Events
187
Thinking Differently ...
192
Abstracts
194
5
Contenu
Inhalt
Editorial
La stratégie de la certitude
Colonel dr. Costinel PETRACHE
Editorial
9
College Interarmees
de Defense
L ’argument
de la fraternite
Strategie der Sicherheit
Oberst dr. Costinel PETRACHE
College Interarmees
de Defense
Das Argument
..
der Bruderlichkeit
Le front et le menton: penser et agir pour
l’officier
Capitaine de corvette Laurent SUDRAT
13
Die Vorderseite und das Kinn: denken
und für den offizier handeln
Lt.-Komandeur Laurent SUDRAT
Le sabre et l’esprit
Lieutenant-colonel
Thibault de BREBISSON
24
Der Säbel und der Geist
Oberst dr. Thibault de BREBISSON
Pacification: l’école française
Chef d’escadron
Philippe Savary de BEAUREGARD
35
Die Friedensstiftung: französische
Schule
Major Philippe Savary de BEAUREGARD
Peut-on laisser les reporters de guerre
“se glisser dans nos lits” ?
Chef d’escadron Gilles JARON
45
Kann man die Kriegsberichter sich
in unserem “Leben verkehren lassen” ?
Major Gilles JARON
Vo Nguyen Giap: stratège de génie
et instrument de l’indépendance
du Vietnam
Chef d’escadron Dominique LUCHEZ
53
Vo Nguyen Giap: genialer Stratege
und Instrument der Unabhängigkeit
Vietnams
Major Dominique LUCHEZ
6
Divergences stratégiques
Capitaine de corvette
Charles-Edouard DARD
63
Contents
Strategische Divergenzen
Lt.-Komandeur Charles-Edouard DARD
La guerre du Nil aura-t-elle lieu ?
Commandant Philippe CAVALIER
75
Wird ein Krieg Nils stattfinden?
Major Philippe CAVALIER
La politique extérieure
des États-Unis d’Amérique
à la lumière de leur histoire intérieure
Commandant Richard ZABOT
84
Die Außenpolitik der Staaten,
die im Licht ihrer internen Geschichte
Major Richard ZABOT
Opinions
Certitudes
•
•
Meinungen • Argumente
Gewissen • Perspektiven
Arguments
Perspectives
La fin du management ?
Capitaine Doina ILIE
La politique globale
Corneliu POPESCU
Geopolitique • Geostrategie
Securite internationale
96
Das Ende des Managements ?
Hauptmann Doina ILIE
100 Globale Politik
Corneliu POPESCU
Geopoliti
Geopolitikk • Geostrategie
Internationale Sicherheit
Réflexions stratégiques: Politique
de force, stratégie qui tient à un fil
Général de brigade (de réserve)
Gheorghe V~DUVA
107 Strategische Überlegungen:
La puissance et son rôle dans le contexte
de la géopolitique post-moderne
Colonel prof. dr. Constantin HLIHOR
114 Die Macht und ihre Rolle im postmoderne
Les rapports politico-militaires
dans la Zone Elargie de la Mer Noire.
Expressions et tendances
Capitaine de vaisseau Ion STAN
124 Die
Gewaltpolitik, Strategie am Rand
des Abgrunds
Bgd. Gen (r) dr. Gheorghe V~DUVA
Geopolitik
Oberst dr. Lehrer Constantin HLIHOR
Tendenz politico-militärischen
Beziehungen in der erweiterten Zone
des Schwarzen Meeres
Komandeur Ion STAN
7
~ 3/2006
135 Der Krieg im Afghanistan im Rahmen
La guerre de l’Afghanistan
dans le contexte de la liquidation
du terrorisme mondial
Lieutenant-colonel dr. Vasile VREME
der Beilegung des weltweiten Terrorismus
Oberst-lt. dr. Vasile VREME
Dialogues RMT
RMT
Interview avec le général de brigade
Niculae TABARCIA, le chef de la Direction
Doctrine et Instruction d’Etat Major
Général
Debats RMT
141 Befragung mit der
Brigade General
Niculae TABARCIA, Leiter der Doktrin-und
Ausbildungsbteilung des Generalstabs
RMT
“La puissance aérienne dans
la paradigme de la globalisation”.
Invités: général de flottille aérienne dr.
Victor STRÎMBEANU, le directeur adjoint
de la Cellule de coordination du Parteneriat
~ CCP, colonel dr. Florian R@PAN,
adjoint du commandant chef de
l’Université Nationale de Défense “Carol I”,
colonel prof. univ. dr. Traian ANASTASIEI,
le chef (le doyen) de la Faculté de
Commande et Etat Major de l’Université
Nationale de Défense “Carol I”, et colonel
prof. univ. dr. Vasile BUCINSCHI, le chef
de la Cathè dre des Forces Aériennes
et Navales de l’Université Nationale
de Défense “Carol I”
Dialoge
Debatten
156 “Luftstärke
im Globalisierungsparadigme”.
Gäste: Luftflottegeneral dr.
Victor STRÎMBEANU, Assistentendirektor
die Zelle der Koordinierung Parteneriat
~ ZKP, Kommandeur dr. Florian R@PAN,
stellvertreter der Kommandant der
Nationalen Verteidigungsuniversität
“Carol I”, Kommandeur Hochschullehrer
dr. Traian ANASTASIEI, Leiter (Dekan)
der Kommando-und Stabsfakultät
der Nationalen Verteidigungsuniversität
“Carol I”, und Kommandeur Dozent
Dr. Vasile BUCINSCHI, Leiter der Luft-und
Seekräftelehrstuhl der Nationalen
Verteidigungsuniversität “Carol I”
Univers militaire
183 Universum
des publications
der Militärveroffentlichungen
Evenements editoriaux
187 Leitartiklerereignisse
Penser autrement ...
192 Anders denken ...
Resumes
194 Zusammengefaß t
8
The Strategy La strategie
of Certitude de la certitude
Certitude – the immediate state
of confidence in one’s own potential,
related to the acknowledged condition
of the future; surrealist blackmail on an
induced utopia; acute sense of interest
motivated by irrevocable desiderata;
confirmation of subtle realities and of
the power to comprehend, know and do;
seductive affinity of expectation with truth
and desire; measure of knowledge
pushed up to the limit of deliberate
avoidance of adventure and, last but
not least, the value of tomorrow within
the unleashed, accelerated power
of today. By way of example, gently
and fastidiously expanding into
complementarities which become
shelters for active meanings crammed
together, the definition seems to be
a matter of absolutes: the frontier
– initiating, the method – implacable,
the way – certain, the motivation
– thorough. Wherefrom the fact, neither
generically confirmed nor historically
contradicted, that in order to have it play
its part in the firm architecture of longlasting constructions, certitude has
to find its own purpose in the radical
significances of a chosen strategy.
Certitude is not an event; it is the work
of the unsimulated truth, of the
methodical expectation and of the
evidence of having the power to find
oneself at supreme levels of existence.
It is, maybe, and this is an important
La certitude – l’état direct de la
confiance dans le propre potentiel,
rapporté à la condition compréhensive
de l’avenir; la pression surréaliste vers
une utopie induite; la perception aigue
d’un intérêt justifiée par des aspirations
irrévocables; la confirmation des réalités
subtiles et de la pouvoir de saisir, savoir
et faire; une séduisante affinité de l’attente
de la vérité et du désir; la mesure de la
connaissance poussée jusqu’à la limite
de l’action d’éviter intentionnellement
l’aventure et, enfin, pas du tout
le moindre, la valeur de demain
dans la pouvoir désinvolte, vivante
d’aujourd’hui. Ainsi, développée
doucement et affectée dans les
complémentarités qui deviennent
des abris pour les raisons actives,
la définition semble être une question
de l’absolue: le bout – initiatique;
la méthode – inéluctable; le parcours
– incontestable; la finalité – accomplie.
Par ici le fait, ni génériquement
confirmé, ni historiquement forcé, que,
pour la mettre en rôle, à l’intérieure
de l’architecture ferme des constructions
durables, la certitude doit se retrouver
dans les significations exigées d’une
stratégie choisie. La certitude n’est pas
un événement; c’est un travail de la
véracité non simulée, de l’attente
systématique et de l’évidence de la
puissance de te retrouver, toi-même,
dans les sens supérieures de l’existence.
Il est, peut être, l’observation nécessaire
9
finding in the neuter dialectics
of becoming, the very reason that causes
certitude to be a disincentive in the
practice of grass-rooted performances,
performances that lack any perspective
on the future. Being in a mutually open
relationship, devoid of any subversive
complicity, certitude and performance
guarantee that, no matter what definition
we might provide for them, it cannot be
a static or negative one, but rather one
that is spatial and dynamic. Performance
cultivates, in the factual equation
of existence, certitude not as an
abstraction, generated by inevitable
philosophy, but as a mood that steadily
nourishes strategies, plans and projects.
This is the very reason why performance
can be seen as an ultimatum that simply
wipes or not those meant to uncertainties
and their static curves out from the
structural organisation chart. We realise,
implicitly, that certitude cannot be
understood as a gift or as fatality lacking
in a solid ground, in which the means
and methods meant to maintain and
develop it come and breed, but as an
inner state that organically loathes
futility, mediocrity and stagnation.
Stirring up the metaphysical fascination
with the impossible, certitude signals
the moments in which professional
shortcomings cannot be supported
any more, cannot be kept in the orbit
of an assisted organisational socialisation;
on the contrary, impartially encouraging
affirmation through competition, it is
supportive for the principle of different
adequacy to context. Certitude cannot
be but genuine and, at worst, it can
be substituted with puzzles, tailored
in a too simple manner to fit in festive
environments by those who desert
from uncertainty, situation that can be
easily detected and qualified. Without
10
~ 3/2006
dans la logique impartiale de devenir,
la raison pour laquelle la certitude
démoralise la pratique des performances
au brin d’herbe, des performances sans
perspective. Repérées dans une relation
réciproque transparente, soutirée
à n’importe quoi complicité subversive,
la certitude et la performance
soutiennent le fait que, n’importe qu’elle
est leur définition, celle-ci n’est pas une
définition statique ou négative, mais
plutôt l’une spatiale et dynamique.
C’est la performance qui cultive,
dans l’équation factuelle de l’existence,
la certitude pas comme une concept
d’une philosophie inévitable, mais comme
un état d’esprit qui nourrit solidement
des stratégies, des modèles et des projets.
Voici, c’est la raison pour laquelle
la performance est un sorte d’ultimatum
qui annule ou pas sur la carte
structurelle de l’organisation ceux-ci
qui sont affectés à l’incertitude et aux
ses courbes stables. Nous réalisons
implicitement que la certitude ne peut
pas être assimilée comme un donné
ou une fatalité arrêtée où les méthodes
et les moyens d’entretenir et développer
apparaissent ou s’accroîtrent ellesmêmes, mais, comme un état intérieur
qui hait organiquement l’inutilité,
la médiocrité et la stagnation. En incitant
le magnétisme abstrait de l’impossible,
la certitude nous découvre les moments
dans lesquels l’incomplet professionnel
ne plus être aidé, ne plus être maintenu
sur l’orbite d’une assimilation
organisationnelle assistée; au contraire,
en engageant impartialement l’affirmation
par la compétition, elle soutient le principe
de l’adéquation différentié au contexte.
La certitude ne peut pas être cachée,
par un stratagème, mais, à pire, elle peut
être substituée par des jeux des figures
aisément adaptées aux circonstances
festives, par des délateurs de l’incertitude,
c’est une condition facilement d’être
Editorial
pretending to have exhausted the
philosophy and effects of the issue,
we allow ourselves to outline the virtues
of certitude, as follows: it supports the
predicted substantiation of a collective
idea, meant to strategically guide conducts
that would lead to optimal development
of forces; it makes the performance
scenario and, implicitly, the one of the
actions taken so that performance could
exist more lively; it induces cohesion
and stability in the system; it excludes
consensus as a result of indifference
and positive loyalty simulation; it consists
neither in a state maintained due
to situational ambitions and colourless
opportunities, nor in the energy provided
by genetic repression, but in the attitude
motivated and nourished by performance
and evidence; it is incompatible with
the display of logic in an order of battle
and with transformed and aesthetically
seduced marginality.
When it comes to the national
military institution and its present
role, the Romanian Armed Forces
Transformation Strategy is,
systemically, the very certitude that lies
at the basis of the Romanian military
body transparent, certified, adequate
and methodical reconstruction. It is the
certitude of all certitudes that will
empower the Romanian Armed Forces
enduring and continuous development
in this century. To ensure such a type
of development, transformation needs,
as we have already acknowledged,
militants in favour of certitude and,
by no means, supporters of success,
who dwell in the shelters created at the
shadow of intermediate achievements.
surprise et qualifié. Sans épuiser, d’une
manière indirecte, son raisonnement
et son effet, nous nous permettons
de trouver les vertus de la certitude,
comme suite: elle soutient le fondement
prédictible d’une idée collective qui
doit orienter stratégiquement les
comportements, ce qui déterminerait
un progresse optime des forces; elle
vitalise le scénario de la performance
et, implicitement, celui de l’action
déployée pour son procès; elle détermine
la cohésion et la stabilité systémique; elle
exclue le consensus par l’indifférence
et la simulation de la loyauté positive;
elle ne consiste pas dans la nature
conservée par des ambitions
conjoncturelles et des opportunités
insipides, pas dans l’énergie donnée
des répliques génétiques, mais dans
l’attitude motivée et soutenue par
la performance et la démonstration;
elle est incompatible avec le rangement
de la logique à l’ordre du combat
et avec la marginalité transformée
et esthétiquement séduisée.
Quant à la vocation concrète
de l’institution militaire nationale,
La Stratégie de transformation
de l’Armée Roumaine est,
systémiquement, la certitude même
avec qui nous rétablissons, dans une
manière transparente, certifiée, adéquate
et méthodique, l’organisme militaire
roumain. C’est la certitude des
certitudes qui accentuera le parcours
du développement durable de l’Armée
Roumaine dans ce siècle. Un
développement dans lequel, nous avons
remarqué déjà, la transformation
a besoin des adeptes de la certitude
et pas du tout des sympathisés du succès,
installés dans les abris situés à l’ombre
des accomplissements intermédiaires.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
Version française par Alina UNGHEANU
11
, Interarmées
College
de Défense
The Evidence of Fraternity
The idea of this collaboration was born
in the tactical scenery of an agreeable
discussion with Major Cristophe Midan,
while we were both attending the National
Defence College. No previous preparations
were necessary; I simply applied the current
editorial conduct, a sign of the fact that,
in the European state of affirmation through
the spirit, barriers ceased to exist long time ago.
I knew a few things about the height of the French School of geopolitical and geostrategic
thought as I had also been familiar, from the current publications as well as from history,
with the height of the French military thinking. It is the reason for which the works that
were sent to our editorial staff did not surprise us, on the contrary, they developed and
consolidated the certitude that the doctrinaire state of the French military thinking
meritoriously keeps the highest trajectory of affirmation. As for the authors, we know
nothing more than the profile that was configured by the articles that were sent to the
editorial staff to be published, which we found extremely convincing.
Acknowledged in and by Collège Interarmées de Défense, editor of a publication
of large and inspired theoretical engagement ~ La Tribune – Lieutenant
Commander Laurent SUDRAT, Lieutenant Colonel Thibault de BREBISSON, Major
Philippe Savary de BEAUREGARD, Major Gilles JARON, Major Dominique LUCHEZ,
Lieutenant Commander Charles-Edouard DARD, Major Philippe CAVALIER, Major
Richard ZABOT draw our attention towards an issue that comprehensively consists
in the essence of theoretical affirmations; the objectivity of the engaged judgements;
the predictive understanding of the nodal commandments of military development;
the analytical character of the discourse; the clarity and pertinence of the invoked
arguments; the academic casualness of the language; the deep culture of philosophical
breath; the inspired complementary incursion into the core of related disciplines;
the active loyalty, although critical of recent history; the lapidary objectivity of conclusions;
the trust in a universe of values that is not rigid and dogmatic but open and flexible.
Beyond all the above-mentioned things, the path opened by this collaboration is,
first and foremost, an encouraging evidence of fraternity.
“RMT”
12
THE FOREHEAD
LE FRONT
AND THE CHIN ET LE MENTON
think and act as
a genuine officer
penser et agir
pour l’officier
“There is no wealth without
“Il n’est de richesse que
people”. This famous John Bodin’s
d’hommes”. Cet aphorisme célèbre
aphorism could be engraved
de Jean Bodin pourrait être inscrit
with golden letters on the
en lettres d’or au frontispice de
frontispiece of all the military
tous les établissements militaires,
establishments, as long as the
tant la valeur d’une armée repose,
value of an army rests, today as
aujourd’hui comme hier, sur
yesterday, on the quality of the
la qualité de son personnel.
personnel. Hierarchical structures
Structures hiérarchisées par
by definition, the armed forces
essence, les forces armées
naturally try to recruit and to train
cherchent naturellement
à recruter et à préparer des chefs
commanders that will be able,
qui pourront, le moment venu,
when the time comes, to take
commander au combat et apporter
command in a battle and to bring
Lieutenant Commander
le succès des armes. Elles briguent
success to their armies. They also
Laurent SUDRAT
aspire to be among the superior ~ The French National Navy ~ de surcroît les esprits supérieurs
que les qualités prédestinent aux hautes
spirits whose qualities predestine for the high
fonctions de conception et d’administration,
functions of conception and of administration,
ce besoin étant exacerbé par les circonstances
this need being exacerbated by the contemporary
contemporaines.
circumstances.
De plus, l’armée doit être organisée, équipée
Moreover, the army must be organised,
et entraînée en fonction d’opérations finalement
equipped and trained according to the operations
assez mal définies, aux multiples scénarios,
that are, many times, poorly defined, to the
dont la plupart ne se réaliseront heureusement
multiple scenarios, out of which the most will
jamais, mais qui s’imposent par principe
be never, fortunately, true to the fact, although
de précaution. Les forces humaines gérées
they are imposed by precautionary principles.
par cette institution destinée au combat jouissent,
The human forces managed by this institution
par conséquent, d’un statut très spécial au sein
destined for battle enjoy, consequently, a very
de la société, statut qui va sous peu être réaffirmé
special status within society, status that may
comme dérogeant aux règles courantes de la
be reaffirmed as slightly breaching the rules
citoyenneté. Ainsi, l’autorité à l’égard du personnel
running citizenship. Thus, the authority with
militaire, malgré quelques concessions marginales
regard to the military personnel, despite some
dictées par l’influence de l’époque, restera quasi
marginal concessions dictated by the influence
absolue et continuera de s’étendre à l’extrême
of the era, will remain almost absolute and will
13
continue to spread itself to the extreme until
this exorbitant “right to risk life”. At the end of
such high stakes, the armies will unquestionably
inscribe themselves in an extraordinary
framework.
To animate it and rise to these vital challenges,
an army needs commanders with varied
temperaments, although, per ensemble, they
share a common base of values:
the thinkers, that seek to catch what future
has in store for them;
the organisers, that ensure the placement
in condition;
the leaders under whose authority the
forces are placed.
We currently oppose a man of thought
to a man of action or, as Jean Guitton so agreeably
said, “the forehead and the chin”. In fact, the first
term carries us towards abstraction and general
laws, while the second blossoms rather in the
concrete and the immediate realisation. It would
be nevertheless hazardous to claim to classify
them in the absolute, according to hierarchy
of values and this analysis deserves to be
explained by placing it in a realistic perspective.
To various degrees, the officer is condemned
to think and to act.
The ambition of this study is thus to contribute
to a renewal of the definition of the military
commander, while emphasising some perspectives
of the diptych thought-action.
To do it, we refer to the reality of the military
employments, their requirements and the required
qualities to exercise them, before approaching
the difficult exercise of the selection of the elite,
supported by the concepts related to character.
The proven primacy of an officer temperament
will allow for proposing some adjustments to
the employment of the high level human resources.
“Multi sunt vocati,
pauci vero electi”
To begin our reflection properly, we will
adopt a classification of the hierarchic levels,
which include, distinguishing between ranks
and the equivalent joint armed forces:
• “subordinate”commanders, from the rank
of lieutenant to the one of lieutenant colonel,
14
~ 3/2006
jusqu’à cet exorbitant “droit de risquer la vie”.
A l’aune de tels enjeux, les armées s’inscrivent
sans conteste dans un cadre extraordinaire.
Pour s’animer et relever ces défis vitaux,
l’armée a besoin de chefs aux tempéraments
variés, bien que partageant un socle commun
de valeurs:
les penseurs qui cherchent à percer
l’inconnu de l’avenir;
les organisateurs, qui assurent la mise
en condition;
les meneurs d’homme sous l’autorité
desquels sont placées les forces.
Or, il est courant d’opposer homme de pensée
et homme d’action ou, comme l’a dit plaisamment
Jean Guitton – “le front et le menton”. En effet,
le premier est porté vers l’abstraction et les lois
générales, tandis que le second s’épanouit plutôt
dans le concret et la réalisation immédiate.
Il serait pourtant hasardeux de prétendre
les classer dans l’absolu selon une hiérarchie
de valeur et cette analyse mérite d’être nuancée
par une mise en perspective réaliste. A des degrés
divers, l’officier est condamné à penser et à agir.
L’ambition de cette étude est ainsi
de contribuer à une rénovation de la définition
du chef militaire, en faisant jaillir quelques
perspectives adossées à ce diptyque
pensée-action.
Pour ce faire, nous nous appuierons sur
la réalité des emplois militaires, leurs exigences
et les qualités requises pour les exercer, avant
d’aborder le difficile exercice de la sélection
des élites, soutenus par les concepts de la
caractérologie. La primauté avérée du
tempérament chez l’officier nous permettra
alors de proposer quelques réajustements
à l’emploi des ressources humaines de haut
niveau.
“Multi sunt vocati,
pauci vero electi”
Pour amorcer convenablement notre
réflexion, adoptons une classification des
niveaux hiérarchiques, en distinguant (grades
et équivalents interarmées inclus):
• les chefs “subalterns”, du grade de lieutenant
à celui de lieutenant-colonel, qui assurent
College Interarmees de Defense ~ The Evidence of Fraternity
who ensure the command of elementary units,
in the specific framework of an army or of
a specialty. The dominating trait for them is
the know-how. They are rarely employed
in transverse tasks and, in case they are, it is
generally under command, as specialists;
• “superior” commanders, from the rank
of colonel to the one of division general, who
exercise their activities in two domains, according
to their position, at the command of joint units
or in the central administration;
• “big leaders”, from the rank of general
of army, whose tasks always require a mixture
of administration and a close relation with civil
and political authorities.
Let us briefly describe the three faces
of an officer:
the subordinate commander is, above all,
a man of action, associated with a technician
that implements equipment and systems
of weapons. His action takes place at the tactical
or even operational levels, which are relatively
easy to take up. Besides idealism, authority and
energy, he is required a rustic character of the
body and of spirit, the sense of duty and the spirit
of discipline. These human qualities widely
compensate eventual deficiencies in the domain
of culture. The common sense and a certain
down-to-earth realism will be the most demanded
aspects of his intelligence;
the responsibilities of the superior
commander, of staff or of headquarters, always
suppose experience, solid military knowledge
and reflection:
the commander of a big unit (a regiment,
a first rank vessel or an airbase) has,
in addition, to have the characteristics
of a leader: character, associated with will
and with the sense of responsibility. But,
according to his position, authority,
dynamism, eyes like a hawk cannot
compensate any deficiency in the process
of organisation, a cardinal virtue, for which
he must combine the action of various
elements;
la conduite d’unités élémentaires, dans le cadre
spécifique d’une arme ou d’une spécialité. Leur
dominante est le savoir-faire. Ils ne sont que
rarement employés dans des tâches transverses,
ou, s’ils le sont, c’est généralement en sous-ordre
et en tant que spécialistes;
• les chefs “supérieurs”, de colonel à général
de division, qui exercent leurs activités dans
deux domaines, selon qu’ils sont placés à la tête
d’unités interarmes voire interarmées, ou qu’ils
participent à l’administration centrale;
• les “grands chefs”, à partir du rang de général
de corps d’armée, dont les tâches comportent
toujours un mélange d’administration, de
commandement et de contact étroit avec les
autorités civiles et politiques.
Balayons succinctement ces trois figures
d’officier:
le chef subalterne est avant tout un homme
de terrain, associé d’un technicien mettant
en œuvre des matériels et des systèmes d’armes.
Son action prend place au niveau tactique voire
opératif, qui reste relativement aisé à embrasser.
En plus d’idéal, d’autorité et d’énergie, on lui
demande la rusticité du corps et d’esprit, le sens
du devoir et l’esprit de discipline. Ces qualités
humaines compensent largement d’éventuelles
déficiences dans le domaine de la culture.
Le bon sens et un certain réalisme terre à terre
seront chez lui l’aspect le plus recherché
de l’intelligence;
les fonctions de chef supérieur, état-major
ou commandement, supposent toujours de
l’expérience, de solides connaissances militaires
et de la réflexion:
le chef d’une grande unité (chef de corps
d’un régiment, commandant d’un navire
de premier rang ou d’une base aérienne)
doit en outre présenter les caractéristiques
du meneur d’hommes: du caractère, associé
à la volonté et au goût des responsabilités.
Mais à l’échelon où il se trouve, l’autorité,
le dynamisme, le coup d’œil, ne peuvent
compenser aucune déficience du sens
de l’organisation, vertu cardinale pour qui
doit combiner l’action d’éléments très
divers;
15
the staff officer participates in the general
management functions, preparing
decisions and watching to their execution.
The first function supposes the aptitude
for analysis and for synthesis, flexible
spirit and imagination fertilised by
experience. The second demands clarity,
order and spirit of accomplishment.
the required qualities for the superior
commander are, one sees it, numerous
and varied. Sometimes, they meet within
the same individual. But, most often,
the officer, without showing a marked
deficiency, is characterised by a special
virtue. This predominance should
determine his employment and his
career: a strong character oriented
towards command, particularly extensive
intellectual capacities to meet the
requirements of his position in the staff,
while a balance between these qualities
should push towards the summits.
the big leader is not necessarily a big spirit,
or a big heart, but a man of character who, placed
at the command of a very important body, makes
the just decisions, while knowing to measure
the issues and to assume the risks. He is
preferentially situated at the “strategic level”.
The case of General Eisenhower on the eve
of the disembarkation on June 6, 1944 is often
quoted as an emblematic example of the crushing
weight of the responsibilities resting on one
single man, alone “to show the merit to have
known to risk the supreme issues”. Following the
example of Hernani conspirators, the big leader
is therefore the one that sets up ambitious
objectives and follows without failing the narrow
and perilous ways of success: “Ad augusta
per angusta…”. Once set up, the army awaits
for those Colbert ones (let us grant Louvois the
joint spirit …) of modern times: legislators,
skilled administrators, leaders responsible for
organisation, as we call them today, whose role
is essential. How to select them ?
This ternary categorisation, no matter how
reprehensible, presents the advantage of putting
in epigraph the required qualities for each level
16
~ 3/2006
l’officier d’état-major participe aux fonctions
de direction générale, préparant les
décisions et veillant à leur exécution.
La première fonction suppose l’aptitude
à l’analyse comme à la synth è se, la
souplesse d’esprit, l’imagination fécondée
par l’expérience. La seconde exige clarté,
ordre et esprit de realization;
les qualités requises chez le chef supérieur
sont, on le voit, nombreuses et variées.
Parfois, elles se trouvent réunies chez
un même individu. Mais le plus souvent
l’officier, sans faire preuve d’une déficience
marquée, est caractérisé par une vertu
particulière. Cette prédominance devrait
déterminer son emploi et sa carrière: un
caractère fortement dessiné oriente vers
le commandement, des capacités
intellectuelles particulièrement étendues
vers l’état-major, tandis qu’un heureux
équilibre entre ces qualités devrait
pousser vers les sommets.
le grand chef n’est pas nécessairement
un grand esprit, ni un grand cœur, mais
un homme de caractère qui, placé à la tête d’un
organisme très important, prend les décisions
justes en sachant en mesurer les enjeux et en
assumer les risques. Il se situe préférentiellement
au “niveau stratégique”. Le cas du généralissime
Eisenhower à la veille du débarquement
du 6 juin 1944 est souvent cité comme exemple
emblématique du poids écrasant des
responsabilités reposant sur un seul homme,
seul à “démontrer le mérite d’avoir su risquer
les enjeux suprêmes”. A l’instar des conjurés
d’Hernani, le grand chef est donc celui qui fixe
des objectifs ambitieux et emprunte sans faillir
les voies étroites et périlleuses du succès: “Ad
augusta per angusta … ”. Cela fixé, l’armée attend
aussi les Colbert (concédons Louvois à l’esprit
interarmées…) des temps modernes:
codificateurs, administrateurs avisés, grands
responsables organiques dirions-nous
aujourd’hui, leur rôle aussi est primordial.
Comment les sélectionner ?
Cette catégorisation ternaire, aussi critiquable
soit-elle, présente l’avantage de mettre en exergue
les qualités requises à chaque niveau
of responsibility. It allows us, at present, to refine
the selection filter of officers, basing on the
primacy of culture and, especially, of character.
“It is necessary
for a military to have
as much character
as spirit”1
There are numerous historical evidence
to associate the action and reflection, and often
to literature, with regard to the same person,
as John François Deniau shows in his last work
“La double passion; écrire ou agir”. The connivance
between the feather and the sword has crystallised
big destinies. From Julius Caesar to de Gaulle,
going through Vauvenargues, Alfred de Vigny
(having been bored in garrison and delivering
the admirable “Servitude et grandeur militaries”),
Richelieu, Napoleon, Stendhal and Clemenceau,
these two burning fires have always driven
the world. But to write, or simply to reflect,
necessitates a referential cultural baggage.
Culture, perceived as a specialisation and
development, is an enrichment of the basic
professional knowledge. One does not imagine
an engineer without scientific culture, or a banker
without financial culture. Consequently, an officer
cannot lack military culture. The ideology
that has tended to substantially diminish this
matter in the formation of the officer for about
twenty years, in the name of a depraved vision
of Modernism, had no other effect than to weaken
the esprit de corps. This tendency seems
fortunately to invert itself today, notably due
to the pragmatic example of the Anglo-Saxon
Armies that place, without ambiguity, the military
training in the foreground of the formation of their
officers, when, in France, university curricula
are still privileged. The return of “leadership”
formation in grace in officer schools gives hope,
but mentalities will have to evolve to place the
military and human training, through its forms
1
de responsabilité. Elle nous permet à présent
d’affiner le filtre de sélection des officiers,
en nous fondant sur la primauté de la culture
et surtout du caractère.
“Il faut qu’un homme
de guerre ait autant
de caractere que d’esprit”1
Les cautions historiques sont nombreuses
à associer l’action et la réflexion, et souvent
l’écriture, chez un même homme, comme
le démontre Jean François Deniau dans son
dernier ouvrage La double passion; écrire ou agir.
La connivence entre la plume et l’épée a cristallisé
de grands destins. De Jules César à De Gaulle,
en passant par Vauvenargues, Alfred de Vigny
(s’étant ennuyé en garnison et nous livrant
l’admirable “servitude et grandeur militaries”),
Richelieu, Napoléon, Stendhal et Clemenceau,
toujours ces deux feux brûlants ont conduit
le monde. Mais écrire, ou simplement réfléchir,
nécessite un bagage culturel de référence.
La culture, perçue comme une spécialisation
et un approfondissement, est un enrichissement
des connaissances professionnelles de base.
On n’imagine pas un ingénieur sans culture
scientifique, ni un banquier sans culture
financière. De même un officier ne peut en aucun
cas se passer de culture militaire. L’idéologie
qui a tendu à diminuer substantiellement la part
de cette matière dans la formation des officiers
depuis une vingtaine d’années, au nom d’une
vision dévoyée du modernisme, n’a eu d’autre
effet que d’amoindrir l’esprit de corps. Cette
tendance semble heureusement s’inverser
aujourd’hui, grâce notamment à l’exemple
pragmatique des armées anglo-saxonnes,
qui placent sans équivoque l’instruction militaire
au premier plan de la formation de leurs officiers,
là où en France on privilégie encore les cursus
universitaires. Le retour en grâce de la formation
au “leadership” dans les écoles d’officier est
porteur d’espoir, mais les mentalités devront
encore évoluer pour placer l’instruction militaire
Napoléon
17
of “Crapahut” (land, air and naval), in the first
row of the taught subjects.
As for the general culture, General de Gaulle
quoted it as being “the true school of command”.
In fact, in broader sense, culture – combination
of several school disciplines – is a formation
of the spirit. It lights up, widens, deepens
the thought, it allows for linking up, dominating
ensembles, understanding the superior laws
of events and things organisation.
This culture is a good leaven; again it is
necessary there to be dough.
In fact, culture must nourish intelligence.
Poorly assimilated, it becomes harmful, for it
distorts perspectives, drives to pride and to the
ease, predisposes to scepticism, disperses: “There
is no cultivated man. There are only men that
cultivate themselves”, said Marshal Foch.
This culture, irrigating intelligence, reveals
itself only through character; let us think of the
chapter of “Le Fil de l’Epée”, dedicated to this
subject: “The man of character embraces action
with the pride of the master (…); without his
gloomy slave-like duty, thanks to the divine game
of the hero (…) it is necessary for virtue to give
the military order a rejuvenated ideal, to confer,
through the elite, the unity of tendencies, to provoke
fervour and to fertilise talent. Character will be
this ferment ...”.
To distinguish the man of character we should
resort to the study of character, this science
that makes us penetrate in what determines
man’s behaviour, to apply a structuring grid
to the military needs.
The classification by physical characteristics
of Cornélius Heymans (Belgian doctor, Nobel
Prize, 1938) offers an impressive picture of human
characters by the combination of the three basic
components that are emotion, activity and effect.
Without pretending to resume the theory here,
we should remember that:
• emotion acts as a powerful supporting
factor. Its decrease induces establishment
of coldness and of a certain detachment;
18
~ 3/2006
et humaine, dont le “crapahut” sous toutes
ses formes (terrestre, aérienne et nautique),
au premier rang des matières enseignées.
Quant à la culture générale, elle a été citée
par le général De Gaulle comme étant “la véritable
école du commandement”. En effet, dans un sens
plus large, la culture – combinaison de plusieurs
disciplines scolaires – est une formation
de l’esprit. Elle éclaire, élargit, approfondit
la pensée, elle permet de relier, de dominer des
ensembles, de comprendre les lois supérieures
de l’agencement des événements et des choses.
Cette culture est un bon levain; encore
faut-il qu’il y ait de la pâte.
En effet, la culture doit nourrir l’intelligence.
Mal assimilée, elle devient nuisible, car elle
déforme les perspectives, conduit à l’orgueil
et à la facilité, prédispose au scepticisme,
disperse: “Il n’y a pas d’homme cultivé. Il n’y
a que des hommes qui se cultivent”, disait
le Maréchal Foch.
Mais enfin cette culture, irriguant
l’intelligence, ne se révèle que par le caractère;
imprégnons-nous du chapitre du “Fil de l’Epée”
qui lui est consacré: “l’homme de caractè re
embrasse l’action avec l’orgueil du maître (…);
sans lui morne tâche d’esclave, grâce à lui jeu divin
du héros (…) il faut qu’une vertu offre à l’ordre
militaire un idéal rajeuni, lui confère, par l’élite,
l’unité des tendances, provoque l’ardeur et féconde
le talent. Le Caractère sera ce ferment …”.
Pour discerner l’homme de caract è re
et se prémunir du caractériel, il est éclairant
de recourir à la caractérologie, cette science
qui nous fait pénétrer dans ce qui détermine
le comportement de l’homme, pour appliquer
une grille structurante aux besoins militaires.
Le classement par caractéristiques
psychiques de Cornélius Heymans (médecin
belge, prix Nobel 1938, d’autres outils ayant
depuis été développés sur la base de ses travaux)
offre un tableau saisissant des caractères humains
par la combinaison des trois composantes
fondamentales que sont l’émotivité, l’activité
et le retentissement. Sans en reprendre la théorie
complète ici, tout au plus rappellerons-nous que:
• l’émotivité agit dans l’action comme un
puissant facteur de soutien. Sa diminution
• activity measures “the action spirit”,
the aptitude to search, to realise, and to take
several actions. It favours optimism and
inspiration;
• effect depends on the propensity
to react to a given situation, in an immediate
or delayed manner, after maturation and
aggregation.
The combination of these properties allows
for identifying a typology of characters,
distinguishing, in particular, the passionate,
the sanguine and the phlegmatic ones.
On this basis, the needs of the armies are
translatable by caracterology, which is used
as a tool for selection. The leader, because
he must know to convince and sometimes
to impose, must possess a marked character:
one can imagine that it is better for a passionate
or a sanguine than for an emotional person,
although active, to be in the position of a leader.
Though history revealed the superiority
of leaders belonging to these two categories,
it should not underestimate the phlegmatic
ones. Gifted thinkers for the abstraction, as they
are balanced, deep, endowed with an excellent
memory, some of them are not less tenacious
in action: thus Joffre left it unfold, without raising
his eyebrow and without resting, the alarming
withdrawal from August 1914 to the Marne
turnaround.
After launching these directions for reflection,
what suggestions can we make ?
“An important man
is the one that sees
quickly, far and just”
This aphorism that belongs to Montesquieu
sends us back to the observation of behaviour
and character.
A first promising direction consists, despite
of inevitable application difficulties, in an
accentuation of the system of patterns in the light
of the individual results and caracterology.
Human resources directorates have
developed procedures that draw to the intimate
entraîne parallèlement une diminution de ses
effets, mais aussi favorise l’établissement de la
froideur et d’un certain détachement;
• l’activité mesure “l’esprit d’entreprise”,
l’aptitude à chercher, à réaliser, à mener de front
plusieurs actions. Elle favorise l’optimisme
et l’inspiration;
• le retentissement rend compte de la
propension à réagir à un événement donné,
de façon immédiate ou à retardement, après
mûrissement et agrégation.
La combinaison de ces propriétés permet
d’identifier une typologie de caract è res,
distinguant en particulier les passionnés, les
sanguins et les flegmatiques.
Sur cette base, les besoins des armées
sont traduisibles par la caractérologie, à utiliser
comme outil d’aide à la sélection. Le chef, parce
qu’il doit savoir convaincre et parfois imposer,
doit posséder un caractère marqué: on imagine
mieux que des passionnés et des sanguins
conduisent leurs semblables que des hommes
dénués d’émotivité et d’activité.
Si l’histoire a révélé la supériorité de chefs
appartenant à ces deux catégories, il ne faut pas
pour autant sous-estimer les flegmatiques.
Penseurs doués pour l’abstraction, car ils sont
pondérés, profonds, dotés d’une excellente
mémoire, certains n’en sont pas moins tenaces
dans l’action: ainsi Joffre a-t-il laissé se dérouler,
sans sourciller (et sans manquer un repas !)
l’angoissante retraite d’août 1914 jusqu’au
redressement de la Marne.
Apr è s avoir ainsi livré quelques pistes
de réflexion, quelles propositions pouvons-nous
formuler ?
“Un grand homme
est celui qui voit vite,
loin et juste”
Cet apophtegme de Montesquieu nous
renvoie à l’observation du comportement
et du caractère.
Une première piste prometteuse consiste,
malgré d’inévitables difficultés d’application,
en une accentuation du système des filières
à la lumière des résultats individuels et de la
caractérologie.
19
knowledge of men and detect their “high
potential”. But the criteria of interpreting
aptitudes are too marked by the French
propensity to academic elitism.
To speak straight, a graduate from Saint-Cyr,
who did not have very good marks in school,
would he have the luck, at the age of 23,
for example, to accede to high functions, even
if he has remarkable qualities in the exercise
of command ? And what is he, a fortiori, but
an officer marked by the original tares of a less
prestigious recruitment ?
Or, the army finality is in the fight. All is
in vain if, when the day comes, our commanders
do not lead us to victory. The French Navy
of 1940 was one of the best in the world, but
we are allowed to believe that at the scuttling
on November 27, 1942, some of its commanders
lacked character.
As a corollary, it is natural to understand
that political authorities do not appreciate those
generals who have a too impetuous character,
who have an insufficiently docile temperament,
who have too asserted ideals or who have
too rogue reactions. In our republican Jacobin
tradition, the officer of character is of course
awaited in the theatres of operations, but he would
be therefore pushed aside, by convenience, from
the circles of power where he would be rendered
unfit. In certain spirits, a loss of the flavoured
feeling of high command – despite some striking
counter-examples – rises to this hypothesis.
We nevertheless believe that the key
orientation of the best officers must be their
character, actually the only one differentiating
criterion, as it alone reveals the deep resources:
“It is necessary for masters to have souls of masters”
(Charles de Gaulle, Le Fil de l’Epée).
Varied allocations, in supervisory position
and in operations, remain privileged moments
to reveal those that possess the fabric
of a leader !
Grading, the central tool of the promotion
device, makes the alchemy between many
variables that can be summarised as follows:
the tangible quality of the rendered services
20
~ 3/2006
Les directions des ressources humaines
ont développé des procédés qui puisent à la
connaissance intime des hommes et détectent
les “hauts potentials”. Mais les crit è res
de décryptage des aptitudes, en aval, sont trop
marqués par la propension française à l’élitisme
académique.
Pour parler sans fard, un Saint-cyrien sorti
avec un classement modeste de son école
à 23 ans a-t-il la moindre chance d’accéder
un jour à de hautes fonctions, même s’il brille
par la suite dans l’exercice du commandement ?
Et qu’en est-il, a fortiori, d’un officier marqué
par la tare originelle d’un recrutement moins
prestigieux ?
Or, la finalité de l’armée est bien dans
le combat. Tout est vain si, le jour venu, nos
commandants ne nous conduisent pas à la
victoire. La Marine française de 1940 était une
des plus belles du monde, mais il est permis
de croire qu’au sabordage du 27 novembre 1942,
certains de ses chefs ont manqué de caractère.
En corollaire, il est habituel d’entendre
que les autorités politiques n’apprécient pas
les généraux au caract è re trop impétueux,
au tempérament insuffisamment docile, à l’idéal
trop affirmé, aux réactions trop rugueuses.
Dans notre tradition républicaine jacobine,
le militaire de caractè re est certes attendu
sur les théâtres d’opérations, mais serait donc
écarté, par commodité, des cénacles du pouvoir
o ù il indisposerait. Dans certains esprits,
un sentiment d’affadissement du haut
commandement – malgré quelques contreexemples frappants – relève de cette hypothèse.
Nous croyons pourtant que la clef de voûte
de l’orientation des meilleurs officiers doit être
le caractère, seul critère réellement discriminant,
car seul révélateur des ressources profondes:
“Il faut que les maîtres aient des âmes de maîtres”
(Charles De Gaulle, Le fil de l’épée).
Les affectations variées, en situation
d’encadrement et en opérations, restent des
moments privilégiés pour révéler ceux qui
possèdent une étoffe de chef.
La notation, outil central du dispositif de
promotion, fait l’alchimie entre de nombreuses
variables, pouvant se résumer en deux volets:
and the supposed aptitude to take care of the
superior functions.
By means of the equivalent intellectual
qualities, it is therefore normal for those whose
character is the most prominent one to be
pushed to the top, without procrastination.
Naturally, the modern army needs skilful
men to achieve the tasks related to conception,
audacious reforming ones, as well as sensible
administrators employed in tasks of high level
that necessitate neither bravery nor exceptional
charisma; their character can be less marked.
They appear to be numerous today.
We can thus draw the conclusion that
commanders that are very good at achieving
t a s k s r e l a t e d t o responsibilities in terrain
are not necessarily those that shine by their
gifts to abstraction and to forecast.
Following this logic, it is essential to make
the selected officer to attain the functions where
he excels without imposing a counterproductive
route, rigidified by “obligatory posts”. In this
respect, the Anglo-Saxons opportunely make
operational command a true “dominant” one,
reserved to some of the military, while the
specialists oriented towards technical systems
(intelligence, logistic, forecast …) benefit from
true career perspectives. In France, the passage
through important posts of command remains
essential. In the Navy, one sometimes sees
officers with promising trajectories placed
at the command of fight edifices, although these
functions do not visibly please them; the
confidence of their crew is not spontaneously
obtained. They seem anxious to leave command
without problems, as this passage is an obligation
carried out with dignity, to rediscover their
Parisian ambitions. This system is contaminated
by dogmatism that does not put at the command
of the instrument of combat those that are likely
to direct it. Rare is the officer capable to excel
just as well as the “employer” of an infantry
regiment engaged in the field, in the division
studies and general plans, and as one in the staff
la qualité tangible des services rendus et l’aptitude
supposée à occuper des fonctions supérieures.
Par ce biais, à qualités intellectuelles
équivalentes par ailleurs, il s’agit donc de pousser
sans atermoiements ceux dont le caractère est
le plus saillant.
Naturellement, l’armée moderne a aussi
grand besoin d’hommes habiles aux tâches
de conception, de réformateurs audacieux
comme de gestionnaires avisés dans des emplois
de haut niveau qui ne nécessitent ni bravoure,
ni charisme exceptionnels; leur caractère peut
être moins marqué. Ils apparaissent aujourd’hui
bien nombreux.
Une approche par filiè re s’impose donc
puisque les chefs les plus aptes aux
responsabilités de terrain ne sont pas
nécessairement ceux qui brillent par leurs dons
à l’abstraction et à la prospective.
Dans cette logique, il est essentiel de faire
accéder aux fonctions où il excelle l’officier
sélectionné sans lui imposer de parcours
contre-productif, rigidifié par des “postes
obligatoires”. A cet régard, les Anglo-saxons font
opportunément du commandement opérationnel
une vraie “dominante”, réservée à quelques-uns,
mais les spécialistes orientés vers des filières
techniques (renseignement, logistique,
prospective…) y bénéficient de vraies
perspectives de carrière. En France, le passage
par les postes de commandement importants
reste indispensable. Dans la Marine, l’on voit
parfois des officiers aux trajectoires prometteuses
placés à la tête de grands bâtiments de combat,
ces fonctions ne les épanouissant visiblement
pas; la confiance de leur équipage ne leur est pas
spontanément acquise. Ils semblent avoir hâte
de quitter ce commandement sans encombre,
ce passage obligé dignement effectué, pour
retrouver leurs ambitions parisiennes. Ce système
est vicié, puisque par dogmatisme, il ne met pas
aux commandes de l’outil de combat ceux qui
sont le plus à même de le diriger. Rares sont
les officiers aptes à exceller aussi bien comme
“patron” d’un régiment d’infanterie engagé
sur le terrain qu’à la division études et plans
généraux de l’état-major ou en cabinet ministériel.
21
or ministerial office. To this precious resource,
it is necessary for us to effectively dedicate
the widest experience in anticipating the future;
to the others, respectively to the big majority,
we must leave the orientation clearly defined
by systems, associated with making profitable
the perennial expertise obtained by means of the
supplementary formation of the middle-career.
A second reformation axis consists in a
rejuvenation of big commanders.
Without assimilating our aging society to
a gerontocracy practicing the demagogic
“juvenile” as Régis Debray recently suggested
(“Le plan vermeil, modeste proposition”) in the
army, the age of accession to responsibilities
is well near the one of the retirement ... Napoleon,
for example, was 26 when he was a general
and 27 when he was the commander in chief
of the army artillery ! This case is of course
atypical; in spite of it, the British, the military
etalon we compare ourselves with, promote
generals at the age of 45. It would be desirable
for us to be inspired of this example. The
advantages of such measures would be multiple:
the colonels and lieutenants body would find
itself revitalised and stimulated, the influence
of our commanders would be registered on longer
term, which would diminish their subjection
to political hazards and would assert without
ambiguity that a general is also a man of action,
as long as this symbolic age, 45, imposes as the
one of the full physical capacity. The recognition
of those responsible for military duties by the civil
society would be reinforced. In fact, it is obvious
that the level of the employments of a colonel
and of a brigade general, as much as that of the
spirit of a distinguished top ranking official
is high in the French collective imaginary.
These nominations would assert at last
that the political strength does not oppose
to consolidation of the military elite in the French
public landscape, giving some of them,
by longevity, a more significant place in the
state apparatus.
22
~ 3/2006
A cette ressource précieuse, il faut effectivement
donner l’expérience la plus large en prévision
de l’avenir; aux autres, c’est-à-dire à la grande
majorité, l’orientation clairement définie
par filières, assortie d’une rentabilisation plus
pérenne des expertises acquises par le biais
notamment des formations complémentaires
de la mi-carrière.
Un deuxième axe de réforme consiste en un
rajeunissement des grands chefs.
Sans assimiler notre société vieillissante
à une gérontocratie pratiquant le “jeunisme”
démagogique comme l’a récemment suggéré
Régis Debray (“Le plan vermeil, modeste
proposition”), observons que dans l’armée, l’âge
d’accession aux responsabilités est bien proche
de celui de la retraite ... Napoléon, quant à lui,
était général de division à 26 ans, et commandant
en chef à 27 ans ! Ce cas est certes atypique; mais
les Britanniques, étalon militaire auquel nous ne
dédaignons pas de nous comparer, promeuvent
aujourd’hui des généraux de 45 ans. Il serait
souhaitable de s’inspirer de cet exemple.
Les avantages d’une telle mesure seraient
multiples: le corps des colonels et capitaines
de vaisseau s’en trouverait revigoré et stimulé,
l’influence de nos chefs s’inscrirait sur le plus
long terme; cela diminuerait leur assujettissement
aux aléas politiques et affirmerait sans ambiguïté
qu’un général est aussi un homme d’action, tant
cet âge symbolique, 45 ans, s’impose comme
celui de la pleine capacité physique, permettant
les grands élans des grands projets.
L a reconnaissance des responsables militaires
par la société civile s’en trouverait confortée.
En effet, il est patent qu’une haute marche étage
les niveaux d’emploi respectifs d’un colonel
et d’un général de brigade, autant dans l’esprit
d’un haut fonctionnaire distingué que dans
l’imaginaire collectif des Français.
Ces nominations affirmeraient enfin que
le pouvoir politique ne rechigne pas à ancrer
davantage les élites militaires dans le paysage
public français, en leur donnant par la longévité
une place plus significative dans l’appareil d’Etat.
“The essential quality
of a Commander in Chief
is the character firmness
and the resolution
to succeed at all price”2
In the time of satellites and cruise missiles,
performance in war goes through technical
superiority, and the planning method seems
to relegate the role of commander to the
congruent portion and to Coutau-Bégarie
lectures on strategy.
It would nevertheless be dangerous to lull
in this scientific illusion. In fact, military success
will continue to be the result of the personal
qualities of some people placed in positions
of command. Alexander the Great, Hannibal,
Attila, Napoleon or Nelson will find new
incarnations, validating this timeless concept.
In times of long-lasting peace or of rather
“non-war”, as we try to define this state
of peripheral crises, or of diffuse and intangible
threat, against our interests, it is of course more
difficult for the big commanders of tomorrow
to appear.
Nevertheless, renouncing to some too French
chimeras such as the excessive intellectualisation
of our elite and a more convenient imperative
of development, we can reach there. Delicate task
but how determining; it is a duty of command.
Therefore, the forehead and the chin do not
oppose themselves but complete themselves
harmoniously, being two indivisible parts of the
same face, the one of an officer: this paradigm
must convince us to be, without complexes
or cowardice, “men of action that reflect”,
according to Michel Godet’s expression.
To think, to write, to act: in history, meditative
warriors have known how to shape themselves
a glorious destiny among long and profitable
moments of introspection, of writing and of dream.
2
“La qualité essentielle
d’un général en chef
est la fermeté de caractere
et la résolution de vaincre
a tout prix”2
A l’heure des satellites et des missiles
de croisière, la performance guerrière passe
par la supériorité technique, et la méthode
de planification semble reléguer le rôle du chef
à la portion congrue et aux conférences
de stratégie de monsieur Coutau-Bégarie.
Il serait pourtant dangereux de se bercer
de cette illusion scientiste. En effet, les succès
militaires continueront de résulter pour grande
part des qualités personnelles de quelques
hommes placés à la tête de leurs semblables.
Alexandre le Grand, Hannibal, Attila, Napoléon
ou Nelson trouveront de nouvelles incarnations,
validant ce concept intemporel.
En temps de paix durable ou plutôt de “non
guerre”, comme nous peinons à définir cet état
de crises périphériques et de menace diffuse,
intangible, contre nos intérêts, il est certes plus
difficile de faire éclore les grands chefs de demain.
Néanmoins, en renonçant à quelques chimères
trop françaises telles que l’intellectualisation
à outrance de nos élites et l’impératif de parcours
trop convenus, nous pouvons y parvenir. Tâche
délicate mais ô combien déterminante; elle est
un devoir de commandement.
Le front et le menton ne s’opposent donc
pas mais se complè tent harmonieusement,
constituant deux parties indissociables d’un
même visage, celui de l’officier: ce paradigme
doit nous convaincre d’être, sans complexe
ni pusillanimité, des “hommes d’action qui
réfléchissent”, selon l’heureuse expression
syncrétique de Michel Godet.
Penser, écrire, agir: dans l’histoire, des
guerriers méditatifs ont su glisser dans les
interstices d’un destin de gloire et de fracas
de longs et fructueux instants d’introspection,
d’écriture et de rêve.
Napoléon
23
THE SWORD LE SABRE
et
and
THE SPIRIT L’ESPRIT
“Wasting everything to prepare
“Gaspiller tout en préparant
yesterday’s conflicts is synonymous
les conflits d’hier, c’est assassiner !”.
with assassinating yourself !”.
Virulente et provocatrice, l’attaque
Virulent and provocative, General
récente du général Copel contre
Copel’s attacking defence policy1
la politique de défense1 n’est
is however not isolated. It falls
cependant pas isolée. Elle s’inscrit
under a whole of reflections and
dans un ensemble de réflexions
interrogations on the adaptation
et d’interrogations sur l’adaptation
of the military instrument to the
de l’outil militaire aux
upheavals of time. Since the rout
bouleversements de l’époque.
from 1940 and the traumatism it
Depuis la débâcle de 1940
resulted in, the military institution
et le traumatisme qui en est
has frequently been blamed
issu, l’institution militaire
for opposition to progress, being
est fréquemment taxée
Lieutenant Colonel
accused of preparing “yesterday’s
d’immobilisme, accusée
Thibault de BREBISSON
~ The French Army ~
war”. General de Gaulle’s
de préparer la “guerre d’hier”.
L’injonction du général De Gaulle “Il faut
intervention, “It is necessary to build the army
construire l’armée de ses besoins et non se satisfaire
starting from its needs and not to be satisfied with
de l’armée de ses habitudes” serait ainsi ignorée
its practices only”, would be thus ignored through
par conformisme, paresse ou manque
conformism, idleness or lack of imagination.
d’imagination. De fait, même si l’outil militaire
In fact, even if the military instrument has been
s’est profondément réformé depuis
deeply reformed since the strategic upheavals
les bouleversements stratégiques de la fin
at the end of the 20th century, it is considered
du XXème siè cle, ces changements seraient
insufficient by some people: limited to
a homothetic reduction, it could not meet
insuffisants au regard de certains: limités à une
the new challenges, particularly those posed
réduction homothétique, ils ne répondraient
by asymmetry2 . The question raised is that
pas aux nouveaux défis, notamment ceux posés
par l’asymétrie2. La question posée est celle
of the finality of the military instrument. Should
1
To prevent the worst, General Etienne Copel,
Michalon.
2
Asymmetry: way of confrontation privileging
the use of untraditional means to elude the military
force. Terrorism is an asymmetrical way of action.
24
Prévenir le pire, général Etienne Copel, Michalon.
Asymétrie: mode d’affrontement privilégiant
l’emploi de moyens non classiques pour contourner
la force militaire. Le terrorisme est un mode d’action
asymétrique.
1
2
it radically break with its past to embrace the
entire spectrum of security issues or should it
continue to reorganise around the traditional
perspective of the conventional military
confrontation3 ? The stake of this question is
important: defence is the second state budget
and the security of the nation depends on its
effectiveness.
In fact, the military instrument does not
have the role to answer to all the new threats.
It must adapt (and it does) to all those
which fall under the range of symmetrical
or dissymmetrical confrontations. Though,
it cannot occupy the field of the asymmetric
ones, even if it has to manage some of its aspects.
Indeed, even if bringing the military
instrument under discussion again such as
it was conceived to adapt to the challenges
of global security4 is tempting, this approach is
dangerous since, by globalising threats,
confusion is created around the finality of the
military instrument, which can compromise
the present and the future.
“Exploring
“New Strategic Options” ?”
In an article entitled Construire une nouvelle
défense5 ~ Building a New Defence, General
Delanghe recommends the exploration of some
“new strategic options”. According to him,
this means building a new and original model
which is not a decline from the preceding one,
but which will have to meet the “general
and total need for security” and the “need
for being able to control any form of violence”.
By military confrontation, one should understand
any confrontation putting the armed forces against
an adversary using military capacities. Those can be
comparable (symmetrical confrontation) or of a lower
level (dissymmetrical confrontation). The guerrilla
fight will be regarded as a relevant way of military
action for the dissymmetrical confrontation.
4
Global security is thus defined by Dominique
David: “hard security (management of the ratio of forces)
+ soft security (promotion of the civil factors of survival)
= Global Security” in Sécurité: l’apr ès-New York,
La bibliothèque du citoyen, Presse de science po.
5
AGIR Review, no. 13, winter 2003.
3
de la finalité de l’outil militaire. Doit-il rompre
radicalement avec son passé pour embrasser
tout le spectre des questions de sécurité
ou peut-il continuer à s’organiser autour de la
perspective classique de l’affrontement militaire3
conventionnel ? L’enjeu de cette question est
d’importance: la défense est le deuxième budget
de l’Etat et de son efficacité dépend la sécurité
de la nation.
En fait l’outil militaire n’a pas pour vocation
de répondre à la globalité des nouvelles menaces.
Il doit s’adapter (et s’adapte) à toutes celles qui
s’inscrivent dans le domaine des affrontements
symétriques ou dissymétriques. Mais il ne peut
occuper le terrain de l’asymétrie, même s’il doit
en gérer certains aspects.
En effet, même s’il peut être tentant
de remettre en cause l’outil militaire tel qu’il
est conçu pour l’adapter au défi de la sécurité
globale4, cette approche est dangereuse parce
qu’en globalisant les menaces, la confusion
se crée autour de la finalité de l’outil militaire,
ce qui peut compromettre le présent et l’avenir.
“Explorer de “nouvelles
options stratégiques” ?”
Dans un article intitulé Construire une nouvelle
défense5, le général Delanghe proposait d’explorer
de “nouvelles options stratégiques”. Il s’agit
selon lui, de bâtir un modèle nouveau et original
qui ne soit pas une réduction du mod è le
précédent, mais qui devra répondre au “besoin
général et global de sécurité” et à la “nécessité
de pouvoir maîtriser toute forme de violence”.
3
Par affrontement militaire, on entendra toute
confrontation mettant les forces armées aux prises
avec un adversaire utilisant des capacités militaires.
Celles-ci peuvent être comparables (affrontement
symétrique) ou de niveau moindre (affrontement
dissymétrique). La guérilla sera considérée comme
un mode d'action militaire relevant de l’affrontement
dissymétrique.
4
La sécurité globale est définie ainsi par
M. Dominique David: “hard security (gestion des rapport
de forces) + soft security (promotion des facteurs civils
de survie) = Global Security” in Sécurité: l’après-New
York, La bibliothèque du citoyen, Presse de science po.
5
Revue AGIR no. 13, hiver 2003.
25
In fact, if becoming aware of a strategic
rupture is essential, the armed forces seem
not to have learnt from it, and that results in
bringing the relevance of the military
instrument in comparison with the stakes of
global security under discussion again.
The Strategic Rupture
To state that the 20 century page is history
is a truism, and it is the same with the evocation
of the two outstanding symbols which are
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks
on September 11. The world has thus changed
its logic and the fear of the bipolar, symmetrical
confrontation has been replaced by the one
of diffuse, multiple and globalised threats, namely
one that ignores borders and space. It is thus
possible to speak about a strategic rupture insofar
as the nature of threat and its field of application
have changed. In this context, it is the challenge
posed by the asymmetrical ways of action
that focuses the attention. By this indirect means,
various actors can face the best equipped
and trained armies, circumventing their power
not only by resorting to indirect strategies, such
as terrorism, but also by manipulating information
and masses. Certain analyses also speak about
the “equalising capacity”6 of asymmetry, implicitly
comparing the consequences of resorting to this
strategy with the upheaval induced by the atom.
It is however necessary to stress that it is an
old way of action. Asymmetry has many aspects
in common with the revolutionary war. They
share the central place granted to population,
as the principal stake in the fight. The rupture
thus lies in the fact that this threat has come to
be very important today and seems to be the
major challenge.
th
The Apparent Immobility
of the Armed Forces
However, the armed forces seem to remain
focused on the symmetrical confrontation and
it appears to take much trouble to give answers
6
Expression used during the meetings “Assises
de l’avenir” that were held at the Army General Staff
between the 17th and 19th of January 2005.
26
~ 3/2006
De fait, si le constat d’une rupture stratégique
s’impose, les armées peuvent sembler ne pas
en tirer les leçons, ce qui conduit à remettre
en cause la pertinence de l’outil militaire au regard
des enjeux de la sécurité globale.
La rupture stratégique
Affirmer que la page du XX ème si è cle est
aujourd’hui tournée relève du truisme, au même
titre que l’évocation de ces deux symboles
marquants que sont la chute du mur de Berlin
et les attentats du 11 septembre. Le monde a donc
changé de logique et à la crainte de l’affrontement
bipolaire, symétrique, s’est substitué celle
de menaces diffuses, multiples et mondialisées,
c’est-à-dire ignorant les frontières et l’espace.
Il est ainsi possible de parler de rupture stratégique
dans la mesure où la nature de la menace comme
son champ d’application ont changé. Dans ce
contexte, c’est le défi posé par les modes d’action
asymétriques qui focalise l’attention. Par ce biais,
des acteurs divers peuvent tenir tête aux armées
les mieux équipées et les mieux entraînées,
contournant leur puissance par le recours aux
stratégies indirectes, comme le terrorisme mais
aussi la manipulation de l’information et des foules.
Certaines analyses parlent ainsi du “pouvoir
égalisateur”6 de l’asymétrie, comparant de fait
implicitement les conséquences du recours
à cette stratégie, au bouleversement induit par
l’atome. Il est cependant nécessaire de souligner
que l’existence de ce mode d’action est évidemment
plus ancienne. L’asymétrie s’apparente par bien
des aspects à la guerre révolutionnaire. Elle partage
en particulier avec cette notion la place centrale
accordée à la population en tant qu’enjeu principal
du combat. La rupture réside donc dans le fait
que cette menace passe aujourd’hui au premier
plan et apparaît comme le défi majeur.
L’immobilisme apparent
des armées
Pourtant, les forces armées semblent rester
focalisées sur l’affrontement symétrique
et paraissent avoir le plus grand mal à apporter
6
Expression employée lors des “Assises de l’avenir”
qui se sont tenues à l’EMAT du 17 au 19 janvier 2005.
to the problem arising from global security.
The first symptom of this difficult adaptation
is undoubtedly maintaining the equipment meant
to the symmetrical fight. Raufer and Bauer
underline thus that “even in 2003, the Pentagon
makes use of 70% of a much bigger budget
for the preparation of conventional war, with
“basic tools” such as aircraft carriers, combat
fighters and armoured vehicles”7. For the same
reason, General Copel declares himself against
using 320 Leclerc tanks or developing Rafale
multi-role combat aircrafts. Beyond the excesses
of the polemic, it is important to take into account
the inevitable inertia of armament programs.
Today’s materials were designed in the context
of the Cold War and were meant to last for long.
In addition to the inertia related to armament
programs, the opposition to progress can also
appear as having an intellectual nature. If there
are a lot of reflections on this topic in the military
areas, the development of a concept for
reorganisation appears to be more difficult. It is
what one could call a partitioned diagnosis
on the need for resorting to actions other than
military to counter asymmetry. But the details
of implementation are more problematic. The fact
that efforts are being made so that the subject
of the exercises deviates from the traditional
scheme of the operations of force stands proof
for that. In the same respect, simulation
encounters difficulties in modelling the action
of non-conventional means and their repercussion
on the enemy and population8. The concept
of effect-based operation might seem an attempt
to answer to that. Inspired by the Anglo-Saxon
La guerre ne fait que commencer, Alain Bauer
Xavier Raufer, Folio documents.
8
In France, the difficulties encountered in the use
of the Spectrum software are illustrative This American
software must make it possible for the simulation of
asymmetrical conflicts, by particularly measuring
the indices of satisfaction related to an action or another
(press release, construction of schools ... ). This
psychological impact is however much more difficult
to quantify than the physical consequences of the action
of an armed force. Lastly, these repercussions are
done on a timeline not very compatible with the work
and operating cycle of the PC.
7
des réponses au problème posé par la sécurité
globale. Le premier symptôme de cette difficile
adaptation est sans doute dans la permanence
d’équipements dédiés au combat symétrique.
Messieurs Raufer et Bauer soulignent ainsi
qu’en “2003 encore, le Pentagone utilise 70% d’un
budget en forte augmentation à la préparation
de guerre conventionnelles, avec comme “outils”
de base, le porte-avions, l’avion de combat type
“chasseur” et les engins blindés”7. C’est à ce titre
aussi que le général Copel s’insurge contre
le maintien de 320 chars Leclerc ou le
développement du Rafale. Au-delà des excès
de la polémique, il importe de prendre en compte
l’inévitable inertie des programmes d’armement.
Les matériels d’aujourd’hui ont été conçus dans
le contexte de la guerre froide et sont appelés
à durer. Mais outre l’inertie liée aux programmes
d’armement, l’immobilisme peut également
apparaître d’ordre intellectuel. Si les réflexions
se multiplient sur ce thème dans les enceintes
militaires, l’élaboration d’une réorganisation
apparaît plus difficile. Il existe ce que l’on pourrait
appeler un diagnostic partagé sur la nécessité
de recourir à des actions autres que militaires
pour contrer l’asymétrie. Mais les modalités
de mise en œuvre sont plus problématiques.
En témoigne le fait que le thème des exercices
peine à s’écarter du schéma classique des
opérations de vive force. Dans le même ordre
d’idée, la simulation se heurte à la difficulté
de modéliser les actions des moyens non
conventionnels et leur répercussion sur
l’adversaire et la population 8. Le concept
d’opération basée sur les effets pourrait
7
La guerre ne fait que commencer, Alain Bauer
Xavier Raufer, Folio documents.
8
En France, les difficultés rencontrées dans
l’utilisation du logiciel Spectrum en sont une illustration.
Ce logiciel américain doit permettre de simuler
des conflits asymétriques, en mesurant notamment
les indices de satisfaction liés à telle ou telle action
(communiqué de presse, construction d’école …).
Cet impact psychologique est cependant beaucoup
plus difficilement quantifiable que les conséquences
physiques de l’action d’une force. Enfin, ces
répercussions se font sur une échelle de temps peu
compatible avec le cycle de travail et d’entraînement
des PC.
27
conceptions, this one aims at combining the
ensemble of military and non-military actions
to obtain a strategic result on the enemy or the
general situation. Iraq certainly represents
a privileged field for the application of this
concept. It is undoubtedly premature to learn
all the lessons out of it. But the difficulties
the Americans come across on this theatre
testify to at least a hazardous implementation.
Raising the Question
of Defence Systems
~ 3/2006
apparaître comme une tentative de réponse.
Inspiré de réflexions anglo-saxonnes, celui-ci vise
à combiner l’ensemble des actions militaires
et non militaires pour obtenir un résultat
stratégique sur l’ennemi ou sur la situation
générale. L’Irak constitue certainement un champ
d’application privilégié de ce concept. Il est sans
doute prématuré d’en tirer tous les enseignements.
Mais les difficultés américaines sur ce théâtre
témoignent au moins d’une mise en œuvre
hasardeuse.
La remise en cause
’
des systemes
de défense
These reports result in putting into question
the military instrument such as it was conceived,
in a context of global security. “The gigantic
military apparatus held by the powers (...) do they
correspond to the situation ?”9. The question raised
by David echoes the remark made by Hashim10,
Professor of strategy at the US Naval War
College, who wonders about the relevance of the
American forces distribution in Iraq when facing
an under-equipped and under-trained army.
The latter stresses that the rapid military
victory is not a guarantee of success. Thus,
the question arises as far as the utility of the
heavy investments in defence is concerned,
even if the limited military capacity of the so-called
“alarming” countries does not seem to justify
such an effort. If it is natural to preserve certain
superiority, dissymmetry can appear excessive
for a number of observers. It is ineffective when
dealing with the asymmetry circumventing
a crushing superiority and especially in combating
vulnerabilities that are not of a military nature.
In addition, the military instrument designed
this way does not consent to an opposition
towards the diffuse threats that can influence
the theatre at national level. The conclusions
drawn from this report are that the armed
forces have not adapted to the strategic rupture.
General Norlain thus pleads in favour of a “strategy
Ces constats conduisent à remettre en cause
l’outil militaire tel qu’il est conçu, dans un contexte
de sécurité globale. “Les gigantesques appareils
militaires détenus par les puissances (…)
correspondent-ils à la situation ?”9. La question
posée par M. David vient en écho de la remarque
faite par M. Hashim10, professeur de stratégie
à l’Ecole de Guerre Navale des Etats-Unis,
qui s’interrogeait sur la pertinence du déploiement
de force américain en Irak face à une armée
sous-équipée et sous-entrainée. Ce dernier
soulignait que la rapide victoire militaire n’avait
pas été pour autant un gage de succ è s.
La question se pose donc de l’utilité des lourds
investissements de défense, alors même que
la capacité militaire limitée des pays dits
“préoccupants” ne semble pas justifier un tel
effort. S’il est naturel de conserver une supériorité,
la dissymétrie peut apparaître excessive pour
nombre d’observateurs. Surtout, elle est inefficace
face à l’asymétrie qui contourne une supériorité
devenue écrasante, pour s’attaquer à des
vulnérabilités qui ne sont pas d’ordre militaire.
Par ailleurs, l’outil militaire ainsi conçu ne permet
pas non plus de s’opposer aux menaces diffuses
qui peuvent peser sur le théâtre national.
Les conclusions tirées de ce constat sont que les
forces armées ne se sont pas adaptées à la rupture
9
Sécurité: l’apr è s-New York, La bibliothè que
du citoyen, Presse de science po.
10
Conference delivered on September 28, 2004,
in Salle des Conseils, Place du Panthéon.
9
Sécurité: l’apr è s-New York, La bibliothèque
du citoyen, Presse de science po.
10
Conférence donnée le 28 septembre 2004, à la salle
des conseils, place du Panthéon.
28
of persuasion”11, which, at operational level,
“involves a major change of our defence system”.
In the same review, General La Maisonneuve
proclaimes that, “if the 20th century Defence
System condemned itself because of its potential
for danger, its cost and its inefficiency,
it leaves us to transform it into another system,
which would finally favour security”. And that
leads him to further affirm that the protection
mission must be reconsidered depending
on the function of the external action, which
does not justify the existence of an “armada
ready to invade, conquer, deliver hypothetical
and especially chimerical battles”. General Copel
follows the same logic when he declares against
useless military expenditure, which would be
better employed to the profit of civil security.
These various analyses agree on the need
for decreasing the means intended for
confrontation to the benefit of the tools that
make it possible for the entire spectrum
of asymmetrical threats to be apprehended.
Th e s t r e s s w o u l d b e t h u s l a i d o n
counterintelligence, information, NRBC
defence12 and civil protection in general.
To meet the requirements of a global security,
the military instrument should focus on
asymmetrical threats. It would have to change
its nature so that it would not be its capacity
to unleash violence anymore, but its capacity
to manage chaos. Such an evolution can appear
dangerous in more than one way.
A Dangerous Approach
stratégique. Le général Norlain plaide ainsi en
faveur d’une “stratégie de la persuasion”11, qui,
sur le plan opérationnel, “implique un changement
profond de notre syst è me de défense”. Dans la
même revue, le général de La Maisonneuve
proclame que “si le système de Défense du XXème
siècle s’est condamné lui-même par sa dangerosité,
son coût et son inefficacité, il nous appartient
de le transformer en un autre, qui privilégierait
enfin la sécurité”. Ce qui le conduit à affirmer
plus loin que la mission de protection doit être
reconsidérée au dépend de la fonction d’action
extérieure, qui ne justifie pas l’existence d’une
“armada prête à envahir, à conquérir, à livrer
d’hypothétiques et surtout chimériques batailles”.
Le général Copel suit la même logique lorsqu’il
s’insurge contre des dépenses militaires
inutiles, qui seraient mieux employées au profit
de la sécurité civile.
Ces différentes analyses s’accordent ainsi
sur la nécessité de diminuer les moyens conçus
pour la confrontation au profit d’outils permettant
d’appréhender tout le spectre des menaces
asymétriques. L’accent serait ainsi mis sur
le renseignement, l’information, la défense
NRBC12 et la protection civile en général. L’outil
militaire devrait donc se recentrer sur la menace
asymétrique pour répondre aux exigences
d’une sécurité globale. Il devrait d’une certaine
façon, changer de nature. Celle-ci ne serait plus
son aptitude à délivrer la violence, mais
glisserait vers sa capacité à gérer le chaos.
Une telle évolution peut se révéler dangereuse
à plus d’un titre.
Une approche dangereuse
This approach is dangerous first of all
because the dissymmetry of forces
compensates for other weaknesses, then
because the soldier does not have to become
involved on the ground of asymmetry,
and finally and especially because today threats
cannot occult the tomorrow ones.
Cette approche est dangereuse d’abord
parce que la dissymétrie des forces compense
d’autres faiblesses, ensuite parce que le militaire
n’a pas à se laisser entraîner sur le terrain
de l’asymétrie, enfin et surtout parce que les
menaces d’aujourd’hui ne peuvent occulter
celles de demain.
AGIR Review, no. 13, winter 2003.
Nuclear, Radiological, Bacteriological and
Chemical.
Revue AGIR no. 13, hiver 2003.
Nucléaire, Radiologique, Bactériologique
et Chimique.
11
12
11
12
29
Maintaining Dissymmetry
~ 3/2006
Maintenir la dissymétrie
Dissymmetry shocks through the fact that
the ratio of forces between the power of Western
armies and that of their current or potential
opponents appears disproportionate. But one
ignores the fact that this power comes to
compensate for other weaknesses. The first one
is of a demographic nature. The power of weapons
and technology comes to mitigate the weakness
represented by their small number. Thus,
the overwhelming American superiority during
the second Iraq War would have enabled them
to gain peace more easily, if the staff had known
to benefit from the stupor caused by their victory.
Battalion Chief Goya speaks on this subject
about “a few weeks timeframe when everything
was possible”13 and further on he underlines the
disproportion between the number of American
effectives and the population to be controlled.
The American Army, on the other hand, is used
to correct this lack of effectives by resorting
to the reserves and the National Guard and by
increasing the number of infantrymen. Battalion
Chief Goya also underlines that the debate on
conscription is somehow revived. But these
solutions are only palliatives and this problem
of effectives is actually insurmountable, because
of the Western demographic vulnerability.
In this respect, there is a ratio of forces which
disfavours these countries and which can be
balanced only by the power of their armies. The
insufficiency regarding the number is thus
partly corrected through technology, which
allows for counterintelligence and speed of action,
through firepower, which neutralises and
dissuades and through cladding, which protects
the rare, therefore precious soldiers.
The second weakness is related to time.
Western societies live on a short cycle, time is
accelerated there by the rate of elections and
the fickleness of the public opinion, subject
to immediate information. It is not the case
of traditional societies that live in the theatres
La dissymétrie choque en ce que le rapport
de force parait disproportionné entre la puissance
des armées occidentales et celle de leurs
adversaires actuels ou potentiels. Mais c’est
ignorer le fait que cette puissance vient
compenser d’autres faiblesses. La première
d’entre elle est d’ordre démographique.
La puissance des armes et de la technologie
vient pallier la faiblesse du nombre. C’est ainsi
que l’écrasante supériorité américaine pendant
la seconde guerre d’Irak aurait pu leur permettre
de gagner plus facilement la paix, si l’état-major
avait su profiter de la stupeur provoquée par leur
victoire. Le chef de bataillon Goya parle à ce sujet
d’une “fenêtre d’opportunité de quelques semaines
pendant laquelle tout était possible”13 et souligne
plus loin la disproportion entre les effectifs
américains et le volume de la population
à contrôler. L’armée américaine s’emploie
par ailleurs à corriger ce manque d’effectif
par le recours aux réserves et à la garde nationale
et l’augmentation du nombre de fantassins.
Le chef de bataillon Goya souligne également
que le débat sur la conscription s’en trouve
ranimé. Mais ces solutions ne sont que des
palliatifs et ce problème d’effectif est en réalité
incontournable, du fait de la faiblesse
démographique des pays occidentaux. Il y a bien
l à un rapport de force qui joue en défaveur
de ces derniers et qui ne peut être compensé
que par la puissance de leurs armées.
L’insuffisance du nombre est alors en partie
corrigée par la technologie, qui permet
le renseignement et la rapidité d’action,
la puissance de feu, qui neutralise et dissuade
et le blindage, qui protége des soldats rares,
donc chers.
La deuxième faiblesse est celle du rapport
au temps. Les sociétés occidentales vivent
sur un cycle court, le temps y est accéléré
par le rythme des élections et la versatilité
des opinions publiques, soumises à l’information
immédiate. Ce n’est pas le cas des sociétés
13
La guerre après la guerre, in Doctrine, special
issue, March 2005.
13
La guerre après la guerre, in Doctrine, numéro
spécial de mars 2005.
30
o f o p e r a t i o n . P a t r i c k C h a u v e l 14, w a r
correspondent, testifies to this shift by reporting
that “tomorrow” means “another day” in many
countries of Asia or Africa. To compensate for
this weakness, the armies can only rely on the
“lightning effect”15, which involves maintaining
consequent forces. In this respect, the Iraqi
campaign is a good illustration of this vulnerability
facing time. Even when the offensive has been
carried at a speed unequalled in history, the
media poses the question of the possible
engulfment when progress takes more than
48 hours to occur. The dissymmetry required
and maintained by the armed forces is not the
result of an expensive blindness, but of the need
for mitigating Western societies vulnerabilities
regarding time and demography.
Do not Follow the Enemy
on the Asymmetry Field
traditionnelles vivant sur les théâtres d’opération.
Patrick Chauvel14, correspondant de guerre,
témoigne ainsi de ce décalage en rapportant que
“demain” signifie “un autre jour” dans bien
des pays d’Asie ou d’Afrique. Pour compenser
cette faiblesse, les armées ne peuvent que miser
sur la “foudroyance” 1 5 , ce qui implique
d’entretenir des forces conséquentes.
Là encore, la campagne irakienne est une bonne
illustration de cette vulnérabilité face au temps.
Alors même que l’offensive s’est déroulée à une
vitesse inégalée dans l’Histoire, les médias
se sont posé la question d’un éventuel enlisement,
lorsque la progression a marqué le pas pendant
48 heures. La dissymétrie recherchée
et entretenue par les forces armées ne procède
donc pas d’un coûteux aveuglement, mais
de la nécessité de pallier la vulnérabilité
des sociétés occidentales face au temps
et à la démographie.
Focusing the military instrument on the
current asymmetrical threat presents another
danger: not using the suitable military instrument
and thus compromising it, without acquiring
the anticipated result. The specificity of the
military instrument consists in imposing a political
will through legitimate violence. This resort
to violence could be effective in short-term in the
asymmetrical fight. But it will lose its legitimacy
and is thus likely to be counterproductive in the
long term, by causing the hostility of a population
that represents the stake of the fight. It is this
danger that the Israeli Army engaged in the
fight against Palestinian terrorism is confronted
with. “In the subversive war, terrorism aims
at causing the decisive rupture of communities
and chaos by establishing a climate of fear through
releasing a “violence – repression” spiral.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not make
an exception from this rule. One should notice that
Centrer l’outil militaire sur la menace
asymétrique présente un autre danger: ne pas
utiliser l’outil approprié et donc compromettre
celui-ci, tout en n’obtenant pas le résultat
escompté. La spécificité de l’outil militaire est
l’imposition par la violence légitime d’une volonté
politique. Ce recours à la violence pourra être
efficace à court terme dans la lutte asymétrique.
Mais il perdra sa légitimité et risque donc d’être
contreproductif sur le long terme, en provoquant
l’hostilité d’une population qui est l’enjeu de la
lutte. C’est ce danger auquel est confrontée
l’armée israélienne engagée dans la lutte contre
le terrorisme palestinien. “Dans la guerre
subversive, le terrorisme vise à provoquer la rupture
décisive des communautés et le chaos en instaurant
un climat de peur par le déclenchement
14
Rapporteur de guerre, Patrick Chauvel, Oh !
éditions, 2003.
15
“The purpose of the lightning effect is not to destroy
everything, but to break the enemy’s rhythm (...)”,
definition inherited from Admiral Labouerie and
mentioned in Engagements futurs des forces terrestres.
14
Rapporteur de guerre, Patrick Chauvel, Oh !
éditions, 2003.
15
“Le but de la foudroyance est non de tout détruire,
mais de briser le rythme de l’adversaire (…)”, définition
héritée de l’amiral Labouerie et donnée dans
Engagements futurs des forces terrestres.
Ne pas suivre l’adversaire
sur le terrain de l’asymétrie
31
at present, in spite of undeniable tactical success,
this vicious circle seems far from breaking out”16.
The same author underlines that “In a subversive
war, the coercive military action cannot lead
to victory by itself and, on the contrary, certain
ways of action appear counterproductive in medium
term when they cause the alienation of populations”.
Further on, he provides the example of “targeted
eliminations”, to stress that tactical effectiveness
has much more debatable strategic and political
consequences.
The paradox is that while going on the ground
of subversion, the military instrument discredits
those who employ it and deprive the fight of its
direction. One cannot justify his combat through
the ideals he violates. The detractors of the United
States are right to highlight the contradiction
between the promotion of democracy and the
inevitable excesses of armed forces that are
assigned tasks proper to intelligence or police
forces. In Algeria, France underwent the
experience of the military instrument being
perverted, as it was assigned responsibilities
that were out of its sphere of competence.
Considering that the Algerian War was won on
the military level can be dangerous as the same
errors may be repeated. The political defeat
and the discredit which the methods employed
cast upon “the fatherland of human rights”
are left behind. In addition to the danger
to compromise the result, there is that
of discrediting the instrument. In her book,
Escadrons de la mort, l’école française17 (Death
squads, the French school), the journalist
Marie Monique Robin analyses how delegating
political responsibilities to soldiers could cause
serious drifts. The journalist reports that, in 1959,
General of Brébisson chaired a commission
regarding “legality – subversive war” whose
report concluded: “To the concept of revolutionary
war corresponds that of total strategy, which interests
the various branches of the country’s activity:
political, financial, economic, psychological,
Un RETEX à ne pas manquer: Intifada Al AQsa,
in Doctrine, special issue, May 2004.
17
Escadrons de la mort, l’école française, Marie
Monique Robin, Editions La Découverte, Paris 2003.
16
32
~ 3/2006
d’une spirale “violence – répression”. Le conflit
israélo-palestinien n’échappe pas à cette règle.
Force est de constater qu’à l’heure actuelle, malgré
d’indéniables succès tactiques, ce cercle vicieux
semble loin d’être enrayé”16. Le même auteur
souligne aussi que “Dans une guerre subversive,
l’action militaire coercitive ne peut aboutir seule
à la victoire et certains modes d’action paraissent
au contraire contreproductifs à moyen terme
quand ils provoquent l’aliénation des populations”.
Plus loin, il s’appuie sur l’exemple des “éliminations
ciblées”, pour souligner que l’efficacité tactique
a des conséquences stratégiques et politiques
beaucoup plus discutables.
Le paradoxe est qu’en allant sur le terrain
de la subversion, l’outil militaire discrédite celui
qui l’emploie et prive la lutte de son sens.
On ne peut justifier son combat par des idéaux
que l’on viole. Les détracteurs des Etats-Unis
ont beau jeu de souligner la contradiction entre
la promotion de la démocratie et les excès
inévitables d’une armée, à qui l’on confie des
tâches de police ou d’information. La France
en Algérie a fait l’expérience de la perversion
de l’outil militaire, quand celui-ci se voit assigner
des responsabilités qui sortent de son champ
de compétence. Il y a aujourd’hui un réel danger
de reproduire les mêmes erreurs, en considérant
que la guerre d’Algérie fut gagnée sur le plan
militaire. C’est oublier la défaite politique
et le discrédit que les méthodes employées
ont jeté sur “la patrie des droits de l’homme”.
En sus du danger de compromettre le résultat,
il y a celui de corrompre l’outil. Dans son livre
Escadrons de la mort, l’école française 17 ,
la journaliste Marie Monique Robin analyse
comment la délégation de responsabilités
politiques à des militaires a pu provoquer
de graves dérives. Mme Robin rapporte
qu’en 1959, le général de Brébisson présida
une commission “légalité – guerre subversive”
dont le rapport conclut: “A la notion de guerre
16
Un RETEX à ne pas manquer: Intifada Al AQsa,
in Doctrine, numéro spécial de mai 2004.
17
Escadrons de la mort, l’école française,
Marie Monique Robin, Editions La Découverte,
Paris 2003.
military, legal (...). That is why it is important
for the responsibility for decision to be unique”.
Marie Robin deduces that this coordination was
obviously to be done under the aegis of the
military. The author of this article has not been
able to check up to now if this last point is part
of the commission’s conclusions. But this is quite
the issue. If it is indeed necessary to involve
various “branches of the country’s activity”, their
coordination must belong to the political
branch, since the subversive, revolutionary
or asymmetrical war is, above all, a political war.
However, the soldier will make the military
effectiveness (against the guerrilla) prevail
in front of the costs of other aspects. In addition,
while becoming a political actor by mistake,
he can be tempted to take hold of this
responsibility and, consequently, to refuse
the authority of the political instrument when
the latter wants to change the orientation
of the action based on certain considerations
that exceed the framework of the operations
in progress. In Algeria, that involved the
well-known excesses and the final failure.
Today, it should be stressed that in parallel
with the reflections mentioned above regarding
the need for the military instrument to take into
account the entire range of global security
issues, the armed forces wonder about the means
of concretely answering to this challenge. There
exists the temptation to modernise the methods
of revolutionary war. The film La bataille d’Alger
(Battle of Algiers) was screened in the United
States in certain military areas. Others declare
themselves in favour of the inevitable character
of torture. The globalisation of threats creates
confusion propitious to skidding and can finally
constitute into a threat to democracy.
What about Tomorrow ?
The last mentioned risk is not the least: by
insisting on asking for an in-depth reorganisation
of the military instrument around global
security, it is its capacity to become engaged
in symmetrical conflicts of high intensity
révolutionnaire correspond celle de stratégie totale
qui intéresse les différentes branches de l’activité
du pays, politique, financiè re, économique,
psychologique, militaire, judiciaire (...). C’est
pourquoi il importe que la responsabilité de décision
soit unique”. Mme Robin en déduit que cette
coordination devait évidemment se faire sous
l’égide des militaires. L’auteur de cet article
n’a pu vérifier si ce dernier point fait partie des
conclusions de la commission. Mais c’est bien
l à que le bât blesse. S’il est effectivement
nécessaire d’impliquer différentes “branches
de l’activité du pays”, leur coordination doit être
le fait du politique, parce que la guerre
subversive, révolutionnaire ou asymétrique est
avant tout une guerre politique. Or le militaire
fera primer l’efficacité militaire (contre la guérilla)
au dépens des autres aspects. Par ailleurs,
en devenant acteur politique par défaut, il peut
avoir la tentation de s’approprier cette
responsabilité et par conséquent, de refuser
l’autorité du politique quand celui-ci voudra
infléchir son action, au nom de considérations
qui dépassent le cadre des opérations en cours.
Ce qui entraîna en Algérie les débordements
que l’on connaît et l’échec final.
Aujourd’hui, il faut souligner qu’en parallèle
des réflexions évoquées plus haut, sur la nécessité
pour l’outil militaire de prendre en compte tout
le spectre de la sécurité globale, des armées
s’interrogent sur les moyens de répondre
concrètement à ce défi. La tentation existe
de remettre au goût du jour les méthodes
de la guerre révolutionnaire. Le film La bataille
d’Alger a ainsi été projeté aux Etats-Unis dans
certaines enceintes militaires. D’autres concluent
au caractère inévitable de la torture. Globaliser
la menace crée une confusion propice aux
dérapages et peut finalement constituer une
menace pour la démocratie.
Et demain ?
Le dernier risque n’est pas le moindre: en
prônant une réorganisation en profondeur
de l’outil militaire autour de la sécurité globale,
c’est son aptitude à s’engager dans des conflits
symétriques de haute intensité qui peut être
33
that can be compromised in long term.
However, the stress laid on the asymmetrical
risk today, in the absence of another apparent
threat, led to concealing certain current
tensions, which could lead to confrontations
much more dangerous otherwise. It is not
the question here to draw up an exhaustive and
catastrophic panorama of the potential sources
of future conflicts. But it is nevertheless
important to stress that the world carries the
germ of some alarming imbalances: exhaustion
of oil resources in ten years, the economic
explosion of China or the economic and
demographic imbalances are only a few examples.
It takes twenty years to carry out a program
of armament in long term. Bauer and Raufer’s
remarks on the American Army continuing
to purchase tanks and aircraft carriers does not
take into account these realities. The disappearance
of the immediate risk of a traditional conflict
being added to the spectacular aspect on the
attacks on September 11 undoubtedly emphasised
asymmetrical risks. Perhaps today it is the time
to make their importance relative as far as future
threats are concerned.
Since the end of the 20th century, the world
has undergone amazing and strongly mediatised
upheavals. When confronted with this rupture,
it is better to wonder about changing the military
instrument. But this step should not result
in denying its specificity with the pretext
of making it the key element of global security.
That would initially mean ignoring the weaknesses
of the present, which force the Western nations
not to reduce their military capacities. It would
also mean forgetting the drifts of a recent past.
It would finally mean not being aware of a future
of which no one can say it would be the bearer
of some major confrontations or not.
“There are only two forces in the world: the sword
and the spirit. In the long run, the sword will always
be conquered by the spirit”18. The stake for the
Western democracies facing the asymmetrical
war today is perhaps knowing to use the sword
without perverting the spirit.
18
34
Napoleon.
~ 3/2006
durablement compromise. Or l’accent mis
aujourd’hui sur le risque asymétrique,
en l’absence d’autre menace apparente, conduit
à occulter certaines tensions actuelles, qui
pourraient déboucher sur des confrontations
autrement plus dangereuses. Il ne s’agit pas
ici de dresser un panorama exhaustif et
catastrophiste des sources potentielles de conflits
futurs. Mais il importe quand même de souligner
que le monde porte en germe des déséquilibres
préoccupants: l’épuisement dans une dizaine
d’années des ressources pétrolières, l’explosion
économique de la Chine ou les déséquilibres
économiques et démographiques en sont des
exemples parmi d’autres. Il faut vingt ans pour
mener un programme d’armement à terme.
La remarque de messieurs Bauer et Raufer sur
la poursuite d’achat de chars et de porte-avions
par l’armée américaine ne tient pas compte
de ces réalités. La disparition du risque immédiat
d’un conflit classique s’ajoutant à l’aspect
spectaculaire des attentats du 11 septembre
a sans doute donné trop de relief aux risques
asymétriques. Il est peut-être temps aujourd’hui
d’en relativiser l’importance au regard des
menaces futures.
Le monde a connu depuis la fin du XXème siècle
des bouleversements d’autant plus stupéfiants
qu’ils ont été fortement médiatisés. Face à cette
rupture, il est sain de s’interroger sur l’adaptation
de l’outil militaire. Mais cette démarche ne doit
pas conduire à en nier la spécificité au prétexte
d’en faire l’élément clé de la sécurité globale.
Ce serait d’abord méconnaître les faiblesses du
présent, qui imposent aux nations occidentales
de ne pas amoindrir leurs capacités militaires.
Ce serait aussi oublier les dérives d’un passé
pourtant récent. Ce serait enfin ignorer un avenir,
dont nul ne peut dire qu’il ne sera pas porteur
d’affrontement majeur.
“Il n’y a que deux puissances au monde,
le sabre et l’esprit. A la longue, le sabre est toujours
battu par l’esprit”18. L’enjeu pour les démocraties
occidentales face à la guerre asymétrique est
peut-être aujourd’hui de savoir utiliser le sabre
sans pervertir l’esprit.
18
Napoléon.
PACIFICATION PACIFICATION
~ the
French School ~
~ l’ecole
~
francaise
,
Curious era: life expectancy
Curieuse époque: l’espérance
rises but each notices that the
de vie s’allonge mais chacun
time to live is shorter and shorter.
constatera au vu de son emploi
Everywhere, complexity is
du temps que l’on prend de moins
invoked as a characteristic
en moins de temps pour vivre.
of current times, but the time
Partout, la complexité est invoquée
devoted to reflection diminishes
comme caract è re des temps
actuels, mais le temps consacré
as a painful skin. Militaries
à la réflexion diminue comme
do not escape this race against
peau de chagrin. Les militaires
the clock: it is necessary to rake
n’échappent pas à cette course
wide, but one sometimes forgets
contre la montre: il faut ratisser
to plough deeply ! To remain
large, mais on oublie parfois
in the rhythm, one sometimes
de labourer profond ! Pour rester
forgets where he comes from,
Major
in the absence of knowledge Philippe Savary de BEAUREGARD dans le rythme, on en vient
~The French Army ~
parfois à oublier d’où l’on vient
about where to go. Animated
by the feeling of urgency, one is tempted
à défaut de savoir toujours où l’on va. Animés
to inspire himself from the Anglo-Saxons
par le sentiment de l’urgence il est tentant de
concepts regarding civil-military operations,
s’inspirer des concepts anglo-saxons d’opérations
psychological actions or stabilisation: when
civilo-militaires, d’actions psychologiques ou de
the time urges it, it is more effective to translate
stabilisation: quand le temps presse, traduire
than to search for something. There is,
est plus efficace que chercher. Il existe pourtant
nevertheless, a French thought on pacification,
une pensée française de la pacification,
forged at the end of the 19th century under the
forgée à la fin du XIXème siècle sous l’impulsion
impulse of Marshal Gallieni, Marshal Lyautey
du maréchal Gallieni, du maréchal Lyautey
and General Pennequin. Value does not await
et du général Pennequin. La valeur n’attendant
the number of years, thus they were colonels
pas le nombre des années, ils étaient alors
or majors when they were planning and testing
colonels ou commandants lorsqu’ils pensèrent
this politics of pacification on the conquered
et mirent en œuvre cette politique de pacification
territories in Tonkin or in Madagascar.
des terres conquises au Tonkin ou à Madagascar.
Why does the Anglo-Saxon doctrine exercise
Pourquoi la doctrine anglo-saxonne exercesuch a fascination ? Cannot we be inspired by
t-elle une telle fascination ? Ne pourrait-on pas
the French experience, when it comes to the
s’inspirer aujourd’hui pour relever les défis
challenges raised by stabilisation ? This era is
de la stabilisation de cette expérience française ?
not one of conquests anymore; the context has
L’époque n’est plus à la conquête; le contexte
changed and the considerable acceleration
a changé et l’accélération considérable du temps
of time is a true upheaval for reflection as well as
est un véritable bouleversement pour la réflexion
35
~ 3/2006
for decision and action. It is necessary to avoid
two obstacles: the forgetfulness of an ideological
heritage and of know-how in a variety of domains
and the transposition of an idealised past into
a burning current event. It is possible to
distinguish, in this work of pacification, some
major principles that remain pertinent. In addition,
some personality traits of these big leaders are
also offered for reflection to imagine original
solutions to the contemporary challenges.
Colonel Lyautey gives a solution in his brief
work “The Colonial Role of the Army”1, which
summarises the principles of the French School
of Pacification: “The military occupation consists
less in military operations and more in an
organisation that works”. The tone is given yet,
which principles can be considered effective
sources ?
In the first place, Lyautey as well as Gallieni
privilege the recourse to indirect administration
as a model of organisation. This structure offers
a big flexibility and avoids overturning ancestral
habits that used to have their intelligence and
their logic. Arriving on a territory or a theatre
of operations means being in line with history.
Instead of leaving the former leaders aside,
it is preferable to use them: “To govern with the
Chinese mandarin and not against the mandarin
… So, do not spoil any tradition, do not change
any habit, we are told that, in all societies, there
is a class born to govern, without which one can
do nothing, and a class to be governed, which
puts the governing class in its service”2. Lyautey
understood that the population adhesion is the
main objective to attain the desired effect. It is
therefore necessary to show respect for traditions
and habits. He also recommends renouncing
all taxation and avoiding any administrative
complications. It is necessary to be generous,
he says. Although Gallieni was confronted with
a different situation, in Madagascar, he remained
true to the principle of weakest change. Political
reasons forced him to depose the queen. Not only
comme pour la décision et l’action. Il faut éviter
deux écueils: l’oubli d’un patrimoine doctrinal
et de savoir-faire d’une grande richesse et la
transposition d’un passé idéalisé à une actualité
brûlante. Il est possible de distinguer, dans cette
œuvre de pacification, quelques principes majeurs
qui demeurent pertinents. En outre, quelques
traits de personnalité de ces grands chefs donnent
aussi à réfléchir pour imaginer les solutions
originales aux défis contemporains.
Une formule du colonel Lyautey dans son
court ouvrage “Du rôle colonial de l’armée”1
résume les principes de l’école française de la
pacification: “l’occupation militaire consiste moins
en opérations militaires qu’en une organisation
qui marche”. Le ton est donné mais quels
principes sont sources d’efficacité ?
En premier lieu, Lyautey comme Gallieni
privilégient le recours à l’administration indirecte
comme modèle d’organisation. Cette structure
offre une grande souplesse et évite de bouleverser
des habitudes ancestrales qui ont leur intelligence
et leur logique. Arriver sur un territoire ou un
théâtre d’opérations, c’est s’inscrire dans une
histoire. Au lieu d’écarter les anciens cadres
dirigeants, il est préférable de s’en servir:
“gouverner avec le mandarin et non contre
le mandarin … Donc, ne froisser aucune tradition,
ne changer aucune habitude, nous dire qu’il y a
dans toute société une classe dirigeante née pour
diriger, sans laquelle on ne fait rien, et une classe
à gouverner, mettre la classe dirigeante dans
nos intérêts”2. Lyautey a compris que l’adhésion
de la population est l’objectif principal pour
atteindre l’effet recherché. Il faut donc se montrer
respectueux des traditions et des habitudes.
Il recommande d’écarter toute fiscalité,
de proscrire les complications administratives.
Il faut être généreux, dit-il. A Madagascar,
Gallieni est confronté à une situation différente
mais il conserve le principe du moindre
changement. Des raisons politiques l’amènent
à déposer la reine. Il s’en acquitte non seulement
1
Lyautey, Du rôle colonial de l’armée, collection
Questions du temps présent, Paris, 1931.
2
Lyautey, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar
1894-1899, second edition, Paris, A. Colin, 1921.
1
Lyautey, Du rôle colonial de l’armée, collection
Questions du temps présent, Paris, 1931.
2
Lyautey, lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar
1894-1899, 20 édition, Paris, A. Colin, 1921.
36
did he prove ability in doing it but he also asked
his subordinates to use the native administration,
as much as possible, in the exercise of
administrative power. Thus, the cutting into
circles of Imerina, in the centre of the island,
followed the trace of the general governments
of this territory, as well as that of their
subdivisions3. Our two thinkers on Pacification
had the same aversion for the French
administration, perceived as more rigid than
rigorous as it developed a taste for procedure
as such and sought to interfere even in the least
recesses. Lyautey has not words harsh enough
to denounce these administrative excesses as
brakes of pacification. To stabilise a country,
today as yesterday, one cannot get rid of the
past, willing to impose on a society a model that
does not fit its legitimate aspirations. In this
respect, the will to export the Western democratic
model seems sometimes misfit.
In this context, Gallieni considers that the
action of pacification has, anyway, to respect
the rules of classical theatre: place, time and
only one action to the orders of only one leader,
no matter he is military or civil. He rejects
the distinction between political or civil action
and the military one. He flays all command
structures that omit the fact that the action
in force and the political action are always
combined. We should not destroy unless we are
able to build better and to take care of the
country and its inhabitants. The first concern
of an officer, after a locality is submitted to him,
is its reconstruction. The political action is the
most important one and consequently,
pacification is planned before the intervention.
The conqueror major concern, when confronted
with the changes in the field, should be
distinguishing between the objectives according
to the principle: less to destroy today for more
to produce tomorrow. At the school of his
commander, in Tonkin, Lyautey writes: “While
avec une grande habileté, mais il demande
à ses subordonnés, dans l’exercice de leurs
pouvoirs administratifs, d’utiliser dans la mesure
du possible l’administration indigène. C’est ainsi
que le découpage en cercles de l’Imerina,
au centre de l’île, a suivi le tracé des gouvernements
généraux de ce territoire ainsi que le découpage
en subdivisions subalternes3. Nos deux penseurs
de la pacification vouent une même aversion
pour l’administration française perçue comme
plus rigide que rigoureuse, cultivant le goût
de la procédure pour elle-même et cherchant
à s’immiscer dans les moindres recoins.
Lyautey n’a pas de mots assez durs pour
dénoncer ces exc è s administratifs comme
des freins à la pacification. Pour stabiliser
un pays aujourd’hui comme hier, on ne peut
pas faire table rase du passé et vouloir imposer
à une société un modèle qui ne répond pas
à ses aspirations légitimes. A cet égard, la volonté
d’exporter le modèle démocratique occidental
semble parfois inadaptée.
Dans cette perspective, Gallieni estime que
l’action de pacification doit, en quelque sorte,
respecter les règles du théâtre classique: en lieu,
en un temps, une seule action aux ordres
d’un seul chef, qu’il soit militaire ou civil. Il refuse
la distinction entre action politique ou civile
et action militaire. Il fustige toute structure
de commandement qui oublie que l’action
de force et l’action politique sont toujours
combinées. Il ne faut détruire que pour mieux
bâtir, ménager le pays et ses habitants. Le premier
soin d’un officier, sitôt obtenue la soumission
d’un village, est la reconstruction de cette localité.
L’action politique est la plus importante et par
conséquent, la pacification se planifie avant
l’intervention. Le regard du chef conquérant
change sur le terrain à conquérir pour discriminer
les objectifs selon le principe: moins détruire
aujourd’hui pour plus produire demain. A l’école
Gallieni described his mission in Madagascar
in his work called Rapport d’ensemble de la pacification,
l’organisation et la colonisation de Madagascar,
published at LAVAUZELLE and available under
cote 24511 at CESAT Library.
à Madagascar dans un ouvrage intitulé rapport
3
3
Gallieni a rendu compte de sa mission
d’ensemble de la pacification, l’organisation et la
colonisation de Madagascar, publié chez LAVAUZELLE
et disponible sous la côte 24511 à la bibliothè que
du CESAT.
37
taking a reference point, one should especially
think about the march established for the next day,
so that it could not be taken the same manner”4.
This necessity declines itself until the lowest
echelons of execution that must constantly act
and behave so that they could reflect their
concern for anticipation. Soon the student rises
above his master, gets self-confident and,
solicited to calm the disturbances at the border
of Algeria, he addresses to the governor in these
terms: “Governor, have the Minister of War to
give all my liberty or send me back to Paris.
I want what I had in Madagascar and what
Gallieni had in Tonkin. I want the unity of my
territory … I also want under my orders not only
all the military services but also all the political
ones, as well as the Intelligence … Everything,
and then, I want, in case of emergency, to have
the same power as the Minister of War … If you
want the pacification of the inhabitants of South
Oran, all these are essential”5. An army cannot
stabilise a country by itself, although it always
brings an essential contribution to it and there
must be a unity of the political project that
translates into a unity of command, be it military
or civil. Today, one could envision that a military
commander makes use of not only troops but
also of civil actors that are subordinated to him
since the first moments of the stabilisation
process. Besides, the staff could be civil and
could integrate the volume of necessary forces.
Too often, the actions are parallel and do not
translate a coherent conduct.
The requirement of a unity of action does
not suffer improvisation. Pacification demands
a method at the height of the issue. In Tonkin,
the military posts are rationally established,
pushed, one by one, towards the final goal,
which is the complete occupation of the field
that has just been conquered. The officer
immediately changes into an administrator,
a builder on the ground where he has hoisted
the flag until the assured quietness and the
solidly established pacification allows for turning
4
5
38
Lyautey, op.cit.
Cited by André Maurois in Lyautey, Plon, 1934.
~ 3/2006
de son chef au Tonkin, Lyautey, écrit: “En prenant
un repaire, on pense surtout au marché qu’on
y établira le lendemain, alors on ne le prend pas
de la même façon”4. Cette nécessité se décline
jusqu’aux plus bas échelons d’exécution dont
les actions et le comportement doivent refléter
constamment ce souci d’anticipation. Et bientôt
l’élève dépasse le maître, prend de l’assurance
et, sollicité pour calmer les troubles aux confins
de l’Algérie, il s’adresse en ces termes au
gouverneur: “Monsieur le gouverneur, ou faîtes
moi donner par le ministre de la guerre toute
ma liberté ou renvoyez moi à Paris. Je veux ce que
j’avais à Madagascar, ce que Gallieni avait
au Tonkin. Je veux l’unité de mon territoire …
Je veux aussi sous mes ordres non seulement tous
les services militaires mais aussi tous les services
politiques, les officiers de renseignement … Tout,
et puis je veux en cas d’urgence pouvoir correspondre
directement avec le ministre de la guerre …
Si vous voulez la pacification du sud-oranais,
c’est indispensable”5. Une armée ne peut pas
stabiliser seule un pays, mais elle apporte
toujours une contribution essentielle et il doit
y avoir une unité du projet politique qui se traduise
par une unité du commandement qu’il soit
militaire ou civil. Aujourd’hui, on pourrait
envisager qu’un chef militaire dispose de troupes
mais aussi d’acteurs civils qui lui soient
subordonnés dans les premiers temps de la
stabilisation. Au-delà , le commandement
pourrait être civil et intégrer le volume de forces
nécessaires.Trop souvent, les actions sont
parall è les et ne traduisent pas une ligne
de conduite cohérente.
L’exigence d’une unité d’action ne souffre
pas l’improvisation. L’entreprise de pacification
exige une méthode à la hauteur de l’enjeu.
Au Tonkin, les postes militaires sont
rationnellement établis, poussés un à un dans
un but d’occupation définitive, sur le terrain
même qui vient d’être conquis. L’officier
se transforme immédiatement en administrateur,
en constructeur sur le sol où il a planté le drapeau
4
5
Lyautey, op. cit.
Cité par André Maurois dans Lyautey, Plon, 1934.
the land back to the normal administration.
Gallieni also insists on the necessity for the small
posts behind not only to be armed and
strengthened but also to be in sufficient number
and to enjoy a strong logistical autonomy,
especially in munitions. He denies the
effectiveness of big posts. In 1898, in Madagascar,
his directives explain the chronology of the
actions: the front cannot progress in the conquest
of new territories to pacify them unless the
bottom is completely organised. It is necessary
for the bottom to be pushed towards the front
by the progresses of the pacification process
while relying on the rallied populations that
facilitate the pursuit of the action. This method
has its advantages, as it protects the households
and the population of the country. It requires
that officers should have some qualities such
as initiative, intelligence, action capacity,
prudence, calm and insight. This method is a
progressive one and it opposes to the method
of the military columns that Lyautey stigmatises
for its main shortcoming: to dissociate the
military and political action. The column must
be employed to the only end of combating
a regrouped enemy, solidly installed and
threatening the neighbouring regions from this
favourable position. Consequently, nowadays,
it is impossible for pacification to be undertaken
without a credible and strongly hardened
military force, able of quick changes of attitude.
But, above all, there is a conviction in
Lyautey, which he will implement from Tonkin
to Morocco, going through Madagascar: it is
in vain to carry out operations that only aim
at destroying piracy or rebellion as the sole
advantage of these insurgent movements
is their mobility. The big columns, according
to the expression of the time, are devoted to failure
by exhaustion. It is thus better to oppose piracy
the best of all obstacles: organisation. There is
no more effective means than that of “returning
the recalcitrant earth to the pirates”6. According
to him, it is more effective to cut the grass under
the foot of piracy while cleaning the environment
6
Lyautey, op. cit.
jusqu’à ce que la tranquillité assurée et la
pacification solidement établie permette la
remise de ce terrain à l’administration normale.
Gallieni insiste aussi sur la nécessité d’armer
en arrière des postes de petite taille, largement
fortifiés, mais en nombre suffisant et jouissant
d’une forte autonomie logistique surtout
en munitions. Il dénie l’efficacité des grands
postes. En 1898, à Madagascar, ses directives
expliquent la chronologie des actions: l’avant
ne peut progresser dans la conquête de nouveaux
territoires à pacifier que si l’arri è re est
complè tement organisé. Il faut être poussé
vers l’avant par les progrès de la pacification
en s’appuyant sur les populations ralliées qui
facilitent la poursuite de l’action. Cette méthode
a sa préférence, car elle ménage le pays et la
population. Elle exige de la part des officiers
des qualités d’initiative, d’intelligence, d’activité,
de prudence, de calme et de perspicacité. Cette
méthode est progressive et elle s’oppose à la
méthode des colonnes militaires dont Lyautey
stigmatise le principal défaut: dissocier l’action
militaire et politique. La colonne doit être
employée dans le seul but de combattre
un ennemi regroupé, solidement installé
et menaçant à partir de cette position favorable
les régions avoisinantes. Par conséquent,
il ne saurait encore aujourd’hui, être entrepris
de pacification sans une force militaire crédible
et fortement aguerrie, capable de changements
d’attitude rapides.
Mais surtout, Il y a chez Lyautey une
conviction qu’il mettra en œuvre du Tonkin
au Maroc en passant par Madagascar: il est vain
de monter des opérations visant seulement
à détruire la piraterie ou la rébellion car ces
mouvements insurrectionnels ont toujours
l’avantage de la mobilité. Les grosses colonnes,
selon l’expression de l’époque sont vouées
à l’échec par épuisement. Il vaut mieux
opposer ainsi à la piraterie le meilleur des
obstacles: l’organisation. Il n’y a pas de moyen
plus efficace que de “rendre la terre réfractaire
aux pirates” 6 . Selon lui, il est plus efficace
6
Lyautey, op. cit.
39
~ 3/2006
in which it prospers. Or, the insalubrities
of the present environment have too often civil
symptoms: faint administration, poor
communication, weak legitimate authorities,
corruption … Sanitation demands though
a military and civil action. For the first stage
of the action, he recommends occupying the
territory with or without fights, to isolate it from
refuge zones and external support and, finally,
to arm the inhabitants. The second stage will
aim at reconstructing the population, at setting
up markets and culture as well as at opening
roads. The pirate does not return anymore where
the land ceased being open. It is then necessary
to focus on the ants work to reconstruct the
area recaptured from pirates by the division of
labour, while dividing the territory in sectors
ruled each by an enterprising, full of initiative
and subtle leader, to reopen the roads, the
markets, to bring the towns back to their
previous condition, in a word, to recreate life.
Today, one could see in the Anglo-Saxon PRT7
a still shy application of this French intuition.
Should we decide upon the centralising will
of these two important military commanders ?
Certainly not, as neither of them envision
pacification without the exercise of the initiative
at all echelons of command. What really
characterises their eminent qualities of big
commanders is the confidence that they are
able to inspire to everyone. As many officers,
as many procedures, as many varieties
of construction, all having the same goal.
In Gallieni’s directives the notion of responsibility
at the level of each echelon is recurrent.
He considers it the key to return to order and
security. These directives set up the objectives
to be attained but leave the entire initiative
of choosing the means and modes of action.
It is not so important for him if the commander
recruits militiamen, arms the population, mixes
inhabitants and the European soldiers for night
patrols. First and foremost he has to avoid
de couper l’herbe sous le pied de la piraterie
en assainissant le milieu sur laquelle elle prospère.
Or, l’insalubrité du milieu présente bien souvent
des symptômes civils: administration défaillante,
voirie dégradée, affaiblissement des autorités
légitimes, corruption … L’assainissement exige
cependant une action militaire et civile. Pour
le premier volet de l’action, il préconise d’occuper
le territoire avec ou sans combat, de l’isoler des
zones refuges et du soutien extérieur et enfin
d’armer les populations. Le second volet visera
à la reconstitution de la population, à l’installation
des marchés et des cultures ainsi qu’à l’ouverture
des routes. Le pirate ne revient plus là où le terrain
a cessé d’être vague. Il faut alors se livrer au travail
de fourmis de la reconstitution de la zone
reprise à la piraterie par la division du travail,
en sectionnant le territoire en secteurs
commandés chacun par un chef entreprenant,
pétri d’initiative et souple, rouvrir les routes,
les marchés, rappeler les villages, en un mot
recréer la vie. Aujourd’hui, on pourrait voir dans
les PRT7 anglo-saxons une application encore
bien timide de cette intuition française.
Faut-il conclure à la volonté centralisatrice
de ces deux grands chefs militaires ?
Certainement pas, car l’un comme l’autre
n’envisagent pas la pacification sans l’exercice
d’une initiative aussi large que possible de tous
les échelons de commandement. Ce qui
caractérise vraiment leurs éminentes qualités
de grand chef, c’est la confiance sans bornes
qu’ils ont su inspirer à tout le monde. Autant
d’officiers, autant de procédés, autant de variétés
de constructions, concourant au même but.
Dans les directives de Gallieni revient aussi
sans cesse la notion de responsabilité de tous
les échelons. C’est pour lui la clé du retour
à l’ordre et à la sécurité. Ces directives fixent
des objectifs à atteindre mais laissent l’entière
initiative des moyens comme des modes
d’actions. Peu lui importe que le commandant
de cercle recrute des miliciens, arme
7
PRT: Province Reconstruction Team; structures
of American inspiration, consisting in security forces
that help with the Afghan provinces reconstruction.
7
PRT: Province Reconstruction Team; structures
d’inspiration américaine mêlant forces de sécurité
et aides à la reconstruction dans les provinces afghanes.
40
pillages and fires that delay pacification. It is
necessary here to keep an always-current
formula: “In the pacification process, there are
no rules, there are only situations”8 . This is
therefore the uniqueness of the situations that
must inspire the actions to be taken with
priority and with the biggest pragmatism.
These principles, briefly described here are
completed with the evocation of some of the
two so different leaders’ character traits. They
were known and appreciated in Tonkin,
although they hardly resembled. Gallieni used
to say about Lyautey: “He is strange, he is noble,
he was raised by the Jesuits and nevertheless
he is intelligent”9 . The first one, a convinced
republican, while the second was said: “This is a
monarchist who gave an empire for the republic”.
Each of them has a nonconformist dimension.
When Lyautey describes Gallieni, he speaks
with veneration about the one he considers
a conqueror, an explorer, a commander in chief
by excellence. He describes him as “the exact
opposite of the corporal, of the military, I would
say, in the official and stuck in a rut conception
of this word in France. The form, the report, the
clichés, the very hierarchies do not exist for him
anymore. The result is nothing but the unique,
and, consequently, the infinite flexibility of means
and the free employment of instruments; under
no circumstances would he put a colonel under
the orders of a more cunning captain. This is all
that matters for him”10. In his turn, Lyautey stifles
within the military institution and, returning
from Tonkin, he is on the verge of depression:
“For eight years of my life, from 39 to 47, I dedicated
my body and my soul to an idea and to the colonial
work, the politics of France outside Europe. But
I cannot do it more. All my effort tends to keep
me firm, until October 24, 1903, when I am free
to retreat … I cannot be resigned with being only
a lost force. When, in some months, my brain
will get used to thinking of small things and not
Lyautey, op.cit.
Cited by Hervé de Charrette, Lyautey, JC Lattès, 1997.
10
Lyautey, op. cit.
la population, mixe habitants et soldats européens
pour des patrouilles de nuit. Il faut éviter avant
tout les pillages et les incendies qui retardent
la pacification. Il faut ici retenir une formule
toujours d’actualité: “dans la pacification, il n’y
a pas de règles, il n’y a que des situations”8. C’est
donc la singularité des situations qui doit
inspirer les actions à mener en priorité avec
le plus grand pragmatisme.
Ces principes, rapidement décrits ici se
complètent par l’évocation de quelques traits
de caract è re de deux chefs tr è s différents.
Ils se sont connus et appréciées au Tonkin mais
pourtant ils ne se ressemblaient guère. Gallieni
disait de Lyautey: “c’est étrange, il est noble,
il a été élevé par les Jésuites et pourtant il est
intelligent”9. Le premier est un républicain
convaincu tandis que du second il fut dit: “c’est
un monarchiste qui a donné un empire à la
république”.
On trouve chez l’un comme l’autre une
dimension anticonformiste. Quand Lyautey
décrit Gallieni, il parle avec vénération de celui
qu’il considère comme conquérant, explorateur,
chef de guerre par excellence. Il le décrit comme
“l’antipode du caporal, je dirai presque du militaire
dans la conception officielle et routinière de ce mot
en France. La forme, le rapport, les clichés,
les hiérarchies même n’existent plus pour lui.
Le résultat, c’est son but unique, et comme
conséquence l’infinie souplesse des moyens et le libre
emploi des instruments; pour un rien, il mettrait
un colonel sous les ordres d’un capitaine plus malin.
Et il est breveté ! Ce que du reste, il s’en fout”10.
Pour sa part, Lyautey étouffe au sein de
l’institution militaire et à son retour du Tonkin,
il est au bord de la déprime: “Pendant huit ans
de ma vie, de 39 ans à 47 ans, je me suis donné
corps et âme à une idée et à l’œuvre coloniale,
la politique de la France hors d’Europe. Mais
je n’en puis plus. Tout mon effort tend à me tenir
ferme jusqu’au 24 octobre 1903, date à laquelle
j’ai droit à ma retraite … Je ne puis me résigner
Lyautey, op. cit.
Cité par Hervé de Charrette, Lyautey, JC Lattès, 1997.
10
Lyautey, op. cit.
8
8
9
9
41
of the important ones, I will have succeeded
in the mental state that suits a cavalry colonel.
I will not suffer because of it anymore”11.
This nonconformism does not express an
unbridled fantasy but a character soaked with
convictions rooted in a solid culture. The thought
related to these two commanders separates
from any form of elucubration but it relies
on a thirst of knowledge and a true open spirit.
No operational activity could divert them from
reading works of all nature or from writing
a correspondence that reveals a true culture.
Their mutual correspondence is full of
references to their common readings, to their
exchanges of impressions on issues from the
famous Revue de Deux Mondes. For Gallieni,
politics passes through the deepened knowledge
of the populations. He considers an officer
that knows populations very good is closer
to pacification than one who does not. In fact,
he considers that the knowledge of races
will determine the political organisation
to provide the means to pacify.
Finally, these two commanders have
a strategic vision of their mission that confers
them a high sense of responsibility. They did
not act in a clear political framework, so that
they could have precise objectives. They knew
how to register their mission in a strategic
perspective: “To keep Tonkin without considering
all the consequences of this occupation, means,
as we are already accustomed, to waste men
and money. So, which was the initial idea of those
that had sent us here ? To simply make it a colony
of people, a colony meant for exportation ? No.
Their essential objective was the commercial
penetration of China through the South … Our
reason to be here, in the political general world,
is that of being the outposts of the big conflict
of dislocation and of civilisation that is suspended
on the Extreme-Orient”. Gallieni lets us notice
the height of this view, while passing a very
skilful policy of communication at the time
of Madagascar pacification. Internally,
11
42
Cited by André Maurois in Lyautey, Plon, 1934.
~ 3/2006
à n’être qu’une force perdue. Quand mon cerveau
aura, dans quelques mois, pris l’habitude
de l’optique des petites choses, et ne pensera plus
aux grandes, je serai parvenu à l’état mental
qui convient à un colonel de cavalerie. Je ne
souffrirai plus du tout”11.
Cet anticonformisme n’exprime pas une
fantaisie débridée mais un caractère trempé et
des convictions enracinées dans une solide
culture. La pensée de ces deux chefs écarte
toute forme d’élucubration mais elle s’appuie
sur une soif de connaissances et une véritable
ouverture d’esprit. Nulle activité opérationnelle
ne pouvait les détourner de la lecture
d’ouvrages de toute nature ou de l’écriture d’une
correspondance révélant une véritable culture.
Leur correspondance mutuelle fourmille
de références à leurs lectures communes,
à leurs échanges d’impressions sur des articles
de la célè bre Revue des Deux Mondes. Pour
Gallieni, la politique passe par la connaissance
approfondie des populations. Il pense même
que l’officier qui connaît parfaitement
les populations est proche de la pacification.
En effet, il estime que la connaissance des races
déterminera l’organisation politique à donner
et les moyens de pacifier.
Enfin, ces deux chefs ont une vision
stratégique de leur mission qui leur confè re
un sens élevé des responsabilités. Ils n’ont pas
agi dans un cadre politique clair, leur donnant
des objectifs précis. Ils ont su inscrire leur mission
dans une perspective stratégique: “Conserver
le Tonkin sans développer toutes les conséquences
de son occupation, c’est, comme nous en sommes
coutumiers, gaspiller des hommes et de l’argent.
Or quelle a été l’idée initiale de ceux qui nous
ont amenés ici ? Y faire simplement une colonie
de peuplement, une colonie d’exportation ? Non.
Leur objectif essentiel, c’était la pénétration
commerciale de la Chine par le sud … Notre raison
d’être ici, dans la politique générale du monde,
c’est d’y être aux avant-postes dans le grand conflit
de dislocation et de civilisation qui est suspendu
sur l’Extrême-Orient”. Gallieni laisse transparaître
11
Cité par André Maurois dans Lyautey, Plon, 1934.
his directives are numerous and allow
for understanding the spirit of the mission.
Externally, Gallieni was intelligent and he did
not miss any opportunity to warn the ministers
and the high Malagasy officials that were
hostile to the action of France: “I am aware
of the fact that certain important Malagasy
personages have not always kept the attitude
that the government has the right to expect from
them … I am on the other hand firmly determined
to repress all hostility acts against the French
authority”12.
These warnings are not sufficient and
Gallieni puts his threats in practice.
He sentences some opponents to death, deposes
the Prime Minister of his functions that are
suspended on October 11, 1896. Simultaneously,
by means of billposters, he addresses the
population to explain his action. In this message,
he puts the blame of the rebellion on those who
want to harm the country and its prosperity.
He mentions the disturbance doers as belonging
to the social elite and he warns them of his
extreme harshness. He comments on his
initiative to eliminate slavery. In the short run,
the objective of this decision is to seduce
an important part of the free population without
delay. He creates a sort of political pliers
exercising a strong pressure on the dominating
class, on the one hand, and ensuring himself
of the full support on the part of the most
disadvantaged one, on the other hand. This skilful
manoeuvre ensures the rallying of the majority.
There can be no stabilisation work without
an internal and external communication that
aims at the persuasion of all, of course founded
on the action in progress.
It is doubtless that no French colonial
conquest would have been taken place without
important men of action, personalities. But, this
chain of historic facts would not have carried
the three colours so far if it had not passed
through a school of thought, the relevance
of reflection towards action and the timely
12
Gallieni, op.cit.
cette hauteur de vue à travers une politique
de communication tr è s habile lors de
la pacification de Madagascar. En interne,
ses directives sont nombreuses et permettent
à chacun de comprendre l’esprit de la mission.
En externe, Gallieni n’était pas dupe et il ne
manqua pas une occasion d’avertir les ministres
et les hauts fonctionnaires malgaches hostiles
à l’action de la France: “je n’ignore pas que certains
personnages malgaches en vue n’ont pas toujours
gardé l’attitude que le gouvernement est en droit
d’attendre d’eux … je suis d’autre part fermement
résolu à réprimer tout acte d’hostilité contre
l’autorité française”12.
Ces avertissements ne suffirent pas et Gallieni
mit à exécution ses menaces. Il prononça des
condamnations à mort, déposa le premier
ministre dont les fonctions furent suspendues
dès le 11 octobre 1896. Simultanément, par voie
d’affichage, il s’adressa à la population pour
expliquer son action. Dans ce message, il fait
porter la responsabilité de la rébellion sur ceux
qui veulent nuire au pays et à sa prospérité.
Il cite les fauteurs de trouble comme appartenant
à l’élite sociale et les avertit de son extrême
rigueur. Il commente son initiative de supprimer
l’esclavage. L’objectif, à court terme de cette
décision est de séduire sans délai une part
importante de la population affranchie. Il réalise
une sorte de tenaille politique en exerçant
d’un coté une pression forte sur la classe
dominante et de l’autre, en s’assurant le plein
soutien de la partie la plus défavorisée. Cette
manœuvre adroite lui assure le ralliement
de la majorité. Il ne peut y avoir d’œuvre
de stabilisation sans une communication
interne et externe qui vise à la persuasion
de tous, du bien fondé de l’action en cours.
Il n’y aurait sans doute pas eu de conquête
coloniale française sans des hommes d’action
d’envergure, des personnalités hors pair. Mais,
cette épopée n’aurait sûrement pas porté
les trois couleurs si loin si elle n’avait pas été
portée par une école de pensée, la pertinence
d’une réflexion sur le sens de l’action et la façon
12
Gallieni, op.cit.
43
~ 3/2006
manner to command. One of the foundations
of this school of thought rests on a paradox: the
best method of pacification is to free it from any
method or, more exactly, from rigidity. The
contradiction is but apparent.
It simply means the refusal of all ideology
and the necessity for one to be able and to know
to adapt himself to a country, a position, and
a culture if one wants to act efficiently. On the
other hand, this thought has to bridge the gap
of a statutory formalism to succeed: it is necessary
to invent and imagine new solutions. In this
direction, the French school of pacification is
a powerful invitation to innovation to rise to the
new challenges of stabilisation. The bases
of this imagination could be the following
principles: an army does not stabilise by itself
and the state that engages armed forces in
stabilising it must consecrate political,
economical, cultural means … The action is one,
as well as the commander, and it is necessary
therefore to avoid sequential cutting as well as
parallel chains. One as the other encourages
competition more than the complementarities
of actions.
In conclusion, stabilisation is a matter
of persuasion and therefore of the credibility
of the armed forces, of communication,
of the leader’s charisma and, without offending
the supporters of the “first in, first out” 13,
of times: to win the population confidence,
basic lever of its stabilisation, means to take
an irreversible engagement. There again,
the French Army has an experience of which
bitterness it never wishes to rediscover.
la plus opportune de la conduire. Un des
fondements de cette école de pensée repose
sur un paradoxe: la meilleure méthode
de pacification, c’est de s’affranchir de méthode
ou plus exactement de carcan. La contradiction
n’est donc qu’apparente.
Elle signifie simplement le refus de toute
idéologie, et la nécessité de vouloir connaître
et savoir s’adapter à un pays, une situation,
une culture si l’on veut agir efficacement.
D’autre part, cette pensée devait battre en brèche
un formalisme réglementaire étroit pour
réussir: il fallait inventer, imaginer des solutions
nouvelles. En ce sens, l’école française de la
pacification est donc une puissante invitation
à l’innovation pour relever les défis nouveaux
de la stabilisation. Les bases de cette imagination
pourraient être les principes suivants: une armée
ne stabilise pas seule et l’Etat qui engage
des forces armées dans la stabilisation doit
y consacrer des moyens politiques, économiques,
culturels … L’action est une, comme le
commandement, et il faut donc éviter le
découpage séquentiel comme les chaînes
parallèles. L’un comme l’autre encouragent
la concurrence plus que la complémentarité
des actions.
Enfin, la stabilisation est affaire de persuasion
et donc de crédibilité de la force armée,
de communication, de charisme des chefs et,
n’en déplaise aux partisans du “first in, first out”13,
de temps: gagner la confiance d’une population,
levier fondamental de la stabilisation, c’est
prendre un engagement irréversible. Là encore,
l’armée française a une expérience dont elle
ne souhaite jamais retrouver l’amertume.
Principle of intervention, stating that the force that
enters a theatre first has to be the first that leaves it.
13
Principe d’intervention qui voudrait qu’une force
armée entrant en premier sur un théâtre, le quitte
aussi en premier.
13
44
SHOULD
WE LET
WAR REPOR
TERS
REPORTERS
“Slip Into
our Beds” ?
PEUT
-ON LAISSER
PEUT-ON
LES REPORTERS
DE GUERRE
“se glisser
dans nos lits” ?
In the spring of 2003, in
Au printemps 2003, dans
a difficult political climate, the
un climat politique difficile,
American forces launched the
les forces américaines se sont
attack on Iraq. This decision,
lancées à l’assaut de l’Irak.
Cette décision, lourde de
full of consequences, raised
conséquences, a soulevé nombre
a number of questions of a moral
d’interrogations d’ordre moral
and ethical nature. However,
et éthique. Pourtant, dè s les
since the first days of the conflict
premiers jours du conflit et en
and in line with the associated
marge de ces considérations,
considerations, an internal
c’est d’une polémique interne,
polemic concerning the methods
concernant les modalités
of covering the operation has
de couverture de l’opération
become the major interest of the
que se sont emparés les médias.
media. It is a question of knowing
Major Gilles JARON
~ The French Army ~
Il s’agissait de savoir si l’insertion
if the insertion of war reporters
among combat units is justifiable or not.
des reporters de guerre parmi les unités
Soon, with the help of the media, the term
combattantes était ou non justifiable.
“embedded”, which described these journalists,
Rapidement, le battage médiatique aidant, le
has become not only inevitable but also familiar
terme d’ “embedded”, qui désignait ces
to the public opinion1.
journalistes insérés, est devenu aussi inévitable
que familier du grand public1.
An American Internet site specialised
in linguistics established that the term “embedded”
was the word of the year 2003. Cited by “Libération”
in its edition of the 26.12.2003.
The term “embedded” designates the one hundred
journalists incorporated in the American forces
during the coercion phase of the operation “Iraqi
Freedom”. The US Department of Defense launched
this proposal for incorporation to the media,
1
1
Un site Internet américain spécialisé dans
la linguistique a d’ailleurs fini par consacrer le terme
d’“embedded” mot de l’année 2003. Cité par “Libération”
dans son édition du 26.12.2003.
Le terme d’“embedded” désigne la centaine
de journalistes incorporés au sein des forces
américaines durant la phase de coercition de l’opération
“Iraqi Freedom”. C’est le département américain
45
Starting from this experience of
communication submitted as being new 2 ,
it is appropriate to wonder about the place
which we intend to reserve in the future to the
journalists present in theatres of operations.
Should they be regarded as “partners” or,
on the contrary, should they be kept away from
the troops ? If the contact is required, should
they prevail, as being the only specialists
in communication regarding defence? Is it
possible to envisage the least co-operation with
these information professionals, considered
to have a sharp spirit of independence ? Armies
must answer, at the highest-level possible
of any engagement, so many questions. In fact,
invited to control a medium that is open
by definition, the forces deployed in a theatre
of operations will be exposed, voluntarily or not,
to the pressure of a profession in full evolution.
It is thus advisable to consolidate the principle
of managing the media during crisis situations.
Of course, the traditionally delicate relations
between armies and media barely plead in favour
of “embedding” journalists in the units. However,
preparing, at least intellectually, for this way
of communication is a reasonable step for our
armies. Between naivety and fascination, it is
more a question of seeking the right balance
in order to act as professionals, aware of the
realities of our time.
In order to become convinced of the
coherence of embedding, it is advisable to firstly
measure the evolutions that make this openness
essential, and then to consider the advantages
ever since October 2002. The journalists interested
in this adventure were selected and invited to sign
an engagement not to compromise the military
operations to come through their reports.
2
In fact, it is advisable to make the new character
of this experiment relative. American forces already
used the idea of embedding journalists, in particular
during the Vietnam War. In June 1999, the commander
of Brigade Leclerc also adopted this solution at the
time of the French forces’ entry in Kosovo. However,
the operation “Iraqi Freedom” remains new because
of the systematic character and the scale of this
practice.
46
~ 3/2006
Tirant parti de cette expérience
de communication présentée comme inédite2,
il convient de s’interroger sur la place que nous
entendons réserver à l’avenir aux journalistes
présents sur un théâtre d’opérations. Faut-il
les considérer comme des “partenaires” ou au
contraire les tenir à l’écart des troupes ? Si le
contact est recherché, faut-il en réserver
la primeur aux seuls spécialistes de la
communication de défense ? Est-il seulement
possible d’envisager la moindre coopération
avec des professionnels de l’information réputés
posséder un farouche esprit d’indépendance ?
Ce sont autant de questions auxquelles les armées
doivent répondre le plus en amont possible
de tout engagement. En effet, appelées à contrôler
un milieu par définition ouverte, les forces
déployées sur un théâtre d’opérations seront,
volontairement ou non, exposées à la pression
d’une profession en pleine évolution. Il convient
donc d’arrêter un principe de gestion des médias
dans la crise.
Bien sûr, les relations traditionnellement
délicates entre armées et médias ne plaident guère
en faveur de “l’insertion” de journalistes dans
les unités. Pourtant, se préparer, ne serait-ce
qu’intellectuellement, à cette modalité
de communication relève, pour nos armées,
d’une démarche raisonnable. Entre naïveté
et fascination, il s’agit bien de rechercher un juste
équilibre, afin d’agir en professionnels conscients
des réalités de notre temps.
de la Défense qui avait lancé aux médias, dès le mois
d’octobre 2002, cette proposition d’incorporation.
Les journalistes intéressés par cette aventure ont été
sélectionnés et invités à signer un engagement
à ne pas compromettre, par leurs reportages,
les opérations militaires à venir.
2
En fait, il convient de relativiser le caractère inédit
de cette expérience. L’insertion de journalistes a déjà
été pratiquée par les forces américaines, en particulier
durant la guerre du Viet Nam. En juin 1999, cette
solution a également été adoptée par le commandement
de la brigade Leclerc lors de l’entrée des forces
françaises au Kosovo. L’opération “Iraqi freedom”
demeure cependant inédite du fait du caractère
systématique et de l’échelle de cette pratique.
each party will be able to draw out of it. But,
first of all, it is important to reconsider the reasons
for which this adaptation causes such great
scepticism on behalf of the defence institution.
A Dialogue that Continues
to be Difficult
In the armed forces, it is the concept of
prudence that dominates, as far as the relations
with the press are concerned. However, it is
very difficult for the information control 3
to interfere with the media aspiration to
broadcast the information in real time, therefore
to adjust two logics a priori antagonistic.
It is a well-known fact, in our democratic
societies, that communication has become
an essential element for carrying out operations4.
However, this requirement cannot lead to a policy
of absolute transparency. Indeed, safeguarding
secrecy, influence strategy and respect for people
are as many limits justifying the progressive
doubts with regard to “embedding”.
Moreover, the professional constraints that
weigh on journalists amply justify the reserves
expressed with regard to “the embedded”.
Indeed, forced by requirements of economic
nature, these information professionals are
increasingly captive to the logic of providing
the public with their production “timely”.
For them, it is not a question of especially
understanding the profound nature of certain
reality, but of adapting to the requirements
of a commercial profit. To this constraint,
the need for sticking not only to the expectations
3
“Information is the propagation of facts or raw data
on the preparation and control of operations to meet
the request of the media, the current of opinion or of
the armed forces personnel”, in Doctrine interarmées
sur la communication opérationnelle (Approval
on July 2, 2001 no. 00658/DEF/EMA/ EMP.1/NP
– 2001 Edition).
4
The effectiveness of operations “rests indeed
on the public opinion adhesion, directly influenced
by the coherence and nature of the speech of various
actors involved in the crisis”, Ibid.
Pour se convaincre du bien-fondé de
l’insertion, il convient tout d’abord de mesurer
les évolutions qui rendent cette ouverture
indispensable, avant de considérer les avantages
que chaque parti pourra en tirer. Mais, en premier
lieu, il importe de revenir sur les raisons pour
lesquelles cette adaptation suscite tant de réserve
de la part de l’institution de défense.
Un dialogue qui reste difficile
Dans les armées, c’est la notion de prudence
qui domine en mati è re de relations avec
la presse. Or, le souci compréhensible de maîtrise
de l’information3 s’accorde mal de l’aspiration
des médias à la diffuser en temps réel, d’où
la difficulté à ajuster deux logiques a priori
antagonistes.
Nous le savons, dans nos sociétés
démocratiques, la communication est devenue
un élément essentiel de la conduite des
opérations4. Pourtant, cet impératif ne peut
déboucher sur une politique de transparence
absolue. En effet, la préservation du secret,
la stratégie d’influence et le respect de la personne
sont autant de limites justifiant les réserves
avancées à l’égard de l’“insertion”.
De plus, les contraintes professionnelles qui
pèsent sur les journalistes justifient amplement
les réserves exprimées à l’égard des “insérés”.
En effet, pressés par des impératifs d’ordre
économique, ces professionnels de l’information
sont de plus en plus captifs d’une logique
de fourniture “à temps” de leur production.
Pour eux, il ne s’agit donc plus nécessairement
de pénétrer la nature profonde d’une réalité,
mais bien de se plier à un impératif commercial
3
“L’information est la diffusion de faits ou de données
brutes sur la préparation et la conduite des opérations
pour répondre à la demande des médias, des relais
d’opinion ou encore du personnel des armées.” Doctrine
interarmées sur la communication opérationnelle”
(Approuvé le 2 juillet 2001 sous le no 00658/DEF/
EMA/ EMP.1/NP – Edition 2001).
4
L’efficacité des opérations “repose effectivement
sur l’adhésion d’opinions publiques, directement
influencées par la cohérence et la nature du discours
des différents acteurs de la crise”, Ibidem.
47
~ 3/2006
of their “clientele” but also to the leading line
of the editorial team they are part of is often
added. Under these circumstances, the image
of Albert London, a mythical reference of this
profession, appears as being emblematic.
During the ’90s, confronted with the
“requirements of mutual adjustment”, the
military and media actors involved in conflicts
changed their behaviour, facilitating the
development of a considered dialogue. For the
armed forces, this adjustment would result
in the profound transformation of their
communication. From a “hierarchical” model,
characteristic to the French political and
administrative tradition, this one evolved
towards a “polycentric” device that favoured word
dissemination within the defence institution5.
As it became much more active, this
communication also gained in coherence,
thanks to the collaboration of new entities
in charge of working out and leading a true
communication strategy. The establishment
o f D I C o D 6, t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e
communication cell of the armed forces staff
(EMA/COM) and the installation of a true
network of communicators within the forces,
all testify to the undertaken efforts and the
importance of this evolution.
During the latest years, in spite of real
difficulties, a first adjustment facilitated
the communication control within and over
operations. However, the set up model remains
still too rigid and quite often it seems to be the
business of experts. It thus seems condemned
to evolve.
de rentabilité. A cette contrainte s’ajoute souvent
la nécessité de coller non seulement aux attentes
de leur “clientèle”, mais aussi à la ligne éditoriale
de leur rédaction. Dans ces conditions, l’image
emblématique d’Albert Londres, référence
mythique de cette profession, apparaît bien
écornée.
Pour autant, au cours des années
quatre-vingt-dix, confrontés à des “exigences
d’ajustement mutuel”, acteurs militaires
et médiatiques des conflits ont modifié leur
comportement respectif, facilitant l’éclosion
d’un dialogue réfléchi. Pour les armées,
cet ajustement s’est traduit par la profonde
transformation de leur communication. D’un
modèle “hiérarchique”, caractéristique de la
tradition politique et administrative française,
celle-ci a évolué vers un dispositif “polycentrique”
qui a favorisé la distribution de la parole au sein
de l’institution de défense5. Rendue plus vivante,
cette communication a également gagné
en cohérence, grâce à la collaboration
de nouvelles entités chargées d’élaborer
et de conduire une véritable stratégie de
communication. La création de la DICoD6 ,
le développement de la cellule de communication
de l’état-major des armées (EMA/COM) et la
mise en place au sein des forces d’un véritable
réseau de communicants témoignent des efforts
consentis et de l’importance de cette évolution.
Au cours des dernières années, malgré
de réelles difficultés, un premier ajustement
a donc facilité la conduite d’une communication
dans et sur les opérations. Cependant, le modèle
qui s’est mis en place demeure encore trop
dirigé et souvent une affaire de spécialistes.
Il semble donc condamné à évoluer.
5
A detailed analysis of this evolution was proposed
in an article published by Jean-François Bureau,
Delegate for Defence Information and Communication:
“There are three crises that have transformed the
relationships of the armed forces with the media:
Lebanon, Gulf, Kosovo”, Actes du colloque sur
l’information dans les conflits armés. Du Golfe au
Kosovo, under the direction of Michel MATHIEN,
Harmattan, Coll. Communication, 2001, pp. 139-161.
6
DICoD: Defence Information and Communication
Delegation.
5
Une analyse détaillée de cette évolution est proposée
dans un article publié par M. Jean-François Bureau,
Délégué à l’information et à la communication
de la défense: “Trois crises ayant transformé les rapports
des armées avec les médias: Liban, Golfe, Kosovo”,
Actes du colloque sur l’information dans les conflits armés.
Du Golfe au Kosovo, Sous la direction de Michel
MATHIEN, L’Harmattan, coll. communication, 2001,
pp. 139-161.
6
DICoD: Délégation à l’information et à la
communication de la défense.
48
The Front
Le front est
Became Quite Open !
devenu bien perméable !
It is important for us to notice that “the
situation” has actually changed. The battlespace
openness, the development of new technologies
and the evolution of the public opinion needs
have all changed the former balance.
First of all, we witness “the elimination”
of geographical constraints. From now on, the
soldiers themselves will think in terms of open
space. The traditional vision of a battlefield
made up of partitioned and difficult to reach
zones is replaced by the concept of “lacunar
combat”, to which vast intervals, lacking
combatants and open to circulation are
associated. War reporters have had more and
more a real freedom of movement. Consequently,
it would be illusory to believe that constraints
from which we precisely intend to free
ourselves are weighing on their profession.
The invulnerability of the front is a vision
that belongs to the past. Would this notion
hold on to the least pertinence at the time
of asymmetrical conflicts ?
The same way, we witness the elimination
of technical constraints. Just like the development
of “info-centred” networks has contributed
to giving freedom of action back to soldiers,
the development of civil communication
technologies largely facilitates the work
of journalists. From now on, producing
and broadcasting information at the same time
is reality. This progress makes it possible
for journalists to do their job while getting close
to the troops engaged in action, but not
preventing soldiers from doing their jobs
in turn. During the operation “Iraqi Freedom”,
they had total technical autonomy of broadcasting
their production. More than ten years before,
during the first Gulf War, they had often
depended on the military means of transmission
placed at their disposal.
Lastly, the expectations of the public opinion
have also evolved. In the absence of a certain
perspective, it calls for concrete testimonies,
close to the model of “telereality”. This need
Force est de constater que “la donne”
a effectivement changé. L’ouverture de l’espace
de bataille, le développement des nouvelles
technologies et l’évolution des besoins
des opinions publiques modifient l’équilibre
antérieur.
Nous assistons tout d’abord à “l’effacement”
des contraintes géographiques. Désormais,
les militaires eux-mêmes réfléchissent en terme
d’espace ouvert. A la vision classique d’un champ
de bataille constitué de zones cloisonnées
et difficilement accessibles, se substitue la notion
de “combat lacunaire” à laquelle sont associés
de vastes intervalles, vides de combattant
et ouverts à la circulation. De plus en plus,
les reporters de guerre disposent et disposeront
donc d’une véritable liberté de mouvement.
D è s lors, il serait illusoire de raisonner
en imaginant voir peser sur leur profession des
contraintes dont nous entendons précisément
nous affranchir. L’étanchéité du front est une
vision qui appartient au passé. Cette notion
conserve-t’elle d’ailleurs la moindre pertinence
à l’heure des conflits asymétriques ?
De la même façon, nous assistons
à l’effacement des contraintes techniques. Tout
comme le développement des réseaux
“infocentrés” a contribué à redonner une liberté
d’action aux militaires, le développement des
technologies civiles de communication facilite
grandement le travail des journalistes. Désormais,
la production et la diffusion de l’information
dans un même mouvement sont devenues
des réalités. Ce progrès offre aux journalistes
la possibilité d’exercer leur profession en se
rapprochant des troupes engagées dans
l’action, ce qu’ils ne se priveront pas de faire.
Durant l’opération “Iraqi freedom”, ils disposaient
d’une totale autonomie technique de diffusion
de leur production. Dix ans seulement
auparavant, durant la première guerre du Golfe,
ils dépendaient souvent de la mise à disposition
de moyens militaires de transmission.
Enfin, les attentes de l’opinion publique
ont également évolué. A défaut d’une mise
49
appears manifest as the military expert is again
used by television news bulletin. While the
military “consultants” were so mediatised
during the first Gulf War, being figures almost
impossible to avoid of the first Gulf War,
the last conflict showed a net disinterest
with regard to their interventions. To satisfy its
“customers”, the media will thus not fail to turn
to the principal actors involved in a conflict who
are the soldiers directly engaged at the heart
of operations.
Establishing a sanitary cord between troops
and journalists becomes thus unrealistic. This
position would be even less bearable if France
were to intervene within a coalition favourable
to the installation of “the embedded”.
Consequently, it is advisable that it should
prepare itself for this situation, by seeking the
best possible way of collaboration between
soldiers and journalists.
On the Theory
of Comparative Advantages ...
Far from yielding to a fashionable purpose,
the choice to “embed” journalists corresponds
to a rational step. Based on the principle
of comparative advantages, this disposition
also allows for respecting the principle
of anticipation, which is important in media
crisis management.
By multiplying testimonies on the realities
of military life, embedding journalists provides
the armed forces with the opportunity to convince
the public opinion of the authorised efforts
and the cogency of their action. Wars, as well as
crises, are not virtual. They claim the engagement
of men and women in extreme situations each
and every time. However, few citizens evaluate
their intensity and sometimes dramatic character.
Favouring thus the recognition of the military
trade specificity should not lead to making it
banal, which is a major risk that weighs on the
transformation of prosperous democracies
armed forces.
50
~ 3/2006
en perspective, elle réclame désormais des
témoignages concrets se rapprochant du modèle
de “télé réalité”. Ce besoin apparaît nettement
à travers la remise en cause du personnage
de l’expert militaire utilisé par les journaux
télévisés. Alors que ses “consultants” très
médiatiques s’étaient imposés comme des figures
incontournables de la première guerre du Golfe,
le dernier conflit a montré un net désintérêt
à l’égard de leurs interventions. Pour satisfaire
leur “clientèle”, les médias ne manqueront donc
pas de se tourner vers les principaux acteurs
d’un conflit que sont les militaires directement
engagés au cœur des opérations.
Etablir un cordon sanitaire entre les troupes
et les journalistes devient donc irréaliste. Cette
position serait encore moins tenable si la France
devait intervenir au sein d’une coalition favorable
à la mise en place d’“insérés”. Dès lors, il convient
de se préparer, en recherchant la meilleure
voie possible de collaboration entre militaires
et journalistes.
De la théorie
des avantages comparés …
Loin de céder à un effet de mode, le choix
de “l’insertion” correspond à une démarche
rationnelle. Fondée sur le principe des avantages
comparés, cette disposition permet également
de respecter le principe d’anticipation qui est
déterminant dans la gestion d’une crise
médiatique.
En multipliant les témoignages sur les réalités
de la vie militaire, l’insertion de journalistes
donne aux forces armées l’occasion de convaincre
les opinions publiques des efforts consentis et
du bien-fondé de leur action. Les guerres, comme
les crises, ne sont pas virtuelles. Elles réclament
à chaque fois l’engagement d’hommes et de
femmes dans des situations extrêmes. Or, bien
peu de citoyens en mesurent l’intensité
et le caractère parfois dramatique. Favoriser
par ce biais une reconnaissance de la spécificité
du métier militaire devrait nous éviter l’écueil
de la banalisation, risque majeur qui pèse sur le
devenir des armées d’une démocratie prospère.
In addition, the insertion must also provide
journalists with the opportunity to reinforce
their credibility. Much closer to the realities
of the battlefield, having more varied information,
they can derive advantage from this experience.
They will be not only capable to meet the
expectations of “their” public but they will be
especially able to widen their sources
of information and their perspective. It remains
of course for their editorial staff to take care
of the compliance with the rules of deontology
that are specific to this profession7.
Finally, this practice should favour the armed
forces better control over the environment.
It can indeed allow, beyond major incidents,
for avoiding a media that can add to the already
delicate conduct of the operation in progress8.
Without this being a question of manipulation,
the privileged contacts between “the embedded”
and the military should favour the development
of a solid relation likely to attenuate a media
crisis. Besides the practical realities of the
engagement, “the embedded” will be capable
to inform their editorial staffs of facts which,
taken out of their context, might leave room
for prejudicial interpretations.
In all the other circumstances, an analysis
on communication led by Electricité de France
~ EDF – Electricity of France at the time of the
great storms in December 1999 tends to
validate this approach. Starting from the
departure of journalists on the ground up to the
Par ailleurs, l’insertion doit également offrir
aux journalistes l’occasion de renforcer leur
crédibilité. Plus proches des réalités du champ
de bataille, disposant d’une information plus
variée, ils peuvent tirer avantage de cette
expérience. Ils seront non seulement plus
à même de répondre à l’attente de “leur” public,
mais ils pourront surtout élargir leurs sources
d’information et leurs angles de reportage.
Il restera bien sûr à leur rédaction à veiller
au respect des règles de déontologie propres
à cette profession7.
Enfin, cette pratique devrait favoriser une
meilleure maîtrise de leur environnement
par les armées. Elle peut en effet permettre,
lors d’incidents majeurs, d’éviter qu’une crise
médiatique vienne s’ajouter à la conduite
suffisamment délicate de l’opération en cours8.
Sans qu’il soit question de manipulation,
les contacts privilégiés entre “insérés” et militaires
devraient favoriser le développement d’un tissu
relationnel solide susceptible d’atténuer la portée
d’une crise médiatique. Plus au fait des réalités
pratiques de l’engagement, les “insérés” seront
à même d’éclairer leur rédaction sur des faits
qui, replacés hors de leur contexte, pourraient
donner lieu à des interprétations préjudiciables.
Dans de toutes autres circonstances, l’analyse
de la communication conduite par Electricité
de France ~ EDF lors des grandes tempêtes
de décembre 1999 tend à valider cette
approche. C’est en prenant le parti d’amener
les journalistes sur le terrain, au contact de leurs
équipes engagées sur les chantiers de réparation,
7
For not having complied with these rules
of prudence, several American media had to resort
to “mea culpa” a few months after the intervention
in Iraq.
8
“The communication during a crisis is a particular
case of the communication in operations. The crisis is
the unexpected, the exceptional situation, the rupture
of balance in which several actors are implied, which
requires an immediate attention in a climate of strong
uncertainty as far as the course of events and the
consequences of the decisions made by the various
parts are concerned”, in Doctrine interarmées sur la
communication opérationnelle, p. 21.
7
Pour ne pas avoir respecté ces règles de prudence,
certains médias américains, et non des moindres, ont
dû effectuer leur mea culpa quelques mois après
l’intervention en Irak.
8
“La communication de crise est un cas particulier
de la communication en opérations. La crise, c’est
l’inattendu, la situation exceptionnelle, la rupture
d’équilibre dans laquelle plusieurs acteurs sont
impliqués, qui nécessite une attention immédiate dans
un climat de forte incertitude quant au déroulement
des événements et aux conséquences des décisions
prises par les différentes parties concernées”, Doctrine
interarmées sur la communication opérationnelle, p. 21.
51
contact with their teams engaged on the
construction site, EDF was able not only to
suppress a media crisis in expectation, but also,
later, to benefit from a capital of confidence
born during this critical period.
The practice of “embedding” thus provides
the military and the media actors involved in
a crisis with undeniable reciprocal advantages.
Rather than taking refuge in a defensive
position, it thus seems more appropriate
to prepare journalists insertion in the units
engaged in operation. It is a choice of common
sense, because this way of covering crises
by the media will not fail to develop. It is also
a rational choice, because this step can make
it possible for the armed forces to preserve
a better control of their media environment.
Therefore, it is not a question of causing
their mentalities to evolve in order to make the
current device of communication in operations
more effective. It would be condemnable indeed,
because of narrow-mindedness or ignorance,
to underestimate the impact journalists can have
on the development of the operation. Since they
represent an undeniable and inevitable constraint,
it is advisable for them to do the best job of it.
Preparing, at least intellectually, in order to work
in such an environment means avoiding to fall
into the trap that threatens any individual
in contact with the media: naivety and fascination.
What is left to do is to put into practice the
methods that allow for adjusting the reciprocal
constraints of the military actors and the
journalists who wish to be embedded.
52
~ 3/2006
qu’EDF a pu non seulement juguler une crise
médiatique en gestation, mais aussi, plus tard,
tirer parti d’un capital confiance né au cours
de cette période critique.
La pratique de “l’insertion” offre donc aux
acteurs militaires et médiatiques de la crise des
avantages réciproques indéniables.
Plutôt que de se réfugier dans une position
défensive, il semble donc fondé de se préparer
à insérer des journalistes au sein des unités
engagées dans les opérations. C’est un choix
de bon sens, car ce mode de couverture
médiatique des crises ne manquera pas
de se développer. C’est aussi un choix raisonné,
car cette démarche peut permettre aux armées
de conserver une meilleure maîtrise de leur
environnement médiatique.
Il ne s’agit donc de faire évoluer les mentalités
pour rendre plus efficace le dispositif actuel
de communication en opérations. Il serait
effectivement condamnable, par manque
d’ouverture ou par ignorance, de sous-estimer
l’impact que les journalistes peuvent avoir
sur le déroulement de la manœuvre. Puisqu’ils
représentent une incontestable et inévitable
contrainte, il convient d’en tirer le meilleur parti.
Se préparer, au moins intellectuellement, à les
voir travailler à nos côtés devrait nous éviter
de tomber dans le double écueil qui menace
tout individu au contact des médias: la naïveté
et la fascination.
Il reste donc à mettre en place les modalités
pratiques permettant d’ajuster au mieux
les contraintes réciproques des acteurs militaires
et des journalistes candidats à l’insertion.
VO NGUYEN GIAP
~ a Gifted Strategist
and an Instrument
of VVietnam
ietnam
Independence ~
VO NGUYEN GIAP
~ stratege de genie
et instrument
de l’independance
du VVietnam
ietnam ~
As we have just
Alors que nous venons
commemorated, it is only some
de commémorer il y a quelques
months, fifty years from the
mois le cinquantième anniversaire
de la bataille de Diên Biên Phu1,
battle of Diên Biên Phu1, one can
be astonished as the number
on peut s’étonner du faible
of the works devoted to one
nombre d’ouvrages consacrés
à l’un des artisans de la victoire
of the artisans of the Vietminh
vietminh et à sa stratégie. En effet,
victory and to his strategy is very
très peu évoquent de manière
small. In fact, very few evoke
détaillée l’action du général
General Vo Nguyen Giap actions
Vo Nguyen Giap, et il est donc
in a detailed manner, and it is
légitime de s’interroger à son
therefore legitimate to wonder
sujet. Doit-on le considérer
about his subject. Should he be
comme un grand stratège, ayant
considered a big strategist,
Major Dominique LUCHEZ
having taken its troops to the ~ National French Gendarmerie ~ mené ses troupes à la victoire
victory, facing two big world powers,
face à deux grandes puissances mondiales,
or modestly, a fighter, having known to show
ou plus modestement, comme un combattant
a tactical direction and take advantage of the
ayant su faire preuve d’un grand sens tactique
given circumstances, as well as of the errors
et profiter des circonstances qui s’offraient
of its opponents ?
à lui, ainsi que des erreurs de ses adversaires ?
In order to understand this history
Afin de comprendre cet “oubli” de l’histoire,
“forgetfulness”, it seems necessary to describe
il semble nécessaire de souligner le parcours
the trajectory of this man and the context
de cet homme et le contexte qui entoura
of his extraordinary evolution, before knowing
ce cheminement hors du commun, avant
a relative decline, and before being nowadays
de connaître ensuite une relative déchéance,
extremely admired by the Vietnamese people.
et aujourd’hui une admiration sans faille de la
If the General symbolises today an army
part de la population vietnamienne.
that successively pushed back the Japanese, the
Si le général symbolise aujourd’hui une armée
French, the Americans, the South-Vietnamese,
qui a repoussé successivement les Japonais, les
1
The battle begins on March 13, 1954 and finishes
on May 7, 1954.
1
La bataille de Diên Biên Phu commence
le 13 mars 1954 et se termine le 7 mai 1954.
53
the Red Khmers and the Chinese, Giap is also
the one who was many times constrained
to criticise himself in public, the one who was
reduced to a lower rank, within the politburo,
before returning in grace and seeing himself
entrusted with tasks in economy or agriculture,
as an expert.
~ 3/2006
Français, les Américains, les Sud-Vietnamiens,
les Khmers rouges et les Chinois, Giap est aussi
celui qui a été contraint à plusieurs reprises
à des autocritiques publiques, qui a été rétrogradé
au sein du politburo avant de revenir en grâce
puis de se voir confier de vagues tâches
d’expert économique ou agricole.
The Apprenticeship
in the Trade of Weapons
This artisan of the victory against the
French colonial power and then against the
United States is, nowadays, celebrated in his
country as a hero, he, who did not intend to make
himself a career in the trade of weapons.
In fact, when Ho Chi Minh entrusted him
with the command of the army in 1946, he had
no experience in the military.
Born in 1912, Vo Nguyen Giap is the son
of a Chinese mandarin. Educated in a French
high school, he takes part in the Communist
movement, beginning with 1930. He studies
History, Law and Economics at Hué and then
at Hanoi, becomes a Professor of History
in Hanoi and joins the Communist Party in 1939.
A convinced patriot, Giap consecrates one of his
courses to the wars of resistance against China
that, during history, invaded Vietnam several
times. He also describes, with eloquence and
passion, Napoléon successes and victories,
as he studied his campaigns in detail.
Being interviewed by Le Monde in 2004,
he does not hesitate to quote Bonaparte: “There
where a goat can pass, a man can pass, too;
there where a man can pass, a battalion can
pass, too”2.
From the battles won by the Emperor, he
keeps the idea of the “concentration of the troops”
and, especially, the one of the “surprise effect”.
In June 1940, he meets Ho Chi Minh for the
first time. He sends Giap to China, to study the
Chinese strategy. In 1942, he attends courses
on guerrilla and on politics, two disciplines that
cannot be dissociated. While Ho Chi Minh
2
54
Interview in Le Monde, April 11, 2004.
L’apprentissage
du métier des armes
Cet artisan de la victoire face à la puissance
coloniale française puis aux États-unis
est aujourd’hui célébré dans son pays comme
un héros, lui qui pourtant ne se destinait pas
au métier des armes.
En effet, lorsque Ho Chi Minh lui confie le
commandement de l’armée dès 1946, il ne
possède aucune expérience militaire.
Né en 1912, Vo Nguyen Giap est un fils
de mandarin. Éduqué dans un lycée français,
il participe au mouvement communiste dès les
années 1930. Poursuivant des études d’histoire,
de droit et d’économie à Hué puis à Hanoï,
il devient professeur d’histoire à Hanoï et adhère
au parti communiste en 1939. Patriote convaincu,
Giap consacre l’un de ses cours aux guerres
de résistance contre la Chine qui avait à plusieurs
reprises au cours de l’histoire envahi le Vietnam.
Il décrit également avec éloquence et passion
les succès et les victoires de Napoléon dont il
a étudié les campagnes dans les moindres détails.
Interviewé par le journal Le Monde en 2004,
il n’hésite pas à citer Bonaparte: “Là où une
chè vre peut passer, un homme peut passer;
l à o ù un homme peut passer, un bataillon
peut passer”2.
Des batailles gagnées par l’empereur,
il retient le sens de “la concentration des troupes”
et surtout, “l’effet de surprise”. En juin 1940,
il rencontre Ho Chi Minh pour la première fois
et celui-ci l’envoie en Chine afin d’étudier
la stratégie chinoise. En 1942, il suit également
des cours de guérilla et de politique, ces deux
disciplines étant indissociables. Tandis
2
Interview au journal Le Monde, 11 avril 2004.
is the witty leader of the movement, Vo Nguyen
Giap is the man of action, inspired by Mao and
convinced that motivation is the key for success
in political as well as in military matters. To this
effect, it is important that all the people should
be guided towards the trade of weapons with
a view to totally transforming society. The entire
population is called to be involved in the fight,
under the form of local militias included. “The
existence of three categories of troops effectively
materialised the policy of the whole people under
arms, this is the manner to organise the armed
forces in a revolutionary war”3. In addition,
Giap uses all the places that can be adapted
to the manufacture of weapons, proving thus
an extraordinary talent to organise, delegate
and motivate his subordinates.
The Commander in Chief
qu’Ho Chi Minh est le chef spirituel du
mouvement, il est l’homme d’action, inspiré par
Mao et convaincu que la motivation est la clé
du succè s en politique comme en matiè re
militaire. A cet effet, il importe de guider
le peuple tout entier vers le métier des armes
en vue d’une totale transformation de la société.
La population dans sa globalité est appelée
à s’engager dans le combat, y compris sous forme
de milices locales. “L’existence de trois catégories
de troupes a effectivement matérialisé la politique
de tout le peuple en armes, c’est là aussi la façon
d’organiser les forces armées dans une guerre
révolutionnaire”3. En outre, Giap utilise tous
les endroits qui peuvent s’adapter à la fabrication
d’armes, témoignant ainsi d’un extraordinaire
talent à organiser, déléguer et motiver ses
subordonnés.
Le chef de guerre
On April 15, 1945, Giap decides to create,
in the six provinces of Tonkin, war regions,
which, in turn, will be regrouped together
to form a liberated zone.
The existing military units become the
“liberation army” under his command. He is
promoted then to the rank of General.
The Vietminh counts, at that time, about
5 000 members. In 1946, military recruitment
and formation turn to full system. The basic
Communist theories and the principles of the
revolutionary war are learnt with the support
of China. In April 1949, Giap had 32 regular
battalions and 137 regional battalions at his
disposal. In May 1950, Ho Chi Minh announces
that all the Vietnamese of masculine sex,
with ages between 16 and 55, who live in Tonkin
or Annam must be incorporated in the army.
In June 1951, Giap had 117 regular battalions
grouped together in regiments as well as
37 regional battalions at his disposal.
The regiments will form divisions of about
10 000 men.
Le 15 avril 1945, Giap décide de créer dans
les six provinces du Tonkin des régions de guerre,
qui à leur tour seront regroupées pour former
une zone libérée.
Les unités militaires existantes deviennent
“armée de libération” sous son commandement.
Il prend alors le grade de général. Le Vietminh
compte à cette période près de 5 000 membres.
En 1946, recrutement et formation tournent
à plein régime. On enseigne les théories
communistes de base et les principes de la guerre
révolutionnaire, avec le soutien de la Chine.
En avril 1949, Giap dispose de 32 bataillons
réguliers et 137 bataillons régionaux. En mai 1950,
Ho Chi Minh annonce que tous les Vietnamiens
de sexe masculin de 16 à 55 ans habitant le Tonkin
ou l’Annam doivent être incorporés dans l’armée.
En juin 1951, Giap dispose de 117 bataillons
réguliers regroupés en régiments ainsi que
de 37 bataillons régionaux. Par la suite,
les régiments formeront des divisions de 10 000
hommes environ.
3
Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army,
1st edition, 1961, edition in foreign languages, Hanoi.
Besides the people’s militias, Giap considers
the regular and regional troops.
3
Vo Nguyen Giap: “Guerre du peuple, armée
du peuple” 1ère édition 1961, édition en langues
étrang ères-Hanoï. Outre les milices populaires, Giap
distingue les troupes régulières et les troupes régionales.
55
At first, Giap completely relies on the
Chinese experts in the domains in which the
Vietminh suffers from serious gaps. China
equally provides equipment, in large quantities,
during the year 1951, which makes Giap
a genuine commander, having an organisation
that enables him to wage a conventional war,
a logical step that must follow the guerrilla and
the mobile war, these being the two first phases
of the revolutionary war, before the general
offensive, according to the Maoist theories.
Giap considers it is time to pass to attack
on all azimuths and to launch offensive towards
Hanoi. He is wrong. The arrival of General
de Lattre de Tassigny, in December 1950,
and his decisive actions stop him in his race;
he is pushed back in all his enterprises (5600
bo-doïs killed in Vinh-Yen, Northwest of Hanoi,
in January 1951). Giap overestimates the state
of his forces and he is constrained to withdraw.
He keeps no reserve troops to exploit a sudden
occasion or to return a difficult position.
He nevertheless uses big formations
and accomplishes extended movements. If his
campaign of 1951 had been successful, it would
have been a model of strategic coordination.
His plan fails, as he is not experienced enough
and as he cannot make use of the means and
the command and control procedures necessary
for such an operation.
In the years that follow, the French
Commanders in Chief (General Salan and then
General Navarre) try to attract Giap in a classical
battle where the superiority of their power would
give them a decisive advantage. Giap has no
intention to make the same mistake and prefers
sacrificing his own-trapped units to letting
himself involved in it, which brings him the
reputation of a person who too easily disposes
of his men’s life.
In 1953, Navarre decides to concentrate
his forces to Diên Biên Phu, a valley of 16
on 9 kilometres, which presents a strategic
interest. This is a passage place towards Laos,
Thailand, Burma and China. The French General
Staff hopes thus to block the way of supplying
weapons and ammunition coming from China.
56
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Dans les premiers temps, Giap se repose
entiè rement sur les experts chinois dans
les domaines où le Vietminh souffre de graves
lacunes. La Chine fournit également du matériel
en très grande quantité au cours de l’année
1951, ce qui fait de Giap un véritable commandant
militaire, doté d’une organisation susceptible
de mener une guerre conventionnelle, étape
logique qui doit suivre la guérilla et la guerre
mobile, celles-ci étant les deux premières phases
de la guerre révolutionnaire, avant l’offensive
générale, selon les théories maoïstes.
Giap estime alors qu’il est temps de passer
à l’attaque tous azimuts et lancer l’offensive vers
Hanoï. Il se trompe. L’arrivée du général de Lattre
de Tassigny en décembre 1950 et son action
déterminante l’arrêtent dans sa course; il est
repoussé dans toutes ses entreprises (5600 bodoïs tués à Vinh-Yen au nord-ouest de Hanoï,
en janvier 1951). Giap a surestimé l’état de ses
forces et est contraint au retrait. Il n’a conservé
aucune troupe de réserve pour exploiter une
occasion soudaine ou retourner une situation
difficile. Il a pourtant utilisé de grandes formations
et accompli de vastes mouvements d’étau.
En cas de succès, sa campagne de 1951 aurait
été un modèle de coordination stratégique.
Son plan ne fonctionna pas car il ne possédait
pas encore l’expérience, les moyens et les
procédures de commandement et de contrôle,
pour une telle opération.
Dans les années qui suivent, les
commandants en chef français (le général Salan
puis le général Navarre) essaient d’attirer Giap
dans une bataille classique où la supériorité
de leur puissance leur donnerait un avantage
décisif. Giap n’a pas l’intention de renouveler
cette erreur et préfère sacrifier des unités prises
au piè ge plutôt que de se laisser entraîner,
ce qui lui vaut sa réputation de disposer
allègrement de la vie de ses hommes.
En 1953, Navarre décide de concentrer ses
forces à Diên Biên Phu, cuvette de 16 kilomètres
sur 9, et qui présente un intérêt stratégique.
C’est un lieu de passage vers le Laos,
la Thaïlande, la Birmanie et la Chine.
While concentrating his forces in a precise
place, General Navarre wishes to attract the
enemy forces and to eliminate them with the
help of his armoured and his aviation.
Facing Giap growing initiatives in this
sector (Lay Chau conquest, North of Diên Biên
Phu, on December 12), Navarre cannot but decide
to increase the number of his forces in the valley.
Giap does not cease pestering Navarre’s troops
that lack any possibility of initiative. In addition,
Navarre does not agree General Cogny, the
Commander of the Land Forces in the North
Vietnam; the divergences between them are
increasing.
Before the beginning of the offensive, Giap
succeeds in achieving two extremely important
objectives: to concentrate an important number
of canons and to more and more disperse
Navarre’s troops. When the battle begins,
on March 13, 1954, Giap has 28 infantry battalions,
about 37 500 fighters, including the artillery and
the genius, at his disposal. There add some
50 000 stewardship soldiers. In contrast to the
estimations of the French Headquarters, Giap
gunners install themselves on the internal
slopes of the valley and can thus fire.
In addition, Giap has his soldiers dig
entrenchments in the neighbouring hills, in the
proximity of the French positions. This way,
as time passes, they gain more and more ground,
to the final fall of the lines, on May 7, 19544
that rings the toll of the French presence in this
country.
The war itself does not finish that day.
Giap’s soldiers continue to pester the French
through Vietnam, until the withdrawal of the
troops, decided upon at the Conference in Geneva
that also triggers about the division of Vietnam
in two States, on the one and the other side
of the 17th parallel.
L’état-major français espère ainsi barrer la route
à l’approvisionnement en armes et munitions
venant de Chine. En concentrant ses forces
sur un endroit précis, le général Navarre
souhaite attirer les forces ennemies et les
éliminer avec ses blindés et son aviation.
Face aux initiatives croissantes de Giap
dans ce secteur (prise de Lai Chau au nord
de Diên Biên Phu le 12 décembre), Navarre
ne peut que se résoudre à augmenter le volume
de ses forces dans la cuvette. Giap ne cesse
de harceler les troupes de Navarre, dépourvues
de toute possibilité d’initiative. En outre, Navarre
ne s’entend gu è re avec le général Cogny,
commandant les FTNV (Forces Terrestres
du Nord Vietnam); les divergences s’accroissent
entre les deux hommes.
Avant le début de l’offensive, Giap a réussi
à réaliser deux objectifs d’une extrême
importance: la concentration d’un nombre
important de canons et la dispersion de plus
en plus grande des troupes de Navarre.
Lorsque la bataille commence, le 13 mars
1954, Giap dispose de 28 bataillons d’infanterie,
soit 37 500 combattants, y compris l’artillerie
et le génie. A cela s’ajoutent quelques 50 000
soldats d’intendance. Contrairement aux
estimations du commandement français,
les artilleurs de Giap s’installent sur les pentes
intérieures de la cuvette et peuvent ainsi tirer
à vue.
En outre, Giap fait creuser des tranchés
dans les collines voisines à proximité des
positions françaises. Celles-ci, au fil du temps,
gagnent de plus en plus sur les lignes françaises,
jusqu’à la chute finale le 7 mai 19544 qui sonne
le glas de la présence française dans ce pays.
La guerre ne s’ach è ve pas ce jour-l à .
Les soldats de Giap continuent à harceler
les Français à travers le Vietnam, jusqu’au
retrait des troupes décidé lors de la conférence
de Genève, qui entraîne en outre le partage
du Vietnam en deux États de part et d’autre
du 17ème parallèle.
4
The French losses: 1 732 dead soldiers and
as many missing ones, 11 721 prisoners, among them
8 431 died in captivity. The Vietnamese losses: between
8 000 and 12 000 dead soldiers in the fights.
4
Etat des pertes françaises: 1 732 morts au combat
et autat de portés disparus, 11 721 prisonniers dont
8 431 morts en captivité. Côté viet-minh: entre
8 000 et 12 000 morts au combat.
57
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In Hanoi, Giap does not remain idle until
the end of the ‘50s. He increases the effectives
of the army and modernises it with up to
date Chinese and Soviet armament. He
simultaneously exercises many responsibilities:
Minister of Defence, Commander in Chief
of the Popular Army, Vice Prime Minister
and Vice President of the Defence Council,
posts where he plays important roles.
In January 1959, the Central Committee
of the Party, which Giap is part of, decrees that
it is the moment to fight for the reunification
with the South, which, little by little, causes
the intervention of the United States, by virtue
of the “domino principle”5, according to which
the last pro Western systems of Asia would risk
falling one after another under the mastery
of Communism.
There again, according to Giap, the priority
of the Popular Armed Forces of Liberation must
be to inflict the maximum of losses to the enemy,
by guerrilla operations rather than by widespread
operations that would cause heavy losses
in the two camps. This is his policy, especially
at the beginning; the widespread operations,
immobilising a large number of soldiers, can
follow attrition operations.
For the American soldiers, the War
in Vietnam put a number of problems that were
not easy to resolve. The army was engaged
in short and violent fights against the Vietcong6,
and, at the same time, it had to face the unities
of the regular Communist army, battalions,
A Hanoï jusqu’à la fin des années cinquante,
Giap ne reste pas inactif. Il augmente les effectifs
de l’armée et la modernise avec de l’armement
chinois et soviétique plus récent. Il exerce
parallèlement de nombreuses responsabilités:
ministre de la Défense, commandant en chef
de l’Armée populaire, vice-premier ministre
et vice-président du conseil de Défense, postes
où il joue un rôle important.
En janvier 1959, le comité central du Parti,
dont Giap fait partie, décrète que le moment
de la lutte est venu en vue d’une réunification
avec le sud, ce qui entraîne peu à peu l’intervention
des États-unis, en vertu de la “théorie des
dominos”5, selon laquelle les derniers régimes
pro-occidentaux d’Asie risqueraient de tomber
les uns après les autres sous l’emprise des
communistes.
Là encore, selon Giap, la priorité des Forces
Armées Populaires de Libération doit être
d’infliger le maximum de pertes à l’ennemi,
par des opérations de guérilla plutôt que par
des opérations de grande envergure susceptibles
de causer de lourdes pertes dans les deux
camps; telle est sa politique, dans un premier
temps du moins; les opérations de grande
envergure, immobilisant un grand nombre
de soldats ennemis, pourraient ensuite
se superposer à cette politique d’usure.
Pour les soldats américains, la guerre
au Vietnam pose un certain nombre de problèmes
qu’il n’est pas facile de résoudre. L’armée est
engagée dans de brefs et violents combats
contre le Vietcong6, mais elle doit aussi faire
face aux unités de l’armée communiste régulière,
5
The domino principle was formulated by the
American State Secretary Foster Dulles during the
Cold War, with regard to the Communist threat in
Asia: the fall of one country causes the fall of
neighbouring countries and, little by little, menaces
even the Western Europe.
6
Viêtcong – term used by the Americans during
the War in Vietnam to denote the Vietnamese
Communist fighters (contraction of Viet Nam Cong
San or Communist Vietnamese). It is, in fact, the armed
forces of the Front de Libération du sud Vietnam
created in the South on December 20, 1963. The term
succeeded that of Viet Minh, abbreviation
of “Viêtnam Doc Lap Dông Minh” (Ligue pour
l’indépendance du Viêtnam created in May 1941
5
La théorie des dominos a été formulée par le
Secrétaire d’État américain Foster Dulles pendant
la guerre froide, à propos du danger communiste
en Asie: la chute d’un pays entraîne celle des autres
pays limitrophes et, de proche en proche, menace
l’Europe occidentale elle-même.
6
Viêtcong est le terme utilisé par les Américains
pendant la guerre du Vietnam pour désigner
les combattants vietnamiens (contraction de “Viet Nam
Cong San” ou communistes vietnamiens). C’est en fait
le bras armé du Front de Libération du sud Vietnam
créé dans le sud le 20 décembre 1963. Le terme
a succédé à celui de Viet Minh, abréviation de “Viêtnam
Doc Lap Dông Minh” (Ligue pour l’indépendance
du Viêtnam créée en mai 1941 par Hô Chi Minh)
58
regiments, as well as divisions, without having
a defined front line.
To a certain extent, it was easier for Giap.
Before 1954, he already took a similar war with
a mixture of regular forces, regional unities
and guerrilla groups. From other perspectives,
it was more difficult as he could have only
an indirect control on the operations and it was
impossible for him to communicate by radio
with all unities.
The offensives of 1968, proposed by Giap
to the politburo in October 1967, caused the
end of the direct intervention of the United
States. On the Ho Chi Minh tarmac arrived tens
of thousands of soldiers and tons of equipment,
necessary to the Têt offensive. As Dîen Bîen Phu
was for the French, Khe Sanh was for the
Americans, the crucial turn of the war.
For the Vietcong, the offensive was a disaster7.
The objectives surpassed the level of the forces
and caused important human and material
losses, fact accepted by Giap. Another failure
was that the population of the South Vietnam
did not rise itself to fight, as it was expected.
For General Westmoreland, Commander
in Chief in Vietnam, it was a failure as well, which
rendered any victory on the spot improbable.
President Johnson lost the confidence of his
people and was replaced by President Nixon.
The South Vietnam thus lost the war and
Giap and his troops did not win it, as they had
won the Indochina War after the coup de grace
of Dîen Bîen Phu. In the South, no decisive
military operation favouring the one or the
other camp was engaged. One simply attends
to a progressive loss of people’s faith, be they
Americans or South Vietnamese.
After the departures of the first American
contingents, about the mid of 1968, it was a total
confusion among both the American and South
Vietnamese Armies. The latter left the South
by Hô Chi Minh), which designated the Vietnamese
forces during the French period 1945-1954. While the
term Viet Minh denotes the ensemble of combat
forces, that of Vietcong refers to the rebel forces
in South-Vietnam.
7
The siege lasted for 77 days, from January till
April 1968, and resulted in about 100 000 dead people
among the North Vietnamese.
bataillons, régiments, voire divisions, sans qu’il
y ait pour autant de ligne de front définie.
Pour Giap, c’est, dans une certaine mesure
plus facile. Avant 1954, il a déjà mené une guerre
semblable avec un mélange de forces
régulières, d’unités régionales et de groupes
de guérilla. A d’autres égards, c’est plus difficile
puisqu’il ne peut plus contrôler les opérations
que de façon indirecte et il lui est impossible
de communiquer par radio avec toutes les unités.
Les offensives de 1968, proposées par Giap
au politburo en octobre 1967, entraînent la fin
de l’intervention directe des Etats-Unis. Par
la piste Ho Chi Minh arrivent des dizaines
de milliers de soldats et des tonnes de matériel
nécessaires à l’offensive du Têt. Comme Dîen
Bîen Phu pour les Français, Khe Sanh est pour
les Américains le tournant crucial de la guerre.
Pour le Vietcong, l’offensive est un désastre7.
Les objectifs dépassent le niveau des forces
et entraînent d’importantes pertes humaines
et matérielles, ce que Giap acceptait. C’est aussi
un échec car la population du Sud-Vietnam
ne s’est pas soulevée comme prévu.
Pour le général Westmoreland, commandant
en chef au Vietnam, c’est aussi un échec qui rend
improbable toute victoire sur place. Le président
Johnson perd la confiance de son peuple et est
remplacé par le président Nixon.
Le Sud-Vietnam perd ainsi la guerre plutôt
que Giap et ses troupes ne la gagnent, comme
ils avaient gagné la guerre d’Indochine après
le coup de grâce de Dîen Bîen Phu. Au sud,
aucune opération militaire décisive avantageant
l’un ou l’autre camp n’est engagée. On assiste
simplement à une perte progressive de la foi par
les peuples, tant américain que sud-vietnamien.
Après les premiers départs, dès la mi-1968,
ce qui reste de l’armée américaine est en plein
désarroi, de même que l’ARVN (Armée de la
République du Sud-Vietnam), laissant le sud sans
défense contre une éventuelle attaque du nord.
qui désigne les forces vietnamiennes pendant la période
française de 1945 à 1954. Cependant si le terme
Viet Minh désigne l’ensemble des forces combattantes,
celui de Vietcong fait référence aux forces rebelles
du Sud-Vietnam.
7
Le siège a duré 77 jours de janvier à avril 1968
et fit près de 10 000 morts nord-vietnamiens.
59
without defence against an possible attack
from the North.
Land operations were followed by heavy air
bombardments. These caused losses among
Giap troops, thus obliging both parties to sit
to the negotiating table.
In the spring of 1972, Giap was ready.
He engaged a massive attack of conventional
type. Twenty divisions representing 125 000 men
crossed the demilitarised zone. For the first time,
he had access to an important number of Soviet
tanks T54 and T72.
Extending the peace talks, while continuing
to kill American soldiers, the North Vietnam
turned the Americans to have a more and more
hostile attitude towards the war. In January
1973, an agreement was signed. It provisioned
the maintenance of the North Vietnamese
forces in the South and the withdrawal of the
American forces.
Nevertheless, Giap did not wish to remain
there. His fight would not finish until the
unification of Vietnam. It was accomplished
on April 30, 1975 with the fall of Saïgon. Giap
had already been the Commander in Chief
for about twenty years and had exercised high
political functions. In December 1978, he equally
conceived the invasion of Cambodia. In 1980,
he abandoned his post of Minister of Defence
and Commander in Chief, although he preserved
his responsibilities in the Politburo, up to 1991.
The Strategist ?
Facing such a career and such longevity,
one cannot but wonder to the personage.
Was Giap actually a big strategist ?
It is difficult to answer this question
straightaway. His manuscripts, although they
let us see his determining action, more
emphasise the role of the Party in the decisions
made, and the man is often obliterated by the
ideology. Certain elements deserve, nevertheless,
to be deepened. Of course, all the decisions
made were collective and approved by the
Politburo, even if Giap was a politician and an
officer at the same time, which enabled him
to influence the decisions.
Later on, Giap experienced some failures:
the offensive of 1951, at Na San in NovemberDecember 1952, then during the campaign
60
~ 3/2006
Aux opérations terrestres vont succéder
des opérations de bombardements aériens
de grande envergure. Ceux-ci causent des pertes
aux troupes de Giap, obligeant ainsi chacun
à s’asseoir à la table des négociations.
Au printemps 1972, Giap est prêt. Il engage
une attaque massive de type conventionnel.
Vingt divisions représentant 125 000 hommes
franchissent la zone démilitarisée. Pour
la premi è re fois, il dispose d’un nombre
important de chars soviétiques T 54 et T 72.
En prolongeant les pourparlers de paix, tout
en continuant à tuer des soldats américains
dès qu’il le peut, le Nord-Vietnam rend l’opinion
américaine de plus en plus hostile à la guerre.
En janvier 1973, un accord est signé. Il prévoit
le maintien des forces nord-vietnamiennes
au sud, et le retrait des forces américaines.
Giap ne souhaite pourtant pas en rester là.
Son combat ne se terminera qu’avec l’unification
du Vietnam. Le regroupement est acquis
le 30 avril 1975 avec la chute de Saïgon.
Giap est alors commandant en chef depuis
près de vingt ans et exerce de hautes fonctions
politiques. En décembre 1978, il conçoit
également l’invasion du Cambodge. En 1980,
il abandonne son poste de ministre de la Défense
et de commandant en chef, pour conserver
cependant des responsabilités au Politburo,
jusqu’en 1991.
Le stratège ?
Face à un tel parcours et une telle longévité,
on peut s’interroger sur le personnage.
Giap était-il réellement un grand stratège ?
Il est difficile de répondre d’emblée à cette
question. Ses écrits, même s’ils laissent apparaître
son action déterminante, mettent davantage
en avant le rôle du Parti dans les décisions prises,
l’homme s’effaçant souvent derrière l’idéologie.
Certains éléments méritent toutefois d’être
approfondis. Certes, toutes les décisions prises
l’étaient de manière collective et approuvées
par le Politburo, même si Giap était à la fois
un politique et un militaire, et qu’il pouvait ainsi
infléchir les décisions.
Ensuite Giap a connu quelques échecs:
l’offensive de 1951, à Na San en novembredécembre 1952 puis pendant la campagne
de 1968 mais aussi de beaux success: la campagne
of 1968, but also some wonderful successes:
the campaign at the RC 4, Diên Biên Phu, the
creation of the Ho Chi Minh tarmac.
For about thirty years, which is exceptional
in terms of duration, Giap proved extraordinary
qualities in all the major domains of the war:
strategy, through his vision in the depth of the
events, tactics, through his mastery of the
guerrilla, often combined to a conventional war.
“The long-term revolutionary war had
to include several different steps: the defensive
one, the one of the balance of the forces, and, last,
the one of the counteroffensive. The living reality
was evidently more complex.”8 Finally, he showed
a big mastery of the logistical issue, without which
nothing would have been possible and knew
how to provide himself with a staff comparable
to the one of a classical army, having a directorate
of the stewardship and a logistical one.
Although the Chinese model and Mao
Ze Dong theories regarding revolutionary war
exercised a real influence on him, Giap knew
how to take distance from them, when needed,
proving realism and pragmatism in finding
solutions “in the Vietnamese style”.
As for the qualities that make him a big
military leader, the aptitude to make decisions,
moral force, capacity of concentration,
intelligence, Westmoreland considered that he
possessed them all. Admiral Thierry Argenlieu,
French High Commissioner in Indochina from
1945 to 1947 says about him: “Giap is for sure,
after Ho Chi Minh, the most important
personality of the Party of which he is a sharply
Anti-French element. He will never acknowledge
himself as being defeated in the fight for the
independence of his country”9.
Such longevity deserves to be signalled,
having in view the fact that many Commanders
in Chief (Generals Lattre, Salan, Navarre for
the French, Westmoreland, Creighton Abrams
for the Americans) confronted with him. Some
of their tactical choices were criticised: all was
said on Navarre errors with regard to planning.
Besides the questionable choice of the location
Vo Nguyen Giap, Guerre du peuple, armée du people,
1st edition, 1961.
9
Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu, Chroniques
d’Indochine, Albin Michel, 1985, p. 254.
8
de la RC 4, Diên Biên Phu, la création de la piste
Ho Chi Minh.
Durant près de trente années – ce qui est
exceptionnel en terme de durée –, Giap
a témoigné de qualités hors du commun dans
tous les domaines majeurs de la guerre: stratégie,
par sa vision en profondeur des événements,
tactique par sa maîtrise de la guérilla, souvent
combinée à une guerre conventionnelle.
“La guerre révolutionnaire de longue durée
devait comporter plusieurs étapes différentes: l’étape
de la défensive, celle de l’équilibre des forces, enfin
celle de la contre-offensive. La réalité vivante était
évidemment plus complexe”8. Enfin, il a fait preuve
d’une grande maîtrise de la problématique
logistique sans laquelle rien n’aurait été possible
et a su se doter d’un état-major comparable
à celui d’une armée classique, possédant une
direction de l’intendance et une de la logistique.
Si le modèle chinois et les théories de Mao
Ze Dong en matière de guerre révolutionnaire
ont exercé une réelle influence, Giap a su aussi
s’en éloigner le cas échéant, témoignant d’un
réalisme et d’un pragmatisme afin de trouver
des solutions “à la vietnamienne”.
Quant aux qualités qui font un grand chef
militaire – aptitude à prendre des décisions,
force morale, capacité de concentration,
intelligence, Westmoreland estimait qu’il les
possédait toutes. L’amiral Thierry d’Argenlieu,
haut commissaire de France en Indochine
de 1945 à 1947 dira de lui: “Giap est certainement,
après Ho Chi Minh, la personnalité la plus
marquante du Parti dont il constitue un élément
très vivement anti-français. Il ne s’avouera jamais
vaincu dans le combat pour l’indépendance
de son pays”9.
Une telle longévité mérite d’être signalée alors
que face à lui se sont succédés de nombreux
commandants en chefs (les généraux de Lattre,
Salan, Navarre pour les Français, Westmoreland,
Creighton Abrams pour les Américains).
Certains de leurs choix tactiques furent
critiqués: tout a été dit sur les erreurs du plan
Navarre. Outre le choix discutable du lieu
Vo Nguyen Giap, Guerre du peuple, armée du peuple,
édition 1961
9
Amiral Thierry d’Argenlieu, Chroniques d’Indochine,
Albin Michel, 1985.
8
1
ère
61
for confrontation, one is aware of the absence
of available reserves, of the waste in case of
Atlanta operation (operation aiming at occupying
the three free provinces in the Centre of Annam),
of the overestimation of the French forces
and of the underestimation of the ones of the
opponent.
Finally, what Giap victory teaches us,
or recalls us in case we would have forgotten,
following the example of the French leaders
of the Fourth Republic, is that the military
success requires certain conditions that cannot
be replaced by the value of the soldiers: defined
and coherent political and military objectives,
the implementation of the necessary means
with a view to attaining these objectives,
the support of the nation for its soldiers and
enduring external alliances. All these can appear
as being a continuation of evidence, although
it was not so, at least on the French side, during
the Indochina war.
To these qualities it is equally added
the Vietnamese fervour and determination
without which the victory could not have been
obtained. In contrast to his opponents, Giap
accepted the losses, considered as the price
to pay, while his soldiers were ready for the
supreme sacrifice to defend their cause.
On the other side, in spite of a superior fire
power, the American war machine, sophisticated
but served by little acclimated personnel,
not too accustomed with the rural conditions
and less motivated, could not crush an army
or so determined armed people.
Technological superiority may be deceiving.
If it allows for inflicting terrible strikes to the
enemy, it does not ensure control over a territory
or over people. Giap understood that the impact
of the events, seen through the prism of the
media, could be decisive and he knew how to
use the Western media, and the Western
society liberty and vulnerability for his profit.
Giap perfectly integrated these parameters
and knew to take advantage out of them.
This is doubtless what allowed for him to be both
a gifted strategist and the instrument of Vietnam
independence (“Doc Lap”) and of its
reunification (the union of the 3 “Ky”, Annam,
Tonkin, Cochinchine) within a Communist
republic.
62
~ 3/2006
de l’affrontement, on ignore rien de l’absence
de réserves disponibles, du gaspillage
de l’opération Atlante (opération visant à occuper
les trois provinces libres au Centre-Annam),
de la surestimation de nos forces et de la sousestimation de celles de l’adversaire.
Enfin, ce que nous apprend la victoire
de Giap, ou ce qu’elle nous rappelle au cas
où nous l’aurions oublié à l’instar des dirigeants
français de la IVe République, c’est que le succès
des armes exige certaines conditions que
la vaillance des soldats ne peut pas remplacer:
des objectifs politiques et militaires définis
et cohérents, la mise en œuvre des moyens
nécessaires à la poursuite de ces objectifs,
un soutien de la nation à ses soldats, et des
alliances extérieures indéfectibles. Cela peut
paraître une suite d’évidences, ce ne le fut pourtant
pas, côté français, pendant la guerre d’Indochine.
A ces qualités s’ajoutaient également une
ferveur et une détermination des Vietnamiens
sans lesquelles la victoire n’aurait pu être acquise.
Contrairement à ses adversaires, Giap acceptait
les pertes, considérées comme le prix à payer,
tandis que ses soldats étaient prêts au sacrifice
suprême pour la cause défendue.
De la même façon, en dépit d’une puissance
de feu supérieure, la machine de guerre
américaine, sophistiquée mais servie par
du personnel peu acclimaté, beaucoup moins
rustique et motivée, ne pouvait écraser une
armée ou un peuple en armes aussi déterminées.
La supériorité technologique est trompeuse.
Si elle permet d’infliger des coups terribles
à l’ennemi, elle ne donne ni le contrôle d’un
territoire ni celui d’un peuple.Enfin Giap
comprit que l’impact des événements, vus à
travers le prisme des média, pouvait être décisif
et sut utiliser les média occidentaux pour
retourner, à son profit, la liberté et la vulnérabilité
des sociétés occidentales.
Ces paramètres, Giap les a parfaitement
intégrés et a su en tirer parti à des moments
cruciaux. C’est sans doute ce qui lui a permis
d’être tout autant un stratè ge de génie que
l’instrument de l’indépendance du Vietnam
(“Doc Lap”) et de sa réunification (l’union
des 3 “Ky”, Annam, Tonkin, Cochinchine)
au sein d’une république communiste.
STRA
TEGIC
STRATEGIC
DIVERGENCES
DIVERGENCES
STRA
TEGIQUES
STRATEGIQUES
Dans une fenêtre de temps
In a rather reduced timeframe,
assez réduite à l’échelle des
compared to the scale of the
mutations géopolitiques (Avril 1999
geopolitical mutations (April 1999
à décembre 2003), trois grands
– December 2003), three big poles
pôles
de puissance, alliés entre
1
of power – NATO , the United
e
u
x
,
ont chacun publié
2
3
States and the European Union ,
un document stratégique
each published a strategic
de référence – l’OTAN1, les Etatsreference document – that is
Unis2 et l’Union européenne3. Ce
a remarkable fact in itself.
fait est en soi assez remarquable.
These documents, presenting
Ces documents en effet
concrete and comparable aspects,
c o n s t i t u e n t ou essayent de
constitute or try to constitute
constituer une vision stratégique
a strategic vision on security,
de sécurité destinée à servir
meant to guide their action. It is
de guide à l’action. Ils présentent
Lieutenant Commander
of course true that, in the domain
donc des aspects concrets
Charles-Edouard DARD
~ National French Marine ~
et comparables. Il est certes vrai
of international politics, facts
que
dans
le
domaine
de la politique internationale
speak better than words. Nevertheless
les
actes
parlent
mieux
que les mots. Toutefois
the compared study of the texts describing
l’étude
comparée
des
textes
décrivant ces trois
these three strategies, in the light of certain
stratégies,
à
la
lumi
è
re
de
certains
faits, peut
facts, can provide us with some teachings.
fournir
quelques
enseignements.
The current speech on the common values
Le discours actuel sur les valeurs communes
that divide the two shores of the Atlantic should
que partagent les deux rives de l’Atlantique
not, in fact, put our critical sense to sleep.
ne doit pas en effet endormir notre sens
Appearances are deceiving. The numerous
critique. Les apparences sont trompeuses.
convergences should not mask the existent risk
Les convergences nombreuses ne doivent
for these centres of power to confront on certain
pas masquer le risque existant pour ces grands
essential aspects of their respective strategies.
ensembles de s’affronter sur certains aspects
A detailed analysis of these three strategic
essentiels de leurs stratégies respectives.
concepts shows, in fact, some inconsistencies
L’analyse détaillée de ces trois concepts
that may be good reasons for our concern
stratégiques fait en effet apparaître des lignes
de fractures qui ont quelques raisons de nourrir
to nourish. This risk of confrontation goes beyond
1
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999) and the
Final Communication, Prague Summit (2002).
2
National Security Strategy (2002).
3
European Security Strategy (2003).
1
Concept Stratégique de l’Alliance (1999)
et Communiqué final du Sommet de Prague (2002).
2
National Security Strategy (2002).
3
Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité (2003).
63
the simple divergences on means or methods
and sometimes touches the very substance
of strategic ambitions.
Deceiving appearances
~ 3/2006
notre inquiétude. Ce risque de confrontation
va au-delà de simples divergences de moyens
ou de méthodes et touche parfois la substance
même des ambitions stratégiques.
Apparences trompeuses
The limits of the strategic concepts
Even if NATO, Europe and the United States
administrations work in a rather transparent
manner, it does not necessarily mean that
the limits of the public documents should be
neglected. It is evidently essential that we should
deepen, while carrying out an interpretation
work, their meanings beyond what is written.
The confrontation with the facts is equally
necessary although it sometimes proves
disconcerting. Two examples are enough
to illustrate this aspect.
For a few years, the progressively rising
tensions pushed Tokyo to register China on the
list of its potential enemies in the latest White
Book of Defence (December 2004). In February
last year, Japan insisted on it once more, while
publishing a common declaration with the
United States on the threat represented by the
emergence of China. With regard to this example,
there is a gap between the United States and what
is written in their strategic concept4.
The same type of example can be given
for Europe. It claims to work with Russia
for the respect of common values5 but its
declarations or its action concerning Chechnya
makes us rather smile. As for the community
of values with Russia, we consider that is still
a relative aspect…
These facts help us understand that the
strategic concepts are not exactly the direct
translation of a vast policy one that would follow
them strictly and precisely. They are progressive
and far from being exhaustive. For example,
Les limites des concepts stratégiques
Même si les administrations de l’OTAN,
de l’Europe et des Etats-Unis fonctionnent
de façon plutôt transparente, il ne faut pas négliger
les limites des documents publiques publiés.
Il est évidemment indispensable d’approfondir
au-delà de ce qui est écrit en effectuant un travail
d’interprétation. La confrontation avec les faits
est également nécessaire et s’avè re parfois
déroutante. Deux exemples suffisent à illustrer
cet aspect.
Depuis quelques années, la montée
progressive des tensions a poussé Tokyo
à inscrire la Chine sur la liste de ses ennemis
potentiels dans son dernier Livre Blanc de la
Défense (décembre 2004). Au mois de février
dernier, le Japon a insisté encore davantage,
en publiant une déclaration commune avec
les États-Unis sur la menace représentée
par l’émergence de la Chine. Sur cet exemple,
les Etats-Unis sont quelque peu en décalage avec
ce qui est écrit dans leur concept stratégique4.
Le même type d’exemple peut être donné
pour l’Europe. Elle prétend oeuvrer pour le
respect de valeurs communes5 avec la Russie.
Au regard de ses déclarations ou de son action
concernant la Tchétchénie, cette phrase prête
plutôt à sourire. Quant à la communauté
de valeurs avec la Russie, considérons qu’elle
présente encore un aspect relatif …
Ceci pour faire comprendre que ces concepts
stratégiques ne sont pas exactement la traduction
directe d’une grande politique qui les suivrait
avec rigueur et précision. Ils sont évolutifs
4
“We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful,
and prosperous China.” National Security Strategy.
5
“We have to continue making efforts to have closer
and closer relationships with Russia, an important
element for our security and prosperity. The respect
for common values will consolidate the progress
that has been made towards a strategic partnership.”
European Security Strategy.
4
“We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful,
and prosperous China.” National Security Strategy.
5
“Nous devrions continuer à oeuvrer pour des relations
plus étroites avec la Russie, élément majeur de notre
sécurité et de notre prospérité. Le respect de valeurs
communes renforcera les progr è s accomplis vers
un partenariat stratégique.” Stratégie Européenne
de Sécurité.
64
the 2002 National Security Strategy neither
approaches nor announces the famous initiative
of the “Greater Middle-East” presented at the
beginning of 2004. These strategic concepts have
to be considered an ensemble of principles and
of keys that open the doors of the policies taken,
which themselves are rarely exempt from
contradictions. In this spirit, it is possible and
efficient to compare them.
et ne sont pas exhaustifs. Par exemple la “National
Security Strategy” de 2002 n’aborde ni n’annonce
la fameuse initiative du “Greater Middle-East”
présentée début 2004. Ces concepts stratégiques
doivent davantage être considérés comme un
ensemble de principe et de clefs qui éclairent
les politiques menées, elles-mêmes rarement
exemptes de contradictions. En gardant cela
à l’esprit, il est possible et fructueux de les
comparer.
Common values
Europe, the United States and the Atlantic
Alliance are ensembles that interlock on the
cultural and historic plane and it is rather difficult
to see the differences regarding the values.
And, in fact, the respective strategies, each in
its way, refer to their own values as to the
guarantee of international security. Everyone
in fact agrees on the need for democracy, human
rights observance and international order.
Besides, in contrast to the accepted ideas,
the United States is not consistent with the latter
one6. They are in sort of original revenge when
they evoke the power of liberty and the
connection between all forms of liberty (political,
religious, economic ...) to build the foundations
of security. To this subject, we often qualify the
American politics as an almost messianical7
one, a determined exporter of its moral values.
Its written strategy reflects this fact, quoting
the word liberty for more than forty times.
Nevertheless, at this point Europe does almost
the same, giving its strategy an evocative
title: a safe Europe in a better world. The second
part of the sentence has a strong moral dimension.
Given the background, should we deduce that
we have to deal with any form of guarantee ?
Is this division of values sort of a wall between
the possible strategic divergences of these poles
Valeurs communes
L’Europe, les Etats-Unis et l’Alliance
Atlantique sont des ensembles très imbriqués
sur le plan culturel et historique et il est bien
difficile de saisir ce qui les différencie sur le plan
des valeurs. Et de fait, les stratégies respectives,
chacune dans leur style font référence aux
mêmes valeurs pour garantir la sécurité au plan
international. Tout le monde en effet s’accorde
sur le besoin de démocratie, les droits de
l’homme et la nécessité d’un ordre international.
D’ailleurs contrairement aux idées reçues,
les Etats-Unis ne sont pas en reste sur ce dernier
point6. Ils sont en revanche plus originaux quand
ils évoquent le pouvoir de la liberté et le lien entre
toutes les formes de liberté (politique, religieuse,
économique ...) pour bâtir les fondements
de la sécurité. A ce sujet, on qualifie souvent
la politique américaine de quasi messianique7,
exportatrice déterminée de ses valeurs morales.
Sa stratégie écrite le reflète en effet, citant le mot
liberté plus de quarante fois. Toutefois, sur ce point
l’Europe se situe sur une ligne assez proche
en donnant à son document de stratégie un titre
évocateur: une Europe sûre dans un monde
meilleur. Cette seconde partie de phrase porte
en elle une forte dimension morale. Cette
constatation faite, faut-il en déduire que nous
avons là une forme de garantie ? Ce partage
des valeurs est-il un rempart aux possibles
6
“We are also guided by the conviction that no nation
can build a safer and better world by itself. Alliances
and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength
of freedom-loving nations.” National Security Strategy.
7
“Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity
to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United
States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great
mission.” National Security Strategy.
6
“We are also guided by the conviction that no nation
can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances
and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength
of freedom-loving nations.” National Security Strategy.
7
“Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity
to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United
States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great
mission.” National Security Strategy.
65
~ 3/2006
of power ? Certainly not. We can even assert
that this convergence of values has not ever been
at the core of strategic alliances. If one can
cite the crusades or the battle of Lepanto
as emblematic examples of this type of alliance,
one also can give a big number of contrary
examples. In Europe, there have been more
wars between Christian countries and the ratio
is the same in the Arab World. In addition, the
divergences of values have never prevented
alliances: the one between Francis I and the
Sublime Porte or between Roosevelt and Stalin
are some to testify to it. One could multiply the
examples.
In conclusion, the accent laid not only
by the leaders, the media but also by the strategic
documents 8 themselves on this division
of common values is often exaggerated and does
not necessarily have strategic consequences.
divergences stratégiques de ces grands
ensembles ? Certainement pas. On peut même
affirmer que la convergence des valeurs dans
l’histoire n’a pas souvent été au centre des alliances
stratégiques. Si on peut citer les croisades
ou la bataille de Lépante comme exemples
emblématiques de ce type d’alliance, on peut aussi
donner un grand nombre d’exemples a contrario.
En Europe, les guerres entre pays chrétiens
sont en nombre infini. Même constat dans le
monde arabe. En outre, les divergences de valeurs
n’ont jamais empêché les alliances: François 1er
ou la Sublime Porte, Roosevelt et Staline
pourraient en attester. On pourrait multiplier
les exemples.
En conclusion, l’accent mis par les dirigeants,
les médias mais aussi les documents stratégiques
eux-mêmes8 sur ce partage de valeurs communes
est tr è s largement exagéré et n’a pas
nécessairement de conséquence stratégique.
Differences in style and method
Important differences in style or in method
can often appear as a source of serious
divergences. If NATO presents a rather neuter
style and methods accepted by everyone, while
reading the strategic concepts we can see that
there are differences between Europe and the
United States. Thus, one discovers in the
American document a sometimes moralistic
and triumphant tone9 that contrasts with the
prudent presentation of the European document.
Nevertheless, this difference in style, besides
national susceptibility, does not have a great
strategic weight.
On the other hand, a more serious issue is
that related to the differences in method. In fact,
this second point often directly touches the values
themselves or their interpretation. One can, for
example, discuss the legitimacy of promoting
democracy by war, which is differently perceived
Différences de style et de méthode
Souvent, des différences importantes de style
ou de méthode peuvent apparaître comme une
source de graves divergences. Si l’OTAN présente
un style assez neutre et des méthodes acceptées
de tous, ces différences, à la lecture des concepts
stratégiques, apparaissent assez nettement
entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis. Ainsi,
on découvre dans le document américain
un ton parfois moralisateur et triomphaliste9
qui contraste avec la présentation prudente
du document européen. Toutefois, cette
différence de style, au-delà des questions
de susceptibilité nationale, ne p è se pas
d’un grand poids stratégique.
En revanche, plus sérieuse est la question
des différences de méthode. En effet, ce second
point touche souvent directement aux valeurs
elles-mêmes ou à leur interprétation. On peut
par exemple discuter la légitimité de la promotion
de la démocratie par la guerre, perçue
8
“Based on common values (...) the Alliance,
even since its creation, has sought to ensure a pacific,
just and enduring order in Europe.” The Alliance’s
Strategic Concept.
9
“Today, the United States enjoys a position
of unparalleled military strength and great economic
and political influence.” National Security Strategy.
8
“Sur la base des valeurs communes (...), l’Alliance
s’attache depuis sa création à assurer un ordre pacifique
juste et durable en Europe.” Concept Stratégique
de l’Alliance.
9
“Today, the United States enjoys a position
of unparalleled military strength and great economic
and political influence.” National Security Strategy.
66
by one party or the other. Besides the method,
the just war becomes a subject entirely related
to moral order. One can identically analyse
the stumbling block constituted by the famous
“pre-emptive” war, which reveals different
conceptions of the international order 10.
Therefore, these differences of methods
can reveal deeper divergences that should
not be underestimated.
Thus, appearances are deceiving. What can
appear in the strategic concepts as a common
base, as common values, does not practically
have any strategic meaning, in reality. What is
worse, the divergences that sometimes appear
superficial and surmountable can, on the contrary
reveal very different background conceptions.
The solid convergences
différemment de part et d’autre. Au-delà de la
méthode, la guerre juste devient alors un sujet
d’ordre éminemment moral. On peut à l’identique
analyser la pierre d’achoppement constituée
par la fameuse guerre “préemptive”, qui révèle
des conceptions différentes de l’ordre
international10. En conclusion, ces différences
de méthodes peuvent donc révéler des divergences
plus profondes qu’il ne faut pas sous-estimer.
Ainsi, les apparences sont trompeuses.
Ce qui peut apparaître dans les concepts
stratégiques comme un socle commun, les
valeurs communes, n’a en réalité pratiquement
aucune signification stratégique. Pire, les
divergences paraissant parfois superficielles
et surmontables peuvent au contraire révéler
des conceptions de fond très différentes.
De solides convergences
Identical analysis
of challenges and threats
It is interesting to note that NATO, the United
States and Europe have each led the analyses
of the important worldwide challenges, close one
to the other, but nevertheless different. NATO
remains mainly marked by its Euro-Atlantic
tropism11, while the United States is more
focused on the idea of liberty, capable to resolve
all the problems in the political as well as
in the economic field. The European concept
is strictly geopolitical in this context, analysing
a series of worldwide challenges able to
generate grave threats: poverty and diseases,
underdevelopment, energetic dependence, water
(climatic warming), competition for natural
resources, migratory movements. For Europe,
contrary to the United States, security, more than
liberty, is a condition of development, which is
Analyse identique
des défis et des menaces
Il est intéressant de noter que l’OTAN,
les Etats-Unis et l’Europe ont chacun conduit
des analyses des grands défis mondiaux
proches les unes des autres, proches mais
toutefois différentes. L’OTAN reste avant tout
marqué par son tropisme Euro Atlantique11,
tandis que les Etats-Unis sont plus focalisés
sur l’idée de liberté, capable en politique comme
dans le domaine économique de résoudre tous
les problèmes. Le concept européen est plus
proprement géopolitique en ce sens qu’il analyse
une liste de défis mondiaux capables de générer
de graves menaces: la pauvreté et les maladies,
le sous-développement, la dépendance
énergétique, l’eau (réchauffement climatique),
la concurrence pour les ressources naturelles,
les mouvements migratoires. Pour l’Europe,
au contraire des Etats-Unis, la sécurité plus que
10
“To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
pre-emptively.” National Security Strategy.
11
“Certain countries in the Euro-Atlantic region
and around it are confronted with major economic, social
and political difficulties. The ethnic and religious rivalries,
the territorial litigation, the inadequacy or the failure
of the efforts on reform, human rights violation and states
dissolution may lead to a local or even regional instability.”
The Alliance Strategic Concept.
10
“To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.” National Security Strategy.
11
“Certains pays de la région euro atlantique et alentour
sont confrontés à de graves difficultés économiques, sociales
et politiques. Des rivalités ethniques et religieuses,
des litiges territoriaux, l'inadéquation ou l’échec
des efforts de réforme, des violations des droits de l’homme
et la dissolution d’Etats peuvent conduire à une instabilité
locale et même régionale.” Concept Stratégique de l’Alliance.
67
a stability factor in itself. Nevertheless, the three
actors, NATO included, rejoin on these very
common challenges, even if they can prioritise
them differently.
This convergence in view is again more
evident in the threats analysis domain. The three
strategic concepts, with not very different
formulas, meet again precisely on the need
of facing terrorism, proliferation of mass
destruction weapons, regional conflicts,
corruption and organised crime. The conjugation
of all these threats is itself not only an extremely
preoccupying global threat12 but also powerful
strategic cement between the three poles
of power that interest us. In this domain, each
knows today that it needs the others (cf. note 6).
A global response
Each of these three strategic actors “is
attached to a global approach of security, which
recognises that the political, economic, social
and environmental factors are more important
than the indispensability of the defence dimension”13.
Through the Mediterranean Dialogue, for
example, NATO shows its will to act in the political
field for the extension and development of the
European Union’s Barcelona Process. As for
Europe, it is by nature a global geopolitical actor,
although militarily limited, the exact opposite
of the Atlantic Alliance. There is an evident
complementarity nowadays. The United
States is powerful in all the dimensions and
consequently acts energetically in all domains.
But the War in Iraq has for example concealed
their action and their considerable expenditures
in the framework of the New Millennium
Challenge Account, meant to support the
development of poor countries and to fight
against AIDS and other infectious diseases.
This type of actions holds an important place
in their security strategy.
12
“The fact that all these elements, terrorism that makes
use of maximum violence, the access to weapons of mass
destruction, organised crime, the weakness of the state
system and the privatisation of the force conjugate, may
expose us to extremely serious threats.” The Alliance
Strategic Concept.
13
The Alliance Strategic Concept.
68
~ 3/2006
la liberté est une condition du développement,
lui-même facteur de stabilité. Toutefois, les trois
acteurs, y compris l’OTAN, se rejoignent
sur ces défis communs même s’ils peuvent
les hiérarchiser différemment.
Cette convergence de vue est encore plus
évidente dans le domaine de l’analyse des
menaces. Les trois concepts stratégiques, avec
des formules peu différentes, se retrouvent
précisément sur le besoin de faire face
au terrorisme, à la prolifération des armes
de destruction massive, aux conflits régionaux
et à la déliquescence des états, enfin à la
criminalité organisée. La conjugaison de toutes
ces menaces constitue une menace globale
extrêmement préoccupante 12 mais aussi
un ciment stratégique puissant entre les trois
pôles de puissance qui nous intéressent. En ce
domaine, chacun sait aujourd’hui qu’il a besoin
des autres (cf. note 6).
Une réponse globale
Chacun de ces trois acteurs stratégiques
“est attaché à une approche globale de la sécurité,
qui reconnaît l'importance des facteurs politiques,
économiques, sociaux et environnementaux en plus
de l’indispensable dimension de défense”13. A travers
le dialogue méditerranéen par exemple, l’OTAN
montre sa volonté d’agir sur le champ politique
et rejoint le processus européen de Barcelone.
L’Europe quant à elle, est par nature un acteur
géopolitique global mais militairement limité.
L’exact contraire de l’Alliance Atlantique. Il y a
aujourd’hui une évidente complémentarité.
Les Etats-Unis sont puissants dans toutes
les dimensions et en conséquence agissent
énergiquement dans tous les domaines. Mais
la guerre en Irak a par exemple occulté leur
action et leurs dépenses considérables dans
le cadre du New Millennium Challenge Account
destinées à soutenir le développement des pays
pauvres et à lutter contre le Sida et les maladies
12
“Le fait est que la conjugaison de tous ces éléments,
un terrorisme fermement résolu à user d’une violence
maximale, l’accès à des armes de destruction massive,
la criminalité organisée, l’affaiblissement du système
étatique et la privatisation de la force, pourrait nous
exposer à une menace extrêmement sérieuse.” Stratégie
Européenne de Sécurité.
13
Concept Stratégique de l’Alliance.
This divided vision on the necessity of a
global response to the challenges and threats
of our time is fundamental. In fact, through their
multiple actions, the three actors create
interdependencies and reciprocal needs that
force them work together and that
convince them of their complementarities.
The United States, for example, leaves
Europe room for manoeuvre in the Iran file for
two reasons: on the one hand they allow for
a new approach to this crisis, a less bellicose
one, but nevertheless credible, thanks to their
support and, on the other hand, they find a
means to act non-militarily, as they do not have
the capacity to drive a second “Iraq” operation.
Thus, the global character of security strongly
ties the United States, Europe and NATO and
obliges them to have a form of common strategy.
The relationships
between the three organisations
The transatlantic link is seen as a strategic
guarantee and its most concrete expression
is the Atlantic Alliance itself, although it is
not the unique expression of the transatlantic
relationships14. The three strategic documents
are perfectly convergent on this point. For NATO,
the fact is easy to understand, as it is a matter
of survival. For the United States, the evaluation
is more complex. They accept this central role
within the NATO provided that the organisation
succeeds in its adaptation15 and, in this framework
they welcome rather favourably, at least in
principle16, the development of certain European
Defence Policy. Nevertheless, the strategic
document maliciously presents the EU as
a powerful organisation, capable, to some extent,
14
“NATO is an important expression of this relationship”
– European Security Strategy.
15
“If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes,
the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security
and interests of its member states as it was the case during
the Cold War”. – National Security Strategy.
16
“At the same time, we welcome our European allies’
efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defence identity
with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations
to ensure that these developments work with NATO”,
National Security Strategy.
infectieuses. Ce type d’action tient une place
importante dans leur stratégie de sécurité.
Cette vision partagée de la nécessité d’une
réponse globale aux défis et menaces de notre
temps est fondamentale. En effet, à travers leurs
actions multiples, nos trois acteurs créent entre
eux des dépendances et des besoins réciproques
qui les obligent à travailler ensemble et qui
les convainquent de leur complémentarité.
Les Etats-Unis laissent par exemple une marge
de manoeuvre à l’Europe dans le dossier de l’Iran
pour deux raisons: d’une part permettre une
nouvelle approche de cette crise moins belliciste
mais cependant crédible grâce à leur soutien
et d’autre part trouver un moyen d’agir non
militaire car ils n’ont pas la capacité de conduire
une seconde opération “Irak”. Ainsi le caractère
global de la sécurité lie fortement les Etats-Unis,
l’Europe et l’OTAN et les oblige à une forme
de stratégie commune.
Les rapports
entre les trois organisations
Le lien transatlantique est vu comme une
garantie stratégique et son expression la plus
concrète en est l’Alliance Atlantique elle-même,
encore qu’elle n’en soit pas l’expression unique14.
Les trois documents stratégiques se rejoignent
parfaitement sur ce point. Pour l’OTAN, le fait
est aisé à comprendre car il s’agit d’une question
de survie. Pour les Etats-Unis, l’évaluation est plus
complexe. Ils acceptent ce rôle central de l’OTAN
à condition que l’organisation réussisse son
adaptation15 et dans ce cadre ils accueillent plutôt
favorablement, au moins dans son principe16,
le développement d’une politique européenne
de défense. Toutefois le document stratégique
présente malicieusement l’UE comme une
14
“L’OTAN est une expression importante de cette
relation”. Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité.
15
“If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes,
the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security
and interests of its member states as was the case during
the Cold War.” National Security Strategy.
16
“At the same time, we welcome our European allies’
efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity
with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations
to ensure that these developments work with NATO.”
National Security Strategy.
69
to be a trade partner17, as opposed to NATO,
which can be a security partner. Certainly,
the transatlantic link still remains strategic for
the United States but the ideal position would
probably be to spend less for Europe security,
having the same control on it. For the European
Strategic Concept, the transatlantic relations
are one of the essential elements of the
international system, not only with regard to the
bilateral interests, but also because they reinforce
the entire international community. As for NATO,
it is considered a multiplicator of force, especially
with regard to the agreements called “Berlin Plus”.
Mention should be made that this
transatlantic link has a special force, as it answers
the democratic principles for both parties.
Modern democracies have always confronted
in a pacifist way, the sixty years of peace in Europe
being a good example. In this context, for the
countries in Europe, NATO was a “machine”
to teach the usage and the democratic functioning
of the armed forces and it continues to be the
same for the new countries of the Alliance.
One can thus consider that the transatlantic
link with regard to the three concepts remains
a strategic pillar. Nevertheless, its permanence,
gained during the Cold War seems to be less
evident today.
Founded worries
Moral incoherences
There is today an important distortion
between the moral values promoted by the
United States – values that are particularly
present in the American Strategic Concept –
and the political reality. Even if the American
document explicitly refutes the relevance
of the famous “clash of civilisations”, it is
nevertheless rather close to the concept and
becomes a reference document for a champion
of civilisation and liberty. It is therefore a matter
of a moral fight, between the good and the evil.
The United States has to expect to be judged
17
70
“Our partner in opening world trade”, ibidem.
~ 3/2006
organisation puissante et capable en tant que …
partenaire commercial17 par opposition à l’OTAN,
partenaire de sécurité. Assurément, le lien
transatlantique reste encore stratégique pour
les Etats-Unis mais la situation idéale serait
probablement de dépenser moins pour la sécurité
de l’Europe tout en maintenant le même
contrôle. Pour le concept stratégique européen,
les relations transatlantiques constituent un des
éléments essentiels du système international,
non seulement au regard des intérêts bilatéraux,
mais aussi parce qu’elles renforcent la
communauté internationale dans son ensemble.
L’OTAN quant à elle est considérée comme
un multiplicateur de force, en particulier
au regard des accords dits de “Berlin plus”.
Il faut ajouter que ce lien transatlantique
a une force particulière dans le sens où il repose
de part et d’autre sur des principes démocratiques.
Les démocraties modernes en effet s’affrontent
toujours sur des modes pacifiques, les soixante
ans de paix en Europe en sont un bel exemple.
En ce sens, pour les pays d’Europe, l‘OTAN
a été une “machine” à apprendre l’usage
et le fonctionnement démocratiques de la force
armée et continue de l’être aujourd’hui pour
les nouveaux pays de l’alliance.
On peut ainsi considérer que le lien
transatlantique, au regard des trois concepts
demeure un pilier stratégique. Toutefois,
sa pérennité acquise pendant la guerre froide
semble moins évidente aujourd’hui.
Des inquiétudes fondées
Incohérences morales
Il y a aujourd’hui une distorsion importante
entre les valeurs morales promues par les
Etats-Unis – valeurs qui sont particulièrement
présentes dans le concept stratégique
américain – et la réalité de leur politique. Même
si le document américain réfute explicitement
la pertinence du fameux “choc des civilisations”,
il en est toutefois assez proche et se pose comme
le document de référence d’un champion de la
civilisation de la liberté. Il s’agit donc d’un combat
moral, entre le bien et le mal. Les Etats-Unis
17
“Our partner in opening world trade”, ibidem.
on the purely moral aspect and it would be done
in a harsh manner. The examples in their
disfavour are evident, from the status of the
prisoners in Guantanamo to the one-way policy
that favours Israel, going through the refusal
of an international court etc. The credibility
of the American policy suffers a lot because
of these negative examples and so does
the force of the American idealism.
The consequences for the relationships
with the European continent are rather serious
in the long run. It is thus necessary for Europe
or NATO to have a more moral policy. The
European will to lift the weapons embargo in
opposition to China or the partnership of the
Alliance with Russia concealing Chechnya are
some to testify. But their policies are “morally”
less noisy. That is why, may it be wrong or not,
in Europe and elsewhere, the conviction that
America demands others to have virtues that
it does not apply to itself installs. On the other
hand, the Americans do not understand
that Europe refuses to seriously share the
international security burden. This conviction
leads, little by little, to a question that each party
addresses: do we always have the same values ?
That introduces a break in what has been seen,
on the two shores of the Ocean, as the cement
of the Alliance: the values. Their values do not
constitute a strong strategic cement (cf. §1),
but the divergence of the values is often the
moral justification of strategic divergences.
There is therefore a risk.
doivent donc s’attendre à être jugés sur l’aspect
purement moral. Ils le sont en effet et sévèrement.
Les exemples en leur défaveur sont légions, du
statut des prisonniers à Guantanamo à la politique
à sens unique en faveur d’Israël en passant
par le refus d’un tribunal international etc.
La crédibilité de la politique américaine souffre
beaucoup des ces mauvais exemples, la force
de l’idéalisme américain aussi.
Les conséquences pour les rapports avec
le continent européen sont assez graves dans
le long terme. Non pas que l’Europe ou l’OTAN
aient une politique plus morale, loin s’en faut.
La volonté européenne de lever l’embargo pour
les armes à l’encontre de la Chine ou le partenariat
de l’Alliance avec la Russie occultant la Tchétchénie
peut en attester. Mais leurs politiques sont
“moralement” moins bruyantes. Ainsi, à tort
ou à raison, s’installe la conviction, en Europe
et ailleurs, que l’Amérique exige des autres
des vertus qu’elle ne s’applique pas à elle-même.
A l’inverse, les Américains ne comprennent pas
que l’Europe refuse de partager sérieusement
le fardeau de la sécurité internationale. Cette
conviction conduit petit à petit à se poser de part
et d’autre la question: avons-nous toujours les
mêmes valeurs ? Cela introduit une fracture
dans ce que les deux rives de l’océan ont toujours
vu comme le ciment de leur alliance: les valeurs.
Et si les valeurs ne constituent pas un ciment
stratégique fort (cf. §1), en revanche la divergence
des valeurs est souvent la justification morale
de divergences stratégiques. Il y a donc un risque.
Major interests in competition
Besides the professions of faith full of a lot
of good intentions, one finds the reality of the
economic issues that almost always lead to
strategic issues. If the economic interweaving
of the two shores of the Atlantic is strong18, it is
far from being totally evident. For example,
Des intérêts majeurs en concurrence
Au-del à des professions de foi pleines
de bonnes intentions, on trouve la réalité des
enjeux économiques qui conduisent presque
toujours à des enjeux stratégiques. Si l’imbrication
économique des deux rives de l’Atlantique est
forte18, elle est loin d’être totale évidemment.
Par exemple, la dépendance énergétique
18
The United States – the most important investor
in Europe and the European Union – the most important
investor in the United States.
18
Etats-Unis premier investisseur en Europe, Union
Européenne premier investisseur aux Etats-Unis.
71
the fact that Europe and the United States
are not energetically independent19 is one
of great concern and, without doubt, constitutes
one of the keys to understand the current policy
of the United States. Thus, considering, on the
one hand, the growing convergence of the
European interests and, on the other hand,
the American political one, there is room to fear
a future strategic clash, which, no matter the form,
is present in the written strategic concepts and
is already visible in the facts (the War in Iraq,
the American presence in Central Asia). This
link between the economic and strategic interests
is, for example, particularly visible in the crisis
that opposes Europe and America in the sale
of weapons to China. Robert Zoellick, number
two in the American diplomacy20, threats are
eloquently related to it. In addition, one can be
all the more worried as the United States
considers the economic dimension a value in
itself (cf. §1) and therefore a pillar of their global
strategy of security, being the object of a complete
chapter of the National Security Strategy21.
In this chapter, the evocation and the wish
for a new era of worldwide economic prosperity
are seen, naturally and legitimately,
as a domination of the American economy.
If the Europeans have, without doubt, the same
ambition with regard to their own economy,
they do not link it so clearly to their security.
Nevertheless, there is here evident room
for clash, which will not be only economic.
The unpredictable NATO
Today, the fall of the iron curtain is still too
recent for many countries, particularly for those
freed from the Soviet yoke, which do not see
19
“The energetic dependence is an issue of great concern
for Europe.Europe is the major world importer of oil
and gas. Its imports today represent about 50 % from
the energy consumption. This percentage may rise
to 70 % in 2030.” European Security Strategy.
20
Possible remise in case of certain transfers
of technologies towards Europe or arrangements
with certain groups of defence (Thal ès, Bae).
21
Chapter 6 : Ignite a New Era of Global Economic
Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade.
72
~ 3/2006
de l’Europe19 et des Etats-Unis est toujours plus
préoccupante et constitue sans doute une des
clés de compréhension de la politique actuelle
des Etats-Unis. Ainsi, considérant d’un côté
la convergence croissante des intérêts européens
et de l’autre la politique américaine, il y a lieu
de craindre un affrontement stratégique futur
dont nous ignorons la forme, mais qui est bien
présent dans les concepts stratégiques écrits
et qui est déjà visible dans les faits (guerre
en Irak, présence américaine en Asie centrale).
Ce lien entre intérêts économiques et stratégiques
est par exemple particulièrement visible dans
la crise qui oppose Européens et Américains
dans la vente d’armes à la Chine. Les menaces
de Robert Zoellick, numéro deux de la diplomatie
américaine20 sont à ce sujet très éloquentes.
En outre, on peut être d’autant plus inquiet
qu’aux Etats-Unis, la dimension économique
est une valeur en soi (cf. §1) et donc un pilier
de leur stratégie globale de sécurité, faisant
même l’objet d’un chapitre complet de la National
Security Strategy21. Dans ce chapitre, l’évocation
et le souhait d’une nouvelle ère de prospérité
économique mondiale sont vus naturellement
et légitimement dans le sens d’une domination
de l’économie américaine. Si les Européens ont
sans doute la même ambition pour leur propre
économie, ils ne font pas un lien aussi clair avec
leur sécurité. Néanmoins, il y a là un évident
terrain d’affrontement, qui ne sera pas
uniquement économique.
L’inconnue de l’OTAN
Aujourd’hui, la chute du rideau de fer
est encore trop récente pour que de nombreux
pays, particulièrement ceux libérés du joug
19
“La dépendance énergétique constitue pour l’Europe
une source de préoccupation particuli ère. L’Europe est
le principal importateur mondial de pétrole et de gaz.
Ses importations représentent aujourd’hui environ 50 %
de la consommation d’énergie. Ce chiffre passera à 70 %
en 2030.” Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité.
20
Possible remise en cause de certains transferts
de technologies vers l’Europe ou d’arrangements
avec certains groupes de défense (Thalès, Bae).
21
Chapter 6: Ignite a New Era of Global Economic
Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade.
the Atlantic Alliance as a guarantee for their
survival. Russia always creates fear, as the
Ukrainian example has recently shown, and
there is not any other military organisation
at the level of the effectiveness of the Alliance
nowadays. But, on long term, there are serious
limits of this conception. In fact, the 1999
Strategic Concept and the 2002 Prague Summit
are of technical nature, as they especially try
to counteract the transformations rendered
necessary by the modern threats and the
expansion in course. They do not answer to the
nature that the Alliance must have in the future.
Now, this issue is a fundamental one if we want
this Alliance to remain at the heart of the
transatlantic strategic cooperation. Is it necessary
for the Alliance to remain a predominantly
regional organisation22 or must it take an actually
worldwide dimension as it is suggested,
for example, by its action in disarmament
or in Afghanistan ? Should the Alliance become
a real political actor rather than remain a “supplier
of military means” as it currently is ? There are,
of course, political ambitions23 but the reality is
different and full of traps. The Alliance political
ambition will always bump itself to the one of the
European Union, while the European Union
military ambition will always bump itself to the
one of the Alliance. There is here a possible
break line. The necessity of a choice, inevitable
and impossible, becomes more visible while
comparing the written versions of the strategic
concepts of the two geopolitical actors. A choice
has to be made by both NATO and, especially,
by the European Union: how will the European
Union translate its slowly taking into consideration
of having security responsibilities outside its
borders ? How will it cooperate with NATO during
this geopolitical maturation phase ? Which will be
soviétique, ne trouvent pas dans l’Alliance
Atlantique une garantie de survie. La Russie
fait toujours peur comme l’exemple ukrainien
l’a récemment montré et il n’y a aujourd’hui
aucune autre organisation militaire au niveau
d’efficacité de l’Alliance. Mais à long terme,
il existe de sérieuses limites à cette conception.
En effet, le concept stratégique de 1999 et le sommet
de Prague de 2002 sont de nature technique, ils
cherchent surtout à affronter les transformations
rendues nécessaires par les menaces modernes
et l’élargissement en cours. Ils ne répondent
pas à la nature que doit prendre l’Alliance dans
le futur. Or, cette question est fondamentale si
on veut que cette alliance reste au cœur de la
coopération stratégique transatlantique. Faut-il
que l’Alliance reste une organisation à dominante
régionale22 ou doit-elle prendre une dimension
réellement mondiale comme le suggè re par
exemple son action dans le désarmement ou en
Afghanistan ? L’Alliance doit-elle devenir un réel
acteur politique plutôt que rester un “fournisseur
de moyens militaires” comme c’est le cas
actuellement ? Les ambitions politiques existent23
mais la réalité est différente et semée d’embûches.
L’ambition politique de l’Alliance se heurtera
toujours à celle de l’Union Européenne tandis
que l’ambition militaire de l’Union Européenne
se heurtera toujours à celle de l’Alliance. Il y a
là une ligne de fracture possible. La nécessité
d’un choix, inévitable et impossible, saute aux
yeux dans la lecture comparée des concepts
stratégiques de ces deux acteurs géopolitiques.
Un choix à faire pour l’OTAN mais aussi et surtout
pour l’Union européenne: comment cette dernière
va-t-elle traduire sa lente prise de conscience
d’avoir des responsabilités de sécurité à l’extérieur
de ses frontières ? Comment va-t-elle coopérer
avec l’OTAN pendant cette phase de maturation
22
“The Alliance embodies the transatlantic association,
capable of establishing a permanent connection between
North America and Europe security.” Alliance Strategic
Concept.
23
“The essential and immutable goal of the Alliance,
as it is announced by the Washington Treaty, consists
in safeguarding all its Members liberty and security,
through military means”.
22
“L’Alliance incarne l’association transatlantique
qui établit un lien permanent entre la sécurité
de l’Amérique du Nord et la sécurité de l’Europe.”
Concept Stratégique de l’Alliance.
23
“L’objectif essentiel et immuable de l’Alliance,
tel qu’il est énoncé dans le Traité de Washington, consiste
à sauvegarder la liberté et la sécurité de tous ses membres
par des moyens politiques et militaires.”
73
the attitude of the United States ? There are so
many questions that rise as many worries.
That is why, at a more careful reading of the
respective concepts, should one worry about
a future strategic confrontation between these
three big poles of power that are the United States,
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance ? Has it already
begun ? All would lead to believe and to fear it.
In contrast to the received ideas, we are not
protected by our common values that seem less
and less common. Some of our vital interests
are in competition and our methods to approach
the problems of the world sometimes deeply
differ. These pessimistic elements are not very
questionable but they must be balanced by two
important ideas that allow us to envision the future
in a more positive manner.
First, these three geopolitical bodies are
subjected to the same threats and, today, they
need each other to face these threats. Security
is in fact a global concept. This very strong link
that unites them is a strong guarantee to avoid
a future confrontation. On the other hand, this
analysis has not approached the central point
constituted by the current emergence of new
poles of power: particularly China and India.
These countries could themselves reveal as an
excellent reason to renew the transatlantic
partnership. They can sometimes constitute
an interesting counterweight to all the American
excessive power, a strategic alternative. It is
therefore essential for us to identify our strategic
divergences in order to profitably strengthen
our convergences and thus to face the common
and emerging threats together. To be convinced
of that, it is enough to listen to the Indian
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, who declared,
in 2005 on the occasion of the visit in India
of his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabio: “Together,
India and China are able to redesign the
world order” …
74
~ 3/2006
géopolitique ? Quelle sera l’attitude des
Etats-Unis ? Autant de questions qui soulèvent
quelques inquiétudes.
Ainsi, à la lecture de leurs concepts respectifs,
faut-il s’inquiéter d’un futur affrontement
stratégique entre ces trois grands pôles de
puissance que sont les Etats-Unis, l’Europe
et l’Alliance Atlantique ? A-t-il déjà commencé ?
Tout porterait à le croire et à le craindre.
Contrairement aux idées reçues, nous ne sommes
pas protégés par nos valeurs communes qui
d’ailleurs à tort, semblent de moins en moins
communes. Certains de nos intérêts vitaux sont
en concurrence et nos méthodes pour aborder
les problè mes du monde divergent parfois
profondément. Ces éléments pessimistes sont
peu contestables mais ils doivent être pondérés
par deux idées d’importance qui nous permettent
d’envisager l’avenir de façon plus positive.
D’abord, ces trois ensembles géopolitiques
sont soumis aux mêmes menaces et ont
aujourd’hui besoin les uns des autres pour y faire
face. La sécurité est en effet un concept global.
Ce lien très fort qui les unit est une garantie
puissante pour éviter un affrontement futur.
D’autre part, ce travail d’analyse n’a pas abordé
le point central constitué par l’émergence actuelle
de nouveaux pôles de puissance: la Chine et l’Inde
en particulier. Ces pays pourraient se révéler eux
aussi comme une excellente raison de renouveler
le partenariat transatlantique. Ils peuvent
constituer parfois un contrepoids intéressant
à la toute puissance américaine, une alternative
stratégique certainement pas. Il est ainsi
indispensable de bien identifier nos divergences
stratégiques afin de fortifier utilement nos
convergences et par là même faire face ensemble
aux menaces communes et émergentes. Pour
s’en convaincre, il n’est que d’écouter le premier
ministre indien, Manmohan Singh déclarant
en 2005 à l’occasion de la visite en Inde de son
homologue chinois, Wen Jiabio: “Ensemble, l’Inde
et la Chine peuvent redessiner l’ordre du monde”…
WOULD THERE BE LA GUERRE DU NIL
AW
AR OF THE NILE ? AURA-T
-ELLE LIEU ?
WAR
AURA-T-ELLE
The search for hydrocarbons
La recherche des
and the control of their extraction
hydrocarbures et le contrôle
seem to constitute the main
de leur extraction semblent
geopolitical preoccupation of the
constituer aujourd’hui la principale
governments of the countries
préoccupation géopolitique
in the world today. However,
des gouvernements des pays du
water is a much more precious
monde. Or, l’eau est une ressource
and badly distributed resource,
beaucoup plus précieuse et tout
and statistics provided by the
aussi mal répartie, et les
international organisations in this
statistiques fournies par les
domain are frightening. About
organisations internationales
80 countries have difficulties
dans ce domaine sont alarmantes.
with water supplying and the
Près de 80 pays connaissent des
worldwide demand should
difficultés
d’approvisionnement
Major Philippe CAVALIER
double before 2025, because
d’eau et la demande mondiale
~ French Air Forces ~
devrait doubler d’ici 2025, du fait de l’explosion
of the demographic explosion and the sociodémographique et du développement socioeconomic development.
économique.
If nothing is done to stave off these
st
Si rien n’est fait pour conjurer ces
phenomena, the conflicts of the 21 century
è nes, les conflits du XXI ème siè cle
phénom
could take place around the issue of water
pourraient avoir lieu autour de la question de la
control. Nonetheless, Yves Lacoste, director
maîtrise de l’eau. Or Yves Lacoste, directeur
of Hérodote Review, estimated in a chapter1
de la revue Hérodote, estimait dans un chapitre1
dedicated to water geopolitics that in spite
consacré à la géopolitique de l’eau, que malgré
of “the alleged hydropolicy forecasts, water is not
“les augures d’une prétendue hydropolitique, l’eau
a paramount stake which would explain and justify
n’est pas cet enjeu primordial qui expliquerait
by itself a water war, but rather an ensemble
et qui justifierait à lui seul une guerre de l’eau,
of political tensions which have existed for more
mais plutôt un ensemble de tensions politiques
or less time in an area” and to which the water
qui existent depuis plus ou moins longtemps sur
issue would only be the catalyst.
une région” et dont la question de l’eau ne serait
If this analysis is born out for most of the
que le catalyseur.
Si cette analyse se vérifie sur la plupart
Near East conflicts, there is one that seems
des conflits du Proche-Orient, il en est un qui
to strongly contradict it, the conflict that takes
1
Hérodote Review, nr. 102 published in 2001,
included in the Bulletin of documentation of CESA
(Centre d’Enseignement Supérieur Aérien, École
Militaire, Paris), nr. 558, p. 7.
1
Revue Hérodote no. 102 publiée en 2001, repris
dans le Bulletin de documentation du CESA (Centre
d’Enseignement Supérieur Aérien, Ecole Militaire,
Paris), no. 558, p 7.
75
shape in the Valley of the Nile regarding the
way the water of this river is distributed. It is
what we will try to highlight by stressing
that, contrary to certain estimates2, the risk
of a medium-term conflict is serious. Owing
to the fact that it is at the origin of life,
settlement, urbanisation, even of our species’
civilisation, water is not a value comparable with
other resources on Earth. It is neither energy
nor mining but simply vital.
Therefore, the risk of a conflict over the Nile
waters is not evaluated only through the prism
of regional antagonisms and ratios of forces
but especially through the one of establishing
the moment when one of the nations of the Nile,
in an attempt to reach its vital interest, the one
of the water, which is the root of any conflict,
will raise the question of its survival. In this
dramatic scenario, Egypt could be the frangible
joint of Nile’s fragile hydropolitical balance.
The Nile, a Vital River
With its 6 671 km, the Nile is the longest
river in the world, it originates in (the White Nile)
at the heart of the Great Lakes area. Its basin
covers a large sector, six times the surface
of France, and extends, with its tributaries, over
the territory of ten states. Close to Khartoum,
it increases thanks to the Blue Nile, descended
from the Ethiopian high plateaus, and Atbara,
coming from Eritrea. It then crosses, for 3 000
km, one of the most arid deserts in the world,
where its volume regularly diminishes3 because
of evaporation and agricultural irrigation4, to flow
into a broad delta in the Mediterranean Sea.
Because of a succession of cataracts5, the
Nile is little navigable. The irrigation and the
hydroelectric production constitute the principal
2
See “Géopolitique, constantes et changements dans
l’histoire”, A. Chauprade, p. 589, La guerre de l’eau.
3
The Nile pours into the Mediterranean Sea only
a quarter of the water collected in its basin.
4
This irrigation represents 85 to 95 % of the overall
consumption of water in the Northern countries
of the Nile (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea).
5
These six cataracts are important waterfalls
on the Nile.
76
~ 3/2006
semble la contredire fortement, c’est celui
qui se dessine dans la vallée du Nil autour
du partage des eaux de ce fleuve. C’est ce que
nous allons tenter de mettre en évidence,
en soulignant que contrairement à certaines
estimations2, le risque de conflit à moyen terme
est sérieux. Du fait qu’elle soit à l’origine
de la vie, de la sédentarisation, de l’urbanisation,
voire des civilisations de notre espèce, l’eau n’est
pas une valeur comparable aux autres ressources
de la Terre. Elle n’est ni énergétique, ni minière
mais simplement vitale.
De ce fait, le risque de conflit autour des eaux
du Nil ne s’évalue pas seulement à l’état
des antagonismes régionaux et des rapports
de forces, mais surtout à déterminer le moment
où une des nations du Nil aura atteint ses intérêts
vitaux, au-del à duquel tout partage, même
équitable des eaux, posera la question de sa
survie. Dans ce scénario dramatique, l’Egypte
pourrait être le point de rupture du fragile
équilibre hydropolitique du Nil.
Le Nil, un fleuve vital
Avec ses 6 671 km, le Nil est le plus long
fleuve du monde, il prend sa source (le Nil Blanc)
au cœur de la région des Grands Lacs. Son bassin
couvre une superficie grande comme six fois
la France et s’étend avec ses affluents sur le
territoire de dix Etats. Près de Khartoum, il se
renforce grâce au Nil Bleu, descendu des hauts
plateaux éthiopiens, et à l’Atbara, en provenance
de l’Erythrée. Il traverse ensuite sur 3 000 km
l’un des déserts les plus arides du monde,
où son débit s’appauvrit régulièrement3 du fait
des prélèvements de l’évaporation et de l’irrigation
agricole4, pour se jeter dans un large delta
en mer Méditerranée.
Du fait d’une succession de cataractes5, le Nil
est peu praticable. L’irrigation et la production
2
Lire “Géopolitique, constantes et changements
dans l’histoire”, A. Chauprade, p. 589, La guerre de l’eau.
3
Le Nil ne déverse à la mer Méditerranée que
le quart des eaux collectées dans son bassin.
Cette irrigation constitue 85 à 95% de la consommation
totale de l’eau dans les pays septentrionaux du Nil
(Egypte, Soudan, Ethiopie et Erythrée).
4
5
Au nombre de six, ces cataractes sont des chutes
d’eau importantes sur le Nil.
stakes of this river. Its medium volume of water,
estimated at 84 billion m3 a year, is very strongly
related to the rain seasons in the high plateaus
of the Great Lakes area. Today, an immense
reserve, Lake Nasser6, was created through
the building of the Aswan Dam. Inaugurated
in 1970, this “Pharaonic” work sheltered Egypt
from destroying floods (1916), big droughts
(1984-1988) and thus from famine, while it has
also ensured the electric needs of the country.
Egypt, “a Gift of the Nile” 7
on the Edge of Asphyxia
hydro-électrique constituent les principaux
enjeux de ce fleuve. Son débit moyen, estimé
à 84 milliards de m3 par an, est très fortement
lié aux saisons des pluies dans les hauts plateaux
de la région des Grands Lacs. Aujourd’hui, une
immense retenue, le lac Nasser6, a été créée
par la construction du barrage d’Assouan.
Inauguré en 1970, cet ouvrage “pharaonique”
a m is l’ Eg ypte à l ’ a b r i d e s i n o n d a t i o n s
destructrices (1916), des grandes sécheresses
(1984-1988) et donc de la famine, tout en assurant
les besoins électriques du pays.
L’Egypte, “un don du Nil” 7
au bord de l’asphyxie
As seen from the sky, Egypt (1.8 times
France) comes in the form of a huge desert,
crossed by a thin blue net, bordered by a green
edging. Northwards of Cairo, the greenery
widens and forms a green triangle, the Delta.
Without this river, the country would not exist.
In all, the cultivable and therefore habitable
surface represents only 5% of its total surface,
the equivalent of the Netherlands. This situation,
bearable during centuries, has become a major
constraint because of a high population density8
and a continuous fall of the agricultural output
today. However, its fresh water resources
are among the weakest in the world: 25 m3
per annum and per capita when the critical point
assessed by the experts is 1 000 m3.
The city of Cairo, convinced that the safety
of the country depends on the available vital
space, have launched into a series of great irrigation
work through the project of creating a new delta
very close to the Sudanese border, by Lake
Vue du ciel, l’Egypte (1,8 fois la France)
se présente sous la forme d’un immense désert,
parcouru d’un mince filet bleu, lui-même bordé
d’un liseré vert. Au nord du Caire, la verdure
s’élargit et forme un triangle vert, le Delta.
Sans ce fleuve, le pays n’existerait pas. En tout,
la surface cultivable et donc habitable,
ne représente que 5% de sa superficie totale soit
l’équivalent des Pays-Bas. Cette situation, vivable
pendant des siècles, est devenue aujourd’hui
une contrainte majeure du fait d’une forte
démographie 8 et d’une baisse continue du
rendement agricole. Or, ses ressources en eau
douce sont parmi les plus faibles du monde:
25 m3 par an et par personne alors que le seuil
critique évalué par les experts est de 1 000 m3.
Le Caire, convaincu que le salut du pays
passe par un important gain d’espace vital, s’est
lancé dans une série de grands travaux d’irrigation
550 km length and a maximum capacity of 157
billion m3 (that is to say nearly two years of the Nile
flow), Lake Nasser is the second in the world in surface
after Lake Kariba on the Zambezi.
7
Famous sentence attributed to Herodotus, Greek
historian from the 5th century BC.
8
Its population, which reaches today nearly
70 million inhabitants, must double in the thirty years
to come. The demographic density is the highest
in the world, with 1 600 inhabitants on km2, four times
more than in the Netherlands and far above that
of Bangladesh, already considered as extreme.
Long de 550 km et d’une capacité maximale
de 157 milliards de m3 (soit prè s de deux années
de débit du Nil), le lac Nasser est le deuxième du monde
en superficie après le lac Kariba sur le Zambèze.
7
Phrase célèbre attribuée à Hérodote, historien grec
du Vème siècle av JC.
8
Sa population qui atteint aujourd’hui près de
70 millions d’habitants doit doubler dans les trente
ans à venir. La densité démographique est la plus
élevée au monde avec 1 600 habitants par km2, quatre
fois plus que les Pays-Bas et loin devant celle
du Bangladesh, considérée comme déjà extrême.
6
6
77
Nasser. This project, known as Touchka9 ,
consists in pumping nearly 10 billion m3 of water
per annum in the Aswan Dam to irrigate more
than 1.5 million hectares by 2017.
However, Egypt already uses its entire annual
quota (55 billion m3). It would thus be necessary
for it to go through an expensive programme
of cutting down damages and loss, like contracting
the irrigation canals to reduce evaporation,
recycling used water, changing irrigation
methods, reducing water-consuming cultures
(rice and cotton). All these are not very realistic
measures, taking into account the political and
financial implications in a country that survives
thanks to international assistance only and which
is confronted with new problems that are always
related to water.
Indeed, the apparent abundance of the
waters of Lake Nasser has entailed an agricultural
over-irrigation, has caused the increase of the
ground water and also of the soil salinity. The
alluvium, blocked by the dam10, does not enrich
the downstream grounds anymore and it has
been replaced by chemical fertilisers, whose
large-scale use11 has caused important ecological12
and health13 damage, contributing to the alarming
pollution of the Nile waters. Results: food
production has increased less quickly than
population, lands have become less fertile.
Thus, 20 years ago, Egypt was self-sufficient,
today it imports more than 60% of its food and
ranks third in wheat imports.
Therefore, Egypt is confronted with water,
demographic, social and consequently human
stress on large scale, whose more complex
equations appear dramatically insoluble
every year.
~ 3/2006
dont le projet de création d’un nouveau delta tout
près de la frontière soudanaise, au bord du lac
Nasser. Ce projet, dit de Touchka9, consiste
à pomper près de 10 milliards de m3 d’eau par
an dans le barrage d’Assouan pour irriguer d’ici
2017 plus de 1,5 millions d’hectares.
Or, l’Egypte utilise déjà la totalité de son quota
annuel (55 milliards de m3). Il lui faudrait donc
passer par un coûteux programme de diminution
des déperditions et des gaspillages, comme
le rétrécissement des canaux d’irrigation pour
réduire l’évaporation, le recyclage des eaux
usées, la modification des méthodes d’irrigation,
la réduction des cultures consommatrices d’eau
(riz et coton). Autant de mesures peu réalistes
compte tenu des implications politiques
et financières dans un pays qui ne survit déjà
que grâce à l’aide internationale et qui est
confronté à de nouveaux problèmes, toujours
liés à l’eau.
En effet, l’abondance apparente des eaux
du Lac Nasser a entraîné une surirrigation
agricole, provoqué la remontée des nappes
phréatiques et causé l’augmentation de la salinité
des sols. Le limon, bloqué par le barrage10,
n’enrichit plus les terres en aval et a été remplacé
par des engrais chimiques dont l’emploi massif11
a provoqué d’importants dégâts écologiques12
et sanitaires13, contribuant à la pollution alarmante
des eaux du Nil. Résultats: la production
alimentaire s’est accrue moins vite que
la population, les terres sont devenues moins
fertiles. Ainsi, il y a 20 ans, l’Egypte était
autosuffisante, aujourd’hui, elle importe plus
de 60% de sa nourriture et se classe au troisième
rang pour les importations de blé.
En partie achevé en 2003.
Ce qui posera un sérieux problème d’envasement
à moyen terme.
11
Avec plus de 400 kg par hectare l’Egypte se classe
parmi les plus grands consommateurs d’engrais
chimiques au monde.
12
Le lac Mariout en est un dramatique exemple: situé
près d’Alexandrie, il est depuis 1959, devenu totalement
pollué et nauséabond.
13
Apparition de la bilharziose, née sur les rives
du Nil.
9
Partly completed in 2003.
10
That will pose a serious silting problem on
medium-term.
11
With more than 400 kg per hectare, Egypt ranks
among the largest consumers of artificial fertilisers
in the world.
12
Lake Mariout is a dramatic example: located
close to Alexandria, it has become completely
polluted and nauseous since 1959.
13
Bilharzia appeared, born on the banks of the Nile.
9
78
10
Unless massive international assistance, the
only response of Cairo to its “wounds” is to turn
again to the Nile and carry out its projects, very
expensive as far as water and money are
concerned, and that will not happen without
influencing the other upstream nations.
The Nile,
a Conflict-Generating River
The relations between the nations of the Nile
remain, above all, dictated by the river and the
distribution of its waters. In 1987, when he was
Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the former
United Nations Secretary, Boutros Gali, stated
that “the next war of Egypt would focus on the
waters of the Nile”.
Dominant power over the river’s basin,
Egypt signed agreements with Sudan,
its natural ally, to fully utilise the Nile waters
in an advantageous way 14. With a galloping
demography and a much-reduced available
agricultural surface, Egypt showed net signs
of aggressiveness when Sudan or Ethiopia,
which were draining Nile’s tributaries, manifested
the desire to exploit their water resources. Egypt
indeed regarded any reduction in its quota,
as provided for in the treaty of 1959, as a strategic
threat. This treaty, signed with Sudan only,
excluded the other countries of the Nile, Ethiopia
in particular, which, being offended, has never
recognised the agreement. However, 85% of the
Nile comes from the Ethiopian territory. Cairo
and Khartoum being the main beneficiaries of
the river’s waters (65% of the water volume for
Egypt, 22% for Sudan), it would only be fair,
according to Addis-Ababa, for the treaty of 1959
to be amended.
Devastated by thirty years of civil war and
confronted with a rapid increase in its population,
Ethiopia has hardly exploited the hydraulic
14
These agreements regarding the distribution
of the Nile waters, signed in 1959 between Sudan
and Egypt, allotted annual quotas: 55.5 billion m3
for Cairo and 18.5 billion for Sudan, on an annual
potential estimated at 84 billion per annum. 95% of
Egyptian waters come from outside its borders.
L’Egypte est donc confrontée à un stress
hydrique, démographique, social et par
conséquent humain de grande envergure, dont
les équations chaque année plus complexes
paraissent dramatiquement insolubles.
A moins d’une aide internationale massive,
Le Caire n’a pour seule réponse à ses “plaies”
que de se tourner à nouveau vers le Nil
et de réaliser ses projets trè s coûteux tant
en eau que pécuniairement, qui ne seront pas
sans incidence sur les autres nations en amont.
Le Nil, un fleuve générateur
de conflits
Les relations entre nations du Nil restent,
avant tout, dictées par le fleuve et le partage
de ses eaux. En 1987, l’ancien secrétaire des
Nations unies, M. Boutros Gali affirmait, lorsqu’il
était ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Egypte,
que “la prochaine guerre de l’Egypte concernerait
les eaux du Nil”.
Puissance dominante du bassin du fleuve,
l’Égypte a signé des accords avec le Soudan,
son allié naturel, pour se garantir de manière
avantageuse l’essentiel du flux d’eau14. Avec une
démographie galopante et une surface agricole
utile très réduite, l’Égypte a montré des signes
trè s nets d’agressivité dè s que le Soudan
ou l’Éthiopie, que drainent les affluents du Nil,
ont laissé paraître une volonté d’exploitation
de leurs ressources en eau. L’Egypte considère
en effet comme une menace stratégique toute
diminution de son quota tel que prévu par le traité
de 1959. Ce traité, signé avec le Soudan seulement,
a exclu les autres pays du Nil et en particulier
l’Ethiopie qui, lésée, n’a jamais accepté cet accord.
Or 85% du Nil provient du territoire éthiopien.
Le Caire et Khartoum étant les principaux
bénéficiaires des eaux du fleuve (65% du débit
pour l’Égypte, 22% pour le Soudan), il ne serait
14
Ces accords de partage des eaux du Nil, signés
en 1959 entre le Soudan et l’Egypte, ont attribué des
quotas annuels: 55,5 milliards de m3 pour Le Caire
et 18,5 milliard pour le Soudan, sur un potentiel annuel
estimé à 84 milliards par an. 95% de l’eau égyptienne
provient de l’extérieur de ses frontières.
79
resources of the Blue Nile and its tributaries15
(hardly 0.3% of their water volume were
exploited in 1998). This country cannot give up
its programme of making its soil valuable
by means of irrigation. The projects taken
in consideration by the Ethiopian government
would entail a decrease of the Nile regime with
eight billion m3 per year and the construction
of tens of micro-dams to fight against fatal
drought and to produce the electricity that is
necessary for its development. The relations
with Cairo quickly worsened when the Ethiopian
government asked for the reopening of the 1959
treaty between Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia felt
humiliated by the construction of the Aswan
Dam without preliminary consultation as well as
by the bilateral treaty. It accused Cairo for
exceeding its quota, stressing that the treaty
had not taken into account the 10 billion m3
(that is to say 12 % of the total water volume
of the Nile) lost each year because of the
evaporation of Lake Nasser.
Addis-Ababa wishes to impose its vision
on arranging the Nile by preventing Cairo from
carrying out its great hydric projects and by
forcing it to sit down at the negotiation table.
It happened the same in 1983, when the Southern
Sudanese guerrilla, protected and armed by
Ethiopia, destroyed the installations and the
giant excavation of Jongleï Canal16 in the South
of Sudan. This Canal had to allow for a good part
of the White Nile waters lost in the marshes
of Southern Sudan to be recovered and to increase
the total water volume of the Nile in Egypt by 5%.
Several times, the tensions between Egypt
and Ethiopia have failed degenerating into open
conflict. Rather than to fight directly, these two
countries confront by means of interposed
guerrillas and interposed enemies. Egypt
secretly supported the Eritrean independence
guerrilla while Ethiopia, in addition to its bonds
Between 1990 and 1997, 28 000 ha were irrigated
in Ethiopia, while the irrigation potential is
of 3.7 million ha.
16
Channel started in 1980, having a length of 360
km, a broad of 28 to 50 m and a depth of 4 to 7 m. 180
km have already been dug.
15
80
~ 3/2006
que juste, selon Addis-Abeba, que le traité
de 1959 soit amendé.
Ravagée par trente années de guerre civile
et confrontée à une augmentation rapide de sa
population, l’Éthiopie n’a guère exploité les
ressources hydrauliques du Nil bleu et de ses
affluents15 (à peine 0,3% de leurs débits étaient
exploités en 1998). Ce pays ne peut, pour
des raisons de survie alimentaire, renoncer
à son programme de mise en valeur de terres
par l’irrigation. Les projets envisagés par le
gouvernement éthiopien impliqueraient une
baisse du régime du Nil de huit milliards de m3
par an et la construction de dizaines de microbarrages, pour lutter contre les sécheresses
meurtrières et produire l’électricité nécessaire
à son développement. Les relations avec
Le Caire se sont rapidement détériorées
lorsque le gouvernement éthiopien a demandé
la réouverture du traité de 1959 entre l’Égypte
et le Soudan. L’Ethiopie a vécu comme une
humiliation la construction du barrage d’Assouan
sans consultation préalable ainsi que le traité
bilatéral. Elle reproche au Caire de dépasser
son quota, soulignant que le traité ne prend
pas en compte les 10 milliards de m3 (soit
12% du débit total du Nil) perdus chaque année
par évaporation du lac Nasser.
Addis-Abeba souhaiterait imposer sa vision
de l’aménagement du Nil en empêchant le Caire
de réaliser ses grands projets hydriques et en
le forçant à s’asseoir à la table des négociations.
Comme en 1983, lorsque la guérilla sud
soudanaise, protégée et armée par l’Ethiopie,
a détruit les installations et l’excavatrice géante
du canal de Jongleï16 dans le sud du Soudan.
Ce canal devait permettre de récupérer une
bonne partie des eaux du Nil Blanc perdues
dans les marécages du Sud-Soudan et d’accroître
de 5% le débit total du Nil en Egypte.
15
Entre 1990 et 1997, ce sont 28 000 ha de terres
qui auraient été mis en irrigation en Éthiopie,
alors que le potentiel d’irrigation en Éthiopie est
de 3,7 millions d’ha.
16
Canal mis en chantier en 1980, d’une longueur
de 360 km, 28 à 50 m de large et 4 à 7 m de profondeur.
180 km ont déjà été creusés.
with the Southern Sudanese guerrilla, strongly
came close to Israel in the ’80s. An Israeli
presence at the sources of the Blue Nile is
a true nightmare for Egypt.
In this fight for influence with Ethiopia,
Sudan is a natural Egypt ally for historical
as well as strategic reasons. But Sudan has been
devastated since 198317 by an appalling war
opposing the North of the country, Muslims
and Arabic-speaking people, to the South, mainly
Christian and black. This country seems to be
an impracticable ground, while its territory18
misses neither water nor fertile ground.
The South asserted its self-determination,
the separation between state and religion
and opposed to the building of Jongleï Canal,
for ecological reasons.
Egypt has chosen to support the Northern
Moslems for the perenniality of Jongleï Canal
and for fear that it should see a new Christian
country emerging at the sources of the Nile.
However, since the 1989 coup in Sudan, which
brought the Islamists to power19, Moubarak has
been confronted with its Egyptians counterparts,
the Moslem Brothers. It is in 1995 that the
tension between the two countries culminated,
shortly after the failed attempt to murder the
Egyptian president while visiting Addis-Ababa.
Claimed by an Islamic commando 20, this
operation had profited from the logistical support
of the regime in Khartoum.
If the entire systematisation policy in Sudan
is compromised by the chronic instability of the
country, the water, the electricity requirements
and the prospects for arable land exploitation
in the South are immense. However, the rare
projects21 conceived by Khartoum only for
the Northern area strongly displease Egypt.
17
After the proclamation of Sharia on the entire
Sudanese territory.
18
Five times the surface of France.
19
Whose intellectual guide is Hassan Al-Tourabi.
20
Jamaa Islamiya.
21
Projects of the dam in Dongola, Northwards of
Khartoum, as well as the development of 1.5 million
ha of new arable lands, especially in the desert, are
seriously considered, even though they cause great
displeasure for Cairo.
A plusieurs reprises, les tensions entre
l’Egypte et l’Ethiopie ont failli dégénérer en conflit
ouvert. Mais plutôt que de se combattre
directement, ces deux pays s’affrontent
par guérillas et ennemis interposés. L’Egypte
a secrètement soutenu la guérilla indépendantiste
érythréenne tandis que l’Ethiopie, outre ses liens
avec la guérilla sud soudanaise, s’est fortement
rapproché d’Israël dans les années 1980. Une
présence israélienne aux sources du Nil Bleu
est un véritable cauchemar pour l’Egypte.
Dans cette lutte d’influence avec l’Ethiopie,
le Soudan est un allié naturel de l’Egypte pour
des raisons tant historiques que stratégiques.
Mais le Soudan est ravagé depuis 1983 17
par une guerre effroyable qui oppose le Nord
du pays, musulman et arabophone, au Sud,
majoritairement chrétien et noir. Ce pays fait
figure d’immense gâchis tant ce territoire18 ne
manque ni d’eau ni de terres fertiles. Le Sud
revendique l’autodétermination, la séparation
entre l’Etat et la religion, et s’oppose au canal
de Jongleï pour des raisons écologiques.
L’Egypte a choisi le camp du Nord
musulman pour la pérennité du canal de Jongleï
et par crainte de voir émerger un nouveau pays
chrétien sur les sources du Nil. Mais depuis
le coup d’état de 1989 au Soudan qui a vu l’arrivée
des islamistes au pouvoir 19, Moubarak est
confronté à leurs pendants égyptiens, les Frères
Musulmans. C’est en 1995 que culmine la tension
entre les deux pays, peu aprè s la tentative
d’assassinat manquée contre le président
égyptien en visite à Addis-Abeba. Revendiquée
par un commando islamique20, cette opération
avait bénéficié du soutien logistique du régime
de Khartoum.
Si toute politique d’aménagement d’envergure
au Soudan est compromise par l’instabilité
chronique du pays, les besoins en eau,
en électricité et, les perspectives d’exploitation
de terres arables au sud sont immenses.
17
Après la proclamation de la Charia sur l’ensemble
du territoire soudanais.
18
Cinq fois la superficie de la France.
19
Dont Hassan al-Tourabi est le maître à penser.
20
La Jamaa Islamiya.
81
Any stability of the situation in Sudan is
therefore a threat for Cairo, which cannot
prevent the freedom fighters of the South
from developing the exceptional potential
of their area.
New Consumers
in the Great Lakes Area
~ 3/2006
Or, les rares projets21 conçus par Khartoum,
pour la seule région du Nord, déplaisent
fortement à l’Égypte. Toute stabilité de la situation
au Soudan est donc une menace pour Le Caire
qui ne pourrait empêcher les indépendantistes
du Sud de développer le potentiel exceptionnel
de leur région.
Des consommateurs nouveaux
dans la région des Grands Lacs
The increasing population and the economic
desire for development also lead the upstream
countries to plan to exploit their water resources
on a great scale. Tanzania, in particular, studies
the possibility of pumping important volumes
in Lake Victoria to irrigate 250 000 ha. In Uganda,
same as in Ethiopia, the government called upon
Israel to set up projects of irrigation aiming
at fighting against the effects of the recurring
drought. In time, the projects for developing
the Nile resources intensify in the bordering
countries, causing great distress to Egypt.
Overall, it is nearly 4.5 million ha that
the governments of the upstream countries
plan to irrigate 10 to 15 years from now.
Such projects would require approximately
25 billion water m 3, that is to say a quarter
of the Nile, and would compromise all the
Egyptian hopes and projects. Would Egypt
further have the means to impose its vision
regarding the distribution of the Nile ?
L’augmentation de la population et le désir
de développement économique amènent aussi
les pays plus en amont à envisager d’exploiter
à une grande échelle leurs ressources en eau.
La Tanzanie, notamment, étudie la possibilité
de pomper d’importants volumes dans le lac
Victoria pour irriguer 250 000 ha. En Ouganda,
comme en Éthiopie, le gouvernement a fait appel
à Israël pour mettre en place des projets
d’irrigation visant à lutter contre les effets
des sécheresses récurrentes. Avec le temps,
les projets de mise en valeur des ressources
du Nil se multiplient chez les pays riverains,
au grand désarroi de l’Égypte. Au total, ce sont
près de 4,5 millions d’ha que les gouvernements
des pays d’amont envisagent d’irriguer d’ici
10 à 15 ans. De tels projets nécessiteraient
environ 25 milliards de m3 d’eau, soit le quart
du Nil, et compromettraient tous les espoirs
et les projets égyptiens. L’Égypte a-t-elle
les moyens d’imposer longtemps encore
sa vision du partage du Nil ?
Towards a Negotiated,
Not Very Credible Solution ...
Vers une solution négociée,
peu crédible …
The Egyptian water policy must juggle
with difficult parameters, tortured by a strong
interior pressure, on the one hand, and by
an external quite clear pressure on behalf
of the other countries of the Nile basin, on the
other hand, which has little capitalised on the
hydraulic resources up to now. However,
these resources, even equitably distributed,
are insufficient in quantity and quality to respond
to the humane distress that takes shape in this
area. According to the principle of communicating
vases, without a massive international aid,
La politique de l’eau égyptienne doit jongler
avec des paramètres difficiles, tenaillée d’un côté
par une pression intérieure forte, de l’autre
par une pression extérieure toute aussi vive
de la part des autres pays du bassin du Nil,
qui jusqu’ici ont fort peu mis en valeur leurs
ressources hydrauliques. Or, ces ressources,
même réparties équitablement, sont insuffisantes
82
21
Un projet de barrage à Dongola, au nord de
Khartoum, ainsi que la mise en valeur de 1,5 millions
d’ha de nouvelles terres agricoles, notamment dans
le désert, sont sérieusement envisagés, au grand
déplaisir du Caire.
the resolution of the problems of some people
will inevitably be made to the detriment
of others.
An encouraging step was taken in
February 1999 under the aegis of the United
Nations, then, in June 2001, with the World
Bank, which made it possible to bring together
the participants, to define priorities for
development and to hope for a long term plan
of total distribution of the Nile waters to be
drawn up. To this end, Egypt was to accept that
it does not have individual right on the waters
of the river anymore. This is not a very probable
prospect, because it would require Nasser
and all the Egyptian international policy of the
last fifty years to be repudiated. Even if Egypt
agreed to let Ethiopia build dams, there would
be little chance for the quotas to be approached.
However, time runs against Egypt, which
cannot politically entrust its future to so many
actors as they are neither stable enough nor
politically credible. Too much cultural
opposition and mistrust divide the countries
of the Nile between a black, Christian South
and an Arab, North Moslem, while the water
demand is felt increasingly. “No other river
of this much importance is divided between
so many autonomous and disparate actors and
no country located downstream a waterway is
as dependent on its existence as Egypt is with respect
to the Nile”22, this is the tragedy of this area.
What will then Egypt do, as the most
important military power of the Nile, being
on the verge of dying because of the lack
of water and threatened in its most fundamental
vital interests ?
en quantité et en qualité pour répondre à la
détresse humanitaire qui se dessine dans cette
région. Selon le principe des vases communicants,
à moins d’une aide internationale massive,
la résolution des problèmes des uns se fera
fatalement au détriment des autres.
Un pas encourageant avait été franchi
en février 1999 sous les auspices des Nations
unies, puis en juin 2001 avec la Banque Mondiale,
qui avait permis de réunir les intervenants,
de définir des priorités de développement
et d’espérer, à terme, un plan de partage global
des eaux du Nil. Pour cela, l’Égypte devait
accepter qu’elle n’ait plus de droit particulier
sur les eaux du fleuve. Une perspective peu
probable, car il lui faudrait pour cela désavouer
Nasser et toute la politique internationale
égyptienne depuis les cinquante derniè res
années. Si l’Égypte a consenti sur le principe
à voir l’Éthiopie bâtir des barrages, la question
des quotas a peu de chance d’être abordée.
Or, le temps joue contre l’Égypte qui ne peut
confier son avenir à autant d’intervenants aussi
peu stables et aussi éloignés politiquement.
Trop d’opposition et de méfiance culturelles
opposent les pays du Nil, entre un sud chrétien,
noir et un nord musulman, arabe, alors que les
besoins en eau se font de plus en plus sentir.
“Aucun autre fleuve de cette importance n’est
partagé par tant d’acteurs autonomes et disparates
et, aucun pays situé en aval d’une voie d’eau n’est
aussi dépendant de son existence que l’Egypte
vis- à -vis du Nil”22, c’est là toute la tragédie
de cette région.
Que fera alors l’Égypte, première puissance
militaire du Nil, lorsqu’elle se considè rera
au bord de l’agonie par manque d’eau, menacée
dans ses intérêts vitaux les plus fondamentaux ?
22
Fragment from “Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley”
by John Waterbury, 1979, Syracuse University Press,
New York.
22
Extrait de Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley
de John Waterbury, 1979, Syracuse University Press,
New York.
83
THE UNITED ST
STAATES
OF AMERICA
FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE LIGHT
OF ITS
DOMESTIC HISTOR
HISTORYY
LA POLITIQUE
EXTERIEURE
DES ET
ETAATS-UNIS
D’AMERIQUE
À LA LUMIERE DE LEUR
HISTOIRE INTERIEURE
“The American foreign policy
“La politique extérieure
explains itself through its domestic
américaine s’explique par son
history”. This phrase, stated by
histoire intérieure”. Cette phrase,
the Chief of the French Armed
prononcée par le chef d’état-major
Forces General Staff in his
des armées dans son discours
inauguration speech of the twelfth
d’inauguration de la XII è me
promotion du Collège interarmées
series of the Joint Defence College,
de défense, offre un regard original
offers an original perspective to
pour la compréhension des affaires
understand the American foreign
étrangères américaines. Nous
affairs. We share numerous values,
partageons avec les Américains
economic interests and some
de nombreuses valeurs, des
long history pages with the
intérêts économiques et quelques
Americans. Yet, we do not perceive
longues pages d’histoire.
the world in the same manner,
Major Richard ZABOT
~ The French Air Forces ~
Cependant, nous ne percevons
our societies not being built on
the same foundations anymore. Thus, in order
pas le monde de la même façon, nos sociétés
to sail, with only a few indicators, in the not
n’étant pas édifiées sur les mêmes fondements.
always peaceful ocean of the American foreign
Ainsi, pour espérer naviguer avec quelques
policy, we must become interested in the
repères dans l’océan pas toujours pacifique
pedestal this great country sits on. The religious
de la politique extérieure américaine, il convient
persecutions, political oppression or economic
de s’intéresser au socle sur lequel repose
poverty that made the emigrants settle
ce grand pays. Les persécutions religieuses, les
in America have determined the establishment
oppressions politiques ou la misère économique
of some basic values.
qui pouss è rent les émigrants à s’installer
A thorough reading of their domestic history
en Amérique en ont fondé les valeurs de base.
allows us to grasp some permanent or occasional
Une lecture attentive de leur histoire
features. Historic isolationism, which represents
intérieure permet de dégager certaines
the first temptation, actually illustrates the original
caractéristiques, permanentes ou contingentes.
and fundamental principles of the first emigrants.
L’isolationnisme historique, qui fut la tentation
84
The civilising mission, that spreads in the
national conscience little by little, explains
the interventionism that will later inspire
the American policy for ideological and
pragmatic reasons. Understanding these
two poles – isolationism and interventionism –
will finally allow for the present to clear up
and for some perspectives of the United States
of America’s foreign policy to be envisaged.
Basic Values:
“E pluribus unum” 1
The values spread by the United States
of America resume the religious precepts of the
descendants of the “Pilgrim Fathers”2: the liberty
to believe and to practice their own cult, the
inalienable and transcending trait of spiritual
and material enrichment through work and
personal qualities. The Mayflower Compact3
established a real democracy ever since the
beginning. In these colonies, any activity
seemed to be governed by the church, following
the example of Pennsylvania and its capital,
Philadelphia, founded by William Penn and his
community of Quakers. The moralising
character of Puritanism and the meaning given
to community have influenced the national
character in a long-lasting manner. Quite often,
The United States foreign policy, in its moralism,
is inspired by these considerations.
The reading of the two founding acts
of the American democracy clearly unveils their
qualities and intentions.
On the 4th of July 1776, the Declaration
of Independence was adopted. At the same time
with the obvious expression of the independent
act towards the British Crown, the essential
première, illustre en fait les principes originels
et fondamentaux des premiers émigrés.
La mission civilisatrice, qui va peu à peu
se répandre dans la conscience nationale,
explique l’interventionnisme qui anima ensuite
la politique américaine, pour des raisons
idéologiques et pragmatiques. La compréhension
de ces deux pôles, isolationnisme et
interventionnisme, permettra enfin d’éclairer
le présent et d’envisager quelques perspectives
de la politique extérieure des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique.
Valeurs fondatrices:
“E pluribus unum” 1
Les valeurs propagées par les Etats-Unis
d’Amérique (EU) reprennent les préceptes
religieux des descendants des “Pilgrim
fathers”2: liberté de croire et de pratiquer leur
culte, caractè re inaliénable et transcendant
de l’enrichissement spirituel et matériel par
le travail et les qualités personnelles. Le pacte
du Mayflower3 institue dès les origines une
démocratie de fait. En ces colonies, toute activité
semble gouvernée par l’Eglise, à l’image de la
Pennsylvanie et de sa capitale Philadelphie,
fondée par William Penn et sa communauté
de Quakers. Le caractère édifiant du puritanisme
et le sens donné à la communauté ont affecté
de maniè re durable le caractè re national.
La politique extérieure des Etats-Unis, dans
son moralisme, s’inspire bien souvent de ces
considérations.
La lecture des deux textes fondateurs de la
démocratie américaine en dévoile clairement
ses qualités et ses desseins.
Le 4 juillet 1776 est promulguée la Déclaration
d’indépendance. En même temps que s’y exprime
1
1
Out of many, one.
2
The Pilgrim Fathers were the first Europeans
to found a colony in the new world.
3
The name of the vessel on board of which the
first pilgrims emigrated. All the passengers united
to form a “civil political body” that had the power to
draft, based on majority, the laws necessary to the
general welfare of the colony.
De plusieurs, un seul.
Les Pilgrim Fathers (pères pè lerins) sont les
premiers européens à avoir fondé une colonie
au nouveau monde.
3
Nom du vaisseau à bord duquel émigrè rent
les premiers pèlerins. Tous les passagers se réunirent
pour former un “corps politique civil” qui avait le pouvoir
d'élaborer à la majorité les lois nécessaires au bien
général de la colonie.
2
85
principles on which the existence of this world
rests were outlined: anti-colonialism, democracy
and, prior to the French Declaration of Human
Rights, universalism of respect towards
the individual. This political idealism was not
only graved in marble but it was also transformed
into facts, uprisings and battles aiming at gaining
freedom. This utopia in action led to the
recognition, on the 3rd of September 1783, of the
United States of America’s independence.
The constitution ratified in 1787 allowed
for the assembly of citizens to make themselves
a text according to their beliefs. It reflected
the two principles that governed the whole
politics of the United States: idealism and
pragmatism, remaining a model of clarity and
conciseness, flexible enough to admit only
twenty seven more amendments in two centuries
of existence. The constitution provided the
federal government, namely the Congress and
the Executive at the same time, with authority
over defence, foreign matters and trade policy.
A terrible event however showed the limits
and the doctrinal character of the Union: the Civil
War4. In the thirteen original colonies, two groups
took shape: the most important consisted of the
puritan colonists of New England in the North
of the territory. The second group, the Southern
one, catholic, aristocratic, rather reflected
a certain art of living close to that of the old
continent. The two societies will evolve in parallel,
one being devoted to its industrial rise, the other
one anchored in the monoculture of cotton.
Their common destiny disaggregated under the
effect of customs, tax and land constraints
imposed on the South by the government5 .
4
This expression is most widely accepted, as against
the War of Secession.
5
The government had granted the North a privileged
customs tariff for its industrial growth, federal
subsidies for transportation and modernisation of its
equipment, an advantageous banking system and
agricultural free lots. These measures favouring
the commercial interests of the North appeared
as discriminatory for the South.
86
~ 3/2006
ostensiblement l’acte d’indépendance vis-à-vis
de la couronne anglaise, se dessinent les principes
essentiels sur lesquels repose l’existence de ce
nouveau monde: anticolonialisme, démocratie,
et bien avant la Déclaration française des droits
de l’Homme, universalisme du respect
de l’individu. Cet idéalisme politique n’est pas
seulement gravé dans le marbre: il se mue
en actes, en soulèvements et en batailles visant
à la conquête de la liberté. Cette utopie en action
aboutit à la reconnaissance de l’indépendance
des Etats-Unis d’Amérique le 3 septembre 1783.
La constitution ratifiée en 1787 permet
ensuite à une telle assemblée de citoyens
de se doter d’un texte à la mesure de leurs
convictions. Elle reflè te les deux principes
régissant toute la politique des Etats-Unis:
idéalisme et pragmatisme. Elle demeure
un modèle de clarté et de concision, suffisamment
souple pour admettre seulement vingt sept
amendements en plus de deux si è cles
d’existence. Elle donne à l’Etat fédéral, c’est-à-dire
conjointement au Congrè s et à l’exécutif,
un pouvoir sur la défense, les affaires extérieures
et la politique commerciale.
Un terrible événement montre pourtant
les limites et le caractère doctrinal de l’Union:
la guerre de sécession4. Dans les treize colonies
originelles, deux groupes se dessinent: le plus
important est constitué par les colonies
puritaines de la Nouvelle-Angleterre dans le nord
du territoire. Le deuxième groupe, celui du Sud,
catholique, volontiers aristocratique, reflète
plutôt un certain art de vivre proche de celui
du vieux continent. Les deux sociétés vont
alors évoluer parallèlement, l’une se consacrant
à son essor industriel, l’autre ancrée dans
la monoculture du coton. Leur destinée commune
se désagr è ge sous l’effet de contraintes
douanières, fiscales et foncières imposées au Sud
par le gouvernement5. L’esclavage, pudiquement
Les américains la nomment “guerre civile”.
Le gouvernement avait accordé au Nord un tarif
douanier privilégié pour sa croissance industrielle,
des subventions fédérales pour le transport et la
modernisation de son équipement, un système bancaire
avantageux et des parcelles agricoles gratuites.
4
5
Slavery, moderately named “the particular
institution” by the founding fathers, crystallises
the antagonism between these two types
of society. The Civil War is very often reduced
to a confrontation between abolitionists
and slave-owners by the Manicheans spirits.
However, it is a war of societies, above all.
In this context, one of the best commanders
of this war, General Robert Lee, is a Southerner
but convinced abolitionist, too attached to its
ground not to serve the South. In this total war,
the victory of one camp or another will decide
the inflection of the course of history. The defeat
of the South in 1865 in Appomattox imposes
the Northern society as model for the federation.
The arguments which encourage the North
to intervene against the South can appear
as the premises of the reasons for which
the American army gets involved in the world
today: a well understood defence of their interests
haloed in a certain moralism.
However, foreign policy remains outside
their concern for a long time, following
George Washington’ principle: “Why quit
our own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why,
by interweaving our destiny with that of any part
of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity
in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest,
humour, or caprice ?”. The wish of the first
president is to preserve the young nation in its
original mould, conscious that any friction with
another part of the world can harm the peace
and justice emanating from this original society.
The isolationist doctrine was theorised by
President Monroe (1817-1825). The United States
promise not to get involved in the European
matters, in exchange for a non-intervention
of the European states on the American continent.
This is, in a way, “Americans’ America”. This
current of thought is still broadly defended
today when it comes to foreign policy. The deeds
of arms of this doctrine are numerous: the
pressure exerted on the French after 1865
so that they withdraw from their Mexican
expedition, the war won against the Spaniards
nommé “l’institution particulière” par les pères
fondateurs, va cristalliser l’antagonisme de ces
deux types de société. La guerre de sécession
est bien souvent réduite dans les esprits
manichéens à un affrontement entre
abolitionnistes et esclavagistes. Or, elle est avant
tout une guerre de sociétés. A ce titre, l’un des
meilleurs chefs de cette guerre, le général
Robert Lee, est sudiste mais abolitionniste
convaincu, trop attaché à sa terre pour ne pas
servir le Sud. Dans cette guerre totale, la victoire
de l’un ou de l’autre camp décidera de l’inflexion
que prendra le cours de l’histoire. La défaite
du Sud en 1865 à Appomattox impose la société
du Nord en mod è le pour la fédération.
Les arguments qui incitèrent le Nord à intervenir
contre le Sud peuvent apparaître comme
les prémices des raisons pour lesquelles l’armée
américaine s’engage aujourd’hui dans le monde:
une défense bien comprise de leurs intérêts
nimbée dans un certain moralisme.
Pourtant, la politique étrangère est restée
longtemps extérieure à leurs soucis, suivant en
cela le précepte de George Washington: “Pourquoi
quitter notre propre sol pour se tenir sur une terre
étrangère ? Pourquoi, en entrelaçant notre destin
avec celui d’une quelconque part de l’Europe,
empêtrer notre paix et notre prospérité dans les
labeurs des ambitions, rivalités, intérêts, humeurs
ou caprices européens ?”. Le vœu du premier
président est de conserver la jeune nation dans
son moule originel, conscient que toute friction
avec une autre partie du monde pourrait nuire
à la paix et la justice émanant de cette société
originale.
La doctrine isolationniste a été théorisée
par le président Monroe (1817-1825). Les EtatsUnis promettent de ne pas s’engager dans
les affaires européennes, en échange d’une non
intervention des Etats européens sur le continent
américain. C’est en quelque sorte “l’Amérique
aux Américains”. Ce courant de pensée est
encore aujourd’hui largement défendu en matière
de politique étrangère. Les faits d’armes de cette
Pour le Sud, de telles mesures favorisant les intérêts
commerciaux du Nord apparaissaient comme
discriminatoires.
87
~ 3/2006
in 18986, or even the Cuban missile crisis7
Central America has always appeared as the
“private hunting ground” of Americans.
The idea of a civilising mission of the United
States, its “manifest destiny”, takes shape around
1845. It is justified by their model of infallible
development founded on liberal democracy and
Christian faith. This principle is conjugated
according to two main trends – realism and
idealism, which form the plinth of the American
foreign policy. The latter remains resolutely
isolationist as long as the American interests
are not concerned.
The end of the 19th century reveals the
beginning of an expansionism centred on the
search for raw materials and markets to sell
their products. In 1901, the election
of Theodore Roosevelt marked the entry
in a policy of realism. This is the beginning
of the involvement in world matters, for the
triumph of American interests in their zone
of influence – the Caribbean and Latin America –
on the one hand, and for maintaining the position
of a new power, on the other hand: the participation
in The Hague Conference in 1907, the mediation
for putting an end to the Sino-Japanese war,
signed in the United States etc.
The United States’ entry into the First World
War is related to trade interests8 and principles:
the undeniable preference of President
Woodrow Wilson goes to the English and
French democracies. The American Army
during that time had neither permanent
doctrine sont légion: pressions exercées sur
les Français après 1865 pour qu’ils se retirent
de leur expédition mexicaine, guerre gagnée
contre les Espagnols en 18986, ou même affaire
des missiles de Cuba7. L’Amérique centrale
a toujours parue comme la “chasse gardée”
des Américains.
L’idée d’une mission civilisatrice des
Etats-Unis, la “destinée manifeste”, se forme
autour des années 1845. Elle est justifiée par leur
modèle de développement infaillible fondé
sur la démocratie libérale et la foi chrétienne.
Ce principe se conjugue selon les deux grandes
orientations, réalisme et idéalisme, qui forment
le socle de la politique étrangère américaine.
Cette dernière est restée résolument isolationniste
tant que les intérêts américains n’étaient pas
en jeu.
La fin du XIXème siècle révèle le début d’un
expansionnisme axé sur la recherche de matières
premières et de débouchés pour leur production.
En 1901, l’élection de Théodore Roosevelt marque
l’entrée dans une politique de réalisme. C’est
le début d’une implication dans les affaires du
monde, pour le triomphe des intérêts américains
dans leur zone d’influence – Caraïbes et Amérique
Latine – d’une part, et pour la tenue de son rang
de nouvelle puissance d’autre part: participation
à la conférence de La Haye en 1907, médiation
pour la fin de la guerre sino-japonaise signée
aux Etats-Unis etc.
L’entrée des Etats-Unis dans la Première
Guerre mondiale est liée à des raisons d’intérêts
commerciaux8 et de principes: la préférence
6
The war broke out, encouraged by the press,
after the explosion of the battleship “Maine” in Cuban
waters. The Spaniards were accused of it, although
it is notorious that there was an “accidental” explosion
on board.
7
Kennedy won this poker game in the media,
whereas the retreat of the Soviet missiles from Cuba
was negotiated against the dismantling of the American
missiles from Turkey.
8
The safeguard of the amounts demanded from
the allies and the restoration of the commercial
liaisons in the fight against the submarines led by
the German Navy were invoked.
6
Le déclenchement de cette guerre, encouragée
par la presse, se fit après l’explosion du cuirassé
“Maine” au large de Cuba. Les Espagnols furent
accusés, alors qu’il est notoire qu’il s’agissait d’une
explosion “accidentelle” à bord.
7
La partie de poker a été gagnée médiatiquement
par Kennedy, alors que le retrait des missiles soviétiques
de Cuba a été négocié contre le démant èlement
des missiles américains de Turquie.
8
La sauvegarde des sommes prêtées aux alliés
et le rétablissement des liaisons commerciales en luttant
contre la guerre sous-marine menée par la marine
allemande furent invoqués.
88
structure nor true tradition. The American spirit
of initiative and organising genius however
made it possible for the allies to win. At the end
of the war, Wilson exclaimed: “America, the only
ideal nation, had the infinite privilege to respect
its destiny. We came to free the world by giving
it freedom and justice”. Today, the
“neoconservatives”, asserted successors of the
Wilsonians, believe in the superiority of the
American model and militate for a democratic
proselytism in the world. This mission goes
together with the idea that the military power
must ensure its domination and perenniality.
It is what was partly decided through the
engagement of the United States in the second
Gulf War, with the hope to stabilise the Middle
East in due time. “It is mainly the Wilsonian
idealism which has given its rhythm to the American
policy from its historical presidency, and which
still inspires it today”9. Wilson is however
“caught up” by the domestic reality: during his
absence, the Republicans regained majority
in the Congress, and the Senate refused to ratify
the Treaty of Versailles as well as to apply
for membership of the League of Nations.
Since 1920, they have returned to strict neutrality,
resuming their customs protectionism and
unquestionable isolationism.
The Prometheus-like
Foreign Policy: Freedom
Guiding the World
The era of Franklin Delano Roosevelt10
announced a reforming and interventionist
policy. The awareness of being a great nation
gave him faith in the virtues of the foreign action.
The bases of the current American foreign
policy were thus laid: contrary to the previous
administrations marked by a primary and passive
anticommunism, he acknowledged the Soviet
Union and China in 1933. He worked to put
the widely isolationist opinion in front of realities.
9
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Fayard, 1996.
The nephew of President Theodore Roosevelt.
10
incontestable du président Woodrow Wilson
va aux démocraties anglaise et française.
L’armée américaine d’alors ne dispose ni
de structure permanente ni de véritable tradition.
L’esprit d’entreprise et le génie organisateur
américain vont pourtant permettre aux alliés
d’emporter la victoire. A la fin de la guerre,
Wilson s’écrie: “L’Amérique, la seule nation
idéale a eu l’infini privil è ge de respecter
sa destinée. Nous sommes venus pour racheter
le monde en lui donnant liberté et justice”.
Aujourd’hui, les “néoconservateurs”, successeurs
affirmés des wilsoniens, croient en la supériorité
du modèle américain et militent pour
un prosélytisme démocratique dans le monde.
Cette mission se combine avec l’idée que
la puissance militaire doit assurer sa domination
et sa pérennité. C’est ce qui a décidé en partie
l’engagement des Etats-Unis dans la deuxième
guerre du Golfe, avec l’espoir de stabiliser
à terme le Proche-Orient. “C’est principalement
l’idéalisme wilsonien qui a imprimé son rythme
à la politique américaine depuis sa présidence
historique, et qui l’inspire aujourd’hui encore”9.
Wilson est pourtant rattrapé par la réalité
intérieure: pendant son absence, les Républicains
ont repris la majorité au Congrès, et le Sénat
refuse de ratifier le traité de Versailles ainsi
que l’appartenance à la Société des nations.
Dès 1920, ils en reviennent à une stricte neutralité,
reprenant leur protectionnisme douanier en même
temps qu’un isolationnisme certain.
Politique extérieure
prométhéenne: la Liberté
guidant le monde
L’ère de Franklin Delano Roosevelt10 annonce
une politique réformatrice et interventionniste.
La conscience d’être une grande nation lui
donne foi dans les vertus de l’action extérieure.
Les bases de la politique étrangère américaine
actuelle sont ainsi lancées: contrairement aux
précédentes administrations sclérosées dans
9
Henry Kissinger, Diplomatie, Fayard, 1996.
Neveu du président Théodore Roosevelt.
10
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He pleaded for the progressive abandonment
of neutrality through an idea in conformity with
the inspiration of the United States: democracies
against dictatorships. Through this title, he
wanted to amend the law related to neutrality
and exceeded the 10th amendment by being
re-elected for the third time in 1940, while
Europe sinks itself in the war11. But he owed
his re-election to the promise he had made
not to get involved in the war. However,
the United States had already committed to it
by arming democracies thanks to Liberty ships12
and by signing the Atlantic Charter, in 1941, proof
of a strategic will of anticipation and preparation
for a non-isolationist future. The bombardment
of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 made
the United States enter the war. The war could
have been declared to Japan, but because of
the game of alliances, it was the Nazi Germany
that declared it to the United States at the end
of 1941. The great war effort led to victory. After
an attempt to return to the isolationist sources,
the United States assumed responsibility during
the Cold War and faced the fear inspired by
the Soviet imperialism. Aware of their Western
leadership, they became involved for the “free
world”: the adhesion to the United Nations
in 1946, the Marshall Plan for European
recovery etc. They grouped all anticommunist
countries. This pragmatism involved, of course,
tolerance towards the dictatorships from Chile,
Franco in Spain or the Greek colonels. However,
the true strategy was not dogmatic: the economic
success was set up as barrier to communism
and partly led to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, “the Empire of Evil” according to President
Reagan.
Since the end of the Cold War, certain inertia
seemed to have gained the upper hand.
un anticommunisme primaire et passif,
il reconnaît en 1933 l’Union soviétique et la
Chine. Il travaille à mettre l’opinion largement
isolationniste en face des réalités. Il œuvre pour
l’abandon progressif de la neutralité dans une
idée conforme à l’inspiration des Etats-Unis: les
démocraties contre les dictatures. Il fait à ce titre
amender la loi relative à la neutralité et outrepasse
le 10ème amendement en se faisant réélire une
troisième fois en 1940 alors que l’Europe s’enfonce
dans la guerre11. Mais il doit sa réélection à la
promesse qu’il a fait de ne pas s’engager dans
la guerre. Cependant, les Etats-Unis ont déjà
pris parti en armant les démocraties grâce aux
Liberty ships12 et en signant dès 1941 la Charte
de l’Atlantique, preuve d’une volonté d’anticipation
stratégique et de préparation d’un avenir non
isolationniste. Le bombardement de Pearl Harbor
le 7 décembre 1941 jette les Etats-Unis dans
le conflit par la volonté de l’ennemi. La guerre
peut être déclarée au Japon, et par le jeu des
alliances, c’est l’Allemagne nazie qui la déclare
aux Etats-Unis en fin 1941. L’effort de guerre
important aboutit à la victoire. Apr è s une
tentative de retour aux sources isolationnistes,
les Etats-Unis assument leur responsabilité
pendant la guerre froide et font face à la crainte
qu’inspire l’impérialisme soviétique. Conscients
de leur leadership occidental, ils s’impliquent
pour le “monde libre”: adhésion à l’Organisation
des Nations-unies en 1946, plan Marshall pour
la reconstruction de l’Europe, etc. Ils fédèrent
tous les pays anticommunistes. Ce pragmatisme
entraîne bien sûr des tolérances envers
les dictatures du Chili, de Franco en Espagne
ou des colonels grecs. La véritable stratégie
n’est cependant pas dogmatique: la réussite
économique est érigée en barrage au communisme
et conduit en partie à la déstructuration de l’Union
soviétique, “l’Empire du mal” selon le président
Reagan.
11
He was even re-elected, for the fourth time, in 1944,
illustrating the saying according to which one does
not change the commander in chief in wartime !
12
Name given to the freighters the Americans used
ever since the beginning of the Second World War
in order to deliver equipment to the United Kingdom.
11
Il a même été réélu une quatrième fois en 1944,
illustrant l’adage qu’on ne change pas le commandant
en chef pendant la guerre !
12
Nom donné aux cargos que les américains utilisent
dès le début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale pour livrer
du matériel au Royaume-Uni.
90
The engagements of the American Army
were subjected to the Weinberger Doctrine:
following the traumatism of the Vietnam
War, Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State
for Defense (1984-1986) worked out criteria
preliminary to the engagement of American
troops: ultimate drive, legitimacy of objectives,
popular support. General Colin Powell
supplemented these doctrines by adding
the will of a decisive and fast victory with
a minimum of human losses.
Reality: Inheritance
of their History
The September 11, 2001 attacks represented
an unprecedented shock, where the United
States domestic history was caught up by their
foreign policy. To want to find causes for this
appalling terrorist action is a delicate undertaking.
This event can nevertheless be analysed as
the single moment when the two pivots of the
American foreign policy, isolationism and
interventionism, collided under the pressure
of an exacerbated anti-American feeling.
The anti-Americanism feeds itself, on a partial
vision, on the American foreign policy. It focuses
itself on an ostentatiously unfair fraction: the
pro-Zionist policy in the Near East to the
Palestinian cause’s detriment, the imperious
defence of their economic interests against less
advanced countries, the stimulation of a state
of siege when facing a growing world insecurity
etc. The moral or partisan principles that seem
to guide the American action in the world adapt
sometimes badly to this force, whose effects
on the ground and in the public opinion are
devastating.
Without focusing on this event or the
operations that followed, it is possible to explain
the continuity of the American foreign policy
over some domains of predilection.
One often accuses the Americans to be
colonisers. They could be considered
colonisers only on their territory. The acquisition
Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, une certaine
inertie avait semble-t-il pris le dessus.
Les engagements de l’armée américaine étaient
soumis à la doctrine Weinberger: suite
au traumatisme de la guerre du Vietnam,
Caspar Weinberger, secrétaire d’Etat à la défense
(1984-1986) a élaboré des critères préalables
à l’engagement de troupes américaines: ultime
ressort, légitimité des objectifs, soutien populaire.
Le Général Colin Powell a complété cette doctrine
en y ajoutant la volonté d’une victoire décisive
et rapide avec un minimum de pertes humaines.
Réalité: héritage
de leur histoire
Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001
constituent un choc sans précédent où l’histoire
intérieure des Etats-Unis est rattrapée par sa
politique extérieure. Vouloir trouver des causes
à cette effroyable action terroriste est une
entreprise délicate. Cet événement peut
néanmoins être analysé comme le moment
unique où les deux pivots de la politique
extérieure américaine, isolationnisme
et interventionnisme, se percutent sous
la pression d’un sentiment anti-américain
exacerbé. L’anti-américanisme se nourrit d’une
vision partiale de la politique extérieure
américaine. Il se focalise sur sa fraction
ostensiblement injuste: politique pro-sioniste
au Proche-Orient au dépens de la cause
palestinienne, défense impérieuse de leurs
intérêts économiques contre des pays moins
avancés, repli obsidional face à une insécurité
mondiale grandissante, etc. Les principes moraux
ou partisans qui semblent guider l’action
américaine dans le monde s’accommodent parfois
mal de cette force dont les effets sur le terrain
et dans les opinions sont dévastateurs.
Sans se polariser sur cet événement ou les
opérations qui ont suivi, il est possible d’expliquer
d’une manière dépassionnée les continuités
de la politique extérieure américaine à travers
quelques domaines de prédilection.
On accuse souvent les Américains d’être
colonisateurs. Si les Américains sont un peuple
colonisateur, ils l’ont été uniquement sur leur
territoire. L’acquisition des territoires de la
Louisiane en 1803 a déclenché la célèbre ruée
91
of the territories in Louisiana, in 1803, started
the famous rush towards West. Homestadt Act,
which made possible for any person to become
the owner of a cultivated patch of land for five
years, was a driving force of this “colonisation”.
On the other hand, the Amerindians were
the victims sacrificed on the altar of the
great American Dream and disappeared
from history13.
The anticolonialism is a constructive value
of the United States: the American imperialism
so often described is primarily founded on the
export of commercial, cultural or political values,
without importers losing their sovereignty.
Instead of invading Canada as they could
have done after the Civil War, they preferred
giving it independence in agreement to England;
having conquered Mexico, they preferred
annexing Texas, where the majority of people
were English-speakers. They refused the
annexations in the Caribbean, gave up colonising
Cuba, engaged the decolonisation of Philippines
before 1939 and abandoned their bases in
countries like France, Philippines, Japan, and,
today, Saudi Arabia. If territories must be “won”
today, they will do that freely. It is possible
to imagine that Puerto Rico, currently free state
associated to the United States, might ask
to become the 51st state of the Union.
It is quite a different logic from the one used
for the Operation “Iraqi Freedom”; this invasion
could however be received as a new form
of colonisation aiming at securing the seizure
on the world oil-bearing richness.
The American oil import represents more
than 60% of their domestic consumption.
Contrary to a widespread idea, this growing
dependence does not force the United States
to make their supplying source exclusive.
In the event of crisis in a good producing country,
13
North America counted more than 12 million
Indians at the commencement of the European
conquest. At the beginning of the 20th century, only
237 000 were left.
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vers l’Ouest. L’Homestadt Act, qui permet alors
à toute personne de devenir propriétaire
d’un lopin de terre cultivé pendant cinq ans,
est un élément moteur de cette “colonisation”.
En contrepartie, les Amérindiens furent
les victimes sacrifiées sur l’autel du grand rêve
américain, et les disparus de l’histoire13.
L’anti-colonialisme est une valeur constructive
des Etats-Unis: l’impérialisme américain
si souvent décrié est essentiellement fondé
sur l’exportation de valeurs marchandes,
culturelles ou politiques, sans perte
de souveraineté des pays.
Au lieu d’envahir le Canada comme ils
pouvaient le faire après la guerre de Sécession,
ils ont préféré lui donner l’indépendance en accord
avec l’Angleterre; après avoir vaincu le Mexique,
ils se sont contentés d’annexer le Texas où les
anglophones étaient majoritaires. Ils ont refusé
les annexions dans la Caraïbe, renoncé à coloniser
Cuba, engagé la décolonisation des Philippines
avant 1939 comme ils ont toujours abandonné
leurs bases dans les pays qui en faisaient
la demande (France, Philippines, Japon, et
aujourd’hui Arabie saoudite). Si aujourd’hui des
territoires doivent être “gagnés”, ils le seront
librement. Il est possible d’imaginer que Porto Rico,
actuellement Etat libre associé aux Etats-Unis,
puisse à sa demande devenir le 51ème de l’Union.
C’est dans une tout autre logique que
l’Opération “Iraqi Freedom” a été lancée;
cette invasion a pourtant pu être perçue comme
une nouvelle forme de colonisation visant
à s’assurer la mainmise sur les richesses
pétrolifères mondiales.
Les importations pétrolières américaines
représentent plus de 60% de leur consommation
intérieure. Contrairement à une idée répandue,
cette dépendance grandissante n’oblige pas
les Etats-Unis à rendre exclusive leur source
d’approvisionnement. En cas de crise dans
un pays producteur, le principal risque est celui
d’une hausse des prix préjudiciable à l’économie
13
L’Amérique du Nord comptait plus de 12 millions
d’Indiens à la veille de la conquête européenne. Il n’en
restait que 237 000 au début du XXème siècle.
the principal risk is that of a rise of the prices,
which is prejudicial to the American and world
economy14. In order to mitigate this, they seek
to support a geographically diversified
production, the expenses for exploration
and production being supported by them alone
for the moment. They must ensure the security
of oil flows at the same time. That explains
the increased presence of American forces
in strategic zones: Bab El Mandeb, Strait
of Hormuz, Iraq etc.
Perspectives: Hyperpower
in Search of ReliableValues
The United States constitutes an unequalled
hyperpower15 today. A certain suspicion yet
persists: the world, as seen from Washington,
would be the “private hunting ground” of America.
The Americans suffer from having a bad image
because of the opacity of their intentions16 and,
perhaps, because the intrinsic contradictions
between isolationism and interventionism.
This rejection is expressed by a harmful
counter-culture of their economic interests
and by an exasperated violence, dangerous
for the safety of the American citizens. That is
14
The true autonomy corresponds to the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) whose stocked volume
temporarily allows remedying a rupture in the
worldwide supplying. “A way to explain why the SPR
was not used during previous oil crises consists
in concluding that it is reserved in case a major
crisis would arise in Saudi Arabia, this country
being the only one able to rapidly increase
its production in significant proportions. There is
no official document to confirm this hypothesis”,
Pierre Noël, Les EU et la sécurité pétrolière mondiale,
Ramses, 2005.
15
Hubert Védrine used this term for the first time
in Jeune Afrique, February 24, 1998. A hyperpower
is a power that possesses, at a given moment, the
supremacy without possible rivalry in four key
domains: military, economic, technological and cultural.
16
One cannot certify anything when it comes
to geopolitics: who can prove that, in twenty years,
one will not celebrate their engagement in Iraq
as a “false step” taken in the right direction ?
américaine et mondiale 14. Pour y pallier,
ils cherchent à favoriser une production
géographiquement diversifiée, dont ils
supportent seuls pour l’instant les coûts
d’exploration et de production. Ils doivent
assurer dans le même temps la sécurisation
des flux pétroliers. Cela explique une présence
accrue des forces américaines en des zones
stratégiques: Bab El Manded, détroit d’Ormuz,
Irak etc.
Perspectives: hyper puissance
à la recherche de valeurs sûres
Les États-Unis constituent aujourd’hui
une hyperpuissance15 inégalée. Une certaine
suspicion est de mise: le monde, vu de Washington,
serait la “chasse gardée” de l’Amérique.
Les Américains pâtissent d’une mauvaise image,
de l’opacité de leurs intentions16 et peut-être
des contradictions intrinsèques entre
isolationnisme et interventionnisme. Ce rejet
s’exprime par une contre-culture nocive à leurs
intérêts économiques et par une violence
exaspérée, dangereuse pour la sécurité
des citoyens américains. Cela est nuisible
14
La véritable autonomie correspond à la Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) dont le volume stocké permet
de remédier temporairement à une rupture dans
l’approvisionnement mondial. “Une mani è re
d’expliquer le défaut d’utilisation de la SPR lors des
crises pétrolières précédentes consiste à considérer
qu’elle est de fait réservée pour le cas où une crise
majeure surviendrait en Arabie saoudite, ce pays
étant le seul à pouvoir augmenter rapidement sa
production dans des proportions significatives. Il
n’existe pas de document officiel confirmant cette
hypoth è se”, Pierre Noël, “Les EU et la sécurité
pétrolière mondiale”. Ramses 2005.
15
Ce terme fut employé la première fois par Hubert
Védrine dans Jeune Afrique du 24 février 1998. Une
hyperpuissance est une puissance possédant
momentanément, sans rivalité possible, la
suprématie dans les quatre domaines clé: militaire,
économique, technologique et culturel.
16
On ne peut rien certifier en matière de géopolitique:
qui prouve que dans vingt ans, on ne célébrera
pas leur engagement en Irak comme un “faux pas”
dans la bonne direction ?
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harmful to their elementary aspirations born
from their domestic history: safety on their
premises and commercial wealth in the world.
The perspectives are conceivable.
Today, dismantling the American troops
from Europe and Asia constitutes the most
important reorganisation of the American
military presence abroad since the Second
World War 17. This withdrawal does not fit
in the imperialist vision of their policy.
A new form of the Weinberger Doctrine
could see the light of day, for the perenniality
of their image and the effectiveness of their
initiatives. That could mean operations meeting
a clearly identified aim and a “required final
state” clearly identified and leaving a few traces.
It is certainly in this direction that the prototype
of aircraft X43A is developed, flying with the speed
of Mach 10, which will allow for the United States
Air Force to quickly and directly operate from
American territory. All the same, “Mobile
Offshore Bases”, floating rigs large as ten
aircraft carriers, have been imagined with the
intention to reduce the vulnerability, visibility
and constraints related to a massive deployment
in a foreign country. From this point of view,
the motto of “Government Issue” (GI’S) would
then become: “Do your job and come back
for Thanksgiving”.
The difficult management of the Iraqi conflict
shows that America cannot consider itself
omnipotent anymore. A reflex of multilateralism
is already detectable. In its future actions, it will
probably be in search of allies with which it will
have to share its sights. It will also have to stick
to a legitimacy that victory alone will not be
enough to provide.
After being the first to have militated
for people’s right decide for themselves and
in spite of the Messianism of which it has made
à leurs aspirations élémentaires nées de leur
histoire intérieure: sécurité chez eux et aisance
commerciale dans le monde. Des perspectives
sont envisageables.
Aujourd’hui, le démantèlement des troupes
américaines d’Europe et d’Asie constitue la plus
importante restructuration de la présence
militaire américaine à l’étranger depuis
la Seconde Guerre mondiale 17. Ce retrait
ne s’inscrit pas dans une vision impérialiste
de leur politique.
Une nouvelle forme de la doctrine
Weinberger pourrait voir le jour, pour la pérennité
de leur image et l’efficacité de leurs initiatives.
Cela passe par des opérations répondant à un
objectif et un “état final recherché” clairement
identifiés et laissant un minimum d’empreintes.
C’est certainement dans ce sens qu’est développé
le prototype d’avion X43A volant à Mach 10,
et qui permettra à l’aviation américaine d’opérer
directement et rapidement depuis son territoire.
De même, des “Mobile Offshore Bases”,
plates-formes flottantes grandes comme dix
porte-avions, ont été imaginées dans le but
de réduire la vulnérabilité, la visibilité et les
contraintes liées à un déploiement massif
en pays étranger. Dans une telle optique,
la devise du “Government Issue’s” (GI’s)
deviendraitalors : “Faire le boulot, et rentrer
pour Thanksgiving”.
La difficile gestion du conflit irakien montre
que l’Amérique ne peut plus se considérer
omnipotente. Un réflexe de multilatéralisme
est déjà décelable. Dans ses actions futures,
elle sera vraisemblablement en quête d’alliés,
avec lesquels elle devra partager ses vues.
Elle devra également s’attacher à une légitimité
que la victoire seule ne suffit pas à conférer.
Après avoir milité la première pour le droit
des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et malgré
le messianisme dont elle fait preuve depuis
“Financial Times”, in its edition on December 4,
2004, writes about the withdrawal of 100 000 men:
this project regards the troops installed in Germany
and South Korea.
Le “Financial Times” dans son édition du
4 décembre 2004 parle du retrait de 100 000 hommes:
ce projet vise notamment les troupes installées
en Allemagne et en Corée du Sud.
17
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17
proof since the attacks on September 11,
let us suppose whether it will accept the
right of civilisations to have their own vision
of the world, even if it is different from
that of Washington. The demographic growth
of the Hispanic or Asian minorities on the
American land will create a cultural relativism
which will incontestably support this equitable
approach to international relations. The American
foreign policy will definitely never limit itself
only to defending the immediate national
interests: what we want is for governors, helped
by “think tanks”18, to be always able to support
the moral values that fully respect their
domestic history and to show more concerned
for the attacks to humankind.
les attentats du 11 septembre, gageons qu’elle
acceptera le droit des civilisations à avoir leur
propre vision du monde, fut-elle différente
de celle de Washington. La croissance
démographique des minorités hispaniques
ou asiatiques sur son sol va créer un relativisme
culturel qui favorisera incontestablement cette
approche équitable des relations internationales.
La politique extérieure américaine ne se limitera
cependant jamais à la défense des intérêts
nationaux immédiats: souhaitons que les
gouvernants, aidés des “think tanks”18 puissent
toujours soutenir des valeurs morales
respectueuses de leur histoire intérieure
et chaque fois plus soucieuses des attentes
de l’humanité.
18
These “think tanks” have practical and
theoretical knowledge which actively mirror the
foreign policy. They well correspond to the American
spirit: individualism in the service of the nation.
18
Ce sont des “réservoirs de pensée” alliant savoir
pratique et universitaire où se réfléchit activement
la politique extérieure. Ils correspondent bien à l’esprit
américain: individualisme au service de la nation.
95
THE END
OF
MANAGEMENT ?
Captain Doina ILIE
~ Personnel Informatisation Bureau
within the General Staff ~
“Thinking strategically means thinking the unthinkable”.
Donald Rumsfeld
M
anagement is a psychological experiment. Highly evolved individuals
incorporate their work into own identity so that work becomes part
of the way in which the individual sees himself/herself. Within a “better”
organisation people are liable to become “better” individuals as well, which leads to a new
organisational development, in a perfect cyclic progressive relationship. Since we cannot
separate the individual from society, when considering society we must not forget that
postmodern vision on the world is rather organic than mechanicist, rather holistic than
part-centred, rather participative than impersonal and it works through top-to-base
oriented hierarchy.
Moreover, the “network” model is to be found in all living systems that are mainly
coordinated through networks (neuronal systems) and not through hierarchies. All these
match the new management postmodern philosophy focused on enhancing
the employees’ role at local level, as well as on self-managed teams and organic systems
– as ever-changing open systems with a non-balanced status so that they could adapt
easily to an ever-changing environment. Therefore, we can state that a so-called
“organisational democracy” has appeared and we should try to demonstrate that it is
to naturally replace classic management.
We mentioned above the living systems and neuronal networks. If we are to maintain
the analogy and address the organisation as a human brain, then we should know that
it operates with up to three distinct individual systems that are closely interrelated: the
mental, the emotional and the spiritual one. The healthiest organisations as well as
the sanest minds learn to respond and adapt to external stimuli through a well-integrated
combination of all the three structures and not through a unique and rigid approach.
96
Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectives
Usually, within organisations the importance of the emotional component and the spiritual
one is denied; however the focus is on efficiency, results and other qualities particularly
associated with mental structure.
It is quite obvious that, if we use only a third of the brain there are two thirds left
unused, which means a huge reservoir of ideas and opportunities by which we may cope
creatively with everyday challenges within an organisation. It is true that the scientific
mental approach has got a long history based on results that have fully contributed
to the progress and revolution of society. It is known that, starting with the 17th century,
the dominant Western paradigm has been designed following the Newtonian model.
This applies to Management as well as to Politics, Economy, Psychology and Education.
According to this, science is deterministic, reductional and atomistic. In other words,
things happen because they must do it and because there are forceful laws to ensure
guarantee and predictability. And then, of course, any whole is better understood if it is
reduced to its components and each and every part is studied separately. According
to Newtonian principles, reality is made of discreet and impenetrable particles connected
to one another by reaction and action forces, nature is structured hierarchically
and there is an obvious demarcation between a scientific observer and the world
he/she observes. Military organisation has functioned perfectly based on this paradigm.
As a matter of fact, the military organisation has understood the model so well that,
as a result, by studying and analysing it, has managed to improve it radically. In addition,
the military organisation is the one that has substantially contributed to defining
and implementing the concept of “leadership” in business. Thanks to the military
organisation the management “by results”– used since the Industrial Revolution in England,
1730 – is replaced in 1950 by the management “by objectives and performance evaluation”.
The 20th century lays the basis of new concepts: relativity, quantum mechanics,
chaos and complexity theory. Thus, as it has happened before, the new scientific discoveries
begin to be applied to other areas as well – Economy, Psychology, Politics. Obviously
the change is not easily accepted but the joy of discovery crosses the borders of these
areas and brings the revelation of a new vision over reality and its laws. By dissolving all
boundaries, not only the interrelated ones but also the physical and even the mental
ones, new unknown perspectives appear, which are likely to bring progress and evolution.
Talking about mental boundaries and focussing on individuals, we can state that,
for human beings, the mental is usually associated to explicit thinking, to the ability
to solve problems, to following rules and to fulfilling goals. But what problems do we
choose to solve ? What goals do we believe that are worth achieving and what is our
desire to follow rules ? All these are the result of our emotional and spiritual side; they
come from the desires, ambitions, and connections we make as well as from our pain,
vision and our deepest values. Obviously, our desires, ambitions, associations and pains
have emotional and social roots: social values, group pressing, interpersonal relations,
childhood experiences etc. The latest psychological studies show that all these are linked
with our need to find a meaning, our most intimate beliefs and visions and finally
with our spiritual side. We understand now why we cannot ignore our spiritual
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and emotional side, why we must not separate these two components from our mental
side when we talk about our individual-personal development. Therefore, since
organisations “organise” individuals, organisations have also mental, emotional and spiritual
aspects. The direct conclusion is that we need to operate with three levels, in order
to proceed to a real transformation within an organisation. Change is vital for an organisation
because it is the only solution for evolution, for surpassing the phases called “it works
anyway” or “if it works that way, let it work”. It is well known that an open, living
“non-balanced” system is always a better choice than a stable, immovable, fixed, balanced
system. For organisations, a continuous transformation is compulsory because they
must be flexible in order to reach a better and quicker adaptability to a permanently
changing and challenging environment. If we refer strictly to the mental component
of an organisation, then we refer to cognitive processes, objectives, priorities and explicit
rules. In Newtonian organisations – where the focus used to be on efficiency and results
– the reason for choosing or achieving an objective did not use to be taken into consideration.
It is clear now why this concept was wrong: because, for organisations, as well as
for individuals, the question “Which objective is more important ?” or “Which objective
should be achieved ?” belongs to the spiritual and emotional component; in other words,
it is included in the basic vision of the organisation and consequently cannot be ignored.
In every human being or every human organisation the real change requires a real,
profound transformation of each and every of the three levels. The change that occurs
only for one level is not efficient but, even so, most of the transformations are still focused
only on one level. That is why we must agree that, if we want a real transformation then
we must accept the necessity of changing all the three levels simultaneously. This way
we will have a solid base on which we can add our next bricks for our future evolution.
Generally, we agree that human behaviour within an organisation follows certain
rules. Therefore, we believe that if we study these rules well enough, then any skilled
person will know how to progress. This is not necessarily true because such logical,
conventionally-wise approaches to management are just too simplistic, as they do not
take into account the paradoxes that are inherent in human nature. As real people financial
decisions, taken individually, are much more complicated and unpredictable than
the simple-minded homo economicus, (the sum of basic economics precepts), the real
people workplace behaviour is much more complex than typical management theories
are able to capture. Parent-child and boss-employee relationships are hardly analogous,
but a parallel can be usefully drawn between management training and parenting
manuals. No one expects to become a good parent just by reading a book. Similarly,
the many aspects of working together successfully in an organisational context are
too subtle to effectively systematise. Our vision is closer to reality if we have vaster
and different related fields knowledge. Therefore, we can claim that information defines us,
it shows who we can become and what we can perceive and assimilate. Blocking or controlling
the information flow slow down our growing and make us become defensive or “die”.
In order to have the progress capability and a better adaptability we need to optimise
“listening” skills and to be open to all information. The “command and control” concept
98
is obsolete, all that boxes diagrams are history because they are hierarchical; power
emanates from the top, and control is vital at every level. They are heavily bureaucratic
and rule-bound, hence inflexible. Today, leaders must use all their skills and capabilities
– emotional and spiritual as well – they must know to search information in all different
sources, disseminate it at every level and to act promptly. “Chaos” and “disorder”
must be considered opportunities. Haven’t you noticed that the more familiar a thing is
to us the more difficult is for us to invent new ways of using it ? Which is, then, the
solution ? The solution is to produce discontinuities and “breaks” every time we can, in our
everyday life. Any change, any break is welcomed because, this way, we are forced
to become more creative and to be more receptive to other people’s ideas at the same
time. This happens because we have the power to define ourselves and the others
– even the ones who oppose us – in different ways: in a narrow, rigid manner that suggests
isolation, protection, constraint and limitation or an open, altruistic, shared-type one.
As I pointed out before, all sciences of the 20th are holistic. Their theses reveal that
the world is made from interrelated systems and not from separated, isolated parts.
Therefore, any small change, in any part affects the whole as well. As it is postulated
by the famous “butterfly effect” in chaos theory, there are not such things like insignificant
changes because “a motion of a butterfly wings in Beijing is enough to generate a tornado
in Kansas”. We must trust much more in each individual personal power, in the growing
role of personal relationships and dare to think that “the end of management” is closer
and “the rise of organisational democracy” is about to occur.
The military organisation has already acknowledged the need for all these changes
to take place and it has been, as usual, a step ahead the time because it has already been
acquainted with facts like flexibility, better training and education – horizontally
and vertically (meaning related areas and specific specialised areas), the increasing
role of a quick reaction and response – all these being already part of the new military
organisations functioning concepts and of the new asymmetric threats responses.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Richard Farson, Management of the Absurd: Paradoxes in Leadership.
• Kenneth Cloke, Joan Goldsmith, The End of Management and the Rise of Organizational Democracy.
• Brad VanAuken, Facilitating Creativity.
• Gheorghe V`duva, Asimetria conflictual`.
• www.defenselink.mil/pubs
• humanresources.about.com.
99
GLOBAL POLITIC
S
POLITICS
Corneliu POPESCU
~ National Defence College Graduate ~
“Global Politics” is a syntagm that grasps the trans-national spread in time and space
of political relations, the extension of political power and activity over the borders of the
modern nation-state. The political decisions and actions in one part of the world or
another can soon acquire world ramifications. In addition, the areas of political action
and/or decision can be connected to complex decision-making or political interactions
networks through high-speed communications. This “spread” is associated with a
“deepening” frequent impact of the global political processes, therefore, unlike the antique
and modern empires, “the action at a distance” penetrates the social conditions and
cognitive states of certain political places or communities with high intensity. Accordingly,
the developments at global level frequently cause for local consequences to occur,
sometimes instantaneously.
The notion of “global
politics” somehow
contravenes the traditional
distinctions between intern/
foreign, territorial/noninternational, domestic/
territorial policy, as it considers them as being imprinted upon the conventional
conceptions of politics. It also brings forward the richness and complexity of the interplay,
which transcends states and societies in the global order. Although governments
and states remain, of course, powerful actors, they currently share the global arena
with a series of other agencies and organisations. The state has a significant number
of intergovernmental organisations (IGO) and international agencies before it, which operate
in different areas, through quasi supra-national institutions, such as the European Union.
Non-state actors, trans-national bodies and professional associations or social movements
intensely participate in global politics, too. The same thing happens to many sub-national
actors and national pressure groups, whose activities often have repercussions on the
international arena. Therefore, the global arena can be conceived as a “mixed system of actors”,
a polyarchic one, in which the political authority and the sources of political action
are widespread.
Nowadays, global politics is anchored not only in the traditional geopolitical concerns
regarding security and military affairs but also in a great variety of economic, social
and ecologic issues. Pollution, drugs, human rights and terrorism are part of the increasing
number of trans-national policy issues, which cross over territorial jurisdictions and current
Globalisation
of Politics
100
global political alignments and which require international cooperation in order to be
efficiently settled. Defence and security issues no longer dominate the global agenda
or the national governments political agenda, as the concept of “global governance” facilitates
drawing up the world matters of interest.
“Global governance” does not mean only the formal institutions and organisations
which draft and support (or not) the rules and norms that govern world order – state
institutions, intergovernmental cooperation and so forth – but also those organisations
and pressure groups – starting with multinational corporations and trans-national social
movements to the plethora of nongovernmental organisations which seek to attain
purposes and objectives that are relevant to the trans-national regulation and authority
systems. Clearly, the United Nations system, the World Trade Organisation and the multitude
of national governments activities are part of the important components of global
governance, but are not the only ones. If social movements, nongovernmental organisations,
regional political associations etc. are excluded from the notion of global governance,
we will not be able to correctly understand its form and dynamics. Global politics entails
a broad notion of global governance as being the necessary element in the changing
scenery of the political life.
The increasing number of political organisation and action forms reflects the rapid
expansion of trans-national connexions and the wish expressed by more and more states
regarding the establishment of a trans-national governance that is able to manage
collective political issues. In addition, it mirrors the increasing pressure exerted
by governmental bodies in order to develop new forms of responsibility in the international
political life. To grasp only a few of the ongoing changes in this field, it is important
for us to understand the concept of “international regime”.
An “international regime” is defined in terms of “sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge
in a given issue-area”1. The regimes of international conduct are not only temporary
agreements but also, more than that, they can be considered as “intervening variables”
between the essential power and the economic structures of the international system,
resulting in specific consequences. For instance, the failure of markets to regulate
the demand and the supply of goods and services or to work out urgent trans-national
issues can generate incentives for states and political actors to establish special regimes.
The regimes can provide a framework of legal guarantees, can improve the available
information, can cut down the transaction costs of cooperation and can inspire the otherwise
“anarchic” relations to acquire a degree of predictability. International regimes are therefore
the expression of the need for finding new ways to cooperate and regulate collective issues.
International regimes mark the continuously increasing institutionalisation of global
politics2. They are forms of global governance that are distinct from the traditional notions
1
2
Krasner, S., International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2.
Young, O., International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 11.
101
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regarding governance and are drawn up in terms of the specific places of sovereign
political power. In the contemporary international system, there is no authority above
the state, naturally. In spite of this fact, international regulatory regimes have developed
very fast, this reflecting the intensification of global and regional involvement patterns.
As Young notices, “International regimes cover a wide spectrum of issues from the perspective
of the functional field, the geographic domain and the members. From the functional point
of view, they vary from the narrow horizon of the polar bear agreement to the broad range
of concerns regarding the Antarctica and the extraterrestrial space agreements. The covered
geographical range can be limited, just as the very restricted domain of the seals from
the North Pacific regime or vast, as in the case of the international air transport regimes
(International Civil Air Organisation, International Air Transportation Association)
or of nuclear tests control. As far as members are concerned, the series may start with two
or three, just as the high seas fishing regime, established by the International Convention
for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, and may have more than one hundred
members, as in the case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Far from being unusual,
these are familiar to the international society”.
International regimes cover a broad range of actors, including governments,
governmental departments and sub-national governmental authorities. Moreover, while
some regimes have an intergovernmental organisation as a core, other agreements are
more fluid, following some treaties, the need to manage certain collective political issues
or, simply, owing to some international communities of interests. Hence, the international
security regime in Europe is built around the complex relations between certain
institutions: the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union and the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe – a group of fifty-five states, all European, except
the United States and Canada, whose main function is to favour political stability
and military security in Europe. Comparatively, the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime is not based on a formal organisation, but on an international treaty combined
with successive international conferences within which key decisions are being made.
This regime is similar to the law of the sea regime, which controls the exploitation
of resources in deep seas. In addition, international regimes have many basic functions.
Some of them become involved only in monitoring activities: it is the case of the arms
control regimes such as the regulation regarding the reduction of armament in Europe
(Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ~ CFE), while other regimes establish forums
for collective decision-making with regard to international property rights, as in the case
of radio or orbit (for satellites) frequency allocation. Despite the diversity of forms,
functions and establishments, international regimes are the expression of a governing
system – or, better to say, of a system of “governing without a government” – in the
contemporary world order.
We must be cautious while talking about global politics and governance and about
international regimes. Judging from their impact, especially from the relation with the states
and the dynamic model of world order, it is necessary for us to reflect on two issues.
102
First of all, it is the fact that the sovereignty of an individual nation-state is undermined
only when it is replaced by “superior” and/or independent, and/or deterritorialised,
and/or functional forms of the authority that reduce the decision-making basis that is
justified in a national frame. This happens in the context in which national sovereignty
entails the entitled idea of both ruling a territory limited by borders and having political
authority within a community, authority that is entitled to decide the frame of rules,
regulations and policies governance relies on.
Secondly, while thinking about the impact globalisation has over the nation-state,
it is necessary for us to make a distinction between state sovereignty and the autonomy
– the state capacity to independently draft and accomplish strategic political objectives.
Accordingly, it is essential that we ask ourselves: Has the sovereignty of the nation-state
remained intact while the autonomy of the state has been altered or has the modern state
confronted with a decrease in sovereignty in the context of politics becoming globalised ?
It is important for us to highlight that the globalisation of politics does not mean that
the modern nation-state has disappeared, that the sovereignty of the modern state
has dissolved or the autonomy of the state has been drastically limited.
The Mediation
of Global Politics
N a t i o n s ,
communities and
organisations are
connected through
many forms of
communication and media
that cross all borders. The revolution in microelectronics, information and computers
technology has almost instantaneously established world connections, which, combined
with the technology in the field of telephony, television, cable and satellite broadcasting
and the field of jet planes has significantly influenced the nature of political
communication. The new means of communication provide the individuals with the right
to go beyond geographic borders, which, in the past, would have hindered any contact,
and gives access to a set of political and social experiences to which the individual
or the group might have never had direct access. This way, the link between the “physic
place”, “the social situation” and “politics” has broken, a link that described most
of the political associations from the premodern period to the modern one. The new
communication systems create new experiences, new ways of understanding and new
frames of political references, irrespective of the direct contact with certain persons
or subjects. At the same time, the unequal access to these new ways of communication
has created new patterns of inclusion but also of exclusion from global politics.
The development of new communication systems generates a world in which
the particularities of the place and of the individuality are constantly rearranged
and reinterpreted by the regional and global communication networks. Yet, these systems
relevance goes much further: the new systems represent means, even if not the only
means for intensifying the many processes of political change, certified in the previous
section and in what will follow; meaning, they are fundamental to the possibility
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~ 3/2006
of organising the political action and exercising the political power at long distance
and for the transformation of the modern political communities and the system of territorial
states, in general. For instance, the expansion of international and trans-national
organisations, the extension of legal international rules and mechanisms, their
establishment and monitoring have all received an impulse on the part of the new
communication systems, depending on them as on a means for reaching their purposes.
Contemporary telecommunications take after political organisations nature and form
and unite the communities in a new interaction frame. Still, they do not serve to the
enlargement of political relations only, they also pay their contribution to increasing
the velocity of political interactions. Rapidly reported events, incidents and catastrophes
might generate almost immediate regional or global ramifications. Millions of people
from all continents witnessed the events in China, in the Tienanmen Square, back
in 1989, or when Greenpeace successfully opposed the attempt made by Shell, the British
corporation, to build a huge oil storage and tanker loading buoy, let alone the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA. The fact that there were cameras that videotaped
these events as they unfolded has made room for access and involvement, so that,
even they were taking place in a certain location, they had an immediate and direct
effect on many parts of the world. This represented, in its turn, a basis for the complex
and diverse reactions on the part of the state agencies and on the one of the civil society.
The current global telecommunication network comprises all the states, although
not all the significant sections of world population. It reflects, same as many other global
networks, the geography of power and privilege. The international or local telephony
service, specific to the developed world, is not available in all the states. For instance,
in the small town Villes de Bravo, Westwards of Mexico, the biggest part of the population
relies on the communal telephony service, while even this one is precarious in other
parts of the country. Asymmetries of success and chance are present in the global
telecommunication network.
It is interesting to notice that the global network is one of the most regulated sectors
of trans-national activity. It is governed by the telecommunication international regime,
comprising the International Telecommunications Union ~ ITU, which, in its turn, consists
of the Radiocommunication Sector, the World Radiocommunication Conference and the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization and of various regional
organisations. Together, these organisations provide mechanisms for international
coordination, which facilitate the running of the entire world telephony, telegraphy,
radio and satellite broadcasting system.
By the end of the 20 th century, the issues raised by the efficient maintenance
of a genuine communication network became more complex and politicised. The stake
was huge, because of the enormous global market that provided communication
services: a figure estimated at over 600 trillion USD per annum, in 1997. The implications
for the national sovereignty and autonomy are considerable because now, unlike the time
104
when the telegraph appeared, no state can enforce rules or control the trans-national
fluxes of mail, images, data and electronic programmes that cross its borders. The Internet
is an extremely interesting case.
The policy of the international telecommunication regime is significant through
what it unravels with regard to the changing balance of state power and corporations
in global politics. Until 1970, there had been few controversies as far as the regime
was concerned. Yet, after the revolution of global financial services and the deregulation
of communications market in the USA and UK, the regime became extremely politicised.
The regime’s basic norms – networks standardisation, collective decision in global
common issues (broadcast range and satellite orbits), services provided in collective
and multilateral coordination – remain intact. The same thing happens, in most of their
part, to the rules and decision-making mechanisms of the regime. The result was to provide
minimum levels of access to the system for all the states, especially to the satellite
communication that a market regime would not have offered. To a certain extent,
the regime has introduced some elements of global equity in the aspects of the
international decision-making process. Improving this approach is the distinct
institutional policy of the regime. This provides the Third World countries and their
monopoles in the communication domain with an increasing voting power that their
economic status might entitled them to, although most of the decisions are consensual.
Nevertheless, as the deregulation of the communication sectors belonging to the
developed economies has rapidly advanced, a trans-national coalition of multinational
corporations has been established in order to promote a much more liberal international
communication regime. Assisted by a trans-national community of financial banking
interests that are based on cheap communications, the pressure exerted for the
liberalisation of the global communication market remains intense. This pressure became
clearly expressed the day before the agreement regarding the liberalisation
of international trade in the services of basic telecommunications, which came into force
on the 5th of February 1998. Yet, even the United States, the most determined supporter
of global deregulation, was ready to accept “the principle of planning a fix system
of satellite services, which makes it possible for each and every nation to have its own position
on the orbit”, in order to avoid the collapse of the entire regulatory order.
The policy of the regime is outlined through the interaction between the relatively
small coalitions of governments, the corporatist interests and the specialists that have
been trying to exert pressures for a bigger liberalisation and to involve a bigger group
of states, with specialists and their national monopoles over communications, which wish
to limit, not necessarily to prevent, liberalisation. The result is the complex interaction
between international and trans-national political forces, wherein political results are
mediated by the institutional dynamics of the regime.
The nature of the contemporary regime of telecommunications illustrates
the dynamics of the manifest interplay between the intern and international domains.
105
~ 3/2006
Furthermore, it enhances the notion of global politics due to the fact that the political
area can no longer be conceived as being limited by the borders of the territorial
nation-state: politics and governance go beyond national borders, therefore a duality
of inside/outside-type, domestic/foreign-type no longer exists. The telecommunication
regime represents a kind of functional political space that transcends national territorial
borders and that articulates, in this particular case, a sense of political community
that is not anchored in a territorial logic in its proper meaning, but, rather in a trans-national
community of interests that derive from the position of the members as providers,
consumers or regulators of the telecommunication service. In this respect, the global
communication infrastructure mediates between the Westphalian order and rearticulates
political interests, structures and outcomes.
Selective Bibliography
• H. Bull, The Anarchical Society, London, Macmillan, 1997.
• A. Cassese, Violence and Law in a Modern Age, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988.
• R. A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven, Yale University Press.
• M. Mann, The Source of Social Power, vol. 1 – A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760,
Cambridge University Press, 1986.
• G. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, London, Hutchinson, 1978.
• W. Wallace, Rescue or Retreat ? The Nation State in Western Europe, in Political Studies,
1994, p. 42.
106
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POLICY
OF FORCE,
STRATEGY
ON A KNIFE EDGE
Brigadier (r.) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD
~ Senior Researcher at the Centre for Defence
and Security Strategic Studies within the National Defence University ~
“Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,
Tempora si fuerint nubila, solus eris”
Ovid
The world seems to have turned upside down. Or vice versa. It seems not to have
enough space, time, arms, roads, air, land, mountains, fields, waters, seas, oceans,
resources, thoughts or wisdom. Nothing is enough to it anymore, as it has reached
the age of the shortcomings. The Great Middle East, in a possible or rather impossible
democratic and prosperous configuration the Americans have dreamt about, namely
a Great East built or rebuilt in the most democratic and prosperous space of the world’s
own image, today’s and yesterday’s American El Dorado, is determined not to believe
in fashionable wonders, wisdom, usually imported, in values that do not belong
to these austere, very poor sands, though very rich, since they shelter large underground
deposits of oil. Not all of them, of course, but enough to focus and concentrate
the interest, will, desire and force for domination upon them. Therefore, in what might
this Great Middle East believe ?
Beyond clarity
This big or small, far or near East, crumbled by tensions, pressures and diversions,
seems to believe in nobody and nothing anymore. For hundreds and hundreds of years,
the entities from this region have been at war. Probably the oil or its impact upon
the planet’s civilisation is to be blamed. Oil is the resource on which the entire technical
and technological progress of humankind, the entire technological civilisation is grounded.
In other words, our civilisation is an oil-based civilisation. An oil and electron-based
one. Almost all that relies on technology on this planet – aircrafts, cars, ships, production
lines, great enterprises etc. – is based on oil. Of course, there are even other energy
resources that can change this configuration entirely but, for the time being, the world
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does not have any intention to change its infrastructure,
technologies, its conception of life and civilisation,
namely everything that has been achieved so far, for the
sake of the bird in the air, as long as it does not have
to do it yet.
The battle for oil, no matter under what form it would
be carried – from bloody war to … strategic partnerships –
is doubled by the one of the borders of all kind, political
and geographical borders included. People fight, and they
still fight for land. The notion of a country and of the right
to have a country, a homeland, still exists, even if some
windbags try to prove, making use of all sorts of bizarre Brig (r.) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD
and confusing savant things, that the time of the country, homeland, native soil has passed.
These individuals, uprooted by who knows what kind of illusion, should consider the dignity
and determination with which the great or small nations of the world honour, defend
and love their countries, such as the Americans, French, Germans, Italians, Spanish,
Jews, Palestinians, Japanese, Chinese and even our parents and forefathers who have
never forgotten, for any single moment, that it is not the country that belongs to them,
but they belong to the country…
In almost everything that happens in the big or small, far or near East, there generally
is a dreadful mixture of big and small battles – some of them for oil, others for borders
or space, concepts, others for dignity or illusions –, which no one can get rid of not even
by cutting the Gordian knot, for the very reason that this kind of knot does not exist.
There can be no knots in a jungle.
Everything that happens on these lands from the centre of the world – where
the richest known, exploited or unable to be exploited energy resources can be found –
is nothing else but a sort of jungle wherein all kinds of interests, actions, reactions,
protests, passions and convictions carried to extreme, judgments and prejudgements,
awful realities and bloody perspectives whirl in a chaos with rash, unpredictable evolutions.
All of them have a good reason, although nothing seems justifiable when it comes
to war, terrorism, aggression against human life, belief and God. Maybe people have
not yet reached that stage of development in which wisdom is much powerful than
interest. Unfortunately, today it is not the interest that is placed in the service of wisdom
– this is not even possible ! –, nevertheless, wisdom is not always hand and glove
with the interest. It is often replaced by diversion, stratagem, deception, pressure, threat
and even force. Obviously, not with the force of wisdom, not with the wisdom of the force,
but with the force of the interest.
Sadly, the Middle East is the battlefield of the war of the beginning of the century,
in which the super-technologised campaigns, in their information and high tech superiority,
encounter primitive actions, carried in despair, all kinds of reactions, in a jungle of paradoxes,
crumbled by fractal, unclear, sometimes parallel, other times extremely tangled and confuse
politics and changing, often on a knife edge, strategies.
108
Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Security
“We all owe a death”
The points, areas and hot issues of the Middle East are numerous and complicated.
Death is ordinary, but, here, no one is afraid of it anymore. The guerrilla war in Iraq,
the uncertain strategic situation, a too violent one, from Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran’s
nuclear programme, the tensions in the Middle East, which have already degenerated
into military confrontations, all represent only what can be seen of all that exists.
The new escalation of tensions in the Middle East seems, at first sight, the last resort
in the attempt to put an end to violence. In truth, the facts stand completely different
and there are all the conditions for the situation to get out of control or, anyway, to even
more deepen the catastrophic gaps which have established and developed between
different entities in the area.
The labels attached to the forehead of one entity or another are not capable to calm
the tensions, but, quite the contrary, they make them ever more predominant. The time
of dissuasion, be it the nuclear one, even if it has not passed yet, needs being much
carefully detailed. People do not get scared so easily anymore. They are too enraged
and affected by the pillars with which they have been thrust at in the soul and heart,
to get scare of something. “We all owe a death”, the poet would have said. But no one
wants to die in chains or in dishonour … and each man has his own way of perceiving
and accepting life or death. There is no law or uniformity here. Instead, there is much
dignity in this Blessed and Cursed Middle East.
It follows that not always and not everywhere may the same measure be employed.
When it comes to politics, life and strategy, there are many particularities and many complex
relations of identity and even those of equivalency are almost missing. It was thought
that, after the death of Arafat, the new elections in Palestine, even if they meant Hamas
group’s coming to power, after the Israeli retreat from the Gaza Strip and the Syrian one
from Lebanon, things would calm down. They did not. Quite the contrary, they got worse.
Israel entered again the Gaza Strip with its tanks and virulently attacked Southern
Lebanon. With aircrafts and tanks. Hezbollah responded with reactive projectiles striking
some districts from Haifa and the Israeli towns near the Lebanese border quite randomly.
Otherwise stated, an all-out war. Attacks, bombings, ripostes, civilian evacuation by ship,
airplanes or helicopters, using all the means of transportation which, one way or another,
can reach the area or its surroundings …
Declarations come one after another. Same thing happens to speculations. Official
statements are doubted, unofficial ones are not credible, therefore cannot be considered,
and speculations are, in their turn, thoroughly speculated, commented and examined.
The Israelis take action in Lebanon same as the Americans took action in Afghanistan,
after September 11, 2001. A justified action, according to those undertaking it, certainly,
since, they say, in Southern Lebanon, at the border with Israel, there are Hezbollah
terrorists, a group that does not leave Israel in peace, with bases for instruction
and departure in actions of all kinds.
Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists do what they want to, attacking Israel through all
means, endangering civil lives, the citizen and the state’s safety. There are attacks almost
every day, from attacks that make use of hand-made means or fire weapons up to suicidal
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actions. And then you, if you were in Israel, what would you do ? Would you stand with
your arms crossed, letting terrorists and self-murderers kill your people in the streets ?
Suicide terrorism has become one of the terrorist strategies in the Middle East,
especially in the area of Israel and Iraq.
Given these circumstances, Israel believes it has the right to defend itself, to take
all the necessary measures to protect its borders, citizens and institutions, no matter
what the entire world says. Israel believes it has to defend itself actively, namely
offensively, because there cannot be other way. On the other hand, Hezbollah and Hamas
groups, no matter what people might say about them, in favour or against them, think
they have the right to fight, through all means, against Israel, that they acknowledge
as an enemy, unwanted in this area and mainly responsible for all the evil things in the
Middle and Near East, including for the fact that, although there is a roadmap and there
are other numerous treaties and documents, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not cease
and the Palestinians do not have a country of their own yet, even if they have been in the
area for over one thousand years. Another mention should be made that, even if the means,
forms and formulae that Hamas and Hezbollah groups use for taking action are terrorist
ones, not everybody includes this political organisations on the terrorism list1.
In fact, in the Near East and, by extension, in the entire Middle East, there are a lot of
truths and rights which, unfortunately, manifest unilaterally, they do not coexist, do not
collaborate but only confront. And they confront chaotically, unexpectedly and extremely
violent. The most important of them can be expressed as follows:
the Israelis have the right to live in a country of their own, which must be
acknowledged by all the states in the area, by the entire world and accepted as such.
In addition, Israel has the right and the obligation to defend its frontiers, citizens
and institutions against terrorists and all those who infringe upon the liberty and wholeness
of this sovereign and independent state.
the Palestinians also have the right to a country of their own, which has not yet
take shape and constituted de jure and de facto, despite all international steps taken all
these years and the roadmap that seems to remain uncovered.
Lebanon is an independent and sovereign country, which has suffered a lot, especially
in the ’80s, but continues to represent a pearl of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
It is normal that its frontiers should not be attacked using the excuse that terrorist
groups act on its territory. Nobody has that right. Only the UN has the right to decide
what forms and formulae are required to be used in order to settle this kind of issues.
That is a series of undisputable truths but, instead of harmonising the relations and
creating firm premises for long-lasting solutions, they result in intolerance and violence.
The unilateral attack against Lebanon without a UN mandate is, undoubtedly, an act
of aggression, even if the pretext seems to be defence, namely Israel does not attack,
but defends itself. This kind of defence means, according to this vision, destroying
the infrastructure and other elements of that particular group. But there is nothing
new under the sun. There are a lot of excuses of this kind in the world.
1
110
For instance, they are not on the terrorist organisations list drawn up by Russia.
Obviously, the Israelis have the right to live in a country of their own, in Israel,
and so do the Palestinians. In order to defend this right, Israel has procured modern
armament, nuclear included, has obtained a strong American support and has made
a considerable military effort. Palestinians cannot procure those kinds of weapons. Israel
carries an active policy, of consolidating the state under all forms and enhancing
the protection against the attacks of the countries in the area that are hostile to the Jewish
state or believe Jews have no right to such a state. For this purpose, Israel has developed
powerful armed forces, procured nuclear means, an impenetrable electronic shield
included, thus becoming the most powerful country in the area, from both economic
and military point of view.
As the dialogue does not work, Israeli leadership seems not to see other solution.
Between the two big wars it waged against its neighbours, in 1967 and 1973, Israel victory
could not be contested. Even during the 1973 war, when two very well prepared Egyptian
armies forced the Suez Canal and basically removed the Jews from the Sinai Peninsula
they had conquered in 1967 by force, the Israelis managed to infiltrate, over the Amar
Lake, through a skilful offensive manoeuvre, a small group of forces, about the value
of a brigade, which reached km 101 on the communication line that led to Cairo and cut
one of the armies supply lines. Under the pressure of the international community,
hostilities ceased, but the Jews were at an advantage again.
The Jews have the most powerful and best equipped armed forces in the area, but
no one knows how long this superiority will last. Syria and Iran are arming, and Iran’s
nuclear programme causes much concern in Tel Aviv, in the region and in the entire
world. However, technological superiority does not always represent the most powerful
weapon. There has already been developed a series of asymmetric strategies that make
use of the human element especially and can cause troubles to technological strategies
and even to those that model Network Centric Warfare. Moreover, Iran has already
missiles at its disposal that may reach even the European continent and can transport
nuclear cargo. Everybody knows that in the event Iran procures the nuclear weapon,
this kind of weapon will not necessarily target Europe and so much the less the United
States, but Israel and, perhaps, the American allies in the area. In this Eastern world
(be it Middle, Near or Far), fidelity, just like infidelity, has a very high price to pay.
Anyway, the evil has already been released, and there is not much to do about it.
If a sole state has nuclear fighting means at its disposal that it can threaten with, control,
discourage or, lately, “manage” the whole world or just part of it, it stands to reason that
such lack of balance, despite all signed or over-signed documents, will not be accepted
on very long term. Any attempt one might have to stop, re-tame and put the bridle on
the nuclear horses created in the stables and laboratories of the science and technology
of highly technologised warfare does not stand a chance to succeed. All the treaties,
conventions, agreements and understanding will last for ten, twenty years, perhaps a
century, maybe more, but, sooner or later, the states and national and international
political entities, even those from the globalisation era – so much the more these ones
– will not accept the same hierarchies and lack of balance for ever.
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Evidently, the UN resolutions and the decisions of the international organisations
and organisms are necessary, useful and even mandatory for these times of strategic
balance when we cannot and must not stand with our arms crossed, waiting for who knows
what flabby pear to fall. But the world needs great-great wisdom in order to successfully
cross the border between confrontation and partnership, from war to peace. That is
why the strategies for this beginning of the century must respond to a certain dialectics
of the wills in search for some different solutions other than those of violent armed
confrontation. It is true, where there is no confrontation there is no strategy. And the
confrontations of the beginning of this century are so numerous, so different and tough,
that it is very difficult for someone to get out of this kind of strategic labyrinth. There
must also be strategies able to put into practice policies of non-confrontation, partnership.
Israel’s riposte, believed to be disproportionate by some people, is only asymmetric.
Here, there is more than only a confrontation between the missile projectile launcher,
used by Hezbollah and the modern Israeli air forces that launch laser-guided bombs
and the Merkava tanks, some of the most modern and powerful fighting machines
in the world. Such a confrontation would be and, in fact, is completely disproportionate.
Two irreconcilable philosophies, two completely different systems confront here,
each one of those involved asymmetrically exploiting the other’s vulnerabilities. Israel
has no means for fighting terrorist-type attacks. No one has. Therefore, it uses whatever
it has got. It acts with highly effective armed forces, created in order to resist to the
attacks of other armed forces of the states in the area and not to the groups attacking
citizens and infrastructure. Yet, terrorists do not attack these armed forces, not even
defend against them, but they attack those vital points in which the Israelis are very
vulnerable: the street, critical infrastructure, people, everyday life.
Some people believe that Iran might be blamed for the new degradation of the
situation in the area, since this country is the one that seems to be in charge of most
of the terrorist phenomena in the area. Within the Shi’a Islamic environment, the term
Hezbollah means an international movement consisting of organisations and individuals
that know each other and are connected through an organic relation with Iran. Hezbollah
movement appeared in the early ‘80s because of the Iranian desire and will to export
the Islamic revolution in the Muslim world. Yet, in Lebanon Hezbollah has become,
in time, a mass political party, with much influence on the political scene of the country,
which has developed important infrastructure and networks, and Hamas has won the
Palestinian elections. In Lebanon, a kind of “libanization” of Hezbollah has taken place,
which has become, according to the statements of some observers, a true “factor
for supporting a confessional system that it previously fought against”. It has given up
its initial objective, namely achieving an Islamic republic in Iran, and has focused
on “maintaining a balance between the 17 Lebanese religious communities, thus becoming
the most efficient guarantor of stability in Lebanon”. Still, it has not given up the guerrilla
against the Israeli state and that has led to an increasing prestige of the two groups
– Hamas and Hezbollah – among the Muslim world.
112
Policies and strategies in the labyrinth
Some analysts from the Middle East Media Research Institute ~ MEMRI, as well as
other experts see the current crisis in strong connection with an indirect strategy
of Iran, which has been interested in causing troubles in the area in order to divert
the attention from its nuclear programme. Iran and Syria seem to make the most of this
conflict, as they will succeed in generating a new support for arming and increasing
the influence in the area, together with those that support these countries.
It is possible things may be really very subtle and there may be almost no way out,
since, in our opinion, we have to deal here with at least three types of policies and with
the same number of types of strategies, all in the labyrinth:
• the policy of force, sustained through direct strategies, which aim at destroying
the bases and networks of Hezbollah and Hamas organisations, discouraging
any actions against Israel and generating the fait accompli;
• the policy of delaying, deceiving and hiding, probably sustained by Iran, Syria
and some of the groups in the area through all sorts of stratagems and indirect
strategies, difficult to identify and analyse, through which one essentially seeks
to intensify the hostility of the Arab world towards Israel, to stimulate the arming,
to justify Iran’s nuclear programme and to consolidate the unity of the Islamic
world, possibly under Iran’s headship, against the Israeli and American supertechnological menace;
• the policy of riposte, sustained through asymmetric strategies, them too in the
labyrinth, through which identifying some of Israel new vulnerabilities and, based
on that, intensifying and radicalising terrorist actions are sought for.
It is difficult for us to imagine that this serious deterioration of the situation in the
Middle East follows only well-established directions, in keeping with accurate policies
and strategies, with very clear and perfectly feasible objectives. There is no doubt that rigorous
plans, drawn up with much scrupulosity, are at the basis of these actions. Nevertheless,
in this kind of world, any action inevitably has chaotic evolutions, with sudden, unpredictable
stages and difficult to anticipate effects. Even if the Israelis are at the end of their tether,
after the numerous actions carried out with terrorist means that have taken place against
them, their actions can difficultly be justified, especially if there is no UN mandate and
the argument according to which Zahal attacks the infrastructure and bases of Hezbollah,
but not Lebanon, cannot withstand a thorough analysis. Just as, of course, the terrorist
actions against the Jewish population cannot be justified, under any circumstances.
With all the American support, it may not be easy for Israel to face the UN Security
Council, Europe and the international public opinion (which, and it is a proven fact, is
hostile to any form of violence or aggression) and justify the reason for which it attacked
Lebanon, the pearl of the Mediterranean and the Near East. It proves that there is a certain
kind of incertitude for Israel, which generates a tempestuous reaction, causes big troubles
in an area wherein things already stand under a lot of tension and uncertainty.
Given these circumstances, it is not strategies that are important, but policies.
And politics today, just as always, needs not only force and ability, diplomacy and logic
but also maturity, objectivity and especially wisdom.
113
POWER AND ITS ROLE
IN POSTMODERN GEOPOLITICS
Colonel Constantin HLIHOR, PhD
~ Professor at the National Defence University “Carol I” ~
T
he theories and concepts that have defined power in international relations
are diversified and sometimes contested, depending on the school of thought
or the philosophical perspective that has been accepted as sufficient
for the explanation and the understanding of this type of realities. Martin Wight
demonstrates, in the second half of the last century, that power and especially the politics
of power have been differently perceived during the history of humankind1.
Some theorists of international relations have analysed power, focusing their
analysis on the capacity, the structure and the forms through which it appears manifest2.
Others have centred upon emphasising the ways in which power is manifest in the
international system3.
It is rather difficult to choose the most appropriate concept while analysing the conduct
of the actors in their geopolitical evolutions as it, along with others in the field of politics
and philosophy, is part of what could be called categories with credibility deficit/contestable.
For a long time, the theorists and analysts within the School of Realism have thought
that, if the international power distribution is known, it is enough to explain the state
attitude and conduct. Today, less and less of them think it sufficient4, because the state
tends to be replaced, as far as its importance is concerned, by non-state actors.
No matter how the contemporary world is perceived and analysed, its realities show
that power and influence, loyalty and affection, coercion and threat of force have weight
with regard to international relations. In geopolitical theory, power must be understood
Martin Wight, Politica de putere, Editura Arc, 1998, p. 31.
See, at length, Stefano Guzzini, Power in International Relations: Concept Formation Between
Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual History, in http/www.isanet.org/noarchive/Analysing power.pdf.;
Mark Rupert, Class Powers and the Politics of Global Governace, in http/www.maxell.sgr.edu/maxpage/
faculty/Sherman/Rupert/Global gov.pdf; Bertrand Russell, Idealurile politice. Puterea, Antaios,
Bucure[ti, 2002.
3
Reinoud Bosch, Exposing the Concept of Power, in www.sase.org/conf 2004/papers/boschreinaud.pdf.
4
Andreas Wenger, The Internet and the Changing Face of International Relations and Security,
in Information & Security, Volume 7, 2001, pp. 5-11.
1
2
114
as not only a relation between actors – A capacity to convince/constraint B to take action
in a direction which he is not interested or he does not perceive as desirable5, but also
as potential (powermeans)6 and will to take action (powercapacity).
Gerald Dussoy considers that, today, power should not be conceived as a monolithic
block, but in its multiple capacities7. In addition to it, Susan Strange states that, “four
analytically distinct structures of power, respectively the power to influence others’ ideas
(structure of cognition), the power to influence the access to loans (financial power),
the power to influence the future of their security (security structure), the power to influence
their chances to have a better life in their quality of producers and consumers (production
structure)”8, should be taken into account in international relations.
Peter Morris defines power starting from the answer he has given to the question
why an actor needs power. He notices that actors need power from at least three
perspectives9: those of practice, morals and the context of their actions assessment.
As far as practice is concerned, the actor has to know if he has the capacity to capitalise
on his opportunities in the dispute with other actors. In the plane of morals, he must
know the values that amplify his actions, and from the perspective of the context,
the actor must evaluate the nature of the social system10. Morris vision is close to the one
of K. Deutsch who states that, in international relations, to judge only the state power
as such is not relevant. To it, its capacity to “manipulate the interdependencies”11 should be
added. Alvin Toffler considers that “power entails the use of violence, wealth and knowledge
(in the broadest sense) to make people take action in a given direction”12. Robert A. Dahl
sees power as “the ability to have others do what they would not do otherwise”13.
The Neomarxist School of international relations defines power in terms of the
economic-social confrontation. It is the result of the confrontation that occurs in the
system of international relations between the Centre, which has hegemonic tendencies
and the Periphery, which contests the dominance of the centre14.
Gianfranco Poggi distinguishes, in contemporary international relations, three forms
of power manifestation: political, economic and ideological or normative15. There are
of course other visions and ways to perceive power, both at the academic research level
and at the political action one, as far as the system of international relations is concerned.
Andreas Wenger, op.cit., in loc. cit., p. 6; Stefano Guzzini, op.cit., p. 67.
Reinoud Bosch, op.cit., in loc. cit.
7
Gerard Dussoy, Quelle geopolitique au XXIe siecle ?, Editions Complexe, Paris, 2001, p. 56.
8
Susan Strange, Political Economy and International Relations, in vol. Martin Griffiths, op. cit., p. 84.
9
Peter Morris, Power. A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester University Press, Manchester,
1987, pp. 37-42.
10
Ibid.
11
www. geostrategie.ens.fr/international/CR-2005/Compte-rendu.Sabatie.pdf.
12
Alvin Toffler, Powershift/Puterea în mi[care, Bucure[ti, 1995, p. 24.
13
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs ? Democracy and Power in an American City, Yale University
Press, 1961; apud Mihail E. Ionescu, op. cit., p. 11.
14
Ibid.
15
Gianfranco Poggi, Forms of Power, Polity Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 23.
5
6
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Power analysis should also take into consideration the way actors perceive and understand
this reality in the international environment.
In geopolitical rivalries, actors are in a permanent competition to impose their interests.
To this end, they will utilise all the available means from the persuasion ones to threats
and constraint. An actor capacity to compel recognition in the dispute with other actors
is given by his power potential/powersources, by the place he takes in the structure
of international relations and by his prestige. This aspect should not be neglected
as it adds to power. The prestige given by the promotion of the political and moral values
that are unanimously accepted confers the actor legitimacy and, consequently, increases
its chances to succeed in the geopolitical and geostrategic competition16.
The place and the role an actor has in the geopolitical field are given by his power
potential, by his will to take action/powercapacity17 and by the legitimacy he builds.
What is very important in deciphering an actor potential is the source defining
and identifying as well as knowing the type of policy of power/powermeans, he promotes
in international relations.
The softpower policy supporters will allot resources that are different from the ones
allotted by the hardpower policy supporters. Alvin Toffler correctly notices that, today,
no matter “how many hammerings, saw cuts and ironmongery actors make”, actors satisfying
their interests “will depend less on their words than on the quantity and the quality
of the power each of them brings at the negotiation table”18.
Traditionally, the power potential/powersources used to be assessed by totalising
the human and the economic resources, the territory size, the quantity and the quality
of the armed forces. From the ancient times to the Industrial Revolution, in Toffler’s
first wave economy, the power potential was given by the size and the quality of a state
population. This fact governed and was taken into account when the denouement
of the confrontations between actors was assessed19.
Entering the 17th century, in the second wave economy, respectively, made industry
and modern means of transport dominant elements in projecting/assessing an actor
power potential. The different rhythms of development and the application of the Industrial
Revolution achievements in the production of weapons disturbed the balance and power
hierarchies. The centre of gravity of the world power system started migrating from
the states with huge demographic potential – for example Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman
Empire, to Europe in the course of industrialisation, state that dominated the actors
that were specific to the first wave20 .
Thierry Chopin, Europe-Etats-Units: retrouver la voie du multilateralisme, in Synthese no. 126, 2002.
Reinaud Bosch, op. cit., in loc. cit.
18
Alvin Toffler, op. cit., p. 25.
19
Mihail E. Ionescu, Dup` hegemonie, Patru scenarii de securitate pentru Europa de Est în anii 90,
Scripta, Bucure[ti, 1993, p. 11.
20
Martin Wight, op. cit., pp. 40-42; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
16
17
116
In the optotronic era, which is specific to the third wave economy, the actor that
will understand the importance of quality in the power potential, element given by knowledge,
economic growth, political stability and will/national cohesion, will have a significant
advantage in the power equation. Today, the highest quality power comes from knowledge
application21. The advantage is that, in case of a confrontation, it does not impose its will
traditionally, by means of constraint.
Knowledge, in Alvin Toffler’s opinion, can be used “to punish, reward, convince
and even transform. It can change the enemy into an ally”22. This fact was evinced, during
the Gulf War, by one of the CNN political analysts, who stated that “military planners
must see beyond the use of bombs and missiles for a precise target acquisition. Technology
will soon allow for destroying the key-elements of a military objective, without killing soldiers
or destroying the target completely”23.
Knowledge has propelled information as an element that is extremely important
in constituting an actor power potential. With the help of knowledge, the actor that is
interested in controlling a certain space can cause troubles to a concurrent actor, without
resorting to the exercise of power under the form of military violence24.
The American military analyst Larry Seaquist considers the power potential must be
redefined, as it was narrowly conceived, referring only to “the arms, their system of application
and certain spatial systems”25. Technology, educational system and economic growth are
more important when measuring an actor power potential than its population or its area.
“Numerically controlled machines – states Larry Seaquist – are now in many Third World
countries. A pharmaceutical plant that is necessary to them has the inherent faculty
to produce biological weapons. The numeric control installations that produce good-quality
cars in the Third World can produce good quality missiles, too”26. From this perspective,
it is thought that “electronic information leak abroad can raise security problems that are
not less important than troops’ movement”27.
The current lack of balance with regard to global communications28 and information
results in spectacular changes in the power potential of the actors in the contemporary
international environment. The actor that dominates informational fluxes can impose
21
See, at length, Colin S. Gray, RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy, “Joint Force Quarterly”, no. 17
Autumn/Winter 1997-1998; and Idem, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming
1999; David A. Baldwin, Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, “World Politics” volume 48, no. 1,
October 1995 pp. 117-141; Stuart E., Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, (eds.), Dominant Battlespace
Knowledge, rev. ed. Washington DC; National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies,
April 1996, pp. 1-14.
22
Alvin Toffler, op. cit., p. 24.
23
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, pp. 155-156.
24
Colin S. Gray, op. cit., in loc. cit.; Andreas Wenger, op. cit., in loc. cit., p. 5.
25
After Alvin and Heidi Toffler, op. cit., pp. 235-236.
26
Ibid., p. 236
27
James N. Rosenau, Turbulen]a în politica mondial`. O teorie a schimb`rii [i continuit`]ii, Editura
Academie Române, 1994, pp. 156-157.
28
Andreas Wenger, op. cit., in loc. cit., p. 5.
117
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its own values, aspirations and image about the world29 . He has the capacity to make
the rules of the game that generates the international normative system, imposing
the rules, norms and principles that regulate the actors conduct in the geopolitical
field and, consequently, the legitimacy of exercising power. The information that
is aimed at with precision via mass-media is as important as exerting power through
classical means30.
The decision in the Cold War was given by the gun that was charged with images/
information. If Nicolae Ceausescu had understood the impact of the revolution in mass
information means and if he had studied the role of mass media in overthrowing
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines31, maybe a “velvet revolution” would have been
possible too, just like in the majority of former communist countries.
In the battle for the “informational space” – in the so-called “imagologic war” –
the victory is no longer recorded as physical elimination or the adversary submission
and the occupation of his sovereignty space, but as the “occupation of his mind”
with those representations and convictions that would turn the adversary into an ally32.
For an actor to be able to use the information weapon with precision, he has to possess
the most effective technologies to get to the target. Economic power, a basic indicator
of the power potential of actors in the future, is no longer measured only in tangible
resources, but especially in those having to deal with the idea of performance that are
intangible ones. The quantity, exactly like in the case of other domains, no longer
accumulates power with necessity. A lot of states possess huge economic primary
resources, but these are not the great economic powers of the world at the same time.
This is not valid for the part of economic resources of a state power potential.
The competition for the control of the intangible resources in the power potential
tends to replace that directed towards the accumulation of weapons and military technique.
As the military threats decrease in intensity, the competition/conflicts for economic
resources will intensify. In analyst Edward N. Luttwak’s opinion, the fear of a nuclear
war, with incalculable consequences for humankind, will cause a shift from the military
means to economic ones with the purpose of solving the conflicts among states.
“Economic” weapons worked during the Golf conflict, as well as in that from
the former Yugoslavian space33. The idea according to which “the trade methods replace
the military ones – available capital instead of fire power, civilian innovation instead
of technical-military progress and market penetration instead of garrisons and bases”
is more and more employed34.
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, McMillan, London, 1974, p. 34.
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, op. cit., p. 203.
31
Ibid., pp. 347-348.
32
Lambakis, Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond, in “Orbis” Volume 39, nr. 3, Summer, 1995;
and The United States in Lilliput: The Tragedy of Fleeting Space Power, in “Strategic Review”, Volume 24,
nr. 1, Winter 1996.
33
Sergiu T`ma[, Geopolitica, Editura Comunicare.ro, Bucure[ti, 2001, p. 228.
34
Lt Col Constantin Hlihor, Europa în c`utarea unei noi arhitecturi de securitate, in “Observatorul
Militar”, no. 49. 10-16 December, 1997. p. 12.
29
30
118
A country’s power potential, and its position in the world hierarchy are the ones
that reflect the country’s possibility to acquire an economic rise at a faster pace35. Besides
the quantitative indicators for the state’s economic potential, the productivity dynamics
and the value added to the manufactured products are elements of great importance
in perceiving economic evolutions.
Nevertheless, it is the military dimension of the power potential that is believed
to give the actor’s place and role in the power equation within the international relations
system, at a certain moment. Just as no one would ever entirely eliminate the importance
of raw materials or manual labour during the production process, it would be absurd
for us to ignore the material elements of the destructive capacity or the human element
in the military potential.
The idea that the Gulf War was a high-tech one, in which the human element was
eliminated from the fight, is a fantasy36. Superior officers Rosanne Bailey and Thomas Kearn,
participants in the Gulf confrontations, state that: “The critical factor that leads to success
in the exploitation of technology remains the human factor, typically exemplified in the
performance from “Desert Storm” of fight pilots who used the AIM-7 air-to-air missile.
The progress was a fivefold performance as against Vietnam, a direct result for a more
improved training” 37. Smart weapons require smart soldiers, adequately trained
for operating ultra-sophisticated technology.
Quality is the essential element in assessing the human dimension of the military
factor, and not the quantity. Nowadays, a fighter aircraft is the equivalent of a supercomputer
with wings38. Its effectiveness almost entirely depends on the knowledge packed in avionics,
armament, and in the pilot’s brain.
The same thing, but on a small scale, happens to the fighters from the other arms.
The Gulf War completely proved this fact. The famous French military theorist and analyst
Pierre Gallois, researching these realities for the First Gulf War, stated that “The United
States sent 500 000 soldiers in the Golf, maintaining between 200 000-300 000 soldiers
in rear guard, for logistic purposes. But, in fact, the war was won by only 2 000 soldiers”39.
On the other side, Saddam Hussein opposed an army of over one million soldiers, with
an experience of war of almost 10 years, but qualitatively inferior as far as training and
the general level of preparation are concerned, while over 98% of the American volunteer
in the Gulf were high school graduates, and many of them had even a higher education40.
That is why today, in order to assess the dimension of the human factor within
the power potential, it is more relevant to make use of the qualitative indicator rather
than the quantitative one. For a state, the size of population means almost nothing
Sergiu T`ma[, op. cit., p. 230.
William T. Johnsen, Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 7 May 1998, p. 4; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, op. cit., p. 93.
37
38
Steven Lambakis, op. cit.
39
40
Ibidem, p. 94.
35
36
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~ 3/2006
for the strength of the future armed forces. By simply comparing the maps illustrating
the demographic potential with the ones showing the population’s education and urbanisation
level, one can easily notice a thing that almost goes without saying, that the armed forces
that are acknowledged as being the best ones do not belong to the states that have
the highest population density.
There are also very interesting the discussions over the place and the role nuclear
weapon has held as against the super-sophisticated non-lethal weapons in the post-Cold
War era in dimensioning a state’s power potential. The American analysts Janet
and Chris Morris, strategy experts, believe that a system of new technologies may replace
the classic military arsenal, which would be employed to defeat the enemy with minimum
bloodshed. They “can anticipate, detect, prevent or block the use of lethal means, reducing
human losses up to minimum”41. Their list might comprise ultrasounds generators to control
masses, substances used to break metals into pieces or to prevent combat machines
from moving by modifying the chemical structures of the fuel etc.
Moriss’ opinions, even if they are sometimes argued42, can be found in some official
American documents regarding military strategies43, and, at global level, one could say
that they were partially confirmed at the end of the Cold War, in the confrontation between
the two superpowers: USA and USSR. The former Soviet Union first disappeared from
the power equation and, then, disappeared as a state from the international relations
system, certainly owing to the regime crisis, but one cannot ignore the impact the Strategic
Defence Initiative ~ SDI had on it. This questioned the efficiency of Soviet long-range
missiles. If SDI could effectively block the missiles launched by Soviets before they reached
US territory, then those would have become useless, and Moscow would have been the
target of a nuclear attack without fearing for retaliations on the part of the attacker.
The economic decline of the Soviet Union made it impossible for it to respond
to the SDI. Moscow saw that it could not defend its empire unless an unacceptable
expenditure and, consequently, it withdrew from the former satellite countries44.
The Cold War had been lost for the Soviet Union without its huge nuclear arsenal being
used for its rescue.
Nevertheless, there are experts and analysts who believe that nuclear weapons
will further play a special part in the power potential of a state even after the Cold War45.
Sir Michael Quinlan, referring to this aspect, states: “The absence of war between advanced
states is a key success. We must seek to perpetuate it. Weapons are instrumental and secondary;
Ibidem, p. 154.
Ibidem, p. 162.
43
See Joint Vision 2010, America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow, pp. 7, 11-15; National Military
Strategy of the United States of America, 1997, pp.18-21.
44
See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Excerpts from “The Hegemonic Quicksand”, The National Interest, winter
2003/04, p. 209-242; Mihail Gorbaciov, Memorii, Editura Nemira, Bucure[ti, 1994, pp. 194-205; 211-222;
Alvin Toffler, op. cit., pp. 391-392.
45
Florian Gârz, NATO: Globalizare sau dispari]ie ? De la R`zboiul rece la pacea pierdut`, Bucure[ti,
1995, p. 58.
41
42
120
the basic aim is to avoid war. Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war
than one with major war but no nuclear weapons”46.
Other experts and analysts from France embrace the same idea, when they “argue
vehemently against any minimisation of the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence”47,
and the same thing happens with some Americans. The National Military Strategy
of the United States of America stipulates that the “strategic nuclear weapons remain
the keystone of US deterrent strategy”48. The United States and the Russian Federation
are known to maintain a great part of their nuclear arsenal in a permanent state of fight49.
At the same time, these states will continue to take action against nuclear proliferation
through economic, political or combined pressures, although with some concessions,
if it is the case: they will control the nuclear technology sales to the countries that persist
in producing nuclear weapons.
Yet, there are countries in the world that are engaged in nuclear arming programmes,
such as India, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Pakistan. From this perspective, nuclear
proliferation will only be delayed, and not stopped. There are other experts who think
that the reduction made by USA and the Russian Federation in their nuclear reserve
are not significant, because “by means of those treaties, Americans and Russians throw
away the old nuclear striking means (…) and keep the ultramodern, mobile and very
accurate ones”50. Therefore, we witness only an ample process of dissemination of missiles
and of other vectors that are capable to transport nuclear weapons to their target,
and not the reduction of nuclear arsenal.
Military and political analysts say that nuclear arsenal must be taken into account
when a state’s power potential is assessed51. Although humankind have not experienced
nuclear war – Japan was a tragic experiment – the use of nuclear armament dominates
the strategic thinking of the main actors of the international relations following the
Cold War. The states that possess nuclear weapons have actual plans of usage at their
disposal, and the exercises at strategic level scenarios with incalculable consequences
in case of the use of nuclear weapons to escalate conflicts are “played”.
Deciphering the mechanisms that lead to the rise or fall of an actor from the top
of the power equation has drawn historians attention for a long time, and, after the Second
World War, that of the theorists of international relations52, the political and geopolitical
analysts. Paul Kennedy reckons that the establishment of a long-term balance between
their economic potential and their military power facilitates the rise of some states among
the great powers. The decline and the fall from the top of the power equation begin
After Eugene E. Habiger, Strategic Forces for Deterrence, in “Joint Forces Quarterly”, Winter ‘96/’97, p. 66.
Jacquelin K. Davis, Charles M. Perry, and Andrew C. Winner, The Looming Alliance Debate, over
Nuclear Weapons, in “Joint Forces Quarterly”, Spring 1997, p. 84.
48
National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997, p. 25.
49
Florian Gârz, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
50
Ibidem, p. 67.
51
Barry R. Posen, Command of Commons. The Military Foundations of US Hegemony, The Mitt Press,
2001, in http://mittpress.mitt.edu/journals.
52
Stefano Guzzini, op. cit., passim.
46
47
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when this balance is disturbed and a discrepancy between the economic basis and the military
expenditure originating in unrealistic strategic objectives occurs53. The statements of the
American analyst are valid for the correlations which are established between economies
and armed forces that are specific to the second wave, and not to those specific to the
21st century. There may occur situations in which the military power does not decrease
in a parallel direction and simultaneously with the economic one. A telling example
is the one of the Russian Federation, during its period of transition. There are also cases
when the economic rise does not necessarily result in the increase of the military potential
– as it was the case for Germany and Japan after the Second World War.
The analyst George Modelski considers that the rise/fall of powers in the system
of international relations is caused/confirmed by the major conflicts in which the subjects
are involved. Studying the major conflicts of the modern and contemporary era,
G. Modelski identifies a series of hegemonic cycles associated with the “long economic
cycles in which the rise of prices and the scarcity of resources result in decreasing power,
its concentration taking place under the circumstances of some low prices and the richness
of resources”54.
The famous theorist of the international relations Martin Wight, analysing the role
of great powers in the history of international relations, reckoned that the term “dominant
power” is not a syntagm that has been accepted in diplomacy. The other states in the
international system recognise, in fact, a dominant power either by collaborating with it,
or by joining the resistance against it. But hegemony has never been accepted in theory55.
The conflicts in which the two superpowers – USA and USSR – were involved during
the Cold War confirm the statement of the American analyst. Sometimes, the ones
who seem weak win eventually, and the ones who seem disorganised outrun the more
organised ones, as it was the case of the Soviet invasion in the wars in Algeria, Vietnam
or Afghanistan.
The historian and military analyst Mihail E. Ionescu is close to Wight’s conception,
stating that, in fact, it is almost impossible to establish a unitary actional hierarchy
in the power equation because of the existence of a structural interdependence
within the international relations system. Hierarchies in the military, economic plane
or “at the low level of trans-national interdependencies” are not identical. World order
is not given by the traditional balance of power56.
The attacks on September 11, 2001 seemed to disturb the traditional way to appreciate
dominant power, in a more and more globalised world. Al-Qaeda, “a gang of insane
and gifted terrorists”57, succeeded in causing troubles to the only existing superpower
after the end of the Cold War.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500 to 2000, 1987, passim.
54
After Mihail E. Ionescu, op. cit., pp. 19-22.
55
Martin Wight, op. cit., p. 49.
56
Mihail E. Ionescu, op. cit., p. 41.
57
Emmanuel Todd, Sfâr[itul imperiului. Eseu despre descompunerea sistemului american, Editura
Albatros, Bucure[ti, 2003, p. 6.
53
122
Mass-media and some analysts do not stop presenting this organisation as a terrible
and omnipresent actor. Is it in the position of a great power ? To fight against terrorism
a multinational coalition was set up and there are voices who speak about a fourth world
war58 and, following the logic of Realism classical theory, we could state that terrorism
has become an omnipotent actor.
The paradox in the analysis shows that power appreciation/perception in the
contemporary international environment cannot be realised by appealing to classical
instruments and methods. Mention should be made that even if the most advanced
means are used it does not have better results. Roni Linser59, in a study conducted
at the Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne in 2004, using
mathematical-information modelling, comes to the conclusion that it is premature
for us to believe that we can draw pertinent conclusions in anticipating the evolutions
in the international environment.
The public opinion, and not only, need explanations for what happens in international
life and diplomats cannot lack expertise to make decisions. That is why, when estimates
of power are made in geopolitical and geostrategic analysis, to see what the possible
hierarchies of the actors in a certain area or at global level are, not only potential elements
but also the relations between the actors must be taken into consideration. In James Rosenau’s
opinion, political relations means more than the actors’ power fundaments60. The place
an actor holds at a certain time in the power hierarchy, as we will further see, the way
he perceives his position, makes him act/react to impose/affirm his interest in a certain
geographical area.
Some experts appreciate that getting to know the power of the actors involved
in competition/geopolitical rivalries well is accomplished if the following questions
could be answered61: How is the power exercised on the other actors ? What are
the outcomes of its exercise in the geopolitical system/field ? What interactions will its
use generate ? What will the reaction of the political and other institutions with vocation
in the field of international relations be ? Practically, “a portrait” of power in its three
dimensions: power as potential/powermeans; power as relations/powercapacity and power
as structure is outlined.
Norman Podhoretz, How to Win World War IV ?, in “Commentary”, February 2002, pp. 19-28.
Roni Linser, Predictive Power of Role-Play Simulations in Political Science: experience
of an e-Learning tool, in http://www.simplay.net/papers/RPSpredictive_power.html#U6.
60
James N. Rosenau, op. cit., p. 148.
61
Reinaud Bosch, op. cit. in loc. cit.
58
59
123
POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA
~ Manifestations and Tendencies ~
Captain Ion STAN
~ Chief Inspector for the Naval Forces, the Ministry of Defence Inspectorate ~
R
omania’s geographical location, at the crossroads of the main directions
in transportation – East-West and North-South –, is the geostrategical
envy of many states, as it has offered opportunities for terrestrial
and naval transportation in the Western part of the Black Sea since ancient times. Today,
a great advantage is represented by the direct connection between the Black Sea
and the North Sea, through rivers and navigable channels. Moreover, the rising interest
of European countries in the energetic resources in the Caspian Sea generates new
perspectives as far as the transportation of natural gas and oil across the area is concerned.
The main road of the goods produced
in the Far East to be sold in Western countries,
the famous “Silk Road”, follows the transportation
routes through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea,
the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea Area,
to the Central and Western Europe.
All types of transportation used to be and
are still threatened with various dangers.
Nowadays, acts of piracy and robbery have
less chances of success, but a new threat has
emerged – terrorism, which accompanies local, interethnic, religious or other conflicts.
In consequence, new methods and means to combat any type of threat are sought
nowadays, resulting in new types of cooperation, new alliances that adopt new strategies
to guarantee security and stability in the own areas of interest within the states of the world.
The recognition of the “Silk Road” importance, as an intercontinental commercial flux,
and of the Black Sea Area, as both a geostrategic entity and a turntable at strategic level,
has made for the Wider Black Sea Area to be more and more the centre of attention
of Western countries and of organisations with vocation for international security – NATO,
OSCE, ONU and the European Union.
124
Geostrategic Characteristics
The Wider Black Sea Area has been more and more talked about lately, as an area
that, besides the Black Sea littoral states – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey
and Ukraine, comprises not only the countries in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea – Armenia
and Azerbaijan, but also Moldova and the countries in the Balkans – Greece, Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia.
The Wider Black Sea Area separates and unites, at the same time, the three neighbouring
continents – Europe, Asia and Africa, thus becoming a strategic node of communications
at the crossroads of main trade, tourist or other routes.
The issue of the geostrategic position of the Black Sea and the neighbouring
territories has been many times analysed and debated, but it is far from being exhausted.
As this important position cannot escape the attention of the great strategists of the world,
their works related to the topic are very extensive.
If the “stage” remained and will remain relatively the same, from the physicalgeographical point of view, we can witness “on-the-fly” change of the “directors”, “script
writers” and “actors”, interested not only in the “plays” that can be played on this stage
but also in the advantages they may directly or indirectly derive from it. The end of the
Cold War, once with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc
from the political scene allowed for the affirmation and confirmation of non-state actors,
the development of a political dialogue and international cooperation based on partnership
and trust, concomitantly with the rapid dissemination of the values of pluralist democracy,
as well as that of the market economy.
However, the end of the Cold War
has not yet brought, either in Europe
or in the Black Sea region and the South East
of Europe, peace, stability and prosperity.
On the contrary, it favoured the reactivation
of latent conflicts, simultaneously with
the appearance of others, thus generating
new hubs of tension and insecurity in the
Wider Black Sea Area: Abkhazia, Transdnistria,
Chechnya, Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh etc.
These hubs add to the picture of the hot spots in the Balkans and directly influence zonal
and regional security and stability.
The accentuation of the energetic crisis has inevitably led to the amplification
of competition for the strategic resources in the Caspian Sea Basin, transportation routes
and commodity markets, resulting in reconsidering the role of the Wider Black Sea Area
within the Euro-Asiatic and Euro-Atlantic Security Strategy.
The oil reserves in Central Asia are very rich: Azerbaijan has 75 billion barrels,
Kazakhstan – 50 billion barrels, and Russia, in the Caspian Sea, over 5 billion barrels.
These reserves cannot be brought to the main Western consumers other way but using
the great pipelines that approximately follow the “Silk Road”.
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The Black Sea Basin represents, on the one hand, an extension of the Mediterranean
Basin towards the Baltic Sea and, on the other hand an extension, through the Caspian
Sea Basin, towards Central Asia and the Middle East, rising thus the interest of the greatest
world actors that have an important political, economic, military, cultural, demographic
etc. potential and that claim for the main roles in the world hierarchy (USA, Russia,
China, Japan, India, Western European countries).
The emergence and affirmation of new state and non-state actors in the competition
for reconfiguring the hierarchy of world power highlight a more and more active
preoccupation with making Central Asia and the Middle East, the Black Sea Basin included,
as linking elements for the two geographical entities involved into the game of global
economic and political interests.
The change of the places for the disposition of the USA military bases in Europe,
as well as the new plans to include Romania and Bulgaria among the possible places
for the disposition of American military bases, to better meet the current strategic interests,
prove the enhancement in the importance of the Black Sea Basin in the near future.
The fact the Wider Black Sea Area is in the centre of current strategic preoccupation
is not only a matter of global interest but also a prerequisite for the political situation
positive development, a guarantee of regional and world stability and security. Given
this background, the necessity for observing human rights and for ensuring individual
welfare and prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area, too, has become as mandatory
requirements in the attempts to consolidate a more secure and stable world.
The “Silk Road” towards West Passes
through Romania, too
From Ancient times, the “Silk Road” has been the most famous westward route
for the goods produced in the Far East. Once the maritime transportation system
developed, Western countries started avoiding the old caravans routes, through Central
Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea Area, to escape from
the gangs of thieves that menaced the ones who used those routes. At sea, the goods
on board of merchant ships could be easily protected against pirates’ threat, with
the help of warship fleets that navigated on the world seas and oceans.
Merchant ships, larger and safer, could
carry, by sea, large quantities of goods from
the Far and Middle East directly to the ports
in Western countries and from there to the
final destination, without facing other dangers.
Thus, maritime transportation has
developed in the Black Sea, too, connecting
the ports in the East with those in the North,
South or West, and through the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles Straits, merchant ships can
freely navigate on all the seas and oceans,
carrying various goods towards and from the farthest ports in the world.
126
We feel bound to recognise that, during the latest period, the number of pirate attacks
has considerably decreased, becoming almost inexistent, due to the present international
legislation and the severe measures of surveillance and intervention at sea currently taken.
The more extensive use of maritime routes has led to the substantial reduction
in land transportation, on the “Silk Road”, although they have never totally disappeared.
On the contrary, we can say that the “dusty road for caravans” has changed into an important
network of modern roads and rails that connect the East and the West, along the old
communication routes.
Traders in Central and Eastern Europe have continued using, on large scale,
the networks of traditional communications proper to the “Silk Road” to carry goods
from and towards Central Asia and the Middle East.
Once the energy crisis was expanded at world level, Western countries have become
more and more interested in the natural hydrocarbon reserves in Central Asia and the
Caspian Sea Area. Moreover, the beginning of an organised fight against terrorism
after September 11, 2001 started to offer new perspectives for land transportation, so the
now modernised terrestrial networks on the “Silk Road” have been paid attention again.
The main “goods” that are carried today to the European countries are gas and oil,
and the means of transportation used are pipelines and tankers. The negotiations
regarding the companies allowed to ensure exploitation and transportation, as well as
regarding the transportation routes have been very hot and they have not finished yet.
The Main Trade Routes
The main trade routes that almost exactly follow the “Silk Road” from the Central
Asia towards Europe pass towards the North and the West of Europe, through
the Caspian Sea and then, through the Black Sea Basin, as follows:
North of the Black Sea – the road stars from the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan,
Georgia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, then the road diverges towards the North
and the Centre of Europe and then towards the West.
South of the Black Sea – the road starts from the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Turkey towards the Mediterranean Sea, then, at sea, towards the centre
of Europe, through the Aegean Sea and the Adriatic Sea, or, directly towards the West.
Through and over the Black Sea – this is the road of great interest for us,
the Romanians, as starting from the Caspian Sea, it passes across the Republic of Azerbaijan
and Georgia, then it may traverse the area directly from the East to West through
the Black Sea, by pipelines, or over the Black Sea, by merchant ships, then to the other
European countries, through the Romanian or Bulgarian ports.
Advantages and Disadvantages
Having in view the strategic importance of the hydrocarbon reserves in Central Asia
and the Caspian Sea Basin, we have to analyse the way one of the above-mentioned
roads is chosen, more from the perspective of exporters, route operators and, last but
not least, from the one of gas and oil consumers.
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~ 3/2006
A series of conferences and bi- or multilateral negotiations have taken place lately,
not only between the owners of these hydrocarbon reserves and the great consumers
in the USA and Europe but also between the owners and all those interested in making
profit out of this business.
It is natural for each country to see the three possible routes through the prism
of the derived advantages and disadvantages. We can thus consider that these stay, mainly,
at the negotiation table.
Each consumer is interested in getting, safely, the entire quantity it needs, at the
time established by contract and at a low price. However, all these conditions depend
on a large range of factors such as: geographical conditions, the length of the road,
means of transportation and, last but not least, the losses resulted from the threats
and menaces to transports.
The Southern road has already been tried as, even since the last year, the first
quantities of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea have been delivered to the Western
countries through the pipelines installed and put in use on the route Baku – Tbilisi –
Ceyhan (Turkish port at the Mediterranean Sea). Despite the geographical conditions
in the area that are very rough and the length of the pipeline, the chosen means
ensures a cheaper transport, the works were successfully completed but it is difficult
and expensive to ensure the safety of transport. This route is advantageous only for
the Western countries.
The Northern route can be accomplished
in almost the same conditions as the Southern
one, although it is more advantageous for the
countries in the East and the North of Europe.
For the countries in Central Europe,
as well as for those in the North and the West
of Europe the third route would be the most
advantageous, respectively the one that crosses
the Black Sea from the East to the West.
Although this route is the straightest one,
it is difficult for the pipes to be installed. However tankers can be used in this case,
as through the already existent oil terminals in the ports of Constanta and Midia, they
can safely carry great quantities of oil from the Eastern part of the Black Sea, the Georgian
ports, directly towards the centre of Europe.
Whenever we speak about the “Silk Road” we have to consider not only oil but also
all the products that can be transported on this route. In fact, nowadays, commercial
exchanges have a double sense, respectively from Europe to the Central Asia and the
Middle East, too.
We can now say that all types of means of transportation have been modernised
and real road and railway networks have been developed (TRACECA), however maritime
transportation is the most efficient one, so the route over the Black Sea is the most
advantageous for the European countries, except those in the North of the Black Sea.
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Goods Transportation
Romania has to take full advantage of both its geostrategic location and the
opportunities generated by the fact that the trade exchanges made on the rediscovered
routes of the “Silk Road” have been paid more and more attention, one of this routes
being the one that crosses the maritime ports in the West of the Black Sea, then through
the natural or artificial navigable routes, to the North Sea. Mention should be made
that, for great quantities of goods, maritime transportation is the most profitable one,
except the perishable goods.
Romania must also start using its capacities to store and process oil and natural
gas at the Midia-Navodari Petrochemical Complex efficiently, so that it could be a provider
of oil derivates and refined products for the other European countries. The direct connection
between the Black Sea and the North Sea through the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the Danube
and the Rhine, makes it possible for the Romanian ships to carry at sea the Eastern goods
to the West and the Western ones to the East.
The capacities of the ports in Constanta can ensure the rapid transhipment
of any type of materials from the ships to the means of road, railway or fluvial transport
and vice versa, so that they stay in the port for a very short period of time.
Given these conditions, the ones of the development of multinational cooperation
in the Danube Basin, it is predictable that this way of communication should be revitalised
and turned into a genuine Cross-European navigable route, which can contribute to render
the maritime and fluvial transportation routes in the entire Black Sea Area, the connection
to the Caspian Sea Basin, through the Azov, Volga-Don System included, profitable.
Risks and Threats
From the economical point of view, the Wider Black Sea Area represents
the necessary connection with the strategically energy and material resources in Central
Asia and the Middle East, as well as with these markets that have undergone a process
of development and affirmation.
From the military point of view, our interest has acquired new dimensions in the
context of asymmetric threats amplification and diversification. Due to the existence
of some specific vulnerabilities in the Wider Black Sea Area, contrary to the evolutions
that are favourable to détente and international cooperation, threats and military
or non-military challenges that can endanger security and stability in the entire region
continue to be manifest. We can thus say that the main challenges, risks and threats
are the following:
• political-economical instability in some of the ex-communist countries in the proximity
of the Black Sea;
• separatist movements, terrorism, sabotage and piracy;
• interethnic and inter-religious conflicts;
• economic crises, poverty, corruption and clandestine emigration;
• organised crime, illegal weapons, drugs, dangerous materials and human beings
trafficking;
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• natural catastrophes, accidental or intentionally caused;
• theatres of military actions in the vicinity;
• increasing environmental pollution;
• economical competition caused by the exploitation and transport of the oil
from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Middle East;
• intensification of the extremist actions of Islamic peoples, especially among
the intellectuals and the young;
• increasing promotion of the interests of the Islamic states in Europe and stimulation
of the Islamic fundamentalism among some compact ethnic groups in the
South-East of Europe;
• existence of hidden sources that financially support terrorist groups.
The Influence of NATO and EU Enlargement
After the latest NATO enlargement, it is the first time in the history of the region
a relative state of equilibrium has been reached: three NATO Member States (Turkey,
Romania, Bulgaria) and three non-member states, although they have special relations
of partnership with the Alliance (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia).
Romania and Bulgaria becoming NATO Member States renders evident the necessity
for these countries to become more active in the region, by promoting NATO policy
in the Wider Black Sea Area. At the same time, it is necessary for the states in the region
to put in value the good neighbourhood and cooperation relations on multiple levels
with the other Black Sea littoral states. Given the conditions, the Back Sea becomes a sea
of cooperation and collaboration on new bases of equality, NATO presence being thus
one that is neither symbolic nor perceived as dangerous, but a substantial one that has
positive effects.
The almost simultaneously EU and NATO enlargement introduces a new factor
of strategic nature in the region, as three of the Black Sea littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania,
Turkey) were included in the area of prosperity of the unique market and in the future
arrangements regarding the Common Security and Defence Policy. Now Turkey has been
approved to open the negotiations to adhere to the European Union.
EU extended relations with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova,
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia highlights its
rising interest in the Wider Black Sea Area, more
and more evidently perceived as a bridge to
the energetic resources and the commodity
markets in the Caspian Sea Area, Central Asia
and the Middle East.
With regard to the new status of the
Russian Federation and EU relations, as well as
to the Strategic Partnership with the USA
and to Ukraine relations with the two integrative
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institutions and with the USA separately, new constructive approaches can be made,
in a multilateral frame, to the issues concerning regional security, mainly combating
unconventional threats, to some of the aspects concerning the military body reform
or energetic security. The efforts made to resolve the “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia,
Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and others might be subscribed to it. What pleases
us even more is the progress made with the negotiations regarding the withdrawal
of the Russian troops and military arsenals that are still placed in the territories of the
states around the Black Sea.
The presence of NATO Member States in leading the military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq stands proof for the enlargement of NATO sphere of interest outside its traditional
borders, towards Central Asia and the Middle East. NATO’s increasing involvement
in managing the crisis situations outside its area of responsibility makes the Wider Black
Sea Area become an outpost that is necessary and useful for the Alliance to project
the stability and security in the region.
The partial detent of the political relations between Greece and Turkey in providing
a reasonable solution for the issue of Cyprus, in connection with Turkey’s accession
to EU, represents a beneficial and dynamic factor in the regional cooperation within
the Wider Black Sea Area.
An initiative meant to make the intensions of cooperation in the Black Sea Area
more concrete was that of launching the “BLACKSEAFOR”, a NATO-type naval group
that comprises all the six littoral states, each of them, in turn, having the leadership
for one year. Thus, Romania took the leadership of “BLACKSEAFOR” in 2005, and the
Russian Federation this year. The main objective is that of accomplishing and enhancing
interoperability between the involved naval forces, so that they could carry out common
actions at sea, such as: surveillance, search-rescue, mines and pollution combat
and humanitarian aid operations in case of calamities etc. “BLACKSEAFOR” annual
activities also ensure reciprocal getting accustomed to the participants through visiting
the ports, meeting the local people, which directly contributes to the consolidation
of trust and security in the Black Sea.
Main Directions
The Wider Black Sea Area represents the strategic pole in securing the “Silk Road”,
as it is to become one of the elements of stability in Europe for the next 10-20 years.
The North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union will monitor promoting peace
and security in the region, being thus forced to counteract the risks generated by terrorist
acts, sabotage and organised crime, as well as by interruptions in the flux of energy resources.
Although NATO has not directly approached the regional security strategy in the
Central Asia – the Caucasus – the Black Sea axis, we cannot but notice the new tendencies
in the field of cooperation, the amplification of the dialogue and the development of the
relations with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, with the countries South of the Caucasus
and the ones in the Balkans.
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The complex situation in the Black Sea Area requires the creation of a background
for dialogue, larger than the one that has been offered so far by the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Forum – BSEC. One notable example of the good intensions of regional
cooperation and collaboration is represented by the recent reunion in Bucharest
(June current year), organised at the initiative of the President of Romania, Traian Basescu,
to create the Black Sea Forum.
To strengthen regional cooperation with a view to preventing and combating
asymmetric and unconventional risks (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, organised crime, illegal armament and human beings trafficking), complex
relations of collaboration between America, Europe, Russia and the countries in the Caspian
Sea region and Central Asia are necessary. From this perspective, NATO will be able
to make proof of its abilities and capacities through defence actions against chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear attacks – CBRN, ensuring the superiority of the means
of communication necessary to the command echelon, accomplishing interoperability
and rapid deployment of combat forces, as well as their support.
The states on the axis the Black Sea – the South Caucasus – the Caspian Sea –
Central Asia, where, in the latest years, the Western countries have developed economic,
strategic and security interests, have the political desire to collaborate, although they have
not had a common political-military action yet. That is why, through creating new institutions
and launching new common projects, concrete and specific, the political-military dimension
of the geopolitical and geostrategic action can be ensured. We appreciate that the institutions
and conventions meant to regulate the unspecific domains of cooperation on the “Silk Road”
are essential although not sufficient to get the estimated results for this stage.
The perspective of the European Union enlargement towards the South-East,
the possible inclusion of Turkey, as well as the European aspirations in the South Caucasus
prefigure the approach of the issue from a purely constructive strategic vision. There has
already been the Economic Community of Central Asia and a new Stability Pact is to be
created in the Caucasus, following the example of the Stability Pact in the Balkans.
The present conditions have caused the starting of the Process of political-military cooperation
in the Wider Black Sea Area to represent a unique opportunity for the Euro-Atlantic
Community, beneficial for all the states in these regions.
The objectives of the political-military cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Area, given
the conditions, might be:
to build modern infrastructure networks, revitalising the EU programmes
in the domains of telecommunications and informatics, transport (TRACECA),
energy (INOGATE);
to consolidate regional projects for the economical-social development;
to extend strategic partnerships;
to develop the economical and commercial relations between Romania and the
countries in the East of the Black Sea;
132
to provide consultancy and economical support for the countries in the East
of the Black Sea to develop and modernise the transportation networks towards
the Black Sea;
to ensure protection for the naval transportation and for the oil pipelines
in the Black Sea;
to modernise the Romanian naval transportation infrastructure (maritime
and fluvial), the railway and road ones;
to discourage the actions that may be law infringements, addressed to ways
and means of transportation;
to consolidate democracy and eliminate disastrous economic situations
that make countries vulnerable to extremism and terrorism;
to consolidate, without interruption, the strategy of regional cooperation
at all levels;
to peacefully resolve the issues related to the separatist movements in the region,
especially those in Armenia and Azerbaijan;
to assimilate the practices of cross-border and sub-regional cooperation,
which have already been experienced within the stability pact;
to sustain a regional programme for the protection of the environmental
protection and for enduring development in the region circumscribed to the
Black Sea.
International efforts should work in concert to materialise a political and economical
offer for the states in the Black Sea – Caucasus Area under the form of a Regional
Stability and Development Pact, with mechanisms similarly to those of the Stability Pact
for South-East Europe or inspired by it. The orientation towards a set of priorities that are
flexible, feasible on short and medium term can lead to the democratic stability and security
the Wider Black Sea Area needs.
A primordial convergence factor in the region will be represented by the development
of commerce. The pursued objectives are the acceleration of preparing the entire region
for the status of market economy, encouraging the areas of free exchange, the clarification
of the status of energetic East-West corridors and the enhancement, in perspective,
of the security of these energy routes.
On the other hand, strengthening the system of border administration is part of the
Europenisation of the strategic East-West relation, together with the development
of cooperation between local communities in border areas. Practical approaches in this
domain are meant to serve the vital interests of all categories of partners, on the entire
surface of the Wider Black Sea Area.
On short and medium term, the Black Sea Basin and the adjacent area will remain
an active area from the point of view of political, economical and even military events
that may affect regional and global security. The potential for conflict that exists in the area,
from the “frozen” conflicts to the latent and ongoing ones, corroborated with the existence
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of some terrorist groups and elements of organised crime, as well as with the rising
interest of some state and non-state actors in the strategic resources from the Caucasus,
Central Asia and the Middle East and the need for the access to them to be under
control, will cause a new substantial concentration of forces and means.
In consequence, we will witness the apparition of new forms of political-military
cooperation and collaboration in the Wider Black Sea Area.
Selective bibliography
• Silviu Jora, Consequences of NATO and EU Enlargement for Regional Cooperation, Harvard University,
April 2002.
• George-Cristian Maior, The Future of the Security Environment in the Region: New Strategic Risks,
Harvard University, April 2002.
• Aurel Sorin Encu]escu, The Impact of the 2004 Dual Enlargement upon the Security of South-East
Europe, “Manfred Wörner” Euro-Atlantic Asociation, July 2003.
• George-Cristian Maior, The New Allies and Emerging Security Dynamics in the Black Sea Area,
Columbia University, March 2004.
• Colonel dr. Ion Co[codaru, Determin`ri geopolitice [i geostrategice în Bazinul M`rii Negre [i în zona
adiacent` acestuia, Gândirea Militar` Româneasc` Journal, April 2004.
134
THE W
AR IN AFGHANIST
AN
WAR
AFGHANISTAN
IN THE CONTEXT
OF WIPING OUT WORLD TERRORISM
T
Lieutenant Colonel Vasile VREME, PhD
~ Commander, 341th Infantry Battalion ~
errorism, which used to be considered a strategic objective of external
security, has now become not only a domestic issue for each state in turn,
but also an international one, to which all the states in the world
should pay attention. The expansion of this scourge at international level has become
more and more important.
The fact that political, social, interethnic and religious contradictions have become
acute at global level, corruption, external interference in the problems of weaker states,
local and regional conflicts have more and more contributed to the motivation of terrorist
organisations that have in hand numerous human resources and considerable
military, material and financial support, so that terrorism is the most dangerous crime
described by penal law. Being an extreme form of expression for the social, ethnic
and religious radicalism and extremism, terrorism knows an unprecedented expansion
at international level.
In this context we can state that the wars and conflicts that take place in a certain
region of the world can, in time, acquire new valences and extend to other territories,
entailing new forces and means and having thus an international aspect. A convincing
example of this fact is given by Central Asia, which is now the object of expansion
and aggression on the part of the forces of terrorism and international extremism.
An important danger for the security of not only the states in Central Asia but also
in the entire world is the war in Afghanistan, country that is now (April 2006) changed
into a polygon of terror, a support for international terrorism and extremism, an extremely
favourable place for drugs traffickers.
Afghanistan represents, at this time, one of the shortest ways for transiting hundreds
of tones of opium and heroin towards the countries in Europe and North America.
The transport can be made, by means of caravans, from the tribal zones to Baluchistan,
from where they leave Pakistan for Iran. Another route can be the one through
the Republics in Central Asia. After the plates are transported and handled, using a variety
of methods – mules, camels, lorries and intermediaries included, they get to Europe
and from here, across the ocean. Even since 1960, the Afghan hashish has been considered
the best one. The Afghan plants are highly appreciated as they rise very fast and produce
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great quantities of resin. The Afghan hashish is known for its unaltered colour and texture,
its sweetness and its narcotic properties, as it induces profound dreamlike states. In their
fight for power, not only during 1997-1999 but also after taking the power and also nowadays,
the Talibans have financially relied upon drugs trafficking. In 1999, 79% from the world
opium crops were produced in Afghanistan.
The Talibans also encouraged the domestic production of heroin. UN officials state
that 95 % from the heroin that gets to Europe comes from Afghanistan. The funds resulted
from drugs trade are mainly used to support terrorism.
After the Taliban regime in Kabul was overthrown, as a result of starting the war
in 2001, the Talibans realised that they could not hold out against a direct confrontation
with the UN forces and, as they did not accept to be defeated for good, they spread
among the populace, withdrew in the mountains or fled to Vaziristan, intended to regroup
and to imply again in the resistance fights that were so familiar to them. Their command
structures remained, in their majority, functional. New recruits are easily co-opted
not only because the unemployment rate is very high, but also because the majority
of the Afghans does not agree with their country to be under foreign occupation.
At this moment, the Taliban fighters together with al-Qaeda members and the
mudjahedins in Hezb-i-Islami often come back to Afghanistan, from the training camps
in Pakistan and Vaziristan, carrying out a virulent guerrilla war that makes numerous
victims among both the Afghan civilians and the Coalition Force militaries, as well as
among the Afghans that cooperate with the Coalition Forces. The Coalition Forces
outcomes in Afghanistan up to now are far from being satisfactory; the war in Afghanistan
is in full swing and there are enough clues that force us to deduce that the state of peace
is far from being achieved. The confrontation between the Coalition forces and the
anti-Coalition ones (multi-coloured) ceaselessly continues.
In 2006 the insecurity in Afghanistan has reached alarming levels, as diversionist
and terrorist actions have continued to strike the Coalition Forces day and night, using
a diversified and ingenious range of procedures. A great part of the regions in the North,
Northeast and Northwest of the country are controlled by the chiefs of the regional
militias who collaborate with the Talibans and the insurgents.
The authority of the Central Government in Kabul is rather limited, being continually
weakened by the phenomenon of corruption that is in full expansion in this country.
The National Afghan Army, poorly paid, equipped and provided for cannot successfully
cope with the diversionist-terrorist actions of the anti-Coalition Forces. The fact that
insecurity persists at the level of the entire state is about to compromise the process
of reconstruction. The chiefs of regional militias that, in their majority, cooperate with the
Talibans have come to be alarmingly powerful. The anti-Coalition Forces have started
to practise a wide range of threats to the civil populace, determining them not to cooperate
with the forces of reconstruction and to adopt a hostile attitude towards them.
If firm actions are not to be taken to counteract all the diversionist-terrorist actions
of the anti-Coalition Forces – by both the firm use of force and concrete reconstruction
actions that follow a well-established plan, Afghanistan may fall, in a short period of time,
under the dominance of the anti-Coalition Forces and, implicitly, the one of the drugs
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traffickers. The persistence of state insecurity compromises the efforts of reconstruction
and the integration of Afghanistan on a positive direction, towards progress and civilisation.
The state of security is the determinant factor in the reconstruction of Afghanistan
and it has to follow two main directions.
The first and the most important one has to be related to firmly and unequivocally
tackle the fight against the anti-Coalition Forces. They must be definitively eliminated,
through not only direct, aggressive, intolerant combative actions, but also through trying
to integrate them in the civil society – through a programme for civic reconciliation.
The second direction – that parallels the first and is interdependent with it – has to tackle,
at the shelter of the security climate achieved through the determined application
of the first one, an ample and coherent programme for the reconstruction of civil society,
that is in a state of unimaginable poverty.
To help Afghanistan and to put it on the way of reconstruction, a climate of internal
security and substantial funds on the part of international community are necessary.
Otherwise, as they do not have “sympathy” for the “foreign benefactors” and as they
are disturbed by the military occupation, the anti-Coalition Forces – these skilled
and aggressive warriors – could overthrow the Pro-Coalition Government in Kabul,
even without the help of the insurgents.
To ensure post-war security, to make it possible for the reconstruction programmes
to run and for a secure climate of stability to be created, the Coalition Forces need to
have experts who can speak the language of the local people, can understand the culture,
the history and the attitudes of the civilians and can make use of sufficient financial
resources.
Up to now, in Afghanistan – the Coalition Forces have not disposed of the necessary
personnel, have not introduced the necessary troops to ensure internal security, for each
Afghan citizen, and have not allocated the necessary financial resources.
In other words, the post-war efforts for the pacification, reconstruction
and democratisation of the country have not made satisfactory progress. The Coalition
Forces have adopted a moderate attitude towards the insurgents, have contributed
with only few soldiers to ensuring a climate of internal security and have not had a solid
and consistent reconstruction plan.
That is why, the incomes from the opium and heroine trade have become to represent
nearly half of the entire economic production of the country, large sums of money getting
into the hands of the anti-Coalition Forces, criminals, insurgents and regional warriors.
Traffickers involved in the narcotics trade, in cooperation with some of the regional
chiefs, menace to keep the country in a state of fragmentation, criminality and political
instability. Given the already created situation and the fact that the Coalition Forces
have adopted a moderate attitude, the Taliban insurgency can overthrow the balance
of forces for their part, thus becoming progressively powerful and having more and more
of the civilians support, forcing the Coalition Forces to withdraw or to massively intervene
again, with significant forces and means, although they expose themselves to greater
risks. For a favourable resolution of the situation in Afghanistan a long period of time,
maybe tens of years, huge investments and substantial human sacrifices are necessary.
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Approaching the problem pragmatically, I consider that Afghanistan is an unknown
quantity in the equation of world power. I appreciate that the world is now in a period
of transition towards a new multipolar order and of a continuous quest for spheres
of influence and substantial natural resources – “vital oxygen bags”. These continuous
search are based on the unstable equilibrium resulted from some new associations
of regional powers. As in all periods of change, this process will be accompanied
by a period of instability and political reorganisation in the world, of revitalisation of the
competition for the domination of the vital space (oxygen bags). The contents of future
international relations will probably be influenced by the apparition of certain great
powers on the political scene, with different civilisations, as well as by their interaction
(Europe, the USA, China, Russia, Japan and India).
As a result of this situation, terrorist activity acquires an acute and unprecedented
form, prefiguring multiple effects on international security in general. Terrorist acts
committed by different groups represent the fight of the weak against the powerful
ones, that is, in fact, the asymmetric warfare – which, in the case of Afghanistan has become
reality and is a process in full swing. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked
a new boundary at the crossroads of the Cold War and the one of entering an undeclared
war, with an invisible and extremely violent, practising and applying the tactics of the
procedure “bite and run”. This marks, in fact, the beginning of a new stage in the evolution
of international relations, stage known under the name of “the war against terrorism”.
In specialised literature there is a wide range of types of terrorism mentioned
– political, state, social, religious, national, of common law etc. In my opinion, not only
in Afghanistan but also in the countries in which the majority of the population is Muslim,
in general, religious terrorism is practised. The religious terrorism practised at this moment
in Afghanistan is a phenomenon that is characteristic to the asymmetric conflict, being
exclusively carried out from inferior positions of force (military, political or economic).
Being a very efficient tactics, it is a form of starting violence on religious grounds
that promotes the superiority of the own creed to the detriment of others. Islamic
fundamentalists terrorism, the one practised in Afghanistan, co-opts the Arab countries,
in which the Islamic religion, the Shariah laws and the dispositions of the Quran are
predominant, all belonging to the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement of Sunni orientation.
In the given conditions, the terrorist activity in Afghanistan is characterised by the bigger
and bigger proportions, the lack of explicit national frontiers, the existence of connections
and interactions with different centres and international terrorist organisations, a rigid
organisational composition formed by leading structures and operative links, informative
subdivisions and of technical-material procurement, mobile fighting and covering groups,
strict conspiracy and minute selection of personnel, the infiltration of agents in law
and state bodies, advanced technical procurement that competes or even outranks
the procurement of the governmental troops subdivisions, in vast networks and conspiring
shelters, in bases and training polygons.
Being a destructive and destabilising factor for the fragile Afghan sate, terrorism
continues to represent a real danger for the security of this state, for the entire international
security, preventing the diplomatic, economic, social and cultural relations of the Afghan
state from developing naturally, leading to enormous economic, moral and political losses
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and exerting, at the same time, a strong psychological pressure on the masses. The type
of terrorism that is practised in Afghanistan at current time is represented by professional
structures capable of avoiding punishment, of carrying out genuine diversionist wars,
sometimes with massive infiltration in the local and regional conflicts, attempting to take
the control over certain territories rich in underground assets and important energy
resources. At current time, important elements of the biggest terrorist organisation
in the world – al-Qaeda – coordinated by its head and the leader, Osama bin Laden, acts
efficiently on the entire territory of Afghanistan, creating panic, uncertainty and major
prejudices against the Coalition Forces and the Afghan state.
The attacks on September 11th, 2001 on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre
(New York) and other five edifices are compared, by a part of specialists, to the attack
on Pearl Harbour, although the number of the deceased (nearly 3000) exceeds that
of the mentioned attack (2400). In my opinion, the proposed goal was absolutely similar.
This attack marked the beginning of the war on terrorism, which was, in fact,
the beginning of another type of international armed conflicts. This type of new warfare
is nowadays experimented in Afghanistan, which has been changed into a sophisticated
polygon (laboratory) for trials. The diversionist activities conducted on the territory
of Afghanistan by the anti-Coalition Forces are based on the Islamic terrorism, although,
through their actions, terrorists infringe the basic Islamic principles and thus they cannot
be called Muslims on the territory of Afghanistan. Terrorist groups belonging to the terrorist
organisation al-Qaeda attack the Coalition Forces, the State institutions (ANA, ANP)
and the civil populace every day, although the Quran, the highest source of authority
in Islam clearly blames terrorism, emphasising that “if anyone slew a person – unless
it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slew
the whole people; and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the
whole people” (Quran 5:32). The Quran bans the hurting of civilians or the destruction
of their possessions; we can thus easily conclude that the terrorism currently practised
in Afghanistan and worldwide cannot be assimilated to the Islamic religion. Nevertheless,
mention should be made that those who support and practise the al-Qaeda type of terrorism
make use of the Islamic religion, interpreting the Quran in their favour and manipulating,
for personal purposes, a major part of the population of Islamic religion, indoctrinating
them with a view of committing acts that are extremely grave for humankind, which,
in fact, contradict the Islam prescriptions.
The most efficient weapon, used by Bin Laden against the Coalition Forces is the
Muslim religion, interpreting the Quran and its role of a catalyst among the Muslims.
“Rise to support your religion. Islam is calling on you … Muslims … your support
for us will make us stronger and will further support your brothers in Afghanistan”,
said Bin Laden in one of his speeches, recorded on a video cassette, broadcast, as always,
by the al-Jazeera Channel in Qatar. This war is, above all, a religious one and this is the
message used by Bin Laden in his attempt to convince the Muslims that it is their duty
to be close to him in what is called the Christians “crusade” against the Islam. He has
made a lot of references to the Quran, citing verses, as well as Mohammed, in an evident
effort to appeal to the emotions, to the religion to which no Muslim can be indifferent.
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Mention should be made that the Islam is today the religion of more than 600 million
of faithful people, spread on all continents. Islam is one of the two non-Christian religious
that have supporters all over the world.
From the cultural point of view, the Islamic religion dominates the lives of most Afghans,
from their birth to death. A new extremely efficient weapon used by the anti-Coalition
Forces in Afghanistan is the Internet, used as a means of communication with a safe
and secret character and as a modality to deliver, online, the information and manuals
necessary for terrorists training. Thus, the global movement initiated by al-Qaeda has
become a coordinated phenomenon, via the Internet, and the secret services proved
inefficient in preventing the terrorist organisation from accessing the Internet. Al-Qaeda
succeeded in building a vast virtual library that contains not only materials used
to train terrorist but also forums for discussions, where experts of the organisation
permanently answer the questions related to preparing poisons or building hand-made
bombs. Al-Qaeda innovation, to use the Internet, causes troubles to the secret services,
as it is impossible for them to strike terrorists when they are vulnerable, respectively
when they move or travel. Although the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan banned the radio
and television, as being modern Western innovations, the leaders of al-Qaeda organisation
make full use of the Globalisation technologies.
Bin Laden has been using mobile phones, video cameras, as well as computers as
means of propaganda and communication with the rest of terrorist cells even since 1996.
The methods used and video recordings are today delivered almost instantly
to millions of supporters, via the Internet. Most of the video images reproduce the experience
in the Afghan training camps. It has been discovered even a library of the al-Qaeda
organisation, containing images about how to organise an assassination or kidnapping,
how to build a grenade, how to attack a state, how to destroy a bridge or to launch
a missile. A major part of the operations described in the training manuals kept
on one of the al-Qaeda sites, Global Islamic Media Front, has been put in practice
in Afghanistan. Never before has a terrorist organisation successfully combined the war
in the battlefield with the electronic Jihad, changing the al-Qaeda techniques into what
experts call the “future insurgency war”, in which no action remains unrecorded, and the
atrocities seem to be committed especially with a view to being instantly delivered online.
Some years ago, there was no such electronic empire and al-Qaeda was little known
on the Internet. Today, the terrorist organisation and its leader, Bin Laden, has acquired
an enormous symbolic capital, especially due to the efficiency in using the Internet to
make the actions popular. In conclusion, the war in Afghanistan is an asymmetric-type
war, which, in my opinion, will be waged for a long period of time. Material and human
losses will be heavier after military operations are officially ended than during the campaign
per se. The after-war period has become more dangerous than the war itself. The military
intervention, if not accompanied by a favourable political solution, risks remaining
a lost victory.
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“The Doctrine
and Training Directorate
is the specialised structure
of the General Staff
with responsibilities
for drafting military doctrines
and regulations, training,
standardisation and training
assessment concepts,
for coordinating the military
education and physical training
activity in the armed forces”
Niculae Tabarcia was born on the
18th of November 1957. He graduated
from the Military High School (1976),
Antiaircraft Artillery Officers School
(1979), Academy of Advanced
Military Studies (1986) and the
Faculty of Political and Administrative
Science, The Political Science Section,
the University of Bucharest (2001).
He filled command and staff
positions as follows: platoon
commander, battery commander,
instructor and lecturer at the Artillery
and Anti-aircraft Missiles Department
within the Antiaircraft Artillery
Training Centre (1979-1984), chief
of staff (first deputy of the commander)
of the 1st Antiaircraft Missiles Brigade
(1992-2001), commander of the
19th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade
(2001-2002), Head of the Operations
Service within the Air Forces Staff
(2002), commander of the 1st Surfaceto-Air Missiles Brigade (2002-2005).
In 2005, he was appointed Head
of the Doctrine and Training
Directorate within the General Staff.
He attended the Post-academic
course for brigade commanders
(1993), an intensive French language
Interview with Brigadier Niculae TABARCIA
~ Chief of the Doctrine and Training Directorate
within the General Staff ~
The statement according to which
the core of an army’s being is determined
by the need for militarily defending
the state and by the necessity for
a specific promotion of the national
interests is a truism, at the level of our
discussion. That is the reason why,
General, I would like you to accept
to engage in discussion to support
those who are interested in becoming
acquainted, “on the shortest path”,
with the essential doctrinaire concerns
regarding the forces operational state
improvement through training.
I believe our dialogue on this topic must be
approached by taking into account, first of all, the place
education holds in the military activities ensemble.
In order to do that, I will turn to the conceptual frame
that defines the topic of this discussion, the capability
concept, respectively. The transformation elements
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regarding capabilities were approached at the
Washington and Prague Summits.
According to this concept, the military capability
represents the “ability to reach a specific objective
in wartime” and includes the forces structure, equipment,
response level, namely education and sustainment.
If the former two and the latter one are “fix” elements,
having an “organisational” nature, a “material” one
respectively, education remains the sole element
with an actional nature capable to develop and improve
itself “on the fly”, because it is pre-eminently represented by the – intellectual and physical
– capacities of the human factor, who is involved himself in the improvement process
that is indispensable for achieving the most effective actional vector, namely developing
the winner’s mentality. In other words, education-training results in essential changes
in the most important dimension of transformation – that of mentality. In addition,
the defining elements for the spiritual area, namely culture, civic spirit, patriotism are
beneficially influenced by it.
But, in this respect, the military body’s concerns are best defined in the Romanian
Armed Forces Transformation Strategy, whose provisions aim at: adapting the entire
education process to the one applied within NATO; process standardisation; becoming
accustomed to operating procedures; applying operational assessment procedures
and achieving a higher operational capacity of forces; carrying out the education based
on modern principles, concepts and technologies; increasing the actional interoperability
between own forces and the other NATO Member States armed forces; making the activity
more effective.
This is, therefore, the way the Romanian Armed Forces will take shape and the
way it will develop a human professional component that is structured and dimensioned
accordingly and that will timely provide the requirements for filling the positions
belonging to the command and execution structures with well-trained personnel.
In a comprehensive view of the topic, we understand that the Romanian Armed
Forces Training System is based on a professionalised training process, context
in which the path from idea to its materialisation is outlined by means of four core
activities, namely: doctrinaire training system planning; its differentiation
according to training levels, structures and forms; system implementation
and accomplishment; training assessment. In this context, The Romanian Armed
Forces Training Doctrine, drafted by the Doctrine and Training Directorate, has been
funded on the current conflicts theory, taking into consideration the evolution of the
modern battlefield physiognomy. On a different level of interest, an important spot that
holds our attention is the training programmes structure, which we have drafted based
on the operational requirements imposed by carrying out fighting actions. As you can
see, it is well known the fact that it is impossible for fighting structures to achieve
and maintain a high level of preparation for all the training requirements, reason
course (1995), the Post-academic
refresher course for command of the
military information activities (1998),
an English language course (2001),
the Post-academic refresher course
for Strategic Command (2001),
NATO Defence College, Italy (2003),
the English course for generals,
Canada (2004).
He is married and has one child.
He can speak English and French.
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for which we apply the principle “we train like we fight and we fight like we train”
through adopting a fight mission-based training system. Because, whether we like it
or not, the useful effect of the work that has been carried out in the training process is
reflected, in the last analysis, in the capacity of the military structures to fulfil missions
and is assessed while the exercises take place. That is the reason for which commanders
and their staffs selectively identify those essential requirements to fulfil fight missions,
requirements subsequently introduced in the “Mission Essential Task List – METL”,
drafted so as to comprise all the activities and actions that any military structure, no matter
what it is, must execute in order to fulfil the assigned fight mission.
Beyond the conceptual frame described above, we are concerned with finding
the best ways and methods to fulfil training standardisation as fast as possible; optimising
training standards so as to acquire the best results, given the circumstances of some
restrictive budgetary allocations and in a quite short period of time; improving training
through the as rapid as possible implementation of new concepts such as “Mission Training
Programmes” – MTP and “Mission Essential Task List” – METL; finding the most adequate
means to adapt the specific normative acts to the provisions of the law package which
will regulate the activity within the military field.
The structure you command manages the way forces training
doctrinaire fundaments are conceived, rethought of and drafted.
From the perspective of these responsibilities, by emphasising
the super-structural architecture of the components that shape
the Armed Forces combative capacity, would you please tell us
which the determinations of this process, its conceptual contents,
its manifest tendencies and, in the already employed logics,
the desired finalities, the projected ones are.
The Doctrine and Training Directorate is the structure responsible for projecting
the architecture of an efficient training system, for implementing this system and for
providing it with the necessary programmes. The training system I am referring to has
already been decided within the Romanian Armed Forces Training Doctrine, namely
the revised version that has been in force since the beginning of the year. This document
lays the foundations of accomplishing the reform in the field of training, a reform that
means the organisation and development of this activity according to the principles
and concepts that are specific to NATO modern armed forces. In keeping with this
document, we have established a series of training priorities for the timeline 2007-2010,
as follows: completing the conceptual frame regarding the collective training planning,
accomplishment and assessment at the level of headquarters and that of forces;
completing the draft for Mission Training Programmes and applying them in the training
process; remodelling the conceptual frame regarding the individual training planning,
accomplishment and assessment; remodelling the conceptual frame regarding the
Romanian Armed Forces taking part in multinational exercises.
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As for the priority execution, we must: implement the Romanian Armed Forces
Training Doctrine provisions; fulfil the requirements of the plans for integrating through
training; develop the MTP-based training process; accomplish the necessary training
level of the forces meant for NATO and EU, in keeping with the standards established
by the NATO and EU structures they subordinate to; increase the effectiveness of the
participation in multinational exercises and in training activities, organised and carried
out by NATO and EU and plan, organise and assess, with a view to certify and assert
forces and headquarters.
We also seek to implement the “Handbook for Drafting Mission Training Programmes”,
difficult tasks devolving upon the military branches staffs and the application schools,
and then, of course, upon the military structures commanders who will train themselves
in accordance with these programmes. However, I believe we will be able to speak about
the tangible effects of the training level starting with 2007. This document will make
it possible for the concept of METL or, much simpler, the training for the assigned mission,
to be put into practice. Therefore, during the following period, we will train the personnel
to plan, develop and assess the training based on this concept.
Another concern is drafting the “Conception regarding the training of soldiers
and volunteer sergeants” and “laying the foundations” of its implementation. In this respect,
we must also work to standardise the individual training.
How do you define, General, in the systemic approach of the
issues tackled, the place, the role, the importance and the courses
of action regarding forces training in the extremely complex equation
of achieving a convincing operational capability ?
Operational capability is the resultant of three distinct components: the conceptual,
the volitional and the physical component one. Forces training is in both the physical
and moral components and represents an essential activity of the process of achieving
operational capability. The result of the training activity is synthetically expressed through
the quality of personnel and military structures.
Forces training cannot be approached isolated, as it interplays with all the other
elements that cooperate to achieve operational capability. Minimising any of these
relations leads to failing to achieve objectives and might result in malfunctions in the
entire military system.
The role of training is manifest not only in generating forces but also in verifying,
ever since peacetime, the viability of operations doctrines and the effectiveness of military
equipment, the organisation of structures and the act of command. In peacetime, training
is the core activity in the Armed Forces.
Training provides forces that are interoperable with the ones belonging to the NATO
or EU Member States armies and capable to fulfil the assigned missions.
Besides, we have more than once stated that, under no circumstance, can a convincing
operational capability be achieved only declaratively. Within an alliance, carrying out
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missions must be seriously considered, especially in theatres of operations, the missions
being fulfilled by perfectly correlating the abilities of those who organise and who lead
the action, headquarters respectively, and direct executants, troops respectively. That
is precisely the reason for which I will further approach the issue from the perspective
of two elements. To begin with, I will mention a few words about headquarters training.
It has been carried out especially to enhance the operational headquarters, units
and big units capability in order to plan, make ready and use forces in military actions,
independently or jointly, inside or outside the national territory, within certain groups
of multinational forces.
In this respect, one has mainly worked to improve the capacity to command
the process of operationalising military structures; to develop the potential of operational
headquarters, big units or units to command forces in joint military actions; to achieve
the capacity to command structures in the new circumstances, created through
restructuring and re-subordination, in order to fulfil the assigned missions; to provide
cohesion, decision-making capacity and speed of action in order to organise military
actions and to make use of forces.
The Doctrine and Training Directorate has coordinated the expertise activity
of the documents of headquarters exercises, with troops and training through simulation,
submitted for approval by the structures subordinated to the General Staff, and the activity
of drafting the training plan in concert with structures subordinate to the Ministry
of Administration and Interior.
At the same time, the Directorate has organised and developed conferences
to plan exercises together with the structures that carry out this kind of activities, seeking
to provide the activities with a joint character.
The headquarters activities that we organise have approached topical issues, that
are closely connected with the current political-military context and the personnel’s
training needs, by laying stress on commanding, training and leading military actions
in complex circumstances.
The subject of the activities has taken into account Romania’s status of NATO
member country and the implications it entails, as well as the necessity of training according
to the specific responsibilities and missions.
The lessons learnt have played an important part in the organisation and development
of some of the headquarters training activities.
As far as Troops Collective Training is concerned, the Romanian Armed Forces
Training Doctrine coming into force has made it possible for the framework necessary
for transformation in the training field to be established. At the same time, military
personnel got accustomed to the architecture of the future training system, the new
concepts and the programmes that are currently undergoing different stages of drafting
or implementing.
Starting with this training conception, our Directorate is drafting the “Order regarding
the Romanian Armed Forces training between 2007-2010”, a core document
which establishes the way the Romanian Armed Forces training is planned,
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fulfilled and assessed, approaching this activity as being an essential part of forces
generation/regeneration and employment cycle.
As far as the document that super-structurally “manages”
the Romanian Armed Forces training process – The Romanian Armed
Forces Training Doctrine, what would the assertion fields of the document,
the engaged objectives, the components of the training process
and its functional nature be ?
With the help of a substantial assistance on the part of the American experts
group reunited within the CUBIC team, in 2003, the first “Romanian Armed Forces
Training Doctrine” has been drafted and entered into force, a conceptual document
that is fundamental to the reform in the field of training. The document, inspired
by similar publications of the American and British forces, introduces some essential
concepts for what we call a modern education, according to NATO vision, especially
regarding: military education, which aims at developing student’s ability to think;
participation in fighting missions, seen as a component of education, too; collective
education and training standardisation.
The new edition of the forces training doctrine – The Romanian Armed Forces
Training Doctrine, the 2006 edition, drafted by the Training and Doctrine Directorate,
is a core document stipulated in the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy,
in which the general theories, principles, concepts and rules that lie at the basis of carrying
out the military education activity are revealed in a modern vision, which is clearer
and more concise, and reflects the official position for the approach of the activity in this
field by the responsible organisms in the military system.
This was drafted based on the experience the decision-making factors have
accumulated since the first edition was put into application, as well as on the experience
accumulated as a NATO Member State.
Consequently, this document represents the authorised source or the fundament
the future specific normative documents/acts will be based on, which will regulate
the standardisation, planning, development and assessment of forces/personnel training.
Through the new doctrine, we have intended to sustain the Romanian Armed Forces
transformation process, identifying and operationalising the priority objectives that devolve
upon us, namely: to substantiate and organise personnel/forces education on modern
principles, concepts and technologies, which are specific to NATO and NATO Member
States armed forces; to implement a new modern, active, unitary, integrated and effective
way of working in the field of education; to increase interoperability between the military
branches and between them and NATO Member States armed forces.
In the new vision, forces education was structured on four basic components,
in which each component plays its part, well defined within the framework of the training
process in its whole.
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Each component has its specific partial objectives, placed in a logic order, from theory
to practice, but one can also notice they interpenetrate in the transition area.
At conceptual level, the reforming process has gone further with the “Strategy
of Education through Simulation in the Ministry of National Defence” and the “Conception
for Training Standardisation” coming into force, as well as other very important
documents that we are drafting at present, as follows: The “METL” and its Application
in the Training Process; The Missions Training Programmes; The Conception regarding
the Lessons Learnt in the Romanian Armed Forces; The “Graduate Model” Concept
and its Application in the Military Education; The Conception of the Military Education
Transformation; The Conception regarding the Soldiers and Professional Sergeants Education.
We believe the latter will be one of the essential parts that will lay at the basis
of the military personnel professionalisation process, considering that this category
of personnel is subject to the most important changes in the field of education. In fact,
the category of soldiers/professional sergeants will significantly influence non-commissioned
officers’ education, too, who, according to a new idea, will almost entirely come from
the category of professional sergeants.
One can easily notice, especially of late, an extremely important
concern for the existence of a certain forces education cycle, and
also for the forces that operate in common to adopt a certain level
of standardisation. Would you be kind to specify the place education
holds in the general plan of the forces generating and employment
cycle and, in this context, to point out the importance of
standardisation in the field ?
It is true, the successive unfolding of activities within each and every education
component is somehow cyclical, nevertheless, presently, one does not use the concept
“education cycle” but a much more complex one – “the forces generation/regeneration
and employment cycle”.
Just as I have mentioned before, each education component has specific objectives.
The issue of standardising the activities within each component with a view to fulfilling
objectives is a complex and long-lasting process, therefore the least standardised
component is the military education (because it is part of the civil education, whose
standardisation must be taken into account at the same time) and is completed with
exercises, which are almost completely standardised, education being somewhere
between the two components, with an intermediate standardisation level.
During the development of this process of forces generation/regeneration
and employment, an intense process of personnel institutional education and missionoriented operational training takes place, simultaneously with the efforts for basic activities
standardisation.
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The essential transformations within the Romanian Armed Forces are found in what
we call the process of “standardisation-interoperability” with the NATO Member States
military structures.
Although this desideratum does not represent a novelty for us, still, given the
circumstances provided by the status of “Alliance’s member”, it is approached in a new
way, in a complex framework, which requires, let us say it, major investments, especially
of financial nature. Its difficulty amplifies when a logic and objective requirement is not
met, namely when the proposed objectives fail to comply with the necessary resources
and when the need for the way of thinking and operating to be harmonised with
the Western conception is not taken into account. It is what we have understood to be
investment and effort in changing mentality and achieving “intellectual interoperability”
with the Alliance.
In this respect, the conception regarding our armed forces education has undergone
great changes, which come from the security environment evolution analysis and of
carrying out military actions new physiognomy.
The lessons learnt following the forces taking part in different international missions,
exercises, meetings and conferences in the field have represented a good opportunity
for the conceptual clarification and a concerted action, with a view to achieving
“the intellectual compatibility” of military personnel.
General, which is, according to the competencies of the structure
you are in charge of, as far as the formal manifestation and of essential
contents are concerned, the decisive issues of education and how
will this be accomplished from the perspective of doctrinaire
“management” ?
As you well know, at present, The Doctrine and Training Directorate is the
specialised structure of the General Staff with responsibilities for drafting military
doctrines and regulations, training, standardisation and training assessment concepts,
for coordinating the military education and physical training activity in the armed forces.
According to competencies, specific normative acts in keeping with the legislation
in force are drafted, the harmonisation between the Armed Forces education concepts
and the ones used in the NATO Member States armed forces is accomplished, the military
education is more and more improved in accordance with the evolution in these fields
at international level.
Drafting the entire system of “reference” documents, as well as translating some
NATO dictionaries and glossaries, within the structures of the Directorate, has necessitated
a constant team effort, a serious documentation in domains which are many times
restrictive or little exploited, and to which other structures with responsibilities in drafting
specific normative acts have contributed, in the spirit of the collaboration institutionalised
in the armed forces.
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In the field of doctrines, regulations, instructions, handbooks and methodologies,
tailoring the new military capabilities to meet the requirements of modern war entails
the implementation of a new system of norms, procedures, regulations and standards
derived from the experience and military actions carried out under NATO command.
The current conceptual system, although it provides the premises for an approach
that is the same with that of the Alliance, is about to be tailored and improved for all
Armed Forces branches, with the purpose to develop rapid and efficient combat operations
and actions in a joint and multinational framework.
The new operational concepts, stipulated in the military doctrines that we draft
or offer expertise for, guide us towards causing fighters to acquire the mentality of winner,
as they must rapidly adapt to the real conditions of operative situations, take action
independently, within national or multinational structures, inside or outside the country,
depending on specific missions and particularities.
Applying the new doctrines and regulations in which concepts specific to the Alliance
have been included will significantly change the structure and functionality of the military
body in its whole, as well as at the level of its components, will also ensure the improvement
of command and the synergy of military action, and will optimise the Romanian Armed
Forces capabilities.
Through harmonising military documents with the Alliance’s requirements, we will
cause the unitary use of the same operational concepts, therefore, the same method
to reason at tactical, operative and strategic level, as our partners do. In this respect,
both Romanian military theory and practice will be made compatible with the Western
ones, in order to efficiently meet the requirements imposed by the nature of current
and future threats, by the quality standards used in training the Romanian Armed Forces
to participate in this kind of conflicts, no matter the theatre of operations and the conditions
it provides (excessive climate, culture and civilisation degree etc.) and the methods
and rules of engaging in order to be successful. The ceaseless effort of those who have
worked to harmonise the content of specific normative acts, doctrines and military
handbooks within the Directorate has been directed towards modernity and
effectiveness, the selective establishment of novelty and the elimination of formalism
and routine, thus paying its contribution to the change of military personnel’s mentality
and the reorientation of most of its part towards the study and assimilation of what
is really valuable.
We reckon that the effort made for implementing the new documents will be
long-lasting and will represent, and there cannot be otherwise, a ceaseless process.
Is the discharged personnel training taken into account
anymore ?
Given the circumstances of the sound change of Romania’s security environment,
of adopting a new national security strategy and, consequently, of the drastic cut of effectives
and their professionalisation, the number of discharged personnel is more and more reduced.
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The new situation requires for the role and the place of discharged personnel to be
reconsidered, especially with regard to the system of recruiting and training it. The general
trend in NATO Member States consists in using volunteer reservists. Through the Law
Draft regarding the Status of Soldiers and Volunteer Reservists one aims at legislating
the status of soldiers and volunteer reservists in the Romanian Armed Forces. Establishing
this category of personnel can have positive effects upon recruiting and training reservists.
Being directly interested in the activity in the military field, reservists will show more
concern for increasing their education level.
Theoretically, reservists must have the same education level with active personnel.
Still, in reality, owing to the specificity of this personnel category, this situation is not
encountered in any army. As far as reservists are concerned, it is essential that, in a relatively
short period, through an intensive and adequate education programme, they are able
to integrate and to reach the performances that are necessary to fulfil missions.
Training volunteer reservists will take place differently, depending on where they
come from, as follows: volunteer reservists who have not fulfilled active military service
and volunteer reservists who have already fulfilled active military service, in the forms
provisioned by the law.
The training of volunteer reservists who have not fulfilled active military service,
with a view to assimilating knowledge and developing skills, will take place during 4 months,
in battalions/training centres and in units.
The training of volunteer reservists who have not fulfilled active military service,
after completing the 4 months of training, and of those who have fulfilled active military
service will take place in generating/regenerating military units in which they are assigned
at the moment of their recruitment. All volunteer reservists participate in the training
2 days a month, in their spare time, on Saturdays and Sundays, and 5 successive working
days every year. The final purpose of educating reservists is the same as in the case
of the active personnel – reaching the training level necessary for missions to be fulfilled.
Military education – the tutelary element of the training process,
its epistemological ground, practically. Would you be so kind to reveal
the principles of its mission and to emphasise the concepts that define
its essence, process, connections, basic structure and finalities.
First of all, I want to say that your question aims at a very controversial domain,
very disputed at the level of our Armed Forces central structures. Under different aspects
and in very different proportions, the responsibility for the military education devolves
upon the Human Resources Management Directorate, Organisation, Personnel and
Mobilisation Directorate, and, last but not least, to the Doctrine and Training Directorate.
To think of the military education as being a basic form of education, together
with training, exercises and training under the prerogatives of the job, is not, by far,
a venturesome attempt to redefine this notion, but an acknowledgement of the place
it holds. Therefore, for us, education is one of the three pillars on which the architecture
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of the training system, as we have dealt with in the Romanian Armed Forces Training
Doctrine, is grounded. The Personnel staff thinks of it as being a matter of concern
for human resources management. I could not explain in what way precisely, though.
No matter who is right, we are aware of the fact that, if this difference of opinion persists,
nobody will win.
The main feature of the activity in the military education domain is represented
by the fact that the process of structural and content reform of the military education
continues, at the same time with the fulfilment of the military personnel formation,
improvement and specialisation plan in activity or in reserve.
In the military education domain, the reforming process has unfolded at conceptual
level, the content of education being reconsidered so that it should respond to the current
training requirements, in agreement with the evolution of structures and the requirements
of the positions the graduates will fill. The syllabuses have a complex, modern content
that is adjusted depending on the needs, personnel forms of training and development,
as well as on its training and development levels.
The Doctrine and Training Directorate has worked together with the Human
Resources Management Directorate to draft “The Conception regarding the training,
professional development and the use of non-commissioned officers and warrant officers
in the Romanian Armed Forces” and “The Conception regarding the formation, the professional
development and the use of officers in the Romanian Armed Forces”.
An extremely important step has been taken through theoretically grounding
the officers’ development process in an indirect way. The new conception regarding
the formation, the professional development and the use of non-commissioned officers
and warrant officers provides the framework for acquiring a cadre of specialists that are
trained for the new missions of the Romanian Armed Forces, as armed forces of a NATO
Member State.
At present, through the “Conception regarding the formation, the professional
development and the use of officers” the foundations of the formative higher education
have been laid, which meets the requirements of the “Law regarding the organisation
of higher education studies”.
In order to meet the Armed Forces need to have a command and staff corps, there
are many possible courses of action. Without claiming to be pioneers of outlining education
systems, I can illustrate this with two classes of the kind, for training officers in a direct
manner that a lot of the NATO Member States make use of. A first one would be the one
that is present, through higher education, within the academies existing at the level
of each branch of the armed forces, and another one in the institutions in which only
the competencies that are specific to the military are formed, the officers receiving
their certificate up to the rank of a major, in the civil higher education system, in distance
learning centres. All these depend on option, resources and, why not, traditions.
Getting back to what is being done at present, the curricula of the National Defence
University, of the military academies of the military branches and of the application
schools are in process of being re-examined, in order to mirror NATO strategies,
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doctrines, procedures and standards, as well as to improve the training of the military
and civil personnel. The purpose of this process is to embrace all NATO regulations,
standards and publications that will become accessible to our country.
The modification of all the regulations regarding joint training will carry on
at the level of the branches of forces, to include NATO standards, doctrines, procedures
and strategies. Non-commissioned officers’ training will further have priority.
The number of the military and civil personnel with English language skills will be
increased in order to fill positions in NATO structures at national or international level.
The training of the personnel identified to fill positions at NATO Headquarters will go on.
In what way does the understanding of this condition, that is
prerequisite for effective armed forces – namely training and its applied
state, relate to what happens in the North-Atlantic Alliance ?
The process of integrating into NATO is very long and complex, especially given
the circumstances in which NATO is undergoing a sound transformation, in other words,
it is a moving target. As far as the field of education is concerned, we can say that we are,
at the same time, lucky, because education has been considered a national responsibility,
but also unlucky, since, because there is no system and there are no NATO training
standards, we have nothing to relate to. What still gives us hope is the fact that the NATO
transformation process also includes the accomplishment of our own education system
and, consequently, we can go on with the reform, knowing where we have to get to.
In the field of training, we have nothing to “recover” during integration. Still, we will
take into account the “synchronisation” of actions, as the training standardisation
will more and more become a reality and not a desideratum at the Alliance level.
The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy pays
special attention to doctrinaire problems and education. What is,
on the background of the fields you manage – doctrines, military
education, training, exercises, the philosophy of transformation ?
The new realities that have occurred in the security environment, the need
to make the structures of forces more effective, as well as the new coordinates of NATO
transformation process all determine sound transformations of the doctrines and of the
education process.
In this context, transformation implies the improvement of doctrinaire concepts
and training programmes, as well as a profound mentality change.
Transformation represents a never-ending process of adaptation and rapid
settlement of the problems occurred, in a dynamic, joint and multinational environment.
In the field of doctrines, one has started to create the necessary framework aiming
mainly at achieving a unitary thinking in the domains of the military concepts, of the
operational language and of the procedures of planning and developing military
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operations, by essentially focusing on the implementation of operational language
and fighting procedures that are able to facilitate the common actions in the full range
of the military operations and to reflect the requirements imposed by the evolutions
of the security environment, techniques and technologies, as well as their influence
on the military art.
When establishing the vision regarding the transformation process in the domain
of forces education, we had in view, first of all, the operational capability that should be
achieved, the resources at hand and the starting education level.
In order to materialise this vision, we are considering the fulfilment of some basic
objectives, as follows: achieving the forces training on modern principles, concepts
and technologies, specific to NATO; establishing a unitary, integrated, effective and modern
way of working at the level of those who have responsibilities in the education domain;
increasing the actional interoperability of own armed forces with those of the other NATO
Member States; making the forces training activity more effective.
Military education will cover the same modernisation stages as the Romanian
education. Through the educational objectives, programmes’ organisation and structure,
military education will provide both the exigencies of the military profession and the
integration of their graduates in the civil life.
Training, as a predominantly practical-applicative activity, will have the formation
and development of individuals’ and military structures’ capacity of action as main
objective, with a view to carrying out the prerogatives of their job/missions. Through
training, one will achieve the fighting cohesion of the military structures, and will also
develop the capacity of forces to answer and act efficiently on the battlefield. The new
concepts have the role to guide the effort made for the modernisation/transformation
of training and to provide the achievement of interoperability between both the military
branches and those and the armed forces of the other NATO Member States. In the
circumstances in which the classic training is an activity that uses al lot of resources,
a particular role will be held by modelling-simulating systems. Using them will represent
one of the most efficient ways of training.
What are the perspectives which define the Directorate
expectations ?
I have mentioned before that the pillars that support the entire architecture
of forces training are the military education, training, exercises and training through
practice. The Romanian Armed Forces seek to form and develop a professional human
component, in military and civil education establishments, structured and dimensioned
accordingly, able to opportunely provide what is necessary for filling the structures
of command and execution with well-trained personnel. As far as military education
is concerned, in general, and the one of an officer’s development, in particular, we consider
several possible courses of action: maintaining the current system and achieving
an obvious structural transformation; gradually transforming the present academies
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in specialised faculties within the National Defence University; maintaining the education
establishments only for forming the military professional profile of officers, their higher
education being completed in the civil system, under the circumstances and forms that
are advantageous for the Ministry of National Defence.
The modernisation of the didactic ways of organising and of the technologies
will comprise, first of all, the establishment of Advanced Distributed Learning ~ ADL,
an educational process facilitated by higher technologies.
Since training, as a predominantly practical-applicative activity, will have the formation
and development of individuals’ and military structures’ capacity of action as main objective,
with a view to carrying out the prerogatives of their job/missions, we are particularly
concerned with the procurement of valuable modelling-simulating systems and efficiently
using them on a larger scale, because we think of them as representing one of the most
efficient way of training. Still, it will not replace classic training, on the contrary, it will add
to it and will enhance its range, many of its segments will develop by means of simulations,
maintaining, nevertheless, a close connection of the training in the field with the reality
of the fight through harmonising the theme and procedures for fulfilling exercises through
simulation (SIMEX-type) with those specific to NATO. We will also be concerned,
in the medium and long run, with the problems raised by exercises. These will represent
a special part of training, which will be covered only by the structures having a relatively
high level of training and will have the development of collective skills for the command
and for actional structures as main objective. Their purpose is achieving the operational
support for assessment, with a view to certifying and asserting the structures meant
to NATO. Taking part in multinational exercises has as main purpose the achievement
of own forces interoperability with NATO and EU Member States armed forces,
the cooperation within regional initiatives, so that, when needed, our forces should be
able to efficiently act in order to fulfil missions. We will also take into account the problem
of training through practice, a new and specific training component, which consists
in storing experience in units, by fulfilling the prerogatives of many jobs, successively,
as well as in theatres of operations, by taking part in actions or filling positions at NATO
Headquarters. In this respect, completing and approving the “Conception regarding the Lessons
Learnt in the Romanian Armed Forces” becomes a priority, which will allow for the system
and process of the lessons learnt in the Romanian Armed Forces to be implemented.
I would like to mention that coordinating and monitoring the establishment of the
National Education Centre, as well as enhancing the number of units participating
in training within the Simulation Training Centre are among the priorities of the Doctrine
and Training Directorate. The organisation and implementation of a unitary system
of lessons learnt in the Romanian Armed Forces, defined as priority objectives within
the Directorate, will allow, among others, for the future military activities to be made
effective, for a great number of reports to be processed, as well as for the doctrines,
handbooks, regulations and normative acts to be modified and updated.
We are also concerned with the fact that the term for the objectives established
for the formation of permanent personnel, in a direct manner (especially the officers
of arms), the real, concrete requirements of the positions they will be assigned is close.
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As far as the domain of drafting specific normative acts, military doctrines and
handbooks is concerned, we want a regulated, efficient and flexible framework to operate
within the military establishment, so that, in keeping with the provisions of the Romanian
Armed Forces Transformation Strategy, the unity in the domains of the military concepts,
the operational language and the procedures of planning and developing military
operations could be achieved, with the final purpose of implementing the operational
language and the fight procedures able to facilitate collective actions in the entire range
of the military operations and mirror, at the same time, the requirements imposed
by the evolution of the security environment, the technique and technologies, as well as
their influence upon military art. In this respect, a series of priority directions for action
has already been established, namely: concentrating all efforts with a view to achieving
a package of unitary and coherent military publications, compatible with those of the
NATO Member States; reassessing the publications existing so far, in connection with
the current needs of the armed forces, the NATO adhesion objectives and the new course
of action in the field; making the process of drafting the “joint” and “multinational”-type
doctrines and manuals a more dynamic one, in order to provide an efficient and
timely support for the structural and actional reform of the Romanian Armed Forces;
embracing NATO similar publications and adapting them to the specific of the Romanian
Armed Forces; initiating a new “philosophy” for approaching the process of drafting
specific normative acts, military doctrines and handbooks; materialising a new system
of structures involved in this process, as well as updating the content of the orders
which regulate the respective process; dynamically coordinating, firmly and ceaselessly
monitoring the process at all levels, simultaneously with implementing and making
the feedback in the field functional; setting up and updating the databases from all echelons
and coming up with solutions for generalising the experience and the special results
obtained gradually, on different hierarchical levels in the field. We will also bear in mind
the process of planning and developing the activities specific to the field of “headquarters
training”, which must take place strictly coordinated with the specific missions of each
type of forces and the implementation of operational military standards in the training
activity of personnel, subunits and units from land, air and navy forces, the ones of arms
and the special ones, in order to prepare and lead the joint force/operation, inside or outside
the country, in the circumstances of our Armed Forces participating in missions in the
NATO-led multinational structures, under UN, EU and OSCE mandate.
It is very important for us that the new concepts that lie at the basis of the
North-Atlantic Alliance transformation could be integrated in the future training of joint
forces. At the same time, we are concerned with the conduct we should embrace
in order to bring the set of traditional military norms and values, the esprit de corps
and the hero and tradition cult in the Romanian Armed Forces back to the attention
of the military. The conceptual domains that will be identified provide us with the possibility
to take action, stressing the new ways of approach that will be developed at the level
of the Doctrine and Training Directorate.
Written down by Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
July 26, 2006
155
T es
M t
R ba
e THE
D
AIR POWER
IN
PARADIGM
OF GLOBALISATION
Guests: Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD, Deputy Director, The Partnership
Coordination Cell ~ PCC, Mons, Belgium, Colonel Florian R@PAN, PhD, Deputy Commandant
of the National Defence University “Carol I”, Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor,
Head (Dean) of the Faculty of Command and Staff, the National Defence University “Carol I”
and Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader, Head of the Air and Naval Forces
Department, the National Defence University “Carol I”
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Air power. I would like you,
not before explaining the meaning of power, in connection to our theme,
to define the concept as such – air power and to reveal its evolution
and its applied condition.
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: In the
broadest sense, power is the capacity to produce a certain
outcome and, if we refer to human action (the conscious one)
the outcome is anticipated, thus becoming a goal. Therefore,
power is the capacity/ability to set a goal, to pursue and obtain
specific outcomes in specific conditions, with specific resources,
making use of specific tools, in a specific period of time.
It presupposes the correct assessment of the momentary state
of facts and the decryption of the tendencies of evolution
to set the directions for action as well as the assessment,
creation and development of the necessary resources for action. I do not want to exhaust
this issue, but to emphasise the fact that it is very difficult to define the concept
of power, as it is a too vast topic. Nevertheless, I would like to add that power, with
the meaning of the ability to do something, the capacity to act physically and morally,
must be manifest: on the one hand, to be proved and on the other hand to be perceived
as such. Power does not mean a state at a given moment (or not only this), but it is also
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action, the transformation of state towards a determined, desired direction. Thus, factors
as technology, education, economic growth become more and more important, while
the quantitative aspects and raw materials lose their importance.
We will encounter both aspects that belong to nature and aspects that depend
on human intervention in nature, on man’s will. These are only some directions
of approaching the subject. I will insist on what is called the dominant environment
in which power manifests, as a possible criterion for analysis. In this context, we can
consider the terrestrial, naval, air and space environment, which are different, due to their
properties and to the different ways man can accede to them. The terrestrial environment
is the place where man appeared and developed, his activity being limited to land, at the
beginning. Subsequently, his curiosity and inventiveness led him to water, a different
environment, represented by the sea that, due to its particular characteristics, resulted
in changing man’s behaviour and mode of action. Only recently, considering evolution,
the man has succeeded in entering airspace, this omnipresent, periterrestrial blanket.
Although air is an element that is essential for man and life in general, it was very difficult
to conquer it. Once having entered this environment, it was relatively easy for man
to surpass its boundaries and to get to outerspace. A brief definition becomes too simplistic
and does not succeed in completely disclosing the pursued meaning.
Air power refers to transferring the concept I have tried to define above to human
action in air, to air mastering. To begin with, we can consider air power as being both
the capacity to act in, from and through air, according to own will and to control
the activity of others in the air, or even to ban it. The analysis of this definition requires
some explanations, in brief.
Although man had dreamt of flying for thousands of years, this dream was practically
accomplished only in the 20th century when, as a result of long lasting search, he succeeded
in realising the first machines that were heavier than air and helped them to take off
and to realise the third space dimension, respectively the vertical one. The appearance
of aircrafts led to the qualities of air power to be revealed and materialised: perspective,
speed, distance, three-dimensional manoeuvre, freedom of movement, the earth
surface being the only distinct frontier, the “air edge”, as it was called by Giulio Douhet,
one of the foremost strategic air power theorists.
Here, at the frontier of the air ocean (with land and water), there are aircrafts “nests”
– airbases or aircraft carriers – where they are prepared for their future actions.
Thus, aircrafts are acknowledged to depend on the terrestrial surface, their survival
and operability being strictly connected to the given facilities to take off/land.
Despite these restrictions, air allows for human power to be amplified, as aircrafts
can reach everywhere in airspace, making practically every spot on the earth’s surface,
be it above land or sea, accessible.
It is the fact that the environment in and from which air power is manifest comprises,
“covers”, not figuratively, the entire earth surface – land or water – that adds to its
importance. Man’s utilising the Air Ocean has lead to the appearance and development
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of a lot of civil (commercial) transport airlines, of networks of airports, as well as
of the aircraft industry and collateral activities. Humankind and its economic development
have extended in airspace, too.
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University
Reader: In a broad sense, I consider that power is the ability
to impose one’s will on others. Along the same line, we could
state that, in its turn, air power may be a form of imposing
will in and from airspace. Even if air power has been manifest
and has played an important part, not only in peacetime
but also in case of the worldwide conflicting situations, the
fundamental elements that define and govern its application
are rather confusing for the majority of people and even
for the military professionals. There has been a large debate
on the concept of air power, which, in my opinion, emphasises the following question: Has
the appearance and development of air power determined essential changes in the strategies
of waging wars ? Even if there are voices saying that air power represents only the addition
of a new weapon to the already existing arsenal, I consider that air power has really
revolutionised warfare. If air power used to be defined as being: “the ability to do something
in airspace” and it used to refer, in essence, to the capacity to carry different things from
one place to another by air, it was later defined as “the ability to project the military force
into the third dimension, using platforms”. In reality, I think that essential changes have
occurred, not only in the effective use of aircrafts, but especially in organisation, training,
command and control, elements that have determined a new doctrinaire approach.
At the same time, air power (and I refer here to a state air power) includes the respective
state air forces and, much more, the aircraft industry, airline companies, producers
of aircraft components etc. In consequence, trying to define the term, I consider that,
in its entirety, air power represents a complex amalgam of physical ingredients (technical
means, aircrafts, armament systems etc.) and theoretical ones, which are equally important
and mark this power efficiency and effectiveness (doctrine, the conception regarding its use,
the personnel education and training, the adopted techniques, leadership, the capacity
of rapid adaptation and experience).
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: As I find the topic of this
debate very inspiring I would like to reveal the semantics of the air power concept.
Surprisingly or not, the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language does not define
air power. The Compact Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1998 edition, defines air
power as the “capability to defeat and attack with the help of aircrafts, rockets etc.”. More
concise, Daniel Moran defines air power, in the subchapter “About Air Power” from the
“Oxford Companion to Military History” as the “air force application” or, in other words,
the air forces product. In time, military theorists have approached this issue from
varied perspectives, from Billy Mitchell’s one – the “ability to do something in the air”,
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to Admiral Radford’s more complex one – “a nation’s capacity
to exploit airspace for own interest, while, at war, the enemy is
forbidden this thing”. A recent definition, a comprehensive one,
from the conceptual perspective, was that given by Philip Towle
in “The Dynamics of Air Power”, 1996: the “use or ban on the use
of airspace or extraterrestrial space for military purposes by the
vehicles capable of controlled and sustained flight beyond the area
of immediate conflict”. This definition is worth our attention
from two points of view: firstly, it extends the domain of air
power beyond the limits of airspace as such, creating
the premises for its developing into a space power. Secondly,
this definition includes rockets as (“vehicles capable of controlled and sustained flight
beyond the area of immediate conflict”), which is particularly important from the national
and global security perspective. Air power should be no way mistaken for air forces,
the latter being the tool whose use leads to creating air potential. The importance of air
power at war, as well as at peace, has been continually increasing, from its initial status
of a contributor to the operations of other categories of armed forces to that of a force
nearly able to win a war by itself, as it was proved in the Gulf War. Nevertheless,
the development of an argumentation referring to the importance of air power compared
to the land and naval analogous ones has no relevance in this context. What is really
worth mentioning is the fact that the dependence on doctrine and, implicitly,
on political issues is much more evident in case of air power than in the one
of air forces. Air power can have an exclusively offensive orientation, due to the role
of the air means anticipated by Giulio Douhet in 1985, as offensive weapons
par excellence, due to its independence from the limits of surface and superior speed;
it can also have a defensive character, the character of a discouraging force, or it can be
applied to support other categories of forces (which does not necessarily mean that it is
less dangerous for the enemy; on the contrary, when correctly applied, it is essential
for the progress of war).
Further on, by developing its recent capabilities (ballistic intercontinental missiles),
air power has already evolved into an airspace power, changing, this time, tactics,
operative mastery and strategy, but also geopolitics, in ensemble, by shifting
the belligerent areal into space.
To the extent to which a country is able to rapidly convert its civil air means
or a part of them, or to redirect its civil air means production capabilities to the production
of air means for military use, one can speak about a “civil” air power component.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: To complement the already
expressed opinions and to refer to Romania’s strategic conduct, I appreciate that air
power represents the Romanian state capacity, expressed mainly in the military domain,
to impose, by force and discouragement, the directive lines of the state in the domain
of air sovereignty, in peacetime, in crisis situations or in wartime. In other words,
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air power is one of the most important components of Romania’s
military power and supposes, in principal, the creation and
development of air forces, capable to operate both in the national
air space and in a crisis/armed conflict area, to discourage, limit
or ban the aggressor from using the respective space.
According to the Doctrine of the Romanian Air Forces,
air power can be expressed in its conceptual, operational,
technical-scientific and psycho-moral components.
As the level of power determines, in the context of the
discussed issue, the level of sovereignty, it is evident that there
is a whole-part relationship between national and air sovereignty.
Air sovereignty cannot exist outside national sovereignty, through the unity
and indivisibility of the territory it refers to. Any damage to air sovereignty affects national
sovereignty. As well, any damage to other domains of national sovereignty manifestation
implicitly gets to affect, under one form or the other, air sovereignty.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Air power – airspace,
an indestructible binomial when we speak about air power. What is
the airspace ? What is the national airspace ?
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: Indeed, an indestructible
binomial by definition: neither term can exist without the other. Air power cannot be
exercised but in airspace; the national airspace cannot exist without an air power
that defines or “guarantees” it. According to the Webster “New World Dictionary”, the national
airspace is “the space above a nation, over which it can claim jurisdiction”. In conformity
with the Manual FA-3.1, referring to the operational air traffic control, the national airspace
represents “the air column that rises above the ground and the aquatic space, being laterally
delimited by the terrestrial, fluvial and maritime frontiers, established by law, and upright
to the inferior limit of the extra-atmospheric space”. More concrete, the concept as such
expresses the space in which aircrafts operate, from the sea/ground level to practically
the ceiling of the aircrafts belonging to the respective air forces; juridical, the national
airspace is the airspace above the national territory/territorial waters.
Airspace is divided into classes, vertically and horizontally, depending on several
criteria and each nation has its own rules, more or less common, according to which
airspace is administrated, which constitute in a “regime of flight in airspace”, regime
imposed, in its turn, by the respective country air power; nevertheless all these have
the same denominator – the rules of ICAO/International Civil Aviation Organisation.
The force of the binomial we are referring to resides in the respective country capability
to impose, by force, if necessary, that the regime established by the use of this space
should be obeyed.
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Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: Indeed, it is very important
to speak about airspace – the place where and in connection with which air power
is manifest.
The term airspace generally represents the periterrestrial cover, the air blanket
above the ground and water surface, without being very exactly delimited upright,
because of the physical properties of the gas that it is made out of. I mention the fact
that, at the beginning, in specialised literature, the thesis according to which airspace
stretches up to the infinite was dominant. Subsequent to the development of aeronautics
and aero-navigation, the issue of its juridical regulation is raised. Thus, today, it is
identified: the airspace belonging to states, a component of the state territory and
the air space with international regime, that is not subjected to any state sovereignty
(for example that above the free sea). The Paris Convention, on October 13, 1919
consecrates and regulates the subjacent states sovereignty on the national airspace.
Although the airspace superior delimitation is no longer discussed about, it has been
advanced the idea according to which this frontier should be established following certain
criteria, more or less conventional. Some of them refer to the air physical properties
– density, composition etc. –, while others refer to the aircrafts capacity to attain a certain
height … We notice that it is very difficult to exactly establish this border, as the
mentioned criteria vary in time. Juridical literature offers an ambiguous, tautological
answer: “the superior limit of airspace is where airspace begins” (sic !). Today, through
bi- or multilateral conventions, although not unanimous, the superior limit of airspace
is considered to be somewhere at 100 or 150 km above the earth surface.
We consider, in this context, that the most important thing is for a country to be able
to exercise its sovereignty in own space, or, today, there are only few countries able
to control their space up to the above mentioned height …
Based on a state sovereignty over its own airspace, it – the state – regulates
the juridical regime of the respective space, carries out different activities within it,
and may give foreign aircrafts the right of freedom of transit and traffic through
its airspace, too. It may also limit the liberty to fly in its airspace or to ban certain
foreign aircrafts from entering this space, may execute jurisdiction on foreign aircrafts
when they are in its airspace, if there is no other special regulation and it has the right
of indemnification for damages caused by foreign aircrafts.
Besides the regulations included in the airspace juridical status, states have ratified
a series of documents regarding the international air navigation. We mention, in this
context, the five “air liberties”, which refer to the right of flying over a particular territory,
as well as to some liberties regarding landing and transportation by air.
Although we are talking about globalisation, I have to pinpoint the fact that not all
states recognise the five air liberties integrally, as they are complex and have multiple
implications at international level. At the same time, we also witness a clear process
of harmonisation in the field of the regulations regarding aeronautical activities.
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Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: The last two decades have changed
the conflict areas by their diffusing in other areas than the ones “traditionally” recognised
to belong to the “conflict arch” or “conflict belt”.
Although the majority of local conflicts has unfolded within the national space
(80%), conflicts that unfold in the extranational space or in contagious areas have
not been eliminated.
Superpowers tendency to promote their interests by using military force far from
the “sanctuaries” is evident. Another tendency is to search for allies (for military or only
diplomatic support) and, this way, to “globalise”– militarily – the conflict.
From this perspective, modern air forces will continue their efforts to plan
actions in maximum safety conditions. It supposes an increase in the safety of actions
by technical, tactical and political methods. The creation of hostile airspace and the
opponent isolation (air blockade) will be accomplished by means of agreements or under
military pressure.
The interests in airspace will be promoted through the creation, in peacetime,
of what we use to call the preventive controlled airspace. It supposes to permanently
maintain air control, to deploy strike forces in the area, to introduce a system of penalties
and to get some international bodies or institutions involved.
With regard to the national airspace (territory), I highlight the fact that it integrally
belongs to the state territory and it is inviolable, as all the other parts of the state
territory. Consequently, the Romanian state regulates the regime of the airspace
that belongs to it, the role of international conventions being that of coordinating
different juridical regimes and of establishing rules that allow for a better international
cooperation.
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader: Airspace is for sure
indispensable for the air power application. The indissoluble connection between them
is evident but I would like to specify some things, which seem necessary in the context
of our debate. Airspace is the environment in and from which air power can be applied.
It represents, as it has been mentioned before, and I repeat it, as it is a defining thing,
the air column that rises above the terrestrial and maritime territories and, in national
context, the airspace above the territory of state sovereignty towards the inferior limit
of the extra-atmospheric space, being an integrant part of the state territory. The effects
of air power surpass though the physical limits of airspace. Subsequently, the application
of air power has effects not only in airspace but also in physical spaces – terrestrial
and maritime – and in economic, diplomatic and informational “spaces”.
In consequence, air power is, indeed, strictly connected to its environment – airspace,
while its effects are manifest far beyond it and I consider, from this point of view,
that an analysis of the air power effects is much more important than – strictly –
the environment in which it manifests.
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Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: I would like you to refer
to air power in the ensemble of the power that defines, expresses
and materialises a state defensive capabilities and, if it is appropriate
in this context, let me think it is, to see what the components of air
power are.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: Air power must be understood
as potential (the abstract side) and as force (the material side), which presupposes
that its development directions have, on the one hand, an abstract organisational content
and, on the other hand, a material content (in terms of the physical resources air power
comprises). Air power is mainly determined, and I refer to the Romanian state, by the
following factors: the weight of the Romanian Air Forces effectives within the country’s
Armed Forces; the Air Forces actional potential, expressed by the quantity of fight means
and the scientific, technical, industrial and financial capabilities the state provides these
forces with; performances of the means (arms, systems, logistics) meant for the Air Forces,
expressed in availability and fight capabilities.
Reader: Sovereignty, as a general concept, in strict connection
with a state defence capability, supposes territorial integrity,
independence and national unity, free access to humanity
common values, free expression in international relations
and, at the same time, the authority to decide on the course
of action to promote and defend national interests. In this
context, national sovereignty is related to the notion of national
territory, in which airspace takes an important part. Therefore,
air security is part of national security and expresses
the particular airspace condition that allows for unrestricted exercise of state
prerogatives. Among the powers that define, express and materialise a state capability
to defence, air power, as a concept, is the state potential, mainly from the military point
of view, that can be used directly or by means of an alliance, to impose its will in the field
of air sovereignty, in peacetime, crisis situations or at war. From this perspective,
air power has many components that are categorically inter-conditioned and interdependent.
The conceptual component is represented by a complex process of thinking, reflected
in the strategies, doctrines and regulations in the domain of air forces. It governs
the activities in airspace, the air forces leadership and logistics and is based on the lessons
learnt from not only own experience but also the modern armies ones. The operational
component emphasises the operational structures within air forces, with all the systems,
equipments, infrastructure and logistics, in connection with the necessary means for achieving
the tasks they have been made for. The scientific-technical and economic component
expresses the general level of development and the potential of the scientific, technical,
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industrial and financial capabilities that are necessary to air forces. The psychological-moral
and professional component highlights the moral, social and professional values of the air
forces personnel. Air power is the one that can rapidly provide a wide range of military
options that can lead to the national interests safeguarding.
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: A state defence capability
is given by the national security system that has, in its turn, many components. Within it,
military power is essential and it depends, in its turn, on many other factors (economical,
political, demographic etc.) and within the military power, the air power has an extremely
important role.
The air power components are given, from the military perspective, by the components
of the air forces that generate the respective air power, more exactly: air-to-air (Air Fighter
or multi-role); air-to-ground (Air Fighter-Striker or multi-role, fight helicopters); airlift
(airplanes or helicopters transport); surface-to-air (air defence means based on ground);
airspace control (radar, radio).
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor:
In addition to what has been already mentioned, I would like
to pinpoint the fact that a state power is given, among others,
by: size, geographical location, climate, resources (human,
materiel, energy, cultural), the armed forces level of training
and procurement, system of government etc. Without any
intention to extend the debate, I attract the attention that these
aspects have to be taken into consideration when speaking
about defence and security, in general, and many levels are
referred to, while defining and materialise them.
A state power comprises many components and, among them, the air power has
a distinct role as it refers, in our opinion, to the totality of civil aviation forces and means,
to its specific infrastructure as well as to the totality of forces and terrestrial means
(even the cosmic ones, if necessary) meant to protect air navigation. All plants that have
an aeronautical profile can be considered here. We could say that air power refers to the
capabilities that allow for the state to manifest its sovereignty in the national air space,
all the factors that ensure the progress of the activities in the air, in appropriate conditions.
The airspace and the ground (water) facilities destined to aeronautical activities
have been integrated in the system of human activities since the development of aviation,
leaving its mark on the evolution of society. At the same time, the air ocean has become
the arena of some terrible and subtle confrontations during armed conflicts, to resolve
military and other disputes (economical, political etc.).
With reference to the military component, some air power essential elements
become evident: airspace and aircrafts, air capabilities and the specific characteristics
of air actions.
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Air power is determined by many factors and I would like to mention the economic
and political ones, which provide the resources and will. I leave a special place
for aeronautical awareness, as it is a source of air power that can be found at the level
of all its components, which it empowers. Science and research in the field, education
in the field, specific infrastructure, air operators and the systems meant for the safety
of air navigation are some other directions in which air power is manifest.
The affiliation to the international bodies meant to control aeronautical activities
(ICAO, EUROCONTROL, NATINEADS) represents, in my opinion, another source
of air power.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: In the logic
approached by Colonel Anastasiei, I would point out some facts
regarding the characteristics of aviation actions.
Thus, aviation actions constitute a component of modern
warfare. They are determined by the characteristics of aircrafts
and other means that have to be adapted, according
to technological development.
Aviation can engage fight with the opponent and act,
in general, in a more extended area than the one that is habitual
for land troops and thus endanger the entire warfare potential.
This way, due to the aviation actions, the enemy is forbidden
to carry out the fight where he wants to and he is also forbidden to spare his means
and forces. Therefore, the state has to pay special importance to the air power that it can
exercise only if it has an available aviation that can meet, quantitatively and qualitatively,
the appropriate place, role and assigned missions.
Air power is, from this point of view, a capability that ensures the use of airspace
according to own will and bans or limits its use by the aggressor. The multitude of the
possibilities to use aviation allows for military leadership to adapt the air actions
(operations) dimension and intensity to the political and actual military requirements.
The actions carried out in/through/from air are very specific and only specialised
forces – air forces are able to carry them.
The characteristics and the possibilities to use aircrafts make avoiding their action
effects impossible. The resulted risk potential requires the same type (level) response
measures, so air power can be counterbalanced by air power only. The states that
do not have their own air power will be, in case of conflict, not necessarily an armed one,
in totally disadvantaged situations.
The existence of an appropriate air power allows for a mobile defence fight at
and from all heights, from the very beginning. At the same time, it makes possible
for the armament efficiency in all domains to be completed and for a unitary command
of all systems of armaments to exist. Air forces, especially aviation, allows for the one
that owns them to adopt a combative, offensive attitude, that results in the impossibility
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for an enemy that has a weak or inactive air force to win the initiative at strategic level
and in the enemy forces overusing in the depth of the disposition, without being able
to properly riposte.
The offensive use of air power can, through the correct choice of the objective
to be struck and the effect of the armament, to exercise a decisive influence on the
intentions of a possible aggressor. This way, air power becomes the key element
to dominate a political conflict and to discourage the enemy.
The opponent being banned from using all the dimensions of the own space is
a strategic advantage for the one that owns and uses air power. At the same time, though,
an opponent corresponding air power may compensate this theoretical advantage
by surveillance at all heights and in all domains, by securing the own territory against
air attackers, by conquering and maintaining the freedom of action, by preventing the
enemy forces from penetrating and, through this, may gain time to successfully carry
out the operations of own land forces.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: What are the place and the
role of the air forces in the manifest equation of air power ? What
are the air forces in the context of air power ?
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader: As I have already
underlined, in my opinion, air power means more than air forces. Though, in case
we refer to the actual actional spectrum of air power, then, evidently we speak about
the air force, which is, in fact, the objective vector that supports air power and puts it
in a concrete form. It is clear that the appearance of aircrafts marked the appearance
of a new dominant and decisive element in modern warfare. Air forces offer a unique
capability, that of exploiting the third dimension. Their role is important in peacetime,
when, due to the actional capabilities (command and control, aircrafts with different
functions, ground based air defence systems, radars, communication and air navigation
systems, support equipments, due infrastructure and logistics, personnel etc.), they
succeed in controlling the national air space and in discouraging possible threats, thanks
to their capacity of reaction. In conflict situations, air forces really demonstrate what
the air power, in its pragmatic and concrete form, means and render evident the power
of the air power components synergy, which I have mentioned before under the conceptual,
operational, scientific-technical, economic, psycho-moral and professional aspects.
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: I resort to a truism but,
paradoxically, I do it in order to consolidate the understanding as such of the specified
relation. Air power does not exist without air forces, because they are the air power generator.
Thus, it is defining air forces we have to pay attention to in order to understand their role
and relation with air power. As for the air forces, the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian
Language defines only the concept of military force, and not the one of air forces.
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The Concise English Dictionary, edited by Oxford, defines the air forces as “a branch
of the armed forces with reference to air fight and defence”. Besides this strictly semantic
meaning, a professional dimension is added by the Oxford Military History Dictionary,
where they are conceptually assimilated to “an instrument by means of which air power
is applied”. It is almost unanimously accepted the idea that air forces include, on the one
hand, the technical factor, meaning the vectors – aircrafts and their cargo (munitions,
air-to-air or air-to-surface/water missiles, bombs, different container etc.) and all
the other technical means that are necessary to facilities, maintenance, logistic support
or use in fight, and, on the other hand, the human factor, meaning pilots, navigators,
radar operators, air traffic controllers, technical experts, staff officers and logistic
personnel, civilians included.
Air forces have developed as an independent branch since the end of the First
World War. Some important moments in the history of the Romanian Armed Forces
are the following: 1983 – the establishment of the first subunit of military air station,
the establishment of the Pilot Schools in Chitila – 1909, Cotroceni – 1911, transformed,
in 1912, in the Military Pilot School and especially April 1st, 1913, when it was voted
the law that lay “the foundation of establishing and organising military aeronautics
as an independent armed force, subjected to the engineer corps headquarters”. Nevertheless,
it took a long tome until the creation of the air forces, as we understand them today,
and until they were recognised as a category of forces. Paradoxically, although the British
launched in the conquest of air later, they were the first who had their independent
military air forces – the Royal Air Forces, under the command of Sir Hugh Trenchard,
on April 1st, 1918. Soon after, the armies belonging to other states separated out their
air forces and they thus became an independent category of armed forces. The concrete
organisation of forces may differ from country to country, or from an aircraft generation
to another. (In this context, the concept generation refers to categories, types and versions
of aircrafts that have common characteristics). Air forces can be tailored to be aggressive/
offensive (focus on fight-strike, assault, close air support, interdiction etc.) or defensive
(focus on fight and air defence). It is important to keep in mind, to better understand
the concept as such, that these features are dictated, through the related doctrines,
by the political orientation of the state or, if it is the case, by the political-military bloc
they belong to. Parts of the air forces may be included, temporarily or permanently,
into the other two categories of armed forces (land and maritime), but this is not relevant
to the topic of our discussion.
A particular case is represented by the aircrafts on plane carriers, on the one hand,
because of their belonging (most frequently they belong to the naval forces) and on the
other hand, more important, from the perspective of the national and global security,
as these aircrafts, although they are mere tactical or operative as far as their range
is concerned, can be taken to any part of the world by the respective carriers. Thus,
they become genuine strategic weapons, having a significant impact on regional or even
global security.
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Another particular case is that of strategic bombers and missiles (medium
and large range), which are of great importance for the national and global security,
importance generated, this time, by their destructive potential, especially of those used
as nuclear vectors.
A last comment on this concept, as it has already been dealt with in the mentioned
definitions and some additional comments, leads to the conclusion that there is a strong
connection between air forces and air power, but under no circumstances should they
be mistaken one for the other.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: I think the place and the role
of the air forces in the manifest context of the air power is denoted, in the last instance,
by the air forces real operational capacity, expressed by the headquarters, operational
structures, big units and units possibilities to fulfil the missions they have been conceived
for and that have been assigned to them; the personnel level of training, defined
by the level of professionalisation, multifunctional abilities and the capacity of generating
and regenerating. Another form of manifestation of the Air Forces role is represented
by the usage strategies materialised in structures, missions, deployment, tactics,
procedures and rules of employment; armed forces categories and other components
of the system capacity to integrate in order to reject the illicit actions that damage
air sovereignty; national institutions and forces capacity to integrate in order to promote
(safeguard) Romania’s air interest and sovereignty, in agreement with other states
or within military alliances, expressed in the degree of interoperability and compatibility.
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: Starting from the fact that
military aviation, air forces, in general, are more and more present in limited actions
in different areas in the world, military experts are more and more preoccupied with
analysing the way in which air power can be efficiently used to persuade the opponent
to make an agreement without a conflict escalation. Therefore, some aspects that
do not belong to the military sphere, but to the political one emerge, depending on the
way and the moment air power is used to influence the opponent.
The Coalition success in the Gulf War (1990-1991) was possible, unquestionably,
due to air forces. The air forces place, role and action in this war could, at first sight,
lead to the conclusion that this is the action-model to be followed in all future wars. It is
true that the offensive attitude and the use of advanced technologies led to what was
often called a future model but authorised voices attract the attention towards the fact
that there were completely special conditions in the Gulf, so the “model” is an atypical
one. We agree to it, as it is quite improbable for the ensemble of conditions that led
to the situation of using preponderantly unconventional weapons in an air fight in which
the opponent uses up-to-date technology, in the conditions of quasi air supremacy, to be
created again. Asymmetry is evident …
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Air power, as well as the aircraft as such, is like a child of scientific progress: it cannot
exist without advanced technology and borrows from it the fascination and mystery
of a special, unknown and … desired thing. As a result, both producers of specific
technology and supporters of air power (defined as the “capacity to use air platforms
for military purposes”) want more and more funds that are everywhere and always bigger
than the allotted budgets.
Air forces represent a way to interact with the opponent without having a physical
contact with him, to strike him powerfully, rapidly and from distance, which determines
us to give the notion “contact line” a second interpretation. The classical “front line”
has disappeared, the enemy being now deeply struck, tens or hundreds kilometres far.
Confrontations take place in airspace and in the electromagnetic environment, so that
the entire area of military actions becomes an area of physical contact, aviation being
the protagonist of this actional model (launching a destructive force against the opponent,
without having a direct contact). “The air power objective in wide-spread conflicts,
and not only, is to destroy the opponent will or/and his capability to resist”.
In modern warfare, what is more and more important is the way to act, the way
to win the confrontation and their impact on the public, which tends to be primordial
in the stage of conflict outcomes. This aspect, relatively new in the history of warfare,
has become significantly important after the First World War, once the law of war was
stated and military actions extended spatially due to the fact their air component was
confirmed. As it was proved by the Vietnam and the Gulf wars, it is necessary to consider
the internal political impact (and the external one, to the extent to which it affects internal
interests) determined by the way the conflict is approached and to calculate (qualitatively
and quantitatively) the adequate force that is to be used. Moreover, we think that, in the
contemporary conditions (in the era of nuclear, chemical, biological and cosmic warfare)
this force will always be smaller than the potential one. We could thus speak about
an “actional sufficiency”, as an escalation in conflict has a direct destructive character
(material and human losses on the part of the opponent combat forces and its country
and, to a certain extent, on the part of own forces) but also indirect ones, through the way
the losses are perceived at internal and external level.
We come to understand that it is not always easy to decrypt what the political interests
of the decisional factors involved in military conflicts are and, moreover, that, many times,
these factors are not exactly known, as they are often hidden, leaving history to, sooner
or later, unveil the truth. In specialised literature, it is stated that “the British riposte in case
of Argentina occupying the Falkland Islands was a disproportionate escalation of a crisis
for internal political purposes”, and the Western political-military analysts mention
that “almost always escalation is an advantage on the part of the weak party in a conflict
if it attracts the international attention towards the conflict or adds complications
to the political scene”.
Synthesising, we could say that the air forces is an instrument for the political
factor of power, being placed at the confluence of the military power and the air power.
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Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: The air power and the military
power – what is the relationship between them and what are
the interdependencies that structure this relationship ?
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: In my opinion, the relationship
is very clear. Air power is a component of the military power and is dependent on not only
the military power but also on the representative state institutions that have attributions
in the security and national defence domains. In the presentation of the air power
responsibilities, its role and place within the military power are clearly evident. Therefore,
in peacetime, air power ensures, at domestic level, the forces training, airspace integrity
and timely alarm, in case of an air attack, and at international level, air discouragement,
trust between states, security enforcement, armament control, cooperation and capacity
to participate in peace-support missions.
In crisis situations, air power accomplishes surveillance and search, offers the options
of response to crisis, ensures the availability of the necessary air potential and balance,
integrates the defence objectives according to the crisis character and intensity
and, finally, in wartime, air power has to ensure survival after the first strikes, to preserve
the offensive and defensive air potential, to launch air counter-strike, to achieve war
objectives and to restore air sovereignty.
Air flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: Before trying to answer,
we have to mention that: air power must be approached in relation with land and naval
powers, as, if we approached it in relation with the military power, it would mean
putting air power in a partial relation with itself (!), as air power is an important
component of the military power.
The relationship between air power and its equivalent land, respectively naval
powers is a complex and dynamic one and has continually developed as far as its weight
and spreading are concerned, from the stage of taking part in land/naval operations
with simple surveillance missions to the one of winning a war by itself, as it is the case
of the Gulf War, which has already been mentioned. Nevertheless, at the current moment,
as well as in the near future, it is quite improbable for the set of favourable conditions
the air power benefited from in the above-mentioned war to repeat. Future wars will be
determined by the joint effort; within this effort, the weight of air power, otherwise
difficult to quantify, is essential, either as a participant in the land/naval operations
or through air operations as such. It is important for the synergism of the three categories
of forces to be accomplished, and to it, air power has a decisive role. In its absence,
the other two categories do not have any chance to succeed or the price of the operation
is unacceptable.
On the other hand, we have to keep in mind the fact that air power rapidly evolves
towards an airspace power; the strategic objectives of future wars will not be terrestrial
points of interest but special ones (geostationary orbits, libration points “Lagrange” etc.).
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Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: Air
power is, in my opinion, the manifestation of state power
in the air environment and includes the mentioned factors
of influence and, I feel bound to emphasise, the majority
of them has a “non-military” nature.
Consequently, the air power and the military power have
both common and specific elements, the problem of their
interdependencies being the result of their study. To simplify,
I could say that the connection between the military and the
air power is represented by air forces and their action.
As it results from the things mentioned above, air power,
in its military component, is the capacity of the owner to ensure the use of air space
according to his will and to limit or ban the others from using it. The multitude of opportunities
regarding its use allows for the military command to adapt the air actions (operations)
dimensions and intensity to the concrete political and military requirements.
Because the actions carried out in/through and from air are specific ones they can
be carried out by skilled forces only – the air forces. Aircrafts characteristics
and possibilities to use make it impossible to escape from their actions effects. The resulted
risk potential requires for the same type (level) response measures, so air power can be
counterbalanced by air power only. The states that do not have their own air power
will be, in case of a conflict, not necessarily armed, in totally disadvantageous situations.
The existence of an adequate air power makes a mobile defence fight, at all
heights possible, from the very beginning. At the same time, it makes possible
for the efficiency of the armament in all domains to be complemented and for the armament
systems to have a unitary command. Air forces, aviation especially, allows for the owner
to adopt a combative, offensive attitude, which prevents an opponent that would have
a weak or inactive air force from winning the initiative at strategic level and causes
him to wear the forces out in the entire depth of his disposition, without being able
to riposte accordingly.
The offensive use of air power can, through the correct choice of the target
to strike and the special effect of the armament, exercise a decisive influence on a possible
aggressor. This is the reason that makes air power the key element regarding
the domination of a military conflict and the enemy discouragement.
We have to notice once more the existent complex relationships and the created
interdependencies between different aspects of power. Thus, a civil air fleet, even
if it is not an element of military power, can contribute, through the force projection,
to its enhancing potential in a theatre of actions. On the other hand, a military aircraft
can be a vital element of the air navigation protection system, for civil aircrafts included.
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader: Winston Churchill
says air power is the most difficult form to measure military force or, at least, to express
in exact terms. Indeed, the extent to which air power contributes to the military power
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application is difficult to exactly quantify. It is therefore sure
that, in current times, air power represents the main component
of military power that, in case of a conflict, may “tip the scale”
to one party or another. Air power, represented by air forces
in the context of military power we are talking about, is the only
force that proves really efficient, especially in achieving
objectives that have a strategic value. Due to certain unique
characteristics of air forces, in general, and aviation, in particular,
operational component (rapidity, range, firepower, precision
etc.), the ways of operating it are fundamentally different
compared to other forms of the military power application,
as far as not only the methods and procedures used but especially the achievement
of effectiveness and efficiency regarding the set tasks are concerned.
Acting in the third dimension, air power may directly affect the opponent centres
of gravity. At the same time, the capacity to win and maintain air superiority ensures
the own military surface structures freedom of action, banning the opponent from doing
the same thing as well.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Coming back to the
particular issue of national military construction, would you be so
kind to place the Romanian Air Forces in the Romanian state power
formulae ?
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader: To be able to approach
this issue from the national military construction perspective, given the extremely
important role of the military power in the national security equation, I consider
it necessary to exactly understand the security strategy at national level. From this
perspective, the national strategy combines diplomatic, economic, military and
informational instruments. In the same context, the military strategy combines different
components of the military force (air, naval, land, informational) to achieve the derived
military objectives. The military national construction is strictly connected to the
achievement of the military objectives. Within the framework of the efforts to consolidate
the capabilities to response to the new threats, Romania, as a NATO member, USA ally
and future EU member, has to reconfigure its military power, in general, and its air
power, in particular, so that it could be capable to meet challenges. The integration
of the land, air, naval operations and the intelligence ones is a desideratum of the Romanian
military construction at the current moment. Nevertheless, it is true that air forces
represent an elite category of the Romanian Armed Forces, and the military construction,
not only at national level but also from the alliances perspective, cannot be accomplished
without taking them into consideration. To the same effect, air forces reconfiguring
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has to be tailored so that it could meet the objective necessity to achieve the goals
of the new types of operations, in peacetime, crisis situations and at war, not only
at national level but also within alliances.
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD:
The Romanian Air Forces have had an important role in the
Romanian state power formula in the latest century. Between
the two World Wars, Romania was a regional air power
and a small European air power at the same time. Today,
the Romanian Air Forces, having undergone a process
of transformation for the latest 16 years, are, quantitatively,
situated at 1/3 from the 1989 level, although, qualitatively, they
are significantly more capable, in other words, they can generate
an air power of some times bigger than the 1989 level.
Practically, almost the full spectrum of missions can be accomplished, independently
or within the Alliance. The Romanian state is able to maintain fundamental values
in case of a conflict with a comparable adversary, relying on its current air forces, but,
in case of a confrontation with an adversary that has a superior military potential,
maintaining or regaining fundamental values is possible only if the “alliance effect”
is accomplished. The weight of the Romanian Air Forces in the context of the armed
forces is nonetheless debatable, in my opinion: under 14%, which does not totally comply
with the current tendencies, with their increasing role and with the need for air power,
in fact, for air security. The effects of an inappropriate ratio will reflect, in case of
an armed conflict, directly on the other categories of forces and indirectly but implicitly
on the entire nation.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: Very briefly, we can state that
the Romanian Armed Forces represent the category of the Armed Forces designated
to participate in defending air sovereignty, integrating in operations, air offensive
and defensive operations (actions) the entire air riposte and reaction potential and the
neutralisation (diminution) of the aggressor economic and military power, available
within the national defence system.
We think this definition highlights the Air Forces coordinating role on all the other
forces specialised in air defence and, through this, their central place within the country
air power. Moreover, it suggests that the participation in defending the country air
sovereignty is a broader process, as well as the general actional forms – air operations
and actions.
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: With regard to this issue,
I would like to pinpoint two aspects as far as air forces are concerned. The first one refers
to air forces as those elements that act in/from and through air with a view to achieving
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tasks that are specific to military actions carried out in and through this environment.
I, therefore, include in the air forces the radar, as a means of air search, aviation
as a flying platform, as well as surface-to-air means of action against aircrafts (artillery,
missiles, radio-electronic means).
The second aspect has in view the armed forces organisation in categories of forces
and we thus have the Air Forces as a core element in the structure of a state military
forces. I mention that the majority of countries has, in the structure of their armed
forces, the air forces as a distinct category of forces. At the same time, though, there are
in many armed forces, the Romanian Armed Forces included, means and forces,
belonging to other categories of forces (land and naval ones), capable of carrying out
actions in the air environment. Of course, the destination and the missions in the two
types of situations are different. If, in case of Air Forces, they refer to state sovereignty
within the national airspace and to the application of its will in the air space of interest,
in case of the structures belonging to the other categories of forces, the missions are
restricted to their direct, immediate and exclusive support.
Thus, the role of the Air Forces in the state equation of power is evident. Having
understood it, we will accept that, under a certain aspect – that of leading and coordinating
the activities carried out in the national airspace, the Air Forces have to get the main
role, ensuring the unity of action.
The role of the Air Forces – ensuring, from the first moments of aggression,
the conditions that are necessary for the economic and social mechanisms to work
properly as well as the realisation of the strategic defence disposition – confers
this category of forces an important position, as a decisive element in the framework
of the national defence system.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: There are still controversies
regarding the doctrinaire understanding of the issue we are debating.
That is why I am asking: How is the issue of air forces, air power,
that of the Romanian Air Forces in fact, solved, within the limits
of the doctrine ?
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: The evolution of the Romanian
air power, in the context of the changes in the system it is part of, can be considered
relatively to the development of aviation, especially the military aviation, at world level,
as well as to the transformations Romania has undergone in many fields (economic,
political, social, military etc.). That is why many factors that influence it should be
considered, factors that cannot be eluded while analysing the condition of the military
aviation and especially while prefiguring its future, in terms of organisation, structuring
and procurement. Among the most important factors that determine the changes
and the direction of the air power evolution, we distinguish: the system of alliances
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made by the political-military leadership – the prominent way to promote and safeguard
national interests, especially those related to security, which is one of the most important
concerns of the state foreign policy; the probable physiognomy of a future conflict
in which aviation will take part – spatiality, rapidity and the “surgical” nature of strikes,
which are some elements that require a certain direction of the air forces development;
the geographical characteristics of the area of military action, which extend the “area
of operations”, in space, up to the limit of the capabilities the air forces means have;
the scientific and technical assets in the field.
The evolutions in the scientific-technical field go hand in hand with the theoretical
conceptions and the practical resolutions with regard to air power and the way it can be
used. It is true that Romania’s aviation (as a basic element of the air power) cannot be
compared, from the size and procurement point of view, at the current stage, to the aviation
of economically and militarily developed states. This is the reason why we consider
it necessary to focus on the activities in the field of military science, so that the best
solutions could be found, regarding the importance of airspace “controlling” and that
of convincing decision-makers to provide air forces with the necessary means.
From this point of view, I salute the initiative of this debate, as well as the symposiums
organised by the Air Forces Staff and the National Defence University “Carol I” regarding
the Romanian Air Forces. Thus, some doctrinaire aspects that are strictly necessary
to those in charge of drafting normative documents in the field have been clarified.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: Modern
visions on the armed forces, either the alliance or the national
ones, are based on the need for coping with the challenges
of the future, which is marked by instability and incertitude.
In most of the cases, these visions offer the image of armies
capable to fight and win, “dominant in the full spectrum of military
operations, persuasive in peacetime, decisive in war and superior
in any type of conflict”.
The future forces projection has in view, preponderantly,
the integrated actions in operations that are specific to war,
in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
Within this general framework, we consider that, between the theoretical analysis
of the air operations content, which lies on the instruments, system of concepts, laws
and principles the military science operates with and these operations including in the
operational plans, which lie on the options and the necessity for the war tasks and objectives
to be achieved, there is the measurable reality of the forces actional capacity that is
necessary for the objectives to be achieved in conformity with scientific norms.
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: There are no major conflicts,
in the field of doctrine, regarding air power and air forces. There are though some
controversies generated by the marginal interferences of their domains of definition.
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An example in this context may be the airspace means being included or not in the air
forces or, from a strictly organisational point of view, the dispute between the air forces
and the naval forces over the aircrafts on plane carriers. These controversies, which
apparently have no importance, have generated, in their turn, consequences, from
the perspective of international laws included, directly affecting some treaties and their
effects in the field of armament control. Another eloquent example of controversy
refers to the air means inclusion in the framework of “conventional forces”; this thing
has blocked the negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe for a long time.
To come back to the strictly doctrinaire aspect in the question, I can say that air
forces and the air potential/air power generated by them has been recognised as such
for a long time and, although the military theorists in the “blue” zone used to be less
prolific, nowadays there is a theoretical foundation that is equal to the ones of the other
two categories of armed forces.
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader: During history,
the controversies referring to the understanding and doctrinaire approach of air power
have been manifest. These facts have occurred mainly in the states that, indeed, have
something to say regarding the conceptual approach to air power role and importance.
From my point of view, this is not only necessary but also beneficial, having in view
the issue of air power, the evolution of the global security environment, the more
and more important role of the air forces in the battlefield which, in its turn, is subject
to transformations, the rapid technical progress in the field of aeronautics, with applications
at the military level concerning avionic equipments, systems of armament, “stealth”
technologies etc. Having in view what has already been mentioned, I consider a continuous
re-evaluation of the necessary objectives, strategies, concepts and programmes, so that
they could be adapted to the conditions proper to the 21st century.
Under these circumstances, the necessity to adapt to a continuously changing
operational environment, the rapid technical progress and the appearance of a new
structural approach to global, regional and national security, the influence of globalisation,
in the military fields included, require for the doctrines to develop. The Romanian Armed
Forces doctrinaire issue raises a series of controversies and debates in the military
plane at national level, especially in relation with other categories of forces, in the context
of their joint usage. The Romanian Armed Forces have undergone one of the most
important transformations in their history, systems’ integration and organisational
evolution being accompanied by new operational concepts and personnel appropriate
training. The fact that there are controversies and debates, disagreements and differences
of opinions, that experts sometimes see things differently, show the importance air forces,
in particular, and air power, in general, has within the national defence system. From
my point of view, as long as this thing occurs in the field of research and the air forces
issue is approached from an objective perspective, based on correct arguments
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RMT Debates
and fundaments, inspired by the desire to find the objective, scientific “way”
for the doctrinaire development of air forces, everything is OK. Problems occur when,
besides the conceptual approach, we encounter elements that may induce in “practitioners”
a feeling of insecurity, of limiting initiative, of doctrinaire approach that is not defined
in the concrete space of air action. Even if, after the year of grace – 1989, there has been
a period in which doctrinaire concepts “got mad” as far as the Romanian Air Forces
represented (in a doctrinaire way), I consider the changes and evolution in the latest
years have succeeded in realising a correct unity of concepts and conceptions, so that
this important category of forces could be used efficiently and effectively. I also consider
there are still many steps to take to clearly define all the doctrinaire aspects of Romania’s
air power. The desired finality may be the result of the integrated approach to the changes
in the doctrinaire, organisational structures, training, equipment, leadership, personnel
and facilities domains, all included in a credible and engaging future projection.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Would it be possible for a …
zero degree-armed confrontation to occur, without the air forces
employment ?
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor:
Surely not ! Future world will be characterised by more
and more subtle confrontations, at different levels, the military
one included. Globalisation has changed the nature of war,
as well as the context in which the state utilises military force
in its conduct in the geopolitical environment.
Without doubt, the “red thread” in the field of military
actions is their joint character, which is known to be a complex
phenomenon as far as theory, organisation and action
are concerned. The air component, more and more refined
and sophisticated, is omnipresent in the armed conflict at the end of the century,
becoming the defining element of modern warfare. Moreover, the accentuation
and extension of confrontation in airspace is forecast, fact that is confirmed by states’
security policies programmatic/normative documents: air forces are included in modern
armies quasi-totality.
Relatively new within the armed forces categories of forces, existing for less than
a century, air forces have rapidly become important, due to their modernity and capacity
to extend in space, which have led to a new way of conceiving military actions. If the
First World War started being an air one, the Second World War was also an air war,
the wars that followed them, no matter they had a local or limited character, highlighted
the tendency of amplifying their air component, and the contemporary war cannot
be conceived without it, at least in the predictable future.
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In the context of military actions accentuated dynamics, of their physiognomy
mobility, we witness the evolution of specific syntagms. Thus, the battlefield gets special
significance, and the contact line becomes a contact surface. Spaces concentrate
and time dilates, the military and non-military targets that are far away in the depth
of belligerent territories can directly and immediately interact.
The fact that the military actions classical image is overturned is mainly due
to aviation that, through its specific properties (spatiality, high speed, independence
from the terrestrial ways of communication etc.), allows for direct contact and immediate
action, in some minutes or tens of minutes, over the enemy’s objectives that are tens
and hundreds kilometres far away. Aviation, air forces in a broad sense, represent
the extension that makes modern military actions consistent, conferring warfare
the third dimension – air spatiality. Imagine a two-dimension world, actions carried out
only in plane (geometrically speaking). It is evidently impossible.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor:
I, categorically, express the same opinion, not ! The latest
local conflicts, the air operations in the wars in the Persian
Gulf and former Yugoslavia and, more recently, in Lebanon
and Palestine, accompanied by a large deployment of support
and strike naval forces, determined some military experts
to state that, in the future, we may face conflicts (wars) carried
out in the air or naval environment only.
Recognising the air and naval actions tendency to increase
their weight, we associate the opinions according to which
future actions will be joint, not only regarding the participant forces but also regarding
the environment, their weight being different, according to the political-military tasks
of the parties in conflict. There is thus an air components increasing tendency, under
these conditions, which become more and more evident.
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD: Everything is possible,
but the hypothesis in the question is unlikely to verify; maybe, only in the context,
absolutely hypothetical, in which neither of the belligerent forces makes use of air forces,
which would be going back in the Middle Ages, and history does not go backwards.
The first who would raise an aircraft in case the opponent could not answer similarly
or could not make use of an efficient means of counter-attack, would win the confrontation,
and the other would have to unconditionally accept the terms imposed by the winner.
Colonel Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD, University Reader: If we take a look back
at what happened in the world in recent past and, at the same time, at what happens
in the world nowadays, we notice there has been no “serious” armed confrontation without
exploiting air and especially the air forces capable of deciding the fate of the conflict
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RMT Debates
or to place one of the parties involved in a strategic-advantageous position. At the current
moment, the unique air forces characteristics and capabilities have revolutionised
the nature of war, changing its “face” forever, so we could not imagine an armed
confrontation without using air forces. Moreover, I think this is the “era” of air forces
and, why not, that of the air-cosmic ones. Superiority and air supremacy are concepts
that have impact not only on theoretical plane but also on the practical one, when, without
gaining air superiority (supremacy) in conflict area, the actions in the other confrontation
space (land, maritime, informational etc.) are impossible, or at least hardly to imagine.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: I suggest transtemporally
“playing” the essential issue of the debated theme. I would like you
to refer not only to the air power image but also to the one of the air
forces, as they have been evoked, at the end of the century that has
just begun.
Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU, PhD:
Air Forces have got a relatively short history compared to the
other two categories of forces. Their evolution is characterised
by a rapid, almost exponential rhythm and it is difficult
to foresee what they will be like and what their weight in the
armed conflicts will be in 90 years. One thing is already evident:
air power evolves firstly towards an aero spatial power and
then towards a spatial power and the fate of future wars will be
decided, undoubtedly, from space. Sometimes, in the future,
a clear cut between air power and spatial power may occur
and thus a fourth category of armed forces – Spatial Forces
could appear. Of course, not all states will afford developing this category of forces
and those that do not do it will be a priori condemned.
Colonel Florian RÂPAN, PhD, Professor: The issue of the third millennium
war physiognomy is a main preoccupation for both political analysts and military
experts in their attempts to provide answers to questions regarding the war content
and the level of engagement, the limits of nuclear confrontation, the war level and the
classical armed fight and the war perspectives and modern armed fight. Currently,
four scenarios concerning future global alternatives are imagined by polemologists.
We declare ourselves in favour of a moderate vision, which is situated between the
two extremes: that of totally excluding wars and that of totally different wars, based
on different laws and principles. Not at all very seldom, looking into the future,
air strategists wonder: “What will the future war be like ?”, “Where will it take place ?”,
“What forces will be employed ?”, “What about its physiognomy ?”, “How could victory
against the adversary become concrete ?”.
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~ 3/2006
In conclusion, in the next years, we will witness spectacular progress regarding
air confrontations development, although we will not witness “Star War” scenarios,
as the role of human factor will remain a top one in warfare and armed fight determinations.
Reader: It is difficult to imagine what air power will be like
at the end of the century. It is not because of the lack
of imagination but because of the extremely rapid air power
development, not only at national level but especially as far as
the great world air powers at the current moment are concerned.
It is very easy, of course, to slip towards “science-fiction”
and to approach the issue of air power from an optimistically
enough perspective. I think that “air power” will soon become
an “aerospace power”. At the same time, the current concept
“network centric warfare” will be found in all the domains of military confrontation
and the role of aerospace power will be decisive in resolving the conflicts of the century
that has just begun. I consider the evolution of aerospace power will again revolutionise
warfare and will definitely mark the air power value applied in and from the atmospheric
and extra-atmospheric space, so effectively that it would not have to be measured using
the power current values.
The long lasting military tendency towards influence and vulnerability different
projection will favour the development of aerospace capabilities, thus remaining in the
sphere of advanced technologies. The progress made as far as speed, range, agility,
precision and lethality, combined with “stealth” technologies, independence/autonomy,
information and data transmission will increase the degree of the third dimension
exploitation for military purposes, through applying what we call air power and, maybe,
aerospace power, as soon as possible.
Colonel Traian ANASTASIEI, PhD, Professor: I accept your challenge
although it is hazardous. Let us not forget that it is 100 years this year since Traian Vuia
managed to “fly” a distance of (only) 12 m, using a machine that was heavier than air,
which could take off by its own on board-means. Although, in short time after
its appearance, aviation was inscribed in God Mars panoply, I think that, in future,
the air power military connotation will diminish compared to the other aspects of human
activity in airspace.
Air power evolution will be strictly connected to human evolution, in general,
and, for a long period, it will be the front platoon of human knowledge development, being
confronted with the general problems of this globalisation era. The important
accomplishments in the field of air power will not belong to one single man or one single
country, therefore scientific and technologic cooperation will be more and more evident
and even compulsory, as one of globalisation manifestations is borders “permeability”
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RMT Debates
up to their becoming merely symbolic. Confrontation bellicose significance will be
diminished and it will more and more become competition.
Subsequent to modern technologies development and our access to them
(automation and miniaturisation), the specific techniques and activities dual character
– air and cosmic – will be emphasised and we could more and more speak about
an aero-cosmic power.
Air power (aero-cosmic) will be very attractive as far as the decision-makers are
concerned, as they will develop and utilise it according to its specific properties: possibility
of opportune, accurate, desired intensity action, exactly where it is necessary and with
minimum effects on the environment.
It will also be preferred under military aspect, due to its coercive as well as
its preventive role.
New ways of airspace “exploiting” will certainly appear and, of course, airspace
will be more accessible to everybody, so more crowded, which requires appropriate
regulations, air transport security being of great concern.
Air power has a large span, be it due to mere the fact that it has been studied
through its form of manifestation, as a witness of the disputes between nations, of the
rivalries and violence that used to culminate in wars, being thus given military
connotations. Unfortunately, all the papers that approach the subject define it from
this perspective and there are even periodicals that bear this title, which come from
the military sphere only. Sometimes the other components are referred to, but only
briefly, without taking into account the fact that they define what air power actually
means. Political leaders, in general, define power as being the ownership of resources
as a basis for imposing their own will in the relationship with others. These resources
include, among others, population, territory, natural resources, economic dimension,
military forces, and economic stability.
Colonel Costinel Petrache, PhD: There came first the man’s
dream of being able to fly, exactly as birds do, of being engulfed
by the air and by the boundless verticality of becoming. Icarus
represented both the measure and the final consequence of this dream.
Then, in an undeclared remoteness of history, there came the flight
itself, the detachment from the earth, by flying a machine that was
heavier than the air we breathe. The flight immediately turns
into power and it is from this point that we choose not to stop
and the flight will not stop either. With a haste that is specific
to earthquakes which once started, do not stop up to the moment
when the energy that has set them moving has consumed its critical
difference, air power becomes, exponentially, the best card of the
military power of a state or of a group of states that play upon their
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interests and destiny, geopolitically and geostrategically speaking.
Seducing triumph of the effect over the cause, the air power
– tendency and cohabitation towards the absolute of speed,
of information and of the organic technology – it makes time
a horizontal dimension, it inhibits the palpable history, it offers
the perspective of the visible over the acoustic, it annihilates
terrestrial references and primary vitalities, it develops abstractions
that are difficult to control and certifies the arrogant victory of intensity
over surfaces and of the instantaneous over the time that is expressed
as depth. Everything, expressed in aesthetic formulae that obsessively
compress the universal. Because either we like it or not, there is
an aesthetic of air power. An aesthetic that, for most of us, transcends
the current understanding of the time and space that govern
our contemporaneity.
Romania – It has been a century since its air power has tutelarily
come out of wish, inspiration, courage and victory, a century since
Traian Vuia’s “bird” historically freed itself from gravitational
constraints. Like an eternal beautiful curse, which we cannot
avoid, we are “sentenced” to adequately keep the status of air power
in understanding, reality and projects. Especially since, it is from
here, from us, that someone has dared and genially succeeded
in measuring the infinite !
182
MILITARY
PUBLICATIONS
UNIVERSE
Groundwatch –
ISTAR in Flux •
Future Weapons:
Power to Burn •
Security: Watch Your
Assets ! • Electronic
Warfare: Osama,
Don’t Phone Home !
• Missiles: New
Dual Role for Antishippers • Vehicles:
Self-Protection •
Helicopters: SelfProtection •
Reconnaissance Vehicles • Communication
System • New French Metal at Eurosatory
• Drones
Armées d’aujourd’hui, France, no. 309,
April 2006
Combat Training for Urban Conflict • Firefighters
in Action • Bad Weather Warning for the Planet
• Effects Based Operations – a New Crisis
Management Concept • Temporary Force
of United Nations in Lebanon • Projection Air
Force • European Air Group • The Temptation
of Walls (File) • Reconversion – a New Adventure
• International Council of Military Sports
Armées d’aujourd’hui, France, no. 310,
May 2006
Sea Gendarmes, Vocation and Passion •
Jean Couturier – a Frenchman of D Day •
South-Saharan Countries on the Way to Democracy
• Adapted Military Service • Defence Central
Pharmaceutical Centre Against Bird’s Influenza
• Marines and Commando Command • European
Security and Defence Policy Moves Forward
Hydrocarbon
Pollution Alert near
Ouessant Island •
Emergency Medical
Evacuation from
N’Djamena • General
Mohammadzai
Khatol – Colour
Bearer of the Afghan
Women • Malacca
Straits to Became
a War Zone ? • Focus
on Road Insecurity
• A White Paper on
Domestic Security Faced with Terrorism,
Wherefore ? • 13th Dragoons Paratroopers Regiment
of Special Forces • Rafale Aircraft in French Air
Force • Intervention Squadron of French National
Gendarmerie (Technical file) • Promoting
the Dialogue North-South • Reserve Forces (File)
• Researches on Stealth Air and Sea Ships
Bulletin européen, Italia, no. 672, May 2006
Turkey on the Threshold of Stepping into Europe:
Historical Premises • Einstein and the Crisis
of Simultaneity Concept • Kantian Roots
of Umberto Serafini’s Thought • France and
European Arms Agency • For a European Federal
Pact • To Conciliate the Free Expression Principle
with Religious Beliefs Observance
183
Bulletin européen, Italia, no. 673, June 2006
We are not the Chaos’ Children • Turkey on the
Threshold of Stepping into Europe • Family
in Europe. Multiples Context and the Family Forms
Diversity • Thoughts About Cultural Diversity
• From Visible to Invisible: Splendour of Mount
Athos Icons
Europäische Sicherheit, Germany,
no. 5, May 2006
Germany’s Interests Between USA and Russia
• Opportunities and Obstacles of the “African
Security Architecture” • What about the Security
of our Energy ? • China’s Rise to a World Power
• “The Future of our Security Systems are in the
Partnership and Friendship with the USA”
• Transformation in the Luftwaffe • Credible Policy
Is Different • NATO and EU Initiative “Strategic
Air Transport” • SOSTAR-X Should Be Realised
as soon as Possible • Dialogue between Georgia
and NATO Continues • 130 Class Corvette –
Naming of the BRAUNSCHWEIG • Network
Centric Warfare of the Army within International
Context • Galileo – An Ambitious Project • Luftwaffe
Hopes for New Aircraft • Traffic/Transportation
Control Centre in the Area of Operations • War
Correspondence – Experiences since 1999
• America’s Security Perspectives • Defence
Against Asymmetric Threats in a Maritime
Environment
nr. 6, June 2006
Problems with the Expansion of the EU • Ethical
Principles of the Bundeswehr • Falludsha and the
Transformation of the Armed Forces • 50 Years
of German Army • The Discussion about German
Security Police Be Broadened • Armament and
Utilization – Basic Functions of Modern Logistics
• Guided Missile Industry in Germany • F 125 –
A Frigate on Course to Innovation • U 212
Submarine • International Air Show Berlin
– ILA 2006 • Command Control and Information
Centre of the Armed Forces for Fire Support
of EU Battle Group • NATO Response Force and
EU Battle Groups and Their Meaning for the Army
• The German Society for Military Technology
in Berlin • Multinational experiment 4 – Shaping
the Future • Standing of the Armed Forces in the
Political Field of “International Security” •
Strategic Crisis Management in Population
Protection – Joint Task and common Responsibility
of the State • EUFOR – German Contribution
184
~ 3/2006
in the Eleventh Year after Dayton European
Colloquium 2006
nr. 7, July 2006
A chance for a New Start • NATO’s Role in the
21st Century • Thoughts on the Officer’s Profession
and Career in Today’s Bundeswehr • Transatlantic
Crisis Reaction: NATO and ESDP • Strategic
Intelligence Command • Operational Command
of the Reaction Forces on the Way to Full
Operational Readiness • “We Dispatch Soldiers
only if the Security Is Guaranteed, as far as that
Is Possible at all”. Interview with Member of the
Bundestag • Logistic Challenges in the Introduction
of New Weapon System – Described by the Example
of the TIGER and NH90 Helicopters • The
Upcoming NATO Summit in Riga Casts Its Shadow
before • University of Ideas. Interview with the
President of the Bundeswehr University Munich
• Mission-Preparatory Training for Conflict
Prevention and Crisis Management • Alliance
Ground Surveillance – End of the Nightmare
of the Military Command • Armoured Vehicles
in Operations • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles • PUMA
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle • “Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik” Builds Bridges of
Understanding with Ukraine • Ukrainian Officers
Experience Armed Forces in the Democracy
• “Sleeping Death” • Effects and Networking
– Two Sides of a Medal • Making Peace – But
How ? • Olmert and Abbas – With Full Speed into
a Dead End ? • Account on the 2006 Berlin
Colloquium on the Clausewitz-Gesellschaft •
Restructuring of Army Officer Training
Foreign Affairs, SUA, vol. 85, no. 2,
March-April 2006
Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon • Intelligence,
Policy And the War in Iraq • The Last Exit from
Iraq • The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy • The
Backlash against Democracy Promotion • Ensuring
Energy Security • Can Hamas Be Tamed ? • To
Targeted Killings Work ? • Offshoring: The Next
Industrial Revolution ? • China and Japan’s
Simmering Rivalry • Taiwan’s Fading Independence
Movement • Two Cheers for Expensive Oil
Jane’s International Defence Review, UK,
vol. 39, May 2006
NBC Reconnaissance Vehicles Are Advancing
from the wilderness • Thales Hopes to Keep Ships
in the Picture with Its Naval Sensor Suite • Navies
Military Publications Universe
Seek Answer to Missing Links • US Finally Looks
Beyond the B-2 for Long Range Strike Capability
• Unlocking the Austrian Defence Matrix
• Cutting Through the Fog of War: Armed Forces
Strive to Reduce Fratricide Threat
vol. 39, June 2006
French Army Transforms to Meet Challenge
of Multirole Future • Underwater Sensors
Shaping Up • Final Frontier Revisited: The US
Responds to Space Requirements • Stryker Scores
with US Tactical Vehicle Force • NATO Pursues
Modern Art of Soldiering • New Danish Combat
Support Ships Offer Greater Flexibility for NATO
Operations • New Era M14 Alleviates Reliability
Issues
vol. 39, July 2006
Dutch Study Range of Helicopter Upgrades
• Upping the Stakes: Demand Rises for New
Generation Tactical UAVs • Sailing Towards
a Visible Horizon with Networked Naval Navigation
• Debate Rages as Military Seeks to Counter
Transport Aircraft Threat • Aerospace beyond
Airframes: New Directions for European Industry
• Flaws in the System: Modern Operations Test
the Theory of Network Centricity • UK Carrier
Force Is Readied for Strike
Military Technology, Germany, vol. 30, no. 5, 2006
Quo Vadis, JSF ? • “Holy Prophet”: Iran’s April
Hoax or Panic ? • Military Radio Communications:
Assessing the Market • “Think Globally, Act
Locally” – The Reform of the Bulgarian Armed
Forces • The Role and Tasks of the Bulgarian
Armed Forces • Bulgarian Defence Companies
at HEMUS’06 • Emerging Sensors Technologies
for Unmanned Aircraft Systems • “We Meet Our
Commitments” • NATO Is and Remains the
Strongest Anchor of Our Common Security • The
Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC)
• Sensors for UAV Systems – The JAPCC’s View
• The EJ200 Engine for the Eurofighter • Russian
Helicopter and Aero-Engine Companies at ILA
2006 • The Network Centric Operations Industry
Consortium: Mastering Security in a Global
Critical Environment
Military Technology, Germany, vol. 30, no. 6, 2006
Toward the “Second Nuclear Age” • Defence
against Biological, Chemical and Radiological
Attacks • The Us
Army/Us Air Force
Joint Light Cargo
Aircraft Programme
• Chief of Defence
Revisited • Thales
FVT Series One-Man
Operation Turrets •
Countering the IED
Threat • Emerging
Opportunities in
Optical Sensing and
Exploitation •
Tailored Tactical Surveillance • Precision
Identification and Persistent Sensing • Opening
the European Defence Market • A “Code
of Conduct” on European Defence Procurement
• Military Shelters • Personal Protection Solutions
for Today’s Armed Conflicts • Track Facts – new
tendencies in the Development of Modern Tracks
• Israel Pursues Land Warfare Technology
Innovation • Top Solutions for Mobile Tank
Container Systems – Made by WEW Westerwälder
Eisenwerk • “New Challenges in the Age
of Changed Threats” • NATO and EU “Strategic
Airlift” Initiative Successfully Concluded
under German Leadership • AUSA Winter
Symposium 2006
ÖMZ (Österreichische Militärische
Zeitschrift), Austria, no. 4, July-August 2006
War Determination Planning • USA’s SubSaharan-Africa Policy • The Historical Development
of the Special Operations Forces • The Century
of Peasants’ Wars in Austria from 1513 until 1626
• Iran after Presidential Election – Aggravation
in the Nuclear Controversy ? • “Nothing Ventured,
Nothing Gained”. Critical Comments on the
Deployment of Western Military Special Forces
Marked by Multiple Conflict Scenarios • No Dead
Bodies ! Modern War and the Grassroots of War
Correspondence • The Importance of Military
Ethics within the Civilian Morality Construction
Revue militaire suisse, Switzerland,
no. 5, May 2006
Management Commission of National Council
to Consider Training System of Force XXI •
1506-2006: Five Hundred Years of Swiss Pontifical
Guard • The Main “reservoir” of the Swiss Pontifical
Guard • Impressions and experiences of a Rookie
in the Swiss Pontifical Guard • Advanced Formation
185
for the Future Generals ? • Formation for “Disaster
Medicine” • 20 th Century: Militia Army in
Switzerland and technology (2) • Suicides Among
Policemen • Samuel Huntington’ Thesis
(the Clash of Civilizations) and the Situation after
11th of September 2001 • Deadlock in Kosovo ?
(2) How are Terrorists Communicate: Myths and
Realities • What Enemy have the Americans in
Iraq ? • To Track After Snappers Opposing to SFOR
Signal, SUA, vol. 60, no. 9, May 2006
People Power Drives Special Operations • Marine
Corps Special Operations Command Hits the
Beach • Special Operations Forces Dive Deep
• Missiles Aim for Mach 4 Capability • Collaborative
Technologies Demand Deep Change • Collaboration
Enables Technological Slight of Hand • Research
Team Seeks Solutions for Warfighters on the Move
• Sweden Seeks Military Communications
Flexibility • System Moves Light with Electrons,
Not Gears • Alert System Attracts Attention •
Coordination among Groups Key to Protecting
Capital Region • Conference Highlights Information
Sharing and Interoperability Priorities
Signal, SUA, vol. 60, no. 10, June 2006
US Recoups Nighttime Primacy • Networking the
World’s Most Powerful Military • US Navy Covers
the Oceans with Technology • US Army Reforges
Training and Readiness • Technology Takes Flight
• Mighty Minis Find Foes • Dedicated Army Force
Speeds Technology to Warfighters • Collaboration,
~ 3/2006
Security and Aircraft loom Large in Defence
Programs • Major Programs Open Europe’s
Checkbook • Effects Based Approach Reshapes
Strategic Landscape.
Survival, UK, vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 2006
Populist Resurgence in Latin America ? • Sources
and Limits of Chinese “Soft Power” • Demilitarising
the “War on terror” • Nuclear Terrorism: A
disheartening Dissent • Europe’s Jihadist Dilemma
• What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe •
Chaos in the North Caucasus and Russia’s Future
• The Emerging Consensus for Preventive War
Truppendienst International, Austria, nr. 2, 2006
The History of Bosnia and Herzegovina from
Ancient Times to the 20th Century • The Collapse
of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
• The State of Bosnia and Herzegovina • The
Population • Geography • Transport and
Communication • Economy • A Single Military
Force for 21st Century • The EUFOR – Operation
Althea • EUFOR’s Activities in Support of the Law
Enforcement Agencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Tackling Organised Crime and Corruption • The
Development of Information Campaigns by IFOR,
SFOR and EUFOR • Deployment of Liaison and
Observation Team • Doctrine of Integrated Police
Units • A Political Survey • The European Union
in Bosnia and Herzegovina • International Missions
to Bosnia and Herzegovina • International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
Selection and Translation
Ioana MANAFU, Delia PETRACHE,
Mihai POPESCU
National Military Library
186
&
EDITORIAL EVENTS
Texts, notes, comments and incidental national
legislation – all these are reunited in the volume România
– NATO. Tratate fundamentale (Romania – NATO.
Fundamental Treaties), a volume that was compiled
by a collective of authors in the field of military law, namely
Brigadier Floarea {erban, PhD, Lieutenant Colonel
Constantin Zanfir, Second Lieutenants Alina Damian and
Daniel Ronciu and coordinated by Teodor ATANASIU.
The book, published by Editura Militar`, reunites
the main Romanian legislative acts regarding the relation
with NATO, thus providing a general image of Romania’s
responsibilities as an Alliance Member. In the four
chapters, the fundamental NATO treaties Romania is part
of are presented – The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), the Agreement Between the Parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces (1951), the Protocol
On the Status of International Military Headquarters Set up Pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty (1952), the Agreement on the Status of Missions and Representatives of Third
States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (1994), in both Romanian and English;
the stipulations regarding the status of the forces that are subject to the bilateral treaties
established between Romania and some of the NATO Member States; excerpts from
the Constitution of Romania, the Civil Code, Law no. 295/2004 on arms and ammunition
regimes, Law no. 182/2002 on classified information protection, Law no. 42/2004 on armed
forces taking part in missions outside the national territory, the Government Emergency
Ordinance no. 121/1998 on military assuming material responsibility, Order of the
Minister of Public Finance no. 292/2006 on the approval of the Procedure for refunding
the value added tax to NATO Member States armed forces that take part in the common
defence effort.
The normative acts are preceded by an introductory study which approaches
the need to have this kind of contribution, the more so as the book can be used as
an instrument in the relations with foreign armed forces, as well as one for those who
actually apply the provisions of these normative acts.
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~ 3/2006
Mention should be made that the normative acts that are presented in this
in volume are based on the ones published in the Official Gazette of Romania up
to 15th of March 2006.
“The powerful word of this writer”, having a penchant
for a comma, a perpetual comma, adds two more
books to the impressive “inventory” of the Professor
Nicolae ROTARU: Psi – leadership. Management
organiza]ional în domeniul siguran]ei na]ionale
(Psi – Leadership. Organisational Management
in the Field of National Safety) (2005) and Lider
[i actant (Leader and Actant) (2006), both published
by Editura ANI.
The first book approaches the organisational
management and military-type leadership. The author
defines organisation, presents its characteristics
and structure, and outlines a typology of organisational
entities, according to the structure, purpose, way of recruitment, coagulation, restrictions,
beneficiaries and way to command. In this “mosaic of tendencies”, organisational
culture proves to be “an ensemble of values, ways of thinking and behaviour of the members
of an organisations”, therefore reuniting the values, beliefs and hypothesis shared
by the members of an organisation. A paideutic approach, according to the author,
which provides us with “the main theoretical milestones and the minimum experimentalpractical support” that is necessary to surpass all the “mandatory steps” in the field
of organisational management.
The second book, a collection of lectures and essays on command, communication
and co-existence, invites us to reading, meditation and competitive spirit through the words
of Traian Liteanu, PhD, University Reader, the one who signs the Foreword.
Therefore, let us cover, between “commanding and managing”, the meanders
of communication, as this is the global “shareholder” in conflict management, navigating
through the “symbols of communication managerial relations”, into intellectual
and aesthetic education and a conversational education in the domain of intelligence.
Among information and communication risks, let us see the communication language
as a metalanguage and let us try to become accustomed with the skill of the
comprehensibility of persuasion. The book is dedicated to all the author’s teachers,
who, as his mentors, helped and supported him to become a gifted mentor in his turn.
We have already mentioned C`lin HENTEA on previous occasions in the pages
of this journal, in fact, its books speak for themselves, and I would like to express
my gratitude for the Imaginile mi[cate ale propagandei (Moved Images
of Propaganda), a book published by Editura Militar`, in the new Colec]ia Polemos,
188
Editorial Events
with a Foreword signed by Radu Voinescu. Balancing
between theory and reality, the author opens the door of
image for us, while admonishing us, with reason, we might
add, saying that many of us “have no clue about all these
wars that have caught our eye because of what we see on TV
news bulletins”, although we speak about them most of the
time and almost everywhere, and they have become some
kind of “ordinary gossips”.
Beyond words, there are always questions and the
topics that the author suggests for us. Communication is
the key, we always say that. But how much can it help us ?
C`lin Hentea closely examines this world that has been
tangled in wonderful things and abjections, in self-pride
and performance, in emotions and anger. Acid, attentive,
sincere and sensible, C`lin Hentea’s style carries us somewhere, in a world wearing
the “new garments of propaganda”, still, an old world, polished up and hidden: “We have
got used to living with the emotions generated by the war that is broadcast live. We come
across it, we see it, we read about it, we comment upon it daily, at home, in the armchair,
at work, during coffee break, or when we go out, to have a beer. We have firm convictions,
we have online information at our disposal, we provide miraculous solutions … We do not
know for sure why it has broken out, how it is waged and not even who will be the one
to win it. This is a paradox of the computerised society, that has entered the third millennium
full of self-pride, after having read, a long time ago, “All Quiet on the Western Front”
and having seen, most recently, on TV, “Apocalypse Now”.
The images of propaganda are “in motion”, the book is an exciting and real movie
about us, first of all, about the soldiers that are in missions, far from the country, “a kind
of ambassadors for the cause of Romania’s NATO or EU integration”, and secondly
a confession of the seen and touched failures: “Sixty years ago, same as now, the soldiers
sent by the Romanian state to defend its interests outside the national borders had
less available means and resources than the allies to promote the country’s image”.
A confession, states the author, “slices” of his life and thoughts. Anyway, the truth
will disappear together with us, and trying to disclose it, by any means, will make
us tired and probably, at one point, we will not know what to do with it. And C`lin Hentea
reminds us that the “unique and absolute truth is only a philosophic ideal”.
{tefan Gheorghidiu knew this, too.
The first issue of this year of the Revista Academiei For]elor Aeriene
(Air Force Academy Magazine) recommends us, through the agency of Professor
{tefan Nedelcu, PhD, in an article entitled “On information”, to reflect, beyond definition
and meanings, on the relationship between scientific information and knowledge – when
does knowledge-based information turn into knowledge as such ? This is a difficult
189
~ 3/2006
question, the more so as, sometimes, in addition
to knowledge, the “original element – information” must
occur. The review consists of a series of articles regarding
the domain of technical sciences and applied mathematics
– “Properties of the Harmonic Series”, “Computer Assisted
Modelling of the Signals Spectral Analysis”, “Experimental
Research regarding the Variation of the Coefficient
of Friction in Sliding Bearings”, as well as regarding
management and social-human sciences – “Communication
and its Esoteric Dimension”, “The Psychology of Change”,
“The Integration of Managers – Starting Point for
Quality Management”, Zoon erotikon: Prolegomena
to a Phenomenological Speech on Erotism”, “The Romanian
Being from a New Linguistic Perspective”, “1906-2006. 100 of years of flying”.
“The air is the realm of the developed states. And this
is not a novelty. It is a reality of one century of aviation.
Nevertheless, the division of labour on the warlike or pacific
sky of the planet, which sends its messengers out in Space,
requires education. It means skills. It calls for talent.
It entails sacrifice …”. The interview given by the Air Forces
Chief of Staff, General Lieutenant Gheorghe CATRINA,
PhD, to the Cer Senin Magazine, no. 2/2006, regarding
the topic of national security and defence lets us know
about sacrifice and self-denial and the tough reality of the
modern air conflict. The magazine provides us with
information about the reunion of the Navigation
Subcommittee of NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (March 2006),
about the “Traian Vuia’s Flight” centenary celebrated in Bra[ov, “Doors Open Day”
at the 70th Air Transport Base (17th of March), the inauguration of “Traian Vuia” Hall,
in the new building of the Aviation Museum, the exercise “Lone Bustard” carried
in the South of France, about the tactical missiles for rapid reaction forces, the exercise
“Volfap 1 – 2006”, the MARS radio programme, the JDAM system from Norway,
and history pages: “The development of artillery and surface-to-air missiles between
1970-1989”, lessons learnt: “Learning from experience”, an interview with Lieutenant
Colonel Ovidiu B`lan, Head of the Lessons Learnt Office within the Air Forces Staff.
From another part of our country, from a place full of history and research activity
– Constan]a, Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Rom#ne ~ 2005 (The Annual of the
Romanian Marine Museum), a special issue, edited on the occasion of the anniversary
190
Editorial Events
of 145 years since the Modern Military Marine Museum
was established, under the aegis of the Editura Companiei
Na]ionale Administra]ia Porturilor Maritime Constan]a S.A.
This volume, which is the eight, encompasses
articles and studies from the field, for instance: “The Danube
– River-Maritime Communication Route”, “The Status
of Dobruja at the beginning of 1916”, “Italian Destinations
in the Black Sea Basin – Ordinary Routes (13th – 14th century)”,
“The Milan Treaty and the Venetian Navigation in the Black
Sea in the First Decades of the 16th Century”, “Macroeconomic
Consequences of the Fall of Constantinople. Milestones”,
“The Evolution of the Romanian Military Marine between
1860-1914”, “The City of Br`ila in the Strategic Conception of the Year 1944”, “The Balkans
and the Great Powers. Romanian Insight over the Strategic Interests”, “Maritime Activities
Geopolitics”, “Certain Historic-Geopolitical Aspects of Russia’s “Game” in the Black Sea
and the way the Romanian historic interests are affected by that”.
Cultural centre, the Romanian Marine Museum has a collection of approximately
6 000 manuscripts and documents from personal archives, autochthonous or foreign,
regarding marine historiography, naval technology, and marine literature. The oldest
book one can find in the Museum’s library is L’Origine del Danubio, which was printed
in Venice, in 1648.
Editorial Selection and Arguments
@ Alina UNGHEANU
191
Thinking
Differently ...
Cristi VECERDEA ~ CRIV
Glory
Tank
192
Thinking Differently ...
Mythology
Map
193
Résumés
La stratégie de la certitude
Pacification: l’école française
L’éditorial met en évidence les traits de la certitude
de la perspective d’un rapport ouvert et positif
entre la certitude et la performance. C’est une
relation transparente, méthodique et adéquate,
où la performance explique et soutient la certitude
comme une sorte d’existence pour de certains
stratégies, plans ou projets. L’auteur souligne
aussi les vertus de la certitude, qui soutiennent
le processus d’une stabilité organisationnelle,
la transformation même de l’institution militaire
nationale, par La Stratégie de transformation
de l’Armée Roumaine.
A la fin du XIXème si è cle a été élaborée, par le
maréchal Gallieni et Lyautey et le général
Pennequin, une idée française sur la pacification,
par la volonté de dépasser, éventuellement,
les concepts anglo-saxons qui étaient la base
de la doctrine de l’armée française. Les initiateurs
proposaient la gestion indirecte comme un modèle
d’organiser de cette école de pacification,
y compris en tenant compte de règles du théâtre
classique: l’unité du lieu, du temps, de l’ action,
à l’ordre d’un seul commandant chef – militaire
ou civil.
Le front et le menton: penser et agir
pour l’officier
Peut-on laisser les reporters de guerre
«se glisser dans nos lits» ?
L’article définie les caractéristiques d’un chef
commandant militaire, nommé à n’importe
quel niveau de responsabilité, particulièrement
au niveau stratégique. Il faut qu’il soit en même
temps un organisateur, administrateur et législateur,
un homme de caractère et capable d’initiative, tout
sur le fond d’une culture militaire significative.
“Un homme d’action qui pense”, en ce cas, le front
et le menton en trouvant dans une complémentarité
autant naturelle, autant forte.
Le sujet de cet article montre l’importance
que nous doivent accorder aux reporters qui
se trouvent dans un théâtre d’opérations. Au-delà
des questions, l’auteur met sur le tapis une possible
coopération, “un dialogue équilibré” entre les
reporters et les forces déployées sur un théâtre
d’opérations, particuli è rement pendant une
situation de crise. Dans ce contexte, l’auteur nous
présente une analyse de communication, réalisée
par la Fondation Electricité de France en 1999.
Le sabre et l’esprit
Vo Nguyen Giap: stratège de génie
et instrument
de l’indépendance du Vietnam
La conviction de Napoléon, comme le sabre est
toujours battu par l’esprit, représente le point
de partir pour une démarche sur la problématique
d’instrument militaire, sur l’apparent immobilisme
de l’institution militaire. L’auteur met sur le tapis
la nécessite et la motivation d’une adaptation
d’instrument militaire à n’importe quelle
confrontation de type symétrique ou asymétrique.
194
L’auteur présente les traits du général Vo Nguyen
Giap, vu comme un commandant chef qui a su
exploiter les circonstances, mais aussi les erreurs
de ses adversaires. Entre l’admiration et déclin,
pendant trente ans, le général a prouvé par
des qualités spéciales autant dans le domaine
Abstracts
de la stratégie, que celui de la tactique, bien connaître
les techniques de guérilla combinées, souvent,
avec celles de la guerre conventionnelle.
Divergences stratégiques
L’auteur analyse par l’opposition les trois concepts
stratégiques fondamentales élaborés dans
l’intervalle avril 1999-décembre 2003 – le Concept
stratégique de l’Alliance, la Stratégie nationale
de sécurité et la Stratégie européenne de sécurité,
ayant comme le point de partir les valeurs
communes de les trois organismes signataires
– OTAN, Etats-Unis d’Amérique, respectivement
l’Union européenne. L’auteur recommande “une
lecture attentive” de ces documents, parce que
les méthodes d’aborder les problèmes du monde
peuvent être, parfois, divergentes.
La guerre du Nil aura-t-elle lieu ?
Pour les pays du Nil les ressources en eau sont
insuffisantes. On peut parler d’une politique
de l’eau égyptienne, dit l’auteur, où l’Egypte
ne doit pas avoir le droit particulier des eaux
du fleuve. Un paradoxe à titre duquel existent,
au fait, de nombreux tensions qui pourraient
se transformer dans un véritable conflit et une
véritable tragédie pour Egypte, touché dans
l’un de ses intérêts vitales. Il semble que ce
problème sera solutionné seulement par un appui
international.
La politique extérieure
des États-Unis d’Amérique
à la lumière de leur histoire intérieure
En allant de la mention du chef d’Etat-major des
armées françaises, qui disaient que “la politique
extérieure américaine s’explique par son histoire
intérieure”, l’auteur nous présente quelques
moments de l’histoire intérieure des Etats-Unis,
dont on peut détacher quelques conclusions
relatives à la compréhension de ceux deux
pôles qui en marquaient son existence et
son développement – l’isolationnisme et
l’interventionnisme. Tout dans le contexte auquel,
bien qu’ils partagent avec les Américains de
nombreuses valeurs, pages d’histoire et des intérêts
économiques, ce sont les Françaises qui percevoient
le monde dans une manière différente.
La fin du management ?
En soulignant la force individuelle et le rôle bien
élevé des relations interpersonnelles, l’auteur
propose un sujet-question: on peut attendre
à la fin du management classique et à la parution
ou peut-être seulement au son remplacement
par une “démocratie organisée” ? En attendant un
réponse, l’article traite le management du point
de vue psychologique et aussi qui provoque une
émotion, du point de vue social et, pas du tout
au final, le management dans l’organisation militaire.
La politique globale
C’est l’auteur qui met en évidence le terme
de “politique globale” en rapportant aux institutes
et organisations formales qui élaborent et
soutiennent les r è gles et les normes qui
conduisent l’ordre mondiale, comme les
institutions d’Etat ou celles du domaine de la
coopération intergouvernemental. La politique
globale renferme non seulement la problématique
géopolitique qui se réfère à la sécurité et aux
affaires militaires, mais aussi une diversité de
problèmes économiques, sociales et écologiques.
Politique de force,
stratégie qui tient à un fil
L’auteur traite la situation présente du sud de Liban
par la prisme de trois types de politiques, chacun
d’eux avec sa stratégie: une politique de force,
qui est soutenue par de stratégies directes, qui
visent la destruction des réseaux Hezbollah et
Hamas; une politique de tromperie et dissimulation,
par des stratagèmes et des stratégies indirectes,
en suivant l’accentuation de l’hostilité du monde
arabe contre l’Israël, mais aussi une politique de
riposte, par de stratégies asymétriques, qui visent
l’identification des vulnérabilités d’Israël.
La puissance et son rôle
dans le contexte
de la géopolitique post-moderne
L’auteur présente quelques théories et concepts
qui ont défini la puissance dans les relations
internationales, parmi lesquelles il y a celles
de Martin Wight, Gerard Dussoury, Peter Morris,
Gianfranco Poggi et Alvin Toffler, pour mettre
en évidence quelques’uns de intérêts et les
195
comportements de différents acteurs dans
le domaine de la géopolitique. La conclusion est
que la politique d’un Etat ou d’un acteur non-Etat
ne peut pas être traitée dans la perspective
postmoderne par des termes d’un déterminisme
géographique rigide.
Les rapports politico-militaires
dans la Zone Elargie de la Mer Noire.
Expressions et tendances
Important nœud de communications qui unit trois
continents, la Mer Noire continue de susciter
l’intérêt de grands stratèges du monde. En allant
du fait que la Zone Etendue de la Mer Noire
se confronte par de nombreux risques et menaces
relatif à son assurance et à son stabilité, l’auteur
nous présente les principales buts de la coopération
~ 3/2006
politico-militaire dans cet area. Il met en évidence
l’élargissement des partenariats stratégiques.
La guerre de l’Afghanistan
dans le contexte de la liquidation
du terrorisme mondial
L’article est une description du cet “polygone
de la terreur” qui est l’Afghanistan, le lieu de
rencontrer et développer le terrorisme, l’extrémisme
international et les trafiquants de drogues.
L’auteur insiste sur l’état de sécurité comme
un facteur décisif dans la reconstruction de
l’Afghanistan, celle-ci en suivant deux directions:
la lutte contre les forces anticoalition et l’application
d’un programme de re-reconstruction de la société
civile, qui se trouve à présent dans un pauvreté
inimaginable.
Version française par
@ Alina UNGHEANU
196
Zusammenfassungen
Strategie der Sicherheit
Der Leitartikel die Züge der Sicherheit hebt unter
dem Gesichtspunkt eines offenen und positiven
Berichtes hervor zwischen der Sicherheit und
der Leistung. Eine transparente, methodische
und adäquate Beziehung wo die Leistung
die Sicherheit als Existenz der Strategien, Pläne
oder Projekte motiviert. Der Autor hebt auch
die Tugenden der Sicherheit hervor, die in der
Schaffung einer organisatorischen Stabilität, in
der Umwandlung der nationale Militärinstitution
selbst durch die Umwandlungsstrategie der
rumänischen Armee bestehen
Die Vorderseite und das Kinn: denken
und für den offizier handeln
Der Artikel die Eigenschaften eines auf
irgendeinem Verantwortungsniveau genannten
Militärkommandant, aber besonders auf
strategischem Niveau definiert. Er muß
gleichzeitig Organisator, Verwalter und Justitiar
sein, er muß Mann von Charakter, intelligenten
sein, und er muß Initiative haben, all das auf
dem Grund einer ausgedehnten Militärkultur.
“Ein Aktionsmann, der sich denkt”, in diesem Fall
die Stirn und das Kinn ergänzen sie sich sowohl
natürlich als auch stark.
Der Säbel und der Geist
Die Überzeugung von Napoleon, gemäß der
Säbel immer durch den Geist besiegt wird,
stellt den Ausgangspunkt eines Vorgehens der,
daß die Problematik des Militärinstrumentes,
die offensichtliche Unbeweglichkeit der
Militärinstitution betrifft. Der Autor die
Notwendigkeit und die Rechtfertigung der
Anpassung des Militärinstrumentes an jede
symmetrische oder asymmetrische
Typenkonfrontation zur Diskussion stellt.
Die Friedensstiftung: französische
Schule
Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts die Marschälle Gallieni
und Lyautey und der General Pennequin haben
einen französischen Gedanken ausgearbeitet
auf der Friedensstiftung, aus Wunsch auf eine
gewisse Art die angelsächsischen Konzepte
überschreiten, die die Doktrin der französischen
Armee schmolzen. Die Initiatoren schlugen als
Organisationsmodell dieser Friedensstiftungsschule
die indirekte Verwaltung unter der Beachtung
der Regeln des klassischen Theaters vor: Ort, Zeit,
nur eine Aktion unter den Befehl einer einziger
Chef – militär oder zivil.
Kann man die Kriegsberichter
sich in unserem
“Leben verkehren lassen” ?
Das Thema des Artikels ist der Ort, den man den
anwesenden Journalisten in einem Operationstheater
gewähren muß. Über die Fragen hinaus lenkt
der Autor die Aufmerksamkeit auf eine mögliche
Zusammenarbeit, “einen überlegten Dialog”
zwischen den Journalisten und den in einem
Theater verteilte Kräften besonders während
einer Krise. In diesem Sinn stellt man uns eine
Analyse der Mitteilung vor, die durch die
Gründung E.D.F im Jahre 1999 erstellt wurde.
Vo Nguyen Giap: genialer Stratege
und Instrument der Unabhängigkeit
Vietnams
Der Autor legt uns die Darstellung des Generals
Vo Nguyen Giap vor, der als ein Kommandant
197
gesehen wurde, der die Umstände, aber auch die
Fehler seine Gegner spekulieren konnte.
Zwischen der Bewunderung und dem Niedergang
dreißig Jahren lang hat der General der Beweis
einer außergewöhnlicher Qualitäten, sowohl im
Bereich der Strategie, durch die Optik, die er
gegenüber den Ereignissen gehabt hat, als auch
in jenem der Taktik, durch die Beherrschung der
Guerillatechniken oft kombiniert mit jenen des
konventionellen Krieges
Strategische Divergenzen
Der Autor analysiert im Genesatz die drei
grundlegenden strategischen Konzepte, die im
Intervall April 1999-Dezember 2003 ausgearbeitet
wurden – das strategische Konzept der Allianz,
die nationale Sicherheitsstrategie und die
Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie, die gemeinsamen
Werte der drei Unterzeichnerorganismen – die
NATO, die Vereinigten Staaten und die EU – als
Ausgangspunkt haben. Der Autor empfiehlt “eine
aufmerksame Lektüre” dieser Dokumente, denn
die Methoden die Fragen der Welt anzugehen
können manchmal unterschiedlich sein.
Wird ein Krieg Nils stattfinden ?
Für die Länder auf Nil die Wassermittel sind
ungenügend. Man kann über eine Politik des
ägyptischen Wassers sprechen, sagt der Autor,
in dem Ägypten kein Sonderrecht nicht mehr auf
den Gewässern des Flusses haben dürfte. Es ist
ein Paradox, unter dem übrigens zahlreichen
Spannungen verborgen, die in einen Konflikt und
in eine echte Tragödie für Ägypten, in seinen
lebenswichtigen Interesse erreicht, zu entarten
könnten. Es scheint, daß das Problem nur durch
internationale Unterstützung gelöst wird.
Die Außenpolitik der Staaten,
die im Licht ihrer internen Geschichte
Ab der Erwähnung, die der Chef des Generalstabs
der französischen Armeen machte, gemäß der
“die amerikanische Außenpolitik ihrer internen
Geschichte erklärt”, stellt der Autor uns einige
Zeitpunkte der internen Geschichte der Vereinigten
Staaten vor, von denen man eine Reihe von
Schlußfolgerungen ziehen kann, was das
198
~ 3/2006
Verständnis der zwei Pole betrifft, die ihm die
Entwicklung un die Dasein markiert haben – der
Isolationismus und der Interventionismus. All das
ab der Tatsache, daß, obwohl sie zahlreiche Werte,
Geschichtsseiten und wirtschaftliche Interessen
mit den Amerikanern teilen, die Franzosen die
Welt auf eine andere Art wahrnehmen.
Das Ende des Managements ?
Der Autor unterstreicht die individuelle Macht
und die verstärkte Rolle interpersonnelles
Beziehungen, und schlägt uns ein Thema-Frage
vor: kann man uns zum Ende des klassischen
Managements und am seinem Aufkommen oder
vielleicht nur an seinem Austausch durch eine
“organisierte Demokratie” erwarten ? In Erwartung
einer Antwort, behandelt der Artikel das
Management unter psychologischen, leichten
erregbar und sozialen Gesichtspunkt und auch
das Management in der Militärorganisation.
Globale Politik
Der Artikel bahandelt das Konzept “globaler
Politik” und hinweist auf die Institutionen und auf
die formales Organisationen, die die Regeln und
die Normen ausarbeiten und unterstützen die die
der weltweite Ordnung regieren, wie beispielsweise
die Institutionen des Staates und jene der
zwischenstaatlichen Zusammenarbeit. Die
globale Politik nicht nur der geopolitischen
Problematik betreffend die Sicherheit und die
Militärangelegenheiten umfasst, sondern eine
Vielfalt wirtschaftlicher, sozial und ökologischer
Probleme.
Gewaltpolitik, Strategie am Rand
des Abgrunds
Der Autor behandelt die derzeitige Lage des Süd
Libanon unter dem Gesichtspunkt von drei Arten
von Politiken, jede mit seiner Strategie: eine
Gewaltpolitik, die durch direkte Strategien
unterstützt wird, die anvisiert, die Netze Hezbollah
und Hamas zu zerstören; eine Betrugs-und
Verbergungspolitik durch Listen und indirekte
Strategien, die die Betonung der Feindseligkeiten
der arabischen Welt gegen Israel verfolgt, und
eine Gegenschlagpolitik durch asymmetrische
Abstracts
Strategien, die auf die Identifikation der Verletzbarkeit
Israels abzielt.
Die Macht und ihre Rolle
im postmoderne Geopolitik
Der Autor stellt jemandes von seinen Theorien
und Konzepten vor, die die Macht in den
internationalen Beziehungen definiert haben,
unter denen von Martin Wighte, Gerard Dussouy
erwähnt, Peter Morris, Gianfraco Poggi und Alvin
Toffler. Der Autor versucht einige Interessen und
Verhalten der verschiedenen Akteure im
geopolitischen Feld umreissen. Die Schlußfolgerung
ist, daß die Politik des Staates oder eines nichtstaatlichen Akteur kann nicht aus postmodernen
Perspektive gedenkt sein, in den Begriffen des
starren geographischen Determinismus.
Die Tendenz politico-militärischen
Beziehungen in der erweiterten
Zone des Schwarzen Meeres
Bedeutend Kommunikationsknot, der drei
Kontinente versammelt, das Schwarze Meer das
Interesse großer Strategen der Welt weiter
hervorruft. Ab der Tatsache, daß die erweiterte
Zone des Schwarzen Meeres sich mit einer Reihe
von Risiken und Bedrohungen an ihrer Sicherheit
und ihrer Stabilität konfrontiert, stellt der Autor uns
die Hauptzielsetzungen der politico-militärischen
Zusammenarbeit in dieser Region vor.
Der Krieg im Afghanistan
im Rahmen der Beilegung
des weltweiten Terrorismus
Der Artikel ist eine Beschreibung dieses
“Polygons des Terrors”, den Afghanistan, Ort der
Zusammenkunft und der Entwicklung des
Terrorismus internationalem Extremismus und
den Drogenhändlern ist. Der Autor betonnt
auf dem Sicherheitsstand als bestimmenden
Faktor in der Konstruktion Afghanistans, das
zwei Direktionen verfolgt: das Kampf gegen
der Antikoalitionkräfte und die Anwendung eines
Programms des Wider-Wiederaufbaus der
Zivilgesellschaft, jetzt in einer unvorstellbaren
Armut.
Übersetzung
@ Delia PETRACHE
Militärische Nationale Bibliothek
199
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RMT

Transcription

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