vertical restraints in comparative competition law le traitement des

Transcription

vertical restraints in comparative competition law le traitement des
Vertical Restraints
in Comparative
Competition Law
Le traitement des
restrictions verticales en
droit comparé de la
concurrence
Friday 23 May 2008
at the Institute of Comparative Law of Paris
Institut de droit comparé
Co-organised by University College London and
Collège européen de Paris - Université Paris-II Panthéon Assas
University College London
supported by / avec le concours de
PROGRAMME
8h30
Registration
9h00 Introduction:
Professor Louis Vogel President, University of Paris II
Sandy Shandro Dean, Faculty of Laws, UCL / Président de la Faculté de droit, UCL [TBC]
9h20 First Roundtable:
The vertical/horizontal dichotomy and the boundaries of Article 81 EC
The session will explore the limits of the application of competition law to vertical arrangements and in
particular the case law relating to the concept of agreement under Article 81 or other national competition law
provisions, the case law on commercial agency agreements and the implications of the horizontal/vertical
dichotomy for hybrid arrangements such as hub and spoke conspiracies, dual distribution practices and
private labels
Chair: President Daniel Tricot Honorary president of the commercial, financial and economic chamber of the Cour de Cassation
Speakers:
Professor Catherine Prieto University of Paul Cezanne Aix-Marseille, CERIC
Dr. Ioannis Lianos Faculty of Laws, University College London, Centre for Law &
Governance in Europe
Commentators:
Chantal Momège Ashurst, Paris
Luc Gyselen Arnold & Porter, Brussels
11h00 Coffee/Tea Break
11h30 Second Roundtable:
Vertical restraints, parallel imports and the objective of market
integration
One of the most significant parameters that framed EC competition policy towards vertical restraints has
been the importance of market integration in Europe. The recent saga of cases on parallel imports of
pharmaceuticals brought under Articles 81 and 82 EC in national and Community courts illustrates the
difficulties of finding a balance between the different objectives of EC competition law, such as consumer
welfare and market integration. The session will explore these difficulties and the different arguments that
were advanced in this important (from a constitutional and substantive competition policy perspective) and still
ongoing debate
Chair:
Professor Robert Kovar University of Strasbourg
Speakers:
Professor Patrick Rey IDEI, University of Toulouse
Thierry Dahan French Competition Council
Commentator:
Dr. José Luis Buendia Garrigues, Brussels
Dr. Assimakis Komninos White & Case, Brussels
13h00 Lunch
14h00 Third Roundtable:
The law and economics of resale price maintenance: a comparative perspective
Since the 1911 Dr. Miles case of the Supreme Court resale price maintenance has been prohibited per se
in US antitrust law. The Supreme Court has recently overruled this almost one hundred years old precedent
in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc ( 2007) and has adopted a rule of reason approach
for resale price maintenance. In contrast, EC competition law has always considered that resale price
maintenance constitutes a hardcore restriction of competition law. The session will examine the competition
law and economics of resale price maintenance in the United States and in Europe as well as the implications
of the Leegin case of the US Supreme Court in a comparative perspective
Chair:
Dr. Philippe Nasse Vice-chairman, French Competition Council
Speakers:
Professor Eleanor Fox New York University School of Law
Luc Peeperkorn DG Competition, European Commission
Professor Anne Perrot Vice-chairman, French Competition Council
Commentator:
Dr. Jérôme Philippe Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Derringer, Paris
15h30 Coffee/Tea Break
16h00 Fourth Roundtable:
Anticompetitive foreclosure and the coherence of competition policy towards vertical restraints
Recent case law of the European Courts, the recent guidelines of the European Commission on nonhorizontal mergers, the decisional practice of the European Commission as well as that of various national
competition authorities and courts seem to focus on the possible anticompetitive foreclosure effects of vertical
relations. However, EC competition policy towards vertical relations producing anticompetitive foreclosure
effects is shaped by the specific characteristics of the competition provisions that may apply in each case
(Article 81, Article 82, merger control) and/or the classification of the vertical restraint in a specific category
type (price versus nonprice restraints, unilateral versus collusive practices or specific “antitrust” categories,
such as exclusive dealing, price squeezing, tying, rebates, predatory pricing, refusal to deal or licence etc).
The session will critically assess the coherence of EC competition policy (Article 81, Article 82 and merger
control) towards vertical relations producing an anticompetitive foreclosure effect and will examine the
arguments for or against a unified framework in dealing with foreclosure effects produced by vertical restraints.
Chair:
Frederic Jenny, President of the OECD Competition Committee, French Supreme Court
Speakers:
Dr. Kay Parplies DG Competition, European Commission
Luc Gyselen Arnold & Porter, Brussels
Commentator:
Dr. David Sevy LECG, Paris
Prof. John Kallaugher Faculty of Laws, University College London; Latham & Watkins LLP, London
Dr. Jérôme Philippe Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Derringer, Paris
18h00 Conclusion
Prof. Laurence Idot University of Paris II, Concurrences
18h30 Conference End
Conférence
8h30
Inscription
9h00 Présentation:
Louis Vogel Président de l’Université Paris II-Panthéon Assas, , Directeur de l’Institut de droit comparé
Sandy Shandro Président de la Faculté de droit, University College London [TBC]
9h20
PREMIÈRE SESSION:
Accords verticaux / Accords horizontaux: Les limites de la distinction
Président: President Daniel Tricot Président honoraire de la chambre commerciale de la Cour de Cassation
Intervenants:
Catherine Prieto Professeur, Université Paul Cézanne, Aix-Marseille, CERIC
Ioannis Lianos Co-directeur, Centre for Law and Governance in Europe, University College London
Discutants:
Chantal Momège Avocat, Ashurst, Paris
Luc Gyselen Avocat, Arnold & Porter, Brussels
11h00 Pause café
11h30 DEUXIÈME SESSION:
Importations parallèles : Comment concilier intérêt du consommateur et intégration du marché communautaire?
Président:
Robert Kovar Professeur émérite de l’Université Robert Schuman (Strasbourg), Ancien Président de l’Université
Intervenants:
Thierry Dahan Rapporteur Général, Conseil de la concurrence
Patrick Rey Professeur, Université de Toulouse, IDEI
Discutants:
José Luis Buendia Avocat, Garrigues, Brussels
Assimakis Komninos Avocat, White & Case, Brussels
13h00 Déjeuner
14h00 TROISIÈME SESSION:
Prix de reventes imposés: Quel est l’apport de l’analyse économique et du droit comparé?
Président:
Philippe Nasse Vice-Président, Conseil de la concurrence
Intervenants:
Eleanor Fox Professeur, New York University School of Law
Luc Peeperkorn DG Concurrence, Commission européenne
Anne Perrot Vice-Président, Conseil de la concurrence
Discutants:
Jérôme Philippe Avocat, Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Derringer, Paris
15h30 Pause café
16h00 QUATRIÈME SESSION:
Effet restrictif des restrictions verticales: L’approche communautaire est-elle cohérente?
Président:
Frédéric Jenny, Président du Comité de la Concurrence à l’OCDE, Conseiller à la Cour de Cassation en Service Extraordinaire
Intervenants:
Kay Parplies DG Concurrence, Commission européenne
Luc Gyselen Avocat, Arnold & Porter, Brussels
Discutants:
David Sevy Economiste, LECG, Paris
John Kallaugher Professeur, Faculty of Laws, UCL; Avocat, Latham & Watkins LLP, London
Jérôme Philippe Avocat, Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Derringer, Paris
18h00 Conclusion
Laurence Idot Professeur, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas ;
Directrice scientifique de la revue, Concurrences
18h30 Fin de la conference
One Day Conference organised by University
College London with Université Panthéon Assas,
Paris II:
Vertical restraints in comparative competition law /
Le traitement des restrictions verticales en droit comparé de la concurrence
Name 1: ........................................................................
Name 2: ........................................................................
Name 3: ........................................................................
Organisation: ................................................................
.......................................................................................
Address: .......................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
Tel: ...............................................................................
Fax: ...............................................................................
Email: ............................................................................
Registration information
Enquiries
Lisa Penfold, Events Organiser at the Law Faculty, UCL
Direct telephone: +44 (0)20 7679 1514
Direct fax: +44 (0)20 7679 1442
Email: [email protected]
www:
ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge
Postal Address
Faculty of Laws, UCL,
Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0EG
Venue Address:
Institut de droit comparé, Paris
28, rue Saint Guillaume
75007 Paris
Fees:
Standard Fee
£95
€120
Academics and Students are free of charge
Special dietary requirements: .......................................
.......................................................................................
How to Pay:
Payment of the registration should be made by cheque, either in
GBP or Euros. Cheques should be made payable to ‘UCL’.
Please register me for the Vertical Restraints in Comparative Competition Law Conference on 23 May.
Accreditation:
Each lecture is accredited with 7.5 CPD hours by the Law Society of
England & Wales. Our Law Society provider reference is IU/UCL.



Standard Fee (£95 / €120)
Academic / Student place
I enclose a cheque in the sum of
£_________ or € ____________ payable to ‘UCL’

Please invoice my firm for the registration fee
PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM TO: Lisa Penfold,
Events Office, UCL Law Faculty, Bentham House,
Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0EG
or fax it to 020 7679 1442
About UCL Law Faculty:
For more information about the Law Faculty at UCL see:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/
For more information about the work of the Centre for Law and
Governance in Europe see:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge