HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE OBSTACLES FOR

International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
4th Working Session: Building Civil Society
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE OBSTACLES FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A CIVIL OR CIVIC SOCIETY
Nancy CARDIA *
A databaseorganized for an on-going research project at the Center for the
Study of Violence (NEV) at the University of São Paulo, shows that during the 80’s
the major daily newspapers in São Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro reported at least
3.578 cases of gross human rights violations involving children, adolescents,
males and females, killed by the police, by “vigilante” groups and by lynching. The
Catholic Church watch group to monitor violence in the rural areas (Camissão
Pastoral da Terra) reported 241 cases of homicide just for the last quarter of that
decade. We are referring here to cases, not to the actual number of vivtimes. This
number is much larger, especially in the rural areas when the victims are Indians.
The database is updated daily and the numbers for the 90’s are not devreasing, on
the contrary they continue to grow. This growth suggests that somehow,
governments at local, state and federal level are not being successful in whatever
efforts they make to stop them 1.
Our concern here is with the role that these continued violations play on the
consolidation of democracy, with their effects on the attempts to strnghten
democratic traits in the society. Since the existence of interpersonal trust and of
trust in the system are considered to be basic elements for a democratic culture to
foster (Inglehart, 1988), the question we wish to explore is what kind of civil or civic
society can develop when basic warranties are not universal and much to the
contrary the prevailing feelings are of fear mistrust of the authorities and moreover
mistrust of the agencies in chargo of social control. Such violations are taking
place in a society market by deep inequalities, not only social and economic but
legal as well as political. These deep inequalities further hinder the connections
between people and lead to more isolation thus being further threat to democratic
consolidation.
The violations and the inequalities are legacies from authoritarian episodes
that seen to have become long-standing features of our society. These legacies
exist amidst many changes conducive to a democratic consolidation : enlaged
franchise, new political actors and parties, greater political competition, alternance
of political parties in power, new Constitution, new rights, lifting of censorship,
greater access to information, acceptance of political dissidence, active nongovernmental organizations. Nevertheless the decision-making process, the
distribution of power within the country and within society remain in the hands of
few. Moreover the paradox presented by the simultaneous experience of some
features of a democracy mingled with authoritarian ones do not seem to provoke ill
feelings inmost citizens. It a minority who are troubled by such legacies. Why is
* Nucleo de Estudos da Violência - Université de São Paulo.
1 Since it is generally agreed as pointed by Pinheiro (1995) that it is no longer a policy of governments in
Brazil to sponsor these violations but that its responsability lies omitting from investigating and
punishing.
International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
there so little public demand for change when information about authoritarian
practices that put democracy as risk are broadly available ? It is fear ? Is it
acquiescence ? Is it sheer ignorance about the risk that they represent ? Or is it
that democracy is not highly valued ? What is the impacts of this paradox on
participation in collective action ?
In order to tentalively answer some of these questions an exploratory research
was carried out by the NEV focusing on beliets, values, attitudes, perceptions that
are widespreadly held concerning gross human rights searching for their
connections to rights and duties of citizens to economic, political beliefs and
values and to moral and ethical issues and finally to their concept of democracy.
The voluminous data 1 was analysed with respondents grouped according with
their social economic class, or their condition as law enforcement officers or yet in
terms of their role in influencing public opinion. Another analysis was performed
grouping the respondents according with their position in relation to gross human
rights violations. Their responses to a series of 38 rights and protections used by
the United Nations Development Program to rate countries in terms of political
freedoms and eight different questions concerning human rights were used to
develop a continuum of authorirarism : reaction to death penalty, to the use of
torture by the police, to police carrying raids without a court warrant, to police using
violenc against an unarmed suspect, to police shooting an unarmed suspect (to
police shooting an armed suspect), to court accepting evidence obtained through
torture and to leaders being “tough” on their followers.
Respondents who did not consider important the existence of rights and
protections and who agreed with the use of torture by police and with most of the
other situations were classified as authoritarians (23 %), those who agreed with at
least four topics including the use of torture were grouped as medium
authoritarians (15 %). Light authoritarians are those who do not approve of torture
or the death penalty but who accept other acts of violence by the police (17 %) and
non-authoritarians disagree with all questions (44 %).
We have discovered that possible the little outcry against the continued gross
human rights violations and with the inequalities derives from the fact that, to some
groups in the Brazilian society, these issues are not a threat to democracy. For the
more authoritarian groupsthere is litle doubt that Brazil is a consolidated
democracy, whereas as we move down our continuum the closer we come to the
authoritarians the less certainty there is that such consolidation has taken place 2.
1 The research took place in São Paulo, data was collected from 52 respondents interviewed through a period of over a year with intervanls between contacts. The
interviews totaled almost 300 hours of taped material, plus self -complexion parts.
2 We did not find differences between the respondents in terms of their economic and political values.
Authoritarians and non-authoritarians : value free entreprise ; ascribe a limited role to the state in the
economy ; disagree with any measure to correct inequalities that targer a specific group, such as
affirmative action ; highly believe in individual merit in competence and the possibility of expressing one’s
abilities, these beliefs seem to be not affected by their views on social mobility. Paradoxically the nonauthoritarians group, the most concerned one with inequality and the one that less believes in social
mobility does not approve of any affirmative action and defends that opportunities must be assured for all
citizens. This believe indicates the strength of the merit myth which seems to resit reality checks. We also
did not find differences between the groups in privatevalues, the majority can be described as quite liberal
in terms of their morals accept sex outside marriage, the right of women to carry out abortions, women’s
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
Brazil is a democracy to the authoritarians because their definition of
democracy is limited to freedom of speech and of economic enterprise. Equality of
rights, accountability by the government, control over governement, over the
actions of their representatives are not traits that they associate to demicracy. For
the non-authoritarians is the opposite, Brazil cannot be described as a fully
democracy society precisely because it lacks these elements, they are also the
group to express concern with the lack of changes in the concentration of both
political and economic power in the country.
We have found our sample to be split between two concepts of democracy ; a
limited one with very little importance attached to citizenship and a broader one
that values an active society. They almost describe two types of society a less civic
one and one that aspires to be civic (Putnam, 1994).
Both sides aére dissatisfied with kinf of social relations and of exchange that
take place in this transitional society ; disrespect between people is seen as
rampant and as tarnishing daily experience. People are disrespected by other
people or by the government, by the police, civic servants, by colleagues at work,
in man-women relations. Disrespect is described as transgressions to one’s righs
and to the laws. It takes place when a behaviour which is expected does not occur,
when something that “should be”, some form of code is broken. It takes place in
the traffic, in public transport at public offices, in hospitals, at the bank, queuing, in
short when people are interacting with strangers but not limited to these since it
happens between colleagues at work as well, but les often with people from their
intimate circle. No one is spared this experience, and the respondents
acknowledge that being victimes of disrespect predisposes them to in turn apply
the same treatment to others. The point is that this constant experience of suffering
some sort of injustice does not foster interpersonal trust. It is an unjust form of
interaction because it denies the victims of their rights or entitlements since it is an
open transgression of their rights, causes them harm, invades their privacy, denies
them dignity and in genral makes people more insecure about their circumstances.
The intense presence of disrespect in the society provokes tension or at least
feeds it. The expectation is that others will break the law and not uphold it. This
very much fits the description of the less civic society (Putnam, 1994). This tension
is not conducive to cooperation, to solidarity, to public spirit or to participation in
the public sphere. Still some people do not cease to value democracy and are not
willing to embark in a tit for tat battle with their fellow citizens. Why is that ? The
differences lies in their perceptions of inequality and in who is to blame for the
constant disrespect.
professional career, women in politics, would vote for blacks. Furthemore the groups do not differ in their
reactions to political parties and to politicians. All groups reveal great dissatisfaction with politics,
politicians and political parties. Most political parties are not considered to be parties at all but temporary
collusion the exc eption being the Workers Party (PT). Even people who are very much anti-PT make a
point of stating it is only true political party with a clear line and program, with a loyal constituency and
with a clear party discipline line.
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
The authoritarian and the non-authoritarian, as defined for our purposes,
present opposing views of inequality. The authoritarians inequality as natural as
intrinsic to human nature ; human beings are born unequal with different traits and
abilities. It is the differences and not on the commonalties that are emphasized by
the authoritarians. This concept is not due to lack of formal education : natural
inequality was defended by highly educated people. Natural inequality goes hand
in hand with blaming people for their circumstances.
To the authoritarian group the poor are to be blamed for their poverty, the
blacks are responsible for discriminating other blacks, women are not interested in
performing certain jobs and are not discriminated against, or they can have
maternity leave and this makes them less appealing to empoyers. In essence what
to others seem consequences are interpreted by this group as causes of the
problems. Blaming the victims exempts them from any responsabiliy towards the
victims and their circumstances and allows them maintain a very individual
perspective from which to consider society. This seems to feed their preceptions
of “natural” inequality and enhance the acceptance that economic inequality
becomes legal, social and political inequality. It is not that courts are harsher when
judging the poorer 1, it is that the poor cannot afford to pay for good councel, or for
experts that will provide evidence to bail them out. The absence of public means to
ovecome this inequality is not an issue because it is not the responsability of
government to ensure that people have the same access to the courts.
There are two undisputed facts for the authoritarian respondents the only way
you can guarantee your rights in the Brazilian society is through having money to
pay your way through,citizenship is a consequence of money, not an
unquestionable right, the second is that the poor are thoroughly mistreated not only
by courts but by public servants as well. Public services in charge of delivering
what little rights the system provides are seen as mistreating the population in
general and the poor in particula : “no one likes poverty, it frightens ans scares us,
it also causes some repulsion and the tendency is to push it away from you and
you will disrespect it ... one associates the poor to ignorance and that is something
you despise, thus you mistrat them” (public prosecutor).
Blaming the victims also goes hand in hand with having a very negative image
of the national identity. The authoritarians present the opposite of the traditional
authoritarian personality syndrome : xenophobia and racial superirity. To the
contrary they ascribe very negative traits to the Brazilan people, this is more
intense among the authoritarians higher up on the power scale (judges, for
instance) and the economic elite they are also more likely to distance themselves
from such negative traits : “they are” he/she is not. This reiterates the fragmentation
present in blaming the victims and further reduces the possibility of compassion
much less of cooperation. The less educated authoritarians ans also the poorer
ones present an intense authoritarian submission in agreement with the
authoritarian personality predictions. They are more likely to defend ; a strong
leader ; “to keep the rascals on the rights tracks”, that teachers should teach their
1 In another public opinion survey by Vox Populi, carried out in 1995, 82 % of the people interviewed all
over Brazil said that they expected the laws to be more rigorously applied to some people ; the poor and
blacks.
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
children to respect, and the only ones that advocate the use of corporal punishment
by parents to discipline their children.
Non-authoritarians discourses are very different. They do not blame the victims
or defend inequality, to the contrary they defend equality in principle despite
accepting that economic inequality is unavoidable. This inevitability would not
make other types of inequality acceptable. They criticize and even verge on
indignation the fact that economic inequality contaminates access to most rights,
but they also acknowledge that having money is the only warranty that your rights
will be respected and your only chance to be treated fairly.
Daily disrespect is to the authoritarians a consequence of people’s
obliviouness of their duties whercas to the non-authoritarian is a responsability of
the authorities who should uphod the laws. The authoritarians place their emphasis
on individual obligations and duties almost as means to compensate for the lack of
control that they feel over the powerful and the perceived lack of responsiveness of
the government to their demands. Meanwhile non-authoritarians present some
concern for collective obligations and some sense of social responsability.
The last difference between the two groups refer to their reactions to the
police. Greater discretion is generally attributed to the police when the police enjoy
great trust from the public (Young, 1991). This is not the case here, the police has
what is primarily a negative image amongst all the groups including the most
authoritarians. The police is perceived as mistreating the poor and as inefficient to
the rich. It is also perceived as violent and as having no credibility. Despite this
negative perceptions the more authoritarian groups approve the
..................................behaviour
by
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
the police because “it is fit to those people” 1. How can such license be granted to
such unreliable group ? What justifies such ambiguity ? Here blaming the victim
may be the response. For this group no innocent is a “suspect”, suspects are
probably guilty so you better exceed than restrict.
When confronted with social dilemmas the differences between both groups
become more tenuous suggesting that there is not one type of authoritarianism in
society but many layers, the one that undervalues gross human rights violations
and that subscribes to a limited definition of democracy and to a “natural
inequality” and that blames the victims for their plights is but one level. We
presented our respondents with some dilemmatic situations concerning corruption
of public officials, nepotism in governement appointments, joining a strike, and the
financing of Carnival by criminals in Rio de Janeiro. Their answers reveal that we
cannot describe the non-authoritarians as liberal par excellece, they are as likely o
have restrictions against strikes as are the authoritarians, they are less vociferous
but still pont to many drawbacks and even fearfulness of joining. What is clear is
that the right to go on strike is not peceived as a right but is more of a threat.
Furthermore the right that is more commonly defended, when discussing strikes is
that of the minority not to join in “the right of the scab”. They reveal a profound
disgust with picket lines ans see these as a violation of the rights of the minority.
The majority rule fades on the background and democracy becomes the right of
the minority to dissent.
They are against pay-offs to government officials and defend that any attempt
at collection of brides should be exposed but they accpet the appointment of
relatives of members of government to positions of trust provided these
appointees are qualified and competent. The main argument being that otherwise
one would be discriminating against them and causing them harm. The public
goods is totally absent from these considerations.
The ambiguities described so far are enhanced when they discuss whether the
“escolas de samba” (samba schools that provide the Carnival parade in Rio)
should continue to be financed by the criminals that head “illegal number lotteries”
(jogo do bicho) and who are also involved with drug trafficking. The dilemma was
overturned by the suggestion that the illegality of the lottery be lifted, the criminals
would no longer be criminals and their contributions legal. The “jogo do bicho” is
perceived as accidentally involved in very serious crimes and not as result of the
actual character of their managers, it is respected as a very honest enterprise.
Where customers get a fair deal, one that brings no damaged to society and that
is free, people are not coeced into gambling.
1 The lack of trusqt in the polico is widespread, a recent public opinion survey carried out in Rio de Janeiro
and in São Paulo (1721 respondents) showed that 61 % of the people have a negative image of the police ;
it provokes more fear than trust, it is seem as corrupt, it is not efficient, believe that it is involved with
organized crime, that policemen take part in death squads and that delinquents are not afraid of the police.
We could expert that such police would not be granted any right to be use violence or torture, the majority
of the people polled despite such terrible image of the police still say that it either uses the “right amount”
of violence or should use more violence (Folha de São Paulo, 14/01/96).
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
The two groups are also very similar in their little knowledge about rights, the
history of rights and the interrelatedness of rights. They also ignore or undervalue
the role of these rights in a democracy. This allows them to maintain nondemocratic expectations of behaviour by civil servants. Very in fact perceive civil
servants as servants and are indignant that in a democracy they should still behave
as if “doing a favour and not their duty”. They ask for a strong government, this is
strengthened by the lack of respect that they identity daily in interpersonal relations
or in their contacts with officials, but they ignore the possibility that citizens should
exercise some control over the state. In their lack of efficacy they demand laws that
“protect citizens from the state”, that is the existing laws are not perceived as
providing this protection. This is dramatically expressed when the majority
perceives that de facto there is no protection in Brazil against ; illegal
disappearances and killings, torture and illegal detention, corporal punishment and
slave labour. If fear has not been climinated 1 demands for rights will not be
forthcoming specially when the state is also the source of fear.
The democracy in course in Brazil cannot be described as “responsive to the
preferences of the citizens” (Putnam, 1994) at least not to all preferences, though
we must admit that some legacies from authoritarian regimes are found to be not
only tolerated but accepted as “natural” by our respondents. When rights are not
experienced as universal and when the state fails at the applications of laws to all
the territory and to all citizens ans moreover when laws are not applied to protect
citizens from excesses committed by the government (O’Donnell, 1993) the state
is fostering extreme individualism, hierarchical and which exclude the majority from
access to rights and ratifying feelings that rights are mere entitlements to be
provided to those who behave well or know the right people 2. Clientelism “tend to
preserve the fragmentation and social disorganization” and to “reinforce vertical
relations of dominance and personal dependence and to discourage horizontal
solidarity” (Putnam, 1994). The state in its failure to curtail illegal violence, to
extend the rule of law to all the territory, to deliver constitutional rights further
reduces interpersonal trust, enhances individual opportunism and reduces the
chances that a civic community develops.
1 Counting the frequency with which the word fear appears in the transcripts provides some interesting
results ; the group that most often uses the word is that of the Military Policement, followed by the middle
class and the working class. Fear is often underestimated and that of policement more so but if is very
intense it could be fueling their aggression and the abuses they commit.
2 Maybe this is the reason why merit and financial success are so highly rated. The only way to circumvent
such limits is to rely on your own efforts.
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
IS SMALL BEAUTIFUL ? HISTORICAL LEGACY AND CREATION OF
MODERN FORMS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PROCESS OF
TRANSITION
Jacek KOCHANOWICZ *
In certain respect, Polish transformation shows success. Economy grows,
small business is thriving. In the political sphere, there is no violence, election
results are observed, basic political rights are respected, media free. There are
obviuos social problems — unemployment and social exclusion, yet they are not
the concern of this paper. I want to concentrate on certain pecularities of the
process of transformation in Poland — pecularities that probably show also in
other countries in Eastern Europe. First is a specific structures of the businesses
— predominance of very small very large firms. Seconds is slow process of the
transformation of the state. Third is a relative strength of civil society organizations,
dating from the communist period, compared with those that emerged during the
process of transition. I will argue that — while there are various factors, explaining
such pattern, there are also common deep, socio-historical reasons for that.
Economic transformation brought about explosion of small, family size
business. While it is true that a substantial number exists — for fiscal reasons —
only on paper, there is also a lot of economic activity going on unreported.
According to some estimates, the parallel economy reaches 20 per cent of GDP.
Legally, majority of small enterprises are owned by individuals. Somewhat larger
are usually registered as companies. THis new small business has tremendous
economic and social consequences. For consumers, goods and services became
easily available, making life much easier — albeit much more expensive — than
under the shortage economy of the communist time. For hundreds of thousands of
families, small business became a basis of survival, and sometimes of real
success. It brought about important socio-psychological consequences, teaching
people market rules, self reliance and entrepreneurship. The overall structure of the
business is problematic, however : there are too few middle size firms. Successful,
small size enterprises have problems with growing, large ones — with restructuring
and splitting into smaller units. Lack of proper legal infrastructure, lack of banking
facilities, or limites managerial skills are usually quoted as reasons.
* Warsaw University - Department of Economics.
International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
The large enterprises are relatively too numerous. Most are still state owned,
although the property situation is complicated and blurred. Some firms are
managed by employee council, some “corporatized”, or “commercializd”, i.e.
having legal form of limited liability company, totally owned by the state. Some
large companies have been privatized, although a substantial amount of shares is
still in the hands of other enterprises, partly belonging to the state. A vivid, highly
politicized debate concerning privatization is going on. It often turns attention from
real goals of restructuring — that of attaining higher efficiency and competivness.
Partial evidence shows that cases of efficient, innovative enterprises can be found
both among those that are privatized and those which remain in the public hands.
Still, however, barriers of financial and human capital, as well as of proper legal
and banking infrastructure, make process of restructuring slow.
In particular, while government pays substantial subsidies to various industries,
subsequent cabinets have problems with formulating industrial policies, articulating
aims and conditions of state support and of targeting help towards selected firms
or industries. These problems have partially ideological reasons, partly are caused
by state weakness and ineffectiveness. Actual subsidies are being extraced from
the state either through political blackmail (strikes), or through clientelist practices
of well connected managers.
State machinery (in contrast to its political structure) remains barely touched by
reforms. Civil service has not been introduced, and consequently a non-political
coprs of officals has not begun to form. Each change of government brings about a
sweep of officials, being replaced by people connected to the new political team.
Lack of independent, competent civil servants is, to a degree, an explanation while
it is so difficult, on one hand, to purse an intelligent industrial policy, and, on the
other, to reform the public service sector (Kochanowcz 1994).
Two most important segments of the public service sector — health and
education - also remain basically unchanged. They are inefficient — consuming
substantial portions of the public finances, while providing at the same time low
quality services. The only process of change they are subjected to are budget
slashes, while no mechanism making them more efficient are introduces. They
undergo a process of hidden, spontaneous privatization — various kinds of
services (especially in the health sector) are being offered in exchange for money
under all kind of pretexts, while there is no method of refinancing them through
social insurance schemes.
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
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4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
Civil society offers a strange picture. Under late phases of communism, there
were two kind of independent organizations : democratic opposition and the
Catholic church. I am leaving the latter out of my considerations, although there is
no doubt that while the Church was immensely important for the softening and final
collpase of the ancien régime, it has very deep problems with adjusting itself to the
exigencies of an open society. The democratic opposition transformed itself into
various new political parties and movements (some new also emerged) and
played an important role at the early stages of transformation. Later, however, it
proved unable to hold its power under democratic electoral system and lost — as
happened in many other countries of the region — to post communist parties.
As it stands, Polish political scene is dominated by the Social Democracy and
the Peasant Party, both originating form the communist times. Non-communist
social democracy is weak. Liberal centrists (Union of Freedom) are not particularly
effective ans seem to be loosing support. The right (which defines itself mostly as
anti-Communist, to certain extents as Catholic, sometimes as nationalist) is
fragmented and lamentably ineffective.
If there are any puzzles in this picture, it is not the weakness of liberals. It is
rather the initial popularity of the liberal economix project that was surprising. The
liberal tradition has always been weak in Poland, and the social bases of
liberalism are also weak today (Cf. Szacki 1995). Something else is rather
puzzling : why some other ideologies, and — consequently — movements and
parties did not take off ?
On is no-communist social democracy, the other is Christian democracy. Noncommunist social democrats at least entered the game, which is not the case with
Christian democracy. This is surprising, since Poland is a Catholic country, there
are good models around (CSU), there are intellectuals able to articulates
ideologies, there is a potentially helpful organization (the Church), there is
electorate. So why political and ideological scene is not divided into three
segments : non-communist social democrats in the left, small liberals in the center,
and Christian democrats in the right ? Why instead do we have 2 strong postcommunist social democrats, strong peasants — and a lot of under-organized, but
popular rightist nationalists ? Or, in other words, why old parties survive and new
are unable to take off ?
One of possible explanations relates to political skill, embodied in old and
new organizations. The old parties apparently proved immensely more efficient in
using the democratic mechanism than the post-Solidarity parties. After a disarray,
caused by the immediate socio-psychological consequences of the change of
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
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4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
regime, they regrouped, and they redefined their image. They have material
resources that new parties do not possess, they have networks and connections,
and they have people trained in semi-open, semi-democratic politics since 1980
(Since then, internal party elections were usually an open ballot, and people had to
compete to move up). New, post-Solidarity parties, of all denominations, seem
much less capable in this respect. Organization, financing and political campaigns
are usually done in a totally non-professional, amateurish way. Non political non
government organization are still weak, although they are visibly emerging.
Three following generalization can be formulated on the basis of the previuos
observations :
1 Successful change occurs in the Polish case when new organizations are
set up upon the basis of personal relations and mutual trust. That is the case
with emerging, small size business. Unfortunately, that is also the case with
patronage and clientelist structures within the state sector and in the unclear
arena between politics and econmoy.
2 In contrast with small scale structures, based upon personal relations, there
are problems with establising — or restructuring — large scale, formak,
proceduralized, hierarchical organizations of a “weberian” type. This is the
case first and foremost with the public services sector, but — to a degree —
also with the large enterprises. In the latter case, however, at least the
market pressure stimulates them to rationalize their structures and
procedures. In the former, there is lack of any analogous mechanism. It is
also the case with political parties and NGOs in that aspect of their
functioning that require large scale organization structures and formalized
procedures of operation. Apparently, an ability to establish and maintain
structures of this kind constitutes social capital which, in the Polish
conditions, is in extremely short supply. Anyone who possesses such ability
has a considerable advantage over othe social actors.
3 There are problems with establishing voluntary association, i.e. horizonal
structures based on something else than personal relations. New political
parties have very limited success with maintaining their membership and
constituency. Non-political NGOs, while they emerge in large numbers, are
usually small anf often with a short life-span.
Are there any common reasons of the above patterns ? Why the Polish society
is more efficient in creating strucutres of face-to-face character than those which
are somehow formalized ?
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In a shortest way, a possible explanation of all these phenomena may be a
post-peasant character of the Polish society (cf. Tarkowska and Tarkowski 1994).
Poland was a predominantly peasant country until the early fifties, pre-capitalist
burgher traditions were weak and capitalist transformations of the nineteenth and
early twentieth century much less comprehensive than in Western Europe.
Moreover, Nazi and Soviet reprisals against intelligentsia, middle and upper
classes were particularly harsh. Communist industrialization and urbanization
allowed for enormous territorial and social mobility, shifting vast masses of
peasantry to the cities, and — for political reasons — promoting members of the
former lower classes. In the course of this vast movements, peasant cultural legacy
was transferred to modern, urban life.
Trust in peasant culture is build upon family loyalty, comprehension of legalrational organizations (including the state) is low, relations within larger structures
usually vertical — paternalistic and clientelistic. It can be argued that communism,
despite tremendous social change, rather reinforced than destroyed certain
elements of peasant legacy — a tendency to rely upon informal networks of
relatives and friends. Family group was a refuge within an alien system. Patronclient relations were important for day-to-day functioning of command economy
(Tarkowski 1981). Not surprisingly, even networks of democratic opposition were
established along relations between friend. Under the process of transition, all this
experience is helpful in establishing small scale, semi-formal forms of social
cooperation. Much less so in creating large structures. If we are to use Putnam’s
(1993) insights, Poland would be much closer to South than to North Italian case.
Or, if we put it in terms proposed by Fukuyama in his new book (1995), Poland is
low on trust. If Max Weber was right that modernization is concomitant with
bureaucratization, Poland has still a long way to go.
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
Bibliography
FUKUYAMA Francis -1995- Trust : Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York, Free Press.
KOCHANWICZ Jacek -1994- Reforming Weak States and Deficient
Bureaucracies. - In : Joan Nelson and contributors (ed.) “Intricate Links :
Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe”. New
Brunswick and Oxford, Transaction Publishers.
PUTNAM Robert D. -1993- Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern
Italy. - Princeton, Princeton University Press.
SZACKI Jerzy -1995- Liberalism after Communist. - Budapest, Central Eastern
University Press.
TARKOWSKA Elzbieta ; TARKOWSKI Jacek -1994- Amoralny familializm czyli o
dezintegracji spolecznej w Polsce lat osiemdziesiatych (Amoral familialism or
about social disintegration in Poland in the eighties). - In : Tarkowski Jacek
“Socjologia swiata polityki”. Warsaw, IFiS.
TARKOWSKI Jacek -1981- Poland : Patrons and Clients in a Planned Economy. In : S.N. Eisendstadt ; R. Lemarchand (eds) “Political Clientelism, Patronage and
Development”. London, Sage Publications.
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
Eva Blay (Discussant)
Je suis beaucoup d'accord avec Pécaut, mais je pars d'un point de vue
complètement différent parce que je pense qu'il faut faire une distinction entre
l'action politique et la recherche. Je dois commenter les contributions de Dezalay,
Cardia et Kochanowicz qui ont analysé la construction de la société civile d'une
manière profonde en s'appuyant sur les différents points de vue. Dans l'étude de la
Pologne, il faut rappeler le titre du papier de Kochanowicz Is small beautiful?
Historical legacy and creation of modern forms of social organization and the
process of transition. Dans cette étude, Kochanowicz considère que la
permanence de la petite entreprise et des relations sociales personnelles dans le
champ politique qui retarde la plénitude capitaliste, qui d'une certaine façon est
vue comme le modèle démocratique à achever. Dans le second papier, Nancy
Cardia analyse la construction de la société civile qu'elle considère implicitement
comme synonyme de société démocratique. Sa recherche a comme paradigme
les comportements et les valeurs autoritaires, et elle répartit les individus le long
d'une échelle qui va du plus autoritaire au non-autoritaire : 44% des interviewés ne
sont pas autoritaires. Et, finalement, dans son étude, Dezalay analyse la
construction de la société civile au travers de la participation des juristes dans le
champ du pouvoir, analyse du passage d'une forme de colonisation impérialiste à
l'action de l'économie multinationale et à la sphère de domination des Etats-Unis.
Donc, ces trois analyses étayent leurs réflexions sur d'importants data empiriques
ou au moins empiriques, et toutes cherchent à comprendre la démocratie et la
société civile. Mais chacun a comme référence un concept paradigmatique, mais
non explicite. Je pense que Cardia a beaucoup avancé ce concept de démocratie
dans son exposé, mais ce n'est pas suffisant selon moi. Car qu'est-ce qu'est
vraiment la démocratie? Qu'est-ce qu'est vraiment la société civile? Il faut avoir
quelques notions pour avoir la possibilité de comparer. Or on parle de choses
complètement différentes. Or, dans le cas des _personnes autoritaires_, il y a un
problème. Par exemple, si les personnes ne sont pas autoritaires, que sont-elles?
L'analyse de Kochanowicz me rappelle les travaux d'économie et de sociologie
sur la première phase d'industrialisation au Brésil dans les années 1950 où les
études analysaient le comportement ouvrier dans le moment de l'industrialisation
et de l'urbanisation récentes et cherchaient à expliquer le processus économique
à travers le comportement de la classe ouvrière. L'origine rurale des travailleurs,
leurs supposés difficultés à s'adapter à la machine, aux horaires et aux rythmes de
travail étaient l'explication de la faible productivité du travail, comme si les
International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
travailleurs pouvaient eux-mêmes introduire à l'usine une autre routine de travail,
des relations familiales et les relations homme-femme d'une façon indépendante
de la structure concrète et des conditions de travail. Parce que je pense que
quand Kochanowicz parle de la Pologne, il a en dehors de sa réflexion une vision
que ce sont les comportements des travailleurs qui expliquent les changements ou
les non-changements de l'économie comme chez nous dans les années 19850.
Du point de vue des entreprises, les études ont découvert différents types
d'attitudes où les relations familiales étaient utilisées dans l'usine et où le
recrutement de parents était défendu. Donc cela était indépendant de la situation
de l'entreprise. Or quand il était nécessaire pour le travail de quelque
apprentissage, immédiatement les travailleurs et les patrons trouvaient des
solutions : écoles professionnelles, la préparation dans l'usine. Le désir d'avoir un
travail bien payé, d'avoir une maison et des moyens de transport, dans cet ordre,
était suffisant pour surmonter la condition rurale et avoir un rapide apprentissage.
Dans cette période, les partis politiques et les syndicats s'organisèrent même
sans entendre les travailleurs, l'hégémonie était de caractère idéologique et
partisan. Il faut donc considérer diverses dimensions sociales. Par exemple, il faut
connaître la taille du marché, les opportunités offertes pour savoir quelles sont les
relations entre le marché du travail, les changements de l'économie et de la
structure politique. Dans des situations où le marché est large, les élites disposent
de se mécanismes pour se préserver d'autres couches sociales, et là on va
rencontrer des liaisons familiales, des relations sociales de classes, parce que
tous les arrangements historiques ne sont pas détruits par le changement
économique. Mais si il y a des changements profonds dans les structures
productives, une nouvelle organisation va se structurer en retenant le poste
privilégié pour l'élite. En tout cas, de nouvelles relations de travail ne peuvent
exister que si les structures productives ne changent pas concrètement. Les
comportements n'empêchent ni ne provoquent le changement. On peut faire un
essai de réflexion et ajouter ceci. Premièrement, la Pologne est entrée aujourd'hui
dans la construction d'un système capitaliste, et du point de vue politique d'un
système décentralisé. Deuxièmement, le Brésil a un développement capitaliste
moyen, une certaine technologie, et politiquement se déroule une lutte interne
entre les groupes pour ou contre l'universalisation des droits de l'homme et la
réduction de la distance économique et sociale entre les individus.
Troisièmement, Dezalay et Cardia ont une perspective située à partir des pays de
plénitude capitaliste en concurrence pour la domination du Tiers Monde, lesquels
proposent l'universalisation des droits civils et non pas une société qui donne
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International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:
Rupture and Continuity
4-6 March 1996, Paris, France
l'égalité à tous les individus. L'analyse comparative permet donc de conclure que
à partir des situations historiques et économiques envisagées chaque pays a un
héritage historique et culturel qui doit être constitutif de son projet économique et
politique. Mais la construction de ce projet social est une option politique et
idéologique. Ce sont les individus qui font leur choix, la définition va se faire dans
le champ de forces politiques
En conclusion, je pense que si les analyses font une claire distinction entre
les aspects qui ont pour base les données empiriques historiques et les aspects
idéologiques de la construction de la démocratie ou de la société civile, ça serait
important puisque les premières permettent de décrire et même d'expliquer la
situation sociale, mais les seconds sont le champ de la lutte politique et peuvent
indiquer les directions à suivre.
3