1 What theory of social justice is best fit for disabled people ? What

What theory of social justice
Colloque ASERH
5 juillet 2012
is best fit for disabled people ?
Philippe Sanchez
What do we owe, politically, to… ? That is the fundamental question of every theory of
justice. What do we owe, politically, to disabled people ? Here is my fundamental question. In
other words, what theory of social justice is best fit for disabled people ? And then I will
propose several possible answers, in order to outline an approach of a theory of social justice
for disabled people.
The aim of a theory of social justice is, notably, to think what the fair transfer of goods
is, for a group of people considered as needing public support. To conceive such a theory, the
thinker has to answer two main questions. Firstly : equality of what ? Secondly : what is the
fair account of distribution?
We could think about some other field of the theories of justice, without distribution as
its prominent feature. But today, my perspective is absolutely distributive, and I will work
here only on the distribution. A theory of justice suitable for disabled people is necessarily
distributive, I believe. It’s my axiomatic assumption, that won’t be proved.
My speech is divided into two parts. Firstly, I will answer the question : equality of
what? Next, I will deal with the question : what is the fair account of distribution ?
I.
Equality of what?
To understand every issue of justice, we need to choose a prominent focus of analysis.
In democratic countries, a problem of justice is absolutely considered in regards to equality
and inequality. We have to choose an element of equality, to justify this, and to appraise the
different unfair inequalities, subjected by a social group, here disabled people, in regards to
another group, here the valid people. This element of equality, in political philosophy and
normative economics, is called “the metric”.
To choose the fair metric, it is interesting to study (here, very quickly, unfortunately)
the debate between the US philosopher Ronald Dworkin and the Indian economist and
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philosopher Amartya Sen (Nobel Prize in Economics, 1998). This debate is interesting for us,
because Dworkin and Sen work specifically about justice for disabled people.
In chapter two of his book Sovereign Virtue : The Theory and Practice of Equality,
Ronald Dworkin (2000, ch. 2) evokes the question : what is unfair for disabled people, in
regards to valid people ? Have the disabled got a lower welfare than the valid ? Dworkin
(2000, 60 (129)) asserts that disabled people, as a social group, could be considered as having
a lower level of welfare. But this hypothesis is not convincing for him. The well-being
depends on each person : we can find some happy disabled people, and also some unhappy
disabled people, explains Dworkin. It is the same for the valid. No rule exists about it. For
Dworkin, the element of equality is absolutely not the well-being, but rather the resources.
Dworkin considers the physical abilities and the mental skills to define the resources,
but he refuses to elaborate his approach from this definition of the resources. To equalize
some different abilities, mental or physical, would imply to define the norm of the good body
and the real and true intelligence. But, for Dworkin (2000, 80 (158)), it is impossible to define
seriously what are the physical or mental norms of reference.
Moreover, Dworkin (2000, 80 (158)) explains that we have to choose between some
transferable and manipulable resources. Indeed, the subject of a distributive theory of justice
is to find some resource, as the metric, that can be distributed. Even if the technologies of
rehabilitation are in rapid progress, we cannot transfer a valid brain or other individual
resources. We have to find a kind of resources what can be used to correct the injustices for
every kind of disability. This kind of resource found may be the criterion used to compare the
different categories of compensation.
Dworkin (2000, 80 (158)) writes about a good conception of resources to deal out
justice for disabled people :
The problem is, rather, one of determining how far the ownership of independent material resources
should be affected by differences that exist in physical and mental powers, and the response of our theory
should speak in that vocabulary.
Le problème consiste plutôt à déterminer dans quelle mesure la possession de ressources matérielles
indépendantes doit être affectée par les différences entre les capacités mentales et physiques des
individus ; la réponse que notre théorie va apporter devra être formulée dans les termes de ce vocabulairelà.
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But Amartya Sen (2009, 265 (323)) criticizes Dworkin, pointing out that the resources
for Dworkin are essentially in cash; but Dworkin doesn’t seem interested by how disabled
people can use these. Sen (2009, 258 (315)) writes about disabled people :
The impairment of income-earning ability, which can be called “the earning handicap”, tends to be
reinforced and much magnified in its effect by “the conversion handicap”: the difficulty in converting
incomes and resources into good living, precisely because of disability.
La dégradation de leur aptitude à gagner un revenu, appelons la le “handicap de gain”, est aggravée et
amplifiée dans ses effets par le « handicap de conversion” : leur difficulté à convertir revenus et
ressources en bien-vivre, précisément à cause de leur invalidité.
Disabled people are compelled to use a large part of their incomes to compensate their
disabilities. That is a strong inequality between disabled and valid people. It is important to
understand what a disabled person with his/her abilities, disabilities, and his/her incomes can
achieve. To answer this question, Sen proposes that the differences of capability are the point
of equality and justice, for every citizen and thus for every disabled person.
Sen (2009, 231-232 (284-285)) writes :
A person’s advantage in terms of opportunities is judged to be lower than that of another if she has less
capability – less real opportunity – to achieve those things that she has reason to value. (…) The concept
of capability is thus linked closely with the opportunity aspect of freedom, seen in terms of
“comprehensive” opportunities, and not just focusing on what happens at “culmination”.
L’avantage d’une personne, en termes d’opportunités, est jugé inférieur à celui d’une autre, si elle a moins
de capabilité – moins d’opportunités réelles – de réaliser ce à quoi elle a raison d’attribuer de la valeur.
(...) Le concept de capabilité est donc étroitement lié à la dimension d’opportunité de la liberté vue en
termes d’opportunités « compréhensives », et pas seulement focalisé sur ce qui se passe « finalement ».
We can find an another definition of the notion of capability, in a previous work of Sen
(1992, 39-40 (66)) :
Closely related to the notion of functionings is that of the capability to function. It represents the various
combinations of functionings (beins and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of
vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another.
Etroitement liée à la notion de fonctionnements, il y a l’idée de capabilité de fonctionner. Elle représente
les diverses combinaisons de fonctionnements (états et actions) que la personne peut accomplir. La
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capabilité est, par conséquent, un ensemble de vecteurs de fonctionnements, qui indique qu’un individu
est libre de mener tel ou tel type de vie.
A capability is not the same as a physical or mental ability, even though a physical or
mental ability can be seen as a capability. A capability is a condition for some valuable
choices. If my dream is to become a champion in motor racing, to be able to see is very
important. It is a capability necessary to achieve my dream. But, to have a good income to pay
for my motorbike and my intensive training is also very important. To have a good income is
a capability for a racer. To live in a country where this sport is encouraged and not forbidden
is likewise a capability.
If I am blind, to become a famous racer is not relevant for me. But I would like to move
along in the street. To live in a land where a public policy gives some guidedogs is a
capability for me, in regards to my need to walk. To live in a land where the traffic lights ring
to inform the walkers to cross the road is a capability for a blind man.
The concept of capability appears very useful to encompass the subtleties of the
political and ethical problems of disabled people. It could be a prominent metric. Now, it
happens to examine two options to choose the fair account of distribution.
II.
What is the fair principle of distribution ?
In the previous part, we have just seen the capability as an interesting metric to appraise
the inequalities between disabled people and able-bodied people, and to distribute some goods
in correction of injustice. What is the fair account of distribution to make justice for disabled
people ?
We could examine several theories of social justice to find the right account :
utilitarianism, prioritarianism, egalitarianism etc… I will sketch rapidly an opposition
between two accounts of distribution. We leave now the debate between Dworkin and Sen,
because Sen is very unclear – maybe even mute – about this point. On contrary, Martha
Nussbaum (2006), US philosopher working on the capability approach, deals with the issue of
the fair account of distribution. We will see the different conceptions of Dworkin and
Nussbaum.
Ronald Dworkin (2000, 287), in his conception of the fair distribution, is very sensitive
to the individual responsibility. For him :
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In principle, I said, individuals should be relieved of consequential responsibility for those unfortunate
features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from
their own choices. If someone has been born blind or without talents others have, that is his bad luck, and,
so far as this can be managed, a just society would compensate him for that bad luck. But if he has fewer
resources than other people now because he spent more on luxuries earlier, or because he chose not to
work, or to work at less remunerative jobs than others chose, then his situation is the result of choice not
luck, and he is not entitled to any compensation that would make up his present shortfall.
En principe, je l’ai dit, les individus ne devraient pas être tenus responsables des conséquences de
caractéristiques malheureuses de leur situation qui sont des formes de malchance brute, mais ils devraient
être tenus responsables de celles qui résultent de leurs propres choix. Si quelqu’un est né aveugle ou sans
les talents dont disposent les autres, c’est la malchance, et, dans la mesure où cela peut être arrangé, une
société juste devrait le compenser pour cette malchance. Mais s’il a moins de ressources que les autres
maintenant parce qu’il choisit de ne pas travailler, ou d’exercer une profession mal rémunérée, alors sa
situation n’est pas le résultat de la malchance, et il ne peut revendiquer une quelconque compensation
pour faire face à sa misère actuelle1.
For Dworkin, it is unfair to have some different conditions of life, when your good or
bad life is determined by brute luck. The differences of life are not unfair when your
conditions of life are determined by your own choices. Dworkin is for equality between those
who have good luck and bad luck. He is “luck egalitarian” and defends an account of
distribution responsibility-sensitive. For Dworkin, if someone is disabled because he had an
accident in his car, being drunk, he is responsible for his shortfall. There is no reason that
society should help him.
But we can find some philosophers who are indifferent to the individual responsibility.
Martha Nussbaum (2006, ch. 3), for example, considers a disabled person as lacking some
capabilities. Nussbaum proposes a list of ten capabilities, too long to develop here. I am just
summarizing this list : to be able to have a long life, to be able to have a flourishing sexuality,
to be able to have security for his/her body and his/her soul (emotional security), to be able to
be taught, to be able to have a critical account of his/her life, to be able to be linked with
others, to be able to play, to be able to live in harmony with other species, to be able to
participate in the political life of your society, to be able to have a job to earn your own
income, and to work in some good conditions without exploitation 2.
1
This quotation is not present in the French translation of Sovereign Virtue. Actually, La vertu souveraine is the
translation of the four first chapters of Sovereign Virtue. I translate this quotation.
2
See the list of the ten capabilities in Nussbaum (2006, 76-78).
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For Nussbaum (2006, ch. 3), never mind about the individual responsibility of disabled
people in their impairments and disabilities. The point of equality is the differences of
capability in a basic level. She doesn’t want to know – in the opposite of Dworkin – if a
disabled person is responsible for his impairments and disabilities. For her, the role of the
political power, in terms of distributive justice, is to lead each citizen above a basic level of
capability, for each capability of her list. She writes about her approach :
It is an account of minimum core social entitlements, and it is compatible with different views about how
to handle issues of justice and distribution that would arise once all citizens are above the threshold level 3.
C’est un schème de droits sociaux fondamentaux, et il est compatible avec différentes vues au sujet de
comment utiliser les questions de justice et de distribution qui élèveraient tous les citoyens au-delà du
niveau de seuil.
Such a conception of social justice is called “sufficientism”. It is fair to lead citizens above a
basic threshold. After, the problems of social justice are to work differently. The first claim to
make justice for disabled people is to lead them above the threshold of capability. Maybe, is
there any other claim to make justice for disabled people; but this is not our topic now.
Conclusion
To conceive a theory of social justice for disabled people – or a minima an approach of
social justice – we have to choose a prominent metric and a fair account of distribution. I have
just proposed two metrics : material resources and capability. I have also proposed two
accounts of distribution : one luck-egalitarian and one sufficientist account. We could propose
some other metrics and some other accounts of fair distribution.
However, my aim, today, has been only to open the options to think a fair conception of
social justice for disabled people. Now, it is to you to think, for you, what is the best approach
of social justice for disabled people. Maybe, I will soon have the opportunity to stimulate our
reflection about it, proposing some other options of metric and account of fair distribution for
disabled people.
3
Nussbaum (2006, 75).
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normative des politiques sociales en faveur des personnes handicapées », in Triomphe
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Dworkin Ronald (2000), Sovereign Virtue : The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge
(USA), Harvard University Press.
Dworkin Ronald (2007), La vertu souveraine, Bruxelles, Bruylant.
Nussbaum Martha (2006), Frontiers of Justice : Disability, Nationality, Species Membership,
Cambridge (USA), The Belknap Press Of Harvard University Press.
Sen Amartya (1992), Inequality Reexamined, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996.
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