Respondents Richar-Rossy-et-al

Court File No: 34060
IN THE SUPREME COURT O F CANADA
(On Appeal from the Court of Appeal for Quebec)
BETWEEN:
CITY O F WESTMOUNT,
APPELLANT
(Applicantlllespondent)
-
and -
RICHAR ROSSY, SHARON ROSSY,
JUSTIN ROSSY, LUKE ROSSY and NICHOLAS ROSSY,
RESPONDENTS
(Respondents/Appellants)
-
and
-
RESPONDENT
(Mise en cause)
FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENTS
GREY CASGRAIN
Barristers and Solicitors
2102-3410 ruepeel
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1W8
Tel:
514-288-6180
Fax: 514-288-8908
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
2600 - 160 Elgin Street
Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1C3
Tel: 613-786-0212
Fax: 613-788-3500
Julius H. Grey
Counsel for the Respondents
Brian A. Crane, Q.C.
Ottawa Agents for the Respondents
NORTON ROSE OR LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
1100 - 1981 Av McGill College
Montreal, Quebec H3A 3C1
Tel:
514-847-4747
Fax: 514-286-5474
NORTON ROSE OR LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
1500 - 45 O'Connor Street
Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1A4
Tel: 613-780-8604
Fax: 613-230-5459
Audr6 Legrand
Counsel for the Appellant
Sally A. Gomery
Ottawa Agent for the Appellant
DUSSAULT, MAYRAND
Barristers and Solicitors
Contentieux Montreal
31" F1. - 800, Place Victoria
Montreal, Quebec H4Z 1L6
Tel:
514-954-7626
Fax: 514-873-4492
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
World Exchange Plaza
1100 - 100 Queen Street
Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1J9
Tel:
613-237-5160
Fax: 613-230-8842
Manon Touchette
Counsel for the Respondent,
SociMe de I'assurance automobile
Automobile du Quebec
Nadia Effendi
Ottawa Agents for the Respondent,
Socikte de I'assurance automobile
Automobile du Quebec
TABLE OF CONTENT
PAGE :
I.
INTRODUCTION
11.
THE FACTS
.
2
.
3
5
111. QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE
IV.
ARGUMENT
Argument I:
Was this an automobile accident
Argument 11:
The Court of Appeal's Reasoning
Was Correct
Argument I11 :
Textual Interpretation of the
Definition
Argument IV:
Decisions in the Rest of Canada
Argument V:
Dismissal on Preliminary Motion
Argument VI:
Irrelevant Issues Raised by Appellant
V.
CONCLUSION
VI.
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
. .
.
. .
.
.
. .
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(On Appeal fiom the Court of Appeal for Montreal, Quebec)
BETWEEN:
CITY OF WESTMOUNT
APPELLANT
(Respondent)
AND:
RICHARD ROSSY
SHARON ROSSY
JUSTIN ROSSY
LUKE ROSSY
NICHOLAS ROSSY
RESPONDENTS
(Appellants)
AND
SOCIETE DE L'ASSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE DU QUEBEC
RESPONDENT
(Mise en cause)
RESPONDENTS' FACTUM
1.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing
Appellant's motion to dismiss and allowing a damage action to go forward;
2.
Respondents and the Mise en cause, Sociiti de 1'Assurance Automobile, took
the same position - that the accident was not an automobile accident under the
meaning of Quebec legislation; Appellant claims that it is;
I.
INTRODUCTION
3.
In its Supreme Court facturn, Appellant attempts to impose an artificial
straight-jacket on what clearly contains both a factual and a common sense
element - the limits of the application of the Loi sur 1 'assurance automobile;
4.
Respondents will argue that the Court of Appeal made no logical error at all
but rather went as far as possible in providing a structure consistent both with
the law and with common sense for making this determination;
5.
Further, the Court of Appeal's test fulfills better than any other the legislator's
intention in adopting the Loi sur 1'Assurance Atrtomobile;
6.
The law defines the damage caused by an automobile as follows:
"prejudice cause par une automobile": tout prejudice causk
par une automobile, par son usage ou par son chargement, y
compris le prejudice cause par une remorque utilide avec
une automobile, mais B l'exception du prkjudice caus6 par
l'acte autonome d'un animal faisant partie du chargement et
du prejudice cause a une personne ou a un bien en raison
d'une action de cette personne relike a l'entretien, la
reparation, la modification ou l'amelioration d'une
automobile;
damage caused by an automobile )) means any damage
caused by an automobile, by the use thereof or by the load
carried in or on an automobile, including damage caused by a
trailer used with an automobile, but excluding damage caused
by the autonomous act of an animal that is part of the load
and injury or damage caused to a person or property by
reason of an action performed by that person in connection
with the maintenance, repair, alteration or improvement of an
automobile;
((
7.
Accident is defined as follows:
Dans la presente loi, a moins que le contexte n'indique un sens different,
on entend par:
((accident)) : tout evenement au cours duquel un prejudice est
cause par une automobile;
In this Act, unless otherwise indicated by context,
((accident))means any event in which damage is caused by an
automobile:
8.
From the outset Appellant attempted to equate the definition used in British
Columbia arises out of ownership use or operation of a vehicle translated in
Amos v. Insurance Company of British Columbia, [I9951 3 S.C.R. 405 as
"dQoule de l'utilisation" as equivalent to Quebec's "cause par une
automobile";
9.
The two statutes are obviously very different from each other and the Supreme
Court made the distinction in Amos v. Insurance Company of British
Columbia, [I9951 3 S.C.R. 405, but in its paragraphs 6 and 7, Appellant seeks
to equate the two and to make the remarks in Amos a mere obiter; this is
clearly inconsistent with the language of the two statutes;
10.
Quebec law explicitly requires causation of the prejudice by the automobile or
its use;
THEFACTS
11.
11.
In its summary of the facts, Applicant goes beyond what was in evidence;
12.
The sole facts, which at the stage of a motion to dismiss, are taken to be
proved, were those in Respondent's amended declaration:
i. Plaintiffs' son Gabriel Anthony Rossy was killed on
the evening of August 1, 2006, when a tree collapsed
on his car on Cbte des Neiges Avenue; the accident
was caused solely by the spontaneous collapse of the
tree;
ii. It turned out that the reason was the failure to
maintain the tree, the whole as appears from an expert
report filed as Exhibit P-1; dated August 2006 and an
updated version of December 2006, filed herein as
Exhibit P-3;
iii. The cause of the incident was totally independent of
the operation of the automobile and the liability is not
precluded by Quebec's no fault system of automobile
insurance;
iv. The failure to examine the tree and/or to detect the
danger and eliminate it was negligent and engages
both Montreal's and Westmount's liability; the tree
was
under
the
Defendant
municipalities'
Westmount's control and Plaintiffs invoke all
presumptions of fact and law;
13.
The expert report confirms the view that the sole fault was the failure to
maintain and/or cut down the tree;
14.
It is not disputed that the deceased was inside the car at the time of the
accident; the question is whether that fact standing alone is sufficient to
transform the event into an automobile accident under the Quebec no-fault
scheme which, textually, requires causation;
15.
Applicant's contention that the car was moving was pure speculation,
unfounded in evidence and, in any event, would not be relevant to this
dispute;
16.
At paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, Appellant clearly attempts to put words into the
mouths of persons whose testimony would, in any case, be hearsay because
they did not see the accident; the best one can say is that there is no admissible
evidence as to whether the vehicle was in motion;
17.
What is clear is that the tree hit the automobile and the victim from above; it
was not down on the street before contact and the victim did not drive into it;
111.
QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE
1.
Whether the facts as alleged describe an automobile accident?
2.
Whether the action could be dismissed at this stage given that the facts
alleged are taken as proved?
3.
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal concisely
and elegantly phrase the issues before the Court:
11.
La famille Rossy et la SAAQ se pourvoient.
11s alliguent que le juge de premiire instance
a commis une erreur de droit. Selon eux, le
d6ces de Gabriel Anthony Rossy et le
prijudice qui en d6coule n'ont pas &ticaus6
par une automobile (ni par son usage ou son
chargement), mais par la chute d'un arbre de
stature imposante (25 mktres de hauteur et 71
centimktres de diamktre). 11s ajoutent que le
fait que la victime ait 6t6 A bord d'une
automobile lorsque l'arbre est tomb6 sur
celle-ci ne suffit pas pour enclencher
l'application de la Loi.
12.
C'est I'unique question en jeu : en tenant pour
aviris les faits allbgub dans la requEte
introductive d'instance, quel est le rbgime
d'indemnisation applicable : celui qui r6sulte
du droit commun ou celui pr6vu dans la Loi?
ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT I: - WAS THIS AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT?
18.
It is submitted that Appellant attempts to create ambiguity and uncertainty
where there is none and then substitute a mechanical and counter-intuitive test
for the one well-established by the jurisprudence;
19.
It is generally accepted that the Quebec no-fault system was a beneficial social
scheme, eliminating "fault" as an element in deciding who is to be
compensated in the case of a car accident;
20.
Car accidents are among the most common mishaps in our society and fault is
often a matter of momentary inattention or awkwardness; the legislator clearly
wanted to make that kind of fault irrelevant for the financial outcome;
2 1.
However, the law was clearly intended for automobile accidents and not as a
substitute for all delictual responsibility if an automobile was directly or
indirectly involved;
22.
There have been in other countries broader legislative schemes replacing
traditional delictual or tortious liability; this is not the case in Quebec;
23.
Only automobile accidents were covered and the reason was clearly the
frequency of ordinary collisions; it was not right for fault to be the
determining factor in such cases;
24.
However, it is implicit in such a scheme that a limit exist; the mere presence
of an automobile cannot automatically be the "cause of the damage";
25.
When applied beyond these common sense limits, the law has been contested,
for instance with respect to impaired drivers and, even more, with accidents
where the autotnobile's role is indirect and where the damage would have
occursed even without the use of the car; it is counter-intuitive to extend the
law to these situations;
26.
More important, the legislator clearly did not intend to extend it so far; to do
this through jurisprudence would diminish the standing of the entire social
plan and make the result arbitrary and inconsistent with legislative purpose;
27.
If the legislator had intended to replace all delictual liability with social
compensation, he could have done so; however, he chose to act with only two
types of accidents
-
automobile and work-place; there obviously must be a
limit on the scope of these two categories; in the case of automobiles, the limit
is causation and that was the express intention of the legislator;
28.
Parayaph 78 of the trial judgment of Reimnitz J. in this case states, it is
submitted, incorrectly:
Le tribunal croit que c'est pour indemniser le type de situation
en cause que la Loi sur l'assurance automobile a it6 adoptCe.
29.
This seems incompatible with paragraph 79 of the same judgment, which
says:
I1 peut sembler incongru de conclure qu'un arbre qui tombe
sur une automobile peut 6tre considCr6 comme un accident
automobile, alors que l'automobiliste n'a CtC qu'une victime.
30.
It is incorrect to ascribe to the legislator incongruous or absurd consequences
unless there is no other way to interpret the law:
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community
College, [2004] SCC 28;
Delbupuet v. La Cour du Ou6bec et als., C.S. Montreal 500-17-015597035; confirmed in Carripan v. La Cour du OuCbec et als., 2005 QCCA
589;
3 1.
It may be that the burden to prove causation is not very heavy in that one does
not apportion liability between different causes, but the legislator clearly left it
in place;
32.
In Les Productions Pram v.
m,[I9921 R.J.Q. 1738 Baudouin J.A. said at
p. 1741:
La premikre est que le lien de causalite requis par la loi
est un lien sui genevis et qu'il est vain, pour le qualifier,
de s'enfermer dans les constructions doctrinales
traditionnelles de la causa causans, causa proxima,
causalit6 adkquate, causalite immediate ou 6quivalence
des conditions. Ces theories sont d'un grand secours en
droit commun, notamment lorsqu'il s'agit, pour le juge,
d'evaluer le rapport causal entre la faute et le dommage.
Elles ne le sont pas ici.
33.
It is sufficient for the automobile to be a causa not the causa causans;
however it is impossible to read ctsui geneuiscausation)) to mean cc no
causation )) at all;
34.
Applicant is attempting to find contradictory jurisprudence in other provinces
where there is none; it also reproaches the Court with ignoring &
Productions Pram v. Lemay,supra, as well as the cases from other provinces;
35.
In fact, the decision of the Court of Appeal is based, in large part on
m,
supra and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Herbison, [2007] SCC 47, La
Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Vvtlinaam, [2007] 3 S.C.R., 373 and
v. Insurance Cow. of British Columbia, 119951 3 S.C.R. 405 were fully
discussed before the Court and they led logically to the decision written by
Thibault, J.A.;
36.
In the present case, both the allegations of the Declaration and the expert
report point to the tree as the only cause, the automobile being irrelevant;
37.
Eveiyone agrees that a "liberal" interpretation of the Act was intended as it
was a social measure; however, it was not the policy of the legislator to give
the term "automobile accident" an interpretation so wide that it would become
counter-intuitive and virtually without limit;
38.
The importance of common sense and the futility of incongruous and farfetched interpretation is convincingly stated by Baudouin J.A. in
m,supra
at p. 1741 and 1742:
...la loi doit recevoir une interprbtation large et
lib6rale. Cette interpretation doit cependant rester
plausible et logi~ueeu 6gard au libel16 de la loi.
underlining ours
1742
1.
39.
La dktermination du lien causal requis par
l'article 1 paragraphe 10 de la loi reste
principalement une question de logique et, de
fait, fonction des circonstances propres B
chaque espkce.
In Pram,supra, Beauregard J.A. makes the correct common sense distinction
at p. 1743:
,
I1 ne s'agit pas d'un cas oh l'automobile n'a pas et6 l'un
des facteurs de la collision. L'avion n'est pas tomb6
par hasard sur la voiture dans laquelle l'intim6 6tait
passager. I1 s'est agi d'une v6ritable collision entre la
voiture et l'avion, lequel volait trop bas.
40.
The Court of Appeal once again returns to the issue of common sense in
S.A A.O. v. Ville de Dorion-Vaudreuil, [2011] QC C.A. 1502 where Pelletier
J.A. said at p. 25:
Pour paraphraser les propos du juge Baudouin dans
l'arret Production Pram Inc. c. Lemay, aussi large et
libirale qu'elle doit &re, l'interpritation de cette loi a
but social et indemnitaire doit demeurer logique et
plausible.
41.
Recently, another case, Letkeman v.
m,[2010] ABCA 259 (CanLII) has
been published and it confirms Respondents' interpretation of the common
law jurisprudence and its compatibility with Quebec; one can also cite
Connors v. Kinfiswav General Insurance, [2005] CanLII 36258 (On S.C.) and
Chisolm v. Liberty Mutual Group, [2001] CanLIl 28236 (On S.C.) confirmed
by the Court of Appeal, Chisolm v. Liberty Mutual Group, 2002 CanLII
45020 (ON C.A.) and Zukowski v.
42.
m,[2010] ABQB 421;
In fact, jurisprudence in recent years has clearly tended to make the distinction
proposed by Respondents and has not applied the law where there is no
causation:
Sociiti de 17Assurance-Automobile v. Restaurants McDonald, REJB
11234 (spilling of coffee on passenger in car);
Bouillon v. La Brasserie Labatt LtCe, 2002 CanLII 16623 (QC C.S.) (beer
bottle explosion);
Les Productions Pram Inc. v.
falling on car)
m,[I9921 R.J.Q. 1738 C.A. (airplane
Girard v. Miscioscia, [I9841 AZ-85011022 C.A. (dog attacking
motorcycle);
Girard v. Les Carrihes St. Eustache, C.S. 700-05-000723-852 (rock
hitting car);
D ' A i ~ l ev. Whitton, 1988 R.R.A. 838 (getting out of a stationary vehicle);
Basciano v.
m,[2006] Q.C.C.Q. 989, (assault with seat-belt);
C...A... v. SAAQ, SAS-Q 082123-01 11 (suicide);
43.
Clearly, the victim in this case would have died had he been a pedestrian or a
cyclist; his presence in an automobile changed or added nothing;
44.
Appellants argue that if one requires any form of causation, the law may not
apply to cases where the weather is a contributing factor; this is sophistry;
45.
Even if weather makes an accident more likely, it is still though the operation
of a vehicle that the damage is caused (e.g. driver's vision is impaired and he
drives into an object); it is to be remembered that exclusive causation is not a
,
supra, par. 32,34)
requirement h
46.
That is entirely different from a situation where a rock, a bullet or a tree falls
from the sky; in such a case, the operation of the car is not part of causation;
47.
It is therefore clear, that under Quebec's definition and under common sense
interpretation, this catastrophe was not an "automobile accident" ;
ARGUMENT I1
48.
-
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S REASONING WAS CORRECT
Appellants' attempt to find faulty reasoning in Thibault J.A.'s judgment is
without basis;
49.
In paragraphs 15 and 16, the Court of Appeal states a position, which, it is
submitted, is unavailable;
15)
Dans leur trait6 La responsabilite' civile, les auteurs Baudouin et
Deslauriers formulent le souhait que, lorsque les tribunaux
interpretent l'expression (( accident d'automobile D, ils ne
s'ecartent pas trop du sens donne a cette notion dans le langage
ordinaire, tout en favorisant une interpretation liberale pour
permettre l'indemnisation des victimes:
1-1140 - Interpretation raisonnable - I1 serait souhaitable
cependant que la jurisprudence, tout en demeurant trks
libkrale dans le but de favoriser l'indemnisation, nuance
certaines de ses attitudes. L'interpretation de ce que
constitue un accident d'automobile ne devrait pas, en effet,
s'ecarter trop du sens de cette expression dans le langage
courant. I1 convient de preciser que l'accident doit se
produire dans le cours normal de l'usage de l'automobile et
non dans le seul cadre general de son usage [. ..]
16)
50.
La Loi a kt6 adoptie pour indemniser la victime d'un (( prejudice
cause par une automobile D. Elle n'a pas kt6 conpe pour
supprimer les principes de responsabilite civile dans tous les cas oh
cette victime se trouve dans une automobile. La jurisprudence a
fait cette distinction et elle a kart6 de l'application de la Loi les
situations ou le prejudice subi ne resultait pas d'un accident
d'automobile.
The court then cites a number of borderline cases on both sides of the law
which illustrate why this case clearly does not fall under the definition:
Richard v. Hydro-Ouibec, J.Ex. 82-53 1;
Girard v. Miscioscia, 119841 R.D.J. 621;
Girard v. Carrihes St-Eustache Ltie, [I9861 R.R.A. 334;
Ormsbee v. Bell Canada, [I9901 R.R.A. 677;
S.A.A.Qv.
51.
m,[I9991 R.R.A. 15;
The seminal decision of S.A.A.O. v. Restaurants McDonald's du Canada,
[I9991 R.R.A. 243 is then discussed; it is not readily distinguishable from the
present matter; if coffee thrown into a vehicle is not an automobile accident, it
is hard to see how a spontaneously collapsing tree would be;
52.
The Court then analyzes Bouillon v. Brasserie Labatt Ltie, [2002] R.R.A.
1010 to show that even when the issue is the loading of an automobile which
is specifically provided in the law, there is not an infinitely elastic definition;
53.
The Court states:
Dans Bouillon c. Brasserie Labatt Itee, les demandeurs ont subi
des blessures a la suite de l'explosion de deux bieres plackes
dans une caisse qu'ils avaient deposke sur la banquette arriere
d'une automobile. La Cour superieure a rejete la requete en
irrecevabilitk du brasseur :
54.
(64)
Ce n'est pas parce qu'il y a une caisse de bikre
l'arrikre de l'automobile qu'ici il peut s'agir
d'un accident cause par le chargement.
(67)
La caisse de biere est dans la voiture mais on
ne peut pas relier le prejudice a l'usage de
l'automobile et I'utilisation de celle-ci. Ce
n'est pas le fonctionnement, ni le maniement
ni la presence de l'automobile qui fait en sorte
que le chargement c'est-a-dire une bi6re de la
caisse qui a cause le dommage.
The Court then continues its list of decisions to consider :
F.B. v. S.A.A.O., AZ-04551601 (T.A.Q.);
Basciano v. Societk de transport de Montreal (STM), [2006] QC C.A.
9809;
Gauthier v. SociktC de wansport de la communaute urbaine dc Montreal
(STCUhl), [2008] QC C.Q. 1 1041;
L.S. (Succession de'l v. Societe de l'assurance automobile du Quebec,
[2008] QC TAQ 09694;
Flannery v. Ville de Gatineau, [2008] QC C.Q. 8570;
Comeau v.
m,[I9971 R.R.A. 1079;
Weiner v. Montreal, [I9981 R.R.A. 820;
GuCrin v. F. Ratti Inc., AZ-50208171, (C.Q.);
v. Centres commerciaux rieionaux du Ouibec Ltie, [2005] R.R.A.
880 (C.S.);
Stante v. Gravino, [2008] QC C.S. 2496;
v. SociitC de transport de Sherbrooke, [2008] QC C.Q. 3244;
St-Pierre v. La Pocatikre (Hatel de ville), [2009] QC C.S. 4896;
55.
The conclusion appears at paragraph 39 :
Si l'on applique les enseignements qui ressortent de
l'analyse de la jurisprudence a notre affaire, il faut
convenir que le prCjudice subi par la famille Rossy n'a
pas it6 causC par une automobile son usage ou son
chargement. Avec les plus grands igards pour le juge de
premikre instance, il a commis une erreur en concluant
que l'accident survenu a Gabriel Anthony constitue un
accident d'automobile. C o m e la jurisprudence nous
apprend, ce n'est pas parce qu'une personne est a bord
d'une automobile que le prijudice subi est qualifii
comme un (( prCjudice causi par une automobile )) et, B ce
titre, est assujetti a la Loi.
56.
Their lengthy and erudite analysis demonstrates not only that the Court was
logical and comprehensive in its reasoning, but also that the matter is settled
with 30 years of fairly consistent jurisprudence behind it; there exists neither
illogicality nor serious controversy, which is what Appellant alleges; one can
cite as well Gaudreau v. The Business Depot Ltd. et als., EYB 2006-109130
S.C. as another example of the established trend;
57.
The test used by the Court of Appeal is thus an orthodox and generally
accepted one;
58.
This test is far more comprehensible than the purely technical and artificial
table proposed by Appellant as the test in its paragraph 133;
59.
In fact, Appellant's test solves nothing; each case would still depend on what
is meant by the words "risulte de";
60.
Presumably it means the same thing as "caus6 par une automobile, par son
usage, on par son chargement" which is the wording of the statute;
61.
Appellant's test is therefore a tautology, restating the law and explaining
nothing about it;
62.
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand elaborates a
test based on the
words and purpose of the law, common sense and the facts of each case;
63.
It is in fact impossible and even undesirable to elaborate a technical test which
solves every case mechanically regardless of its facts or of common sense;
64.
The extremely technical and turgid nature of Appellant's argumentation is the
direct result of the attempt to find an impossible, automatic formula instead of
interpreting the law in the light of the rules of interpretation, common sense
and the facts;
ARGUMENT 111- TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION
65.
Appellant has based itself on the "purpose of the law" and has, in
Respondents' view misunderstood it;
66.
However, if one were to do a purely textual analysis of the definition, which is
normally the first step in interpreting it, Appellant's position is even less
tenable;
67.
If the legislator had intended the words "usage d'une automobile" to have the
virtually infinite boundaries, it would not have been necessary to specify that
the "loading" ("chargement") of a vehicle is included; it would be automatic;
68.
In the very recent case Canadian Human Rights Commission v. A.G. Canada,
[201I] SCC 53, this Court makes the following point at paragraph 38:
The interpretation adopted by the Tribunal makes the
repetition of the term "expenses" redundant and fails to
explain why the term is linked to the particular types of
compensation described in each of those paragraphs.
This interpretation therefore violates the legislative
presumption against tautology. As Professor Sullivan
notes, at p. 210 of her text, "it is presumed that the
legislature avoids superfluous or meaningless words, that
it does not pointlessly repeat itself or speak in vain.
Every word in a statute is presumed to make sense and to
have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative
purpose". As former Chief Justice Lamer put it in R.v.
2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 28, "it is
a well accepted principle of statutory interpretation that
no legislative provision should be interpreted so as to
render it mere surplusage". See also Attorney General of
Quebec v. Carrihres Ste-Thhkse Ltke, [I9851 1 S.C.R.
831 at p. 838;
m,
"underlining ours"
69.
If one gives effect to the requirement of causation which is found in the law,
then loading a car has a very real purpose and is not redundant;
70.
Moreover, in the only other social scheme where a major part of delictual law
was removed from private law and regulated, the Loi sur les accidents de
@avail,a very different definition of work accident is found:
"accident" un evknement imprkvu et soudain, attribuable
toute cause, qui survient a une personne par le fait ou a
I'occasion de son travail et qui entraine pour elle une
blessure, une maladie ou le dkchs;
ct accident )) means an unexpected and sudden event,
attribuable to any cause, which befalls a person, arising out
of or in the course of his work, resulting in injury, illness or
death;
"underlining ours"
71.
Clearly, when the legislator wishes to eliminate causation and make a mere
((
occasion )) suffice for compensation, he knows how to do it; in fact the Loi
szlr les accidents de travail uses a definition similar to that used in the B.C.
supra, which the Supreme Court aptly contrasted with the Loi
statute in b,
sur les accidents automobiles;
72.
When the automobile legislation was adopted, workmen's compensation
existed for many decades and was surely studied as a model;
73.
The legislator clearly decided not to go so far in the definition of automobile
accidents, in the Loi sur les accidents automobile; he maintained causation by
the use of the word "cause", specified that loading was also included although
it, too, requires causation (Bouillon v. Brasserie Labatt Ltke, supra) and set the
stage for the existing jurisprudence;
74.
In Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra, the Supreme Court said at
par. 45:
The legislative evolution and history of the CHRA shed
light on two important matters. First, it strongly supports
the inference that it is likely that Parliament would have
chosen the familiar legal term of art had it been the
intention to confer a power to award costs. Parliament is
presumed to know the law and it is a reasonable inference
that its failure to use familiar terms of art shows that some
other meaning was intended. The history of the enactment
of the provisions in issue supports applying that reasonable
inference because the legal term of art "costs" was used in
some draft provisions but not others. Second, the role
envisioned for the Commission explains why the power to
award costs was not part of Parliament's intent.
"underlining ours"
75.
This makes untenable the view, put forward by Appellant at par. 110 of its
factum, in the discussion of Professor Gardnier's article La loi sur 1 'assurance
automobile: loi d'interpretation libirale, (1992) 33 Cahiers de Droit 485, that
causation under this law does not mean causation as we generally understand
it; when the legislator says "caus6 par" he means exactly what he says; only
he does not require causa causans since the purpose of the law is to eliminate
"fault";
76.
Had he meant something else, he would have said 'A l'occasion den as he did
for workmen's compensation; however, it was "fault" not "cause" that he
wanted to remove;
77.
He is also presumed to know other statutes such as the Loi sur les accidents de
travail and to distinguish them on rational grounds and not per incuriam;
78.
Therefore, the fatal event in this case cannot be described as one caused by an
automobile or by its use;
ARGUMENT IV - DECISIONS IN THE REST OF CANADA
79.
Respondent has shown that
supra makes precisely the distinction which
applies here;
80.
He has also pointed out several recent decisions going the same way;
81.
Two recent judgments of the Supreme Court, Lumhermens Mutual Casualty
Company v. Herbison et als., 2007 SCC 47 and La Citadelle v. Vvtlinaam,
2007 SCC 46, make it clear that even with the use of the words "directly and
indirectly" in the insurance policy in those cases, in stark contrast with
Quebec law, the notion of "car accident" had to remain within the bounds of
common sense;
82.
The Quebec jurisprudence as summed up by Thibault J.A. is thus fully
compatible with other Canadian cases;
ARGUMENT V - DISMISSAL ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS
83.
At the stage of the motion to dismiss, the facts are taken as alleged and any
ambiguity is resolved in favour of Plaintiff;
84.
In
v. Najafi, 500-09-011844-023 the Court of Appeal said:
1. Le premier juge a rejeti le recours de l'appelant a
l'encontre de l'intimi Najafi. Ce faisant, il faisait
droit a une requ&te en irrecevabiliti au motif
d'absence d'alligations de faute a l'igard de ce
difendeur personnellement.
2. Malgri le caractkre ambigu des alligations de la
diclaration amendie, il existe des iliments de cette
declaration qui permettent de conclure que l'appelant
recherche la responsabiliti personnelle de Najafi. Ce
dernier, m2me a titre de mandataire, n'ichappe pas
nicessairement sa responsabilite personnelle.
3. Quoi qu'il en soit, s'il y a un doute 21 ce sujet, le
premier juge aurait dfi en faire binificier I'appelant.
85.
The classical case, involving automobile accident legislation then is force is
v. Fonds d'Indemnisation, [I9701 C.A. 878 and one can also cite
Supermarch6 Coulombe Inc. v. Fediration des Caisses Populaires Desiardins,
119961 R.D.J. 639; both show that one should not readily terminate actions at
the stage of motions to dismiss especially where the facts can vary
significantly from case to case;
86.
In the present case, both the allegations of the Declaration and the expert
report point to one source of fault, the automobile being irrelevant; the
examination of the parents on discovery deal only with the damages since the
parents were not present at the time of the accident;
87.
It was an error to dismiss the action without a full hearing (about the nature of
the accident) since, as Baudouin J.A. pointed out, in
m,supra, each case
depends on common sense applied to its own facts;
88.
The trial judge, when he dismissed the case, clearly misunderstood the facts
radically in paragraph 4 where he thought that the father was in the car;
everyone agrees he was not and this error illustrates the dangers of premature
dismissal;
89.
In
Girard v.
Miscioscia, 500-09-001371-814, this Court allowed an appeal
from an analogous dismissal on motion; the late Mr. Justice Monet said at p.
A ce stade, la Cour superieure etait-elle fondie de conclure
que la prisente action du demandeur n'est pas recevable
devant elle? En d'autres termes, etait-elle ligalement justifiie
de dkcider, en l'espkce, que le dommage corporel a it6 causi
par une automobile? Je ne le crois pas.
I1 est indiniable que les alligations de la diclaration
inoncent que le prijudice corporel subi par le demandeur a
it6 causi par le fait d'un animal dont la difenderesse est
propriitaire. II est a tout le moins douteux, a la lecture de ces
alligations, que le prkjudice a it6 causi par le cyclomoteur,
que ce soit au moment ou le demandeur a perdu I'iquilibre
ou que ce soit aprb.
Dans les circonstances, plutBt que de ((mettre fin
primaturiment au procks D, pour employer ici les termes de
l'article 2 C. pr. Civ., je suis d'avis que la requ6te en
irrecevabiliti aurait dii &tre rejetie. Aussi, selon moi, le
pourvoi doit &re accueilli.
(See also Gosselin v. Ville de Laval, 500-05-013653-835, Durand J.,
v.
m,EYB, 2005-91572, lsabelle J.C.S. and R. v. Imperial Tobacco,
201 1 SCC 42.)
90.
This case should not be dismissed on motion;
ARGUMENT VI - IRRELEVANT ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT
91.
Two arguments raised by Appellant merit brief consideration;
92.
Appellant produces videos and other non-judicial materials concerning the
collapse of an overpass in Quebec and the decision by the government to refer
the case to the SAAQ;
93.
It is essential to note that this was a political decision, that there was never
either a suit or a judgment and that there was widespread social concern and
even dismay about this result; such matters cannot be used as authority one
way or the other; it is simply improper to bring this before the Supreme Court;
94.
Similarly, Appellant's doubts about the propriety of the SAAQ's taking a
position in the case are highly unusual, especially when, in the end, Appellant
accepts it;
95.
In fact, this is a quintessential case where a public body may participate in the
debate in order to state its view of its jurisdiction; no reproach is justified
against it;
96.
Both of these matters are unnecessarily pleaded and are irrelevant;
J
V. - CONCLUSION
97.
Respondents ask that the appeal be dismissed with costs, which in the
circumstances should be taxed on a solicitor/client basis;
MONTREAL, this 2nd day of November 201 I
Attorneys for Respondents
PART VI .
Table of Authorities
Paragraphs
Alberta Union ofProvincia1 Enzployees v. Lethbridge Comnzunity College.
[2004] SCC 28 .....................................................................................................
30
Amos v. Insurance Company ofBritish Columbia. [I9951 3 S.C.R. 405 ............. 8.9.71. 79
Basciano v. STM. [2006] Q.C.C.Q. 9809 ......................................................... 42. 54
Biland v. Fonds d'lndeinnisation. [I9701 C.A. 878 ............................................ 85
Bozrillon 11. La Brasserie Labatt Lfie. 2002 CanLII 16623 (QC C.S.), [2002]
R.R.A. 1010 ..................................................................................................... 42. 52. 73
C...A... v. SAAQ, SAS-Q 082123-01 11 ...............................................................
42
Canadian Hzr~nanRights Commission v . A.G. Canada, [2011] SCC 53 ............. 68
Carrigcrn v. La Cour du Quibec et als., 2005 QCCA 589 ................................... 30
Chisolnz v. Liberty Mzrtual Grozp, [2001] CanLII 28236 (On S.C.) ................... 41
Chisolnz v. Liberty Muttral Group, 2002 CanLII 45020 (ON C.A.) .................... 41
La Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Vytlingam, [2007] 3 S.C.R., 373 .............. 35, 81
Conzeazr v. Pozrliol. [I9971 R.R.A. 1079 ..............................................................
54
Connors v. Kingsway General Insurance. [2005] CanLII 36258
(0nS.C.) .............................................................................................................. 41
D'Aigle v. Whitton. 1988 R.R.A. 838 .................................................................. 42
Delbzrguet v. La Cour dzr Qzribec et als., C.S. Montreal
500-17-015597-035 .............................................................................................. 30
F.B. v. S.A.A.Q., AZ-04551601 (T.A.Q.) ...........................................................
54
Flannery v. Ville de Gatineau. [2008] QC C.Q. 8570 ......................................... 54
Gazrdreatr v. The Business Depot Ltd . et als.. EYB 2006-109130 S.C ................ 56
Gauihier v. Sociifi de transport de la communauti urbaine de Montrial
(STCUM). [2008] QC C.Q. 11044 ...................................................................... 54
Gii-nrd v. Les Carri2res St. Eustache, C.S. 700.05.000723.852, [I9861
R.R.334 ............................................................................................................. 42.50
Girard v. Miscioscia, [I9841 AZ-85011022 C.A.. [I9841 R.D.J. 621 ................. 42, 50, 89
Gosselin v. Ville de Laval, 500-05-013653-835, Durand J.................................. 89
Guirin v. F. Ratti Inc., AZ-50208171, (C.Q.) .....................................................
54
L.S. (Succession de) v. Sociiti de l'asswance automobile du Que'bec, [2008]
QC TAQ 09694 ...................................................................................................
54
Lazcrin v. CCRQ, EYB, 2005-91572, Isabelle J.C.S., [2005] R.R.A. 880 (CS) ... 54. 89
Letkeman v. Cvitko, [2010] ABCA 259 (CanLII) .............................................. 41
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Herbison, [2007] SCC 47 ........................ 35, 81
Ormsbee v. Bell Canada, [1990] R.R.A. 677 .................................................... 50
Richard v. Hydro-Québec, J.Ex. 82-531 ............................................................ 50
Pagé v. Société de transport de Sherbrooke, [2008] QC C.Q. 3244 ................... 54
Les Productions Pram v. Lemay, [1992] R.J.Q. 1738 ........................................ 32, 34, 35, 38,
39, 42, 87
S.A.A.Q. v. Benoît, [1999] R.R.A. 15 ................................................................ 50
S.A A.Q. v. Ville de Dorion-Vaudreuil, [2011] QC C.A. 1509 ........................... 40
Sara v. Najafi, 500-09-011844-023 ................................................................... 84
Société de l’Assurance-Automobile v. Restaurants McDonald, REJB 11234 ..... 42, 51
St-Pierre v. La Pocatière (Hôtel de ville), [2009] QC C.S. 4896 ....................... 54
Stante v. Gravino, [2008] QC C.S. 2496 ........................................................... 54
Supermarché Coulombe Inc. v. Fédération des Caisses Populaires
Desjardins, [1996] R.D.J. 639 .......................................................................... 85
Weiner v. Montréal, [1998] R.R.A. 820 ............................................................ 54
Zukowski v. O’Bee, [2010] ABQB 421 ............................................................. 41
R. v. Imperial Tobacco, 2011 SCC 42………………………………………….
24
89