D`une instabilité (régionale) à d`autres (nationales)…

O B S E R VAT O I R E A S I E D U S U D - E S T 2 0 1 4 / 2 0 1 5
étude
D’une instabilité (régionale)
à d’autres (nationales)…
Étude quadrimestrielle n°2, cycle 2014/2015, Observatoire Asie du Sud-est
Juillet 2015
Impossible d’échapper à la mer de Chine méridionale.
Aussi avons-nous décidé de prolonger notre suivi sous
un angle juridique et indirectement institutionnel en
questionnant la centralité de l’ASEAN dans l’architecture
de sécurité régionale (1.).
Mais pendant que les autorités et leurs cortèges
d’analystes s’époumonent sur le sujet, la vie continue,
notamment la vie politique : que ce soit en Thaïlande,
en Birmanie1, au Vietnam ou aux Philippines, des
échéances électorales ou parlementaires se préparent,
Maison de la
recherche de l’INALCO
2
rue
de
Lille
75007 Paris - France
Tel : +33 1 75 43 63 20
Fax : +33 1 75 43 63 23
www.centreasia.eu
[email protected]
siret 484236641.00029
1- L’usage de « Birmanie » ou « Myanmar » est laissé à l’appréciation des auteurs, tout comme pour l’ensemble de toponymes.
à plus ou moins long terme, et l’impact y sera de poids
pour les populations. Ces échéances risquent d’être
parasitées par des questions sécuritaires, surtout auprès
des minorités ethnico-religieuses, comme en Birmanie
ou aux Philippines (2.).
Ce sont donc toutes ces questions que nous abordons au
cours de cette Etude quadrimestrielle, grâce aux regards
croisés d’Européens – français et britannique – ainsi
que des Sud-est asiatiques – thaïlandais, vietnamien et
indonésien.
Sommaire
1. Sécurité régionale
1.1. Mer de Chine méridionale
1. Sécurité régionale
1.1. Mer de Chine méridionale
“Developments in the Arbitration Case on the South
China Sea Disputes”
“Developments in the Arbitration Case on the South
China Sea Disputes”
Leonardo Bernard (CIL-NUS)
By Leonardo Bernard: Research Fellow, Centre for
International Law, National University of Singapore.
1.2. L’ASEAN dans l’architecture de sécurité régionale
Introduction
1. The Positions of the Philippines and China on the
Arbitration Case
2. China’s Position Paper
3. Bifurcation of the Arbitration Case
4. China’s Reclamation Works and its Effect to
the Arbitration Proceeding
Conclusion
“Towards Better Understanding of the ASEAN
Centrality”
Termsak Chalermpalanupap (ISEAS-ASEAN Studies
Centre)
2. Stabilités nationales
2.1. Elections à venir ?
Introduction
« Thaïlande : Démocratie à reculons »
Arnaud Leveau (Centre d’études de l’ASEAN-Université
Chulalongkorn)
« Myanmar’s 2015 Elections »
By Professor Robert Taylor (School of Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS), London, Buckingham University).
« Vietnam, un an avant le Congrès »
Alexander L. Vuving (Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies-Université de Tulane)
« Avant-veille d’élections présidentielles aux
Philippines »
Eric Frécon (Ecole navale, Asia Centre, RSIS, CSCAP)
2.2. Instabilités aux frontières
« Myanmar 2015 : guérillas et Rohingyas au-delà des
élections »
Louis-Arthur Borer (Asia Centre)
« Le « massacre » de Mamasapano : Le processus de
paix à Mindanao est-il en danger ? »
François-Xavier Bonnet (IRASEC)
On 22 January 2013, the Government of the Philippines
brought an arbitration case against the People’s Republic
of China challenging China’s maritime claims in the South
China Sea2. The case was brought under the compulsory
dispute settlement mechanism under the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)3,
to which both the Philippines and China are parties.
In addition to challenging the legality of China’s
maritime claims, the Philippines’ case questions
whether some features in the South China Sea
are entitled to generate an Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) even though they are so small that it is almost
impossible for these features to be inhabited.
Both China and the Philippines claim sovereignty over
most of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
UNCLOS, however, does not prescribe any procedure for
the determination of sovereignty and instead only sets out
what maritime zones may be claimed from land territory
(including islands), as well as the rights and jurisdiction of
States in such maritime zones. In its Statement of Claim,
the Philippines astutely avoids the question of sovereignty
and argues that no matter who has sovereignty over
the features in the South China Sea, there are still legal
questions on whether some of those features are entitled
to generate an EEZ and continental shelf4.
China has staunchly snubbed the proceeding and has
refused to participate in any stage of the arbitral process.
China’s non-participation, however, does not prevent the
arbitral proceedings from going ahead and the Tribunal
from making an award5.
On 16 March 2015, the Philippines submitted a
2- Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs
Manila, Notification and Statement of Claims, No 13-0211 (22
January 2013), online: https://www.dfa.gov.ph/.
3- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
10 December 1982, UNTS 1833, 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
4- See Notification and Statement of Claim of the Philippines, Op.
Cit.
5- See generally UNCLOS, Annex VII, Art. 9.
2
Supplemental Submission to The Hague-based
Tribunal6. The Supplemental Submission was in response
to the request by the Tribunal for additional argument
and information regarding both the tribunal’s jurisdiction
and the merits of the Philippines’ claims challenging the
lawfulness of China’s claims.
Most of the features that can be considered as ‘islands’
in the Spratly Islands are small, remote and not capable
of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their
own. Thus, they are likely to be classified as ‘rocks’,
and would only be entitled to a 12 nautical mile (M)
territorial sea7. This seems to be the position taken
by the Philippines in this case, which prevents whoever
owns the islands from claiming resources beyond 12 M
of each ‘rock’8. Since most of these ‘rocks’ are located
within the 200 M limit of the Philippines’ EEZ entitlement,
the Philippines argues that the only disputed waters are
the territorial seas surrounding each rock9, thus leaving
a large part of the waters and the seabed under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines. They do
not recognise the legitimacy of China’s historic claim
to the resources in and under the waters inside the ninedash line, which is the main basis of China’s maritime claim.
When the arbitration case was initiated, China asserted
that the tribunal was formed without any legitimacy and
thus did not join the proceeding to formally challenge
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the case10. However, as
the 16 December 2014 deadline set by the Tribunal
for China to respond to the Philippines’ written submission
got closer, China seemed to have changed its mind
and decided that it was necessary to make its position
known to the Tribunal, in one way or another.
dash line, either as a national boundary line or a claim to
historic rights, would not accord with the international law
of the sea12. Vietnam also reportedly submitted a formal
statement to the Tribunal after the publication of China’s
Position Paper, reserving its interests and protecting its
legal rights in the South China Sea, which may be affected
by the arbitration case13.
In the Position Paper, China argues that the case
involves sovereignty disputes over land territories,
which is not covered by UNCLOS. Even if the Tribunal
decided to distinguish the sovereignty dispute from the
maritime dispute, China argues that the maritime dispute is
so intertwined with the issue of maritime delimitation that it
is impossible to settle one without affecting the other. Since
China has made a declaration to exclude any disputes
concerning maritime delimitation from the jurisdiction
of the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime14, China asserts
that the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to hear the case.
Although China has made it clear that the Position Paper
should not be ‘regarded as China’s acceptance of or its
participation in the arbitration’15, it remains the only official
statement of China’s position regarding its objection to
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal, having had
no response or argument whatsoever to consider from
China, seized upon the Position Paper and decided
to treat it as ‘constituting a plea concerning the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction’16.
The fact that the Tribunal now has in their hands China’s
arguments regarding jurisdiction – or the lack thereof – is
a game-changer in the proceeding of the case. Without
it, the Philippines would have had to try to anticipate
and counter all possible arguments China may have had
against both the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the merits
of the case. Now, the Philippines can focus on countering
the arguments specifically raised by China in the Position
Paper.
2. China’s Position Paper
3. Bifurcation of the Arbitration Case
On 7 December 2014, exactly ten days before the
deadline, China published a Position Paper detailing why
they believe the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider
the case11. The timing of the release of the Position Paper
was impeccable. Just a couple of days prior, the US
Department of State issued a study on China’s nine-dash
line, stating that any claims by China based on the nine-
The Tribunal previously was faced with the difficult challenge
of having to consider the positions of both parties without
the benefit of hearing from one of the disputing parties.
There were indications that the Tribunal may have to hear
the Philippines’ arguments on jurisdiction and merits of the
case at the same time. However, now that the Tribunal has
formal arguments from both sides – at least on the issue
of jurisdiction – it has decided to conduct a preliminary
hearing to address the objections to jurisdiction as set out
1. The Positions of the Philippines and China on the
Arbitration Case
6- Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines,
Statement on the Philippines’ Supplemental Submission to the
Arbitral Tribunal, 17 March 2015.
7- UNCLOS, supra note 2, Art. 121(3).
8- The Philippines challenges the maritime claims that can be
made from the disputed ‘rocks’ currently occupied by China (the
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross
Reef). The Philippines also argues that the geographic features in
the Spratly Islands that are currently occupied by China (Mischief
Reef, McKennan Reef, Gaven Reef and Subi Reef) do not meet the
definition of an island as set out in Article 121(1) of UNCLOS. See
Notification and Statement of Claim of the Philippines, Op. Cit.,
note 1.
9- See Notification and Statement of Claim of the Philippines, Op.
Cit., note 2.
10- China’s Note Verbale to the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
27 August 2013.
11- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of
China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 7 December 2014
(Position Paper).
12- US Department of State, Limits in the Sea No. 143 on China’s
Maritime Claim in the South China Sea, 5 December 2014.
13- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Remarks by MOFA
Spokesperson Le Hai Binh on the South China Sea Arbitration
case, 11 December 2014.
14- China has made a formal declaration excluding maritime
boundary delimitation claims from the Convention’s compulsory
binding dispute settlement mechanism and this is one of the main
reasons why China refuses to accept the jurisdiction of the ad hoc
arbitration tribunal formed under UNCLOS. See Declaration under
Article 298 by the Government of the People’s Republic of China
(25 August 2006): UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of
the Sea.
15- Position Paper, Op. Cit., note 11.
16- Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Arbitral Tribunal Sets
Dates for Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Fourth Press
Release, 22 April 2015.
3
in China’s Position Paper17.
4. China’s Reclamation Works and its Effect to the
Arbitration Proceeding
In addition to challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
China seems to be trying to convince the international
community through its Position Paper that the decision not
to participate in the case is consistent with and supported
by international law18. However, China’s attempt to sway the
international community may not be perceived as genuine,
given China’s continued massive land reclamation works
on the reefs it occupies in the South China Sea. In recent
months, China has conducted large-scale reclamation
projects to turn some of the reefs and low-tide elevations in
the South China Sea into artificial islands. The strategically
important Fiery Cross Reef, for example, has now been
transformed into what is probably the largest island in the
Spratly Islands group19.
China’s reclamation works seem to be strategically rather
than legally motivated. The reclamation works would not
strengthen China’s sovereignty claim over those of the
Philippines or Vietnam, as once a dispute over sovereignty
is crystallised, the State that occupies and controls
the islands cannot strengthen its claim by undertaking
reclamation works or building installations and structures.
The reclamation works also would not change the
legal status of these reefs under UNCLOS, as only
islands that are ‘naturally formed’ would be entitled
to maritime zones20. It would, however, boost China’s
military presence in the region. The reclamation on
Fiery Cross Reef would turn it into a combined naval/air
base far larger than any other in the Spratly Islands, with
a harbour that can accommodate China’s largest naval
vessels and an airstrip long enough for most of China’s
combat and support aircrafts21.
Despite China’s insistence that these works are ‘mainly for
the purpose of improving the working and living conditions
of people stationed on these islands’22, China’s move
does nothing to placate the concern of other states in
the region of the possible militarisation of the South China
Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam publically protested
China’s reclamation activities. Meanwhile, the US stated
that China’s actions ‘seriously increase tensions and
reduce prospects for diplomatic solutions’ in territory
claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam23.
China’s massive reclamation projects also raise serious
concerns about the effects of such reclamation on the
marine environment. China claims that the ecological
environment of the South China Sea has not been
damaged, and that the construction projects on the
islands and reefs followed a high standard of environmental
protection, taking into full consideration the protection
17 The preliminary hearing on jurisdiction is scheduled to be held
in July 2015, see the press release from the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Op. Cit.
18 See the op-ed by China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, “China, a
staunch defender and builder of the International Rule of Law”, 24
October 2014.
19 Jane Perlez, “China Building Aircraft Runway in Disputed
Spratly Islands”, The New York Times, 16 April 2015.
20 UNCLOS, Op. Cit., note 2, Art. 121.
21 Victor Robert Lee, China’s New Military Installations in the
Disputed Spratly Islands: Satellite Image Update, 16 March 2015.
22 “China building ‘great wall of sand’ in South China Sea”, BBC
News, 1 April 2015.
23 David E. Sanger, Rick Gladstone, “Piling Sand in a Disputed
Sea, China Literally Gains Ground”, The New York Times, 8 April
2015.
of ecological environment and fishing resources24.
The Philippines slammed this assertion, stating that China’s
ongoing reclamation activities ‘are causing irreversible and
widespread damage to the biodiversity and ecological
balance to waters’25.
This seems to be a valid argument raised by the Philippines.
Since three of the features on which China is undertaking
reclamation works in the South China Sea are either just
inside or just outside the limit of the EEZ claimed by the
Philippines, it is reasonable for the Philippines to argue that
China has the obligation to notify the Philippines about its
reclamation plans, to assess the environmental impact
of the reclamation projects and to share the result of such
assessment with the Philippines26.
Since the reefs being reclaimed by China are either
being disputed or located in the middle of an area
that is being disputed, China cannot take unilateral
action that would permanently change the status quo
of these reefs27. Moreover, these reclamation works
are making it impossible for the Tribunal to determine
whether these reefs – which are at the heart of the
arbitration proceeding – in their natural forms fall under
the categorisation of island, rock, low-tide elevation or
completely submerged feature. If the Tribunal finds that
it has jurisdiction to rule on the legal status of the features,
it is not likely to be pleased by the fact that China has
taken unilateral action that has permanently changed
the very features whose status the Tribunal has been
asked to determine.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen what action, if any, the Tribunal would
take against China’s continued land reclamation projects
in the South China Sea. China has already turned Subi
Reef, another submerged reef in the South China Sea,
into an island with a 3,300 metre long airstrip28. Despite
warning that China is moving toward having de facto
control over the South China Sea29, the Philippines has
not requested any provisional measures to the Tribunal
to halt China’s land reclamation activities. This might be
a calculated move by the Philippines, who may think that
the provisional measures proceeding will only delay the final
award of the case. Indeed, without any provisional measure
requests to entertain, the proceeding is moving forward
and the Tribunal is set to hear arguments concerning its
jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Philippines’ claims in
July 2015. The Tribunal has given China until 16 June 2015
to comment on the Philippines’ Supplemental Submission,
after which the Tribunal may pose further questions to the
parties to be addressed in the course of the July hearing30.
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press
Conference on April 9, 2015.
25 Michaela Del Callar, Chinese claim of South China Sea
reclamation not causing damage unacceptable — DFA,
13 April 2015.
26 See Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and
around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional
Measures, ITLOS, Order of 8 October 2003.
27 Guyana v. Suriname, Arbitral Court, Award, September 17,
2007, at para 407.
28 Victor Robert Lee, “South China Sea: China’s Unprecedented
Spratlys Building Program”, The Diplomat, 25 April 2015.
29 Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines,
Intervention of Secretary del Rosario during the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 26 April 2015.
30 See the press release from the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Op. Cit., note 16.
4
China will probably stick to its position of formally not
participating in the proceeding, but it will be interesting to
watch if it will publish another position paper before the 16
June 2015 deadline.
in ASEAN and collective commitment to ASEAN of all
the 10 ASEAN Member States in enhancing regional
peace, security and prosperity.
1. ASEAN’s External Relations
1.2. L’ASEAN dans l’architecture de sécurité régionale
“Towards Better Understanding of the ASEAN
Centrality”
By Termsak Chalermpalanupap: visiting research fellow
at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore.
Before joining the ASEAN Studies Centre in July 2012,
he had served at the ASEAN Secretariat for nearly 20 years.
His last post before retiring from the ASEAN Secretariat
was Director of the Political-Security Directorate in the
APSC Department.
His e-mail address: [email protected].
Abstract:
ASEAN Centrality (AC) has four basic components,
of which the most visible one is in the ASEAN
leadership and management of its growing external
engagements. But in fact the more important part of AC
is inside ASEAN; it is the ongoing community-building
to increase more weights to ASEAN. Both ASEAN’s
external engagements and community-building
efforts are supported by the third component of
AC, which is the institutional framework of ASEAN
based on the ASEAN Charter. And the most
important part of AC, albeit least visible one, is the shared
responsibility in ASEAN and collective commitment
to ASEAN of all the 10 ASEAN Member States in
maintaining
regional
peace,
security
and
prosperity. The 48-year-old Association remains
largely a top-down inter-governmental regional
grouping. Its success in building the ASEAN
Community beyond 2015 and in enhancing AC
depends on how the ASEAN Member Governments
will go about involving more of their peoples in the
community-building endeavour.
The evolving security architecture in the Asia-Pacific
has attracted a great deal of attention. Discussions
on this complex issue often include scrutinizing the role
of ASEAN and questioning the ASEAN Centrality (AC).
Many outsiders dismiss AC as irrelevant or, worse,
caricaturize it as ASEAN’s self-delusion of omnipotence.
This article explains what AC is all about and suggests
ideas of how to enhance its credibility.
AC has four basic components, of which the most
visible one is in ASEAN leadership and management
of its growing external engagements. But the more
important part of AC is inside ASEAN; it is the ongoing
community-building to increase more weights to ASEAN.
Both ASEAN’s external engagements and communitybuilding efforts are supported by the third component
of AC, which is the institutional framework of ASEAN
based on the ASEAN Charter. And the most important part
of AC, albeit least visible one, is the shared responsibility
The ASEAN Charter prescribes AC as an ASEAN
principle in external relations in Article 2 Paragraph 2 (m).
AC calls for active, efficient, constructive, non-discriminatory
and forward-looking leadership in all the dialogue
and cooperation processes which ASEAN has initiated.
They include ASEAN+1 with 10 Dialogue Partners31 and
the UN, the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and the
RoK), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)32, the East Asia
Summit (EAS)33, the ADMM-Plus34, and the Expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF)35. ASEAN can rightfully
claim the role of the primary driving force in leading and
managing these external engagement processes.
ASEAN also engages other regional groupings such as
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,
the Pacific Islands Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization,
and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In recent years,
ASEAN has found good prospects in pursuing closer ties
with the GCC, which consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Most of these Gulf
States have oil wealth which can contribute to infrastructure
investments in the ASEAN region.
At the sub-regional level, ASEAN Member States that are
Mekong River riparian states (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
Thailand and Viet Nam) have development cooperation
31- In alphabetical order: Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India,
Japan, the RoK, New Zealand, Russia, and the US. Each ASEAN
Member State coordinates a partnership with one of these Dialogue
Partners for three years. The current triennial rotation is from the
end of the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) in
Phnom Penh from July 2012 until the 48th AMM in Malaysia in
early August 2015. For example, Singapore now coordinates the
ASEAN-Canada partnership; after the 48th AMM in Malaysia
in early August 2015, Singapore will move on to coordinate the
ASEAN-China partnership, succeeding Thailand which will move
on to coordinate ASEAN-EU partnership from 2015-2018. Pakistan is a Sectoral Dialogue Partner and its cooperation with ASEAN
is coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat. At the 47th AMM in Nay
Pyi Taw last August, Norway became a new development partner
of ASEAN. Papua New Guinea has been a “Special Observer”
with no prospect of joining ASEAN as a full member, because the
country belongs to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
32- 27 Participants in the ARF are: 10 ASEAN Member States, 10
Dialogue Partners of ASEAN, Bangladesh, the DPRK, Mongolia,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste. TimorLeste has since March 2011 applied for the ASEAN membership.
Its application is under consideration in a working group set up by
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC).
33- 18 EAS participants are 10 ASEAN Member States and eight
Dialogue Partners except Canada and the EU.
34- 18 participants in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
are 10 ASEAN Member States plus eight Dialogue Partners except
Canada and the EU. However, it should be emphasized that it is
simply a coincidence that the same eight Dialogue Partners are participating in both the ADMM-Plus and the EAS. Membership in the
ADMM-Plus was determined in 2006-2007; whereas the decision
to expand the EAS to include Russia and the US was made in 2010.
35- All the EAS participating countries are also participating in the
EAMF; the Third EAMF was held in Da Nang and chaired by Viet
Nam on 28 August 2014, back to back with the annual ASEAN
Maritime Forum. Indonesia has volunteered to host the AMF and
the Fourth EAFM in 2015.
5
with China and the ADB in the Greater Mekong Subregional
(GMS) Economic Cooperation, with India in the MekongGanga Cooperation, and with Japan, the RoK, the US
and other “Friends of the Lower Mekong”36. In addition,
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam are in the Mekong
River Commission. One pertinent question here is how to
make these Mekong processes complement one another
to avoid wasting time and resources in overlapping efforts.
The other sub-regional cooperation arrangements in the
ASEAN region are: the BIMP-EAGA37, the IMT-GT38, and
ACMECS39.
Myanmar40 and Thailand are active in the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which includes Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Indonesia
and the Philippines are prime movers in the West Pacific
Forum, which involves Australia, New Zealand, Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste41.
ASEAN Member States have also been participating in the
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Non-Aligned Movement,
the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the WTO and the UN etc.
Seven of them (excluding Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar)
are participating economies in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). Indonesia is a regular participant
in the G-20, and the ASEAN Chairman (in 2015, it is
Malaysia), accompanied by the Secretary-General of
ASEAN, has been invited to the G-20 summits.
Indonesia hosted the 60th anniversary of the “Bandung
Spirit” of Asian-African Conference in Jakarta and in
Bandung from 19-24 April 2015. A total of 109 delegations
from Asia and Africa attended. In April 2005, Indonesia
also hosted the golden jubilee celebration of the “Bandung
Spirit” in order to revive the South-South cooperation
between Asia and Africa. But follow-up from the African
side has been lacking and not much cooperation
in this inter-continental process took shape over the 20052015 decade. Nevertheless Indonesia has tried to keep
alive the “Bandung Spirit” because it was an initiative of
the first Indonesian President, Sukarno. His daughter,
Ibu Megawati Sukarnoputri (President of Indonesia from
2001 to 2004), is now leader of the government party
PDI-P, which is supporting President Joko Widodo.
AC requires ASEAN Member States to try to speak
with one unified voice when defending ASEAN
and advancing ASEAN interest in international forums.
In the UN, for example, the ASEAN New York Committee,
consisting of Permanent Representatives to the UN from
the 10 ASEAN Member States, meets regularly to compare
notes and coordinate their positions on UN issues.
Malaysia is now one of the 10 non-permanent members
of the UN Security Council for 2015-2016. In the WTO,
the coordination is done by the ASEAN Geneva Committee
36- At the Fourth Meeting of Friends of the Lower Mekong in Nay
Pyi Taw on 11 August 2014, the “Friends” of Mekong included
Australia, the EU, Japan, the RoK, New Zealand, the US, the ADB,
World Bank, and the Secretary-General of ASEAN.
37- Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines—
East ASEAN Growth Area.
38- Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand – Growth Triangle.
39- Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation
Strategy.
40- Myanmar hosted the Third BIMSTEC in Nay Pyi Taw, 3-4
March 2014, when BIMSTEC Leaders agreed to set up the BIMSTEC Secretariat in Dhaka, and to appoint Mr Sumith Nakandala
from Sri Lanka its first secretary-general.
41- Timor-Leste chaired the WPF in 2014; in 2015, Papua New
Guinea is chairing the WPF.
formed by the Ambassadors to the WTO from the ASEAN
Member States. All the ASEAN 10 have joined the WTO.
Laos was the last in ASEAN to join on 2nd February 2013.
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
(TAC), which was signed by Leaders of the five founding
ASEAN Member States42 at the first ASEAN Summit in Bali
in February 1976, now has 32 high contracting parties43.
ASEAN considers the growing popularity of the TAC as
international endorsement of its peace-oriented principles.
Dr Marty Natalegawa, when he was foreign Minister of
Indonesia, proposed internationalizing the TAC principles
in a new Indo-Pacific treaty of amity and cooperation to
overcome what he considered as “trust deficits” in the
Asia-Pacific.
1.1. Manifestation of ASEAN Centrality in External
Engagements
AC in external engagements can be seen in five aspects:
(a) membership of an external engagement process, (b) the
“ASEAN Way”, (c) agenda setting, (d) outcome documents,
and (e) ASEAN bodies for external engagements.
a. Membership
ASEAN Member States develop the terms of reference
of a new external engagement process and determine
which countries will be invited to participate.
They become the gatekeepers in charge of allowing
additional participants to join after the process has been
launched.
A country interested in joining an ASEAN-led process
usually approaches the ASEAN Chair Country in a given
year to convey its wish to join. The ASEAN Chair Country
would then undertake some internal consultations among
ASEAN Member States. If there is a clear consensus
to welcome the new participant, then the positive
decision will be conveyed to the applying country, as
well as to other countries participating in the process.
Non-ASEAN countries are not expected to object or
oppose the ASEAN consensus. If there is no consensus
among ASEAN Member States, then the applying country
will have to wait.
b. The “ASEAN Way”
The “ASEAN Way” includes basic principles and practical
standard operating procedure. Sovereign equality,
non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs,
peaceful settlement of disputes, non-discrimination,
and goodwill in cooperation are basic principles in ASEAN.
Contrary to what critics generally assume, non-interference
is not uniquely ASEAN’s. ASEAN certainly did not invent
the principle. Non-interference is as a matter of fact based
on sovereign equality of all independent states under
international law. It is reinforced by the principle of selfdetermination. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document, which more than 170 Leaders from around
the world adopted at the UN World Summit in September
2005, paragraph 5 of the historic UN resolution included
non-interference among the principles for the establishment
42- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
were the five founding members of ASEAN. Brunei Darussalam
joined ASEAN in January 1984, Viet Nam in July 1995, Laos and
Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in April 1999.
43- 10 ASEAN Member States, 10 ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners,
Bangladesh, Brazil, France, the DPRK, Mongolia, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Turkey, and the
UK.
6
of a “just and lasting peace all over the world…”44.
Non-interference has been enshrined in the TAC to which
32 States, including the US, China, Japan, India, Russia,
the UK, France, the EU, and Brazil, are parties. This means
all of the major powers in the world accept non-interference
as a legally-binding inter-state commitment and agree
not to intervene in the internal affairs of any Southeast
Asian state.
Non-interference is necessary in ASEAN because of the
diversities in the ASEAN membership, especially in size,
political system and historical context. On the political
spectrum, Laos and Viet Nam are in the extreme left,
each is under the rule by a communist party.
At the opposite end stands Brunei Darussalam, which
is a de facto absolute monarchy in which the Sultan
is both the head of state and the head of government.
In between them are a variety of political systems:
one-party dominance in Singapore and Cambodia;
colourful but noisy presidential republic in Indonesia and
the Philippines; and occasional military rule in Myanmar
in the past and in Thailand now. Evidently ASEAN
Member States have more political dissimilarities than
commonalities. Hence ASEAN sets no political criteria
for membership, unlike in the EU where a prospective
member must prove first of all to be a functioning liberal
democracy with good record of human rights protection.
Non-interference has assured smaller ASEAN Member
States of the respect for their sovereignty from their bigger
neighbours. This is crucial for the national survival and
stability of Brunei Darussalam, whose population is only
about 400,000; the sultanate is sandwiched between
Indonesia (252 million in population) and Malaysia (30
million). In early January 1984 immediately after gaining
independence from the British, Brunei Darussalam
joined ASEAN because of the assurance of respect
for sovereign equality and non-interference from the five
founding ASEAN Member States (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Similarly, Singapore
(5.5 million) has greatly benefited from non-interference
in ASEAN. Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia
in a traumatic break-up in August 1965. While in the
Federation, Singapore joined Malaysia in border clashes
with Indonesia in the confrontation of the early 1960s.
Without non-interference in ASEAN, Singapore would have
been in a very precarious position after independence.
The ASEAN assurance gave Singapore time and breathing
space to normalize relations with Malaysia and Indonesia,
and to focus on nation-building as well as to cope with
domestic security threats.
Although non-interference is sacrosanct in ASEAN, it is
neither absolute nor unconditional. Its application cannot
go against the collective responsibility of all Member
States in maintaining peace, security and prosperity in
the ASEAN region. No ASEAN Member State can claim
non-interference and do whatever it likes at home in total
disregard of ASEAN common interest. Should such a
situation arise, ASEAN calls for “enhanced consultation”
so that Member States can exchange views about their
concerns in the domestic situation of a Member State in
question. This was how ASEAN Member States interacted
with Myanmar when the country was struggling with a
44- See the
NO5/487/60.
document:
www.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
slow pace of democratization prior to the end of military
dictatorship in 2010.
Non-interference is also constrained by international
commitments from the UN membership, or from
international agreements to which a state has joined
(such as the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons), and ASEAN commitments. In Southeast
Asia, all the 10 countries that are now in ASEAN are
parties to the 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). They must fulfill all
the basic undertakings under the Treaty. None of them can
claim non-interference and secretly try to develop nuclear
weapons. If and when doubt about compliance arises,
the control system under the Treaty can be activated to
verify, including sending a fact-finding mission and seeking
necessary remedial measures. In the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) there are clear-cut time frame for
implementation of trade and economic liberalization
measures. No ASEAN Member States can claim noninterference and then ignore their commitments or fail to
meet implementation deadline in the AEC blueprint and
economic cooperation agreements.
Complementing the principles of ASEAN in the “ASEAN
Way” are standard operating procedure which includes
chairing of important meetings by the ASEAN Chair
Country; respect and support for the ASEAN Chairman;
decision-making by consultation and consensus; low level
of institutionalization to minimize expenditure; and the use
of English as the only working language. Such ASEAN
standard operating procedure has also been adapted
and adopted in APEC and in ASEM (although some EU
members may question the use of English as the only
working language).
c. Agenda setting
In hosting and chairing ASEAN Summits and Ministerial
meetings45, the ASEAN Chair Country would usually take
the lead in setting the summit theme46 and the agenda.
Occasionally, ASEAN Leaders and some Ministers
go out to meet their counterparts in some special meetings
outside of the ASEAN region47.
Part of the standard operating procedure involves blending
into the agenda key issues of common interest in ASEAN,
such as promoting ASEAN connectivity, narrowing the
development gaps, promoting the ASEAN Communication
45- Key ASEAN Ministerial meetings which will be chaired by
the ASEAN Chair Country are: the AMM, the ARF, the ASEAN
Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM), the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus, all the meetings of
the three community councils, the ASEAN Coordinating Council
(ACC). The CPR and the AICHR are also chaired by the ASEAN
Chair Country.
46- Malaysia’s theme for the 26th ASEAN Summit was
“Our People, Our Community, Our Vision”.
47- Occasionally, ASEAN Leaders go out of the ASEAN region to
meet their counterpart from an important Dialogue Partner country
for a special meeting. For example, ASEAN Leaders went to meet
RoK President Park Geun-hye in Busan from 11-12 December
2014 for the Second ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit
to celebrate the 25th anniversary of ASEAN-Korea partnership.
ASEAN Defence Ministers met with US Secretary of Defence
Chuck Hagel in Hawaii on 1 April 2014 for a special informal meeting. They have a plan to go to Beijing in December 2015 to meet
with Chinese Defence Minister. After the Beijing trip, ASEAN
Defence Ministers have agreed not to meet any Dialogue Partner
anywhere outside of the ASEAN region again.
7
Master Plan, and strengthening regional peace, security
and prosperity. These are issues that are conducive to
friendly discussion and international cooperation.
ASEAN and its Member States would resist any attempt of
any non-ASEAN country to bring up divisive controversial
issues which should better be discussed elsewhere by the
parties directly concerned. The key is to be constructive,
positive and forward-looking. However, sometimes
some “hot issues” like disputes in the South China Sea,
or the nuclear deadlock on the Korean Peninsula do
surface in ASEAN-led meetings. In that case, the ASEAN
Chair Country will have to work extra hard in damagecontrol.
d. Outcome documents
Controlling outcome documents constitute yet another
important aspect of AC. ASEAN and its Member States
would try to present a positive tone of dialogue and record
only points of agreement in outcome documents. Usually
an outcome document is drafted first by the ASEAN side
and circulated to external parties concerned for their
comments and suggestions. However the ASEAN Chair
Country would have the final say, especially when the
documents are chairman’s statements of meetings.
e. ASEAN bodies for external engagements
In Jakarta, the Committee of Permanent Representatives
to ASEAN (CPR), consisting of the 10 Permanent
Representatives (PRs) of the 10 ASEAN Member
Governments, is ASEAN’s frontline in engaging ASEAN
external partners on a day-to-day basis. The PRs
also interact with a growing number of Ambassadors
to ASEAN. At last count, 81 countries, the Holy See and
the EU have accredited their Ambassadors to ASEAN.
The US, Japan, China, the RoK, Australia, New Zealand,
and India have set up their Permanent Missions
to ASEAN in Jakarta headed by their respective resident
Ambassadors to ASEAN. The EU is expected to follow
suit within 2015. The growing number of Ambassadors
to ASEAN and Permanent Missions to ASEAN are welcome
as political support of the international community for
ASEAN and AC.
At last count (April 2015), 47 ASEAN Committees
in Third Countries (ACTC) have been formed. They
are in all the capitals of the 9 Dialogue Partners of
ASEAN, and in Brussels. In addition, in Europe, there
are ASEAN Committees in Athens, Berlin, Bucharest,
Copenhagen, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Oslo,
Paris, Prague, Rome, UNESCO (Paris), Vienna, and
Warsaw. Ambassadors of ASEAN Member States would
act collectively through their ACTC in advancing ASEAN
agenda and strengthening ties with their host government.
In defence cooperation, the ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting (ADMM) has attracted a great deal of international
attention when it launched in Ha Noi in October 2010
the ADMM-Plus process to engage Defence Ministers
from eight Dialogue Partners. The ADMM-Plus
has increased its meeting frequency to once every two
years, instead of three. The third ADMM-Plus will be hosted
by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, 18-19 November 2015,
in the same week when Malaysia will host the 27th ASEAN
Summit. Cooperation in the ADMM-Plus has expanded
to include six joint experts working groups (EWG) on
maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, peace-keeping operations,
military medicine, and the newest one on humanitarian
mine action48.
In external economic engagements, the ASEAN Senior
Economic Officials Meeting (ASEAN SEOM) is the driving
force in the ongoing ambitious negotiation on the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The goal
is to create new synergies among the 10 ASEAN economies
with their free-trade-area counterparts from China, Japan,
the RoK, India, and Australia and New Zealand.
RCEP is considered as ASEAN’s solution to end the
unhealthy rivalry between China and Japan: China
preferred pursuing the ASEAN Plus Three FTA, whereas
Japan advocated an East Asia Economic Community
under the EAS framework. If successfully created, RCEP
can rival the emerging Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) led
by the US and Japan. Four from the ASEAN side are also
taking part in the TPP negotiation: Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam. How the TPP and
RCEP will complement each other is an intriguing question.
Conventional wisdom says they will eventually go into
forming the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, which
China proposed in the Beijing APEC Economic Leaders
Meeting last October.
In finance, ASEAN Member States, China, Japan and
the RoK have created a pool of US$ 240 billion for currency
swap under the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
(CMIM)49. But the ASEAN Secretariat was deemed
incapable of managing the highly complicated CMIM.
Thus the ASEAN Plus Three Macroeconomic Research
Office (AMRO) has been established in Singapore to do
the job. So far this regional financial safety net has not yet
been tested in a real financial crisis. But at least it is seen
as a psychological deterrence against speculative attack50
on the national currency of any country in the CMIM.
1.2. Successful ASEAN’s External Engagements
ASEAN and its Member States have been quite successful
in attracting attention of the international community
and support from their external partners. Canada
and the EU want to join the ADMM-Plus, and the EAS.
The EU is exploring with ASEAN the possibility of resuming
negotiations of an ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement
in the near future. In 2014, ASEAN-EU trade amounted
to US$ 248.2 billion, making the EU the third largest
trading partner of ASEAN after ASEAN and China. In FDI,
however, the EU constituted the top investor in the ASEAN
region in 2014 with US$ 29.1 billion, or about 21.3% of the
FDI inflows into ASEAN51.
48- Each EWG is co-chaired by one ASEAN country and one
non-ASEAN country: Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand are
co-chairing the EWG on Maritime Security; Singapore and
Australia are co-chairing the EWG on Counter-Terrorism; Laos
and Japan are co-chairing the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief; Cambodia and the RoK are co-chairing
the EWG on Peace-Keeping Operations; Thailand and Russia
are co-chairing the EWG on Military Medicine; and Viet Nam and India are
co-chairing the EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action.
49- The US$ 240 billion came from the following contributions: China and
Hong Kong, US$ 76.8 billion (Hong Kong’s contribution is US$ 8.4 billion);
Japan, US$ 76.8 billion; the RoK, US$ 38.4 billion; and ASEAN, 10 US$ 48
billion. See details at www.amro-asia.org.
50- In the 1997 “tom yum goong” financial crisis, the Thai baht, Indonesian
Rupiah, Malaysian Ringgit, and South Korean Won were attacked by speculators and each of them lost significantly in exchange value.
51- See the joint media statement of the Thirteenth AEM-EU Trade Commissioner Consultations, 26 April 2015, Kuala Lumpur, at the ASEAN Secretariat’s website: www.asean.org.news/asean-statement-communiques/item/
thirteenth-aem-eu-trade-commissioner-consultations-26-april-2015-kualalumpur-malaysia (accessed on 27 April 2015).
8
Others want to join the ARF. The UN wants to undertake
more cooperation activities with ASEAN. Norway
became a new Development Partner of ASEAN in 2014
and contributed US$ 7 million to the Norway-ASEAN
Regional Initiatives Fund. See details of ASEAN-Norway
cooperation in the Joint Statement on ASEAN-Norway
Partnership adopted at the 47th AMM in Nay Pyi Taw
on 8 August 2014. Other donors, such as Germany,
Switzerland, and France seem to want some new
formal ties with ASEAN. And Timor-Leste has applied
for the ASEAN membership. Ex-Secretary-General
of ASEAN Dr Surin Pitsuwan describes the success
as the “ASEAN’s convening power”. When ASEAN initiates
a new engagement process or cooperation activity, several
external partners come and support ASEAN, because,
according to Dr Surin, they know and appreciate the fact
that “ASEAN is welcoming all, and threatening none.”
1.3. Complacency and Challenges
ASEAN and its Member States cannot be complacent.
Publicly many foreign leaders and Ministers would routinely
praise ASEAN and voice support for AC. But privately,
some of them and their senior officials might still harbour
some doubts about the viability of AC and the unity
of ASEAN Member States in the wake of intensifying power
rivalries in and near Southeast Asia. Sharp differences
about disputes in the South China Sea among ASEAN
Foreign Ministers during the 45th AMM in Phnom Penh
in July 2012 resulted in the unprecedented cancellation
of the issuance of the customary joint communique
of the AMM.
However, subsequently on 20 July 2012, ASEAN Foreign
Ministers managed to come up with their joint ASEAN
Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea52
to reaffirm their common stand on the South China Sea,
and to try to dispel the widespread public misgiving over
the apparent breakdown of ASEAN unity and AC.
Beyond the ASEAN region, AC would often encounter
doubt and disdain. Mr Kevin Rudd, when he was Prime
Minister of Australia, dismissed AC when he tried to push for
his short-lived initiative to establish a comprehensive AsiaPacific Community. His grand idea didn’t gain international
traction because Australia lacked the “convening power”
that ASEAN has. Australia lacks the image of constructive
neutrality that ASEAN has.
ASEAN and its Member States must be vigilant in
strengthening and improving AC with innovative leadership
and thoughtful external engagements. At a minimum,
AC within the ASEAN region must be tenaciously
defended and advanced for international recognition
and support. External powers must be persuaded to believe
that AC will make Southeast Asia peaceful, stable and
prosperous. And it helps to record international support
for AC in some public documents, like in the Declaration
of the East Asia Summit on the Principles
for Mutually Beneficial Relations, done at the Sixth
East Asia Summit, in Bali on 19 November 2011.
On the other hand, when ASEAN and its Member
States expand the scope of their external engagements,
they must also pay due attention to legitimate strategic
interests of all their external partners. The ASEAN region
52- See the text of the document: www.asc.iseas.edu.sg/links/
item/219-statement-of-asean-foreign-ministers-on-asean’ssix-point-principles (accessed on 30 April 2015).
happens to be one of the few areas in the world where
all major powers (the US, China, India, Japan, Russia,
Australia, the UK, and even the EU) claim to have some
strategic interests which they want to advance.
This being the case, ASEAN and its Member States
must accept the fact that ASEAN is just one of the
many players in this multi-polar international community.
Outside of Southeast Asia, ASEAN must continue to work
harder to earn international support for AC with careful
action and consistent adherence to peace-oriented
principles.
In this connection, ASEAN Leaders have already
agreed to create by the year 2022 an ASEAN common
platform for ASEAN and its Member States to coordinate
and formulate their common policy stands on major
global issues. The commitment came in the Declaration
on the ASEAN Community in a Global Community
of Nations (Bali Concord III)53 at the 19th ASEAN
Summit in Bali in November 2011. A Plan of Action
for 2013-201754 to implement the Bali Concord III was
adopted at the 21st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on
18 November 2012.
The Plan of Action contains mostly existing action
lines from the three community-building Blueprints.
There is nothing new about institution-building
in preparation for the creation of the ASEAN
common platform. This begs the question how the
ASEAN common platform will emerge in the year 2022.
Another question is how to ensure efficient and credible
use of the ASEAN common platform by all ASEAN
Member States.
As things stand now, ASEAN Member States may
share some common policy on a few key global issues
such as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and all
other weapons of mass destruction; denuclearization
of
the
Korean
Peninsula;
counter-terrorism
and anti-extremism; combatting corruption; non-use
of force and peaceful settlement of international disputes;
and peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China
Sea in accordance with universally-recognized principles
of international law, including UNCLOS. But on many other
global issues, ASEAN Member States have yet to form
their common stand. These include the global climate
change; the Arab-Israeli issues55; and prohibition
and destruction of anti-personnel mines56.
2. Community-Building
Active and efficient ASEAN leadership can win international
recognition for ASEAN as the primary driving force
in Southeast Asia. But it should be clear to all in ASEAN
53- See text of the Bali Concord III at the ASEAN Secretariat’s
website:
www.asean.org/archive/documents/19th%20summit/
Bali%20Concord%20III.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015).
54- See the text of the Plan of Action: www.kemlu.go.id/ptriasean/Magazines/Bali%20Plan%20of%20Action%20Three.pdf
(accessed on 29 April 2015).
55- Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, and Malaysia (the three Muslims-dominated countries in ASEAN) tend to be more sympathetic
towards Arabs; whereas the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
often side with Israel.
56- Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, and Viet Nam have not joined the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.
9
that such external recognition could come and go
with time. ASEAN and its Member States have little or no
control, especially when they have to deal with external
powers, who have their own interests to tend to.
To make international recognition for AC long-lasting,
ASEAN must increase its own weights through meaningful
community-building beyond 2015. This is the crucial
internal dimension of AC. It is a basic law of physic:
the object with greater mass has more gravitational pull.
As a combined one ASEAN market and regional production
base of over 624 million people (in 2014, see details
in Table 1 below), the ASEAN Community was the
world fourth most populous market after China, India,
and the African Union. In 2012 it was the world’s fourth
largest trader, with US$ 2.54 trillion in foreign trade,
after the US (US$ 3.75 trillion), China (US$ 3.64 trillion),
and Germany (US$ 2.73 trillion). A more integrated ASEAN
market through increased infrastructure connectivity
and harmonization of rules, regulations and laws of ASEAN
Member States will enhance the ASEAN economic
competitiveness and attractiveness for foreign direct
investment. Harmony and unity will increase political
and diplomatic weights of ASEAN, and enable ASEAN
to speak with one authoritative voice, especially
on Southeast Asian affairs.
Table 1: Basic Indicators of ASEAN
To be on the safer side, at national level, some individual
ASEAN Member States have their own “security insurance”
in cooperation with external powers. The Philippines
and Thailand are non-NATO allies of the US.
They used to be members of the now-defunct
SEATO57. Malaysia and Singapore are in the Five Power
Defence Arrangements58. Brunei Darussalam has
some security cooperation with the UK, which includes
the stationing of a battalion of British soldiers in the sultanate
since independence from the British in January
1984. Cambodia relies heavily on Chinese security
support because of its border disputes with Thailand
and Viet Nam59. Likewise, the military dictatorship
in Myanmar used to rely on arms supply from China.
But now the democratic government of Myanmar is
diversifying its security cooperation with other external
powers, notably India and the US. Viet Nam, meanwhile,
is relying on security support from Russia, including
the purchase of six Kilo-class Russian submarines,
four of which have already been delivered
to the Vietnamese Navy.
In community-building, AC calls for giving due importance
to ASEAN, with goodwill in exercising equal rights
of the ASEAN membership, and best national efforts
in fulfilling all obligations in ASEAN. In the ASEAN Charter,
Article 5 Paragraph 2 stipulates that “Member States shall
take all necessary measures, including the enactment
of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement
the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all
obligations of membership.”
All ASEAN Member States are obliged to ratify without
delays and implement all ASEAN agreements signed
by their Leaders and Ministers. This is easier said than
done. In the ASEAN Political-Security Community,
there are three ASEAN legal instruments that are still
awaiting full ratification: the 2006 ASEAN Framework
Agreement on Visa Exemption, which, according to
the ASEAN Secretariat, still requires the ratification
of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore; the 2009
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations60;
and the 2010 Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Charter
on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms61 .
One of the crucial strategic challenges facing ASEAN
is how to continue to play its constructive role
in maintaining regional peace and harmony in Southeast
Asia in the wake of rising China and US rebalancing to Asia.
Obviously China and the US are competing for influence
in Asia-Pacific and for ASEAN attention. As a group,
the 10 ASEAN Member States need not and should not
take sides, although individually some of them may be
pro-US and others pro-China. Their most pragmatic
common stand as a group of 10 is to be pro-ASEAN.
Therefore, ASEAN Member States should continue
to enhance AC and build a successful ASEAN Community.
A strong, unified, and prosperous ASEAN Community
can cope with the dynamics of great power rivalries.
It can also help shield its individual Member States
from excessive external pressure, making it unnecessary
for any of them to take sides and antagonize any external
powers.
57- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was set up in 1954 with its
headquarters in Bangkok as part of the US-led containment against
China. Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Thailand, the UK, and the US were members of SEATO. But after
the Sino-US normalization of diplomatic ties in the early 1970s,
SEATO was quietly disbanded in 1977.
58- The UK set up the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
in 1971 to enhance its security support for Malaysia and Singapore
following the British withdrawal from east of Suez. The FPDA also
involves Australia and New Zealand.
59- Cambodia was invaded and occupied by Vietnamese forces
from December 1978 until the Paris Peace Accords of 1991.
60- The 2009 Agreement includes provisions for operationalization
of the “legal personality of ASEAN” under Article 3 of the ASEAN
Charter. At last count (9 April 2015), only four Member States have
ratified this Agreement: Singapore, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and
Cambodia. For ratification status of ASEAN agreements: www.
agreement.asean.org/search/by_pillar/1/3.html.
61- Also at last count (9 April 2015), only three Member States
have ratified the 2010 Protocol: Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Cambodia.
10
In addition, ASEAN Member States are expected to adjust
their national policy to keep it in line with what they are
doing in ASEAN. This, too, is not always easy, especially
when national interest must take precedence over ASEAN
common interest. Government officials would normally
advance national interest first. They see no real benefit in
defending ASEAN common interest. They seldom face
any punishment for failing to implement ASEAN
agreements or doing ASEAN works. Neither will they be
rewarded for spending extra time doing ASEAN works
or attending ASEAN meetings.
Nevertheless, nowadays, national sovereignty is no longer
absolute, especially when a country interacts with others
in the international community, in the UN, and in ASEAN.
Every ASEAN government must fulfil all obligations arising
from the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN agreements.
ASEAN Member States need to develop a good balance
between national interests and ASEAN common interests.
In the long-run, these interests should complement
one another. After all, ASEAN common interests
are determined by ASEAN Member States themselves
through consultations and consensus.
Therefore, in community-building, AC requires all ASEAN
Member States to give due recognition to ASEAN
commitments and to ratify as well as to implement ASEAN
agreements with genuine political goodwill. The problem
is always the lack of incentive in ASEAN for officials to do
ASEAN works.
If ASEAN Member States do not give importance
to their own commitments to ASEAN, no one else
will. Claims about AC will not be taken seriously
by the international community.
3. Institutional Support
To sustain and enhance its role as the premier regional
player in Southeast Asia, and as an emerging global player,
ASEAN requires efficient and coherent institutional support
and more resources. This is the institutional part of AC.
At the 25th ASEAN Summit in Nay Pyi Taw last November,
ASEAN Leaders agreed to implement recommendations
from the High Level Task Force on Strengthening
the ASEAN Secretariat and Reviewing the ASEAN Organs.
This was good news for ASEAN. The money required
in implementing some of these recommendations
will come from the un-utilized budget allocation for 2014.
In recent years, the ASEAN Secretariat could not spend
all of its annual budget allocation, chiefly because
of the many staff vacancies. As a rule, the un-utilized
budget allocation had to be returned to Member
Governments. This in turn became an excuse for some
Member Governments not to allocate more budgets for
the ASEAN Secretariat in the following year.
In 2015, the budget allocated for the annual operations
of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta is only about
US$ 19 million. The 10 Member Governments, rich
or poor, big or small, each contributes one equal share
of US$ 1.9 million to fund the ASEAN Secretariat.
The equal contribution has been written down as
a principle in Article 30 Paragraph 2 of the ASEAN
Charter, much to the chagrin of some newer and poorer
members who wanted but failed to change the equal
contribution when the ASEAN Charter was being drafted.
The over-riding principle is that sovereign equality
in ASEAN entails equality of financial responsibility.
The annual operating budget is only enough to pay
the ASEAN Secretariat’s staff to attend and service
the growing number of ASEAN meetings. It has little
for project cooperation activities. Most of the projects
in ASEAN are usually funded by ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners,
notably Japan, Australia, and the EU. Occasionally,
some strategic projects are funded by the ASEAN
Development Fund62. In 2015, for example, the Fund
will pay for two confidential studies on political-security
implications from the possible accession of TimorLeste to the ASEAN membership, and on socio-cultural
implications of the same63.
Unlike in the EU, ASEAN has no continuing flows
of revenues for its Secretariat. Whenever ASEAN starts
some initiatives that require resource mobilization, ASEAN
and its Member States would often run into differences
on: who to contribute and how much. Equal contribution
sometimes gives way to the second best option of voluntary
contribution, like in the case of raising the seed capital
for the ASEAN Foundation, the ASEAN Infrastructure
Fund (US$ 485.3 million has been raised), the AHA
Centre (ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian
Assistance and disaster management) in Jakarta, and the
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), also
in Jakarta. Lack of a firm commitment to fund the AIPR
on a regular basis has put in serious doubt the future of this
two-year old new ASEAN entity.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of post-2015 communitybuilding in ASEAN, the mood in some ASEAN Member
States seem rather downbeat. Laos, the incoming ASEAN
Chair Country in 2016, seems determined to cut down its
expenditure by reducing to only once a year the hosting
of the ASEAN Summit. Now officials are trying to figure
out how to go about doing it when the ASEAN Charter
stipulates in Article 7 Paragraph 3 that ASEAN Summit
shall be “held twice annually, and be hosted by the
Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship; (…)”
One possible solution is to convene in Laos the 28th and
29th ASEAN Summits back to back in the last quarter of
2016.
Since the ASEAN Charter entered into force in December
2008, each ASEAN Chair Country would host two
ASEAN Summits in one year: The first is usually held
in the second quarter and is focused on internal ASEAN
community-building affairs. It includes summit sessions
with representatives of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Assembly (AIPA), ASEAN Business Advisory Council
(ABAC), ASEAN youths, and ASEAN civil society.
The second one is usually held in the last quarter and
it involves meetings with key external partners in ASEAN+1
summit sessions with China, Japan, the RoK, India,
and the US; and sometimes the UN Secretary-General;
ASEAN Plus Three (with China, Japan, and the RoK), and
the East Asia Summit.
62- Each Member State has contributed US$ 1 million to the
ASEAN Development Fund. Only 80% of its annual interest/
revenues can be used for project activities.
63- The political-security implications study was undertaken jointly by ISEAS
and RSIS; the socio-cultural implications study will be done by ISIS-Malaysia.
11
Cutting the number of ASEAN Summit to once a year may
help save the host a lot of money. But at the same time
it may also threaten to weaken AC. For it may create
a new opportunity for some non-ASEAN countries
to propose, for example, convening the East Asia Summit
outside of the ASEAN region.
Therefore, a more sensible solution is to cut the hospitality
services and facilities provided by the host to all delegations.
Let each delegation pay its own expenditure especially
hotel accommodation. In the longer-run, perhaps
all future ASEAN Summits and Ministerial meetings can
be held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, just like
most of the EU major meetings are held in Brussels.
And every delegation shall pay of all its expenses.
No freeloading on the host. This will remove from
the smaller or poorer ASEAN Member States the heavy
burden of hosting ASEAN Summits and Ministerial
meetings when they hold the ASEAN Chairmanship.
At the same time, it will also save the ASEAN Secretariat a
lot of money from otherwise paying its large delegation of
staff to attend the ASEAN Summits and meetings outside
of Jakarta.
Another possible solution is for ASEAN to acquire some
revenues, so that ASEAN can help subsidize the hosting
of ASEAN Summits and major ASEAN Ministerial
meetings. One old idea is to impose a surcharge of
US$ 1 per international air ticket issued within the ASEAN
Community. If this can be done, at least US$ 20 million
can be easily raised each year from the growing
international air traffic in the ASEAN region. But so far,
many airlines in Southeast Asia are reluctant to accept
the new responsibility of collecting the proposed US$ 1
surcharge. This is a disappointment, considering the fact
that all of the airlines routinely impose fuel and airport
security surcharges.
With more resources, ASEAN can strengthen
its key bodies which are handling ASEAN cooperation
on a full time basis: the CPR, the ASEAN Secretariat,
the 10 ASEAN National Secretariats, and the ASEAN
Foundation. It is imperative that the CPR, the ASEAN
Secretariat, and the 10 ASEAN National Secretariats have
enough staff and resources to handle the growing workload
and to maintain close contacts to share information in a
timely manner.
How to mobilize more resources remains a tough question
in ASEAN’s quest to strengthen its institutions, particularly
the ASEAN Secretariat. Without strong and efficient
institutional support, AC will be weakened in practice and
structure.
4. Commitment to ASEAN
ASEAN Leaders have already looked beyond 2015 and
agreed that central elements of the post-2015 ASEAN
Community shall include “realizing a politically cohesive,
economically integrated, socially responsible and a
truly people-oriented, people-centred and rules-based
ASEAN”64. The phrase “people-oriented, people-centred”
indicates some subtle but fundamental difference within
64- See the Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on the ASEAN
Community’s Post-2015 Vision, issued at the 23rd ASEAN Summit,
held in Bandar Seri Begawan on 9 October 2013.
the ASEAN membership. At least one Member State is
reportedly not yet ready to see the ASEAN Community
become a full-fledged “people-centred” organization, in
which ASEAN people will have more say in communitybuilding and future direction of the ASEAN Community.
Nevertheless, based on the central elements endorsed
at the 25th ASEAN Summit, senior officials from the three
community pillars will be formulating the new ASEAN
Roadmap for 2016-2025. The new Roadmap, together
with a new set of three community blueprints (one each
for the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN
Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community) will be submitted to Leaders at their 27th
ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in the last quarter of 2015.
An ad hoc High Level Task Force, led by Ambassador Hsu
King Bee of Malaysia, has been established to coordinate
the formulation of the three new Blueprints for the 20162025 Roadmap. The High Level Task Force is directly
in charge of drafting a new Blueprint for the ASEAN
Political-Security Community, because most of them
are (or used to be) senior officials65 from Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
At the 26th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Leaders also agreed
“to further intensify our work to realize an ASEAN Community
that is politically cohesive, economically integrated and
socially responsible in order to take advantage of current
and future opportunities, and effectively respond to regional
and international challenges…”
In addition, in their Langkawi Declaration on the
Global Movement of Moderates66, issued on 27
April 2015 after the summit retreat on Langkawi Island
of Malaysia, ASEAN Leaders reiterated their pledge to,
among other things, “strengthen ASEAN unit and solidarity
and its central role in maintaining and promoting peace,
stability and prosperity in the region; (…)”.
Unfortunately, ASEAN Leaders don’t seem to have given
much thought to resource mobilization. They still hope to
see more ASEAN works done in fewer ASEAN Summits
and meetings with little or no increase in ASEAN’s
own resources. What ASEAN needs is some systematic
resource mobilization to support community-building in
post-2015 ASEAN Community.
ASEAN will be as strong as its Member Governments
want it to be. If they truly believe in sharing their common
destiny in ASEAN, then they must be serious about
community-building, shared commitment and collective
responsibility to ASEAN. In this regard, it is imperative
that they promptly ratify and implement all the ASEAN
agreements their Leaders and Ministers have signed.
They must also comply in good faith with the ASEAN
Charter. ASEAN Leaders seemed to know vaguely about
the ratification delays. They urged in the Chairman’s
Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit “ASEAN Member
65- For example representatives from Cambodia, Singapore,
and Thailand are: Ambassador Kan Prarith (the ex-Cambodian
PR to ASEAN), Ambassador Ong Keng Yong (Secretary-General
of ASEAN 2003-2007, and ex-Singapore’s Ambassador
to Malaysia), and Ambassador Sihasak Phuangketkeow (now
Ambassador of Thailand to Japan).
66- See the full text at the ASEAN Secretariat’s homepage:
www.asean.org.
12
States to ratify all outstanding legal instruments under the
ASEAN Charter in a timely manner67.”
4.1. The ASEAN Peoples
In
their
Kuala
Lumpur
Declaration
on
a People-Oriented, People-Centre ASEAN68, ASEAN
Leaders agreed to
continue establishing a people-oriented,
people-centred and rules-based ASEAN
Community where all people, stakeholders
and sectors of society can contribute to
and enjoy the benefits from a more integrated
and connected Community encompassing
enhanced cooperation in the political-security,
economic,
and
socio-cultural
pillars
for sustainable, equitable and inclusive
development.
Notwithstanding the pledge to bring ASEAN benefits
to ASEAN peoples, one serious missing link in ASEAN’s
community-building is the lack of involvement of ASEAN
peoples. ASEAN remains very much a top-down
inter-governmental Association. Few in the ASEAN
Community know what is going on in ASEAN. Fewer still
understand why ASEAN Member Governments are trying
to build the ASEAN Community.
Since December 1997, the ASEAN Foundation has been
established to promote public awareness of ASEAN69.
But it has had little success owing to chronic lack of
resources. After initial contributions (voluntary)70, ASEAN
Member States have not agreed to any regular top-up
contribution to strengthen the ASEAN Foundation.
One major recent initiative to promote public awareness
of ASEAN came in the ASEAN Communication Master
Plan71, unveiled at the 25th ASEAN Summit in Myanmar’s
Nay Pyi Taw in November 2014. The central message
in this new ASEAN Communication Master Plan
is : “ASEAN: A Community of Opportunities”. The
document was developed with funding support from the
Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund. But it is silent on how
implementation will be funded.
“The peoples of ASEAN need to understand what
it means to be part of an integrated region where
67- See the full text of the Chairman’s Statement of the 26th
ASEAN Summit, issued in Kuala Lumpur on 27 April 2015, at the
website of the ASEAN Secretariat: www.asean.org.
68- Issued on 27 April 2015 after the 26th ASEAN Summit. See the
text: www.asean.org.
69- See the homepage of the ASEAN Foundation:
www.aseanfoundation.org.
70- ASEAN Leaders agreed at the Second ASEAN Informal
Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 on
the following: Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia each contributed
US$ 1 million; Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Singapore
each contributed US$ 500,000; Thailand and Viet Nam each
contributed US$ 100,000; Malaysia contributed 1.5 million Ringgit,
about US$ 333,000. After joining ASEAN in April 1999, Cambodia
contributed US$ 75,000 to the ASEAN Foundation. In 1999
Japan contributed US$ 20 million to the ASEAN Foundation.
This was the largest amount of contribution given to the ASEAN
Foundation so far.
71- See the text of the ASEAN Communication Master Plan at the
homepage of the ASEAN Secretariat: www.asean.org.
there are shared, equitable opportunities for personal,
business, and community growth,” said Mr Le Luong
Minh, Secretary-General of ASEAN in launching the
ASEAN Communication Master Plan at a ceremony
in Nay Pyi Taw on 11 November 201472. The Master
Plan, he added, will guide ASEAN Member States in
conveying to their peoples through traditional media and
modern electronic social media the central message
that the developing ASEAN Community represents
opportunities to all ASEAN peoples.
However, one important missing component of the
Master Plan is, again, resource mobilization. The Master
Plan is mute on this crucial issue. And it is assumed that
each ASEAN Member State shall find its own resources
to implement the Master Plan. This is indeed a tall order for
some ASEAN governments.
Another new development that could help promote
public awareness of ASEAN was the formation
in March 2015 of the Network of ASEAN Studies (NAS).
NAS has brought together more than 30 universities
and think-tanks with a common interest in teaching
and researching on ASEAN issues. Thammasat
University’s Centre for ASEAN Studies73 is now serving
as the secretariat of NAS. Singapore’s RSIS’ Centre
for Multilateralism Studies and ISEAS’ ASEAN Studies
Centre will team up to organize the second NAS annual
conference in Singapore in 2016.
At the 26th ASEAN Summit, Malaysia launched what it
claimed to be the world’s first ASEAN-focused TV travel
channel called “GOASEAN”. The TV channel will provide
24/7 all year round TV, mobile and digital broadcasting
platforms for all ASEAN Member States to promote their
respective tourism destinations74.
Tourism promotion is one area in which ASEAN has
excelled. In 2013, ASEAN saw as many as 98 million tourist
arrivals, of which 43.2 million were ASEAN peoples going
for intra-ASEAN visits. In 2013, the total tourist arrivals
in France was 84.7 million; in the US, 69.8 million; in Spain,
60.7 million; and in China, 55.7 million75. In other words,
the ASEAN region was actually the world’s top tourist
destination in 2013.
The vibrant intra-ASEAN tourism is partly due to
the growing connectivity and the visa exemption bilateral
arrangements of ASEAN Member States. So far,
the visa exemption has been extended to all nationals
of the first seven Member States. Only Laos, Myanmar,
and Cambodia are still lagging behind in visa exemption
with other ASEAN Member States.
Myanmar is a difficult case because it has a very large
number of people wanting to leave the country for jobs
overseas. In Myanmar there are also Rohinyas who would
72- See news of the launch: www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-launches-communication-master-plan
(accessed on 28 April 2015).
73Facebook:
www.facebook.com/CenterForAseanStudies,
Thammasat University.
74- See details: www.nst.com.my/node/81934 (accessed on
28 April 2015).
75- See details: www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Tourism_rankings (accessed on 29 April 2015).
13
risk everything in order to find a better life outside the country.
Inside Myanmar, those Muslims who call themselves
Rohinyas are not officially recognized as Myanmar citizens.
Hence, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are still reluctant
to enter into any bilateral arrangement on visa exemption
with Myanmar for fear of the influx of migrant workers and
Rohinyas from Myanmar.
their operating hours to benefit ASEAN peoples doing
business and travelling within the ASEAN Community
with one time zone. However, ASEAN Foreign Ministers,
when they met in Kuala Lumpur before the 26th ASEAN
Summit, have agreed to defer further consideration
of ACT. The idea is good but its time has not come.
4.3. ASEAN Citizenship?
Another area of cooperation in which ASEAN has made
good progress is in promoting “open skies” for ASEAN
airlines to operate more flights with fewer restrictions
to destinations within the ASEAN Single Aviation Market.
The deadline to create the ASEAN “open skies” is in 2015.
But Indonesia and the Philippines remain reluctant to
fully open their domestic civil aviation market to ASEAN
competition.
ASEAN also has “open skies” agreement with China76,
and it is negotiating “open skies” agreement with India,
Japan and the RoK. In 2013, the number of non-ASEAN
tourist arrivals from China topped the list with 12.6 million;
followed by 8.7 million from the EU 28; 4.9 million from
the RoK; 4.7 million from Japan; 4.3 million from Australia;
and 2.9 million from India77.
4.2. ASEAN Common Time
In early 2015, Malaysia revived the old idea of “ASEAN
Common Time (ACT)” as one potential deliverable
for its Chairmanship of ASEAN. ACT calls for synchronizing
the time in all ASEAN capitals under one single time
of GMT+8. If this is done, ACT will share the same time
of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Russian provinces
of Buryat, Irkutsk, and Ust-ordyni, and Western Australia.
This collectively will form the world’s largest single time
zone with more than 2.1 billion people.
At present, only four ASEAN capitals are using the GMT+8
time: Bandar Seri Begawan, Kuala Lumpur, Manila,
and Singapore; whereas five ASEAN capitals are using
the GMT+7: Bangkok, Jakarta, Phnom Penh, Ha Noi,
and Vientiane. Myanmar’s Nay Pyi Taw is in GMT+6:30.
Timor-Leste, while it was under Indonesian occupation
used the GMT+8 time. But after independence
in May 2002, the young Southeast Asian nation moved
to the GMT+9 to take advantage of the longer daylight.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo has indicated
his support for ACT. Indonesia has long been contemplating
changing its three time zones into two or just one.
At present, Western Indonesia, which includes Jakarta,
is using the GMT+7 time; Central Indonesia, which includes
Bali, is using the GMT+8 time; and Eastern Indonesia,
which includes Papua, is using the GMT+9 time.
If and when it is put in place, ACT will help facilitate
people-to-people contacts within the integrated ASEAN
Community. Government offices, border checkpoints,
banks, stock markets and business firms can all synchronize
76- Although all 10 in ASEAN signed the ASEAN-China Air
Transport Agreement with China in 2010, only five ASEAN Member States are implementing the agreement with China: Malaysia,
Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
77- See the ASEAN tourism statistics: www.asean.org/news/item/
tourism-statistics.
What else can ASEAN do to benefit its peoples?
The ASEAN citizenship was briefly discussed during
the early stage of the drafting of the ASEAN Charter
in 2006 and quickly dropped. Most ASEAN Governments
were not, and still are not, ready to recognize any ASEAN
citizenship, the way EU Member Governments recognize
the European citizenship.
The diversity and disparity among ASEAN Member States
are too drastic for ASEAN to allow complete freedom
of residence and employment. Within the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC), there is cooperation to facilitate free
flow of only skilled labour and professionals in eight fields
with ASEAN mutual recognition arrangements: engineering,
nursing, surveying, architecture, medical practitioners,
accountancy, dental practitioners, and tourism.
However, implementation of these mutual recognition
arrangements is usually regulated by the prevailing laws
and regulations of the receiving country. Without such
national control, Brunei Darussalam (with population of only
400,000; per capita GDP at US$ 37,777) and Singapore
(5.5 million of population; per capita GDP at US$ 51,296)
would face a sudden influx of Indonesian economic
migrants (Indonesia’s population is over 252 million,
per capita GDP at only US$ 3,549). Each of these two
small ASEAN countries could see a double of population
in less than one month’s time if ASEAN were to introduce
the ASEAN citizenship.
Every receiving country in ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) wants to maintain
national control over migrant workers and foreign talents,
and to avoid surrendering such control to any ASEAN
convention. This is why it is taking ASEAN more than
eight years now to develop an “ASEAN instrument” for
the protection and promotion of rights of migrant workers.
ASEAN Leaders already agreed at the 12th ASEAN
Summit in Cebu, the Philippines, on 13 January 2007 to
task “the relevant ASEAN bodies to…develop an ASEAN
instrument on the protection and promotion of the right
of migrant workers, consistent with ASEAN’s vision of a
caring and sharing Community, (…)”78 At the 26th ASEAN
Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 27 April 2015, ASEAN Leaders
had nothing new to say about this matter except to task
“the ASEAN Labour Ministers to continue working on the
finalization of an ASEAN Instrument on the Protection and
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.79”
78- See the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection
and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers: www.asean.org/
news/item/asean-declaration-on-the-protection-and-pomotion-ofthe-rights-of-migrant-workers (accessed on 29 April 2015).
79- See Paragraph 46 of the (revised) Chairman’s Statement
of the 26th ASEAN Summit: www.vietnamnews.vn/politicslaws/269717/chairman-statement-of-26th-asean-summit-issued.
html (accessed on 29 April 2015).
14
When ASEAN peoples see no direct benefits
from the ongoing community-building endeavour
in ASEAN, they do not pay attention to ASEAN. Neither
will they demand their political leaders to do anything
in particular in ASEAN. Consequently, ASEAN issues have
never been and are not election issues in any ASEAN
Member States.
Occasionally, Leaders and Ministers attend ASEAN
Summits and meetings. Few of them see the whole
picture of the ASEAN Community. Fewer still know what is
actually going on in the Roadmap for 2009-2015 towards
an ASEAN Community. Most of them rely chiefly
on reports and talking points prepared by their senior
officials, who instinctively would always emphasize
the positive and avoid shortcomings in ASEAN.
One of the eight priorities of Malaysia in chairing ASEAN
in 2015 is “to steer ASEAN closer to its peoples”80. It is
still unclear how this priority is being or will be realized.
At least one ASEAN Member State still insists on
the awkward concept of ASEAN being “people-oriented,
people-centred”, instead of being fully “people-centred”.
Conclusion
AC is valid and working in ASEAN’s external engagement.
It is also very relevant to ASEAN internally. AC will become
even more important as ASEAN Member States advance
the community-building endeavour beyond 2015.
To succeed in building a more integrated, unified
and prosperous ASEAN Community, more resources
are needed to strengthen ASEAN institutions, especially
the CPR and the ASEAN Secretariat, and to fund
community-building projects.
The future of ASEAN and the viability of AC are in the
hands of the ASEAN Member States. If they are serious
about their commitment to ASEAN, they have to involve
more of their peoples in building the ASEAN Community.
They must go for practical cooperation activities which help
solve problems and improve livelihood of ASEAN peoples.
A successful ASEAN Community can be and will be
able to attract international attention and recognition
by its own merit. The ASEAN Centrality must be by design,
not by default, regionally indisputable and internationally
agreeable to all.
4.4. New Glimmer of Hope
A new glimmer of hope surfaced in a recent survey
of ASEAN awareness among university students in the
ASEAN Member States81. One interesting finding was
“the general positive attitude towards ASEAN” among
the university students taking part in the survey. Students in
Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were especially enthusiastic
about ASEAN; whereas their counterparts in Singapore
and Thailand82 were more ambivalent. One big change
from 2007 was in Myanmar where students no longer
held the serious skepticism about ASEAN. Overall, 90% of
the students felt that the ASEAN membership is beneficial
to their countries; and nearly 70% of them felt that
the ASEAN membership is beneficial to them personally83.
The researchers, however, pointed out that the university
students interviewed in the survey do not represent
and cannot be regarded as representing the general public
in each ASEAN Member State. The largely positive findings
in the survey could be attributed to the outward-looking
and digitally-connected lifestyle of the university students,
who stand to benefit from ASEAN integration, connectivity
and community-building.
80- The other seven priorities of Malaysia are : “to formally
establish the ASEAN Community; to develop the ASEAN
Community’s post-2015 vision; … to strengthen the development
of SMEs in the region; to expand intra-ASEAN trade and investments; to strengthen ASEAN’s institutions; to promote regional
peace and security through moderation; and to enhance ASEAN’s
role as a global player.” From Paragraph 3 of the Chairman’s Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit.
81- The ASEAN Awareness Survey 2014 was undertaken by Dr Eric
C. Thompson of the National University of Singapore, and Ms Moe
Thuzar of the ASEAN Studies Centre of the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS) from June-December 2014. About 4,000
students in 23 universities in the 10 ASEAN Member States were
interviewed. This was a follow-up survey to a similar one undertaken in 2007.
82- The coup in Thailand on 22 May 2014 may have contributed to
the new ambivalence of Thai university students towards ASEAN.
83- According to the two researchers who presented their
preliminary report at ISEAS in Singapore on 22 April 2015.
15
2. Stabilités nationales
2.1. Elections à venir ?
“Thaïlande: Démocratie à reculons”
Par Arnaud Leveau : Chercheur au Centre d’études de
l’ASEAN (ASC) à l’université Chulalongkorn.
Il aura fallu près d’un an au Comité de rédaction
pour proposer un premier projet de constitution
permanente84 pour le royaume en remplacement de la
constitution provisoire du 22 juillet 2014 promulguée
suite au coup d’État militaire du 22 mai 2014.
Outre le renversement du gouvernement élu de Yingluck
Shinawatra, le coup de 2014 a abrogé la constitution
de 2007 pourtant rédigée dans la foulée du coup
du précédent coup d’État militaire de 2006 fomenté dans
les mêmes cercles que celui de 2014.
Les trente-six membres du Comité de rédaction
de la constitution (Constitution Drafting Committee)
nommés par le Conseil national pour l’ordre et la paix
(NCPO – National Council for Peace and Order) ont
donc remis le 17 avril 2015 une première version de leur
texte. L’armée, le gouvernement et le Conseil national
pour la réforme avaient jusqu’au 25 mai pour examiner
le texte et proposer d’éventuels modifications.
Si le processus se poursuit comme prévu, une version
finale du texte devrait être soumise au Roi le 4 septembre
de cette année. Sauf surprise, ce dernier devrait
la signer comme il l’a fait pour les précédentes.
Il s’agirait de la vingtième constitution depuis l’instauration
d’une monarchie constitutionnelle en 1932.
La suite de la procédure est un peu moins claire.
Les autorités militaires hésitent encore sur l’organisation
éventuelle d’un référendum d’approbation. Elles semblent
toutefois préférer passer par une série de consultations
auprès de mille personnes « représentatives » issues
des 77 provinces du pays. Cependant l’idée
d’un référendum n’est pas tout à fait exclue.
En cas de vote positif l’armée pourra s’enorgueillir
d’un succès populaire et continuer à tirer plus ou moins
directement les ficelles du prochain gouvernement.
Si par contre le texte était rejeté, elle trouverait un prétexte
pour prolonger sa présence à la tête du gouvernement
afin de relancer un nouveau projet de constitution.
Le débat sur le texte est particulièrement bien encadré par
les autorités actuelles. Le texte par exemple a été envoyé
pour information aux différents partis politiques du pays
mais ceux-ci ont eu interdiction d’organiser des réunions
pour en débattre. Pourtant plusieurs points de ce projet
pourraient porter à débat :
- L’article 315 stipule que les organisateurs
du Coup d’État du 2014 bénéficieront d’une immunité.
Les autorités militaires s’étaient déjà octroyé l’immunité
84- La traduction (non officielle) en anglais du texte est disponible
sur le site : http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/constitutionkingdom-thailand-draft-17-april-2015-unofficial-translation-english.
par les articles 47 et 48 de l’actuelle constitution provisoire.
Ce point est particulièrement sensible dans la mesure où
c’est à la suite d’un projet d’amnistie politique que les
manifestations de la fin 2013 avaient repris.
- La Chambre des députés pourra nommer
à la majorité des 2/3 le Premier ministre. Ce dernier n’aura
pas besoin d’être élu, ni d’être affilié à un parti politique.
Cette disposition ouvre la voie la nomination de Premiers
ministres issus de l’armée.
- Les élections seront organisées selon
un mode de scrutin proportionnel. Cela favorisera les petits
partis et la constitution de gouvernements de coalition.
Il s’agit d’une manière de s’assurer qu’aucun parti
ne puisse obtenir la majorité et gouverner par luimême. Pour Borwornsak Uwanno, Président du Comité
de rédaction de la constitution, il s’agit d’un moyen d’éviter
« la dictature de la majorité85 ».
- Cent vingt-trois des 200 sénateurs seront
nommés. Seuls 77 seront élus.
- Les règles d’organisations des campagnes
électorales seront plus strictes. Ces dernières devront
au préalable être autorisées par la Commission électorales.
Les débats publics devront être contrôlés et expurgés
des « politiques populistes ». Il n’est toutefois pas précisé
comment les projets de « politiques populistes » pourront
être filtrés.
- La procédure de mise en accusation
(impeachment) sera assouplie. Il suffira d’obtenir
une majorité simple au parlement pour que la motion soit
adoptée.
- Une « Assemblée morale nationale » devra
établir ou approuver un « Code d’éthique », procéder
à l’examen moral des candidats et des élus, et élaborer
des standards moraux pour les fonctionnaires.
Ce projet de constitution apparaît comme un recul
démocratique non seulement par rapport à la constitution
de 1997 mais aussi au regard de celle de 2007 pourtant
déjà rédigée sous mandature militaire. Non seulement
elle affaiblira de manière importante le poids et le rôle
des partis politiques mais elle permettra également
la nomination d’un Premier ministre non élu. Une
définition vague des « standards moraux » auquel devront
se soumettre les élus et les fonctionnaires permettra
aux autorités militaires et aux institutions qu’ils auront
nommées ou créées de manipuler aisément le jeu
des nominations et des destitutions.
Si ce projet de constitution est approuvé alors les
autorités militaires seront assurées à l’avance que les lois,
décrets et autres textes promulgués par l’administration
de Prayuth Chan-Ocha, chef du NPCO et actuel Premier
ministre seront tous constitutionnels. Cette manière
de procéder remonte à la première constitution
de 1932. Les instigateurs de la « révolution » de 1932
avec à leur tête Pridi Banomyong remirent
deux documents au roi Prajadhipok. Le premier document
était le texte de la première constitution du royaume.
Le second un projet d’amnistie pour les responsables
du coup d’État. Aujourd’hui les projets d’amnistie
ne sont plus remis séparément. Ils sont directement
inclus dans le texte constitutionnel. Ainsi depuis 1953 la
Cour suprême considère que chaque coup d’État
85- Mongkol Bangprapa, Draft charter halts “dictatorship of majority”, Bangkok Post, 21 avril 2015.
16
est légal à partir du moment où il devient effectif.
Par conséquent l’ensemble des actes qui découlent
d’un coup sont également légaux. Cela peut cependant
apparaître contradictoire avec l’article 113 du Code pénal
qui prévoit la peine de mort ou la prison à vie pour ceux
qui tentent de renverser ou de modifier la Constitution,
de renverser le pouvoir législatif, le pouvoir exécutif
ou le pouvoir judiciaire de la Constitution ou d’annuler
son pouvoir.
Si les initiateurs de coups d’État réussis sont assurés
de bénéficier d’une amnistie, il n’en est pas de même
pour les responsables politiques élus destitués. Ainsi
le procès de Yingluck Shinawatra pour négligence devait
débuter le 19 mai 2015, cinq ans jour pour jour après
la répression sanglante des chemises rouges initiée
par le gouvernement d’Abbhisit Vejjajiva avec le soutien
des responsables militaires actuels. Prayuth Chanocha était ainsi en 2010 vice-commandant du Centre
de résolution des situations d’urgence, organisme
en charge de la répression. Les accusations portées
à l’encontre de Madame Shinawatra concernent
pour l’essentiel le programme gouvernemental d’achat
subventionné du riz à environ 50 % au-dessus du prix
du marché. Les pertes occasionnées par ce programme
sont évaluées à près de 12,5 milliards d’euros. Si elle
est reconnue coupable, Yingluck Shinawatra encourra
une peine pouvant aller jusqu’à dix ans de prison.
L’enjeu principal de ce projet de constitution est
de savoir combien de temps l’armée restera
au pouvoir et sous quelle forme. La classe moyenne
et supérieure qui a soutenu le coup d’État espérait entre
autres que l’armée relance l’économie. La croissance
restera sans doute faible par rapport aux autres pays
de l’ASEAN en 2015. Pour justifier son maintien au pouvoir
l’armée va sans doute devoir se trouver de nouveaux
ennemis et exercer un contrôle plus strict de la population
tout en réduisant la liberté d’expression.
Les récentes mesures prises par les autorités militaires
thaïlandaises montrent que ces dernières restent
sur une ligne dure aussi bien à l’encontre des réseaux
de la famille Shinawatra que des Chemises rouges
ou d’éventuels opposants. Si la volonté d’affaiblir,
voire d’éliminer, les capacités d’influence des réseaux
Shinawatra n’est pas une chose nouvelle, le raidissement
récent des autorités laisse supposer que ces dernières
restent sur la défensive.
Des critiques sur la politique économique suivie
et l’absence de résultats se font entendre, même parmi
les groupes ayant soutenu le coup d’État de mai 2014.
Depuis la prise de pouvoir par l’armée les capitaux
quittent le pays (1,33 milliard d’euros en huit mois).
En 2014, la croissance de 0,8 % a été la plus faible des
pays de l’ASEAN. Le rebond espéré en 2015 sera sans
doute moins fort qu’initialement prévu. Avec une inflation
d’environ seulement 0,6 % un risque de déflation se
fait également sentir. Si la Thaïlande continue d’attirer
des investissements étrangers, le rythme de progression
est moins élevé que chez ses principaux partenaires
et concurrents d’Asie du Sud-est (Vietnam, Malaisie,
Indonésie, Singapour ou Philippines). Les investisseurs
japonais s’intéressent toujours à la Thaïlande, notamment
pour le développement des infrastructures ferroviaires
mais cette dernière n’est plus considérée comme
une destination prioritaire. Toyota Motor pourtant
fortement impliqué en Thaïlande cherche aujourd’hui
à diversifier ses implantations notamment en Indonésie.
De son côté, en novembre dernier, lorsque le sud-coréen
Samsung a décidé d’investir 2,5 milliards d’euros pour
la construction d’une nouvelle usine de téléphone mobile,
c’est le Vietnam qu’il a choisi.
L’instabilité politique de ces dix dernières années
n’a pas permis au pays de gérer efficacement
le « tournant digital » que ses principaux partenaires
au sein de l’ASEAN (Singapour, Malaisie, Indonésie)
ont su prendre. La Thaïlande est compétitive en termes
de construction automobile et de disque dur mais demeure
faible en matière de téléphone mobile et de tablettes.
À titre d’exemple, entre 2007 et 2014, la Thaïlande
est tombée de la 33e à la 67e place au classement
du Forum économique mondial sur la compétitivité.
Si le gouvernement a prévu un budget de 77 milliards
d’euros d’investissements dans les infrastructures,
les mesures concrètes tardent à se mettre place.
Les réformes proposées, notamment en matière
d’éducation, peuvent laisser craindre que le pays
ne réalisera pas les efforts nécessaires en matière de
recherche et de développement et qu’il aura du mal
à rattraper son retard. Les projets de développement
des infrastructures ne seront pas suffisants et sans doute
trop tardifs pour relancer durablement l’économie.
La politique de réconciliation nationale, pourtant
ardemment proclamée par les autorités, peine à se mettre
en place. Les résultats économiques mitigés conduisent
les autorités à vouloir faire diversion et à rejeter une
partie des responsabilités sur l’ancien gouvernement.
Les divisions et les tensions entre les milieux
conservateurs et l’armée d’un côté, les chemises rouges,
les réseaux Thaksin et les opposants au pouvoir militaire
de l’autre, ne faiblissent pas même si le strict contrôle
sécuritaire actuel les rend mois visibles.
Des résultats économiques en demi-teinte pourraient
conduire les autorités militaires à maintenir un contrôle
strict sur le pays avec comme objectif d’éviter
tout débordement. Cependant cela contribue à élargir
le fossé entre ces autorités et les « anciennes chemises
rouges ». A terme cela risque d’accroître les facteurs
d’instabilités. En attendant, faute de mieux, les milieux
d’affaires favorables au coup d’État de 2014 continueront
sans doute de soutenir l’armée préférant encore la stabilité
politique à la croissance économique. À la différence
du coup d’État de 2006, les autorités militaires ne
souhaitent pas retransmettre le pouvoir aux civils
tant que la question de la succession royale ne sera pas
réglée et tant qu’elles ne seront pas assurées qu’après
d’éventuelles élections le pouvoir restera entre les mains
des milieux conservateurs.
17
“Myanmar’s 2015 Elections”
By Professor Robert Taylor: Professeur de Science
politique à la School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS) de Londres, et vice-chancelier de l’université de
Buckingham.
1. Complex Electoral System Shaped by Ethnic
Claims
2. Demands for Constitutional Reform Falter
3. What Happens After the Election Determines Who
Wins
By early November this year Myanmar must conduct
elections for 330 members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s
Assembly) and 168 members of the Amyotha Hluttaw
(Nationalities Assembly). Theses renewed assemblies,
including an additional 25 per cent of members respectively
appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, will convene together as the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
(Union Assembly) in early 2016 and elect a new president
and two vice-presidents from amongst three candidates
nominated by each of the two elected bodies and a third
nominated by the military members meeting separately
in advance. Given the strongly presidential constitutional
order of Myanmar, the choice of the president will be
crucial for the functioning of the government for the next
five years.
1. Complex Electoral System Shaped by Ethnic
Claims
In addition, the polls this year will see the voters electing
fourteen unicameral state and regional assemblies
and councils for six self-administered zone, with ethnic
designations, will also be elected. While these bodies
have relatively little power, those for the self-administered
zones and the seven ethnically-designated states
provide symbolic representation to the ethnic diversity
of the country which succeeding constitutions
have attempted to recognise in order to appease
the politics of identity which has plagued the country
since 1947 if not earlier. The highly complex electoral
system, which is biased in favour of areas predominantly
populated
by
ethnically-designated
persons,
even includes the election of so-called ‘ethnic affairs
ministers’ for the state and regional assemblies
for each group which allegedly has 0.01 percent
of the population and the area in which they reside is not
designated in its name. At the last elections, the first under
this constitution, in 2010, 29 such ministers were elected.
Constituencies at all levels are based administrative units
known as townships which have widely varying populations
(from 1,500 to over 500 thousand). While there have
been demands for amendment of the constitution,
which many see as a structure to preserve the power
of the armed forces in politics and ensure that the leader
of the major opposition political party, Nobel Peace Prize
winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is not eligible to serve
as president, none of the calls for reform of the constitution
concern the unfairness, on a one-person, one-value
basis, of the electoral system. Consideration was given
to switching to a system of proportional representation;
this possible reform was abandoned as being skewed
in favour in the current majority party, the United Solidarity
and Development Party (USDP). The USDP was formed
from a mass organisation established by the former
military government, though the overwhelming majority
of its members are civilians.
The atmosphere surrounding the 2015 election is greatly
liberalised from that of the 2010 polls. So-called
political prisoners have been released, press censorship
terminated, international observers present, and a
general atmosphere remarkably free and open prevails.
This was also the case at the time of bye-elections
in 2012 which saw Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s party,
the National League for Democracy (NLD), gain 43
seats in the legislature, and herself become a member
of the Pyithu Hluttaw where she chairs a committee
concerning the rule of law and the establishment of public
order, and conduct several conversations, either singularly
or with other political leaders, with the President elected
in 2011, U (former General) Thein Sein.
While there appear to be at least 73 political parties
registered with the Election Commission at the time
of writing, only two seem likely to win a large enough
number of seats to determine the Presidency, the NLD
and the USDP. Two others can be considered also
“nationwide” parties. These are the National Unity Party
(NUP), the rebranded Burma Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP), the former single party of the Ne Win socialist era,
and the National Democratic Force (NDF), which split off
from the NLD when the latter boycotted the 2010 elections.
Both parties had small representations in the previous
Hluttaw but have modest followings, the NUP amongst
the older generation, and the NDF amongst a rather militant
and sometimes chauvinistic minority. However, both are
respected for opposing both the USDP and the NLD.
The majority of the minor parties are organised around
the names of various ethnic groups. These include Mon
(2 parties), Kayah (2), Chin (5), Bamar (1), Danu (1),
Dawei (1), Inn (1), Kachin (4), Kaman (1), Kayan (1),
Kayin (4), Khami (1), Kokang (2), Lahu (1), Lisu (1), Mro
(3), Pao (2), Rakhine (2), Shan (2), Palaung (1), Tai Lai
(Red Shan) (1), and Wa (2). Some of these are affiliated
with either the USDP or NLD, especially where there are
two or more parties with the same ethnic designation.
Others are not and as a general rule, the smaller the ethnic
group, the fewer the number of parties. The remainder
of the parties has a name such as the 88 Generation
Student Youths or the Modern People’s Party which are
generally identified with the Bamar majority ethnic term
or from a possible coalition of ethnic minorities such as
the Ethnic National Development Party. While none
of these minor parties are capable of forming a government,
those who win seats in the election are likely to be courted
when the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw meets, especially if neither
of the major parties (the NLD or USDP) are in a position
to dominate the assembly.
18
The election is managed by the Election Commission
which is appointed by the President. Chaired by
a former member of the USDP and a retired army
officer, the Commission was doubled in size in April
to sixteen members following the appointment of eight
persons with ethnic minority identities as the Commission
had been criticised for being all Bamar. Despite the origins
of the Commission from the previous army regime and
the political party it established, the Commission has
been noted for attempting to ensure the election is “free
and fair”, inviting international observers, seeking advice
from international electoral support institutions and NGOs,
and operating in a largely transparent manner. However,
at the local level, the Commission works through the
staff of the General Administration Department (GAD),
which is an arm of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the minister
for which, by constitutional mandate, must be a serving
army officer.
2. Demands for Constitutional Reform Falter
Constitutional reform over a number of issues,
concentrating on the requirement that fundamental
constitutional amendment requires the support
of the twenty-five percent of the hluttaws composed of
the army and the exclusion of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
from eligibility has been a constant backdrop to the run
up to the elections. The NLD has attempted repeatedly
to find a way to force amendment and, as a final threat,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has said that the NLD will
not stand in the election unless amendment takes
place. However, many see this as an empty threat for
several reasons. One is that the promise of amendment
might be held out for after the election, as U (former General)
Shwe Mann, the speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,
recently implied. Another is, having used without success
the boycott tactic in 2010, and finding that not all
of her party supported that move, already some NLD
members have indicated that whatever she says,
the party will stand. Her once dictatorial power over the NLD
appears to be waning just as her international iconic stature
has been tarnished by her failure to defend forthrightly the
rights on Muslims in Myanmar’s predominantly Buddhist
society.
Even if the NLD did not stand, almost certainly they would
be boycotting the polls alone and with more than seventy
parties contesting, and the election being linked indirectly
with the nationwide peace process to end Myanmar’s
ongoing civil armed conflicts, it is unlikely that more
than the die-hard Daw Aung San Suu Kyi supporters
would wish to see the re-imposition of the Western
economic sanctions which were imposed on Myanmar
for fifteen years without visible effect on the ability
of the government to function. By establishing
a constitutional system of governing in which the NLD
has been participating for the past three years, claiming
that it would be illegitimate if the West’s favoured candidate
did not win would be obviously blatant interference
in the domestic affairs of another state.
Why will people vote in the elections, and how?
There are basically three reasons to vote for a particular
candidate or party.
- One, which favours the NLD, is opposition
to the army and devotion to the daughter of the founder
of modern Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
- A second is that you or your community
will materially benefit from the outcome. This would favour
the SPDC because it now forms the government and
has demonstrated its ability to provide bridges, roads,
dams, wells, and jobs.
- A third is the politics of identity in which people
vote for the party which claims to represent a person’s
declared ethno-linguistic identity. This is also, where there
are more than one such party available, links to clan,
village or other patrimonial ties. The ethnically designated
political parties have attempted to persuade the NLD
and the USDP not to stand candidates in constituencies
where they compatriots reside but with little success
so far. This may result in a weakening of the vote
for the ethnically-designated parties but this does not
ensure that either the NLD or the USDP will necessarily
prevail, given the electoral system.
Candidates with only a plurality of votes can win
and therefore it would be rash to attempt to predict
at this point the likely outcome of the election.
- Whereas one can assume that much
of the business community, which has the money
to support political parties, would support the USDP,
many prominent businessmen have attempted
to demonstrate their support for the NLD and its leader.
Moreover, the Thein Sein government has not favoured the
indigenous business community over foreign investors as
it has sought to win support from the American and other
Western governments.
Many believe that the NLD, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
are so popular that they will inevitably dominate the election
results. We shall only know in November.
3. What Happens After the Election Determines Who
Wins
But as explained above, the election is only the first step
in choosing the next president. When the Hluttaw
members meet to nominate their respective candidates,
much bargaining could take place. As long as Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi remains ineligible, there are as of now
three likely candidates for the presidency:
- incumbent President Thein Sein,
- Pyidaungsu Hluttaw speaker Shwe Mann,
- and armed forces Commander-in-Chief Min
Aung Hlaing.
None has ruled out accepting the position.
- Thein Sein is now 70 years of age and is known
to have heart problems.
- Shwe Mann is two years younger and gives
the appearance of seeking to be a compromise candidate
acceptable to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
-
Min Aung Hlaing is ten years younger than
Thein Sein and has been gaining much domestic
and international exposure during the past year.
Whether the three generals are competing amongst
each other for the top slot, or merely choreographing
an election, is unknown.
In the meantime, the election takes place against
a continuing “peace process” in an attempt to end armed
19
insurgency in the name of ethnicity which has plagued
the country since independence. So far, despite valiant
efforts by the Thein Sein government, an effort to achieve
a nationwide ceasefire agreement, preliminary to political
talks, has been stymied and armed conflicts are occurring
in various parts of the ethnic minority borders lands.
Ethnic politics in Myanmar has many dimensions of which
party politics is only one. While some ethnic political parties
see their co-patriot armed groups as threats, others are
off spring or allies of the insurgents. Whether any persons
or any group has sufficient capacity to control the situation
will remain in doubt until next year. In the meantime, a
return to military rule, or the postponement of the elections
or the Hluttaw cannot be excluded from the range
of possibilities available. As the year progresses, we shall
learn more, but for now, all bets are off.
“Vietnam, un an avant le Congrès”86
By Alexander L. Vuving: Professeur à l’Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies de l’Université de Tulane.
Next year, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP)
will convene its 12th national congress. This event, which
takes place only once in five years, provides the Party
with a major opportunity to select new leaders and set
new policy guidelines for the country. The last year prior
to the congress is usually a period of intense struggle
over power, personnel, and policy between the contending
groups within the ruling elite.
According to the party’s statute, the national congress
is the highest decision making body in the party.
While the congress’s decision on policy provides
the guidelines for what the leadership should do in the next
five years, its personnel decision often carries more
weight than its policy decision. The most important acts
of the congress are the elections of the Central Committee
and the Politburo. It is the Central Committee that is
the highest body to make decision when the congress
is not in session. As the Central Committee normally meets
only twice a year, the Politburo takes over its role during the
time in between. The Politburo meets about once a month,
but it also has a weekly session (giao ban hàng tuan) where
its key members review past actions and policies and make
decision on behalf of the Politburo. While the congress
is to set guidelines for policy until the next congress,
its personnel decision is more important because it is
the Politburo and Central Committee members
who interpret and translate the guidelines into actual
policies.
Against this background, elite groups jockeying for profit
and policy often focus on personnel first. But the issues of
who goes and who stays proved to be an extremely hard
nut to crack for the competing groups in the Vietnamese
elite. Almost every time the VCP prepared for its national
congress since the early 1980s, the Central Committee
had to meet one or more additional sessions on the eve
86- The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do
not reflect those of his employers.
of the congress only to settle disagreements on this issue.
As a result, leaders have had very little time to really focus
on making adequate policy for the country.
This time, the prospects for a timely settlement of
the personnel issues appear even dimmer. At the time
of the 12th Congress, ten of the sixteen members of
the Politburo will be older than 65 years, the age limit
for a new Politburo member. The Party will not replace
all these older members, but the pressure of the age
limit is significant. If all those members who will be older
than 68 years have to go, then General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong (72), National Assembly Chair Nguyen Sinh
Hung (70), Personnel Department Chief To Huy Rua (69),
and Control Committee Chief Ngo Van Du (69) will retire.
Six other members will be between 65 and 68 years old,
and they include several heavy weights: State President
Truong Tan Sang (67), Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung
(67), Standing Party Secretary Le Hong Anh (67), Defense
Minister Phung Quang Thanh (67), Hanoi Party Chief
Pham Quang Nghi (67), and Ho Chi Minh City Party Chief
Le Thanh Hai (66). The pressure is for most of these men
to retire at the 12th Congress.
The biggest — and toughest—question before
the 12th Congress is to find the next General Secretary
of the Party, the second biggest question is to find
a new Prime Minister. With Nguyen Phu Trong being
72 years old and Nguyen Tan Dung having served two
terms as Prime Minister, the 12th Congress will need to find
two different Politburo members to replace these leaders.
These are dictated by the age limit and the term limit,
which do not rule out exceptions, however.
Dung is reportedly aspiring to become the next Party chief.
But he and Party chief Trong have been at loggerheads
for most of the last four years. Shortly after becoming
VCP General Secretary in 2011, Trong launched
a major campaign aimed at uprooting corruption.
This anti-corruption campaign quickly became Trong’s
signature project. The main target of this campaign
is Prime Minister Dung, who is thought to be the key
leader that allowed corruption to go rampant in the country
since his rise to power in 2006. Corruption and
mismanagement are thought to be the main causes
of the economic difficulties and turbulences that have
haunted Vietnam since 2008. Corruption is also believed
to be the central factor that erodes the population’s trust
in the Party and severely undermines the Party’s legitimacy.
Trong’s anti-corruption campaign helped to create
an informal bipolar structure in the Vietnamese
political system. Many commentators think this bipolar
arrangement is “the Party vs. the Government,”
but the real arrangement looks differently. It is true
that institutionally Trong is the boss of the Party apparatus
while Dung the boss of the Government. But their actual
influence appears to be channeled through people
as much as institutions. While Dung is able to plant his
allies in the Party bureaucracy, Trong is also able to attract
leaders working in the Government. One example is
former Finance Minister Vuong Dinh Hue, who at Trong’s
call has changed jobs to lead the reestablished Economic
Department in the Party Central.
20
Neither Trong nor Dung bases their choice of allies on
ideology. Although Trong is a moderate conservative,
his allies also include several modernizers and even
rent-seekers that, by way of connection, remain in
his camp. Dung is a rent-seeker, but he also receives
support from many modernizers and even some
conservatives that are on his side by way of connection.
Nevertheless, Dung is more pragmatic than Trong
in his choice of allies. For him, as the famous Deng Xiaoping
motto says, “it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white as
long as it catches mice.”
Trong’s choice of allies tends to be those who
have worked with him in the past, their allies, those
who are resistant to bribery, and those who have
worked competently for the common good. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom, it was Trong, not Dung,
who promoted former Chief of the Government Office Vu
Duc Dam and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh to Deputy
Prime Ministers. Other prominent protégés of Trong include
the late Nguyen Ba Thanh, former Party chief of Central
Vietnamese City Danang, and Vo Van Thuong, former chief
of the Party’s Youth League. Known as the closest Vietnam
had to a Lee Kuan Yew, Thanh was called upon by Trong
to head the reestablished Internal Affairs Department
in the Party Central and oversee the anti-corruption
campaign. Thanh was meant to be Trong’s counterbalance
against Prime Minister Dung, but his illness last year
and early death in February this year hit the Trong camp
with a heavy blow. Believed to be resistant to corruption,
Thuong was installed in April 2014 at the young age of 44
as Standing Deputy Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party
Committee. In this position, Thuong is slated to replace
Le Thanh Hai, a rent-seeker who was involved in several
corruption affairs in this megacity. Hai is in his second term
as the City Party boss and thus will have to either move
or retire. If Thuong becomes the Party boss of Ho Chi Minh
City, he will be the youngest Politburo member at the 12th
Congress.
The bipolar structure centered on General Secretary
Trong and Prime Minister Dung provides the center
stage for the power struggle leading up to the 12th
Congress. Both camps are trying to implant their
own members in the next Central Committee. Trong’s
advantage lie mainly in his position as the supreme leader
of the Party. However, the Dung camp is financially superior
because Dung and his close allies, such as Central Bank
Governor Nguyen Van Binh and Deputy Prime Minister
Hoang Trung Hai, control a budget that dwarfs that of
Trong and his allies. In addition, Dung and Co. are closely
connected to a larger network of both state-owned
and private companies that can finance their election
campaign. They are also more adept at employing social
media to their advantage. Their financial and communicative
superiority appears to carry more weight than the Trong
camp’s institutional superiority. Dung survived several
attempts to unseat him, and at the latest confidence vote
in the Central Committee in January 2015, he emerged
as one of the most trusted leaders. The confidence vote
was sponsored by Trong as a key measure to “name
and shame” corrupt and incompetent leaders. But it turned
out to be Trong’s strategic error, and ironically, revealed
Trong’s own incompetence.
The selection of the next Central Committee goes
through several stages. It is first recommended
by the Party Central Personnel Department headed
by To Huy Rua, a Trong ally whose wife is amenable
to bribery. The General Secretary, as Party chief and
as head of the Congress’s subcommittee for personnel
issues, will have a large influence over this selection.
But the final list for the Congress to select from is to
be nailed down by the current Central Committee.
The problem for Trong is that he is not popular in this Central
Committee. While Trong still prevails in the Politburo, Dung
has more support from the Central Committee.
This bipolar structure has implications for the question
of who will be the next leaders of Vietnam after the 12th
Congress. Even if Dung can gather a majority support in
the Central Committee for his bid for General Secretary,
Trong will be able to veto it through his control of the
subcommittee for personnel issues and his majority
support in the Politburo. Thus, although Dung is extremely
ambitious and financially strong, it is very hard for him to
become the next VCP chief.
But it is equally hard for a prime candidate of the
Trong camp to succeed him. Trong’s first pick as his
successor was Hanoi Party boss Pham Quang Nghi.
Although without a counterpart in the American system,
Nghi went to the United States in July 2014 in an
official trip that was both to polish his foreign policy
credentials and to prepare for Trong’s inaugural visit there
the next year. But Nghi gathered more criticisms than
praises for his handling of the visit. In the next months,
his connections to a number of corruption affairs were also
revealed and his chance to be nominated plummeted.
Trong’s next choice appears to be Public Security Minister
Tran Dai Quang. Quang traveled to the United States
in March this year, also the first official visit of a Vietnamese
Minister of Public Security to the United States,
in a preparatory trip for Trong’s visit later this summer.
The election of the next General Secretary of
the VCP will result from a bargain mainly between
the Trong camp and the Dung camp. If Trong and Co.
cannot stop Dung’s bid for Party chief, they will try hard
to advance their candidate as the next Prime Minister.
As things stand today, a more likely outcome is
a compromise candidate to take up the post
of the General Secretary. This compromise candidate must
be approved by both Party chief Trong and Prime Minister
Dung. Three of the current Politburo members appear
to be most likely to pass this test. They are Standing
Party Secretary Le Hong Anh, Propaganda Department
Chief Dinh The Huynh, and Fatherland Front Chairman
Nguyen Thien Nhan. Anh, a former Public Security
Minister and former Party boss of Kien Giang province
in South Vietnam, is reportedly among the senior members
who will retire. Nhan is widely seen as a Dung ally,
but his resistance to corruption and intellectual background
has won Trong’s sympathy. However, Nhan may be
deemed too inexperienced for the top post as he has
just been on the Politburo since May 2013. He was also
seen as unsuccessful as Education Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister. Huynh is often regarded as an ally of Trong
since he was, like Trong, from the propaganda branch
21
of the Party bureaucracy. But he is pragmatic enough
to be acceptable to the Dung camp. Still, Huynh can be
seen as inexperienced because his entire career has been
in the propaganda front. His last post prior to Propaganda
Department Chief was Editor-in-Chief of the Party’s central
newspaper, the Nhan Dan. The difficulties with finding
the next boss for the VCP suggest that the 12th Congress
will bring some surprises. If the two camps are unable
to come to an agreement, the default option is for Trong
to stay on for a half term despite his age.
the definite decline of the conservatives. But the same
congress is unlikely to be a turning point since the primacy
of the rent-seekers is unlikely to be broken.
Independent from the power struggle at the top,
there are strong currents that are redefining the
political landscape in Vietnam. Top among these is
the rise of anti-China nationalism. Nationalism has always
been a significant current in Vietnam’s political landscape.
But it was suppressed during the 1990s and 2000s
because it tended to be anti-China and pro-Western.
Beginning in the late 2000s, China’s growing assertiveness
in the South China Sea has given a strong impetus
for Vietnam’s nationalism to break to the surface. Last year,
China unilaterally installed a giant oil drilling platform, the
Haiyang Shiyou 981 (also known as the HD-981), in waters
within the Vietnamese EEZ off the Central Vietnamese
coast. This was the ultimate event that turned Vietnam’s
anti-China nationalism into an irresistible force.
Par Eric Frécon : docteur en science politique ; coordinateur
de l’Observatoire Asie du Sud-est et enseignant-chercheur
à l’Ecole navale. Il est aussi membre du comité européen
du CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific).
As an implication of these developments, the military
leadership is divided between those who opted
for a soft approach toward China and those who
prefer a harder approach. The softliners have prevailed
since Le Duc Anh, Minister of Defense during 19871991 and State President during 1991-1997.
The current Minister of Defense, General Phung Quang
Thanh, is known to be a pro-China leader. His successor,
be it General Do Ba Ty, the current Chief of the General
Staff, or someone else, will likely be less so soft. The military
may exploit the China threat to enlarge its representation
in the next Central Committee, but a significant increase
is unlikely as most of its leadership, including the Minister,
the Deputy Ministers, the Chief of the General Staff
and the General Directorates, the Commanders
of the military branches and military zones, and the chiefs
of other major units such as the National Defense Academy,
are already members of the Central Committee.
The China threat and the rise of nationalism also
provide a favorable environment for the modernizers
and an unfavorable one for the conservatives. The effects
of these developments on the rent-seekers are mixed.
These developments are pushing Vietnam closer to
the West, especially the United States and Japan.
On the one hand, a turn to the West and the United States
will put pressure on Hanoi to further liberalize the economy
and the society. This will make life for rent-seekers harder
than before. On the other, the increased capital flow
from Japan, South Korea, and the United States is
loosening the safety valve on the crisis-prone Vietnamese
economy, making life easier for the ruling rent-seekers.
In the long term, modernizers have the best prospects
among the three strategic paradigms, but in the short
term, rent-seekers still are the strongest. The 12th Congress
is likely to be a turning point in the sense that it will mark
“Avant-veille d’élections présidentielles aux
Philippines”87
Introduction : tout commençait si bien…
1. Le défi de l’organisation
2. La course à la candidature
Conclusion : les clés d’une bonne campagne
Introduction : tout commençait si bien…
Les Philippines ont semblé relever la tête ces derniers mois.
Début décembre 2014, Hagupit (ou Ruby) était le second
super-typhon à s’abattre sur l’est des Visayas en un an
– après Haiyan ou Yolanda) fin 2013. A cette occasion,
la population se montra bien mieux préparée. De même,
l’économie continue de croître, avec 6,2 % en 2014
et des prévisions à 6,3 % pour 2015 (contre 5,2 %
et 5,5 % en Indonésie ou encore 3,0 % et 3,0 %
à Singapour). En novembre 2014, les flux entrants
d’investissements directs étrangers avaient doublé
sur un an et le chômage était à son plus bas (6 %)88.
Même sur le front sécuritaire, les analystes ont noté
le grand pas en avant à Mindanao, suite à la signature
en 2014 du Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB). Il ne constitue certes qu’une première
phase du processus de paix mais conclut « 17 ans
de discussions tendues entre le gouvernement philippin
et le Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)89». Reste la lutte
contre la corruption : dynamisée en 2014 mais qui paraît
parfois ciblée contre la seule opposition.
C’est dans ce contexte que se préparent les élections
du 9 mai 2016. Il s’agit de renouveler la tête de l’exécutif
d’un régime présidentiel, à savoir non seulement le président
et son vice-président – respectivement Benigno « Noynoy »
Cojuangco Aquino III et Jejomar « Jojo » Cabauatan Binay
Senior, tous deux en poste depuis juin 2010 – mais aussi
la moitié des 24 sénateurs ainsi que la totalité des élus
de la Chambre des représentants et environ 18 000 élus
locaux. Ces scrutins sont amenés à prendre des allures
de test : il serait en effet dommage que le volet strictement
87- Cette étude repose en grande partie sur les commentaires du Dr
Alma Maria O. Salvador, du département de science politique de
l’université Ateneo ; elle y mène un groupe de travail sur la réforme
dans le secteur de la sécurité. Les commentaires de François-Xavier
Bonnet (IRASEC) se sont révélés tout aussi précieux.
88- “Philippines”, ISEAS Monitor, 1er semestre 2015, p. 9-10.
89- François-Xavier Bonnet, « Philippines – Année 2014 : entrée en
période préélectorale », in Abigaël Pesses, François Robinne (dir.),
L’Asie du Sud-est 2015 – Bilan, enjeux et perspectives, Bangkok,
IRASEC, 2015, p. 237.
22
politico-partisan nuise aux efforts logistiques, économiques
et sécuritaires entamés ces dernières années.
Pour y répondre, assurons-nous de l’organisation (1.)
et des candidats (2.) qui devront s’attaquer aux chantiers
nationaux (Conclusion).
1.2. Les avertissements de la société civile
1. Le défi de l’organisation
a. L’appel de l’Eglise catholique
Officiels ou pas : ils sont plusieurs à veiller sur la bonne
tenue des élections.
Celle-ci a lancé en mai dernier une vaste campagne
intitulée « Tu ne voleras pas ! » (Huwag kang magnakaw
en tagalog). L’idée est de lutter contre une pratique
largement répandue : l’achat de voix, qui entraîne
par contrecoup la corruption des élus bien obligés
de rembourser leurs « investissements ». Pour rappel,
la précédente présidente avait été enregistrée en train
d’acheter un million de voix à la Comelec, d’où le recours
aux « machines à voter » pour limiter les risques de fraude
en 2016 – après les précédentes expériences en mai
2010 et 2013. En réalité, selon l’Eglise, cette méthode
permettrait la création de bureaux de vote fantôme
et le gonflement des listes électorales, en plus
des méthodes classiques : distribution de riz, d’argent,
de téléphones portables ou intimidations directes.
1.1. Le rôle de la Comelec (Commission on Elections)
Le succès de l’élection dépend en grande partie
du travail mené en amont par la Comelec (Commission
on Elections), dirigée depuis mai 2015 par l’avocat
et ancien doyen d’une faculté de droit Andres Bautista,
en remplacement de Sixto Brillantes parti à la retraite.
Bautista a des allures de futur leader ou de personne
à suivre de près : il été formé à Ateneo et Harvard avant
de partir à New York ; il avait été pressenti en 2012
pour occuper les fonctions de chef de la justice ; de même,
il avait participé aux travaux de la Constitutional Reform
Commission sous la présidence de Macapagal-Arroyo ;
depuis 2010, il est aussi le responsable de la Presidential
Commission on Good Governement. Avec en sus
deux autres nominations pour sept ans qui portent
le nombre de ses membres à sept, la Comelec est
pleinement opérationnelle90.
Bien qu’extérieurs à la Comelec, les impétrants ont été
plutôt bien accueillis. Le sortant Sixto Brillantes s’inquiétait
simplement d’un éventuel retour au vote manuel suite
aux doutes émis sur le Precint Count Optical Scan –
des machines prévues pour les élections… jusqu’à
ce que la Cour suprême annule fin avril un contrat conclu
avec Smartmatic-Total Information Management (TIM),
initialement désigné pour fournir ces machines.
Certes, les finances ne devraient pas poser problème
: avec un budget de 11 milliards de pesos pour 2014,
en plus des réserves de 3 milliards de pesos, l’acquisition
des 82 000 machines PCOS et leur utilisation pour
trois élections demeurent parfaitement envisageables91.
Toutefois, la question se pose de la réparation
de ces machines ou bien de l’acquisition de 100 000
autres. En mai, les deux options étaient encore envisagées.
Quel que soit le résultat des deux devis, aucun report
des élections n’était planifié92.
En parallèle aux organes officiels, différents acteurs sociaux
ne manquent pas de veiller. Le plus important d’entre eux
demeure l’Eglise, dans un pays à 80,9 % catholiques94.
A l’action du Comité pour les affaires publiques
de la Conférence des évêques catholiques s’ajoute
celle du Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting
(PPCRV) fondé à l’initiative des évêques. Sa dernière
campagne « One good vote », lancée mi-avril, se concentre
sur les villageois et les jeunes95.
b. Initiatives diverses
En parallèle, un député a déposé une proposition de loi
(5269 – Presidential Debate Reform Act) pour la mise
en place d’une commission en charge de l’organisation
d’un débat présidentiel. L’objectif est ainsi de mieux
informer le corps électoral96.
De même, le National Movement for Free Elections,
en partenariat avec diverses organisations professionnelles,
a organisé une série de forums pour sonder les principaux
secteurs de la vie économique.
Enfin, même les vedettes ont été sollicitées par Tweeter
pour promouvoir l’enregistrement des données
biométriques afin de s’assurer du bon déroulement
des élections sur les « machines à voter ».
2. La course à la candidature
Il n’en demeure pas moins que la manœuvre risque
de coûter ; pour Jarius Bondoc, il s’agit en l’espèce
du problème numéro un de ces élections, bien avant les
conditions d’éligibilité des candidats (cf. infra)93.
90- Delon Porcalla, “PCGG head named new Comelec chief”,
The Philippines Star, 5 mai 2015.
91- Jess Diaz, “Comelec has P14 B for the 2016 polls – House”,
The Philippines Star, 9 mai 2015.
92- Paterno Esmaquel II, “2 bids, 1 choice to seal fate of 2016
elections”, Rappler, 6 mai 2015.
93- Jarius Bondoc, “PCOS still 2016 issue, not Poe”,
The Philippines Star, 5 juin 2015.
Depuis la dictature Marcos et l’arrivée au pouvoir
de Corazon Aquino, envisager une prolongation
de mandat demeure un tabou absolu. Quand le fils
Aquino a osé envisager l’éventualité d’un second mandat
en août 2014, à travers un amendement à la Constitution,
il a dû rapidement se rendre à l’évidence. Le peuple
philippin – qu’il appelait alors « ses patrons » – n’est
94- Et 11,5 % de chrétiens protestants ainsi que 5 % de musulmans.
95- « L’Eglise catholique lance une campagne pour des élections «
propres » en 2016 », Eglise d’Asie, 13 mai 2015.
96- “Rosette Adel, Presidential Debate Commission pushed”, The
Philippines Star, 23 avril 2015.
23
pas disposé à de telles largesses97. En agissant de la
sorte, Aquino a mis un terme à une période de stabilité
et d’embellie, notamment en termes macro-économiques,
dont les Philippines avaient bien besoin. Les deux dernières
années de présidence se révèlent plus difficiles : scandale
autour du Priority Development Assistant Fund, mauvaise
gestion post-crise du typhon, morts de forces de l’ordre,
etc.
Certes des mesures d’impeachment ont été tentées,
de même que des rumeurs de coup d’état ont circulé.
Mais le président peut encore compter sur une forte
majorité au parlement ainsi que sur des troupes militaires
largement professionnalisées98. Demeure le souci de
savoir ce qu’il adviendra pour sa politique – et pour lui –
avec le prochain président, d’où l’importance
des manœuvres qui se trament : tour d’horizon
des principaux prétendants, par ordre décroissant
d’importance…
a. Le vice-président Binay
Issu de l’opposition (United Nationalist Alliance – UNA),
cet actuel vice-président compte au rang des candidats
les plus sérieux : seize années d’expérience comme maire
et cinq comme vice-président. Des doutes ont été émis
à propos de malversations quand il était maire de Makati,
ce qui a provoqué des enquêtes au Sénat. L’Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) poursuit ses investigations
auprès des comptes en banque du candidat, dès lors
obligé de se justifier. Mais sur le terrain, sa popularité
semble solide99.
b. La sénatrice Grace Poe
Au printemps dernier, au gré des sondages, elle a
souvent pointé en deuxième position. Son père avait été
candidat malheureux contre Macapagal-Arroyo en 2004.
Lors des élections de 2013, elle est celle qui a obtenu
le plus de voix. Récemment, Grace Poe a rencontré
le président, curieux de savoir si elle serait en mesure
de poursuivre les réformes lancées. L’idée d’un ticket
avec le candidat de la majorité – Roxas (cf. infra) – a
alors été envisagée ; des caciques du parti ont rappelé
qu’elle avait concouru pour les sénatoriales en 2013
sous la bannière présidentielle. Mais certains l’imaginent
volontiers s’engager auprès d’autres prétendants,
tel Lacson (cf. infra)100: plus que jamais un cœur à prendre…
Début juin 2015, tout a été remis en cause du fait d’une
condition préalable a priori non respectée à cause
d’un séjour de treize ans aux États-Unis, jusqu’à la mort
de son père, l’acteur Fernando Po : la résidence aux
Philippines lors des dix années précédant les élections101.
97- “My bosses, my muse: politics in the Philippines”,
The Economist, 23 août 2014.
98- Richard Javad Heydarian, “His popularity waning, embattled
Aquino overreaches in the Philippines”, World Politics Review, 4
septembre 2014.
99- Jennifer Rendon, “No stopping Binay in 2016”, The Philippine
Star, 25 mai 2015.
100- Christina Mendez, “No final plans yet for 2016 – Poe”,
The Philippine Star, 11 mai 2015.
101- Voir l’article VII section 2 de la Constitution ; Xianne
Arrcangel, “10-year residency requirement disqualifies Grace Poe
in 2016 —UNA”, GMA, 3 juin 2015.
Hasard ou coïncidence : cette manœuvre de l’opposition
intervint peu de temps après que Grace Poe a fermé
la porte à un éventuel poste de vice-président de Binay –
qui avait été chef de campagne de Fernando Poe en 2004.
Et la sénatrice de faussement s’interroger sur les craintes
que sa candidature pourrait susciter102. Finalement,
nulle inquiétude puisqu’il ne s’agit pas que de la présence
physique mais aussi de l’intention de revenir. Or, Poe aurait
inscrit ses enfants à l’école philippine dès 2005, dit-on.
Aussitôt, une nouvelle polémique surgit et prend le relais :
puisqu’elle a été abandonnée par ses parents biologiques,
est-on bien sûr de sa nationalité ?! En attendant
la prochaine tentative de déstabilisation…
c. L’indépendant Lacson
L’ancien sénateur Panfilo « Ping » Lacson a annoncé
sa candidature fin avril, comme candidat indépendant,
avec toujours comme souci la lutte contre la corruption.
Il a aussitôt pris ses distances avec le processus de paix
dans le Su, prônant la mise en place de sous-régions
afin que chaque groupe ethnique soit équitablement
traité103. A l’origine, c’est un groupe d’officiers
et de policiers qui avaient demandé à ce qu’il se positionne
comme candidat.
d. Estrada en embuscade
L’ancien président Joseph Estrada avait affirmé
envisager une candidature si d’aventure ni Binay, ni Poe
ne se présentait. Début juin, l’actuel maire de Manille
a rencontré Binay. Ce dernier a ensuite évoqué un éventuel
ticket: le « BEST » (Binay-Estrada). Estrada l’a assuré
de son soutien en 2016, quand bien même la fille
de son ancien collègue et ami comédien, Fernando Poe,
risque aussi de concourir104. Si c’était le cas, puisqu’il est
son parrain, il lui serait difficile de s’engager davantage
auprès de Binay. Pour l’heure, son principal souci est
de faire sortir son fils Jinggoy de prison.
e. Roxas au nom du parti présidentiel
Le secrétaire d’État à l’Intérieur et aux affaires locales,
Manuel Roxas II, ne parvient pas à percer, bien qu’étant
affiché comme candidat présidentiel105. Il n’était crédité
que de 4 % des intentions de votes en mars 2015,
encore moins que Ferdinand « Bongbong » Marcos
Junior : 6 %106. Aussi Aquino l’a-t-il tout d’abord tenu
en dehors des opérations menées en janvier 2015
à Mamasapano (et soldée par la mort de 44 policiers)
avant de l’intégrer aux discussions avec Poe en vue d’un
éventuel ticket107.
102- ANN, “Senator Grace Poe says she’s qualified to run in
Philippines’ elections”, The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 4 juin 2015.
103- PNA, “Lacson to run for President in 2016 elections”,
The Manila Bulletin, 24 avril 2015.
104- “‘BEST’ Binay-Estrada tandem in 2016?”, The Manila
Bulletin, 5 juin 2015.
105- Eva Visperas, “LP ready for 2016 with Mar for president”, The
Philippine Star, 13 mai 2015.
106- Kristine Angeli Sabillo, “Philippine Vice President Binay
leads 2016 polls: Pulls Asia survey”, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
18 mars 2015.
107- Cecille Suere Felipe, Jess Diaz, “Mar in the loop on talks with
Grace”, The Philippine Star, 13 mai 2015.
24
Il a aussi envisagé d’aller chercher un candidat au sein
de la coalition gouvernementale – et non pas seulement
au sein de son parti – à défaut de se représenter lui-même
pour assurer le service après-vente de ses réformes
économiques et sécuritaires (cf. supra)108.
Fin mai, les observateurs donnait au président jusqu’à
son sixième State of the Nation Address (en juin-juillet)
pour annoncer clairement la candidature présidentielle.
Toutefois, la légitimité et crédibilité d’Aquino est
largement écornée suite à l’échec des opérations
anti-terroristes à Mamasapano (Mindanao)109 et aux
négociations malhabilement menées dans le Sud. Ses
seuls recours pour ne pas apparaître comme un poids –
avant d’éventuellement contribuer à la victoire – sont
à chercher du côté de ses succès économiques et de la
réputation de sa famille.
campagne. Les réseaux sociaux seront amenés à
jouer un rôle central pour orienter les débats et interpeler
les candidats. Grace Poe, Defensor Santiago et Escudero
sont les plus en pointe pour affûter leurs arguments
en ligne. En ce qui concerne la sphère académique,
elle jouera son rôle habituel mais en ordre dispersé
selon les accointances de chacun. L’armée – et dans
une bien moindre mesure la police – poussera
de son côté pour aborder les questions de souveraineté
en mer de Chine et ne pas oublier la prochaine phase
de modernisation de l’appareil militaire. D’autres lobbys –
comme ceux des transports ou des télécommunications,
dans un contexte de libéralisation – seront probablement
fort influents dans certaines circonscriptions. Enfin,
ne pas mésestimer le rôle de Washington qui va chercher
à s’assurer du respect de l’EDCA (Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement) signé en avril 2014 afin de veiller
à son « rééquilibrage » en Asie-Pacifique.
f. Duterte et les autres ?
Des groupes de pression ont demandé au maire de Davao,
Rodrigo Duterte, de se positionner ; Binay lui a même
proposé de s’engager avec lui comme vice-président
mais l’intéressé a pris son temps et a préféré jauger
sa popularité au gré de réunions publiques 110: finalement,
c’est aux sénatoriales qu’il se présentera.
Chiz Escudero, serait aussi à surveiller, de même
que Drilon, le président du Sénat, qui s’est distingué
dans les sondages du printemps. Miriam Defensor
Santiago aurait également fait part de ses intentions.
Enfin, l’homme d’affaires Manuel Villar Junior, président
du Nacionalista Party (NP), suscite de plus en plus
d’intérêt. Même le nom du boxeur Manny Pacquiao
a été cité comme possible vice-président aux côtés
de Binay. Le mois de juin risque ainsi d’être animé
sur le front des candidatures, jusqu’aux inscriptions
officielles en octobre111.
Sur bien des aspects, les élections philippines rappellent
celles d’Indonésie : même problème d’achats de voix,
mêmes pronostics sans fin sur la constitution des
tickets présidentiels, même coups bas sur le parcours
des candidats et des problèmes de fonds rarement
abordés – non seulement en politique interne mais
aussi étrangère. Un tel contexte débouchera-t-il alors
aux Philippines sur une surenchère populo-nationaliste
comme ce fut le cas en Indonésie en 2014 ?
Conclusion : les clés d’une bonne campagne
Les alliances sont particulièrement versatiles :
les candidats n’hésitent pas à faire et défaire les accords.
Les appartenances partisanes n’ont que peu de sens ;
la coalition présidentielle rassemble aujourd’hui le Liberal
Party, le Nacionalista Party, le Nationalist People’s
Coalition, le PDP-Laban et le Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino : mais pour combien de temps ?
Comme de coutume depuis 1998, le prochain président
viendra fort probablement du Sénat112. En plus
de cette origine institutionnelle, les financements seront
cruciaux.
Restent la question des thèmes qui borneront la
108- Norman P. Aquino, Clarissa Batino, Rosalind Mathieson,
“Aquino widens net for 2016 presidential race as popularity falls”,
Bloomberg Business, 25 mars 2015.
109- Voir infra : la note de François-Xavier Bonnet sur le sujet.
110- “Binay-Duterte in 2016? ‘Being considered’ – VP”, Rappler,
22 mai 2015.
111- Janet Grace Ortigas, “One Response to 2016 Election: Next
President of the Philippines, Who Will Lead?”, The Philippine Star,
23 mai 2015.
112- Leila B. Salaverria, “Philippines senators in 2016: who’s
running for what”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 avril 2015.
25
2.2. Instabilités aux frontières
“Myanmar 2015 : guérillas et Rohingyas au-delà des
élections”
Par Louis-Arthur Borer : Junior Fellow Asia Centre,
chercheur associé IPSE.
1. Perspective des élections de novembre 2015
2. Des élections tributaires de la situation sécuritaire interne
3. La crise des Rohingyas
Parmi les dix États membres de l’ASEAN, le Myanmar est
probablement celui qui connaît la période de transition
la plus importante113.
Longtemps isolé sur le plan régional et international,
le Myanmar fut dirigé par une junte militaire qui prit
différents noms : le « Conseil d’État pour la Restauration
de la Loi et de l’ordre » sous le général Ne Win
de 1962 à 1988, changé en 1997 en « Conseil d’État
pour la paix et le développement ». En 2010, le pays a
entamé son ouverture et sa transition démocratique, sous
le regard attentif des observateurs internationaux étatiques
et des non-gouvernementaux.
Avec l’organisation du premier scrutin pluraliste depuis
deux décennies, les élections de 2010 constituent
la première étape de la transition démocratique.
Lors des précédentes élections de 1990, après la victoire
du LND (Ligue Nationale pour la Démocratie), le parti
de la figure emblématique de la transition démocratique
du pays et prix Nobel de la paix en 1991, Madame Aung
San Suu Kyi, qui avait alors rassemblé 80 % des voix, avait
finalement été destitué par la junte militaire114.
Toutefois, les élections de 2010 ont été critiquées à bien
des égards par l’Union Européenne et les États-Unis,
et furent boycottées par le LND115 qui accusait la junte
militaire de s’immiscer dans ces élections aux lois
électorales jugées contraignantes, durant lesquelles
les observateurs internationaux et les journalistes (qui
n’avaient pas le droit d’approcher les bureaux de vote à
moins de cinquante mètres) étaient tenus à l’écart.
Le nouveau président réformateur, et ancien général,
Thein Sein a multiplié les signes d’ouvertures depuis
113- Cette note vient actualiser l’Etude trimestrielle de 2014 sur
la Birmanie : Louis Borer, « L’armée et les réformes politiques
au Myanmar », Étude trimestrielle, Observatoire Asie du Sud-est,
n°5/8, cycle 2013-2014, juillet 2014.
114- Oren Samet, « Myanmar Elections: Incumbency May Thwart
Opposition Victory », The Diplomat, 7 janvier 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/myanmar-elections-incumbency-maythwart-opposition-victory/ (consulté en mai 2015).
115- « Myanmar. Les Birmans en quête de changement », Courrier
International, 10 novembre 2010, http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2010/11/10/les-birmans-en-quete-de-changement
(consulté en mai 2015).
son investiture, s’attirant les premières faveurs
de la communauté internationale. De nombreuses
réformes sont lancées : libération d’opposants
politiques, discussion avec les partis d’opposition, et
une volonté affichée de mettre un terme à soixante ans
de conflits internes au pays entre les minorités ethniques
et les groupes armés qui divisent le Myanmar
depuis son indépendance en 1948, ce qui en fait le conflit
interne le plus long de l’histoire contemporaine.
Les élections législatives partielles116 du 1er avril 2012
ont été jugées globalement acceptables et encourageantes.
Avec un gouvernement composé en majorité de civils
depuis mars 2011, le pays connaît avec ces élections
le grand retour du LND qui obtient la majorité des sièges
au Parlement. Aung San Suu Kyi acquiert ainsi son premier
mandat de député.
A l’approche des élections de 2015, les défis restent
de taille, dans un contexte où le dialogue avec l’opposition
et les rebelles reste délicat, et avec la nécessité de concilier
réformateurs et conservateurs, ainsi que les responsables
militaires. Les libertés publiques et de la presse restent
limitées, le pouvoir judiciaire n’est toujours pas indépendant,
et les indices de corruptions de Transparency International
classent le Myanmar au 156ème rang sur 175 pays.
1. Perspective des élections de novembre 2015117
Les élections qui se tiendront fin octobre
début novembre 2015118 opposeront principalement
le parti de Thein Sein l’USDP (Union Solidarity and
Development Party), actuellement au pouvoir, et le LND
de Aung San Suu Kyi. Si cette dernière est placée favorite
dans les sondages, l’article 59F de l’actuelle constitution
lui interdit légalement d’accéder au poste de présidente.
La raison invoquée dans cet article calibré à son intention,
est l’interdiction d’exercer une haute fonction d’État si
l’époux ou les enfants du candidat sont étrangers, ce qui
est le cas d’Aung San Suu Kyi, dont le défunt mari est
d’origine britannique.
Malgré des discussions engagées sur la réforme
de la constitution, notamment sur l’article 59F, le LND
n’a pas d’autres candidatures évidentes dans ses rangs
susceptibles de représenter le parti, d’autant plus que
l’état de santé de madame Aung San Suu Kyi, 69 ans,
reste fragile119.
Dans ces conditions, selon l’analyste Bertil Lintner, le
LND n’aurait pas plus de 25 % de chances de remporter
116- Bruno Phillip, « En Birmanie, le parti d’Aung San Suu Kyi
triomphe aux législatives partielles », Le Monde, 2 avril 2012,
http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2012/04/02/en-birmanie-le-parti-d-aung-san-suu-kyi-triomphe-aux-legislatives-partielles_1678954_3216.html#961lqBF0c9JVJ3v9.99 (consulté en
mai 2015).
117- Sur ce thème, voir supra : l’article du professeur Robert Taylor.
118- « Myanmar’s Electoral Landscape », International Crisis
Group, Asia Report, n°266, 28 avril 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.
org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/266myanmar-s-electoral-landscape.pdf (consulté en mai 2015).
119- « Aung San Suu Kyi doctor fears for her health after illness on
Europe tour », The Gardian, 15 juin 2012, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2012/jun/15/aung-san-suu-kyi-illness (consulté en mai
2015).
26
les élections, malgré sa nette avance dans les sondages
et au Parlement. De plus, en dépit de l’invitation
d’observateurs extérieurs120 tels que l’Union Européenne
et l’United States Carter Center, censés valider
le bon déroulement des élections, la Commission qui
encadre les élections reste proche du gouvernement.
Le contexte sécuritaire intérieur va également peser
de manière significative, notamment sur la question
de l’accessibilité aux bureaux de vote qui doit être
harmonisée et sécurisée sur l’ensemble du territoire.
Les minorités sont particulièrement concernées,
avec certains groupes ethniques encore marginalisés,
dont la communauté musulmane qui pâtit d’un
sentiment antimusulman virulent dans certaines régions
comme l’État de Rakhine, où leurs documents de vote
ont été supprimés. Une large participation permettrait
pourtant de légitimer le nouveau gouvernement,
qui serait alors en meilleur position pour stabiliser
les
cessez-le-feu
entre
les
groupes
armés
et le gouvernement (cf. infra).
Illustrant la complexité de la grille électorale nationale,
chacun des 16 principaux groupes ethniques (sur un total
de 63 recensées en décembre 2013) a un représentant
politique121, et sont regroupés au sein du Federal Union
Party122, parti reconnu par le gouvernement, et qui vient
s’ajouter au LND et à l’USDP. Le Federal Union Party
est quant à lui naturellement enclin à une construction
politique fédérale du Myanmar et une égalité des droits
entre les ethnies, et représente potentiellement 40 %
des électeurs.
Quel que soit le parti vainqueur, le dialogue entre
les partis123, le rôle de l’armée dans la gouvernance
du pays, l’égalité avec les musulmans, la révision
de la constitution, et la poursuite des réformes engagées
en 2011 (qui connaissent sinon une période de régression
depuis fin 2012-début 2013, au moins une stagnation)
resteront les principaux objectifs politiques à traiter.
2. Des élections tributaires de la situation sécuritaire
interne
Les rébellions et conflits armés internes, ainsi que la crise
des migrants Rohingyas font partie des défis majeurs
auxquels le Myanmar doit faire face à l’horizon des
élections de 2015.
120- Aung Hla Tun, « Myanmar to invite Western observers for
general election », Reuters, 24 mars 2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/03/24/us-myanmar-election-iduskbn0mk0cl20150324
(consulté en mai 2015).
121- Paul Keenan, « Ethnic Political Alliances », Burma Center
for Ethnic Studies, Briefing Paper No 18, Octobre 2013, http://
www.burmalibrary.org/docs16/BCES-BP-18-Ethnic_Political_Alliances-en.pdf (consulté en mai 2015).
122- Lawi weng, « Burma Govt Approves Federal Union Party »,
The Irrawaddy, 30 octobre 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/politics/burma-govt-approves-federal-union-party.html (consulté en
mai 2015).
123- Sur ce point, un dialogue six parties a été instauré entre le
président Thein Sein, Ang San Suu Kyi et d’autres personnalités
tels que le chef de l’armée birmane, la Tatmadaw, le général Ming
Aung Hlaingn ou Aye Maung, le président du Rakhine National
Party.
La plupart des accords de cessez-le-feu signés
en 2011 sont bilatéraux, et de nombreux doutes persistent
quant au respect de ces accords entre les groupes
qui se sont assis à la table des négociations en mars 2015
dans le cadre du nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA124),
entre l’Union Peace-Making Work Committee (UPWC)
gouvernemental et les groupes armées regroupés au sein
du Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT)125,
qui travaille depuis 2013 sur ce dossier.
Les dernières actions de la Tatmadaw, qui est en première
ligne dans cette guerre interne depuis sa création
(faisant de l’armée birmane l’une des plus aguerries
et expérimentées d’Asie du Sud-est dans les opérations
contre insurrectionnelles en milieu tropical) remettent
en cause ce fragile équilibre.
Lundi 9 février 2015, des combats opposant l’Armée
de l’Alliance Nationale Démocratique du Myanmar
(MNDAA) et la Tatmadaw ont eu lieu dans la région
de Kokang, dans l’État de Shan, une zone frontalière avec
la Chine riche en jade (raison pour laquelle les rebelles
et le gouvernement cherchent à contrôler la région).
L’objectif militaire était notamment de reprendre le contrôle
du chef-lieu de la région de Kokang, la ville de Laukkai,
et le dégagement des routes parsemées de mines
et de barricades dans la zone de San Ta Aik Shan126.
Selon certains médias, le chef rebelle Pheung Kya Shin
aurait initié la reprise des affrontements127, qui auraient
fait 126 morts et 359 blessés dans les rangs de la
Kokang Ethnic Army et 16 morts et 110 blessés dans
l’armée régulière birmane (mais les chiffres varient selon
les sources), ainsi que de nombreux véhicules détruits.
90 000 personnes auraient pris la fuite vers la Chine.
Selon le général Mya Tun Oo128, la proximité de la Chine
aurait permis à certains mercenaires chinois de grossir
les rangs des rebelles via le Yunnan, ou d’agir de façon
indirecte pour eux par des formations ou du soutien
logistique.
124- « Draft nationwide ceasefire deal signed in Myanmar », Xinhua,
31 mars 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-03/31/
content_19964357.htm (consulté en avril 2015)
- Liste des membres et des rencontres: « Nationwide Ceasefire
Coordination Team », Myanmar Peace Monitor, http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/192-ncct
(consulté en mai 2015).
125- Kyaw San Wai, « Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement: Second Chance at Peace? », RSIS Commentaries, CO14175,
8 septembre 2014, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/
co14175-myanmars-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-secondchance-at-peace/#.VVZ-Afmqqkp (consulté en mai 2015).
126- « Myanmar : 126 soldats tués dans le combat avec l’armée
Kokang », french.xinhuanet.com, 19 avril 2015, http://french.xinhuanet.com/monde/2015-04/19/c_134163447.htm (consulté en
mai 2015).
127- « La reprise brutale du conflit de Kokang décrédibilise
de nouveau la volonté du gouvernement de parvenir à des accords
de paix au niveau national », Info Birmanie, 19 février 2015,
http://www.info-birmanie.org/la-reprise-brutale-du-conflit-de-kokang-decredibilise-de-nouveau-la-volonte-du-gouvernement-deparvenir-a-des-accords-de-paix-au-niveau-national/ (consulté en
mai 2015).
128- Nirmal Ghosh, « Myanmar army says rebels using China
mercenaries », The Straits Times, 23 février 2015, http://www.
asianewsnet.net/Myanmar-army-says-rebels-using-China-mercenaries-71995.html (consulté en mai 2015).
27
Dans le Nord-est, le doute persiste avec la Kachin
Independant Organisation129 et sa branche armée
KIA, créée en 1961 et forte de 100 000 hommes.
La trêve conclue entre 1980 et 1993 a permis
à l’organisation de se renforcer sur le plan politique
et militaire. Le gouvernement tentait de faire pression
sur la KIA dans l’objectif d’intégrer ses forces au sein
du corps de garde-frontières, les Border Guard Forces.
Les négociations houleuses ont entrainé une escalade
des tensions jusqu’en 2010, soldées par une reprise
des combats en 2011, concentrés autour de la ville
de Sang Gang, dans l’État du Kachin.
Ces affrontements ont entrainé la suspension partielle
des négociations fin 2014130 entre la Tatmadaw et les chefs
de groupes ethniques. Lors des dernières discussions,
le chef des négociations du gouvernement (Aung Min),
le ministre des Affaires frontalières (le général Htet
Naing Win), et le ministre de l’Immigration (Khin Ye),
étaient présents au Myanmar Peace Center (MPC)
de Rangoon, mais pas les dirigeants militaires de l’armée
régulière. Plusieurs membres du NCCT manquaient
également à l’appel131, dont l’influent général Gun Maw
(KIA), et Tar Aik Bong, le leader des Ta’ang National
Liberation Army (TNLA).
3. La crise des Rohingyas
L’ASEAN et l’Europe traversent toutes deux une crise
humanitaire maritime, avec d’une part les Rohingyas
dans la mer d’Andaman, qui partent du Myanmar
et dans une moindre mesure du Bangladesh dans l’objectif
de rejoindre la Malaisie et l’Indonésie, et d’autre part,
des migrants Syriens, Erythréens, Libyens, qui tentent de
rejoindre l’Europe via l’Italie ou la Grèce.
En Méditerranée, l’Europe a déployé des moyens (jugés
largement en-deçà des réels besoins que requiert
une telle crise) dans le cadre de l’opération Mare Nostrum
(Italie) relayée par l’opération Triton (issue du programme
européen FRONTEX). Avec la crise des Rohingyas,
les États de l’ASEAN132 se trouvent dans une situation
assez similaire, nécessitant une réponse rapide
et pour laquelle chaque État répond encore de manière
indépendante, sans coordination régionale sur le plan
politique ou opérationnel.
Localisés dans l’État d’Arakan, les Rohingyas représentent
près 50 % de la population de cette région et comptent
entre 800 000 et un million d’individus. Ce groupe
ethnique d’obédience musulmane est considéré par l’ONU
comme l’un des plus persécutés au monde. Effectivement,
129- Matthew Henman, IHS Jane’s World Insurgency& Terrorism,
Vol. 39, 2014, p. 405-445.
130- Lawi Weng, « Top Ethnic Leaders, Burma Army Reps Absent
From Ceasefire Talks », The Irrawaddy, 22 décembre 2014, http://
www.irrawaddy.org/burma/top-ethnic-leaders-burma-army-repsabsent-ceasefire-talks.html (consulté en mai 2015).
131- Tin Aung Khine et Thiha Tun, « Sixteen Myanmar Army
Soldiers Die in Battle with Kokang Insurgents », Radio Free Asia,
16 avril 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/sixteensoldiers-die-in-battle-with-kokang-insurgents-04162015165049.
html (consulté en mai 2015).
132- Luke Hunt, « ASEAN’s Refugee Embarrassment »,
The Diplomat, 15 mai 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/
aseans-refugee-embarassment/ (consulté 15 mai 2015).
ces derniers sont exposés à des discriminations
récurrentes, voire structurelles au Myanmar, et n’ont
toujours pas été naturalisés depuis l’ancienne junte.
Ils sont donc considérés comme des immigrés illégaux
bangladais sur le territoire, et sont traités comme tels,
ou au mieux comme des citoyens de seconde classe
par la plupart des birmans. Illégitimes au regard
des citoyens birmans et des extrémistes bouddhistes,
ils sont à l’origine de tensions qui sont vite apparues
autour des questions cadastrales, et l’accès à la plupart
des services de base (nourriture, éducation, santé…)
leur est limité, auxquelles s’ajoutent des restrictions
à la mobilité, de possibilités de travail, jusqu’au droit au
mariage, pour lequel ils doivent effectuer une demande
spécifique.
Face à cette situation, les Rohingyas tentent de fuir
massivement, créant une crise humanitaire régionale
tant sur le plan maritime que continental. Selon le HCR,
50 000 personnes ont pris la fuite entre janvier
et novembre 2014, soit une hausse de 15 % par rapport
à 2013, représentant un flux d’immigrés particulièrement
vulnérables d’environ 7 000 personnes par mois.
Depuis plusieurs semaines, c’est en mer que se concentrent
les principaux problèmes. Environ 5 000 migrants seraient
entassés sur quelques vétustes chalutiers parsemés
dans la mer d’Andaman, avec l’objectif de rejoindre
la Malaisie ou l’Indonésie. Malheureusement, Bangkok,
Jakarta et Kuala Lumpur ont refusé d’accueillir ce flux
de migrants. Ces chalutiers chargés d’apatrides dérivent
sur la mer des Andaman depuis presque deux mois dans
des conditions sanitaires et sécuritaires critiques. En
pleine saison chaude, les températures atteignent jusqu’à
55 degrés, et les migrants viennent à manquer d’eau
et de nourriture. Ceux qui ont succombé ont été jetés
à la mer. De violentes rixes ont éclatés entre les migrants
Rohingyas et Bangladais sur les navires, concernant
le partage des vivres.
En attendant de trouver une solution plus durable,
certaines initiatives étatiques ou privées ont
été prises par les États riverains, ou plus éloignés.
Les pêcheurs indonésiens d’Aceh ont apporté leur soutien,
des bâtiments de garde-côtes philippins ont été envoyés
sur zone, et des hélicoptères de la Royal Thaï Air Force
ont procédés à des largages de colis en mer pour répondre
à « ses obligations humanitaires »133. Bangkok a également
déclaré son intention de mettre en place des camps dans
la province de Ranong134.
Sur terre, la situation n’est pas meilleure. Les migrants
sont exposés au trafic d’êtres humains qui se déroulent
133- « Nous leur avons refusé l’entrée dans notre pays mais
nous leur avons donné de la nourriture et de l’eau pour remplir
nos obligations humanitaires », a déclaré le général Puthichart
Ekachant, chef provincial de la police : « En mer depuis deux
mois, des migrants appellent à l’aide au large de la Thaïlande »,
Le Monde, 14 mai 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/
article/2015/05/14/des-rohingyas-en-perdition-au-large-de-la-thailande_4633576_3216.html#cdspRE2CzjP7hEm4.99 (consulté en
mai 2015).
134- « Thailand may set up camps for Rohingya migrants »,
The Straits Times, 15 mai 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/
asia/south-east-asia/story/thailand-may-set-camps-rohingya-migrants-20150515 (consulté en mai 2015).
28
le long de la frontière thaïlandaise, où les forces de polices
et l’armée thaïlandaise jouent un rôle ambigu. 50 policiers
thaïlandais ont d’ailleurs été inculpés (simple changement
d’affectation) à la suite d’affaires de trafics d’êtres humains.
Les conditions de traitement ne sont pas optimales,
avec près de 3 000 personnes enfermées dans
des centres de détention pour immigrés. Plus préoccupant
encore, un charnier a été découvert à 300 mètres
dans la frontière thaïlandaise.
La crise Rohingyas suscite une attention importante
sur le plan médiatique et international : l’Union Européenne
se mobilise135 depuis 1994 via son service d’aide
à la protection civile (ECHO), doté de 57 millions d’euros
de budget entre 2010 et 2015, de même que les ÉtatsUnis, l’ONU, l’Australie et l’ASEAN. Les principaux pays
concernés (outre le principal intéressé, le Myanmar)
– Indonésie, Malaisie, Singapour puis Thaïlande –
participent quant à eux depuis 2004 (avec Singapour),
à des patrouilles coordonnées Malacca Straits Sea
Patrols (MSSP) dans le cadre de la lutte contre la piraterie
dans le détroit de Malacca ; celles-ci se sont avérées
fructueuses. Serait-il donc envisageable d’étudier
les RETEX possibles des MSSP (détroit de Malacca) →
crise des migrants (mer d’Andaman), sur le même modèle
européen Atalante → Méditerranée ?
Face à la pression internationale et médiatique, les États
riverains, jusqu’alors réticents, se sont mis d’accord
pour mettre en place une aide humanitaire
« temporaire »136. Les ministres des Affaires étrangères
malaisiens, indonésiens et thaïlandais se sont rencontrés137
mercredi 20 mai 2015 et ont convenu d’organiser
un « sommet d’urgence138 » réunissant 15 pays
à Bangkok le 29 mai. Après moult négociations,
le Myanmar a finalement accepté d’assister au sommet,
même si Naypyidaw ne reconnaît toujours pas l’existence
officielle de cette crise139.
Selon certains analystes de l’OIM (Organisation
Internationale pour les Migrations), ce sommet serait
une coquille vide dans l’objectif de calmer les ardeurs
médiatiques et les pressions internationales.
Enfin, le manque de prise de position et le peu
d’empathie apparent d’Aung San Suu Ky à l’égard
des Rohingyas a soulevé de nombreux questionnements,
135- « La crise Rohingya », Commission européenne, aide
humanitaire et protection civile, Fiche Info ECHO, avril 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/rohingya_
fr.pdf (consulté en mai 2015).
136- « Malaysia, Indonesia agree to offer temporary shelter to
7,000 migrants », Asia News Network, 20 mai 2015, http://www.
asianewsnet.net/REFUGEE-CRISIS-Malaysia-Indonesia-agree-tooffer-t-75333.html (consulté en mai 2015).
137- « Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand to meet on boatpeople
crisis », Channel News Asia, 20 mai 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/malaysia-indonesia-and/1858468.html
(consulté en mai 2015).
138- Bruno Philip, « Des centaines de migrants à la dérive dans
la nouvelle « Méditerranée d’Asie » », Le Monde, 15 mai 2015,
http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2015/05/15/des-centaines-de-migrants-a-la-derive-dans-la-nouvelle-mediterranee-dasie_4634063_3216.html (consulté en mai 2015).
139- « PM: Myanmar can’t be forced », The Nation, 16 mai 2015,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/PM-Myanmar-cant-beforced-30260261.html (consulté en mai 2015).
certains membres d’ONG allant jusqu’à demander
le retrait de son prix Nobel de la paix. Dans cette crise,
Aung San Suu Kyi apparaît effectivement comme une
femme davantage soucieuse des perspectives politiques
que de ses principes humanistes. Le manque de popularité
des Rohingyas au sein de la population birmane pouvant
lui faire perdre une partie de son électorat.
La crise sécuritaire et humanitaire que traverse le Myanmar
tend donc à rendre plus opaques les perspectives
électorales et le contexte dans lequel celle-ci se dérouleront.
“Le « massacre » de Mamasapano :
Le processus de paix à Mindanao est-il en danger ?”
Par François-Xavier Bonnet : IRASEC à Bangkok.
1. Les espoirs d’une paix durable à Mindanao
2. Le « massacre » de Mamasapano
3. Le « massacre » et son impact sur l’opinion
publique
4. Le processus de paix suspendu au bon vouloir
des parlementaires
5. La commission pour la paix : dépasser
les émotions
6. L’urgence du vote de la BBL
Conclusion
L’année 2015 s’ouvrait sur un vent d’espoir. Les députés
et sénateurs philippins promettaient que leurs travaux
sur la Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) étaient prêts
de s’achever. Le vote final devait avoir lieu en mars 2015
soit un an après l’accord historique sur la Bangsamoro.
Pourtant, le 25 janvier 2015, l’opération anti-terroriste
Exodus tourne au drame avec la mort de 44 policiers
d’élite. Quels sont les impacts de ce fiasco policier
sur le processus de paix lui-même ? Quels sont
les scénarios possibles à court et moyen termes ?
1. Les espoirs d’une paix durable à Mindanao
Le 27 mars 2014, le gouvernement Philippin et le Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signaient l’accord historique
sur la Bangsamoro (CAB – Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro). Cet accord met fin à 17 années
de négociations tendues entre les deux parties,
entrecoupées d’offensives militaires (en 1998, 2000,
2003 et 2008) et d’espoirs déçus (région autonome
de la Bangsamoro Juridical Entity ou BJE, déclarée
anticonstitutionnelle en septembre 2008)140.
Cependant, le CAB, composé de quatre annexes
(transition, partage des ressources naturelles et du pouvoir,
désarmement, eaux territoriales) n’est que l’aboutissement
de la première phase du processus de paix. Le CAB
est en effet la source à partir de laquelle la Commission
140- François-Xavier Bonnet, « Philippines : Année 2014, entrée en
période préélectorale », in Abigael Pesses, François Robinne (dir.),
L’Asie du Sud-est 2015 – Bilan, enjeux et perspectives, Bangkok,
IRASEC, 2015, p. 237.
29
de transition de la Bangsamoro a élaboré la loi
fondamentale de la Bangsamoro (BBL – Bangsamoro
Basic Law). Cette « Constitution » de la Bangsamoro
fut transmise, le 10 septembre 2014, après
de nombreux mois de retard, au Parlement et au Sénat.
Ces derniers devaient débattre, éventuellement amender,
puis voter ce texte pour le 17 mars 2015. C’est durant
cette période extrêmement sensible qu’est intervenue
la mission secrète Oplan Exodus qui visait à éliminer
deux terroristes cachés sur l’île de Mindanao.
2. Le « massacre » de Mamasapano
Le 25 janvier 2015, plus de 300 policiers des forces
spéciales (Special Action Force – SAF) participaient
à une mission secrète qui visait à capturer deux
terroristes dans la municipalité de Mamasapano (province
de Maguindanao, Mindanao). Ces deux terroristes,
le Malaysien Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan et son partenaire
local Abdul Basit Usman, faisaient l’objet d’une chasse
à l’homme depuis 2010141 et leurs têtes étaient mises à prix
à 5 millions de dollars et 1 million de dollars respectivement
par le Département de la justice américain.
Le commando parvint à neutraliser l’une des cibles,
Marwan, mais fut pris au piège par différents groupes
armés au moment de quitter les lieux. Après des heures
de combat intense, le bilan était extrêmement lourd :
44 policiers de la SAF, 18 combattants du Moro islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) et quatre civils dont un enfant
furent tués. Par ailleurs, ces combats déplaçaient
1 500 personnes et quatre écoles étaient temporairement
fermées (affectant 5 000 élèves et 124 enseignants).
3. Le « massacre » et son impact sur l’opinion
publique
– BIFF142) mais aussi des factions du MILF lui-même,
comme le 118e Base Command dirigé par le commandant
Wahid Tundok, sensées soutenir ce même processus.
Se sentant trahie par le MILF, l’opinion publique exprimait
un certain rejet du processus de paix avec le groupe
rebelle. Le sondage du Social Weather Stations (SWS)
de mars 2015143, par exemple, montre un très net
déclin de l’option « uniquement négociations pacifiques
avec le MILF » par rapport au sondage réalisé un an
auparavant au moment de la signature du CAB. Ainsi,
si en mars 2014, 62 % des personnes interrogées
étaient conscientes que seules des négociations
pacifiques étaient efficaces pour régler la question
du MILF, ce pourcentage avait chuté en mars 2015
pour atteindre 45 %144. En corollaire, l’option « offensives
militaires uniquement » passait de 9 % en 2014 à 20 %
en mars 2015. De même, l’option « panachage »
(offensives militaires et négociations selon les cas) attirait
la sympathie de 29 % des sondés en 2014 mais 35 %
en 2015. Pire, les résultats du sondage de Pulse Asia
de mars 2015 montrent que seulement 4 %
des personnes sondées sont « très favorables » au passage
de la loi sur la BBL et 17 % « favorables ». A l’inverse,
44 % des personnes sondées s’opposent «fortement»
(27 %) ou « très fortement » (16 %) à cette loi.
Cette opposition est d’autant plus inquiétante qu’elle est
la plus forte sur l’île de Mindanao, avec 62 % des personnes
sondées se déclarant hostiles à cette loi145.
Ce retournement de l’opinion publique philippine vis-à-vis
du processus de paix, qui pourrait n’être que passager
et lié à l’émotion et à la colère du moment, s’est
accompagné d’un blocage total des discussions
sur la BBL au Sénat et au Parlement.
4. Le processus de paix suspendu au bon vouloir des
parlementaires
Surnommée le « massacre de Mamasapano » par
les médias, la mort au combat des 44 policiers
de l’unité d’élite SAF, a provoqué une vague d’indignation
et une émotion considérable non seulement au sein
des sphères dirigeantes mais aussi au cœur du peuple.
L’indignation et la colère étaient d’autant plus intenses
que les groupes armés qui avaient combattu les
SAF n’étaient pas seulement des groupes opposés
au processus de paix entre le gouvernement Aquino
et le MILF (tel le Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter
A la suite du fiasco de Mamasapano, le sénateur Ferdinand
R. Marcos Jr et le député Rufus Rodriguez, tous deux
présidents des comités respectifs en charge de discuter
la loi sur la BBL, déclaraient l’arrêt total des débats tant que
la lumière n’était pas faite sur le drame. Cependant, au-delà
de la nécessaire enquête sur le fiasco et l’établissement
des responsabilités, les parlementaires prenaient en otage
le processus de paix, et justifiaient la nécessité d’amender
et d’éliminer purement et simplement certains articles.
141- Marwan est fortement soupçonné d’être à la tête du groupe
terroriste Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) membre
du groupe terroriste international Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
et d’avoir fabriqué des bombes pour les attentats réalisés de 2000
à 2015 dans la région. Usman est accusé lui aussi de nombreux
attentats sur l’île de Mindanao (il est lui-même tué le 3 mai 2015).
Entre 2010 et 2015, pas moins de dix opérations ont été réalisées pour capturer ou éliminer les deux terroristes. A chaque fois,
les deux ont reçu des informations leur permettant in extremis d’échapper à leurs poursuivants. L’opération Exodus
de Mamasapano devait donc être Top secrète, sans
coordination avec la police nationale ou l’armée. Voir par
exemple: Christina Mendez, « 10 operations hatched by PNP vs
Marwan », Philippine Star, 10 février 2015, http://www.philstar.
com/headlines/2015/02/10/1422125/10-operations-hatched-pnpvs-marwan.
142- Le BIFF est issu d’une scission avec le MILF. Il refuse tout
processus de paix avec le gouvernement qui n’aboutirait pas à l’indépendance de Mindanao. C’est le BIFF qui a protégé Marwan et
Usman depuis environ deux ans. Le commandant Kato, chef du
BIFF, est mort le 14 avril 2015.
143- Social Weather Survey, “Filipinos prefer peaceful means in
dealing with the MILF, even while being less satisfied with the administration in peace efforts”, First Quarter 2015 Social Weather
Survey – SWS Special Report, 3 mai 2015, www.sws.org.ph.
144- Il s’agit presque du pourcentage le plus bas depuis que le SWS
sonde l’opinion publique sur cette question c’est-à-dire depuis
1999. En juin 2003, seulement 38 % des sondés étaient en faveur
de négociations uniquement (ce sondage coïncidait avec de vastes
opérations militaires).
145- Andreo Calonzo, “44% of Pinoys oppose passage of BBL
– Pulse Asia, GMA” Network, 19 mars 2015, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/455097/news/nation/44-of-pinoys-oppose-passage-of-bbl-pulse-asia.
30
Ainsi, sur 221 sections formant la BBL, 60 seraient
marquées pour amendement ou élimination, les autres
seraient acceptées146. Sur les 60 sections en jeux,
au moins huit d’entre elles devraient disparaitre dont cinq
qui limitent l’indépendance d’institutions (Commission
of Audit et Commission of Elections), deux qui affectent
les opérations militaires et policières dans la future
région et une qui autorise l’agrandissement de la future
région sans limite dans le temps147. Au total, entre
les 52 amendements et les huit délétions, la nouvelle région
Bangsamoro pourrait avoir une autonomie plus faible
que celle de l’actuelle région autonome (Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao – ARMM).
5. La commission pour la paix : dépasser les
émotions
Face au blocage institutionnel et à l’urgence de poursuivre
le processus de paix, le président Aquino invitait
cinq personnalités hautement respectées de la société
civile afin de créer une commission chargée d’étudier
en profondeur la BBL et d’aider à clarifier les zones
d’ombre148. Après la consultation de 136 personnalités
d’horizons divers, la commission concluait que : « D’une
manière générale, nous reconnaissons que la BBL est
très largement acceptable et devrait avoir le soutien
de tous les Philippins. Sur les quelques sections
qui ont besoin d’être peaufinées, nous offrons
des recommandations149 ».
Au total, la commission se concentrait sur les 20
sections les plus litigieuses, considérées par le parlement
comme anticonstitutionnelles, contraires aux lois existantes
et inacceptables. Sur ces 20 sections, une seule était
recommandée pour délétion par la commission (section
sur l’extension sans limite dans le temps de la région).
Les 19 autres devraient être soit légèrement amendées
soit peaufinées150.
6. L’urgence du vote de la BBL
Les retards accumulés notamment par les blocages
des travaux parlementaires (fin janvier à mi-avril) ont
réduit considérablement la période dite de « transition »
c’est-à-dire l’établissement d’un gouvernement provisoire
dirigé par le MILF. Cette période, à l’origine de deux ans,
devrait s’étendre jusqu’en mai 2016 et faire coïncider
l’élection présidentielle avec la première élection
de la Bangsamoro.
146- Gilles Cabacungan, “Committee vote on BBLbegins Monday
in House”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 mai 2015, http://newsinfo.
inquirer.net/690512/committee-vote-on-bbl-begins-monday-inhouse.
147- Jess Diaz, “P-Noy: House panel to pass BBL this week”,
Philippine Star, 11 mai 2015, http://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2015/05/11/1453453/p-noy-house-panel-pass-bbl-week.
148- Les cinq membres étaient : Cardinal Luis Tagle (évêque de
Manille), Hilario Davide Jr (ancien président de la Cour suprême et
l’un des artisans de la constitution de 1987), Howard Dee (ancien
ambassadeur au Vatican), Jaime Zobel-Ayala II (président d’Ayala
Corporation) et Bai Rohaniza Sumnad-Usman (fondatrice d’ONG
telles Teach Peace).
149- Citizen’s Peace Council, Report of the Peace Council on the
Bangsamoro Basic Law, 27 avril 2015, p. 4, http://www.opapp.gov.
ph/sites/default/files/peace-council-report-bbl.pdf.
150- Patricio Diaz, BBL: Citizen’s Peace Council tells Congress,
5 mai 2015, http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/05/05/
comment-bbl-citizens-peace-council-tells-congress/.
Le scénario le plus optimiste considère que la loi sur la
BBL pourrait être votée en séance plénière avant le 11 juin,
permettant ainsi à la Commission des élections (Comelec)
de préparer le referendum prévu pour septembre.
Dans ce cas de figure, le gouvernement provisoire pourrait
s’installer à la fin 2015. Le second scénario, le plus réaliste
mais aussi le plus risqué, prend en compte le fait que si
le parlement passe à temps sa version de la loi, tout semble
indiquer que le sénateur Marcos et son comité « trainent
des pieds » et fassent tout pour ralentir le processus.
Les visites des sénateurs dans les provinces affectées
par la BBL devraient se poursuivre jusqu’à la fin mai.
Or, si le texte n’est pas définitivement adopté
par les deux chambres avant le 11 juin, il est peu probable
qu’un référendum puisse se tenir avant la fin de l’année
2015. En effet, le parlement arrête ses travaux du 11 juin
au 26 juillet d’une part, d’autre part la Comelec a besoin
d’au moins trois mois pour organiser le referendum.
Ainsi, l’organisation du referendum pourrait interférer
avec l’organisation des élections présidentielles
(les candidats doivent s’inscrire au plus tard en octobre
2015) et être politisé. Par ailleurs, le MILF accepterat-il de siéger dans un gouvernement provisoire de
quelques mois ? L’hypothèse la plus vraisemblable est
que le MILF demande l’extension de la période de transition
de la Bangsamoro. Un ancien chef des négociateurs
du gouvernement, Jesus Dureza proposait que cette
extension corresponde aux élections locales de 2019151.
Cependant, au-delà de ces questions cruciales
de calendrier, le processus de paix est encore vulnérable.
De fait, le flou réside quant aux modifications
du texte de la BBL. Pour la commission pour la paix,
les législateurs doivent avoir une interprétation libérale
de la constitution et prendre en compte les particularismes
historiques, politiques etc. de la Bangsamoro.
Le sénateur Marcos et le député Rodriguez insistent
à l’inverse sur l’inconstitutionnalité de certains articles.
Quelle interprétation prévaudra à l’issu du vote final ?
Le MILF acceptera-t-il une version galvaudée de la BBL ?
Par ailleurs, les forces armées opposées au processus
de paix sont nombreuses et actives (BIFF et Abu
Sayyaf par exemple) et l’on voit émerger des leaders
locaux du MILF dont la loyauté au mouvement est floue
ou à géométrie variable. Le commandant Wahid Tundok,
par exemple, respecté par plus de 3 600 guérilleros et chef
du 118e Base Command est, bien que membre du MILF,
plus proche des leaders du BIFF (par les liens familiaux)
que de son voisin le commandant Zacaria Goma, chef
du MILF 105e Base Command. Entre les deux
commandants du MILF il existe une guerre de clan ou
rido, rendant les deux hommes volatiles. Le succès
de la Bangsamoro passera donc nécessairement
par le soutien actif de puissants chefs locaux tels Tundok
et Goma.
Enfin, la nouvelle Bangsamoro devra nécessairement
intégrer le Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),
le mouvement historique de la lutte moro dirigé par Nur
151- Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Dureza: extend Bangsamoro transition
period to 2019”, Mindanews, 15 septembre 2014, http://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2014/09/15/dureza-extend-bangsamoro-transition-period-to-2019/.
31
Misuari. Le MNLF, seul mouvement moro à être reconnu
par l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique (OCI),
avait signé le premier accord de paix en 1996 avec
le gouvernement Ramos. Misuari refuse de reconnaître
le processus de paix entre le gouvernement et le MILF
et demande une révision des accords de 1996. Or,
lors d’une visite du sénateur Marcos à Jolo le 13 mai 2015,
des représentants de plusieurs factions du MNLF ainsi
que plusieurs politiciens locaux menaçaient de voter
« non » lors du referendum sur la Bangsamoro, amputant
celle-ci de Sulu, Tawi-Tawi et Basilan152. Menaces
en l’air ? Rien n’est moins sûr car l’essentiel des forces
u MNLF sont sur ces trois îles (ethnies tausug et samal).
Que deviendrait la Bangsamoro sans le territoire historique
du sultanat de Sulu ?
Conclusion
Les événements violents de Mamasapano ont cassé
la formidable dynamique de paix impulsée par
l’administration Aquino et le MILF depuis 2011-12.
La lutte anti-terroriste peut, à tout moment, faire déraper
les négociations et le processus de paix si elle est mal
gérée. Ces dérapages permettent aux stéréotypes
anti-musulmans d’émerger (« les musulmans sont des
fourbes » etc.) et de légitimer l’élimination d’articles
jugés « inacceptables ». La détermination sans faille
du président Aquino d’aboutir à la Bangsamoro,
permet de contrebalancer le camp des sceptiques.
Une interprétation libérale de la constitution, telle que
prônée par la commission prévaudra-t-elle au Congrès?
Passé l’obstacle parlementaire, le gouvernement
et le MILF devront lancer une campagne de sensibilisation
dans tous les villages de la Bangsamoro afin, notamment,
de convaincre les habitants de Sulu, Tawi-Tawi
et Basilan de voter « oui » au referendum. L’essentiel
du processus doit être réalisé avant mai 2016 et irrémédiable,
alors que la volonté politique est encore puissante.
152- Angela Casauay, “MNLF, sultans want out of Bangsamoro”,
Rappler, 13 mai 2015, http://www.rappler.com/nation/93115-mnlfsulu-sultanate-oppose-bangsamoro.
32