Revue Concurrences

Concurrences
Revue des droits de la concurrence
Competition Law Journal
UNCTAD’s collaborative information
platform
Horizons l Concurrences N° 4-2012 – pp. 204-207
Ariel Ezrachi
[email protected]
l Director, University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy
Hassan Qaqaya
[email protected]
l Head, UNCTAD Competition and Consumer Policies Branch
Horizons
Ariel ezraChI
[email protected]
Director, University of Oxford Centre
for Competition Law and Policy
UNCTAD’s collaborative
information platform
Hassan qaqaya
[email protected]
Head, UNCTAD Competition
and Consumer Policies Branch
Abstract
U
NCTAD has launched an initiative dedicated
to information exchange between competition agencies,
as part of its ongoing work on capacity building and
international cooperation. The new information platform
will facilitate exchange of non-confidential information and
serve, in particular, to enhance and aggregate the enforcement
capacity of young and developing competition regimes.
L
a CNUCED a lancé une initiative sur les échanges
d’informations entre autorités de concurrence dans le cadre
de ses travaux sur le renforcement des capacités des autorités
et la coopération internationale. Une nouvelle plateforme
facilitera les échanges d’informations non confidentielles et
permettra notamment de renforcer et de combiner les capacités
des régimes de concurrence en voie de développement.
I. Introduction
1. The application of competition law in an international setting has long been a
challenging area for competition agencies. Legal and practical obstacles often limit
an agency’s ability to obtain information on multinational violations and engage in
effective enforcement and prosecution.
2. These limitations have been particularly noticeable in the case of developing
countries and economies in transition. These regimes are characterised by limited
enforcement capacity and tend to focus their attention on domestic violators and
on efforts to foster a “competition culture”. The challenge of tackling sophisticated
cross-border anticompetitive activity and the imposition of effective sanctions on
international violators may be beyond their reach.
3. Unfortunately, the limited enforcement capacity of these regimes often results
in an increased and disproportionate exposure to multinational anticompetitive
activity. This exposure is particularly harmful given the ever growing level of crossborder trade. Indeed, in many instances, unless the cross-border activity is challenged
by other, more powerful jurisdictions, developing economies and economies in
transition remain exposed to negative transfer of wealth.1
4. This reality serves as a powerful incentive for these regimes to enhance their
enforcement capacity in order to effectively tackle cross-border infringements.
To facilitate these efforts, UNCTAD has recently launched a new initiative that will
foster transparent information flow and collaboration between competition agencies.
This initiative – known as the Collaborative Information Platform – forms part of
UNCTAD’s on-going work on international cooperation and enforcement.
II. Capacity-building and technical cooperation
5. The obstacles which undermine effective domestic and extraterritorial
enforcement by developing and young competition regimes, have been at the focus
of work conducted by UNCTAD.2 The aim of these ongoing efforts has been to
enhance the effectiveness of competition regimes’ dealing with domestic and
transnational violators, through building capacity and fostering competition cultures
in the domestic markets.
6. Particularly noteworthy in this context are the Set of Principles and Rules
on Competition, (“the Set”) which outlines UNCTAD’s mandate in promoting
competition. In line with the Set, UNCTAD has been deeply involved in enhancing
developing countries’ awareness of the adverse effects upon their markets of anticompetitive practices; in providing technical assistance for the adoption, reform,
or better implementation of competition laws and policies; and in promoting
1
Theabilitytorideonotheragencies’ enforcementeffortsoftendependsontheanticompetitiveactivitygeneratingsimilar
harmfuleffectsinmorethanonejurisdiction.
2
SeeforexamplenotebytheUNCTADsecretariat–Cross-borderanticompetitivepractices:Thechallengesfordeveloping
countriesandeconomiesintransition(19April2012).
Concurrences N° 4-2012 I Horizons
204
A. Ezrachi & H. Qaqaya, UNCTAD’s Collaborative…
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende
(art. L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
@ See also: J. Barahona, “Competition enforcement in Chile: A necessary overview”
on concurrences.com
competition authorities concerned to seek opportunities
for cooperation in a proactive way, exploring not only
case-specific cooperation, but also more general exchange of
views on enforcement policy developments.
11. The proposal envisages two main forms of communication,
both triggered in the first stage of investigation of individual
cases. First, information sharing may follow on from a search
by one regime, which opens an investigation into certain
activity and identifies relevant past investigations by other
jurisdictions. Such use would entail the regime with past
experience, sharing more detailed information with the
enquirer. This knowledge sharing might relate to the means
used to define a market, the characteristics of a particular
industry or other similar non-confidential information.
Access to these types of information results in “case specific
capacity building” and will enhance the ability of the
enquiring jurisdiction to effectively investigate and enforce
its own competition regime.
7. Taking into account the challenges faced by young and
emerging competition regimes, and in line with the Set,
UNCTAD has recently endorsed a proposal for the creation
of a Collaborative Information Platform.5
III. The collaborative information
platform
8. The Collaborative Information Platform will see the
creation of a virtual forum for the sharing of non-confidential
information between competition agencies. It will allow
agencies to easily identify whether other jurisdictions
are investigating or have investigated similar violations
and whether they face similar challenges in dealing with
anticompetitive cross-border activity. Further, by creating
a flow of information, the framework will reduce the often
fragmented nature of enforcement by young jurisdictions,
by enabling them to join forces when dealing with activities
which give rise to joint concern.
12. Second, collaborative communication will take place
when a search reveals that jurisdictions are engaged in
similar investigations in parallel. In such instances, two- or
multi-way collaboration may reduce fragmented enforcement
and enhance agencies’ effectiveness when dealing with
sophisticated cross-border activities. Collaboration may
involve the exchange of information and discussions on
the timing of respective procedures; the delimitation of
relevant markets; the anti-competitive effects of an activity
or transactions; remedies that might be envisaged and the
avoidance of conflict between them. Even where these
agencies take different views on certain points, contacts
through the platform can enable them to understand each
other’s thinking, refine their analyses and reduce system
friction. The extent of such case-by-case communication will
be determined by the agencies on an ad-hoc basis.
9. At its base, the platform will serve as an accessible and
transparent repository of information. Each jurisdiction
will upload basic information on past cases and ongoing
public investigations on the database. Information will be
classified by company name, industry, market and the nature
of the activity – be it cartel and other unlawful agreements,
unilateral conduct, or mergers and acquisitions.
13. Beyond the direct benefits of case by case cooperation, the
collaboration between jurisdictions may enable aggregation
of the deterrent effect and coordination of remedies, as
agencies present a united front when negotiating with,
and enforcing against, large multinationals. Collaborative
communications may also enable jurisdictions to better
prioritise their enforcement and utilise their limited resources
prudently. For instance, when other jurisdictions are already
tackling the activity, the agency may decide to wait, and
later “ride” on that investigation when considering domestic
remedies.
10. When a jurisdiction is confronted by anticompetitive
activity it will be able to search the database and obtain
information on whether the alleged violator has been or
is being investigated by other jurisdictions, or whether
other jurisdictions are already engaged in work in that
industry or market. Crucially, the platform will do more
than just provide a smart search engine. Its aim is to foster
a communicative attitude between jurisdictions, even when
formal collaboration is yet to be established. It will spur the
3
In2012,forinstance,theUNCTAD’sIntergovernmentalGroupof ExpertsonCompetition
LawandPolicyheldconsultations,inter-alia,on:(a)peerreviewsof Mongolia,Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe competition laws and policies; (b) challenges in regional and
internationalcooperationincompetitioncases;(c)knowledgemanagementastoolsof agency effectiveness; and (d) competition law as a tool for combating bid-rigging and
promotingefficientuseof developmentresources.
4
The Model Law is accompanied by a periodically revised commentary which reviews
theapproachesfollowedontheseelementsunderdifferentcompetitionlaws.Notethat
theModelLawdoesnotaffectthediscretionof countriestochoosepoliciesconsidered
appropriateforthemselvesbutratherprovidesthemwithinformationthatcanhelpthem
tomakesuchchoices.
5
TheschemewasproposedinakeynotespeechbyArielEzrachiatUNCTAD’sroundtable
onCross-borderAnticompetitivePractices:TheChallengesforDevelopingCountriesand
EconomiesinTransition,12thSessionof theIntergovernmentalGroupof Expertson
CompetitionLawandPolicy(July2012).
Concurrences N° 4-2012 I Horizons
14. One of the key advantages of the proposed platform is
the relative ease with which it can be set up. In the case of
jurisdictions that already possess a clear and public online
database, that information can easily be mirrored on the
new platform. In the many other instances in which young
competition agencies do not have a clear and accessible
databank, the platform will provide an interface on which
these jurisdictions can easily upload their past and present
work. The joint database will also include information as to
contact persons in each agency, to facilitate enquiries and
communication.
205
A. Ezrachi & H. Qaqaya, UNCTAD’s Collaborative…
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende
(art. L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
better international understanding, co-operation and
“soft” convergence in this area. The Set also provides for
consultations (envisaged both within and outside UNCTAD)
and the exchange of non-confidential and confidential
information.3 In addition, as part of its strive to support
new and young competition regimes, UNCTAD publishes
a number of key documents, among them the Model Law
which is based upon the Set and provides a skeleton of the
central elements of competition law.4
20. As evidenced by an UNCTAD questionnaire prepared
for the WGTC,7 seven respondents (Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama and Peru) reported that they
were parties to 91 trade agreements containing 46 chapters,
which address cooperation on competition policy, as well as
48 inter-agency cooperation agreements. The main provisions
of these agreements cover notification of enforcement
activities affecting the other party’s important interests;
consultations to avoid or resolve conflicts between the parties’
respective laws, policies and national interests; coordinated
action in respect of anti-competitive practices occurring in
both countries; requests for assistance in investigations when
the anti-competitive conduct on the territory of the party
requested are adversely affecting the significant interests
of the requesting party; assistance, including by providing
non-confidential information and in some cases, confidential
information (subject to safeguards); and technical
cooperation. The respondents to the questionnaire indicated
that they have experience with informal cooperation, such
as sharing information on the status of an investigation
or sharing substantive theories of harm. However, while
informal cooperation has been an important way of keeping
informed of developments in competition law and policy in
other jurisdictions in the region through the exchanging of
views, the usefulness of such cooperation has been limited in
cases where an authority requires enforcement assistance in a
particular matter, or confidential information. The responses
also identified certain common obstacles to effective formal
cooperation, such as legal constraints on the exchange of
confidential information. With the exception of Chile and
Costa Rica, respondents also identified the lack of systematic
notification of cases opened by other competition agencies8.
IV. COMPAL as a pilot project
for the collaborative information
platform
16. The Collaborative Information Platform will provide
an additional layer of collaboration between competition
agencies. It will enhance current efforts to foster better
cooperation in competition law which are undertaken by the
UNCTAD, the OECD and the ICN.
17. As a cost effective opt-in platform, this initiative can
be deployed on a wide multinational scale. Still, as a first
stage, it will be implemented at the regional level as part of
UNCTAD’s activities in Latin America. The regional focus
implies common interests and concerns, and should therefore
deliver all the advantages described above. The platform
will supplement existing efforts in this region through the
Competition and Consumer Policy for Latin America
Programme (“COMPAL”).
21. The implementation of the Collaborative Information
Platform as part of COMPAL will provide COMPAL
member agencies with the regional-level infrastructure
necessary to exchange information effectively. It will elevate
current cooperation and communications by offering a more
consistent and transparent flow of information, which will
serve as a spring board for case-by-case collaboration. It will
also assist participating agencies to experiment with casespecific cooperation, while continuing to reflect on what
provisions concerning information exchange they would put
in place in order to improve the quality and effectiveness
of enforcement and decrease its cost. More generally, the
information platform will strengthen existing cross-border
relationships that have been fostered through the COMPAL
programme.
18. COMPAL was launched in April 2004 by the UNCTAD
and SECO,6 as a joint effort to foster effective competition
law and policy in Latin America. The programme initially
covered five countries and today thirteen Latin American
competition agencies are members of COMPAL. After years
of work in the region the COMPAL programme became
a concrete means for the Latin American competition
and consumer agencies to promote dialogue, consensus
building and networking among policy makers and
enforcers. COMPAL is structured around tailor-made
annual individual country programmes and a set of regional
activities. The annual meetings are held once a year in a
Latin American country with the partnership or support of
a host competition authority, or at the UNCTAD in Geneva,
Switzerland.
19. It is noteworthy that all Latin American countries
active in competition policy have entered into co-operation
agreements with one or more jurisdictions (often with those
that are geographically close or close trading partners),
with numbers of agreements comparable to those existing
among OECD Member countries. Some of the enforcement
agreements deal solely with competition law and policy while
others deal with cooperation on competition law and policy
as one element in a wider agreement.
6
SwissStateSecretariatforEconomicAffairs.
Concurrences N° 4-2012 I Horizons
206
7
Marcia Banda Garay «Coherencia Interna y Externa entre las Políticas de Comercio y
Competencia.»SELA-UNCTADWorkingGroupontheinterfacebetweenCompetition
andTrade,Lima,18-19June,2012.Availableathttp://www.unctadxi.org/templates/
DocumentList____9452.aspx
8
nother forum for the exchange of views, technical cooperation and discussion of A
competitionandtradeissues,whichwasestablishedundertheauspicesof UNCTADand
theLatinAmericanEconomicSystem(SELA)in2008,istheLatinAmericanWorking
GroupontheInterfacebetweenCompetitionandTrade(WGCT).ThisSELA-UNCTAD
co-operativeinitiativeaimstosupporttheimplementationof theprinciplesrelatingto
deeperregionalintegrationprinciplesinLatinAmericaadoptedbybothorganizations;
workhassofarfocusedonexchangeof informationandexperiencesonbestpracticesand
conceptsincooperationintheenforcementof competitionrulesandtraderelatedissues.
A. Ezrachi & H. Qaqaya, UNCTAD’s Collaborative…
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende
(art. L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
15. Not surprisingly, as in other more formal modes
of collaboration, the need to respect the confidentiality
of information remains key, and may limit the extent of
collaboration. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, the
parties may sign waivers in order to facilitate collaboration
between the competition agencies. Naturally, in the case
of unilateral infringements and cartels, parties will have
limited or no incentive to facilitate collaboration between
competition agencies. Still, even the exchange of nonconfidential information and best practices in these cases
may add value and should not be underestimated.
25. The strength of the proposed Collaborative Information
Platform lays in its simple design and operation, its cost
effectiveness and the network effects it delivers. The platform
will help pool resources and reduce fragmented enforcement.
It will support effective case-by-case investigation and
collaboration and enhance the deterrence effect exerted
by young and developing regimes. It is expected that the
collaborative “pick-up-the-phone” attitude that the platform
will foster would result in better case specific communication
between agencies. These processes, in turn, will provide
valuable back wind to a gradual process of convergence and
efforts to establish more formal means of cooperation.
23. In merger cases the platform will facilitate: (i) early
identification of whether an investigation involves parties or
evidence located outside the jurisdiction; (ii) making enquiries
as to whether the parties are filing notifications in other
jurisdictions; (iii) engaging in consultations on remedies;
(iv) assessing whether enforcement by one jurisdiction may
alleviate concerns by another, thus allowing less-resourced
agencies to benefit from enforcement elsewhere; and (v)
sharing valuable non-confidential information between
agencies on market realities and enforcement approaches. For
example, agency staff can discuss their thoughts on market
definitions, potential competitive concerns and theories of
harm, and information that they may seek from the parties.
Such informal cooperation is helpful not only with regard to
the investigation of the specific case, but may also improve
the quality and effectiveness of enforcement and decrease
its cost. When possible, agencies may seek confidentiality
waivers from the parties.
26. The first stage implementation as part of the COMPAL
framework will provide a valuable opportunity to weave
the platform into an existing collaborative framework.
Following this launch, UNCTAD intends to open the
platform to additional jurisdictions and invite competition
agencies to join the infrastructure, thus widening its scope
and effectiveness.
n
24. In the area of cartel investigations, the platform will
allow COMPAL member agencies to share information
and aggregate enforcement capabilities when dealing with
cross-border violations. In addition, the proliferation of
effective leniency programmes in most COMPAL members
will result in an increasing number of applicants considering
how to seek leniency simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions.
Enforcers would therefore need to coordinate investigative
steps, share – with the applicant’s consent – information
provided by a mutual leniency applicant, and coordinate
searches. Coordinated searches and other investigative steps
would be a major step forward in coordinated investigation
of cartels. Thus, the Collaborative Information Platform can
go some way toward eliminating safe havens for domestic as
well as international cartels.
Concurrences N° 4-2012 I Horizons
207
A. Ezrachi & H. Qaqaya, UNCTAD’s Collaborative…
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende
(art. L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
V. Concluding remarks
22. It is envisaged that the flow of information through the
platform will particularly facilitate collaboration between
COMPAL member agencies in merger cases and cartel
investigations.
Concurrences
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