Chapitre 4. Justice as Fairness : Rawls

John Rawls
1921-2002
Chapitre 4.
Justice as Fairness : Rawls
Références
Arnsperger, C., Van Parijs, P. (2003) Ethique économique et sociale, Paris, La Découverte,
Repères n°300, chapitre 4
Freeman, S. (2008) Original Position, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/#VeiIgn
Kymlicka, W. (2003) Les Théories de la justice : une introduction, Paris, La Découverte,
chapitre 2
Wenar, L (2008) “John Rawls”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/
Richardson, H. (2005), “John Rawls”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/
Le "libéralisme égalitaire" de John Rawls
A. Démarche et méthode
B. Le contenu de la "Justice as Fairness"
C. Critiques et débats
D. Expériences
- voile d'ignorance et maximin
- adhésion à la justice procédurale
A. La démarche rawlsienne
Objectifs
Selon Rawls, la philosophie politique a 4 grands rôles
1. Rôle pratique : trouver les fondements d'un contrat social raisonné entre les membres d'une
société potentiellement tiraillé par ma mésentente et menacée de divisions (cf. Hobbes et son
Léviathan ou Rousseau et son Contrat Social)
2. Aider les citoyens à s'orienter au sein de leur société, en décrivant la façon dont l'ordre social
se constitue
3. Tester les limites de la mise en œuvre des utopies politiques : la philosophie politique doit
s'attacher à décrire des arrangements politiques réalisables, mais dans ce cadre elle doit décrire
le meilleur ordre social possible
4. Permettre la réconciliation des citoyens avec l'organisation politique et sociale dans
laquelle ils vivent : elle n'est pas uniquement marquée par la domination, la cruauté, les préjugés,
la corruption et l'irrationalité. Elle obéit à une certaine forme de rationalité.
Concernant sa propre œuvre, Rawls se donne deux grands objectifs

Apaiser le conflit entre égalité et liberté au sein des théories de la justice

Décrire les limites moralement acceptables de la tolérance civile et internationale
"Justice as fairness", une éthique alternative à l'utilitarisme
"Perhaps I can explain my aim in this book as follow. During much of modern moral philosophy the
predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism. (…) Those who criticized [the
great utilitarians] … pointed out the obscurities of the principle of utility and noted the apparent
incongruities between its many of its implications and our moral sentiments. But they failed, I believe,
to construct a workable and systematic a moral conception to oppose it. (…) What I have attempted
to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the
social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant."
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, pp. xvii-xviii
"Justice as fairness" : une éthique retravaillée tout au long de son oeuvre
A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press.
Political Liberalism (1993), New York, Columbia University Press.
The Law of Peoples (1999), Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press.
Justice as Fairness : A Restatement (2001), Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press.
Rawls contre l'utilitarisme (A Theory of Justice, 1971)
Rawls adresse 3 critiques fondamentales à l'utilitarisme
1. L'utilitarisme classique est indifférent à la distribution des satisfactions
individuelles.
"The striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not
matter, except indirectly, how this sums of satisfactions is distributed
among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man
distributed his satisfactions over time." (p.23)
2. La justice sociale dépend de l'appréciation du bien-être à l'échelle de la
société : l'éthique sociale utilitariste adopte le point de vue d'un observateur
bienveillant et impartial mais imaginaire et distinct des membres de la société. Il
ne prend pas au sérieux les différences intrinsèques entre les individus.
"[The utilitarist] view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending
to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this
extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imaginative
acts of the impartial sympathetic observer. Utilitarianism does not take
seriously the distinction between persons." (p. 24)
Rawls contre l'utilitarisme (A Theory of Justice, 1971)
3. Argument des préférences perverses : l'utilitarisme se donne comme objectif la maximisation
des désirs des individus, sans exception.
"In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself witch must be
taken into account in deciding what is right. (…) In justice as fairness (…) [t]he principles of
right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value (…) Hence in justice as
fairness one does not take men's propensities and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and
then seek the best way to fulfil them. Rather, their desires and aspirations are restricted from
the outset by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men's systems of ends
must respect." (pp.27-28)
Comme antidote, Rawls propose une éthique sociale déontologique (c'est-à-dire procédurale),
où le juste n'est plus nécessairement confondu avec le bon
"(…) Utilitarianism is a teleological theory whereas justice as fairness is not. By definition,
then, the latter is a deontological theory, one that (…) does not interpret the right as
maximizing the good. (…) Justice as fairness is deontological (…) [f]or (...) there is no reason
to think that just institutions will maximize the good." (pp. 26-7)
"Justice as fairness" : la méthode du voile d'ignorance
Rawls s'inscrit dans la tradition contractualiste de Locke, Rousseau et Kant : ces
philosophes ont recours à une position originelle fictive pour détailler les principes
souhaitables pour fonder le contrat social (l'organisation légitime de la société)
Rawls argumente que l'éthique déontologique qu'il propose est celle qui serait choisie par tout
individu libre, moral et rationnel placé sous voile d'ignorance


ignorant de

sa position sociale,

la qualité de ses biens premiers naturels (intelligence, force...)

sa conception particulière de la vie bonne

ses caractéristiques psychologiques (empathie, égoïsme...)
mais conservant ses connaissances générales de la nature humaine et adhérant à l'idée
d'égalité intrinsèque et d'égale liberté des êtres humains
Parce que l'individu sous voile d'ignorance doit déterminer l'organisation d'une société où il
sera inséré sans connaître son propre statut, il est sous contrainte d'impartialité et
formulera des principes d'organisation équitables.
"Justice as fairness" : la méthode du voile d'ignorance
"In justice as fairness the original position of equality
corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of
the social contract. (…) Among the essential features of this
situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status, nor does any one knows his fortune
in the distribution of natural assets and capabilities, his
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that
the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their
special psychological propensities. The principles of justice
are chosen behind a veil of ignorance." (Rawls, 1999, p.11)
B. Le contenu de la
"Justice as fairness"
1. Les biens premiers
Les biens premiers, étalon de mesure de la vie bonne
Définition : les biens premiers sont les moyens généraux nécessaires (et pas
seulement désirés) pour se forger une conception de la vie complète et d'en
poursuivre la réalisation
"[The primary] goods are things citizens need as free and equal
persons living a complete life : they are not things it is simply
rational to want or desire, or to prefer or even to crave." (Justice as
Fairness, 2001, pp.57-8)
La liste des biens premiers n'est pas établie de manière relative ou
subjective : elle dépend du contexte socio-historique mais aussi d'une
conception normative et universelle de la dignité humaine
"(…) the account of primary goods does not rest solely on
psychological, social, or historical facts. (…) [I]t does so only
together with a political conception of the person as free and equal,
endowed with the moral powers, and capable of being a fully
cooperative member of the society. This normative conception is
necessary to identify the appropriate list of primary goods." (Justice
as Fairness, 2001, p.58)
Principe d'égale liberté
Principe d'égalité des opportunités
Les biens premiers chez John Rawls
Biens premiers naturels (par exemple, intelligence, vigueur, talents) : ne dépendent pas de l'organisation
institutionnelle et ne doivent pas être compensés par elle
Biens premiers sociaux : dépendent de l'organisation institutionnelle, dont la légitimité dépend de leur
répartition
(BS1)
Basic rights and liberties : freedom of thought and liberty of conscience (…). These rights and
liberties are essential institutional conditions required for the adequate development and full and
informed exercise of the two moral powers.
(BS2)
Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse
opportunities, which opportunities allow the pursuit of a variety of ends and give effect to decisions to
revise and alter them.
(BS3)
Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility.
(BS4)
Income and wealth, understood as all-purpose means (having an exchange value) generally needed
to achieve a wide range of ends whatever they may be.
(BS5)
The social bases of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally essential
if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with
self-confidence.
Rawls, Justice as Fairness : A Restatement (2001), pp.58-9
2. Deux (trois) principes
et une clause lexicographique
Une distribution équitable des biens premiers sociaux respecte
1. Deux (trois) principes de justice
(I) "Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
Principe d'égalité des libertés fondamentales : respect d'une liste déterminée
de libertés fondamentales (les biens premiers BS1 et BS2)


au niveau le plus élevé qui puisse être garanti de manière égale à tous
une liberté fondamentale peut être restreinte ou régulée au nom d'une autre
liberté fondamentale
(Arnsperger et Van Parijs, 2001, p.59)
Une distribution équitable des biens premiers sociaux respecte
1. Deux (trois) principes de justice
(I) "Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions :
(IIa) first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity ;
Principe d'égalité des opportunités :


Pas de garantie de la même probabilité d'accès aux positions sociales mesurées
à l'aune des biens premiers sociaux BS3, BS4 et BS5
Mais garantie d'une même opportunité d'accès compte tenu
- des différentes conceptions individuelles de la vie bonne
- des différentes dotations en biens premiers naturels (talents) : l'approche
rawlsienne n'entend pas compenser les inégalités "naturelles"
Une distribution équitable des biens premiers sociaux respecte
1. Deux (trois) principes de justice
(I) "Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions :
(IIa) first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity ;
(IIb) and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society (the difference principle)."
Principe de différence (ou maximin)
Sous la contrainte des deux autres principes, il impose de choisir, parmi tous les
arrangements institutionnels envisageables et réalisables, celui qui rend aussi
élevé que possible l'espérance d'un indice composite des biens premiers
sociaux des plus défavorisés (dont l'identité peut varier d'un arrangement à un
autre).
Une distribution équitable des biens premiers sociaux respecte
1. Deux (trois) principes de justice
(I) "Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions :
(IIa) first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity ;
(IIb) and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society (the difference principle)."
2. Clause lexicographique : principe I > principe IIa > principe IIb
Rawls cherche à concilier liberté et égalité
L'égalité des opportunités et le principe de différence en faveur des plus
défavorisés sont subordonnés au respect égal des libertés de base ;
Le principe de différence en faveur des plus défavorisés est subordonné au principe
d'égalité des opportunités.
Illustrations
Si les 3 états sociaux respectent
identiquement les principes d'égalité des
libertés fondamentales et d'égalité des
opportunités, le principe de différence établit
que :
Comparaison graphique des critères d'équité
(Atkinson et Stiglitz, 1980)
Indice des
opportunités
de l'individu 2
A
Groupes sociaux
États
sociaux
I
II
III
A
9
9
9
B
50
5
30
C
10
11
12
B
C
D
Le principe de différence n'est pas

Un principe égalitariste

Un principe utilitariste maximisateur

Un principe de priorité aux pauvres
45°
Principe de Pareto
Principe utilitariste
Principe égalitariste
Maximin C
Indice des
opportunités de
l'individu 1
entre A et C
B
D
C. Critiques et débats
1. Critiques du voile d'ignorance rawlsien
Une position originelle psychologiquement impossible
Le voile d'ignorance rawlsien est trop épais : comment choisir les principes fondateurs de l'organisation
d'une société sans connaître ses propres valeurs ?
Réponse : le voile d'ignorance est une position originelle fictive où ne sont conservés que les éléments
moralement indispensables à la formulation des principes organisateurs d'une société juste. Dire que les
êtres humains doivent être libres et également considérés par la société suffit pour ce faire sans qu'il soit
nécessaire de chercher à connaître leurs croyances et valeurs.
Critique conséquentialiste


Il n'y a aucune assurance que les principes découlant de l'éthique rawlsienne conduisent à une
quelconque maximisation du bien-être de la population.
Bien plus, si l'on ne possède pas de conception d'un bien ultime (quelle que soit la définition de
celui-ci), on ne peut pas se mettre d'accord pour mettre en place des institutions permettant d'atteindre
ce bien
2. Harsanyi et le principe de différence
Selon le principe de différence, il faut choisir l'arrangement institutionnel qui
maximise les opportunités associées à la pire des situations sociales possibles.
Selon Harsanyi (1975)



Jan Harsanyi
(1920-2000)
Le choix du principe de différence (maximin) par des individus placés dans la
position originelle correspond à un cas particulier où les individus ont une aversion
au risque infinie.
Le principe de différence ne peut être choisi que par un individu paranoïaque qui
chercherait à limiter les dommages si c'était son pire ennemi qui choisissait sa
position sociale.
Un individu possédant une aversion au risque non infinie devrait choisir un principe
maximisant, non la situation du plus défavorisé, mais l'utilité espérée moyenne (=
celle que recevrait un individu pris au hasard dans la population)
La réponse de Rawls (1987) : probabilités difficiles à estimer ; les individus s'intéressent
surtout au minimum vital ; maximum = pb
3. Le principe de différence vs. le "maximin" des économistes
Lorsqu'ils comparent des états sociaux, les économistes utilisent souvent le maximin
comme un critère alternatif (ou complémentaire) au critère utilitariste cardinal de la
somme des utilités.
Cela n'est pas cohérent avec l'approche de Rawls


Parce que le principe de différence a un sens dans une perspective procédurale
(déontologique) : il n'est pertinent que pour évaluer le caractère équitable ou non
d'ensembles institutionnels et ne s'applique pas à un moindre niveau de généralité
Parce que le principe de différence s'applique à la situation de l'individu le plus
défavorisé appréciée à l'aune des biens premiers sociaux – et non d'une métrique du
bien-être utilitariste subjective.
Comment identifier les plus défavorisés ?


Indice multidimensionnel permettant d'agréger les biens premiers sociaux
(libertés fondamentales + opportunités sociales)
Si les libertés et les opportunités sont égales (principes I et IIa respectés),
alors les plus défavorisés sont ceux qui disposent du niveau de revenu le plus
faible
3. Le principe de différence vs. le "maximin" des économistes
"This conception is understood to apply to the basic structure
of society : hat is, to its major institutions (…) and how they
fit together into one system. (…) But the maximin criterion is
not meant to apply to small-scale situations. (…) Maximin is a
macro not a micro principle"
(Rawls, AER, 1974, p.142)
"The two principles of justice assess the basic structure according to
how it regulated citizen's shares of primary goods, these shares
being specified in terms of an appropriate index. Note that primary
goods are given by reference to objective features of citizen's social
circumstances, features open to public view : their secured institutional
rights and liberties, their available fair opportunities, their (reasonable)
expectations of income and wealth seen from their social position, and
so on.
(…) In a well-ordered society where all citizen's equal basic rights
and liberties and fair opportunities are secure, the least
advantaged are those belonging to the income class with the lowest
expectations."
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 2001, p.59
4. Rawls et l'inégalité de biens premiers naturels
Dans une société démocratique


Les citoyens doivent se considérer également libres et égaux en dignité
Pourtant des inégalités sociales existent : les opportunités des individus sont
affectées par leur famille, leur classe d'origine, leurs biens premiers naturels et par la
chance
Les 3 principes de la justice comme équité sont ceux à la lumière desquels des personnes
morales libres et égales peuvent tolérer que leurs relations soient affectées par la fortune
sociale et la loterie naturelle
Dans la justice comme équité


Le principe de différence ne s'applique pas aux biens premiers naturels : il ne
s'agit pas de compenser les individus les moins biens dotés par la nature
L'arrangement institutionnel le plus juste peut moralement découler des différences
naturelles et de naissance entre individus à condition que l'inégalité qui en résulte
favorise les moins biens lotis sachant que les handicaps en termes de biens
premiers naturels peuvent être (et sont souvent) à l'origine de biens premiers
sociaux de moindre qualité
4. Rawls et l'inégalité de biens premiers naturels
"Thus at first sight the distribution of natural assets and unequal lifeexpectations threatens the relations between free and equal moral
persons. But provided the maximin criterion is satisfied, these relations
may be preserved : inequalities are to everyone's advantage and those
able to gain from their good fortune do so in ways agreeable to those
less favored"
John Rawls, "Some Reason for the Maximin Criterion", AER 1974, p.145
D. Expérience (1)
Les personnes valorisent-elles
la justice procédurale ?
Anand P. (2001) Procedural fairness in
economic and social choice: evidence from a survey of voters. Journal of
Economic Psychology 22 : 247-270.
5 claims for procedural fairness
1. Resource allocation conflicts are such that no exclusively
outcome-based resolution is available (cf. Sen and the
paretian liberal impossibility theorem, 1979).
2. Outcome uncertainty may be so pervasive that processes are
all we can monitor or control (cf. legal system with high
uncertainty).
3. Fair processes might bring about efficient outcomes (cf.
Rawls, 1971).
4. We may wish to impose limits on the discretion of those in
positions of power.
5. Situations may exist in which the treatment process has a
(dis)utility that is interpreted as being (un)fair : agency
matters !
Hypothesis 1. People reject random choosing when facing
unequal outcomes
(...)
Hypothesis 3. Sensitivities to fair process are often linked to
inequalities between interacting agents (be they individuals
within firms, markets or other non-market institutions designed
to support co-operation)
Hypothesis 4. Actions (verbal insults for example) that may have
no apparent impact on a person's expected wealth levels can be
deeply disturbing to someone who sees them as threatening to
their status as a person.
(…)
Hypothesis 5. There is a relation between fairness perception
and insulting treatment of someone.
Hypothesis 1
People reject random choosing when facing unequal
outcomes
Question 1
Two adults arrive at casualty with a life-threatening
condition that does not affect their ability to make
decisions. The doctor explains that there are resources
only to treat one patient and then proposes that she will
decide which one is to be treated by tossing a coin.
a) If you were one of these patients, would you think that
a doctor's choice based on a coin toss was a fair way of
choosing which patient to treat?
b) Do you think it is fair if patients could decide who will
benefit from the treatment ?
Question 2
You work for a small firm and your boss considers how
to distribute a one-off Christmas bonus of £1000 between
his five employees, including yourself. S/he considers
two options:
(A) Conduct a lottery between the between the five of
you and give £1000 to the winner.
(B) Give £200 to each of you.
a) S/he then decides to conduct the lottery (option A). Is
this fair ?
b) Workers vote for or against the lottery. Is this fair ?
Results

People thing that random choice is unfair

But the unfairness of it is lower when it is imposed !
"It could be that in an unfair situation, people would rather not
have control on themselves" (Anand, 2001, p. 257)
Résultats – promo 15-16
Question 1
Very Fair
Fair
Unfair
Very Unfair
A
2
3
10
10
B
0
3
7
15
A
0
1
14
10
B
5
15
4
1
Question 3


Santé : même résultat que chez Anand : le tirage au
sort est injuste et d'autant plus que les personnes
concernées doivent prendre part à la décision.
Différence avec Anand : tirage au sort accepté dans le
cas 'travail'
Hypothesis 3
Sensitivities to fair process are often linked to
inequalities between interacting agents (be they
individuals within firms, markets or other non-market
institutions designed to support co-operation)
Question 5
A company is selling time-shares in holiday homes to clients
who are ordinary people on holiday. It takes potential customers
to a hotel where it makes a presentation lasting one hour during
which free glasses of wine and salted nuts are distributed
liberally to the audience.
By the end of the presentation, Fred is feeling somewhat merry
and signs up for a one week time-share costing £500 per year for
the next five years. He regrets it later. Do you think the process
by which the sale was made was fair?
a) if Fred is a company representative himself
b) if Fred is one of the holiday-maker
Question 6
The managing director of a small company finds that
an employee has made a serious error of judgement
and she asks her to resign immediately. How fair is the
managing director's request?
a) if the employee is the head of finance
b) if the employee is a young manager
Results

The greater the inequality between the agents, the less
the processes are judged acceptable
Résultats promo 15-16
Q5
Q6

Very Fair
Fair
Unfair
Very Unfair
A
5
15
4
1
B
0
1
14
10
A
2
14
8
1
B
1
7
14
3
Même résultat que chez Anand
Hypothesis 4
Actions (verbal insults for example) that may have no
apparent impact on a person's expected wealth levels
can be deeply disturbing to someone who sees them as
threatening to their status as a person.
In economic contexts, we believe that requests for
certain kinds of information, sensible as they may seem
from an efficiency view-point, can be threatening in just
this way (and are therefore resisted by policy-makers).
Question 7
Do you think it is fair for insurance companies to require a
medical test when determining whether a person is to be given
life insurance?
a) if the test is a genetic test
b) if the test is a blood sample exam
Question 8
Do you think it is fair for an employer to require a written test
when determining whether a person is to be given a job?
a) if the test is a personality test
b) if the test is a skills test
Results

Requests for information that is either more revealing
and possibly more damaging to the person's sense of
value as an agent are perceived as being less fair
Résultats promo 15-16
Q7
Q8
Very Fair
Fair
Unfair
Very Unfair
A
0
1
9
15
B
1
2
12
10
A
0
9
14
2
B
6
17
2
0
On retrouve le fait que les demandes d'information moins personnelles
(prise de sang vs. test génétique / test de compétences vs. de
personnalité) sont vécues comme plus justes.
Par contre, toutes ces demandes sont vécues comme plus injustes,
globalement, que pour les répondants d'Anand.
Hypothesis 5
There is a relation between fairness perception and
insulting treatment of someone
In the ultimatum game, contrary to what game theory
suggests, equal splits are often proposed and unequal
splits with payoffs for both parties are regarded as
insulting and avoided or rejected by those who are
averse to actions that could be taken as signals of
disrespect
Question 9
You are in an ultimatum game in which you are one of the two
players who has to divide 100€ given to you by an experimenter.
The other player must suggest a division of the money and you
can accept the proposed division, whatever it is or reject it.


If you accept the proposed division then that is what you will
both get.
If you reject the proposed division, neither of you will receive
anything.
Question 9
What would you do?
□ Accept the proposal (division is 90€ for your opponent and 10€ for
you)
□ Reject the proposal (division is nothing for both of you)
□ Do not know
a) If your opponent doesn't justify her proposal : "take it of leave it"
b) Your opponent makes the following point : this may not be an equal
split but it is the only logical thing to do responsibility, if there is any,
lies with the designer of the situation, not the proposer. S/he believes
you would do the same under similar circumstances and that such a
response would be entirely understandable.
Question 10
John's work is not up to scratch so his manager gives him a
warning.
At the end of the month, there are many complaints about his
rudeness to customers and other members of staff and he is given,
in person and in writing, the contractual period of notice to leave.
Is the manner of John's sacking fair?
a) if the warning was writen and oral, with a face-to-face
discussion of the problems and possible remedies
b) if the warning was only written
Results

Strong preference for the active involvment of the
individual in an area where norms are neither strong
nor, one suspects, uniform
Résultats promo 15-16
Q9

Accepter (%)
Rejeter (%)
A
24
76
B
20
80
Même résultat que chez Anand (mais différence non
significative...)
Résultats promo 15-16
Q10
A
B
Very Fair
Fair
Unfair
Very Unfair
13
11
1
0
0
7
13
5
Même résultats que chez Anand
Conclusions
People often have good reason to be "morally productive"
There is a strong lay resistance to the use of random choosing as
a fair process... but, apparently, not because it removes control
(voice) (?)
The processes which imply involvement, even through
representatives, are strongly preferred to what might be called
'closed' choice mechanisms in which the decision problem is
completely defined and the preferences are inferred by some
indirect method
A sense of due process has value in curtailing possible abuse of
discretion within hierarchical groups
Treatment showing less than appropriate regard for a person as
an agent is regarded as unfair
D. Expérience (2)
Les personnes choisissent-elles
toujours le maximin lorsqu'elles sont
placées en situation d'impartialité ?
John H. Beck
School of Business Administration
Gonzaga University, Spokane
Tableau des gains
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
Impair
Pair
$25.00
$23.05
$21.20
$19.45
$17.80
$16.25
$14.80
$13.45
$12.20
$11.05
$10.00
$9.05
$8.20
$7.45
$7.08
$0
$1.15
$2.20
$3.15
$4.00
$4.75
$5.40
$5.95
$6.40
$6.75
$7.00
$7.15
$7.20
$7.15
$7.08
Partie 1
You must choose which row in the table -- A, B, C, etc. -- will
be used to determine your payoff.
Your payoff will be determined by the roll of a (virtual
http://de.virtuworld.net/ ) die at the end of the period (one roll
for everybody). If the die shows 1, 3 or 5 you will receive the
amount in the column headed "odd"; if the die shows 2, 4 or 6,
you will receive the amount in the column headed "even."
Payoffs will be made privately so you will know only your own
payoff.
Partie 2
You must choose which row in the table -- A, B, C, etc. will be used
to determine the payoff for everyone in class.
Before throwing the die to determine individual payoffs, one of
these forms will be drawn at random; the row designated on that
form will be used to determine individual payoffs for all students in
the class.
The die will then be (virtually) rolled separately for each individual
in the class. Payoffs will be made publicly so everyone knows how
much everyone else receives. If the die shows 1, 3 or 5, you will
receive the amount in the column headed "odd"; if the die shows
2,4 or 6, you will receive the amount in the column headed "even."
You are not allowed to make any transfers of part of your payoff to
other students in the class after the experiment is concluded.
Partie 3
The entire group must unanimously agree on which row in the
table -- A, B, C, etc. -- will be used to determine the payoffs for
everyone in the class. If the group does not reach unanimous
agreement within 15 minutes, the payoffs from Part C will be
zero.
The die will then be (virtually) rolled separately for each
individual in the class. Payoffs will be made publicly so
everyone knows how much everyone else receives. If the die
shows 1, 3 or 5, you will receive the amount in the column
headed "odd"; if the die shows 2,4 or 6, you will receive the
amount in the column headed "even."
You are not allowed to make any transfers of part of your payoff
to other students in the class after the experiment is concluded.