Review no. 67

Review no. 67
Press Review
16—30 April 2014
Table of Contents
Pages
African Union
- Press Release of the High-Level Retreat on 28-29 April 2014 in Durban, South Africa,
on the theme Silencing Guns in Africa: Building a Roadmap to a Conflict-Free Continent
- La MISCA endeuillée par la mort d'un soldat du contingent Camerounais de la mission
- Communiqué of the AU PSC of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU),
at its 429th meeting
- Communique de Presse de la 430ème réunion du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'UA
- The African Union deeply concerned at the prevailing situation in South Sudan
- The African Union-led Regional Task Force captures a commander of The Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) In the Central African Republic
- L’Union Africaine se félicite de l'évolution encourageante de la situation politique à Madagascar
Communiqué of the AU PSC of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its
429th meeting on the upcoming elections in Egypt by the Department of the Political Affairs
of the AU Commission
- Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 429th meeting
on the situation in Guinea Bissau
4
6
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9
12
14
15
16
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Terrorism in Africa
- UE/Afrique, deux continents, une même vision dominée par un partenariat stratégique
- New message from al Qaeda leader
- Pourquoi faut-il croire en l’Afrique ?
- Afrique: les pays les plus développés sont aussi les moins sécurisés
19
22
24
34
Cameroon
- PRISE D’OTAGES : A QUI PROFITE LE CRIME ?
37
Congo
- Congo: M23 Down but Not Out
41
Egypt
- Draft terrorism law ‘won’t make the country safer’: Human Rights Watch
- Inside Egypt's new threat: Ansar Beit al Maqdis
- Ajnad Misr claims latest bombing in Cairo
- Egypt: Violence & the struggle for power
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45
49
51
Kenya
- Kenya’s anti-terror (anti-Somali) strategy begins to emerge
2
53
Libya
- INTEL ANALYST: GADHAFI WANTED OUT
58
Mali
- Mali: Polls Show Turn to Optimism
62
Nigeria
- INSECURITY IN NIGERIA: It’s another civil war — says Gowon
- BOKO HARAM’S ROOTS IN NIGERIA LONG PREDATE THE AL-QAEDA ERA
- Boko Haram gagne du terrain en Afrique de l’ouest
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Rwanda
- Rwanda - 20 Years After the Genocide, A State of Fear
82
Uganda
- Uganda: 'My Healing Has Begun' - Uganda Votes to Provide Gender-Sensitive Reparations Fund 87
Trends & Developments
USA
- Water wars: Military sees climate change as 'threat multiplier' for violent clashes
90
Regional Economic Communities
ECOWAS
- Stratégies contre la criminalité organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest
93
International Organizations
UN
- Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 'Destructive As Any Bomb or Bullet,' Security Council Told
95
Terrorism in the World
France
- Hollande issues ‘probable death’ notice – and everyone’s perplexed
98
United Kingdom
- Tony Blair, the Violent Islamist's Best Friend
- A return to Londonistan?
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107
USA
- When it comes to security at nuclear facilities, danger likely lurks from within,
Stanford scholar says
- Telling the Truth about Terrorism and Islamic Charities
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112
115
African Union
Press Release of the High-Level Retreat on 28-29 April 2014 in Durban,
South Africa, on the theme Silencing Guns in Africa: Building a
Roadmap to a Conflict-Free Continent
PENING REMARKS OF DR DLAMINI ZUMA AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE
AFRICAN UNION HIGH LEVEL RETREAT SITTING UNDER THE THEME: SILENCING THE GUNS IN AFRICA: BUILDING A ROADMAP TO CONFLICT FREE CONTI-
Durban, 29 April 2014: The African Union Commission (AUC) convened a High-Level
Retreat on 28-29 April 2014 in Durban, South Africa, on the theme Silencing Guns in
Africa: Building a Roadmap to a Conflict-Free Continent, with the intention of exploring concrete options towards silencing guns in Africa. The overarching objective
of the Retreat was to lay a foundation for the subsequent elaboration of a
Roadmap towards a conflict-free Africa.
This Retreat was convened in the spirit of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration,
adopted on 25 May 2013 by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
The Retreat took place in the aftermath of the recently concluded Open Session of
the AU Peace and Security Council, which addressed itself to the same issue. Thus,
this Retreat constituted part of an on-going process to coordinate efforts towards
concretely living up to the commitments of the AU Assembly.
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The Retreat was conducted under the leadership of the Chairperson of the AUC,
H.E. Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In her opening remarks, the Chairperson called
upon the Experts in attendance to engage in frank and open discussions in order to
develop concrete and innovative ideas towards silencing guns in Africa. The Chairperson noted that, “unless we silence the guns and bury the machetes, the AU vision of building an integrated, prosperous and conflict-free Africa will remain an
abstract goal.”
The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, provided
the context of the Retreat, as well as its expected outcome. He stressed the need
for participants to bear in mind the necessity of identifying elements that will constitute the Roadmap for silencing guns in Africa.
The deliberations of the High-Level Retreat were indicative of the overarching nature of the tasks required towards building a concrete roadmap. In this context,
Experts reflected on the current and on-going efforts to consolidate the growing
positive trends in areas of democracy and governance, the continent’s ability to
rapidly respond to conflicts and crises, as well as efforts to enhance Africa’s engagements with the rest of the world in order to derive maximum possible socioeconomic benefits for all Africans. Further, the participants underlined emerging
trends concerning the continent’s changing demographic profiles, broader socioeconomic and environmental conditions, and their subsequent impacts on ensuring
sustainable peace and ending all wars.
The participants agreed that the deliberations emerging from this High-Level Retreat should constitute the building blocks within the framework of the AUC’s ongoing efforts towards the elaboration of a concrete roadmap towards silencing all
guns in Africa.
The AUC expressed its appreciation to the participation of African experts, drawn
from the Regional Economic Communities, including the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), as well as
from African think-tanks and civil society organizations, and representatives from
multilateral partners and international organizations.
The AUC expressed its gratitude to the Government and People of South Africa for
the hospitality provided, as well as to the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) for its support in facilitating the Retreat.
5
La MISCA endeuillée par la mort d'un soldat du contingent Camerounais de la mission
Bangui, le 27 avril 2014: Le Représentant spécial de la Présidente de la Commission de l’Union africaine (UA) et chef de la Mission internationale de soutien à la
Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA), le Général Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, a appris avec tristesse le décès d’un soldat du contingent camerounais de la
MISCA à la suite d’un incident survenu à Paoua, au Nord-Est de Bangui, le 26 avril
2014. Cet incident a également fait un blessé. Une enquête a été diligentée par la
MISCA pour déterminer les circonstances de l’incident. Cette nouvelle perte porte à
25 le nombre de personnels en uniforme décédés et à 148 celui des blessés depuis
le déploiement de la MISCA, le 19 décembre 2013.
Au nom de la Présidente de la Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamin-Zuma, le Représentant spécial et chef de la MISCA adresse ses sincères condoléances à la famille
et aux proches du soldat décédé, ainsi qu’au Gouvernement camerounais. Il souhaite un prompt rétablissement au soldat blessé.
Le Représentant spécial réitère la détermination de la MISCA à mener à bien sa
mission, conformément au mandat fixé par le Conseil de paix et de securité de l’UA
dans son communiqué du 19 juillet 2013 et le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies
dans sa résolution 2127 (2013) du 5 décembre 2013.
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Communiqué of the AU PSC of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union (AU), at its 429th meeting
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its
430th meeting, held an open session, on 24 April 2014, devoted to the theme:
“Silencing the Guns: Pre-requisites for Realising a Conflict-Free Africa by the Year
2020”. Statements were made by AU Member States, non-African countries, bilateral and multilateral partners and international organization/institutions, as well as
by civil society organisations (CSOs).
Participants and Council agreed on the need for rapid, appropriate and courageous
response to early warnings on potential outbreaks of violent conflicts. In this context, they called for the further strengthening of all existing preventive diplomacy
tools, including the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System
and to ensure quick response when the need arises. Participants underscored the
importance of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and called for its
full operationalization, particularly the African Standby Force and its Rapid Deployment Capability.
Participants and Council acknowledged the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in maintaining international peace and security and
stressed the need for enhancing the strategic partnership between the AU PSC and
the UNSC. They also emphasized the importance of the partnership between Africa
and the international community in effectively addressing both current and emerging threats to peace and security on the continent. They nonetheless, stressed the
primary responsibility of AU Member States in protecting their citizens and ensuring stability.
Participants and Council also emphasized the obligations of individuals and nonstate actors to uphold the culture of peace and tolerance, as well as to refrain from
actions that undermine peace and stability on the continent.
Participants and Council stressed the need for the identification and neutralisation
of the root causes of violent conflicts. They called for common understanding, definition of, and response to, the root causes of violent conflicts so as to build consensus on the solutions required to comprehensively and effectively address them.
The importance of good governance, respect for human rights, popular participation and inclusivity was recognized. In this regard, there was a strong call for AU
Member States to deepen the culture of democracy, accountability and good governance on the continent. Furthermore, they called on AU Member States that are
yet to sign, ratify and domesticate existing AU legal frameworks and normative instruments, to do so, with a view to promoting durable peace and stability.
As a foundation for durable peace and stability, Member States were urged to re-
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double their efforts in economic development, ensure the well-being of their people and comprehensively address the problem of youth unemployment on the continent.
Participants urged Member States to strengthen their regulatory mechanisms on
the exploitation and management of natural resources and to ensure that the proceeds from these resources are utilized in meeting the basic needs of their people,
with a view to promoting equitable development and distribution of benefits.
There was a strong call for Council to be more engaged and to make efforts to
make regular visits to conflict and post-conflict areas. Council welcomed the suggestion and agreed to include such visits in its Annual Programme of Work.
Participants called for greater synergies within the AU Commission and among AU
Member States. They stressed the need for greater engagement and collaboration
with CSOs and the African academia, within the context of the Livingstone Formula,
taking into account the Conclusions of the Maseru PSC Retreat of February 2014.
Participants recalled paragraph 17 of Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.501
(XXII), which declared 2014-2024 as the Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa and, in this regard, stressed the importance of national reconciliation in nation-building, conflict resolution, as well as promotion of national
healing and justice.
Participants and Council called for practical measures to effectively address the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and other types of weaponry, including
the need for universal signature and ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty. They
called for the naming and shaming of suppliers, financiers, facilitators, transit
points and recipients of illicit weapons, with a view to stemming the phenomenon
of the illicit proliferation of these weapons.
Council requested the Commission to undertake a comprehensive study on the
flow of illicit weapons into and within Africa and submit to it the outcome of such a
study.
Council agreed on the urgent need for the elaboration of a Roadmap, to be submitted, for consideration by the Assembly, to underpin the actions necessary for
the attainment of the goal of a conflict-free Africa by 2020, and called on all stakeholders to contribute to this process. Council requested the Commission to prepare
the elements of a Roadmap for its consideration.
Council agreed to remain seized of the matter.
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Communique de Presse de la 430ème réunion du Conseil de paix et de
sécurité de l'UA
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS ) de l'Union africaine ( UA), en sa
430ème réunion, a tenu une séance publique, le 24 avril 2014, consacrée au thème :
‘’Faire taire les armes : conditions préalables pour réaliser une Afrique exempte de
conflits d'ici 2020''. Des déclarations ont été faites par les États membres de l'UA,
les pays non-africains, les partenaires bilatéraux et multilatéraux, les organisations/
institutions internationales, ainsi que par les organisations de la société civile (OSC).
Les participants et le Conseil sont convenus de la nécessité d'une réponse rapide,
appropriée et courageuse aux alertes rapides sur les déclenchements potentiels de
conflits violents. Dans ce contexte, ils ont appelé à renforcer davantage tous les
outils existants de diplomatie préventive, y compris le Groupe des Sages et le système continental d'alerte rapide et à assurer une réponse rapide en cas de besoin.
Les participants ont souligné l'importance de l’architecture africaine de paix et de
sécurité, et ont appelé à son operationalisation intégrale, en particulier la Force
africaine en attente et sa capacité de déploiement rapide.
Les participants et le Conseil ont reconnu la responsabilité principale du Conseil de
sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales et ont souligné la nécessité de renforcer le partenariat stratégique
entre le CPS de l'UA et le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Ils ont également
souligné l'importance du partenariat entre l'Afrique et la communauté internationale dans la lutte efficace contre les menaces actuelles et émergentes à la paix et à
la sécurité sur le continent. Ils ont, néanmoins, souligné la responsabilité principale
des États membres de l'UA de protéger leurs citoyens et d'assurer la stabilité.
Les participants et le Conseil ont également souligné les obligations des individus et
des acteurs non-étatiques de respecter la culture de la paix et de la tolérance, ainsi
que de s'abstenir de toute action qui compromet la paix et la stabilité sur le continent.
Les participants et le Conseil ont souligné la nécessité d'identifier et de neutraliser
les causes profondes des conflits violents. Ils ont appelé à une compréhension, définition et réponse communes aux causes profondes des conflits violents, afin d’établir un consensus sur les solutions nécessaires pour y répondre de manière globale
et efficace.
L'importance de la bonne gouvernance, du respect des droits de l'homme, de la
participation populaire et de l'inclusion a été reconnue. À cet égard, un appel puissant a été lancé aux États membres de l'UA pour approfondir la culture de la démocratie, de la responsabilisation et de la bonne gouvernance sur le continent. Les
Etats membres de l'UA qui n’ont pas encore signé, ratifié et intégré dans leur légi-
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slation les cadres juridiques et les instruments normatifs existants de l'UA, ont
été, en outre, appelé à le faire, afin de promouvoir la paix et la stabilité durables.
En tant que fondation pour la paix et la stabilité durables, les États membres ont
été exhortés à redoubler d'efforts dans le développement économique, à assurer
le bien-être de leurs populations et à régler globalement le problème du chômage des jeunes sur le continent.
Les participants ont exhorté les États membres à renforcer leurs mécanismes de
réglementation de l'exploitation et de gestion des ressources naturelles et à
s'assurer que les revenus de ces ressources sont utilisés pour satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de leurs populations, afin de promouvoir un développement
équitable et un partage des avantages.
Un appel puissant a été lancé au Conseil pour s’engager davantage et déployer
des efforts pour effectuer des visites régulières aux zones de conflit et postconflit. Le Conseil s'est félicité de la proposition et a convenu d'inclure ces visites
dans son programme de travail annuel.
Les participants ont appelé à de plus grandes synergies au sein de la Commission
de l'UA et entre les États membres de l'UA. Ils ont souligné la nécessité d’un engagement et d’une collaboration plus importants avec les OSC et le milieu universitaire africain, dans le cadre de la Formule de Livingstone, en tenant compte des
conclusions de la retraite du CPS à Maseru de février 2014.
Les participants ont rappelé le paragraphe 17 de la décision de la Conférence de
l’Union Assembly/AU/Dec.501 (XXII), qui a proclamé 2014-2024 comme la Décennie Madiba Nelson Mandela de la réconciliation en Afrique et, à cet égard, souligné l'importance de la réconciliation nationale dans la construction de la nation
et le règlement de conflits, ainsi que la promotion de l’apaisement national et de
la justice.
Les participants et le Conseil ont appelé à prendre des mesures pratiques, afin de
lutter efficacement contre la prolifération illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre et d'autres types d'armes, y compris la nécessité de signer et de ratifier le
Traité sur le commerce des armes. Ils ont appelé à la dénonciation publique des
fournisseurs, des financiers, des facilitateurs, des points de transit et des bénéficiaires d'armes illicites, en vue d'endiguer le phénomène de prolifération de ces
armes.
Le Conseil a demandé à la Commission d'entreprendre une étude globale sur le
flux des armes illicites vers et en Afrique et de lui soumettre les conclusions de
cette étude.
Le Conseil est convenu de la nécessité urgente d'élaborer une feuille de route, qui
sera soumise, pour examen par la Conférence, afin de sous-tendre les actions né-
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cessaires à la réalisation de l'objectif d'une Afrique exempte de conflits d'ici à
2020, et a appelé toutes les parties prenantes à contribuer à ce processus. Le
Conseil a demandé à la Commission de préparer les éléments d'une feuille de
route qui lui sera soumise pour examen.
Le Conseil a décidé de rester saisi de la question.
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The African Union deeply concerned at the prevailing situation in
South Sudan
Addis Ababa, 22 April 2014: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is deeply concerned at the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in South Sudan. In this respect,
she strongly condemns the deliberate and criminal attack on civilians in Bentiu, Unity State, on 15 April 2014, where over 200 civilians were reportedly killed and more
than 400 wounded while sheltering in a Mosque. This dastardly act was followed
by another attack on civilians who were under the protection of peacekeepers in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) camp
in Bor, Jonglei State, on 17 April 2014, during which over 40 people were killed and
many others were wounded.
This tragedy is all the more shocking as it came amid efforts by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to facilitate the implementation of the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that was signed by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A
- in opposition), on 23 January 2014.
The Chairperson of the Commission would like to remind both the Government and
the SPLM/A (in opposition) of their responsibility to fully abide by the Agreements
they signed and their obligation regarding the protection of all civilians, including
those who are under the protection of the UN. She urges both parties to fully cooperate with the IGAD-led Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM), in order to
investigate these attacks and to bring their perpetrators to justice.
The Chairperson of the Commission strongly urges both parties to the conflict in
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South Sudan to take seriously the upcoming political negotiations to resolve their
dispute and fully cooperate with IGAD to facilitate the early completion of
the deployment of the Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs), so as to avoid
such similar tragedies in the future.
Finally, the Chairperson of the Commission reiterates AU’s continued support to
the IGAD efforts aimed at finding a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in South Sudan.
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The African Union-led Regional Task Force captures a commander of
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) In the Central African Republic
Addis Ababa, 22 April 2014: The African Union-led Regional Task Force (AU-RTF)
troops in the Central African Republic (CAR), on 21 April 2014, captured a commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Lt. Charles Okello, West of River Kotto,
about 20km West of Bakuma in the South-eastern part of the country. During the
battle in which Lt. Charles Okello was captured, the AU-RTF troops also rescued
three women and seven children, and recovered one (01) sub-machine gun, three
(03) hunters’ rifles, assorted ammunition and one (01) Walkie Talkie radio. The AU
Forces are continuing to track other members of the group to which Lt Charles
Okello belonged.
Elsewhere, the AU-RTF troops are conducting search and destroy operations in Ango Territory in north-eastern DRC, to rid the area of small scale LRA attacks aimed
at looting supplies for survival.
The AU Commission commends the RTF for its successive successes against the
LRA, as illustrated by a reduction in LRA attacks on civilians and the relative improvement in the security as well as humanitarian situation in south-eastern CAR
and north-eastern DRC.
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L’Union Africaine se félicite de l'évolution encourageante de la situation politique à Madagascar
Addis Abéba, le 18 avril 2014: La Présidente de la Commission de l’Union africaine
(UA), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, se félicite de l'évolution encouragente de la situation politique à Madagascar. Dans ce contexte, elle note avec satisfaction la nomination, le 11 avril 2014, par le Président Hery Rajaonarimampianina d’un nouveau Premier ministre en la personne de M. Kolo Christophe Laurent Roger et la
formation, ce jour, d'un nouveau Gouvernement.
La Présidente de la Commission souligne que ces développements imprimeront la
dynamique nécessaire aux efforts des autorités malgaches visant à consolider les
acquis remarquables enregistrés ces derniers mois et faciliteront le processus de
relèvement socio-économique du pays. Elle réitère l’appel lancé par la neuvième
réunion du Groupe international de contact sur Madagascar (GIC-M), tenue à Antananarivo, le 28 mars 2014, pour que les partenaires internationaux apportent à
Madagascar tout le soutien dont le pays a besoin.
La Présidente de la Commission réaffirme l’engagement de l’UA, en tant que coPrésident du Groupe international de soutien pour Madagascar (GIS-M), qui se
substitue au GIC-M, à poursuivre ses efforts en appui au Gouvernement malgache,
particulièrement en ce qui concerne le développement socio-économique, la gouvernance et la réconciliation nationale.
15
Communiqué of the AU PSC of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union (AU), at its 429th meeting on the upcoming elections in
Egypt by the Department of the Political Affairs of the AU Commission.
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 429th meeting, held
on 16 April 2014, was briefed on the upcoming elections in Egypt by the Department of the Political Affairs of the AU Commission.
Council took note of the briefing. Council recalled all its legal instruments on unconstitutional changes of government, as well as its communiqué PSC/AHG/
COMM.3(CDXVI) on the situation in Egypt, adopted at its 416 th meeting held on 29
January 2014, and agreed to review the overall situation in Egypt following the
presentation of the report to be submitted by the AU High-Level Panel for Egypt.
Council further encouraged the Department of Political Affairs to continue its engagement in support of democratization efforts in Africa.
Council agreed to remain seized of the matter.
16
Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
(AU), at its 429th meeting on the situation in Guinea Bissau
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 429 th meeting held
on 16 April 2014, adopted the following decision on the situation in Guinea Bissau:
Council,
1. Takes note of the briefing provided by the Director for Political Affairs of the AU
Commission on the post-election situation in Guinea Bissau. Council also takes
note of the statement made by the Representative of Ghana, in its capacity as the
Chair of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
2. Recalls its previous communiqués and press statements on the situation in Guinea Bissau, in particular communiqués PSC/AHG/BR/1(CCCXCVII), adopted at its
397th meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government, in New York, on
23 September 2013, and PSC/PR/COMM.1(CDVIII) of 13 December 2013;
3. Expresses its deep appreciation to the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), notably Nigeria and the ECOWAS Commission for developing an
elaborate package of assistance to the Electoral Management Bodies (EBMs) in
Guinea Bissau, in particular, the Technical Support Agency for the Management of
the Electoral Process (GTAPE) which greatly facilitated the successful holding of
Presidential and Legislative elections in Guinea Bissau on 13 April 2014. Council welcomes the peaceful atmosphere in which the elections took place in a free,
fair and transparent manner;
4. Further expresses its appreciation to the AU Commission and the AU Election
Observation Mission (AUEOM), which was led by former President Joaquim
Chissano of Mozambique, for its support to Guinea Bissau and its people, which has
significantly contributed towards the completion of the transition. Also expresses its appreciation to the international partners for providing support to the election process in Guinea Bissau and appeals to them to continue to support Guinea
Bissau to emerge from the crisis;
5. Commends the political parties, independent candidates and the people of Guinea Bissau for signing a consensual code of conduct and abiding by its provisions to
allow the electoral process to take place in a calm and peaceful environment
throughout the electioneering campaigns;
6. Welcomes the progress made in Guinea Bissau’s transitional process, a country
with a long history of unconstitutional changes of government which have greatly
weakened the country’s democratic institutions. Council acknowledges that the
general elections of 13 April 2014 mark a significant step towards the full restoration of constitutional order in Guinea Bissau;
17
7. Calls on political parties, independent candidates and the people of Guinea Bissau to continue to remain calm and to allow the electoral process to be completed
in accordance with the Constitution of Guinea Bissau. Council warns all potential
spoilers not to undermine the ongoing electoral process in the country
and stresses that spoilers of the process will be held accountable for their actions;
8. Decides, in the light of the successful holding of Presidential and Legislative elections in Guinea Bissau on 13 April 2014, that upon announcement of the presidential winner and assumption of office by the new President in accordance with the
Constitution of Guinea Bissau, the country will be invited to resume its participation in the AU’s activities in line with paragraph 6 of communiqué PSC/PR/COMM
(CCCXVIII) adopted by the PSC at its 318th meeting of 17 April 2012;
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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Terrorism in Africa
UE/Afrique, deux continents, une même vision dominée par un partenariat stratégique
62Avril, 2014
Après le 4ième sommet UE/Afrique (23 avril 2014, Bruxelles), la revue
Géopolitique Africaine vous présente
les
contributions
de
son dernier numéro mettant en
perspective les déclarations et conclusions du sommet.
Préambule
Poto-Poto est l’un des plus anciens quartiers de Brazzaville connu pour le brassage de sa population et les rapports spécifiques qui se nouent entre ses habitants. Henri Lopes, Directeur général de la revue, s’interroge dans son éditorial
« Le monde vu de Poto Poto » sur la guerre en République Centrafricaine et sur le
travail de reconstruction que ce pays doit accomplir pour retrouver la stabilité. La
nécessité de cette reconstruction figure dans lesconclusions de la réunion spéciale
sur la République Centrafricaine (RCA) tenue lors du sommet de Bruxelles.
L’Union européenne (UE) et l’Afrique s’engagent à coordonner leurs efforts pour
une stabilisation durable de la RCA. Henri Lopes va plus loin et considère que, si la
communauté internationale doit aider la République Centrafricaine, encore faut-il
que ce pays commence par se prendre en mains lui-même pour se réformer.
« Aide-toi et le ciel t’aidera » : c’est à ce prix, dit-il, que la solidarité demandée
aux autres Etats deviendra effective.
Si l’Afrique est traversée par des crises, ce n’est pas une fatalité. La paix, l’ardeur
au travail, la bonne gestion et le culte de l’excellence ne sont pas l’apanage des
autres continents ! D’où l’importance accordée au concept actuel
d’ « émergence », autrement dit l’ensemble des transformations économiques,
sociales, politiques et culturelles permettant à un Etat, une nation et un peuple
d’atteindre une croissance soutenue. Voilà une réalité dont tous ceux qui se réfèrent à la « génération Poto-Poto » – croisement de cultures, tolérance, ouverture
sur le monde – doivent se saisir. Avec, au premier rang d’entre eux, les artistes et
musiciens toujours prêts à mettre en peintures ou en chansons la réalité sociale
et politique du pays où ils vivent.
Les contributions : vers un nouveau partenariat stratégique
A l’occasion du 4ième sommet UE/Afrique, les auteurs de la revue Géopolitique
Africaine mettent l’accent sur les nouvelles relations politiques et économiques
19
fondées sur un partenariat stratégique gagnant/gagnant entre l’Union européenne et l’Afrique. Ce partenariat doit épouser de nouveaux contours tenant
compte des préoccupations des deux parties.
L’Afrique, longtemps bénéficiaire de l’aide de l’UE dont le rôle de bailleur de
fonds n’est plus à démontrer, souhaite modifier cette relation ancienne en établissant avec l’Europe un rapport nouveau basé sur la multi-polarisation des relations politiques, économiques, commerciales, financières, culturelles et sociales.
Pour l’UE, la mondialisation crée un cadre nouveau qui doit permettre d’analyser
les domaines prioritaires de coopération entre les continents et d’approfondir le
dialogue politique.
L’ensemble des contributeurs insiste sur les destins liés de l’Afrique et de l’Europe
pour construire un partenariat spécifique. Selon le Président du CongoBrazzaville, Denis Sassou N’Guesso, l’Europe doit être un partenaire à l’écoute de
l’Afrique, ce qui n’exclut pas une coopération bilatérale de l’Afrique avec certains
membres de l’Union européenne. Cette coopération renouvelée, écrit-il, reprendra les priorités énoncées au cours du sommet, à savoir la paix, la sécurité, le développement humain et le changement climatique. Traditionnellement, les relations entre les deux continents portaient surtout jusque-là sur le commerce grâce
à de nombreux accords (ACP-Cotonou) et sur l’aide apportée aux Etats Africains
depuis 1959 par le Fonds européen de développement (FED). Pour le Président de
la commission européenne, José Manuel Barroso, les relations nouvelles entre
l’UE et l’Afrique insisteront davantage sur la paix et la sécurité, comme sur la coopération en matière d’infrastructures.
Le Président sénégalais Macky Sall, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies pour
l’Afrique Carlos Lopes et l’Ambassadeur Eugène Berg se félicitent tous de l’instauration d’un partenariat stratégique entre l’Afrique et l’Union européenne. Les
problèmes de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance, de culture et de Droits de
l’homme ont été évoqués au cours du sommet de Bruxelles dans le but de favoriser un développement politique et économique harmonieux. Mais les participants
se sont penchés également sur les dossiers du capital humain et de l’utilisation
rationnelle des ressources africaines.
Les relations entre l’UE et l’Afrique doivent être comprises et expliquées à partir
de ce nouveau partenariat stratégique, estiment Philippe Hugon, Pierre Pougnaud et Maurice Enguéléguélé. Pour ces auteurs, il est urgent que l’Afrique et
l’UE analysent leurs relations anciennes et les réactualisent en tenant compte du
nouveau contexte de globalisation dont Emmanuel Nkunzumwani et Augusta
Conchiglia soulignent la portée.
Au-delà des difficultés économiques et des crises internes, d’autres menaces planent sur l’Afrique comme l’insécurité maritime ou le terrorisme. La contribution
européenne est indispensable aux Etats africains pour renforcer l’aspect opérationnel de l’AAPS (Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité) à travers le renfor-
20
cement de la Force africaine en attente (FAA) ou l’accroissement des capacités
africaines dans la prévention des crises, la consolidation de la paix et la reconstruction post-conflit (conseil, formation et livraison d’équipements). L’Europe et
l’Afrique doivent, enfin, fonder leur partenariat stratégique sur les questions liées
à l’environnement et aux changements climatiques et bâtir dans ce secteur des
relations fortes (Célestine Odingui-Abaré).
La relance de la coopération entre les deux continents est en partie dictée par
leur histoire commune. En tout cas, c’est à l’aune de cette longue histoire qu’il
faut comprendre le 4ième sommet Union européenne/Afrique et les enjeux nouveaux qu’il a fait émerger (Cheick-Tidiane Dieye).
http://www.geopolitique-africaine.com/
21
New message from al Qaeda leader
Audio is question-and-answer purportedly with al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
CNN: Familiar terrorist groups, familiar threats, familiar boasts and grievances -- all
in new messages tied, either directly or indirectly, to al Qaeda.
Two videos and one audio link have come to light in recent days that suggest that
the world's most recognizable terrorist group is still active, at least in online
postings.
The audio is a question-and-answer session purportedly involving al Qaeda leader
Ayman al-Zawahiri that was published Friday on the radical Islamist website
Hanein. While CNN has not verified the authenticity of the tape, the voice is similar
to al-Zawahiri's from previously authenticated recordings.
In a wide-ranging, nearly hour-long interview with al Qaeda's media arm, known as
al-Sahab, al-Zawahiri touches on everything from drones to Syria to Egypt. He insists that al Qaeda is holding strong 13 years after the United States launched its
"war on terror" following the September 11, 2001, attacks.
"The upper hand is for the one who does not withdraw from his land," al-Zawahiri
says. "Who has withdrawn from Iraq, and who has not? Who has withdrawn from
Afghanistan and who has not?"
Al-Zawahiri adds that even U.S. President Barack Obama knows al Qaeda "is expanding."
"Al Qaeda is scattered in all the Islamic world and among the oppressed," he said.
That analysis is relatively peaceful compared with the chilling words uttered in a
22
newly discovered video from Al-Shabaab.
Among its threats: "We will blow you up, until we finish you off."
Members of the Somalia-based, al Qaeda-linked militant group also use the video
to reflect on one of its most memorable, deadliest attacks to date -- the four-day
siege last September of an upscale Nairobi, Kenya, indoor shopping center that
ended with at least 67 killed.
That Westgate Mall attack may have been one of the bloodiest tied to Al-Shabaab,
but it won't be the last, men featured on the video suggested.
"It's not that Westgate was enough," they say. "There are still hundreds of men
who are wishing for such an operation."
Peter Bergen, an authority on terrorism who interviewed the late Osama bin Laden
and is a CNN national security analyst, said that this Al-Shabaab threat has to be
taken seriously.
"We certainly can't dismiss their ability to carry out those kinds of terrorist
attacks," Bergen said.
The two messages come on the heels of another one that got attention this week
showing what looks like the largest and most dangerous gathering of al Qaeda in
years.
In the middle of that video clip, the man known as al Qaeda's crown prince, Nasir al
-Wuhayshi, appears brazenly out in the open, greeting followers in Yemen. AlWuhayshi is the No. 2 leader of al Qaeda globally and the head of al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, which is considered the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate.
In a speech to the group, al-Wuhayshi makes it clear that he's going after the United States, saying "We must eliminate the cross. ... The bearer of the cross is America!"
The video started appearing on jihadist websites recently, drawing the attention of
U.S. officials and global terrorism experts. U.S. officials say they believe it's authentic.
They believe the highly produced video is recent. With some fighters' faces blurred,
there is worry it signals a new round of plotting.
http://www.news4jax.com/news/New-message-from-al-Qaeda-leader/25559288
23
Pourquoi faut-il croire en l’Afrique ?
11 avril 2014
Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Xavier CHATILLON, Groupe D4, stagiaire de la
21e Promotion de l’école de guerre*
Pour beaucoup de nos contemporains, le continent africain, dans sa diversité ethnologique, géographique, économique, géopolitique, est synonyme de guerres
permanentes, de corruption rampante, de pauvreté généralisée menant le plus
souvent à la famine, d’explosion démographique génératrice de misère, de rivalités ethniques insurmontables, d’épidémies incontrôlables, de catastrophes écologiques et désormais depuis quelques années, de terrorisme. Le mot espoir est en
quelque sorte banni du champ lexical de ces contempteurs dont la caractéristique
principale est un pessimisme irréfragable.
Il est vrai que l’Afrique n’est le plus souvent évoquée qu’au travers du prisme des
drames qui la secouent, de ses difficultés qualifiées d’insurmontables, et cet intérêt sélectif constitue le facteur aggravant d’un pessimisme qui, ainsi, s’autoalimente. La Presse écrite et audiovisuelle ne rend pas davantage compte de l’actualité de ce continent, sauf à évoquer de manière univoque, toujours avec le même
credo larmoyant, les seules tragédies qui le frappent – qui ne manquent certes
pas…
Car c’est vrai, l’Afrique, dans son ensemble, n’a été épargnée ni par l’Histoire, ni ne
l’est par le Présent ; les espoirs nés de la décolonisation ont fait place à des désillusions d’autant plus fortes que les mouvements se sont opérés, globalement(1), par
un transfert d’autorité de la puissance coloniale vers les nouveaux pouvoirs représentés très souvent par une élite formée dans les universités et écoles du colon.
24
Dans un certain nombre de pays, autrefois essentiellement de la partie subsaharienne du continent, désormais élargie à son bloc septentrional, les crises succèdent aux crises, le développement économique relève de l’hypothèse, la stabilité
est une vue de l’esprit.
Dès lors, la même question revient toujours, comme une antienne entêtante :
l’Afrique réussira-t-elle à épouser la modernité, et à inscrire son évolution dans une
perspective de progrès, de long terme et vertueuse, comme l’a fait l’Asie en moins
d’un demi-siècle ?
Elle est pourtant, et incontestablement, en mouvement, avance et prend sa part
dans l’évolution du monde. Elle possède d’importants atouts, dont il convient de
maîtriser l’exploitation. Mais elle ne saurait épouser les évolutions du développement mondial sans une réelle stabilité qui relève encore, dans un certain nombre
de pays, d’un vœu pieux…
Des atouts indéniables qu’il convient d’accompagner
Les perspectives offertes par sa démographie
L’Afrique est avant tout caractérisée, bien davantage que les autres continents, par
cette donnée démographique incontournable, qui pourrait constituer, demain, un
instrument de puissance : avec un doublement de population tous les 40 ans, et au
rythme de croissance démographique actuel(2), ce ne sont pas moins de 2 milliards
d’Africains qui pourraient peupler notre planète en 2050, et 4 milliards autour de
2100 ! Le Nigéria, « géant du continent », sera ainsi un « géant du monde »(3) ; la
RDC, l’Egypte , l’Ethiopie, l’Ouganda, la Tanzanie et même le Niger(4) sont susceptibles de dépasser largement les 200 millions d’habitants, et une théorie de pays
actuellement peu peuplés(5), tutoieront les « grands » du monde occidental, lesquels stagneront, au mieux, voire verront leur population diminuer(6).
L’ordre mondial ne pourra dès lors qu’être analysé différemment, à l’aune de ce
bouleversement majeur, qui peut générer des conséquences incontrôlables pour le
continent et doit dans ces conditions être impérativement accompagné d’une politique de développement qui saura prendre en compte ses spécificités, notamment
ce temps africain qui l’inscrit dans une perspective différenciée.
Cette démographie de puissance est susceptible d’ouvrir un marché intérieur
propre à accélérer le développement économique du continent, et ainsi constituer
un vivier de consommateurs nouveaux - et donc nombreux - pour les pays du
« Nord », mais également les émergents, qui bénéficieraient ainsi de nouveaux débouchés économiques.
Bien sûr, ce marché suppose une politique concertée entre pays et l’ouverture d’un
marché commun (avec ouverture des barrières douanières dans des pays particulièrement protectionnistes) que pourrait inspirer celui initié par la CEE à sa fondation, un développement industriel(7) et la mise sur pied, à grande échelle, de capacités de production par une main d’œuvre formée, adaptée aux enjeux écono-
25
miques de l’avenir(8) …mais également du continent. Le chemin est donc long… Il
contribuerait également à conférer au continent le statut de puissance exportatrice
que les richesses de son sous-sol, de ses océans et de ses terres agricoles placeraient en position privilégiée.
Les ressources naturelles, « carburant » du développement, dont l’exploitation
doit être maîtrisée…
Car l’Afrique possède, à l’appui de son développement, un atout de taille que sont
des matières premières à la fois abondantes(9) et très diverses, répondant par ailleurs pleinement, outre aux besoins traditionnels des pays développés, à ceux,
croissants, des émergents, qui n’en disposent pas nécessairement.
Bien entendu, leur exploitation ne peut, pour le moment, échoir aux seuls pays qui
en disposent(10), qui ne sont pas en mesure de faire face aux colossaux investissements nécessaires et ont dès lors besoin de l’appui de grands groupes étrangers,
mais elle pourrait constituer, à terme, un catalyseur de développement au bénéfice
d’investissements d’avenir(11).
Naturellement, il importe que ces ressources naturelles soient exploitées de manière vertueuse en vue d’éviter un choc écologique et de servir un clan ou une
caste, au détriment de l’intérêt général, objectif impératif du développement du
continent.
Dans cette mesure, le projet de production, à grande échelle, d’électricité photovoltaïque dans l’arc sahélien, encore esquissé, est une illustration de projet adapté
aux possibilités locales, utilisant une ressource inépuisable, et facteur de développement dans une perspective de long terme.
L’Afrique possède également un potentiel touristique inégalé. Certains pays emblématiques de ce point de vue, comme l’Afrique du Sud, le Kenya et la Tanzanie, ont
su capitaliser sur ce qui offre de vraies potentialités à haute valeur ajoutée offertes
par la nature. Beaucoup d’autres pays, en dépit de possibilités exceptionnelles en la
matière, ont toutefois encore d’importants progrès à accomplir dans ce secteur qui
requiert il est vrai des infrastructures adaptées et la garantie, par la stabilité, de la
sûreté personnelle des visiteurs.
Les économies égyptienne et tunisienne, particulièrement dépendantes d’un tourisme pourvoyeur de devises et de nombreux emplois, ont d‘ailleurs, à ce titre, notablement souffert des soubresauts politiques qui les ont marquées ces dernières
années…
Ces atouts, nombreux, ne pourront que bénéficier à ce continent qui montre des
signes objectifs de développement.
Les prémices d’une dynamique de développement…
26
Le continent africain s’inscrit en effet indubitablement dans une dynamique continue qui va croissant, et dont les signes actuels(12) ne trompent d’ailleurs pas l’observateur averti : alors que les pays du « bloc développé » connaissent une crise
sans précédent depuis celle de 1929, bancaire, économique, et désormais régalienne car budgétaire, la croissance africaine montre des signes de vitalité, avec des
évolutions situées entre 5 et 10% en rythme annuel dans certains pays, à l’instar du
Kenya, du Tchad ou de la Côte d’Ivoire, pourtant non épargnés par les crises ces
dernières décennies.
A titre d’illustration, l’Afrique australe, stabilisée à long terme, a su trouver le chemin d’une croissance durable, aidée par une vitalité démocratique qui doit faire
école : l’Afrique du Sud a su refermer les plaies béantes de l’apartheid pour devenir
l’un des moteurs du continent, l’Angola a transformé l’échec de la guerre civile en
pari sur l’avenir, le Mozambique commence à décoller au plan économique et la
Namibie n’est plus la « 10e province sud-africaine » mais un petit Etat prospère au
développement polymorphe(13) qui doit désormais réguler des flux d’immigration…
Par ailleurs, il importe de souligner que la révolution numérique, loin d’être réservée aux seuls pays développés, a notablement touché l’Afrique : faute d’infrastructures coûteuses de téléphonie fixe à grande échelle, les Africains sont directement
passés au téléphone portable, élément-clé des modes de communication interpersonnels. Autrefois objet statutaire, c’est désormais un instrument de mode de vie…
qui n’a toutefois pas effacé la survivance de croyances traditionnelles.
La modernité de la technologie, d’aujourd’hui (internet est en développement
constant) et bientôt de demain(14), s’accorde ainsi parfaitement avec l’intemporel
culte des ancêtres.
…mais un développement différencié…et qui nécessite une approche plus globale
et un accompagnement…
Car, à l’instar de cette dualité toute africaine, la clé du développement africain est
celle d’un développement différencié, adapté aux besoins du continent, et qui doit
permettre à tout un chacun d’accéder aux services de base (eau potable, sources
de nourriture, soins médicaux, éducation…).
Dans cette perspective, l’Afrique doit continuer à être accompagnée. L’UE, l’ONU à
travers ses différentes agences, demain, sans doute, l’UA, sont les acteurs privilégiés de cet appui. Nécessaire pour le bien de ce continent et de ses habitants, ce
dernier rejoint également l’intérêt-même du monde dit développé.
La démographie africaine, facteur potentiel de puissance pour le continent, ainsi
qu’il a été évoqué, doit en effet s’accompagner du nécessaire développement qui
est seul en mesure de fixer les populations et de limiter de considérables mouve-
27
ments migratoires vers le Nord – dont on assiste aux prémices. Susceptibles de devenir incontrôlables par leur ampleur et la permanence des flux générés, ils constituent d’ores-et-déjà un vrai enjeu pour les sociétés des pays « d’accueil »…
Dans ces conditions, les pays « du Nord » - et notamment, s’agissant de l’Europe,
l’Union européenne(15) - doivent résolument s’orienter, aux côtés des pays africains, vers une véritable politique d’immigration concertée qui privilégie l’accompagnement du développement économique local(16), aux intérêts partagés, sur le
principe du « gagnant-gagnant ». En particulier, les anciennes puissances coloniales, qui ont à ce titre une responsabilité d’accompagnement de long terme dans
le développement du continent, doivent dans ces conditions résolument s’orienter
dans cette voie, qui leur bénéficiera à de multiples titres dans l’avenir(17), et en
finir ainsi avec une auto-culpabilisation paralysante qui ne bénéficie par ailleurs pas
à l’Afrique.
La jeunesse africaine(18) n’a d’ailleurs cure de ces considérations qui relèvent d’un
passé – certes récent à l’échelle humaine - mais qu’elle n’a pas connu et qui ne
l’intéresse finalement que fort peu. Cette jeunesse qui, désormais, a accès pleinement au monde qui l’entoure grâce à l’utilisation massive d’internet, des réseaux
sociaux et qui bénéficie d’une capacité d’information en temps réel sans les restrictions imposées par des régimes parfois autoritaires, c’est l’avenir de l’Afrique, qui
porte ses espoirs et sur laquelle repose le devenir du continent (19).
Les Etats-Unis ont, quant à eux, une politique plus volontariste, qui, avec la récente
- et longue - visite du Président Obama in persona, y compris dans le « pré carré »
francophone, où ils ne s’étaient jusqu’alors que peu aventurés, démontrent ainsi
une esquisse de réorientation de leur politique étrangère.
Certes, cette visite revêt un caractère hautement symbolique, lié à la personnalité
de Barack Obama et à ses origines paternelles, mais les visites d’un président américain en Afrique se comptent sur les doigts d’une main, et sont symptomatiques
des espoirs placés dans le continent dont il reste, bien entendu, à trouver des démonstrations concrètes...
Une confiance déjà acquise, celle des émergents…
Observatrices attentives de ces jalons pour l’avenir, les plus grandes puissances de
demain ne se sont, pour ce qui les concerne, pas trompées dans leurs orientations :
la Chine a posé le pied depuis maintenant plusieurs années en Afrique, d’une manière certes pas toujours vertueuse, et qui alimente la polémique sur ses intentions
réelles(20), mais résolue, avec un agenda de développement de long terme qui fait
la
part
belle
à
ses
propres
intérêts
économiques(21).
Elle est désormais suivie par l’Inde, mais également par d’autres pays majeurs, tel
le Brésil dont les échanges avec les ex-colonies portugaises (Angola, Guinée-Bissau,
Mozambique) ne cessent de se développer d’année en année.
28
Certes, cette politique d’investissements n’épouse pas toujours les intérêts premiers des pays africains, mais certains d’entre eux, fort heureusement, en ont toutefois compris le danger et savent désormais mieux encadrer ces derniers en faisant prévaloir leurs conditions et intérêts propres…
Ces échanges « Sud-Sud » ne relèvent plus de l’anecdote mais sont source de développement aujourd’hui et surtout demain, ôtant ainsi son monopole à la verticale
Nord-Sud, comme un retournement de l’Histoire...
Bien entendu, et malgré des atouts réels, nombreux et en phase avec les besoins
générés par la mondialisation, il ne saurait y avoir de développement africain sans
une stabilité durable et générale du continent, prérequis impératif.
L’impératif de stabilité
A ce titre, les exemples de situations conflictuelles voire explosives ne manquent
pas : Sahel, bien sûr, Corne de l’Afrique, désormais le Machrek avec la Libye et
l’Egypte, et une partie du Maghreb(22) aussi, mais également des situations malheureusement déjà ancrées dans l’histoire continentale postérieure à la décolonisation(23).
Le terrorisme djihadiste a par ailleurs trouvé avec la partie septentrionale du continent un terrain de manœuvre privilégié. La situation sécuritaire déficiente de beaucoup de pays(24) et leur incapacité à contrôler leurs considérables frontières, souvent situées en zone aride voire désertique, et marquées par leurs considérables
élongations, en favorise en effet l’expansion géographique…
Dans ces conditions, la constitution de réelles capacités de réponses aux crises et
de planification régionales(25), en mesure de se déployer au plus près des zones
touchées, est un élément-clé de cette stabilité.
Bien entendu, ceci requiert, avec un soutien institutionnel résolu de la communauté internationale, des ressources militaires équipées, formées et commandées, ainsi que la poursuite de la constitution d’un vivier de cadres en mesure de planifier et
commander sur le terrain.
Sur ce plan, la mise sur pied, par la France, d’écoles nationales à vocation régionale
(21) dans des domaines civilo-militaires très divers, constitue une initiative remarquable. Ses objectifs pertinents s’avèrent un précieux investissement pour l’avenir
dans un domaine essentiel qui vise à placer le continent en capacité autonome de
gestion des crises, sur le principe du « self empowerment »(27) …
Des initiatives ont, d’ailleurs, d’ores-et-déjà été prises en la matière, encourageantes : AMISOM, en Somalie, armée par des contingents est-africains, engagement de pays de l’arc sahélien dans le cadre de l’opération Serval(28), MISCA en
Centrafrique...
29
Une dimension politique qui doit être guidée par l’intérêt général...
Cette stabilité générale doit parallèlement s’accompagner d’une stabilité politique durable, socle de la nécessaire bonne gouvernance. Un certain nombre de
pays s’illustrent en la matière(29), qui doivent inspirer le reste du continent.
A l’aune de ces exemples encourageants, il importe, cependant, que le dirigeant
africain soit motivé et également guidé par l’intérêt général, sans arrière-pensée
ethnique.
Chaque habitant, sans distinction, pourra ainsi bénéficier des fruits de la croissance et du développement économique. Les sentiments nationaux, cette « unité
dans la diversité » caractéristique du continent, pourront ainsi s’exprimer sans
restriction, et la répartition des richesses s’opérer de manière plus vertueuse en
récompensant les talents - de plus en plus nombreux - et non les appartenances
claniques. Les pays africains pourront ainsi développer, pour le bien commun,
leurs infrastructures de base qui manquent cruellement en matière de santé,
d’éducation et de transports.
Dans le même ordre d’idées, la conscience d’un destin commun doit également
guider l’Homme africain des décennies à venir, en dépit d’un découpage géographique post-décolonisation qui s’est fréquemment heurté aux réalités de la diversité ethnique marquée de ce continent, fruit de mouvements de populations à
très grande échelle(30).
***
L’Afrique, dont les atouts sont ainsi légion(31), s’illustre également par une capacité de résilience exceptionnelle qui lui permet, à l’instar des herbes de la savane,
de toujours trouver le chemin de la croissance après la sécheresse ou les grands
incendies de brousse. L’optimisme permanent qui constitue une marque de fabrique de l’Homme africain, et contraste avec le pessimisme notable des sociétés
développées, en constitue l’un des fondements.
Il n’y a, ainsi, pas de fatalité africaine, il y a ce temps africain qui se conjugue à un
rythme différent de celui du reste du monde, et qui dimensionne l’évolution de
ce
continent.
L’Afrique, incontestablement, ne manque pas de temps, et la patience est requise
vis-à-vis d’un mouvement de développement qui, s’il est inéluctable, a cependant
besoin d’un certain nombre de prérequis - au premier rang desquels une conscience et une prise en mains par les Africains eux-mêmes, et l’émergence de locomotives économiques - pour s’inscrire dans la durée.
« Vous avez la montre, nous avons le temps » : qui n’a jamais entendu cette célèbre maxime qui résume parfaitement, avec cet humour africain bien connu et
jamais loin de vraies réflexions marquées à la fois par leur profondeur et leur bon
sens, les enjeux du continent ?
30
Article publié sur la proposition de l’Ecole de guerre.
*De recrutement universitaire, ancien officier de réserve, le Lieutenant-Colonel
Xavier CHATILLON, actuellement stagiaire de la 21e Promotion de l’école de guerre,
a exercé des responsabilités de conception à la direction générale de la gendarmerie nationale, ainsi que de commandement tant à la garde républicaine qu’en compagnie et groupement de gendarmerie départementale. Il a également servi à
l’étranger, en Afrique du Sud, en qualité d’attaché de sécurité intérieure adjoint
auprès de l’ambassade de France.
Ce qui ne signifie évidemment pas dans leur totalité, chacun a à l’esprit les décolonisations chaotiques de l’Algérie, du Congo, de l’ex-Rhodésie, de l’Angola, du Mozambique...
2 Conjugué à une baisse importante de la mortalité infantile liée aux progrès de la
médecine dont bénéficie également le continent.
3 Les prévisions des Nations-Unies tablent sur une population équivalente à celle
de la Chine en 2100 !
4 Peuplé de 17 millions d’habitants, mais possédant le taux de fécondité le plus
élevé du monde (7,6 enfants par femme)
5 Tchad, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroun,…
1 A l’instar de l’Allemagne, qui aura la population de la France d’ici à 40 ans en raison d’une démographie déficitaire.
7 L’exemple éthiopien, avec la récente délocalisation-relocalisation d’usines textiles « H et M » jusqu’alors implantées en Chine, constitue certes une situation
pour le moment isolée, mais qui est sans nul doute appelée à se reproduire.
8 Et qui pourrait ainsi prendre le relais de pays d’Asie dont les coûts de main
d’œuvre seront bientôt moins compétitifs…
9 On estime, à titre d’exemple, que la production de pétrole dans le Golfe de Guinée dépassera celle du Golfe persique dès 2020...
10 D’autant que l’enclavement de récents producteurs de brut - à l’instar du
Tchad et du Sud-Soudan - nécessite le concours et les infrastructures de leurs voisins côtiers, ce qui aggrave leur dépendance et est susceptible de générer des conflits.
1 Infrastructures de base, avant, à plus long terme, et grâce à l’affectation d’une
31
partie des ressources récoltées, la constitution de fonds souverains comme ont su
le faire de petits pays comme le Qatar ou les Emirats arabes unis avec Dubai.
2 Dans de nombreux pays du continent, une classe bourgeoise fréquemment formée dans les universités et écoles occidentales, émerge, consommant, ayant soif
d’innovations et de produits dernier cri.
3 Ressources naturelles (pierres précieuses, pétrole, gaz), tourisme haut-degamme, filière agro-alimentaire exportatrice…
4 Certains pays, à l’instar du Tchad, ont lancé un plan de développement de la fibre
optique.
5 L’Union, il est vrai, consacre de très importants moyens au continent, mais ses
actions n’ont toutefois pas la visibilité nécessaire, car il leur manque indubitablement la réelle volonté de s’y impliquer de manière plus « incarnée », et moins technocratique…
1 Le soutien au micro-crédit, qui a fait ses preuves dans le sous-continent indien, et
se développe en Afrique, en constitue à n’en pas douter l’un des leviers.
7 Le Club des BRICS s’enrichira en effet dans les décennies qui viennent, à n’en pas
douter, de nombreux pays du continent africain (Nigéria, Kénya, Tanzanie, Ethiopie...).
8 Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai. Photo: Reuters
Les
moins de 15 ans représentent plus de 40 % de la population africaine, en croissance
exponentielle (contre 15% des habitants de l’Union Européenne)…mais seuls 5,5%
des Africains sont âgés de plus de 60 ans, à comparer aux 22% d’Européens…
9 Ce qui requiert bien entendu la mise sur pied de structures d’enseignement supérieur adaptées aux enjeux du continent et à ses besoins, contribuant ainsi à éviter
une funeste fuite des cerveaux, qui nuit aux perspectives de développement.
20 Les accords « infrastructures contre ressources naturelles » en RDC ne sont pas
un paradigme de vertu - c’est le moins que l’on puisse dire - et n’ont pas particulièrement bénéficié à la population…
21 Achat de terres agricoles et de gisements supposés receler des matières premières indispensables à sa propre croissance.
22 Si les mouvements du printemps arabe de 2011 avaient laissé entrouverte la
porte de l’espoir, ces espérances se sont malheureusement rapidement fracassées
32
contre le mur des réalités et l’impéritie de régimes confessionnels.
23 RDC et la région des grands lacs, République centrafricaine, Sud-Soudan.
24 Au rang desquels le Nigéria, en proie, depuis plusieurs années, aux exactions
terroristes de la secte islamiste « Boko haram »
25 Forces en attente de l’UA par bloc sous-régional
21 ENVR, soutenues par le Quai d’Orsay à travers sa direction de la coopération de
sécurité et de défense.
27 Que l’on pourrait exprimer, en langue française, par la notion de prise en main
de son propre destin
28 En particulier le Tchad qui déploya sur sa ressource propre un contingent de
près de 2000 soldats aux côtés de l’armée française. 29 Sénégal, Afrique du Sud,
Ghana, qui a organisé avec profit une transition politique sans heurt, Rwanda, qui a
démontré sa résilience malgré le génocide, Botswana, Tanzanie, Kénya, Namibie…
29 Touaregs de la Mauritanie au Soudan, Peuls du Tchad au Sénégal, Bambaras du
Mali au Niger, Bantous de la Centrafrique à l’Afrique du Sud, Arabes de l’Atlantique
à la Méditerranée…
30 Au nombre desquels, il convient de ne pas l’oublier, l’emploi de quelques
langues vernaculaires, à vocation mondiale : le Français - l’Afrique étant d’ailleurs
le fer de lance de la francophonie, l’Anglais, mais également, l’Arabe, et, dans une
moindre mesure, le Portugais. Ces quelques langues permettent aux Africains de se
comprendre, facilitent leurs déplacements, et contribuent à leur capacité à évoluer,
d’ores et déjà, dans le concert de la mondialisation.
http://www.affaires-strategiques.info/spip.php?article9521
33
Afrique: les pays les plus développés sont aussi les moins sécurisés
71Avril 2014
Le Nigeria a été secoué cette semaine par un violent attentat dans une gare routière en banlieue d’Abuja. Une centaine d’écolières ont également été enlevées
dans le Nord du pays, où les islamistes de Boko Haram sont particulièrement actifs. A l’instar du Kenya ou de l’Afrique du Sud, le Nigeria est à la fois l’une des
économies les plus florissantes d’Afrique et un pays où violence et insécurité
rythment la vie quotidienne. Analyse de ces sociétés à deux vitesses avec Philippe
Hugon, directeur de recherches à l’IRIS en charge de l’Afrique.
Le Nigeria, moteur économique en Afrique - Photo Shardayyy / Flickr cc
JOL Press : Le Nigeria est aujourd’hui la proie d’un terrorisme violent. Le Kenya en a
fait les frais aussi, l’Afrique du Sud n’est pas en reste… Pourquoi les pays les plus
développés d’Afrique sont aussi les plus concernés par la violence ?
Philippe Hugon : En Afrique du Sud, la violence est essentiellement liée à des facteurs urbains. Au Nigeria, Lagos est l’une des villes les moins sécurisées du monde,
tout comme Nairobi. Le dénominateur commun à ces violences urbaines tient dans
les profondes inégalités.
Par exemple, 45% de la population noire sud-africaine n’a pas d’emploi. La fin de
l’apartheid n’a pas réduit ces inégalités, elle a seulement fait qu’une partie de la
bourgeoisie noire a accédé à la richesse et a rejoint celle des blancs. Autrement,
34
l’écart s’est creusé, avec un « indice de Gini » qui s’est accentué. L’économie est
très prospère, son industrie… Ces inégalités génèrent une violence, à laquelle
s’ajoute celle qui touche les chômeurs de la population noire post-apartheid, qui ne
trouvent pas de petits emplois… Cette violence se bâtit aussi sur un terreau de trafics divers : Johannesburg et Lagos sont particulièrement touchés par le trafic de
drogue.
Par ailleurs, le Kenya (avec le Shebab) et le Nigéria sont tous deux infiltrés par des
réseaux terroristes d’islamistes radicaux. Boko Haram génère une violence spécifique sur le territoire nigérian, comme on a pu le voir ces jours-ci avec l’attentat
meurtrier d’Abuja et l’enlèvement d’une centaine de collégiennes.
Les trois pays que vous citez sont également en liens étroits avec les États-Unis…
JOL Press : L’insécurité patente, la violence et les risques qu’elles représentent ne
découragent pas les investisseurs étrangers (le Kenya était le pays d’Afrique qui
attirait
le
plus
d’IDE
en
2013).
Comment
l’expliquer
?
Philippe Hugon : Les taux de retour sur investissement sont les plus importants en
Afrique, et de loin. Il est donc normal d’y investir, dans une logique de rentabilité.
En outre, les grandes sociétés qui y sont implantées mettent en place des systèmes
de sécurité privée, des logements protégés pour leurs employés…
Les violences spécifiques contre le personnel d’une multinationale implantée au
Kenya ou au Nigéria sont infimes. Le problème est qu’en dépit de cette probabilité
très faible, la presse mondiale s’en empare dès que ce type de violences survient.
C’est d’ailleurs la raison d’être de ces attaques : elles ont un potentiel de retombées médiatiques qui nourrit les organisations terroristes. Néanmoins, le danger
est moindre que ne veulent le montrer les médias. Le Nigéria sait très bien gérer les
prises d’otage : les entreprises vont immédiatement payer une rançon, puisque
c’est même inscrit dans leurs contrats de travail.
JOL Press : A terme, la persistance des risques d’attentat ne risque-t-elle pas, tout
de même, de nuire à l’économie de ces pays en précipitant une fuite des capitaux
et
des
entreprises
?
Philippe Hugon : C’est évidemment la stratégie des djihadistes, à savoir faire partir
toute référence au monde occidental. Néanmoins, ils savent que ce type de guerre,
aujourd’hui, se gagnent par la communication, la peur et l’impact médiatique plus
que par les armes.
Maintenant, au-delà de cette volonté stratégique de la part des terroristes, le
risque demeure faible. Un attentat est évidemment tragique parce que quand il
arrive, des centaines de personnes meurent, mais ce type d’événement est rare et
peu probable en termes de risque.
35
Le vrai risque est que les entreprises, sans remettre en cause leur implantation,
prennent peur, se « bunkerisent », surprotègent leurs salariés et travaillent moins
avec les acteurs locaux. Si le risque djihadiste est présent, il n’a pas de frontière : la
France aussi abrite des cellules dormantes, qui se réveilleront un jour.
Propos recueillis par Romain de Lacoste pour JOL Press
http://www.jolpress.com/
36
Cameroon
CAMEROUN - PRISE D’OTAGES : A QUI PROFITE LE CRIME ?
24 AVRIL 2014
Les séries de rapts et de libérations à n’en plus finir font penser que sont-ils devenus un
marché juteux tant du côté du
Nigeria que du Cameroun ? Une
chose est certaine : il y a un flou
entache la série de prise
d’otages dans la région de
l’Extrême-Nord.
La secte islamiste Boko Haram,
qui sévit au Nigéria et dans les
pays environnants, vient une
fois de plus de frapper en procédant à l’enlèvement de trois
religieux. Il s’agit, en l’occurrence, de deux prêtres de nationalité italienne et d’une religieuse d’origine canadienne. L’enlèvement s’est produit dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi 5 avril 2014 dans la paroisse de Tcheré dans
le diocèse de Maroua-Mokolo, à l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun, une localité située à
une quinzaine de kilomètres du Nigéria.
Les autorités camerounaises qui ont confirmé l’information ont déclaré avoir mobilisé les moyens, non seulement pour renforcer la sécurité dans cette partie du pays,
mais aussi «tout faire» pour retrouver «sains et saufs» les trois religieux. Comme à
l’accoutumée, les personnes enlevées au Cameroun ont été ramenées au Nigéria,
où la secte Boko Haram multiplie des exactions et des attentats contre des populations civiles, malgré la vigilance des forces de défense nigérianes.
D’après des témoignages concordants, les assaillants qui étaient plus de dix, et
lourdement armés, ont attaqué le presbytère où résidaient les religieux, tenant notamment en respect les vigiles et des riverains. Le mode opératoire laisse croire
que ces éléments de Boko Haram connaissaient bien les lieux, puisque ces derniers
n’auraient pas eu trop de difficultés pour atteindre les religieux qui étaient leur
principale cible.
Au terme de cette expédition punitive, le Père Giampaolo Marta, qui était en mission au Cameroun, depuis plus de six ans, et le Père Gianantonio Allegri, qui était
revenu au Cameroun il y a quelques mois après y avoir effectué précédemment un
séjour d’une dizaine d’années, ont été enlevés, de même qu’une religieuse canadienne, Italie Gilberte Bussier, qui totalise également plusieurs années de présence
37
missionnaire au Cameroun.
Collusion
L’enlèvement des trois religieux intervient après la libération le 31 décembre 2013
du Père Georges Vandenbeusch, un prêtre d’origine française enlevé le 14 novembre 2013 par Boko Haram, alors qu’il officiait comme curé de la paroisse de
Nguetchewé, toujours dans le diocèse de Maroua-Mokolo, à une vingtaine de kilomètres du Nigéria. C’est toujours dans cette région, plus précisément à Dabanga,
que fut enlevée la famille Moulin-Fournier en février 2013, les sept Français avec
femmes et enfants qui furent libérés fin avril, après deux mois de captivité. Pour le
moment, les autorités camerounaises, qui s’habituent de plus en plus à ce genre de
situations, n’en disent pas plus, même si selon toute vraisemblance, tous les
moyens sont déployés pour retrouver vivants les deux prêtres et la soeur dont l’âge
relativement avancé doit certainement rendre plus difficile leur détention.
Ces deux derniers kidnapping, on se souvient, avaient connu un tapage médiatique
international à tel point que les soupçons qui pesaient sur le groupe islamique Boko
Haram ont fini par être confirmés par le chef Abubakar Shekau, leader du groupuscule depuis 2009. Tout juste après la libération de la famille Moulin-Fournier, la
presse camerounaise et beaucoup d’opinion diverses soupçonnaient le gouvernement camerounais d’avoir donné une rançon au groupe islamique Boko Haram
pour la libération des Blancs français. Ces soupçons se sont encore renforcés lorsque la même France a encore eu maille à partir avec le kidnapping du prêtre
Georges qui a été libéré quelque semaines après. Ces séries de rapts et de libérations à n’en plus finir font penser que c’est devenu un marché tant du côté du Nigeria que du Cameroun.
Comment cela pouvait-il en être autrement tant il est vrai que l’implication des négociateurs et intermédiaires dans la libération des Moulin-Fournier et du père Vandenbeusch capturés dans la région de l’Extrême-Nord suscitent moult interrogations. La rapidité avec laquelle ces négociations ont abouti et surtout vu le gros
moyens mis en jeu par Yaoundé pour la réussite de ces opérations, laissent aujourd’hui entrevoir une probable collusion de ces négociateurs dans la prise d’otages.
Du moins si l’on s’en tient à l’avis des observateurs.
D’autant plus que l’avis est partagé : il y a un flou qui entache la série de prise
d’otages dans la région de l’Extrême-Nord. Aussitôt capturés, aussitôt ces otages
sont libérés ; si simple que ça. Et toujours est-il que ce sont des négociateurs camerounais, dont des hauts cadres de l’Etat, des autorités administratives, des élus du
peuple, des chefs traditionnels et des opérateurs économiques originaires de la région qui ont souvent piloté à succès les opérations ayant conduit à la libération
d’otages. Il y a tic du moment où on sait que des gros moyens sont toujours dégagés par le gouvernement camerounais pour la réussite de ces opérations.
Une affaire de gros sous
38
Fort de ce qui précède, il n’est pas exclu que ces soi-disant négociateurs soient
directement impliqués dans cette série de prise d’otages. Ceci pour deux raisons :
soit pour faire chanter le chef de l’Etat, soit pour s’enrichir. Qui sait si ce ne sont
pas de prises d’otages montées de toutes pièces pour que le gouvernement débloque ces gros moyens au profit de ces individus tapis dans l’ombre ? Une analyse que plusieurs autres acteurs de la scène politique et de la société civile et
géo-stratèges y accordent du crédit au regard des milliards débloqués par l’Etat ;
plus de 10 milliards pour les deux premières opérations en l’espace de 7 mois.
On se rappelle de ce que la presse avait largement fait échos, évoquant 7 à 8 milliards pour la libération de la famille Moulin en avril et 6 à 7 milliards pour celle
du prêtre Georges Vandenbeusch. Le confrère de L’oeil du Sahel avait parlé de 6
milliards dépensés par le Trésor camerounais pour sa libération, l’argent du négociateur détourné, des responsables de la police sanctionnés. Mais également du
rôle ombrageux joué par le président de l’Assemblée nationale, Cavaye Yéguié
Djibril.
Pour certains, il s’agit d’un stratagème bien huilé pour reconquérir l’estime du
président de la République. Une possibilité à ne pas exclure au regard de la mise
en exergue des hauts commis de l’Etat, des autorités administratives, des
hommes politiques et chefs traditionnels. «La libération des otages peut constituer une arme de chantage au chef de l’Etat. Pourquoi ces négociateurs réussissent toujours s’il n’y a pas de connivence avec ces sectaires ? Donner l’argent
peut susciter beaucoup de gourmandise, d’appétit chez ces derniers et cela peut
facilement faire prospérer les marchés d’otages au Cameroun», se dit-on tout
bas.
L’on se souvient que dans le cas de la famille Moulin Fournier, c’est pratiquement
la même somme qui avait été débloquée mais cette fois avec l’implication
d’autres négociateurs. Le ministre Amadou Ali, le député Abba Malla Boukar et
un opérateur économique ont été largement cité dans la presse comme étant des
acteurs de premier plan dans le processus de cette libération.
Le cas Liman Oumaté
Autant d’éléments qui semblent faire croire que ces opérations, qui ont porté ses
fruits au final, peuvent avoir des répercussions lourdes sur la crédibilité de ces
hautes personnalités. Dans les coulisses, il se marmonne que d’autres interpellations et auditions seront d’ailleurs menées. Des responsables politiques locaux,
des officiers supérieurs de l’armée et même des responsables traditionnels seront, apprend-on, auditionnés.
Certainement pour éplucher comment les négociateurs ont eu des contacts avec
les terroristes basés au Nigéria et Comment sont-ils parvenus à les convaincre.
Rappelons que l’affaire Liman Malloun Oumaté Boukar, le présumé rebelle des
Monts Mandara avait aussi fait couler beaucoup d’encre et de salive. Ce natif de
39
Mora qui a ameuté la République en 2009 était présenté comme celui là qui voulait
destituer Biya. Sa tête avait été mise à prix pour quiconque le traquerait. En un laps
de temps, il avait été capturé.
L’opération était toujours menée par ces hauts cadres de l’Etat aujourd’hui impliqués dans la libération des otages français. Après ce succès, des révélations ont été
faites selon lesquelles, cette affaire était fabriquée de toute pièce. Les artisans à
l’époque n’étaient pas en odeur de sainteté avec le chef de l’Etat et il fallait trouver
un alibi pour regagner la confiance du locataire d’Etoudi. Le coup avait réussi.
Source: http://www.camer.be/
40
Congo
Congo: M23 Down but Not Out
April 25, 2014
A road in front of Goma airport, where the Uruguayan battalion is deployed, with Nyiragongo
Volcano to the right. (Photo: Derick Wolf)
When the M23 (March 23 Movement) marched into Goma, the regional capital of
North Kivu, in November 2012, it marked perhaps the lowest point in the 15-year
U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo known as
MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Congo). In 2009,
then-named MONUC managed to hold the city of Goma, despite the mutiny of Congolese military forces and being under siege from the CNDP (National Congress for
the Defense of the People). In contrast, in 2012 U.N. forces did not fire a shot when
the M23 took the city. MONUSCO calculated that a prolonged firefight in a densely
civilian-populated area would have done more harm than good. One year later, in a
major turn of events, the M23 surrendered after a series of military offensives lead
by the FIB (Force Intervention Brigade) and FARDC (Armed Forced of the DRC).
While this was a major victory for the United Nations and the Congolese government, ultimately if MONUSCO and the FIB are to be successful, they will have to
defeat, disarm or negotiate the surrender of the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda).
Background on the conflict
The original cause of the Congo wars is often obscured and over-simplified by the
41
media who often perpetuate the myth that they were fought just over "blood minerals." Most newspaper articles refer to the Congo wars as civil wars, when they
were primarily an external invasion involving nine African armies and several dozen
local and foreign militia forces. Rwanda originally invaded the Congo to wipe out
the Hutu militias and former members of the genocidal government and military of
Rwanda. The new Rwandan army under President Paul Kagame (then vicepresident and defense minister) attacked the Zairian refugee camps, killing between 150,000 and 200,000 people in an act that could possibly constitute genocide. Most of the casualties were women, children and the elderly, and many more
deaths were caused by starvation and disease. The international community largely
overlooked this atrocity in large part due to its failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide. In addition, the current Congolese government was also culpable. At the
time, President Joseph Kabila was a rebel commander in the AFDL (Allied Democratic Forced for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire), and Kabila's father, the late Laurent Kabila, was the head of the AFDL. Following the end of the First Congo War,
Rwanda and Uganda refused to leave the DRC, causing the Second Congo War, a
conflict that has been estimated to cost the lives of 5 million people. While the formal war ended in 2003 with the signing of the Sun City Accords, the proxy war between the Congo and Rwanda did not really end until the defeat of M23 in 2013.
http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/4005.cfm
42
Egypt
Draft terrorism law ‘won’t make the country safer’: Human Rights
Watch
April 28, 2014
Rights group says the laws threaten human rights
Egypt’s new draft terrorism laws are “exceedingly vague and overly broad” and
must be revised to “to protect the right to life and other rights and freedoms” according to a Sunday statement by watchdog group Human Rights Watch.
The draft laws in question were sent to the Ministry of Justice for approval by interim President Adly Mansour on 14 April, and if approved, would provide the Egyptian security apparatus with wider powers to arrest, detain and use force against
suspected terrorists.
“Terrorist attacks are clearly a serious security threat in today’s Egypt, but
trampling on fundamental rights won’t make the country safer,” said Human Rights
Watch deputy Middle East and North Africa Director Joe Stork. “Respect for human
rights needs to be at the heart of the battle against terrorism.”
Earlier this month, the cabinet amended articles of the Penal Code and Criminal
Procedures Law, putting in place harsher punishments for crimes relating to terrorism. The council of ministers amended Article 86 of the code to state that joining a
“terrorist organisation” is a crime punishable by a maximum of 10 years in prison,
as well as for those who “promote” terrorism through speech, text, flyers or recordings.
The cabinet added to Penal Code Article 63. The draft article exempts the official
executing an arrest from accountability should he use force “in carrying out his duty, in protecting himself, others, or their property from imminent danger,” if his use
of force is “necessary and proportionate to the danger faced”.
Article 133 was amended in a manner which maximises the punishment for insulting (through signs or speech) or threatening any public official. Such a crime is
now punishable by a maximum of two years in prison, instead of six months in prison, or an EGP 10,000 fine, instead of an EGP 200 fine.
An additional draft law would allow prisoners to be held for up to 72 hours, at
which point their detention could be extended for an additional week.
According to Humans Rights Watch, the changes to the law could classify labour
strikes and peaceful protests as terrorism if they hinder “the work of public officials, or universities, mosques, embassies, or international institutions”.
“By these definitions, anyone who participated in the popular uprisings of 2011 or
2013 could be branded a terrorist. Peaceful protest should not be criminalised as
43
terrorism,” said Stork.
The draft laws have also been criticised by rights group Amnesty International,
which said they “give the Egyptian authorities increased powers to muzzle freedom
of expression and imprison opponents and critics,” and limit “the right to free expression…and expands the scope of application of the death penalty”.
Egypt has faced a rash of bombing and attacks on security forces that have increased since the 3 July ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi. On 24 January, a large explosion hit the Cairo security directorate, killing 4, injuring 76, and
destroying the façade and many artefacts in the Museum of Islamic Art across the
street.
Sinai-based militant group Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis claimed responsibility for the
attack along with two other bombings that took place in different parts of Cairo on
the same day.
In April, Egypt, the United States and the United Kingdom all officially designated
Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis a terrorist group.
-See more at: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/28/
44
Inside Egypt's new threat: Ansar Beit al Maqdis
April 23rd, 2014
Ansar Beit al Maqdis claimed responsibility for an attack on a Korean tourist bus in
Sinai.
On Monday the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters ruled that Ansar Beit Al Maqdis be
classified as a terrorist organization. A number of Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia,
had already designated the group as terrorist. They were quickly followed by Washington.
In the same week the leader of the organization was killed in an ambush in Al-Toma
village in the north Sinai district of Sheikh Zuwaid and military and security forces
successfully
forestalled
a
number
of
terrorist
operations.
They also conducted several raids that led to the deaths of three members of Ansar
Beit Al Maqdis organization and the detention of several others.
Many questions about the structure of Ansar Beit Al Maqdis organization and its
links with other salafi jihadist groups and organizations in Sinai remain unanswered. There is no question that there is an active network of such organizations.
The network operates on two levels. On the structural level it is led by commanders
who have experience operating in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.
They moved from the Asian to the African arena — Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia,
45
Syria and then Egypt — lured first by the collapse of the tight security that had prevailed in the pre-Arab Spring regimes and then by the rise of the religious right, or
the Islamist movements, in the political sphere.
The second level is ideological and shaped, in particular, by Abdallah Azzam, the
godfather of Al-Qaeda, and Abu Mohamed Al-Maqdisi a leading Salafist Jihadist
ideologue.
A week ago, Egyptian authorities arrested Al-Qaeda officer Tharwat Shehata in the
Tenth of Ramadan City. The place where he was hiding out is thought to belong to
a
Muslim
Brotherhood
member.
Whether or not this is the case Shehata’s presence in Egypt cannot be separated
from events in Sinai. He can best be described as a central intelligence unit for Al
Qaeda, whether in its first “Afghan jihad” version or its second “post-Arab Spring
jihad” version. Many Egyptian security experts, including General Khaled Okasha,
describe the capture of Shehata as a major event.
Intelligence on extremist activities in Sinai is accumulating though Okasha says
much more remains to be done. There has also been a qualitative shift in the operational capacities of the security forces with the creation of a specialized rapidintervention anti-terrorism unit.
A senior intelligence expert told Al-Ahram Weekly that Shehata had been under
surveillance for some time before his arrest and that the observation had revealed
important
information.
On the evolution of Al-Qaeda networks he said: “I believe that they are more extensive than many believe and that there is an ability to extend even further given
that some international parties are keen to ignite fires in the region. I do not exclude the US from this.”
The source also spoke about the progress of security operations in Sinai in recent
months. Measures already taken on the eastern front were “ideal”, he said. He
warned, however, that the western borders with Libya require much more intensive security activity and facilities. Libya, he said, has become a prime exporter of
jihadist extremism.
“If Egypt could install radars on the borders there and increase aerial surveillance
with pilotless aircraft that situation would change. Israel restricts the use of such
radars in Sinai. We should therefore use them along our western borders in order
to curb cross-border infiltration as much as possible.”
The source said acquiring pilotless aircraft had become an urgent priority for Egypt.
“We need the sort that is being manufactured by Israel. The Russians, Americans,
Germans, Turkey and India all depend on drones that Israel makes. But Israel is certainly not going to give us one directly.”
46
But could Russia act as a third party and include one in a deal with Egypt?
“That would be difficult. Even conventional weapons being discussed with Egypt
at present are contingent on the arrival of Field Marshall Abdel Fattah Al Sisi to
the president’s office.”
In a related development, Libya’s ambassador to Cairo, Mohamed Fayez Jibril,
met
on
Monday
with
Prime
Minister
Ibrahim
Mehleb.
Although much of the meeting was devoted to the problems of the more than a
million Egyptians living in Libya and, particularly, hate crimes targeting Egyptian
Copts, the two officials also discussed border security. Jibril laid the blame for the
current situation on the Qaddafi regime which he said has used the border area
as a recruitment zone for foreign mercenaries.
But Jibril, says Libyan expert Al-Hussein Bin Karim, is ignoring the facts and saying
only
what
the
government
wants
to
hear.
“True, the Qaddafi regime had its bad points. But there are two parties responsible for what is happening in Egypt now. One comprises the salafist jihadist emirs
of various stripes who control a sizeable segment of Libya.
The other comprises the weapons emirs and their tribal networks of smugglers
which extend from Upper Egypt to Marsa Matrouh.”
Israeli Chief of General Staff Benny Gantz has observed that the four areas surrounding Israel are unstable. With respect to the “southern front” — Sinai — he
urged good security coordination with Egypt, which is something he said the
Egyptian army can do in keeping with the arrangements of the security protocol
of
the
Camp
David
accord.
The Israeli military leader noted: “We are happy with the calm that has prevailed
on Sinai front recently. But we do not depend on it and, therefore, we will continue our deployment operations.”
“At this phase there is no need for military operations because of the close and
good relations with the Egyptian side. The more coordination and cooperation
between us develop the more the likelihood of a military operation diminishes.
However, we are an army that knows how to work.”
Israeli affairs expert Said Okasha linked Gantz’s remarks to statements issued by
Ansar
Beit
Al-Maqdis
claiming
that
it
controls
Sinai.
“If such claims were true the Israeli chief of general staff would never have issued
such remarks. Nor would the Egyptian army have achieved such successes in the
field. For example, the army has secured the Suez Canal and traffic through it has
revived. Tourism [in Sinai] is also moving and customary economic activities con-
47
tinue uninterrupted.”
Despite an expanding terrorist environment generated by the aftermath of the 25
January revolution and developments following 3 July 2013 that necessitated a
massive intensification of military operations in Sinai it appears that Egypt’s resistance
to
terrorist
operations
is
relatively
good.
This is heartening, given that the situation in Sinai is not just a local but also a regional, and perhaps international, concern. Nevertheless there remains the question related to Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis. If this is a terrorist group, how do we rank all
the other groups and organizations that are operating in Sinai and that take “Ansar
Beit Al-Maqdis” as a mere banner for carrying out terrorist operations.
There definitely remain ambiguities surrounding the terrorist map of Sinai and beyond. More importantly, however, the existing agreements, protocols and cooperative arrangements are far from sufficient if we are speaking about a terrorist map
that spans the greater Middle East. At the same time, according to Nabil Abdel
Fattah, editor-in-chief of the report on the state of religion produced by Al-Ahram
Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, “Cultural and religious discourse requires
much more extensive and deeper treatment than the very superficial attention that
is being accorded at present".
http://www.albawaba.com/node/570818
48
Ajnad Misr claims latest bombing in Cairo
April 23, 2014
In a statement released to its Facebook and Twitter pages, the jihadist group Ajnad
Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) took responsibility for today's bombing in the western Cairo suburb of 6 October City. The attack killed one police officer, Brigadier General
Ahmed Zaki, and wounded at least two others.
Ajnad Misr said that its fighters had monitored and recorded Zaki's movements
prior to the attack. Along with its statement, the jihadist group released three images of Zaki approaching and getting in his car. According to the statement, which
was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, Ajnad Misr fighters managed to
plant a "sticky explosive device on the car of the criminal."
"It was detonated after we had chosen the appropriate time and place, such that
no damage would befall those passersby on the street," the group said.
Zaki, according to Ajnad Misr, had "followed all possible methods of camouflage
and escape," prior to today's bombing. Today, he had entered a car that "did not
bear any sign of being part of the criminal apparatus."
According to Ajnad Misr, Zaki had been involved in the targeting of Egyptian youth
with live ammunition as well as "arresting and torturing many of them."
Ajnad Misr
49
Ajnad Misr, which formally announced itself on Jan. 23, 2014, has said it is engaged
in a campaign to target "criminal" elements of Egypt's current regime. The group
has taken credit for at least 15 attacks since November, according to a tally maintained by The Long War Journal. These attacks have killed four and wounded at
least 39.
Several of those attacks were claimed in a statement released on April 2, in which
the jihadist group took credit for bombings at Cairo University as well as attacks on
March 4, March 11, and March 29 in the Cairo area. On April 17, the jihadist
group issued a video detailing 8 of its attacks.
Ajnad Misr, which has been described as "our brothers" by the Sinai-based jihadist
group Ansar Jerusalem (Ansar Bayt al Maqdis), has said that it is prepared to receive "information about the movements of the officers and personnel of the criminal services, and their addresses."
Ajnad Misr has also claimed to have aborted or altered certain of its operations out
of concern for civilians in the area.
Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/
50
Egypt: Violence & the struggle for power
18 April 2014
As Egypt prepares for the first post-coup presidential elections, there is no sign to
show that political violence is abating.
Political violence has become even more pronounced since the ouster of the democratically-elected President, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, on July 3, 2013. The ouster is in
fact one of the primary causes for the increased violence.
They are inter-linked for two reasons. The suppression of Morsi’s movement, the
Muslim Brotherhood, by the military-backed interim government has been violent.
Peaceful protest camps were crushed in a deadly operation on August 14, 2013. At
least a thousand people were killed in a week of violence. Thousands of Brotherhood members were arrested, including its spiritual leader, Mohamed Badie. The
Brotherhood was declared a ‘terrorist’ group in December 2013.
On March 25, 2014, 529 people - many of them connected to the Brotherhood were sentenced to death by a court for rioting and killing a policeman. The brutal
severity of the decision shocked the world.
The suppression has continued with the enactment of a new law against terrorism
which provides for the death penalty to anyone committing ‘terrorist acts’ or establishing or joining a ‘terrorist organization’.
The law announced by the government on April 3, 2014, also increases the number
of judicial districts dedicated to handling terrorism-related trials, to ensure ‘speedy
trials’. It was a response to bomb explosions that killed two people, including a Police Brigadier-General, in the vicinity of Cairo University.
This brings us to the second reason for the escalation of violence in Egypt in recent
months. As we have seen, Brotherhood members and supporters have been reacting to the suppression of their movement through their own acts of violence.
Security personnel have been their targets, which explains the large number of policemen killed in the course of the last nine months.
For the Brotherhood, violence is not just reactive or defensive. Since 1943, it has
engaged in paramilitary activities. In 1948, a Brotherhood member allegedly murdered an Appellate Court judge for passing a harsh sentence against a colleague. In
the same year, the then-prime minister of Egypt was killed by a Brotherhood member. On October 26, 1954, the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Egyptian
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.
There are other groups which perceive themselves as Islamic that have also sought
to pursue their political agenda through violence. In Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, the
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis is the source of some of the violent activities we have witnessed there for a few years now. The Al-Furqan Brigades are active throughout
51
Egypt.
Violence on the part of both the government and the Brotherhood and other
groups is related to a much bigger battle which has marred and mired Egyptian politics for decades. It is the struggle for power between the military on the one hand,
and Islamic forces on the other, particularly the Brotherhood, which has expressed
itself in one form or another since the Free Officers revolt of 1952. Even before
1952, during the period of the monarchy, the Brotherhood was already challenging
state power.
This tussle for power will go on and continue to impact negatively upon the lives of
ordinary people. Elections will not resolve this conflict as proven by the postMubarak situation.
In spite of presidential and parliamentary elections which indicated the people’s
preference for Islamic parties, the military and its allies have sought to perpetuate
their power through subterfuge and manipulation. The unjust overthrow of Morsi
was the culmination of this process.
After the overthrow and the consolidation of its power, the military has, as we have
noted, used and abused its authority to emasculate and decimate the Brotherhood.
The new constitution endorsed in a questionable referendum on January 14 and
15, 2014, will further ensure that the power of the military is entrenched and extended beyond the present. The Presidential Election scheduled for May 26-27,
2014, will to all intents and purposes provide the imprimatur to the right of the military to rule Egypt for a long time to come.
If there is a remedy to this situation, it lies with the people. The people have
demonstrated that they have the wisdom and the maturity to send the right signal
to their rulers. It was the people, millions of them, who through sustained, peaceful
mass action over a few weeks pushed out the dictator, Hosni Mubarak, on February
11, 2011. It was a bold and brave rejection of authoritarianism, corruption and nepotism. At the same time, the popular uprising with its epicenter on Tahrir Square
was a plea for justice, freedom, equality and, most of all, for human dignity. This is
why the Egyptian people should not acquiesce with the re-assertion of authoritarianism, the resurgence of military power, through the ascendancy of General Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi.
It would be a betrayal of the hopes and aspirations of the millions who yearn for a
new Egypt guided by the rule of law, rather than the might of men, a new Egypt
which honors through deeds the poor and powerless citizen seeking shelter in the
cemeteries of the rich in Cairo rather than a state which continues to glorify the
pompous and arrogant elite who aggrandize power and wealth for their own ego.
But those who ride the wave of the people’s hopes and aspirations should also ensure that they do not exercise power and authority in a manner that subverts the
trust of the masses. The Brotherhood was in a sense guilty of this. Granted, it faced
52
formidable obstacles in the short time that it was in power. Nonetheless, because
of its attachment to dogma – a commitment to projecting its own version of Islam
– it was often diverted from focusing upon the fundamental challenges faced by
the people such as the lack of basic amenities, a poor delivery system, street-level
corruption and a severe paucity of jobs especially for the young.
Not only did this erode its popular base; it alienated the Brotherhood from a significant segment of the middle-class. It also led to the reinforcement of an approach to Islam that emphasized form at the expense of substance.
Given the Brotherhood’s orientation and what the military represents, shouldn’t
the Egyptian people go beyond both these forces to secure their future?
http://www.panorama.am/en/analytics/2014/04/18/chandra-muzaffar/
53
Kenya
Kenya’s anti-terror (anti-Somali) strategy begins to emerge
Nairobi (HAN) April 10, 2014 – It’s precisely a year to the day since the Jubilee alliance took control of Kenya’s government under a cloud of controversy over a
flawed election and uncertainty about how the world would respond to a government led by suspected war criminals. At the time, the President, Uhuru Kenyatta,
and Vice President William Ruto were awaiting trial at the International Criminal
Court and western governments warned of “consequences” for Kenya if it elected
the two leaders suspected of inciting the previous poll violence in 2007 and
claimed to be preparing for a diplomatic relationship limited to “essential contacts”. A year on, the front page of last weekend’s leading newspaper, The Nation
carried a photo of a smiling Kenyatta relaxing in State House receiving the envoys
of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia in a joint visit to
pledge moral and material support for Kenya’s war on terrorism. What a turnaround.
It’s been a good year for Kenyatta and Ruto. In part the change in their fortunes is
due to the natural hypocrisy of high-handed western governments whose foreign
policy is always subordinate to interests rather than values. But in large part their
luck has been self-made. Witnesses in the case before the International Criminal
Court have withdrawn at a rapid rate causing the prosecutor to cry foul and to
ask for more time. And although the Kenyan government fell short of its goal to
get the cases dismissed, Kenyatta’s case has been postponed several times, now
until October 2014. It has pursued the defence of its leaders with such vigour that
the coalition has come to be seen by many Kenyans as a one-issue government.
This week, however, on the anniversary of their accession to power, the Jubilee
alliance seems to have found another raison d’être: terrorism. The response to
the Westgate attack last September was bungled and embarrassing. The main
thrust of policy following the attack was to hound the media that exposed the
truth of the cock-ups, looting and friendly fire and to scapegoat Kenya’s large ethnic Somali community as well as Somali refugees – the difficulty of distinguishing
the two appearing to be of little concern to the police that conducted round-ups
in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi.
But now, six months after the attacks and one year into their tenure, a strategy is
beginning to emerge. In response to a recent spate of violent attacks, (six people
killed in a church shooting in Mombasa, 3 grenade attacks in Eastleigh in Nairobi
killing another 6 and two further grenade attacks in the Dadaab refugee camp),
the government appears to have found its feet and is responding with force. The
police have been issued with shoot-to-kill orders, 4000 people have been arrested in Mombasa and Nairobi. All urban refugees have been ordered to return to
the northern refugee camps of Kakuma and Dadaab. And police are going house
54
to house in Muslim and Somali neighbourhoods in the main towns doing what
they do so well: beating, looting and ransoming people without proper ID cards,
or, in many cases, even those with proper papers. The newspapers are awash
with vitriol against Somalis and ethnic Somali MPs who have made public statements questioning the utility and manner of the crackdown have been branded
traitors.
The violence that preceded this enormous response was, by Kenyan standards,
normal. Similar attacks of lesser scale have taken place since Kenya invaded So-
55
malia purportedly in pursuit of al-Shabaab in October 2011. The killing of two of the
church suspects by police five days after the original attack and the execution, on
April 1 of the controversial cleric, Abubakar Sharrif, better known as
“Makaburi” (‘graveyard’ – in Swahili) were also not unprecedented.
Painstaking work is not one of the Kenyan police’s strong suits. Makaburi was the
fifth outspoken cleric to be assassinated in murky circumstances since 2012. A report by the Kenyan pressure group, Muslims for Human Rights and the Open Society Justice Initiative, released earlier in the month, pointed the finger for a range of
killings and disappearances firmly at the state. The report’s eerie title, a quote from
a police officer, said it all: “We are tired of taking you to court.” What is new
though is the defiant tone and language of the government in justifying its potentially illegal actions (even going so far as to appear to claim the right to have killed
Makaburi, even as it disavows doing so).
On the eve of the government’s one-year anniversary, the Inspector General of Police, Kimaiyo, issued a legally questionable directive to shoot-to-kill, telling officers:
“you are justified to use your firearm effectively. You have no control over where
the bullet will hit. It can hit the head or heart even when your aim is to disable.”
The week before, the day after the church shooting, the Cabinet Secretary for the
Interior ignored a High Court ruling that had quashed an earlier attempt to relocate
refugees to camps and announced that all urban refugees should relocate forthwith or be forced to do so. The attempt to cleanse the cities of nomads had a kind
of Biblical resonance, but nothing at all to do with the crimes at hand. In Dadaab,
where I was on the day of the order, no one believed that the urban refugees
would actually arrive. But this week, people had begun to trickle in, scared by the
actions of the government, by the state-sponsored terror in Eastleigh and the high
prices being charged by police for ransoming relatives from custody. Its worth remembering that the Kenyan police call Somalis in Nairobi “ATM machines”.
The fact that this heavy-handed collective punishment and blatant discrimination is
counter-productive is surely known to the intelligent people in the Kenyan government. The police and security apparatus in Dadaab and along the border with Somalia have spent the last three years building relations with the refugees and pursuing a community policing strategy in a (largely successful) bid to improve security
in the camps. But, in Nairobi, either old habits die hard or else something else is at
play.
Nearly everyone I have spoken to in Kenya during the last two turbulent weeks
(and 99% of Muslims and Somalis) acknowledges that the main beneficiaries from
the violence have been the politicians at the top of government. Not only in terms
of the re-booting of Western policy towards the regime, but also in terms of the
overshadowing of the latent tensions within the government (it is an uneasy coalition at best), and of uniting a sceptical Kenyan polity behind an administration that
has made zero progress on combating corruption, reforming the police or on im-
56
proving basic standards of living. The insecurity also holds another, more sinister
silver lining for the Uhu-Ruto government: the foregrounding of an attack on human rights and the hard-won constitutional protections of Kenya’s infant constitution, ratified in 2010.
The shoot-to-kill police force has now been normalised. “We should expect it to
become a permanent fixture,” one civil society activist told me recently (afraid to
be quoted by name). He thought that Kenyatta had his eyes not on the next election, he could count on that, but on the clauses in the constitution that impose
Presidential term limits.
Writing in The Nation on Tuesday April 8, Eric Ng’eno, the director of messaging
in the Presidential Strategic Communications Unit, posed the question, “Should
we observe the rights of all suspects, including violent jihadists, and ignore the
threat they pose to the public?” In an article in which he distanced the state from
the killing of Makaburi, he concluded with a call that revealed perhaps more than
he might have intended: “The whole picture is larger and more complex than bailing terror suspects, then moaning about extrajudicial executions.”
Such an analysis makes it easy to see why many refugees hold it as a fact that
each childishly targeted grenade is the work of people paid by the state. It should
come as no surprise that many more are coming to similar conclusions. Kenya’s
war on terror is likely to be a long one.
Ben Rawlence is an Open Society Foundation fellow and the author of “Radio
Congo: Signals
- See more at: http://geeskaafrika.com/
57
Libya
INTEL ANALYST: GADHAFI WANTED OUT
22 April 2014
WASHINGTON – A top intelligence analyst who participated in negotiations to keep
Muammar Gadhafi in power says the Libyan crisis and the Benghazi attacks were
avoidable – because a “brutal” Gadhafi wanted out – he wanted peace – and the
chance to pursue al-Qaida himself.
Instead, Gadhafi’s requests for exile received silence from the U.S. government and
allies.
That meant the door to peace was closed, and al-Qaida was armed because of the
inaction of the U.S. government, the analyst said.
That same inaction, said Rear Adm. Charles Kubic, CEC, U.S. Navy, retired, is responsible for the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and U.S. Special Forces members in the terror attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi.
“What went on there was un-American. We don’t put people in the field and not
come to their support,” added retired Adm. James “Ace” Lyons at a Citizens Commission news conference Tuesday.
Lyons, former commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the father of the Navy SEAL Red Cell Program, hails from what many deem as the “Greatest Generation.” As the oldest member of the panel, he has seen other communist-backed
nations crumble, and what happened in Benghazi was no different.
58
Kubic, who is not a member of the Citizens Commission but is well-versed in military intelligence, said he was a key player in the 2011 failed negotiations that
would have resulted in peace between U.S. and coalition forces and Libya.
According to a Citizens Commission Report, a senior aide to Gadhafi requested a
72-hour truce with U.S. military command officials to negotiate a cease-fire with
talks to be held in Tripoli. If all conditions were deemed acceptable, Libya would
“stop all combat operations immediately and withdraw all military forces to the
outskirts of all cities, and assume a defensive posture.”
To ensure credibility with the international community, the Libyans recommended
observers from the African Union be invited into Libya to ensure a truce was honored.
After a year-long investigation, the Citizens Commission on Benghazi issued a
damning report Tuesday with allegations that go beyond saying the U.S. government is responsible for the events in the Benghazi attacks. It says that in 2011, U.S.
leadership switched sides in the war on terror and “committed treasonous acts”
that subsequently led to the 2012 deaths of Stevens and the other Americans.
“The United States switched sides in the war on terror with what we did in Libya
by knowingly facilitating the provision of weapons to known al-Qaida militias and
figures,” Clare Lopez, former CIA operations officer and vice president for research
and analysis at the Center for Security Policy, told WND.
Lopez blamed the Obama administration for failing to stop a $500 million United
Arab Emirates arms shipment from reaching al-Qaida, which she said is backed by
the Muslim Brotherhood. The same Muslim Brotherhood that as a result, holds
key positions within the U.S. taxpayer-sponsored Libyan National Transitional
Council.
Lopez told WND the weapons that flowed into Benghazi from Qatar were permitted to enter by U.S. armed forces who were “blockading the approaches from
air and sea.”
“They knew these weapons were coming in, and that was allowed,” she said.
She told WND, because of the current administration’s inaction, leaders in the
Muslim Brotherhood are now high-ranking members of Libya’s government.
“These figures go back to the Afghan War against the Soviets in the 1980s. Gadhafi
was bad, but he kept the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida down,” she said.
When reporters pressed for answers about who exactly is responsible for Benghazi, committee members stated the fault falls on all branches of the U.S. government. But they said the commander in chief has ultimate authority and responsibility for securing the safety of U.S. interests and troops.
That sentiment did not seem to come easy for Lyons and Kubic. Trust is a battle-
59
field mantra. Without trust, especially in small intelligence units like the one on
the ground during the Benghazi attacks, the command structure crumbles, morale caves and soldiers die, they suggested.
“The intelligence community was part of that, the Department of State was part
of that, and certainly that means that the top leadership of the United States, our
national security leadership, and potentially Congress – if they were briefed on
this – also knew about this,” Lopez said.
Committee members said weapons were intended for Gadhafi but were allowed
by the U.S. to flow to his Islamist opposition.
“A mere 10 years after al-Qaida (supported by Hezbollah and Iran) attacked the
American homeland in the worst act of terrorism ever suffered by this country,
U.S. leadership decided to facilitate the provision of weapons to jihadist militias
known to be affiliated with al-Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood in order to
bring down a brutal dictator who also just happened to be a U.S. ally in the global
war on terror at the time,” Lopez said.
In the days prior to the attack in Benghazi, unrest rose in Cairo, Egypt. While the
U.S. embassy in Cairo blamed the uprising on a YouTube movie, the real driver
behind it was a coalition of Islamist groups, committee members said. Those
groups were not protesting a movie. According to the warning they published in
Egyptian media, they had a specific demand:
“The group, which consists of many members from al-Qaida, called for the quick
release of the jihadi sheikh, Omar Abdul Rahman [the 'Blind Sheikh'] whom they
described as a scholar and jihadi who sacrificed his life for the Egyptian Umma,
who was ignored by the Mubarak regime.”
The report said Islamists threatened to burn the U.S. embassy in Cairo with those
in it, and take hostage those who remained, unless the Blind Sheikh was released.
Citizens Committee panel member Wayne Simmons said, “Islamists did attack the
U.S. embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012 – the same day of the attack in Benghazi, Libya. The attackers breached the embassy’s walls and replaced the American flag with the black flag of Islam.”
Kubic said he knows how those soldiers felt that night.
“I know the feeling of having to trust someone would pick me up after I completed a long, lonely mission in a foreign land. I could count on it every time.”
He said U.S. Special Forces instead faced the ultimate betrayal.
“Those snake-eating warriors looked in the eyes [of their killers] knowing what
was going to happen next.”
Several committee members said they and others in the intelligence community
suspect that the events surrounding Gadhafi and Benghazi were “the most well-
60
planned ‘ops’” they have ever seen.
They suggest that there are those within the U.S. government on both sides of the
aisle who could be implicated based on the fact that they may have material
knowledge of the U.S. government’s material support for terrorism.
The committee is gathering the evidence, and members told reporters they are
“very close” to closing the gaps to reveal who is responsible for U.S. soldiers’
deaths in Benghazi, the new U.S.-backed, al-Qaida-supported Libyan National Transitional government and a resurrected Middle East turmoil – all of which they say
could have been easily prevented.
Read more at http://www.wnd.com/2014/04/intel-analyst-gadhafi-wanted-out/
#OB0ODltS02fqdtCF.99
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Mali
Mali: Polls Show Turn to Optimism
17 APRIL 2014
"In an Afrobarometer survey in December 2012, three quarters of adult Malians
were worried that the country was moving in 'the wrong direction.' At that time, at
the depths of a profound national crisis, most Malians thought the future looked
bleak. A year later, however, a follow-up survey reveals newfound hope in the future. By December 2013, two thirds of all Malians now consider that that the country is headed in the 'right direction.'"
The survey did not ask about views of the "international" intervention, which involved multiple forces with different interests (France, African Union, UN, logistic
support from USA), and responses to open-ended questions clearly put major responsibility for the crisis on internal factors and on outside "terrorists" in the
North. But the implication of the polls is that this stabilization, together with the
elections that Mali pulled off successfully (according to the survey) in 2013, on balance improved the situation, according to the majority of Malians. [On the UN involvement, with some background from UN perspective, see http://tinyurl.com/
o8u97wa]
Whatever one's analysis of the broader international and regional factors lying behind the ongoing crisis in Mali, it is critical to give primary weight to the opinions of
the people of Mali themselves. The Afrobarometer surveys are careful and balanced. Even such a dramatic shift towards overall optimism, however, should be
measured against the fact that 'the right direction' does not mean satisfaction with
the new status quo. Four out of six Malians, and over half of Northerners, said that
basic security had not been restored in the country as a whole in 2013.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin includes a summary article on the polls, and brief excerpts
from two reports from AfroBarometer.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Mali, visit http://www.africafocus.org/
country/mali.php
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on peace
www.africafocus.org/peaceexp.php - Editor's Note
Malians Show Dramatic Leap in Confidence
31 March 2014
AllAfrica.com
http://allafrica.com/stories/201403312507.html
62
and
security,
visithttp://
Cape Town - The return of democracy and peace to much of Mali has generated a
complete turnaround in public confidence in the country's future, according to a
new opinion survey.
Afrobarometer, the leading continent-wide researcher of African public opinion,
says that a survey in southern Mali in December 2012 - following a military takeover of the government, the seizure of the north by insurgents, an attack on a civilian president and the arrest of the prime minister - showed that only one in four
people believed the country was headed in the right direction.
However, following the recovery of the north from rebels and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2013, two in three Malians believed a year
later they were heading in the right direction.
"Interestingly," Afrobarometer adds, "people residing in the three northern regions
- who could now be interviewed due to an improved security situation - were
slightly more optimistic about the country's trajectory than people living in the
south (71 versus 66 percent).
"One possible reason is that northerners experienced the biggest change, namely
from the strict rules of sharia law to a more relaxed, secular regime. Furthermore,
persons displaced by the conflict - who were identified during the survey in both
north and south - were the most likely to say that the country was back on the
'right' track."
The Afrobarometer report, written by researchers Professor Michael Bratton and
Peter Penar of Michigan State University in the United States, added that 60 percent of Malians and 67 percent of internally-displaced people felt secure at the end
of 2013, compared with 17 percent and 10 percent respectively a year earlier.
In a second analysis, Afrobarometer found that Malians had changed their views
over the year on the causes of their country's crisis.
"In the December 2012 Afrobarometer survey," writes researcher Professor Massa
Coulibaly of the University of Bamako, "Malians highlighted the primary causes of
the serious sociopolitical crisis that their country was going through, as lack of patriotism on the part of the leaders and weakness of the State. At that time, most
Malians had lost trust in the political class and in politicians.
"One year later, however, a follow-up Afrobarometer survey revealed that foreign
terrorists and corruption are rather the two primary causes of the Northern conflict
and occupation."
Other key findings cited by Afrobarometer:
"Some 60 percent of adult citizens also consider that their country is now safe and
secure from armed conflict, up from 17 percent in 2012.
"But Malians still regard political instability as the country's most important prob-
63
lem, especially those who live in the northern regions or have been displaced from
their homes.
"Malians feel very positive about the quality of national elections held in 2013, with
83 percent seeing the presidential contest as "completely free and fair.
"Although still cautious about prevailing economic conditions, Malians perceive recent signs of recovery and hold high expectations for future economic wellbeing.
"In changing their minds about the direction of the country, Malians make reference mainly to economic and security considerations and, to a lesser extent, the
quality of elections."
Mali's Public Mood Reflects Newfound Hope
Afrobarometer Policy Paper 9 | Michael Bratton and Peter Penar
March 2014
[full text available at http://afrobarometer.org/publications/policy-papers]
Introduction
In an Afrobarometer survey in December 2012, three quarters of adult Malians
were worried that the country was moving in "the wrong direction." At that time,
at the depths of a profound national crisis, most Malians thought the future looked
bleak. A year later, however, a follow-up survey reveals newfound hope in the future. By December 2013, two thirds of all Malians now consider that that the country is headed in the "right direction."
What explains this remarkable turnaround in the public mood? The upswing in the
country's collective frame of mind within the space of a single year is traced to several positive developments. These include an improved security situation, the restoration of a freely elected government, and rising confidence in economic recovery.
Perhaps unexpectedly, the residents of Mali's three Northern regions as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs) - two groups that bore the brunt of the crisis - are
especially sanguine about the direction of the country. But major challenges remain
for these groups including an uncertain peace and persistent inequalities in regional development.
Key Findings
In a complete reversal of opinion from one year earlier, two out of three Malians
say that their country is moving in the "right direction" at the end of 2013.
Some 60% of adult citizens also consider that their country is now safe and secure
from armed conflict, up from 17% in 2012.
64
But Malians still regard political instability as the country's most important problem, especially those who live in the northern regions or have been displaced from
their homes.
Malians feel very positive about the quality of national elections held in 2013, with
83% seeing the presidential contest as "completely free and fair."
Although still cautious about prevailing economic conditions, Malians perceive recent signs of recovery and hold high expectations for future economic wellbeing.
In changing their minds about the direction of the country, Malians make reference
mainly to economic and security considerations and, to a lesser extent, the quality
of elections.
The Perceived Direction of the Country
To measure the general public mood in a country, the Afrobarometer survey asks:
"What about the overall direction of the country? Would you say that the country
is going in the wrong direction or the right direction?" This question was first asked
in Mali in December 2012 following the largest series of calamities in the country's
postcolonial history. A March 2012 coup d'etat against the elected national government was prompted by a Touareg-led rebellion in the north in January 2012 and
followed by the takeover of northern cities by Islamic jihadists. Tens of thousands
of people fled their homes and travel and trade became dangerous in many localities. For all intents and purposes, the Malian state collapsed in the three northern
regions and also in Douentza cercle (in Mopti region). There was also a marked deterioration in the rule of law in the south, exemplified by the abduction of journalists and the extra-judicial execution of coup opponents.
Faced with democratic breakdown, a failing state and a weakening economy, most
Malian citizens expressed alarm. In December 2012, only 25% stated that Mali was
headed in the "right direction"; fully 75% saw the country moving in the "wrong
direction" (see Table 1). These figures represent popular opinion in the six southern
regions because the 2012 survey could not be conducted in the north due to ongoing conflict. At that time too, internally displaced persons were still on the move
and their numbers and locations remained fluid.
The crisis escalated in January 2013, when insurgents occupied territory close to
Mopti and threatened to advance on Segou, then Bamako. In response to an urgent
call for military intervention from Mali's interim government, a French-led air and
ground force, later backed by the United Nations Security Council, drove the rebels
out of the northern cities. The quick success of this military offensive created political space for the government to approve a "roadmap" for political transition that
promised elections, the reestablishment of order, and national reconciliation. In a
landmark achievement, legitimate civilian authority was restored by means of open
elections for president (July/August 2013) and parliament (November/December
2013).
65
By the end of the year, public opinion had turned around completely. In late December 2013, a clear majority of Malians (67%) now considered that their country
was progressing in the "right direction." Only one third of all adults (33%) now expressed concern that the country was on the "wrong" path. Interestingly, people
residing in the three northern regions - who could now be interviewed due to an
improved security situation - were slightly more optimistic about the country's trajectory than people living in the south (71 versus 66%). One possible reason is that
northerners experienced the biggest change, namely from the strict rules of sharia
law to a more relaxed, secular regime. Furthermore, persons displaced by the conflict - who were identified during the survey in both north and south - were the
most likely to say that the country was back on the "right" track (75%).
Most Important Problems
But Mali's complex crisis is far from resolved. Major difficulties remain. To obtain
people's views of the challenging terrain ahead, the Afrobarometer survey asked:
"In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that
the government should address?" Although respondents were offered the opportunity to name up to three problems, the one mentioned first is taken to be the priority problem and thus is reported here (see Table 2).
Malians regard political instability as the country's biggest challenge, which is not
surprising in the aftermath of armed rebellion. More than one quarter (27%) of all
adult citizens place the resolution of conflict and the return of peace at the top of
the list of important problems. This sentiment is especially widespread among
northerners (35%), who continue to experience political violence (though at greatly
reduced levels), and among internally displaced persons, who were interviewed in
both the north and the south (43%).
Food insecurity is the other prominent concern on the minds of Malians. Southerners are especially likely to be preoccupied with hunger (25%, not shown in Table 2)
as compared to both northerners (16%) and IDPs (17%). This regional and intergroup disparity is probably due to the preponderance of rural areas, where selfprovided food supplies are sometimes unreliable, in the survey sample for the
southern regions. By contrast, food is usually available for purchase in urban areas,
where northern and IDP respondents are concentrated; moreover, the north is the
focus of emergency food relief efforts, making food supplies more readily available
there than in the south. Residential location (rural or urban) also helps to explain
the higher levels of concern among northerners about unemployment and crime
and the lower priority they grant to addressing problems of water shortage.
This wide array of basic developmental problems does not seem to dent popular
expectations for social and economic progress. Remarkably, a strong majority of
Malians (62%) supposes that the government is potentially able to solve "all" these
problems. And a further 31% estimates that the government can solve "most" of
them. These high levels of public confidence, shared equally across north and
66
south, seem inconsistent with the fact that armed conflict and military coup have
undermined the capacity of the state. But rising expectations are consistent with
the observation that, by the end of 2013 - and especially compared to the dark
days of 2012 - Malians think that their country is embarked on a brighter future.
What Explains the Public Mood?
Several factors may drive the observed U-turn in Malians' popular outlook. Three
will be considered here:
An improved security situation;
The restoration of elected government; and
Perceived economic recovery.
[full report looks in detail at opinion on each of these issues]
Conclusion: What Drives the Public Mood?
This paper found evidence that Malians believe that their country has a fresh
chance to correct problems that led to an armed conflict and a military coup. In the
interval of just one year, between December 2012 and December 2013, the public
mood swung from deep pessimism (75% "wrong direction") to solid optimism (67%
"right direction"). The analysis in this paper has established that the current bout of
popular hope is linked to positive mass attitudes about security, democracy and the
economy.
But which of these factors matters most? If policy makers are to make decisions
that contribute to sustaining the country's recent progress, where should they concentrate their efforts? To compare the relative effects of security, electoral and
economic considerations, this paper concludes with a simple logistic regression
analysis (see Table 6). It reveals that, even when controlled for each other, all three
factors remain statistically significant, that is, influential in explaining the public
mood. So each factor - state strengthening, democracy building, and equitable economic growth - deserves policy attention.
...
In sum, the main driver of the public mood appears to be popular attitudes about
the condition of the economy. The obvious implication - without neglecting the rebuilding of a flimsy state or the consolidation of a fragile democracy - is that the
new government ought to direct priority attention to choosing effective policies for
economic development. A good starting point would be those policy areas - especially food security, but also employment creation and poverty alleviation - that
citizens have identified as the country's most important economic problems. In so
doing, the government would also be well advised to first target the special needs
of internally displaced persons and the long-neglected issue of the economic development of Mali's northern regions.
67
gover
Popular Perceptions of the Causes and Consequences of the Conflict in Mali
Afrobarometer Policy Paper 10 - Massa Coulibaly
March 2014
[full text available at http://afrobarometer.org/publications/policy-papers]
Summary
In the December 2012 Afrobarometer survey, Malians highlighted the primary
causes of the serious sociopolitical crisis that their country was going through, as
lack of patriotism on the part of the leaders and weakness of the State. At that
time, most Malians had lost trust in the political class and in politicians. One year
later (December 2013), however, a follow-up Afrobarometer survey revealed that
foreign terrorists and corruption are rather the two primary causes of the Northern
conflict and occupation.
The change in perceptions on this question in the space of a year is explained by
the change in the nature and scale of the crisis. The crisis went from the occupation
of two-thirds of the territory to war via the intensified radicalism in the occupants'
management of the occupied areas and their many acts of banning and punishment. Next, the change in perceptions is also explained by the peaceful organization of presidential and legislative elections with record participation rates of Malian citizens since the advent of democracy in 1992, more than 50% in the presidential ones and a little less than 50% in the legislative ones. These elections deemed
free and honest explain in turn that the need to resort to violence for a good cause
is perceived by close to one out of five Malians versus close to one out of three Malians one year prior.
One of the major challenges of the governance in Mali is still maintaining and deepening confidence between Malians and their ruling class. To do so, measuring the
populations' perceptions helps to track the will of the people and ensure that policies serve this will and not the reverse.
Key Findings
The main popular perceptions from the December 2013 Afrobarometer survey can
be summarized as follows:
The three main reasons for the Northern conflict and occupation are foreign terrorists, corruption and the desire for natural resources. However, in formerly occupied
areas, the weakness of the State is in conflict with the desire for natural resources.
For the overwhelming majority of Malians, rebels and Islamists appear in first place
of those presumed to be involved in drug trafficking, alongside transnational organized crime.
68
The Northern conflict brought about internal displacement of populations of
around 6% with 3% who already returned home, 2% with the intention of returning
and 1% with no intention of returning. This phenomenon proportionally affects city
dwellers, women and those under 25 or age 35-44 slightly more.
In total, close to one out of three Malians were affected, personally or through
family members, by the Northern conflict and occupation, in one of the many ways
in which one could be affected, from the explosion of one's domicile to death via
sharia punishment or physical aggression of any kind
For the very large majority of Malians (86% to 95%), three major options would
help resolve the conflict: civic education, justice and a strong State
For close to two out of three Malians, signing a new agreement will probably be the
basis for sustainable peace in Mali.
Causes of the conflict
There were quite a few causes for the conflict, from the arrival of foreign terrorists
on the national territory to the military coup d'etat via corruption, incompetence or
lack of patriotism of the Malian leaders, etc. We can certainly add drug trafficking
including rebels and Islamist groups as well as foreigners, and even transnational
organized crime who are suspected of this, based on the survey data.
1.1. A variety of reasons
In December 2012 when we surveyed Malians on the causes of the crisis that the
country was experiencing, they put at the top the lack of patriotism of the leaders,
weakness of the State, foreign terrorists and incompetence of the political class,
four reasons which accounted for more than two-thirds of all of the causes listed
(68%). When we know that foreign terrorists accounted for only 11%, it becomes
apparent that the three main reasons were internal, for 57% in total, with 67% for
survey respondents from Segu and 69% from Sikasso.
When we asked the same question in December 2013, thus coming out of the occupation of two-thirds of the national territory, foreign terrorists were by far the primary cause of the occupation and Northern conflict. Lack of patriotism of the leaders went down to fifth place, replaced by corruption, desire for natural resources
and weakness of the State. Note that this classification experiences some regional
effects except that regardless of region, foreign terrorists are still perceived as the
primary cause for the Northern conflict and occupation thus with no regional
effects.
On the 9 reasons listed, lack of development in the North is ranked 8th, just before
the coup d'Etat that occupies last place, except in the regions directly concerned,
where it occupies 4th, 5th, and 7th place respectively in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.
For all of the areas occupied by armed groups, rebels and Islamists, this reason
climbed to 4th place. Likewise, the desire for natural resources is perceived as the
69
3rd reason for the conflict versus a modest position of 6th place in formerly occupied areas.
1.2. Drug trafficking
It has always been said that drug trafficking was one of the major causes of the crisis in the North and thus the occupation and armed conflict. Studies (GREAT, 2013)
have also revealed that generally, trafficking of all kinds was the basic issue between all those involved in the Sahel-Saharan strip: trafficking of drugs, arms, cigarettes, human beings, etc. Among those most involved in this traffic, rebels, transnational organized crime and Islamic groups are at the top. In Gao and Kidal, the
primary offenders are rebels and Islamists, specifically the two occupants of the
north, with the highest scores, 96% each. This must be considered a revelation
from actual experience and not just a simple perception. In two other regions of
the country, in this instance Kayes and Sikasso, these two groups (rebels and Islamists) are perceived as being the two biggest drug traffickers.
One significant difference between Kidal and the other two Northern regions, even
with the entire rest of the country, is the clearly higher score in Kidal than everywhere else of the involvement of public bodies like customs (61% in Kidal versus
29% in Gao and 5% in Timbuktu), Malian military (22% versus 3% each of the two
other Northern regions) and local elected officials (28% versus 6% respectively 2%).
Isn't that also another revelation from actual experience of the populations of this
region and not just a simple perception?
…
Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/201404171579.html?viewall=1
70
Nigeria
INSECURITY IN NIGERIA: It’s another civil war — says Gowon
26 April 2014
General Yakubu Gowon, who led
Nigeria through a 30-month civil
war, yesterday, lamented that the
country had fallen into full scale
civil war with the spate of crises in
the northeast.
His assertion was corroborated by
the Non-Academic Staff Union of
Educational and Associated Institutions, NASU.
The assertions came as the governor of Borno State, Alhaji Kashim
Shetima lamented that the last
General Yakubu Gowon
seven days have been the worst in
his life following the abduction of
129 girls from a secondary school in the state. He disclosed that seven more girls
had escaped from the hideout of the Boko Haram insurgents bringing the number
of those remaining in captivity of the Islamic insurgents to 77.
Meanwhile, despite Saturday’s formal lapse of the state of emergency in the troubled Northeast, the military remained fully deployed in the three states with strict
restriction on the movement of persons in the states.
However, telephone communications which were once curtailed after the proclamation of emergency rule by President Goodluck Jonathan last April have noticeably improved.
Nevertheless, opinion on the sustenance of the state of emergency remained
mixed among stakeholders from within and outside the troubled states. While
some called for the full implementation of emergency rule with the suspension of
the elected political institutions, other stakeholders differed. All parties were nevertheless agreed that the soldiers deployed to the region should remain.
The president has not given notice of his inclination towards renewing or suspending the state of emergency. A security meeting between the president and the nation’s governors is expected to hold on Wednesday following which a formal announcement on the issue would be clarified.
The state of emergency was first proclaimed by President Jonathan in April 2013
and renewed after six months last November.
Gowon, who spoke exclusively to Vanguard on the sideline of events marking the
71
75th birthday of former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Chief Ufot
Ekaette, said it was imperative for the government to firmly deal with the rising
wave of terrorism in the country so as to keep the country one.
The former head of state pointed out that what was going on in Nigeria was close
to the challenges the 30-month civil war posed to his administration. He said that it
was necessary for all Nigerians to team up with the government to ensure that the
forces opposed to the continued unity and progress of the country were roundly
defeated.
Describing the insurgents as enemies of a united Nigeria, Gowon enjoined Nigerians to support the federal government with necessary prayers to God to end the
cycle of violence being unleashed on the nation by the insurgents.
It’s civil war — Gowon
Gowon said: “What we are witnessing today is not too different from what happened during my administration as head of state and we moved ahead to checkmate the insurgency.
“We need to pray and work with the government to ensure that this ugly cycle of
violence comes to an end so that the unity of Nigeria is not threatened. It is therefore imperative for the government to take appropriate decisions to deal with the
spate of violence sweeping through the country so that this country can remain as
one united entity,” he admonished.
While speaking at the birthday celebration, Gowon had said that he stood his
ground to ensure that Nigeria remained as one during the civil war because he believed in the unity of the nation. He pointed out that although he was not the one
who coined “Go Ahead With One Nigeria, GOWON”, the coinage significantly inspired him to resist all attempts by certain elements to divide the country.
The former head of state therefore appealed to Nigerian leaders at all levels to ensure that they render quality service to their people and also resist the temptation
to stay in office beyond the stipulated terms in the constitution. Gowon, who
poured encomiums on Chief Ekaette, who had served him as Private Secretary between 1968 and 1975, said the former SGF was an embodiment of loyalty, hard
work and transparency, who should be emulated by all well meaning Nigerians.
NASU in a statement recalled the April 14, 2014 bombing at Nyanya Motor Park,
Abuja, which claimed over 100 lives with over 250 others injured, and the abduction of several female students from a Government Girls Secondary School, GGSS,
in Chibok, Bornu State, 24 hours after the Nyanya bombing.
Speaking through its General Secretary, Peters Adeyemi, NASU, argued that it was
unbelievable that one week after, the whereabouts and safety of some of the abducted students had remained unknown till today, calling on the Federal Government especially, the military to live up to its responsibilities of protecting the nation
both internally and externally.
72
My worst days ever — Shetima
Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima has described the last one week as his
most troubling moment since he took over the mantle of affairs in May, 2011.
The statement came as seven more girls escaped from captivity, bringing the total
number of those who have escaped to 52 leaving 77 still in captivity.
Shettima’s expression of feelings was contained in his Easter message released by
his spokesman, Isa Gusau and followed the abduction of 129 school girls in the early hours of last Tuesday at Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno
State.
The Governor said though he had witnessed very dark days of insurgency inherited
by his administration, none of the attacks had been more troubling for him as the
abduction of the school girls.
“I am also very much aware that the girls abducted consist of not just those with
origins traced to Chibok but also from other parts of the state and the country
which is typical of a good secondary school that should unite Nigerians. I am also
aware that the abducted students include both Christians and Muslim faithful.
“I am made to understand that the Ameera (spiritual head) of the Muslim Students
Society in the school is among those abducted and yet to be freed. She was abducted alongside her Christian and Muslim colleagues without the insurgents worried
about the religion any of the students practice. We must therefore remain united in
our shared grief to pray vehemently for our girls as well as the patriotic security
agencies and civilian volunteers currently in relentless search and rescue efforts.
“Between last night and this evening, seven more girls escaped from captivity,
bringing to 52 the number of those with us out of 129 students that were at the
hostel on the day of that attack. This means 77 students are yet to be found.”
CAN declares fasting, prayers, appeal for their release
Meanwhile, the Christians Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Borno State, yesterday,
called on all Christians in the state and Nigeria to begin fasting and prayers for the
release of all the secondary school girls kidnapped by insurgents in Chibok.
State chairman of the association, Rev. Titus Pona at a press briefing in Maiduguri
yesterday equally appealed to members of the Boko Haram to release the school
girls.
“We are calling on all Christians in Borno state, Nigeria and the world to fast and
pray for the release of the girls.
He also called on the insurgents to lay down their arms and channel their grievances through dialogue with the federal and state governments.
Source: http://www.osundefender.org/
73
BOKO HARAM’S ROOTS IN NIGERIA LONG PREDATE THE AL-QAEDA ERA
Analysis: While the group is linked with Salafist groups in North Africa, it’s a product
of northern Nigeria’s collapse
April 23, 2014 8:27AM ET
The bomb blast near Abuja, Nigeria, on April 14 that killed at least 75 people, and
the kidnapping the following day of what appeared to be more than 100 schoolgirls in the northeastern Nigerian town of Chibok, have placed Boko Haram firmly
at the top of local news. Security was tight in Abuja’s churches and cathedrals over
the Easter weekend, and in a video released to Agence France-Presse on Sunday, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed responsibility for the bomb,
warning, “We are in your city, but you don’t know where we are.”
But northeastern Nigeria had been bandit country long before the emergence of
Boko Haram. And while it may coincide with the growth over the past two decades
of Salafist armed groups elsewhere in the region and beyond, the real context for
Boko Haram's emergence is the long political and economic decline of Nigeria's
northeast and enduring Kanuri opposition to northern power structures.
Writing in 1917, just three years after the amalgamation of south and north into a
unified Nigeria, the colonial official Herbert Palmer reported back to London on the
porous zone known colloquially by the British Foreign Office as "Central Sudan."
The portent of his words repays quoting at length:
The whole Sudan belt is one country with no real geographical obstacles, with homogeneous peoples having a common religion, and with few or no real racial antip-
74
athies. They would be quite capable under certain circumstances of fighting for
their faith ... though that is hardly a likely contingency in Nigeria so long as their
Muslim life and social order are protected as they have been since 1903 ... There
would, however, probably be a point at which their general sentiment for Islam and
an instinctive desire for independence and freedom from Christian control might
get the upper hand of their discretion, and assert itself.
Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north to this day maintains its fluid connections
with the wider Sahel region — or "Sahelistan," as some have begun to refer to the
region after the emergence of various armed Salafist groups operating across borders. The 1903 moment cited in Palmer's report refers to Lord Lugard's colonial annexation of the Sokoto Caliphate, founded in the 19th century by the Fulani leader
Usman dan Fodio, who had called for "jihad" against the Hausa kingdoms of northern Nigeria. The British adopted an "indirect rule" policy, leaving administrative
matters to Nigerians, consolidating the authority of an "emirate" that empowered
the local Fulani elite as the "protectors" of Muslim life and social order.
But the authority of the local emirs has been steadily eroded over the years by
grinding poverty, social breakdown and conflict over resources often masked in religious terms.
One precedent for Boko Haram was the 1979 revolt led by Mohammed Marwa,
known as "Maitatsine" — the one who damns. He declared himself a prophet and
led a rebellion against religious authority in Kano that claimed 5,000 lives. His supporters, the "Yan Tatsine," were often non-Hausa northerners alienated from local
power structures and facing declining employment prospects. They are not direct
precursors to Boko Haram, but they do reveal a history of violent rebellion in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram's backstory also taps into an older historical tradition of
resistance to the colonial-controlled Sokoto elite led by Muhammad al-Kanem. Boko
Haram's hierarchy is dominated by Kanuri people, who are descendants of the
Kanem-Bornu empire.
Historical legacy aside, Boko Haram's rise has been fueled by economic decline.
Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 percent in the past 40 years, drastically affecting fishing
livelihoods and irrigation farming for a surrounding population of 30 million. And
desertification claims more than 770 square miles of cropland every year. Boko Haram has emerged in the poorest part of Nigeria, where 71.5 percent of the population lives in absolute poverty and more than half are malnourished.
Still, despite the complex matrix of political, economic and historical trends into
which it emerged, Boko Haram began as a simple local dispute. A decade ago, the
radical Kanuri cleric Mohammed Yusuf had been running an effective alternative
government to the Borno state Gov. Ali Modu Sheriff, providing welfare and jobs to
locals who lacked access to the governor's patronage network. Yusuf was popular
among the region's impoverished and disaffected youth, and his death in police cus-
75
tody in 2009 after an altercation at a funeral prompted many of them to take up
arms and begin attacking police stations to avenge their slain leader. Yusuf was succeeded by the more militant Shekau, and the insurgency began to spread west and
south.
Five years on, however, Boko Haram has morphed from a local rebellion into part
of a pan-Sahelian insurgency with a diffuse set of targets, from schools and universities to the U.N. It has formed linkages sharing expertise, training camps and
equipment with groups in Mali and Libya. It has now also splintered into six factions, including Ansaru — which has more direct links with Al-Shabab in Somalia
and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). However, it is thought that Shekau
has little operational control over these groups.
The massive increase in federal military spending on the counterinsurgency effort
(the annual military budget is now $6.25 billion) has also created a perverse incentive within Nigeria's military to keep the war going. An International Crisis
Group report (PDF) from earlier this month referred to “allegations that substantial
sums are pocketed from defence and security appropriations by government officials, security chiefs and the contractors supplying military hardware.”
In June 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan made the startling claim that Boko Haram had widely infiltrated Nigeria's power structure.
"Some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the
parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the
judiciary," Jonathan said. "Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other
security agencies."
Even if Boko Haram has evolved into a national and regional insurgency, the movement's power structures may have begun to intersect with the dynamic of corruption within the state's security apparatus. At least, that's what Nigeria's president
appears to believe. Others, such as Adamawa state Gov. Murtala
Nyako, controversially accuse Jonathan himself of supporting Boko Haram.
A political motive for disrupting the northeast is easy to see. The International Crisis Group report notes there are now “suspicions the ruling PDP and President Jonathan, who is expected to seek a new term, are trying to suppress ballots in the region, which is largely controlled by the newly-formed opposition party the All Progressives Congress.”
Meanwhile, establishment elders such as former Chief of Air Staff Al-amin Dagash
and former Minister of Finance Mallam Adamu Ciroma called a press conference in
early April to query how authorities could not be aware of the use of helicopters to
drop supplies to Boko Haram strongholds.
While Shekau remains the Boko Haram figurehead, the six factions of the organization, the ease with which they can penetrate secure locations in Abuja and the
76
looming 2015 election create a far more complex picture. Even though Boko Haram
has now claimed responsibility for the Abuja bomb, the State Security Service and
the police are not restricting their investigations to Boko Haram. In the most recent
video clip, Shekau did not even mention the Chibok kidnapping.
Political solutions are often touted as the answer to armed insurgencies, but
there's little reason to expect that Nigeria's politics — and next year’s nationwide
election — will produce an answer to the challenge posed by Boko Haram. The
movement has established supply routes and funding sources. Caches of recovered
Boko Haram weapons have been traced to Libya, and Ansaru, at least, has established links with AQIM and Al-Shabab. Nor is a "hearts and minds" approach likely
to succeed when ideology may not be the key driver of the insurgency. Nor does
the government in Abuja seem likely to divert resources to address the extreme
poverty of the northeast; it had adopted such an “amnesty program” in response
to a different insurgency in the Niger Delta largely because rebel attacks on oil
pipelines there threatened state revenues. Plans to refill Lake Chad by diverting
water from a tributary of the Congo are not politically feasible, and desertification
is an unstoppable feature of northern life.
With these forlorn factors in mind, it is hard to see Sahelistan being anything other
than violently lawless for decades to come, with its epicenter in the northeast of
Nigeria. Boko Haram may by now be a mirage on the dunes fostered by alienation
and merciless economic hardship; it will also remain as an opportunity to continually destabilize the Nigerian state from within. Either way, it looks as if the movement that terrorizes so many thousands of ordinary Nigerians is unlikely to be uprooted anytime soon.
http://america.aljazeera.com/
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Boko Haram gagne du terrain en Afrique de l’ouest
le 14 Avril 2014
Née dans le nord-est du Nigéria avec une farouche volonté de convertir à une
idéologie religieuse fondamentaliste, la secte Boko Haram est devenue un mouvement transnational qui s’est associé à la nébuleuse d’Al-Qaïda pour parvenir à
ses fins. En employant les méthodes qu’elle condamne.
Crédit photo: Tous droits réservés Google Image
Le bilan de la terreur attribuée à la secte Boko Haram s'alourdit. Lundi 14 avril, un
violent attentat a frappé une gare routière proche de la capitale, causant la mort
d'au moins 71 personnes. Ce drame est le dernier d'une longue série de violences
meurtrières dont le rythme s'est récemment accéléré. La première semaine de
Mars : le 1er, un double attentat massacrait vingt-neuf civils en pleine rue à Maiduguri, la principale ville à l’extrême nord-est, puis les équipes médicales venues au
secours des survivants. Peu après, une attaque tuait trente-neuf personnes à 50 km
à l’ouest de Maiduguri. Le 2 Mars, un groupe d’islamistes armés s’introduisait au
Cameroun et affrontait l’armée. Résultat : sept morts, dont six membres du
groupe. Depuis 2009, ce sont quelque 4 500 nigérians qui ont perdu la vie.
Le "réseau" Boko Haram
Le gouvernement a lancé, en 2013, une vaste offensive contre Boko Haram, mais
sans succès : les moyens mis en place, bien que très lourds –aviation et blindés –,
ont été insuffisants pour venir à bout des terroristes. Que faire ? Une réflexion glo-
78
bale est menée par les spécialistes sur le caractère transnational de ce qu’il convient d’appeler désormais le « réseau » Boko Haram, qui expliquerait en partie
l’abondance de moyens militaires à sa disposition. Plusieurs entités sont en effet à
l’oeuvre dans la zone sahélo-saharienne, composées d’individus souvent issus de
pays hors d’Afrique (Yémen, Arabie Saoudite…), et dont la radicalisation représente
une menace de plus en plus importante pour le Nigeria et ses voisins. Il devient
donc capital d’identifier ces différents groupes et de les qualifier, pour les infiltrer
éventuellement, mais surtout pour tenter d’anticiper leurs actions. La répression
semble être le moins bon des moyens de lutter, le coup de pied dans la fourmilière
n’ayant jamais fait que disperser les fourmis.
Une mouvement transnational
Boko Haram était à l’origine – au début des années 2000 – une simple secte fondamentaliste nigériane opérant à l’intérieur des frontières. Aujourd’hui, les chercheurs comme les hommes politiques affirment qu’elle est capable d’orchestrer
des opérations transnationales en raison des liens qu’elle a su créer avec la nébuleuse Al-Qaïda. Au point que, comme l’indique le chercheur Benjamin S. Eveslage
dans son article publié par la revue "Perspectives on terrorism" début novembre
2013 : « Les rapports de la Chambre des représentants américaine et le Comité sur
la défense et la sécurité britannique ont conclu que Boko Haram représentait désormais une menace croissante pour les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni . » Une terminologie qui permet à ces deux pays d’agir directement et militairement contre
cette cible. Mais peuvent- ils être plus efficaces que les nigérians eux-mêmes ? En
raison des frontières poreuses et des découpages coloniaux peu soucieux de préserver l’intégrité des communautés, Boko Haram n’a eu aucun mal à devenir un
mouvement transnational. Dans certaines régions isolées, la limite entre un pays et
un autre est une notion purement administrative, sans aucune matérialisation sur
le terrain. Éventuellement trouve-t-on parfois entre le Nigeria et le Cameroun, au
hasard d’une piste, une vague chaîne en travers de la route et un garde isolé, assis
sur une chaise devant une table en bois. La secte est née à Maiduguri, dans l’État
de Borno voisine du Tchad, du Niger et du Cameroun, et où vit une population de
langue haoussa.
Les liens linguistiques et culturels transcendent toute idée de nation et le sentiment national est relativement peu marqué. On appartient à une famille, à un village, à une communauté, mais l’État est loin et la langue du colonisateur, qui aurait
pu être un marqueur de la différence entre un Nigérian et un Tchadien, n’est parlée
par pratiquement personne sur le terrain. À l’opposé, certains des chefs actuels de
Boko Haram sont nés à l’étranger ou ont résidé à l’extérieur pendant plusieurs années, ce qui accentue leur côté allogène, mais constitue aussi autant de possibilités
de liens extranationaux parfois fort éloignés de leur zone d’activité. Lorsqu’il s’agit
de trouver un refuge sûr, de faire une tractation concernant des armes ou des
hommes, des amis au Pakistan ou dans les pays arabes se révèlent précieux. Enfin,
Boko Haram se déploie dans la zone que les organismes internationaux nomment
désormais « l’arc d’instabilité », qui s’étend sur tout le Sahara, de l’océan Atlan-
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tique à l’océan Indien : une bande désertique immense, dans laquelle aucune frontière ne saurait être garantie et où l’État – quel qu’il soit puisque, on l’a vu, même
l’Algérie s’est laissée surprendre à In Amenas – a bien du mal à assurer sa présence.
C’est en ce sein que prospèrent les groupes djihadistes de tout acabit. Les plus forts
proposent alors aux plus faibles – souvent plus discrets et mieux implantés – des
collaborations qui peuvent se traduire par une capacité décuplée à lancer des
attaques terroristes contre les intérêts internationaux.
La Libye, mais pas seulement…
L’effondrement de la Libye du colonel Kadhafi a été le catalyseur de forces déjà
présentes dans cette région mais qui, d’un coup, ont vu s’ouvrir devant elles une
aubaine extraordinaire en matière de fourniture d’armes et de munitions, mais
également de recrutement. Des combattants expérimentés, formés à l’action, mais
aussi à la réflexion, se trouvaient « sans emploi » et prêts à n’importe quel engagement qui leur rapporte un peu d’argent. Les hommes du désert que le Guide utilisait pour lutter contre les migrants se sont volontiers repliés vers le sud, vers les
régions dont ils étaient originaires ou qu’ils connaissaient bien. Ils sont rentrés chez
eux, où ils ont trouvé une situation politique et sociale très détériorée.
Dans le nord du Mali, le déclencheur de la révolte n’a pas été l’afflux d’armes, mais
bien l’absence de l’État, le faible niveau de développement, la famine parfois et la
désertification contre laquelle il devenait impossible de lutter faute de moyens.
Avoir compris et utilisé cette situation a été le coup de maître des islamistes extrémistes. Les populations locales ont succombé au chant de sirènes voilées de
chèches qui ont prétendu avec force soutenir leurs intérêts tout en moralisant une
vie publique que les trafics et contrebandes en tout genre avaient rendue, effectivement, quelque peu relâchée. Un leurre, puisqu’une bonne partie de ces activités
illégales ont été reprises par les nouveaux « maîtres » de la région. C’est ce procédé
qu’a utilisé Boko Haram, lui aussi infiltré et idéologiquement travaillé par des éléments exogènes radicaux venus du nord. La chaîne de la propagande a parfaitement fonctionné.
Une lutte religieuse
Benjamin Eveslage, dans son analyse, note un élément assez peu commenté : le fait
qu’en Europe, on parle toujours de « Boko Haram », qui signifie globalement «
l’éducation [à l’occidentale] est un péché » et dont la connotation idéologique anti
-occidentale vient conforter la peur que le groupe inspire. Sur le terrain, les
membres de la secte appellent leur organisation « Jama'atu Ahlul Sunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad », qui veut dire quelque chose comme « passionnément déterminés à propager les enseignements du Prophète et le djihad ». On a tendance à
ne voir que les volets politiques et militaires de la présence de ce mouvement au
Nigeria, mais il s’agit pourtant d’une lutte religieuse. Les leaders du groupe sont
animés par une véritable volonté de convertir. Le nord-est du Nigeria, et plus exactement le pays haoussa, est musulman sunnite, profondément imprégné par les
80
idées et l’oeuvre d’Usman Dan Fodio qui rêvait d’une société idéale, libre de l’oppression et de la perversion. Adepte du Djihad pour lutter contre les cités qui opprimaient les paysans, il est le fondateur de l’empire peul de Sokoto, un territoire
s’étendant sur les actuels Nigeria, Cameroun, Tchad et Niger. Restent aujourd’hui
des musulmans que l’on peut qualifier de « modérés » et de nombreux soufis. Ils
n’ont rien à voir avec la pratique rigoureuse et fondamentaliste de l’islam prônée
par les tenants de Boko Haram. C’est ce qui explique que le groupe soit à l’œuvre
sur le plan national et s’autorise à attaquer des écoles, publiques ou privées. Faisant feu de tout bois, la secte a repris et utilisé pour son compte le sentiment
d’abandon dans lequel se trouve la population. Elle a cristallisé le mécontentement
sur l’Occident, considéré – avec ses institutions bancaires, ses impératifs parfois
mal compris, parce que mal expliqués, de santé publique, de scolarisation, de recensement, etc. – comme le grand responsable de la déréliction, ressentie comme
une injustice. L’amalgame avec l’idéologie salafiste est ainsi facile : les ancêtres vivaient mieux, leurs valeurs les protégeaient mieux, retournons à cette situation
idéale… Contre ce qui est considéré comme une « post-colonisation », contre un
monde globalisé qu’ils ne comprennent pas, mus davantage par la crainte d’une
répression aveugle qui a fait des centaines de victimes – parfois par des bombardements aériens – que par celle des exactions de Boko Haram, les Haoussas du Nigeria enfourchent désormais le cheval de bataille tant redouté : celui de l’intégrisme.
http://mondafrique.com/lire/international/2014/04/14/boko-haram-un-problemeouest-africain
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Rwanda
Rwanda - 20 Years After the Genocide, A State of Fear
24 April 2014
OPINION
cc PTRwanda has made remarkable progress to rebuild after the genocide. But the
country is in the grip of a ruthless Tutsi oligarchy that has silenced everyone who
doesn't agree with President Kagame. His critics are either dead, in jail or exile. The
struggle for a just and free nation should be intensified
I have many memories of Rwanda from my visit in 2010. But three stand out. I was
among a small army of journalists from Kenya and Uganda flown into the country
by the government of President Paul Kagame to cover festivities marking the 16th
Liberation Day, a commemoration of the end of the 1994 genocide and the coming
to power of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) party. 'Expression Today', the respected but also much reviled magazine I worked for, was devoted to the defence
of media freedom and promotion of journalistic excellence in East Africa. We regularly featured Rwanda, carrying unflattering reports about the relentless government crackdown on independent media there.
The first thing on my mind from those four days in Rwanda is that we were chaperoned by state officials throughout the visit: only allowed to marvel at the spotlessly
clean city of Kigali, talk to gently smiling government officials who did not say
much, visit the national memorial of the 'genocide against the Tutsi', enjoy beautiful dances and watch throngs of apparently contented Rwandans chanting 'Mzee
wacu!' (Our elder/leader, in praise of Kagame) at Amahoro Stadium on Liberation
Day. My secret contact in Kigali, a reliable source, told me that the persons taking
us around were actually intelligence agents.
The reporters could not be left to wander out on their own, lest, I thought, we met
with opposition leaders and the few remaining independent local journalists. There
is no civil society in Rwanda to write about - to give us another view of the state of
affairs in the country. And so the excited scribes, their cheeks glowing from the
touch of Rwandan hospitality, flew back on RwandAir to their respective work stations in Nairobi and Kampala to publish colourful stories about the wonders President Kagame was doing.
Second: The day before our arrival in Kigali, the funeral had been held at a Catholic
parish for Jean-Leonard Rugambage, Acting Chief Editor of then suspended critical
newspaper 'Umuvugizi' and a media freedom activist. No eulogies were allowed by
state security people. Umuvugizi's Chief Editor, John Bosco Gasasira, had fled into
exile in Uganda shortly after the paper was suspended and upon being tipped by
security sources that he was targeted for elimination. Maybe the three or four bullets pumped into Rugambage outside his home in a Kigali suburb were initially
82
meant for his colleague, Gasasira. He was shot dead at close range by unknown
gunmen on the day he published two articles critical of the government, one of
them linking the Kagame regime to the attempted murder in South Africa of
Rwanda's former intelligence chief Kayumba Nyamwasa.
I wanted to know more about the fallen scribe and possibly meet his family. I deserted our group as they embarked on yet another chaperoned trip and went out
to meet a group of journalists at a small hotel my contact considered safe from the
eyes of the ubiquitous state intelligence. We huddled over drinks in a corner, the
handful of Rwandan journalists quite unable to hide their anxiety about the dire
risks their work exposed them to. Under the cover of darkness, Epiphanie, the 28year-old widow of journalist Jean-Leonard Rugambage and mother of their twoyear-old son, was sneaked into the hotel. We spoke in low voices about the sudden
tragedy that had struck her family, her hopeless situation (she was jobless) and her
many fears for herself and her son. Had state intelligence pounced upon us, I am
sure we would have all been arrested and charged with something like conspiring
to overthrow the Government of Rwanda.
The third incident I clearly recall happened on Liberation Day. Our minders warned
us that mobile telephones were not allowed, even when switched off, at Amahoro
Stadium where President Kagame was scheduled to lead the nation in celebrations.
We were asked to leave our phones in our hotel rooms. But for some strange reason, I ended up with my switched-off phone at the main entrance to Amahoro Stadium where security officers frisked us. They were thoroughly agitated on seeing
the gadget. They kept it, promising to hand it over at the end of the ceremony.
They never did. One of our minders assured me that he knew who had the phone
and would follow up the matter. We proceeded that evening to a banquet at the
presidential palace. But it was not until the next day, shortly before our departure,
about 24 hours later, that I was given back my phone.
On arrival in Nairobi, startling news awaited me. My wife told me that someone
had called her on my phone the previous night from Kigali, asking whether she was
my wife. The caller said I had lost my phone and that he had recovered it and was
on his way bringing it to me. The agents at Intelligence had hacked my phone.
We shall return to these three incidents in a moment, but first: Rwanda is this year
marking the 20th anniversary of the genocide in which up to 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were massacred in about 100 days. By all accounts,
the people of Rwanda have made remarkable progress to heal at individual and
community levels and to rebuild their devastated nation. Given the events of 1994,
it would seem unreasonable to disagree with plenty of the analysis that characterises Rwanda's recovery as an incredible journey, 'extraordinary', or as 'Africa's biggest success story'. But is it? What picture does one get on closer scrutiny, beyond
the carefully choreographed official narrative parroted by the Kagame regime's
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cheerleaders at home and abroad?
A RESTLESS NATION
The three incidents narrated above - and information gathered subsequently draw up a reality about Rwanda that far too many people may not know or are unwilling to speak openly about. It is a frightening reality that is sometimes explained
away with excuses (such as 'the benevolent dictator') by possibly well-meaning
people who have lapped up tall tales churned out by Kagame's massive propaganda
machine. Rwanda, truth be told, is a restless nation with an uncertain future. President Kagame has exploited the genocide to gain unimaginable political mileage inside and outside Rwanda. It is impossible not to conclude that the genocide has
been for him a godsend. As in the pre-genocide years of elite Hutu rule, Rwanda
today is in the grip of a ruthless Kagame-led Tutsi oligarchy that has personalised
state power, 'Tutsified' public institutions, trashed the rule of law, excluded and
silenced the majority Hutu, sharpened ethnic consciousness, criminalised dissent
and any meaningful alternative political organising. The list goes on.
In Rwanda everyone, except those in power and their relatives and friends, lives in
fear. No one is free. That is not the portrait of a country at peace, even if there are
no mass murders going on and the economy is said to be galloping steadily at eight
percent per annum - energised by donor dollars and the blood of over 5 million
people in eastern DR Congo who have been butchered in the process of looting the
area's vast mineral wealth. What exists in Rwanda today is what John Galtung, 'the
father of peace studies', famously described as 'negative peace.' A peace enforced
by brutal repression.
At the 20th anniversary commemorations on 7 April, President Kagame praised
Rwandans for rebuilding their nation: 'Your sacrifices are a gift to the nation. They
are the seed from which the new Rwanda grows. Thank you for allowing your humanity and patriotism to prevail over your grief and loss', he said. But isn't it ironical that the same Kagame appears to think that the national stability, peace and
economic development of 'the new Rwanda' are incompatible with the people's
enjoyment of fundamental human rights such as the freedoms of opinion, expression and assembly? How real or sustainable is such stability? Did the RPF 'liberate'
Rwandans in 1994 only to push them into new bondage?
Perhaps it is a matter of chance that no one from inside Rwanda has contributed to
this special issue of Pambazuka News dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the genocide. But it is also certain that any Rwandan who dares to say anything different
from the single narrative of the genocide or any other public issue faces terrible
consequences from the regime. They would be accused of denying 'the genocide
against the Tutsi', terrorism or the curious charge of 'divisionism'.
'GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI'?
84
In a country where discussions about ethnicity are not allowed, it is strange that
the horrors of 1994 must always be referred to as 'the genocide against the Tutsi' a phrase that expressly downplays the massacres of many moderate Hutus and covers up the killings by the rebel forces led by Kagame during the genocide but also
for four years beginning in 1990 when the Rwanda Patriotic Army invaded the
country from Uganda. In fact, there is a large body of opinion convinced that what
happened in Rwanda in 1994 was not a 'genocide' as such but a 'civil war'. There
were massacres on both sides of the conflict - even though Hutu extremists committed more atrocities.
In the past two decades, Rwanda has tried thousands of perpetrators of the genocide in formal courts at home, at the traditional Gacaca tribunals and at the Tanzania-based International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which winds up its work
this year. Other suspected perpetrators have been tried abroad under the doctrine
of universal jurisdiction. But in all these trials, very few members of the ruling RPF
party have faced justice for the crimes they committed in 1994. 'For the vast majority of families of victims of RPF killings,' says a new report by Human Rights Watch,
'there is therefore little hope of seeing the perpetrators prosecuted. A few have
attempted to demand justice for these crimes, but it has been a difficult struggle.
There are tight restrictions on free speech in Rwanda and few people dare to
broach publicly the sensitive subject of RPF crimes.'
Rwandans have paid a steep price to keep Kagame and his henchmen in power.
Genuine opposition parties have been destroyed by Kagame. The unregistered FDU
-Inkingi party's president, Victoire Ingabire, is serving a 15-year jail term on
trumped up charges of threatening state security and 'belittling' the genocide. PSImberakuri's president, Bernard Ntaganda, is in jail as well. Only a faction that RPF
engineered can participate in elections as RPF's 'coalition partner'. PDP-Imanzi's
president, Deo Mushaidi, is serving a life-sentence on a politically motivated conviction. The Green Party was registered after its vice president, Andre Kagwa Rwisereka, was beheaded by state agents in 2010. Its leader went into exile but was later lured back into the country. Amahoro People's Congress and the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) are not registered in Rwanda. Why is the Kagame regime
scared of all these political formations? Do the tight restrictions on political space,
jailing and assassinations represent the will of the Rwandan people?
Still on politics, Rwanda has the highest number of women in parliament in the
world. In last year's elections, women took 64 percent of the seats in the Lower
House. But who are the women who win the seats? What are their political
pla orms? How competent are they? How do they use their positions and numerical strength to articulate the interests of women and Rwandans in general and to
conceive alternative visions for a country with such extreme political intolerance?
The women simply get into parliament through RPF and co-opted parties.
A RWANDA WITHOUT KAGAME
85
For how long will the current situation last? Obviously not forever. President Paul
Kagame may be all-powerful, but he is not immortal. One of the most important
questions for Rwanda has surely to be what happens after Kagame - after 2017
when his constitutional two terms lapse, or whenever he exits the presidency
(should the parliament his party controls amend the law to make him president for
life). How will the pressure of repression that has built for two decades vent out? It
is time for Rwandans to begin to think beyond Kagame.
Already this is happening - but mostly outside the country where many vocal Rwandans have fled to save their lives. The groups outside Rwanda must continue to organise. The challenge remains how to organise for political change from inside
Rwanda. It is going to be a long journey of small steps.
Lessons from other nations that have successfully challenged bloody dictatorships
show that the people themselves must gather the courage to stand up to their oppressors. They cannot wait for saviours. Rwanda's journalists, teachers, students,
artists, academics, women, young people, the unemployed, must interrogate the
political situation in their country and begin to demand the changes that will create
a just and progressive society free of fear and stifling restrictions. They must organise, create spaces to express themselves and build alliances. They must break the
silence imposed upon them by the Kagame regime. It is not easy. But it can be
done.
Source: http://allafrica.com/
86
Uganda
Uganda: 'My Healing Has Begun' - Uganda Votes to Provide GenderSensitive Reparations Fund
62APRIL 2014
ANALYSIS
More than six years after the war in Uganda came to a formal end, the country has
taken a landmark first step by unanimously adopting a resolution that opens the
door to the country's first gender-sensitive reparations fund.
The resolution - adopted unanimously by parliament on April 9, 2014 - urges the
government to provide reparations for both women and men who were subjected
to violence by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, and calls upon
the government to take robust action to remedy the plight of thousands of victims
still in need of assistance.
"With this resolution, Uganda sends a clear signal that it is finally ready to take
concrete action on its previous commitments towards'promoting redress' and reconciliation across Ugandan society," explains Michael Otim, ICTJ Head of Office in
Uganda.
The resolution was the first acknowledgment by the Ugandan parliament of the
need for institutional support to facilitate healing and justice for women, and
comes after several years of delay.
"The very fact that the term 'gender sensitive reparations' is used is very
encouraging for us" said Amrita Kapur, Senior Associate with ICTJ's Gender Justice
program.
"Oftentimes, an analysis of women's experience in conflicts - such as the one in
Uganda - is limited to sexual violence. By promising to consider all the ways that
women - and men - experience conflict, this reparations fund can also address conflict-related harms that have a gender dimension, such as land dispossession, lack
of access to education, stigma of victimization, and economic disempowerment,"
she said.
Designing Reparative Justice
After formal hostilities between the LRA and the government of Uganda ended in
2006, thousands were left with deep emotional and physical scars.
In the 2007 Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda committed itself to 'promoting redress'; however, apart from sporadic cash payments
to a few victims, government action has yet to translate into concrete action.
These continual stalls help illustrate why the central components of the new reso-
87
lution mark a significant step forward: it calls on the government to create a gender
-sensitive reparation fund to address the needs of both women and men affected
by the LRA. These reparations would prioritize services for victims such as
healthcare, skills training, and education.
The resolution also recommends expanding the budget to incorporate additional
free health services for victims, specifically in the realms of reproductive health,
orthopedics, and psycho-social support. it suggests empowering regional governments affected by LRA violence in their efforts to identify and integrate children
born or abused in captivity.
Additionally, it urges the government to make a robust attempt to identify, integrate, and resettle child victims and women who were abducted during the war.
The inclusion of specific consideration to gender in the reparations fund is the result of a hard-won victory of grassroots organizing among women in Ugandan civil
society.
The Women's Advocacy Network (WAN) - with technical assistance from ICTJ and
the Justice and Reconciliation Project - created a petition and used it to mobilize
national women's rights organizations across the country, including the Ugandan
Women Parliamentarian's Association.
ICTJ's Kapur recalls the scene while the resolution was passed. "It was a very emotional moment," she said. "Many victims of the LRA violence were in attendance.
One woman expressed to me how moved she felt to be there, to see the direct results of community action, and take back charge over her life."
One of the victim advocates present during the debate on the resolution stated,
"Today my healing has begun."
Ensuring Implementation
After the resolution passed, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament appointed a committee monitor to inform parliament about the government's progress to implement the resolution.
"The passage of the resolution on "gender sensitive" reparations is a great first
step, but much is yet to be decided in regards to design and implementation," said
Ruben Carranza, Director of ICTJ's Reparative Justice program.
"While a positive indicator, this is by no means an assured success. It is critical that
civil society remain vigilant in order to ensure that the final manifestation of the
reparations program is not watered down by politics."
In the 2012 ICTJ report entitled Unredressed Legacy: Possible Policy Options and
Approaches to Fulfilling Reparations in Uganda, ICTJ offers a framework for discussing reparations if State and survivors were to directly engage with one another.
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The framework takes into account lessons from early humanitarian assistance work
in the north among donors and NGOs, as well as the capacities and resources available in government development programs.
The next step, says ICTJ's Michael Otim, is for the government to proactively engage civil society to design the fund.
"It is the State's obligation to reach out to survivors and victims," he said. "Not the
other way around."
http://allafrica.com/stories/201404250474.html?viewall=1
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Trends & Develpments
USA
Water wars: Military sees climate change as 'threat multiplier' for violent clashes
Apr 25, 2014
Military sees climate change as extraordinary threat to national security. RTCC
The US Department of Defense announced the release of a 64-page 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report in March, which warns that climate change has
been and will continue to be a “threat multiplier” in matters of US national security
and hotspots around the world.
The report is released every four years and represents an outline for military strategy in dealing with potential threats and this year’s report highlighted the “everworsening” disruptions of global climate change events, as did the QDR report in
2010.
It details many challenges caused by climate change in relation to global tempera-
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tures, increasing droughts, anomalous weather and rising sea levels, which has the
power to “devastate homes, land and infrastructure.”
“The impacts of climate change may increase the frequency, scale, and complexity
of future missions, including defense support to civil authorities, while at the same
time undermining the capacity of our domestic installations to support training activities,"stated the report.
"These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as
poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions — conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence."
Wars over resource scarcity have to be anticipated and strategized, was the overall
message in regards to recent reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, which sees climate change as an imminent threat to humanity.
Eric Holthaus wrote for Slate this week, “Climate change worsens the divide between haves and have-nots, hitting the poor hardest. It can also drive up food prices and spawn megadisasters; creating refugees and taxing the resiliency of governments.”
Holthaus recently interviewed retired Army Brig. Gen. Chris King and got his view of
national security and climate change.
“This is like getting embroiled in a war that lasts 100 years. That’s the scariest thing
for us,” King told RTCC. “There is no exit strategy that is available for many of the
problems. You can see in military history, when they don’t have fixed durations,
that’s when you’re most likely to not win.”
Retired Navy Rear Adm. David Titley gave Holthaus an even more dire view of climate change in an interview earlier this year, when he referenced parallels between political decisions made that led up to World War I to similar political hubris
happening now over climate change.
Titley, who transitioned from a, “a pretty hardcore skeptic about climate change”
to labeling it “one of the pre-eminent challenges of our century,” answered a number of questions about his concerns.
Here is one of the most telling parts of the extensive Q&A:
Q. You’ve been a leader when it comes to talking about climate change as a national security issue. What’s your take on the connection between war and climate?
Climate change did not cause the Arab Spring, but could it have been a contributing
factor? I think that seems pretty reasonable. This was a food-importing region, with
poor governance. And then the chain of events conspires to have really a bad outcome. You get a spike in food prices, and all of a sudden, nobody’s in control of
events.
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I see climate change as one of the driving forces in the 21st century. With modern
technology and globalization, we are much more connected than ever before. The
world’s warehouses are now container ships. Remember the Icelandic volcano with
the unpronounceable name? Now, that’s not a climate change issue, but some of
the people hit worst were flower growers in Kenya. In 24 hours, their entire business
model disappeared. You can’t eat flowers.
According to an RTCC report, analysis of 155 countries indicates the US government
isn't the only one strategizing climate change associated threats.
President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have come out in a firm
stand against climate change, with Kerry drawing criticism for saying that climate
change was a bigger threat to the world than terrorism.
However, it seems military experts believe the two are interconnected in ways yetto-be revealed to a world unprepared for civil wars fought over water, food, land
and other valuable resources.
http://www.allvoices.com/
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Regional Economic Communities
ECOWAS
Stratégies contre la criminalité organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest
samedi 19 avril 2014
La CEDEAO s'engage davantage dans la lutte contre la criminalité organisée - La
Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) a réaffirmé
son engagement à s’impliquer encore plus dans la lutte contre la criminalité organisée en contribuant à la promotion d’une plus grande synergie des efforts des
forces de police des différents Etats membres de l’organisation.
Cet engagement a été formulé dans un communiqué sanctionnant les travaux de la
réunion du sous-comité technique «formation et opérations» du Comité des chefs
de police d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CCPAO), tenue les 16 et 17 avril 2014 à Bamako.
Outre la résolution affirmée par la CEDEAO d’organiser une formation sur la cybercriminalité et une opération conjointe de police de contre-terrorisme et d’éradication du phénomène des coupeurs de route et des fugitifs, la réunion a formulé des
recommandations à l’intention du CCPAO.
A cet effet, les chefs de police d’Afrique de l’Ouest ont été appelés à s’impliquer
davantage dans la collecte et la mise à la disposition de la CEDEAO de données statistiques pour une analyse conséquente des tendances criminelles, en vue d’une
meilleure orientation des programmes de formation et des opérations de police.
Incitant la CEDEAO à produire un formulaire uniforme de collecte de données statistiques criminelles, les chefs de police invitent le Groupe intergouvernemental
d’action contre le blanchissement d’argent en Afrique de l’Ouest (GIABA) et Interpol à organiser des formations nationales et régionales sur le blanchiment des capitaux et le financement du terrorisme, au profit des agents chargés de l’application de la loi.
Le Groupe intergouvernemental d’action contre le blanchiment d’argent en
Afrique de l’Ouest est une institution spécialisée de la CEDEAO chargée d’organiser
et de conduire la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux dans les pays de la sousrégion, rappelle-t-on.
Les participants ont par ailleurs suggéré à la CEDEAO, dans le cadre des réformes
en cours, la création d’une Direction de la sécurité régionale chargée de la lutte
contre la criminalité transnationale organisée et encouragé la création d’unités de
renseignements et de lutte contre la cybercriminalité au sein de la Division sécurité
régionale.
Elle a pour objectif général de favoriser la coopération entre les officiers de police
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spécialisés dans la formation et les opérations, en vue de renforcer les capacités
régionales pour une lutte efficace contre la criminalité organisée et diverses autres
formes de crime.
Outre l’état de mise en œuvre des recommandations de la précédente assemblée
générale du CCPAO, relatives aux formations et opérations conjointes de police, les
participants ont procédé à un échange d’informations et à un partage d’expériences et de bonnes pratiques en matière de formations et d’opérations de police.
Chaque délégation nationale a présenté à cette occasion un rapport et des statistiques sur les activités criminelles telles que le trafic des êtres humains, le vol de
véhicules, le trafic de drogues et de médicaments contrefaits et illicites, le terrorisme et le phénomène des coupeurs de route, ainsi que la traite des êtres humains
et les pires formes de travail.
Devenu une institution spécialisée de la CEDEAO en décembre 2003, le CCPAO est
un corps consultatif pour la coopération régionale de police. Il vise à renforcer la
coopération des forces de police de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, ainsi que l'efficacité de la
prévention en matière de crime, de lutte contre la criminalité transnationale dans
la région, de faire des recommandations aux autorités de la CEDEAO et d’exécuter
leurs décisions dans le domaine de la sécurité.
La réunion de Bamako, qui s’est tenue en présence de participants venus de 13 des
15 Etats membres de la CEDEAO, a regroupé des officiers de police, des personnels
spécialisés de l’organisation, des représentants d'Interpol et d'autres services d’application de la loi.
Source : PANA
http://www.nlsguinee.com/articles/article9665.html
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International organisations
UN
Africa: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 'Destructive As Any Bomb or
Bullet,' Security Council Told
62APRIL 2014
Despite the current unprecedented political will to eliminate sexual violence in conflict, hold perpetrators to account and support victims, the reality is that raping a
woman, child or man is still a largely "cost-free" crime, United Nations officials
warned today, appealing to all States to strengthen their cooperation to end impunity and protect the vulnerable.
"This grave human rights abuse is as destructive as any bomb or bullet," UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, opening the Security Council's day-long debate on sexual violence in conflict, a serious crime, which, he said, inflicts unimaginable suffering on victims, impedes peace and contributes to enduring poverty and
insecurity.
The Council, through successive resolutions, has created a strong global framework
for prevention. "Grievous violations still occur too often, but we are beginning to
make tangible progress," Mr. Ban said, referring to his latest report on issue, the
focus of today's debate. Covering 21 countries of concern, the report makes concrete recommendations, both to the affected States themselves and to the wider
international community.
Compiled by Mr. Ban's Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab
Hawa Bangura, who also briefed the Council today, the report outlines concerning
trends, including the acute vulnerability of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the need for justice and assistance for all victims, regardless of gender.
The plight of children born of rape, and the links between sexual violence, displacement and organized crime are also highlighted.
The Secretary-General in his remarks noted the progress made by several countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia, where
"just a few years ago, rape in these conflicts seemed intractable and inevitable." He
explained that the DRC is developing new legal structures to end impunity, and Somalia has shown commitment at the highest level to end sexual violence, including
signing a joint communique with the UN.
"Every day more countries are building the technical capacity to prevent and
redress sexual violence," said Mr. Ban, adding that another key element in political
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and peacekeeping missions has been the deployment of Women Protection Advisers. "Their expertise on human rights, gender analysis, and peace and security is
helping to mainstream the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence into
peacekeeping and special political missions," he said.
In line with the principle of "Delivering as One," UN Action against Sexual Violence
is an inter-agency network of 13 UN entities. Chaired by Ms. Bangura, this coordination mechanism ensures the Organization's response avoids duplication, leading
to a measured, sustainable and coherent strategy that makes the best use of limited resources and the strengths of each agency.
"Prevention is our collective responsibility. Only through coordination and
partnership can we succeed in protecting the most vulnerable," said the UN chief,
underscoring the importance of the Security Council's continued leadership and
support as stakeholders work together to eliminate sexual violence in conflict.
In her remarks, Ms. Bangura presented harrowing reports of wartime rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence, labelling such abuse a "great moral issue of our time" and declaring: "This crime, in its utter destruction of the individual
and the pervasive way in which it undermines the prospect of peace and development, casts a long shadow over our collective humanity."
Recalling her visit last year to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where she witnessed firsthand "the long-term implications of war-time sexual violence left unaddressed,"
she said that an estimated 50,000 women were targeted with sexual violence during 4 years of conflict.
"But 20 years after the peace was made, impunity for these crimes still reigns. The
truth, most likely, is that most of the survivors will see no justice, because the evidence is long lost and the perpetrators have long since 'fled the immediate scene
of the crime,'" she said.
Yet, the irony is that those same perpetrators never really went away. "They still
walk among the women and their families, occupying positions of authority and
power that shield them from justice," Ms. Bangura said, emphasizing that for those
victims, the perpetrators are "a daily reminder of their broken lives."
"But the impunity that the perpetrators continue to enjoy is also a reminder to all
of us - a reminder of our commitment to justice and accountability."
At the same time, she emphasized that there have also been positive developments. "While the road ahead to eradicate sexual violence in conflict remains long
and hard, there is some light on the horizon. Never before in history have we seen
such a level of political will and momentum," she said, echoing the Secretary-
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General's acknowledgment of the respective steps taken by the DRC and Somalia to
address the issue.
Ms. Bangura stressed however that most perpetrators of wartime rape are never
brought to justice, and emphasized that unfortunately, the unacceptable reality is
that today it is still largely 'cost-free' to rape a woman, child or man in conflict.
"Sexual violence has been used through the ages precisely because it is such a
cheap and devastating weapon."
Thirty-four armed groups from countries on the Security Council's agenda that are
credibly suspected of rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence are
named in the annex of the report. The annex also points to an unknown number of
armed elements on all sides of the Syrian conflict. The list includes both government security forces and rebel groups.
Special Representative Bangura ended her statement with a message directly to
the perpetrators: "There is no hiding place. If you commit, or command, or condone such crimes against humanity, humanity will pursue you relentlessly, and
eventually you will be held to account. This is our solemn promise to the survivors."
http://allafrica.com/stories/201404251578.html?viewall=1
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Terrorism in the World
France
Hollande issues ‘probable death’ notice – and everyone’s perplexed
04/24/2014
It’s not often that the leader of a major Western European nation issues an official
statement declaring someone "probably dead".
That’s exactly what happened this week here in France.
It kicked off Tuesday, when the AFP reported that a spokesman for the jihadist
group MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) called the news agency to say French hostage Gilberto Rodrigues Leal had been killed “because France is
our enemy”.
Rodrigues Leal, a retired French aid worker, was kidnapped in November 2012 and
held hostage in Mali.
Shortly after the AFP report, French President François Hollande issued a statement
noting that there was “every reason to believe that our compatriot died several
weeks ago due to the conditions of his detention”.
But the French government stopped short of officially confirming his death.
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Hollande’s statement left many intelligence officials and counter-terror experts
scratching their heads in bewilderment.
Security and intel guys are often very reluctant to weigh in on political decisions –
on the record. They tend to stick to their business of monitoring threats.
But it was well known, in counter-terror circles, that Rodrigues Leal had been dead
for at least five months. Given the lack of concrete evidence, his family, quite understandably, had not been informed.
There are many plausible theories as to why MUJAO didn’t make any announcement over the past few months. Jihadist groups holding European hostages are
often negotiating releases in exchange for hefty ransoms and/or the release of
their imprisoned colleagues. In such cases, groups like MUJAO hope to hold as
many bargaining chips as possible.
Just two days before the MUJAO-AFP phone exchange, French Foreign Minister
Laurent Fabius had said, "We haven't had any news for a long time. We are in contact with the family but we are extremely worried." That’s the sort of carefully
crafted official statement we expect from a foreign minister.
But for the president to issue a hedging, fuzzy statement of likely death is
not...well...presidential. One can only imagine the trauma of uncertainty that Rodrigues Leal’s loved ones are living through.
It’s hard to get into the heads of heads of government and, to paraphrase the Bard,
uneasy lie those heads. So, I’m not getting into the decisions behind that presidential statement.
When French hostages come
home
But it’s certainly true that the
French have a particularly personal, emotional narrative on
hostage stories.
Giant photographs of French citizens in captivity occasionally drape the walls of town and city halls across the country.
Hostage returns turn into state occasions with former captives arriving in Paris to a
waiting French president and foreign minister on the tarmac. The heart-warming
images of relieved families greeting their loved ones drown out the rumblings of
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million-dollar ransom payments that are often paid, but never officially acknowledged.
Sometimes, there are even negotiated prisoner releases that are mentioned in the
media below, or after, the headline-grabbing “back home safe on French soil”.
Fallout of a prisoner exchange
The roots of the latest captive tragedy can probably be traced to a happy hostage
story four years ago.
In February 2010, when French aid worker Pierre Camatte was released from
AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) captivity, news reports noted that, he was
“freed in exchange for four Islamist prisoners held by Mali – a move that angered
Algeria and Mauritania”.
Mauritania was so upset by the Malian release of Islamist prisoners – including a
Mauritanian national – that the country temporarily recalled its ambassador to
Mali in protest over the “flagrant contradiction of judicial co-operation accords
and security co-ordination agreements”.
Turns out that the Mauritanian national released in exchange for Camatte’s freedom was none other than a certain Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, who went on
to form MUJAO, according to French media reports.
A Tilemsi Arab hailing from the herding groups of the Tilemsi Valley in what is now
northern Mali, Kheirou is a veteran of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s
war in Chad. In 2005, he was arrested and detained in the Mauritanian capital of
Nouakchott. But after a few
months in prison, he managed
to escape disguised as a woman, according to the French
weekly, Jeune Afrique.
In 2009, he joined a katiba
(brigade) headed by Mokhtar
Belmokhtar, then an AQIM
commander who went on to
earn international notoriety for
his audacious January 2013
attack on the In Amenas gas
facility
in
southern
Algeria.
But forget Belmokhtar, let’s get back to Kheirou. The Mauritanian jihadist was cap-
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tured again in 2009 and imprisoned, this time by Malian authorities in Bamako,
where he stayed until the 2010 prisoner release that liberated Camatte, according
to the French monthly, Le Point.
A year later, toward the end of 2011, Kheirou formed MUJAO.
MUJAO and Boko Haram: West African brothers-in-arms
Many analysts believe Kheirou and his fellow AQIM jihadist Belmokhtar were
chafing under AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel’s leadership. An Algerian national,
Droukdel is widely believed to favor Algerians for senior positions in AQIM.
MUJAO’s stated aim is to spread jihad in West Africa and the group often cites colonial-era Islamist preachers from the region as their “ideological ancestors”.
But it was not until 2012 that MUJAO got the opportunity to flex its regional muscles when a military coup in Mali led to a power vacuum in Bamako, which in turn
sparked a jihadist takeover of northern Mali.
As various militant groups divvied up a region the size of France, MUJAO and Belmokhtar’s groups established themselves in the northern Malian city of Gao. That’s
where MUJAO kidnapped seven Algerian diplomats in an April 5 attack on the Algerian consulate in northern Mali’s largest city.
The rebel control of northern Mali saw all sorts of fighters from across the region
head to the new jihadist haven. These included Boko Haram militants from Nigeria,
according to Malian officials. In an April 2012 interview with AFP, Abu Sidibe, a regional deputy, noted that, “There are a good 100 Boko Haram fighters in Gao…
They’re not hiding. Some even speak in the local tongue, explaining that they are
Boko Haram”.
More than a year later, French Foreign Minister Fabius corroborated the reports
when he announced that French troops had found documentary evidence that
“terrorists from Boko Haram were being trained in the Ifoghas Mountains” – a remote mountain range in northern Mali.
Fabius was speaking at a security conference in Morocco months after the launch
of the French military operation to wrest northern Mali from jihadist control.
The French mission – known as Operation Serval – succeeded in wresting control of
northern Mali and by August 13, the reunited West African nation even succeeded
in holding presidential elections.
France is now winding down its force in Mali from a peak of around 5,000 soldiers
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to around 1,000 after the spring. A UN peacekeeping force has taken over from a
pan-African military mission, which has been supporting the French troops.
A bloody, bruising year for Mali’s jihadists
There’s little doubt the French military intervention crippled the jihadist onslaught
in Mali.
“If you look at the statements coming from the leadership of AQIM now, it’s clear
they are really focusing their efforts on Tunisia and Syria. We can assume they’ve
lost most units in northern Mali and are therefore refocusing on the situation in
Tunisia – there’s no more mention of Mali,” said Jean-Paul Rouiller, director of the
Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis of Terrorism.
Earlier this month, five kidnapped Malian aid workers were liberated in a French
military raid in Timbuktu. Last month, a senior MUJAO commander, Omar Ould
Hamaha – known as 'Red Beard' because of his henna-dyed whiskers – was killed in
a French air strike. Hamaha’s death came exactly a year after France confirmed that
top AQIM leader Abou Zeid had been killed in the Ifoghas Mountains.
It’s been a bloody, bruising year for jihadist groups in northern Mali. But some security experts warn that they could be regrouping. “The French intervention dealt a
blow to the jihadi groups, it dispersed them and forced them to find new methods
of acting,” said Imad Mesdoua, a London-based political analyst. “But it didn’t get
rid of them.”
Whether they’re trying to regroup or redirecting their attention to other battle
zones, AQIM and its splinter groups could do with a hefty cash infusion.
Right now, there’s only one French national still in captivity in Mali. According to
Fabius, there are indications that Serge Lazarevic, who was abducted in 2011, is still
alive. In media interviews, his family has said they continue to hope for his release.
Meanwhile, a French government spokesman has responded to the Rodrigues Leal
family’s anger and criticism, noting that France never “drops” a citizen in captivity,
but “we do not succeed every time”.
As for Hollande, he has assured the family that the death of a French hostage will
“not go unpunished”. Well, at least that’s presidential.
http://leelajacinto.blogs.france24.com/
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United Kingdom
Tony Blair, the Violent Islamist's Best Friend
23/04/2014
I wanted to begin this piece with the sentence "Tony Blair is back". But, of course,
our former prime minister has never really been away. Not for him a quiet life
of self-portraitsand coin tosses. Blair, unlike his ol' partner-in-crime George W.
Bush, has spent his 'retirement' agitating for military action against Syria, calling
for regime change in Iran,dodging citizen's arrests over his illegal invasion of Iraq
and making the case for Tory-style austerity at home. Oh, and don't get me started
on all those awkward rumours about the former PM and the former Mrs Murdoch.
This morning, the ex-Labour-leader-turned-Middle-East-peace envoy turned up at
Bloomberg's HQ in London to deliver a keynote speech on the threat from Islamist
extremism. It was a classic from the Blair-as-liberal-hawk meets Blair-as-expert-onIslam genre; a collection of half-truths, belligerent threats, sweeping statements
and ill-informed generalisations.
TONY THE NEOCON
"On foreign affairs, Tony is basically a neocon," a former cabinet ally of Blair once
told me. "Tony believes he has a unique ability to join up the dots and see the big
picture. The question is: do the dots exist and is he right to join them up in the way
he does?"
Take Syria. Blair has long been a supporter of Western military intervention against
the brutal regime of Bashar al Assad and in support of the Syrian opposition, despite the fact that in the conflict between Assad and the opposition, the violent Islamists - in the form of the hand-chopping, suicide-bombing ISIS and the al Qaedaaligned Nusra Front, among numerous others - are on the side of... wait for it... the
opposition. Blair glosses over this rather crucial point in his Bloomberg speech,
making only a brief reference to "extremist groups" and saying, almost in passing,
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that they "should receive no support from any of the surrounding nations". (They
do - including from our close ally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.)
Then there's Tunisia, which Blair bizarrely praises for the "genuine and positive
attempts by the new government to escape from the dilemmas of the region and
to shape a new Constitution". Why do I use the word "bizarrely"? Well, the new,
interim government in Tunisia was appointed in December, according to the BBC,
as "part of a deal reached... that will see the moderate Islamists hand over power
to end the political deadlock". Moderate Islamists? You don't say.
In fact, the behaviour of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, like the AKP in Turkey, undermines Blair's hyperbolic claims about the "essential battle" being between the
wild-eyed supporters of a singular "Islamist ideology" and everyone else. Islamism, as I have previously argued, is a deeply-contested term. To pretend that, say,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan of AKP shares the views or ideology of Mullah Mohammed
Omar of the Afghan Taliban is absurd. It is Blair's simplistic, nuance-free and Manichean approach to this rather complicated subject, and region, which enables people such as the former EDL leader Tommy Robinson to gleefully proclaim that the
former prime minister's analysis of Islam and Islamism "confirms everything we
say."
IRAQ-SIZED ELEPHANTS
The biggest problem with Blair's speech this morning, however, is that it brazenly
avoided the Iraq-sized elephant in the room. The former PM said that the threat
from radical Islam "is not abating. It is growing. It is spreading across the world."
Yet the inconvenient truth for Blair and his (thankfully) dwindling band of supporters and apologists is that the biggest boost to radical/violent/Islamist/al-Qaeda
(pick your own descriptor) ideologies was delivered by Blair himself, in 2003, when
he decided to participate in Bush's illegal, unprovoked and catastrophic invasion of
Iraq. TB and GB turned out to be the violent Islamists' best friends.
Don't take my word for it. The decision to attack and occupy Iraq, admitted former
MI5 director-general Eliza Manningham Buller in September 2011, "increased the
terrorist threat by convincing more people that Osama Bin Laden's claim that Islam
was under attack was correct. It provided an arena for the jihad... [and] spurred
some young British Muslims to turn to terror."
In fact, in February 2003, a month before the invasion, Blair himself received a
memo from the Joint Intelligence Committee, which pointed out to the prime minister and his advisers that violent Islamist groups such as al Qaeda "continued to
represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to western interests" and that "the
threat would be heightened by military action against Iraq". The PM ignored the
JIC's warning and didn't share it with parliament.
The empirical evidence linking Blair's Mesopotamian misadventure to the rise and
rise of violent Islamism is pretty clear, too: according to a 2007 study by terror ex-
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perts Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "the Iraq war has generated a stunning
sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to literally
hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and thousands of civilian lives lost". Blair
and Bush's war of choice against Saddam Hussein, the study's authors concluded,
"greatly increased the spread of the al-Qaeda ideological virus". Thanks, Tony!
SHILLING FOR THE GENERALS
Blair, in his speech this morning, also talked of the need to take "coherent" positions on the various Middle East conflicts and crises. "We have to take sides," he
declaimed. Maybe, but let's take a moment to look at whose sides he takes.
The former PM used his Bloomberg address to heap praise on Israel, "a western
democracy", while conveniently ignoring the Jewish state's ongoing human rights
abusesand defiance of international law and refusing to mention the words
"occupation" or "settlements".
He called on the West to "reach out and cooperate with.. Russia and China". Why?
"China and Russia have exactly the same desire to defeat this ideology as do the
USA and Europe." No mention from Blair as to how how China and Russia try and
"defeat" Islamist terrorism - for example, China's odious record of torture against
its mainly Muslim Uighur population or Russia's carpet bombing of Muslim-majority
Chechnya in the late 1990s. (Then again, perhaps we shouldn't be surprised: back
in 2000, "liberal interventionist" Blair decided toattend the opera with Vladimir
Putin at the height of the latter's repression of the Chechen population.)
Worst of all, Blair in his Bloomberg speech reiterated and ramped up his support
for the military junta in Egypt. He refused to use the word "coup" in reference to
the Egyptian army's takeover of power in July 2013, referring only to "the absolutely necessary rescue of a nation" from the dastardly - yet democratically-elected Muslim Brotherhood government. He seemed blissfully unaware of the argument
that driving the MB underground, and declaring them a terrorist organisation,
could increase the threat from, and popularity of, violent Islamists both in Egypt
and across the region.
"We should support the new [Egyptian] government and help," he declaimed. Help
and support with what exactly? Gunning down unarmed protesters? Forcing
'virginity tests' on female protesters? Arresting and detaining foreign journalists?
Forget all of that: according to Blair, we in the West need to "show some sensitivity
to the fact that over 400 police officers have suffered violent deaths and several
hundred soldiers been killed" in Egypt since the coup. So? This is dictator apologism
of the worst sort. Couldn't a defender of the Assad regime say the same sentence
vis-a-vis Syria security forces killed while cracking down on Syria's opposition? Why,
then, the double standard with Egypt?
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Is this what the former prime minister of Great Britain, the thrice-elected leader of
our country, the self-styled crusader for Western democracy and liberal interventionism, has been reduced to in his retired life? Shilling for unelected and bloodstained Egyptian generals? Pontificating on how to tackle an Islamist terror threat
that he helped exacerbate and spread through the region?
As even the arch-Blairite writer Stephen Bush, a contributing editor to the Blairite
magazine Progress, reluctantly conceded in February: "In retirement... Labour's serial election winner may have finally found an enemy who is capable of destroying
him: himself."
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/-
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A return to Londonistan?
16 April 2014
Could London once again become a haven for dissidents following the Arab Spring?
The widely acknowledged failure of the Arab Spring uprisings to deliver democracy to the Middle East is reverberating here in Britain.
With a backlash under way by some Arab governments against their opponents,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, could London once again become a haven for Arab dissidents bent on removing their own governments, as it was in the 1990s?
French intelligence officials had a contemptuous word for our capital back then.
They called it "Londonistan".
It was a reference to the plethora of Middle Eastern and North African dissidents
plotting the downfall of secular governments in countries like Egypt, Yemen and
Algeria.
Politically, London is a good space for all the political people to move around and
express themselves without any pressures from dictators, or some political pressure from back home”
Most were peaceful, but some were radical extremists with links to violent groups
overseas - even Osama Bin Laden openly kept a PR operation in London - the
"Advice and Reformation Committee" - with its own PR rep, a Saudi national since
extradited to the US.
'Democratic ideals'
Yet for years the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police and MI5 all largely turned a
blind eye, believing that by providing a "covenant" of protection, Britain itself
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would be safe from attack.
The London bombings disproved that.
Fast forward a decade and clearly there is some head-scratching going on in Whitehall about just what Arab opposition activists are up to on British soil.
On 1 April, Prime Minister David Cameron ordered a review into the activities of
the Muslim Brotherhood after unsubstantiated reports that some of its leaders
were linked to terrorist attacks in Egypt.
"There's always been a sort of historical constellation of people within the UK who
are involved with political activism in foreign countries," said Raffaello Pantucci, an
expert on extremism at the Whitehall think tank, the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI).
"The element that's changed now is the fact that people now look at those groups
with an element of suspicion as well.
Whitehall officials are becoming more concerned about what Arab opposition activists are up to in Britain
"I think previously there was a sense that they were allowed to operate here and it
wasn't a huge concern but now, given the links that we see to other terrorism that
has taken place in the United Kingdom that has emerged in this broader community, they are watched a lot more carefully and this makes it much more difficult for
them to operate abroad."
I think it would be surprising for Londonistan to emerge again in the same way
that we saw in for example the 1990s”
Raffaello PantucciExpert on extremism
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But hang on, surely Britain is meant to be a haven of free speech and democratic
ideals?
With democracy largely denied in the Arab world, is it not a credit to the UK that
peaceful opponents of unelected regimes should choose London as their base?
And is there not a risk in Britain of driving harmless dissidents underground and
into the arms of extremists?
'Fight against terrorism'
Saleh Magaache is an Algerian dissident living in London and he welcomes what it
offers.
Egyptian and Yemeni governments complained to Britain about the activities hate
preacher Abu Hamza al-Masri
"Politically, London is a good space for all the political people to move around and
express themselves without any pressures from dictators, or some political pressure from back home.
"It's good access to all the UK officials."
So when does freedom of speech cross over into illegal activity? I put the question
to David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Government Terrorism Legislation.
"There's a test that always has to be satisfied," he said.
"The group must be concerned in terrorism. It's a very broad test, it applies really
to any group that is violently opposed to any government in the world.
"To narrow it down, the home secretary applies her discretion and she'll look at a
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number of factors: she'll look at where the terrorism has been taking place, she'll
look at how strong the presence of the group is in the United Kingdom, and very
importantly, in many cases, she'll look at the solidarity with other countries in the
fight against terrorism."
The trouble is, Britain's definition of who constitutes a threat to society has frequently failed to match the views of its conservative Arab allies overseas.
For years the Egyptian and Yemeni governments complained to Britain about the
activities of radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri.
But it was not until 2004 that he was finally arrested and imprisoned on a US extradition warrant - he was jailed in the UK in 2006 for inciting murder and racial hatred
and extradited to the US in 2012 where he is currently on trial facing 11 terrorism
charges.
David Cameron has ordered a review into the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood
In Cricklewood, north London, a Saudi dissident continues to live freely while his
own government back home designates him a terrorist.
And in the wake of the Arab Spring, rulers in the United Arab Emirates have complained loudly about the Muslim Brotherhood, which they see as a threat to their
rule - and many of whose members live in Britain.
"There are plenty of cases in which other countries have banned organisations and
would like us to do the same," said David Anderson added.
"And we certainly don't go along with that in every case. We have to be satisfied
that the statutory test (on terrorism) is met."
'Shared values'
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Ultimately, the question is now whether Britain has got the balance right, knowing
when it is time to close down those who propagate hatred or violence, and when
to permit peaceful free speech, however much that might be anathema to some
governments in the Middle East.
In a statement sent to the BBC, the Home Office said it was looking to improve
ways of tackling terrorism and extremism, including deportation and depriving people of citizenship.
"Coming to live in the UK is a privilege that we refuse to extend to those we believe
are seeking to subvert our shared values and represent a threat to our society," a
spokesman said.
So have the lessons from past mistakes been learned?
Mr Pantucci thinks a return to the days of Londonistan is unlikely. "Since the 1990s
we have seen a shift in that perception and analysis of these groups. You've seen
that there is still a lot of activism that goes on in this country so elements of Londonistan do persist," he said.
"However, I think that the sort of open radicalisation and recruitment that we used
to see, its difficult to see that re-emerging again in such an open fashion."
http://www.bbc.com/news/27055108
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USA
When it comes to security at nuclear facilities, danger likely lurks
from within, Stanford scholar says
Stanford Report, April 24, 2014
The greatest dangers to nuclear facilities are sabotage and theft from insiders,
according to political scientist Scott Sagan. Analysis of past incidents can help
boost safeguards at these sites.
A diesel generator at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in Southern California was possibly sabotaged, likely by an insider, in 2012.
Insider threats are the most serious challenge confronting nuclear facilities in today's world, a Stanford political scientist says.
In every case of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft
are known, the perpetrators were either insiders or had help from insiders, according to Scott Sagan and his co-author, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, in
aresearch paper published this month by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
"Given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone
being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they
were perpetrated by insiders as well," they wrote.
And theft is not the only danger facing facility operators; sabotage is a risk as
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well, said Sagan, who is a senior fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor in Political Science.
While there have been sabotage attempts in the United States and elsewhere
against nuclear facilities conducted by insiders, the truth may be hard to decipher
in an industry shrouded in security, he said.
"We usually lack good and unclassified information about the details of such nuclear incidents," Sagan said.
The most recent known example occurred in 2012 – an apparent insider sabotage
of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear facility in California. Arguably the
most spectacular incident happened at South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power
plant (then under construction) in South Africa in 1982 when someone detonated
explosives directly on a nuclear reactor.
Lessons learned
In their paper, the authors offered some advice and insights based on lessons
learned from past insider incidents:

Don't assume that serious insider threats are NIMO (not in my organization).

Don't assume that background checks will solve the insider problem.

Don't assume that red flags will be read properly.

Don't assume that insider conspiracies are impossible.
 Don't assume that organizational culture and employee disgruntlement don't
matter.
 Don't forget that insiders may know about security measures and how to work
around them.

Don't assume that security rules are followed.

Don't assume that only consciously malicious insider actions matter.
Don't focus only on prevention and miss opportunities for mitigation.
The information for the research paper emanated from an American Academy of
Arts and Sciences project on nuclear site threats, Sagan said.
"It was unusual in that it brought together specialists on insider threats and risks
in many different areas – including intelligence agencies, biosecurity, the U.S. military – to encourage interdisciplinary learning across organizations," he said.
Sagan explained that the experts sought to answer the following questions:
"What can we learn about potential risks regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear
power facilities by studying insider threat experiences in other organizations?
What kinds of successes and failures did security specialists find in efforts to pre-
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vent insider threats from emerging in other organizations?"
'Not perfect'
He noted that only a few serious insider cases in the U.S. nuclear industry have
arisen, thanks to rigorous "personal reliability" programs conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. military for people with access to sensitive
nuclear materials.
But there is room for improvement, Sagan said.
"These programs are effective," he said, "but they are not perfect. And relative
success can breed overconfidence, even complacency, which can be a major
cause of security breaches in the future."
For example, the nuclear industry needs to do more research about how terrorist
organizations recruit individuals to join or at least help their cause. It also needs
to do a better job on distributing "creative ideas and best practices" against insider threats to nuclear partners worldwide.
Sagan said the U.S. government is not complacent about the danger of insider
threats to nuclear security, but the problem is complex and the dangers hard to
measure.
"Sometimes governments assume, incorrectly, that they do not face serious
risks," he said.
One worrisome example is Japan, he said.
"Despite the creation of a stronger and more independent nuclear regulator to
improve safety after the Fukushima accident in Japan, little has been done to improve nuclear security there," said Sagan.
He added, "There is no personal reliability program requiring background checks
for workers in sensitive positions in Japanese nuclear reactor facilities or the plutonium reprocessing facility in Japan."
Sagan explained that some Japanese government and nuclear industry officials
believe that Japanese are loyal and trustworthy by nature, and that domestic terrorism in their country is "unthinkable" – thus, such programs are not necessary.
"This strikes me as wishful thinking," Sagan said, "especially in light of the experience of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group, which launched the 1995 sarin gas
[chemical weapon] attack in the Tokyo subway."
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/april/nuclear-security-risks-042414.html
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Telling the Truth about Terrorism and Islamic Charities
April 26, 2014
The link between “charity” groups and terrorist organizations is frequently not
recognized or is ignored. The chairman of the British Charity Commission, William
Shawcross, on April 20, 2014 expressed his concern about charities being used as
vehicles for such groups. He warns that the “problem of Islamist extremism… is
not the most widespread problem we face in terms of abuse of charities but is
potentially the most deadly... and it is growing.”
The growth is evident from the analysis in the British list of terrorist organizations
proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Of the 55 organizations, 33 are Islamist,
alphabetically, from the Abu Nidal Organization, whose declared aim is the destruction of Israel, to Saved Sect or Savior Sect, a group that has disguised its
name on a number of occasions and which seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate
ruled by Sharia law.
Shawcross’s righ ul concern was that some charities in the UK as elsewhere in
Western democracies purportedly raise funds to provide aid for desirable objectives, and do so to some extent, but that they are also engaged in money laundering to organizations that are involved, directly or indirectly, with terrorist groups.
More specifically, Shawcross found that some people accused of terrorist offenses serve as charity trustees.
Oxfam International, which showed such courage in trying to prevent the powerful Scarlett Johansson from taking a job with the Israeli company SodaStream, appears naïve and politically inept in not grasping this link. In January 2014 Oxfam
was about to cosponsor an exhibit on Gaza in the East London Mosque together
with Ibrahim Hewitt, a trustee of Interpal, officially the Palestine Relief and Development Fund, a so-called charity organization.
Oxfam, though now universally famous for its acute knowledge of the precise
conditions in Israeli settlements, did not know, as every schoolboy in London
does, that the East London Mosque is a notorious cauldron of anti-Western and
anti-Semitic hatred. One of the individuals, Sakeel Begg, due to speak at another
event at the Mosque, describes jihad as “the greatest of deeds.” The Mosque has
also entertained other speakers such as Saad al-Beraik who refers to Jews as
“monkeys,” and calls on Palestinians not to “have mercy or compassion on the
Jews,” and to wage jihad against them.
It is also well known that the Mosque is an organization close to the Bangladeshi
wing in the UK of Jamaat-e-Islami, a violent Islamic terrorist group, responsible
for mass murder in 1971, and linked to the Global Muslim Brotherhood.
Oxfam understood that Hewitt was due to speak at the Mosque in conjunction
with the Gaza exhibition it was cosponsoring. But then it cancelled the event not
because of the hatred expressed in Hewitt’s remarks about Israel but because of
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his comments about homosexuality about which Oxfam had been previously unaware. Hewitt is reported as wanting homosexuals to suffer “severe punishments”
for their “great sin.” He is not clear, at least officially, whether gays should be executed or whether they should simply be subjected to stoning. In spite of the cancellation, the irrepressibly naive Oxfam still “looks forward” to working with the
Mosque to “highlight the plight of children of Gaza.”
Oxfam seems not have known about Ibrahim Hewitt or Interpal and the relation
of this “charity group” to Hamas in Gaza. Hewitt, a convert to Islam in 1981, is an
individual who wears a number of hats, all of which have a certain pattern. He is
senior editor of Middle East Monitor (Islamist outlet). He is also a trustee of the
International Board of Educational Research and Resources, an organization in
South Africa, founded by Yusuf Islam (the former Cat Stevens) which distributes
Islamist educational material. Hewitt was formerly, 2004-2006, the Assistant Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, a group that is dominated by the
jihadist group, Jaamat-e-Islami.
Hewitt is a skilled polemicist who makes no secret of his views. In his pamphlet
Blood on the Holy Land, of March 13, 1988, Hewitt referred to the “so-called Holocaust.” He is proud of his mastery of the subject of national characteristics, especially those of Jews and Israelis. One example is his statement, “By their behavior in vandalizing and destroying Mosques and Churches, the Jews have demonstrated that they cannot be entrusted with the sanctity and security of this Holy
Land.”
Hewitt has obviously not been reading carefully the recent news about the peaceful and humanitarian conditions, and the careful preservation of antiquities and
religious structures in the freedom-loving and tolerant countries of Syria, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Nevertheless, Hewitt on April 15, 2014 comprehended
“The undeniable fact that the creation of the state (of Israel) is the prime cause of
the unrest in the Middle East.” He also knows that the U.S. government is a
“puppet” of Zionism. Hewitt frequently asserts that Israel has committed war
crimes and is a threat to world peace.
Above all, Hewitt is chair and trustee of Interpal, the British charity founded in
1994 that claims to be supporting Palestinians by alleviating poverty, providing
health care, and advancing education, and by transferring funds to local authorized partners in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. More realistically, the U.S. in
2003 named it as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization. And the
BBC, in its Panorama program in July 2006 alleged that money collected by Interpal was going to fund other charities, voluntary organizations, that sponsored
educational projects encouraging children to become suicide bombers. The BBC
further alleged that these charities had links with, even run by, senior Hamas
members.
Interpal was part of, perhaps the most important affiliate, of the charity organizations making up the Union of Good, a coalition headed by the leader of Global
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Muslim Brotherhood, Youssef Qaradawi, who helps raise funds for Hamas. The
Union of Good is a coalition of charities that manages financial support for Hamas. This group was banned by Israel in 2002, a year before it was designated as
a terrorist group by the U.S. A U.S.Treasury statement in 2008 claimed UOG’s executive leadership and the secretary-general board of directors included Hamas
leaders. The UOG and Interpal were close: the secretary-general of UOG also acted as vice-chairman of Interpal. The former general-secretary of the UOG, Essam
Mustafa, is the Managing Trustee of Interpal. He and Hewitt both met in Gaza
with Ismail Haniya, senior member of Hamas, on July 31, 2011.
Interpal has been careful to cover its tracks. As a result, the UK Charity Commission, the body that regulates charities, issued a cautious and nuanced report in
February 2009 that concluded it could not verify that Interpal had distributed
funds to other organizations promoting terrorist ideology or activities, especially
those of Hamas. However, it did not give Interpal a clean bill of health. It held
that Interpal’s continued membership of UOG was not appropriate and that it
should end its membership. Many of the partners of Interpal appear to have promoted and supported Hamas. Again, in its 2012 report, the UK Commission, was
uneasy but did not censure Interpal for its involvement with Hamas. Interpal
does, however, appear to have ended its membership of UOG after the Charity
Commission report advised it to do so.
This reluctance on the part of the British Commission, which is an objective body,
to state the obvious is surprising. Lloyds Bank’s attitude was clear-cut. It decided
in 2009 that it would not provide services for Interpal which had an account with
the Islamic Bank of Britain. The Commission might have reached a similar conclusion if it had considered the activities of two individuals in Britain. Zaid Yemeni
(Zaid Hassan), the representative of Interpal in Birmingham, who has met with a
Hamas leader in Gaza who called on God to annihilate Jews and not leave any
one of them alive. Ibrahm Dar (Abu Hana), the Bradford representative of Interpal, is an open admirer of Anwar Al-Awlaki, a major al-Qaeda leader whose
main ambition is blow up U.S. planes.
Plain speaking on terrorism is essential in all democratic countries. The most recent report of the British Commission evades that and lacks clarity and robustness. So do some participants in a recent controversy in New York City. A brief
film to be shown at the opening of the National September 11 Memorial Museum
refers to those who committed the crime of 9/11 as terrorists whose mission is
jihad. Some clerics dislike this wording, arguing that it casts aspirations on all
Muslims. Clearly it does no such thing. It is incumbent to call terrorists by their
right name, whether in this particular case or in reference to British “charities”
which camouflage their real intentions.
http://www.americanthinker.com/
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of the African Union Commission (AUC),
Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and
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