on track - Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Transcription

ON TRACK
SPRING / PRINTEMPS 2009
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1
Canada-US Defence Relations After the
Obama Visit
It Didn’t Have to Be This Way
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan - Then, Now and
Beyond
The Impact of Missile Defence on China’s
“Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear Posture
Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan
Canadian Forces photo by / Photo Forces canadienne par Vic Johnson
DONOR PATRONS of the CDA INSTITUTE DONATEUR PATRONS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD
Mr. Keith P. Ambachtsheer
Dr. John Scott Cowan
Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Roger Girouard
Jackman Foundation (1964)
Brigadier-General (Ret’d) Don W. Macnamara
Mr. David Scott
COMPANIONS of the CDA INSTITUTE
Admiral (Ret’d) John Anderson
Mr. M. Corbett
Brigadier-General (Ret’d) James S. Cox
Colonel (Ret’d) Douglas A. Fraser
General (Ret’d) Paul D. Manson
Royal Military College Club of Canada Foundation
Brigadier-General (Ret’d) T.H.M. Silva
Mr. Robert G.Tucker
Colonel (Ret’d) John Catto
Colonel The Hon. John Fraser
Dr. J.L. Granatstein
Senator Colin Kenny
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Morrison
Senator Hugh D. Segal
COMPAGNONS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD
Mr. Paul Chapin
Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) L.W.F. Cuppens
Mr. John A. Eckersley
Major-General (Ret’d) Reginald W. Lewis
Colonel (Ret’d) Gary Rice
Colonel (Ret’d) Ben Shapiro
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Ernest Skutezky
Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Jack Vance
OFFICER LEVEL DONORS to the CDA INSTITUTE DONATEURS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD - NIVEAU d’OFFICIER
Major-général (Ret) Clive Addy
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile
Mr. Paul Brunelle
Honourary Colonel Bernard J. Finestone
Mr. Ian D. Isbester
Colonel (Ret’d) Charles R. Keple
Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) William Leach
Lieutenant-Colonel Markus C. Martin
Colonel (Ret’d) William McCullough
Colonel (Ret’d) Conrad A. Namiesniowski
The Hon. David Pratt
Major (Ret’d) John W. Richmond
Major (Ret’t) Miroslaw Szulc
Lieutenant-Commander Arnold R. Westerbert
Brigadier-General (Ret’d) W. Yost
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) J.A. Bélanger
Breakout Educational Network
Honourary Colonel James Burns
Honourary Colonel Blake Goldring
Colonel (Ret’d) The Hon. R.A. Jacobson
Mr. Albert Kranenburg
Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald
The Hon. Dwight Mason
Colonel (Ret’d) Donald Bruce McGibbon
Captain (N) (Ret’d) Charles M. Nicholson
Major (Ret’d) Angus V. Read
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) David L. Stinson
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret) Lucien Villeneuve
General (Ret’d) Ramsey Withers
Mr. W. H. Young
ON TRACK
contents
contenu
VOLUME 14 NUMBER 1
SPRING / PRINTEMPS
PRESIDENT PRÉSIDENT
Dr. John Scott Cowan, BSc, MSc, PhD
From the Executive Director...................................................4
Colonel (Ret’d) Alain Pellerin
Le mot du Directeur général...................................................4
Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin
Summary of the CDA Institute’s 25th Annual Seminar
and the 72nd Annual General Meeting of the CDA..10
Canada-US Defence Relations After the Obama Visit ........18
Paul H. Chapin
It Didn’t Have to Be This Way...............................................20
Colonel George Petrolekas
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan Then, Now, and Beyond...........................................17
Lieutenant-général Michel Gauthier
Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan..........27
Roy Thomas
Un dernier tour de piste à Fort Bliss.....................................32
Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gilles Paradis et
Leutenant-colonel (Ret) Raymond Taillefer
Dealing with Islamism...........................................................36
General (Ret’d) Paul Manson
Employer Support................................................................38
Jayson Spiegel
Onward Christian Soldiers?.................................................43
Anne Frances Cation
White Phosphorous in Gaza New Accusations of War Crimes..............................44
The Impact of Missile Defence on China’s
“Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear Posture...................45
Thomas Adams
R2P as a Doctrine................................................................47
Eric Morse
Book Reviews.............................................................49
VICE PRESIDENT VICE PRÉSIDENT
General (Ret’d) John de Chastelain, OC, CMM, CD
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL
Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD
SECRETARY-TREASURER SECRÉTAIRE TRÉSORIER
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Gordon D. Metcalfe, CD
HONOURARY COUNSEL
Mr. Gavin Freitag
PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELATIONS PUBLIQUES
Captain (Ret’d) Peter Forsberg, CD
PROJECT OFFICER AGENT DE PROJET
Ms. Bonnie Butlin, MA
SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICER
Mr. Arnav Manchanda, MA
Conference of Defence Associations Institute
222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B
Ottawa ON K2P 2G3
PHONE TÉLÉPHONE
(613) 236 9903
e-mail courriel: [email protected]
website site web: www.cda-cdai.ca
ON TRACK is published by the Conference of Defence
Associations Institute (CDA Institute). The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute
ON TRACK est publié par l’Institut de la Conférence des
associations de la défense (l’Institut de la CAD). Les points
de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des
auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l’Institut de la CAD.
Copyright © 2008. ISSN 1916-6699 ON TRACK (Print)
(imprimé)
Copyright © 2008. ISSN 1916-6702 ON TRACK (Online)
(en ligne)
Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from ON TRACK.
A credit line is desired. For inquiries contact the Public Affairs Officer, Captain (Ret’d) Peter Forsberg, CD , at: (tel) (613)
236 9903; (fax)
(613) 236 8191; (e-mail) [email protected].
Permission est accordée de reproduire en tout ou en partie des articles de ON
TRACK. Nous souhaitons que la source soit mentionnée. Pour demander des renseignements, contactez l’agent des affaires publiques, le Capitaine (ret.) Peter Forsberg, CD au (tél) 613-236-9903; (fax) 613-236-8191; (courriel) [email protected]
COVER PHOTO: A CH-147 Chinook helicopter
prepares to sling bridge segments during a combat engineering exercise at Camp Wainwright
AB. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Un
hélicoptère Chinook ch-147 se prépare à élinguer des segments de pont pendant un exercice
d’ingénierie de combat au Camp Wainwright AB.
ON TRACK
FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
We are pleased to begin the 14th
MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL
C’est
avec plaisir que nous
commençons la 14ème année de publication
year of publication of the CDA Institute’s
de ON TRACK, la publication de l’Institut
ON TRACK. The quarterly journal is
de la CAD. Cette revue trimestrielle est un
an important vehicle through which the
important véhicule grâce auquel l’Institut
Institute contributes significant value to the
apporte une valeur significative à la discussion
discussion of defence and security issues in
des questions de défense et de sécurité au
Canada, with the presentation of excellent
Canada, avec la présentation d’excellents
articles by experts in those fields.
articles rédigés par des experts de ces
Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD domaines.
Dans la présente édition de ON
We feature in this edition of ON TRACK
TRACK nous présentons des articles de grande actualité,
articles of current significance in the areas of, among
notamment dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité
others, national defence and security, Canada-U.S.
nationale, des relations Canada-U.S., de l’Afghanistan,
relations, Afghanistan, Islamism, the Chinese concept
du concept chinois de défense minimum, des munitions
of minimum defence, artillery ammunition, and U.S.
d’artillerie et du soutien aux employeurs des États-Unis.
employer support.
Il est remarquable qu’Ottawa ait été la première
It is noteworthy that Ottawa was the first foreign
capitale étrangère à être visitée pae le président des Étatscapital to be visited by the U.S. President soon following
Unis, tôt après son élection. Paul Chapin écrit, dans
his election. Paul Chapin writes, in ‘Canada-US Defence
« Canada-US Defence Relations After the Obama Visit »,
Relations After the Obama Visit’, that President Obama’s
que la visite du Président Obama à Ottawa fut un triomphe
visit to Ottawa was a policy triumph for Canada. He
politique d’Ottawa. Il donne une analyse de l’importance
provides an analysis of the importance of Canada’s
des relations du Canada avec les États-Unis. M. Chapin
relations with the United States. Mr. Chapin is a research
est associé de recherche aux Defence Management Studies
associate with Defence Management Studies at the School
de la School of Policy Studies de l’Université Queen’s et
of Policy Studies at Queen’s University, and is a Member
un des directeurs de l’Institut de la CAD.
of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.
Le Colonel George Petrolekas note que, en
Colonel George Petrolekas notes that in
Afghanistan, des décisions mal mûries prises il y a
Afghanistan ill-considered decisions long ago have come
longtemps sont revenues nous hanter. Dans « It didn’t
back to haunt us. In ’It didn’t Have to be this way’ Colonel
Have to be this way », le Colonel Petrolekas examine en
Petrolekas details the policy decisions and their outcome.
détail les décisions en matière de politiques et ce à quoi
He concludes that the time for blame is past now; it is
elles ont abouti. Il conclut que le moment est maintenant
how we apply our lessons going forward that is of import
passé de distribuer les reproches et que, ce qui importe
now.
maintenant, c’est la façon dont nous appliquons les leçons
que nous avons apprises, au moment où il faut aller de
l’avant.
La mission des Forces canadiennes en
The Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan
Afghanistan exige un niveau de coordination et de
demands a far greater level of coordination and cohesion
cohésion beaucoup plus élevé qu’auparavant entre les
among stakeholder agencies of Government than ever
organismes gouvernementaux qui y ont partie prenante. Le
before. Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier provides an
Lieutenant-Général Michel Gauthier présente un aperçu
overview of the extent of the CF’s presence in the Afghan
d’ensemble de l’étendue de la présence des FC dans le
theatre from early 2002 to today, and notes, in ‘Canadian
théâtre afghan, depuis le début de 2002 à aujourd’hui, et
Forces in Afghanistan – Then, Now, and Beyond’, the
il note, dans « Canadian Forces in Afghanistan – Then,
influences that will bear on the CF’s military emphasis.
Now, and Beyond », les influences qui auront un effet sur
Lieutenant-General Gauthier is the Commander Canadian
l’emphase militaire accordée par les FC. Le LieutenantExpeditionary Force Command.
Général Gauthier est commandant du Commandement de
la Force expéditionnaire du Canada.
4
PROMOTING INFORMED PUBLIC DEBATE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
PROMOUVOIR UN DÉBAT PUBLIC ÉCLAIRÉ SUR
LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA DÉFENSE NATIONALES
ON TRACK
One Canadian initiative of which we should be
proud was the creation by the Canadian Forces (CF) of
the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A).
While there has been debate in some quarters regarding
the appropriateness of the SAT-A operating under the
leadership of the CF which resulted in its closure,
Roy Thomas provides a historical overview of the
circumstances which led to the creation of the SAT-A in
‘Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan’.
Last January and February, some 3,000 soldiers,
mostly from Canadian Forces Base Valcartier who form the
current operational task force in Afghanistan, underwent
training in Fort Bliss, Texas, in conditions similar to those
they will face in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d)
Gilles Paradis reports on his visit to observe the troops in
training, in ‘Un dernier tour de piste à Fort Bliss’.
We wonder to what extent is the Islamists’
radical view of the world representative of the thinking
of mainstream Islam. General (Ret’d) Paul Manson
provides us with some thought on this challenging issue,
in ‘Dealing with Islamism’. General (Ret’d) Manson is a
former President of the CDA Institute and is a Member of
the Institute’s Board of Directors.
Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director of the
Reserve Officers Association of the United States, outlines
the challenges that both reservists and business are facing
in the United States, in ‘Employer Support’. While Mr.
Spiegel’s provides us with an informed analysis of those
challenges that are extensive in the United States, a not
dissimilar situation has slowly begun to occur in Canada.
We are reminded that “there are no atheists in
a foxhole” in Anne Frances Cation’s article, ‘Onward
Christian Soldiers?’ Anne outlines the mission of the
military’s chaplaincy and provides an overview of the
work of our chaplains. Ms. Cation is an Associate at the
Canadian International Council.
We have seen the published Agence France
Presse photo of a number of white phosphorous pads from
an M875 A1 round falling into a United Nations school
in Beit Lahia, Gaza. Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald
provides us with a review of the development and use of
smoke ammunition in, ‘White Phosphorous in Gaza – New
Accusations of War Crimes’. Colonel (Ret’d) MacDonald
is CDA Senior Defence Analyst and Member of the Board
of Directors of the CDA Institute.
Thomas Adams writes, in ‘The Impact of Missile Defence
on China’s “Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear Posture’,
Une initiative canadienne dont nous devrions être
fiers, ce fut la création, par les Forces canadiennes, de
l’Équipe consultative stratégique - Afghanistan (ECS-A).
Malgré qu’il y ait eu dans certains lieux un débat
concernant l’à-propos du fonctionnement de l’ECS-A
sous le leadership des FC, qui a abouti à sa fermeture,
Roy Thomas nous donne, dans son article « Origins of
the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan », un aperçu
historique des circonstances qui ont mené à la création de
l’ESC-A.
En janvier et février, quelque 3 000 soldats, la
plupart de la Base des Forces canadiennes Valcartier, qui
forment la force opérationnelle présente en Afghanistan,
ont fait de l’entraînement au Fort Bliss (Texas), dans des
conditions semblables à celles auxquelles ils vont faire
face en Afghanistan. Dans « Un dernier tour de piste à
Fort Bliss », le Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gilles Paradis
fait rapport de sa visite d’observation des troupes à
l’entraînement.
Nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure le point
de vue des islamistes sur le monde est représentatif de la
pensée de l’Islam de tout le monde. Le Général (ret.) Paul
Manson nous livre quelques réflexions sur ce problème
difficile dans son article « Dealing with Islamism ». Le
Général (ret.) Manson est un ancien président de l’Institut
de la CAD et un des directeurs de l’Institut de la CAD.
Dans son article « Employer Support », Jayson
Spiegel, ancien directeur général de la Reserve Officers
Association of the United States, décrit les défis que les
réservistes aussi bien que les entreprises doivent affronter
aux États-Unis. Même si M. Spiegel nous donne une
analyse informée de défis qui sont répandus aux ÉtatsUnis, il commence à se produire au Canada une situation
qui n’est pas sans ressembler à la situation américaine.
« Il n’y a pas d’athées dans un trou de tirailleur »,
nous rappelle-t-on dans l’article d’Anne Frances Cation
intitulé « Onward Christain Soldiers ? » Anne décrit la
mission de l’aumônier militaire et donne un aperçu du
travail de nos aumôniers. Mlle Cation est « associée » au
Conseil international du Canada.
Nous avons vu la photo publiée par l’Agence
France Presse, d’un certain nombre de plaquettes
blanches phosphoreuses provenant d’une ronde de M875
A1 tombant dans une école des Nations Unies à Beit
Lahia (Gaza). Le Colonel (Ret) Brian MacDonald nous
donne une revue du développement et de l’utilisation des
munitions fumigènes dans « White Phosphorous in Gaza
– New Accusations of War Crimes ». Le Colonel (Ret)
MacDonald est l’analyste principal de la défense de la
CAD et un des directeurs de l’Institut de la CAD.
Thomas Adams écrit, dans « The Impact of Missile
Defence on China’s “Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear
5
ON TRACK
that some analysts have suggested that ballistic missile
defence will lead to a shift in China’s nuclear doctrine
of “minimum deterrence” with corresponding increases
in its strategic nuclear forces. He challenges this analysis.
Thomas is the Strategic Studies Officer at the Canadian
International Council.
In ‘R2P as a doctrine’ Eric Morse writes
that two of the sustaining myths of Canada’s perception of
itself in the world are our history and role as peacekeepers
and our adherence to ‘soft power’ in conflict prevention
and resolution. To this is now added the new concept of
Responsibility to Protect. Eric provides a critical analysis
of the concept. Eric is the Director of Communications
of the Royal Canadian Military Institute and is a former
officer of the Canadian Foreign Service.
Arnav Manchanda reviews Sally Armstrong’s
book, ‘Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate
of Afghanistan’s Women’, which outlines the progress
made in women’s rights in post-Taliban Afghanistan and
the threats posed to that progress by retrograde elements
in society and by insecurity. Arnav Manchanda is the new
CDA Defence Policy Analyst.
Ms Bonnie Butlin reviews Dr. David Bercuson’s
book, ‘The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History
from New France to Afghanistan’. Bonnie notes that
Bercuson’s book introduces three important lines of
discussion in Canada which she outlines in her review.
Ms. Butlin is a Department of National Defence Security
and Defence Forum (SDF) Intern, employed as the Project
Officer with the CDA Institute.
Dr. David Anido has provided a review of the
book, ‘The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to
9/11’, written by Lawrence Wright. David writes that the
“road” in the book’s title refers to the five-decade span of
detailed and broad analysis as to how Osama Bin-Laden
became a cave-dwelling terrorist. Dr. Anido is a Member
of the Board of Directors of the CDAI.
Our 25th Annual Seminar was held on the 26th of
February. Its theme, Canada-U.S. Relations – the Security
Dimension, was a timely one, given the recent changes of
Government in Canada and the United States. The Ballroom
of the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar
was held, was filed to capacity. The luncheon address was
given by Senator Hugh Segal. We heard presentations
given by the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister
of Foreign Affairs; General (Ret’d) Raymond Henault,
former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO;
Dr. Mark Katz, George Mason University, Washington,
D.C.; Mr. Michael Hart, Simon Riesman Professor of
Trade Policy, Carleton University; Dr. Joseph Jockel,
6
Posture’, que certains analystes ont suggéré que la défense
antimissile balistiques va mener à un déplacement de la
doctrine nucléaire de « dissuasion minimum » de la Chine
avec une augmentation correspondante dans ses forces
nucléaires stratégiques. Il conteste cette analyse. Thomas
est agent d’études stratégiques au Conseil international du
Canada.
Dans « R2P as a doctrine ». Eric Morse écrit que
deux des mythes soutenant la perception que le Canada a
de lui-même dans le monde sont notre histoire et notre rôle
comme soldats du maintien de la paix et notre adhésion
au « soft power » dans la prévention et la résolution de
conflits. À cela s’ajoute maintenant le nouveau concept de
la « responsabilité de protéger ». Eric donne une analyse
critique du concept. Il est directeur des communications
du Royal Canadian Military Institute et est un ancien
functionnaire au Ministère des affaires extérieures.
Arnav Manchanda nous donne un compte rendu
du livre de Sally Armstrong, « Bitter Roots, Tender
Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan’s Women »,
qui décrit le progrès fait dans les droits des femmes dans
l’Afghanistan d’après les Talibans et les menaces que
posent à ce progrès les éléments rétrogrades de la société
et l’insécurité. Arnav Manchanda est le nouvel analyste
des politiques de défense de la CAD.
Mme Bonnie Butlin a lu le livre de David
Bercuson, « The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental
History from New France to Afghanistan ». Bonnie note
que le livre de M. Bercuson introduit trois nouveaux
volets de discussion importants au Canada, qu’elle décrit
dans son compte rendu.
M. David Anido nous donne un compte rendu du
livre « The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to
9/11 », de Lawrence Wright. David écrit que « the Road »,
dans le titre du livre, c’est la période de cinq ans d’analyse
détaillée et large de la façon dont Osama Bin-Laden est
devenu un terroriste qui se terre dans une caverne. M.
Anido est un des directeurs de l’Institut de la CAD.
Notre 25ème séminaire annuel s’est tenu le 26
février. Son thème, Les Relations Canada-États-Unis
– la dimension de la sécurité, ne pouvait mieux tomber,
étant donné les récents changements de gouvernements
au Canada et aux États-Unis. La Salle de bal du Fairmont
Château Laurier, où s’est tenu le séminaire, était remplie
à capacité. La conférence du déjeuner a été donnée
par le Sénateur Hugh Segal. Nous avons entendu des
présentations de l’Honorable Lawrence Cannon, ministre
des Affaires étrangères, du Général (ret.) Raymond
Henault, ancien président du Comité militaire de
l’OTAN, de M. Mark Katz, de George Mason University,
Washington (D.C.), de M. Michael Hart, Simon Riesman
ON TRACK
Professor and Director, Canadian Studies Programme, St.
Lawrence University; Colonel John Blaxland, Defence
Attaché, Australian Embassy, Thailand; Dr. Jim Boutilier,
Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor, Maritime Forces Pacific;
Dr. Norman Friedman; Commander James Kraska, U.S.
Naval War College; and Mr. Rafal Rohozinski, the SecDev Group.
Professor of Trade Policy de l’Université Carleton, de M.
Joseph Jockel, professeur et directeur du Canadian Studies
Programme, St. Lawrence University, du Colonel John
Blaxland, attaché de défense, Ambassade de l’Australie,
Thailande, de M. Jim Boutilier, conseiller en matière
de politiques pour l’Asie-Pacifique, Forces maritimes
du Pacifique, de M. Norman Friedman, du Commander
James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College, et de M. Rafal
Rohozinski, du Sec-Dev Group.
There was significant media interest in the
seminar, at which simultaneous interpretation was
provided. I am pleased to note the very positive feedback
we have received.
The seminar was attended by members of the
Canadian Forces, Ambassadors, Senators and MPs,
military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military
College of Canada and from Collège militaire royal de
Saint-Jean, and members of the Canadian public. The day
was filled with speakers from across Canada, Australia,
and the United States.
Electronic copies of the addresses that were
delivered at the seminar are available at http://www.cdacdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm.
The conference, continuing on 27 February, was
held in conjunction with the 72nd annual general meeting of
the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA). Addresses
included those of the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister
of National Defence; General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of
the Defence Staff; General James Mattis, NATO Supreme
Allied Commander, Transformation; General Victor E.
Renuart, Jr., Commander NORAD/US NORTHCOM;
Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land
Staff; Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the
Maritime Staff; and Lieutenant-General Angus Watt,
Chief of the Air Staff.
Le séminaire, doté d’un service d’interprétation
simultanée, a soulevé un grand intérêt chez les médias.
J’ai le plaisir de noter les commentaires très positifs que
nous avons reçus.
Assistaient au séminaire des membres des Forces
canadiennes, des ambassadeurs, des sénateurs et des
députés, des attachés militaires, des cadets-officiers du
Royal Military College of Canada et du Collège militaire
royal de Saint-Jean et des membres du public canadien.
La journée a été remplie de conférenciers du Canada, de
l’Australie et des États-Unis.
Des copies électroniques des conférences
prononcées lors du séminaire sont disponibles à l’adresse
http://www.cda-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm.
Le séminaire a enchaîné,le 27 février, sur la
72ème assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence
des associations de la Défense (CAD). Des allocutions
furent prononcées par l’Honorable Peter MacKay,
ministre de la Défense nationale, le Général Walter
Natynczyk, chef d’état-major de la Défense, le Général
James Mattis, commandant suprême des Forces alliées de
l’OTAN, Transformation, le Général Victor E. Renuart,
Jr., commandant de NORAD/US NORTHCOM, le
Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie, chef d’état-major de
l’Armée de terre, le Vice-Amiral Drew Robertson, chef
d’état-major de la Force maritime, et le Lieutenant-Général
Angus Watt, chef d’état-major de la Force aérienne.
Le séminaire annuel et l’AGA ont tous deux été
une vraie réussite, qui a été le reflet de l’intérêt accru du
public envers le rôle que joue le Canada dans les domaines
de la sécurité internationale et de la défense nationale.
Notre analyste principal de la défense, le Colonel (ret.)
Brian MacDonald, présente un sommaire des délibérations
dans le présent numéro de ON TRACK.
La présence de si nombreux conférenciers de tous
les points du globe a été rendue possible grâce à l’aide
financière de General Dynamics Canada, de General
Dynamics Land Systems – Canada, de Pratt & Whitney
Canada, d’ATCO Frontec, de l’Organisation du Traité
de l’Atlantique Nord, de ADGA Group Consultants, de
Boeing, du programme Forum sur la sécurité et la défense
du ministère de la Défense nationale, de Bombardier, ainsi
que du département des Defence Management Studies de
Both the annual seminar and the AGM were truly
successful, reflecting the general public’s heightened
interest in Canada’s role in international security and
national defence. Our Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel
(Ret’d) Brian MacDonald, presents a summary of the
proceedings in this edition of ON TRACK.
The presence of so many speakers form around the
world was made possible through the financial assistance
of General Dynamics Canada, General Dynamics Land
Systems – Canada, Pratt & Whitney Canada, ATCO
Frontec, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ADGA
Group Consultants, Boeing, the Security and Defence
Forum programme of the Department of National
Defence, Bombardier, and Defence Management Studies
department of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s
7
ON TRACK
University. Coffee for the seminar was generously
provided by CSMG of Ottawa. Following the conclusion
of the seminar General Dynamics Canada graciously
hosted a reception for the attendees.
One of the major events in the CDA Institute’s
calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to
one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding
contribution to the defence and security of our nation and
the preservation of our democratic values. Last year’s
programme was an outstanding success, with a record
number of excellent submissions that were considered by
the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme
culminated with the presentation of the Award to General
(Ret’d) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff, by
the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice
of Canada, before some 630 guests at a formal dinner in
the Canadian War Museum.
This year’s presentation of the Vimy Award will
take place on 20 November at a gala reception and dinner,
again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award
truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for
this year’s recipient. While we have already received a
number of nominations, CDA member associations as
well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations
for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for
nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go
on line at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/2008%20
Award/vimycall09.htm.
The Ross Munro Media Award will also be
presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award
for 2008 was Monsieur Alec Castonguay, of Le Devoir
and of L’Actualité. This prestigious award, launched
in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence &
Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), will be presented
to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant
contribution to the understanding by the public of defence
and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes
with a cash prize of $2,500. The notice of the call for
nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and
on our website at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20
Award/munro_media_award_main.htm.
Both programmes last year were outstanding
successes. I am pleased to report that support for the
programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is
very encouraging.
Within the past year the federal government has
provided Canada’s citizens with a focus on the defence
and security needs of this country. While we welcome
such an initiative, there still exist elements within
8
la the School of Policy Studies de l’Université Queen’s.
Le café pour le séminaire a été généreusement fourni par
CSMG d’Ottawa. Suite à la conclusion du séminaire,
General Dynamics Canada a gracieusement offert une
réception à l’intention des personnes présentes.
Une des activités majeures du calendrier de
l’Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix
Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une
contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense
et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos
valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l’an passé a
connu un succès retentissant, avec un nombre record
d’excellentes candidatures qui ont été considérées par le
comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a eu
son point culminant avec la remise du prix au Général
(ret.) Rick Hillier, ancien chef d’état-major de la Défense,
par la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, Juge en chef
du Canada, devant les 630 invités d’un dîner formel au
Musée canadien de la guerre.
Cette année, la présentation du Prix Vimy aura
lieu le 20 novembre au cours d’une réception et d’un dîner
de gala qui se tiendront à nouveau au Musée canadien de
la guerre. Pour que le prix ait vraiment une signification,
l’Institut a besoin de vos candidatures pour désigner le
récipiendaire de cette année. Même si nous avons déjà
reçu un certain nombre de mises en candidature, les
associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les individus
sont encouragés à nous faire parvenir les dossiers de leurs
candidats. Reportez-vous à l’avis d’appel de candidatures
qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro et allez en ligne à
l’adresse http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/2008%20
Award/vimycall09.htm.
Ce prix prestigieux, lancé en 2002 en collaboration
avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
(CDFAI), sera remis à un ou une journaliste canadien qui
a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension
par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité qui
touchent le Canada. Le prix s’accompagne d’un prix en
argent de 2 500 $. L’avis d’appel de candidatures paraît
aussi dans ce numéro et sur notre site Web, à http://www.
cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/munro_media_award_
main.htm.
Les deux programmes ont connu un succès
retentissant l’an dernier. J’ai le plaisir de dire que l’appui
accordé à ces programmes par l’industrie canadienne et
les particuliers est très encourageant.
Au cours de la dernière année, le gouvernement
fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur
les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité.
Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à une telle initiative,
ON TRACK
Canadian society who are not well informed on the major
issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment
for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in
the resources that are required to address long-standing
defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA
Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians
with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact
on the defence and security of this country.
In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors,
particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level
donors for their financial support for the work of the
CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed
to fulfill our mandate. If you are not already a donor to
the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and
recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page
of this journal and are available on line at http://cda-cdai.
ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm.
il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne
qui ne sont pas bien informés sur les enjeux majeurs des
opérations militaires, de l’acquisition d’équipement pour
les FC et des pénuries continues dans les ressources qui
sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins à long terme
de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Mais
l’Institut de la CAD va continuer à offrir aux Canadiens
une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui
ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays.
En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs,
particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patrons,
compagnons et officiers, pour l’appui financier qu’ils
accordent au travail de l’Institut de la CAD, ce qui nous
permet de réaliser notre mission. Si vous n’êtes pas déjà
un donateur à l’Institut de la CAD, je vous inviterais à
le devenir et à recruter un/e ami/e. Les formulaires de
donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal
et on peut aussi se les procurer en ligne à l’adresse http://
cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm.
Merci. ©
Thank you. ©
Warrant Officer Stéphane Grenier, R22eR,
was recently decorated with the Medal
of Military Valour (MMV), for his valiant
conduct when his Section was ambushed
in Afghanistan and received heavy fire from
insurgents. He exposed himself to great peril
when he engaged the enemy to rescue and
evacuate two wounded soldiers. The Chief of
the Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk,
recognized and thanked Warrant Officer
Grenier and other Members of the Canadian
Forces for their service to Canada, during the
annual general meeting of the Conference of
Defence Associations.
L’Adjudant Stéphane Grenier, R22eR,
a récemment été décoré de la Médaille
de la vaillance militaire (MVM) pour sa
vaillante conduite quand sa section a été
prise en embuscade en Afghanistan et s’est
retrouvée sous un tir nourri des troupes de
l’insurrection. Il s’est exposé à un grand péril
quand il a engagé l’ennemi pour rescaper et
évacuer les soldats blessés. À l’occasion
de l’assemblée générale annuelle de la
Conférence des associations de la défense, le
Chef d’état-major de la Défense, le Général
Walter Natynczyk, a reconnu et remercié
l’Adjudant Grenier et d’autres membres des
Forces canadiennes pour les services qu’ils
ont rendus au Canada.
Photo by / Photo par Gord Metcalfe
9
ON TRACK
Summary of CDA Institute 25th Annual Seminar and
72nd CDA AGM
26-27 February 2009, Ottawa
by Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald
Day 1: Canada-US Relations –
The Security Dimension
Keynote Address
The
Hon
Lawrence
Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
began with a quick review of the
discussions between President Obama and Prime Minister
Harper in which President Obama informed the Prime
Minister of the ways in which he saw US foreign policy
would change in order to emphasize a new multilateralism,
a new approach to Afghanistan, and an emphasis upon
“smart power.” He then spoke of the priorities of Canadian
foreign policy with particular emphasis on the Canada/
US continental bi-lateral, which would see US/Canada
cooperation along the defence, security, and economic
dimensions and the need to maintain an “open border,”
one open to trade but closed to crime and terrorism.
A second priority was that of the Canadian Arctic,
and mentioned meetings with the Arctic Council which
saw Canada as an Arctic power with special interests in
Arctic resources, climate change, security, and sovereignty
and the purchase of new Arctic Patrol Ships and a heavy
ice-breaker as important facets of that policy.
Other priority areas included cooperation with
the US in the G8 discussions and actions against terrorism
and the existence of international crime, as well as shared
security interests including the protection of North
America. Canada would continue cooperation with NATO
with a particular emphasis on burden-sharing.
In Afghanistan Canada would continue to focus on
security, the training of Afghan National Army elements,
and development and governance, all of which would
see a stronger Canadian civilian presence than before. In
addition Canada would remain engaged in hemispheric
matters including the 5th Summit of the Americas this fall,
as well as contributions to non-proliferation, arms control
Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald is Senior Defence Analyst,
Conference of Defence Associations, and Member of the Board
of Directors of the CDA Institute
10
and disarmament including the 2020 Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review.
Special Address: “NATO at 60 from a Military
Perspective”
General (Ret’d) Ray Henault, former Chair of
the NATO Military Committee, dealt with three themes:
NATO’s expanding operations, the process of improving
capabilities, and the development of partnership
opportunities.
He spoke of the increases and number of taskings
in “out of area” roles and contingency operations and the
practical problems of coordinating the activities of 26 (soon
to be 28) nations, particularly while having to deal with
the modernization of forces and development of multinational forces, especially when the NATO operational
tempo conflicted with NATO Transformation’s agenda in
the competition for limited national resources.
The European members of NATO have found the
shift from operations in Europe to “out of area” operations
problematic especially with respect to the availability of
strategic airlift, and NATO has responded through the
development of a force of shared C-17s. He mentioned
partnership activities which have included the Partnership
for Peace (including four states in Asia), the Mediterranean
Dialogue, as well as NATO/UN and NATO/EU relations,
and the Canadian interest in helping Ukraine.
Panel I – Canada-US Relations Under New
Administrations
Cross Border Economic Relations
Professor Michael Hart, Carleton University,
observed that the visit of President Obama had laid the
foundation for progress in the Canada/US relationship.
However, Professor Hart noted, there were still obstacles
to overcome.
ON TRACK
The global economic situation has no clear
solutions to inspire confidence since the problem has been
building over the last 10 years. While Canada is the best
positioned of all of the OECD states the situation in the
US will affect us given that cross-border trade amounts to
$2 billion every day.
Canada/US trade has been in trouble for the last
eight years. While the NAFTA impact had been completed
by 2000, the events of 2001 created a critical security
issue for the US and the border has become “thick” due to
the loss of American confidence in Canada as a security
partner. This is particularly problematic since our preNAFTA “trading relationship” has been replaced by an
integrated dual economy.
The auto industry is a key example of cross
border parts and assembly integration, with the average
auto “crossing the border” six times in its construction.
The “thickened border” is more costly for Canada than
for the US and the border is increasingly dysfunctional
with the number of new rules increasing. We need,
therefore, to rethink the border and its regulations to
determine whether they are really needed, to reform the
border decision processes, and to reduce the 240 informal
networks that have appeared.
American BMD. Without such a decision the future of
NORAD is obsolescence and termination, neither of
which is in Canada’s national security interest.
The Hon. Lawrence Cannon,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Photo by Gord Metcalfe
Continental Defence
Professor Joseph Jockel, St. Lawrence University,
is a long time analyst of US/Canada relations, and is no
stranger to the CDA. His remarks followed his previous
pattern of trenchant realism. His fundamental thesis
was that we have, with the new administration in the
US, a fleeting opening to save and restore NORAD, an
institution which is now in decline.
NORAD’s original role was the defence of North
America from an attack by Soviet bombers and evolved
to one of aerospace warning and defence as the USSR
shifted to ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile defence was
intended but the technology of the time was inadequate
to the task and the role was abandoned. Later, with
advances in technology, BMD became feasible and the
US deployed a limited system. Canada, under thenPrime Minister Martin, declined to participate and since
Canadian locations were not required for BMD interceptor
basing, the US transferred the tasking from NORAD to
USNORTHCOM. Since the two have overlapping roles
USNORTHCOM can handle the US air defence role
without the participation of NORAD and Canada, with
the result that there is a danger that USNORTHCOM and
NORAD will be split and NORAD allowed to disappear.
With the election of President Obama the antiBush feeling in Canada is gone and there is a narrow
window to rethink Canadian participation in North
Luncheon Speech: “Keeping Recession Angst
from Turning into War: the Civilian-Military
Challenge”
Senator Hugh Segal reminded the conference of
the lesson of the 1930s when the post-1929 cycle of midDepression Europe led irrevocably to reducing military
capacity as governments re-allocated spending priorities
and let military preparedness fall by the wayside, with
the result that a war which could have been stopped with
little risk in 1938 led to 50 million dead. His key question
for the present was very clear – how do we prevent
global recession from turning into global depression, and
depression from once again turning to war.
He warned that “this is not the time to let recession
dilute the rebuilding of our forces – as some would love
to let happen in Treasury Board, PCO, and Finance
Canada,” and bluntly rebuked “those who would see a
weakened Canada, militarily unable to deploy, politically
internalized and parochial, able only follow the lead of
others and unable to pay its own way or contribute to the
defence of its own interests. Some in the civil service have
and are using ‘process uber alles’ to dilute the pursuit of
our national objectives. Others simply prefer a quiescent
Canada which stands for little, defends less, and has no
core principles or strategic goals.”
11
ON TRACK
His closing line, “This is not what we believe in this hall,”
got the standing ovation from the audience which it so
richly deserved.
Panel II – Asia-Pacific and Canadian Defence and
Security
Looking West, Not East, to Afghanistan
Colonel John Blaxland, Defence Attaché,
Australian Embassy, Thailand, began with a review of
Australia’s international deployments, which amount to
3,000 troops world-wide, including 1,100 in Afghanistan,
making Australia the largest non-NATO contributor to that
mission. He noted that Australia’s geo-strategic interests
The Hon. Hugh Segal,
The Senate of Canada
Trade and Security
Dr. Jim Boutilier, Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor,
Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, noted that all AsiaPacific nations had been impacted by the global economic
crisis, as well their fears of its possible impact driving a
radicalized working class. China’s exports, for example,
were down 17% and imports down 53%, a measure of
the inter-relationship between the Chinese and American
economies as well as that between China and other Asian
states.
China and India have turned from a strategic focus
on their interior space to one focusing on the sea. There are
concerns about an emerging India/China maritime rivalry.
China is reliant upon the Indian Ocean energy transport
routes and has moved naval and military assets into the
area to Myanmar and Pakistan which has been worrying
the Indians.
The Chinese navy is experiencing rapid growth
with the launch of destroyers, frigates, submarines, and
support ships. China is preparing the aircraft carrier
Varyag, which it acquired from Ukraine, to go to sea and
is planning the construction of three additional carriers
in the 50,000 tonne class by 2020, of which one will be
nuclear-powered.
India has been pursuing the purchase of a
former Russian carrier, though the escalating cost of its
refurbishment has led to some delay. India has also planned
the acquisition of modern submarines. Other states in the
area are acquiring submarines as well, including Japan,
South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. The US has
moved an increasing number of its naval assets into the
Pacific.
are served by its participation in that mission since Australia
is located in Asia-Pacific, in a particularly volatile part of
the world, and cited the cases of the terrorist bombings in
Bali and of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, as well as
the cases of incidents and insurrections in Timor Leste,
the Solomon Islands, and Tonga, as well as the need to
deal with the effects of the tsunami in Indonesia.
In such a context Australia’s strategic policy
pillars include the alliance with the US and a readiness
to be engaged in the Asia-Pacific region which relies on
the presence of US forces, and the continuing American
ability and commitment to the management of the US/
China bi-lateral, as well as a willingness for engagement
in UN-mandated operations in the area.
12
Regional Balance of Power
Dr. Norman Friedman, defence analyst, New
York City, posed a series of strategic questions to ask
when looking at regional balance of power issues in the
broader Asia-Pacific region: whether deterrence (and selfdeterrence) was still operative, what were the war-fighting
capabilities of states (and their perception by other states),
and the probability of conflict actually taking place. Other
factors were the effects of nationalism, internal stability
and the Islamic Revolution.
He noted that China was sitting on a volcano,
with its regime using nationalism as a means of retaining
popular support.
He observed that the immediate effect of the
Christian Reformation was the launch of a 30 year war
and posed the question as to whether that might be a
correct analogy for understanding the current situation in
Islam. The Islamic Revolution seems to be characterized
ON TRACK
by a rising religious fervour, lethal factionalism, a demand
for purity on an impossible scale, and gross xenophobia.
Under such circumstances we may be in for a 50 year
problem as we try to ride out the storm.
He argued that past experience points to bleak
outcomes since bad economic times frequently result
in a toxic nationalism in which borders are never just,
though nationalism by itself does not finance conquest.
He questioned whether an “Asian way to solve disputes”
would follow a similar path and suggested that we
remember the fate of the League of Nations when
depending on ASEAN to be a panacea.
Turning to the Maritime environment he suggested
that strategic success rested on the ability to sustain
power projection (a function of aircraft carriers) and
expeditionary operations (a function of naval logistics).
Other key factors are ocean surveillance and a unified
command and control system.
He suggested a Chinese operational concept
based upon the early neutralization of the Taiwanese
air force by missile fire to achieve air dominance, while
simultaneously eliminating the Taiwanese navy at the
outset, to be followed by an amphibious invasion. He noted
that the Chinese have developed a shore bombardment
capability and is developing amphibious lift.
Panel III – Contemporary Security Concerns
Arctic Security
Commander James Kraska, US Naval War College,
drew our attention to the fact that US president George
W Bush had issued a National Security Policy Directive/
Homeland Security Policy Directive (NSPD-66/HSPD25) on January 9, 2009 to deal with US Security policy with
respect to the Arctic. The Presidential Directive includes
objectives for the enhancement of Arctic governance
through organizations such as the International Maritime
Organization and the eight member Arctic Council, and
encourages the US Senate to confirm the US accession
to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, suggesting
that the US has sufficient interests that it should proceed
to accession to the Treaty.
He cited a CIA study which sees open water in
summer by 2025 in both the North East Passage and the
North West Passage, which will provide much reduced
travel distances, particularly for Asian states, as well as
access to new resources. This will result in new players at
the Arctic table which will have significant implications for
US Homeland Defence (and by extension for Canada).
He noted that the US had vital interests in the
Arctic for strategic defence and conventional deterrence. It
also had clear national interests in freedom of navigation.
Panel II - Asia-Pacific and Canadian Defence and Security - l-r: Panelists Dr. Norman Friedman, Dr. Jim Boutilier, and
Colonel John Blaxland; with Moderator Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Ken Summers
13
ON TRACK
The maintenance of strategic access to the Arctic is a key
national interest of the US, as is the need for increased US
surveillance over the maritime Arctic. The US requires a
greater icebreaker capacity than it has at the moment. He
also noted that the US and Russia control access to the
Western Arctic.
Strategic Significance of Cyberspace
Rafal Rohozinski, The SecDev Group, challenged
the audience to begin to understand that in cyberspace the
centre of gravity is not driven by geography but rather
by the population. He noted a crucial difference between
populations in the developing world and the developed,
in that the former are using cyberspace for empowerment
rather than for security; the fact that cyberspace has fewer
controls than is the case with normal media enhances this
empowerment.
He noted that many of today’s governing elites
are “digital immigrants” who have been introduced
to cyberspace through having to cope with it in their
workspace, but remain limited in their approaches to using
it. Opposed to the “digital immigrants” are the “digital
natives,” who have grown up with access to cyberspace
throughout their entire lives.
He noted that some terrorist organizations are
beginning to make the transition from “old Media” to the
“New Media.” Hezbollah, for example, has moved from
Old Media channels such as television, radio, and combat
camera to transitional media such as streaming videos
on the internet and to New Media such as internet games
with a strong ideological/propaganda content.
He also noted the Russian use of “denial of
service” attacks on Georgian government websites during
the Russo-Georgian war as an example of something
which we must plan for in the future. And he expressed
some scepticism about the possibility of establishing any
sort of deterrence in cyberspace since the domain is so
inherently anarchic.
The Russian Challenge
Professor Mark Katz, George Mason University,
noted that the Obama administration inherited some of the
Bush administration’s views, which has left Russia with
deep concerns about the US and its policy with respect
to Russia. These concerns include perceived American
interference in internal Russian affairs, an unwillingness
to accept Russia as a major gas supplier to Europe or to
accept that the former Soviet republics in Asia are within
a Russian zone of interest, and NATO expansion into the
former Soviet strategic space. Russia also has difficulty
in accepting that it is not the principal focus of American
14
policy, since the US is central to Russian foreign policy.
Russia’s policies are equally confusing to the
West. Russia has taken steps to improve its relations with
Iran and together with China has eased UN pressures on
Iran. Iran, however, has been less than cooperative and
accordingly Russia has been reluctant to sell advanced
weaponry such as the S-300 missiles to Iran. Russia
fears a US/Iran rapprochement and a parallel sale of US
nuclear technology to Iran. It also fears the construction
of alternative pipelines through the Caspian/Iran corridor
as another development which would make Russia less
influential in US policy.
The Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National
Defence
While Russia fears the growth of American
influence in Central Asia it also fears the growth of Islamic
influence in the area, as well as among its own Muslim
population. One consequence has been that Russia’s
relations with Israel are closer than before.
Going forward Russia will continue to seek US
concessions through its leverage obtained by allowing the
passage of non-military supplies through its transportation
network north of Afghanistan and thereby reducing
pressure on the NATO/US supply line through Pakistan.
Russia and the US have overlapping concerns over the
growth of radical Islamic influence and this may lead to
greater cooperation between the two states.
Day 2: “Changing Times, An Evolving Canadian
Forces, a New Defence Strategy”
Introductory Address
The Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National
ON TRACK
DONATIONS
LES DONS
Conference of Defence Associations
Institute
L’institut de la conférence des associations de la
défense
A gift provided under your will means a great
deal to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. It perpetuates a commitment in support the mission of the Institute.
Un don inscrit à votre testament revêt une
grande importance pour l’Institut de la conférence des
associations de la defence (l’ICAD). Il perpétue votre
engagement envers l’Institut et assure le soutien continu à sa mission.
Making an outright or planned gift to a nonprofit organization such as the CDA Institute is a private decision, and should fulfill philanthropic wishes
while maximizing tax and other financial and personal benefits. Planned gifts are commonly referred
to as deferred gifts, such as bequests, life insurance,
charitable remainder trusts and similar undertakings,
whereby the commitment is made now, but the funds
do not become available to the Institute until a set
time in the future.
Faire un don immediat, ou un don planifié à un
organisme comme l’Institut de la CAD est un décision
privée qui doit répondre aux désirs philanthropiques,
tout en maximisant les avantages fiscaux, financiers et
personnels. Les dons planifiés sont communément appelés dons différés. Ils incluent les legs, l’assurancevie, les fiducies résiduaires de bienfaisance et toute
entente similaire. La personne s’engage dès maintenant, mais les fonds ne sont versés à l’organisme qu’à
une période déterminée dans le futur.
Including a bequest to the CDA Institute in
your will is one of the most popular and simplest
ways to make a planned gift. It allows you to make
thoughtful decisions regarding your family, other
loved ones, and also organizations and charities you
have supported throughout your lifetime.
Un legs à l’Institut de la CAD est une des façons les plus simples de faire un don planifié. Il vous
permet de prendre des décisions réfléchies concernant
votre famille, vos êtres chers et des organismes que
vous avez appuyés tout au long de votre vie.
By including the CDA Institute in your estate
planning you will ensure a long-lasting legacy for the
Institute.
En incluant l’Institut de la CAD dans vos
plans de succession, vous assurerez un héritage durable pour l’Institut.
For further information or to advise the CDA
Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903
or [email protected]. All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.
Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour
aviser l’Institut de la CAD de vos intentions, veuillez
communiquer avec le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord
Metcalfe en composant le 613 236-9903 ou courriel
[email protected]. Toute demande d’information
sera traitée de manière personnelle et strictement confidentielle.
Defence, reminded the audience that the fundamental aim
of the Canada First Defence Strategy was to rebuild the
Canadian Forces over the period of the next twenty years
by addressing the critical gaps in current capabilities
and the need to invest in their closure. He noted that the
Defence Budget would rise from the current $18 billion to
over $30 billion by the end of that period.
The government planned to increase the strength
of the CF to 100,000, of which 70,000 would be regulars
and 30,000 reserves, though he acknowledged that the
current effects of early retirements and increased attrition
rates would be challenging.
He observed that the re-equipment process was
successfully launched, with the purchase of C-17s and
CH-47s, and movement was underway on a variety of
other programmes. He acknowledged that there was a
deep need to vastly improve the defence procurement
system.
15
ON TRACK
He noted that the recent meeting between
President Obama and Prime Minister Harper, as well as a
series of other meetings, represented an era of increased
US/Canada cooperation in defence and security matters.
He noted that an expansion of the scope of NORAD to
include maritime warning, as well as the development of
closer working arrangements between USNORTHCOM
and Canada Command, were aspects of this cooperation.
He drew the audience’s attention to the planned
end to the current Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan
mission in 2011, but pointed out that this would not mean
an end to Canadian activity there. He remarked that there
was still a fundamental need for security if the other
activities are to be able to be carried out and suggested
that Canadian efforts in reconstruction and development
are paralleled by efforts to train the Afghan National
Police and the Afghan National Army, noting that Canada
is currently mentoring five battalions of the ANA with
success.
General Walter Natynczyk,
Chief of the Defence Staff
Special Address
It was particularly satisfying to see General
Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, continue
an innovation of his immediate predecessor, General
Rick Hillier, in his annual address to the CDA, that
of recognizing the contributions made by individual
members of the Canadian Forces. This recognition of
the contributions of individual members of the Forces
by the CDS provides a particularly powerful means of
connecting Canadians with the CF, and of connecting the
members of the CF with the citizens they have committed
to defend and protect.
General Natynczyk began his address with
a sweeping overview of the extent of the operational
deployment of the CF, noting that we were treating
operations within Canada, under Canada Command, as
those within a Theatre of Operations, mentioning that the
CF Search and Rescue operations were now handling SAR
incidents at the rate of about three per day on a 24/7/52
basis.
He flagged the increasing importance of Canada’s
Arctic as a part of the Canadian Theatre of Operations
which relies heavily on the CF’s infrastructure and
operations, including the patrolling activities of the
Canadian Rangers as a means of demonstrating Canadian
sovereignty over the area.
Canada Command has become the Headquarters
which deals with Canada/US cooperation in such
structures as NORAD and USNORTHCOM to jointly
manage the continental defence of North America, which
may include elements of cross-border support in such
non-military areas as natural disaster operations.
16
The CF is involved in many other missions
abroad in addition to those in Afghanistan. Traditional
“blue helmet” peacekeeping operations are still a feature
of Canada’s contribution to international security, as
are those involved with Canadian contributions to the
international naval forces dealing with piracy operations
off the coast of Somalia.
Afghanistan remains the most prominent and
most difficult of Canada’s operations abroad. While
it will end in 2011, that will not necessarily end all
Canadian military commitments to that country. Civilian
contributions to reconstruction and development and the
improved governance of that country depend on there
being a secure environment for those activities.
The CDS looked to the future of the CF,
observing that while we cannot predict where we are
going to be going next, we still have to be ready to do
so. He praised the government’s decisions to improve
our equipment capabilities, many of which are already in
place and providing us with the “global legs” to respond to
contingencies as they may arise. He was pragmatic about
the difficulties that remain since it is difficult to reverse
rust-out overnight, but was confident that the government
commitment to the 20 year financial commitment of the
Canada First Defence Strategy was a move in the right
direction.
Lastly, he turned to “the people” dimension,
admitting that the challenge of “growing” the human
resources of the Department of National Defence remains
a key priority, since the “demographic bubble” which
came from the decisions in the 1990s to effectively stop
recruiting has created a difficult experience distribution,
ON TRACK
which is being exacerbated by opportunities for individuals
to retire after 20, 30 or 35 years of experience. He noted
that the operational tempo impact upon families was
another contributing factor in the higher attrition rates
described a number of measures being taken to reduce
the impact upon families. Part of this required attention to
the way in which injured and wounded CF members are
looked after.
It was a vigourous, optimistic, but realistic address,
one which left the audience secure that the CF remains in
capable hands and that its future remains bright.
Special Address
General James Mattis, NATO Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation, expressed a deep respect
for the CF and the success of its transformation back to
the force which it used to be, and cited Canada as a role
model for much of the rest of NATO in this regard.
He then turned to NATO’s Multiple Futures
Project, which seeks to establish what can be agreed about
future threats. While NATO stands supreme in air, naval,
and heavy mechanized operations, it is not supreme in
irregular warfare, which will become the norm in future
“wars among the people,” especially when the operational
centre of gravity remains the “will of the people.”
He concluded his address by noting that the
challenge for NATO will be the maintenance of a balance
between military and non-military means, but that there
will always remain a need for strategic expeditionary
forces which can disaggregate into smaller balanced
forces to deal with specific tasks and missions, led by
commanders marked by imagination and creativity.
Special Address
General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., Commander
NORAD/USNORTHCOM, spoke of a future in which the
ability to integrate soft and hard power on the battlefield
will be a critical force multiplier and will increasingly
force a capability to anticipate events as never before.
He noted that NORAD’s missions had been
changed and now included both space warning and maritime
warning. The addition of the task of maritime warning has
led to the challenge of looking into the maritime domain to
understand how surveillance, identification, and warning
of maritime threats might be undertaken. To complicate
this is the need to understand and anticipate what acts of
war might be in the cyber domain, which affects both the
space and maritime dimensions, and which is increasingly
vulnerable to “denial of service” attacks, as we saw in the
Russo-Georgia campaign.
He noted that NORAD sees about 13 million
ship-borne containers passing through its maritime
domain each year. Consequently there is a profound need
for the recapitalization of NORAD and other military
and naval forces to achieve the development of capable,
interoperable forces, even in difficult economic times.
Panel I – Environmental Update: Land, Maritime,
and Air
Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Andrew
Leslie, painted a picture of an excellent small army which
was being pushed to its limit by an extremely high tempo
of operations. With an Army of 20,831 full time soldiers,
19,327 part-time reserve soldiers, and 5,355 civilians
the Army has to man 15,918 positions in support of our
international and expeditionary operations – and relies on
the Reserves to provide about 22% of the strength of each
rotation.
While recruiting has been going well it has
been counter-balanced by an increasing attrition rate
approaching 10% annually, much of which is structural
as members of the Army hit the 20 year, 30 year, 35 year
points at which members may leave the Forces to take
advantage of pensionable service retirement points.
Equipment is becoming a problem – while its
quality is good there simply is not enough of it available
to sustain operations at current tempos. With Afghanistan
the priority the vehicle fleet in Canada has suffered. Of
the 600 vehicles in the LAV fleet about 30-40% are VOR
(vehicle off road for necessary repairs and maintenance).
The MTVs (the rebuilt M113 APCs) are suffering an 80%
VOR rate in Canada. The Coyote fleet is effectively at the
end of its useful life with a 70% VOR rate in Canada.
The Army is planning for the future, which the
Army sees as involving both littoral and urban warfare
which will be impacted by such factors as climate change,
mass migration and urbanization, rapid technological
change, and multidimensional terrorism. These factors
will drive organizational change in the Army as it evolves
from the “Army of Today” (2009-2016), which can be
described as a “Balanced Medium Weight Army,” into
“the Army of Tomorrow” (2021), which will be a LAVbased Army, and finally into the Future Army (2040),
which will include some heavy assault vehicles.
17
ON TRACK
Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral Drew
Robertson, struck a sombre note as he compared the
developments in the global maritime strategic space with
the reduced fleet capacity that Canada will experience
over the next ten years, and led the audience to the obvious
conclusion that the re-capitalization of the Canadian Navy
is central and critical.
He noted that the global strategic maritime space
is seeing a growth in importance of the Asia-Pacific
region and that ocean politics is growing, especially with
the rise in global oil production and its transportation by
sea, developments which may threaten energy supplies.
Moreover, while the focus on the implications of Arctic
warming and loss of ice cover has implications for Arctic
shipping, there may well be future concerns about the
security of Arctic oil and gas deposits.
Canada’s Navy remains a forward deployed navy
with such current deployments as those in support of
counter-narcotics operations, those involved in anti-piracy
and convoy escort operations in the Indian Ocean, and
those involved in humanitarian operations in delivering
supplies to coastal villages in Haiti.
Current critical projects needed to support
the “Future Navy” include the Joint Support Ship, the
Canadian Surface Combatant, the Arctic Operations
Patrol Ships (which will eventually replace the Maritime
Coastal Defence Vessels), the Submarine mid-life refit,
and the new Multi-Mission Aircraft which will replace
the Auroras.
Chief of the Air Staff, Lieutenant-General Angus
Watt, in his address was both upbeat and worried. On the
one hand real progress has been and is continuing to be
made in terms of fleet recapitalization. The success of
the C-17 project has been followed with real progress
in the acquisition of C-170Js and CH-47s, as well as the
establishment of an air expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan.
While the average age of aircraft in the fleet is very high
at about 25 years, the acquisition of the new aircraft
has meant that average has begun, at last, to decrease.
On the other hand there are serious concerns about the
increasingly dysfunctional pattern of the demographics
of the Air Force as we continue to experience personnel
attrition and the attendant drop in experience levels.
Finally, there is the problem of the Air Force’s
infrastructure, 50% of which is over 50 years old. The
Air Force estimates that the bill for replacement of its
infrastructure is currently around $6 billion and that the
current allocations for maintenance amount to about 1.6%
annually, whereas the allocation for recapitalization/
replacement is only about 1.9% annually. ©
Canada-US Defence Relations after the Obama Visit
by Paul H. Chapin
A policy triumph
B
arack Obama’s visit to Ottawa was a public
relations success for the United States, but it was a policy
triumph for Canada. The media, ever shallow, missed
it. Not so the senior officials who travelled back to
Washington with the President. In a briefing on Air Force
One, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg described
the tone of the discussions as “really excellent.” It was
Paul Chapin is a former head of the political section at the
Canadian Embassy in Washington and director general for
international security at Foreign Affairs. He is currently a
research associate with Defence Management Studies at the
School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and is a Member
of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.
18
their content, however, that most impressed. “It was a very
strategic discussion,” Steinberg said, “heavily focused on
the economy and then next on Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
There had not been the “narrow focus on little issue . .
. the kind of smaller-level bilateral kinds of problems”
typical of previous meetings between presidents and
prime ministers.
Clearly, Prime Minister Stephen Harper had not
heeded the public advice of many experts on Canada-US
relations to be friendly but keep a safe distance, to push for
hassle-free trade at the border and cooperation on climate
change, and to do something “distinctive” to demonstrate
Canada’s “independence,” including not succumbing
to US pressure to extend Canada’s military mission in
Afghanistan beyond 2011. Instead, there was high-level
discussion of the high-level economic and security issues
ON TRACK
testing both countries and agreement to work together
on the global agenda. The outcome, rare in the annals of
Canada-US relations, was US recognition that Canada
today is an international player with a performance record
to be envied, views worth listening to, and influence to
be taken account of in the lead-up to the G20 meeting
in London on April 2, the NATO summit in Strasbourg
on April 3-4, and the Summit of the Americas in Port of
Spain on April 17-19.
Learning from the past
There is scant evidence that a strategy of keeping
your distance has ever served Canada well, whatever its
political attractions. The reason is that there is nothing
in it for the United States and no benefits for American
politicians in spending scarce political capital on
‘Canadian’ issues. It is an iron law of international politics
that every state’s interests come first, and a successful
relationship between states requires both sides seeing the
relationship as serving their interests. The corollary is that
once it is no longer obvious to one side or the other that
there is a gain to be made or a loss to be avoided, the
relationship will quickly atrophy, and then sour if one side
continues to press. If the win/win is not evident, it is not
going to happen.
Adopting such an attitude this time could have
proved disastrous for Canada. With the enormous problems
they have to deal with, the new leaders in Washington
have little reason to take the slightest interest in anyone or
anything not helping to lighten their burden.
Some history can be instructive. April 2004 was
a bad month for the President of the United States. US
casualties in Iraq had suddenly spiked to their highest
monthly level since the war began; the media was
carrying photos of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; George
W. Bush’s job approval rating had dropped below 50%;
and the polls showed him in an unexpectedly tight race
for the presidency in November. That was when the new
Prime Minister of Canada came to Washington to discuss
softwood lumber, mad cow disease, and Devil’s Lake.
A year later, touring Bush’s ranch, Paul Martin “really
went after him” on how drilling for oil in the Arctic
might imperil migrating caribou. When the President of
the United States needed a friend and counsellor on great
affairs of state, he got a provincial satrap with grievances.
Why anyone in the Prime Minister’s Office thought Bush
would respond positively to Canadian concerns remains
a mystery. He did not, of course, and Canadian interests
suffered – and so eventually did Paul Martin.
The emerging defence agenda
The Harper government came to office three
years ago determined to restore Canada’s international
credentials, to better protect and promote Canadian
interests. Eschewing the grandiose policy reviews typical
of new governments, it moved directly to address the most
pressing foreign and defence policy issues of the times
– not least the nature and extent of Canada’s strategy
in Afghanistan and the political, economic and military
means required to pursue such a strategy successfully.
Other matters it put aside for more propitious times,
including the systemic issues undermining NATO’s
ability to conduct “out-of-area” operations such as in
Afghanistan, and the institutional architecture required
for the future defence of North America.
With the advent of a new administration in
Washington and with Europeans more confused than ever
about how to address the security challenges confronting
democratic states, the time is right for Canada to assume
a leadership role on allied defence issues.
Afghanistan
There is a new Afghanistan strategy coming.
During his visit to Ottawa, Obama confirmed that the
administration had commenced a strategic review of US
policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan whose findings are
to be ready within 60 days, in other words by the time
of the NATO summit. The US would be seeking input
from its allies, the President said, so that the result could
be “a comprehensive strategy for which we all take
responsibility.”
The objectives of the new strategy will not differ
markedly from those pursued to date: protect populated
areas, reduce the flow of insurgents from Pakistan, train
Afghan military and police, secure major highways,
improve governance, and accelerate economic growth. But
management and tactics are likely to evolve to incorporate
more of the counterinsurgency lessons learned in Iraq and
in Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke, the new US special
envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, outlined some of the
management challenges to be overcome at a conference
in Munich in early February: better coordination within
the US government, better coordination within NATO,
“attainable objectives with adequate resources instead of
the reverse,” and a regional approach that engages all the
neighbours, especially Pakistan.
Canada needs to be an author of the new strategy,
not just a consumer. Canada is among NATO’s halfdozen most experienced participants in the Afghanistan
campaign and must not lose the opportunity to share the
knowledge it has acquired in designing the new tactics.
19
ON TRACK
The Canadian Forces (CF) have earned Canada the right
to be listened to on how to win the war in Afghanistan,
and Canadian diplomats, development assistance officers
and police officers on how to win the peace.
Obama also confirmed that the administration
intends to send 17,000 additional troops to the region
within the next few months, with another substantial
complement likely to follow. The net effect would be
to double the number of US troops to around 60,000
and increase the number of US combat brigades from
two to six. With NATO and other coalition members
contributing a further 30,000 troops, this would make
some 90,000 foreign troops available to support the new
strategy. Afghan security forces would also be available,
of course. This is an encouraging increase in military
resources for an enterprise only recently being written off
as a lost cause, but the total remains modest compared to
the commitment made to Iraq. As Michael O’Hanlon of
the Brookings Institution has noted, 90,000 foreign troops
is only two-thirds of what the US alone deployed in Iraq
before the surge; and Afghanistan’s 150,000 military and
police forces, only a third of whom can be considered
combat ready, pale in comparison to the 400,000 Iraqi
forces that supported the surge in 2007 and 2008.
A conclusion easily drawn is that Canada will
indeed face pressure to maintain its military presence in
Afghanistan beyond 2011. For the time being, however,
Washington appears little interested in making an issue
of it. On the contrary: as Jim Steinberg observed, “[in]
relative terms, the commitment up to 2011 is a much
longer-term commitment than anyone else has given.
Many other allies have existing commitments for six
months to a year.”
But as planners begin to think about Canada’s
engagement after 2011, a continued military component
cannot be ruled out. First, the Government motion of
March 14, 2008 spoke of ending Canada’s military
presence in Kandahar, not in all of Afghanistan. Second,
there are indications that the new Liberal leadership may
be rather more open to the idea of a future role for the CF
even in Kandahar, perhaps to provide ongoing protection
for the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team and
to continue training and mentoring the Afghan National
Army. As Defence Minister Peter MacKay recently told
this year’s annual meeting of the Conference of Defence
Associations, “We can reconfigure the mission . . . but
with the full support of Parliament.” Finally, July 2011 is
still two years away, and two years can be a long time in
international politics. ©
It Didn’t Have to be This Way
by Colonel George Petrolekas
In Afghanistan, as with the global financial crisis,
ill-considered decisions long ago have come back to haunt
us, and now require a sustained effort to correct them. So
we must run to keep up, when we should be walking to
get ahead. Richard Holbrooke, the new US envoy to the
region, told a conference in Munich: “I have never seen
anything like the mess we have inherited.” Problem is that
it’s a mess of our making.
In 2003, NATO began its mission centered in
Kabul whilst the US was responsible for the rest of the
country. At the time, there was a real sense of optimism: a
constitution was crafted, the international community was
committing development funds, elections were to be held,
and the country as a whole was relatively safe. Certainly,
George Petrolekas represented the Chief of the Defence Staff
and Commander CEFCOM to NATO’s Operational Command
of the ISAF mission from 2003 to 2007. He assisted every US
and NATO/ISAF commander in preparing for their Afghan
mission and functioned as a trusted agent for them frequently.
He was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for his efforts.
20
there were daunting challenges: opium production was
growing, the infrastructure was in serious disrepair, and
warlords held considerable sway.
However, the fates intervened on many planes and
the great chance was lost. The principal ill fate was Iraq.
American forces and political attention were diverted as
the military victory turned bad, and Afghanistan became
a casualty.
America pressed NATO into taking responsibility
for Afghanistan. This turnover was supposed to be
‘conditions based’ (meaning that only when there were
sufficient resources available would NATO assume
responsibility). The minimum levels for troop strength,
equipment (such as helicopters) and robust Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that NATO set as conditions
prior to assuming control were never met. This resulted
in wide swaths of territory having minimal or no NATO
presence. Furthermore, throughout this turnover, NATO
never fully grasped that military presence and action had
to be linked to development activity.
ON TRACK
Shortly after assuming leadership of the Afghan
Transitional Authority, Hamid Karzai clearly identified
the obstacles before it. First, the physical threat presented
by a dormant Taliban in its sanctuaries; second, the lack of
human capital (literate and trained people) which thwarted
improvements in governance and security; and lastly, the
absence of unified action by the multitude of governments
and organizations which diluted development efforts and,
correspondingly, potential effects.
Ironically, some of the very same people who
now argue in favour of limited but achievable goals,
tighter integration of the international effort, more troops,
a regional approach and more effective governance and
development were the cause of the problem a mere five
years ago.
Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Secretary of
Defense, frequently painted the Taliban as a spent force
numbering no more than 600 to 1,000 adherents. These
pronouncements demonstrated that it was a movement
whose dynamics and roots we little understood. Not
clearly knowing why the Taliban did things confounded
our ability to defeat it.
It is entirely possible that senior American and
NATO officials publicly underplayed the threat to ease
and facilitate NATO’s involvement so that America could
turn its attention elsewhere. But that strategy led to an
under-resourced NATO mission, which recent ‘surge’
talk now seeks to remedy. Denial of the threat also
extended to the US Embassy in Kabul, which equally
underplayed the menace, and, in both military and nonmilitary endeavours, constrained the potential authority
of Commander International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.
This was manifest in command arrangements
which made integration and coordination difficult. On the
diplomatic front, different G8 nations retained lead roles
which were never made subordinate to a senior alliance
civilian authority. On the military front, two separate
missions continued to operate, though some steps were
grudgingly taken to achieve a semblance of unity in
command. Without unity in command on the diplomatic,
development or military fronts, it is difficult to imagine
how unity of purpose could ever be achieved.
The warning signs were certainly present. After
eliminating many hundreds of Taliban with no effect and
only superficially understanding tribal relationships, the
US and NATO were hard pressed to explain the lingering
insurgency. Where was this magical fount of Taliban?
Of course, it was Pakistan and disaffected Afghans.
Many US intelligence officers on the ground knew that
the refugee camps and sanctuary provided in Pakistan’s
frontier provinces were fertile ground for recruitment and
regrouping.
Furthermore, the failure of development to
penetrate the countryside created the ‘accidental insurgent’
and poppy continued to grow. The Pakistan problem had
existed for decades – we just refused to acknowledge it
in higher circles. In not doing so, we failed to confront it
until recently. It has become impossible to ignore, leading
to the conclusion that a military solution is no longer
possible. Only now, with the production of opium firmly
linked to the financing of the insurgency, is concerted
action being envisioned against those who protect, move
and profit from it.
But it did not have to be this way.
In 2004, Canada’s Rick Hillier became
Commander ISAF. En route to taking command, his
first stop was Pakistan, in recognition that there was a
regional conflict at play. In Kabul, building on lessons
from Bosnia, a roadmap was prepared which sought
to unify development, governance and military action
(now euphemistically termed ‘whole of government’).
Hillier’s ISAF V planners sought to harmonize efforts on
a strategic level within a structure called the Investment
Management Framework, synchronizing separate and
sometimes divergent mandates into one common vision for
the country designed to move from a position of recovery
to that of sustainable development. From a financial
standpoint, this meant moving towards programme
financing inexorably tied to national development
planning, as opposed to shotgun style project financing
on which national signature projects and NGO efforts, to
this day, are based.
This first approach to integration was rebuffed
by not only NATO but also by Hillier’s own national
authorities, for whom the ‘whole of government’ approach
had not moved much beyond a marketing slogan. “No
General, NATO’s remit is simply to provide security.
The rest is for development specialists, diplomats and
politicians, not for the military to do.” This was heard
whilst demands for support from other government
departments lay unanswered or unfilled.
In 2006, Britain’s General Sir David Richards,
in his turn as ISAF commander, also tried to demolish
the walls which prevented the international community
from achieving synchronized effort, only to be similarly
rebuffed. However, he did succeed in instituting a Policy
Action Group (PAG) which at least put all the major actors
in Kabul around a table on a regular basis.
But during Richards’ term, the Taliban began
to make its presence felt in more substantial ways,
particularly in the South, leading Richards to plead
publically for a few thousand more troops, (less than a
quarter than is being asked for in the upcoming surge) so
21
ON TRACK
that he might nip the insurgency in the bud. But even the
existence of a PAG in Kabul could not answer his pleas
for more troops, freedom of action or strategic adjustment
if his NATO superiors were not listening.
Without reinforcement, Richards developed an
‘inkspot’ strategy which sought to provide security and
development in key populated areas, not everywhere.
It was eerily similar to what is now being considered
as the way forward. But, again, it was a strategy borne
of too few resources; without sufficient military and
development resources, NATO could not benefit from
even a momentary advantage.
When NATO defeated the Taliban in Kandahar in
2006, Brigadier-General David Fraser, NATO’s southern
regional commander, said, “we’ve won this battle and
I’ve bought you time, but you have to fill the vacuum I’ve
created.” No one heard the message.
As an Assistant Secretary General of NATO told
me when we travelled back and forth from Kabul, “I see no
evidence of a unified plan, the NATO commander has little
power, PRTs answer to their own national governments
and priorities, intelligence sharing is pathetic and the
security timidity of various national PRTs and contingents
imperils all the gains that have been made to date.”
At this critical juncture, the hollowness of the
overall mission was revealed. It lacked the dexterity in
development programs to fill the vacuum that had been
created by military success and lacked sufficient military
resources to consolidate hard fought gains.
Though America shares much blame, NATO also
bears responsibility for the current state of affairs. Clearly,
NATO’s leadership – and by extension the leaders of its
constituent nations – knew that the state of affairs was
precariously balanced between success and failure. Yet,
troop contributions never materialized in a substantial
way and caveats remained. NATO could not even agree
on an omnibus detention policy, leaving it to nations to
negotiate bilateral agreements though it was fully aware
that NATO expansion and probable combat would lead to
detainees becoming an issue. NATO also failed to extract
a substantial US commitment, which led to a condition
where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated,
“In Afghanistan we do what we can.” Without American
leadership and involvement, “what we can” was not good
enough.
“Almost everything wrong on the military side
here can be traced to decisions made in Rumsfeld’s office
and that NATO submitted to,” stated a senior advisor to the
Afghan government, adding that, “the same holds true on
the development side where successive US Ambassadors
have effectively neutered [the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan].” Coupled with the UN’s
22
congenital impotence and preoccupation with process
instead of effect, the results were entirely predictable.
The time for blame is past now, and everyone
shares a portion: the US, the UN, NATO, the member
states in Afghanistan, the International Community and
its NGOs, even the Afghan Government itself. Of import
now is how we apply our lessons going forward, especially
for those who exerted influence five years ago and who
now pepper the Obama administration.
Afghanistan needs the ‘Marshall Plan’ that President
Bush promised in 2002.
The tone of recent commentary seems to focus
on the limited goals of security and governance and
how difficult they are to achieve, laying the blame on
corruption within the Afghan government (amongst other
factors) and neglecting the lack of unity. At the same time,
this commentary ignores the economy, where since 2004
the unemployment rate has not budged from its current
40% level. Corruption exists precisely because of high
unemployment and because we did not adequately assist
the Afghan government in ridding itself of warlords who
offered jobs in exchange for personal gain.
Every single senior Canadian officer who has
served in Afghanistan understands the simple fact that jobs
are a far better anti-corruption and counter-insurgency
tool than anything else. Afghanistan needs a massive job
creation effort to dry up the pool of unemployed young
men who will pick up an AK out of desperation. In short,
Afghanistan needs the ‘Marshall Plan’ that President
Bush promised in 2002. Unfortunately, the collective will
has weakened to the point that we will be satisfied with a
solution that falls somewhat short of that vision.
To illustrate the failure of the economic dimension
in the simplest terms: after eight years into an international
presence, 60,000 plus foreigners in Afghanistan drink
water that is bottled outside the country. In effect, a
self-sustaining $40 million a year business which could
provide employment has never been incubated.
At this point it would be simple to lay down
prescriptive solutions. These themes were articulated by
General Hillier in Einsiedlerhof, Germany on the day he
first met the international staff that would comprise his
headquarters. Six years on, they retain their validity. One,
lead from behind: we are not there to tell Afghans how
to do things, but rather to demonstrate and assist them;
where credit is due, it is to be theirs alone. Two, put an
Afghan face in all we do: we are not occupiers, this is
not our country. Whenever occasion permits, Afghans –
ON TRACK
their government, their institutions, their ministries, their
security forces – must be in front of all we do. Third, this
is all about Afghanistan, not just us: the true measure of
our effect must be ‘how does this improve the lot of the
Afghan people.’ If it is measured only in terms of our own
agendas, then we will never succeed.
Of all we have learned these past eight years, it
can be distilled into the need to follow four principles for
the future.
The first is consensus. For some nations,
participation in the Afghan mission marked their ‘coming
of age,’ as the Chief of the Defence Staff of a newer
NATO member state told me. For others, participation
garners points with Brussels or Washington, as for many,
al-Qaeda and the spectre of a Taliban-provided sanctuary
is America’s security problem, not theirs. On that basis
alone, many allied countries committed troops for
reasons other than denying Afghanistan to al-Qaeda and
its allies, and are now reluctant to admit circumstances
have changed and that we now face an insurgency. As the
international reach of al-Qaeda has shown, it is a problem
for us all.
But without representative government, security
and an improved economy in Afghanistan, that aspect
of the threat will never disappear. If we cannot agree on
why we’re in Afghanistan, we’ll never be able to agree or
focus on an outcome.
As Fredrick Kagan notes, “We should accept
whatever contributions they are willing and able to make,
but avoid allowing tensions over those contributions to
distort the overall understanding of the fight.” In some
nations, participation comes at great domestic political
cost; governments will stand or fall on the issue. We must
be cognisant of that fact.
The second principle is understanding. To solve
the problems in Afghanistan we must have a holistic
understanding of local dynamics in the national context.
The term ‘Afghanistan’ implies a unitary whole which
does not completely exist, while solutions are applied
using Kandahar, Helmand and the Eastern provinces as
a metaphor and models for the whole. This will have
to be reconciled. In some areas, this will mean that
internationals will have to live among the people; in other
areas, too much living among the people will only increase
resentment. The very nature of the country, its geographic
and political divisions as well as its religious, ethnic,
linguistic makeup, defies the broad application of prêt
à porter solutions without some thought to asymmetric
execution.
The third principle is planning. Afghanistan
needs more troops and a civilian surge, but it needs them
under one umbrella. It needs a unified roadmap, with
buy-in from the Afghan Government, our allies, and the
civilian organizations that will help execute it. Without
one, we will only repeat past errors of disjointed action.
Developing, resourcing, synchronizing and monitoring
such a plan should be the immediate focus of the alliance.
We have failed in this regard not because we have not
known that we must, but because the quid pro quo tradeoffs and sacrifices necessary to achieve this have sapped
the will to do it.
Therefore, we need an overarching body that
can coordinate international efforts and mesh them with
military planning. The PAG, augmented with a robust
secretariat, could serve that function. Without such an
overarching body, or a group of principals, the best laid
plans will be of no avail. This overarching body must have
at its head an individual in whom all international authority
is vested. Whilst consensus must continually be sought, it
must not become an impediment to advancement.
Once it has a plan and a coordinating authority,
the alliance must then appropriately apply its plan. The
alliance cannot turn away from the central government
and seek solutions only at the local level at the expense of
the central government. A lack of a strong connection to
the central government invites ethnic strife and instability.
The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
serves as an example: bottom-up definition of needs, topdown financing, coordination and assistance. There are
benefits that can only be provided by central governments,
infrastructure and regulatory environments, but that does
not necessarily mean centralized governance. Equally,
strong central leadership does not imply a central
strongman.
The final principle is commitment. Everyone has
heard the now-famous insurgent quote, “you may have
the watches but we have the time.” Until it is widely
believed that NATO will remain in Afghanistan until the
insurgency is defeated (or marginalized or brought into
government) and an Afghan government can stand on its
own two legs, doubts about our commitment will continue
to fuel the insurgency. In turn, the competing dichotomy
of time-based commitment and conditions-based exit
must be clearly resolved.
The tragedy in all this is that Afghans may have
to settle for something far less than the vision of the
Afghan Compact, but at least that something is far better
than the course we’re presently on. Karl Marx, building
on Santayana’s dictum that “those who ignore history are
condemned to repeat it,” said that “the first time history is
repeated, it is a tragedy, the second time it is repeated it is
a farce.” The tragedy is that it did not need to be this way
at all; whether it turns out to be a farce, only time will tell.
©
23
ON TRACK
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan
– Then, Now and the Road Ahead
by Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier
The Canadian Forces (CF) mission in Afghanistan
represents a significant chapter in our military history. It is
the first time since the Korean War where we have faced
a declared adversary in combat. It is the only instance in
modern times where our operations have been centred
on counterinsurgency. It demands an unprecedented
level of coordination and cohesion among engaged
Government agencies. Canada has ambitiously staked out
uniquely national objectives, consistent with international
community aims, in a militantly opposed nation-building
effort of epic proportions.
Canadian ground forces first arrived in
Afghanistan in early 2002 as part of a coalition response
to the 9/11 tragedy. At the onset, a Battle Group deployed
to Kandahar Province with US forces to provide airfield
security. They also participated in combat operations
against Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Paktia Province,
and in the Tora Bora, as well as establishing a coalition
presence to operate with Afghan forces in Zabul Province.
Our forces departed Afghanistan in July of that year but
returned the following year to play a leading role in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) authorized
under the United Nations Security Council. Initially based
in Kabul, this contingent at its peak numbered 1,900 and
contributed to security in the capital and the surrounding
areas.
Canada’s prominence in the southern province
of Kandahar is reflective of a determination to play a
greater leadership role in international operations as well
as the nation’s commitment to peace and security. In 2005
our forces first established a Provincial Reconstruction
Team and the following year assumed responsibility
for security efforts throughout the Province. Our troops
were confronted by an increasingly violent insurgency
bent on usurping the legitimately elected Government of
Afghanistan and challenging the presence of our forces in
the region.
Not long after our arrival in the South our
forces were fiercely opposed by concentrated insurgent
groups who hoped to test NATO’s resolve. Under
Canadian leadership, OPERATION MEDUSA – the most
significant operation in NATO’s history – demonstrated
Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier is the Commander
Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Canadian Forces.
24
to our adversaries the futility of directly challenging
well-equipped and trained Alliance forces. It broke their
emerging stranglehold and allowed many thousands of
internally displaced persons to return to their homes and
livelihoods.
Post MEDUSA, ISAF operational tactics shifted
to consolidating and expanding the security footprint
by the creation of ‘Afghan Development Zones’. Given
the limited forces available, the concept was to establish
concentrations of coalition and eventually Afghan security
forces, in areas strategically linked to development, which
could provide the security environment needed for growth
of economic and reconstruction efforts. It was predicated
on the expectation of steady growth in the capacity of
Afghan security forces to augment and eventually succeed
coalition forces as the stability footprint expanded, with
progressively greater reconstruction efforts strengthening
public confidence and associated security and stability.
Through 2007 and into 2008, our forces twice
successfully undertook to significantly expand the
security influence in Zhari and Panjwayi Districts, on
the strategically important eastern approach to Kandahar
City. Unfortunately, in both instances it became apparent
that the role we had hoped Afghan security forces might
play in supporting the expansion of the Kandahar City
Afghan Development Zone was not achievable.
Much progress was made in the professionalization
of the Afghan National Army, but similar results with the
police proved much more elusive. At the same time the
Taliban re-oriented their approach, choosing to concentrate
on the more vulnerable Afghan security forces while
increasingly using asymmetric tactics of suicide bombings
and improvised explosive devices to limit ISAF freedom
of movement, all of this aimed to thwart any perception
among the population of improving security and stability.
This was and is also a reality in neighbouring provinces
of the south and to a lesser extent in other parts of the
country.
Canadian hopes for a shifting balance of effort from
security to governance and development in Afghanistan
have been frustrated by these multiple challenges. It was
during this timeframe that the Manley Panel conducted its
very thorough deliberations, and provided comprehensive
recommendations regarding burden-sharing among the
coalition, capability enhancements for our forces, rePROMOUVOIR UN DÉBAT PUBLIC ÉCLAIRÉ SUR
ON TRACK
oriented ‘Whole of Government’ emphasis, and the need
for greater transparency of effort to the Canadian public.
Government’s response to the Panel’s report led to the
formulation of six areas of mission priority and associated
benchmarks derived to measure progress. These were to
be communicated to Canadians through quarterly reports,
the third of which has just been released. Government
direction also resulted in the introduction of medium lift
helicopters and more capable unpiloted aerial vehicles,
another allied battalion in Kandahar, and a much more
robust Canadian civilian presence.
coalition force levels are insufficient. The people of
Kandahar have increasing concerns for their security.
Many are harassed and intimidated by Taliban and are
frustrated by inadequate support or entrenched corruption
of their own government officials. Without sufficient faith
in the eventual outcome, they are reluctant to take sides
in the struggle with the insurgency. This is a matter of
significant concern and overshadows the effects of our
very substantial achievements.
Looking forward, there is a growing international
consensus on the impediments to progress in Afghanistan
and what must be done to eliminate them. Various envoys
...the model we have developed has attracted
much praise and positive interest from our
coalition partners in the South.
By these and other metrics, progress
on many fronts is clear. The competence
and professionalism of Afghan Army units
trained and mentored by our forces has been
impressive and a source of considerable pride.
They are regarded by many as the best of
any throughout the country and are steadily
assuming greater responsibility for security
operations. Police reform is also taking hold,
particularly in Kandahar City, though their
reach and effectiveness in rural areas remains
a vulnerability.
Kandahar Province, Afghanistan; 8 October 2008 — Warrant Officer Tom
In areas of healthcare, education,
Jones of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team works with Afghan soldiers
infrastructure and numerous others, there have during Operation ARAY. Conducted by ISAF Regional Command (South) in
also been many positive developments, largely partnership with the Afghan National Army, Op ARAY disrupted insurgent
attributable to steadily increasing Canadian command and control networks in Panjwayi District and prevented the
civilian presence in the mission. Together our insurgents from infiltrating into Kandahar City.
Joint Task Force Commander and the civilian
DND photo by: Master Corporal Karl McKay
Representative of Canada in Kandahar (the
RoCK) have developed a Kandahar Action
are being appointed and the Obama administration is
Plan which closely integrates objectives and activities of
nearing completion of a comprehensive review of its
the numerous Federal Government Departments involved
strategy in the region.
in the mission. This level of integration in planning and
In a pure military context, it is widely accepted
implementation is unprecedented in our history.
that there are insufficient forces, either ISAF or Afghan,
There remain many challenges to be overcome,
to win public confidence and reverse the insurgency. The
but the model we have developed has attracted much
US has already announced its intention to dramatically
praise and positive interest from our coalition partners in
increase troop commitments in the South, and we know
the South.
this will have a substantial effect on the ISAF presence
Nevertheless, the situation throughoutAfghanistan
in Kandahar province. Likewise, ISAF’s strategy has
in early 2009 is widely portrayed as disappointing in
also evolved as lessons have been learned or re-affirmed.
relation to the initial objectives of both Afghans and the
Chief among these are a progression from the Afghan
international community. Reports cite increased levels
Development Zone concept of the early days to the “Shapeof violence through 2008, higher civilian and military
Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer Security lead” model that has
casualties, and greater Taliban influence in areas where
25
ON TRACK
THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE
ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
26
WISHES TO THANK
L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE
DES ASSOCIATIONS DE
LA DÉFENSE
DÉSIRE REMERCIER
FOR THEIR CO-SPONSORSHIP
OF
THE INSTITUTE’S
25th ANNUAL SEMINAR
POUR LEUR PARRAINAGE
DU
25e SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL
DE L’INSTITUT
FAIRMONT CHÂTEAU LAURIER
OTTAWA, CANADA
OTTAWA, CANADA
26 FEBRUARY 2009
LE 26 FÉVRIER 2009
ON TRACK
achieved some success in various provinces and districts,
and a clear recognition of the need for a more “bottom
up” approach to effects while continuing to extend the
capacity and legitimacy of the central government.
The CF has been working closely with US military
planners, other Regional Command South partners,
and the ISAF chain of command to set the conditions
for continuing progress by our forces in 2009 in ways
that are fully consistent with both the evolving ISAF
strategy and our own strengthened Whole of Government
foundation. More coalition troops in Kandahar will allow
the CF to concentrate its effort more sharply where the
majority of the population lives: on Kandahar City and
the key villages making up the populated approaches to
the city. We will work alongside Afghans to protect the
population where they live and sleep, and build Afghan
confidence of improved and enduring security at the
village or community level. All this should allow us to
build irreversible momentum that sets the conditions for
sustained progress, leading to more enduring holding and
building effects where it matters most in the province.
It has been understood all along that insurgencies
are won politically, not militarily. This reinforces our
approach to harness all elements of available power
and ability, including local, tribal, business, Afghan
governance, Afghan security forces, CF, Whole of
Government, International and Non-Governmental
Organizations, down to city and village level so it is clear
to Kandahar citizens that life improves when we work
together. This will result in the weaving of the social,
economic and political fabrics of Afghan communities.
Canada will make a difference for Afghans.
We will incorporate Whole of Government power and
influence aimed at empowering Afghans to provide an
enduring framework for their people. This struggle will
Kandahar City, Afghanistan — Early morning in a typical
street market.
DND photograph
ultimately be won by Afghan leadership applying Afghan
solutions that are meaningful and visible, and engender
popular support and commitment.
With the noblest of intentions, Canada has made
an enormous commitment to the people of Afghanistan
and endured tremendous sacrifice in doing so. Military
personnel and increasing numbers of Canadian civilians
are experiencing hardship, danger, and professional
challenges of a scope and complexity unlike any we
have experienced in several generations. The pace of
progress, while disappointing to many, is consistent
with the dimensions of the international challenge. The
Canadian response has been resilient and adaptive and will
continue to be so to ensure we leave an enduring legacy of
achievement that Afghans will remember and appreciate
and for which all Canadians can take enormous pride. ©
Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan
by Roy Thomas
In
the pre-election days of August 2008, the
termination of Operation ARGUS garnered little media
attention. This was the label given to the Canadian Forces
Roy Thomas is a retired Armour officer with United Nations
service in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Afghanistan,
Macedonia, Sarajevo and Haiti. He was hi-jacked in South
Lebanon and taken hostage in Bosnia. Mr. Thomas is a graduate
of the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College, Quetta,
Baluchistan.
(CF) Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A),
initiated in September 2005, consisting of 15-18 military
planners and one or more civilians led by a Colonel.1
Ignoring the ending of this short-lived initiative
shortly after the departure of General Rick Hillier as
Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff in July 2008 should
come as no surprise. After General Hillier departed as
Commander International Security and Assistance Force
(ISAF) in August 2004, the ISAF Strategic Advisory Team
that he had provided was also withdrawn. Indeed the very
27
ON TRACK
origins of direct military planning assistance to Afghan
government departments seem to be unknown, especially
among the critics2 of the CF’s SAT-A.
This short paper will outline the origins of
Canada’s SAT-A, which in fact can be found in 2004 –
before its start date of September 2005 – and may very
well have roots that reach back to the continued unresolved
political situation in Bosnia.
In the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia,
“the military and security objectives of the Dayton Accord
were solidified fairly early in NATO’s deployment but
other objectives of governance and development were
not.”3 Thus it has been suggested that the provision of
the first planners to the Afghan government from NATO
staff in 2004 was the result of experiences in the former
Yugoslavia.4 These first planners provided to Afghan
authorities in Kabul came from NATO’s ISAF headquarters
during the tenure of General Hillier as commander,5 not
from Canada.
At a meeting preceding General Hillier’s
assumption of command of ISAF in early 2004, Afghan
President Hamid Karzai had noted that “the absence
of unified action by the multitude of governments and
organizations in Afghanistan had resulted in a dissipation
of development efforts, and correspondingly, the potential
effects”6 as the most pressing of his four major concerns.
The urgent requirement for a unifying framework is best
understood by looking at the strategic situation confronting
ISAF in February 2004.
There were two major military campaigns
underway in Afghanistan at that time. First, there was the
ISAF military effort itself, dedicated to securing the capital
of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and its hopedfor elected successor in 2005. Canadians contributed to
ISAF under the aegis of Operation ATHENA. Second,
there was the American-led campaign, labeled Operation
Enduring Freedom,7 to uproot the terrorist al-Qaeda
28
The author (centre) with some companions outside the
Frontier Scout fort at Ashewat near Qumruddin Karez
on the so-called Pakistan / Afghanistan border, 1989.
institutions accepted by the Taliban regime on Afghan
soil. Canadians contributed to this campaign under aegis
of Operation ARCHER and until October 2003 under
Operation APOLLO. The need for coordination between
these two campaigns – not to mention the armed elements
of the ATA – necessitated an American creation, the Office
of Military Co-operation for Afghanistan.
Literally
thousands
of
non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) operated in Afghanistan...
Governance and development were part of a
basically uncoordinated international effort to provide
resources to reconstruct Afghanistan and hopefully to
reconcile Afghans of various sects, tribes, language
groups and political persuasion. Nominal lead for relief,
recovery, reconstruction and ultimately development
of Afghanistan as a sovereign state was the mandate of
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA). Notably missing in Afghanistan was any UN
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs presence,
which was often found in other missions. This coordination
function was added to the burdens of the UN Secretary
General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan. The
extent of UN involvement is illustrated by the fact that the
UNAMA website had links to 27 other UN agencies with
interests, indeed most with a footprint, in Afghanistan.8
Literally thousands of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) operated in Afghanistan, ranging
from major multinational agencies such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross to small NGOs. The need
for coordination was evident in the creation by the NGOs
themselves of several coordinating bodies. One such
example is the Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau, which
at end of 2003 listed over 200 members.9 Another example
is the Agency Coordinating Body Afghan Relief,10 which
listed even more members at the start of 2004.
In early 2004, in the short term, Karzai’s ATA
regime had to organize an election. For the longer term
ON TRACK
THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE
ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE
DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA
DÉFENSE
WISHES TO THANK
DÉSIRE REMERCIER
FOR THEIR
POUR LEUR
GENEROUS SPONSORSHIP
APPUI GÉNÉREUX
OF
LORS DE
THE INSTITUTE’S
25th ANNUAL
SEMINAR RECEPTION
LA RÉCEPTION DU
25e SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL DE
L’INSTITUT
OTTAWA, CANADA
OTTAWA, CANADA
THURSDAY, 26 FEBRUARY 2009
JEUDI, LE 26 FÉVRIER 2009
goal of sustaining some form of central governance, his
transitional regime had to try to coordinate the wellmeaning attempts to develop Afghanistan into a sovereign
state.
It is at this point that General Hillier stepped in
to provide the initial team of ISAF planners, assigned
from NATO resources under his command, to assist
in developing a strategic framework. This ISAF SAT
produced a proposal which was initially known as the
Structured Process for the Harmonized Development of
Afghanistan. Subsequently it was called the Investment
Management Framework.11 This framework was
developed through a review of the mandates of all the
major organizations in Afghanistan and then compiling
a list of these. ISAF staff on the SAT then assisted the
ATA with incorporating this information into National
Priority Programmes (NPPs). The unifying function of
these NPPs was to be that donor aid would be channeled
through an Afghan budget process. The NPPs represented
a shift from recovery and reconstruction to sustainable
development.12
Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani was
given help with planners for strategic analysis. Two
additional CF officers were deployed from Canada to
help translate the work done so far into a strategic vision
for Afghanistan, to include all the themes necessary for
the creation of a sustainable sovereign state. The product
of this small team and the ISAF planners was the paper
Creating a National Economy: The Path to Security and
Stability in Afghanistan, which provided the strategic
coordinating concept needed for the ATA to take the lead
in re-establishing Afghanistan as a functioning state.13
This paper served as the precursor to the Afghanistan
National Development Strategy.
The planning assistance provided under the aegis
of NATO through ISAF was apparently appreciated.
29
ON TRACK
Finance Minister Ghani, at an International Development
Research Centre conference in Ottawa in March 2005,
before the creation of Canada’s SAT-A, is reported to have
complimented the ISAF planners and, in particular, the
Canadians assigned to the ISAF SAT for their unfettered
assistance.14
Although the Afghans appeared pleased with
the assistance provided by the ISAF planners, General
Hillier’s successor as Commander ISAF withdrew these
personnel after he assumed command. This provided an
opportunity for civilians, whether from governments or
agencies or NGOs, to step in and provide the planning
assistance requested by the central Afghan authorities.
None stepped up!
In 2005, “when [Hillier] visited troops in
Afghanistan as the Chief of Defence Staff, President
Karzai asked if he would be willing to provide those guys
again. The CDS agreed.”15 The CF SAT-A deployed on
Operation ARGUS starting in September 2005. When
asked in an interview about this decision, General Hillier
was quoted as saying, “We did it because no one else
did, but our intention was to shift it to a civilian focused
capability.”16
The history of Operation ARGUS remains to be
told.17 However, it is clear that its origins are to be found
in the help provided by ISAF planners during General
Hillier’s tour as Commander ISAF in 2004. The usefulness
of that assistance led to President Karzai’s request in 2005
for uniquely Canadian assistance as, in the intervening
year, no civilian agency or agencies had stepped up to
provide similar help.
We should be proud of that Canadian leadership
and initiative.
(Endnotes)
1
Mike Capstick, “Operation ARGUS,” http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/Operation_ARGUS.pdf, and Nipa
Banjerjee, “Capacity Building – A Myth in Afghanistan?” On Track, Summer, 2008, Vol. 13, No. 2.
(continued p. 32)
30
ON TRACK
THE VIMY AWARD
Nominations are invited for the 2009 Vimy Award.
The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the
Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) to
recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made
a significant and outstanding contribution to
the defence and security of our nation and the
preservation of our
democratic values.
Previous recipients of this prestigious award include:
General John de Chastelain, Major-General
Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo
Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Right
Honourable Brian Dickson, Lieutenant-General
Charles H.Belzile, the Honourable Barnett
Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall,
Colonel the Honourable John Fraser,
General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson,
Mr. G. Hamilton Southam, BrigadierGeneral David Fraser, General Raymond
R. Henault, and General Rick Hillier.
LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
Nous invitons les nominations
Distinction honorifique Vimy 2009.
pour
la
La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée
en 1991 par l’Institut de la Conférence des
associations de la défense dans le but de
reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou
Canadienne qui s’est distingué par sa contribution
à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la
preservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.
Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction
honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général
John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis
MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire,
M. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian
Dickson, le Lieutenant-général Charles
H. Belzile, l’Honorable Barnett Danson,
le Commodore de l’Air Leonard Birchall,
Colonel l’Honorable John Fraser, le Général
Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G.
Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général
David Fraser, le Général Raymond R.
Henault et lr Général Rick Hillier.
Any Canadian may nominate one
individual citizen for the award.
Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied
by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and
include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee.
Nominations must be received by 1 August 2009, and
should be addressed to:
Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut
nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour
la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent
nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d’un
sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination
et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent
nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2009, et doivent être
adressées au:
VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3
COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION
ONORIFIQUE VIMY
L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE
LA DÉFENSE
222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3
The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday,
November 20 2009, at a gala dinner that
will be held in the Canadian War Museum.
La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi,
le 20 novembre 2009, à un diner qui aura lieu dans le
Musée canadien de la guerre.
For more information, including ticket orders for the
Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence
Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236
8191; e-mail [email protected]; or telephone (613) 236 9903.
Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande
de billets pour le diner, veuillez contacter l’Institut de la
Conférence des associations de la Défense à l’adresse cihaut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel:
[email protected]; or téléphone (613) 236 9903.
31
ON TRACK
2
Paul LaRose Edwards, “NATO and Militaries as Trusted Partners in Civil-Military Interaction”, The Pearson Papers, Vol.
11, Issue 1, Spring 2008, p.22 – cites the CF SAT-A as an example of the military undertaking what civilians should do. Other critics
note that the CF SAT-A has been associated with a government linked with corruption, a somewhat ironic criticism in view of the fact
that the Gomery Inquiry was ongoing over part of the life of the Canadian SAT team’s existence.
3
Colonel Mike Capstick, “A Military Solution to Fostering Civil Service Capability,” Vanguard, May/June 2007, p.12.
Colonel Capstick was the first commander of the CF SAT-A.
4
General Hillier, in an essay co-authored with Howard Coombs, also suggests the provision of military planners was the
result of Canadian experiences in the former Yugoslavia. Their contribution was titled “Command and Control during Peace Support
Operations: Creating Common Intent in Afghanistan”, in Allan English, editor, The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives,
Leadership and Command, Kingston, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006, p. 178. General Hillier was the Commander of ISAF
when ISAF provided military planners in the original SAT-A and Howard Coombs was a Canadian officer brought from Canada to
augment this 2004 ISAF team.
5
General Hillier commanded ISAF from February 9 to August 12, 2004.
6
Coombs and Hillier, in English, op cit; p. 177
7
Operation Enduring Freedom also had theatres of operations in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa, with all three
reporting to Central Command headquarters in Florida.
8
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, www.unama-afg.org
9
Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau, www.ancb.org
10
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, www.acbar.org
11
Howard G. Coombs and General Rick Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in PostConflict Afghanistan”, Canadian Military Journal, Autumn, 2005, Vol. 6, p. 8.
12
Coombs and Hillier, Ibid; p. 9
13
Coombs and Hillier, Ibid p. 10, 11
14
Scott Gilmore and Janan Mosazai, “Defence, Development and Diplomacy,” in Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods, editors,
Exporting Good Governance, Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007, p. 158
15
Colonel Capstick, op cit; p. 13
16
Interview, General Hillier with Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher as reported in “Transforming Force”, Vanguard, March/
April, 2008, p18.
17
Colonel Capstick, “A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan,” On Track, Autumn, 2006, Vol. 11, No. 3, p13,
14 – provides a good start point for the history of Operation ARGUS. ©
Un Dernier Tour de Piste à Fort Bliss
par le lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gilles Paradis, en collaboration avec le lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Raymond
Taillefer
En
janvier et février dernier, environ 3,000
militaires, la majorité d’entre eux provenant du Secteur
du Québec de la Force terrestre (SQFT), ont complété leur
entraînement préparatoire au déploiement en Afghanistan
de la Force opérationnelle 1-09 (FO 1-09). Au moment
où vous lirez ces lignes, la plupart d’entre eux seront déjà
arrivés dans leur secteur de mission ou seront en route
vers la province de Kandahar afin de relever les militaires
du Secteur du Centre de la Force terrestre de la FO 3-08.
Cet entraînement, avec la série d’exercices
Le lieutenant-colonel Gilles Paradis ainsi que le lieutenantcolonel Raymond Taillefer ont fait carrière avec le Royal
22e Régiment. Le lieutenant-colonel Paradis est depuis 1999
analyste militaire avec la Société Radio-Canada (SRC) et avec
le Réseau de l’Information (RDI) de la SRC à Montréal. Le
lieutenant-colonel Taillefer effectue des fonctions similaires
avec Le Canal Nouvelles (LCN) à partir de Québec.
32
tenus à Wainwright à l’automne 2008, aura été le point
culminant d’un cycle qui aura duré près d’un an pour
la vaste majorité de ces militaires. Comme les aires
d’entraînement situées au Canada ne peuvent offrir
en hiver des conditions se rapprochant de celles avec
lesquelles les soldats canadiens seront appelés à vivre en
Afghanistan, cette phase d’acclimatation dans le désert
du Texas et du Nouveau-Mexique devient essentielle
afin d’optimiser la préparation et faciliter l’adaptation en
théâtre opérationnel. Une préparation dans des conditions
quasi-identiques de topographie, de climat, de variations
de température, de poussière, de types de missions et ce
au sein des mêmes équipages et équipes qui oeuvreront
en Afghanistan permet de diminuer les risques inhérents à
cette mission.
Suite à une invitation du Conseil national de
(voir p. 34)
ON TRACK
THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD
PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
Nominations are invited for the 2009 Ross Munro
Media Award.
Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross
Munro, 2008.
The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in
2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations
(CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its
purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian
journalist who has made a significant and
outstanding contribution to the general
public’s understanding of issues that relate to
Canada’s defence and security.
Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la
première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des
associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration
avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs
Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître
annuellement un journalist canadien qui a
contribué de manière importante et remarquable
à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions
liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.
The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of
the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of
$2,500.
The past recipients of this prestigious award are
Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon
obson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie
Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, and Alec
Castonguay.
Anyone may nominate a journalist for
the award. Nominations must be in writing,
accompanied by two letters of support,
and include a summary of reasons for the
nomination, a brief biographical sketch
of the nominee, and samples of the journalist’s work.
Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click:
Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1
September 2009, and should be addressed to:
Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une
reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix
en argent de 2500 $.
Au nombre des lauréats des années
précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne,
Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce
Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford,
Matthew Fisher, et Alec Castonguay.
Toute personne peut nommer un
journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les
nominations doivent nous parvenir par
deux letters du soutien, être
accompagnées d’un sommaire citant
les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d’une biographie
du candidat et des examples des écrits du journaliste.
Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro
Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus
tard le 1 septembre 2009, et doivent être adressées au:
ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3
COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222 SOMERSET STREET, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3
The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on
Friday, 14 November 2008, at the Vimy Award dinner
that will be held in the LeBreton Galley of the Canadian
War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable
Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, has been
invited to attend as the guest of honour.
Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 14
novembre 2008, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans la galerie
LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence
la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale
du Canada, a été invitée.
For more information, including ticket orders for the
Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence
Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail [email protected], or telephone (613) 236-9903.
Pour de plus informations, incluant la demande de
billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des
associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191;
courriel [email protected], ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.
33
ON TRACK
Entraînement aux manœuvres d’approche et de prise de contrôle
d’un hameau où la présence d’insurgés a été confirmée.
liaison des forces canadiennes (CNLF) et du bureau des
affaires publiques du SQFT, quelques officiers retraités
agissant comme analystes militaires auprès des médias du
Québec ont pu passer quelques jours en compagnie des
soldats à Fort Bliss. Ils tiennent par le biais de cet article à
présenter quelques-unes de leurs observations qui peuvent
être partagées avec les lecteurs de la revue ON TRACK.
Bon nombre d’informations sur les tactiques, la capacité
des armes et des équipements ne peuvent toutefois
être divulguées pour des considérations de sécurité.
Un entraînement de plus en plus adapté à la
réalité afghane
L’entraînement tenu à Fort Bliss est très polyvalent. Il intègre aux manœuvres d’une guerre conventionnelle les opérations de contre-insurrection,
d’assistance aux projets de développement et de bonne
gouvernance, illustrant ainsi la transition qui a cours dans
la doctrine et les méthodes d’entraînement de la Force
terrestre. Lors de discussions tenues avec le Lieutenant
général Andrew Leslie (Chef d’état-major de la Force
terrestre) et le Major général Marquis Hainse (Commandant du Système de la doctrine et de l’instruction de
la Force terrestre), tous deux de passage à Fort Bliss en
visite aux troupes, on retient que ce qui est devenu primordial est la capacité d’analyser rapidement les leçons
apprises en Afghanistan et d’adapter conséquemment la
préparation des contingents suivants. Le processus est
ainsi grandement accéléré et les soldats n’ont plus à attendre la publication des manuels de doctrine officiels
afin de mettre en pratique les modifications exigées par
34
le besoin de continuellement s’adapter aux conditions
toujours changeantes des opérations en Afghanistan.
Tous les principaux groupes constitués qui
opéreront en Afghanistan au cours de la prochaine
rotation se sont entraînés en conditions de tir réel en
vue de leurs futures missions. Le groupement tactique
du 2e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment (GT 2e R22eR)
commandé par le lieutenant-colonel Jocelyn Paul, a mis
l’accent sur les opérations prolongées, pouvant aller
jusqu’à quelques semaines en campagne, des équipes de
combat (sécurisation de zones et de hameaux, défense
de points d’appui, bivouacs en leagers, manœuvres
pour parer aux embuscades, etc.) avec une coordination
interarmes bien rodée. L’élément de sécurité de l’équipe
de reconstruction provinciale (ERP Kandahar) ainsi
que les équipes de liaison et de mentorat opérationnel
(ELMO) ont appris à mieux maîtriser les différentes
facettes de leurs tâches. La batterie d’artillerie, équipée
des canons M777, a impressionné les observateurs
autant par la capacité d’atteindre avec grande précision
des cibles situées à une distance très supérieure à la
portée des autres obusiers que par la cadence de tir
qu’une section de servants bien entraînée peut soutenir
pendant une action intense. Les sections d’ingénieurs, dont
dépend la lourde responsabilité d’améliorer la sécurité
des déplacements contre la présence d’engins explosifs
improvisés (EEI), ont également profité d’un entraînement
parallèle tout aussi intensif. Quant au bataillon d’aviation,
unité récemment formée suite à la mise en service en
Afghanistan d’hélicoptères CH-146 Griffon et CH-147D
Chinook, les pilotes et membres d’équipage ont tiré
profit de la topographie et de la poussière de Fort Bliss
pour pratiquer leurs manœuvres en appui aux troupes de
combat terrestres ou au soutien logistique.
Le déploiement à Fort Bliss aura également permis
aux militaires constituant l’élément de soutien national
(ESN) d’adapter leur travail aux conditions exigeantes
des régions désertiques. Le personnel d’entretien des
véhicules et de l’équipement doit contrecarrer les effets
nocifs de la poussière dans les mécanismes et dans les
systèmes électroniques sensibles. Les membres des
services médicaux ont été particulièrement en mode
préventif avec une campagne énergique visant à prévenir
les troupes gastriques, les morsures de serpents, les
piqûres d’insectes, les effets néfastes de la déshydratation
et de multiples autres menaces contre la santé du soldat,
et donc contre leur capacité opérationnelle, avec lesquels
ils sont beaucoup moins familiers au Canada.
Le commandant du 5 Groupe brigade mécanisé
du Canada (5e GBMC), le Colonel (bientôt promu au
grade intérimaire de brigadier général pour la durée
de l’affectation) Daniel Ménard, a également exploité
l’occasion pour débuter l’entraînement du futur
ON TRACK
dans les domaines de l’habillement et de l’équipement
individuel ainsi que les améliorations continues apportées
aux véhicules blindés, à l’armement, aux technologies
de l’information et, tout aussi important, aux mesures de
soutien aux soldats et à leur famille.
Le Conseil de liaison des Forces canadiennes
Les membres des équipes de liaison et de mentorat
opérationnel (ELMO) s’entraînent à accompagner
les soldats de l’armée nationale afghane (ANA)
lors de patrouilles à pied.
Un mot sur la participation du Conseil de liaison
des Forces canadiennes (CLFC). Le bureau du Québec
du CLFC a été l’instigateur de la présence pendant
quelques jours de gens influents du milieu des affaires
du Québec parmi les soldats à l’entraînement à Fort
Bliss. Cet organisme récemment créé a comme objectif
global de promouvoir les relations entre les institutions
militaires et les milieux d’affaires du Canada. Un aspect
qui lui est important est la sensibilisation des dirigeants
d’entreprise aux bénéfices de la présence de réservistes
dans leur organisation et au gain qu’ils peuvent retirer
de leur participation à une mission en termes de sens
de l’initiative, de responsabilisation individuelle et
de la capacité à travailler en équipe. Le groupe des
dirigeants d’entreprises invités s’est intégré aux soldats
en n’hésitant pas à porter le casque d’acier et la veste antifragmentation. Ces personnes ont été unanimes à exprimer
comment elles étaient impressionnées par le réalisme de
l’entraînement, la qualité du soldat canadien et l’efficacité
de l’organisation militaire dans l’ensemble.
quartier général de la Force opérationnelle interarmées
(Afghanistan) qui prendra la relève du quartier général
présentement sous le commandement du brigadier général
Jonathan Vance.
L’effort logistique exigé par le déploiement à
Fort Bliss aura été colossal et les logisticiens qui l’ont
réalisé peuvent en être fiers. Transporter par groupes
successifs plus de 3,000 militaires et observateurs ainsi
que les véhicules et l’équipement requis pour soutenir
l’entraînement aura nécessité une vingtaine d’aéronefs des
Forces canadiennes, 232 wagons de train, 55 conteneurs
maritimes et bien d’autres statistiques
impressionnantes dont nous vous faisons
grâce.
L’entraînement ne remplace jamais
réellement l’expérience acquise dans la
dure réalité des opérations de combat. Le
contingent profitera toutefois amplement de
l’expérience de 20% à 25% de ses membres
qui en seront à leur deuxième tour et d’une
cinquantaine d’autres dont ce sera la troisième
mission en Afghanistan. Enfin, soulignons
l’apport indispensable des réservistes qui
constitueront environ 15% du contingent.
Des critiques fusent occasionnellement
à propos de la qualité de l’équipement
militaire canadien. Bien qu’il y ait toujours
des lacunes et de nouvelles technologies à
intégrer dans l’inventaire militaire, les soldats
rencontrés sont dans la vaste majorité très
satisfaits de leur matériel. Les plus anciens
aiment souligner les changements importants
Troupe d’artilleurs avec le canon M777 en mission de tir dans un
survenus au cours de la dernière décennie
paysage qui rappelle la province de Kandahar.
35
ON TRACK
Conclusion
Concluons en soulignant que cet entraînement
dans un environnement aussi similaire qu’il se peut au
théâtre opérationnel permettra sans doute de réduire significativement les risques auxquels sont confrontés les
soldats servant dans la province de Kandahar et épargner
possiblement la ressource la plus précieuse des Forces
canadiennes: la vie de ses soldats. L’effort logistique et
financier requis pour ce déploiement aura été un investissement à grande valeur ajoutée non seulement pour les
Forces canadiennes en regard de son actuelle implica-
tion sur le théâtre afghan mais également pour la société
canadienne qui y gagne des soldats qui continueront tout
au long de leur vie à servir comme citoyens aptes à faire
face avec succès à des situations exigeant une capacité
d’analyse et de décision ainsi qu’un sens aigu des responsabilités dans un cadre de travail d’équipe. Au retour de
ce voyage d’observation tous avaient à l’esprit l’image
de ces hommes et femmes dédiés à leur profession, unis
par un esprit d’équipe unique à la vie militaire face au
danger qui se pointe et confiants devant les nombreux
défis qui les attendent dans la région de Kandahar. ©
Dealing with Islamism
by General (Ret’d) Paul Manson
Commenting
in a useful
way on Islamism is a daunting
task. For one thing, the threat
posed to our Western world by this
militant and often violent form of
Islam is bewildering. Imperfect
as our society may be, it surely
represents the best that mankind
has produced, with its freedoms, respect for human
rights, and opportunities for collective and individual
advancement. To borrow a well-known line from the TV
sitcom, Seinfeld, “How could anybody not like us?” Yet we
face today a force which, in the name of a major religion,
threatens to change our society in the most radical way,
in effect setting it back many centuries while potentially
killing millions along the way.
A measure of our bewilderment is the proliferation
of names which are variously assigned to this threat and
its purveyors. Beyond Islamism, one hears and reads about
Jihad, Radical Islam, Militant Islam, Islamic Extremism,
Islamic Terrorism, Islamofascism and other such names
which attempt to distinguish this abhorrent form of Islam
from its more benign mainstream.
Whatever it may be called, the phenomenon is very
real, and it must be understood if it is to be thwarted.
But therein lies a problem. By what rules of
logic and rationality can it be analyzed, and judgments
made? When in the 20th century we confronted Hitler’s
Nazis and Mussolini’s Fascists (and to a lesser extent
Japanese Imperialism) we pretty well understood what
General (Ret’d) Paul Manson is a former Chief of the Defence
Staff, and is a past president of the CDA Institute. He is a
member of the CDA Institute’s Board of Directors.
36
we were up against, because their political philosophies,
as repugnant as they were, were clearly understood.
Likewise, Communism was more or less an open book. In
these cases we were able to judge the opposing systems in
the context of a familiar analytical frame of reference, the
product of centuries of evolving western thought.
Not so in the case of Islamism, partly because its
proponents, practitioners and apologists think in radically
different ways, according to a mindset that is based on
a rigid and harsh interpretation of the Qur’an and an
evolved body of religious doctrine called the hadith. Thus,
the extremists see Islam as the only true religion, while
rejecting and condemning all who do not subscribe to it.
They believe it is the will of Allah that the world become a
universal ummah, or Islamic community, and that all nonbelievers be converted, subjugated or eliminated within
the political confines of a global Caliphate, returning to
the 7th century Islamic ideal.
Regrettably, our failure to analyze, understand
and speak frankly about Islamism is also due in no small
way to an atmosphere of political correctness and selfcensorship, producing a doctrinal blindness that was not
present in the cases of National Socialism, Italian Fascism
and Marxism-Leninism.
The radical search for a new Caliphate lay dormant
for centuries, as Muslim expansion into Europe and Asia
was reversed, and as social progress was inhibited through
factional strife, corruption and ineffective leadership. It
was awakened in the 1920s with the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, but this was largely ignored by
the free world. Our attention was caught in 1979 with
the expulsion of the Shah of Iran and occupation of the
American embassy in Teheran, but little heed was paid
by the West until the horror of 9/11. Since then, Islamist
ON TRACK
fervour has been growing exponentially throughout the
Middle East and beyond, with new outrages in London,
Madrid, Bali, Mumbai and Lahore, to say nothing of preempted strikes elsewhere.
In the eyes of those who subscribe to this extreme
brand of Islam, such murderous activity is justified by their
tendentious interpretation of religious doctrine. The West
is seen as an infidel, decadent society given to excesses
that are offensive to Islam; it can only be saved by being
brought into the Islamic fold. In executing this religious
imperative, the extremists feel none of the behavioural
constraints, legal or moral, that qualify our own activity.
Suicide attacks in the name of Allah are glorified
and encouraged with promises of Qur’anic paradise.
Beheadings are justified through an interpretation of the
Prophet Muhammed’s entreaty that “When you meet
the unbelievers, strike off their heads.”1 International
humanitarian law is utterly disregarded in their conduct
of military operations. Non-combatants are legitimate
targets. Even the killing of innocent Muslims – a frequent
outcome – is excused.2
Such radical thinking is not a recent development.
In the words of a 14th century historian and philosopher,
Abdel Rahman ibn Khaldun, “In the Muslim community,
the jihad is a religious duty because of the universalism
of the Islamic mission and the obligation (to convert)
everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force.”3
It might be argued that this is not very different
from the 15th century Spanish Inquisition, but that was
centuries ago, and the comparison with today’s Islamist
zealotry is hardly valid. Such excesses in the 21st century
as the gleeful beheading of “infidels” and the execution of
apostates set Islamists apart. It is important to understand,
in trying to make sense of their heinous behaviour, that
they have their own logic and reference frame, a grossly
distorting window through which they in fact see us as the
aberrant society, justifying their actions.
A very important question, in all of this, is the
extent to which their radical world view is representative
of thinking in the mainstream of Islam. Moderate Muslim
leaders tell us that, on the contrary, theirs is a peaceful, nonviolent religion; this is certainly the general impression
that prevailed before 9/11. In the wake of that event it is
fair to say that there has emerged a notion in our society
that all of the world’s one and a half billion Muslims fall
1
2
Qur’an, Sura 47:4.
For a fascinating first-hand account, see The Development of A Jihadist’s Mind, by Tawfiq Hamid, Hudson
Institute Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the
Muslim World, 6 April 2007
3
Quoted by Efraim Karsh in the Wall Street Journal, 4
April 2006
into either one or the other of two categories, namely the
mainstream, moderate and peaceful version on the one
hand, or the extremist version on the other.
How serious, then, is the real threat from Islamism
today?
There is considerable evidence that this is an
oversimplification. In the UK following the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some 35% of
Muslims declared in a poll that Al Qaeda’s attack was
justified. In that country and in Europe in general, there is
growing concern that the expanding Muslim population is
a threat to traditional values and institutions, a sentiment
that is reflected in pointed terms like “Eurabia” and
“Londonistan.”
And then there was the violent and incomprehensible reaction to the Danish cartoons throughout the
Muslim world.
Here in Canada the Muslim community has
been damaged by less-than-categorical statements from
certain Islamic associations and their leaders, purporting
to represent the attitudes of the community at large. The
World Trade Center episode was condemned, but all
too often with an added “however.” Demands for the
superimposition of Sharia law on Canadian Muslims
have raised serious concerns, and the appearance on our
streets of women dressed in head-to-toe burkas suggests
that there are echoes here of the Taliban’s dreadful
subjugation of women in Afghanistan. There have been
calls for the creation of special prayer spaces, meal
provisions and reserved times in recreational facilities
for Muslim university students. Some of our universities
have become hotbeds of anti-Israel sentiment and thinly
disguised anti-Semitism.
Nevertheless, Canadians recognize that the vast
majority of Muslims in this country detest the extremism
of Al Qaeda and its worldwide affiliates, including the
Taliban. Many Muslim immigrants – perhaps most –
came to Canada to escape the conflict and oppression that
militant Islam had brought to their countries of origin.
How serious, then, is the real threat from Islamism
today?
It must be taken seriously, for a number of
reasons. There is no denying the spread of extremism into
the democratic world, as evidenced by the uncovering of
numerous terrorist cells, some of them home grown, but
usually having some sort of connection with professional
jihadists based in the Middle East. A particular concern
is the proliferation of Madrassa religious schools, chiefly
37
ON TRACK
in Pakistan, where impressionable young Muslim boys
are indoctrinated (some would say brainwashed) into a
culture of hatred and total dedication to the destruction
of Western society. Al Qaeda is known to have active
branches ranging from West Africa to Indonesia, and it
is penetrating northward into the Balkans. Increasingly,
Al Qaeda is becoming adept at the use of global
communications to spread its word. As laughable as these
are, the occasional video proclamations by Bin Laden and
his deputy, al Zawahiri, are taken seriously by countless
Muslims.
These are reasons enough for us to pay heed to the
Islamist phenomenon, but one additional aspect demands
our full attention: the threat of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction. The discredited WMD link
with the invasion of Iraq has numbed our society in regard
to these weapons to the point of scepticism, but their
potential use by terrorists raises the spectre of devastating
attacks on our cities and people, attacks that would make
9/11 look like child’s play. As we have seen, there is
no moral inhibition on their part to the use of nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons against the West. The
only obstacle, in the eyes of the Islamists, is the practical
matter of difficulty of access and delivery.
Meanwhile, the extremists carry on their insurgent
campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other areas. They
continue to work towards the elimination of Israel and
other democratic nations. Terrorist attacks continue around
the world. Infiltration of the “infidel” West continues, and
the radicals increasingly present themselves as the voice
of Islam.
All of this sounds alarming, but at best it is a modest
estimate of what is happening in what has been called
“The Long War,” a global conflict in which Afghanistan,
Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza are mere skirmishes.
How then should we respond?
“More seriously” is one answer. NATO and its
international allies have to stop the Taliban from returning
to power in Afghanistan, but until now they have not
done a good job of it. We need to show the Muslim world
that the West is not the “Great Satan” that it is made out
to be by the jihadists. We can do this, for example, by
increasingly sharing our wealth with poorer parts of the
world through overseas development assistance. We
need to show relentlessly that the free and democratic
way of life we enjoy is infinitely better than the virulent,
misogynist society which Islamism brings to its subjects.
At home, we must demonstrate clearly that we
will not allow our hard-won democracy to be eroded by
proponents of religious extremism. We must also show
that we are utterly determined to protect our cherished
way of life, and that we are able to do so without violating
the sacred freedom which is the hallmark of our liberal
democratic society.
In the final analysis, however, it is from within
Islam itself that the principal solution must be found.
Moderate adherents of this religion have to remove the
destructive cancer that is growing within it. In effect,
the jihadists are attempting to hijack Islam, and they are
succeeding largely because of the passive stance of many
Muslims in what has been called the struggle for the soul
of Islam.
Islamism has to be seen for what it really is: a
political rather than a religious phenomenon.
Failure to stop it, both from within and without
Islam, will only encourage a continuation of its assault
on enlightened society, reversing centuries of human
progress, and at huge cost. ©
Employer Support for US National Guard and Reserve
by Jayson L. Spiegel
The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
have placed enormous strain on the members of the
United States National Guard, Reserve and their civilian
employers. Unlike their active duty counterparts,
members of the Guard and Reserve must simultaneously
maintain both a civilian and military career. Despite the
Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director of the Reserve
Officers Association of the United States
38
unprecedented level of Guard/Reserve mobilization, most
employers have fulfilled their legal obligation to their
employees who are called up. Some employers do more
than the minimum required by federal law and continue
to provide pay and benefits to their employees while
they are on active duty. However, recent developments
suggest that there may be cracks in continued employer
support. Without such support, the Pentagon’s ability to
rely on the Reserve Components in the future will become
problematic.
ON TRACK
Since September 11, 2001, the National Guard
and Reserve have evolved from a strategic reserve to an
operational force that provides forces for deployment
on a rotational basis. As of January 2009, over 126,600
Guardsmen and Reservists were on active duty in support
of ongoing operations. In addition to their overseas
responsibilities, 50,000 National Guard soldiers served in
Hurricane Katrina relief operations and thousands more
participated in border security operations. Since 2001,
over 350,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers
have deployed for duty in Iraq, Afghanistan or homelanddefence missions.
Many observers have questioned whether the
Guard and Reserve can remain a viable operational
force. In its March 2007 report to the US Congress, the
Commission on National Guard and Reserve (CNGR)
stated:
The current posture and utilization of
the National Guard and Reserve as an
‘operational reserve’ is not sustainable
over time, and if not corrected with
significant changes to law and policy, the
reserve component’s ability to serve our
nation will diminish.
The CNGR noted that “the long-term viability for
recruiting and retention remains highly problematic” for
the Guard and Reserve. Over the last decade, the number
of prior active duty personnel enlisting in the Guard and
Reserve has steadily decreased. The percentage of parents,
teachers and other ‘influencers’ willing to recommend
military service to their children or other young people
has continually decreased. The total youth propensity to
enlist declined from 15% of the population to only 10%
from 2005 to 2006.
Of greater concern is the potential for declining
support for the Guard and Reserve among civilian
employers. Without continued robust employer support,
the Pentagon may have to rethink its future use of the
Reserve Components.
In a very real sense, private industry subsidizes
national defence. The National Guard and Reserve are an
attractive manpower pool because they are only called
upon and paid when needed. Since they are not paid fulltime, they cost less than their active duty counterparts
who are paid full-time. Reliance on the National Guard
and Reserve, therefore, makes fiscal sense. However,
when members of the National Guard and Reserve are
needed for duty, any economic consequences their
employers might suffer because of their absence are not
considered by the Pentagon. Employers must allow their
employees to report for mobilization or military training,
regardless of the circumstance. The employer must allow
the employee to go even if the employee volunteered for
duty, the absence is at a crucial time for the employer,
and the absence of the employee would be economically
devastating.
Federal law as embodied in the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA) generally requires employers to return
members of the Guard and Reserve to their former jobs
upon their return from duty.1 Because the employee’s job
is protected under federal law, employers are limited in
how they can replace the employee.
If an employer hires a temporary replacement,
it incurs hiring and training costs and suffers a loss of
productivity until the temporary employee becomes
proficient. When the reservist-employee completes
military duty, he/she must be reinstated, even if
the temporary replacement is a superior employee.
Accordingly, employers are subsidizing national security
because their employees can be called away for extended
and multiple deployments, sometimes with little or no
notice, regardless of the economic cost to the employer.
Employers bear the risk of economic loss if their employee
is mobilized as federal law provides no compensation if
the employer suffers as a result of mobilization.
Significantly, most employers only have one
reservist on the payroll – more than 80% of all employers
that employ at least one reservist only employ one reservist.
Despite the fact that there are over one million members
of the Guard and Reserve, only five businesses employ
more than 700 reservists. According to the Department
of Defense the leading employers are Wal-Mart (2,611
reservists), United Parcel Service (1,145), Home Deport
(1,010), FedEx Corp. (974), and Lockheed Martin (738).
The absence of one employee from a Fortune 500
company due to mobilization should not pose a problem.
However, the absence of that one employee from a small
business could be devastating, especially if the reservist
is a key employee. The fact that most businesses only
employ one reservist may also lead to a corporate culture
that is less understanding of Guard or Reserve duty. In the
absence of a critical mass of reservists, employers may
be less informed about USERRA and feel less interested
in providing support other than the minimum required by
law.
Six percent of reservists are self-employed, many
of them doctors, lawyers, dentists, construction workers
or tradesmen. Obviously, a self-employed reservist risks
severe economic loss upon mobilization as his/her business
may be shuttered during mobilization. Customers may
gravitate to other businesses during mobilization while
business debts remain due. A variety of programmes
including Small Business Administration disaster loans are
39
ON TRACK
available to assist self-employed reservists in rebuilding
their business after mobilization. Loss of goodwill or a
customer base cannot, however, be easily recovered.
Today, members of the Guard and Reserve can
expect to serve at least one year out of every five on
active duty with many months of additional training
leading up to the year of mobilization.
The CNGR noted that over 50% of employers
stated in a 2007 survey that they would not hire a
reservist because their employee could be mobilized,
despite federal law prohibiting such discrimination.
Significantly, the CNGR stated that the trend of employers
to question hiring reservists is directly correlated to
when the Pentagon began referring to the Guard and
Reserve as an “operational reserve” as opposed to a
“strategic reserve.” As the report explained, if the Guard
and Reserve are “operational,” then they are not really
a force held in reserve. Accordingly, employers are less
willing to hire prospective employees more likely to face
frequent extended absences due to deployments. Despite
USERRA’s prohibition on discrimination in employment,
the poll suggests that discrimination occurs.
Further cracks in employer support are also
apparent. A November 2007 hearing of the US Senate
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee
demonstrated that reservists find that mobilization has put
their jobs, healthcare and benefits at risk: nearly 11,000
reservists were denied reemployment; more than 22,000
lost seniority, pay and benefits; nearly 20,000 had their
pensions cut; nearly 11,000 failed to get their health
insurance back; and 23% of reservists surveyed in 2006
who could not find a job after deployment attributed their
unemployment to the failure of their employer to comply
with USERRA.
Such findings may not be surprising in light of the
extent of the ongoing mobilization. Employment support
laws like USERRA were not originally designed for a
Guard and Reserve that serves as an operational rotational
force similar to active duty forces. At the time USERRA
was enacted, the Guard and Reserve were a strategic
reserve intended to support domestic operations such as
natural disasters or fight in World War III. The former
operations might occur frequently but would be of only
a few weeks duration. The latter might last for years but
would only occur once in a generation, if ever.
Today, members of the Guard and Reserve can
expect to serve at least one year out of every five on active
duty with many months of additional training leading up
40
to the year of mobilization.
Although USERRA is generally understood as
requiring that members of the Guard and Reserve return
to their civilian jobs when they are released from active
duty, there are exceptions to the law. First, the law does not
actually guarantee a job upon demobilization. USERRA
only obligates the employer to return the reservist to
the employment status he/she would have had in the
absence of mobilization. If the employee would have
been promoted had he/she not been mobilized, then he/
she must be promoted upon return. If the employee would
have been laid off had he/she not been mobilized, they
will be laid off upon demobilization.
When USERRA was passed, the United States
was still a largely industrial economy with many Guard/
Reserve personnel working in the manufacturing sector.
Barring a recession, employment was steady. An employee
leaving for a year’s mobilization could anticipate that the
factory’s workload would not significantly change during
that year, thereby limiting the likelihood of layoffs. In
today’s service-based economy, employment may depend
on shorter-term contracts and entrepreneurial skills.
When an employee completes one contract, he/she moves
to another contract or opportunity. Many reservists find
today that the contracts they work on expire while they
are mobilized or shortly thereafter. When this happens,
the employer can properly claim that the employee would
have been laid off if he/she had not been mobilized and
USERRA does not apply. Recent Senate hearings suggest
that this USERRA exception is being cited as a basis for
denying re-employment rights.
Moreover, many lawyers argue that a reservist
is not entitled to reemployment if doing so presents a
hardship to the employer, is unreasonable or impractical.
Although lower federal courts have not as yet accepted
that argument, it will continue to be raised. It may be only
a matter of time before a court rules that the reemployment
right is limited, particularly because the reemployment
statutes were not designed for the current environment.
Many employers now require that their employees
sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment, effectively allowing arbitrators to determine
the scope and extent of employee rights under USERRA.
Although various bills have been introduced to prohibit
arbitration of USERRA claims, it is unclear whether any
bill will be passed in the next session of Congress.
Despite the ongoing pace of mobilization, some
employers go beyond the minimum required by USERRA
and provide extensive benefits to their mobilized
employees. These include paying the difference between
military and civilian pay if military pay is lower and
continuing health insurance. Such employers are to be
ON TRACK
commended for their support of their employees. However,
most employers, particularly small businesses, lack the
resources or revenue to continue to pay employees who
are not contributing to the bottom line.
It would be possible to allow market forces to
address the reservist-employer relationship. As the current
mobilization continues, reservists may leave employers
who are less supportive and gravitate toward employers
whose policies are more supportive. Those whose civilian
employment and economic situation so dictate will leave
the military. Reservists who continue to serve may accept
that service limits their civilian career advancement.2 If
these trends prove correct, then employers and reservist/
employees on their own will achieve an equilibrium in
which reservists are available to deploy and then return to
the civilian economy.
Such a state of affairs would not, however, be
acceptable. Our nation has come to rely upon members
of the Guard and Reserve as a critical component of
national defence. The Guard and Reserve represent
hometown America, and when citizen-warriors deploy,
America deploys with them. As the Canadian Forces so
aptly describe it, citizen-warriors are the “footprint” of
the military in the community.
More importantly, members of the Guard and
Reserve possess critical capabilities developed in the
civilian economy that are a valuable asset to the military.
Civil affairs is one area where reservists excel because
skills like agriculture science, municipal or school
system management can only be developed in the civilian
economy. Similarly, civilian policemen, truck drivers,
doctors, lawyers, dentists and engineers often serve
in comparable military occupations and apply civilian
knowledge and skills to military operations. If, however,
service in the Guard and Reserve limits maintaining a
robust civilian career, then such highly skilled individuals
may not join or remain in the Guard and Reserve.
Traditionally, the reservist-employer relationship
has been a one-sided affair. Other than non-monetary award
programmes, the government provides little recognition
of the employer’s sacrifice. Despite the fact that private
employers subsidize national security, the government
provides no financial compensation for economic losses
associated with mobilization, no matter how catastrophic
the losses may be. While expressions of gratitude are
important, they do not contribute to the bottom line.
One way to address this challenge is to recognize
the financial loss that employers, particularly small
businesses, suffer when an employee is mobilized.
Congress has frequently considered bills providing
tax credits to small businesses whose employees are
mobilized. Congress recently passed a bill that provides
credits for employers who pay the difference between
military and civilian salaries where military salaries are
lower.3 This bill is a good first step because it incentivizes
business to support their employees who are mobilized.
Such credits, however, do not help the many businesses
whose economic dislocation during mobilization is
such that they cannot afford to pay a salary differential.
Moreover, the credits do not address the losses suffered
by all businesses upon mobilization and the costs incurred
addressing staffing shortfalls.
The current economic slowdown may cause
employers to question the fairness of the current system
which imposes costs and obligations on employers of
Guardsmen and Reservists. Addressing the employerreservist relationship, therefore, requires a dialog among
business, labour and the Pentagon. As the Army Reserve
has described it, reservists represent a “shared workforce”
that is employed by both the private sector and military. In
order for a “shared workforce” to function in everybody’s
best interests, employer support programmes must
move beyond the traditional one-sided emphasis on the
employer’s legal obligations and award programmes.
By virtue of serving in the Guard and Reserve,
reservists provide intangible value to their employers.
They are necessarily physically fit, free of medical
problems that drive up insurance rates, drug free, do
not have criminal records, capable of operating under
stress and trained in leadership. Good soldiers make
good employees and private businesses should want
to employee them. However, reservists are subject to
periodic deployment. Employers looking for prospective
employees with the traits derived from military service
could simply hire veterans with no Guard or Reserve
commitment and thereby reap the benefits of employees
with military experience.
...most military medical, police, transportation, and
engineering personnel are in the National Guard and
Reserve.
To ensure robust employer support in the
future, creative programmes should be considered that
provide economic value to the employer in exchange
for sharing its workforce with the Pentagon. ‘Sharing’ is
most obvious where reservists are employed in the same
field in both their military and civilian capacities. For
example, most military medical, police, transportation,
and engineering personnel are in the National Guard
and Reserve. Many of those personnel are employed in
substantially similar occupations in the civilian sector.
This presents government and industry with collaborative
opportunities that create economic benefit for both and
41
ON TRACK
provide some partial offset for the loss employers suffer
when employees are mobilized.
The US Army Reserve has taken the lead in this
effort, establishing an employer partnership initiative that
formalizes a relationship between the Army Reserve and
the private sector. As the Army Reserve describes it:
The Army Reserve Employer Partnership
is a joint public-private venture designed
to give business leaders tangible benefits
for employing and sharing SoldiersEmployees. Since the Army Reserve and
Employers share a valuable resource,
the Army Reserve can recruit a Soldier
for the Army Reserve and for a civilian
business. The Army Reserve can also
share training by aligning military and
civilian credentialing and licensing,
providing highly skilled and capable
Soldiers who can meet the demands of
the civilian workplace.4
This important initiative attempts to demonstrate
the tangible value to the private sector of service in
the Guard and Reserve. By harmonizing training,
professional certification and licensing requirements for
like specialties in the military and civilian sector, industry
would realize cost savings from hiring Guardsmen and
Reservists. The Army Reserve initiative ensures that
trained military policeman, truck drivers, construction
tradesmen, engineers and health care professionals could
move easily between the military and civilian workforce.
The government should also pay for state licenses, bar
and other professional dues that benefit reservists in both
their civilian and military careers.
The government and private sector can also
collaborate on recruitment. The Army Reserve website
allows Army Reserve Soldiers to search for civilian jobs
with Army Reserve partners.
In addition, the Guard or Reserve could strategically
locate new military police units in communities that
have a shortage of law enforcement officers. As military
policemen are assigned to the unit, local law enforcement
agencies would have access to a pool of trained candidates
for employment. Similarly, transportation units could be
located in communities which have a shortage of truck
drivers. The government and private employer can engage
in joint recruiting and credentialing programmes that
provide a trained workforce for both. Such collaboration
also ensures that the private sector and military understand
their mutual obligations and requirements upon alert for
duty and mobilization.
As members of the Guard and Reserve continue
to deploy at regular intervals, continued employer support
will be tested. Ensuring that the civilian and military
sectors can share the workforce will require more than
a legislative regime that provides reemployment rights.
Ultimately, the Pentagon will have to make the case to the
civilian sector that there is economic value in a system
where employees can be called away every few years. If
service in the Guard and Reserve is viewed only as a burden
on the civilian sector, then business support for the Guard
and Reserve will decline. Collaborative programmes such
as the Army Reserve Employer Partnership initiative can
mutually benefit both the civilian and military sectors and
ensure that citizen-warriors continue their extraordinary
contributions to national security. ©
(Endnotes)
1
USERRA provides that the re-employment right does not apply if the employee serves more than five years of active duty or
is discharged under other than honourable circumstances.
2
Of course, the psychic and monetary value of military service would compensate those individuals for any loss in civilian
income or progression.
3
According to the General Accounting Office, 41% of reservists earn less in military pay upon mobilization than they earned in
their civilian jobs. Reservists whose income decreases after mobilization are less likely to remain in the force. There is a real pay gap that
must be addressed. Employers who provide continued compensation or benefits upon mobilization are a valuable part of the solution.
4
The website for the programme can be found at: http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/arweb/news/word/Employer_Partnership.
htm
42
ON TRACK
Onward Christian Soldiers? Religion in the Canadian Forces
by Anne Frances Cation
Any
association
between Church and State
makes many Canadians deeply
uncomfortable. Nevertheless,
Canada, like the United States
and Britain, has traditionally
embedded organized religion
in its agent of power, the
Canadian Forces (CF). Serving
first in the Boer War and later
established formally in 1945, members of the CF Chaplain
Branch currently serve in Afghanistan, and have worked
with Canadian troops in United Nations peacekeeping
missions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Rwanda.
Despite the controversial Church-State connection
inherent in the military chaplain role, it provides
psychological support for Canadian soldiers and further
reflects Canada’s principals of multiculturalism.
The military chaplaincy considers itself to
symbolize higher principles of hope and faith. Beyond
performing religious ceremonies, chaplains counsel
soldiers and their families and help staff the five CF
Operational Trauma and Stress Support Centres. The
chaplains are accessible to the soldiers, having a continual
presence both on base and during operations.
Whereas health care professionals agree that
the stigma associated with mental health issues impedes
treatment, there is no stigma associated with talking to
a chaplain, unlike other mental health options available
to a soldier during duty. In addition, because chaplains
are visible and present in the theatre of operations and
on base, they can develop relationships and trust with the
soldiers which is not frequently available to other health
professionals.
While having decidedly Christian roots, over the
last several years the CF Chaplain Branch has become
more reflective of Canada’s cultural mosaic. In 2007, there
were 192 chaplains in the Regular Force, representing
a variety of faiths and denominations, including:
Anglican, Roman Catholic, United Church, Pentecostal,
Presbyterian, Salvation Army, Judaism and Islam. The
Chaplain Branch’s insignia reflect this diversity. Christian
Anne Frances Cation has a Master of Arts in Religion and
International Relations from the Munk Centre at the University
of Toronto. She is the Security and Defence Forum Associate at
the Canadian International Council, has interned at the Office
of Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations and has worked
for Canada Command and Canadian Forces College.
chaplains wear a badge with the Maltese cross. For Jewish
chaplains, this cross is replaced with the Star of David and
two tablets, which is again changed for Muslim chaplains,
whose insignia bears a crescent.
These badges underscore the CF’s wider efforts
at multiculturalism. The Diversity in Recruiting campaign
has publicized CF opportunities for visible minorities,
Aboriginal people and women. The Muslim community,
which, as of 2006, represented less than one percent of
the Forces, has received a specific recruitment drive:
recruitment officers have presented at mosques and
former Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier
attended a service at a mosque. In particular, the CF
has demonstrated accommodation towards Lieutenant
Wafa Dabbagh’s religious requirement since she joined
the Canadian Navy over a decade ago. Lt. Dabbagh is
permitted to wear a head covering and loose clothing and
is able to follow her dietary restrictions.
As chaplains do not carry weapons, the Chaplain
Branch is a positive alternative for religious people who
want to represent Canada abroad but who do not want to
engage in combat. The chaplaincy can be most helpful
for some religious adherents, including Muslims, who
maintain the principle of never killing someone else from
the same faith.
This inclusion of other religions and cultures
in the CF adds an important grey area to the mission
in Afghanistan, a critical shade in the black and white
world of terrorism. Canada considers itself tolerant
and multicultural, and by having the CF reflect these
characteristics, it will facilitate other countries and their
citizens to consider Canadians as such.
The Army Chaplain Manual writes that “there are
no atheists in a foxhole.” When in an extremely stressful
situation, faith or spirituality provides emotional support.
Even without the religious component, discussing
problems with a trusted friend can alleviate stress and
encourage mental health. Warfare is extremely stressful:
Veterans Canada estimates that ten percent of war zone
veterans, including peacekeepers, will experience posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It has also been noted
that the ‘elusive’ enemy and high degree of uncertainty in
Afghanistan further encourages PTSD. By spring 2009,
Veterans Canada expects to double its mental health
clinics, from five to ten.
Canada owes its soldiers every preventative
measure possible to respond to the needs of military
personnel and their families. Having a friend or religious
mentor always available is an important step. ©
43
ON TRACK
White Phosphorus in Gaza: New Accusations of War Crimes
by Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald
Every campaign of the seemingly perpetual war
between Israel and the Palestinians seems to be marked
by accusations of war crimes, each side alleging that
deliberate targeting of civilians by the other has taken
place.
The 2009 Gaza Conflict has been no exception,
except that mainstream international non-governmental
organizations are now getting into the act. One of these is
Amnesty International, which issued a report on February
24 accusing both Hamas and Israel of committing war
crimes during the conflict and calling on the United
Nations to impose an arms embargo on both sides.
Amnesty did not spare Hamas, declaring that,
“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups fired
hundreds of rockets that had been smuggled in or made of
components from abroad at civilian areas in Israel.”
But its criticism of Israel was far more stinging.
Donatella Rovera, the head of the Amnesty fact-finding
mission to Gaza, declared that, “Israeli forces used white
phosphorus and other weapons supplied by the United
States to carry out serious violations of international
humanitarian law, including war crimes.”
White phosphorus (WP), of course, has been used
for many years as a means of screening portions of the
battlefield from enemy observation and thus preventing
the enemy from bringing aimed fire against armour and
infantry forces moving on the battlefield. The white
phosphorus contained in WP shells ignites when
the shell is detonated, and causes an almost
instantaneous cloud of smoke to rise above
the point of impact. WP also has a lethal effect
which can be particularly hideous and its use
as an anti-personnel weapon is prohibited by
international law, as is its use against civilians
and civilian property.
A limitation to the effective tactical use
of WP occurs when conditions on the battlefield
are hot and windless. The intense heat released
by the ignition of the WP may cause the smoke
to ‘pillar,’ forming a narrow column of smoke
which has a much reduced screening effect.
Gunners characteristically carry a second type of
smoke shell called ‘base ejection’ (BE) smoke, carried in
small containers in the shell which are ejected out the rear
of the shell by a small expelling charge at a certain point
in the shell’s trajectory. Since the BE canisters burn more
slowly than WP, the pillaring effect does not take place.
A limitation to the use of BE stems from the fact that
44
it usually takes more time to plan and execute a screen
mission using BE, though the screen itself tends to hug
the ground more successfully since BE lacks the intense
thermal effect of WP. BE shells also lack the lethal antipersonnel impact of WP.
The United States has recently developed a
different form of WP shell (the M875 A1) in an effort
to overcome the pillaring effect of WP and to produce a
more effective quick screening effect.
Instead of a single solid mass of WP, the new
round contains 96 small quarter circle pads of about 4-inch
in diameter, which are impregnated with granular WP.
The pads are ejected from the shell casing at a calculated
point on the shell’s trajectory and the pads, which have
ignited once in contact with air, fall over an oval dispersed
pattern which is about the size of a Canadian football
field. The smoke emitted by the burning pads produces
an area screen since the individual pads do not generate
enough heat to produce pillaring. This mid-air dispersal
of the burning WP pads produces the striking aerial ‘pink
jelly-fish’ pattern which photographers have frequently
captured during the course of the conflict.
The M875 A1 is an example of effective weapons
development. Under normal battlefield conditions outside
urban areas, the new shell produces a faster screen not
subject to pillaring. When fired in urban areas, however,
care must be taken to select the location and height of
Photo - Agence France Presse
burst of the shell to minimize the probability of the
burning pads falling into civilian installations.
This, then, brings us to the allegations made by
Amnesty International that Israel is guilty of war crimes
through the use of M875 A1 shells in dense urban areas in
Gaza.
Judged by the visual evidence of the pink jellyfish
ON TRACK
photos, as well as evidence on the ground of empty shells
with their serial numbers including manufacturing sources
still evident, it appears that M875 A1 shells were used in
Gaza, and that, as the sole manufacturer of the shells, they
were supplied to Israel by the US.
Central to the controversy is likely to be the
question of the interpretation of the Agence France Presse
photo of a number of WP pads from an M875 A1 round
falling into a UN school in Beit Lahia, Gaza.
No doubt those attacking Israel will allege that
this represented a deliberate targeting of a clearly civilian
installation, whereas Israel’s defenders may argue that
there was a legitimate military target in close proximity
to the civilian installation and that there was no intent to
deliberately target the civilian site.
This will be the subject of intense international
political debate, and the outcome of that debate, if any, is
yet to be seen.
And, as a by-product, we can expect a call from
the disarmament lobbies for such rounds to be outlawed,
regardless of their practical utility under normal battlefield
conditions. Such a campaign can be expected to follow
the model used in the ‘Ottawa Process’ to ban the use of
land mines, and which is being used again in the campaign
against the use of cluster munitions. ©
Photo - Agence France Presse
The Impact of Missile Defence on
China’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ Nuclear Posture
by Thomas Adams
In December 2002, the
Bush Administration announced its
intention to begin fielding ballistic
missile defence (BMD) assets
starting in 2004. Since then, there
has been a heated discussion among
world leaders, policy makers,
and strategists as to the implications this would have on
regional and global security. Reactions from potential
peer competitors such as Russia and China have been
especially negative. For the latter, this is understandable:
China has always fielded the smallest nuclear force of
all the established nuclear powers and does not want its
nuclear capabilities degraded by the deployment of BMD.
As a result, some analysts have suggested that BMD will
lead to a shift in China’s nuclear doctrine of ‘minimum
deterrence,’ with corresponding increases in its strategic
nuclear forces.
Thomas Adams is the Strategic Studies Staff Officer at the
Canadian International Council. He specializes in Northeast
Asia security and defence issues with a particular focus on
China.
The modernization of China’s strategic nuclear
forces predates the deployment of BMD by decades.
Though the deployment of BMD worries China to the
extent that it will reduce the effectiveness of its minimum
deterrent, there is scant evidence to suggest that BMD is
directly causing China to make quantitative, qualitative or
doctrinal chances to its strategic deterrent forces. China
will most likely wait and see the nature and extent of BMD
deployment so as to determine how that might degrade its
own deterrent and then make the necessary quantitative
and qualitative adjustments to its nuclear forces in line
with its doctrine of minimum deterrence.
What is China’s
deterrence?
concept
of
minimum
The purpose of China’s nuclear forces is defensive.
They are meant solely to deter foreign invasion and nullify
the kinds of nuclear threats and blackmail that the country
was subject to in the early 1950s. This posture has been
reinforced by China’s declared ‘no first use’ policy: its
nuclear weapons would only be used to retaliate against
45
ON TRACK
the initiator of a first-strike, thereby hopefully deterring
such an attack in the first place.
Beijing’s nuclear doctrine has long rested on the
concept of minimum deterrence. Despite possessing the
ability to greatly increase the size of its nuclear arsenal,
China’s leaders have long believed that deterrence only
requires a relatively small number of its nuclear-armed
missiles to survive a first-strike and be able to retaliate
against an attacker’s cities. An essential component of this
strategy is to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces;
if China’s leaders feel that only a relatively small number
of nuclear weapons are needed to deter a first-strike, then
China must ensure that they can survive a first-strike and
be capable of retaliation in the event that deterrence fails.
China’s minimum deterrence posture is further exemplified
by its relatively small nuclear arsenal. Though China’s
nuclear submarines (SSBN) were first launched in the early
1980s, they are neither substantially deployed beyond
China’s waters nor considered operational. Land-based
delivery systems constitute the core of China’s nuclear
arsenal. Its land-based strategic nuclear missiles are
currently composed of the 13,000 km range, three-stage,
liquid-fuelled DF-5 and DF-5A intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) which are capable of hitting targets as
far away as the continental United States. Approximately
20 DF-5/5As are believed to be operationally deployed in
silos. With a range of approximately 11,000km, its new
DF-31A ICBMs are land-mobile. Approximately 10 DF31As are believed to now be deployed.
Possible Impact of BMD Deployment on China’s
Nuclear Forces
BMD is any weapon system that can destroy a
ballistic missile and/or its warhead before it can reach its
target, with differing systems designed to target the missile
in each of the three phases of its trajectory – boost phase,
midcourse phase, and terminal phase. A multilayered
defence is one in which several weapon systems capable
of destroying the missile and/or its warhead in each phase
is deployed. Such a multilayered defence would be most
useful in providing redundancy measures should the
missile and/or its warhead get through one of the lines
of defence. As terminal defences are currently used for
tactical battlefield purposes, only the boost and midcourse
phases of missile interception will be discussed.
The boost phase is the period during which the
rocket is launched which carries an ICBM’s warhead to
the exoatmosphere. In this phase, the missile is easily
traceable and highly vulnerable to interception by
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) sea-based interceptors (SBI)
deployed on Aegis ships and, once made operational, the
46
Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system
composed of interceptors mounted on trucks or airborne
lasers (ABL) deployed on modified commercial Boeing
747 aircraft. The drawback of boost-phase interception is
that these systems need to be already stationed close to a
potential launch site to be able to intercept a missile in its
early launch phase.
Through 2007, 21 SM-3 SBIs have been deployed
on three Aegis cruisers and seven destroyers. China’s
ICBM forces are located deep inside China’s interior,
and SBIs would not be able to reach them on time before
the ICBMs have reached the exoatmosphere. There are
currently no THAAD fire units or ABLs deployed; even if
and when they become deployed, they will also be unable to
negotiate their way through China’s air defences and travel
all the way into the interior in time to destroy an ICBM
while still in its boost phase. All three systems would also
be largely ineffective against submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM), as it would be near impossible to know
in advance where an SSBN is located and to station an
SBI accordingly. Interception of an SLBM will be made
all the more difficult with the deployment of China’s new
Type 094 Jin-class SSBN carrying 12 Julang-2 8,000 km
range, three-stage, solid-fuelled SLBMs. It is believed that
each JL-2 will be capable of holding up to four multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), though
capability does not necessarily translate into intent. The
People’s Republic hopes to eventually deploy four to six
Jin-class SSBNs by about 2010.
While these boost-phase interceptors will be
largely ineffective against China’s ICBMs and SLBMs,
two systems of space-based interception are also currently
in development – the kinetic energy interceptors (KEI) and
directed energy systems/space-based laser (SBL). KEIs
will be placed in low orbit; upon detection of a missile
launch, an exoatmospheric hit-to-kill vehicle (HKV) would
come out of orbit and smash into the missile, destroying
it through force of impact. The US Missile Defense
Agency estimates a constellation of three to six spacebased KEIs to be operationally deployed by 2011-2012.
The proposed SBL system will consist of a constellation
of satellites capable of focusing a high-intensity laser on
the missile until it is destroyed. Because the laser will
travel at the speed of light, the system will be the most
effective for boost-phase interception. Whereas sea-based
assets must either be currently deployed or redeployed in
close proximity to an enemy launch area for successful
interception (in the latter instance, it would probably be
too late), a constellation of space-based interceptors will
offer a truly global capability to intercept a missile from
wherever it is launched. It is perhaps for this reason that
China is so vehemently opposed to the ‘weaponization
of space,’ while paradoxically developing anti-satellite
capabilities.
ON TRACK
In the midcourse phase, the warhead has been delivered into the exoatmosphere, which in turn heads for its
target through momentum and gravity. In order to intercept the warhead at this stage, a ground-based interceptor
(GBI) is launched with a HKV as its payload. Once in the
exoatmosphere, the HKV destroys the warhead by colliding into it.
Through 2007, 24 GBIs have been deployed at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Fort Greely,
Alaska, with the total number expected to reach 44 by
2013. This would essentially protect the North American
continent from ballistic missile strikes coming from
North Korea or Iran, or limited launches from Russia or
China. However, those 24 GBIs will most likely not be
able to successfully intercept all 30 of China’s currently
deployed ICBMs. Deployment of at least 100 GBIs,
however, might neutralize China’s 30 ICBMs. Thus, it is
believed that China is developing countermeasures for its
missiles, including decoys and manoeuvrable warheads.
However, despite the fact that China is reported to have
had the ability to tip its missiles with MIRVs for some
time now, it has chosen to mate each of its missiles with
a single warhead. It is believed that China’s new DF31A ICBMs will also only be mated with one warhead
each. This may change with the further development and
deployment of BMD. But even if China decides to MIRV
these new ICBMs as a result of BMD developments, it
would do so to reinforce its minimum deterrence doctrine,
not to move away from it.
Conclusion
China has been modernizing its nuclear forces for
decades, long before the Bush administration announced
its intention to deploy BMD. Increases in the quality and
quantity of China’s deterrent forces do not necessarily
imply that it is moving away from its doctrine; ‘minimum’
is relative to an opponent’s ability to successfully destroy
China’s nuclear forces in a first-strike or effectively use
BMD to intercept any surviving retaliatory missiles. The
primary rationale for this modernization is to increase the
survivability of its nuclear forces in order to reinforce its
minimum deterrence doctrine, not move away from it.
©
Chasing myths: soft power in a hard world
by: Eric Morse
“Canadians don’t fight wars. We’re peacekeepers!”
- Woman in coffee shop, 2002 [as told by Sean Maloney]
“Who will bell the cat?”
- Aesop, 6th century BC
“The Horn? Nobody wants to go near the Horn.”
- Canadian general, February 2007
Myth is important to any nation. It is the emotional distillation of a people’s collective experience,
entwined with the facts of history but not identical with
them, and it provides the basis for a sense of destiny,
aspiration and purpose in the world.
Myth can also get nations in serious trouble when
it encounters hard reality on the ground. Think: the transposition of the values of the New American Century into
Iraq. But also think: the myth of peacekeeping and the
Eric Morse, a former Canadian diplomat, is vice-chair of
defence studies at the Royal Canadian Military Institute in
Toronto and writes in the Canadian media on issues of strategic
and foreign policy.
international doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect
‘R2P’, both of which are tenets of faith among the advocates of soft power among the Canadian foreign policy
commentariat.
Eugene Lang has recently noted that Canada’s
involvement in United Nations peacekeeping missions
holds mythical status in this country. That is the case not
only with ordinary Canadians, but also with a very strong
element of Canadian opinion leaders to whom we may
refer to broadly as advocates of ‘soft power’.
Lang comments: “Peacekeeping reminds us of an
important post-war Canadian role in international affairs,
symbolized by our innovative involvement in Suez in the
47
ON TRACK
1950s, and in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. Peacekeeping also helps with Canada’s self-definition by setting us
apart from the Americans. For many Canadians, a foreign
policy anchored in peacekeeping equates with a defensive
military, one that rarely if ever is engaged in violence,
combat or war.”
It has been argued by Professor Sean Maloney of
the Royal Military College of Canada, among others, that
the ‘classic’ non-violent peacekeeper image was only ever
matched in reality by the two early missions in Suez and
Cyprus. Both were put in place to separate combatants
who, for reasons of their own, preferred that situation to
continued conflict, and both served the interests of superpowers to whom continued conflict was inconvenient –
but neither could have existed without the consent of the
warring parties. Other UN ‘peacekeeping’ involvements
through the decades have not been so tidy; some have
ended in catastrophe (as with the Rwanda massacres) and
very few have operated outside the shadow of continuing
violence or its imminent threat.
Somalia, the Congo and Sudan all exemplify sincere attempts at ‘peacekeeping’ where there is no peace
to keep. They also exemplify running humanitarian sores
which seem to demand action by the international community while defying solution by means of any available
implementation of R2P.
Given that peacekeeping and non-violent conflict
resolution or prevention have been the touchstones of
soft-power advocates in Canada for decades, it is an odd
juxtaposition – to say the least – that R2P has now been
added to the soft-power mix, insofar as its application has
every chance of being very far away from non-violent.
R2P evolved in the 1990s when it became clear
that in the post-Cold War era there were many ruling regimes that practiced on their own peoples what the international community generally defines as crimes against
humanity. The doctrine was adopted in the 2005 World
Summit outcome document, which states that: ‘The international community, through the United Nations, also has
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared
to take collective action . . .”
The problem is: what action can be taken that is
consistent, exemplary and effective?
R2P has been embraced by the advocates of ‘soft
power’ in Canada, who indeed took the lead in framing it,
essentially on the basis that it is to be applied and enforced
principally by ‘appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and
48
other peaceful means’, with violent intervention only as
a last resort. That is a high and laudable aspiration, and
consonant with a worldview which values due process as
the central vehicle for conflict prevention or resolution.
However, as time passes, it is becoming uncomfortably
clear that the last resort may be the only resort in practice
– and even that may not be viable.
In the worldview of ‘soft power’, the UN is
viewed as the ultimate legitimizing authority in any type
of international peacekeeping operations, and has now
been charged with mandating any action under R2P. This
presents some issues of the ‘elephant in the room’ type
since it is in no way clear that all of the 192 members of
the UN accord it as much legitimacy as a paramount international authority in the way that Canadian opinion does,
or that the UN is in fact capable of either articulating or
enforcing consistent international policy.
Leaving aside all the metaphysical but very serious issues of the limits to Westphalian national sovereignty, the universality, or lack thereof, of the UN as a
legitimizing body for action, and the opportunity that the
doctrine affords any state so minded to cloak aggressive
intent in the doctrine of just intervention, the major problem with R2P is that in the end it must present consistent
and credible sanctions if it is violated, or it will be ignored.
Whatever successes may be credited to ‘soft power’ are
laudable – but the doctrine itself stands or falls by the will
and ability of its supporters to resort to the ultimate sanction, and to carry it off successfully. The track record here
is nonexistent and the prognosis is, frankly, poor.
There are various reasons for this, and they are
basically the stumbling blocks on which R2P collapses as
a concept:
-
R2P attempts to define the circumstances under which
it may be invoked. But the conditions and process
are both so convoluted that by the time action can be
agreed on, it is most often too late – and the rules always furnish adequate pretext to defer action if such
a pretext is desired.
-
Although the doctrine prescribes that all peaceful
means be attempted, the situations that are most in
need of urgent intervention are generally perpetrated
by regimes that are impervious to any sanction short
of force.
-
Even if the use of force is agreed on – it never has been
since R2P was enacted – there is no guarantee that it
will succeed, and no hint of a viable exit strategy. In
any case, these things cannot be programmed.
ON TRACK
-
If force is resolved upon, from where is it to be had?
Suitable deployable forces are in short supply anywhere.
The worst-case scenario here has already happened, in Somalia in 1993, which serves both as a poster
case for an R2P intervention and as a dire warning.
Both the American and Canadian militaries in Somalia were eventually forced out by uncontrollable local
chaos. The Canadian military suffered public humiliation
as the result of having sent in troops that were in no way
suitable for the mission, but that was not the worst that
could have happened. Only by the fortunes of war were
we not also treated to the spectacle of Canadian corpses
dragged through the streets, as happened to the men of
‘Blackhawk Down’. Since then, Somalia has chewed up
and spat out yet another internationally-sanctioned intervention force, and looks like it is sliding further into chaos.
If ever there was a candidate for both peace enforcement
and R2P intervention, it is Somalia, but the chances of any
successful intervention appear minimal.
Darfur has always been a cause célèbre in Canada as a humanitarian issue, and in 2005, according to
Lang, then-Prime Minister Paul Martin wanted to deploy
the Canadian Forces to Darfur if authorized by the UN
Security Council. Lang states that Martin was advised by
defence staff that such a mission could be more dangerous for Canadian troops than Kandahar. (All things being
equal on the world and Canadian political stages come
2011, it would seem that Darfur is by no means off the
political radar, assuming that the Canadian Forces’ commitment in Kandahar ends in 2011)
In passing, the reaction of the regime in Sudan in
expelling or threatening international agencies in response
to Bashir’s indictment before the International Criminal
Court may be noted as a consequence of indicting a tyrant
who still has force at his disposal. While the act may be
morally satisfying, the results for the people of the region
are likely to be very unfortunate.
At the most recent Munk Debate on Humanitarian Intervention, International Crisis Group’s (now former) head and R2P proponent Gareth Evans claimed that
several non-violent resolutions could be credited to R2P,
including Kenya, but he was unable to make a convincing case for any of them. On the other hand, there are
several high-profile instances (Myanmar, Darfur, Zimbabwe, North Korea) where action is wanting. The recent
‘compromise’ in Zimbabwe is not to be taken seriously as
anything but a cynical slap in the face of humanity; it is
a fig-leaf that staves off intervention. But in any case, no
state wishes to be the first to call for intervention because
it would then all too probably find itself fighting its way
into the country.
As for R2P – General Rick Hillier, who has
had more experience than most with unintended consequences, has said that he would not commit the life of a
single soldier to any mission as ill-defined in means or
ends as an R2P intervention is likely to be. A cooperative
and humane international community is a guiding dream
for humanity, and the warrants against and actual detentions of a very few war criminals are scattered lights in
the darkness, but in this eighth year of the 21st century,
a dream is all it is. And some dreams can be nightmares.
©
Book Reviews
Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of
Afghanistan’s Women
by Sally Armstrong
Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda
Sally Armstrong. “Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan’s Women.” Penguin Group Canada,
November 2008. Hardcover, 304 pages, $32.
Arnav Manchanda is the CDA Defence Policy Analyst. He holds
a Master’s degree in political science from McGill University
and has interned with the United Nations in New York.
During a talk in Ottawa in January, a prominent
Canadian journalist who covers Afghanistan reflected on
whether bringing stability, democracy and development
to Afghanistan was worth the price being paid in Afghan
49
ON TRACK
and Western blood. Paraphrasing Kurt Vonnegut, he asked
whether the prospect of the return of the Taliban was so
horrendous that it was a “fate worse than death” (in the
sense that it was better to fight and die than live under the
Taliban).
At the time I also happened to be reading Sally
Armstrong’s Bitters Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain
Fate of Afghanistan’s Women. In it, I came across a
reference to hundreds of women in one year having
“chosen death [by self-immolation] rather than face a
forced marriage or another beating.”
Perhaps there was a fate worse than death, I
thought.
In Bitter Roots – a sequel to her 2002 Veiled
Threat: The Hidden Power of Women in Afghanistan,
which focused on the plight of women under the Taliban
– Armstrong, a Canadian journalist and human rights
activist, explores the prospects of Afghan women in postTaliban Afghanistan.
What is most striking about the book is the series
of stories of individual women who struggle to make a
life and advocate for their rights in the new Afghanistan.
The tales chronicle such extreme hope and despair that
I felt at times as if I were reading Khaled Hosseini’s A
Thousand Splendid Suns.
There is the story of Annisa, a burn victim and
survivor of the practice of trading daughters without
dowries. There is an entire chapter devoted to the
indefatigable Sima Samar, head of the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission, a perch from
which she tirelessly advocates for the rights of women
and withstands attacks from retrograde elements within
government and society. Female parliamentarians like
Safia Sadiqi and the outspoken Malalai Joya are examples
of greater female representation in politics. There is also
that emblematic story of hope, of girls going to school
and enthusiastic for a better future: “They were coming
over the hills, down the valleys, in twos, in fours, as far
as the eye could see along the furrowed paths and dusty
byways.”
That hope and progress is now under threat from
what Armstrong calls the “fundamentalist menace.”
Social tension and psychological and physical trauma are
combined with entrenched and systematized brutalization
of women and intolerance. Girls are still jailed for ‘sex
crimes’ and for running away from their marriages.
Misogynistic attitudes remain pervasive within the
Afghan government among the legitimized strongmen and
officials. For instance, Armstrong describes a particularly
bizarre encounter with Chief Justice Shinwari, an
octogenarian misogynist who keeps a thick rubber strap
50
for ‘punishment’ on his wall and
holds backward views of women’s
roles in public and private life.
One unexpected revelation
(at least for this reader) was the
activities of various volunteer
Canadian groups in the advocacy
of women’s rights in Afghanistan.
These
snapshots
showcase
concrete links between cultures
that would otherwise have had very little contact. There
are Canadian women who have raised funds to train
Afghan teachers, organizations such as Canadian Women
for Women in Afghanistan, and gutsy 10-year olds like
Alaina Podmorow who founded Little Women for Little
Women in Afghanistan.
The book’s biggest strength – apart from vividly
portraying the personalities and actions of its female
protagonists – is that the reader’s inner cynic will be
dealt a sharp blow. Armstrong is forceful without being
didactic, and bases the narrative in her own experiences
and hard facts. If you claim that women’s inequality is
part of Afghan culture, Armstrong counters that a ‘culture’
cannot be defined without the input of half its population.
If you say that change can only come from within Afghan
society without outside interference, Armstrong would
counter that internal progressive forces often need an
outside helping hand. If you assert that the Taliban brought
stability and security, Armstrong would undoubtedly assert
that they were more interested in minimal government
and victimizing females and minorities.
The book’s biggest weakness is its propensity
to meander and lose focus on the principal subject.
The chapters feel episodic instead of integrated, and
interviews are often too broad and could have done with
some editing. Armstrong also describes projects that have
no clear link to women, such as the Turquoise Mountain
Foundation in Kabul and the Kabul Medical Library
Project. Nonetheless, the stories are always informative.
Since Armstrong gives us stories, I will add
another to the list. In January Dexter Filkins of The New
York Times wrote that several Kandahari girls who had
acid thrown on them for daring to be educated were now
returning to school.1 Armstrong, I’m sure, would not be
surprised: she would tell us that once an opportunity is
grasped, it’s difficult to let go.
But will Afghan women and girls be able to hold
on? The new American administration under President
Barack Obama is surging troops into Afghanistan as
part of a strategy to augment stability. However, the
1
Dexter Filkins, “Afghan Girls, Scarred by Acid,
Defy Terror, Embracing School,” The New York Times, 13
January 2009. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/
world/asia/14kandahar.html
ON TRACK
administration is simultaneously paring down its goals.
Talk among Western allies nowadays tends to bypass
progressive optimism and the ‘soft’ issues, for example
democracy, human rights and education for girls.
Furthermore, renewed negotiation with the Taliban might
entail the acceptance of their cultural and social practices
– witness the effects of appeasement of the Pakistani
Taliban on the tribal areas.
Canada’s policymakers should take note of this
book as they decide on the extent of, and justification
for, Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan post-2011, and
even to examine Canada’s commitment since 2002. How
do we balance addressing the ‘hard’ issues – insurgency,
drugs and stability – and the ‘softer’ ones, such as human
rights, democracy and women’s rights? Should – and can
– we treat them as distinct phenomena? Should we, as the
Canadian journalist at the University of Ottawa suggested,
allow the ‘unpleasant’ mistreatment of the female half of
the Afghan population to continue as the necessary price
of stability and security? As Armstrong writes, “[to] a
world still traumatized by 9/11, Afghanistan has become
a story about terrorists, drug barons, and the Taliban
insurgency. To me, it remains a chronicle about blameless
women and girls who continue to pay an awful price for
the opportunism of angry men.” ©
The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History
from New France to Afghanistan
by David J. Bercuson
Reviewed by Bonnie Butlin
David J. Bercuson. “The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan.”
Harper Collins, September 2008. Hardcover, 400 pages, $34.95.
David J. Bercuson’s book, The
Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental
History from New France to Afghanistan,
describes the development of the regimental tradition in
Canada from its Aboriginal and European roots to the
present. To do so it covers a variety of battles and regimental
milestones in the Canadian historical experience.
From a historical perspective, it is not a standalone history of Canadian regiments or the featured
battles. The book lacks sufficient background, detail, and
continuity to either clearly visualize battles or easily trace
regimental histories. This may be due to the chronological
ordering of the book which shifts between regiments in an
ambitious attempt to cover a lot of ground over decades of
conflict.
From an analytical perspective, there is very little
interpretation of facts, including in the concluding chapter,
which is a light five pages. The book overtly says little
about the Canadian regiment-based army, in contrast to
Dr. Bercuson’s 1996 book, “Significant Incident: Canada’s
Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia,” which is
a staple for analysis of the regimental system. Alternatives
Bonnie Butlin is a Department of National Defence Security
and Defence Forum (SDF) Intern, employed as the Project
Officer with the CDA Institute.
to the regimental system such as religion and ethnic-based
structures are not discussed in depth despite currently
being the subject of much debate. Andrew Bacevich’s
book, “The New American Militarism: How Americans
are Seduced by War,” and Stephen Mansfield’s, “The
Faith of the American Soldier,” are notable works on
alternatives.
Due to these weaknesses, the book risks being
wrongly dismissed as lacking relevance beyond being
an enjoyable historical narrative. The true strength of the
book is its clear understanding of how Canada fights wars.
It is a key work on Canadian socio-military culture. It
identifies the historically significant incidents and trends
of regimental development and engagement that form the
context of how Canada as a state and as a people fights
wars. It reveals how Canadians think about and use their
military forces. This includes a time-tested propensity for
neglecting the regimental tradition on which the army is
based, underfunding the military during times of relative
peace, and going to war with the army available rather
than the minimum force required.
While the narrative focuses on individual
regiments and battles, it is this cyclic behaviour influenced
by Canadian propensities that gives the reader a sense of
51
ON TRACK
déjà vu; much of the book could have been written in
reference to the mission in Afghanistan. As in Afghanistan,
Dr. Bercuson points out that Canadian forces in the past
have fought in unfamiliar parts of the world, been thrust
unexpectedly into pivotal roles, struggled with mission
transformation, suffered the “steady trickle of casualties,”
and experienced overstretch under international and
coalition demands. Canadians at war have also previously
encountered jihad-like warfare, unexpected opposition,
unclear time horizons, no-fail missions, strategic surprise,
limited funding and the threat of extinction of the
regimental system itself.
The book’s contextual clarity concerning
Canadian regimental history and development through
war, and thereby of the Canadian socio-military culture,
allows the reader to step back from the Afghanistan
mission and view it through the wider lens of how Canada
fights wars. It offers a more strategic-level understanding
of Canadian engagement in Afghanistan.
The book’s real accomplishment is that it serves
as a platform, leveraging contextual understanding to
inspire three needed lines of discussion concerning
Canadian military engagement, particularly in light of
the Afghanistan mission. These lines of discussion hold
the potential to turn a sense of déjà vu about Canadian
military engagement into 20/20 hindsight and change the
way Canada wields its military.
First, the regimental system has traditionally
been viewed as a capability that allows soldiers to fight, a
view supported by Dr. Bercuson. Interpreting the context
and propensities of Canada at war as laid out in the book,
the regimental system might also serve as a stabilizing
catalyst on a strategic level for how Canada goes to war.
By consciously and deliberately embracing the regimental
tradition, Canada may leverage it to stabilize Canadian
military and foreign policy efforts and avoid the highs and
lows that the Canadian military has repeatedly faced in
terms of size, funding, support, readiness and results. It
would ensure that a military capability minimum threshold
would be sustained so that when the Canadian Forces are
deployed, they will “have the oxygen they need to put out
the fires properly.”
Second, should Canada actively commit to
the regimental tradition, the Canadian population and
politicians may be guided toward a better understanding
of what armies do and what kind of results they are
designed to achieve. This would have a tangible effect
on the expectations that are placed on the military in
terms of missions, roles, results and timelines. The
civilian population and government, in understanding
the entrenched regimental system and the finite role
of a regimental-based military, would maximize the
effectiveness of its small military force. This would reduce
strategic surprise and work against the perception that
insurgencies are unbeatable under modern humanitarian
and legal expectations.
Third, Dr. Bercuson also introduces the
difficulties related to how Canada perceives and
deploys the Reserves. Canada has repeatedly relied on
the Reserves to back-fill within the larger military. The
Reserve has been theoretically problematic within the
regimental tradition, and yet is being employed to fill the
gaps in under-strength regiments. This line of discussion
will be significant in the coming months and years given
planned Reserve responses to new and emerging threats,
and given the current move to amalgamate the Reserves
to address the lack of experienced soldiers to lead units
and the small size of units that prohibits training for large
operations.1 Dr. Bercuson recently commented that some
of the proposed changes make sense.2 He argues that the
regimental tradition has been exceptionally resilient; how
resilient it can be under these pressures remains to be
seen.
Dr. Bercuson suggests that the Afghan mission
has been more damaging than previous challenges to
the regimental tradition, such as the Somalia Incident,
numbered units and unification. The three lines of
discussion inspired by the book may alternatively reveal
that the Afghan mission is not the problem for the Canadian
way of war, but rather symptomatic of a Canadian lack of
commitment to the regimental tradition – a tradition which
could stabilize Canadian efforts and add predictability and
reliability to Canadian capabilities. The Afghan mission
may likewise serve to reinforce regimental identification
due to the rotational nature of deployments, despite backfilling by the Reserves. It could thus bring Canadian
society to recognize the army as consisting of fighting
units rather than a single, national-level, peacekeeping
force. The mission may also alter the character of the
Reserves in the Canadian military landscape.
The book is timely given current uncertainty
about the prospects for success in Afghanistan and the
changing nature of the War on Terror. As Dr. Bercuson
indicates, there are no “supermen,” and no enemy is
immune to defeat. While his book does not prescribe how
to defeat enemies, it subtly reveals critical weaknesses in
Canadian strategic engagement and the Canadian way of
war, and serves as a platform from which Canadians can
discuss and address those weaknesses. ©
Endnotes
1
2
52
CBC News, “Army looking to overhaul reserves through amalgamation,” 11 March 2009
Adrian Humphreys, The National Post, “Military Revamps Domestic Defence,” 05 March 2009
ON TRACK
The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
by Lawrence Wright
Reviewed by Dr. David Anido
Lawrence Wright. “The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.” Knopf Publishing
Group, August 2007.
The Looming Tower
is the seminal work to date
on al-Qaeda. It deservedly
won the Pulitzer Prize in
2007 for its scholarship and
educational excellence. The
Economist called the book
“the most comprehensive,
objective, and readable guide
to al-Qaeda’s emergence.”
Author Lawrence Wright demystifies much that surrounds
al-Qaeda and its activities. We know the conclusion from
the title: the destruction of the Twin Towers. However,
the ‘road’ to that event spans nearly five decades of
detailed and broad analysis as to how a rich, urbane Saudi
polygamist became a cave-dwelling fanatical killer.
In the prologue the author touches on a central
theme – the world, and particularly the United States, was
not prepared for the most successful international terrorist
system in history. He tells the story of Daniel Coleman
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who was
assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA)
Counter-Terrorism Center, which was already tracking
bin-Laden as a financier of Islamic fundamentalist
terror. The CIA knew that bin-Laden had the intention
of attacking the US, but it did not act. A major feature
of the book is that “the most frightening aspect of this
new threat . . . was the fact that almost no one took it
seriously.” Coleman was left wondering why a group of
fewer than a hundred jihadists would be a real threat, but
most of his colleagues were trained for Cold War issues.
He worked relentlessly on the al-Qaeda file, but, when the
Towers fell, he was “to suffer permanent damage to [his]
lungs because of the dust [he] inhaled that day.”
In another chapter entitled “The Martyr,” Wright
traces the seeds of fundamentalist Islam to Hassan alBanna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was
assassinated in Cairo in 1949. Banna had rejected the
Dr. David Anido is the former Chairman and President of the
Canadian Mediterranean Institute, and is a director of the CDA
Institute.
Western model of secular, democratic government and
believed that “the nature of Islam [is] to dominate, not to
be dominated, to impose its law (Sharia) on all nations,
and to extend its power to the entire planet.”
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in
1932, and Europeans and Americans were still involved
in imperialist enterprises in Arabia. Wright notes that the
Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco, was established
and dominated an impoverished Saudi Arabia whose only
other source of major income was from the pilgrims to the
hajj at the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Wright notes
that one of bin-Laden’s reasons for hating the Americans
was their presence in the country of his birth.
Bin-Laden had a temper and an adventurous
nature and “was very stubborn.” But when the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan, a “fear of bodily participation kept
[him] well away from the battlefield in the early years
of the war, a fact that later caused him great shame.”
He witnessed in a mountain camp the poor state of the
weaponry of the mujahideen and went back to Saudi
Arabia and raised a fortune for the jihad in Afghanistan.
A small group of Arabs called the Brigade of Strangers
came to Peshawar. They prayed that when they crossed
the Khyber Pass, “their crossing would lead to martyrdom
and Paradise.” The author writes, “martyrdom promised
such young men an ideal alternative to a life that was so
sparing in its rewards . . . the martyr who is poor will be
crowned in heaven with a jewel more valuable than the
earth itself.”
While bin-Laden was in the battle zone, his role
was still mainly that of financier. The Americans supplied
the Stinger, a hand-held weapon deadly to Soviet aircraft.
In 1986, the same year as the arrival of the Stinger,
Mikhail Gorbachev offered a plan for the complete
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Bin-Laden
was disappointed with the Arab Brigade, which flinched
under fire while the Afghans stood firm. “I began thinking
about new strategies, such as digging caves and tunnels”
– the precursor to his troglodytic preference. He was now
leading men into battle.
An interesting interlude in the bin-Laden saga was
his sojourn in the Sudan, “which was until then a cultural
53
ON TRACK
backwater.” The idea was to create an international Muslim
community, the ummah, which would carry the Islamist
revolution around the world. The Sudanese government
courted bin-Laden in 1990 and offered the entire country
as a base of operations for al-Qaeda. The real motive was
probably for cash, and the Sudanese became disillusioned
with the lack of great sums. Bin-Laden left in 1996. The
Sudanese had allowed French intelligence to kidnap
Carlos the Jackal, who had sought asylum to “undergo
an operation on his right testicle.” There were rumours
in Khartoum that bin-Laden was “the next Carlos” and
would be betrayed. Bin-Laden did not feel secure in such
an environment; indeed, the Sudanese government was
ready to hand him over to the Americans, who still regarded
him “as a wealthy nuisance, not a mortal threat.”
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was bin-Laden’s righthand man and was known to be a brilliant surgeon. He
went to Peshawar and “had never endorsed wholesale
murder.” But he became “strident, antagonistic and
strangely illogical [with] a weird and malicious manner.”
Wright believes he had an identity crisis and was soon to
betray his Hippocratic Oath, thus preferring death over
life. Wright investigates the meaning of the Quran and
how bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri interpreted the
scriptures. He notes that the Quran is full of references
to jihad, and bin-Laden took literally that believers must
“slay the idolaters wherever you find them.”
The mix of these two men, Wright implies, was
lethal. Bin-Laden said that “the United States had always
been his enemy. He dated his hatred to 1982 when America
permitted the Israelis to invade Lebanon and the American
Sixth Fleet helped them.” Wright notes that the CIA had
not infiltrated al-Qaeda during the metamorphosis of binLaden and al-Zawahiri, leaving the US vulnerable. By
1998, “after the formation of the Islamic Front the CIA
54
started to take more interest in al-Zawahiri’s al-Jihad
and bin-Laden’s al Qaeda.” But the horse was out of the
barn.
The bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania and the attack on the USS Cole off the coast
of Yemen were precursors to the destruction of the Twin
Towers. The climax was, in Wright’s eyes, inevitable
because of the complacency and lack of coordination
among American intelligence agencies. For instance,
they still relied on tracking cell phones; even though the
National Security Agency was able to monitor calls on
satellite phones, “it refused to share the raw data with the
FBI or the CIA or Dick Clarke in the White House.”
On the sunny morning of September 11, 2001,
the Twin Towers were destroyed by the impact of two
aircraft.
Wright’s book is a masterpiece, not only as
a record for history, but also as an explanation of
what happens when terrorist treachery meets Western
procrastination and lax intelligence. There are copious
notes, a bibliography, biographies of the major players,
interviews by the author, and an index. It is essential
reading for any student of terrorism.
Postscript: On January 22, The Economist published an
article entitled “The growing, and mysterious, irrelevance
of al-Qaeda.” The synopsis: “Osama bin Laden’s messages
from the wilderness get little attention nowadays. AlQaeda has been unable to land a blow on Western soil since
the 2005 London bombings.” There is still the danger of
sleeper cells and disaffected criminals born in democratic
countries, but security is much more sophisticated. The
West is much better co-ordinated in intelligence terms and
Allied troops are fighting terrorist killers such as al-Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the borderlands with
Pakistan, where the culprits are hopefully cornered. ©
ON TRACK
CDA INSTITUTE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Admiral (Ret’d) John Anderson
Général (Ret) Maurice Baril
Mrs. Kathleen Birchall
Dr. Douglas Bland
Mr. Thomas Caldwell
Dr. Jim Carruthers
General (Ret’d) John de Chastelain
The Hon. Barnett Danson
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire
Colonel, The Hon. John Fraser
Honourary Colonel Blake C. Goldring
Général (Ret) Raymond Henault
The Hon. Colin Kenny
Major-General (Ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Michel Maisonneuve
Mr. John Noble
The Hon. Hugh Segal
Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Joe Sharpe
Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Ken Summers
Dr. David Anido
Dr. David Bercuson
L’hon. Jean-Jacques Blais
Mr. Robert T. Booth
Mr. Mel Cappe
Mr. Paul H. Chapin
Dr. John Scott Cowan
Mr. Dan Donovan
Mr. Robert Fowler
Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Roger Girouard
Dr. Jack Granatstein
Dr. Frederick Jackman
Brigadier-General (Ret’d) W. Don Macnamara
General (Ret’d) Paul D. Manson
The Hon. David Pratt
Colonel (Ret’d) Ben Shapiro
Dr. Joel Sokolsky
Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Jack Vance
Mr. John Watts
55
ON TRACK
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B, Ottawa ON K2P 2G3
PHONE / TÉLÉPHONE: (613) 236 9903 FAX / TÉLÉCOPIEUR: (613) 236 8191
www.cda-cdai.ca
L’Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense
Donateur - formulaire d’adhésion
222 rue Somerset Ouest, Pièce 400B, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2G3
Tél: (613) 236-9903 Fax: (613) 236-8191 Courriel: [email protected] URL: cda-cdai.ca
° Patron
($ 1,000+)
___ Chèque/mandat poste
___ Master Card
___ VISA Date d’expiration: ________ Signature: ____________________
° Compagnon ($ 500)
° Officier
($ 300)
Nom:
° Associé
___________________________________________________
($ 150)
Adresse: ___________________________________________________
° Supporter
($ 75)
Ville:
___________ Prov: ___ Code postal: ____ ____ Tél: (____) ____-______
The Conference of Defence Associations Institute
Donor Application Form
222 Somerset Street West, Ste 400B, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2G3
Tel: (613) 236-9903 Fax: 236-8191 E-mail: [email protected] URL: cda-cdai.ca
___ Cheque/Money Order
° Patron($ 1,000+) ___ Master Card
___ VISA ______________________ Expiry Date: ________ Signature: __________________
° Companion ($ 500)
° Officer
($ 300)
° Associate
($ 150)
° Supporter
($ 75)
Name:
___________________________________________________
Address: ___________________________________________________
City: _________ Prov: ___ Postal Code: ____ ____ Tel: (____) ____-______

on track - Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Transcription

Documents pareils

Forum Chine Europe - Forum China‑Europa

Army Outlook 2015 - Canadian Association of Defence and Security

Contact Name: Alison Hunt Title: Fundraising Coordinator

Minister of National Defence Announces First Refresh to the

“Canada`s place in the world: How can we fix our foreign policy

[Descartes e il Seicento 5] Jean-Robert Armogathe, Vincent Carraud

4. L` animal a... Le poisson a . Le cochon d`Inde a . L

4228 Holland Dr Des Moines, IA 50310 | Home for Sale | Real