The origins of social microcredit activities in France: The Pawnshops

The origins of social microcredit activities in France:
The Pawnshops as Social Banking Organizations (SBO).
Pascal Glémain1.
First version for communication
Abstract: Since 2006, social microcredit seems to be concerned with a “new” social domestic
banking innovations in France. Indeed, thinking to struggle against banking exclusion through
the Social Cohesion Plan whose name was “Plan Borloo”, “social microcredit” or “guaranteed
personal microcredit” appears like a social credit for consumption against social over lending
process. During a period of crisis, solidarity-based credit and social help are becoming the
high targets of the social side of microfinance in developing countries. In this paper2, we show
that: social banking under social rationality settled in the French social policy through a social
banking production, in which we have both solidarity-based financing and social
accompanying policy.
Key words: social microcredit, social lending activities, money-based exclusion, social
policy, French fielwork.
JEL: D12, D69, E51, I38.
1
Assistant-professor post doctorate graduate in Management Sciences and in Social & Solidarity Economy.
University Rennes 2. Faculty of Social Sciences (Social and Economic Administration). CIAPHS EA 2242.
Cooperating researcher United Nations Research Institute on Social Development (UNRISD). Place du Recteur
Henri le Moal. CS24307. 35043 Rennes Cedex - France. [email protected]
2
This chapter comes from a french research work under our FIMOSOL’s scientific and administrative
responsibility, for the French National Direction of Social Cohesion (interministerial mission for social
economy) and the High Committee for Social Cohesion.
1
The origins of social microcredit activities in France:
The Pawnshops as Social Banking Organizations (SBO).
Since the end of the 1980’s with the profesionnal microcredit experiences in one side
and since the middle of the 2000 for the social microcredit in the other side, public opinion
seems to discover a new financial and banking innovation under social rationality. But, we
think that we are only in face with a new kind of local social banking microcredit system,
which was in the same way of social banking than pawnshops activities in the Preindustrial
Europe (Fontaine, 2010). Indeed, neither social microcredit, neither professional microcredit,
the pawnshop activity is always concerning with distrained goods to cover domestic or
professional cash flow problems. This social banking activity is under a “social rationality”,
i.e. under a rationality which takes social processes into account (Lindenberg 2003, p.359).
About pawnshops in France, even if we have only pawnshop activities (Demartial and
al. 2008, Pigalle 2008), or only social microcredit activities (FIMOSOL 2009, 2010), our
hypothesis is the following: social banking organizations are under a social rationality more
than an economic one. To test it, first, we’re studying the domestic dimension of social
microcredit from 2005 to nowadays (part one). Thus, we try to understand the local social
banking innovation in the west area of France, in particular in the “Pays-de-la-Loire” region.
There are not enough empirical and theoretical research programmes about this
fieldwork in France. But, these which come from Universities of Bordeaux and Limoges
(2008), and those ones which were driven by FIMOSOL (Universities of Angers, Nantes,
Rennes and Poitiers), seem to be in the same way of path research about the French social
banking organizations and activities. Therefore, it’s more and easier to understand why the
French society is needed about a social banking model during this period of financial,
economic and social crisis, to go towards a fair model of territorialized social sustainable
development?
2
1. From lectures on the macro level of social banking activities to their micro scale
fundamentals into the SBO.
In order to understand the supply social banking side, we have to explain the
differentiation between the banking organizations through their bundling: “commercial”
versus “social”. Indeed, the social challenge is “to set up a bundling system whom objective
function is to reduce banking exclusion, by supplying at all citizens banking-based services”
(Vaubourg 2001, p.1). Therefore, we try to develop a first organizational approach of the
French reality of its social microcredit landscape.
11. Lecture on macro level of the French social banking activities: the domestic social
microcredit.
During the current period of crisis, we have seen a significative growth of the number
of the allowed social microcredits in France (fig.1):
Figure 1. The increasing number of allowed social microcredits in France
number of social microcredits
8000
7000
6000
number of social 5000
microcredits per 4000
3000
year
2000
1000
0
number of social microcredits
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
year
Source: by author inspired by CDC Report (2011).
But, we can’t consider that this phenomena is only the consequence of the financial
and social crises due to the subprime one. Indeed, the French domestic experimentation has
begun since 2006. In other words, this endogenous growth is the result from the
institutionalized process of a new kind of social banking tool: the social banking principle
under state guarantee (domestic guaranteed funds which supplied by the French government
through the Social Cohesion Funds)3. With the underlying figure (fig.2), the percentage of
3
This Social Cohesion Funds (FCS) is under the responsibility of the French “Caisse des Dépôts et
Consignations (CDC).
3
claims (yellow curve) is growing, but not in the same trend that the number of social
microcredits:
Figure 2 Diachronic analysis of the growth of the guarantee, and, the
percentage of claims
14000
number or %
12000
11904
10000
8000
7499
6000
4000
4020
2000
0
1979
457
0
2006
1,16
2007
1,64
2008
2,29
2009
3,72
2010
Year
number of social microcredits
percentage of claims
Source: by author inspired by the statistics from CDC’s report (2011).
If we couldn’t explain the growth of Social Microcredits in France only by the period
of crisis which translates the current social banking exclusion, and the social overindebtedness increasing process. Therefore, we decide to compare the usings of social
microcredits between the aims consumer spending both in 2008 and 2011 (fig.3a and fig.3b):
Figure 3a – The aim usings of social microcredits in France, 2008.
4
Figure 3b Allocations from Social Microcredit in France, 31/12/2011 (CDC)
10%
1%
5%
employment and mobility
13%
housing
others
health
education
71%
Source: by author inspired by the statistics from CDC’s report (2011).
Under this indicator “allocations”, “employment and local mobility” is the first using
of social microcredit both in 2008 and 2011. But, the using to health expenditures appears as a
new one. This evidence fact means that we have now a larger vulnerability than three years
ago. In other words, not only we have a social banking needed expectation, but a social help
needed too. To explain this observation, we must consider a local scale territorialized level,
such as the French administrative regions (fig.4).
5
At this local territorialized scale, the west part of France became the more important
space of social microcredit experimentations (74%). Thus, the question of social and
geographic proximity takes an important meanings.
12- The micro level scale of the French social microcredit systems: the regionalized
approaches.
At the end of the Middle-Age (Fontaine 2008, p.164), religious communities
(Franciscains and Récollets) tried to promote “honest credit instead of gift” because, the
relationship with money access is less “hot” and less moral constrained than those which
comes from gifts. But, Microcredit is a fair banking credit (Glémain and Moulévrier, 2011).
Indeed, social microcredit is an individual lending in the house of consumption credits4 with a
time during, which is under 3 years and for a small amount of loan (Marchal and Poulon
1987, p. 353). But, more precisely, we are in face with a “social banking” activity with
Reifner (2000, p.200). This author gave the following definition: “social banking is a singular
form of banking-based supply, where actors are in strategic interaction with the social
consequences of their decisions”. In other words, “social banking” activity could be consider
as a social model of banking which are supplied by social banking organizations such as:
cooperative banks and in the French public pawnshops. In those one, the social return on
investment is more important than the financial and economic one. We can consider that this
social banking organizations are producing a kind of bio economy “not only to maintain the
optimal health status for the global society, but to get a real social sustainable development
for Humanity” (Martin-Pécheux 2008, p.51). In our capitalistic society, access to money
seems to be as important as to have blood for a body and this, in spite of social and local
currencies units which exist all over the world to sustain local and social exchanges. Those
social and local currencies units are not using in France for giving social microcredit to
people. Thus, “at the individual level, each one must have access to money to cover all his
needed” (Martin-Pécheux 2008, p.74). But, it is not the case because of the banking exclusion
in France despite on the generalized banked-based access to credit. Therefore, we must
consider the micro scale access to banking services to understand the fair value of the social
microcredit supply in France.
4
The “Lagarde’s Law” from July 2010. Miss Christine Lagarde was the French Ministry of Economy during this
period of time.
6
2 – Lectures on the local of bioeconomic model of social banking in the west region of
France (2005-2011).
We don’t consider here the whole of our first French FIMOSOL’s report, which wrote
in December 2010. This report gave us first results about the supply siders of social
microcredit in France, such as the French cooperatives banks like Savings or Mutual Banks
(“Caisse d’Epargne”, “Crédit Mutuel” and “Crédit Agricole”). But those cooperative and
mutual banks have not the leadership on the social microcredit market. The French
Pawnshops, which are considered as cooperative banks even if they have a local public status,
have the leadership in particular two of them: Paris’ pawnshop and Nantes’ pawnshops. We
have decided to study the Nantes’ pawnshop. Under an evidence based management research,
we are during this fieldwork the scientific coordinator under a research partnership
convention. The Nantes’s pawnshop is a good fieldwork because, it can be considered as a
social banking organizations which supplies two social microcredit tool:
the social
microcredit guaranteed by the local public administration on their own public funds (MPG-C),
and the social microcredit guaranteed by the Social Cohesion Funds (MPG-FCS) under the
responsibility of the “Caisse des Dépôts”. We have collected qualititive and quantitive data
about the bioeconomic model of social microcredit, which is sustained by the French
pawnshop as social banking organizations: the “Crédit Municipal of Nantes”.
21- The social microcredit under the public and local-based guarantee (MPG-C) in
Nantes5 : the local “Stability Loan”.
The local “Stability Loan” tool of social microcredit in Nantes is co-producing by the
“Crédit Muncipal of Nantes” (Nantes’ pawnshop) and by the local centre of social help
(Centre Communal d’Action Sociale). The social side of microcredit is under the
responsibility of the CCAS, and the financial side is under those of the Nantes’ pawnshop.
This MPG-C knew an important part of women (58.8% to compare with the 54% for the
French level). More of them are in couple (fig.5), and 41.2% had got one child at home. 7.7%
of them came from a foreign country. That fact means that “stability loan” is a solidaritybased social microcredit tool for people who are excluded from the French banking system,
and who are under the social following from the Social District Help Center (CCAS).
5
The “Crédit Municipal of Nantes” is at the 7th ranking in the French market of social microcredit (CDC, 2011).
We worked with a sample of 87 people who wanted an access to social microcredit.
7
Figure 5-
Situation m aritale des bénéficiaires en 2011 du
MPG collectivité (STAB) CMN-CCAS Nantes
18%
Couple
8%
Mar ié
Séparé
6%
68%
Divor cé
Source: inspiring Glémain (2011), FIMOSOL’s Final Research report for the General Direction of Social
Cohesion.
For sociologists, the first solidarity-based unit is the family. Therefore, we have
chosen the native place to appreciate the solidarity-base link through the distance between
their native place and the city of Nantes. Thus, 31% are coming from a french region which is
not a neighbouring of the region Pays-de-la-Loire (fig.6). That means either that Nantes’
public pawnshop could search recipients outside is natural branded territorialized area, or that
we have a significate mobility towards this region. But, under our status of scientific council,
we know that the Nantes’ pawnshop has an activity not only in Britain and Pays de la Loire,
but in the region Poitou-Charentes too. Therefore, this public social banking organization can
supply its “stability loan” credit tool in these several French regions. But, most of recipients
are coming from the city of Nantes (39%), as we can see in the following figure (fig.6):
8
Figure 6 Origine de naissance des bénéficiaires du MPG collectivité, en
2011, CMN-CCAS Nantes
10%
Nantes
39%
PaysdeLoire
Bretagne
31%
Autre Région
12%
8%
Etranger
Source : inspiring by Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-Final research Report for DGCS.
Recipients of social microcredit MPG-C (CMN-CCAS of Nantes) are aged under 45
years old (72%) (fig.7). Younger people who are less than 35 years old, know difficulties to
integrate the French labour market as outsiders, even if: 40% of them are unemployed (fig.8).
The other ones are either in a social revenue activity6 status or, are unemployed (38% of
them).
Figure 7Répartition des bénéficiaires du MPG collectivité (STAB) en 2011 par
classe d'âge, en 2011, CMN-CCAS Nantes
16%
41%
12%
[25-35[
[35-45[
[45-55[
[55 et plus
31%
Source : Inspiring by Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-Final research report for DGCS.
6
Social Revenue of Activity (RsA ) is a social income which take the place of the minimum integration income
(RMI), in the French social policies.
9
Figure 8Situation vis-à-vis de l'e m ploi de s bé né ficiaires du MPG
colle ctivité, e n 2011, CMN-CCAS Nante s
6%
SE
16%
32%
6%
CDI
CDD
rSa
Invalidité
18%
Retraite
22%
Source: inspired by Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-final research report for DGCS.
If 70% of people haven’t got any problem with their own bank thus because they are
not excluded from it, we can conclude that social microcredit tool is not only a potential to
reduce banking exclusion in France. Most of them are customers who come from cooperative
banks, such as: Crédit Mutuel-CIC (CM-CIC) (18%), or Savings Banks (4%), or Crédit
Agricole (Agricultural Credit Bank) (18%) (fig.10). This result is amazing because all those
cooperative bank groups have themselves a social microcredit programme under both their
own system of solidarity-based guarantee, and public guarantee funds-based system with the
“Caisse des Dépôts”.
Figure 9Ventilation par hébergement bancaire des bénéficiaires du
MPG Collectivité, en 2011, CMN-CCAS Nantes
BP
LCL
CM-CIC
6% 2%
18%
32%
CE
SG
BNP
4%
8%
4%
18%
8%
CA
BPA
CN
Legends: BP (banque postale), LCL, CM-CIC (groupe Crédit Mutuel-CIC), CE (Caisses d’épargne), SG (société
générale) ; BNP, CA (Crédit Agricole), BPA (banque populaire atlantique), CN (crédit du Nord).
Source: inspiring by.Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL- Final Research Rapport for DGCS.
10
To understand the using of social microcrédit « MPG-C », we have defined six
consumer spendings: employment and mobility, access to social housing, education, health,
and for “the others”: the domestic treasury. This one represents 82% of the total affectation of
the solidarity-based public guarantee (fig.10). We can conclude that those recipient people are
in a monetary disqualified status, which put them out of the money-flow access though credit.
Therefore, we can consider than social microcredit is a kind of social protection against credit
revolving demand. These credit revolving often lead poeple to social overlending situation.
Figure 10 Affectation du MPG collectivité par poste, en 2011, CMN-CCAS
Nantes
2%
2%
8%
4%
td
2%
tdi
tdl
tdm
logement
82%
santé
Légende : td( domestic treasury) ; tdi (domestic treasury and work integration), tdl ( domestic treasury and social
housing) , tdm (domestic treasury and mobility), tds ( domestic treasury and health access).
Source: inspiring by Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-Final Research Report for DGCS
Social Banking Organizations like the public French pawnshops, can be assimilate to
solidarity-based banks. Indeed, they appear like producers of social microcredit to struggle
against the domestic treasury disequilibrium, which incite them to demand revolving credit. It
seems to be the main role for the “stability loan” (the French social microcredit guaranteed by
the Nantes’ pawnshop itself). Which are the results for the national guarantee social-based
funds under the responsibility of “Caisse des Dépôts”?
11
22- The social microcredit under the national guarantee funds system: MPG-FCS in
Nantes.
The social guarantee funds system is more recent than the French pawnshop’s one.
Indeed, it was in experimentation since 2006 (1999 for the first one). Like with the first
model, more of the recipient poeple are in couple. But, in this model, we find a less part of
divorced or separated families, than in the “stability loan” model (fig.11).
Figure 11Ré partition par type de fam ille des bénéficiaires du MPG FCS,
e n 2011, CMN-CCAS Nantes
11%
6%
Couple
8%
Marié
Séparé
Divorcé
6%
69%
Veuf
Source : Inspiring by Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-Final Research Report for DGCS.
What is very significant for our sample is the native place indicator. 70% of recipient
people are coming from another country (39%), or from another French region (31%) (fig.12).
Social microcredit can appear like a new kind of social policy in the hands of social workers.
In other words, that means that social workers haven’t find another social help for themselves
near the social policy Institutions, such as: “honour lendings” from Family Insurance
Organization. In this case, guarantee funds-based social microcredit becomes an element of
the social side of the French microfinance, as we have demonstrated it (Glémain and Meyer,
2011).
12
Figure 12 R é p a r t i t i o n p a r o r i g i ne d e na i s s a nc e d e s b é né f i c i a i r e s
d u M P G F C S , e n 2 0 11, C M N - C C A S N a nt e s
19%
Nant es
39%
3%
Pay sdeLoi r e
Br et agne
8%
Aut r e Régi on
Et r anger
31%
Source: inspiring by P.Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-Final Research Report for DGCS.
In comparing with our theoretical statistics results, people who are in the national
guarantee funds-based model of social microcredit, are out of work (36%) or labour occupied
for 41% of them (fig.13). At the national level, the part of unemployed recipient poeple is
about 23.6%, and the part of them who are occuppied is about 36% (CDC, 2011). We have a
stylized fact: most of recipient of social microcredit are in a precarious status on the labour
market.
Figure 13 Situation vis-à-vis de l'em ploi des bénéficiaires du MPG FC, en
2011, CMN-CCAS Nantes
14%
SE
3%
36%
6%
CDI
CDD
rSa
19%
Invalidité
22%
Retraite
Source: Inspiring by Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL-Final Resarch Report for DGCS.
Most of them are customers from the « Banque Postale » (fig.14). This constatation
can be explain by the fact that recipient poeple are yet in social help eitheir with social action
towards them or, through the social activity revenue.
13
Figure 14 Ré par tition par hé bé r ge m e nt bancair e de s
bé né ficiair e s du M PG FCS, e n 2011, CM N-CCAS
Nante s
3%
BP
19%
28%
LCL
CM- CIC
CE
SG
6%
BNP
6%
8%
CA
11%
19%
BPA
Légende : BP (banque postale), LCL, CM-CIC (groupe Crédit Mutuel-CIC), CE (Caisses d’épargne), SG
(société générale) ; BNP, CA (Crédit Agricole), BPA (banque populaire atlantique), CN (crédit du Nord).
Source : Construction P.Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL, Rapport final DGCS.
If « domestic treasury » is the main affectation of this social microcredit model (43%)
(fig.15), the guarantee funds-based system can be characterised by the mobility expenditures
(17%), and the health expenditures (3%) that we haven’t found with the “stability loan” tool.
Several couple of expenditures are a mixt with domestic treasury and something else, such as:
domestic treasury and mobility (17%), for example.
Figure 15Affectation du MPG FCS, en 2011, CMN-CCAS Nantes
3%
11%
td
tdi
17%
43%
tdl
tdm
tds
mobilité
santé
6%
17%
0%
insertion
3%
Légende : td (trésorerie domestique) ; tdi (trésorerie et insertion), tdl (trésorerie et logement, tdm (trésorerie et
mobilité), tds ( trésorerie et santé).
Source : Construction P.Glémain 2011, FIMOSOL, Rapport final DGCS.
14
At the end of this exploratory analysis, we obtain two aim results:
-
The bundling solidarity-based supply of social microcredit, included MPG-C
(solidarity-based caution model) and MPG-FCS (guarantee funds-based model),
appears like a new tool of local social policy in a context of crisis;
-
The different idealtype of recipient people suppose that we can supply in each territory
the dual social microcredit model.
Social microcredit models in France, a banking tools in servicing social
cohesion policy: challenges and perspectives.
At the end of this first analysis, we have achieved two results. In one side, guarantee
social microcredit (MPG-C and MPG-FCS) which is either under the social caution (CS) or
under the guarantee funds (FG), can be considered through its “social mission” to supply
solidarity-based credit AND a social help from social banking organization: French public
pawnshops. Mixing social accompaniment AND banking operation of lending, it appears like
a socioeconomic issue both for the domestic treasury in order to escape to financial
disqualification (monetary and banking exclusion), and for the social rationality which
develop the trust in himself, and in our society in which they are evolving.
In the other side, guarantee social microcredit opens an important thinking about the
expenditures that they aren’t concerned with the official affectations. The Law would be
reconsidered in order to integrate the “domestic treasury” because over lending situations
could exist, and because the health care financing is shwing us a new dimension of the social
exclusion. It will depend on the extension of the “social side” of French microfinance, in face
with the “commercial side” which could be develop through an ethic-based banking model.
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théorique et empirique d’une activité pionnière de la microfinance », research paper
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FIMOSOL, 2011, A la recherche d’une modélisation de la fonction accompagnement et des
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Marchal J, Poulon F, 1987, Monnaie et crédit dans l’économie française. Paris, CUJAS.
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16
Rey J-M, 2002, Le temps du crédit. Paris, Desclée de Brouwer.
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Annexe 1 – The co-production of social microcredit by Crédit Municipal and CCAS.
Caisse des
Dépôts
Ville de Nantes
Ville d’Angers
1
2
2
CREDIT
MUNICIPAL
DE NANTES
Zone
d’expérimentation
du microcrédit
social
3
3
CCAS
Angers
CCAS Nantes
5
4
4
Bénéficiaires
effectifs ou
potentiels du
MCS Nantes
Bénéficiaires
effectifs ou
potentiels du
MCS Angers
6
Zone
d’exclusion
bancaire par
multi
endettement
(dont crédit
revolving).
Absence de
fichage FCC ou
FICP.
Multi endettement
credit revolving
ou
7
Crédit Agricole
SA :
Sofinco,
Finaref
Groupe Crédit
Mutuel :
Crefidis,
Financo,
Sofemo
Groupe
Banques
Populaires :
Novacrédit
(avec
Cetelem)
Groupe Caisse
d’Epargne :
CEFI (dont 33%
du capital pour
Cetelem)
BNP-Paribas (actionnaire de) : Cofidis, Laser-Cofinoga
Source : P.Glémain, rapport d’étape FIMOSOL au HCSA-DIIESES, décembre 2008.
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[1] The « Caisse des Dépôts » is the manager of the Social Cohesion Funds. This means that
« Crédit Municipal » (public credit and social help bank) can supply the guarantee fundsbased social microcredit (during the period 2006-2012)
[2] Angers and Nantes cities through their urban social policies are promoting this singular
way of social help.
[3] The Local Social Action Center (CCAS) make the social ingeneering part of social
microcredit function of production.
[4] Social workers can leave people who know a certain kind of demestic problem towards
social microcredit process.
[5] One upon the official banking exclusion near the « Banque de France) (fichages: FICP,
FCC) was verifies, thus the Crédit Municipal gives guarantee funds-based social microcredit
service.
[6] Among 80% of overlending status, we are in face with credits revolving. But, if they can’t
be in the “FCS” system, we find some of them in the solidarity-based caution model (MPGC).
[7] In their own banking group, cooperative banks have credit revolving products in their
production game.
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