GRASSROOTS` ORGANIZATIONS, DECENTRALIZATION AND

Transcription

Università di Torino
Linkoping University
CSA
ITC of the ILO
GRASSROOTS' ORGANIZATIONS,
DECENTRALIZATION AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
AFRICAN EXPERIENCES IN THE 1990s
Proceedings from a workshop
Edited by
Hans Holmén
Enrico Luzzati
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIiIIIII!iiiijiijijjjjj
5968
Copyright © International Training Centre of the ILO 1999
This publication enjoys copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention.
Applications for authorization to reproduce, translate or adapt part or all of its contents should be
addressed to the International Training Centre of the ILO. The Centre welcomes such
applications. Nevertheless, short excerpts may be reproduced without authorization, on
condition that the source is indicated.
GRASSROOTS' ORGANIZATIONS, DECENTRALIZATION AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT: African Experiences in the 1990s (Proceedings from a Workshop)
ISBN 92-9049-367-4
First published 1999
The designations employed in publications of the International Training Centre of the ILO,
which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein
do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Centre concerning i.a.
the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies
and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and publication does not constitute an
endorsenient by the Centre of the opinions expressed in them.
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the following address:
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Cover design: Matteo Montesano, Desktop publishing: Michele McClure
Printing: International Training Centre of the ILO, Turin, Italy
CONTENTS
Foreword
Introduction
Ho/men - E. Luzzati
Keynote address:
Poverty Alleviation, Participation and Development
Rizwanul
PART I - DECENTRALIZATION
The Quest for the Right Balance and Responsive and
Accountable Governance: Lessons from
Decentralization Experience
A. Shah
VII
Ix
xxiii
3
Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDA): An
Overview on Present Situation and Future Perspectives
M. Mel/i
59
Rural Communities and Community Development in
Mozambique: A Historical Perspective
R. E. Galli
71
PART II- GRASSROOTS' ORGANIZATIONS
A. General
The Challenge to Cooperatives as Tools for Development
in Post-Structural Adjustment Africa
H. Holmén - M. Jirströin
111
Grassroots Development and Multipurpose Cooperatives
in Africa today
E. Luzzati
133
Le défi coopératif et le développement en Afrique
A. S. Kibora
149
III
Le programme ACODEP pour la satisfaction des besoins
essentiels des populations défavorisées au Mali.
C. Touré
173
B. Natural Resources
Grassroots Policy Intervention in the Face of a Retreating
Recalcitrant State: A Case Study of Chiweshe District,
Zimbabwe
P. B. Matondi
185
Organisation paysanne et ressources renouvelables en
propriété communeS Action collective Ct nouvelles formes de
coordination
215
P. M. Bosc
C. Finance
Financing Economic Self-reliance and Member
Participation in Farmer Organizations in Kenya
J. Rouse
249
Savings at the Grassroots in Western Province, Zambia:
A Matter of Policy-making, Rain-making or Witch-making?
0. Hospes
273
Le développement des structures de financement
communautaires en Afrique
M. Socquet
311
D. Socio-political Aspects
Iv
Grassroots Development and Participation in Policy
Negotiations: Bridging the Micro-macro Gap in Senegal
N. McKeon
331
Jeux d'acteurs autour du développernent institutionnel
T. Dahou
355
CONTRIBUTORS
P M. Bosc
CIRAD - TERA
Montpellier
France
T Dahou
Doctorant a 1'EHESS
Paris
France
R. E. Galli
Institute of Rural Development
Maputo
Mozambique
H. Holmén
Associate Professor
Department of Geography
Linkoping University
Sweden
0. Hospes
Senior Lecturer
Department of Social Sciences,
Agrarian Law and Legal Anthropology Group
Wageningen Agricultural University
Netherlands
M. Jirström Lecturer
Department of Social and Economic Geography
Lund University
Sweden
A. S. Kibora Director, ICA West Africa
Ouagadogou
Burkina Faso
E. Luzzati
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
University of Turin
Italy
V
P B. Maondi Doctoral candidate
Depai tijient of Rural Development Studies
University of Uppsala
Sweden
N. McKeon
Programme Officer, FAO
Rome
Italy
M. Meii
Directorate General to Development Cooperation, Minisfry of Foreign Affairs
Rome
Italy
L Rizwanul
Deputy Director
Development Policies Department, ILO
Geneva
Switzerland
.1. Rouse
Senior Officer, FAO
Rome
Italy
A. Shah
World Bank
Washington
US.A.
M. Soc quet
International Training Center, ILO
Turin
Italy
C. Touré
Directeur Acodep
PNTJD
Bamako
Mali
VI
Foreword
FOR]I WORD
In September 1998 a two-days workshop on recent trends in African formal and informal cooperative development efforts was held at the
International Training Centre of the ILO in Torino, Italy, promoted by
the Università di Torino, Dipartimento di Economia, the Department of
Geography, University of Linkoping (Sweden), the International Training Centre of the ILO, Torino, and the Centro Piemontese di Studi Africani, Torino. The purpose of the gathering was to share experiences of
and interpretations concerning the possible revival of cooperative
organizations in Africa in the aftermath of implementation of Structural
Adjustment Policies during the l980s and 1990s. Although much new
and interesting indigenous organization-building occurs in towns and
cities, the main focus of the workshop was on rural organizations. The
main reasons for this were two: a: topical delimitations were deemed
necessary otherwise it would not be possible to generalize findings and
b: contemporary development theories emphasize the crucial importance of rurallagricultural improvements for general development to
"take off'.
Invited were both academic researchers and practitioners, as this
was expected to provide a ground for a fruitful encounter between concerned people with varying but complementary backgrounds and perspectives. The objective of the workshop was analysis, but we believe
that theoretical approaches can be improved by viewpoints from experienced field practitioners and hence that this would enable the workshop
participants to draw more informed conclusions than a more categorial
rally would have permitted. A further hope was that this approach would
also permit the participants to present suggestions relevant also to people more oriented towards implementing development in the field.
VII
Grassroots' Organizations, Decentralization and Rural Development
Participants came from Africa and Europe. All in all 22 people
participated representing aid agencies, universities, NGOs, the International Cooperative Alliance, FAO and the World Bank. The chapters
that follow below present some of the papers delivered and the introductory chapter is inspired by the discussions they provoked. The workshop
was bilingual and the speeches given were in French and English. In this
report the different contributions are presented in their original language
with a summary in the alternative language.
We are grateftil for financial support from University of Torino;
Centro Piemontese di Studi Africani, Torino; Regione Piemonte; Provincia di Torino; Comune di Torino; Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di
Torino; Banca Popolare di Novara; International Training Centre of the
ILO, Torino; Swedish Cooperative Center, Stockholm.
We are especially indebted to the followings persons: Prof. Giorgio Brosio (University of Torino) for his contribution in preparing for
the workshop; Mr Karl-Johan Fogelstrom (Swedish Cooperative Centre) for his active participation during the meeting; Mr Frans Lenglet
(ITC, ILO) for his stimulative conclusions at the ending of the sessions;
Mrs Costanza Prada and Mr Ngandu Mukendi for their invaluable assistance in many ways before, during and after the conference.
We also thank Stefania Bessone for her patient and accurate
editing work.
Torino, December 1998
Hans Holmén - Enrico Luzzati
Introduction
INTRODUCTION
Depending on historical perspective, it can be argued that the subject of cooperatives in LDCs is either an old or a recent phenomenon.
Cooperation is necessary in all societies and the history of informal cooperative organizations is probably almost as old as mankind.
Formal cooperative organizations on the other hand is a rather recent
phenomenon. In Europe and other presently industrialized countries
they evolved during the 19th century as a response to and constituting a
part of the process that transformed the then agrarian and fairly selfreliant and vertically integrated small societies into urban grand societies with a mass of global connections and dependencies.
Formal cooperatives have a somewhat shorter history in Africa,
where they were generally introduced by the colonial powers during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. But this is also where the similarities
end. European cooperatives commonly evolved from below as a protective measure by people with limited resources who saw their traditional
livelihood strategies being undermined by capitalism. Generally, however, the poorest segments of the population could not make much direct
use of the cooperatives. In order to cooperate you must have something
to contribute'. Nevertheless, one important aspect of this spontaneous
organization-building was that these newly formed organizations
allowed more people to be included in the modernization process. In
Europe it can thus be argued that early cooperatives at the same time
both intensified and softened the transition to 'modernity'.
1 There is a widespread misunderstanding here. It is often argued that cooperatives either are
'the most suitable means to help the poor or that they should pecjfIcally tiy to include the
poor', or even the poorest, groups ofsociety. This is particularly the case when aid and cooperation is discussed Howevei; to base cooperatives (or any other member-based organizations) on groups with no means of their own leads to strong and long dependency on external
financing (and, inevitably, goal-setting and management) which isfarfrom the self-help ideal
on which the cooperative ideas are based. In most cases the poor would benefit more from
other measures. Indirectly, the poor would of course benefitfrom cooperative undertakings f
these contribute to the general development of an area (Holmén 1990).
Ix
The origin of African cooperatives was quite different. During
their initial phases they were not the concern of the indigenous population, nor were they meant to be. In most settler-colonies formal cooperative organizations were set up exclusively to support the white farmers
producing export crops for the markets in their "mother countries" and
Africans were initially barred from membership.
However, it did not take long before the colonial powers realized
that they could use cooperatives as a means to tax and control the indigenous peasant economy to drag the peasants into the monetized economy
and to direct also the native agricultural production to "higher" needs.
But they were not intended to improve or modernize the peasant econ-
omy. Exogenously controlled marketing boards and forced deliveries
under monopsonic systems gave little influence and few incentives to
the African peasants who, nevertheless, in many cases were forced to
"join" these organizations. In those cases where indigenous cooperatives were formed, the colonial powers went to lengths to establish their
hegemony over them. Uncontrolled development efforts from below
were not on the administrators' agenda. Patterns were similar in both
French and British colonies2 and generally resulted in a widespread distrust of "cooperatives".
With independence came a new wave of cooperative ideology and
implementation. This time the objective was to use these organizations
as a means to improve, modernize and commercialize the African
smaliholder sector. In accordance with prevailing development theory
and ideology of the time, the State was supposed to take the lead in
development also at grassroots level. Most often this meant that
marketing boards, monopolies and direction of village production from
above and outside prevailed or was meant to prevail. Not only the
former colonialists, but quite commonly also the new governments and
administrators, tended to view the African peasants as tradition-minded,
lacking achievement orientation and self-help initiatives and therefore
2 The Portuguese colonies faced a different experience. Due to Portugal limited capacity to
administer her colonies, "hardly any attempts were made to raise and/or commercialize peasant production ' ('Gyllstrom 1991:4).
x
Introduction
being in need of enlightened supervision from above (see e.g. Marei
1957; Mabogunje 1989). Although the idea had initially been to use
cooperatives to modernize agriculture, a combination of inefficient
bureaucracies and lack of other indigenous income sources for the State
soon turned these presumably supportive organizations into means for
taxation which catered more for the governments' (or its local officials')
needs than for those of the peasants.
At the same time poverty in LDCs was suddenly discovered
among Western governments and populations alike. A number of aidorganizations, both public and private, were set up in order to modernize
less developed countries. With external help and in collaboration with
African governments large numbers of cooperatives were established all
over Africa. However, also among these outsiders the view of the African peasant as not only materially resource poor, but also as being back-
ward oriented, ignorant and essentially anti-developmental was
widespread (Flores 1969; von Muralt 1969; Treydte 1971; de Planhol
1979). Also among these benevolent outsiders the opinion was common
that grassroots could not be entrusted with development being such a
grand and delicate project and therefore African cooperatives needed a
weaning period before they could be "handed over" to their members.
Somehow, this weaning period never seemed to end. Hence, also for
such reasons the common mistrust of cooperatives and "development
experts" was strengthened among large parts of the African peasantry.
One can interpret this as a consequence of (at least) two different
and mutually reinforcing processes. One is that the external expert, the
modernizer be s/he a public official or a foreign expert has (believes
himlherself to have) the answers and the necessary skills to make local
development "take oft". The other is the precarious situation the new
governments found themselves in after independence. They took over
an artificial, non-democratic State apparatus with alien origin and weak
links to the indigenous society and a very weak financial basis. These
States were faced with two immediate tasks: to modernize the society/economy and to create a nation of (establish its hegemony over) the
unnatural and disunited territory it was to govern/develop. Generally, to
XI
establish State hegemony was prioritized over development and financially independent actors (would-be contenders for power) were often
seen with suspicion. Hence, the urge to control and exploit agriculture,
in most cases the only sector of the economy worth mentioning At the
same time foreign aid (and nationalization of foreign firms) gave the
State a relative economic autonomy vis-à-vis local social groups and
emerging classes. This actually reduced the pressure on the States to
modernize the indigenous economies.
During the cold war, western and eastern official donors accepted
and exploited this situation and gave "development aid" also to antidevelopmental rulers in order to establish political alliances (and military bases) with dependent governments in the super-power struggle for
global dominance. Although it was often officially declared that development aid aimed at facilitating self-help, independent development of
LDCs countries was not on the top of these agendas, on the contrary.
This is not to say that there were no altruistic reasons for giving aid
and/or well-meaning perons involved. But their influence on the practice of development efforts were limited in effect. Together, all these
efforts and (often hidden) intentions combined to form a shared project
to "capture" not only the African governments, but also the peasants,
sometimes for progressive but more often for regressive reasons.
Peasants, however, being the owners of their (limited) means of
production, are not so easily captured (Hyden 1983). Peasant societies
have a variety of means to resist external control attempts (Wolf 1971),
even at the price of development opportunities forgone. This should not
be confused with a perception of peasants as being hostile to development per Se. But it shows that, due to the ways development has often
been presented and administered, the price has simply been too high.
Africa is still a comparatively sparsely populated continent and in some
parts of Africa and for some groups escape into the bush has been an
option when the grand society demands too much and offers too little. In
larger parts of Africa the predominantly rural population has often found
it more in their interest to stick to subsistence farming (to the extent possible), rather than getting involved in the corrupt and dysfunctional,
XII
Introduction
quasi-modern economy of outsiders and developers. Contemporary
examples on preferences for subsistence agriculture and obstacles to
savings and capital accumulation are found in the papers by Hospes and
Matondi. Formal cooperative organizations have generally been seen as
part of this superimposed hostile environment. No wonder that there has
been much tallc about a perceived cooperative crisis in LDCs, not only at
present (see papers by Rouse and Holmén & Jirström) but particularly
during the 1970 and 1980s (IJNRISD 1975; Verhagen 1984).
At the same time as cooperative and development practice leaves
a lot to be desired, there has been a perceived "impasse in development
theory" since the mid-i 980s. Both general main-stream and radical
development theories have proved incapable of convincingly explaining
development problems, let alOne present workable solutions. Grand
theories and standardized solutions are no longer in vogue. The belief
that the outsider knows it all and that local (socio-economic) problems
can be overcome by technical solutions and enlightened planning has
been thoroughly undermined (see paper by Dahou). In the case of coop-
eratives this means that the supposed transferability of one idealized
organizational form to a different (socio-economic, cultural) environment has been increasingly questioned. The equation of development
with growth and "modernization" has been criticized and the (nowadays
often implicit) assumption that the West is a model for less developed
countries to catch up with has lost much of its former appeal. Bspecially
the assumption that development can be orchestrated and implemented
from above according to a prefabricated plan is today increasingly seen
as unrealistic, for both practical and theoretical reasons.
One reaction has been to blame the State in LDCs for the failure to
develop. For very different reasons and based on quite different analyses
both the left and the right, which normally do not agree on much, have
here formed an unholy alliance (Mackintosh 1992) and joined the same
chorus depicting the LDC State as the major contemporary obstacle to
development. Not that the State is totally innocent, there are many gov-
emments, maybe particularly in Africa, that can best be described as
corrupt and parasitic, but it is as if these States were not manipulated and
often coopted into global patronage structures by outside aid-givers.
Moreover, one is tempted to agree with Sanyal (1994) who suggests that
this critique of LDC States has surfaced because critics are angry when
their fine theories showed themselves to be worthless. They needed a
scape-goat and the State looked like a suitable culprit. 'If governments
have not behaved according to theoretical predictions, blame the governments'. The World Bank and the IMF have joined the chorus line and
translated this view of the State into the standardized solution to underdevelopment: Structural Adjustment, meaning an end to planning and
State-led development to be replaced by "market forces", private initiatives and non-governmental organizations. We are not arguing that SAP
is always the wrong medicine. In many cases it is probably the proper
cure (see paper by Holmén & Jirstrom). But it is too simplistic to
believe, as does the World Bank, that there are any miracle cures that
will yield the same results on all patients on all occasions.
As a consequence of this change of attitude, development aid is
both declining and made conditional on the implementation of "market
reforms". The effects are much debated but it seems yet too early to
judge whether arising (inevitable) problems are temporary adjustment
pains or permanent ills. Perhaps the major outcome is that the externally
provided life-line that many African governments could previously
depend on is now withdrawn. Some see this as a major incentive: at last
the African governments will need to opt for the development of "their"
countries' recources3. Self-reliance is finally an option!4 Cooperatives,
being a self-help device, it is today often maintained, would have an
obvious role to play in this changed politico-economic environment.
Others, however, underline effects that point in a rather opposite
3 A major factor behind the rapid economic growth and industrialization of the East Asian
"miracle" economies Taiwan and South Korea was that the USA already in the 1950s
announced that the initially massive transfer offinancial (and mi1itaiy) resources was only to
last for afew years. Thereafter these countries would have to depend on their own resources
(Gunnarsson & Rojas 1995).
4 Others have a more chastened explanation for why external development aid has declined:
DifjIeld (1994:122) has made the perhaps cynical but apparently correct observation that
"with the collapse ofthe superpower confrontation, the rationale for aid ... has disappeared".
XIV
Introduction
direction. Africa, it is maintained, will be chanceless in a global competitive economic climate characterized by "raw capitalism". Hence, it
has been noted (Hydén 1995) that in Africa there has in recent years
been a retreat of large groups of rural inhabitants into a primordial, premodern and subsistence oriented 'economy of affection' as a result of
SAP implementation. If this is a lasting effect, SAP might actually have
made the situation worse also in the long run. This would then limit the
possibilities for a cooperative revival, since cooperatives represent a
more or less "modern" mode of organization.
Another reaction to the perceived failure of previous (and
contemporary) development theory and practice has been to plea for
"another development" which, apart from rejecting the equalization of
development with "growth" andlor "modernization", is often
unspecified in content. Its advocates are a rather heterogenous group of
more or less radical visionaries and among them there are many
alternatives to "modernization". Many propagators of another
development may not agree on the end product, but generally they
emphasize development from below with, not for, the grassroots, that
development (however interpreted) must be "fair" and both ecologically
and socially sustainable, and that the western lifestyle (as if there was
only one) and consumerism can not be copied on a worldwide scale.
Localized, decentralized, democratized, small-scale and step by step
development, and even more so empowerment, involvement,
participation and womens' emancipation, are familiar buzz-words.
These are all desirable goals, but the alternative development paths
sometimes even "alternatives to development" and "anti-development"
(see Rigg 1997; Morris 1998) are by no means unproblematic. For all
the benevolent intentions and positive expectations on (another)
development, development always has a price and it is not an
unproblematic process. Development requires not only the construction
of new institutions and social and economic networks, but also the
destruction of some old institutions and old networks (Sanyal 1994).
This is often a painful process. But it is as if many of the advocates of
"another development" want development without costs involved, i.e.
xv
to arrive at the desired destination without having to do the journey.
Moreover, some authors say that there are as yet only few examples of
successful development from below (Sanyal 1994; Morris 1998). Nevertheless, this is a line of thinking that has become more widespread in
recent years, perhaps especially among development NGOs. Among
propagators of cooperatives as development instruments, there has
always been those who have seen them as a means to realize "another"
development.
For reasons described above, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) are presently propagated by both leftists and rightists as the new
solution to under-development. That this is largely an ideological message is obvious, when we realize that the concept is basically a negative
one: it does not reveal what these organizations are, only what they are
not (Holmén & Jirström 1994). Nevertheless, a growing proportion of
(remaining) development aid is channelled to and through NGOs
(Holmén & Jirström 1996). In this changed climate cooperatives have
found a new identity. While it was formerly often accentuated that cooperatives were in essence non-capitalist enterprises, junior partners of the
State or the like (see Holmén 1990), they are now preferably depicted as
essentially market oriented and capitalistic enterprises, although sometimes claimed to have "a human face".
The number of NGOs somehow oriented towards betterment of
living conditions in the LDCs has mushroomed in the last 15 to 20 years.
Many NGOs are doing a good job in terms of improving the lives of
grassroots. However, in many cases NGOs actually "attack symptoms,
not causes" (Chambers 1989). The reason for this being that a large
number of NGOs are more oriented towards (short-term) charity provision than towards (long-term) development and should therefore not be
considered as development-NGOs (NGDOs). Among the remainder of
NGOs resources, managerial approaches, priorities and worldviews differ greatly. It is therefore difficult to talk about a "NGO-movement"
(although this is sometimes done). Beside these differences it has been
found that, generally, NGOs are not as democratic as they are often
supposed to be. Both foreign and indigenous NGOs tend to operate as
xvi:
Introduction
intermediary organizations supporting and sometimes coordinating
local (LO) and community based organizations (CBOs). As intermediaries they often compete for clients and actually tend to create new kinds
of dependencies among grassroots (Holmèn and Jirström 1996; see
paper by Soquet). Hence, it has been suggested that NGOs can probably
best be studied as a new form of patronage systems (Tropp 1998). Espe-
cially among those foreign NGOs that emphasize lobbying activities
andlor which base their activities on a political vision - often some version of "another development" - outside goal-setting tends to be the
norm. Despite all participatory rethoric surrounding most NGOs, "conscientization" often means making the grassroots see things the outsid-
er's way (Holmén and Jirström 1996). Hence, also in the world of
NGDOs, aid is seldom given without strings attached.
Within their newfound role as NGOs, northern cooperative unions
and organizations, as so many others, find it essential to maintain or
extend their role as donors5, but an outspoken ambition has become to
bypass the State and "movement to movement" support is a major contemporary aim. It is of course rational to support (presumably) likeminded but it is perhaps bit too early to speak of any cooperative
"movements" to support in Africa. Those national unions that existed
until recently have in many cases been liquidated and those that remain
have shrinked and often face major difficulties in spelling out a new role
for themselves. The emerging informal (pre)cooperative and community based organizations that now evolve all over Africa are generally
dispersed, heterogenous and localized. Hence, it is (yet) difficult to talk
about a movement (see papers by Kibora and Holmén & Jirström but see
also McKeon's paper).
Cooperatives, having both social and economic objectives and
constituting a "modern" collective self-help endeavour for people with
limited resources, may actually facilitate development by including
more people in the process and at the same time function as a cushion
against the most brutal effects of capitalist adjustment. It is true that in
5 Actually, in most cases, as channels for government supplied funds.
the West cooperatives have largely 'degenerated', i.e. over time they
have come to adopt increasingly more of the characteristics of capitalist
companies. From this we can conclude that in the West cooperatives did
not represent "another" development, but initially they often had the
function of shock-absorber, thereby actually facilitating development in
general (see paper by Luzzati and Holmén 1990). These are functions
(as shock-absorber and as extender of possibilities under a process of
transformation) that might make cooperatives and similar memberorganizations particularly attractive during a transformation process.
However, due to their common social commitments they also often face
certain disadvantages on a competitive market which may jeopardize
their economic viability in the longer run (see paper by Luzzati; see also
Holmén 1990). As mentioned above, in many cases the newly emerging
multitude of local organizations also reflect either a "traditional" or a
"retreating" pre-modernity which either can represent a passing
adversity or a long-term obstacle to development, for example when
cash farming, monetized savings and capital accumulation is avoided
and sometimes seen as witchcraft (see papers by Hospes and Matondi).
In other cases, peasants do save in institutions where capital does
accumulate and avoid other forms of savings (see paper by Rouse). In
some parts of Africa, cooperatives and other forms of peasants'
organizations have managed to carve out a progressive, but by no means
uncomplicated role as modernizers and pushers for development (see
papers by McKeon and Kibora).
As many contributions to this anthology show, there are very
mixed experiences from indigenous organization-building in contempo-
rary Africa. More or less successful attempts to reform older formal
organizations are taking place parallel to the emergence of a multitude
of more or less formal, more or less cooperative and more or less business oriented member organizations. This indicates that what we might
be witnessing is the birth of a new generation of truly indigenous African cooperatives. In many cases, but far from always, they tend to be
real associations. As yet often informal and perhaps shortlived (as
in Europe during a similar process) they are formed by people who
Introduction
voluntarily choose to cooperate in non-traditional ways and to define
and reach definite objectives together. Varying greatly in size and scope,
these new associations operate in a number of areas in both towns and
countryside: commercialization, agricultural value added, savings,
credit, input supply and marketing, technical assistance and vocational
education. Some are strictly business oriented, while others allocate
some of their surplus for local and community public goods (see papers
by Bose and Luzzati).
Even if development represents a break with tradition and culture,
culture is a resource in development. No matter how poor Africa may
seem in terms of other resources, the continent is still rich in terms of
indigenous institutions and social relations. As mentioned above, these
will be altered during transition, but the prevalent opinion is that this
social texture represents the real base from which this new generation of
cooperatives takes its strength and origin. Of course, the ties to traditional society could also have the effect of suffocating these new organizations, at least temporarily and/or in certain regions. It is, however, too
early to judge whether we are witnessing just a new experiment or a consolidated phenomenon.
At this moment it is probably wise to be extra cautious with
generalizations about what will become of Africa and how its future
may be influenced by its newborn organizations. The continent
presently faces a mass of problems that may seem overwhelmingly
great. But, apparently, the lid has been lifted and the desire to get out of
poverty and backwardness is deep and diffuse at mass level. Given the
limited presence of autochtonous entrepreneurs and the failure of the
State, cooperatives and other forms of local and regional associations
represent a reasonable answer to perceived needs and challenges.
Eventually, these dispersed and as yet small-scale associations may
evolve into a social movement, a spontaneous effort to create an
institutional framework which is not only more organization-friendly,
but which also allows economic growth and technical progress at the
same time as it assures the preservation of some of the traditional values
of sociality and solidarity of which Africa is so rich. In this situation we
XIX
need to ask ourselves whether such a new movement can be sustained
through external development aid.
With this heterogenous picture in mind, it is more than likely that
cooperative and similar forms of organizations may significantly contribute to development in Africa. However, development from below is
a slow process and many, perhaps outsiders in particular, are of the opinion that time is what Africa lacks the most. It may therefore be tempting
for outsiders to try to speed-up the process, thereby again risking to
destroy the self-help element that, theoretically at least, legitimizes
cooperatives as development vehicles. Moreover, one should be careful
with generalizations about the nature, ambitions and potentials of these
commonly small new organizations. In case they, as a real project from
below, actually do represent some kind of "alternative development",
i.e. development without modernization, it will be a precarious endeav-
our to support them from outside. After all, the external supportive
organizations are part of the modernity that is increasingly being questioned today.
Hans Holmén - Enrico Luzzati
xx
Introduction
REFERENCES
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Longman, 1989.
dePlanhoiX., The World oflslam, London, Cornell University Press, 1979.
Duffield M., 'NGOs, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the Horn.'
FORUM Vaiutazione a cura di CISP-Movimondo, pp. 107-131.
Rome, 1994.
Flores X. A., Institutional Problems in the Modernization of African
Agriculture. In A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing
Areas, pp. 199-275. Geneva, UNRISD, 1969.
Gunnarsson C., Rojas M., Tillväxt, stagnation, kaos. En institutionell
studie av underutvecklingens orsaker och utvecklingens
mojligheter, Stockholm, SNS Forlag, 1995.
Gyllstrom B., State Administered Rural Change. Agricultural
Cooperatives in Rural Kenya, London, Routledge, 1991.
Holmén H., State, Cooperatives and Development in Africa, Uppsala,
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1990.
Holmén H., Jirström M. Eds., Ground Level Development. NGOs,
Cooperatives and Local Organizations in the Third World, Lund
Studies in Geography 56, Lund University Press, 1994.
Holmén H., Jirström M., No Organizational Fixes: NGOs, Institutions
and Prerequisites for Development, Stockholm, Sida,
Publications on Agriculture and Rural Development No 4, 1996.
Hydén G., No Shortcuts
to
Progtess - African Development
Management in Perspective, London, Heinemann, 1983.
Hydén G., The Economy of Affection Revisited: African Development
Management in Perspective, Paper presented at a special research
course on "Improved Natural Resource Management: The Role of
Formal Organizations and Informal Networks and Institutions"
held at Hotel Solfrid, Jyllinge, Denmark, Oct 23-26, 1995.
xx'
Mabogunje A., The Development Process: A Spatial Perspective,
London, Hutchinson & Co, 1989.
Mackintosh M., 'Questioning the State' In (Eds.) Wuyts, Mackintosh &
Hewitt: Development Policy and Public Action, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1992.
Marei S., La Reforme Agraire en Egypte, Cairo, Institut Français
d'Archéologie Orientale, 1957.
Morris A., Geography andDevelopment, London, UCL Press, 1998.
Rigg J., Southeast Asia, The human landscape of modernization and
development, London, Routledge, 1997.
Sanyal B., Cooperative Autonomy, The dialectic of State-NGO
relationships in developing countries, Geneva, International
Institute for Labour Studies, 1994.
Treydte K. P., Genossenschafien in der VAR (Agypten) Entwicldung,
Stand und Struktur des Agyptischen Genossenschaftswesens,
Hannover, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeshehen, 1971.
Tropp H., Patronage, Politics and Pollution. Precarious NGO State
Relationships: Urban Development Issues in South India,
Linkoping, Linkoping University, 1998.
UNRISD, Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change: A Research Report
anda Debate, Geneva, 1975.
Verhagen K., Cooperation for Survival, Doordrecht, Royal Tropical
Institute, AmsterdamllCA, 1984.
von Muralt J., "Rural Institutions and Planned Change in the Middle
East and North Africa ", In (Eds.) Fals Borda & Inayatullah, A
Review of Cooperation in Developing Areas, 1969, pp. 277-337.
Geneva, UNRISD.
Wolf E. A., Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, London, Faber &
Faber, 1971.
Fovery a1leviation participation and development
Keynote address at the workshop:
POVERTY ALLEVIATION, PARTICIPATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Islam Rizwanul
I feel highly honoured to have been invited to deliver the keynote
address at this international workshop on Grass-roots Organizations,
Decentralization and Rural Development: African Experiences in the
1990s. And I must thank the Turin Centre, and especially Mr. Frans
Lenglet, the Director of the Training Department of the Centre, for having extended this kind invitation to me. I am also happy that I am able to
start on a positive note about the economic performance of Africa.
It is heartening to note that the economic performance of African
countries has improved in recent years after almost two decades of dis-
appointing performance. In 1995, for instance, 33 African countries
recorded an economic growth rate exceeding that of their population
growth. The overall growth rate for the continent increased from 1.9 per
cent in 1994 to 3.7 per cent in 1995. Indeed, during the past few years,
several countries of Africa achieved GDP growth of over six per cent,
and a dozen more attained levels between three and six per cent per
annum. Thus, many African countries appear to have achieved a turnaround in economic growth. In addition, there are indications that some
of these economies are becoming competitive in the international mar-
kets. Also, a climate conducive to increased domestic and foreign
investment is being created, capital markets are being formed and African entrepreneurship is expanding. These positive developments point,
hopefully, to a reversal of the marginalization of Africa which has been
in evidence since the early 1980s.
While resumption in economic growth is certainly a welcome
news, it is extremely important to see whether this is being accompanied
by declines in the incidence of poverty. Unfortunately, paucity of data
makes it very difficult to assess the situation on that count. Regional
XXIII
data show that between 1987 and 1993, the percentage of population living below a dollar a day in sub-Saharan Africa increased slightly (from
38.5 per cent to 39.1 per cent). The only other developing region experi-
encing an increase in the incidence of poverty thus defined was Latin
America; but that was from a much lower level (from 22 to 23.5 per
cent). East Asia and the Pacific as well as South Asia attained
improvements.
On the basis of the percentage of the population living below the
one US Dollar poverty line it is clear that sub-S aharan Africa is still the
second poorest region in the world, after South Asia. There is, however,
a large variation within SSA in this respect. While the incidence of pov-
erty is very high (over 50 per cent) in countries like Guinea-Bissau,
Zambia, Madagascar, Niger and Senegal, in countries like Tanzania,
South Africa, Nigeria, Bthiopia, Guinea, and Mauritania, less than a
third of the population was below poverty line in the late 1980s or early
1990s. There are also some silver linings with respect to the trend in
poverty - although it is even more difficult to say anything with confidence in that respect given the data limitations. A few signs of improvement in the poverty situation may be worth highlighting. In Ghana, for
example, the incidence of rural poverty declined during 1984-86 and
that of urban poverty declined quite substantially during 198 1-91. In
Kenya, there has been a slight reduction in rural poverty during 198292, although poverty in urban areas increased.
Development prospects of Africa were adversely affected by the
increasing marginalization that many countries of the continent experi-
enced during the 1 970s and the 1980s. Amongst the various factors
responsible for such a situation, crisis of governance - especially due to
widespread strife and instability - was identified as an important one.
Indeed, good governance has been mentioned by major international
development agencies (e.g., the UNDP and the World Bank) as an
important element in their proposed strategies for poverty alleviation.
And in that context, the importance of broad, popular involvement or
participation is being pointed out. More commonly, reference is made to
XXIV
Poverty alleviation, participation and development
the notion of 'civil society' or other forms of citizen organization which
could serve as the vehicle for this participation.
Development thinking and practice in the 1990s appears to be
strongly influenced by the concept of 'participation' and by perspectives which, at both the macro-political and micro-operational levels,
seek to promote wider popular participation. While the origins of a 'participatory approach' and its attendant practice could be traced back to
the 1 960s and while it has long been vigorously adopted as a basic principle at the grass-roots by NGOs, it is only recently that it has become
popular among international development institutions working in the
field of poverty alleviation.
The ILO itself advocated and experimented with the approach of
participatory rural development. Its programme on participatory organizations of the rural poor contributed to the idea of participatory development by:
collecting and disseminating information on significant participatory processes;
[.1
collaborating with rural workers' organizations and national devel-
opment agencies in methodological experimentation in new
approaches to promote participatory rural development; and
L synthesizing methodological knowledge from field work and providing guidance to interested agencies in applying them.
Community based approaches and popular participation continue
to remain an important element in ILO's employment intensive infrastructure programme. While there is a broad range of experience in this
field, the importance of grassroots level organizations is clearly brought
out by such experiences.
Participation in the context of strategies to alleviate and eradicate
poverty can be viewed from two distinct but complementary
perspectives:
xxv
At the macro level, the concept would refer to democratic participation in the political system and processes by which public poli-
cies and priorities are determined. At this level, people's
participation could be influential in creating a political base for
effective anti-poverty action.
At the programme and project level, the concept is normally
linked to direct beneficiary participation in design and implemen-
tation. The common argument behind such participation in the
context of poverty alleviation programmes is that it leads to more
successful and sustainable programmes.
While the above perspectives are yet to crystallize into a clear participatory poverty alleviation strategy, a number of lines of enquiry or
action are beginning to emerge which give the strategy some shape.
These include:
the decentralization of functions and resources to local government,
thus strengthening the accountability of local leaders to programme
beneficiaries;
the development of local level organizations of the rural and urban
poor as a basic means of their participation;
the direct targeting of productive assets (e.g., credit) at the poor in
order to enable them to build a minimum economic base from which
they can play a more active role in development;
the direct involvement of the poor in poverty assessment, thus enabling a more authentic identification of trends and priorities; and
increasing role for NGOs in implementing poverty alleviation
programmes.
Africa is known to have a long history of participation. Indeed,
colonial Africa was characterized by popular participation in nationalist
coalitions to win political independence. But, unfortunately, the postcolonial period witnessed significant reversal of this pattern, and the
majority of the African people appear to have been systematically
Poverty alleviation, participation and development
excluded from the political and development arena. On the other hand,
given the experience with structural adjustment programmes in African
countries, one view which appears to be gaining ground is that
fundamental reforms in their political systems are required in order for
adjustment policies to lead to sustainable economic recovery. The 1 990s
have actually seen a strengthening of the argument for the
'democratization' of development processes in Africa, for Government
and institutional reform and for conditions of 'good governance' as a
prerequisite for success in economic adjustment.
The adjustment process has brought in its wake demands for institutional reforms, for greater decentralization, and for a more widespread
commitment to popular participation. 'Good governance' is now
regarded as one of the preconditions for successful economic adjustment; and popular participation in the implementation of adjustment is
considered to be more crucial than was realized earlier.
The demand for a greater degree of popular participation in Africa's political and development processes has been made at several influential fora. Prominent amongst them were: the International Conference
on the Challenge of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development,
held at Abuja, Nigeria, in 1987; the Khartoum Conference on the
Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development in
1988; and the Arusha Workshop (in 1990) on the role of Popular Partici-
pation in Meeting the Challenges of Recovery and Development in
Africa. The Arusha Workshop proclaimed the Africa Charter for Popu-
lar Participation in Development and Transformation. That Charter
asserts the fundamental role of popular participation in generating the
support necessary to overcome the economic crisis.
As I mentioned already, despite the unfavourable environment
during three decades of the post-colonial era, Africa has a long history of
people's participation. Recent reviews and case studies indicate that
through the participatory process, poor people are gaining access and
achieving some measure of economic and political influence, although
it is not easy to document these trends and their true extent. Given the
broad range of experiences with participatory micro projects (i.e., their
sectoral spread), and the valuable role that is being played by local level
organizations, one can feel optimistic about the future of participatory
development in the context of overall African development. However,
the ongoing efforts need support and further strengthening if they are to
consolidate into an effective strategy for alleviating poverty which continues to afflict the lives of many Africans.
SOMMAIRE
Après vingt ans de résultats négatifs, dans les dernières années Péconomie de plusieurs Etats Africains a donné des signes d'amélioration
réconfortants.
Toutefois, en ce qui concerne Pincidence de la pauvreté, on
n'apercoit pas des ameliorations, au contraire, en Afrique on a eu peutêtre une faible aggravation en termes de pourcentage. Dans les années
quatre-vingt dix, dans les politiques de développement on a progressivement attribué beaucoup d'Importance au theme de la participation, aussi
bien au niveau théorique,que dans es réalisations pratiques.
ILO même a une longue experience en matière de développement
rural participatif.
Une participation populaire plus grande, aux niveaux macro et
micro des programmes et des projets, peut se révéler une arme efficace
dans la lutte contre la pauvreté.
L'Afrique dans ces années est en train de connaItre des processus
de réforme institutionnelle vers la démocratisation et de reconnaItre un
role plus important aux organisations de base.
Les pauvres, de cette façon, peuvent acquérir graduellement plus
d'influence politique et économique.
Toutefois, il s'agit de tendances qui doivent être développées si on
souhaite un impact significatif en termes de reduction de la pauvreté.
Part I
Decentralization
The Quest for the Right Balance and
Responsive and Accountable Governance:
Lessons from Decentralization Experience
ANWAR SHAH'
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in the World Bank Conference on Evaluation
andDevelopment, April 1-2, 1997 and an abridged summary of this paper was published in
Piccolo and Wiesner eds., (1998). The views expressed in this paper are those of the author
alone and should not be attributed to the WorldBank Group. The author is grateful to Melville
McMillan, Robert Picciotto, Rui Coutinho, Eduardo Wiesner and A. Sayeh for comments.
Please address all comments toAnwar Shah, WorldBank Room G6-079, 1818 HStreet, N. W,
Washington, DC 20433, USA. Telephone: 202-473-7687; Fax: 202-522-3124; E-mail:
ASHAH@WORLDBANK ORG@INTERJVET
The Quest for the Right Balance and Responsive andAccountable Governance
1.
INTRODUCTION
During the past half a century, by subscribing to various variants
of central planning paradigms of development, developing countries, by
and large, followed a path of centralization and as a result, they are more
centralized today than industrialized countries were in their early stages
of development (Boadway, Roberts and Shah, 1994). A number of
recent developments, discussed below, are prompting most developing
countries to i:eexamine the respective roles of various levels of government, the private sector and the civil society as partners in development.
This rethinking has caused much heated controversy and debate in
development policy fora. Regrettably, this debate has focused on straw
men of "centralization" Vs "decentralization" (see Prud'homme 1995,
Tanzi 1996, Sewell, 1996 and McLure, 1995) and ignored the precepts
of federalism that appropriate institutions and mechanisms must be
introduced in support of the constitutional assignment of responsibilities
in multilevel or multicentered governments. It must be noted that contrary to focus in the above mentioned debate, the federalism literature is
concerned with seeking optimal assignment of responsibilities among
different levels of government in support of good governance (see Shah,
1994). This paper examines the reasons for a rekindling of an interest in
fiscal rearrangements in both industrial and non-industrial countries. It
reflects upon the debate on the "dangers of decentralization" by providing an evaluation of the decentralization experience using a systemic
framework. It draws general and institutional lessons to enhance the
effectiveness of decentralization as a means to foster listening, learning
and evaluation environment for responsive and accountable governance. An overall conclusion of the paper is that decentralized fiscal
structures are more suitable in the institutional environment of developing countries especially so if careful attention is paid to the design of
institutions vital for the success of decentralization policies such as the
rule of law, conflict resolution and coordination, charter of rights, effective limitations on the authority of governments beyond their designated
spheres of influence, accountability and institutional capacity for
evaluation at all levels.
5
2.
THE QUEST FOR THE RIGHT BALANCE
The reasons for rethinking fiscal arrangements are manifold and
the importance of each factor is country specific. Nevertheless, generic
catalysts for change include the demise of communism, desire to
breakaway from the vestiges of colonialism as in Africa, national government failures, subnational government failures, assertion of basic
rights by the courts, globalization of economic activities and the demonstration effects of the European Union and Latin America (see Picciotto
1995, Shah, 1995). The demise of communism prompted a major
change in government organization and geographical boundaries of
some countries especially in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.
These countries sought guidance from the principles and practices pursued in industrialized countries where federal systems of decision making have evolved over a long period of time. In Africa, both former
French and English colonies inherited highly centralized systems of
governance geared towards command and control and against responsiveness to public at large. Inmost countries, national governments have
failed to ensure regional equity, economic union, central bank independence, a stable macroeconomic environment or local autonomy. The
record of subnational governments is also not very commendable. Subnational governments have often followed beggar-thy-neighbour policies, sought to seek free ridership with no accountability and, in pursuit
of narrow self-interest, often undermined national unity.
The judicial systems in some countries are also providing stimuli
for change by providing a broader interpretation of basic rights and
requiring that national and subnational legislation conform to the basic
rights of citizens. The emergence of a new "borderless" world economy
complicates this picture by bringing new challenges to constitutional
federalism (see Courchene 1995). These challenges arise from the
decline of nation states in carrying out regulation of certain economic
activities as borders have become more porous and information technology has weakened their ability to control information flows. The European Union's policies and principles regarding subsidiarity, fiscal
6
harmonization and stabilization checks are also having demonstrable
effects on country policies. Similarly the success of decentralization in
improving efficiency and equity of public provision and accountability
of the public sector in some Latin American countries especially
Colombia and Chile has encouraged other countries to have a review of
own fiscal arrangements (see Wiesner 1994). Finally, resurgence of
interest in the federalism principles and best practices has served a powerful basis to restructure and re-orient public sector.
Special Challenges Arising from Globalization
Globalization of economic activity poses special challenges to
constitutional assignment discussed above. With globalization, it is
increasingly becoming apparent that nation states are too small to tackle
large things in life and too large to address small things. More simply
nation states are fast loosing control of some of their areas of traditional
control and regulation such as regulation of external trade, telecommunications, and financial transactions. National governments are experiencing diminished control in their ability to control the flow of goods
and services, ideas and cultural products. These difficulties are paving
way for the emergence of specialized institutions of global governance
such as the World Trade Organization, Global Environmental Facility
with many more to follow especially institutions to regulate information
technology, satellite communications, and international financial transactions. Thus nation states would be confederalizing in the coming years
and relinquishing responsibilities in these areas to supranational
institutions.
In the emerging borderless world economy, interests of residents
as citizens are often at odds with their interests as consumers. In securing their interests as consumers in the world economy, individuals are
increasingly seeking localization and regionalization of public decision making to better safeguard their interests. With greater mobility
of capital, and loosening of regulatory environment for foreign direct
investment, local governments as providers of infrastructure related
7
services would serve as more appropriate channels for attracting such
investment than national governments.
With mobility of capital and other inputs, skills rather than
resource endowments will determine international competitiveness.
Education and training typically however is subnational government
responsibility. Therefore, there would be a need to realign this responsibility by giving the national government a greater role in skills enhancement. The new economic environment will also polarize the distribution
of income in favor of skilled workers accentuating income inequalities
and possibly wiping out lower middle income classes. Since the national
governments may not have the means to deal with this social policy fallout, subnational governments working in tandem with national governments would have to devise strategies in dealing with the emerging
crisis in social policy.
International trade agreements typically embody social policy
provisions. But social policy is typically an area of subnational government responsibility. This is an emerging area for conflict among different levels of government. To avoid these conflicts , a guiding principle
should be that to the extent these agreements embody social policy provisions they must be subject to ratification by subnational governments
as is currently the practice in Canada.
The information revolution is leading to a decrease in transaction
costs and therefore lowering of costs to correct for information asymmetries and of writing and enforcing better contracts (see Bid, 1996). Hart
(1995) has argued that in such a world organizational form is of lesser
consequence and therefore, as a consequence, the need for decentralized
institutions is diminished. Globalization of information - satellite TV,
internet, phone and fax - serve also to enhance citizens' awareness of
their rights, obligations, options and alternatives.
The overall impact of these influences is to force a rethinking on
assignment issues and to force a jurisdictional realignment in many
countries around the globe. Appendix Tables 1-3 present a newer federalism perspective on the assignment of responsibilities and the design of
8
transfers by taking into account the considerations noted above is neces..
sary. These tables show that at the conceptual level some functions such
as regulation of financial transactions, international trade, global envi-
ronment, international migration need to be passed upwards (centralized) beyond nation states, some subnational functions such as training
should have greater central government inputs (centralization) and local
functions should be completely decentralized and should involve
greater participation by the civil society and the private sector. In developing countries, rethinking these arrangements has led to gradual and
piecemeal decentralization of responsibilities for local public services to
lower levels in a small but growing number of countries. The development and strengthening of institutional arrangements for the success of
decentralized policies has significantly lagged behind. It is remarkable
that with the single exception of Colombia, no other developing country
has paid any attention to developing the institutional capacity for
evaluation. Even strengthening of central and intermediate level functions required for the success of this realignment have not always materialized. In fact in some countries, decentralization is motivated by
shifting the budget deficit and associated debt burdens to subnational
governments.
Emerging Governance Structure in the 21st Century
Rearrangements taking place in the world today embody diverse
features of supranationalization, centralization, provincialization and
localization. Nevertheless, the vision of a governance structure that is
slowly taking hold is the one that indicates a shift from unitary constutitional structures in majority of the countries to federal or confederal
constitutions for a major part of the world. It implies thatwe are likely to
move from a centralized to a globalized and localized world. The role of
the central governments in such a world would change from that of a
managerial authority to a leadership role in a multi-centred government
environment. The culture of governance is also slowing changing from a
bureaucratic to a participatory mode of operation; from command and
control to accountability for results; from being internally dependent to
9
being competitive and innovative; from being closed and slow to being
open and quick; and from that of intolerance from risk to allowing freedom to fail or succeed. Financial crisis around the world are hampering
this change and as a result the new vision will take some time to shape in
the 21st century (see Table 1) and in many developing countries this
vision may not actually materialize due to the conceptual and practical
difficulties noted in the following sections.
Table 1: Governance Structure 20th Versus 21st Century
20th Century
10
21st Century
Unitary
Federal/confederal
Centralized
Globalized and localized
Command and control
Responsive and Accountable
Internally dependent
Competitive
Closed and slow
Open and quick
Intolerance of risk
Freedom to fail/succeed
ITh
The Quest for the Righi Balance and Responsive andAccountable Governance
3.
WHY THE ROAD TO REFORM REMAINS A FIELD OF
DREAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A simple way to see why the public sector is dysfunctional and
does not deliver much in developing countries yet is difficult to reform,
is to have a closer look at public sector mission and values, its authorizing environment and its operational capacity.
Public sector mission and values. Societal values and
norms, e.g., as embodied in the constitution or in annual budget policy
statements, may be useful points of reference for public sector mandates
and the values inherent in these mandates. Unwritten societalnorms that
are widely shared or acknowledged should also be taken into consideration. In industrialized countries, the mission and values of the public
sector are spelled out in terms of a medium term policy framework. For
example, there is a formal requirement in New Zealand that a policy
statement of this type be tabled in the parliament by March 31 (about 2-3
months in advance of the budget statement). Public sector values in
developing countries are rarely addressed. This is because the orientation of the public sector remains towards "command and control" rather
than to serve the citizenry. For an official trained in 'command and control', the need to develop a code of conduct with a client orientation,
may appear frivolous.
Authorizing environment. This includes formal (budgetary
processes and institutions) and informal institutions of participation and
accountability. Do these institutions and processes work as intended in
providing an enabling environment for the public sector to meet its
goals? Do various levels of government act in the spirit of the constitution in exercising their responsibilities? What are the checks and balances against deviant behavior? Is the independence of the central bank,
the judiciary, and the auditor general guaranteed? Is the central bank
focused solely on price stability or is it expected to pursue multiple
objectives? Are there formal rules to ensure fiscal discipline? Is the
11
design of transfers consistent with their objectives? Are there private
agencies that rate various levels of government for their credit worthiness? Is public sector borrowing subject to financial market discipline?
How is government performance measured? Are output and outcome
indicators for public services monitored by any one? In industrialized
countries, institutional norms are strictly adhered to and there are severe
moral, legal, voter and market sanctions against non-compliance. In a
developing country environment, non-compliance is often neither
monitored nor subject to any sanctions.
Operational capacity and constraints. What is authorized is
c)
not necessarily what will get done as the available operational capacity
may not be consistent with the task at hand. Further, even the operational
capacity that is available may be circumvented by the bureaucratic culture or incentives that reward command and control, and corruption and
patronage. Some key questions, the answers to which will give a better
understanding of operational capacity, include: Do the agencies with
responsibility for various tasks have the capacity to undertake them? Do
they have the right skills mix as well as the incentive to do the right
things and to do them correctly? Is the bureaucratic culture consistent
with the attainment of societal objectives? Are there binding contracts
on public managers for output performance? Does participation by civil
society help alleviate some of these constraints? To what extent can
these constraints be overcome by government reorganization and
reform? Whereas, in industrial countries, answers to most of the above
questions are expected to be in the affirmative, this is not true in the case
of a developing country.
The challenge of public sector reform in any country is to hannonize
the public sector's mission and values, its authorizing environment and its
operational capacity so that there is a close, if not perfect, correspondence
among these three aspects of governance (see Figure 1). Such a task is
daunting for many developing countries since they often have lofty goals,
but lack an authorizing environment that is capable of translating these
goals into a policy framework. This problem is often compounded further
12
Figure 1: Public Sector Institutional Environment in
Developing Countries
Values,
mission,
\gls
Authorizing
environment
*
Pperationai
capacity
Outputs, results,
outcomes
by bureaucratic incentives that make any available operational capacity
to implement such a framework completely dysfunctional.
Table 2 presents a stylized comparison of the institutional environment in a primitive society, a developing country and an industrialized
country. It is interesting to note that while technical capacity in the modem sense was non-existent in a traditional society, due to harmonization
of its goals, its authorizing environment and its operational capacity, publie sector outcomes were consistent with member preferences. The cultures of such societies more often than not focused on accountability for
results. The system of rewards and punishment was credible and swift and
much of the business relations were based on informality and trust. Thus
while per capita GDP in such societies was quite low, member satisfaction
with collective action, the so called "viagara index" was observed to be
high and quite possibly not too far behind the degree of satisfaction with
public sector experienced in today's industrial societies.
13
tO
0
:
-
0
.1
I
0
-
-
-
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J
b
0rj
'ti
0
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.
:
--
'-i
-
:
.
.1
.1
-
0
f.4_I
0
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--
ci
-
-
-
-
-
L C
This contrast with the picture that can be portrayed for a typical
developing country. In such a country, there is discordance in the society's goals, authorizing environment and operational capacity. As a consequence of this disharmony, not much gets accomplished and citizens
expectations are belied. Lack of accountability and focus of the evaluation culture on frying a big fish occasionally but doing nothing with the
systemic malaise means that any self-correcting mechanisms that may
exist are blunted. Semi-formality imposes additional costs on doing
business but does not lead to any benefits in business relations due to
disrespect for law. Contracts may not be honoured and therefore carry
little value. In view of this completely dysfunctional nature of public
sector in many developing countries, it is important for these to leapfrog
forward (or even backwards) to a public sector culture that puts premium on client orientation and accountability for results. This is however, unlikely to happen soon for reasons to be discussed later.
In the following section, we take a look at some of the factors that
are at play in impeding the progress of realignment of functions and harmonization of public sector mission, values, authorization environment
and operational capacity in developing countries.
4.
WHY THE ROAD TO REFORM REMAINS A FIELD OF
DREAMS?
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We noted that fiscal systems in most developing countries require
significant restructuring. Progress todate on such reforms have been
uneven. A number of factors impede the progress of reform to varying
degrees in various countries.
15
Political Factors
Political ownership is critical to the success of any fiscal rearrangements. In Latin America and former centrally planned economies,
emergence of democratic governance and political freedoms led to
heightened interest in improvement of public sector performance and
decentralization of local public services was seen an important element
of this reform. In Latin America, disenchantment with military rule and
dictatorships of various persuasions has led to creation of a political culture that places a premium on decentralized decision making to forestall
a return to the past. In China, decentralization was seen as a means for
social cohesion, faster economic growth and preservation of communist
party rule. Politics blocks reform in other countries. In Indonesia, forefathers of the constitution clearly intended it to be a centralized unitary
country and dictated against establishment of "states within the state".
These concerns for political unity have dominated the design of institu-
tions. Well entrenched roles of military and civil service in political
affairs with a strong belief in command and control from the Center
have sustained centralization of responsibility. Appointment of governors and mayors also strengthens centralization and limits local autonomy. In recent years, however, social development and economic
prosperity and concerns for improving the delivery of public services
are bringing a degree of accommodation for decentralized institutions.
In Pakistan, political instability and feudal interests have contributed to setting aside constitutional dictums and introducing a system of
centralized governance. Pakistan has been under military rule for a
maj or part of its existence and military mind set does not accommodate
decentralized decision making. During the periods, political activities
were permitted, feudal influences dominated the political system and
these influences favored either a centralization or provincialization of
authority. This is because, while Pakistan has experienced heightened
urbanization in recent years with over forty percent of the total popu-
lation as urbanized, electoral system still recognizes 1981 basis of
16
The Questfor the Right Balance and Responsive andAccountable Governance
population distribution (17% urban)2. In rural areas of Sind and
Balochistan, and to a more limited extent in rural areas of Punjab and
NWFP provinces, feudal lords do not allow effective political participation. The use of antiquated basis of population allows feudal lords to
dominate politics at the federal and provincial levels. A centralized system allows these lords to have greater effective control than would be
possible under a decentralized system where the urban sector would
have a more significant voice. To further entrench feudal lords, under
the leadership of the former Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto in 1994, local
governments were disbanded in all metropolitan areas and not restored
even when in 1996 the Supreme Court of Pakistan found this practice to
be in contravention of the law. Grants to members of national and provincial legislatures for development projects as practiced until 1997,
may have worked against the development of local governments as
these members enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in project execution in the absence of a well functioning system of local government.
Bureaucratic Factors
Many countries in Africa and Asia share a common colonial heritage. The British , Dutch and French colonial systems instituted a sys-
tem of bureaucratic control to achieve with maximum efficiency
colonial objectives of a predatory state. The system created a core of
civil service elite which was highly educated and highly dedicated to
serving the colonial rulers. Their loyalty to rulers and detachment from
the common man was duly rewarded by allowing them preferential
access to all public services through elite institutions and by ensuring
them financial security through a system of cash rewards and land
grants. Thus colonized countries such as India, Kenya, Pakistan and
Indonesia inherited civil service regimes that were highly centralized,
efficient, accountable, professional and completely detached from local
population. These regimes have remained resistant to change. For
example, after independence, in Indonesia, civil service over time
2 The population census scheduledfor J99lwas finally held in 1998.
17
became an active political partner with military in governing the country. Both partners viewed central control as a key element in holding this
country of 14,000 islands together. A centralized regime also was conducive to capturing rents from private sector development. Over time,
nevertheless, they discovered that initial degree of centralization was
not sustainable and therefore substantial degree of autonomy to local
governments while keeping a weak structure of provincial governments,
is necessary to improve delivery of local services. A gradual shift
towards local control (localization) is thus seen as posing no threat to
national unity and to the preservation of a command and control oriented bureaucratic regime.
Similarly in Pakistan, after independence, the civil service
retained its "professional" orientation for a while benefiting from an
increasing array of perks such as almost costless acquisition of prime
real estate, free membership in sports and entertainment complexes
financed by public funds, privileged access to elite educational institutions for children etc. Political purges of the civil service in late sixties
and early seventies set the civil service on a road to administrative
decline (see Haque 1 996). With insecurity regarding the lack of tenure,
areas of public intervention expanded beyond limits and perks and
bribes mushroomed. Corruption now enables officials to insure their
careers against political risks. Thus the administrative system became
highly centralized, entrenched yet dysfunctional. A key feature of this
system has a special bearing on local governance. Key positions on provincial (provincial secretary) and district governance (divisional and
district commissioners) are held on assignment by officers of the elite
"District Management Group". While performing these duties at subnational levels, they remain primarily accountable to the federal government only. This system negates federalism and re-re-enforces federal
3 This point is contested by a reviewer who argued, " Ithink the reason for the demise ofthe civil
service are more complicated than portrayed on p.7. In particular, while political interference
(and the political purges late sixties and early seventies" as the paper notes) was certainly
highly detrimental, some of the changes introduced under Prime Minister Z A. Bhutto ' 1973
reforms were potentally good ones (e.g. lateral entry) in and ofthemselves; they foundered in
the absence of action to address other systemic issues (e.g. political interference)."
18
control over local decision making. For local governments, an especially worrisome aspect of this system of governance is that if the local
governments function well, district commissioner's powers are considerably curtailed. On the other hand, if the local government is not opera-
tive, the district commissioner becomes the sole discharged of
legislative, judicial and executive functions at the district level. No wonder, one sees that local governments are not allowed to succeed in Paki-
stan (see Shah, l996).
Institutional Factors
Institutional factors also impede effective decentralization. Tradi-
tional institutions and mechanism of governance and accountability
over time have withered away but these have not been replaced by
newer institutions. Instead, all pervasive role of the state have retarded
critical look at public policies and institutions. There is almost complete
monopoly of the government on institutions of critical thought and
media in many countries. Any critical review of government policies
and programs invites a government backlash. In Pakistan, rural self government worked well in earlier days of its independence. This system
was abandoned in favor of a more centralized system which has resulted
in denial of access to basic services by rural population. While lack of
institutional capacity was cited as a reason for disbandment of the participatory system, the newer system left a majority of citizens with no
voice and participation and no access to basic public services. Indonesia, on the other hand, is now nurturing self-government in rural areas
through its village development and poor villages grant programs (see
Shah, 1996).
Another important aspect of institutional factors is the citizens'
philosophy towards government. Do people generally (politicians,
bureaucrats, public employees generally and the public/voter) view the
public sector as one where one does service for fair compensation or a
position to exploit for personal gain. Various opinion surveys suggest
4 Local elections were held in 1998.
19
that the prevailing public perception about the public sector especially
in South Asia and Africa tend to support the latter view and citizens tend
to associate public sector with a predatory role.
Contrary to common misconceptions (see for example, Tendler's
characterization of Decentralization and Participation paradigm
[D&PJ), the success of decentralization policies critically require a
strong responsive and accountable government at the national level
just as the success of centralized governance critically depends upon
responsive, accountable and competent field offices of the central gov-
ernment. This is the least understood "paradox of decentralization
(rearrangements)". This suggests that centralization requires a higher
degree of local (field office) institutional capacity and competence and
greater sophistication and integrity of public information monitoring,
finance, accounts and audit systems than required under a decentralized
system. The success of decentralized structures on the other hand critically depends upon the higher level enabling environment and citizen
participation and less so on the local institutional capacity and information network as confirmed by the Colombian experience (see Fiszbein,
1995). Local institutional capacity and information networks are no
doubt important yet these can be overcome by borrowing such capacity
from internal and external sources at least during the earlier phases of
decentralization provided a supporting higher level enabling environment prevails.
External Participants
Some external participants may also unwittingly impede development of a decentralized public sector in developing countries. A multi-
tude of factors contribute to this development. First, a centralized
system lowers transaction costs for external assistance and enlarges the
comfort zone for external participants in terms of monitoring the utilization of their funds for intended purposes. Second, some external partici-
pants have concerned themselves with the revenue performance (so
called "resource mobilization") of developing countries. Such concerns
may lead to larger centralized bureaucracies that pay little attention to
20
efficient delivery of public services. For example in Pakistan, minor
improvements in revenue performance of governments have in the past
been accompanied by ever deteriorating quality and quantity of public
services5. Third, centralized systems are more prone to a lack of internal
policy agenda due to a lack of citizen participation and more dependent
on external advice on policy reform. Typically this leads to quick policy
fixes with little sustained reform. For example, in Pakistan, while the
1956 Constitution stated achievement of universal literacy as a goal for
the next decade, forty years later, there has been little change in literacy
rates. In population planning, with US assistance, Pakistan established a
goal to reduce population growth rate to 2% by 1975. More than twenty
years later, in 1998, growth rate hovers around 2.7% Similarly public
deficit reduction has been an elusive goal for the past several decades.
External assistance, contrary to its intentions, may have helped the
country avoid facing difficult choices in reducing public sector interventions in marketplace. Availability of generous external assistance
might have played a part in motivating the federal government in assuming some provincial responsibilities and the provincial governments in
overtaking local government mandates.
-
5.
MAKING DREAMS COME TRUE:
GETTING INSTITUTIONS RIGHT
Adherence to federalism principles or "getting prices right" or
even "getting the rules of the game right" as discussed earlier is a necessary but not a sufficient conditions for the success of decentralized deci-
sion making. Complementary formal and informal institutions are
needed to ensure that all players in the game adhere to agreed upon set of
ground rules and deviant behavior is properly dealt with. In the following, we discuss selected aspects of this consideration.
5 This point is not shared by a reviewer who argues that: " Revenue pe,formance has not really
improved signflcantly anyway; so the implication that the government (with support from
external actors as implied) sacrficed better service delivery to revenue improvements is not
warranted"
21
Institutions and Processes of Intergovernmental Coordination
Federal countries require both formal and informal institutions of
intergovernmental coordination. In some federal countries, areas of
potential conflict among different levels of government is minimized
through clear separation of national and subnational responsibilities (the
so-called layer-cake model of federalism as practiced in Australia, Canada, India and Pakistan) and the two levels interact through meetings of
officials and ministers (executive federalism) and in Australia, India and
Pakistan through federal unilateralism. Some countries place a greater
premium on a common response through shared or joint tasks such as
Germany, a federal country and the Republic of South Africa, a pseudo
federal country. In these countries, in addition to executive federalism,
the upper houses of parliament (Bundesrat and the Council of Provinces) play a key role in intergovernmental coordination. In countries
with overlapping responsibilities (the so-called marble cake model of
federalism), such as United States and Brazil, state lobby of Congress
and interstate relations serve coordinating roles. In China, where growth
concerns have imposed a federalism structure on a unitary country,
regional communist party bosses/governors exercise a moderating
influence on otherwise monolithic orientation of the State Council.
Constitutional provisions per se can also provide coordinating
influences. For example, in some federal countries, constitutional provisions require that all legislation recognize that ultimate power rests with
the people. For example, all legislation in Canada must conform to the
Canadian Charter of Rights. In Switzerland, a confederation by law but
a federal country in practice, major legislative changes require approval
by referenda. In Switzerland, there is also a strong tradition of coordination through consensus initiatives by cantons.
Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Relations
The structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations, especially the
system of grants, must be determined by some body. There are five main
alternatives. The first is for the federal government alone to decide on it.
22
This alternative negates federalism and would not be acceptable in
many countries. The second is to set up a quasi-independent body, such
as a grants commission, whose purpose is to design and reform the system as practiced in Australia, India and the Republic of South Africa.
This alternative is prone to more ideal solutions rather than pragmatic
approaches and therefore runs the risk of presenting complex solutions
and recommendations that may not be politically platable. The third
alternative is to use federal--state committees to negotiate the terms of
the system as done in Canada. The fourth alternative is to have a joint
intergovernmental cum interlegislative commission such as the Finance
Commission in Pakistan and the fifth alternative is to have an intergovernmental legislative body such as the upper house of the German Parliament (Bundesrat) as in Germany. The latter three systems allow for
explicit political inputs from the jurisdictions involved, and therefore
are likely to opt for simple and feasible but less than ideal (compromise)
solutions.
Institutions of Accountability
Institutions of accountability is the key to the success of decentralized decision making. This entails institutions and mechanisms for citizens voice and exit, norms and networks of civic engagement ("social
capital" according to Putnam, 1994), social consensus (Williamson,
1994 and Weingast, 1993), preservation instinct of a "stationary bandit"
who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes (Olson,
1993), judicial accountability, vertical and horizontal accountability.
The citizen voice and exit require institutions of democratic participation, and accountability provisions for elected officials. The origins and
success of decentralization programs in Latin America is traceable to
the democratic traditions that emerged in the continent in late 1 980s. In
Philippines, recently enacted local government legislation while
empowering these governments have provided for regular elections and
recall of elected officials for a breach of public trust (see the Republic of
Philippines Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code, 1991). While
norms and networks of civic engagement were reasonably well
23
developed in pre-colonial traditionalist societies found in many developing countries such as the Panchayat Raj in Pre-British India, these
institutions withered away either under the colonial rule or subsequently
under centralized bureaucratic governance structures. The net result has
been rise of opportunism and social distrust culminating in dysfunctional societies when formal institutions of governance failed. The Afri-
can and the South Asian development fiascoes share this common
underpinning. Societal consensus on economic and political rights is
also conducive to accountability at all levels. According to Weingast
(1993), this consensus need not take any formal expression but would
work so long as a majority of people share a common belief as to the limits of governmental intervention and are willing to police those limits by
withdrawing their support from a government that fails to abide by them
(see Weingast, 1993, p. 306). Preservation instincts of a stationary ban-
dit also respect accountability (see Olson, 1993). This is because, the
stationary bandit strengthens his grip on power, so long as economic
performance is strong and citizens see their well being improved. This
explains partly the success of the Asian Tigers and the failure of some
South/Southeast Asian regimes. The latter regimes were controlled by
"roving bandits" whose main aim was to make the loot to pad their
Swiss bank accounts and then disappear in a foreign haven.
Judicial accountability strengthens the credibility of public commitments. This is particularly important for transition economies, where
framework laws on property rights, corporate legal ownership and con-
trol, bankruptcy, and financial accounting and control are not fully
developed. Interestingly enough, judicial accountability is much more
difficult to enforce in a parliamentary democracy than in a democratic
system which respects separation of legislative and executive functions.
This is because, under a parliamentary democracy, the 'executive branch
can override judicial accountability by amending the legislation - a
game played ad infinitum in Pakistan to undermine a decentralized federal constitution. Judicial accountability is further compromised under a
British style civil service organization as in India and Pakistan where
divisional and district commissioners hold simultaneously executive,
24
legislative and judicial powers. As noted by Montesquieu (1970), such a
situation is ripe for the abuse of powers as "...When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same body of magistrates, there can
be no liberty... Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and executive" (Montesquieu, 1970, p.
397).
Evaluation Capacity
We noted earlier that there is a broad consensus on principles that
should guide the division of powers and pai tnerships among different
governmental and non-governmental agents (see also Tables 1-3). How
to adapt these principles to the existing institutional and cultural context
to improve public sector performance should be an ongoing concern.
Such improvements will automatically evolve over time and would
obviate the need for major painful realignments if learning by doing,
evaluation and accountability for results is embedded in the public sec-
tor organizational culture. Such a cultural change can be induced by
building institutional capacity for evaluation. Such a capacity is vital for
citizen participation and higher level oversight - the two important
ingredients for the success of any decentralization program. To build
such a capacity, it is important to adopt a simple and reasonably objective evaluation methodology and then have mechanisms in place for
self, higher level and independent evaluation. Independent evaluations
of government programs may be encouraged by formal institutions such
as fiscal commissions or associations of local governments as in South
Africa, by think tanks, press and the informal sector. The evaluation
methodology adopted by the Operations Evaluation Department of the
World Bank provides a good starting point for such evaluation. In determining how well a program is performing, it asks three sets of simple yet
powerful questions as follows:
(a)
Is the public manager doing the right things?
Relevance: Are the objectives he/she seeks responsive to the
needs of the community, he is expected to serve?
25
Institutional Development: Is the initiative he/she is undertaking will result in improvements in local capacity to do
things better in future?
Is the public manager doing things right?
Efficacy: Are the programs achieving agreed upon objectives?
Efficiency: Is he/she using resources economically by forging appropriate partnership within and without the public
sector?
Will the benefits of interventions be sustained?
By linking evaluation to performance incentives and budgeting, a
culture of responsive and accountable governance can be nurtured. Thus
building institutional capacity for evaluation should rank high on the list
of priorities for those interested in creating governments that work and
strive for excellence in serving their citizens.
It should be noted that inspite of the benefits associated with
building evaluation capacity, attention to development of such capacity
is unlikely to materialize without changes in the existing incentive struc-
tures. Rationalization of fiscal transfers to include conditionality on
standards of services and access to such services will provide positive
stimulus for evaluation at all levels. Citizen education as to their rights
and obligations and the role of public sector and developing independent institutions of critical thought will strengthen demand for such
evaluations. Horizontal information exchanges say through voluntary
associations of local governments would also serve to enhance demand
for evaluations and municipalities would be interested in learning from
experiences of member municipalities.
Traditional Channels of Accountability
The audit, inspection and control functions should be strengthened, since they tend to be quite weak in transition and developing
economies. The auditor-general should be given greater authority and
autonomy in exercising his mandate. At the same time, a case can be
26
made for loosening the constraints of the central planning process in
developing countries. Central plans lead to a centralization of authority,
a reduction in flexibility, innovation and autonomy at the local level and
delays in private sector activity. On a more specific point, as fiscal
responsibility is decentralized to the state and local levels, it would be
beneficial to create the institutional capacity for local borrowing so that
more reliance is placed on borrowing and less on capital grants to
finance capital projects. Examples include loan councils or municipal
finance corporations.
Oversight of Local Governments:
Responsibility within Boundaries
Freedom
and
Monitoring and oversight of local governments is an area of concern in both federal and unitaly countries alike. For example, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 1996 (Section 139(1) (b)) provides
for a disbandment of local government in the event of failure to (I)
"maintain national standards or meet minimum standards of service";
(II) "prevent actions prejudicial to the interests of another municipality
or the nation as a whole"; and (III) "maintain economic unity." It further
provides for withholding of tax shares and transfers for non-compliance
with tax effort (Section 227(2)). The fulfillment of constitutional
obligations regarding these provisions require a significant and superior evaluation capacity at provincial and national levels. Evaluative
measures that can assist in this oversight include requirement of annual
commercial corporate audit of local governments; fiscal capacity measurement using a common yardstick i.e. equalization of municipal
assessments; greater emphasis on formula grants over project grants in
provincial-local transfers; greater emphasis on public-private-civil society partnership in public provision; opinion polls on service standards
and citizen satisfaction; and performance ratings of local governments
based upon outputs, outcomes and citizen satisfaction.
Audit of local governments in industrialized countries at the most
fundamental level pays attention to three elements, adherence to the
principle of ultra vires, the procedure by-law and fulfillment of funded
27
mandates. The principle of ultra vires states that a local government
should do only those things that the statutes say it can do and it may not
do anything for which it has no express authority. The procedure by-law
requires that all policies of local council should be embodied in by-laws
and an auditor should look at the council operations for its conformity
with policies and beyond the system of internal control. Thus a local
government audit would involve the following:
Revenues: by-laws for tax collection and administration; established procedures for assessments, appeals; budget reports incorpo-
rating all revenues, financial reports with necessary information;
observance of legal requirements of statutes.
Expenditures: by-law for policies, established procedure for purchasing, tendering, payments, inventories etc.; establishment of
expenditure limits; financial regulations; observance of statutes.
Others: legal requirements for borrowing; insurance coverage;
unfunded mandates; debt; deficit; long term budget commitments;
contingent commitments; cost controls; resource use; staffing.
Services: quality and quantity and distribution.
6.
DECENTRALIZATION: FINE IN THEORY
BUT WHAT IS THE PRACTICE?
Some writers have cautioned against a shift in division of powers
in favor of subnational governments in a developing country environment and have highlighted the "dangers of decentralization"
(Prud'homme, 1995, also see Tanzi, 1996). These authors have
expressed concerns ranging from macro mismanagement, corruption,
redtape, andwidening gulfbetweenrich andpoorpersons regions under
decentralized fiscal system. Sewell (1996) and McLure (1995) provide
rejoinders to these concerns by marshalling conceptual arguments and
anecdotal evidence in support of their viewpoints. Others (see Tendler,
1997) have argued that much of the fruits of decentralization can be bet-
28
ter achieved by delegation (local government acts on behalf of the
higher level government) or deconcentration (regional offices or
autonomous agencies of the higher level governments are the implementing agencies) by enlightened central and state governments with
strong mistrust of local governments. Such options invite less political
and bureaucratic resistance and may not be inferior to decentralization
options in terms of their outcome. They argue that healthy antagonism
between different levels of government and strong activism by central
and state governments improves performance of the public and other
support agencies.
In the following, we reflect upon various elements of the "dangers
of decentralization" based upon available empirical evidence. In doing
so, we primarily focus on the quality of institutional environment for
governance rather than the policies themselves. In relating decentralization to quality of institutional environment for governance, four aspects
of governance quality are stressed: citizen participation, social develop-
ment, government orientation and economic management. These
aspects are considered in turn in the following paragraphs.
Citizens Participation
Citizen participation ensures that public goods are consistent with
voter preferences and public sector accountability. Such participation is
possible only if political freedom (voice and exit) is permitted and
political stability prevails. Decentralization strengthens citizen participation by bringing governments closer to the people they are intended to
serve. The USAID assistance programs has given due recognition to this
principle by making decentralization and democratic governance a cornerstone of their policy to develop transparent and accountable government institutions (see USAID, 1997). The success of decentralization as
a tool for citizen participation, however, critically depends upon a classless society and the strength of local government institutions (see also
Heymans, 1996). In a feudal structure such as the one prevalent in rural
Sindh province of Pakistan, economic dependency of a landless tenant
on the feudal lord is so strong that feasible choices as to voting with feet
29
or by ballot do not exist. Under such circumstances, decentralized institutions become captive to the whims of the local elite. In urban areas of
Pakistan, where such economic dependency does not exist, the success
of decentralization is curtailed by lack of sufficient powers and
resources and accountability mechanisms at the local level. Feudal politics and bureaucratic institutions consider implementation of legal provisions on devolution as a threat to their interests and render any such
provisions ineffective. In spite of these difficulties, the record of decentralized fiscal systems in promoting citizen participation is quite impressive as shown by Huther and Shah (1998) using data for a sample of 80
countries. They find that political stability and political freedom indices
and a composite index on citizen participation are positively correlated
with the index of fiscal decentralization. This relationship is statistically
significant which suggests that citizen participation and public sector
accountability go hand in hand with decentralized public sector decision
making.
James Manor based upon his work in India and Africa concludes considerable promise for decentralization in promoting citizen
participation, increasing information flows between governments and
citizens, enhancing transparency and accountability, integrating society
with the state and reinforcing and invigorating democracy at the
national level (see Manor, 1996). Recognizing this, India has recently
amended its constitution to strengthen local government institutions
(see Paul, 1996). The same results are reaffirmed by Garman and Haggard (1995) based upon a comparative study of Latin America. They
conclude that "greater the political sensitivity of central level politicians
to subnational political outcomes, the more decentralized the system is
likely to be (p. 2).
30
The Quest for the Right Balance and Responsive and Accountable Governance
Table 3: Correlation of the Decentralization Index
with Governance Quality Indicators
(sample size: 80 countries)
Pearson Correlation
Coefficients
Citizen Participation
Political Freedom
O.599**
Political Stability
0.604**
Government Orientation
Judicial Efficiency
Ø544**
Bureaucratic Efficiency
0.540**
Absence of Corruption
O.532**
Social Development
Human Development Index
0.369*
Egalitarianism in Income Distribution (inverse of Gini coefficient)
0.373*
Economic Management
Central Bank Independence
0.327*
Debt Management Discipline
(Inverse of Debt to GDP Ratio)
0.263
Openness of the Economy
(Outward Orientation)
0.523**
Governance Quality Index
0.617**
* significant at the 0.05% level (2-tailed test)
** significant at the 001% level (2-tailed test)
Source: Huther and Shah (1998)
31
Government Orientation
Public sector orientation plays an important role in public sector
performance If the public service is oriented towards serving its citizens, bureaucratic red tape and corruption would be minimal and judiciary will further enforce accountability though timely and fair decisions
in the administration of justice. One finds such an orientation typically
lacking in some developing countries where the civil service pursues
rent seeking and power and influence through command and control and
bureaucratic red tape and graft.
A composite ranking of countries of three indicators of government orientation, judicial efficiency, bureaucratic efficiency, and the
lack of corruption, provides a good indicator of public sector orientation
and performance. We relate the degree of expenditure decentralization
to the ranking of countries on individual indicators as well as to the composite rank on government orientation and find that all of these correlations show a positive, and statistically significant, association (see Table
3). This suggests that typically decentralized countries are more responsive to citizen preferences in service delivery and strive harder to serve
their people than centralized countries.
Several case studies corroborate above findings. Crook and
Manor (1994), Meenakshisundaram (1996) based upon a review of
experience of the Indian state of Karnatka, and Blair (1996) based upon
Philippines' more recent experience with decentralization, conclude
that decentralized democratic governance had a positive impact on the
quality of governance especially in re-orienting government from a
command and control to a service provider role (see also Blair and Hansen, 1994). Landon (1996) carried out a study of education costs in Canada and concluded that local control regimes were more successful in
controlling overhead costs than provincial control regimes. Teacher
salaries, on the other hand, were better controlled by provincial systems.
Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996) report that for a large sample of
countries decentralization leads to lower unit administration costs for
road services.
32
Social Development
Two aspects of social development are considered: human development and income inequality. For ranking countries in terms of their
achievements on human development, we solely rely on the United
Nations' index on human development. This index incorporates life
expectancy, adult literacy, educational enrollments and per capita GDP
in purchasing power parity terms. Egalitarian nature of the society is
captured by an inverse rank on the Gini coefficients estimated by Deininger and Squire (1996). Table 3 shows that fiscal decentralization is
positively correlated and statistically significant with both the indices.
Institutional Environment for Macroeconomic Management
It is frequently argued that a decentralized public policy environ-
ment of the type found in developing countries contributes "to the
aggravation of macroeconomic problems" (Tanzi, 1996, p.305). In the
following, we reflect upon the available empirical evidence on aspects
of institutional framework for monetary and fiscal policies to form a
perspective on this issue.
Institutional Setting for Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is clearly a central function and best entrusted to
an independent central bank (Shah, 1994, p.1 1). The critical question
then is whether or not independence of central bank is compromised
under a decentralized fiscal system. One would expect, a priori, that the
central bank would have greater independence under a decentralized
system since such a system would require clarification of rules under
which a central bank operates, its functions and its relationships with
various governments. For example, when Brazil in 1988 introduced a
decentralized federal constitution, it significantly enhanced the independence of the central bank (Bomfim and Shah, 1994). On the other
hand, in centralized countries the role of the central bank is typically
shaped and influenced by the Ministry of Finance. In an extreme case,
the functions of the central bank of the U.K., the Bank of England, are
33
not defined by law but have developed over time by a tradition fostered
by the U.K. Treasury.
For a systematic examination of this question, we relate the evidence presented in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) on central
bank independence for 80 countries to indices of fiscal decentralization
for the same. The correlation coefficient in Table 3 shows a weak but
positive association confirming our a priori judgment that central bank
independence is strengthened under decentralized systems. Increases in
monetary base caused by the Central Bank's bailout of failing state and
non-state Banks represents an important source of monetary stability
and a significant obstacle to macro economic management. In Pakistan,
a centralized federation, both the central and provincial governments
have, in the past, raided nationalized banks. In Brazil, a decentralized
federation, state banks have made loans to their own governments without due regard for their profitability and risks causing the so called $90
billion state debt crisis in 1995. Thus a central bank role in ensuring
arms length transactions between governments and the banking sector
would enhance monetary stability regardless of the degree of centralization.
Available empirical evidence suggests that such arm length trans-
actions are more difficult to achieve in countries with a centralized
structure of governance than under decentralized structure with a larger
set of players. This is because a decentralized structure requires greater
clarity in the roles of various public players, including the central bank.
No wonder one finds that the top three most widely acknowledged independent central banks (Swiss Central Bank, Bundesbank of Germany
and the United States Federal Reserve Board) have all been the products
of highly decentralized fiscal structures.
Fiscal Policy
In a centralized country, central government assumes the exclusive responsibility for fiscal policy. In decentralized countries, fiscal
policy becomes a responsibility shared by all levels of government and
34
the federal (central) government in these countries use their powers of
the purse (transfers) and moral suasion through joint meetings to induce
a coordinated approach. Several writers (Tanzi, 1995, Wonnacott, 1972)
have argued, without empirical corroboration, that the financing of subnational governments is likely to be a source of concern within open fed-
eral systems since subnational governments may circumvent federal
fiscal policy objectives. Tanzi (1995) is also concerned with deficit crea-
tion and debt management policies of junior governments. Available
theoretical and empirical work does not provide support for the validity
of these concerns. On the first point, at a theoretical level, Sheikh and
Winer (1977) demonstrate that relatively extreme and unrealistic
assumptions about discretionary non-cooperation by junior jurisdictions
are needed to conclude that stabilization by the central authorities would
not work at all simply because of this lack of cooperation. These untenable assumptions include regionally symmetric shocks, closed econ-
omy, segmented capital markets, lack of supply side-effects of local
fiscal policy, non-availability of built-in stabilizers in the tax-transfer
systems at subnational levels and in interregional trade, unconstrained
and undisciplined local borrowing and extremely non-cooperative collusive behavior by subnational governments (see Spahn, 1997) . Their
empirical simulations for Canada further suggest that failure of a federal
fiscal policy in most instances cannot be attributed to non-cooperative
junior governments' behavior. Saknini, James and Sheikh (1996) further
demonstrate that, in a decentralized federation with markedly differenti-
ated subnational economies with incomplete markets and non-traded
goods, federal fiscal policy acts as an insurance against region-specific
risks and therefore decentralized fiscal structures do not compromise
any of the goals sought under a centralized fiscal policy.
On the potential for fiscal mismanagement with decentralization
as noted above by Tanzi, empirical evidence from a number of countries
suggests that, while national/central/federal fiscal policies typically do
not adhere to the European Union (EU) guidelines that deficits should
not exceed 3% of GDP and debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, junior
governments policies typically do. This is true both in decentralized
35
federal countries such as Canada and centralized federal countries such
as India and Pakistan. Centralized unitary countries even do worse on
these indicators. For example, Greece, Turkey and Portugal do not satisfy the EU guidelines. It is also interesting to note that fiscal stabilization failed under centralized structures in Brazil ands Argentina but the
same countries achieved major successes in this arena later under decentralized fiscal systems. The results in Table 3 provide further confirmation of these observations.
Subnational Borrowing
Capital finance needs of developing and transition countries are
currently estimated at about $100 billion a year. Most of these investment needs are for local public infrastructure. Water and sewerage projects account for one-half of these investment needs. Local governments
typically command a lion's share in public sector investments with a low
of 30% in developing countries and 70% in industrialized countries.
Therefore, subnational credit market access represents a major challenge to finance development needs. In a centralized fiscal environment,
this challenge poses significant risks for macro stabilization policies of
the national government as its options for credit rationing and direct
controls are significantly constrained by constitutional division of powers. Instead decentralized fiscal systems rely upon a combination of
credit market discipline, moral suasion and agreed upon rules to impose
financial discipline on local governments. Which system works better is
an empirical question worthy of rigorous research. The available evidence nevertheless point to superior performance of decentralized systems in restraining subnational debt. Central controls as imposed in
France, Spain, U.K., India, Pakistan and Australia (till 1992 under the
old Australian Loan Council) failed to keep subnational debt in check as
intergovernmental gaming led to weaker discipline and the possibility
of central bailout encouraged less rigorous scrutiny by the financial sector (see Shah, 1997 for details). Decentralized federations, on the other
hand, rely on a combination of guidelines, intergovernmental cooperation and market discipline to keep subnational debt within sustainable
36
limits. They typically adopt a "golden rule" guideline by which subnational borrowing is constrained for capital projects only or for short term
purposes to smooth out revenue inflows and outflows within a single fiscal period. This is the practice in Canada, USA, Germany and Switzerland. European Union has imposed guidelines on deficit and debt limits
as discussed earlier and has prohibited central banks from bailing out
any governments. Intergovernmental cooperation or moral suasion is
achieved through executive federalism as in Canada or multilateral
information exchange through the New Australian Loan Council as in
Australia or through bilateral negotiations as in Denmark. Most importantly the cornerstone of financial discipline under a decentralized fiscal
system is the market discipline enhanced by an enabling public policy
environment that stresses central bank independence, disengagement of
governments from ownership of commercial banks, no bailouts by the
central bank or by a higher level government and requirements for public dissemination of information on public finances. Some countries
such as Switzerland require further that all public borrowing should be
subject to popular referenda. State debt crisis in Brazil should not come
as a surprise to an informed observer as Brazil opted for a decentralized
fiscal constitution but failed to adopt appropriate policies to ensure market discipline in such environment as it allowed states to own commercial banks and borrow from these in a relatively unconstrained fashion
while holding open the possibility of central government bailout in the
event of default. Only recently Brazil has moved to create an enabling
framework for credit market discipline for subnational borrowing (see
also Ter-Minasian, 1996). Recent initiatives to control state/local debt
include: sale or rigid controls over state owned bank; privatization of
utilities; downsizing; and restructuring and harmonization of the state
value added tax (ICMS) to limit its potential for state industrial policy
(see Afonso and Lobo, 1996).
Outward Orientation
Economic liberalization is now commonly accepted as a cornerstone of good economic management. World Bank has recently ranked
37
Grassroots Organizations, Decentralization and Rural Development
countries on the openness of their economies taking into account factors
such as GNP originating from trade, manufacturing exports, foreign
direct investment as a share of GDP, commercial credit rating and manu-
facturing content of exports. This index of economic liberalization is
positively related to the index of fiscal decentralization.
Institutional Environment for Economic Management
Huther and Shah (1998) combine the three aspects of economic
management considered above in a quality index of economic management: the resulting index shows a positive association with the degree of
fiscal decentralization. This is to be expected as the decentralized systems are more transparent in defining the role of various public agents
and place a greater premium on accountability for results.
Quality of Governance and Decentralization
Huther and Shah (1998) further combine indices on institutional
environment for economic management, social development, government orientation and citizen participation to derive an overall index of
governance quality. This index is then related to the degree of fiscal
decentralization. Given the positive correlation between all of the
governance quality component indices and the composition of government expenditures, the positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and governance quality is to be expected, yet it is surprising to
discover the strength of this positive association (as indicated by correlation coefficient of 0.62) and further that about 38% of the variance in
governance quality is explained by fiscal decentralization alone.
Decentralization and Regional Equity
While we have not addressed the regional equity issue due to paucity of data, a few casual observations may be in order. As we noted ear-
her, regional inequity is an area of concern for decentralized fiscal
systems and most such systems attempt to deal with it through the
spending powers of the national government or through fraternal pro-
38
The Quest for the Right Balance and Responsiv andAccountable Governance
grams. Mature federations such as Australia, Canada and Germany have
formal equalization programs. This important feature of decentralization has not received adequate attention in the design of institutions in
developing countries. Despite serious horizontal fiscal imbalances in a
large number of developing countries, explicit equalization programs
are untried, although equalization objectives are implicitly attempted in
the general revenue sharing mechanisms used in Brazil, Colombia,
India, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan. These mechanisms typically combine diverse and conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall
significantly short on individual objectives. Because these formulas
lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to address regional equity
objectives satisfactorily.
Regional inequity concerns are more easily addressed by unitary
countries but it is interesting to note that the record of unitary countries
in addressing these inequities is uneven and certainly no better than federal countries (For evidence on regional income inequalities, Canada,
Shah [1996], China, Tsui [1996], Indonesia, Shah and Others [1994],
Brazil, Shah [1991], Pakistan, Shah [1995], India, Rao [1996]).
Decentralization and the Size of the Government
The public choice literature, in an extreme version, has portrayed
the government as a monolithic entity, "Leviathan" that acts purely in its
own interest relatively unconstrained by the voters. It is usually thought
to be interested in maximizing its own size. To the extent that this is true,
it will have consequences for the assignment of powers in the sense that
greater decentralization may reduce the ability of governments to
increase their size wastefully. This is because both "voting with feet"
and "voting by ballot" constrain the bureaucratic and political temptations for empire building. Ehdaie (1994) provides empirical support for
this proposition. He concludes that simultaneous decentralizatioiu of the
national government's taxing and spending powers, by directly linking
the costs and benefits of public provision, tends to reduce the size of the
public sector. Expenditure decentralization accompanied by revenue
39
sharing delinks responsibility and accountability and thereby fails to
achieve this result.
7.
SOME LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The following important lessons for reform of fiscal systems in
developing countries can be distilled from a review of past experiences.
Enabling Environment for Decentralization i.e. Institutions of
Citizen Participation and Accountability Must be Addressed in Any
Serious Reform of Fiscal Systems. Even in primitive societies such as
pre-British India, systems of local governance worked effectively to
deliver local services and collect local charges due to well understood
mechanisms of citizen participation and accountability. More modern
systems of local governance such as those run by elite Pakistani bureaucrats with training in management including financial management have
failed due to a lack of citizen voice and accountability checks. The
reform effort must embody appropriate provisions of recall of elected
officials for negligence or misconduct. Fostering institutions of critical
thought and evaluation, independence of judiciary and a free media can
play an important part in political and bureaucratic accountability.
These elements have not been sufficiently addressed in most reform
efforts.
Societal norms and consensus on roles ofvarious levels ofgovernments and limits to their authorities are vital for the success of decentralized decision making. In the absence of such norms and consensus,
intergovernmental gaming leads to dysfunctional constitutions.
Civil Service Reform is Critical to the Success of a Decentralization Program. Bureaucratic ownership of a reform program is critical
but such ownership would not be forthcoming in most developing countries where decentralization is seen as an attempt to weaken the powers
of central bureaucracy. To overcome this, the reform of fiscal systems
must embody reform of central bureaucracies. Such a reform must
40
ensure that the Center has no direct say in the recruitment and promotions of civil servants, other than overseeing that standards of transpar-
ency and fairness are met at the subnational levels and that
remunerations of subnational services must be competitive with the central government. Further, civil service incentive structure should reward
service orientation and performance and discourage command and control and rent seeking. This can be accomplished through performance
contracts, stay with it culture, recognition of specialized skills and
evaluation systems that link performance, rewards and budgeting.
Evaluation capacity development is offundamental importance in
public sector reform in developing countries. Formal ex-post evaluation
nurtures a climate of listening, learning and accountability in the public
sector. This is of greater importance in the context of developing countries where "government failures" have been spectacular but resulted in
little afterthought on appropriateness of development objectives and
strategies as institutions for accountability are weak or non-existent. In
such an environment, evaluation can nurture a "bottom-line" or
"development effectiveness culture" as Picciotto (1993) has argued that
"evaluation is to the public sector what accounting is to the private sector". It is interesting to note that the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa has imposed stringent monitoring and evaluation require-
ments on higher level governments to ensure proper monitoring and
oversight of local governments.
Traditional administrative capacity matters but should not be
considered as an impediment to decentralization. Administrative capac-
ity to develop and maintain modern organizational practices such as
budgeting, auditing and accounting systems is no doubt important but
should not be considered as a barrier to decentralization provided citizen
participation and transparency in decision making is ensured. This is
because technical capacity can be borrowed from supportive higher
level governments and elsewhere
Asymmetric Decentralization as provided under the Indonesian
Decentralization Program and Under Provincial Local Government
41
Ordinances in Pakistan offers a thoughtful approch to Decentralization. Regardless of the availability of help from higher level governments, lack of institutional capacity should never be considered as an
excuse not to decentralize. Instead, an objective program of decentralization which recognizes the nature and type of local government, its cli-
entele and its fiscal capacity can be developed and various local
governments can be assigned differential powers by taking into account
the above mentioned factors as was done in Pakistan in the past and
more systematically being done in Indonesia by rating each local
government.
A major separation ofspending and taxing decisions leads to lack
ofaccountability in the public sector. In Mexico, South Africa and Pakistan, federal revenue sharing transfers finance up to 99% of expendi-
tures in some provinces. This delinking of taxing and spending
responsibilities have led to accountability problems at the provincial
levels. In the event of such de-linking, role of conditional (conditional on standards of services and access to such services and not on
expenditures) block transfers and evaluation is worth examining to
enhance accountability.
Sharing of revenues on a tax by tax basis distorts incentives for
efficient tax collection. In Pakistan in the past (until 1996), tax by tax
sharing of income and sales taxes may have impeded reform of trade
taxes which were not shared with the provinces.
Successful decentralization cannot be achieved in the absence ofa
well designed fiscal transfers program. The design of these transfers
must be simple, transparent and consistent with their objectives (see
Appendix Table 3) . Properly structured transfers can enhance accountability of the fiscal system just as general revenue sharing has the poten-
tial to undermine it. Experiences of Indonesia and Pakistan offer
important insights in grant design. For example, Indonesia's education
and health grants use simple and objectively quantifiable indicators in
allocation of funds and conditions for the continued eligibility of these
grants emphasize objective standards as to access to these services.
42
hidonesian grants for public sector wages on the other hand, represents
an example of not so thoughtful design as it introduces incentives for
higher public employment at subnational levels. Pakistan's closed-end
matching grant for resource mobilization, similarly rewards relatively
richer provinces more for additional tax effort. An open-ended precursor of this grant program in vogue during 199 1-1996 also called into
question the credibility of federal commitment as the federal government was not able to meet its commitment arising from that grant program.
The role offiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the supply ofpublic goods should not be overlooked. For example, transfers for
basic health and primary education could be made available to both public and not-for-profit private sector on equal basis using, as criteria, the
demographics of the population served, school age population and student enrollments etc. This would promote competition and innovation
as both public and private institutions would compete for public
funding. Chile permits Catholic schools access to public education
financing. Canadian provinces allow individual residents to choose
among public and private schools for the receipt of their property tax
dollars. Such an option has introduced strong incentives for public and
private schools to improve their performances and be competitive. Such
financing options are especially attractive for providing greater access
to public services in rural areas.
Finally, contrary to a common misconception, a developing
country institutional environment calls for a greater degree of
decentralization than needed for an industrialized country. For an
efficient working of a centralized bureaucracy, advanced information
gathering and transmittal networks, an efficient and dedicated civil
service, and well developed institutions of citizen participation and
accountability are needed. This is possible in the setting of an
industrialized country environment. A more primitive public sector
environment is more suited to a decentralized form of governance. This
is because information requirements and transaction costs are
minimized by moving the decision making closer to people who are
43
affected by those decisions. Closeness also serves to enhance better
participation, preference matching for public services, transparency and
greater accountability.
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51
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SOMMAIRE
Pendant la premiere moitié du siècle les Pays en voie de develop-
pement généralement suivirent une voie de centralisation et comme
résultat us sont aujourdthui plus centralisés des pays industrialisés dans
leurs premieres étapes de développement.
Quelques récents événements ont conduit la plupart des Pays en
voie de développement a réexaminer les roles des différents niveaux de
gouvernement, du secteur privé et de la société civile. Ce changement a
provoqué une discussion très animée dans le milieu des experts de la
politique du développement.
Maiheureusement ce débat stest focalisé sur le theme de "la centralisation contre ceux de la décentralisation" et ii a ignore les règles du
fédéralisme qui visent a l'introduction d'institutions et mécanismes
appropriés a i' appui de la repartition constitutionnelle des compétences
entre les plusieurs niveaux de gouvernement.
Ce papier examine les raisons du renouveau d'intérêt pour la réorganisation du secteur publique soit dans les pays industriels, soit dans
les pays non industriels; on y réfléchit sur les "dangers de la décentralisation", en fournissant une evaluation de l'expérience de la décentralisation. II donne aussi des indications générales et institutionnelles pour
augmenter l'efficacité de Ia décentralisation, comme moyen pour favoriser la creation d'une ambiance d'apprentissage et d'évaluationpourun
gouvernement responsable.
Ce papier conclut dans le sens que les structures fiscales
décentralisées sont les plus adaptes a l'ambiance institutionnelle des
Pays en voie de développement, pourvu qu'on donne l'attention
nécessaire a des institutions telles que le role de Ia loi, la resolution des
conflits, la limitation de l'activité des gouvernements hors de leurs zones
de competence, la responsabilité et l'évaluation a tous les niveaux.
58
Local Economic Development Agencies
(LEDA): An overview on present
situation and future perspectives
MARTINO MELLI
Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDA)
1.
LEDAS APPROACH: INTRODUCTION TO THE
METHODOLOGY AND MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS
1.1
Development Framework for Programs Involving
LEDAs Strategy
The General Directorate to Development Co-operation of the Foreign Affairs Italian Ministry has been particularly involved, during the
last ten years, in implementing Human Development programs in different areas of the world. Among the first most significative initiatives we
can recall the program named PRODERE, executed in various countries
of Central America, in close co-operation with UNDPIUNOPS. One of
the key strategies of the program was, among the many activities performed, the constitution and implementation of Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs).
Programs involving LEDAs have the aim of realizing integrated
socio-economic interventions and projects addressed to improve the
standard of life of the most vulnerable people, facilitating the access to
jobs and business, to social services and safeguarding human, civilian,
union rights, especially in the areas where socio-economic rehabilitation after conflict is needed.
Main objectives to be achieved with the constitution and operation
of an appropriate strategy involving Local Economic Development
Agencies are:
To integrate economic, cultural and social policies, so that
they become mutually supportive and acknowledge the
interdependence of public and private sphere of activities.
To strengthen own capacity of people for participating in the
formulation, implementation and evaluation of decisions
determining the functioning and well being of society.
To harmonise economic and social development with
appropriate programs, that would entitle and enable people
61
living in poverty and disadvantaged, especially women, to
participate fully and productively in the economy and
society.
To develop policies to expand work opportunities and productivity, investing in human resources development, promoting technologies that generate employment, and
encouraging self-employment.
To improve access to land, credit, information, infrastructures and other productive resources for small and microenterprises, including those of the informal sector.
To promote access for everybody to education, information,
and technology and know how as essential means for
enhancing communication and participation in civil, political, economic, social and cultural life, and ensure respect for
civil political, economic, social and cultural rights.
A first group of countries where programs with LEDAs initiated
are: Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Belize,
Panama, Bosnia Herzegovina; presently they are starting in Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Tunisia, Cuba, Santo Domingo.
Similar programs financed by other donors are running in Cambodia, Haiti and Ukraine Republic.
In Europe LEDAs approach started in late 60's to find solutions to
problems such as: economic crisis, unemployment, and industrial conversion. European LEDAs are local based structures where local actors
are capable to establish common strategies and set up technical and
financial instruments for local business development.
160 European LEDAs are presently operating associated in a net-
work called EURADA, in its first steps supported by the European
Commission.
62
1.2
LEDAs Structure and Organisation
LEDAs implemented by UNDP-UNOPS, with the support of
DGCS, are mixed public-private no profit organisations, where the local
actors agree on economic development plans and initiatives, provide the
technical support to realise them, with the main aim to offer to beneficiaries - priority is given to most disadvantaged groups - opportunities to
have access to the productive and economic processes.
Usually, the members are representing public institutions, local
administrations, local NGOs, association of producers, other local private associations.
The permanent structure consists of a small but skilled technical
staff: in case of need, they involve resources from members.
Main services offered and delivered by LEDAs are:
Lii
the realisation of studies and diagnose on local economy, local eco-
nomic plans, information systems, policies of local support
development;
[1
to stimulate creation of business (mainly the development of
micro/small/medium enterprises);
D to provide technical and financial assistance to business: identification, formulation of business plans, assistance in business follows
up;
Lii
to fund rising of local economic projects and business;
0 the training.
Presently:
[1
14 LEDAs are operating in five Central American Countries (Costa
Rica 1, El Salvador 4, Guatemala 3, Honduras 2, Nicaragua 4). All
of them are associated in a sub-regional network;
[1
9 LEDAs are operating and networked in Cambodia;
63
Li
7 LEDAs are running and networked in Bulgaria;
L 4 LEDAs have been created in Mongolia;
Li
1 LEDA in Kyrghizstan;
1 LEDA in Bosnia Herzegovina.
1.3
LEDAs Main Achievements
Sustainability - The most important result is that, once international co-operation programs terminated, LEDAs are still performing in
a self-sustainable way.
In Central America - PRODERE terminated in 1995 - the number of
Agencies further increased, new ones have being constituted by
imitation.
Decentralisation - The decentralisation processes were enhanced
by: I) reinforcing local ability to decide own development; II) allowing
the maximum of local actors participation; III) facilitating peace
processes in conflictive areas; iv) aiming at solving high priority common problems (access to credit, unemployment, bring efficient solutions to the economic development processes, co-ordinate actions and
resources).
Sustainabiity and low cost of operations - The main point of
strength of the Agencies' strategy is the integration of strategic decision
on development plans and actions with the technical and financial
resources to execute them in order to achieve sustainability and to minimize costs. This represented one of the main factors capable to convince
national and international institutions in involving LEDAs.
Recognise the importance of LEDAs at national and international levelIn several cases Agencies were called by national Governments and llnternational Organisations to play an official role (for
example, in El Salvador, ADEL Chalatenango is a permanent member
of the national council for sustainable development, in Nicaragua the
Government established a legal and political framework to rule the
64
constitution of LEDAs, international donors such as US AID, FAQ,
GTZ, Canadian co-operation, European Union, international NGOs
were involved in supporting Agencies. Financial agreements were
established with World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, etc.).
Among some of the important results obtained through LEDAs'
approach so far, we can recall: nine of the Central America Agencies
created almost 3.500 jobs and assisted 550 micro and small business
activities; five Agencies in Cambodia created 11.500 jobs and assisted
3.200 micro businesses and 5.900 informal businesses.
2.
STRENGTHENING AND CONSOLIDATION OF TIlE
STRATEGY
LEDAs alone, due to the lack of resources and skills, cannot give a
full answer to problems affecting the development of local economies in
developing and transitional countries. Thus a strategy was studied, in
order to bring more sustainability and fuily capacitate the Agencies to
match the created expectations. The construction and functioning of an
organised network among the existing Agencies, has been considered
fundamental. National, regional and inter-regional networks will
enhance the capability of LEDAs, allowing the constitution of d-base,
continuous exchange of experiences, orientation and co-ordination of
workshops, teclmology transfer, etc.
Below are summarised the main factors, tools and initiatives driving the on-going process to create an efficient and wide network among
LEDAs.
The main factors to be afforded in order to give impulse to local
economies driven by LEDAs are:
Technology assessment, to improve the quality and competitiveness of the products and the cost of product process.
65
Credit management, to improve the effectiveness of credit allocations, financial management, and relationships with financial
institutions.
Marketing and commercialisation, to widen products' market
niches at international level.
Environment management, to find out means for matching business opportunities deriving from environment protection.
Managerial tools are also common to all the LEDAs, therefore to
realise economies of scale would be useful.
Some of these tools are: territorial planning, business plan, credit
administration, business self-diagnosis, territorial analysis of the value,
chains or commodity systems model, standards of quality assessment
and quality management.
Common collection and management of the information would be
indubitably useful.
Meetings could be arranged to set emerging problems and solu-
tions, to exchange know how, to meet other equivalent expertise
between different realities (Agencies belonging to EURADA, U.S economic development agents associated in CUED, Canadians agents associated in EDAC, etc.).
Future initiative to consolidate and strengthen LEDAs will promote an appropriate environment to facilitate joint response to next
challenges between developed and developing countries. In this context
an appropriate use of LEDAs and their network would be useful to:
Facilitate the exchange of expertise in areas as: technology transfer,
credit access, marketing, environmental management.
111
Promote potential joint venture opportunities oriented to match
developed countries demand of products/raw material and demand
of technology /finance needed by developing countries and promoted by LEDAs.
66
Local Economic Development Agencies (LED4)
Li
Find new sources of funds for joint ventures investments.
Li
Facilitate a permanent linkage through a network structure capable
of sustaining the mentioned services in the future.
As a consequence of the above, during the last LEDAs workshop
(9-10 June 1998), the representatives of the Agencies expressed the
need for an International Liaison Service (ILS).
The final result of the workshop, was the formulation of the following proposal of services to be implemented by ILS-LEDAs:
Communication and Information
The expected result is the multiplication of the information
exchange among the LEDAs and with the external partners. Main services provided by ILS-LEDA are:
LT
Production and diffusion of information material describing
LEDAs, and distributed through EURADA, UNOPS and ILO mailing list.
LI
Utilisation of UNOPS, ILO and EURADA web sites in order to
facilitate dissemination of any useful information.
Li
Editing of a monthly news bulletin, enclosed to EURADA news,
and possibly to CUED and EDAC bulletin.
LI
Dissemination of specialised documentation through ordinary mail,
e-mail, fax, etc.
Li
Organisation of meetings and workshops. Next workshop should be
organised in December.
Partnership
Attention will be dedicated to the realisation of projects coming
from a partnership between LEDAs operating in developing countries
and LEDAs operating in developed countries.
67
Projects could involve Joint ventures, business promotion, export-
import, technology and know-how transfer, other areas of common
interest.
Technical assistance
This service will involve the improvement of the Agencies operations and the sustainable creation of new ones.
Technical assistance including co-operation among LEDAS, will
be concentrated in areas such as:
Li
J
Training
Technology transfer
Li
Management
Li
Special projects
Business to business
The expected result is to increase import-export of local products
and raw materials, among the areas where LEDAs operate. The following services could be provided:
Editing of a catalogue, which includes information on the
supply of raw materials and products.
Editing of a catalogue, which includes the information on
the demand of raw materials and products.
Identification of exportable products and raw materials
through a process of matching demand and supply and technical assistance for the implementation of the exportation.
Gathering, organisation, publishing and dissemination of
information on foreign national trade legislation.
68
Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDA,)
5)
Fund Raising
New sources of financement should be found to support projects
and activities of LEDAs coming out from the above mentioned activities, or others stimulated by the existing financial opportunities.
The following services should be provided:
a)
Inventory of a different sources of financing lines at least at
three levels:
Local level, in charge of the different LEDAs, through
a research at national and regional level.
European level, through tripartite meetings EuradaILO-European Union.
In. United Nation system, on charge of ILO/UNOPS
b)
Analysis of the chances of agreements with international
financial Foundations (such as Soros, Swiss Bank Inter-Cooperation, etc.) aimed at supporting either a pre-investment
or a Guarantee Fund in favour of the LEDAs.
c)
Decentralised Co-operation, through the involvement of the
local developed countries committees, including local
administrations, civil society organisations, NGOs etc. to
support ILS-LEDA initiatives and the associated LEDAs
activities and proposals.
3.
CONCLUSIONS
We can therefore state that the strategy adopted by the Italian co-
operation through LEDAs so far, has been more than positive. This
approach strongly helped the implementation of Human development
programs and the confirmation of policies involving decentralisation
processes. Thus, the General Directorate to Development Co-operation
having in mind the significant results achieved, has decided to further
sustain and widen LEDAs strategy, not only expanding programs but
also including the strategy among his development policies.
69
SOMMAIRE
Les Agences locales pour le développement économique (LEDA)
ont été instituées (quelques-unes sont actuellement en voie de creation)
par la Cooperation au développement italienne dans plusieurs pays en
voie de développement et ex-communistes.
Les premieres Agences ont été créées ii y dix ans dans le domaine
du programme nommé Prodere, réalisé en Amérique Centrale avec la
collaboration de UndplUnops.
Les LEDA sont des organisations non profit, a initiative mixte
publique et privée (y participent organismes publics, ONG, associations
de producteurs, etc.) qui ont le but de promouvoir le développement
local.
Le personnel des Agences, en nombre restreint, mais hautement
qualiflé, offre principalement des services de soutien aux activités productives de petites ou moyennes dimensions.
Les résultats obtenus jusqu'ici sont importants, surtout pour la
nouvelle occupation créée.
On est maintenant en train de réaliser un réseau pour joindre les
différentes Agences afin de renforcer et développer leur action.
70
Rural Communities and Community
Development in Mozambique:
A Historical Perspective
ROSEMARY GALLI
Rural Communities and Community Development in Mozambique
INTRODUCTION
Power, alongside of environmental forces and blood ties, has historically shaped the relationship of people to land in Mozambique. This
relationship received renewed attention with the onset of structural
adjustment policies in Africa, particularly in those countries where agricultural investment was thought to be a key to development as a whole.
Investment was understood to be linked to security on the land. In
Mozambique pressures to change the land law to give greater guarantees
to smaliholders came not only from domestic groups but the international community as well'.
In a seminal article, Jean-Philippe Platteau reviewed historical,
economic and anthropological arguments against equating tenure security in Africa simply with individual titles to land and he offered instead
"a pragmatic and gradualist approach that re-institutionalizes indigenous land tenure, promotes the adaptability of its existing arrangements,
avoids a regimented tenure model, and relies as much as possible on
informal procedures at local level" (1996:74). While sensitive to African realities, this approach will require not only research, but also caution and humility. In Mozambique, as I suspect elsewhere, no two
situations are alike, so that there can be no ready-made formula for reinstitutionalizing indigenous land tenure. Even though the proposal in
Mozambique is for community management through a land committee,
there is great hesitation to recognize indigenous structures that perform
this role. The tendency is to view what is essentially a political question
in technical terms and as a technical exercise and this partly explains the
highly centralized models on offer. This paper focuses on some of the
historical processes involved in the formation and disintegration of
1 There was active participation ofthe government, non-governmental organizations, and donor
agencies at the two land conferences in 1992 and 1994 sponsored by the University of
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center and the Ad hoc Corn issâo das Terras. Moreove,: the Comistho
dcix Terras solicited opinion widely while it was drafting the proposed land law in 1996 and
1997. Finally there was an extensive debate in the National Assembly before the law was
passed in July 1997. See Scott Kloeck-Jensen, "Analysis of the Parliamentary Debate and
New National Land Law for Mozanibique ", Land Tenure center 1997.
73
indigenous structures in Mozambique, the review of which suggests that
a move towards formalizing land security will not be easy because, at
the very least, it will require a change in how power has been exercised
at least in the twentieth century. The paper suggests that a new approach
would include the revaluation as well as facilitation of rural
communities.
DEFINITIONS
Rural peoples in Africa have been denominated and classified by
various terms including 'tribe' and 'ethnicities'. The colonial and pejorafive connotations of the word 'tribe' led to its substitution in the 1970s
for the more neutral term 'ethnicity' or 'ethnic group' but some see it as a
poor substitute2. The term, 'local community', currently being used in
the political discourse in Mozambique to denote rural settlements also is
loaded with meanings and therefore needs to be defined3. Portuguese
administrators utilized the terms, povoacdo meaning village or settlement, tribu (tribo) meaning tribe, and império meaning empire and the
sequence, império, tribu, povoacâo, described the hierarchy of African
societies in Mozambique as they understood it. In order to impose its
own rule, Portugal eliminated impérios. It broke the Gaza empire and
Karanga states into component parts, and transformed so-called tribes
into administrative units which were called regedorias. These were fur-
ther divided into grupos de povoac6es (population groups) and
povoactes (villages or settlements). This new three-tier hierarchy was
led by a régulo (paramount chief), one or more chefes de grupo de
povoacöes (chiefs) and chefes depovoacão (village headmen).
2 A "conversation" on the use of these two terms in reference to African peoples took place in
August-October 1997 on the African history list server sponsored by Michigan State University c'H-Africa@!-I-NETMSU.EDL9. Particularly helpful were comments made by Pier Larson of Pennsylvania State University, Misty Bastion of Franklin and Marshall College and
Brian Siegel ofFurman University.
3 Scott Kloeck-Jenson 's thought-provoking paper (1997,) as well as archival research conducted
between April andAugust on the Yao and Gorongosa peoples demonstrate the complexities of
characterizing Mozainbican communities.
74
In order to subject Mozambican communities, Portugal took away
sovereignty over territory. In his description of the Yao under colonial
rule, Manuel Gomes Amaral put the matter clearly: "The extension of
Portuguese law to the country altered the situation; the Sultans [which is
how the Yao termed their leaders] lost their rights of sovereignty as well
as their land rights but maintained their authority with respect to cus-
toms and norms, within reasonable limits" (1990:116). He also noted
that the Yao failed to take the new situation into account and continued
informally with their local level procedures. This is a reality which still
pervades many areas today.
The disassociation of territory from community was legitimized
by intellectual discourse. Jorge Dias defmed the tribu as "an aggregate
characterized by the existence of political, military and judicial institutions which are able to give cohesion to a certain number of autonomous, although culturally homogenous, communities" (cited in Rosa
Lobo, 1966). The term "community" thus also made its way into political discourse. The notion that in Mozambique communities were cultur-
ally homogenous was, however, not the case, not in the 1960s and
certainly not today.
In lieu of the word 'tribet, this paper uses the more neutral term 'people& as in the Portuguese povo. "Community", for this paper, signifies
a local aggregate of people living in a commonly recognized rural area
and having a decision-making structure. Commonly recognized means
simply that neighbours agree that the area belongs to the community in
question. It should be noted that this definition includes not only the
space occupied by the community but also its organization; it does not
include characteristics often associated with community such as group
solidarity, non-differentiation, and harmony.Yet even this bare-bones
definition is not unproblematic, as shall now be seen.
75
MOZAMBICAN RURAL COMMUNITIES IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Most of the historical information on Mozambican rural peoples is
from Portuguese explorers4 and officials who often adopted names used
by such other "intruders" as the Maraves and Ngunis, both of whom
were invading forces which occupied large parts of Mozambique.
Names, also, changed from author to author, and from place to place. A
rough sketch of some of the commonly recognized larger groups follows.Beginning in the North: along the frontier with what is now
Malawi, there are a number of peoples, including the Nyanjas, along the
banks of Lake Malawi, further east are the Yao who extend into Tanzania. To the south and east of the Yao live the Makua and to the north of
them the Makonde, also spilling over into Tanzania. In what is today
Nampula province are Makua, mainly, overflowing into Zambezia province. Zambezia is home to a branch of the Makua known as Lomue
whose homeland is said to be in the Namuli mountains. Zambezia also
hosts the Manganja people north of the Zambeze river, and the so-called
Zambezi peoples along the banks of the Zambeze. In Tete are found the
Tawaras and Angonis. In Manica and Sofala are the Manyika and
Shona-speaking peoples, including the Vandau or Ndau, Sena and
Tonga people; the latter extending southward into Inhambane. Then
there are the Shangaan in Gaza and Maputo provinces and the Rongas or
Tsonga in the southernmost part ofMozambique. Although not rural, the
Swahili communities along the coast and inland along the long-distance
trade routes should not be forgotten.
Where these groups came from and how they got to Mozambique
is hard to pin down since there has not been much archaeological exploration, there are few written records before the fifteenth and sixteenth
century and oral tradition is only reliable for about 100 years back. A
common hypothesis is that hunters and gathers initially inhabited areas
4 Haflcin notes that the earliest records ofpeople in northern Mozambique were written by Arab
geographers of the tenth and 12th centuries (1973:1),
76
of Mozambique and they were displaced by a number of migrating
Bantu-speaking agricultural peoples. It is not possible to date their arrival with any certainty but Jorge Dias thinks the migrations began about
the seventh century A.D. (1964-65).
According to Manuel Simoes Alberto, who did the first ethnographic census in the 194 Os, the oldest peoples in Mozambique are the
Macuas5. They have suffered the least changes in habitat, having always
occupied the same geographical sites. Originating in central Africa, they
migrated southeast to Lake Niassa, and from there descended east to
what is now the southern part of Cabo Delgado and then south to Nampula and Baixa Zambezia, first in the plains and highlands. They comprise the largest population group in Mozambique. After the Makua
came the Tongas from east of Lake Niassa, descending to the right margin of the Zambeze river (1947:22, 23). Newitt thinks that the Tongas
probably had to migrate from the high to low veldt under pressure from
the Karanga from about the 14th century onward. As already mentioned,
they continued southward into the area known as Inhambane.The
Karangas, who came to be located on the central highlands between the
Zambeze and Save rivers, were the founders of the realm of Monomotapa. Newitt puts their arrival in the highlands around about the 10th
century. A southern pastoral people (as opposed to the Makua and Tongas who were agriculturalists), they divided into two groups: those who
settled around Bulawayo and based their economy mainly on cattleowning, mining and long-distance trade. The second group were linked
to the great Zimbabwe known for their stone wall-building, mining and
long-distance trading in gold (1995:35). Junior members of this group
moved north and were the peoples that the Portuguese identified as
Karanga. They went north because it was less populated and there were
unexploited gold fields. This expansion continued into the 15th century
and, shortly after the Portuguese arrived, Karanga rulers were
actively trying to establish themselves in the low veldt of Sofala. By
5 Nancy J. HaJkin states that proto-Macua peoples arrived between c. 800-1000 A.D. They
divided into Macua and Loniue (1973:2).
77
the sixteenth century they had subordinated the Tonga and Sena peoples
of the Zambeze valley.
Alberto ventures the hypothesis that when the Karangas went
south, to the Umbeluzi river, they met the Tonga and the mixture of these
two groups gave rise to the Tembes, Maputos, Mabalois and Rongas
located in the southernmost part of Mozambique between the Transvaal
and the capital city (1947:23). For Dias, the Tsongas-Shangaans were
the product of the fusion between the most ancient agricultural peoples
and the other great migrants, the pastoral Ngunis.
Newitt (1995) sees Mozambican history in terms of the subjugation of relatively small political units, represented by the Tongas and
Makuas, by invaders possessing a more centrally organized state system. The invaders - in the 16th century, represented by the Karanga became, in effect, overlords and collected tribute from the smaller units
but did not displace the local chieftaincies from their territories. In the
late 16th and early 17th centuries, Portuguese officers begin to replace
the Karanga as a type of overlord in the Zambeze river valley, giving rise
to the prazo system of land tenure. Both Newitt (1995) and Isaacman
(1973) agree that the Tongas, Senas and other Zambeze valley people
retained 'ownershipt of their lands even under this indirect form of Portuguese rule6. During the 18th and 19th centuries, however, these agri-
cultural communities were forced to move periodically because of
drought, more invasions and, finally, the harshness of colonial rule.The
Yao (Wa-yao or Ajaua), whose origins are also very uncertain, are
thought to have dispersed from their homeland in the 1 830s and 1 840s
because of drought and invasions (Abdallah, 1983; Liesegang, n.d.).
Although basically agriculturalists, at some point in time, they began to
become involved in long-distance trade and took over the monopoly of
the ivory trade from the Maraves, who, from the fourteenth century
onward, had developed a centrally organized state system that expanded
into the Shire Valley gaining control over the Chewa and Mang'anja
peoples. Later the Maraves invaded Mozambique in a search for the
6 Isaacman argues that the prazo -holders and the system itselfbecame Africanized over time.
78
commercial monopoly with the Coast and left their mark on the Makua
and Swahili communities they found there. There is even a legend that
the Yao people were born out of the union between a Marave invader
and a woman from the Yao mountains who had gotten separated from
her peoples during the invasion.
The Yao became great long-distance traders not only in ivory but
also in slaves and out of this transformation of their economy grew a
system of formidable territorial chieftaincies that protected the Yao
from the seemingly inevitable subordination in the face of marauding
invaders. The peoples, from whom the Yao successffihly defended them-
selves, were the Lobs (originally a Zulu group), the Malcua (who
founded the Maua state also in the 19th century), the Ngunis and finally
the Portuguese over the course of the nineteenth century. The price was
first dispersion and then continual movement. Even in the 20th century
and especially after their greatest warlord was put down by the Portuguese in 1912, the Yao emigrated to escape the rigors and atrocities of
the Nyassa Company.
The African invaders which have had the greatest impact not only
on Mozambique but the whole of southern Africa were the Ngunis;
without a doubt, because they were the last before the effective occupation of the Portuguese. The Nguni speakers occupied the area south of
Delagoa bay in a territory which abutted that of the Tsongas. They were
closely interconnected in their development as referred to above. The
Tsonga had created large unified kingdoms in the 16th century in order
to profit from European trade and in the late 17th century they had
moved northward incorporating the Tongas, as far northward as the Pungue River.
The Ngunis were patrilineal mixed farmers, originally grouped in
small chieftaincies built up through the accumulation of cattle. Drought
affected pasturing of the cattle and a competition grew for well-watered
lands. Warfare grew among the chieftaincies in the early 18th century
and also cattle-raiding. The decentralized lineages began to form mili-
tary regiments from age-sets and hunting bands; for example, the
79
Ndwandwe, the Swazi and the Mthetwa/Zulus. Chaka Zulu defeated the
Ndwandwe chieftaincy in 1819 causing it to disperse northward. In
1821, Ngwana Maseko and his followers moved to Karanga areas. In
1821, Nxaba (Muava) occupied southern Mozambique, taking recruits
among the Tsonga, and also conquered areas within central Mozambique later on in the decade. By 1834 the centre of his operations may
have been the heartland of Sofala (Newitt:1995:260). Liesegang counts
four northward migrations in the 1821-1839 period (1970:317)
The Ngunis moved even further north into Malawi and into the
Rovuma valley in Tanzania, but they were unsuccessful in trying to subjugate the Yao that were living east of Lake Niassa, as has already been
mentioned, and they were kept from dominating the Zambeze valley
communities and the Karanga state ofBarue by one powerful prazo war-
lord, Manuel Antonio de Sousa. Through their conquests, the Ngunis
created the Gaza kingdom, "a large, powerful and cohesive unit" out of
the fragmented lineage-based polities of lowland Mozambique. It lasted
throughout the 19th century (Newitt, 1995:261). The empire was based
on a core area where the King ruled, recruited regiments and maintained
his herd, and peripheral areas which paid tribute and were governed
either by their local chieftaincies or by the prazo-holders. In Manica and
Sofala, for example, Gaza sent resident representatives and warriors to
each area to keep an eye on things. They were paid by the local residents.
Annually, a band of warriors was sent to collect tax.
This thumbnail sketch of the most important rural peoples in
Mozambique serves two purposes: 1) to locate over time the general
areas in which communities lived; and 2) to give an idea of the political
structure under which they lived. In general, under African rule, most
subjugated communities, at least those on the periphery, tended to be left
to govern themselves in their own territories. This, however, did not preelude their assimilation to the conqueror's culture. Nor was it unheard of
that the invaders adopted the local customs or that a fusion of the two
cultures occurred.
80
This historical outline shows a great deal of movement rather than
simply migration and fixed settlement, prompted by severe environmental conditions as well as invasions. Some invasions had less to do
with conquest and more to do with the need to search for food and for
better, more productive lands. Even under the best of climatic and social
conditions, the type of agriculture generally practised was itinerant.
Moreover, people moved in response to trade opportunities, as well as to
procure trade goods, which involved them in raiding for slaves, cattle,
and other marketables.
The upshot of widespread movement was that rural communities
in Mozambique have not had demarcated, secure or stable territories,
only large generalized spaces that they occupied. On the other hand,
upheaval did not preclude emotional, spiritual, economic and political
attachment to the land (Parker Shipton, 1996). As shall now be seen,
Portuguese rule brought even more instability to peoples' lives despite
claims to the contrary.
PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION
When they first arrived in Mozambique at the end of the fifteenth
century, the Portuguese recognized the integrity and sovereignty of the
peoples they encountered. This was a question of relative power and
attitudes changed over time. In the first instance, Portuguese officials
asked permission of the leaders of the various rural communities to
begin settlements on their lands; negotiations took place and contracts
of sorts were drawn up. Portuguese officials even bought land. Kings
were accorded their rank as kings, even when the Portuguese interfered
in the succession disputes. The Portuguese king made delegations to
Monomotapa of the Karanga peoples and the latter ceded territories.
However, as soon as it was practicable and convenient, smaller chiefdoms and peoples were subordinated. The Portuguese even sent an
expedition to try to wrest sovereignty from the Karangas in 1573
but failed miserably. Lacking funds and personnel, domination was
81
confined mainly to coastal enclaves and the Zambeze valley, for most of
the centuries of Portuguese contact with East Africa.
The Scramble for Africa, at the very end of the nineteenth century,
made it imperative for Portugal to subjugate the Mozambican peoples
and gain control over their lands. In the process of pacification, the Portuguese adopted the tactic of "divide and rule", as already mentioned7.
Wherever a centrally organized kingdom resisted, its territories were
divided into smaller units and those who had been vassals to a paramount ruler were now recognized as chiefs (regedores or régulos; see
above for the fri-level stmcture imposed). Whenever any regedor gave
the Portuguese administration or its surrogates trouble, he was beaten,
fined, jailed or deposed and a Portuguese-appointed person put in his
place.
For most of colonial rule, the boundaries of lands, apart from
urban sites, were mainly left unsurveyed and undefined, except when
concessions were made. But this situation had to do with the lack of
financial and administrative capacity rather than a commitment to the
rights of local peoples to live there. Even the chartered companies that
ruled Niassa, Cabo Delgado, much of Zambezia, Tete, Manica and
Sofala, had little to no capital available for investment in either plantation or small-holder agriculture.The newly-formed Zambezia Company
was not even able to occupy all of its area let alone administer it. The
Boror Company, the Luabo Company, Société du Madal, Mozambique
Sugar Company (later Sena Sugar Estates) leased the company's lands
along the Zambeze. In Tete, the company leased 126 of the 134 prazos in
its concession. In the case of the Mozambique Company in Manica and
Sofala, the Company attempted large-scale coconut and rubber plantations but these failed, so it began to promote compulsory cropping
7 According to Silva Cunha, the Portuguese authorities followed the practice ofstripping power
from paramount rulers and making alliances with their vassals or smaller powers who then
became their agents. This was the policy of Enes and Mouzinho de Albuquerque after the
pac(/ication of the JVunis in 1895. The Reforma Administrativa of Mocambique of 1907,
article 87, said that the limits of the circunscriçães civis, capitanias-mores and military
commands should coincide as far as possible with native boundaries, so that administrative
authorities can easily use, absorb and substitute the native authorities. (1 953:191).
82
among African small-holders. Quite apart from its efforts, a thriving
sector of non-African maize farms grew up (Neil-Tomlinson, 1990:215263). Small, medium-sized and large plantations eventually dotted the
countryside in northern Mozambique, and had a great impact on
Mozambican labour and lands.
Migration - this time, out-migration - depopulation, flights into
the forest or up mountains, were all consequences of the several
Companies' polices and direct Portuguese administration. People
uprooted themselves in resistance. In Yao areas, whole communities
moved with their chiefs, as a result of the pacification campaigns. More
migrations occurred during tax collections, as a result of compulsory
cotton-growing and when forced labour began. On an individual level,
the burden of taxation normally meant that the male population spent
much of its adult life in search for work in neighbouring countries
because taxes were often collected in sterling.
In Manica and Sofala, the administration of the Mozambique
Company was based on physical violence and the threat of violence.
There were ten military campaigns waged to establish its authority in the
first period of its long reign from 1892 to 1942. In the Gorongosa area,
ten chiefs and their communities fled from their very fertile valleys into
the Serra de Gorongosa in 1897 in opposition to the imposition of the
Company in their area. Tomlinson says that similar occurrences happened in the Buzi and Mossurize areas, the first due south of Beira and
the second on the frontier with then Rhodesia. Other villages moved
constantly to avoid the tax collection (1990:171, 172). However, the
Gorongosa peoples could not hold out on the mountain sides for lack of
food and made a deal with the Company. An uneasy peace followed
until full-scale rebellion broke out with the revolt of the former Karanga
state, Báruè, in 1917. The community known as Kanda lost almost twothirds of its population during the war and its aftermath (Companhia de
Moçambique, 1919-1923).
Serious social dislocations occurred not simply at the level of
communities but also within families. The three largest communities in
83
Gorongosa each had near to or more than 5,000 people, but, when the
new Administrator arrived in 1919, he found the inhabitants living and
hiding in widely spread groups of 3-8 people. He. couldn't find whole
villages. In terms of how this tragedy affected families, the Administrator gave the example of one family where the father had hidden by himself high up in the mountains; his younger son was living in a village on
the other side of the mountains; two other sons, already adults, were in
the lands of another chief, while the mother and the two youngest were
in the lands of still another chief, not knowing the whereabouts of the
others (Companhia de Moçambique, 1919b). This turmoil continued
into the 1920s. Similar situations occurred at the end of the recent armed
conflict in Mozambique.
Much more odious than tax collection8 was coerced labour
recruitment. Not only were people forcibly rounded up but wages were
set lower than neighbouring countries and working conditions were
miserable. The reaction was flight. Since the Company would seize the
families of men who hid or fled, the only option was migration of the
entire family, either to areas of low labour recruitment or outside the territory. Neil-Tomlinson notes that the situation in 1910 was particularly
bad and people in the entire territory were on the move (1990:30 1). One
concrete example of continual motion came out of Administrator Lima's
1922 report on Gorongosa. The population numbered 24,718 in that
year, seven thousand of whom had changed their community, by either
leaving Gorongosa, coming into Gorongosa because conditions were
even worse elsewhere or moving to another village. Fully 28% of the
population moved from place to place to avoid Company policemen and
to search for food as 1922 had also been a year of drought.The New
State which took over in 1928 from the Republican regime in Portugal
aimed at establishing administrative order which also meant putting an
end to the concession companies and their excesses.
S The Mozambique Company in vivid contrast to the Nyassa Compaiy set its taxes in relation to
the taxes ofneighbouring Rhodesia andSouth Africa. At times, taxes were set lower than those
prevailing in these countries which sometimes motivated in-migration. (B. Neil-Tomlinson,
1990).
84
Not that colonial rule in the rural areas immediately became any less oppressive. Although the 1928 labour codes specified that administrative officers
were not to be directly involved in labour recruitment, the government still let it
be known that companies seeking labour must be allowed to obtain what they
needed. The state also continued to use the pressgang for the recruitment of
colonial troops, and in the 193 Os compulsory cotton growing added a new
dimension of oppression (Newitt, 1995:453).
Emigration continued as one form of resistance. In some areas
such as Tete and northern Zambezia, the emigration was massive. A
1945 report put the number of Tete males in Nyasaland (Malawi) as
69,000. They were escaping Mozambique's high tax rates and the unfavourable terms of trade. In Malawi, taxes were lower, women were not
taxed, agricultural crops fetched higher prices and trade goods cost less
(Newitt, 1995:514-515). Inspection reports in Nyassa district confirmed
this situation which was the subject of much discussion with local lead-
ers between 1938 and 1950. Emigration of thousands of people was
reported between 1938 and 1940 for the same reasons as in Tete. Forced
labour recruitment continued. High taxes and unfavourable terms of
trade still plagued people in 1950; emigration continued but probably on
a diminished basis. Nevertheless, all these factors were compounded by
compulsory cotton-growing which was accompanied by violence, fraud
in the marketing process and a negative impact on household subsistence in times of drought (Inspeccâo dos Serviços Administrativos e dos
Negocios IndIgenas, 1938-1940; 1944; l950). Newitt reports the massive migration of Lomue peoples to Nyasaland (Malawi) during the
years 1920s-1940s, due to the intensification of forced labour. The peak
may have been reached in 1930. In 1931, the number in Nyasaland was
calculated at around 236,000, double the number of ten years earlier
(1995:415). "If migration began as a search for economic opportunity
and as a means of evading colonial oppression, it soon became an
essential aspect of people's life pattern as the social economy of different regions became in one way or another dependent upon migration"
(Newitt, 1995:4 14). So far the focus has been on clandestine migration.
9 There were no inspection reports for Nyassa district as a whole in the ]950s and 1960s.
85
However, the labour of the people in many areas was systematically
exploited through legalized export to the mines of the Rand, southern
Rhodesia and Katanga.
The upshot of this continual movement both inside and outside the
country meant that many communities changed their habitat every so
often, many received outsiders fleeing one form of exploitation or
another and many communities were made up of old men, women and
children. As voluntary labour replaced forced labour in plantation areas
in the 1950s and 60s, communities of migrant labourers from various
localities formed.
A further cause of instability was engendered by the frequent
redrawing of administrative areas. As the colonial administrative service grew, new administrative units were added and boundaries changed.
For example, between 1934 and 1963, the area known as Unango in
Nyassa passed under the administration of three different rural circumscriptions (known today as districts). This was not simply a change of
name but also of size of administrative unit. For the peoples of Unango
this made little difference but there were peoples whose territories were
affected with the change of units. One concrete example occurred in
Gorongosa when the area of Maringue was removed from the circumscription and passed to Chemba. This gave rise to contradictions within
the regedoria that lost its land.
The creation of the National Park of Gorongosa gave rise to even
more land problems in that circumscription because the people who
lived in this huge reserve had to move onto the lands of other peoples,
causing confusion between leaders and peoples. In 1948, the lands of the
Sacudzo community were taken from Barue and passed to Gorongosa.
In the 1960s, a new regedoria was established called Pungue out of
lands that formerly had belonged to another area. The regedor of these
lands was deposed and made a chief under the new regedor. This type of
intervention in the leadership of communities was rather common.
When, in 1898, the peoples of Gorongosa finally submitted to the
administration of the Mozambique Company, it was ruled by 20
86
chiefs' 0; in 1967, there were seven chiefs, five of which were disputed.
In the same year, research was conducted on the traditional forces in the
entire territory of Manica and Sofala. The author warned the Administration that the communities which had their leadership tampered with
did not lose the sense of who their genuine leaders were and were biding
their time until they could vent their anger at the many injustices caused
by the Administration. He recommended that the Administration work
with the natural community leaders and to include them in decisionmaking in matters relating to their lands so that they could feel solidary
with the Administration and identify with Portugal. He went so far as to
recommend decentralization in the face of the threat of the nationalist
movement (Portugal, 1967:64).Besides making rural people tenants on
their own land, the colonial administration, whether company or direct
rule, undemiined both genuine and imposed community leadership.The
lack of authority and prestige of regedores was well-known and considered a prime administrative problem of the colonies in general and not
simply Mozambique. Professor Silva Cunha, who taught the cream of
Portuguese colonial administrators, in 1953, worried "... that the laws
are not being carried out. In the selection of the native authorities, it is
rare that habits and customs are respected and administrative authorities
rarely, with some honourable exceptions, worry about defending the
prestige of native rulers.. .The result is that chiefs recognized by Portuguese authorities rarely have effective control over their populations..."
(1953:196). However his answer to the problem involved the social
engineering of communities which engendered even more alienation in
the relation of peoples to their leaders and land.
The creation of entirely new social units, aldeamentos, was initially seen as a first step towards community development and the integration of rural peoples into Portuguese society. The model was the
creation of a Mozambican peasantry similar to the Portuguese peasantry, resident in settled communities, known as autarquias, adminis-
10 "Resurno do Arrolamento de paihotas e recenseamento da popu1acio indIgena no ano de
1913 Arcjuivo Histórico de Moçambique, Companhia de Mocambique, Caixa 189.
87
tered by local authorities known as freguesias' . Without a doubt, this
was the most alienating of all the colonial instrumentalities.
Some ambitious administrators began to implement this policy
even before 1950. In the Unango area, the administrator began to move
people along the roadside in order to better control them and make it
easier to implement compulsory cotton-growing. One of their chiefs,
Nampanda, reported to the Inspector who visited him in 1951, that
despite the government order, the people had left the site along the road
in order to be close to their fields. However by 1967, the entire district of
Nyassa was in aldeamentos. The five aldeamentos in the Unango area
were particularly repulsive to those who lived in them. According to
interviews conducted in 1981, the camps were surrounded by barbed
wire. People were not allowed out to farm without the presence of armed
guards. There was no water or hygiene in the early years of the war for
liberation. The function of the aldeamentos had not changed: to control
population movements and, in the context of the war, to prevent youth
from joining the FRELIMO liberation movement and people in general
from supporting it. Not only Nyassa was affected; in the district of Cabo
Delgado, 250,000 people were moved into aldeamentos in 1966
(Newitt, 1995:527). In Tete, the policy was implemented as well. For its
part, FRELIMO established communal villages in the areas liberated
from Portuguese rule, in small areas of Makonde country and in the
interior of Nyassa.
During the war for independence, the dislocation of people was
nearly total in the areas of battle. Those not moved into aldeamentos fled
either to the bush or mountains, to FRELIMO areas, or to neighbouring
countries.
11 This model was institutionalized in 1961 in the Decree no. 43:386 which provided, among
other things that:
Regedorias were incorporated into Portuguese law;
the territory of each regedoria was recognized as a local autarchy;
the Regedores were the representatives of their people at all levels ofgovernment, in the
Legislative Council, in the District government and in the Freguesia government.
the Regedorias constituted a new administrative unit.
88
After Independence, FRELIMO made villagisation one of the cornerstones of rural development policy, for a time, causing even further
alienation, which some commentators see as one of the reasons for the
spread of social banditry and the resistance movement, RENAMO'2.
Localized terrorist actions turned into full-scale war after 1985 causing
nation-wide dislocation. Around five million people were forced to
move to district capitals, urban areas, RENAMO bases, or to neighbouring countries in the search for safety Estimates of those who left the
country ranged from one and a half to two million people, most of whom
went to Malawi, but also Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and South
Africa. Severe drought in the 1980s and especially the early 1990s hit
rural peoples at a time when they were away from own fields and confined to tiny overworked plots either assigned to them by district officials, or ceded to them (sometimes be grudgingly) by local populations.
A preliminary analysis of an agricultural census carried out in 1993
showed that a significant proportion of families farmed less than one
hectare of land13. Agricultural production fell alarmingly. In May 1992,
the National Executive Emergency Commission (CBNE) calculated that
the drought had destroyed all but 237,000 tons of grain which is less
than 15% of the estimated necessary 1.6 million tons. CENE therefore
estimated that 3.1 million people were in need of free food distributions
while another 6 million were dependent upon commercial food aid
(donated food sold at concessionary prices on urban and semi-urban
markets). These figures did not include the people in RENAMO areas
(Galli, June 1993). With over 70% of the population relying on imported
food, there was enormous pressure on the warring parties to bring the
conflict to an end in order that people could return to their zonas de ongem (zones of origin), the problematic term used by the government.
12 See, for example, C. Geffrcy (1990.) and Margaret flail (1991).
13 The PSA MA/MSU Equipa de Pesquisa survey showed in districts in Nampula (Angoche,
Ribaue and Monapo), Zambezia (Gurue, Nicoadala.) and Cabo Delgado (Pemba, Montepuez)
there were between 25-75% offarm families cultivating a total area ofless than one heetare.
89
Grassroots' Organizations, Decentralization and Rural Devclopment
RESETTLEMENT
In 1993, approximately 600,000 hardy and courageous individuals began the trek out of the refugee camps without the assistance of any
agency. The usual pattern for the internally displaced was for families to
send an adult member to survey the situation, take stock of the damage,
and, if possible, begin the task of rebuilding. Because many people had
been away for seven to ten years, the bush had returned and had to be
cleared. And there were the mines. There were few if any constructions
left. In the community itself, where there might have been a school or
health post, a burnt out structure remained Mostly, however, people
were worried about security. Was it safe for the other family members to
return?
When convinced that the war had definitely ended, families had
more hard decisions to make because, in the district capitals, in urban
areas and in refugee camps, they had grown accustomed to schooling for
their children, more or less readily available health care, possibly some
training, as well as hand-outs of one kind or another. In the rural areas of
Mozambique, very few services had ever been available. Thus it became
common for men to return home first, then older children and lastly
wives and younger children. In many cases, the children remained
behind in order to finish schooling. In many cases, this meant divided
families, not a new phenomenon for Mozambican rural peoples, as we
have seen.
Beginning in 1994, the Mozambican government institute,
INDER, (Instituto de Desenvolvimento Rural) began leading research
teams for the purpose of discovering how the process of resettlement
was taking place. In 1996, these same teams began leading communi-
ties and provincial and district level officials in an experiment for
decentralized planning of small-scale infrastructures. By then most people who were going to return had already resettled. In the course of this
continuing work more than forty communities have been visited in four
provinces, Sofala, Zambezia, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and small
infrastructural projects undertaken. The analysis of rural communities
90
in Mozambique that follows is based mainly on this experience enriched
by other research in Gaza and Maputo provinces.
A typology of communities: Among the communities visited,
three broad categories could be discerned: 1) "Established Communities"; 2) "Migrant Communities" and 3) the former Communal Villages.
For purposes of analysis, established communities were those that had
recognized territories and indigenous governing structures that even
some local "officials" recognized and allowed to function. Migrant
communities, on the other hand, had no land of their own, and were governed by locally-appointed officials. As their name implies, they were
made up of migrants and were located in frontier areas, in colonial company concession areas or near former plantations. The Communal Viilages, found mainly in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, had mainly
land problems.
The following breakdown is of 22 communities that I personally
visited and interviewed. Of the 22 communities, 12 were more or less
established. However, five of these communities had leadership problems and one had a land problem due to a government concession which
divided its territory. None reported internal land conflicts and all had
mechanisms for administering land and dealing with such other matters
as justice, policing, religion, health and education. This is not to imply,
however, that they were harmonious, simply more or less selfgoverning. Of the other ten, four were former Communal Villages, all
having land and leadership problems. All the migrant communities had
land problems and three had administrative problems.
The land problems included:
El
occupation of land recognized as other peoplets land, such as a
former company or private owner;
o occupation of land with no water resources: this was the case in two
of the four former communal villages;
91
Grassroots' Organizations, Decentralization andRural Development
divisions within the community between the so-called naturais or
"original" occupants of the land and the deslocados, those who had
migrated there even though this might have been many decades ago;
F1
conflicts arising from newly-granted concessions;
LI
land exhaustion. This was particularly true in both communal viilages and migrant communities. The ramifications were that people
had to travel long distances to their fields cutting down on either
productive and/or leisure time, leading to physical exhaustion and
to having to abandon villages to camp in fields during the season of
heaviest agricultural activity.
Leadership problems included:
U dual administration. This was particularly true in established communities in the immediate post-war period where régulos recog-
nized under RENAMO existed side by side with the officials
appointed by the FRELIMO party structure. However, it was also a
problem inherent to the former Communal Village setup.
Li
contested leadership among the leading families in the relatively
established communities;
Li
contests between old and young in communal villages where the
older members of the family and of the community wish to return to
the former, generally more fertile or well-watered lands but the
young disagree because they prefer the social life the larger aggregate community affords.
Perhaps even more devastating from the point of view of development are the communities that have no young people in them. This is a
recent finding in the frontier Matutulne district of Maputo province bordering on South Africa.
All of the communities visited had serious social problems, some
of which signalled a breakdown in value systems; for example, frequent
theft, disregard for people's property, the abandonment of the old, frequent divorce, attacks on women, wife-beating, the virtual abandon-
92
ment of the family by men who do not contribute to their wives' and
children's welfare and so on. Not all communities displayed all of these
symptoms but many have one or more of them.
Of an even more general nature is the breakdown of the extended
family system, that is, in terms of three generations living together. The
normal pattern today is for young families to move away from the family compound as soon as possible in order to live in nuclear units. This
point needs further investigation and analysis but apparently there were
signs of this already in the 1960s. Jorge Dias noted in his university
course on the socio-economic structures in Mozambique that
Thday, the type of village which Junod described has disappeared The
extended family has broken into small groups, of two or three huts each one
with their own head offamily and cattle. At times relatives can live relatively
near each other in a community of neighbours but the old patriarchal extended
family has ceased to be functional. The men are used to migrate to the land of
the Rand, where they work in the mines or in industiy, or go to lookfor work in
urban areas, especially in Lourenco Marques. Money has begun to circulate
among these people and cattle is no longer indispensablefor the payment of the
bride price. The mythical character of cattle is lost and with it the cohesive
force which bound all the men of the extendedfamily (1964/65:93).
Dias was referring to communities in southern Mozambique. Our
work in the centre and north also showed that nuclear families are the
norm in the communities visited.
On the economic side, besides the lack of land in some areas, there
is an overall lack of employment opportunities for youth. This is particularly felt in communities with an established tradition, forced and volun-
tary, of male migrant labour or male agricultural labour on near-by
plantations. Rowevei even in provinces such as Cabo Delgado and
Niassa, where plantations and companies were rare and small-holder
communities the norm, this lack of alternative work is felt and is
probably the consequence of the thirty or more years of almost
constant warfare. Youth were mainly forcibly pressed into active miiitary service, some at a very young age, so that they have become gener-
ally alienated from household agricultural labour, the only readily
available employment in the countryside.
93
A deficient marketing system undermines smaliholder commodity production. Immediately after the Peace Accord in October 1992,
production was low as people were in the process of resettlement and
irregular rainfall and drought hampered agricultural activity. However,
since 1994-95, there have been increasing amounts of grain, groundnuts, cashews, potatoes and other produce for sale but commercialization has not kept pace. The government-sponsored cereals institute has
been in a state of disarray due to reorganization. Its outlets now function
as buyers from small and intermediate traders but, because of bad debts,
they have not had access to sufficient credit to keep up with supply on
the market and, when credit has been granted, it has arrived late in the
season. This situation has been particularly damaging to small traders
who buy early and have few storage facilities for crops and who depend
on a quick turnover in order to continue buying from, producers.
The government also intervened in the marketing process by setting minimum prices for such important crops such as maize, the general
staple in Mozambique. In 1995-96 it announced the price of 1500 meticais (app. 15 cents) per kg of white maize at the beginning of the season,
raising farmer expectations. As this was a year of regular and abundant
rainfall, there was a bumper crop all across southern Africa and the government decided in mid-season not to support this price. The result was
chaos. Prices plummeted, in the northern and central regions which are
the main producers, to one-third and even less than the previously
announced price with the result that many farmers boycotted the market.
However because of inadequate on-farm storage facilities much of this
crop was lost. Moreover, in many areas, it was the first really good crop
that the farmers had seen in five or more years. Last year and this year,
the weather has been reliable for most northern and central areas and,
because of poor production in neighbouring countries, there has been
demand, and more imp orantly, buyers on the market. Agents from the
Malawian State Marketing Board have been active in driving white
maize prices up to 1000 or more meticais per kilo in the country's most
productive regions.
94
Rural Communities and community Development in Mozambique
However, this has only slightly improved the problem of unfavourable terms of trade and did nothing to ameliorate the lack of readily
available consumer goods in rural areas. In colonial times, the most productive regions were supplied by stores established in or near them. The
shops received agricultural produce in exchange for the soap, salt,
matches, cotton wrappers, etc., that producers needed. Their disappear-
ance in the post-independence era has required people to take long,
arduous trips to the nearest town with basket loads on their heads or, in
the case of the more prosperous, on their bicycles. The prices received
for produce and those paid for goods are extremely prejudicial.
In addition to these pressures, rural communities face poor
conditions generally in terms of roads, communications, health,
education, water and so on - all the subject matter of community
development - which government and non-governmental organizations
are attempting to improve. An analysis of how these problems are being
met and of the approaches being taken cannot be attempted in this paper
but it puts forward the argument that questions of land and leadership
should be the starting point for community development.
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
The post-war reconstruction of Mozambique was very much conceived of as a matter of rehabilitating, reconstructing and/or construct-
ing infrastructure: roads, communications, health centers, schools,
water points and so on. Great advances have been made in re-establishing
a minimum of services in the most accessible areas but much more still
needs to be done to reach the majority of rural communities' The point
being made in this paper is that communities themselves may need reha-
bilitation and reconstruction (i.e., revalidation) not along the lines of a
pre-conceived model brought from the outside, such as the Portuguese14 For example, the present health service covers only 40% of the countrys' population. The
Rural Water Program hopes to reach 40% by the year 2001, Only a small percentage of the
mines have been removedfrom the countryside.
95
inspired autarquias, but very much in their own terms. This is how Platteau's phrases 'indigenous land procedures' and 'informal procedures at
the local level' are interpreted in this paper.
The definition of rural communities as groups of rural peoples liv-
ing in a commonly recognized territory nd having a decision-making
structure is offered as a starting point with which to analyse the structural as opposed to strictly infrastructural needs of communities. The
newly-drafted land law passed by the National Assembly in July 1997,
would seem to recognize the need of communities to secure their land
rights; that is, it recognizes the right of communities to be consulted before land concessions and titles are given out. Moreover, there are indica-
tions that communities will be able to participate in the resolution of
land conflicts and in the management of natural resources. Mechanisms
to ensure community participation in these political processes are still
under discussion.
However, there are problems with the way the land law understands community land. It defines a community as "a group of families
and individuals living within a geographical area at the territorial level
of a locality or subdivision thereof and which seeks to safeguard its
common interests through the protection of areas for habitation or agriculture including both fallow and cultivated areas, forests, areas of cultural importance, pasture land, water resources, and areas for
expansion". It is reassuring to note that cultural definitions of rural peo-
ples have been put aside, and that the definition takes into account a
broad conception of land occupation. However the definition confounds
territory with administrative units and avoids the ticklish but fundamental question of how land is administered or managed within the community, and thus the question of 'indigenous land procedures'.
The linkage of community boundaries with the boundaries of
administrative units is a legacy of Portuguese colonial practice, as has
been seen. Portuguese law mandated that administrative boundaries
were to be set in accordance with "traditional" boundaries but gave the
right to fix boundaries to local administrators (footnote 7). As men-
96
tioned above, delimitation was often arbitrary and administrators split or
joined communities according to perceived political or bureaucratic
necessity. When a highly centralized state arrogates to itself the ownership and control over land, there is little space for community definition
of boundaries. Because it allows for delimitation of community lands
with community participation, the new land law in Mozambique would
appear to be a small step in the direction away from this mind set.
However, how delimitation is implemented will be decisive. The
tendency to understand community boundaries in terms of administrative ones still permeates Mozambican bureaucracy. Two experiments
have been carried out by the national survey and cadastral agency
(D1NAGECA) in 1997 to determine methodologies for carrying out
delimitation. In the first experience, in Pambara, Vilankulus, Inharnbane, no consultation with indigenous community leaders took place,
only a dialogue with state-appointed officials. In its analysis of the experience DINAGECA realized that more communication with the community to be delimited was essential.
In its second experience in Mucorro, Alto-Molocue, Zambezia, in
November 1977, DINAGECA involved INDER in order to train their
technical teams in methodologies of community dialogue. However, it
was not disposed to follow the advice of the community in terms of setting the boundaries. The reconnaissance of boundaries was again made
with administrative personnel and not with recognized community leaders. Local 'officials' are often not from the area that they administer and
even if they are they do usually not know the "secrets" of the community. A further complicating factor is that locality and subordinate
administrative units have not been officially demarcated, so that conftision exists, at local level, over the boundaries of these units. An added
complication surfaced in the case in question. In 1994 electoral
boundaries were constituted and the community of Mucorro was
divided into two constituencies. Because of these complications and
some technical problems, the decision was taken to delimit only the cen-
tral part of Mucorro (as per the electoral law) despite the fact that
the elders of Mucorro had produced a mental map with more or less
97
recognizable natural frontiers which could have been the point of departure for the reconnaissance.
In regard to the issue of community management of land, it
appears, from the debate going on inside the Interministerial Commission, that the disposition is to impose a mechanism, a Land Committee
at community level, rather than simply define competencies and allow
communities to organize how and who will exercise these competencies
and represent them.
The historical section of this paper has shown that the recognition
of land rights including the management of land has always been a question of power and how it has been exercised. In most cases under African overlordship and even under the prazo system, local communities
were apparently left to govern themselves as long as thy paid tribute
and contributed rations to their rulers. There was centralization of
wealth but, for the most part, decentralization of governance. Once
effective occupation was possible, Portugal and the post-colonial government dispossessed rural communities bit by bit and stripped them of
their leaders. The current concern with delimitation of community lands
occurs in the context of a new round of "invaders" including Boer farmers, domestic elites, and international investors in tourism and plantation agriculture and thus gives rise to the preoccupation that delimitation
may be the instrument for recreating indigenous reserves. This, of
course, is the pessimistic view.
Nevertheless, even a highly centralized state can move hesitatingly toward change and the optimistic view is that the Mozambican
jgovernment is sincerely committed to enabling conditions for rural
communities based on the conviction that smaliholder production is still
important to the political economy. Even though the new land law reiterates state ownership of land, giving the state, in the final analysis, the
right to determine access to land, the test of which view is more accurate
will be the extent to which state agencies responsible for land will recognize people's established relationship to land, where that still exists, and
will facilitate access to the communities that lack land or want to re-
98
establish their relation to former lands. Will they allow private investors'
claims to prevail over community rights? Will they vigorously monitor
investor actions on concession lands?
Another proof of the sincerity of the government's claim will be in
the extent to which established indigenous structures for land management are allowed to function. No one is arguing that this is a simple matter: in both established and non-established communities, there is great
scope for encouraging and facilitating community organization and
decision-making around common problems, what might be called
community-building.
One of the indirect objectives of the INDER program, mentioned
above, that has involved more than 40 communities in making needs
assessments, deciding priorities, and drawing up a plan of action, was to
provide both communities and local officials with an experience of
decentralized "democratic" decision-making. Done in each community
on a one-off basis, the process was unlikely to have had much influence
on the way that these communities do their business other than to expose
them to the possibility of more or less open discussion of problems
involving people of all ages including women and youth as well as men.
As a normal way of taking decisions, the process is cumbersome and
probably only replicable in situations requiring wide-spread community
involvement.
Even more formative than structured experiences, such as the one
just referred to, would be a formal recognition of communities as
responsible for certain areas of their well-being, and the opening of a
political space to let them struggle, using their own 'informal
procedures' of consensus-building and organizing, without direct
intervention unless specifically requested. This might include issues
such as water supply, road maintenance, the collection of taxes,
planning public investments with local officials, the regulation of
forests, and other natural resources according to how far and how fast
communities decide they want participate15. Such a move would
indicate a commitment, on a progressive basis, to decentralization.
15 This last point is Julie Born's whose conversations through the years have been very helpful.
99
Grassroots' Organizations, Decentralization anq'Rural Development
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Diagnóstico Participativo de duas comunidades, Tundo e Simbe,
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Diagnóstico Participativo de Maleia, Namacurra e Dugudiva,
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DiagnOstico Participativo de tres distritos, Montepuez, Namuno e
Balama, da ProvIncia de Cabo Delgado, with Judite Muxihanga,
macjo Sitoe and Ofelia Simo, INDER, December 1996.
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101
Diagnóstico Participativo de dois regulados no distrito de Mopeia,
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104
Rural Communities and Community Development in Mozainbique
SOMMAIRE
La nouvelle loi sur le terre approuvée au Mozambique en juillet
1997 reconnaIt le droit des communautés rurales d'être consultées avant
que les titres de propriété soient attribués. Cependant les formes pratiques d'implication des communautés dans les procédés d'attribution
des terres sont encore en train d'être définies.
Mais la loi n'explique pas bien ce que signifie exactement le terme
"commmunauté" dans le contexte rural du Mozambique.
Dans ce papier sont exposés, d'une facon synthétique, les événements complexes qui ont conditionné les types d'établissement rural des
différentes populations du Mozambique, des les époques anciennes
jusqu'à Ia période coloniale et de l'indépendence.
Le theme dominant a été celui de l'instabilité, qui n'exclut pas la
permanence de précis liens de nature spirituelle, économique et politique des différentes communautés avec leurs terres.
L'administration coloniale, mais aussi le nouveau Etat indépendant, pour définir les délimitations administratives, n'ont pas respecté
les limites traditionnelles des communautés.
On souhaite que le lien des communautés avec la terre (on il y en a
encore), soit reconnu en termes clairs et formels et que aux structures
autochtones pour l'administration du terroir (oü elles existent encore)
soit permis de continuer a fonctionner.
105
Part II
Grassroots' Organizations
A. General
The Challenge to Cooperatives as Tools
for Development in Post-Structural
Adjustment Africa
HANS HOLMEN
MA GNUS JIRSTROM
The Challenge to Cooperatives as Toolsfor Development
INTRODUCTION
With few exceptions, the history of cooperatives in Africa has
been dismal. Having been dominated by outsiders - foreign advisors
and/or government officials - cooperatives have more often than not
failed to realize the tasks they were assigned. Today, under the so
called "Structural Adjustment" process, there are many who expect a
rennaissance for cooperatives and other local organizations. Great
hopes are pinned on their ability to enhance the pace of development.
We also share this view about the potentials for cooperatives in
Africa. However, it is worth mentioning this historical perspective
since previous hopes have largely been unfulfilled. Partly this is
because earlier attempts at cooperative promotion have been based a:
on premature analysis (or lack thereof) of the environment in which
cooperatives were to operate and/or b: cooperatives have been controlled by outsiders, and c. they have been assigned tasks for which
they were not suitable. Before going into a discussion of what cooperatives could and, perhaps, should do we need to say something
about the changing environment in which they are supposed to function.
PROS AND CONS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
As so many times before, Africa is in a state of crisis - or,
rather, it is facing a number of inter-related crises. We are all familiar with problems of population growth, irregular rainfall, land deg-
radation, poverty, underemployment and malnutrition, not to
mention corrupt and parasitic governments, civil wars, banditry and
113
millions of political and ecological refugees'. To these "fundamental
development problems" have, according to some writers since about
1980, been added the externally imposed administrative reforms better
known as "Structural Adjustment Programmes" (SAP). Some see SAP
as more or less the root cause of Africa's present predicament.
It is thus claimed that "SAPs have not succeeded in achieving their
goals" (Muleba 1996), that SAPs heve been implemented too fast (FCC
1994; Launder 1998), and that "the social costs of SAP in Africa - are
high - ... with serious consequences for the majority of poor people"
(Pangetti 1998:13). It seems, however, somewhat premature to dismiss
SAP and/or to blame Africa's present hardships so onesidedly on SAPs.
After all, the above mentioned adversities predated the SAP reforms.
While the social costs of adjustment are likely to become visible much
sooner than the expected social and economic gains, it necessarily takes
some time before investments, newly established enterprises and
restructured organizations bear fruit. Apparently, many critics of SAP
are dissatisfied because they expect immediate progress without social
costs of any kind or magnitude. That, however, would be to demand the
impossible. This is not to say that all is well, but to wholly reject SAP on
such short-sighted grounds might prevent prosperity in the long run.
In the 1960s and 1970s the "dependency school" in development
theory (which still has its adherents) used to argue that Africa's main
problem was too much capitalism and adverse external influences (this
I Much critique of the Third World State has been ideologically motivated (Mackintosh 1992),
ill-founded and exaggerated (Sanyal 1994,). Nevertheless, it seems as f it is more relevant in
Africa than elsewhere (Gunnarsson & Rojas 1995,). Hence, complaints that many African
governments are "soft", overdeveloped, parasitic and essentially anti-developmental are, in
many instances, correct. Howeve,; whether these characteristics are causes or symptoms of
the present development dilemma is another question. After all, during the "cold war" when
most African States gained independence, the super-powers' ambitions were to establish
dependent clients rather than to promote independent development in most former colonies.
"Aid" often provided an artflcial hfe-line that enabled corrupt but politically favoured
govcrnments to survive without developing the potentials of "their" countries. Th the extent that
the African State today is a "monster", it is to a large degree a monster of external making (see
firtherfootnote 2).
114
The Challenge to cooperatives as Tools for Development
also presented a much welcomed excuse for African scholars, politicians and bureaucrats to pretend that all development problems were
exogenously caused, thereby relieving them of responsibility). In the
early 1980s, Hydén (1983) instead argued that Africa's main problem
was "too little capitalism". According to him, aid agencies, the UN and
African governments alike had all prevented capitalism and hence
development to take root on African soil. This is also the view that
underlies the World Bank's, IMF's and many donors' contemporary
demands for SAP as a precondition for further development assistance.
While many active cooperators welcome this development reorientation, others are not so enthusiastic. After all, there are many within
the 'movement' who have advocated cooperative ideologies as an alternative to capitalism (Holmén 1990). This is a dilemma that today's pro-
motors of cooperation will have to overcome. Much of the current
critique of previous cooperative practices has been directed against
those outsiders who have tried to control cooperatives and use them for
their own purposes. However, also within the movement some selfcritique and reflexion on the role and potential of cooperatives seems
necessary.
When commenting on SAP, writers commonly stress its external
orientation, i.e. its ambition to create "macro-economic balance" by
reducing trade-barriers, devaluation of currency, etc. The outcome, it
has frequently been maintained, is that Africa now lies wide open for
external capitalist exploitation. This, however, seems not to be the case
(yet). Presently, Africa seems not to be particularly attractive to international capital. In fact, at the same time as development aid (which often
has been exploitative) declines2, so do foreign direct investments
(Holmén 1997) and transnational corporations tend to leave Africa for
more profitable endeavours elsewhere (Stierna 1993). In this respect
SAP has not, apparently, resulted in increased integration of Africa with
the world economy. Rather, the continent seems to have become more or
2 Diffleld (1994: 122) has made the perhaps cynical but nevertheless correct observation that
"with the coilpase ofthe superpower confrontation, the political rationalefor aid... has disappeared".
115
less left to itself. This, it has been argued, is probably a necessary precondition for development to take off there (Borgin & Corbett 1982).
The other side of SAP is its internal content. Usually is here mentioned the "rolling back" of the State and reliance on NGOs, the abolishion of subsidies, decentralization, deofficialization and privatization of
State-enterprises. Frequent complaints are that these measures tend to
hit hard on the poor. However, what critics of SAP usually forget to
mention is SAP's aim to establish conditions and incentives for
increased rural production and productivity. Agricultural development
is central not only to SAP but to most contemporary development the-
ory. A reversal of the previous urban-industrial bias, improved rural
infrastructure and higher producer prices would definitely benefit the
poor, the large majority of which are peasants.
In so far as poverty, malnutrition and low productivity are major
problems in Africa, it may be worth noticing that in e.g. Vietnam, which
in the 1980s was ranked as one of the poorest countries on earth, market
reforms and cooperative liberalization under the "Doi Moi" (although
also here partial and hesitantly implemented) in a very short time has put
an end to hunger and turned the country into a major exporter of rice
(Rigg 1997). In Vietnam, however, the package of drastic reforms did
not start with an unpopular austerity program. Rather, reforms at the
micro level, including changes in the incentive structure, preceded the
attempts to reduce the large macro imbalances. During the 1980s,
conservative opposition to reform was gradually squeezed both 'from
below' and 'from above'. As summed up by de Vylder (1995:37): "The
expression tshortterm pain for long-term gain', so common in other
countries undergoing structural adjustment, does not apply to Vietnam;
rather it was long-term pain that was replaced by short-term gain".
Whether, or to what extent, a similar internal 'pressure for change' is
present also in Africa, is still an unanswered question.
We may like the present situation or not, but, to our minds, SAP is
not only a menace but also an opportunity. Most likely, SAP is here to
stay anyway and, consequently, rather than rejecting it, it may be more
116
beneficial to regard it as the starting point for any kind of development
that may occur.
The World Bank and the IMF have been criticized for more or less
trying to replace the State by various non-governmental organizations.
However, the task is not to eliminate the State. How, could it be? Except
for some neo-liberal economists, also advocates of SAP are aware that
the State has important roles to fill in any development process albeit, in
many countries, on a reduced level of involvement in daily businesses.
This said, it is probably wise not to make too much of the the contemporary "rolling back" of the African State and/or of presumed effects
of implementation of SAPs. In fact, "there appears to be a lack of
empirical studies of the actual effects on fann prices and production"
(Launder 1998:25). Investigations show a mixed record of SAPs, sometimes beneficial and sometimes detrimental to economic growth in different countries (Mosley et al 1995). Other studies have found that the
results of SAP have neither been as devastating as its critics foresaw, nor
the panacea that its most fervent advocates would have it to be (Den Ny
Verden 1994). Why is this so?
Egypt's president Mubarak once characterized the IMF as a
"quack doctor prescribing fatal doses of - the appropriate - medicine"
(The Middle East, July 1989). In many cases this may well be a correct
observation. The Bank obviously deserves critique for its naïve belief
that there is one development policy which, if implemented, would yield
the same results everywhere. As we have seen, it doesn't. But at the
same time president Mubarak's statement may serve as a convenient
excuse for many governments for not implementing necessary reforms.
Cynically as it may sound, we do not believe that it is a widely felt concern for the poor that prevents many governments from implementing
SAP, but rather the ambition to remain in office, sometimes at any price
- and, as usual, it is the poor who pay that price.
Apparently, neither the World Bank nor the IMF are as difficult to
deal with as is often maintained. Investigations reveal that there are
many ways in which governments can delay or refuse SAP and still
117
obtain loans from the World Bank. The more indebted the government,
the greater this opportunity seems to be (Mosley et all 995). Hence, critics of SAP in Africa, like Pangetti (1998:13) who complains that SAP
has "not achieved increases in economic growth", also admits that, for
example, in Zimbabwe the second phase of SAP, which was to be implemented in 1995, "has not yet been launched". For all we know, in Zimbabwe as elsewhere, the lack of economic opportunities and the "social
costs of adjustment" may just as well be explained by too little SAP as
by too much of it, i.e. by a failure to adjust rather than by a "failure of
adjustment". In fact, there are many who today would claim that Zimbabwe's major development problem is its highly centralized, if not personalized, and increasingly suspicious political leadership.
COOPERATIVES AND ADJUSTMENT
Now, what has all this got to do with cooperatives and other
attempts at organization building from below? Quite a lot, actually.
However, to fully appreciate this conclusion, we need to briefly recapitulate the history of formal cooperatives in Africa. The record, naturally, on such a vast continent, is mixed and uneven. Nevertheless, some
generalizations can be made. The great majority of cooperative societies
are found in rural areas and most of them handle input supply and agricultural marketing. Most of them have been established and supervised
from above, often with the help of donors. Until recently there was very
little establishing of independent cooperatives from below by the peasants themselves. Not that the rural African is unable to organize in new
ways for productive purposes, but there have in most cases been a lack
of incentives to do so. Actually, so called "grassroots" have often been
prohibited to establish their own cooperative and other societies.
Quite frequently, formal cooperatives were first supported by
colonial authorities but exclusively for the benefit of white settlers.
When membership was later extended to include also native peasants,
the aim was primarily to enhance government control over rural areas
118
and to tax agriculture more effectively (Gyllstrom 1991). These aims
were generally maintained after independence and cooperatives became
increasingly regarded as the extended arm of the new governments.
Hence, they were given monopolies over strategic inputs and agricultural products and their objectives were, more often than not, to make
the peasants produce "according to plan". Although all this was usually
disquised under a "cooperative" rethoric, the result, generally, was
paternalistic organizations that exploited agriculture rather than contributing to its development. Within these top-heavy structures, there was
not much room for development from below.
Not only were cooperatives instrumental in the control and taxation of agriculture in favourable and easily accessible areas, in remote
and less favourable farming areas peasants were often forced to grow
unprofitable crops with the result that they were operating at a loss with
heavy indebtness of many cooperative societies. The element of profitability was often played down in favour of social purposes and propagation of a "cooperative ethos". In many cases, cooperatives were to be allinclusive, i.e. they were to cater for all peasants irrespective of their contributions to the society. Bspecially, cooperatives were, by governments
and donors alike, expected to benefit the poor, i.e. those who were least
able to fulfil the obligations of a cooperative member. Consequently, all
over Africa formal cooperatives were often both economically unviable
and socially insignificant and the number of dormant and/or unsustainable societies grew large.
It was, perhaps, inevitable that, after decolonization, nationbuilding took precedence over development (Holmén 1990; 1991).
Hence, the attempts by most African governments to establish their
hegemony over social and economic space, and to control rural organizations, is understandable. The circumstance that, during the cold war,
"aid" was often given for similar reasons is understandable too. What is
less understandable, however, is that many non-governmental, western,
charitable and cooperative organizations played a part in this charade.
119
Today there seems to be a change of attitude among those who
believe that cooperatives can still contribute to the development of
Africa. Many individuals and organizations are trying to find a new role
for cooperatives in the development process. It has thus been emphasized that cooperatives must stand on their own feet and that cooperafives can only prove themselves on an open and competitive market
(ITolmén 1990). Leading representatives of the "international cooperative movement" welcome the present adjustment process (SCC 1997)
and emphasize that cooperatives are "private sector organizations"
operating for profit (Birgegaard & Genberg 1994; FCC 1994). A "modi-
fied strategy for cooperative development" is now called for (Birgegaard & Genberg 1994), whiIe others go further and underline that "it is
not until present that the preconditions for a successful development of
cooperative organizations begin to take shape" (Fogelstrom 1996:4).
This changed cooperative sentiment implies a massive restructuring if not liquidation of existing "supervised" parastatal cooperatives
and marketing boards. It also implies that finally peasants are - should
be - permitted to establish their own local organizations or "informal
groups" in order to improve their positions on a far from perfect market.
Whether reorganized or newly emerging, these organizations will now
operate on an increasingly competitive market. There is a problem here,
though. For while the old parastatals, used as they were to operate under
monopoly conditions, are often ill-prepared to face an open market,
newly established local organizations may lack resources necessary to
establish themselves on a competitive market.
In the remainder of this paper we will look into what a modified
strategy for cooperative development actually has meant. How have
these now-present favourable preconditions been utilized by cooperators in Africa? We will do this under three headings: a. how have parastatals adjusted?, b. (to what extent) are (pre-)cooperatives and similar
groups formed from below? and c. has there been a change in the form
and content of foreign support to cooperatives?
120
Restructuring of old cooperative organizations
For the old, state-supervised cooperative organizations the present
situation is extremely problematic and reports about a "virtual collapse
of the cooperatives" in Sub-Saharan Africa presently abound (ICA
1998; Launder 1998). However, since these organizations were already
characterized as "giants on clay-feet" (Hydén 1991), this "cooperative
crisis" is not a result of the present reforms but rather (part of) their
cause. The present situation has been described as one where governments are "delinking from cooperatives" and both governmental and
donor support is declining or terminated (SCC 1997).
The process of liberating and restructuring the old parastatals has
been slow and reluctantly implemented. If the question is how to bring
the cooperatives back to the cooperators, vested interests frequently
appear to stand in the way for such development. For example, in 1990,
under the auspices of ICA, a regional coordinating committe comprising
representatives of the cooperatives and ministers responsible for cooperatives in east, central and southern Africa was set up to facilitate the
liberation of cooperatives. The aim was to arrive at fully autonomous
movements by 1995 (Braverman et a!, 1991). However, these ministerial conferences primarily discussed how to improve the image of cooperatives (FCC 1994). Since then, all countries in the region have had
their laws and policies under review but only two countries (Kenya and
Namibia) passed new laws and cooperative development policies (ICA
1998).
This is not to say that nothing has happened. There are nuances to
this picture. The "crisis" seems to be more manifest at secondary and
national levels where adjustment seems most problematic. Partially
restructured cooperative organizations suffer from undercapitalization there is only one strong cooperative bank in the region (Kenya) (SCC
1997) - and from lack of adequate management skills in the new com-
petitive environment. In many African countries the performance of
restructured coopertative organizations is "weak" or "shaky" and their
situation remains "unclear" (ICA 1998), and "top-down blue-print
121
approaches continue to this day" (Launder 1998). Hence, in those cases
where limited liberalization has occurred, cooperative officials "just
don't know what to do with their newly won semi-autonomy" (FCC
1994).
On the other hand, "many cooperatives have ... been able to turn
the deregulated market to their advantage and increased their market
shares" (SCC 1997; ICA 1998). Some District Cooperative Unions are
deemed very competitive (Amini & Borovkova 1993). However, agricultural marketing societies have not, generally, done so well and com-
petition from private traders put them in a difficult and unfamiliar
situation. Savings and credit cooperatives have done better (Brundin &
Sandström 1992; SCC 1997). On the whole, therefore, in this sector, the
cooperative crisis is real.
Grassroots' societies emerging from below
Consequently, an organizational vaccuum has emerged when the
parastatals more or less collapse. However, such a situation is not likely
to last for long and the "market" is instead filled with new actors. Private
traders and money-lenders find their niches on the market, but so do
various grass-root groups in their attempts to establish joint ventures of
various kinds. Litterature today frequently mentions the establishment
of new local and voluntary organizations from below like "self-help
groups" and more or less informal "associations" which may or may not
be cooperatives (Fogelstrom 1996; Launder 1998; Luzzati 1998). They
are not likely to call themselves cooperatives though, as the name cooperative often has a bad reputation and still is associated with the government. They may, however, develop into more formal cooperatives at a
later stage (Fogelstrom 1996). Even if one gets the impression that
Africa, in this sense, is a very creative arena at the moment, these
reports, generally, do not reveal much about what kinds of group
associations and enterprises that are presently being established. Are
they, for example, primarily urban or rural based, consumer or producer
oriented? Do they engage in activities beyond savings?
122
As yet, these new, more or less informal, groups tend to suffer
from the same difficulties as the somewhat restructured older cooperative organizations: undercapitalization, low credit-worthiness, lack of
management skills and contacts, and a relative unfamiliarity with doing
business on a competitive market. Due to the frequent mentionings of
heavy competition from private traders, and the general shortage of
working capital in these organizations, it seems that they so far have had
little impact on agricultural input supply and marketing. Hence, their
activities tend to be limited both in scope and geographically. While
some hold that a wider field of activities would increase farmers' interest in these associations and attract new members (Amini & Borovkova
1993), others find that their greatest advantage apparently lies in their
small size where members are personally acquainted and social control
strong (Brundin & Sandström 1992; Launder 1998). Actually, many of
these cooperatives may well loose their competitive advantages if they
grow in size (Luzzati 1998). The situation is thus far from uniform and
we need to know more about these types of associations and (pre)coop-
eratives. Which are their characteristics?, Who are their members?
Where/under which conditions are they established and where/under
which conditions are they not? Hopefully, this workshop will shed light
on such questions.
How to aid cooperatives in the future?
Today, both old and new cooperatives and other more or less formal organizations find it difficult to work profitably on the emerging
African markets. ICA (1998:2) finds that "cooperative market shares are
plummeting and those of the private traders rise" (see also FCC 1994).
In this situation it is not uncommon to find statements that this competition is "unfair" and that cooperatives should receive special treatment
and not be placed on equal footing with other economic actors (Abul
Kheir 1987). Going through studies of cooperatives in Africa, one easily
gets the impression that they are particularly disadvantaged. Therefore,
it is tempting for outsiders to provide, for example, credit on privileged
terms. This is a dubious reaction for at least two reasons. a: financial
123
support inevitably creates dependence on the supplier and limits the
autonomy of would-be member-run societies. b: it is questionable
whether (pre)cooperatives and similar associations actually are disadvantaged. Inmost cases the private traders are under-capitalized too and
just as unfamiliar with the new situation. They also tend to be "small
operators with inadequate access to finance and storage and with limited
capacity to take on input distribution or lending" (Launder 1998). In our
view, this rather reflects Africa's generally low level of economic development than a particularly disadvantaged position for cooperatives. In
any case, a major problem in Africa has not been an absence of special
treatments, but rather too much thereof.
One thing we can learn from the above historical resumé is that
aid-giving is a difficult and delicate matter. For a number of reasons, it
has often been counter-productive leading to aid-dependency rather
than development. One of the reasons for external domination of indige-
nous groups (cooperatives and others) has been a widespread belief not only among government officials but also among aid-agencies and
development organizations - that grassroots were not capable of handling their own affairs. Hence, cooperatives were believed to need a
"weaning-period" before they could be "handed over" to their members
(Holmén 1990; Hydén 1991). For some odd reason, the weaning-period
never seemed to end.
The paternalistic approach towards cooperatives was (and is), by
no means, typical only for Africa. Also in Asia, State policy has generally implied a firm grip on the cooperative sector. An example from a
study of the Farmers' Associations (FAs) in Muda, Malaysia is illustrative. A government agricultural officer responsible for the development
of the FA describes the official approach: "The FA movement aims at
motivating farmers to participate in their own organizations actively, so
that ultimately, the role of management will be transferred back to the
hands of the farmers" (Jirström 1994:91).
True, most development theory in the 1950s and l960s emphasized the role of the State as leader of development and showed little
124
confidence in the creative and adaptive capacities of the African peasant. But this attitude did not dissappear with the 1960s. For example,
Mabogunje (1989:120), a dedicated advocate of cooperatives, claims
that it is "the persistence of traditional social norms that acts as a major
factor inhibiting widespread change and development" in Africa. Today,
when "development from below", preferably organized in peasant
groups, cooperatives and other NGOs, is relied upon to spur (rural)
development, this attitude still seems to prevail among many supporters
of "another development" (Holmén & Jirström 1996). For all the partici-
patory rethoric today surrounding development theory, cooperatives
and NGO activities, outside goal-setting still seems to be common practice and "empowerment" and "conscientization" often means little more
than making the grassroots see things the way the outsider does (ibid).
Peasants and other "beneficiaries" are thus not only to be "shown how to
organize" but also to have their "consciousness raised" by outsiders
(Tandon 1989).
Previous attempts at cooperative training and education has been
criticized for being too academic and unpractical and for placing too
much emphasis on teaching about a "cooperative ethos" instead of
managerial and business skills. It is therefore somewhat disturbing to
find, although business efficiency is presently seen as essential, that
cooperatives are still primarily "characterized by ideological principles"
(Birgegaard & Genberg 1994:3).
This is not to say that all external support to cooperatives and
other member organizations (or, for that matter, aid as such) should be
terminated, only that greater care should accompany it. After all, our
understanding of the general process of socio-economic development
"is still fairly limited" (Sanyal 1994:45). Generally, it is a rather slow
process (covering the life-span of a few generations). Also, "building a
true member-based, member-run cooperative system from below is a
time-consuming task" (Braverman et al 1991:32). However, due to the
urgency of the matter - the magnitude of poverty and mal-nutrition in
Africa - it may be tempting for foreign advisors and support-
125
organizations to try to speed-up the process. History tells us that there
are tremendous risks involved in this.
There is no doubt that cooperatives have important roles to play in
the development of Africa. But if we are sincere about our ambition to
"turn the cooperatives back to the cooperators", more confidence must
be placed in the Africans' ability to run their own (cooperative) socie-
ties. Moreover, in order to contribute to development, cooperatives
should raise their own capital and prove themselves on equal terms with
their competitors. Strengthening the institutions that would guarantee
cooperatives an equal footing with their competitors on ill-functioning
markets is probably one of the most essential tasks for external aidorganizations. Preferential (financial) treatment by external supporters
of "aided" business undertakings may improve the image of the donor
and strengthen "their" organizations' competitive advantage, at least in
the short run. But it also enhances the imperfectness of already weak
markets as such behaviour is likely to put indigenous but non-supported
actors out of business. In the long run, this may again retard the whole
development process.
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Braverman A., Guash IL, Huppi M., Pohlmeier L., Promoting Rural
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Brundin I., Sandström M., Savings and Credit in the Informal and
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de Vylder S. 'State and Market in Vietnam: Some Issues for an Economy
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Duffield M., NGOs, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the Horn.
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FCC, Evaluation of the SCC Support to ICA Development Programme.
The Finnish Cooperative Development Centre, 1994. (mimeo).
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Gunnarsson C., Rojas M., Tillväxt, Stagnation, Kaos. En institutioneil
studie av underutvecklingens orsaker och utvecklingens
mOjligheteii Stockholm, SNS, 1995.
Gyllstrom B., State Administered Rural Change. Agricultural
Cooperatives in Rural Kenya. London, Routledge, 1991.
Holmén H., State, Cooperatives and Development in Africa. Research
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Holmén H., Building Organizations for RuralDevelopment - State and
Cooperatives in Egypt. Lund, Lund University Press, 1991.
Holmén H., Limits to Globalization. European Review Vol. 5, No. 1,
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Launder J., Co-ops and Agricultural Marketing: Liberalisation in
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129
SOMMAIRE
Après 40 ans d'efforts pour développer l'Afrique, aussi bien de
l'intérieur que de l'extérieur, les Africains ont été livrés maintenant a eux-
mêmes. Cela est, en grande partie, l'idée de SAP (Structural Adjustement). Les interpretations de son effet sont extrêmement contradictoires,
ony va de la consideration que SAP aille trop vite ou trop lentement a des
affirmations qui soulignent quand même son effect assez modeste. Une
partie de SAP consiste dans la reduction de l'implication du Gouvernement central dans les affaires locales et dans les réformes institutionnelles
qui visent a renforcer - or plutôt a créer - le "marché". L'Etat dans quelque
mesure se retire, l'aide étrangère pour le développement s'est réduite et
les Africains ont été abandonnés a leur sort. Un des problèmes avec SAP
en Afrique, qui peut-être explique son effect limité dans 1'Afrique subSaharienne, est que, contrairement a Ia situation en Asie, SAP en Afrique
st impose de l'extérieur et ce n'est pas une réponse a des pressions intéieures pourun changement. Iln'est donc pas surprenant que SAP soit souvent réalisé sans enthousiasme ou parfois même pas réalisé.
Cela met 1'Afrique dans une situation plutôt difficile. Elle est, en
quelque sorte, destinée a s'aider, malgré la demande pour des mesures
de auto-aide soit relativement faible. A cause du role réduit des gouvernements centraux, par exemple, dans le domaine de la vulgarisation
agricole, dans l'achat et le marketing de produits, les cooperatives semipubliques se trouvent a faire face a plusieures difficultés comme un
manque de fonds, de personnel spécialisé et de management, ainsi que
peu de familiarité avec les mécanismes d'un marché compétitif. A ça il
faut aj outer les réformes législatives qui sont en retard ou a peu près nulles de forme que les directeurs de ces organismes semi-publics n'ont pas
trop clair le but de leur travail. Toutefois le tableau de la situation n'est
pas si bien défini. Ces problèmes sont plus visibles auxniveaux centraux
et intermédiaires, mais ii y a quand même des éléments qui prouvent que
1' adaptation a eu un certain succès aux niveaux locaux ou de département.
130
Les commerçants privés et les usuriers entrent a faire partie de ce
marché emergent, mais les organisations rurales enjoignant leurs forces
créent leurs propres associations et (pré-) cooperatives, afin d'améliorer
leurs débouchés commerciaux et les sources d'approvisionnement pour
éviter une exploitation par les monopolistes privés. Quoique l'actuelle
situation soit loin d'un dynamisme uniforme, ces groupes non officiels
souffrent aussi d'un manque de fonds et de management. Dans cette
situation ii existe sürement de l'extérieur une tentation pour interferer
dans ces organisations rurales en vue de les aider au moyen de financements subventionnés et accords d' échange discriminatoires. Mais cette
reaction pourrait avoir des consequences negatives. L'histoire nous
apprend qu'il faut faire bien attention aux interferences extérieures. Ii
faut se rappeler que la plus part des commerçants privés tendent a être de
petits opérateurs avec des ressources limitées et par consequent ces his-
toires de monopole et de concurrence déloyale souvent paraissent
exagérées. Tant que l'aide extérieure vise a altérer ou a gêner le marché
et a reduire ainsi la pression pour une action de auto-aide collective, elle
peut effectivement causer des dommages au lieu de faire du bien.
131
Grassroots Development and Multipurpose
Cooperatives in Africa today
ENRICO LUZZATI
A high percentage of world population, mostly in Africa and in
some parts of Asia and Latin America, lives in abject poverty.
1.
The enormous gap between the rich in the North and the poor in
the South is a new phenomenon in history: never before has a 5-6000
times gap existed between the per capita income in the richest country
(Switzerland) and in the poorest (Mozambique)'.
The strategies followed over the last 40 years to promote the economic development of backward countries have given unsatisfactory
results in terms of reduction of mass poverty, with the exception of the
New Industrialized and a few other countries.
The first strategy applied was based on State intervention: its main
objective was industrialization, through import substitution, public
enterprises, various kinds of market regulation, etc.
The more recent strategy relies on the free forces of the market,
and is being applied through structural adjustment programs.
Why have these two kinds of strategy been adopted? A certain
form of ethnocentrism may have conditioned the choice, as the State and
the market are the two main institutions of Western society.
But it has to be underlined that both of them have been formed
through a long and elaborate historical process, while, especially in the
case of Sub-S aharan Africa, the cultural and social conditions for a correct general thnctioning of these two institutions are not yet present: it is
therefore not very surprising that such limited results have been
obtained2.
Since the beginning of the 80's a new phenomenon can be
observed in many areas, both rural and suburban, of the Third World,
I GNP per capita (dollars 1995): Mozambique 80; Switzerland 40,630.
Source: World Development Report, 1997, World Bank
On the novelty ofsuch a level of disparity between rich and poor countries, cfr P Bairoch.
The economic development of the Third World since 1900, Methuen, 1975.
2 Stimulating reflections on the weaknesses ofthe modern African State can be found in B. Davidson, The black man ' burden. Africa and the crisis of the nation State, limes Book, 1992.
135
where the presence of poor people is greater: new organizations, which
can be called associations or cooperatives (formal or informal) are being
created.
It is a new process of institutions building, which is continuously
expanding and has now reached conspicuous dimensions3.
Some authors think that it cannot be considered a spontaneous
movement, but rather it is an opportunistic response to the organisational schemes suggested by aid agents, first of all NGOs.
Others think, on the contrary, and we believe more correctly, that
what is happening is a genuine and culturally appropriate effort of
deprived populations to fmd a way out of their difficult situation; and
that the support to these new organizations can be considered as the
nucleus of a new strategy of economic deve'opment, variously called
"from below", or "self-reliance" or "grassroots"4.
Many kinds of associations or cooperatives are appearing with
varying objectives: commercialization, collective buying of inputs or
machinery, credit, consumption, the management of irrigation perimeters, the common administration of natural resources, and so on. We can
even find, although less frequently, workers' cooperatives.
3 Enrico Luzzati, ((Nuove prospettive per ii "grassroots development" nei paesi in via di sviluppo, Rivista della cooperazione, n. 21, 1995.
Some authors even speak of a new peasant movement: D. Gentil, M.R. Iviercoiret, Ya-t-il un
mouvementpaysan en Afrique noire?, Revue Tiers Monde, oct-déc, 1991.
Interesting up-of-date information can be obtained, on West Africa from Grain de Sd, published quarterly by Inter-rdseaux, Paris; and on Latin America from Grassroots Development,
Journal of the Inter-American Foundation, Arlington, U.S.A.
4 We therefore disagree with the following sentence: "This strongly suggests that cooperatives
may not be the ideal vehicle to assist the rural population in resource-poor areas or those
where little surplus is produced" (A. Braverman, ,J.L. Guasch, M. Huppi and L. Pohlmeiem
Promoting rural cooperatives in developing countries, World Bank Discussion Papers, n. 121,
1991, pag. 28,).
On the contramy we agree with H. Holmén and M. Jirstrom, when they write that "the success
of local organizations in often inversely related to supposedly favoura ble physical environments ", and that "it is generally in the less favoured lands that local and non-governmental
organizations have been successful", Old wine in new bottles?, in II. Holmén - M JirstrOm
eds., Ground level development, Lund University Press, 1994.
136
They are very different from the State cooperatives of the 60's and
7 0's: those were cooperatives only by name, while in fact they were controlled or directed by the State.
The State is now retreating, facilitating the creation of new, selfmanaged and more or less democratic associations.
The basic aim of these organizations is to counteract the rent seek-
ing and exploitative behaviour of traders and capitalists in imperfect
markets, or to substitute non-existent markets.
The experience of Western countries was in some way similar5.
Starting in the middle of the last century, first in England and then in
France, Germany and Italy, various kinds of cooperatives were formed,
whose aim was to resist the inequities deriving from inefficient markets
or to remedy the non-existence of markets. The poor were organizing
themselves against the exploitation of traders or capitalist owners, or
were trying to obviate the absence of entrepreneurs.
2.
In the course of Western economic development, cooperatives
generally abandoned their defensive position and entered the market as
normal operators: but, in order to be competitive, they modified their
identity, assuming certain characteristics of other kinds of enterprise
(mainly the share company)6.
The reason for this gradual process of assimilation is that
cooperatives suffer from some competitive disadvantage in terms of
economic efficiency: the democratic decisional process is slow and
complex; the temptation of free-riding is ever present; financing in the
capital market is subject to serious constraints.
The evolution - of cooperatives in developing countries will
probably be different. Here again we have to be careful not to fall into
5 For a synthetical historical review: .1G. Craig, The nature ofcooperation, Black Rose Books,
1993.
6 An illuminating analysis of the economic factors responsible for the djfferent patterns of ownership is offered by H. Hansman, The ownership of enterprise, Harvard University Press,
1996.
137
the mistake of ethnocentrism, and think that cooperatives in LDCs
should necessarily evolve as the ones in the North.
The context, in fact, is different: modern capitalist institutions and
markets do not seem able to offer, in a reasonable future, concrete perspectives for responding to the needs of the majority of the poor.
On the one hand, therefore, cooperatives continue to operate as
defensive instruments.
On the other hand, some of them are evolving in a different direction: growth is their main objective, not only for the cooperatives, but
more generally of the community in which they are located.
This tendency can sometimes also be observed in Western countries7, but it is more important in LDCs8, and especially in Africa, where
communitarian links still constitute the basic texture of society: we are
not only refelTing to the extended family, but also to other kinds of com-
munities, such as the village or the clan. Without exaggerating their
importance, it has to be recognized that the feeling of identification and
pertaining of the individual to these communities is still very strong. No
idealization is possible: conflicts are everywhere present9; but common
ties are still many and diffuse, in terms of habits, religion, ceremonies,
feasts, etc.
In rural areas the presence of vital communities is more evident,
but they are not absent in the suburban areas of the main towns.
7 B. Fairbairn, J. Bold, lvi Fulton, L.H. Ketilson, D. Lh, Cooperatives and community
development: economics in social perspective, Centre for the study of cooperatives,
University ofSaskatchewan, Saskatoon, 1991.
Wilkinson, J. Quartei; Building a comniunily-confrolled economy: the Evangeline
cooperative experience, University of Toronto Press, 1996.
P.
8 Some interesting cases are described in the Internet site: FAQ/SD Dimensions/People Partic ipation Programme. For a general presentation. Participation in practice: Lessons from
the Fao People Programme, Nov. 1997. For details on a specic project: A. Bonfiglioli, Participation and grassroots oi'ganizations in integrated range and livestock development, Pakistan, June 1997.
9 They are eniphazised in: 1,-P. Jacob, P. Lavigne Delville, Les associations paysannes en
Afrique, Organisation et dynandque, Karthala, 1994.
138
The relationship between traditional communities and modern
cooperatives is controversial: on the one hand the first tend to force the
development of new institutions into the old moulds; on the other hand,
and this seems to be the more prevalent'0, they offer the breeding ground
for the successful operations of new communitarian enterprises.
In order to sustain their communities, cooperatives take on a multiflinctional, multipurpose nature": they operate in various fields at the
same time, such as credit, commercialization, consumption, etc. When a
surplus is obtained, it is partly destined to the creation of local public
goods, or to the redistribution inside the community.
In poor rural areas, cooperatives usually have no chance to operate
as modem enterprises: the main reason is the extremely limited presence
of the State, that is the absence of those basic public goods (infrastructures, but also education and health) without which the modern functioning of an enterprise is impossible.
3.
Cooperatives tend to become the instrument through which those
public goods are gradually created: roads, wells, energy, reforestation,
basic and vocational education, etc.
In suburban areas, cooperatives have a better chance to enter the
market.
As they have to operate in a more competitive environment, they
tend to take on some of the institutional characteristics of the share company (as we have seen happening in the North).
On the other hand, if they continue to pursue the objective of
showing a way out to the masses of the poor, they also appear to function
10 Thetis the opinion ofM. Haubert, Dc/a tradition cornnzunautaire ala modernité cooperative:
evolution, greffage on rCcupération? Revue Tiers Monde, Oct.-Dec. 1981.
See also: RE Dore, Modern cooperatives in traditional communities, in P Worsley, ed., Two
blades of grass. Rural cooperatives in agricultural modernization, Manchester University
Press, 1971.
11 A. Benjacov, Cooperatives a buts multiples dans les regions rurales des pays en développement, ILO, 1987.
139
as communitarian entities: the surplus is partly destined to redistributive
aims. This is done by offering employment to more people than would
be economically efficient; by sustaining poor members whom it would
be economic to leave out; by financing some public services insufficiently provided for by public authorities, such as general education and
basic health'2.
The multifunctional cooperatives with a communitarian basis are
still a minority in the panorama of LDCs.
But they represent an original and interesting case of institutional
creativity: a private enterprise, a cooperative, takes on some duties
which are of a public nature, in a role of support and substitution of the
lower levels of local government. In this way the weak structures of the
African State are receiving new life blood "from below".
APPENDIX:
THE GENERAL UNION OF COOPERATIVES
(MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE) AS A MULTIPURPOSE
COOPERATIVE
1.
The General Union of Cooperatives IUGC) is organized at two
levels: the Union itself, a second level cooperative, where about 1,000
workers are employed, mostly women; and 185 primary cooperatives,
with 5,400 members, 90% of whom women (mostly illiterate).
All cooperatives are located in the Green Zones, a farming belt
within a 20 km. radius from the city of Maputo: all of them are involved
in agricultural activity and almost all in poultry production (mainly
broilers). They started as production cooperatives: but since 1991 agriculture is done individually, and each member cultivates her own piece
of land.
12 See the AppendLv.
140
Land itself continues to be owned collectively, and the same is
true for basic infrastructures and main production means.
The Union, whose seat is in Maputo city, provides technical assis-
tance and input credit to the cooperatives; the Union itself is directly
involved in poultry production (both meat and eggs); it provides also
general and vocational education; basic health services; it supplies consumption goods and gives support to the National Union of Cooperatives (UNAC).
The General Assembly is the governing body of the cooperatives,
and it elects a Board of Directors, with a President, a Treasurer and a
Secretary.
The members produce, on 3134 ha, various vegetables, mainly
with dry land farming techniques.
Cultivation is conducted on plots with an average extension of
half an hectare; collective fields are now the exception. Poultry production, on the contrary, is done on a collective basis, under the responsibility of a team of two-three workers.
Members spend their day in the cooperative, but do not live there.
35 cooperatives have functioning nurseries.
The Union's General Assembly is made up of representatives for
each cooperative, and a Board of Directors; the seat, and the administrative offices, are in the center of Maputo.
UGC was granted legal status in 1990.
The main function of the Union is to sustain the poultry production of the cooperatives and the family sector (that is relatives of members of the primaly cooperatives).
141
The Union is organized in the following way:
Breeder day old chicks are imported from South Africa: UGC has
poultry housing for 60.000 breeders. There are two hatcheries, with
a total capacity of 400.000 eggs.
Day old broiler chicks are sent to the cooperatives (and to poultry
houses pertaining directly to the Union); surplus chicks are sold on
the market.
Chicken feed is produced in a mill, with a capacity of 1000 t/month.
Some feed ingredients have to be bought in South Africa (and are
transported with 4 trucks, property of UGC).
Technical assistance to cooperatives is provided by 2 veterinarians,
5 technicians and 25 operators.
Specific service depai tinents exist for constructions, for maintenance of the large fleet of vehicles owned by the UGC, for the production of poultry equipment.
A slaughterhouse, with a capacity of 8,000 chicken/day, has
recently started operating.
Cooperatives can sell chickens directly, but the majority is commercialized through the Union.
Coming now to the activities directly managed by the Union, as we
said before, it breeds broilers and hens in poultry housing under its
own direct control.
On the social side, the Union runs three secondary schools and one
technical institute (all recognized by the State): the students are generally sons of cooperative members.
A Training Center offers short courses on cooperative management
and agro-zootechnical methods to members of cooperatives ofUGC
and liNAC.
142
O Distribution of consumption goods is now limited, while basic
health services are just beginning to be supplied.
The primary cooperatives started in 1980, thanks to the initiative
of an energetic Italian missionary, Prosperino Gallipoli, who was at the
time working in the Green Zones Administration of Maputo, after a long
experience in the '60s and '70s in the organization of cooperatives in
Zambesia.
4.
The socio-economic situation was terrible in those years: Frelimo's economic policy was showing all its limitations, Renamo had
started its guerrilla activity, the population was abandoning the rural
areas looking for refuge in the suburbs of main towns.
Prosperino Gallipoli started organizing a group of extremely poor
and illiterate women, mostly abandoned by their husbands or widows.
They had been granted some land in the Green Zone of Maputo. The
new cooperatives, self-managed and democratic, were different from
the Frelimo's ones created some years before, in the period of the "aldeias comunais".
Notwithstanding the opposition of some burocrats, and with the
help of some local politician and of many foreign NGO's, the first 7
cooperatives with a total of 50 members were organized.
Work was collective: the main activity was the cultivation, with
primitive farm implements, of vegetables for city market.
By 1981 the cooperatives had become 24, with 1177 members; the
first vehicle was acquired.
The Union was formed in 1982, and since then Prosperino Galli-
poli has been contributing to its direction informally, with the ever
increasing participation of a local leadership (the President of UGC and
the majority of Departments' chiefs are women).
Since the very first days, general and vocational education was
given the greatest importance.
143
During the '80s there was a great scarcity of basic staple goods:
the Union carried out an important activity as a consumption cooperative. In 1987 the members reached the record number of 11.000. But
when the distribution of consumption goods lost importance, many
members resigned: since then the membership has stabilized.
In the middle of the '80s, duck and rabbit breeding was started,
afterwards a big investment was made in breeding pigs. The results were
not positive. It was only in 1989 that the right road to expansion was
found, large scale poultry production.
In 1995 primary cooperatives produced 690.000 broilers; the family sector 164.000; and the Union 730.000, for a total of 1.584.000.
The average rate of profit (Profit/Revenue) was 11.9%, and the
average rate of mortality 12.1%. 38% of broilers were sold frozen. In
addition, 2 million chicks and 4 million eggs were sold.
Cooperatives produced 2500 t of vegetables, 1160 t of corn and
beans, 750 t of fruits.
Donors' assistance is still important for UGC, although it is more
difficult to be obtained.
The UGC case merits careful consideration.
It is now a modern enterprise, operating in a competitive
environment.
Management techniques and technical equipment are reasonably
modern and efficient.
However the productive base is represented by more than 5.000
illiterate and very poor women, living in the highly deprived suburban
area of Maputo.
144
On the one hand UGC has to function as a modern enterprise, in
order to continue being competitive; on the other it is committed to
strengthening its very weak human base.
As we said, collective production at the primary level has been
almost completely abandoned. Only poultry production is still conducted collectively. But even here new production systems are being
experimented, as new poultry housing are being constructed for individual families: may be a new kind of cooperative will result, with all production family based, with only land, general infrastructures and main
equipment still in common property.
Basically the UGC continues to be a democratic institution. But the
concrete possibility of members to influence day to day choices of the
Union has become limited: hierarchy is becoming more and more important.
While a significant quota of the surplus is attributed to mutual redistribution, salaries at the Union are very low, usually at the national minimum level, and earnings in the cooperatives are minimal.
But important social activities are financed, especially in education
and health. Weak cooperatives continue to be sustained, and their losses
are covered by the Unjon.
Members of cooperatives and workers at the Union are probably
excessive relative to what efficiency would require: but this means that
the Union is making a significant contribution to fight unemployment.
Finally it gives considerable support to UNAC, for strengthening
the national cooperative movement.
145
SOMMAIRE
Après quarante ans de programmes de développement réalisés par
les Etats, avec la contribution de la cooperation au développement
étrangère, les résultats en Afrique semblent être très réduits, et le continent attend encore son take-off.
Aujourd'hui, dans le contexte de la réalisation des programmes
d'ajustement structure!, ii parait que le nouveau phénomène de la
creation de cooperatives (dans ce cas un effort spontané pour un developpement qui nait du has), puisse donner une importante contribution a la
reduction de la pauvreté et a Ia promotion d'un veritable processus de
développement.
Ily a une certaine ressemblance entre la situation actuelle de 1'Afrique et celle de !'Europe du dernier siècle, quand les premieres coopérafives sont apparues. En Europe le role des cooperatives était de défendre
les petits producteurs contre les distorsions ou itinexistence des marches.
Aujourdthui des organisations 'grassroots' semblent apparaItre un
peu partout en Afrique. Mais ii y a quand même des importantes différences vis a vis de !'expérience européenne. L'Europe du siècle passé
connaissait déjà des institutions de l'Etat et du marché, qui s'étaient
formés pendant un long processus historique. Dans la majorité des pays
Africains la situation est différente, et les conditions culturelles et pour
un correct fonctionnement de l'Etat et du marché ne sont pas encore présentes. Des institutions de type familial, clanique, ethnique et des diffé-
rentes formes de propriété collectives influencent largement les
relations et les obligations économiques et sociales.
L'Etat est en train de réduire sa presence et de limiter !'offre de
services publics et d'infrastructures; le marché a généralement un
caractère embryonnaire: la contexte dans lequel les organizations
'grassroots' sont en train de se structurer sont donc fort différentes de
celles de 1'Europe du siècle passé.
146
La faiblesse des institutions de 1'Etat conduit ces organisations a
assumer aussi des fonctions de nature publique, et a intéragir avec les
niveaux les plus décentralisés de l'Etat.
Elles ne se limitent pas a s'intéresser aux nécessités économiques de
leurs membres, mais fournissent aussi des biens publics loca'ux et réalisent
une redistribution des revenus a l'intérieur des communautés oü elles agissent.
D'un côté cela contribue a aggraver les désavantages compétitifs
dont les cooperatives souffrent. D'autre côté ce mélange de public et de
privé, de marché et de communauté représente un cas très intéressant de
créativité institutionnelle, dans une situation oiX l'Etat et les bailleurs de
fonds se retirent d'une promotion directe du développement.
Une analyse détaillée d'un cas de cooperative communautaire a
Maputo, Mozambique, est présentée.
147
Le défi coopératif et
le développement en Afrique
ADA SOULEYMANE KIBORL4
Le dell cooperatifet le développement en Afrique
1.
CONTEXTE ET DEFIS DU DEVELOPPEMENT
Selon les données du Rapport Mondial sur le Développement
Humain 1994 du PNUD, l'Afrique de 1'Ouest comptait en 1992, 206,6
millions dthabitants avec un taux d'accroissement aimuel de 3,2%. Les
projections de PAn 2000 estiment la population a 263 millions d'âmes.
Environ 34% de cette population vit en-dessous du seuil de pauvreté en
milieu rural. Sur les 206,6 millions d'habitants, un peu plus de 150 millions d'individus n'ont aucun accès aux services de sante, dteau potable
et d'assainissement.
L'Afrique de l'Ouest comptait en 1990, une moyenne de 22 000
habitants pour un médecin, et environ 4 300 habitants pour une infirmière.
La population urbaine est passé de 14% a 40% de Ia population
totale au cours des 30 dernières années. Plus de 50% de la population est
jeune.
Si les tendances actuelles se poursuivent, l'Afrique de l'Ouest
éprouvera de plus en plus de difficultés a nourrir ses habitants, a les
soigner, a absorber les nouveaux demandeurs d'emplois et a éduquer ses
enfants.
Certains pays, malgré leurs immenses potentialités agricoles, connaissent des pénuries alimentaires. La sécurité alimentaire s'est
dégradée.
La crise a aussi un coüt humain considerable. Dans plusieurs pays
les dépenses consacrées aux services sociaux ont fortement diminué, le
taux de scolarité est en baisse, la mortalité infantile reste élevée. Avec
l'application des PAS, les Etats ne consacrent que le quart de leurs budgets a itéducation soit a peine la rnoitié des enfants scolarisables. La
même situation prévaut dans le domaine de la sante.
Le chomage déclaré est lui aussi en augmentation dans les villes,
notamment parmi les jeunes diplôrnés y compris les médecins, les
151
infirmiers et sages-femmes malgré les énormes besoins dans le domaine
sanitaire.
La bonne gouvernance, le respect et l'application des principes
démocratiques, la décentralisation et le transfert du pouvoir et du savoir
a la base, la démocratisation du développement et le respect des droits de
l'Homme sont des préalables et des conditions indispensables a tout
processus de développement en Afrique
Au egard a la gravité des problèmes précédemment évoqués,
FAfrique risque de connaItre un avenir tragique si de nouvelles stratégies et des actions concretes et durables ne sont pas immédiatement
mises en oeuvre. Toutefois, vue la complexité des problèmes, ii n'existe
pas de solutions rapides cu de programmes dtaction simples.
2.
LE CONTEXTE DES COOPERATIVES EN
AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST
IiAfrique de ltOuest continue de vivre sous le signe et les effets de
la crise économique, des programmes d'ajustements structuraux, de la
libéralisation des economies et du désengagement partiel ou total des
Etats dans plusieurs secteurs de 1' économie.
Malgré les declarations et les publications de données, de
paramètres et d'agrégats macro-économiques positifs ou optimistes, La
question fondamentale de l'impact positif de toutes ces mesures sur Ia
vie quotidienne et sur le développement global, humain et durable des
africains moyens et des couches défavorisées demeure sans réponse
satisfaisante.
Ces constats sappliquent également aux cooperatives qui, malgré
ou a cause du libéralisme dconomique et du désengagement des Etats,
continuent de connaItre les mêmes difficultés de financement, de gestion, de commercialisation et de participation des membres.
152
Le dell coopératifet le développernent en Afrique
Depuis les indépendancesjusqu'aux années 1980-1990, la typologie génerale des organisations d'auto promotion et de développement a
la base se présente comme suite:
Li
des cooperatives calquées sur le modèle occidental respectant plus
ou moms les principes coopératifs issus des pionniers de Rochdales;
Li
des groupements précoopératifs ou a vocation cooperative censés
évoluer vers la forme cooperative mais ayant garde ce statut pour
des raisons de commodité ou de défaillance des services étatiques;
O des organisations socio-traditionnelles ou socioculturelles au
niveau des villages @our travaux collectifs, solidarité cornmunautaire);
O des organisations hybrides a cheval entre les groupements, les
cooperatives et les associations socio-traditioimelles;
[Ti
des associations de développement a la base, crées par des fils et des
flues d'une localité pour promouvoir le développement de leurs
terroirs.
Nous constatons, et cela est particulier dans les pays francophones, la creation de nouvelles organisations sous l'instigation de
partenaires au développement extérieurs ou nationaux. En plus des
cooperatives et des groupements, nous avons a present les organisations
paysannes (OP), les organisations professionnelles agricoles (OPA) et
autres denominations. Ce phénomène n'est pas nouveau mais ii s'amplifie avec le désengagement des Etats et les nouvelles politiques de coopé-
ration intemationale et les nouveaux enjeux et défis auxquels sont
confrontés. Cela affecte les cooperatives dont certaines se dissolvent ou
assistent impuissantes au nomadisme de leurs membres.
L'on est toutefois en droit de se demander pour qui crée-t-on ces
nouvelles organisations? Et dans quel but? Parfois, l'approche utilisée et
la pratique ne sont pas en conformité avec 1' esprit et la philosophie de
1' auto-promotion.
153
L'auto-promotion, l'approche participative au développement,
"Les Grassroots organisations" que certains opposent, substituent ou
préfèrent aux cooperatives semblent revenir "a la mode". La lutte contre
la pauvreté, la promotion d'un développement durable en général et
humain en particulier constituent d'autres nouveaux themes ou "innovations" dans la region.
Queue est la place ou le role des cooperatives dans ces concepts?
Et qui doit decider de ce role? Deux questions dont les réponses sont
souvent dictées par ltattrait ou les considerations de financements exté-
rieurs. Dans ces conditions, les cooperatives ou les autres nouvelles
formes d'organisation deviennent un instrument des promoteurs. Hier,
ctétait itEtat. Aujourd'hui, se sont les ONG et les autres partenaires au
développement. Les mêmes risques d'échec demeurent.
Sous l'instigation dthommes politiques ou de sociétés commercia-
les, des cooperatives se font une concurrence déloyale alors que les
mêmes sociétés passent, officiellement ou officieusement, des accords
entre elles pour se partager les marches. Ce phénomène est surtout sensible dans les secteurs de la commercialisation des intrants agricoles et de
Fexportation des produits de rente.
Peut-on dans ces conditions parler de marché libre et transparent,
de concurrence loyale lorsque dans certains cas pouvoir politique et
pouvoir économique se confondent par personnes interposées?
Face a une telle situation, quels sont les pouvoirs, les capacités et
quel sera Pavenir des cooperatives en Afrique en general et en Afrique
de 1'Ouest en particulier?
Au Sénégal, par exemple, les cooperatives agricoles, les groupements et les associations de paysans ont créé un cadre de concertation et
de "lobbying" des ruraux, appelé Conseil National de Concertation des
Ruraux (CNCR)
Au Mali et au Burkina Faso, des actions sont en cours au niveau de
certaines organisations paysannes dans le but de se doter de structures
ou de forums similaires.
154
Le défi coopératifet le développement en Afrique
Parallèlement a ces nouvelles formes d'associations, les unions et
les fédérations continuent de se créer ou de s'affaiblir.
Les cooperatives d épargne et de credit connaissent un regain de
vitalité et acquièrent une plus grande confiance de leurs membres et des
bailleurs de fonds qui les utilisent de plus en plus comme canaux de distribution de leurs lignes de credit en direction du monde rural. Cette
fonne de financement exogène pourrait conduire les CO OPEC au même
sort que les caisses ou les Banques de credit Agricoles si elle ntest pas
liée a une obligation dtadhésion et d'épargne des bénéficiaires.
Des cooperatives emergent de plus en plus dans des secteurs
inédits comme ceux de la sante (Bénin), de Penvironnement ou de la
foresterie.
Au niveau des partenaires d'appui au développement des coopératives ou des organisations dtautopromotion, non seulement leur nombre
croIt, mais la mobilisation des ressources financières se fait de plus en
plus difficilement. En raison d'une forme de concurrence entre partenaires au développement coopératif, certains deviennent de plus en plus
de simples agences d'exécution, perdant par Ia même occasion leur
autonomie d'action et leur capacité d'adaptation aux réalités locales des
bénéficiaires et a leur dynamisme endogene. Seule une cooperation
franche et honnéte on tout simplement un echange d'informations entre
partenaires au developpement peuvent contribuer au réajustement et au
décollage des cooperatives.
Au plan politique, les processus de démocratisation se poursuivent mais ne se ressemblent pas en terme d'impacts et de résultats.
Les récents événernents au Bénin, au Togo, au Niger et au Nigeria
illustrent parfaitement la complexité, les contradictions et les interrogations dans le domaine politique en Afrique.
Les guerres civiles en Guinée Bissau et en Sierra Leone constituent un autre douloureux exemple des risques d'instabilité politique et
d'insécurité qui menacent la sous-région.
155
Les cooperatives sont devenues plus indépendantes et plus
autonomes en raison des processus démocratiques et du désengagement
des Etats. Mais dans le même temps elles souffrent, dtune part, du manque d'intérêt des gouvernements excepté pendant les campagnes électorales et, d'autre part, des tentatives de récupération par certains hommes
politiques.
En conclusion, il est plus que nécessaire et urgent que les
cooperatives:
L prennent conscience de leur force et de leurs faiblesses;
Li
aient le courage de s'auto-ajuster au plan stratégique, financiei;
commercial, humain et organisationnel;
fl
en véritables groupes de pression et de dialogue poli-
tique et économique, soit entre elles, soit en association avec
d'autres organisations ayant les mémes intérêts et les mêmes
problèmes au niveau local, regional et national.
3.
LES ORGANISATIONS COOPERATIVES FAITIERES ET
REGIONALES
Depuis plusieurs années, les unions et fédérations font face a une
crise profonde et sont ltobjet de sévères critiques. Certaines persoimes et
institutions vontjusqutà declarer que les unions et les fédérations ne sont
plus utiles. Pourtant, les mutations économiques, politiques et technologiques militent en faveur dtun regroupement et d'une structuration des
mouvements coopératifs. Ne dit-on pas que Funion fait la force? Ii faut
aux cooperatives africaines des unions et des fédérations d'un type
nouveau.
En Afrique de l'Ouest, l'on comptait en 1997 une vingtaine
d'unions et de fédérations nationales dans neuf pays francophones et
lusophones. Les principaux secteurs concernés sont l'agriculture,
ltepargne et le credit, l'artisanat, la consommation et la sante. Leurs
156
Le dfi coopératifet le developpement en Afrique
principales fonctions sont des services économiques: collecte, groupage, transport, approvisionnement, intermediation financière, sécurisation des dépôts ainsi que Ia representation et Ia formation. Quelques
unes comme 1'UCOBAM du Burkina, assurent la transformation des
produits agricoles.
3.1
Assurer la relève du désengagement de 1'Etat
Le désengagement des Etats dt aux réformes et ajustements en
cours a créé plusieurs vides que les ONG et certains projets de develop-
pement tentent plus ou moms de combler (formation, encadrement,
financement, commercialisation, audit). Vu les experiences passées et le
caractère temporaire de toute assistance, les mouvements coopératifs
doivent s'organiser pour assurer ou relever ce premier défi. Cette organi-
sation reposera sur une nouvelle stmcturation dii mouvement coopératif, et sur la consolidation des unions et fédérations déjà existantes.
Ii ne s'agit toutefois pas de remplacer un pouvoir, une tutelle ou
une bureaucratie par une autre. Les unions et les fédérations doivent non
seulement être l'émanation des cooperatives, mais surtout être a Pécoute
des besoins de celles-ci en développant des services appropriés pour y
répondre.
3.2
Services etudes et appui-conseil
Un autre defi ou vide a combler, se situe au niveau de la libéralisa-
tion économique et des marches. La structuration du mouvement doit
permettre aux cooperatives de se preparer, d'acquérir des compétences
et des moyens leur permettant dtêtre plus compétitives sur les marches,
de tirer un meilleur profit des nouvelles opportunités et de promouvoir
des formes alternatives de cooperation et de développement en fonction
des besoins des membres, des besoins et réalités des marches.
Les unions et les fédérations devraient soit se doter de compétences propres, soit faire appel a des instituts et cabinets spécialisés pour
appuyer les cooperatives dans plusieurs domaines. Les plus importants
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sont les etudes et Ia recherche de nouveaux marches; la planification
stratégique et La gestion des ressources et des activités; la tenue des
documents comptables; les procedures d'audit inteme et de contrôle
budgétaire; l'entrepreneuriat coopératif; la mobilisation des moyens
techniques et financiers.
Ii est evident que tous ces domaines ne peuvent être couverts en
méme temps. Les unions, les fédérations et leurs cooperatives affihiées
devront opérer des choix, fixer des priorités et determiner les moyens
requis. Les services offerts seront dans tous les cas payants.
3.3
Restaurer l'image et l'esprit coopératif
Le contexte actuel est également marqué par une degradation de
l'image de marque des cooperatives, le découragement, la perte de confiance des coopérateurs et un deficit de l'esprit coopératif.
Les unions et les fédérations doivent développer des actions et des
strategies pour remédier a ces maux qui minent la racine et l'essence des
cooperatives.
Le role des unions, des fédérations et de la confédération en la
mátière doit s'inscrire dans des actions et strategies permanentes et
régulières.
Ces organisations faItières peuvent restaurer l'image des coopératives, redonner confiance aux coopérateurs et ressusciter Pesprit coopératif par:
des actions d'information et de sensibilisation destinées a 1 opinion
publique, a travers les journaux, la radio et Ia télévision pour faire
connaItre et mieux conscientiser sur ltidéal, Pidentité, les valeurs et
particularités des cooperatives;
Porganisation de voyages d'études et la publication dtétudes sur les
experiences positives des cooperatives, leurs contributions au
développement local et national;
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Le dé z coos ératif et le develop 'ement en Afrique
L
une collaboration avec les autorités des systèmes éducatifs en vue
d'introduire 1'éducation et la pratique cooperatives dans les écoles
primaires, les lycées et les universités;
I'organisation de séminaires et d'ateliers destinés aux elites sur des
themes d'actualités lies a la contribution des cooperatives telle l'ave
fir de l'Afrique, de sajeunesse; le chomage; le modèle de société; la
degradation des valeurs morales et civiques; la globalisation; la
sécurité alimentaire, etc.;
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Facquisition d'espaces collectifs sur Internet et Web pour une plus
grande ouverture vers le monde extérieur et pour une recherche et
une diversification des partenaires.
3.4
Representation, lobbying et concertation
Un autre défi auquel les cooperatives prises individuellement sont
confrontées se situe au niveau de la politique et du lobbying. Malgré les
processus de démocratisation, les cooperatives sont Fobjet de tentatives
de récupération. Ces tentatives créent souvent des conflits et des tensions internes au niveau des membres individuels.
Dans le secteur agricole, exception faite des cooperatives, ii
n'existe presque pas de syndicats pour défendre les intérêts des paysans.
Les réformes actuelles se soldent souvent par des processus de privatisation et de vente dentreprises et dtunités industrielles dont dépendent les activités et l'avenir des cooperatives.
Combien de cooperatives ont-elles réellement été associées aux
négociations de vente et combien ont Pu effectivement participer au
rachat de ces entreprises et unites? Parfois, une part symbolique sans
pouvoir de decision a été offerte aux cooperatives alors que celles-ci
détiennent souvent l'essentiel de production de la matière premiere
(café, cacao, coton, arachide, ...) Cette situation préjudiciable aux
cooperatives a été possible en raison de la sous-structuration du mouvement coopératif, de la faiblesse des organisations faItières existantes et
du manque de capital. Dans certains cas, des partenaires et des capitaux
159
ont Pu être mobilisés, mais la capacité de négociation et Ia pression politique ont fait défaut.
Sur un autre plan les réformes des politiques et des legislations
cooperatives ont touj ours été entreprises suivant une approche participative qui implique les cooperatives.
La principale contrainte et lacune vient du mode de choix et de Ia
représentativité des organisations Ct des personnes représentant le
mouvement.
Les structures étatiques sont parfois obligées de choisir les organisations qui ne sont pas toujours en mesure de parler au nom de tous les
mouvements.
Les difficultés apparaissent lorsque surviennent des différents
(conflits) nés de prescriptions legales ou de choix politiques qui
touchent aux intérêts des cooperatives. Qui des représentants du mouvement prendra des initiatives ou aura assez d'audience pour contacter les
autorités compétentes et parler au nom de toutes les cooperatives?
Ces lacunes dues a la faible structuration du mouvement coopératif ou a l'absence d'un cadre de concertation n'ont pas souvent permis
dtinfluencer positivement ltélaboration des nouvelIes politiques et legislations cooperatives.
Malgré les tentatives de récupération ou d'alliance politiques ou
commerciales, les cooperatives ne doivent pas attendre que leurs avocats viennent de l'extérieur. Files doivent plus que j amais étre maItresses
de leur propre destin. Elles n'ont pas le choix car le salut ne viendra pas
de Pextérieur mais de Pintérieur, de leur sein. D'oi l'important role de
médiateur, de lobbying, de porte-parole, &avocat et de protection politique des organisations faItières.
En conclusion l'on peut affirmer que la structuration du mouvement coop ératif est importante et difficile, vu le contexte de mutation et
de transition qui prévaut et vu les contraintes et les intérêts en presence.
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Le dell cooperat?fet le développeinent en Afrique
L'Afrique de l'Ouest tout comme les autres regions de la planète
sont ou seront régies par une seule idéologie qui a pour nom Ia mondialisation et par un seul pouvoir qui a pour cadre le marché libre.
Nul ne peut échapper ou se soustraire a ce processus. Les coopératives tout comme les nations ne peuvent se permettre dtaller a la mondialisation isolément ou en rang disperse au risque dtéchouer.
Les cooperatives doivent se structurer en unions et fédérations et
constituer des alliances a caractère économique. L'intercoopération si
peu developpée constitue Ia premiere forme d'alliance.
Les strategies dalliance ne doivent pas concerner et privilégier
uniquement les cooperatives entre elles. Les alliances doivent également prendre en compte les mouvements et les organisations ne s'appelant pas cooperatives, mais ayant avec ces demières, un certain
nombre de principes, de traits identitaires, d'objectifs et d'intérêts
communs.
L'unité idéologique qui soutend ces différentes formes
d'organisations doit les conduire a des alliances stratégiques. La nature
économique et/ou politique de ces alliances dépendra des problèmes et
des contextes nationaux.
4.
LES ACTIVITES DE L'ACl/BRAO ET LE
DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL
4.1
La mission et les objectifs de 1'ACl/BRAO
Le Bureau Regional pour l'Afrique de 1'Ouest (BRAO) de l'alliance Cooperative Internationale (ACT) a été créé avec une double mis-
sion; d'une part, une mission de representation de PACT et des
organisations cooperatives dans la sous-région et d'autre part, celle dtap
pui au développement des cooperatives.
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Grassroots' Organizations, DecentralizatiOn and Rural Development
Pour remplir cette mission, l'ACl/BRAO s'est fixé pour objectifs:
Favoriser l'existence d'un dialogue constructif entre les
mouvements coopératifs et les autorités gouvernementales et contribuer
au développement d'un environnement approprid et favorable a la promotion de ces organisations.
Appuyer l'emergence et la consolidation d'organisations
cooperatives faItières.
Appuyer la promotion et le perfectionnement de ressources
humaines, locales et nationales.
Appuyer la creation et la consolidation de services ou de
systèmes de formation au sein des unions et fédérations pour initier et
soutenir Pautonomie des cooperatives en formation.
Favoriser les échanges d'informations et d'expériences entre
mouvements coopératifs de la sous-région.
4.2
Les appuis du BRAO et le développement a la base
Nous avons choisi dtillustrer les experiences du BRAO en matière
de développement a la base, a travers deux programmes au Bénin et au
Burkina.
4.2.1 Bénin
En 1994, PACIIBRAO a accordé une subvention de deux millions
de FCFA (20 000 FF) a la Fédération des Caisses d'Epargne et de Credit
Agricole Mutuel du Bdnin (FECEAM).
Cette subvention avait pour but d'initier un programme dénommé
"le Tout-Petit Credit aux Femmes (TPCF)". Les objectifs de ce programme sont:
améliorer le sociétariat féminin dans le réseau des caisses locales
affiliées a Ia FECEAM, c'est-à-dire les Caisses locales de credit
agricole mutuel (CLCAM) a raison de 200 femmes par an;
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Le dell coopératifet le développeinent en Afrique
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mettre a la disposition des femmes a faibles ressources, les moyens
d'entreprendre une activité génératrice de revenu dans leur localité;
E ass ouplir les conditions d'accès au credit en faveur desdites femmes
Le public cible est constitué de femmes dérnunies qui ne peuvent,
de ce fait, adherer aux CLCAM.
Stratégie et procedure
La mise en place du TPCF est précédée d'un travail dtinformation
et de formation des bénéficiaires potentiels selon les étapes suivantes:
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Les responsables de la CLCAM font des seances de sensibilisation
dans les quartiers, en vue d'inviter les femmes a adherer a un groupe
de solidarité constitué par activité, par affinité ou par catégorie
socioculturelle;
[1
a cette occasion, des leaders féminins sont responsabilisés par
activité ou par catégorie socioculturelle; la liste des membres est
ensuite transmise a Ia CLCAM qui Panalyse;
les responsables de la CLCAM organisent ensuite des reunions de
sensibilisation et de formation a l'intention des membres des
groupes solidaires, sur la notion de cautionnement solidaire et sur le
fonctionnement de la CLCAM. A cette occasion, les femmes sont a
nouveau invitées a confirmer leur intention d'adhérer au groupe de
cautionnement solidaire. Elles procèdent, ensuite, a itélection des
membres du bureau responsable du groupe de cautionnement
solidaire Présidente, Secrétaire, Trésorière). Celles-ci se chargeront de finaliser la liste des membres de leur groupe et de la communiquer a la CLCAM.
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les femmes élues collectent les cotisations nécessaires en vue de
remplir les formalités suivantes:
adhesion du groupe au sociétariat de la CLCAM, avec 200
FCFA (2FF) de droit d'adhésion et 1 000 a 5 000 FCFA (10 a 50
FF) de parts sociales en fonction des Caisses;
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ouverture du compte collectif du groupe (5000 FCFA) (50 FF);
adhesion individuelle des femmes au sociétariat de la CLCAM,
avec 200 FCFA (2 FF) de droit d'adhésion et 1 000 FCFA (10
FF) de part sociale.
Une fiche de demande collective de prêts TPCF est remise aux
responsables du groupe. Cette demande est remplie, signée et déposee a la CLCAM. Sur Ia base des informations contenues dans la
demande collective de TPCF, le Gérant procêde a l'analyse technique du dossier qu'il transmet au Conseil d'Administration de la
CLCAM pour délibération.
Les credits sont octroyés en fonction de la moralité et de la
capacité de remboursement de chacune des demandeuses.
Après le premier TPCF, les femmes ayant honoré leurs échéances
de remboursement sont admises a exprimer une deuxième demande de
montant plus important. Cette demande ne doit, en aucun cas, dépasser
le plafond de 30 000 FCFA (300 FF) ou de 50000 FCFA (500 FF) retenu
par la Caisse. Cette deuxième chance est accordée a la femme pour lui
permettre de réunir ltepargne préalable nécessaire pour accéder a un prêt
supérieur au TPCF.
Impact - Acquis - Résultats
Une evaluation réalisée en Mars 1996 a permis de quantifier les
acquis et les résultats suivants.
Le montant total des credits alloués était de 901 053 781 FCFA (9
010 537,81 FF) pour 47 579 sociétaires femmes. Le taux de remboursement était de 95%.
La progression stest faite de la manière suivante:
- sociétaires
- capital social:
- déposants:
- montant des dépôts:
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+ 64%
+ 58%
+ 59%
+ 39%
Le dfi coopératifet le développement en Afrique
Ltévaivation a également montré que le TPCF s'est révélé être un
succès en tant que produit spécifique et &appel pour les femmes
Au niveau local, le TPCF a eu les impacts positifs suivants:
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les femmes ont Pu entreprendre ou améliorer leurs activités génératrices de revenus;
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amelioration des revenus au niveau des femmes et des ménages;
O amelioration de Palimentation des enfants et des conditions de vie
des families;
O augmentation du sociétariat féminin au sein des caisses locales. Au
niveau de l'UR-CLAM du Zou par exemple 2/3 des sociétaires sont
des femmes.
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de nombreuses femmes se sentent valorisées et considérées grace a
leur contribution financière au budget et aux dépenses de la famille.
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reduction du pouvoir usurier des commerçants locaux;
o reduction du taux d'exode rural féminin vers les villes
El
47 579 femmes ont fait leur entrée dans un système financier
moderne.
4.2.2 Burkina
Groupement mixte, Songtaaba comptait dans ses rangs des
femmes très engagées et désireuses de prendre leurs responsabilités,
toutes leurs responsabilités: initier et gérer des projets rémunérateurs
pour se rendre autonomes. Cette determination les a conduites a créer
leur propre groupement, "Manegré" que l'on peut traduire en français
par "Développement". Les membres de Manegré, conscients qutune
participation accrue ala vie du group ement supposait qu'eiles se libèrent
de certaines tâches traditionnelles qui leur prenaient du temps ont inscrit
au tableau de leurs preoccupations, et en bonne place, la question du
mouiin a grain.
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Comment accéder a cette "machine", qui fait gagner jusqu'à trois
ou quatre heures a certaines ménagères qui ont Ia chance d'en trouver
près de leur domicile?
La persévérance de ces femmes allait, enfin, être payante grace a
ItACl/BRAO qui leur a app orté un appui en juillet 1988.
L'appui de l'ACl/BRAO se chiffrait a 1 567 500 Francs CFA (15
675 FF) décomposés comme suit:
Provisions pour l'achat du moulin:
1 200 000 FCFA (12 000 FF)
Contribution aux charges d'exploitation: 165 000 FCFA (1 650 FF)
Provisions pour achat de matériaux:
Provisions pour frais de formation:
150 000 FCFA (1 500 FF)
52 500 FCFA (525 FF)
Avec enthousiasme, les femmes de Manegré se sont appropriés
leur moulin: un Comité de gestion était prêt qui n'attendait que I'outil de
travail, mais tout le monde, au sein de leur groupement, est impliqué
dans les multiples tâches que requiert le fonctionnement d'un moulin a
grain. Elles sont gestionnaires et clientes a la lois. Les femmes des
autres localités environnantes sont egalement contentes de l'aubaine.
L'on accourt de partout avec son mu. L'argent entre. De Fargent
qui n'est pas thésaurisé mais déposé dans une caisse populaire et qui servira, plus tard, de caution pour un prêt.
Parallèlement, Manegré utilise une partie des recettes du moulin
pour appuyer les initiatives de la communauté. En effet, entre temps, le
nombre de groupements est passé a quatre. Les quatre, de concert, se
sont lances dans un ambitieux plan de développement qui prévoit des
infrastructures stratégiques. Manegré, a chaque étape, interviendra:
en 1988, les quatre groupements construisent lécole de trois
classes de Tanlili ainsi que le logement du maître;
en 1990, le second logement du deuxième enseignant est prêt;
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Le d4fi coopératifet le développement en 4frique
celui du troisième s'aligne, fièrement, sur les deux premiers en
1991.
L'exemple des quatre premiers groupements fait tache d'huile.
Des groupements créés, par la suite, dans des villages environnents se
joignent a eux.
Le 7 novembre 1992, les douze groupements peuvent se constituer en Union, leur voeu le plus cher. us lui donnent le nom de
Namenegbzanga, littéralement "quelque chose qui va assurer le
développement integral". Cette famille agrandie génère plus de ressources, mais suppose aussi plus de responsabilités et d'actions.
Le programme d'infrastructures s'étoffe. Les recettes du moulin
seront encore mises a contribution pour edifier:
le bâtiment de la banque de céréales, en 1994;
le magasin de stockage, une année plus tard;
les bureaux et Ia salle de reunion et de formation la même
année;
la maison d'accueil, en 1996.
Pour la construction de ces quatre derniers beaux, au regard de
leur sérieux, les groupements constituant l'Union ont Pu obtenir de
l'aide, sous des formes diverses, d'ONGs italiennes et canadiennes. Les
membres de l'Union, en plus des recettes partielles du moulin qu'ils yont
investies, ont assure la main-d'oeuvre.
5.
CONCLUSION GENERALE
L'Afrique de l'Ouest et plus particulièrement les pays de la zone
sahélienne, connaissent, depuis quelque temps, des deficits ou des
pénuries alimentaires dues aux aléas climatiques, mais également aux
politiques agricoles qui continuent de privilégier les cultures de rente
d'exportation au detriment des cultures vivrières.
167
Et pourtant que de declarations faites et d'engagements pris tant
aux plans national, regional qu'intemational sur la sécurité alimentaire,
sur le développement humain durable et sur la lutte contre Ia pauvreté!
Les exigences de Ia mondialisation et le poids de la dette pour ne
citer que ceux-là contraignent les gouvernements africains a focaliser
les ressources nationales (terres, hommes, argent, technologie et stratégies) et internationales (subventions et credits) sur les cultures de rente.
Cela n'est pas nouveau, mais plutôt étonnant lorsque Fon j ette un regard
sur les experiences passées du développement de ce continent. Ii est parfois a se demander si les experiences du passé servent.
Le troisième engagement du Sommet Mondial de l'Aiimentation
organisé par la FAO du 13 au 17 Novembre 1996 a Rome, stipule que
"...des politiques et méthodes participatives et durables de développement alimentaire, agricole, halieutique, forestier et rural seront poursuivies pour assurer des approvisionnements alimentaires adequates et
fiables..." La participation, l'approvisionnement et la sécurité alimentaires reposent en grande partie sur l'organisation des hommes et des
femmes acteurs et bénéficiaires de ces politiques et strategies.
La mise en oeuvre de cet engagement implique la definition de
politiques et strategies nationales qui prennent en compte la dimension
de l'organisation de la société civile, dont les cooperatives et les groupements d'auto-promotion sont une des imp ortantes composantes.
Depuis quelques années, les institutions internationales developpent, vulgarisent et appliquent un nouveau concept dit "développement
humain durable" Le développement humain durable a pour fondement
FHumain en tant qu'acteur et bénéficiaire des actions de développement.
La concept de développement humain durable intègre la creation
au niveau national d'un environnement qui permette aux individus de
s'épanouir, de jouir de leur droit universel a la Vie et a la Sécurité.
Le droit a la vie et a la sécurité signifie la recherche des voies et
moyens pour accéder a la nourriture, au travail, a l'instruction, aux soins
médicaux, aux droits civiques et politiques. La réalisation ou la sauve-
168
Le défi cooperatifet le développement en Afrigue
garde de tous ces droits suppose l'organisation des populations sur une
base indépendante consciente et démocratique.
Le self-help, l'auto organisation, l'autonomie et tindépendance
sont des principes de base des cooperatives. La mise en oeuvre de ce
concept implique entre autres, la definition de politiques et de strategies
nationales incitatrices et favorables a la promotion de cooperatives et de
groupements autonomes et viables capables de contribuer a Ia réalisation de la sécurité alimentaire, au développement humain durable et a la
lutte contre la pauvreté.
Auj ourd'hui tout le monde pane et privilégie le secteur privé, la
defense des droits de l'homme et la promotion de la démocratie.
Les cooperatives sont des entreprises privées tout en assumant sur
leur initiative des fonctions de developpement a la base que l'Etat ne parvient plus a assurer correctement. Les cooperatives sont des entreprises
privées qui contribuent a La mobilisation de Fépargne nationale
(Coopec), facteur indispensable de tout développement. Le développement ne peut pas et ne doit pas se concevoir uniquement en termes de
subventions et de credits extérieurs.
Les cooperatives, par les valeurs et les principes qu'elles
véhiculent et pratiquent, sont de véritables écoles d'apprentissage des
droits de l'homme et d'exercice de la démocratie.
A ces différents titres, elles méritent plus dattention, d'appui et de
consideration.
Les cooperatives et La mondialisation de l'économie est le message
de LtACI a l'occasion de la 76ème journée Internationale des
cooperatives.
S'il est admis que nul ne peut échapper ou se soustraire au processus de mondialisation, ii est également certain que ceile-ci ntest pas une
panacée universelle, car elle a ses exigences.
La mondialisation est comme un train en marche. Ceux qui ne
le prennent pas a temps resteront sur le quai. Mais comme pour tout
169
voyage, celui-ci comporte des inconnus des exigences et des risques.
Comme le disent les sages, pour voyager loin, ii faut ménager sa
monture.
L'Etat, les cooperatives, et les autres composantes de la société
africaine doivent se concerter, se preparer, définir des objectifs, des
strategies et des politiques pour pouvoir stinsérer au mieux et tirer profit
de la mondialisation.
Pour les cooperatives, aller a la mondialisation isolement ou en
rang disperse équivaudrait a un échec. Elles doivent constituer des
alliances, des regroupements, des unions ou des fédérations a caractère
économique. Les strategies dalliance ne doivent pas privilegier
uniquement les cooperatives. Elles doivent également prendre en
compte les mouvements et les organisations ne s'appelant pas
cooperatives, mais ayant avec ces dernières, un certain nombre de
principes, de traits identitaires, d'objectifs et d'intérêts communs.
L'unité idéologiques qui soutend ces différentes formes
d'organisations doit les conduire a des alliances stratégiques. La nature
économique et ou politique de ces alliances dépendra des contextes
nationaux.
Le Conseil National de Concertation des Ruraux (CNCR) au
Senegal et les Fédérations des Organisations paysannes au Bénin et au
Mali constituent des exemples d'Alliances stratégiques. Elles
regroupent cooperatives, groupements et organisation paysannes.
Les cooperatives étant des entités d'un ensemble ou d'un espace,
leur avenir et devenir dans la mondialisation dépendront des capacités et
des contraintes de leur environnement face aux défis et aux exigences de
la mondialisation.
us subsistent toutefois des interrogations dont les réponses ne sont
ni simples, ni Cvidentes.
Tout dtabord, a qui profite ou profitera la moridialisation? Ensuite,
tous les individus, toutes les nations et toutes les entreprises ont-elles
170
Le défi coopératifet le développernent en Afrique
réellement les mêmes chances, les mêmes capacités, et les mêmes
compétences face a la mondialisation? Enfin la mondialisation ne
risque-t-elle pas de creuser encore plus le fossé si grandissant entre les
nantis et les pauvres d'un même pays, entre les peuples et entre les continents de notre planète?
SUMMARY
In spite of many declarations and many actions to promote sustainable human development and to fight against poverty, West Africa
still faces today serious problems of food security, health, education,
unemployment etc.
Moreover the traditional model of cooperative is passing through
a crisis, while a lot of other groups or associations, which may be considered as informal cooperatives, are arising.
As the previous ones were an instrument in the hands of Govern-
ments, so the new ones run the risk of becoming a pure and simple
expression of NGOs, who are promoting their creation.
Today in different countries of West Africa we see unions or ass 0-
ciations being constituted. It is important that these new structures do
not act bureaucratically: they should listen to the members and offer
services to them.
Second and third level unions can give cooperators more confidence and strengthen cooperative spirit.
The Regional Office for West Africa of International Cooperative
Alliance moved in this direction, supporting the birth of unions and federations of cooperatives (formal and informal).
It has also started some programmes to support base groups: two
of these are being illustrated, one in Benin (credit associations for
women) and another in Burkina Faso (multipurpose women's groups).
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Le programme ACODEP pour la
satisfaction des besoins essentiels des
populations défavorisées au Mali
CHEIKNA TOURE
Le programme ACODEP
1.
CONTEXTE DE L'INTERVENTION
Le Mali est un pays du Sahel, enclave, avec une superficie de 1
240 000 km2 Sa population est estimée a 10 millions d'habitants avec
un taux moyen de croissance de 2,6%. La population malienne est en
majorité rurale (près de 75%), relativement peu alphabétisée (36%); le
taux de scolarisation est estimé a 31%.
Le PIB reel par habitant, estimé a 500 $ US, classe le Mali parmis
les pays plus pauvres du monde. ltagricolture est l'activité la plus importante. Elle occupe environ 80% de la population active et représete environ 50% du PNB. L'elevage et la production de coton représentent
presque la totalité des exportations.
Le secteur forestier j oue un role fondamental dans Ia stratégie
nationale d'auto-suffisance alimentaire par la mise a Ia disposition des
populations des produits de premiere nécessité, notamment l'énergie
domestique et les produits de cueillette pour l'alimentation, la sante, Partisanat, etc. La production forestière occupe una place importante dans
l'économie du Mali. les besoins en énergie domestique du pays sont cou-
verts pour plus de 93% par le bois-énergie, sous forme de bois de
chauffe et de charbon de bois. La consommation de bois-énergie pour
l'ensemble du pays est estimée actuellement a peu près de 5 000 000 de
tonnes par an. Le commerce urbain de combustible ligneux génère un
chiffre d'affaire supérieur a 10 milliards de F cfa par an.
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les ressources naturelles
au Mali, comme partout ailleurs au Sahel, ont été l'objet de sévères
degradations dues aux effects combines de la sécheresse et d'une pression humaine et animale croissante sur les écosystèmes.
Quoique difficiles a quantifier, ces phénomènes de degradation
des ressources naturelles du pays sont estimés par le Programme
National de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles comme suit:
175
une proportion de terres fortement dégradées par rapport a La
superficie de terroirs, passant respectivement deS a 51% et de 18 a 60%
dans deux sites analyses en zones Nord et Sud du pays;
un abaissement du niveau des nappes phréatiques de 6 a 12m,
selon les sites, entre 1981 et 1995;
un taux de mortalité des arbres dèpassant 30% en zones
sahéliennes Ct VOjSifl de 5% en zone soudanienne.
A partir des années 70, l'Etat Malien avec ltappui de ses partenaires au développement a mis en oeuvre des projets et programmes
destinés a la protection de l'environnement et a l'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations. Maiheureusement la plupart de ces actions
n'ont pas atteint les objectifs qui leur étaient assignés. La principale raison évoquée est le manque d'implication des populations bénéficiaires
dans la conception, l'exécution, le suivi et l'évaluation de ces projets.
A partir de 1990, les projets mis en oeuvre affichaient le souci de
mettre lthomme au centre du processus de développement et de privilégier dans ce sens une approche participative. Pour appuyer ce processus
de responsabilisation des populations, le Gouvernement a rendu effec-
tive la décentralisation par la promulgation d'un nouveau Code des
Collectivités. Ainsi l'Etat a réduit son role aux fonctions régaliennes
d'orientation, de contrôle, d'arbitrage, dtappui technique et financier.
Les organisations associatives, cooperatives et mutualistes, ainsi que les
autres composantes de la Société Civile ont ainsi bénéficié du transfert
de compétences et de ressources.
Les activités du Programme ACODEP ("Appui aux Collectivités
Décentralisées pour un développement participatif"), stinscrivent dans
cette dynamique. Ltexpérience de Simba, un village encadré par ACODEP, présenté ici en étude de cas, donne une illustration de la participation responsable des populations dans la gestion de leur terroir.
176
Le programme ACODEP
2.
PRESENTATION SOMMAIRE DU PROGRAMME
ACODEP
Initié par le Gouvemement de la Republique du Mali, le Programme ACODEP bénéficie du soutien financié du Programme des
Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD). le Bureau International
du Travail (BIT) apporte un appui technique et administratif en tant
qu'agence associée de réalisation.
La finalité recherchée par le Programme ACODEP est de permettre un développement rural autogéré et autosoutenu par le renforcement
de la capacité gestionnaire des organisations paysannes afin. qu'elles
améliorent elles mêmes leurs conditions de production et de commer-
cialisation, tout en protégeant leur environnement. Cette finalité se
traduit par des activités de structuration, de formation et de microréalisation que le Programme execute de façon complémentaire et
intégrée.
Les objectifs immédiats découlant de cette finalité sont:
0 l'accroissement des connaissances debase et techniques des popula-
tions des villages impliqués dans le processus de structuration/investissement et l'alphabétisation des j eunes de 10 a 16 ans de
ces villages là oi ii n'y a pas d'école;
Li
ltaccroissement de la capacité d'autogestion par une structuration
adequate en vue du développement économique et social des populations des villages cibles;
Li
la mobilisation des ressources d'épargne locale on externe pour la
réalisation de projets d'infracstructures productives et sociales
resultant des initiatives de base et soutenant une amelioration du
bien-être des populations concemées.
La mise en oeuvre du programme est assurée par une Unite de
Gestion comprenant trois cellules opérationelles et une cellule
Suivi/évaluation. L'exécution des activités sur le terrain est confiée, sur
la base. Ses principaux partenaires sont: les Services déconcentrés de la
177
Direction Nationale de l'Appui au Monde Rural (DNAMR), 8 ONG
maliennes, 3 ONG étrangères (SNV AFVP, PRODILO), ACOPAM, la
CMDT, le CESAO.
Quatre ans après le démarrage, Peffort du Programme se traduit:
a)
par un développement reel du capital humain:
7000 néo-alphabètes sont capables de gérer les micro-
projets et les activités économiques initiées par les
villages,
4000 jeunes (dont 30% de filles) alphabétisés préparent
une relève efficace des responsables actuels des organisations villageoises,
2500 femmes alphabétisées assurent la bonne gestion des
ressources allouées par le Programmme aux femmes,
525 centre d!alphabétisation et 12 bibliothèques rurales,
animés par des moniteurs viallageois et monitrices villageoises acceuillent les auditeurs et les auditrices
désirant se former;
b)
par I'émergence de structures capables de satisfaire les
besoins essentiels de leurs membres:
251 organisations paysannes de forte capacité en gestion
sur les 586 encadrées,
1300 responsables assurant la distribution des Fonds de
Promotion (240 millions) et tenant àjour les documents
de gestion des credits,
28 plans de développement préparés par des animateurs
villageois, ces plans servent de référence pour Ia gestion
du terroir villageois,
178
Le programme ACODEF
9 micro-barrages, 14 périmètres maraichers, 4 puits
domestiques, 15 centres permanents de formation, 97
centres d'éducation de base pour le développement,
21 noyaux d'extension du Programme (NEP), un système
par lequel des paysans encadrent d'autres paysans, qui
consacrent la durabilité de l'expérience du Programme.
3.
APPUI DU PROGRAMME ACODEP A LA
GESTION DU TERROIR VILLAGEOIS DE SIMBA
3.1
La situation initiale
Simba est un petit village de 400 âmes situé a 60 Km de Bamako,
dans le cercie de Koulikoro. ii se situe dans la zone soudanienne caracté-
risée par des savanes arbustives, mais aussi des savanes arborées et
quelques foréts sèches, avec une pluviométrie aimuelle dépassant 1200
nm.
Le relief autour de Simba est très accidenté, rendant alors difficile
l'accès au village. Les plaines sont arrosées par de nombreux cours d'eau
saisonniers.
Le terroir villageois de Simba est victime aujourd'hui de Pexploitation et de la commercialisation des produits forestiers. Cette activité
est conduite par le privé urbain du secteur informel qui utilise les populations rurales sans grande organisation.
Cette exploitation abusive des ressources forestières compromet
aujourd9aui les activités économiques des populations du village a travers ses effets directs sur la production primaire, mais aussi ses effets
indirects sur la sante humaine, et les autres secteurs de l'économie par la
perte en bois, la reduction de la fertilité des sols, la diminution des superficies cultivables par le fairt de Férosion et, a la longue, la disparition des
espèces animales et végétales.
179
Devant cette situation, le Programme ACODEP a organisé et diffuse a Fintention des responsables villageois de Simba un module de for-
mation portant sur Ia méthodologie de preparation d'un plan de
développement villageois. Après le diagnostic participatif des problèmes et besoins du village, Ia communauté a retenu comme action prioritaire, Ia réalisation &une retenue d'eau pour la relance des activités
agro-pastorales et la restauration des différents écosystèmes.
3.2
Le processus de changement
Grace a la démarche participative appliquée par le Programme, les
objectifs de la micro-réalisation ont été réalisées par le Genie Rurale
(service public) du cercle de Koulikoro. Ce servicea aussi assure le suivi
technique au cours de la réalisation de l'ouvrage.
L'ouvrage a coüté au Programme près de 18 millions de Fcfa. La
participation du village a été estimée a 3 174 000 Fcfa. Il a été réalisé par
une entreprise privée.
Après la reception provisoire de Pouvrage en mai 1997, plusieurs
missions techniques ont bété réalisées pour appuyer la population dans
1'exploitation de la plaine. Ces missions étaient composées des
responsables de 1tUGP-ACODEP, de 1'OHVN (Operation Haute Vallée
du Niger) et de FEx CAC (Centre d'Action Cooperative).
Sur le plan structurel, une organisation intervillageoise a été constituée, regroupant 5 villages situés an amont du barrage. Un comité de
gestion a été mis en place pour une exploitation rationnelle des superficies mises en valeur pour la riziculture et le maraichage.
ACODEP a accordé un appui de 400 kg en sémences de riz, reparti
ebntre 103 exploitants. Pour la saison 97, Ia superficie exploitée a été
assure par les agents de I'OHVN.
180
Leprogramme ACODEP
3.3
Les résuitats
A la récolte, Ia production a donné 40 tonnes. Ce résultat couvre
près de la moitié des besoins de consommation des populations en
céréales. Ajouté a la production de mu, la communauté est en passe d'atteindre ltautosuffisance alimentaire.
Grace ala remontée de Ia nappe (de 12 a 02 m), le maraichage s'in-
tensifie. Les exploitants préparent, avec Fappui de l'OHVN, des parcelles de haricots verts et de gingimbre destinés a l'exportation. une
étude est en cours pour la culture de tabac destine a la SONATAM
(Société Nationale de Tabac et Allumettes du Mali)
Au niveau des changements institutionnels, le proj et a contribué a
la relance des activités d'encadrement de 1'OHVN au niveau de la localité de Simba.
Des concertations ont été instituées entre les villages pour une
meilleure exploitation des ressources naturelles et la gestion des conflits
dans le terroir.
Avec les nouvelles activités, les populations sont de moms en
moms portées vers Pexploitation du bois comme source de revenu.
Grace a cette nouvelle attitude, le couvert végétal va pouvoir regénérer;
les différents écosystèmes se restaurer.
4.
LES LEONS APPRISES
La plupart des villages dans les zones hors Operations de
Développement Rural (ODR) sont abandonnés a eux-mêmes. L'exempie de Simba montre qu'il ne faut pas nécessairement de gros moyens
pour redonner confiance a leurs populations en proie au désespoir.
La responsabilisation des populations par la structuration est la
meilleure gage d'une meilleure exploitation des ressources natureiles.
181
De facon générale, on peut retenir que les méthodes participatives
dévéloppées par ACODEP enregistrent aujourd'hui, auprès des cornmunautés concernées, des résuiltats encourageants. Le Programme con-
tribue de façon significative a promouvoir des formes &autoorganisation et d'auto-gestion pour la prise en charge de facon durable,
du développement local.
Le Programme a institué des relations contractuelles a tous les
niveaux, créant ainsi entre entités déconcentrées de l'Etat, les ONG et les
Opérateurs privés, une synergie reproductible dans dautres localités ou
regions du pays.
SUMMARY
Acodep Programme (Assistance to decentralized communities in
view for a participative development) was started by the government of
Mali four years ago, with the UNDP financial help and the ILO technical
support.
The Programme primary aim is to strengthen farmers' organizations, in order to improve their productive capacities, in the respect of
the environment.
Up to now literacy and vocational training actions, design of local
development programmes, small barrages and irrigation plants for vegetable growing, etc... have been carried out (in favour of 586 organizations).
In the specific case of Simba village a little dam was built in 1997,
with the population's active collaboration. This dam permitted a rice and
vegetable growing development.
People were induced by the productive results obtained to reduce
deforestation, which was a serious problem for the locality.
Simba's example proves that, with limited means and thanks to
participative methods, self-organization and self-management institutions for local development can be realized, with a positive indirect
effect on environment protection.
182
B. Natural Resources
Grassroots Policy Intervention in the Face
of a Retreating Recalcitrant State: A Case
Study of Chiweshe District, Zimbabwe
PROSPER MATONDI
Grassroots Policy Intervention in the Face of a Retreating Recalcitrant State
1.
UNDERSTANDING RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE 1990S
1.1
Aim and objectives of the study
This paper is a modest attempt to present the findings of a study
into the (a) changed role of grassroots organisations in rural development following the implementation of structural adjustment programme
(SAP) in Zimbabwe in 1990. The paper uses empirical data collected
during the period 1995 to 1996. Whilst the paper specifically focuses on
grassroots organisations with an environment focus, it however (b)
broadly analyses the efficacy and potential of local people to influence
policy on aspects that affect their daily lives. (c) It also examines the
development concepts that are used mostly by Non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) as set objectives of 'development' as well as the
criteria of choice of policies and projects used in the process of achieving development. Being aware of the controversy of defining what
development means to different people the paper defines development
simply as the qualitative change in the people's standard of living. The
(d) study sought to evaluate the role of NGOs in dealing with the problem of land degradation' at the national and local level. The local level
investigations identified the nature and process of local land and natural
resource degradation, and the need for environmental NGOs to play a
significant role in dealing with the degradation of land. (e) Local
struggles for the control of natural resources and the socio-political
influence such struggles by grassroots people bring to bear on national
I When a former administrator of the United States of America Environmental Protection
Agency, William Reilly, was asked how countries with massive environmental needs and few
resources managed to tackle their problems, his answer was: "Start with the disclosure of
emissions. Require that the data be published in local newspapers, Then support a healthy
NGO movement, At that point, a fascinating dynamics begins to occur. The community
interacts with plant managers and workers and government to bring down pollution levels.
Such is the power of information" (Gagliardi and Alfian, 1994, p.14). This influenced to a
large extent this study as it demonstrated what NGOs, the media and the people can do to solve
environmental problems.
187
environmental policy and management strategies were examined in
relation to environmental NGOs activities.
1.2
The Retreating Recalcitrant State
The implementation of SAP from 1990 had wider repercussions
for the Zimbabwe State. The main problems that led to the implemen-
tation of adjustment was the uncontrolled budget deficit caused by
overexpenditure by the government (Skälnes, 1995). Lack of fiscal
discipline, overvaluation of the local currency, protection of inefficient industries and parastatals, subsidies to loss making enterprises,
price controls where some of the elements that led to the adoption of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IN/IF) adjustment
and stabilisation programmes (Mkandawire, 1984; Gibbon, 1995;
Gibbon and Olukoshi, 1996). The most notable change within the
adjustment package was the recommendation on the State to withdraw
partially and completely from those functions that could be efficiently
provided by other sectors. It is clear, that due to the retreating State, a
power vacuum in terms of 'making decisions'2 has occurred at the district level in Zimbabwe. Indeed some of the State functions, especially
the way they were executed and funded, was deemed to be contradictory to market principles. For this reason it became necessary for the
State to streamline and trimline its activities through general budgetary cuts which forced the State to recede3 in the provision of
2 The term making-decisions with respect to local authorities has raised much controversy in
conteniporaly Zimbabwe (Wekwete, 1987; Helmsing, 1991,). Up until the formal adoption of
structural adjustn2ent in 1990 there was more decentralisation than devolution ofpower. Line
Ministries decentralised strictly followed prescriptions from the central authorities, whilst the
local authorities were directly administered through the Ministiy of Local Government,
National and Urban Housing.
3 Receding of the State may be directly through the withdrawal (or decline) ofpersonnel performing certain functions or services , freezing posts, freezing Public Sector Investment Programmcs (PSIP), charging on services which were once free (privatisation or
commercialisation), disinvestment in direct production, etc.
188
many services4 (health, social welfare, environmental programmes)
in Zimbabwe's rural environs.
The challenge to the State has been coming from many quotas
(students, workers - in all sectors, farmers - small and big, indigenisation lobby groups, industry and commerce). It would be futile to think
that the State accepted the changes (brought by structural adjustment,
growth of civil society, shedding off non-essential functions etc) hands
down without any form of resistance and therein lies the reason why it is
recalcitrant. The fact that the State portrayed itself to its citizenry as if it
was in control of the economy in particular whilst being 'forced' to
implement fiscal discipline demonstrated how it was double faced and
why critics began to see trends of double talk. Whilst the elite and urban
class continue to debate these issues and receive wider attention from
the press and academic commentators, the smallholder farmers and
many grassroots organisations who have consistently been challenging
national and local political processes have largely remained at the margins5. The main reason why the local level political processes have not
received wider attention range from: the suppression of dissent views at
the local level; no access to conduits of information dissemination; and
insecurity caused mainly by lack of access to means of social reproduction.
4 The State in 1996 starteclthe RuralDistrict Council Capacity BuildingProgramme toformally
surrender power to local authorities to be responsible for rural development without being
dependent on central government for revenue. However this fundamental assumption borrowed from multilateral agencies has also createdfurther controversy, in that local authorities view the State withdrawal as denigrating its responsibility to provide services through the
line ministries and in addition revenue collected from resources in the jurisdiction of local
authorities still goes to central government.
5 The local people dealings with their traditional leaders, officials and developmental agencies constitute local active policy support.
189
2.
THE PREMISES OF NGO POLICY INTERVENTION IN
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
The general agreement amongst those with most field experience
is that the best way NGOs can respond to environmental issues is to start
at the local level. However, this is not sufficient. It is only a starting
point to other levels. An important prerequisite for sustainable livelihoods is the enhancement of skills for pushing policy changes at the
national level. This means that civil society with the assistance ofNGOs
has to develop to meet the developmental dispensation by working
closely with the marginalised people who have to grapple with external
policy they have limited information on. A key problem with specific
reference to environmental NGOs is that many have been involved in
environmental policy merely in an indirect way (Nyoni, 1987). Their
participation has mainly been through the promotion of conservation
measures in their attempt to reverse land degradation. In many instances
failure to grasp the national-local dialectic in relation to policy issues
means that NGOs have generally lost out on the advantages of using the
knowledge and experiences of communal farmers in mitigating land
degradation (Vivian, 1994). Such people based knowledge and experience is rarely used by developmental practitioners at the national level
to pressure for the necessary policy change to combat land degradation.
Governments in sub-S aharan Africa now acknowledge that
NGOs, in generl, are key vehicles of environmental change and act as
complements to State efforts in environmental management programmes. NGOs in Zimbabwe are increasingly being involved in the
policy formulation process as well as playing a major role in the implementation of policies that are formulated by government6. Some NGOs
6 In spite of this influence the relationsh4, between NGOs and government remains precarious:
a love-hate relationship. For example in 1998 the State was highly suspicious of the British
government califor a routine meeting with NGOs on development issues. The meeting had to
be cancelled in spite ofpromises of a meeting with government later with the same agenda.
190
have successfully worked on policy issues in Zimbabwe since the
1920s7. To date, NGOs in Zimbabwe are involved at sub-national levels
of planning i.e. development committees at village, ward, district and
provincial level. NGO participation in most cases ends at the provincial
level and does not usually filter through to the national level8. Many of
environmental NGOs draw their projects from the national plans that are
prescribed from the top9. The fact that many NGOs are gap fillers of
government plans at implementing rural projects (Vivian and Maseko,
1994) explain why they do not implement projects based on their own
initiative i.e. by carrying out independent baseline surveys.
The objectives of most institutions that work on land management
at the local level tend to focus on mitigating the perceived deteriorating
land and related resource base. NGOs are said to be a critical medium
for solving environmental problems, because they are said to be 'people
based' (Clark, 1991). Participatory strategies tend to be more effective
than centralised government programmes that promote better land use
practices because:
They secure greater access and improved distribution of
benefits for those excluded from the development process;
they set an example in the field of effective, appropriate and
low cost10 techniques in the development process;
7 Many ofthe pre-independence NGOs were pure ly driven by the 'ethics' ofnature conservation
and preservation (wi1d1jfe, wetlands, trees eEc,). The NGOs were grassroots in nature as they
relied on members' subscriptions for their operations. Unfortunately these grassroots movements were representing the white community and were closely associated with the architects
ofcolonial legislation to deny Africans utilisation ofnatural resources through confiscation of
land and slapping preservation laws on many resources adjacent to communal areas.
8 Mungate and Mvududu (1991) have highlighted the need for NGOs to participate at the
national level.
9 For example many critics point out that policy-makers are inflexible, they continue to stick to
outdated environmental polices. The example ofthe 30 metres restriction on stream bank cultivation used by the Department ofNatural Resources (or 100 metres as in the Forest Act) is still
applied arbitra,y without any considerations of agro-ecological variations. This is because
the policy-makers do not get input from the affected people when they enforce the laws.
10 Low cost can mean 'underfunded' or 'poor quality' 'IJolmén and Jirströn2, 1995, p. 12).
191
HI)
they are aware of local conditions and consequently are sensitive to local needs and aspirations;
they act as advocates for the marginalised or poorest strata,
while emphasising the benefits of self-help and collective
action; and
they show political independence11 and are thus guided less
by considerations of the type that have corrupted the public
service (Hyden 1983; Gore etAl., 1992; Bratton, 1990).
The debate on the strength of NGOs as agents of development has
focused on their advantages over government agencies. However,
NGOs do not necessarily practise what they preach'2. Some NGOs are
highly centralised and thin on the ground and yet do not make use of
government technical departments such as the Forestry Commission
and Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services
(AGRITEX) who work with the people on a day to day basis (Mungate
and Mvududu, 1991). Because NGOs champion 'people-problems' they
have tended to be over-generous with their resources, thus some NGO-
funded programmes have tended to create a dependency syndrome
(VOICE, 1987). For example, while the Forestry Commission
emphasised the need to make satellite nurseries economically viable and
self-sustaining, several NGOs insisted that the nurseries they were
funding give seedlings to the surrounding communities free of charge.
These NGOs are generally seen as generous by the local people, who
naturally prefer to work with them rather than with those who emphasise
self-reliance.
This study sought to assess whether NGOs do indeed support
environmental policy changes, with special emphasis on land
11 'Politically independent' may mean powerless' or 'disconnected' (ibid.,1
12 In cases where they practice what they preach, NGO programmes are said by government to
be a disaster The major complaint from government was that NGO programmes are not sitstamed and government had to come in later to finish uncompleted projects.
192
degradation'3. When I set out the study agenda, I deliberately wanted to
find out the extent to which the so called voice of the poor was reflected
in many of Zimbabwe's national environmental policies. The
environment policies that I sought to analyse in the context of Chiweshe
district were:
The National Conservation Strategy;
District Environmental Action plans;
Amendments to the Natural Resources Act;
Resources allocations through the budgetary votes of the
Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism and through
the Public Sector Investment Programme; and
Policy on extension services in the environment sector
(Matondi, 1996).
In the field I increasingly found out that what the development
NGOs increasingly preach had tended to mislead us into believing that
the ordinary farmers were indeed having an input into the wider national
policy issues. Interestingly I found out that there is a large body of information showing how the smaliholder farmer have continued to deal with
local level policy process related to the environment. I therefore had to
redefine my understanding of grassroots policy intervention to mean:
I)
That when the local people engage in environmental projects and consistently raise issues with the officialdom, traditional leaders and development practitioners that is
grassroots active policy support;
13 The study considered both the national and the local level prograrnnes ofNGOs, so as to see
how people at the local level benefitfrom mainstream environmental policies concerning land
degradation.
193
when the local people participate in local meeting, invite
development practitioners, officialdom and traditional leaders to respond to particular set pieces of development objectives and they take up the issues with the line ministries or
Rural District Councils, that is grassroots policy
intervention;
when the local people (supposed beneficiaries) declare that
they are opposed to imposition of projects, what development practitioners and officialdom call set pieces of development intervention that is grassroots policy intervention'4;
and
when resources are successfully allocated by the State or
development agencies to particular environmental projects
through the lobby by the local people that against constitute
grassroots policy intervention.
For this reason the study ended up adopting a multi-focused
approach in its attempt to find out how local people benefited from the
work of environmental NGOs' programmes. The level at which community decisions where reflected in environmental projects became a set
criterion to judge the policy influence of the local people. At the national
level, the successe of environmental NGOs dealing with land degradation was measured through the direct influence on changes in specific
environmental policies as well as through an assessment of their
involvement in the policy formulation process. In the field I did not
entirely change my approach or parameters as I sought to find out how
the ordinary people actively support policy. The set parameters thus still
included problem identification and the application of pressure on government, using the media and other channels of information dissemination, and the participation of environmental NGOs in formulating policy
and its implementation.
14
The example of chemadzimbahwe is detailed later in this papei
194
3.
RECONCEPTUALISING RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
CIII WESHE IN THE 1990S
The case study was undertaken in the Nyota and Chiwororo Wards
of Chiweshe District in Mashonaland Central Province. There are 33
wards under the Mazowe Rural District Council, with 13 of those wards
in Chiweshe Communal Area and 20 in the large-scale commercial
farming areas. Chiweshe is surrounded by commercial farms some of
whose average size is more that 2 000 hectares compared to communal
areas with an average of 13 hectares. The district lies in agro-ecological
region II in the Mazowe-Lomagundi valley regarded as the bread-basket
of Zimbabwe. Whilst the commercial farms have the best soils and
infrastructure, the communal areas suffer from inadequate infrastructure and poor soils. There were 74 000 people in Chiweshe with a
growth rate of 3.1% (CSO, 1992). Chiweshe district has one of the cornmt.mal areas with the highest population density (60 people per square
kilometre) in Zimbabwe. The population intensity has also meant that
there are more grassroots movements in Chiweshe communal lands, and
they continue to grow due to the new rural development dispensation
that calls for more rural people participation in development. However,
one needs to strike a balance between, the evolution of movements waiting to simply tap on the 'free' aid from donor NGOs and those that are
genuinely working to improve the lives of the people in Chiweshe communal lands. Indeed the increasing role of grassroots initiative on policy
issues is the new ethos of rural development in Chiweshe district15.
3.1
Land Degradation Problems in Nyota and Chiwororo
Wards
Land degradation in Chiweshe is mainly visible through widespread gully development, deforestation and general soil erosion,
particularly in Nyota and Chiwororo wards. People of Nyota Ward per-
15 This is a new trend reflecting that rural people are beginning to realise that projects sponsored
by NGOs are only partial in solving their long-term proble,ns.
196
ceive land degradation to be a serious problem, as made apparent in
interviews and discussions. The Department of Natural Resources personnel have intensified the prosecution of stream bank cultivators16 in
order to lessen the damage to the land that now seems to be out of control. People are aware of the problem of gully expansion. For example,
one household was forced to relocate elsewhere because a gully had
crept right up to the homestead. More than three-quarters of the farmers
believe that they have experienced a loss in agricultural productivity
through declining crop yields due to soil erosion and loss of soil fertility.
Farmers attribute this to the overutilisation of the land resources.
Land degradation has always been a problem in Nyota and Chiwororo. Figure 3.1 indicates the land degradation problems of Nyota
and Chiwororo as detailed by households and key informants in the
areas. The chart shows that the physical symptoms such as falling crop
yields; gully and sheet erosion, deforestation and overgrazing are glaringly obvious to the people in the area. AGIRJTEX, the Department of
Natural Resources and NGOs blame land degradation mainly on overstocking and the cutting down of too many trees. Unequal distribution of
land rights and insensitivity about gender issues as well as inheritance
laws, are said by a representative of Zimbabwe Women's Bureau to have
militated against the proper management of land resources. Environmental NGOs usually prescribed technocratic solutions such as tree
planting, gully reclamation and nutrition gardens in Nyota and Chiwororo wards. Government environmental projects include forestry and
agroforestry, water harvesting, and the creation of greenbelts. However,
this approach fell far short of resolving the land degradation problems of
Nyota and Chiwororo wards because they primarily attack the symptoms.
16 The restriction on stream bank cultivation was initiated by the Natural Resources Act in 1941.
The legislation that was both riparlan and agricultural in nature was written in strictly conservationist terms. The restriction was however based on limited empirical evidence (Bell and
Hotchkiss, 1991).
197
3.2
Environmental Programmes in the Nyota and
Chiwororo Wards
Chiweshe district is taken by NGOs and government agencies to
be in an environmental crisis, which requires immediate intervention.
Several NGOs have responded to this crisis through tree, agro-forestry,
and natural farming methods and gully reclamation projects.
The limits of this study were twelve projects'7 funded by
Africa2000Network in Nyota and Chiwororo Wards under the
Chiweshe
Rural
Afforestation
and
Environmental
Awareness
Programme. School, group projects varying in their length of
existence'8 and co-operatives (such as grazing schemes, dairy projects
and irrigation schemes) tended to be the most popular and were used as
thç entry points of NGOs in environmental educational programmes.
Most of the projects utilise land and therefore were conceived with the
aim of sustainable utilisation of land resources. The two principal aims
of the projects were environmental rehabilitation and income
generatIon' Table 3.1 summarises the projects in Nyota and Chiwororo
Wards, by looking at their location, what they were doing and their
impacts as perceived by the local people. Using this description of the
projects it became increasingly unclear how communities were involved
in environmental policy issues as claimed by representatives of
NGOs.The projects initiated by the people were an attempt to solve
problems related to deforestation and the resulting soil erosion, which
has over the years contributed to lowering of yields in their fields.
However, there were other projects, such as the Sawi, created with the
17 Twelve const it uted groups that are female and youth dominated.
18 Some of the projects started in the early 1980s when the State campaigned heavily for rural
reforestation to combat deforestation by planting eucalyptus trees, then disappeared when
this approach proved to be unpopular and were revived in the 1990s in dffferent forms.
19 Many of the projects sponsored by the NGOs in Chiweshe assumed that all the people had
access to land. This was not true and many people without land resources were further
aggrieved by the fact that some people who already had land resources were further benefiting
from NGO money. The case of Chemadzimahwe clearly illustrated these land probi ematics.
198
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Grassroots Policy Intervention in the Face qf a Retreating Recalcitrant State
specific aim of obtaining donor money and resources. Environmental
rehabilitation was therefore a secondary aim. Some of the farmers who
did not participate in the projects (especially men who have the de facto
land ownership through usufruct rights) were aware of the problem of
land degradation but remained aloof from participating in the grassroots
initiatives. The reasons for non-participation ranged from soeio-cultural
factors20, lack of appreciation of the intentions of group initiative or a
defeatist attitude21. The extent to which women22 and the youth were
prepared to solve problems directly affecting their basic source of
income, with or without NGO, men or government assistance was an
exhibition of the strength of the grassroots movements in initiating a
new rural development discourse.
One widely held hypothesis is that rural environmental awareness
programme in the 1 990s should be attributed to NGOs. However, based
on Nyota and Chiwororo wards grassroots movements23 and govern-
ment institutions as well as farmers' unions can claim that they were
also responsible for that awareness. This dispels the notion that NGOs in
Chiweshe were solely responsible for the growing environmental
awareness. In the first place the State has the overall responsibility
for the provision of extension services and environmental awareness
20 Socio-culturalfactors inhibit the men to participate directly in projects initiated by women. In
general rural Shona men do not nix in many activities with women.
21 A defeatist attitude that pol icy-makers are not interested in their land problems. Some rural
commentators sarcastically point out that policy makers in 'bambazonke' ('nickname for
Harare which means ta/ce all) owe their survival to the perpetuation ofthe problems ofthe less
powerful. Or that the extent of the gully problem is beyond their capacity to redress them.
22 The DNR staffnoted that some ofthe projects were providing an income, but to a minor extent,
and indeed women are being used by men, in some instances, to obtain funds from NGOs
because they have a gender sensitive approach.
23 Ho/men and JirstrOnz, (op. cit.) argue that the most likely reason smallholders and landless
join movements is due to econonhic benefits not usually obtainable on a personal basis. This
theoretical'.alid observation is limited in the case of chiweshe. In the first place people were
concerned with resource degradation, and secondly the movements were a source of social
intervention (women and youth,) and thirdly, the availability of resources provided an attraction. However one needs to strike a balance, because in spite of the resources available there
were households which did not join (see footnote 20).
201
programmes inNyota and Chiwororo Wards24. Secondly the majority of
the farmers were genuinely concerned with land degradation and fall in
yields. Therefore, they appreciated the sponsorship they received from
donor NGOs in land reclamation, particularly in providing the materials
for fencing around exotic and indigenous woodlots. For this reason, villagers were taking forestry seriously, as shown by the interest generated
in the projects at almost all the twelve projects visited by the author.
Thirdly some farmers went beyond the grassroots initiatives to start
woodlots at their homes and preserve indigenous trees. Fourthly the traditional leadership also supported the initiative by passing laws against
unnecessary felling of indigenous trees, particularly in areas regarded as
culturally important, as well as setting aside land for projects. Thus the
traditional leadership also played a crucial role in land use planning in
the communal areas and was increasingly an important entry point for
active policy support.
The people of Chiweshe were determined to change policy with
respect to how local resources were allocated and who benefited, thus
challenging the local institutional framework. They wanted to see more
extension services and more prioritisation of land related projects,
which most people depended on for their socio-economic reproduction.
Furthermore, they wanted the Mazowe Rural District Council through
the natural resources committee to play a more active role in environ-
mental issues. The villagers pointed out that, before the merger of
Mazowe Rural Council and the Chiweshe district council, the Mazowe
Intensive Conservation Area Committee used to play a pro-active role in
environmental issues and since amalgamation it had almost died a natural death. Indeed the Mazowe Rural District Council responded posi-
tively to the peoples call for the council to be more proactive. The
council set a wildlife sanctuary and in one of the rarest cases was granted
241n interviews with District Nat ural Resources Officers (1995), they pointed out that apartfrom
the limited extension services they were offering, they had done the best they could. In fact the
State had the best conservedfarm and school competition (a government sponsored conipetition to see which homestead or school had excelled in environmental issues through tree growing and conservation) in the district, surpassing the projects initiated by NGOs in the guise of
grassroots initiatives.
202
appropriate authority status without a natural wildlife sanctuary adj acent to it. In fact the council also managed to obtain USAID funding for
the project amounting close to Z$2 million in 1997.
At the household level most farmers in Nyota and Chiwororo
wards wanted to practise conservation measures such as crop rotation
and the construction of contour ridges, but they felt that they were
constrained by the small amount of land they had access to. They were
eager to learn natural farming methods, which was a priority area in
NGO development efforts, so as to minimise expenditure on artificial
fertilisers as well as to prevent damage to organisms that help in
eliminating pests from the fields. However few had adopted the natural
farming methods, because they had no knowledge of the techniques and
requiredtraining and exposure25. This suggested that the NGO approach
to natural farming methods was rather inadequate even though it was a
priority area. The people of Nyota and Chiwororo wards pointed out that
they needed environmental programmes, but the stop gap measure of
NGOs could not resolve the root of the problem that was the land
question.
3.3
People Participation and Grassroots Representation
Some NGOs in Nyota and Chiwororo wards professed to work at
the grassroots level using government departments as focal points of
extension. The author asked how the projects were initiated? The majority of the beneficiaries responded by saying they initiated the projects
with advice from people who had been retrenched from government
technical depaitiiients or from government extension workers. The
respondents also suggested that the participatory strategy may be more
of an ideal than a reality, because of the logistical difficulties faced by
NGOs in carrying out extension work with limited staff. While the
objectives of avoiding bureaucracy and benefiting people directly are
25 Further probing revealed that the people were not interested as they saw the root cause of the
land degradation as lying in the heinous colonial land expropriation. They alluded that this
tended to affect their long tradition ofshjfting cultivation.
203
indeed noble, most of the beneficiaries indicated that it would be worthwhile to employ more local staff6 independent from the State to train
the local people in extension work project and financial management.
This was because most projects collapsed because of misuse of funds,
and the withdrawal of NGU support. The training was seen as a long-
term solution to the lack of extension experienced by the people.
Another major problem pointed by officials was that NGOs assumed
that the government would assist with extension on projects that they
had already conceived elsewhere.
This local level image does not correspond with national images
that NGOs ascribe to. NGO representatives are invited to attend national
fora, because of their strength as development initiators as well as their
increasing role as the 'voice of the grassroots people'27. But the validity
of these claims by NGOs working in Nyota and Chiwororo wards was
doubtful, when assessed against the approaches used and the benefits
realised from their projects. The interviews also suggested that people in
Nyota and Chiwororo formed groups purporting to initiate projects tailored to alleviate land degradation, not with the intention of joining a
participatory process but in the hope of gaining access to resources disbursed as part of NGO projects.
The responses of some of the members interviewed at Pepukai
project to a question regarding what they hoped to gain from initiating a
forestry project and associating it with an NGO are given in the table
3.4. Although grassroots people felt a sense of ownership and of being in
control of their development, their responses to questions of ownership
were generally non-committal because participants felt that they were
not in a position to tell NGOs what to do, although they were willing to
26 The National Programme Officer and National Co-ordinator (working on a voluntary basis)
had to attend to al/projects scattered throughout the two districts and also national meetings.
For instance, in Chiweshe there were projects located in inaccessible areas such as Kushinga
and even officials ofNGOs sponsoring such projects were said to never have visited them.
27 The NGO workshop on the effects of ESAP on the operations of NGOs and their services
attended by the author in 1995 echoed the same sentiments.
204
accept assistance. On the other hand, the same people had strong ideas
about government policies and programmes.
Table 3.4
What the People Hoped to Achieve Through
Initiating a Forestry Project and Associating it with
an NGO
Benefits
Number
%
(1)
Income derived from selling seedlings and poles
4
(II)
Improved community relations
2
33.3
16.7
(II!)
Receiving material from NOOs
5
41.7
Non of the specified
1
8.3
12
100.0
(IV)
Total
Source: Matondi (1996)
They readily expressed their opinions about what government
ought to do about the land problems, the gullies and the water problems. For instance, villagers from Nyakudya wanted government, in
the short term through the local Rural District Council, to assist in
reclaiming the gullies and in the long-term to acquire land for resettlement to ease the pressure on land in the wards. The people felt they had
influence over government at the village level, in terms of allocation of
resources for environmental projects, because they voted for the government. This shows a sense of identity with a government that was not
providing resources for the environmental sector. The grassroots people are aware that to resolve the gully problem required them to have
access to better land. Any rehabilitation efforts on the basis of small
projects was an unjustifiable parochial approach as the people of Chiweshe felt that they sacrificed their blood, soul and limb fighting for
the land during the liberation struggle.
3.4
NGOs and Local Level Policy Issues
The active policy support strategy used by NGOs in Chiweshe
District involves the co-optation of grassroots projects into the mainstream of their programmes. The NGOs heavily relied on the good
205
will of government experts from the Department of Natural Resources,
AGRITEX and the Forestry Commission in educating communities and
provision of extension services. This strategy depending on government
institutions and services meant that work was at times not done on time
or to the required specification because government agencies were
sometimes too busy to complete NGO tasks. The collaborative mecha-
nism was weak, because the performance of projects, though "conceived" by the locals, was not to their expectations. NGOs sometimes
approved funding for projects that government agencies felt were not
viable or needed more time to be considered in order to avoid wasting
resources23. However, to NGOs these were seen as fundable because
the people initiated by the projects29.
The District Administrator of Mazowe indicated, in a discussion
with the author, that he was aware of the projects funded by NGOs in
Chiweshe communal lands. The problem was that he had not formally
met with some of the NGOs in the Rural District Development Committee where all the NGOs were supposed to provide inputs. This indicated
firstly that NGOs can work independently anywhere in Zimbabwe, and
that secondly the potential benefits through networking was completely
lost. This implied that in some cases NGOs lost out and in other cases
they were short of having an informed position when speaking for the
people at the national level. To fully grasp the institutional interface of
NGOs influence on policy and planning at the local level, one needed to
understand the role of NGOs in the structure of the Council30.
28 But to NGOs this is one form of government bureaucracy and they (NGOs) prefer rapidly
implemented projectsfor the people to benefit quickly.
29 The people in Nyota felt that these problems they were facing where much wider than the mandate of NGOs and also needed much more financial commitment as well as much more than
technological support, because the gullies had developed beyond what the grassroots movement could handle.
30 There is a Council which meets in chambers and make resolutions, and the executive group
(i.e. those employees of council) responsible for implementing the resolutions made by the
Rural District Council. There are various committees, where policies are evolved, depending
on the direct input of councillors and heads of ministries and their departments as well as
NGOs. The District Administrator represents the minister oflocal government rural and urban
planning in the local authority.
206
In an ideal situation NGOs must make use of the Rural District
Council structures. However, some NGOs failed to utilise proper channels such as the Rural District Council. In the case of Chiweshe District,
the District Administrator was willing to facilitate the work of NGOs as
new partners in rural development dispensation. The Rural District
Council welcomed those NGOs prepared to advise Council about what
should be done to solve particular environmental problems. Moreover,
policies with regard to particular problems, such as land degradation,
devised by technocrats, politicians, civil servants and NGOs could be
tailored to local ecological conditions. NGOs could have contributed in
trying to influence policy from the local level through education and
promoting certain innovations by targeting local authorities and other
environmental movements. Critics generally point to the absence of a
well-constituted grassroots environmental movement at the national,
which tends to prohibit the development of vociferous movements at the
provincial and local level.
The literature on NGO active policy support points out that educa-
tion among communities is a major goal of NGOs. This emphasis
among NGOs reflects the argument that people must first be mobilised
and made aware of the causes of their problems, and then must be helped
to understand what solutions to implement. But increased awareness is
very difficult to measure. The group discussions in Nyota and Chiwororo Wards show that the people felt that the army worm and poor
rains had affected the food situation in Chiweshe. The effect of the economic structural adjustment programme was also a major area of concern. However, analyses of environmental factors militating against the
environment in Chiweshe received less attention. The major discussion
perhaps was the one at Chemadzimbahwe, where the land issue and relations with the District Administrator cropped up. In this respect NGOs
seemed to follow firstly their own guiding mandates to solve problems
that were visible to them rather than following local sentiments and priorities. In this way they avoided being dragged into support of wider
policy changes with respect to land reform.
207
4.
SUMMARY AND WAY FORWARD
The local case study of Nyota and Chiwororo Wards has shown
that there is still much more work to be done by NGOs in order for their
active policy support initiatives to be successful. The question of the
transparency of NGO operations is an area of concern to the villagers
and the State. People in communal areas believe that a culture of subservience is being created by NGOs because they control the finances. It is
believed that such a situation will only lead to a dependency syndrome
with limited work on the ground. Land redistribution, supported by
environmental projects and introducing new technologies, were what
the people believe could be the foundation of a successful local lobby by
NGOs. On the basis of this case study it appears that NGOs have not created or contributed to such a successful local lobby. They, however, have
contributed to the establishment of a foundation on which future environmental management programmes could be designed and
implemented.
The use of participatory methods which ensures greater access
and distribution of benefits for those excluded from the development
process was a key to the success of projects conceived and run by local
people. By setting appropriate low cost techniques and being sensitive
to local conditions, peoples' needs and aspirations of grassroots organisations were seen as effective channels for policy influence. In the case
of Chiweshe District the grassroots organisations advocated several
issues on behalf of and led by the marginalised or poorest strata, they
showed political autonomy in the face of increasing economic difficulties and passive withdrawal of State extension service and were the new
champions emphasising self-help and collective action.
Many grassroots movements in Zimbabwe are beginning to realise that their goals cannot be reached through soliciting technical and
financial resources directed at projects alone, and that they need to start
a dialogue with government to change things in a more structured way.
Indeed, many people now realise that they can participate in projects and"
lobby for change at the same time, but this required more collective than
208
individual action. While it is essential to implement poverty reducing
projects and programmes, there is a need to vigorously support environmental policy changes at local and national levels. True, the active sup-
port of environmental policy is not always explicit, since many
grassroots movements use their programmes, innovations and technologies to influence environmental policies in more ways than one. Viewed
this way, it can be argued that the active support of environmental policy
change is not an entirely new field for Zimbabwean grassroots movements, although they have not always been engaged in it vigorously.
In the paper I have tried to sketch out the local level policy making
processes and pointed out that, due to the receding State, many
grassroots NGOs are beginning to realise that projects are partial in
solving the difficulties, which they encounter. The fact is that many
recalcitrant State political leaders and senior State officials usually
express reservations on local level policy processes. This is because of
the different conceptions (and mistakenly taking empowerment for
rebellion) of what inputs the smaliholder farmers should have on the
national policies. Concomitantly the local people did not interact that
much with their elected leaders as compared to NGOs and traditional
leaders as well as public service providers. The local level organisations
were also beginning to question how resources are allocated by the
State, who benefits and why. This was a completely new trend in
grassroots movements that started in the 1990s. In trying to influence
policies at national level grassroots movements have discovered that
many obstacles exist. The grassroots are directly challenging the
established power structures that are reluctantly receding due not to
their own volition, but because of pressure from SAPs.
209
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Bratton, M. (1990) 'Non-governmental organisations in Africa: can
they influence policy, Development and Change, Vol. 21, No. 12,
pp. 13-27.
Chiweshe Rural District Council Environment and Natural Resources
Sub-Committee (1993) An Environment and Development
Proposal Submitted to Africa 2000 Network, Mimeo.
Clark, J. (1991) Demo cratising Development: The Role of Voluntary
Organisations, Earthscan, London.
Gagliardi, R. and Alftan, T. (1994) Environmental Training: Policy and
Practice for Sustainable Development, ILO, Geneva.
Gibbon, P. (1995) Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in
Zimbabwe, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Gibbon, P. and Olukoshi, A. 0. (1996) Structural Adjustment and Socio-
economic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Conceptual.
Methodological and Research Issues, NM, Research Report No.
102.
Gore, C., Katerere, Y. and Moyo, S. (1992) The Case for Sustainable
Development in Zimbabwe: Conceptual Problems, Conflicts and
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Heimsing G. A. H. G. et al. (1991) Limits to Decentralisation in
Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe/Institute of Social Studies,
Harare/The Hague.
Holmén, H. and Jirström, M (1995) Second Thoughts about NGOs as
Triggers for Development, IRDCurrents, 11,, pp. 8-17.
Hyden, G. (1983) No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development
Management in Perspective, Heinemann, London.
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Matondi, P. B. (1996) The Active Policy Support Role of NonGovernmental Organisations in Dealing with Problem of Land
Degradation in Zimbabwe, Unpublished Masters Thesis,
Geography Department, University of Zimbabwe.
Mkandawire, T. (1984) "Home Grown Austerity Measures in
Zimbabwe" (mimeo: ZIDS working Paper: Harare).
Mungate, D. and Mvududu, S. (1991) 'Government and NGO
collaboration in natural rçsources in Zimbabwe', ODI, Network
Paper 24, London.
Nyoni, S. (1987) 'Indigenous NGO's: liberation, self-reliance and
development', WorldDevelopment, Vol. 15, Supplement, pp. 5 1-56.
Vivian, J. (1994)' NGOs and sustainable development in Zimbabwe: no
magic bullets', Development and Change, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 167-193.
Vivian, J. and Maseko, G. (1994) 'NGOs participation and rural
development: testing the assumptions with evidence from
Zimbabwe', Discussion paper, United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development.
VOICE (Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise) (1987)
NGO activities in income generating projects (IGPs) in
Zimbabwe: report of a study conducted under the auspices of
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211
Grassroots Organizations, Decentralization and Rural Develop,nent
SOMMAIRE
Ce papier présente une diagnosis de l'actuelle force et faiblesse
des organisations rurales dans le département de Chiweshe, au Zimbabwe. Ii focalise les formes érnergentes d' efforts de la part de petits
exploitants agricoles qui mettent l'Etat et les autorités locales au défi de
donner des services considérés d'intérêt publique. D'abord la question
de la terre. Après tout c'est la terre, la raison pour laquelle le peuple a
combattu au cours de Ia guerre de liberation.
Le département de Chiweshe a été constitué a la suite du Land
Tenure Act de 1969 (Loi sur la propriété de la terre) qui assigna aux
colons blancs les terrains agricoles productifs, mais pénalisa les populations indigenes par une operation forcée de "terrains cominunautaires"
tout a fait improductifs et pourvus d'infrastructures insuffisantes. Le
département de Chiweshe a un taux d'accroissement démographique
supérieur a 3% et sa densité de population est la plus élevée de tout le
Zimbabwe. Par consequent la degradation du terrain est de grande
portée et elle continue a s 'aggraver. Nombreuses NGOs spécialisees
dans les questions de l'environnement sont actives en différents projets
de développement et de preservation des terrains dans cet endroit.
Selon l'avis dominant, les NGOs sont plus proches et elles conviennent mieux aux exigences de la population que des officiers de PEtat. Donc elles ont une capacité potentielle pour attirer l'attention sur les
segments marginaux de la population qui n'ont aucun pouvoir. Dans le
département de Chiweshe, les NGOs étrangères sont toutefois orientés a
réaliser des projets plutôt que conseiller ou essayel; même si indirectement, d'influencer la politique. Les NGOs partagent plusieurs points de
vue et priorités avec les officiers de l'Etat et elles ne veulent pas être
réputées antigouvemementales. La terre est un problème urgent, mais
les NGOs se mantiennent réticents a s'engager en discussions concernantes la question de la redistribution des terrains.
212
Cette redistribution est quand même ce que Ia population
demande, mais cela s'oppose au mandat des NGOs. Pour cette raison les
NGOs rurales et indigènes commencent a contester la légitimité des
NGOs étrangères. Le mécontentement des populations rurales a
entraIné quelquefois des actions de violence et de vandalisme.
Actuellement la situation est caractérisée par une superposition
d'institutions. La leadership traditionnelle concevoit le problème d'une
maniêre, le gouvernement central et local d'une autre, et les NGOs a leur
façon. Les organisations rurales se basent habituellement sur la
communauté et elles travaillent en relation avec la leadership
traditionnelle. Les officiers de 1'Etat et apparemment aussi les NGOs ont
tendance a considerer les leaders traditionnels ignorants et contraires an
développement. Comme résultat les populations rurales se sont trouvées
a soutenir une action collective et de auto-aide. Elles contestent non
seulement les NGOs éxtérieures, mais aussi l'autorité du gouvemement
central et local. En plus, au dela de participer aux projets, les
organisations rurales de base ont compris qu'exercer des pressions sur
les groupes politiques est une fonction pour les organisations qui devient
de plus en plus importante; fonction tout a fait nouvelle pour les
mouvements des populations rurales au Zimbabwe.
213
Organisation paysanne et ressources
renouvelables en propriété commune:
Action collective et nouvelles
.
formes cle coordination
S
I
PIERRE-MARIE BOSC
1 Papier présenté a Ia "Crossing Boundaries Conference" 7ème conference de I 'International
Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP,), June 10-14, Vancouve,; British
Columbia, c'anada.
Organisation paysanne et ressources renouvelables en propriété commune
INTRODUCTION
Dans cette communication nous montrerons que les inegalites
sociales au sein d'une société donnée ne constituent pas un obstacle
dirimant a l'établissement de nouvelles formes de gestion des ressources renouvelables. Nous montrerons en effet que ces inégalités qui
forment des lignes de partage, certes mouvantes, mais suffisamment
claires entre individus et groupes stratégiques, ne font pas obstacle a la
modification des modes d'appropriation des resources renouvelables.
Elles ne rendent pas impossible la creation de biens publics, d'une nouvelle ressource en propriétó commune et l'émergence des modalités de
sa gestion.
L'action collective est rendue possible par la creation d'une
organisation paysanne qui devient le lieu de confrontation de strategies
individuelles contrastées (migrants de retour an pays, anciens, femmes,
cadets sociaux...) oa le pouvoir au sein de la société locale demeure a la
fois un enjeu central et tine condition de l'emergence de ces nouvelles
formes de gestion des ressources renouvelables. L'organisation permet
de créer de nouveaux lieux de négociation ouverts aux categories
dominées. Ces nouvelles instances ne se substituent pas aux institutions
coutumières - qui demeurent garantes des decisions finales - mais elles
permettent tine expression de revendications et de projets jusqu'alors
non pris en compte par ces institutions.
Cette communication repose sur l'étude du cas d'une société de
basse Casamance au Sénégal, confrontée a une remise en cause profonde des modes de gestion des ressources renouvelables dans le cadre
des systèmes d'exploitation agricole soumis a des changements sociaux
forts a la fois climatiques et sociaux. Cette étude de cas a fait l'objet
d'une recherche, conduite a partir de plusieurs séj ours sur le terrain entre
1992 et 1997, qui a donné lieu a la redaction d'une these (Bosc, 1998).
217
INEGALITES SOCIALES ET MUTATIONS DU
CONTEXTE LOCAL
1.
1.1
Les bases des inegalités sociales
Très souvent présentées comme égalitaires (Pélissier, 1966), les
sociétés de basse Casamance sont en réalité traversées par de multiples
inégalités d'origines diverses, historiques, sociales et économiques.
Certains auteurs présentent l'Islam - récemment apparu par le biais des
échanges davantage que par les marabouts conquérants de la fin du
XIXème siècle - comme un des moteurs du développement de certaines
de ces indgalités (Linares, 1992). En fait, ii semble que les inégalités
entre individus en matière de modes d'appropriation des ressources
renouvelabies relèvent d'une construction plus compiexe, faisant
intervenir de multiples facteurs dont les plus structurant sont lies a
l'antériorité de l'accès au foncier. Les consequences se manifestent au
plan des ressources renouvelables par des inégalités concernant les
modalités de participation aux prises de decision concernant la gestion
des ressources.
En fonction des enseignements de l'histoire et des formes spéci-
fiques de la structuration sociale dans cette partie de Ia basse
Casamance, nous pouvons identifier plusieurs types de pouvoir en fonction de leur origine:
pouvoir lie a l'appropriation du foncier et des ressources renouvelables qui se fonde sur l'antériorité de l'installation des families et
du type de relation qui s'est instauré avec le premier installé
(alliances matrimoniales, accueil d'un parent ou d'un étranger...);
I
pouvoir conféré par la pratique du rituel de l'initiation2 qui peut se
confondre plus ou moms avec le pouvoir précédent sans que cela
constitue une regle générale;
2 Dans les sociétés de basse C'asamance, I 'initiation reste le moment determinant de ía vie d'un
hoinme qui accede par cctte cérCmonie a / 'age social d 'adulte, pent alors se marier et acquiert Ic
droit a Ia parole dans les assemblées coutumiCres oh se règlent notamment les questions relatives
a Ia gestion des ressources renouvelables.
218
r:
pouvoir lie a l'âge, caractéristique d'une société lignagère oii les
aInés disposent du pouvoir de decision sur les affaires familiales, du
quartier et du village; les adultes hommes sont donc soit chefs de
ménage, chef de fank (unite de production pouvant comprendre un
ou plusieurs menages), chef de famille (ou eluup).
E pouvoir lie au sexe; les femmes sont exclues des prises de decision
concernant l'usage des terres, des ressources renouvelables et du
capital d'exploitation qui se transmettent de manière patrilinéaire et
patrilocale;
L pouvoir fondé sur Ia 'notabilité'; cette notabilité peut avoir
plusieurs origines souvent confondues ou non avec les formes de
pouvoir évoquées ci dessus: (a) pouvoir administratif lie aux fonctions de relais avec 1'Etat (chef de village, chef de quartier considéré
comme adjoint du chef de village, autrefois chef de canton); (b)
pouvoir politique, représentants locaux des partis politiques nationaux, élus au conseil rural présentés par les partis politiques...; (c)
pouvoir religieux non animiste (iman); (d) pouvoir économique et
politique, responsable de section cooperative nommé pour siéger au
Conseil rural...; (e) pouvoir lie aux responsabilités dans le mouvement associatif paysan.
Ces inégalités fondent des lignes nettes de clivage entre ceux qui
"détiennent la parole" au sein de la société et ceux qui, par difference, ne
la détiennent pas. Les premiers ont un poids certains soit pour influer sur
les prises de decision, soit pour en garantir la conformité par rapport aux
normes et aux règles en vigueur.
1.2
Inégalités sociales, accès aux ressources et modalités de
prise de decision
Les sociétés de basse Casamance, a peuplement dominant diola,
sont souvent décrites comme "acéphales" par opposition a d'autres
sociétés plus hiérarchisées oi, en outre, certaines fonctions peuvent correspondre a des castes. Leur organisation socio-politique est souvent
219
présentée comme limitée, l'anarchie est citée comme mode de "gouvernement". Ainsi Pélissier (1966), parlant de la société diola écrit:
'Les Diolas constituent une société egalitaire et individualiste; le d4faut de
structure politique va de pair chez eux avec 1 'absence de hiérarchie sociale.
Leur société est constituée defainillespaysannesjuxtaposees et éventuellement
associées mais non dépendantes les unes des autres'.
Si une telle caractérisation apparaIt correspondre a certains cornportements socio-politiques, ii nous paraIt important de nuancer ce pro-
05 afin de prendre en compte des éléments essentiels de la structure
sociale et des strategies des différentes categories d'acteurs a l'intérieur
de celle-ci. Le caractère égalitaire des sociétés diolas trouve en effet ses
limites dans l'analyse des modes d'appropriation des ressources
renouvelables qui traduit dans une certaine mesure l'organisation sociale intrinsèque.
Au niveau des villages qui correspondent a des fédérations de
quartiers, le lignage fondateur du quartier originel occupe une place
prééminente car ii s'approprie l'ensemble des terres et dispose d'une
certaine autorité stir la gestion du foncier même Iongtemps après i'm-
stallation d'autres quartiers. Chaque quartier dispose ainsi d'une
autonomie certaine dans la gestion des terres et des ressources renouvelables, mais cette autonomie relative n'efface pas la chronologie de
l'installation, avec en particulier la primauté du droit de hache et des
liens directs de parenté sur les autres formes d'accès aux ressources
renouvelables.
L'organisation sociale est consubstancielie des inegalités en
matière d'accès aux ressources productives (ressources renouvelables et
moyens de production), du pouvoir de gestion sur ces ressources et enfin
de la possibilité de prise de parole. Les aInés détiennent le pouvoir, géré
par le conseil des anciens au niveau du quartier et du village et
l'accession des hommes a la parole au sein des assemblées villageoise
passe par l'initiation et le manage. Ii existe donc pour les cadets deux
statuts, celui de cadet initié célibataire qui peut assister aux assemblées
de quartier ou de village mais sans avoir le droit d'y prendre la parole et
celui de cadet initié mane qui participe a la discussion lors des reunions
220
Organisation paysanne at ressources renouvelables en propriété commune
de kellumak3. L'initiation et le manage correspondent aux étapes du
passage an statut d'adulte qui acquiert ainsi la possibilité de s'exprimer
dans les assemblées.
Les excius des processus de concertation et de decision sont donc
les cadets non initiés (et célibataires par consequent) qui ne disposent
d'aucun droit ni politique, ni économique et les femmes, mariées ou
non, auxquelles ii est reconnu moms de droit que le cadet non initié bien
qu'elle dispose par ailleurs d'un pouvoir économique a travers la
gestion du grenier. Les evolutions récentes montrent cependant que leur
pouvoir economique tend a augmenter alors que leur statut social ne
progresse pas au même rythme (Dardé, 1995).
Par ailleurs, ii faut certainement comprendre la notion 'd'absence
d'autorité politique' comme la faiblesse de la structuration politique
'verticale' avec des niveaux de hiérarchie allant croissant, ce que Pélissier (1966) exprime encore de la rnanière suivante:
'L 'émiette,nent politique des Diolas se traduit aussi par 1 'absence d'encadre-
ment administratf intérieur Sans doute certains villages étaient-ils épisodiquement soumis a l'autorité d'un chef cumulant parfois cette charge avec
desfonctions religieuses. Mais us 'agissait alors d'un état defait, lie aux quailtCsparticulières d'un individu, et nonpas d'une institution génerale; I 'autoritC
réelle gouvern ant une communauté ne pouvant en effet rep oser que dans 1 'assemblée des vieux'.
Car s'il est vrai qu'il n'existe pas d'institution de 'niveau géographique supérieur' an village entendu comme une federation de
quartiers relies par des liens de parente et/ou d'alliance, on observe bien
entre les lignages a l'échelon des terroirs et a l'intenieur des lignages
entre les families une hierachie nette qui reside dans la preeminence fon-
cière de certains lignages et dans I'affirmation d'individus on de frac-
tions de lignages par des voies diverses (politique, coutumière,
intellectuelle...) qui confère a l'individu ou au groupe une notabilité a
l'echelon local.
3 Rappel ens que Ic kellurnak désigne Ic lieu oft se déroulent les reunions des anciens et par
extension, cc terme peut designer / 'assemblCc elle-rnêrne,
221
En outre, depuis 1' emergence de la politisation partisane de la vie
publique au Sénégal, la basse Casamance n'est pas restée a l'écart - au
contraire - des mouvements d'idées et des mouvements sociaux qui ont
faconné le Sénégal contemporain. La region du Fogny en particulier
présente des clivages politiques parfois anciens mais encore prégnants,
et qui peuvent donner lieu a des recompositions selon les évènements.
Le mouvement qui se structure autour des organisations paysannes et
notamment du Cadefn'échappe pas a ces clivages qui interférent sur la
dynamique d'organisation a l'échelle micro-locale.
1.3
Une soclété aux prises avec une crise multiforme
Les populations de basse Casamance se trouvent aux prises avec
une crise complexe et multiforme qui puise ses racines dans les
sécheresses des années 1970 et 1980 et dans la persistance d'une stagna-
tion économique trés sensible depuis plus de vingt ans. Cette baisse
drastique de la pluviométrie va entralner un processus massif de salinisation des rizières qui occupent des vallées ou des bas-fonds en relation
plus ou moms directe avec la Casamance (et donc avec le sel).
A partir des années 1980, les plans d'ajustement structurel et la
Nouvelle Politique Agricole (1985) entraInent de profonds bouleversements dans le dispositif d'appui au secteur agricole et, notamment, en
ouvrant un espace socio-politique aux mouvements d'organisations
paysannes. C'est aussi dans ce contexte qu'émergeront de manière violente les revendications d'indépendance de Ia Casamance a partir de la
fin 1982 dont on peut légitimement penser qu'elles ne sont pas sans relation avec la stagnation économique de la region.
Ces comportements s'expriment massivement dans le cadre de
strategies individuelles a dominante defensive qui visent essentiellement la survie des unites de production familiales (Yung, Zaslavsky,
1992). Leur amp leur dans cette période revêt un caractére tout a fait
exceptionnel favorisant l'extensivité des systémes de production agricole. Cette extensivité se traduit par une mise en valeur importante du
terroir qui remet en cause les formes usuelles de reproduction de la fer-
222
tilité, notamment sur les plateaux qui sont le siege de déboisements
accélérés et a l'origine de processus érosifs qui aboutissent a l'ensablement des vallées.
Aux mouvements d'exode rural qui caractérisent la basse
Casamance sur la longue période (Brooks, 1975) mais aussi plus
récemment (Thomas, 1959; Snyder, 1978; Cormier, 1985), un mouvement inverse va s'engager a partir des années 1980, fortement ampliflé
par les politiques d'ajustement structurel. En effet, a cette période se
développent tout aussi massivement de nouvelles formes d'action collectives se traduisant au plan organisationnel par une structuration forte
du monde paysan a l'échelle du département.
2.
ACTION COLLECTIVE ET NOUVELLE RESSOIJRCE EN
PROPRIETE COMMUNE
2.1
Organisations paysannes, groupes sociaux et ressources
renouvelables
Les organisations sont un fait social massif au Sénégal dans son
ensemble (Berthomé, Mercoiret, 1992) mais peut-être plus encore dans
le département de Bignona oà le champ économique et institutionnel est
alors progressivement occupé par un mouvement paysan fédérant des
organisations aux parcours respectifs varies (Bosc et aL, 1995).
Les femmes et les cadets sociaux sont les deux principales catégories sociales mobilisées a travers l'action de ces organisations paysannes. Majoritaires au niveau des groupements de base, les femmes se
trouvent relativement marginalisées au niveau des instances de direction
de chaque organisation (bien que cela soit variable d'une organisation a
l'autre et évolue au profit des femmes avec le temps) ainsi qu'au niveau
des instances fédératives (Dardé, 1995). Femmes et cadets sociaux ont
pour point commun dans la société d'être en marge des institutions coutumières, et des processus de prise de decision concernant les modes
d' appropriation des ressources renouvelables.
223
Grassroots' Organizations Decentralization and Rural Development
Au delà de leur incontestable dynamisme, l'analyse des activités
entreprises par les organisations paysannes laisse apparaItre un net
déséquilibre au profit d'activités relativement stéréotypées qui concernent de manière privilégiee les "marges des systèmes deproduction" et
non les cultures qui forment la base économique des systèmes de production (riz, arachide et céréales pluviales) de la region. Très peu d'organisations aifrontent directement les problématiques centrales pour les
systèrnes de production de Ia region: comment stabiliser et sécuriser les
systèmes de production dans un environnernent physique fortement
dégradé et avec des producteurs ne disposant pas de ressources
monétaires pour investir dans des tecimiques de production ou de protection du milieu?
Cette question technique se double d'une autre interrogation et
d'un paradoxe apparent: en quoi et a queues conditions les organisations
paysannes qui mobilisent des acteurs en marge des instances coutumières de prise de decision peuvent elles jouer un role dans la modifica-
tion des modes d'appropriation des ressources renouvelables, dans la
creation d'une nouvelle ressource en propriété commune et 1' établissemelt de nouvelles modalités de gestion de cette ressource?
2.2
Un cas original: le Cadef
La question de la rehabilitation des vallées salées apparaIt simple
au premier abord. Les solutions techniques existent depuis longtemps:
ce sont les barrages anti-sel construits en basse Casamance depuis maintenant plus de trente ans (Montoroi, 1995; Bose, 1998).
D'autre part, en marge des actions publiques ou parapubliques,
plusieurs organisations paysannes ont cherché a réhabiliter des vallées
salées et ont, pour ce faire, construit des barrages en réponse a la forte
mobilisation de leurs adherents sur ces questions. Les résultats sont loin
d'être probants (Bose, 1998) en dépit des résultats techniques obtenus
par la recherche (Brunet, 1988; Boivin, Loyei; 1989). Cependant, une
organisation paysanne, le Cadef, a obtenu globalement de meilleurs
224
résultats sur une période de plus de 10 ans, même si ceux-ci restent variables d'une situation a l'autre (Bose, 1998).
La creation de barrages anti-sel et de retenue d'eau par une de ces
organisations - le Cadef - offre un exemple permettant de comparer
différentes situations d'aménagement oi le Cadef est intervenu dans des
contextes soeio-politiques contrastés notamment quant a la position de
l'organisation paysanne par rapport aux jeu des forces politiques
locales.
Le Cadef est ime organisation pays anne créée en 1983 par un
groupe de ressortissants du Fogny (petite region de la basse Casamance)
qui décident de quitter Dakar, oi ils avaient émigré, pour revenir dans
leurs localités d'origine. Ce processus de retour au pays d'un groupe va
reposer sur plusieurs réseaux d'alliances complexes. Le premier est un
réseau de militants de l'opposition au parti dominant qui va servir de
base a la négociation avec les autorités coutumières. Les femmes et les
jeunes regroupés au niveau des blocs maraIchers vont constituer la base
de l'organisation au niveau des quartiers et des villages. Les anciens et
personnalités coutumières importantes seront intégrés au niveau de l'organisation sous la forme d'un conseil des Sages ayant a approuver les
principales decisions et orientations de l'organisation.
Le Cadef va egalement nouer des alliances a l'extérieur de la
société locale qui serviront dans une premiere étape a renforcer sa
crédibilité a l'intérieur de celle-ci: une collaboration longue et étroite
avec une Ong (le Ciepac), plus ponctuelles et conjoncturelles avec
d'autres Ong ou bailleurs de fonds puis, dans le cadre d'un projet de
recherche-développement avec la recherche agricole, le Ciepac et une
institution de formation sénégalaise (Bnea). C' est dans le cadre de cette
operation que seront réhabilitées plusieurs vallées devenues incultes du
fait de la salinisation: en 10 ans, près de 800 ha de rizières seront
réhabilités a l'aide d'une dizaine de barrages globalement appropriés
par les populations, même si les situations locales apparaissent plus
nuancées.
225
Nous avons donc cherché a comprendre en quoi une organisation
paysanne pouvait jouer un role spécifique (et parfois donc positif) en
matière de ressources renouvelables dans une société marquee par
d'importantes inégalités sociales qui ne se révèlent qu'après une analyse
approfondie des rapports sociaux. Ces inégalités ne pourraient-elles pas
constituer un obstacle a l'évolution des modes d'appropriation des
ressources et a la construction de nouveaux biens publics et de nouvelles
ressources en propriété commune?
2.3
Matériau empirique et concepts
2.3.1
Matériau de terrain
Cette recherche a été conduite en plusieurs étapes correspondant a
des séjours de terrain de courte durée correspondant a des etudes ayant
pour theme les organisations paysannes, leur histoire et leurs activités
(novembre 1992), a notre implication dans un projet recherchedéveloppement avec le Cadef: plusieurs missions entre 1993 et 1994 sur
les aspects agronomiques et la mise en place d'un système de suivi des
unites de production agricole. Deux autres séjours (en 1994 et en 1997)
nous ont ensuite permis de completer les informations obtenues dans le
cadre des séj ours a finalité directement opérationnelle. En 1994, nous
avons effectué une enquête approfondie sur un échantillon d'aménage-
ments de vallées ou de mangroves réalisés dans le département de
Bignona par différents opérateurs, ainsi que sur les techniques proposees pour améliorer la riziculture. A cette occasion et selon les opportu-
nités nous avons également réalisé des entretiens sur l'histoire de
l'implantation de certains villages afin de confronter ces informations
avec la bibliographie disponible. En 1997, notre dernier séjour a concerné plus specifiquement les situations d'aménagement du Cadef sur
lequel nous avions choisi de focaliser notre recherche afin de completer
les informations disponibles dans le cadre du projet de recherchedéveloppement. A cette occasion, nous avons également complété l'historique de l'organisation Cadef a l'aide d'entretiens spécifiques auprés
d'anciens et de notables de la société locale et d'acteurs directs de l'histoire du Cadef.
226
2.3.2 R4férences conceptudlles
Nous avons utilisé des références et des concepts qui ont été
développés par les économistes travaillant sur les ressources en propriété commune. Nous avons ainsi fait appel aux concepts proposes par
Schiager et Ostrom (1992) et Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971) qui permettent de
distinguer les droits s'exerçant a un niveau opérationnel (rights at an
operational-level) et les droits relevant d'un niveau de choix collectif
(rights at a collective-choice level) en précisant qu'il s'agit de la "différence entre l'exercice d'un droit et la participation a la definition de ce
droit". Schiager et Ostrom mentionnent que c'est "l'autorité d'imaginer
les nouveaux droits opérationnels qui rend les droits décidés collectivement aussi puissants"4.
Dans le domaine des ressources en propriété commune, Schiager
et Ostrom (1992) définissent en outre deux types de dro its opérationnels
et trois types de dro its relevant de choix collect?fs.
Les dro its opérationnels sont ainsi définis:
Li
les droits d'accès qui déterminent qui peut physiquement entrer
dans le domaine physique des ressources en propriété commune;
Li
les droits de collecte des produits de la ressource en propriété
commune.
Les dro its collectfs définissant les modalités d'exercice des droits
opérationnels concernent respectivement:
Li
les droits de gestion (management,): droits de réguler les modes
d'usage et de transformer la ressource en procédant a des aménagements.
"Les individus quipossèdent ces droits ont lapossibilité de dejInir
des dro its de collecte desproduits de la ressources, c 'est a dire de determiner de quelle manière, quand, comment et oft la collecte desproduits
4 "The authority to devise future operational-level rights is what makes collective-choice rights
so powerful" Schlager et Ostrorn, J992).
227
de la ressource pourra se dérouler ci de 1 'opportunité et des modalités
de transformation éventueiie de la structure de Ia ressource
LI
les droits d'exclusion: droits de determiner qui va pouvoir accéder a
la ressource et selon queues modalités ce droit pourra être transféré.
LI
les droits d'aliénation: droits de vendre ou de louer (lease) l'un ou
les deux droits collectifs de gestion et d'exclusion.
La possession des différents types de droits permet a Schlager et
Ostrom (1992) de définir des statuts différenciés pour les individus concernés par les ressources en propriété commune. Elles distinguent ainsi
les individus en fonction des types de droits qui s'imposent a eux et/ou
qu'ils contribuent a définir. Ces notions sont a rapprocher du concept de
mode d'appropriation (Weber, 1991; Weber, Reveret, 1993) défini de
manière très synthétique par les cinq niveaux suivants:
"(I) les representations de la nature constitue lepremier niveau du
mode d'appropriation de i'écosystème et renvoie a cc que E. Ostrom
(1989) appelle des "constitutional choices "; (II) les usages possibles de
la ressource représente le deuxième niveau du mode d'appropriation qui
ne sontpas uniquement déterminés par l'existence d'un marché. C'est
au niveau des usages que se nouent les interactions entre dynamiques
naturelles et dynamiques sociales ci que les sciences de la nature interviennent dans i'anaiyse des modes d'appropriation. C'est a cc niveau
que sejouent la gestion des risques ou la prise en compte des incertitudes attaches aux variabilités naturelles; (Iii) les modalités dtaccès et
de contrôle de l'accès aux ressources constituent le troisième niveau du
mode d'appropriation. Les droits d'accès aux ressources sont transférabies, a l'intérieur d'une gCnération et d'une génération a l'autre, scion
une grande divers ité de possibilités [parmi lesqueiiesJ(..) la vente sur
un marché ne constitue qu'unepossibiiitéparmi d'autres; (iv) la transférabilité des droits d'accès constitue le quatrième niveau d'un mode d'appropriation; (v) enjmn, lafacon dont les ressources, ou les fruits que i'on
5 "Individuals who hold rights of management have the authority to determine how, when end
where harvesting from a resource may occur and whether and how a resource may be
changed" (Schlager et Ostrom, 1992).
228
en tire, sont répartis ou partagés au sein du groupe dejinit le cinquième
niveau d'un mode d1appropriation...
3.
INEGALITES SOCIALES, MODES D'APPROPRIATION
DES RESSOURCES ET COORDINATION
3.1
Barrage et nouvelles formes de coordinations
Apparemment simple la construction d'un barrage suppose la
mobilisation de ressources renouvelables gérées par les chefs de lignage
dans le cadre des institutions coutumières dans un contexte oi le lignage
fondateur du quartier peut se prévaloir d'un droit eminent sur le foncier
et les ressources renouvelables correspondantes. La construction d'un
barrage suppose également la mobilisation de ressources matérielles et
de compétences techniques extérieures a l'organisation6.
Le barrage retient les eanx de pluie et de ruissellement créant ainsi
une nouvelle ressource en propriété commune qui devra être gérée collectivement pour des usages a la fois collectifs et individuels partielle-
ment compatibles et Ce, sur des espaces pouvant être soumis a des
concurrences d'usages.
Les usages de cette nouvelle ressource imposent une coordination
et des arbitrages entre l'ouverture des ouvrages pour les lachers d'eau
indispensables au désalement des terres et la fermeture du barrage pour
retenir la quantité d'eau maximale pour pratiquer la riziculture. Ce derflier point suppose en outre une coordination entre les ouvertures et les
fermetures permettant de satisfaire des besoins en eau contrastés entre
l'amont et l'aval avec de fortes tensions aggravées par les incerfitudes
climatiques.
6 Dans de trop nonibreuses situations, les questions techniques ne paraissent pas avoir fait
/ 'objet d'études pre'alables sifflsanunent approfondies en dépit de l'irnportance des
connaissances disponibles sur la region.
229
Bile impose également une coordination fine en termes d'itiné-
raires techniques sur le riz: les zones les plus proches du barrage
devant ëtre mises en culture précocement et avec des variétés a
pailles longues, les zones les plus éloignées i'étant progressivement
au fur et a mesure de la montée des eaux. Ces mises en culture qui sont
décidées individuellement doivent être coordonnées avec les niveaux
d'inondation décidés collectivement. D'autre part, un autre niveau de
coordination doit être géré car les vallées constituent des espaces disputés en debut d'hivernage entre la riziculture et le pâturage.
3.2
Inégalités, organisation et niveaux de prise de decision
3.2.1
Une approche technique centrée sur lii maIfrise
de l'eau... mais qui a des consequences sociales
directes
Premièrement l'organisation permet d'obtenir au sein de la
société locale un comprornis sur des questions techniques et
notamment sur la question de la maItrise de l'eau. Les actions vont
d'abord concerner la maItrise de l'eau en saison sèche, puis la
réflexion portera sur l'ensemble du système de production.
Le Cadef développe dans les premiers temps une stratégie
militante s'appuyant sur ia mobilisation des femmes et des jeunes a
partir de la reactivation de certains réseaux d'alliance entre
quartiers (et/ou villages) tout en prêtant une attention certaine mais
variable a l'adhésion des responsabies couturniers correspondant.
Cette action militante débouche sur ia creation de groupements qui
s'établissent autour de "blocs" maraIchers et fruitiers, dont la
creation va s'imposer aux populations comme une solution a ia
recurrence des crises climatiques7. Dans cette zone les groupements
7 Cc type de solution fle groupement autour d'un bloc maraIcher etfruitierJpromu par les Ong
et Ia plupart des grandes agences d 'aide inultilatérales (Unicef projets parapublics sur
financements internationaux, Ong internationales [Care,...]) après les grandes sécheresses
sahéliennes va rencontrer un echo tres favorable auprès des populations pour lesquelles ces
actions vont servir de support a des strategies de diversfIcation des activités et des revenus
pendant Ia saison sbche, permettant ainsi de pallier les baisses de production et de revenus
enregistrCcs sur les grandes cultures.
230
Organ/sat/on paysanne et ressources renouvelables en propriété commune
s'étabiissent de manière dominante sur la base des quartiers qui
constituent l'entité sociale de base du peuplement et par consequent de
1' appropriation des ressources renouvelables.
Ces groupements sont ainsi charges d'une forte valeur sociale et
symbolique car us supposent l'affectation par les aInés de ressources
foncières aux femmes et aux jeunes et impliquent une action collective
de l'ensemble des families du quartier. Les blocs maraIchers constituent
un point de rencontre et d'échanges oi peuvent s'exprimer les jeunes et
les femmes; us permettent aux responsables du Cadef de se constituer
une base sociale, de faire partager leur diagnostic de la crise et leur projet pour Pavenir de ltagriculture du Fogny et d' engager les premieres
actions en direction du maraIchage et de l'arboriculture. Les actions
engagées initialement contribuent ainsi a apporter des réponses techniques ponctuelles aux problèrnes poses par le développement des blocs
maraIchers8 tout en favorisant l'insertion de jeunes (cadets, jeunes
femmes) au niveau des groupements a travers le développement des
fonctions d'animateur.
Le Cadefs'appuie sur lesjeunes (garcons et flues) entre 25 et 30
ans, revenus d'exode pour participer a l'implantation du Cadefdans les
huit premiers villages, puis les groupements progressivement vont
choisir une centaine d'autres jeunes qui seront formés pour devenir des
animateurs de groupements, scolarisés et aiphabétisés en langue diola.
Ces formations a l'animation et a l'encadrement vont contribuer a réhabiliter et revaloriser socialement femmes et cadets sociaux.
Cependant, les actions sur les blocs maraIchers vont s'avérer rapidement limitées car elles ne touchent pas les fondements économiques
des systêmes de production. Poursuivant la réflexion collective au
niveau des groupements, puis au niveau global de l'organisation, le
Cadef s'attaque ensuite aux problèmes cruciaux de Ia maItrise de l'eau
8 Mise en place de clotures en grillage, fon cage de puits modernes, amelioration dii système
d 'exhaure (ponipes manuelles), fabrication de pet its materials de jardinage, formation (techniques de production, de stockage, de conservation, de transformation), organisation cia Ia
commercial is at/on...
231
durant l'hivernage en privilégiant l'aménagement des vallées et la réhabilitation de la riziculture qui est une activité a dominante feminine dans
la zone. Le travail des femmes se verra revalorisé car la dynamique collective rassemblera toutes les categories sociales pour construire les premières digues, rétablissant ainsi les capacités des femmes a alimenter le
grenier familial.
Deuxièmement, l'organisation met en place des structures spéci-
fiques pour répondre aux défis techniques que suppose Ia mise en
oeuvre de nouvelles formes de coordination auniveau d'une vallée pour
gérer la nouvelle ressource en propriété commune.
Les comités de gestion sont des structures décentralisées qui ont
pour objectif d'assurer sur le long terme la gestion sociale et technique
au niveau de chacun des barrages. Les premiers comités de gestion ont
été expérimentés et mis en place dans une des zones d'action du Cadefla zone de Bougoutoub - en capitalisant de manière empirique a partir de
la mise en fonction du premier barrage. Les fonctions des comités de
gestion sont globales et ont pour objectifà court terme la valorisation de
l'aménagement au cours de la saison de culture de maniêre a permettre
une mise en culture la pIus large possible sur l'ensemble de la vallée:
gestion concertée de l'eau avec les populations bénéficiant du barrage,
vigilance et organisation de lentretien des digues et des ouvrages, appui
a la diffusion des themes techniques individuels, contribution a Ia
maItrise de la divagation des animaux en debut de cycle...
Dans cette vallée, plusieurs barrages seront progressivement construits pennettant ainsi de sécuriser l'eau pour la riziculture pour l'ensemble des quartiers du village, tous adherents au Cadef, mais dont
bénéficieront les autres villages riverains de la vallée. La structuration
mise en place fait apparaItre deux niveaux: les comités de gestion qui
opèrent au niveau de chaque barrage - ii y en a trois dans la vallée de
Bougoutoub, un par barrage - et le comité de coordination des barrages
de la vallée de Bougoutoub.La repartition des tâches entre les deux types
de structure correspond a des compositions significativement différentes en termes de pouvoirs. D'autre part, dans les autres situations d'amé-
232
nagement de vallées étudiées, les relations entre les responsables des
groupements et les membres des comités de gestion d'une part et les
responsables des structures coutumières d'autre part, expliquent en partie les résultats contrastés obtenus par le Cadef.
3.2.2 Inégalités sociales, coordination technique et
légitimité ins litutionnelle dans le cas de la vallée
de Bougoutoub
Mises en place pour répondre a des problèmes techniques, les
nouvelles structures se révèlent des lieux d'expression et d'affirmation
des intéréts directs des categories non dominantes.
Le Comité de coordination présente une majorité d'individus se
rattachant plus ou moms directement au lignage fondateur: ceux qui s 'y
rattachent directement relèvent du quartier a l'origine du village [Katadie] et plus spécifiquement des families fondatrices, ceux qui s'y rat-
tachent indirectement relèvent des quartiers périphériques créés par
scissions du lignage fondateur. Ce constat est a mettre en relation avec
l'homogénéité qui caractérise Ia structure et l'histoire du peuplement du
village de Bougoutoub. Les allies proches du lignage fondateur partici-
pent a ce Cornité de coordination o us sont représentés par le chef
actuel de la famille venue directement sous la tutelle des fondateurs de
Katadié et qui occupe également les fonctions poiitico-administratives
de chef de quartier. Plus de la moitié des hommes représentés dans ce
comité de coordination (six sur onze) assument directement ou mdirectement une responsabilité dans les rites initiatiques concernant les
hommes et deux d'entre eux occupent directement des fonctions importantes dans ie déroulement du rituel, ce qui leur confère une autorité supplémentaire. Près de la moitié des membres du Comité de coordination
sont des aInés; une minorité seulement (trois sur onze) est chef de
famille ou chef de fank et exerce donc un contrôle direct sur les moyens
de production et les individus relevant de la famille; ies autres, soit la
majorité, sont chefs de ménage.
233
Les responsabilités politico-administratives sont représentées de
manière significative au sein du Comité de coordination qui comprend
le chef du village, deux chefs de quartier, deux conseillers ruraux et trois
responsables politiques, soit huit notables occupant des fonctions politiques et administratives sur les onze hommes du Comité.
La comparaison de Ia óomposition des Comités de gestion avec
celle du Comité de coordination met en evidence des points communs
mais egalement des differences significatives.
Les families se rattachant directement au lignage fondateur sont
représentées de manière majoritaire dans les trois Comités de gestion
des barrages tout comme dans le Comité de coordination. La difference
entre les trois Comités de gestion reside dans la plus ou moms grande
implication des responsables directs des cérémonies de l'initiation.
Représentés de manière significative dans le comité de gestion du barrage de Banny (trois personnes jouent directement un role dans l'initia-
tion), us sont encore presents (deux personnes) dans le Comité de
gestion du barrage de Sounaye, mais ne sont pas presents dans le Comité
de gestion du barrage de Margoune. Ces représentants n'apparaissent
donc pas indispensables au niveau de ce type de structure.
Les responsabilités poiitiques et administratives sont présentes
dans les trois Comités mais de manière moms significative que dans le
Comité de coordination: pas de responsable administratif parmi les
membres des Comités de gestion des barrages de Sounaye Ct de Margoune, un seul chef de quartier - périphdrique - parmi les membres du
Comitd de gestion du barrage de Banny, mais qui dispose d'une autorité
relevant également - voire surtout - de ses fonctions dans les domaines
coutumier (initiation) et familial (chef de fank).
Les differences avec le Comitd de coordination apparaissent aussi
par la repartition des fonctions et des classes d'âge entre les deux types
de Comités. Les Comités de gestion comprennent une plus forte propor-
tion de personnalités considérées dans la société locale comme des
intermédiaires entre les j eunes Ct les anciens et qui j ouent un role signifi-
catifdans la dynamique villageoise, au niveau de la 'Jeunesse', du foyer
234
des j eunes ou comme intermédiaires dans les concertations devant
impliquer les anciens et les 'Sages'. La composition des Comités de gestion des barrages tient aussi compte de paramètres opérationnels lies aux
fonctions desdits Comités: des cadets considérés comme dynamiques et
ayant déjà fait preuve de leur dévouement dans l'intérêt général du viilage sont prioritairement choisis pour faire partie des Comités de ges-
tion, la proximité du barrage du lieu de residence est également un
critère technique important qui conditionne la rapidité d'intervention en
cas de forte pluie. D 'une manière générale, les Comités de gestion cornprennent des représentants des principales classes d'age ou générations:
génération 'âgée' (mais pas les anciens ou 'sages'), génération
intermédiaire et 'jeunes', ces derniers étant nécessairement initiés et
manes. Dans le Comité de coordination, même si la génération des
cadets est réprésentée, la proportion dejeunesest moms importante que
dans les comités de gestion. Ainsi, on peut interpreter la composition et
les fonctions des deux types de structures de la manière suivante. Les
Comités de gestion paraissent constituer l'entité opérationnelle permettant l'application concrete de règles collectives qui rendent indispensable l'adaptation des pratiques culturales au niveau des parcelles: ce sont
les comités qui règlent les hauteurs d'eau en concertation avec les
femmes qui gèrent les mises en culture des parcelles de riz, qui diffusent
avec les animateurs Cadef (groupement et territoire) les informations
techniques nécessaires a l'adaptation de l'itinéraire technique (variétés
en fonction du niveau d'inondation, date de mise en culture, prevention
de la divagation du bétail...). Les autorités queue que soit la nature de
leur pouvoir et de leur légitimité, sont représentées dans ces comités,
mais elle n'y jouent pas un role moteur contrairement a leur place dans
le comité de coordination.
Le comité de ccordination a une fonction que l'on pourrait qualifier d'institutionnelle et de regulation, en amont de la gestion au quotidien des barrages. L'ensemble des autorités et des légitimités y sont
représentées de manière significative (segments du lignage fondateur,
alnés, responsables de I' initiation, responsables politico-adminsitratifs
et femmes ayant une position sociale reconnue...) etjouit de ce fait d'une
235
autorité incontestée. Ii intervient comme instance de regulation des
litiges, comme autorité chargée d'identifier les modes de négociation les
plus appropriés en cas de conflit ou de discussion avec les villages nverains de Ia vallée...
Les deux types de structures ne jouent pas sur le méme niveau; les
comités de gestion ont la responsabilité du fonctionnement des barrages
et des regulations techniques censées permettre un usage optimum de la
ressource en propriété commune, alors que le comité de coordination
intervient comme garant de la légitimité sociale des comités de gestion
et de leurs interventions vis a vis des villageois et des autres villages
riverains. On retrouve là, dans un contexte singulièrement different, les
hierarchies entre niveaux de prise de decision développés par CiriacyWantrup (1971 et 1967) qui distingue pour sa part trois niveaux: les
niveaux constitutionneis, institutionneis et opérationnels.
3.3
Inégalités et légitimité des structures de l'organisation:
comparaison de plusieurs situations
Au niveau de B ougoutoub, la coherence est forte entre les structures Cadef et les structures du pouvoir coutumier, alors qu' a Diagong
on observe un décalage net entre les détenteurs des pouvoirs coutumiers
- 'ceux qui de'tiennent la parole' - et les acteurs impliqués dans les
structures du Cadef au niveau local. L'action du Cadef se fait avec leur
accord mais leur choix de se positionner a l'écart des responsabilités
dans ces structures tendra a terme a les fragiliser vis avis de 1' extérieur.
Dans le cas du barrage de Diagong, en dépit d'une presence parfois très ancienne dans le terroir et donc d'une cohabitation de plusieurs
générations avec les lignages fondateurs, les families aliochtones sont
encore considérées comme 'étrangères' par rapport aux fondateurs du
village et ce statut s'étend egalement aux families alliées. Si les families
considérées comme 'étrangères' se trouvent en situation de dépendance
vis avis des iignages fondateurs pour les questions foncières et sous ieur
autorité pour ce qui reléve de i'initiation, elles occupent en revanche des
positions de responsabilité dans le domaine politique et administratif
236
(notables du chef de village, responsabies politiques) ainsi que dans le
domaine associatif. Les représentants élus au bureau du groupement
Cadef ne sont pas issus des families se rattachant au lignage fondateur
qui n'occupe d'ailleurs aucune fonction publique ou privée particulière.
Les familles alliées ainsi que les families 'étrangères' se retrouvent
ainsi de manière dominante dans les postes de responsabilité du groupement Cadef ainsi qu'au niveau du Comité de gestion dii barrage. Tout
sembie se passer comme si les families fOndatrices déléguaient aux
families accueillies ce type de fonction et de pouvoir, dans la mesure oii
elles adherent également au Cadef, mais ne s 'y investis sent pas. Certames expressions nous paraissent illustrer tout particulièrement cette
dichotomie dans la repartition des pouvoirs au niveau du quartier Koussobaly:
"Ceux du Comité de gestion du barrage ant duré a Diagong, on
leur a donné le pouvoir pour le barrage, mais ii n 'est pas possible de
leur donner le pouvoir pour 1 'initiation ".
"Les gens du Comité de gestion n 'ontpas defonction 'politique'
dans la société traditionnelle".
"Les gens delèguentparfois aux pastes de responsabilité des gens
qui sont disponibles mais qui n 'ontpas laparole dans la société".
Cette disjonction entre 'pouvoirs coutumiers' et 'pouvoirs modernes' nous paraIt avoirjoué un role significatifdans les difficultés ren-
contrées pour la mise en oeuvre de l'aménagement et en garantir la
pérennité. Si cette dichotomie dans Ia repartition des pouvoirs nous
paraIt être un élément explicatif essentiel, elle ne saurait en revanche
rendre compte entièrement de i'échec de l'opération tel qu'iI peut être
constaté aujourd'hui. D'autres éléments sont a rechercher dans ies conditions et les modalités d'intervention du Cadef dans cette vallée.
Le cas de Suelle est encore different dans la mesure oi'i l'insertion
du Cadef dans ce village très important du Fogny s 'est fait de manière
indirecte par le biais d'un accord entre associations (accord entre Cadef
et une autre organisation paysanne) et sur la base de liens plus faibles
237
entre les fondateurs du groupe dakarois et les populations. La situation
sociale est complexe et traduit un émiettement des pouvoirs lie a l'histoire du peuplement et aux clivages politiques et sociaux plus récents.
De ce fait, tant la légitimité des groupements que celle du Comité de
gestion peut être questionnée.
238
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3.4
L'organisation paysanne contribue a modifier les modes
d'appropriation des ressources renouvelables
L'organisation paysanne joue un role certain dans l'évolution des
modes d'appropriation des ressources renouvelables. Ce role s'explique
par la mobilisation des categories sociales dominées - femmes et cadets
sociaux - et depend directement des compromis que l'organisation est
en mesure de passer avec les détenteurs des pouvoirs coutumiers.
Les groupements constitués autour des blocs maraIchers représentent le premier niveau oà se matérialise une arnorce de changement
dans les modes d'appropriation des ressources. Ce changement concerne les modalités d'accès aux ressources naturelles renouvelables et
leurs usages. Les revenus des productions maraIchères échappent au
contrôle des détenteurs du pouvoir foncier car us sont exciusivement
contrôlés par les femmes. On ne peut donc parler a ce niveau là que d'un
changement partiel des modes d'appropriation des ressources naturelles
sur les terres de plateau.
Même si Ufl tel changement est significatif eu égard aux statut des
femmes dans la société, il demeure précaire, car dépendant de la poursuite de l'exploitation des jardins maraichers. Cette exploitation peut en
effet être remise en cause pour des raisons économiques et notamment
par la degradation des conditions économiques qui pourraient rendre
cette activité encore moms attrayante. Elle peut aussi être remise en
cause par les détenteurs du pouvoir foncier qui ont la possibilité de
retirer du jour au lendemain les terres concédées.
Sur les terres de rizières, les actions entreprises par le Cadef ne
modifient pas les representations et les usages relatifs a ces ressources
mobilisées pour Ia production agricole. Les cadres de concertation que
constituent les groupements et surtout les comités de gestion, lorsqu'ils
fonctionnent, sont utilisés par les femmes pour accroItre leur influence
sur les modalités d'utilisation des ressources. Le contrôle de l'usage des
ressources conditionne Ia valorisation du travail investi par les femmes
dans les rizières.
240
Organisalion paysanne et ressources renouvelables en propriété commune
Sur les terres de plateau exploitées par les hommes en culture pluviale, l'action de l'organisation paysanne ne modifie en rien les modes
d'appropriation des ressources. Chaque année a l'approche de
l'hivemage, une partie du terroir est consacrée aux cultures pluviales
alors que les parcelles cultivées l'année précédente retournent a la
jachère et sont vaiorisées par le bétail qui y est conduit pendant l'hivernage. Ces mises en cultures itinérantes, décidées collectivement par
les aInés, ne favorisent pas la mise en oeuvre de strategies dtaméliora
tion du milieu du fait du role determinant du bétail dans le processus.
Ii semble bien que le bétail et sa conduite soient au coeur des processus de prise de decision des aInés et responsables famiiiaux sur ce
type de terroir, mais aussi sur les rizières aménagées. Le bétail géré par
les aInés chefs de famille constitue en effet une référence bien plus significative que les cultures comme en témoignent les difficultés rencontrees par les femmes pour exciure le bétail des rizières aménagées en
debut d'hivernage, alors qu'il s'agit d'une condition imperative de
valorisation des barrages. Sur cette partie du terroir, les actions techniques du Cadef n'ont pas suscité une mobilisation aussi importante
que dans les valiées et les succès demeurent extrêmement limités. Si le
manque de références techniques disponibles en matière dtamenage_
ment des versants et des plateaux est certainement un facteur explicatif
non negligeable, ii demeure partiel et secondaire au regard de l'importance croissante des zones de pâturage, multipliées par deux en trente
ans, et du poids économique et social du bétail dans les strategies des
families régies par les anciens et les chefs de families.
L'importance du bétail apparaIt de manière récurrente dans les
écrits consacrés aux sociétés dites diolas de basse Casamance, mais I' accent a été mis par de nombreux travaux sur les rizières dont ies aménage-
ments de mangrove ont retenu l'attention des observateurs pour leurs
qualités techniques. Cependant, dans les écrits historiques et de manière
récurrente l'équivalence riz-bétail a souvent été mentionnée sans que
soit accordée une importance equivalente a l'étude des dynamiques
sociales et économiques propres au bétail. En outre, ii apparaIt que les
superficies consacrées aux 'grandes cultures' ont régressé de moitié au
241
niveau du département depuis les années 1960, ce qui a eu pour effet de
libérer environ 40 000 ha pour le pâturage. Ces troupeaux sont maintenant le coeur du système de production et conditionnent les possibilités
concretes d'initiative en matière de gestion des ressources renouvelables. Comprendre les logiques sociales et économiques liées aux
troupeaux et la rationalité de l'usage de l'espace par le bétail nous
apparalt comme une condition de l'amélioration collective de la gestion
des ressources renouvelables dans cette region.
Tableau n°2:
Interpretation des résultats du Cadef sur les
terres de plateau et sur les terres de rizières
Recomposition d 'un
modèle technique a
partir de références
diverses
Rizières
Plateau
Pression sociale
en faveur d'une
action sur les
ressources
Dimension
socio-économique
Oui, mise en coherence
Forte dynamique des Reconnaissance partagée
de rCsultats de recherche femmes a travers les
de l'importance du riz
et de développement _rou .ements et le Cadef entre hommes et femmes
Pas d'action collective
Forte importance du
sur des ressources dont
Manque de rCfCrences
bétail
dans les dynamiles contours familiaux
techniques de base
ques sociales gérCes par
varient d'une année
les ames et les anciens
l'autre
REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES
Berthomé J., Mercoiret M. R., Situation et evolution des organisations
paysannes et rurales. Le Sénégal, Paris, France, Réseau GAO,
1992.
Boivin P., Loyer J. Y., Mise en valeur des mangroves au Sénégal,
Rapport final ORSTOM. Commission des Communautés
Européennes, Rapport TSD A 104 (MR), 1989.
Bosc P.-M., Dardé C., Berthomé J., Mercoiret M. R., Goudiaby B.,
"Organisations socio-professionnelles: innovations organisationnelles
242
et institutionnelles et strategies des acteurs. Le cas du département
de Bignona au Senegal". In: Innovations et Sociétés. Queues
agricultures? Queues Innovations? Vol. 2. Les diversités de
l'innovation, Chauveau J. P. et Yung J. M. (Eds), Actes du
Séminaire "Innovations Ct sociétés", Montpellier 13-16
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France, 1998.
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SUMMARY
In the present document, the author shows that in a given society
the social differences do not constitute an impediment to the implementation of new ways of management of "renewable resources".
The author demonstrates that such differences, which create barriers surely movable but enough marked among the individuals and the
strategic groups, do not constitute an impediment to the changes in the
rules of taking possession of "renewable resources". These barriers do
not constitute an impediment to the creation of public goods, and of new
modalities management.
The collective action is made possible by setting up a peasant
organization in which the individual contrasting strategies (emigrants
coming back to the native village, elderly and young people and women)
can confront each other. The peasant organization enables the exploited
class to negotiate and to express their claims and projects. Nevertheless,
such new claims and projects cannot substitute the traditional institutions that continue to take the final decisions.
245
This document is based on a case of a collectivity in Senegal's
"Basse Casamance"; it analyses changes in the rules of "renewable
resources" in a peasant system subjected to relevant social and climatic
changes. The research has been conducted by the author during several
missions to Senegal between 1992 and 1997 and ended up with the writing of a thesis.
246
C. Finance
Financing Economic Self-reliance and
Member Participation in Farmer
Organizations in Kenya
S
5
1
JOHN ROUSE
I The world offinance - especially that of co-operative finance - is a dlfJIcult world to fathom,
especially in these current days when most of the old rules offinance don 't seem to apply
anymore. The author admits that he is more a novice than an expert in this field and only hopes
that his own amateur opinions on the topic may spark some debate aimed atfinding a solution
to an issue which is becoming central to the survival and self-reliance of many farmer
organizations in the Third World.
The author would like to thank his colleagues: Seppo Ikaheimo and Pasi Malinen from the
Thrku School ofEconomics and Business Administration in Finlandfor helping him keep his
arguments on-course, Special thanks are due Pekka Jamsen, another member of the Thricu
team, for his in-depth observations on the Kenyan co-operative scene and for sharing his
views on the financial problems currently facing Kenya dairy and coffee co-operatives
movements.
On the other hand, the views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author
alone and do not necessarily represent those ofthe persons mentioned above or ofthe author
organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Financing Economic Self-reliance and Member Participation
In the 1970s and 1980s, when inflation was the driving force, the
key to success was using other peoples money. Going into debt was a
smart thing to do; the money you paid back was worth far less than the
cash you borrowed several years earlier
Times have changed. With prices falling in many parts of the
world, money gains value over time instead of depreciating.... With
lenders still charging interest, not only do debtors pay back more expensive (sic. valuable) dollars than they borrowed, they have (sic. get) to
pay for that privilege2.
1.
RISING COSTS OF EXTERNAL BORROWING
Times are indeed changing. While the above quote applies to cur-
rent conditions within advanced countries, it probably applies even
more so to conditions in the developing world. According to development writer Jacques Gélinas "Third world debt has grown from $9 billion in 1955, to $572 billion in 1980 and $2177 billion in 1996". Even
more worrisome, he adds, is that in relative terms this aggregate debt
burden now represents 34% of total Developing Countries GNP and
rises to as 79% of regional GNP in Sub-Saharan Africa3.
Africa's farmer organizations are not immune to this crisis,
particularly agricultural service co-operatives. Although the latter have
provided useful and valued services to small farmer members and
communities in many African countries, it must also be recognized that
most have done so under heavy government control, operating within
protected markets, and with access to significant government and
donor-provided grants and favorable credits to finance their business
operations.
2 International Herald Tribune, "Advice to investors on locating debt-free investment targets,"
International Herald Tribune, Bologna, Italy, 19 September 1998, P. 17.
3 Gdlinas, J.B., "Freedom from Debt: The Re-appropriation ofDevelopment through Financial
Self-Reliance," Zed Books Ltd, London, 1998, p. 34. The figures are stated in current US
dollars.
251
Now these "favorable conditions of trade" are fast disappearing.
As government services to co-operatives are privatized, markets
liberalized, and their access to externally-provided grants and
subsidized credits are reduced as their debt burdens rise, agricultural co-
operatives are now experiencing more capital shortages . Unless co-
operatives can adjust to the new conditions and become more
financially self-reliant by tapping member funds to finance their
business activities, many will simply disappear from the scene. In the
author's view, this would be a great tragedy4.
In 1993 FAO launched a research program to specifically address
this "capital scarcity problem" in transitional and Developing countries.
During the 1993-1995 period, it initiated a series of field studies on cooperative capital formation problems within agricultural co-operatives
in Guatemala, India, Poland, Hungary and Kenya in collaboration with
the Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives
(COPAC)5, independent researchers, the Finnish Co-operative Center
(FCC) and participating national research institutions and co-operatives
in those countries. Two years later, it undertook a second, more in-depth
study of co-operative capital formation focusing on Kenya, in collaboration with Turku School of Economics and Business Administration and
the Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives (KNFC) to explore further technical issues not covered in the 1995 study.
This paper is based on the above research and argues that
increased member equity (member share capital) participation in agricultural co-operatives will improve the self-financing capacities of these
organizations and may lead to increased member participation in
decision-making within the co-operative and to improvements in its
business performance; however, the author points out that the mobiliza4 FAQ, "Co-operatives: Has their Their Time Come - or Gone?," Rural Institutions and
Participation Service, Food andAgriculture Organization ofthe United Nations, Rome, 1996.
5 The Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives (CQPAC) is an interagency committee of UN and NGO agencies whose members include FAQ, the International
Labour Office (ILQ), the UN, the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA,), the International
Federation ofAgricullural Producers (IFAP,) and the International Federation of Plantation,
Agricultural and Allied Workers (JFPAAW,).
252
tion of increased member capital in agricultural co-operatives in Kenya
is problematic and is only likely to succeed if the political and economic
incentives that motivate members to contribute to the co-operative business are significantly changed to fit the new liberalized market conditions. The author provides some tentative ideas of how this might be
done.
2.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF COFFEE AND DAIRY
CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA
Agricultural co-operatives were first established in Kenya more
than sixty years ago during British colonial rule. The first dairy cooperatives appeared in the 1930s and the first coffee co-operative was
established in 1950. While initially small, in terms of membership, dairy
co-operatives grew in size and number during the post- independence
period. By 1997, there were 165 active registered dairy co-operatives,
with 116,300 registered members and an aggregate turnover of K.shs
2,782 million. Coffee co-operatives - which generally had larger memberships than dairy co-ops - followed a similar growth trajectory. In the
same year (1997), there were 192 coffee registered co-operatives in
Kenya, serving a membership of 392,700 and having an annual turnover
of K.shs 6,963 million6.
As in other countries of the region, government has played a major
role as promoter, financier, auditor and sometimes even manager of cooperatives, especially in key sectors such as daiiy and coffee where it
also played a role as processor and marketer. In Kenya, the governance
of the vertical structures of dairy and coffee co-operatives that later
developed reflected that history, with the primary societies serving as
the main milk and coffee collection points at bottom level, which were
linked to the secondary societies (district unions) at district level that
6 Jamsen, P., ikaheirno, S., and Ma/men, P., Capital Formation and Kenyan Farmer Owned Co-
operatives, Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Turku, Finland,
(forthcoming).
253
provide additional service support to primary societies, which, in turn,
were linked to tertiary level co-operative unions (federations of secondary co-operatives) at national level that assisted affiliated cooperatives in the processing and marketing of produce.
In the particular case of coffee co-operatives, primary societies
collect and normally process all coffee. Coffee district unions provide
complementary non-marketing support services to affiliated primaly
societies, like bulk fertilizer supply, banking, and including management and accounting. With regard to marketing, primary societies send
their coffee directly to the Kenya Planters Co-operative Union (KPCU),
the coffee sector apex organization at national level, nominally owned
by the primary societies but actuality heavily controlled by government.
KPCU also does the milling and grading of the coffee. Coffee auctions
and sales are organized by the Coffee Board, which is a government
body. In contrast, within the co-operative dairy sector, most primary
dairy societies collect the milk and transport it to Kenya Co-operative
Creameries (KCC), in principle the dairy sector apex organization, but
again in the hands of the government7.
While Kenyan dairy and coffee co-operatives are nominally
referred to as "member - governed and member financed" organizations, based on the "one member one vote" principle, the management
and financing of their day-to-day operations remains firmly in the hands
of the co-operative unions, which continue to select and pay the salary of
the general manager of the affiliated primary society. Members voting in
the Annual General Meeting theoretically have the power to set overall
policy and dismiss a manager if he/she performs poorly; but in practice,
this power is seldom exercised. As the Kenya study findings indicated,
most members of the primary societies interviewed seemed to regard the
management of their own co-operative as more responsive to the wishes
of government, the union or the general manager than to those of the
members themselves.
7 Jamsen, P Comments on original draft of this papeJ October 1998.
254
During the 1960-1990 period, Kenya's dairy and coffee cooperatives operated within relatively protected markets and benefited
from government grants and access to subsidized credit. The price cooperative members paid for this support frequently translated itself into
increased government intervention into running the co-operative's
affairs, management inefficiencies as more non-productive employees
were hired and consequently lower prices paid to member producers,
delays in member producer payments, and a low sense of member
ownership of the co-operative enterprise. But since the co-operative was
the only permissible way in which small dairy and coffee producers
could market their crops, the system continued to survive.
3.
ORIGINS OF THE CAPITAL PROBLEM
The Kenya government's introduction of Structural Adjustment
reforms in the early 1 990s, coupled with a marked decline of development assistance and subsidies to the co-operative sector and liberaliza-
tion of markets, has now placed Kenya's dairy co-operatives under
increasing competitive pressures. While this is not yet the case for Kenya's coffee co-operatives, competition is likely to increase if market liberalization reforms continue and private buying from farms is allowed.8
As the preliminary findings of the 1997 FAO-Turku study on five
"representative" dairy and coffee co-operatives (three dairy and two
coffee co-ops) have shown, the ratio of short plus long-term debt to total
co-operative assets has risen significantly during the last decade.9 Debt
servicing in the sampled co-operatives now consumes much of the cooperatives' earned income, leaving little remaining to pay for member
produce received or promised. In the special case of coffee co-operatives, working capital shortages are also serious but more the
8 Ibid., October 1998.
9 Janisen, P., Ikaheimo, S., and Ma/men, P., Capita/Formation and Kenyan Farmer OwnedCo-
operatives, Turim School of Economics ands Business Administration, Turku, Finland,
(forthcoming). pp. 108-23 7.
255
result of delays encountered in delivering member producer advance
payments financed by the World Bank Second Coffee Improvement
Program which has forced primary societies to reduce the amount of
individual advances paid to members thus leading to growing member
dissatisfaction with co-operative services.
In the dairy sector, competition from the private traders is increas-
ing and some members are now being lured away by private buyers
offering higher prices and prompter payment than the co-operative,
largely because co-operatives are no longer above to mobilize sufficient
working capital to finance their business operations. As a consequence,
member solidarity and participation- two essential requirements for collective action - are beginning to decline'0.
4.
LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS
Some critics argue that the key to Kenya's dairy and coffee cooperatives' survival is for them to improve their management efficiency
and the quality of services they offer members, while simultaneously
identifiing new sources of external credit to finance their working capital and investment needs. Yet this is easier said than done. Many co-
operatives can't improve member and business efficiencies, like
improving accounting and reporting systems without investing in new
computer technology and that requires more capital, neither can they
significantly improve member services without additional working
capital. To escape this "capital conundrum", co-operatives have at least
three options. They can: (1) seek funds from external lenders or donors;
10 Ibid., p. 186. In all three daity co-operatives studied, working capital shortages limited their
ability to provide the same cash payment terms that private buyers were offering and, as a
result, co-operatives were losing members. Capital for longer-term investments in the daiiy
co-operatives was also dWicult to find at reasonable rates. In both coffee co-operatives
studied, obtaining adequate working capital was also a problem. The most typical way coffee
co-ops have managed to finance their coffee purchases through the World Bank Smallholder
Coffee Improvement Programme (SCIP) is through bank overdi'afts taken at much higher
interest rates.
256
Financing Economic Seif-reliance and Member Participation
(2) generate additional funds from the net earnings of the co-operative's
business; or (3) ask their members to contribute their own funds.
5.
OBSTACLES TO MOBILIZING CAPITAL
5.1
External capital: increasing scarcity, rising costs
Amid growing signs that the world economy is now headed
towards a period of recession, it seems unlikely that cash-strapped dairy
co-operatives will have much luck in tapping additional external
sources of funds at reasonable rates to satisfy their working capital and
investment needs, i.e. from banks, government, donors or suppliers.
Coffee co-operatives operating within the World Bank-supported SCIP
have less difficulty now, but it is also clear that this solution cannot be
sustained in the long-run. Unfortunately, the underlying inability of
most coffee co-operatives to attract sufficient reasonably-priced external credit to finance their operations remains unsolved. This news may
not be easy to swallow for dairy and coffee co-operative managers long
accustomed to easy access to grants and below-market subsidized credits, but it is quickly becoming a reality.
5.2
Internal capital: human nature and co-operative
principles
With the shrinking possibility of accessing low-cost external
funds, the prospect of raising new funds for investment from internal
sources, i.e. from the net earnings of the co-operative business or from
member contributions is beginning to look more attractive. But the
obstacles are still formidable.
Certainly the first place to look for internal capital is in the Profit-
Loss Statement of the co-operative. If the co-operative enterprise is
profitable then, the possibility exists to utilize some of these profits for
increasing the working capital base of the co-operative and investing in
new facilities and equipment. In the case of the five co-operatives
257
studied, all were generating some net income, though net income margins could have been increased significantly through further increases in
efficiency, automation of accounting and communication systems, etc.
Yet there are other considerations.
First, there is basic human nature. Saving for investment involves
sacrifice and that can be painful. Whether the decision is one of the
entire co-operative membership to use the end-of-year surplus funds as
working capital or to invest in a new truck, or whether it is that of a single member to purchase an extra share in the co-operative, both of these
decisions involve the withholding of immediate consumption to achieve
some future value or gain. Under the past government-controlled market
conditions where there were no other marketing options, this form of
saving was relatively easy to impose. Members simply had to endure;
there was no choice; however, under Kenya's new liberalized market
conditions, more market options are beginning to appear. Co-operatives
must now provide increased economic and non-economic incentives to
members to encourage them to help finance the operations of their cooperative.
Many observers of the Kenya dairy and coffee co-operative scene
argue that the average Kenyan farmer has always been more interested
in immediate rewards rather than long-term future gains. He/she wants
to receive the highest price he/she can get for produce delivered to the
co-operative or pay the lowest cost for co-operative services received.
But member expectations are also affected by the level of trust the member has in the co-operative; for example, if there is little transparency in
transactions, if money to be paid to members is not paid or payments
delayed, if capital contributions cannot be redeemed without inordinate
delays, then trust will be weak and member's expected future gains will
be lower.
While there may be some truth in these observations, we also
know from the Kenya studies that when trust exists, and members see a
worthwhile investment opportunity that holds expectation of future
(individual or collective) gain, they are often willing to contribute. This
258
Financing Economic Seif-reliance and Member Participation
was clearly seen in one coffee co-operative that researchers visited
where most members also belonged to a co-operative savings and credit
society (SACCO) located nearby. While this coffee co-operative struggled to mobilize sufficient working capital for its operations, the cash
savings balances coffee co-operative members had deposited in the
SACCO continued to grow. Presumably, that was because members had
trust in the management of the SACCO and expected to receive a better
financial return for their savings deposited there than had they invested
the same funds in their coffee co-operative".
Co-operative principles constitute another obstacle. Two of the
most important ones that distinguish co-operatives from other forms of
business and define their co-operative identity are the "one person-one
vote" and the "limited return on capital" principles. Rigid adherence to
these two co-operative norms can make mobilizing member capital in a
co-operative very difficult. The reasons are quite simple.
One of the motivating incentives for acquiring additional equity
(ownership) shares within a corporate enterprise is to obtain more
decision-making power and control over the enterprise; however, the
co-operative's "one member-one vote" principle works against this.
Each member, no matter how many shares he/she owns, has only one
vote; thus, there is little incentive for the member acquiring more shares
to influence the decision making process. In that sense, co-operatives
are much more democratic than corporate forms of business, but, as all
the FAO studies have shown, some co-op members, due to their political
influence or heavy volume of business transactions with the cooperative, are "more equal than others".
The co-operative principle of "limited return on capital" also creates some problems for member capital formation. Co-operatives are
supposed to be "people-centered" organizations, not "capital-centered"
enterprises; therefore, while earning return on capital invested by members is permissible, it shouldn't be excessive. Unfortunately within Kenya's dairy and coffee co-operatives, "limited return on capital" has often
i/Ibid. p.109
259
meant "no return on capital" at all. While Kenyan agricultural cooperatives are encouraged to allocate part of their surplus to pay dividends on member shares, in practice they seldom do so. In the five Kenyan co-operatives studied, none had paid a dividend on member shares
for the last 8-10 years; most of the surplus had been returned to the members in the form of direct delivery payments'2.
While a "pro-payment, no-dividend" policy may appeal to member users, it is likely not to appeal much to member investors (in the case
of a co-operative, they tend to be one-in-the same person). As we saw in
the case of the previously mentioned coffee co-operative, members
investors are more likely to invest their surplus funds in their cooperative only if the expected future value of their contribution (as
measured in either monetary or non-monetary terms) looks attractive.
This may partly explain why SACCOs have generally out-performed
other foniis of co-operatives in Kenya. They seem to have found a set of
financial incentives which encourage member to invest in their SACCO
rather than somewhere else'3.
Another factor limiting the return on member shares is their "nonmarketability". According to most co-operative laws within the region,
member shares are not transferable to third parties, implying there is no
secondary market for member shares and they must be resold to the cooperative upon the member's withdrawal. The purchase or sale value of
a member share is also fixed at its "par value," i.e. the cash value of the
share as set forth in the co-operative's constitution at the time of
registration. That par value remains invariant, even if there is a change
in the net worth of the co-operative. Thus, if a member wishes to leave
the co-operative or sell some or all of his/her shares, the money he/she
will receive from the co-operative for redeeming his/her shares will be
12 Ja,nsen, Pekka, Comments on original draft paper; October; 1998.
13 According to the World Council of Credit Unions, Inc., 1996 Statistical Report, there were
1,229 co-operative credit and savings societies in Kenya serving a membership of 934,056
persons with aggregate member savings ofover US$ 355 million, loans to members ofjust US$
302 million, and total assets of U5'$ 523 million, indicating a high levelself-financing andseifreliance.
260
equal to the par value of the share, multiplied by the number of shares
the member redeems. Consequently, the member investor can expect no
future capital gain (or capital loss) in cash money terms.
In the case of the Kenyan co-operatives examined, this represents
another disincentive to members' investing in their co-operative. Were
the expected future value of a redeemed share - at withdrawal time -
significantly greater than its purchase price, a member might be
interested in purchasing more; but generally that just doesn't happen.
Each member knows that he/she will be repaid (at withdrawal time), an
amount equal to what he/she paid into the co-operative, nothing more
and nothing less. Of course during periods of inflation when money is
losing its purchasing power overtime, the prospect of being repaid in the
future in deflated currency is not a very attractive investment
proposition. This is why Kenyan co-operative members tend to
purchase only the minimum number of shares required to maintain their
membership access rights and why they seem to have so little interest in
building the organization's net worth. Another factor relates to the
difficulty a member may face in redeeming his/her share capital. Most
co-operatives also require a specific waiting period, before a member
share redemption transaction can be made- usually around six months.
In conclusion, the limited return on member shares, coupled with
members' low expectations of achieving any capital gains on future
share tend to discourage members from accumulating more than a mini-
mum of shares. These obstacles also promote "free rider" behaviour
among co-operative members, where members start viewing their
shareholdings more as a one-time expense in purchasing their "cooperative membership card" allowing them access to inexpensive cooperative services and more profitable producer prices, rather than as a
long-term investment in the co-operative business' growth and success.
Another weakness of share redemption at par value is that it tends
to operate in favor of new members vs. old. For example, suppose that
one of the 100 founding members of a hypothetical dairy co-operative
paid US$ 100 to join their co-operative in 1978, thus forming a total
261
start-up capital of US$ 10,000. At that moment, the net worth of the cooperative was $10,000 and the average net worth per member was $100.
Now let's further assume that management's chooses to use a large proportion of the co-operative's net earnings to finance the growth of the
co-operative business, thus there is no additional need for more member
share purchases and that by the end of 1997 (i.e. twenty years later), the
co-operative has achieved a net worth of US$ 500,000. If no new members have joined in the interim, then this would imply that the average
non-market value of a founder's share (as measured in terms of total net
worth of the co-operative - $500,000 - divided by the total number of
members (100) would have increased to $5,000!
Now suppose one of the founding members wants to retire, leave
the co-operative and redeem his share capital. According to the cooperafive's statutes, he will receive back only the original US$ 100 that he put
in but not a penny more - even though the value of the co-operative he
helped build over a period of twenty years is now worth 50 times what it
was worth originally. That's a bit discouraging. In contrast, a new member joining the co-operative in 1998 would be able to join the same co-
op - now with a net worth of $500,000 - at the bargain price of just
$100! In order to preserve their own privileges and prevent this from
happening, older members therefore may decide to limit new member-
ships, thus creating a sort of "fortress co-op" or "private club" type
situation in which potential new members are discouraged from joining,
which would be in violation of another co-operative principle, that of
"open membership"14
14
This indeed happened in one of the co-operatives studied in 1995.
262
6.
WAYS OF MOBILIZING INTERNAL CAPITAL:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Clearly for co-operatives to make headway in mobilizing internal
capital to finance their business operations and growth, some modifications will have to be made in the laws which govern co-operatives in
Kenya and the co-operative principles they supposedly follow. Some
observations and suggestions are provided below.
6.1
Institutional capital
One way in which Kenyan agricultural co-operatives can mobilize
more capital is through retaining a larger portion of the business' net
earnings (including grants received) and using this cash to finance its
future business operations and growth. Co-operative legislation states
that a certain amount of this surplus must be allocated to maintain "legal
reserves" (e.g. for general reserves, member education, etc); however,
the remainder can be used either for financing the business operations of
the co-operative or can be returned to the members in the form of dividends on member shares or patronage refunds. The total amount of net
surplus retained by the co-operative (legal reserves plus other retained
earnings) we will refer to as "institutional capital"5.
institutional capital is the cheapest source of internal capital since
there is zero dividend or interest costs associated with it16. It also differs
from other forms of capital because it represents funds owned by all
members collectively rather than individually. As a consequence, its
ownership is diffused and not individually assigned. Because institutional capital belongs to "everybody," its control and use usually falls
under the influence of those who manage the co-operative on a daily
15 Rouse, .1 G., and VonPischke, ,J. D,, "Mobilising capital in agricultural service co-operatives,"
Food andAgriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome, Italy, 1997, P. 12.
16 There is, of course, an imputed economic opportunity cost to the member; nevertheless, in
those cases where alternative rural investment opportunities are limited or lacking, that
opportunity cost may be close to zero.
263
basis, i.e. the Manager and Board of Directors, rather the base members
themselves'7.
As we have seen in the particular case of Kenya's dairy and coffee
co-operatives, managers are selected and paid by the union to which the
co-operative is affiliated and not by the co-operative. Since the manager
is more financially dependent on and therefore more accountable to the
union for his/her pay, and in view of the fact that control of institutional
capital tends to fall under the control of management instead of members, the latter's incentives for accumulating larger amounts of institutional capital are few.
Current taxation laws in Kenya also discourage the accumulation
of co-operative institutional capital. Co-operatives have been subject to
income tax since 1985 and taxes are charged on "total income," but
deductions are allowed on up to 80 percent of that for dividends and
bonuses paid to members'8. To avoid paying higher taxes, many cooperatives therefore choose to redistribute as much of their net earnings
as they can to members leaving little for direct reinvestment. Thus some
modification in these taxation laws might encourage more accumulation
of institutional capital.
6.2
Member capital
Another source of internal capital comes from the members themselves. "Member capital" refers to a range of member-owned cash funds
that individual members lend to, or put at the disposal of the cooperative under various terms and conditions. It can range from the purchase of long-term equity "ownership" shares in the co-operative, member fixed-term deposits or bonds held with the co-operative, outstanding
payments due the member from the co-operative, or member demand
deposits (cash balances) kept with the co-operative.
17 Of course, there are exceptions to this rule.
18 1/cahcirno, S., Jamsen, P and Malinen, P. op. cit. page 26.
264
It is distinguished from "institutional capital" in three important
ways - all of which have an impact on co-operative governance and
member participation in decision-making. Firstly it is individually
owned and controlled in contrast to "institutional capital" which is collectively owned and controlled by the entire membership. In other
words, member capital contributions remain the property of the individual contributing member. Secondly, it is provided by members to the cooperative only under certain agreed-upon terms and conditions which
define the rewards, privileges of membership and incentives that motivate the loan, e.g. that define the period of time, the fixed or expected
interest or dividend rate, certain redemption or withdrawal conditions or
voting rights attached, etc. And thirdly, it can be voluntarily withdrawn
(redeemed) by the member.
The fact that member capital has economic value - both to the cooperative and to the member - and can be withdrawn at the member's
request, makes member capital an important potential tool of cooperative governance; for example, if a particular member is dissatisfied
with the co-operative, he/she has a right to withdraw and, after passing
the required waiting period, the co-operative is obliged to repay the
member the value of all his/her shares purchased, at par value. Thus
members are able to influence decision-making within a co-operative
not just by their individual votes but also by threatening to "vote with
their feet", i.e. to withdraw from the co-operative and redeem their
shares.
Since the potential loss of a member would also involve a loss of
capital to the co-operative and represents a visible sign of member
dissatisfaction, the co-operative's management generally tries to keep
these member defections to a minimum by improving the quality of
member services. As three of the main problems now facing Kenya's
dairy and coffee co-operatives are: (a) a pressing need to mobilize more
internal capital to finance continued co-operative business growth; (b)
low rates of member participation in co-operative decision-making and
declining co-operative member solidarity; and (c) declining quality of
member services, mobilizing additional member capital could help.
265
6.2.1
Member share capital
The co-operative can mobilize new member share capital through
its sale of additional equity shares to individual members by: (1) asking
members to voluntarily purchase certain number of shares from the cooperative to meet a collectively agreed upon investment target, which
we refer to as "voluntary shares"; (2) by deducting from the produce
payments due to each member a fixed amount to purchase an agreed
upon number of shares, which we call "deducted shares"; and/or (3) distributing a portion of the patronage bonus due back to members at the
end of the year (based on the vilue of their transactions with the cooperative) in the form of purchased shares instead of cash money, which
we refer to as "patronage shares". Since each method of share capital
mobilization involves the use of different incentives and modalities,
they are dealt with separately below.
6.2.2
Voluntary member shares
The main way voluntary share contributions are currently being
mobilized within Kenyan dairy and coffee co-operatives is either by
encouraging new members to join and purchase the minimum number of
shares needed to meet the membership requirements or by periodically
launching member share subscription campaigns amongst existing
members to mobilize additional capital to finance investment projects.
But in view of the near-zero rate of cash dividend return to members on
their shares in all five co-operatives studied and the unattractive par
value redemption policy on shares at withdrawal time, it has been difficult arousing strong member interest in such voluntary share sub scriptions.
6.2.3
Deducted shares
One way some co-operatives have coped with the above problem
is by getting members to agree to purchase additional shares by deducting the cost of the share purchase from their milk and coffee delivery
payments. This method of member capital formation was extensively
266
used in the Kenyan co-operatives studied and seems to be a much simpler, less painful way of mobilizing additional member share capital;
however, the method as applied in Kenya suffered from two major
weaknesses: (1) often deducted share purchases were made in a lessthan-transparent way, without fully informing the member involved;
and (2) since the new member shares purchased through this method did
not produce dividends and had a low future redemption value, most
members have viewed these new share acquisitions as nothing more
than an additional "cost of doing business" through the co-operative
rather than as acquisition of an equity holding that might generate a
positive future return.
Two ways in which co-operatives could generate more member
interest in purchasing additional shares would be either by paying more
competitive member dividends on member shares or by introducing a
share redemption policy which would better reflects the future market
value of a share at the time of redemption. The apparent success with
which rural SACCOs in Kenya are able to mobilize the savings of their
members - who also happen to be members of neighbouring coffee cooperatives - by paying attractive interest rates on savings would lead us
to conclude that both dairy and coffee co-operatives could raise more
member capital just by paying more competitive dividend rates on
member shares. Likewise, by periodically adjusting the redemption
value of shares to better reflect near-market prices, perhaps through
some internal closed bidding process which would be limited to existing
and new member applicants, these same co-operatives increase the
attractiveness of accumulating additional share capital.
6.2.4 Patronage shares, preferred shares or bonds
Since co-operatives redistribute surplus net earnings to members
at the end of the accounting year, via "patronage refunds", based on the
volume of business the member does with the co-operative, while endof-year patronage refunds are not practiced in the five co-operatives
studied, in theory, it could represent another way to mobilize additional
member shares. This could be done by reaching an agreement with
267
members to redistribute a fixed portion of this refund in the form of
additional share purchases instead of cash payments, similar to the
deduction approach mentioned in previous section, but applied to endof-year patronage refunds rather than member producer payments. This
system might be attractive to members, provided they were informed of
the quantity and value of additional shares purchased and assured of a
future positive dividend return.
While this mechanism would be relatively simple to administer,
one problem it would generate would be that high-volume users of the
co-operative's services would quickly increase their shareholdings
faster than low-volume users. This could begin to violate co-operative
law which states that no member may own more than 10% of the total
share capital of the co-operative and might lead to friction between large
and small shareholders. A way around this might be to issue them as a
sort of "preferred share" or bond which would be of a fixed time duration, would carry a more attractive fixed dividend or interest rate and
would be redeemable within a fixed period of time.
6.3
Other forms of member capital
Co-operatives can also access member capital by deferring payments due them for produce. While the dairy co-operatives examined
rarely did this, all of the coffee co-operatives practiced some form of
delay in their payment of members. While this approach is certainly
effective, it is not a very popular in the eyes of members. If abused, it
will quickly lead to increased member defections from the co-operative
in a more competitive market environment.
One other way that has been used by some coffee co-operatives in
Kenya is to deposit produce payments to members in individual member
demand deposit accounts held with the co-operative and allow members
to draw down their balances as needed. In situations where no other
banking services are available to members, this financial service might
be appreciated and used by members, and since most like to keep some
balance of their payment in their account, the co-operative could, using
268
Financing Economic Sef-re1iance and Member Participation
proper financial accounting controls and transparency, tap these balances to cover short-term cashflow working capital needs'9.
7.
CONCLUSIONS
The financial problems facing the Kenyan co-operatives examined in this paper are not dissimilar from those facing agricultural cooperatives in other parts of Africa. This is not surprising since the development of farmer co-operatives in many parts of the continent shares
similar colonial past. Colonial governments saw the co-operative more
as an instrument of government policy and social control rather than as a
farmer-run and -financed business and consequently played a major
guiding and sometimes controlling role in managing and financing these
organizations and marketing their produce (in the case of coffee and
cocoa). Post-independence governments continued this top-down tradi-
tion, though emphasizing more the "nation-building" role of cooperatives rather than their business role.
From the 1960s until the early 1990s, African farmer cooperatives operating in key export or strategic sectors (export crops and
in the case of Kenya, dairy) of the ec6nomy enjoyed easy access to sub-.
sidised credit and grants from governments and donors to finance their
business growth. The multi-tiered structures that developed, primed by
external funds from the top down and enforced by strong government
control, created a co-operative leadership and management that was
heavily accountable to higher levels of the structure rather than to mem-
bership at lower levels. Now that whole world is crumbling. Government is gradually withdrawing from the scenes, subsidies are being cut
and markets are being liberalised and competition is increasing in oncegovernment protected export markets. Yet the financial dependence of
19 .Jamsen, P While this method could be used, it must be pointed out that it is a risky one and
should not be done without proper financial accounting controls and systems. The failure of
the Union Banking System (UBS) a banking system serving coffee co-operative unions and
their nembershis was partly due to an abuse of this method
269
co-operatives on higher levels remains. Consequently, many farmer co-
operatives are beginning to suffer from severe capital shortages to
finance their business operations. With declining credit worthiness and
increasing burdens of debt, many co-operatives have had to turn to their
members for financial support. But will members be interested in
financing their co-operative?
In the case of the Kenya co-operatives studied, it has been seen
that strengthening the self-financing capacities of agricultural cooperatives will not be easy; nevertheless, there plenty of room for hope.
Certainly, the necessary pre-conditions for capital must be in-place. The
enterprise must be able to operate at a reasonable profit and there must
be a minimum level of trust in management's capability and transpar-
ency in communication between management and member. Furthermore, some changes in the country's co-operative law and tax laws will
probably be needed to provide a more conducive policy and legal environment to encourage more member capital formation. Yet more importantly, co-operatives themselves must find new ways to increase the
expected future value of member contributions to the co-operative.
As Von Pischke says "...in corporate markets, this is normally
done when a corporation issues shares of stock, promising rights of
control and allocations of expected earnings that are traded in the
present.. Thus, value arises when a financial contract or promise is
.
made or traded."2° In the author's view, co-operatives will have to look
for similar approaches to strengthening the expected future value of
their member capital contributions to the co-operative without
undermining the basic co-operative principles of one member one vote
and limited return on capital.
Strengthening member capital in Kenya's agricultural co-
operatives may not be such a bad thing since "Through capital
accumulation, and thus savings and productive investment, the people
acquire political power, the only real power that can force governments
20 Von Pischke, J.D., Finance at the Frontier: Debt Capacity and the Role of Credit in the
Private Economy, EDI Development Series, World Bak, Washington, D.C., 1991, P. 6.
270
to change their outlook and sometimes their agenda. Political power ultimately heeds nothing but the economic power on which it is based"21.
SOMMAIRE
A cause de la diminution de l'assistance et des credits dii gouvernement au secteur agricole des Pays en voie de développement et avec
l'augmentation de la competition de la part du secteur privé, plusieurs
organisations agricoles a cractère associatif sont en train maintenant de
chercher dans leurs mêmes membres les moyens pour aider le financement de leurs operations et de leur développement.
Toutes ces organisations, petits groupes dtauto-aide, associations
d'agriculteurs ou cooperatives, ont besoin d' épargne et de capital, c'est a
dire de fonds utilisables pour financer les operations et les investissethents.
Elles ont deux sources pour obtenir cela: de P"extérieur" (banques, gouvernements, fournisseurs), ou de Y"intérieur" soit en retenant les revenus nets
des activités économiques des organisations, soit par leurs mêmes membres.
Les conditions et les termes dans lesquels les membres pourront
financer volontairement leur organisation dependent des compensations
ou des encouragements qu'il vont recevoir ou qu'ils attendent de
recevoir en échange, en termes d'accès aux services, contrôle des processus décisionnels ou revenus économiques.
Ces termes ou conditions sont importants aussi parce qutils défin-
issent le type d'intérêt de ltassocié dans l'organisation et, de manière
indirecte, ils influencent la facon dans laquelle l'organisation est dirigée,
le niveau de participation des membres dans les affaires et même la performance économique de l'organisation.
Ce papier met en relief surtout le problème de la mobilisation du
capital des membres a l'intérieur des cooperatives agricoles en Afrique
(particulièrement dans les secteurs du lait et du café au Kenya) et analyse
les côtés forts et les côtés faibles de plusieurs instruments pour réaliser cet
objectif dans le contexte du Kenya.
21 Gelinas, op.cit., p. 143.
271
Savings at the Grassroots in
Western Province, Zambia:
A Matter of Policy-making,
Rain-making or Witch-making?
OTTO HOSPES
Savings at the Grassroots in Western Province, Zambia
INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses social-spatial, economic, ecological and
cultural determinants of savings behavior in Western Province and of
group-based savings as promoted by the PPS (Peoples Participation
Society) in particular'. Until June 1996 PPS had the status of a project
called the Peoples Participation Project (PPP). It was implemented by
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) and
technically supported by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO). Since 1996 PPS has been active as a registered NGO, now
funded through the Netherlands Embassy and technically supported by
SNV, the Dutch Organisation for Development Cooperation.
The general objective of the paper is to stimulate policy and scien-
tific discussion on savings options and decisions of rural people in
Africa and what might be considered the various social-spatial, ecological, economic and cultural determinants and dimensions of such options
and decisions - this all on the basis of some exploratory research and literature review. Two more specific objectives ofthis paper are to support
the PPS with the identification of "best savings services", given their
mission but also given cultural, economic and ecological conditions of
Western Province; and to foster discussion among various actual and
potential donor agencies of PPS on the findings and what they might
imply for the organisation and promotion of savings activities (of whatever kind) by and through self-help groups in Western Province and
elsewhere in Zambia.
I This paper is based on a one-month field research visit to Western Province in the period
March-April 1997, reading of evaluation reports, books and articles dealing with the Peoples
Participation Project ('PPP.), studies of the economics and culture of Western Province and
review of the cultural dynamics of savings behavior in other parts ofAfrica. The research in
Zambia is part of a larger WA U-FAQ research project on the impact of socio-culturalfactors
on savings of the poor in Africa. Ms. Tine Bollin and Ms. Nicoliene Qudwater former
graduate students ofthe WA U, greatly assisted me with the preparation and implementation of
my explorat ory field research. Their follow-up studies have resulted in the field report (1997)
entitled "No sweat, no sweet? A study of self-help groups as promoted by PPS in Western
Province, Zambia ". Though the research has been organized in kind cooperation with John
Rouse (FAQ/SDAR, Rome) andfinancially supported by FAQ and WA this paper expresses
my views and not necessarily the ones ofFAO officials.
275
Savings can be defined as "any conservation of movable property
by an individual or group for future use or disposal" (Shipton 1992: 26).
Theoretically speaking, one can conserve property in various ways: say-
ings in kind, savings in cash, storing debt claims, individual savings,
group savings and savings with third parties (like a trusted person or a
bank). A central argument of this paper is that one cannot explain decisions of people related to savings without an understanding of their
social-spatial organization, cultural dynamics, ecological and economic
conditions.
1.
THE DETERMINANTS OF SAVINGS IN WESTERN
PRO VINCE
This part reviews various social-spatial, economic, ecological and
cultural determinants of savings options and decisions of rural people in
Western Province. To assess the differential impact of these determinants or conditions, every section also includes some details about savings options and decisions of rural people in two different agroecological areas: one is Kalabo District that is situated at the west bank
of the Zambezi river and is generally known as a distant and resourcepoor area; the second one is Kaoma district that is situated upland and
begins at some 100 to 140 kilometers at the east side of the Zambezi
river. The eastern zone of this district is often called the 'maize belt' of
Western Province as an expression of its better agro-ecological conditions and surplus production.
1.1
Early settlers and late corners: ethnical groups,
processes of migration, distribution of ownership and
usufructuary rights, ways and patterns of housing
Western Province, like all other provinces of Zambia is a multiethnic area where it is hard to reach consensus on who are the original own-
ers of the land, the waters, the wood and the game, who are the
newcomers and what authority has the final say in what kind of resource
276
dispute. Pre-colonial wars, British indirect rule (cf. van Binsbergen
1992), post-colonial land tenure reforms, and more peaceful processes
of migration of people from poorer soils of Western Province (and elsewhere in Zambia) to the richer ones (like those of Kaoma district), have
resulted in an ethnic jumble and much contributed to legaladministrative complexity - to put it nicely. Some called all inhabitants
of Western Province Lozi people - possibly referring to pre-colonial
times when the various tribes were federated under Lozi rule (cf. Hayward 1987: 8) - whilst others situated Lozi in particular parts of Western
Province. Some simply labelled Mbunda people as Luvale people,
whilst others really got upset when the two names were treated as
synonyms.
Anyway, in every part of Western Province, there are early settlers
and newcomers with the last category usually having lesser or no owner-
ship rights on land and water. In the Lukona Action Area of PPS in
Kalabo District the Lozi are the early settlers who consider Luvale and
Mbunda people as the newcomers, except those who married with Lozi
people and descend from Luvale or Mbunda who settled here nearly a
century ago. Typically, the newcomers live in the upland areas where
they mostly cultivate millet and cassava on not so fertile, sandy soils.
The situation is quite the reverse in Mangango Action Area in Kaoma
District where most of the Lozi and Luvale are newcomers. In this area
the Nkoya are early settlers who have great difficulty accepting the presence and rule of a Lozi chief who claims to be senior to the two Nkoya
chiefs.
Processes of migration and (re)distribution of ownership and
usufructuary rights on land, water, trees, etc. greatly affect possibilities
to conserve movable property. In Kandiana village of Lukona area, for
instance, the Lozi have allowed the Mbunda to settle at a strip of land
behind their houses and to cultivate millet and cassava more upland.
Lacking first ownership rights on land, it is typical that it is Mbunda who
undertake petty shopping activities. Related to this, we found some
evidence of newcomers being more open and eager to undertake joint
action as promoted by development workers: those Village Health
277
Committees of Kalabo District that were being awarded official prizes
for exemplary performance were managed by Mbunda people, said the
environmental officer, not being an early settler either. From this he
even concluded that if an agency would like to start a project here, then
there is a greater chance of success when targeting Mbunda than Lozi.
The Group Promoter of Munkuye B of Kaoma District, a Lozi lady,
reported that the early settlers, the Nkoya, were quite reluctant to
organize themselves into PPS-groups in contrast to the newcomers, the
Lozi and Luvale people.
Possibly, the largest category of newcomers are women. When a
woman marries2, she moves to her husbands place and starts to work
her husbands fields. "She does not belong there, she is a foreigner"
(Kahanda, pers.comm. 1997), even though, of course, she might have
grown up in a neighbouring village. So, in other words the PPS groups
that consist for about 70 percent of women are groups of "strangers"
working together. In the Lukona area of Kalabo District these women
were often left behind by their husbands who had died or migrated. We
hardly met adult and able-bodied men in this area, which confirms the
observation of Kanyangwa and Shula (1985) who found on the basis of
their baseline study in Kalabo, Kaoma and Mongu Districts that, "Of
the total households visited only 19.3 percent had men of36 to 50 years"
(p. 5). This altogether means that membership of PPS groups to a large
2 Polygamy is not veiy common in Western Province, said several female key-informants based
on their field work experience (Lubinda 1997, Kahanda 1997). Others (Ndanko and Mulyoka,
pers.comm. 1997) explained that polygamy used to be quite common among Lozi but has
declined as a result of economic hardship and the increasing influence of christian church
leaders preaching monogamy. "If a man (with the help of his w([e) would only have to grow
enough crops tofeed his family, then having Iwo wives would still have been possible or even
an advantage ", said Mulyoka ('pers.conlm. 1997). Yet, "when he is supposed to regularly provide some money to his wife to buy salt, soap and sugal; then having too wives may become too
costly and cumbersome" (ibid,). Monogamy seems more a sign ofpoverty than an expression
ofstrict obedience to Christian norms. Besides, it is still rather common that men share their
sexual life with more than one woman.
3 19.3 percent is the average number for the three Districts. Probably, this means that the
percentage for Kalabo is (much) lower as this District is the one and only District with (high)
out-migration (District Planning Officer ofKaoma, pers.comm. 1997).
278
extent mirrors the age and gender composition of local society: a typical
member of such a group is a widow or divorcee of 30 to 50 years old.
A final important social-spatial parameter of conservation of
movable property (that is: savings) are local conceptions and practices
of housing and settlement. All Lozi respondents when asked to translate
the concept of household in their local language, suggested the word
lapa. However, it proved very difficult to reach consensus on what
exactly is a lapa. Some said it basically means 'fence', that indeed surrounds most or a large part of a hut or compound in Lozi places - also
supporting the widely held belief that Lozi are 'secretive'. This is in contrast with Luvale and Mbunda who usually do not fence their huts and
are said to be more 'open' and 'interactive'. Others emphasized that
lapa refers to 'being independent' in terms of consumption and production, which means that also those who have not fenced their hut, like
three yet unmarried brothers living together, can form a lapa. These two
definitions happen to match with those of Jalla's dictionary (1982): a
lapa is a yard round the house or in front of it; fence surrounding it; and
in the figurative sense: people living in the house, family.
What this all implies for savings activities is yet unclear. Can
members of one lapa put claims on savings in kind of another lapa, are
lapa units of savings or do we have to further differentiate the lapa
according to gender to identify and analyse savings practices? Location,
storage and ownership of granaries might provide some clues in this
connection. Yet, the location of granaries both inside and outside the
fences is confusing or at least defying the existence of one dominant
savings norm.
One or two lapa (headed by one man or two brothers) can make a
rnunzi, which is being translated into 'village' or 'family village'. It is
important to note that the concept of munzi differs from the concept of
village as known and practiced in official circles. The munzi is a kinshipbased unit (of 1 to 15 huts) which is considered too small for administrative purposes. For this reason, government officials have identified 'registered villages' to include a number of munzi.
279
1.2
Either too wet or too dry
According to Hayward (1987), "the province is dominated by the
great flood plain of the Zambezi: the traditional life of people in both the
plain and the upland valleys was conditioned by the yearly flooding
cycle" (p. 8). The flood plain is about 225 kilometers long and 40 to 60
kilometers wide, with a large part of the population of Western Province
living at its edges (see Maimbo 1996: map 2), including the inhabitants
of Mongu, Senanga and Kalabo town. The unpredictable flooding of the
Zambezi river make the production of food and cash crops in the flood
plain unsecured, which is one of the main reasons why Kalabo District is
a "food deficit area", according to Weinberger (pers.comm. 1997).
These ecological insecurities also have large implications for possibilities to accumulate money. For instance, rice cultivation that is being
considered a potentially attractive way to make money - also by some
PPS groups in Kalabo District - can yield a nice income in one year but
bad ones in following years, hereby depleting the savings fund or working capital of an individual or (PPS-)group.
The vastness of the province covering approximately 126,386
square kilometers (Chabala 1994:3) is misleading: it suggest that there
is enough (fertile) land for everybody and that few land conflicts will
have occurred. Hayward, explaining the "unique and productively forbidding ecology" of Western Province, speaks of "marginal agriculture
on the thin band of soils neither too dry nor too wet, neither too sandy
nor too clayey" that have "put sharp limits on the expansion of cultivation and have generated political competition and domination of the
richest sites" (1987:8)
Maimbo et al. (1996) distinguish three distinct economic systems
of Western Province: "the semi-subsistence oriented economy of the
Barotse flood plain and surrounding areas, the semi-market oriented
economy of the new settlement areas in Kaoma district, and the economy of Sesheke" (p. 74) that is oriented towards Southern Province"
(and excluded in their study). They conclude that, "The food security
situation of the wetland-based livelihood systems (plain/plain edge,
280
upland river valleys, dambo areas) is relatively comfortable" (ibid.) but
warn that, "The recent series of relatively dry years may have had an
impact on cropping decisions by farmers" (p. 75).
Kaoma district enjoys better soil and rainfall conditions than the
rest of Western Province, explaining high crop productivity but also
high in-migration. Maimbo et al. (1996) conclude that, "For the majority
of households, there is no subsistence risk. However, there is a distinct
category of resource-poor households - mainly female-headed
households - which depends heavily on piecework income probably
constituting one of the most vulnerable groups in Western Province" (p.
76). It is exactly this category that seems well represented among PPSgroups in the Munkuye B Action Area of Kaoma district. According to
the Group Promoter of PPS her groups were brewing beer, cutting grass
and/or working in someone else's field (piecework) against payment in
cash or maize.
1.3
Signs of well-being and/or bad evils
According to Chabala (pers.comm. 1997), "Value is still much
perceived in Western Province and in particular among the Lozi. Money
is preferably converted into tangible things, like cattle, a plough or a
fishing net". Money is quickly transformed into non-monetary capital;
yields are quite often bartered, like maize and fish. These preferences
might, of course, greatly affect the significance and use of a group fund
(see 2.3.2). Money accumulation is not and cannot be a goal in itself.
The fund of a group is used as working capital to enable purchase of tangible things, like tradeable basic goods (like maize, salt, paraffin and jerrycans) with the ultimate objective however, to buy a plough or cattle.
It is generally believed that Lozi people very much define being
wealthy in terms of ownership of cattle. Weinberger who is an engineer
stationed in Kalabo town, mentioned that, "ownership of cattle" and
"throwing away food" to dogs are signs of wealth among the Lozi
(pers. comm 1997). Kahanda referred to the saying: "This person is poor
(bubotana), he does not even have a cow, only a duck" (pers.comm.
281
1997). Cattle ownership was indeed quickly mentioned as a sign of wellbeing in a discussion with members of a Village Health Committee of
Mashwafela, a Lozi village in the Lukona area. Yet, the village headman
who chaired the VHC, then complained that all of his villagers (together
14 lapa) had to be classified as 'being poor', except a few members of
three lapa who own cattle.
Another salient outcome of the discussion with this same VHC
was that "food throughout the year" was the first-mentioned sign of
well-being. This, of course, would mean that being poor might very well
be of a seasonal nature and so much dependent on food production,
changing household composition and demands of needy relatives and
friends. But it basically suggests that food security is simply of vital
importance to villagers. Other signs of well-being, according to the peopie attending the meeting, were furniture, a well-maintained house (with
no insects and leakages) and proper clothes. Ownership of land, ploughs
and ox-cart were also mentioned as signs of well-being but one of the
members of the VHC commented that a land-owner does not always
properly manage his land whereas a tenant might do so (which, however, provides no clues whatsoever on who exactly profits from the hard
work of the tenant).
Contrasting views were given with regard to the question whether
it would be acceptable to dress nicely to show off prosperity. Some said
this would quickly lead to rumours accusing the nicely dressed person of
being a witch. Others, including the village headman, said that the success of one person should inspire others to imitate her or him. Probably,
he also told us this out of self-defense as he explained that one year he
was the only recipient of hybrid sorghum-seed whereas his villagers had
to wait another year to receive such seed as well.
A culture ofjealousy greatly affects options and decisions related
to savings and more in particular possibilities for capital accumulation.
Roberts (pers.comm. 1997) characterized jealousy as one of the main
social-cultural traits of African people, next to the related fear to offend
other people and (their) spirits. According to him, "people are afraid of
282
moving ahead because of jealousy." Piece-workers prefer to be paid
when it is dark so that rumours about their payments will not reach their
family. A 'community' prefers to use limited funds to construct founda-
tions for everyone in a housing project, instead of building complete
houses for a limited number of people. A Zambian environmental officer stationed in the Lukona area of Kalabo District, put it this way:
"Africans, and Lozi in particular, are not people who can appreciate
someone else succeeding." He added that, "Most of the government
retirees originating from this area, fear to be bewitched because they are
considered rich. They do not come back" (Mutyoka, pers.comm. 1997).
According to Weinberger (pers.comm. 1997), "If you are doing well,
you have either 30 relatives in your yard or you are bewitched." His
story of an old lady was very telling:
An old woman had just lost 4 ZK million because her house burned down
together with the money put under it. Her neighbours called her stupid but she
replied fiercely: "No, I am not stupid, otherwise my relatives would have
claimed it."
This all confirms earlier findings of Hayward (1987) thatjealousy
"appears to involve a conception of 'zero-sum benefit' or 'limited good'
[...J by which one person's improvement is another persons loss. Those
in a family group who achieve economic success are the target not only
of increased demands to share their wealth - the natural process in a
reciprocal, diffuse economic framework - but are also the object of both
overt and covert (e.g. sorcery) attempts to bring them back down from
their present level of pride" (p. 20).
Yet, one should not conclude at this point that a culture ofj ealousy
is the one and only normative order to completely regulate the behavior
of all inhabitants of Western Province, whether Lozi, Luvale or
Mbunda. Also, it would not be fair to conclude that ownership of cattle
is the one and only preferential asset of these same 300,000 people. For
instance, two Lozi development workers stationed in Munkuye B of
Kaoma District did not mention cattle ownership at all when asked
about signs of wealth, but referred instead to a big house, a clean house
and yard, and big fields that can feed many mouths. According to the
283
same informants, a culture of competition characterizes the social interaction among the Lozi as well as the Luvale of Kaoma district whereas
their Nkoya neighbours feel that it is dangerous to become rich as there
is a risk to become bewitched. On a continuum from rich to poor, they
would definitively position the Nkoya closer to the poor end and the
Lozi and Luvale to the richer one. Unfortunately, the Group Promotor of
Munkuye B found it very hard to convince Nkoya to organize themselves into PPS-groups: Nkoya blame Lozi and Luvale to have stolen
their land (see also 2.1) and do not like the idea of being told to get
organized in a PPS-group. And if Nkoya and Lozi join hands and
become member of one PPS-group, then there is the risk that at a time of
new tensions between the Lozi chief and the two Nkoya chiefs of
Kaoma District, the groups will fall apart - like recently happened with
two groups that were started in 1995, reported the Group Promoter of
Munkuye B Action Area.
Definitions of 'being rich' and 'being poor' are very much subject
to interests and points of reference of those defining these concepts. One
can get a general idea about local perceptions of 'being rich' and 'being
poor' when one asks several local informants (who are used to speak
English) how to translate these concepts into the local language(s) and
then discuss with groups of individuals what they consider the dominant
features of those 'being rich' and 'being poor' in their own area. A
wealth-ranking exercise with an individual who has a supposedly
detailed understanding of the life-histories of people living in a particular area, is fluent in English and not unfamiliar with some of the habits
and interests of the interviewers (in this case: foreign researchers), can
generate a more nuanced, yet very location-specific picture. The chairlady of the Area Development Team of Lukona who had earlier worked
as a teacher and then with an airline, met all these criteria. When we
asked her to rank lapa of her village from rich to poor and to cluster them
into groups, she finally classified 28 lapa into four clusters.
The poorest seven consist of old widows with no children to look
after them, a women addicted to beer, young people with no land to cul-
tivate - all of them facing great difficulties to guarantee food security
284
and not owning cattle. According to our key-informant, the second cluster of eight "poor but not very poor" lapa have at least the means to sustain themselves. They own some land but not a plough or oxen. Often,
they work for other people. The third cluster consists of 10 lapa who
own land and can sometimes afford to hire people to work for them. This
cluster also includes (Lozi) people who own cattle and (Mbunda) people
who easily make money with petty trading or the sale of their labour
power. The richest cluster is the only cluster with people who used to
have a formal employment. The cluster consists of three lapa: two of
them concern two ladies who are married to a retired government
worker and the third one is headed by our key-informant herself, who is
also a retired government worker. These government workers own cattle
and a plough. This means that, "food-wise it is easier" said our interviewee, who further added that especially the husband of the two wives
has not to worry much about food supplies: each wife brings her own
food.
In a final stage of the time-consuming exercise, the key-informant
was being asked to classif' the 28 lapa in terms of ethnical background,
marital status and (non-)membership of a PP S-group. All but the richest
cluster consisted of a more or less equal number of Lozi and Mbunda
lapa. The richest cluster consisted ofLozi only. Eight of the 13 lapa with
a married woman, were classified into the two richest clusters. Ten of
the 15 lapa headed by an unmarried woman (divorcee and/or widow)
belonged to the two poorest clusters. Ten out of 14 lapa with PPSmembers were put in the two richest clusters whereas 11 out of the 14
lapa without PPS-members were ranked into the two poorest clusters4.
1.4
To live in the present or in the future
Storage of food and general attitudes towards conservation of
movable property for future use or disposal can be much defined by the
social construction of time and time-horizon. For several reasons many
4 Whether this means that FF5 is not serving the rural poor in this village or has rather
succesfully helped people who used to be poor to improve their social-economic well-being, is
hard to say.
285
women are not really calculating how much food is left in the granary or
elsewhere until the next harvest - with a view to make decisions on how
much food can be on average consumed every week or day. "One eats as
long as there is food", says Roberts (pers.cornm. 1997). Even if there
would be enough for the whole season to feed a lapa, then still shortage
of food might occur due to claims of other relatives, neighbours and/or
friends. According to Roberts, "There are so many factors in social relationships that it is frustrating to set a budget." Likewise, if one person or
lapa faces shortage of food herself or itself, then one can always put a
claim on another person or lapa.
Two key-informants put it this way: "People live in the present"
(Weinberger, pers.conim. 1997; Roberts, pers.comm. 1997). Both also
mentioned that many food relief agencies have unintentionally reinforced this mind-set during the last five to seven years characterized by
more or less regular provision of food aid. Chiefs and their followers
(now) increasingly expect such agencies to help in case of food
shortage.
2.
STORAGE AND SAVINGS: LOCAL CONCEPTS,
OPTIONS AND DECISIONS
When faced with unusually low income or unusually high expenditure for either planned or unforeseen purposes, an individual, or group
of individuals, can either draw upon his or her savings and/or make use
of credit (Oxfam 1990: 6). This paper does not systematically review
borrowing options, yet under particular conditions rural people might
very well prefer to borrow (or exchange goods, money and/or services)
instead of using own savings. Also, borrowing options might very well
affect when and why people (do not) make use of own savings.
Another, more fundamental option when faced with increasing
costs of living is to withdraw from monetary transactions and put a
greater emphasis on subsistence production and/or barter. According to
Roeber (pers.comm. 1996), "Traders who provide basic commodities to
286
the rural areas such as second hand clothing, sugar, salt, cooking oil,
soap, etc. often barter with local farmers who have little need for cash
since they have no access to formal financial systems." Roeber in this
connection referred to the "problem of demonetization in the rural
areas" of Zambia. A livestock officer of Kalabo District even told us
that, "Money is not a source of exchange here in this area. It is a barter
system" (Mkumba, pers.comm. 1997).
2.1
Tosavethedead
The Lozi word for "savings" is pulukelo, which has been translated into English by Jalla (1982) as a "box in which valuable goods are
kept; a safe". According to several key-informants and Lozi villagers,
one can only speak of pulukelo when referring to storage of grain or
money. The word 'pulukelo' can not be used to denote the keeping of
cattle. For this purpose, Lozi use the word 'liluwo', which means 'keeping things that are living' (see 2.2). Such things differ from money and
grains that are not living things, at best of vital importance in terms of
petty investment, food security and other basic needs (see 2.1.1, 2.1.2
and 2.3).
Mbunda use three different words for storing grain, each referring
to a different phase or purpose: litulikilo is storing with a view to dry
grains; sishete is storing of grains for (nearly) immediate consumption;
kambendekela is to store food for the thture, which might be considered
the Mbunda equivalent of savings of grain. Kambendekela is also being
used to refer to maize porridge (nshima) that is being kept apart by a
wife for her husband, just in case he has 'sat elsewhere' but not eaten
enough.
2.1.1 To store grains
The chairlady of the Area Development Team of Lukona, Kalabo
District, showed us that the Lozi of her village typically store their maize
in granaries located inside the courtyard whereas Mbunda who do not
fence their houses, store their millet in granaries grouped together at
287
some distance from their huts. Possibly, the fact that maize cobs are easier to steal than millet and that Mbunda more rely on millet cultivation
than Lozi, explains to a large extent why Lozi store their grains inside
the courtyard in contrast to Mbunda. What makes it complicated again is
that Mbunda seem to have a wider spatial notion of the domestic sphere.
Anyway, grains are also stored inside the hut or kept in drums - if a granary can not be built or is not necessary.
Speaking in general, a women development worker believed that
in 8 of out 10 cases, the granary is the responsibility of the wife
(Lubinda, pers.comm. 1997). This was also the general opinion at a
meeting of the Village Health Committee of Mashwafela (Lukona area,
Kalabo District), consisting of 12 men and 3 women. They upheld the
image of the granary as a woman's domain but recognized that if the
husband wants to make some money, he can go into the granary and collect some grain for sale. Still, one of the male members of a PPS-group
of Munkuye B area of Kalabo District described the granary next to his
house as "the bank of the stomach."
2.1.2 To keep money at home
According to Chabala, the subsistence-orientation of many people
of Western Province, does not imply that they do not save cash (see also
Roberts 1972): "The amount of money they keep depends on what they
think is needed to pay school uniforms, food in case of deficit times and
medicines" (pers.comm. 1997). This seems plausible given the potential
money claims of relatives and neighbours. Still, there are also cases
reported (see 2.3) of millions of Kwacha being saved at home, only
reaching the surface v and the attention of the fortunate researcher who
happens to be around - in case of a fire or other calamity endangering the
house and its treasure.
2.1.3 To keep money with trustees
We only came across one case of a man who not only strongly preferred to save in money but also to keep (part of) his money with anyone
288
whom he could trust. The man was of Mbunda origin and lived in the
Lukona area of Kalabo District. He was a member of a local PPS-group,
quite outspoken and entrepreneurial-minded. Possibly, this keeping of
cash savings is part of what Mutyoka (pers.comm. 1997) meant with
supportive networks of Mbunda "who help each other to improve" and
"are like Indian businessmen."
2.1.4 To save money at a bank
To save with a bank is close to a non-option to most of the inhabitants of Western Province. Mongu city counts branches of two banks:
the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB) and Standard Chartered Ltd. In Koama city the Credit and Saving Union Bank has just
opened a branch this year, not long after the collapse of the Lima Bank.
First of all, for many people it takes at least a day or so to travel to
a bank and another day to get back home - walking on sandy roads,
crossing the Zambezi Flood Plain per canoe or postboat, and/or hitchhiking with a pick-up on one of the few but very bad tar roads. Motorbikes, that can be of great profit to both clients and (mobile) bankers, are
hardly seen in Western Province.
The considerable travelling time and low bank-density make one
wonder why it is often so crowded at the branch of the ZNCB, in contrast to Standard Chartered. These are, however, not people bringing
their savings to the bank or applying for a loan. Most of them are civil
servants (or their treasurers or trustees) who have come to collect their
salaries. ZNCB is a window for distributing salaries. According to a senior bank employee, the branch serves nearly 10,000 civil servants (at
total population of about 300,000 in Western Province) but not without
conditions: they are all supposed to keep the ZANACO savings account
through which the salaries can be transferred. The minimum balance of
this savings account (with an annual interest of 22 percent) should be
ZK 50,000, which is about the size of a monthly salary of a civil servant.
The total number of 'savers' of another 'savings program' amounts to
600. The minimum balance of this savings program (with an annual
289
interest of 29 percent) is ZK 250,000. Only large entrepreneurs, who can
meet this condition, have such an account, said the senior bank
employee5. Obviously, next to physical distance, these minimum bal-
ances provide a major barrier to potential small savers. Roberts
(pers.comm. 1997) put it very bluntly: "Banks and bank savings are not
an alternative in a country with an average per capita income of 400
USD per year."
According to Chabala (pers.comm. 1997), the policies of the British and post-colonial rulers, in practice, were not directed at integration
of the indigenous people or peasants into the 'main-stream economy',
explaining the present low bank-density and lack of interest of banks to
open (more) branches in Western Province.
2.2
To keep the living
Kahanda (pers.comm. 1997) believes that cattle is not so much a
form of savings but an asset in the eyes of the Lozi who rather perceive
cattle (see also 2.3) as wealth (bufumu). She added that the difference
between savings and this form of wealth is that, "It is easy to start savings, but not easy to keep cattle as it runs in families", referring to conflicting (types of) ownership claims on the same cattle.
A Mbunda man explained to us that the word kambendekela is
used to refer to savings of cattle. The word means that the future use of
the cattle has been earmarked and, for instance, reserved for payment of
a bride price or school fees (the word can also be used to refer to savings
in grain or money).
2.3
Saving the dead but vital - with PPS-groups
To understand to what extent participation in a PPS-group is an
option for rural people of Western Province to save, why quite a few of
5 This all means that the loan portfolio of the bank is at least the sum ofZK 500 million and ZK
150 million, that are probably "invested" in treasury bills and/or loans to large urban-based
enterprises.
290
them do so and how they define and use the group savings fund, one has
to analyze the participation and significance of PPS-groups at large.
This again is very much dependent on (a) the wider philosophy, more
concrete credit and savings policies, and the group formation approach
of PPS, (b) other options in the field of savings and credit (see 2.1, 2.2
and 3) and (c) social-spatial, ecological, economic and cultural conditions (see 2) defining the range of options and providing background
and meaning to decisions related to savings.
2.3.1 Changing capacities ofFPS to enable and enforce
savings
A very concise version of the wider philosophy of PPP - now PPS is the long-term goal: "Enabling the rural poor in the action areas (with a
special emphasis on rural women) to improve their socio-economic conditions through a sub-village development approach based on the estab-
lishment of small, informal self-help groups, organised around group
income-generating activities, which members themselves identify."
Indeed, PPS-groups do not start as pure financial self-help groups, like a
ROSCA or ASCRA, but rather as labour groups or economic self-help
groups with one or more financial self-help functions. Yet, some of the
(older) groups have adopted features ofASCRAs: members have agreed
to regularly contribute to the accumulating group fund from their individual fields and income.
The credit and savings policy of PPS can be seen as a tool or
method to realize the long-term goal. Interestingly, the year of 1994
marked a dramatic shift of the official lending policy of the then PPPproject. From 1987 till 1994 the so-called rotating fund of the project
was used to provide seasonal loans on soft terms (no rate of interest) for
agricultural purposes. A cooperative union managed the fund. Unfortunately, the rotating fund proved to have been evaporated when the cooperative union was dismantled during the early 1 990s. No savings policy
whatsoever had been followed until 1994.
291
After 1994 the PPP started to manage a 'recapitalized' rotating
fund itself, keeping the donor money at an account of the branch of Standard Chartered of Mongu city. It was decided that loans (with interests at
commercial bank rates) should be provided to stimulate off-farm activities. Also, next to short-term loans to be repaid in 12 months, medium-
term loans were offered - though hardly provided in practice till now,
according to the executive director6. To be eligible for a loan, a group
"must show evidence of having saved regularly for at least 6 months immediately prior to the loan application, showing the frequency and
amount of savings" (PPP Credit Leaflet, 1995) or 12 months in case of
an application for a medium-term loan. In addition, the Credit Leaflet
warns that, "The project does not accept a steep increase in the savings
in the last months to secure a loan". Finally, at least half of the own contribution of 20 percent of the investment-sum should come from regular
savings.
Key-persons acting as interfaces between the executive director
and the many small groups are district coordinators and group promoters. They promote rural poor to organize themselves in small, economic
self-help groups and are supposed to explain the (changing) lending policy of PPS. The start of a PPS-group is very much the effort of a Group
Promoter or agricultural officer. Until 1996 PPP was implemented
through the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF). The
project District Coordinators of PPP were based in the district MAFF
offices and agricultural assistants were supposed to assist the GPs at the
village level (Chabala 1994: 28-29). Not surprisingly, in Kalabo District, "45 percent of the groups interviewed were initiated by the local
official, while 31 percent were initiated by district officials outside the
area and 24 percent of the groups had been established by own initia6 This is not surprising as the average amount of savings per group is about USD 20 or ZK
26,000, which is not enough to qualiJjifor a medium-term loan: the minimim contributionfrom
own savings should be 10 percent of the cash value of the investment-sum of at least ZK
600,000 but not more than ZK 3,600,000 'PPP Leaflet 1995,). Howeve, quite some groups
might apply for a short-ter,n loan as the cash-value of the investment-sum should then be
between ZK 60,000 and ZK 600,000, which means that the own contribution from regular
savings should be minimally ZK 6,000.
292
Savings at the Grassroots in Western Province, Za,nbia
tive" (ibid.: 40). The so-called officials played a similar role in Kaoma
District: "79 percent of the groups in Kaoma were established with the
initiative of the local officials of the area while 21 percent were established with own initiative" (ibid.: 42).
In the action area of the new and young GP of Mangango, 22
groups have been started. These days 15 groups are said to be still active,
of which 11 have been newly formed by the GP in the period April-June
1996. This suggests that seven of the older groups have collapsed and
four of the older groups have decided to continue operations with the
support of the new GP. These dynamics indicates that the rise and fall of
quite a few groups - and also the validity of the reporting - are closely
related to the GP, her presence, personal characteristics and human
skills. It should be noted, however, that the older groups were set up at a
time when the then PPP was supported and monitored by a government
agency, the MAFF. The dismantling of this 'governance structure'
-
might have eroded a major force keeping a number of groups together
the expectation to gain some benefits (like cheap agricultural loans) and
privileges from the MAFF through group membership.
2.3.2 Accumulating working capital, insuring and
saving with PPS-groups
Given the enormous contextual diversity (see 2) and changes of
governance structure, programmes and personnel of PPP, one can
expect an enonnous diversity of PPP-groups in terms of membership,
age, range and types of income-generating activities (see PPS Annual
Report 1996: 7-8), relations to other groups and agencies, size of group
funds, ways of contributing to a group fund, etc. For instance, the Group
Information Update of September 1996 shows enormous variations of
the size and nature of the group fund: in the Sikongo Action Area (of
Kalabo District) four groups have stored brush millet or maize worth ZK
15,000 up to ZK 90,000, two groups have respectively ZK 5,000 and ZK
30,000 in cash, and five groups have zero in cash, as per September
1996. Also, in Muweshi Action Area (of Kalabo District) six out of 10
groups seem to manage a grain bank instead of a fund. In the Litooma
293
Action Area (Kalabo District) the average amount of money kept per
group is ZK 3,200 whereas in Mangango Action Area (Kaoma District)
the average amount is nearly ZK 30,000 per group.
This section provides some insights of the dynamics of PPSgroups, not of the typical but non-existing PPS-group. At best, various
ways of cooperative management of scarce resources in an ecologically
hostile and socially demanding environment can be distinguished.
Whenever appropriate, a wider issue will be dealt with on the basis of
the short description of the activities and social dynamics of a PPSgroup.
People With One Heart
The PPS-group of Mushwafela village (Lukona area, Kalabo District) is called Piluilinwi, which means "people with one heart or interest". The GP believes that this group does not any longer need intensive
support from her as she thinks that the group can stand on her own feet.
Interestingly enough, the PPS-group has been incorporated by the Village Health Committee to a large extent: the group does not undertake
separate economic activities any longer and four members of the group
belong to the staff of the VHC that not only includes a health and a sani-
tation sub-committee but also an agricultural and a business subcommittee.
About four years ago the agricultural sub-committee had used a
large part of the yield (11 bags of 90 kgs.) from rice cultivation to buy
ploughs. The remaining money was handed over to the business subcommittee who bought paraffin, matches and salt. According to the
chairperson of this sub-committee, the income from the sale of paraffin
and matches was ZK 7,500 whereas the salt was exchanged for 3.5 bags
of maize worth ZK 32,500. The total amount of ZK 40,000 was then
used to buy jerrycans for sale and to contribute to the construction of a
protected well of a neighbouring village, leaving the VHC-cum-PPS
group with only ZK 4,000 in cash. Money accumulation seems not a
294
goal per se but rather making money through an efficient and intensive
use of limited financial means.
After 1993 the agricultural sub-committee faced, two disappointing rice harvests due to drought. They decided to plant another crop.
Those in charge of the Prevention Against Malnutrion (PAM) program
provided them with sorghum seeds on very soft terms7. The village
headman had given usufructuary rights to the VHC to grow crops on the
collective field. This man happens to be the chairperson of the VHC,
which has proved to be a great advantage to the group.
According to Kahanda (pers.comm. 1997), in most cases a jointly
cultivated piece of land does not belong to the group or a member of the
group. Women ask the village headman permission to cultivate a piece
of land for a certain period. They do not acquire ownership rights but
work on it on a temporary basis. Kahanda further explained that working
a piece of land together is not so much an imitation or revival of lubile.
This is an old and now weak tradition of collective labour on someones
field followed by a beer thinking session organized by the owner of the
field to celebrate the end of the work and to 'pay' the labourers. Accord-
ing to Kahanda, the joint labour is rather an expression of PPP
philosophy.
We also asked whether those 30 people attending the meeting of
the VHC, a mix of staff, clients and PPS-members, preferred to save in
grains or in cash. An old man immediately responded saying that to save
in grains is the best as "food is the one which makes life." A young and
casual attendant of the meeting preferred to save in money to be put at a
bank. Another old man replied fiercely: "If one has a lot of money, one
can still die of hunger; if one invests in food, one can always survive."
When asked what they would do (as an individual) when they would all
of sudden avail of ZK 500,000, a vivid debate started again: a middleaged man would buy animals as they can reproduce themselves and
bring wealth; money can only be squandered. A young man said he
would invest the money into businesses. Yet, another young man dis7 PAM provides soft loans as well as subsidies (Bollin and Oudwater pers.comni. 1997).
295
agreed and replied that "one should understand where one comes from".
Then, he summed up all the advantages (see 2.3) of converting money
into cattle. Unfortunately, not a single woman took the floor to speak up
during this village debate.
The Chiefs Field
In 1995 nine women started the PPS-group Namukau (which
means: the chief's field) in the Lukona area of Kalabo District. Now the
membership has doubled including 14 women and 4 men, all of Lozi
origin, coming from three different villages. The group counts six married women, of which two are married with a male member of the group.
The men were invited to become members because this would save
them money: it would no longer be necessary to hire men for ploughing
services. One of the men is the village headman. He allowed the group to
cultivate a piece of land, also explaining the name of the group. This
shows that male membership can be of strategic interest to a femaleheaded PPS-group.
During their first season, the members cultivated sorghum on their
common plot. They divided the yield among each other because all of
them faced shortage of food. Yet, in spite of the food security function of
sorghum cultivation, the group decided to cultivate rice in the next season "because there is no market for sorghum". Next to.cultivating food
crops, the group grows vegetables and produces baskets for sale in
Mongu. One of the members keeps the group income. When a member
is ill and has to go to a clinic, she will be given a donation from the group
fund to cover (part of) the costs.
The group was very puzzled when I asked about a monthly contribution of, for instance, ZK 500 to the common fund and replicated with:
"Why would we do so? We cannot afford to contribute that much to the
fund on a monthly basis!" They complained that none of them (but the
husband of one of the women) owned cattle. Possibly, senior claims on
scarce money (Hospes 1997) and the young age of the group together
296
explain the lack of a periodical contribution to a rotating or accumulating fund.
Ifyou are not providing for yourself nobody is
One of the oldest PPS-groups in the Lukona Action Area of
Kalabo District is Wakanokutonena, which means "if you are not providing for yourself, nobody is". The group started in 1983, following the
advice of an agricultural officer. Membership composition has changed
through time, also because women married and left the village. Nowadays total membership is 13, consisting of eight women and five men.
There are four Mbunda people, including one married couple. Only
three Lozi women were married, one of them with a member of the
group. Three members own cattle: the chairlady, the (female) treasurer
and a Mbunda man. The 10 animals of the chairlady ("given by mother")
were kept by someone trusted (mafisa). The Mbunda man had bought
his one and only cow from his income as a carpenter.
During the first years members concentrated on broom- and
basket-making. The income from this work helped them to expand their
individual fields and to start communal vegetable gardening. These days
they also jointly cultivate sweet potatoes and run a petty shop (kantemba).
The members monthly contribute ZK 500 each to the common
fund from the yield of individually cultivated vegetable gardens, carpentry, beer brewing, cooking fresh maize and selling fried fish at the
secondary school. Interestingly enough, the women explained that cultivation of their individual fields can be seen as one of their group activities. Members can borrow money from the fund to be repaid within 4 to
6 weeks. In case of an emergency, a donation might be given to a group
member. The cash is kept somewhere in the village with the treasurer. If
there is enough money, the group wants to buy farming implements and
then an oxen for ploughing. Strangely enough, those attending the meeting informed us that the group had recently applied for the first time for a
297
short-term loan from PPS with the aim to buy sprayers and seeds for the
vegetable garden.
The Lozi women and Mbunda man attending the meeting had
sharply different savings preferences. The Lozi women preferred to
save in cattle but acknowledged savings in grain to be their most used
form because "this is vital". The Mbunda man preferred to save in cash
(with one or more trusted persons, not necessarily relatives). He did not
like to keep cattle as savings because "one can not sell a cow at any
time."
We are working together
The Swalisano-PPS group of the Munkuye B Action Area of
Kaoma District consists of four women and four men, a mix of Nkoya,
Lozi and Luvale. They come from different (kinship-based) villages and
did not know each other before 1991 when an agricultural officer
advised them one by one to organize a PPP-group. According to the
group members, others do not want to join their ranks because they are
"too conservative" or think the group is "just playing" - possibly also
explaining why a number of people quitted the group in the past.
The major point of the agenda at tle time of the meeting was how
to raise money to be eligible for a loan from PPS. The group fund
amounted to ZK 45,000 (which is enough to meet the own contribution
for a short-term loan from but not for a medium-term loan, see 3.3.1).
One of the members said that, "There is money around us, we should
scout for piece-work to get money." Several options were then considered: harvesting of groundnuts, cooking maize and collecting firewood.
The group used to cultivate a communal field but had to give up this
activity due to increased costs of inputs8 and lack of implements.
The group also concluded that another way to increase the size of
the fund was to put more pressure on those who had borrowed from the
group fund to repay the money. It is not only possible for members to
8 A bag offertilizer costed about ZK 40,000 in March-April 1997.
298
borrow from the fund, but also for non-members. In contrast to members, non-members have to pay an interest. For example: a non-member
who borrows ZK 20,000 has to repay ZK 25,000. Also, the fund is used
to financially support a member when he or she is ill. No repayment is
required.
Not all members participate in an income-generating activity
every time. Every member has even his or her own passbook in which
the income from his or her labour is registered. Yet, this income is still
considered to belong to the group. In case a working group of seven
earns ZK 2,000 for instance, ZK 200 is added to the name of the participant and the remaining ZK 600 is kept apart to pay for expenses of meetings (food, pencils, etc.). The members certainly did not want to keep
their 'share' at home because they feared to spoil it. They explained that
if it is kept with a treasurer, they feel shy to go there and use it.
2.3.3 Linkages with a bank
According to the District Coordinator of Kaoma, the treasurer
usually keeps the group savings at home. He remembered that 8 groups
(of a total of 47 groups operating in four different action areas, see PPS
1996) had opened a bank account at Standard Chartered in Mongu town.
He was rather hesitant to advise groups to open an account at the closer
Union Bank of Kaoma town as it had just been opened and had yet to
win the confidence of the population. Institutional linkage-building with
savings of a PPS-group to serve as alternative collateral for a bank loan,
has not been tried in Western Province. This is not a pity but wise. Institutional linkage-building is certainly a bridge too far because PPS has
first to further develop and test its own financial linkage-building prescribing that at least half of the own contribution of 20 percent of the
investment-sum should come from regular savings (see 2.3.1). Till now
this financial linkage-building has implied that nearly all PPS-groups
could not effectively apply for larger loans, that is, medium-term or
'bank-sized'.
299
3.
SOME CONCLUSIONS: QUALITIES, MOTIVES AND
THREATS
In the former part various forms of savings have been outlined. In
this part some hypotheses will first be tested with a view to provisionally
conclude what qualities or motives prompt what individuals or groups to
select what kind of (combination of) savings forms. Then, two forces or
processes will be dealt with that either strengthen or threaten the identity
and operations ofPPS-groups - also on the basis of working hypotheses.
3.1
Attractive qualities
Several criteria or qualities can be distinguished that prompt an
individual or group to select a particular form of savings. These criteria
include: immediate access, convenience, status, yield (price), reciproc-.
ity (potential access to loans). The starting hypothesis in this connection
has been that, "yield (price) ranks lowest in the ranking order of rural
poor savings motives. It is rather a particular combination of liquidity
and illiquidity preferences that lead rural poor to highly appreciate a
combination of safety and immediate access to savings services."
If we concentrate on motives of Lozi living in Kalabo District to
keep or invest in cattle, we might very well have to reject the hypothesis
as yield is very important in their eyes, however, not in the sense of gaining maximum interest in cash but in the sense of securing a stable supply
in kind (manure, milk, off-spring) to feed the family and prepare the
fields. Also, many Lozi living close to the Flood Plain consider cattle
ownership as a sign of wealth or economic status, although a minority
really owns cattle. Cattle is not kept to cash it at any time for any reason,
which means that keeping cattle is not so much an expression of a liquidity preference but more of an illiquidity preference. Besides, it is not the
conversion of cattle into cash which is at stake in conflicts about cattle,
but the ownership right of this preferential asset itself.
The popularity of savings of grain (maize, millet) can not so much
be explained in terms of the aforementioned criteria. It has simply more
300
to do with food security. It is literally of vital importance in a
subsistence-oriented economy. Savings of grain is not only practiced in
the domestic sphere but also in some PPS-groups of Kalabo District that
keep a fund in kind. Maybe in case of keeping grains in granaries, one
could better speak of storage instead of savings of grain because of an
undefined future perspective and lack of anticipation of possible food
shortages.
As regards savings in cash there are a number of options: keeping
cash at home, with a trusted person, with a bank or with a PPS-group.
The scope of savings of cash at home is and can hardly be documented.
Yet, there are some anecdotes of old people who lost a lot of money
when their hut burnt down. Lack of nearby banks, quasi-banks or boxes
to safely store money in combination with potential claims of relatives,
will have discouraged many to start saving in cash in the first place.
Those very few still motivated to save money have no alternative but to
secretly save cash at home or participate in a PPS-group. At this point,
we should add that local migrant populations seem to have another
option as well, that is: to save with trusted persons. The ethnical peers of
newcomers are not so demanding but rather supportive. This all and
indirectly suggests again that safe places and reliable money keepers are
a pre-condition for savings in cash.
The potential access to a loan from PPS might have been one of
the main reasons to join a PPS-group before 1994 when seasonal loans
were provided on soft terms to those organized in a PPS-group - without
conditions in terms of own contributions from savings. It is unclear to
what extent the introduction of a more stringent lending and savings policy in 1994 has resulted into the collapse of groups andior change of
membership composition and to what extent potential access to loans
from PPS is (still) a prime motive tojoin a PPS-group based on a savings
philosophy. Anyway, the amounts of savings per group are not really
impressive, which partly explains why the number of outstanding loans
to groups has been modest: 21 groups were indebted to PPS (revolving
fund) as per December 30th, 1996, of a total of 308 groups (see Annual
Report PPS, 1996).
301
It is not so much a stipulation of the savings contract but the wish
to share and efficiently invest scarce resources that prompts individuals
to become a member of a PPS-group. This is also related to the social
climate that hardly accepts individual success and enrichment. Group
mobility is easier to accept than individual mobility. Savings in the sense
of accumulating capital is not a goal in itself of many PPS-groups but
rather making money and re-investing small sums as soon as possible.
The group fund is not a savings fund but rather a working capital fund,
which also means that it is not really fair to use the amount of savings of
one or more PPS-groups on a particular day of the year as a final criterion to judge their savings performance.
A final function of many funds of PPS-groups brings us again
back to the criterion of reciprocity or potential access to loans but on the
level of the group itself. In case of emergencies or a sudden opportunity
to make a petty investment, members are donated and/or lent money
from the group fund. This is, of course, highly appreciated by the meinber facing a mishap or an investment opportunity9.
3.2
Popular motives
Motives to save include the wish to accumulate capital for investment, to gain access to credit, to meet a combination of liquidity and illiquidity preferences, to anticipate lack of food and/or money, and to get
an interest payment. The specific working hypothesis has been that,
"Processes of individualisation (or emancipation if you like) explain the
success of group savings: kin escaping or avoiding money claims of
relatives, women joining hands vis-à-vis their husbands, youngsters
revolting through savings clubs against elders and their ascribed positions."
Two general but possibly related motives of escaping claims
through participation in savings groups can be distinguished: the first
9 Further studies should reveal more of/he actual use of this social security firnction and how
people legitimize or disqual/i the use ofpart of/he group fund for emergency purposes.
302
one is to become rich(er) without being accused of doing so; the second
one is to prevent money being spent by male persons for purposes that
endanger food or income security of the social unit of consumption. We
found evidence of both these motives but in two different sets of
relationships:
According to Geran (1996), "Out of the 60 groups interviewed, 10
were based exclusively on extended family ties. The rest seemed to be a
combination of related and unrelated people" (p. 2). Malambo (1988)
investigated five groups of which four consisted of people coming from
the same 'village' and one of people coming from seven different 'villages'. Do these observations support or undermine the just-mentioned
hypothesis? First of all, the observations have to be interpreted with
great care as the concepts of 'village' (registered village or family village, see 2.1) and 'being unrelated' have not been properly investigated
and defined. Anyway, the observations show that PPS-groups are not
only consisting of non-kin. This again means that there are two different
ways to use membership of a PPS-group to deal with (potential) money
claims and accusations of relatives. The first one is to become a member
of a group that mostly consists of "unrelated people" from "different
family villages". This is to escape money claims and de-appreciate kinship relationships. A second one, and maybe typical for Western Province, is to become a member of a group together with other kin. This is to
neutralize money claims but at the same time recognize kinship relationships. Group membership makes it more difficult to accuse a relative of
individual enrichment.
About 30 percent of the members of all PPS-groups are men (PPS
1996). Our visits to groups in Kalabo and Kaoma District confirmed this
picture. This makes it difficult to conceive the PPS-groups as a popular
action of women vis-à-vis men. Yet, our general impression was that
men are simply 'being accepted' only and that there is a chance that new
groups might not allow men to become a member at all. The young
Namukau PPS-group of Lukona Action Area (Kalabo District) invited
four men to become a member, just to avail of cheap labour power for
ploughing services. The young Shimbimbe PPS-group of Mangango
303
Grassroots' Organizations. Decentralization and Rural Development
Action Area (Kaoma District) consists of women only. Their main rea-
son not to invite men was that they feared that they would abuse the
group fund as happened elsewhere.
3.3
Flexible functionality of PPS-groups turning their hands
to anything
A third working hypothesis guiding the research has been that,
"small groups that have developed and are working with a multitude of
savings systems are strong and self-reliant." Such multitude can refer to
savings schemes proposed by PPP and those designed by the participants themselves, but also to the co-existence of rotating and accumulating types of savings. Finally, multitude can refer to the various purposes
of savings, for instance: savings directed at capital accumulation for
investment and savings that are meant for emergency situations.
Neither in the earlier reports nor during my own short visit, evidence could be found of own savings systems set up parallel to the PPS-
savings activities. Also, PPS-groups are not a hybrid of the ROSCAmodel and ASCRA-model as they do not manage a rotating and accumulating fund at the same time but only an accumulating one. PPSgroups come indeed closest to the ASCRA-model, yet because quite
some of them, especially the younger ones, have no system of regular
contribution to a common fund, most PPS-groups can best be characterized as labour groups with one or more financial self-help functions.
Money accumulation to enable joint investments is the primary financial function. Disbursement of small loans to members (and sometimes
non-members) and provision of gifts to members in case of emergencies
are two other popular functions. This last-mentioned function certainly
suggests that those financial self-help groups that allow for change of
collective (savings) action towards social security at times of hardship
are the strongest and most popular groups.
304
3.4
The dangers of shopping institutions and institutional
shopping
A fourth working hypothesis has been that, "early and easy intro-
duction of financial linkage-building (savings as a pre-condition or
alternative collateral for external loans) is a guarantee for the formation
of weak quasi-groups."
This hypothesis is very difficult to verify or reject without definitions of 'early' and 'easy'. Yet, the hypothesis has brought our attention
to - what might be called - centrifugal powers. These powers are at work
now that PPS requires a PPS group that applies for a loan to show evidence of having saved regularly for at least 6 months (in case of a shortterm loan) or 12 months (in case of a medium-term loan) prior to the
loan application. Also, unintended effects have resulted from another
rule emphasizing the importance of savings in PPS philosophy: half of
the own contribution of 20 percent of the investment-sum (to be paid to
PPS before disbursement of the loan) should be paid from the savings.
What are these centrifugal powers and unintended effects? They concern a side-effect of the success of PPP in strengthening claim-making
power of poor people.
Geran (1996) concluded that, "The most impressive accomplishment of PPP so far is the success it has achieved in promoting the participation of women in the various development initiatives in the Western
Province" (p. 3). Indeed, PPS is not the only development agency that is
active in this province and quite a few of them also provide loans, subsidies (or a mixture of them) to individuals and/or groups. In the Mangango area of Kaoma district, next to PPS-groups, there are also groups
organized by Women for Change, the Village Health Committee and
other community development projects. Chabala (1994) reported about
the Animal Draught Power project that, "In 1993 (under the current
phase) it was realized that the individual approach was cost ineffective.
This led to the formation of Loan and Savings Groups (LSG). There are
21 LSGs with 128 participants and 40 percent are women" (p. 23). Other
examples of development agencies or programs that provide loans in
305
one way or another, are the Village Industry Services, the Rice Promotion Project, the Red Cross and the Primary Health Care programme
(Chabala 1994: 25-27; Dekker, pers.comm. 1997). For instance, the Red
Cross "wanted to assist single women and widows by giving them loans
especially if they were already organized in groups (Chabala 1994: 27).
Not surprisingly, the "PPP has proved to be a very useful channel for
development and community-based support activities" (ibid.: 54).
The danger or price of it is that tighter regulations with regard to
access to the PPS credit facility (since 1994) including financial
linkage-building, might bring members of PPS groups, of which many
have already found their way to and in other development organizations,
to take the easier route to credit. We found some evidence of this when
we visited the Village Health Committee of Mushwafela village that in a
way had absorbed the local PPS-group. All members of this group are
also being served by the VHC. Four of them are even staff member of
the VHC. The members of the PPS-group used to have their own
income-generating activities but now they have merged with those of
the VHC. They have too little savings to apply for a loan from PPSheadquarters. It is then easier for them to apply fOr a loan through the
VHC to the Rural Health Centre as this agency provides soft loans on
easier terms.
REFERENCES
Barlett, P.F., "Introduction: Dimensions and Dilemmas of
Householding," in: R.R. Wilk (ed.), The Household Economy:
Reconsidering the Domestic Mode of Production. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1989, pp.3-10.
Binsbergen, W. van., Tears of Rain: Ethnicity and History in Central
Western Zambia. Leiden: Africa Studie Centrum, 1992.
Bouman, F.J.A., "ROSCA and ASCRA: Beyond the Financial
Landscape," in: F.J.A. Bouman and 0. Hospes (eds.), Financial
306
Savings at the Grassroots .jn Western Province, Zambia
Landscapes Reconstructed. The Fine Art of Mapping
Development. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 375-394.
Bouman, F.J.A., "ROSCA: On the Origin of the Species" in: Savings
and Development XIX(2): 117-148, 1995.
Chabala, Ch. et al., Social-Economic Impact Study of Project
Beneficiaries of the PPP Project in Western Province of Zambia,
1994.
Cheal, D., "Strategies of Resource Management in Household
Economies: Moral Economy or Political Economy?" in: R.R.
Wilk (ed.), The HouseholdEconomy: Reconsidering the Domestic
Mode of Production. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp.11-22.
Geran, J.M., The Effect of Group Formation on Rural Women Access
to Services: The PPP Experience in Western Province, Zambia.
Michigan State University, Department of Resource
Development, 1996.
Hayward, P.B., Prospects for Replicability of the Peoples Participation
Project in Zambia: Evaluation Report, FAO: Rome, 1987.
Hospes, 0., "New Studies on Informal Finance: Exploring the State-ofthe-Art and the Art of the State." Savings and Development
XX[(1): 5-18, 1997.
Jalla, A., Silozi-English Dictionary (third edition). United Church of
Zambia, 1982 (first edition: 1914).
Kanyangwa, J. and Shula, E., Summary Report on Baseline Study of
People's Participation Project: Western Province. Namushakende,
Mongu, 1985.
Maimbo, F., Huijman, A., Muiwanda, D. and Lof, B., Opportunities for
Western Province: An Agro-Economic Reconnaissance Study.
Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1996.
Mahon, D., Savings and Credit Consultancy. People's Participation
Programme. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United
Nations. Tanzania, 1995.
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Mahon, D., Rural Finance Study. Peoples Participation Programme,
Western Province, Zambia, 1996.
Malambo, L., Assessment of the Peoples' Participation Project.
Department of Rural Economy and Extension Education.
University of Zambia, 1988.
Mrak, M. "The Role of the Informal Financial Sector in the
Mobilization and Allocation of Household Savings: The Case of
Zambia." Savings and Development XIII( 1): 65-85.
People's Participation Service. Group Information Updated. September
1996.
People's Participation Service. Annual Report 1996.
Roberts, R.A.J., The Role of Money in the Development of Farming in
the Mumbwa and Katete Areas of Zambia. University of
Nottingham, PhD-thesis, 1972.
Shipton, P., "The Rope and the Box: Group Savings in The Gambia." in:
D.W. Adams and D.A. Fitchett (eds.), Informal Finance in LowIncome Countries. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 25-41.
Shipton, P., "How Gambians Save: Culture and Economic Strategy at an
Ethnic Crossroads." in: Guyer, J.I. (ed.), Money Matters:
Instability, Values and Social Payments in the Modern History of
West African Communities. Portsmouth: Heinemann en Currey,
1994, pp. 245-276.
Shipton, P., "Luo Entrustment: Foreign Finance and the Soil of the
Spirits in Kenya" Africa 65(2): 165-195, 1995.
Stringfellow, R. et al., The Provision of Agricultural Services Through
Self-Help in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis Report for Phase I.
Policy Research Programme Project, Natural Resources Institute:
Plunkett Foundation, 1996.
308
SOMMAIRE
Ce texte essaie de comprendre plus de près les options d'épargne
et les strategies auprès des populations rurales dans la Province Ouest du
Zambie. Ii s'agit d'une zone multiethnique avec une migration remarquable oi ii est difficile de reconnaItre les propriétaires originaux des
terrains et des eaux. Ii est aussi bien difficile de determiner queue est
l'autorité qui peut prendre les decisions sur les ressources. L'agriculture
est principalement de subsistance, mais ii y a des differences entre les
groupes sur ltorientation au marché ou a Ia subsistance. En cas d'adversite ii y a tendance a démonétiser, c'est a dire a se retirer temporairement) du marché.
Une aide extérieure a permis de constituer ce qu'on appelle PPS
(Peoples participation Societies) qui gèrent un épargne de groupe. Leur
but est celui de créer un marché de credit, d'encourager une accumulation de fonds et faciliter ainsi les investissements pour la production et le
développement. De cette manière les PPS sont en mesure de gérer des
fonds, une fonction qui a quand méme ses problèmes a cause d'une culture on l'enrichissement est consideréré comme illégitime ou comme le
signe d'un ensorcellement.
Les gens épargnent, mais elles ne visent pas a accumuler. Les Ban-
ques ne sont pas une bonne alternative, étant donné les revenus mdividuels très bas. Ceux qui épargnent de l'argent comptant préfèrent le
cacher (l'enterrer sous leur chaumière) ou le confier a une personne de
confiance, préférablement pas a un de leurs parents. Les gens de la Province Ouest vivent "dans le present" et dans cette zone, largement on-
entée a la subsistance, l'argent est vite transformé en capital non
monétaire comme bétail et/ou semences. Mais pour aucune raison le
bétail est destine a être objet de vente. L' accumulation d' argent n ' est
pas, et elle ne peut pas étre,, fin en soi. Les petits marges, les magres
recoltes, les événements imprévus, ainsi que les obligations envers les
consanguins mettent ceux qui ont eu du succès dans la condition de
devoir s'occuper des plusieurs proches qui revendiquent des droits sur le
surplus.
309
Toutefois les PPS ont eu un certain succès clans cette zone. Ily a
plus de 300 groupes d'epargne qui représentent une diversité enorme du
point de vue des membres, age, dimension et sorte d'activités pour la
production de revenu. Ii est difficile de généraliser sur ces groupes, et ii
n'y en a pas un qui peut être considéré "typique". On peut quand méme
relever des traits communs. Les nouveaux venus, surtout les femmes,
qui comptent sur Un travail a la pièce, sont parmi ceux qui sont attires le
plus par les groupes PPS. L'objectifde l'accumulation along terme connaIt toutefois des limites et les fonds sont souvent traités comme capital
circulant a court terme. Les groupes PPS devraient être plus opportunément considérés comme des groupes de travail avec une ou plus
fonctions financiaires de auto-aide.
310
Le développement des
structures de financement
communautaires en Afrique
MARC SOCQUET
Le développernent des structures de financement communautaires en Afrique
INTRODUCTION
Les structures de financement de type communautaire représen-
tent aujourd'hui le plus important secteur organisé dans lequel se
regroupent les populations africaines.
Elle occupent également la plus importante place dans le secteur
de la micro finance, représentant, après l'échec des systèmes bancaires
centralisés, la deuxième génération des services financiers offerts aux
segments les plus défavorisés des populations du continent.
Les banques de développement nationales, mises en place après
les indépendances, n'ont en effet pas réussi a opérer de manière efficace
et durable. Elles ont très largement souffert de leur mauvaise gestion, et
ont manqué de savoir faire dans les strategies de réponse et la nécessaire
adaptation de leurs techniques financières au profit des populations
ciblées.
Une profonde recomposition des paysages financiers a fait suite a
leur disparition ou a leur reconversion. De nombreuses institutions
financières ont été privatisées, de nouvelles banques commerciales se
sont installées et un effet de concurrence a commence a jouer, de nou-
veaux mécanismes d'intermédiation financière, dans lesquels l'Etat
jouait souvent encore un role, ont été mis en place. Cependant, l'aversion au risque et la recherche de la profitabilité maximale, que demon-
traient ces différentes institutions, leur ont fait ignorer, durant de
longues années, les besoins de financement des populations reconnues
les plus affectées par les manifestations de la pauvreté.
LA PROFUSION DES INTERVENANTS
La place laissée vide par l'échec des banques de développement a
favorisé la multiplication de nouvelles interventions dans le domaine de
la micro finance. Dans un premier temps, les premiers réseaux de
structures de financement décentralisées ont été créés a partir des
313
interventions d'organismes spécialisés, tels que: la Societe de Develop-
pement Internationi Desjardins (SDID - Canada), le Credit Mutuel
Francais, le World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU -USA), et les
Caisses Raiffeisen...
Ces interventions ont principalement favorisé la constitution de
réseaux de structures de fmancement de type communautaire, organisées généralement scion un modèle coopératif. Soutenue de manière
continue par la Cooperation Suisse depuis la fin des années 70, Ia première experience des Banques Populaires du Rwanda a pu prendre la
valeur d'un veritable "modèle", qui a pu entraIner de nombreux efforts
de replication.
Au debut des années 90, Ct partir d'un maillage très dense sur
1' ensemble du territoire, le réseau. de banques constitué rassemblait
queique 350.000 sociétaires, et avait réussi a lever, dans un pays
reconnu comme i'un des pius pauvres du monde, une épargne locale de
plus de 40 millions de Dollars US.
A la fin des années 80, ces premieres interventions pouvaient être
amplifiées par un nouvel intérêt marqué pour cc secteur, par les grands
bailleurs de fonds. Les experiences ont Pu ainsi se multiplier, soutenues
par des financements assures par: la Banque Mondiale, i'Agence
Française de Développement, ie Fonds Africain de Développement...
ainsi que par les diverses agences de cooperation bilatérales: ailemande,
beige, francaise... Très rapidement, une importante dynamique était
reconnue au niveau de l'émergence et du déveioppernent des structures
de financement de type communautaire ainsi appuyées.
Parallèiement et dans le même temps, on assistait a une deuxièrne
importante occupation de cc secteur. Dc nombreuses ONG en effet, en
vue de répondre aux besoins exprimés par les populations auprès
desquelles dies intervenaient, décidaient ainsi de raj outer a i' éventaii
des services qu'elles offraient, un nouveau "voiet credit". Les premieres
initiatives de cc type se multipiiaient rapidement a travers l'importante
communauté des ONG operant dans ies divers pays africains. Ces
mécanismes de credit rapproché, engages a partir de fonds spéciaux mis
314
Le développernent des structures definanceinent communautaires en Afrique
en place, et non rattachés a un effort d'epargne préalable ou ultérieur des
populations concernées, se distinguaient fortement des premieres pra-
tiques observées. En opérationnalisant elles-même directement des
fonds de credit de tailles très variées, ces ONG créaient ainsi un nouveau
sous-secteur financier, pouvant se reconnaItre sous l'appellation de
structures de financement intermédiaires (c'est a dire: non bancaires et
non communautaires).
Enfin, et un peu plus tardivement, au debut des années 90, les premiers organismes spécialisés dans le micro credit pouvaient également
se mettre en place dans différents pays. A la difference des autres struc-
lures de financement intermCdiaires, ces opérateurs se spécialisaient
dans la seule fourniture de services financiers, au profit de segments
ciblés de Ia population (petits entrepreneurs, femmes marchandes...).
3.
LA PLURALITE DES FORMES
ORGANISATIONNELLES
Les nombreux appuis assures au développement des structures de
financement de type communautaire,ont favorisé le rapide essor de ce
sous-secteur. Une résultante de ces appuis de provenance et d'inspiration variées, a été la pluralité des formes organisationnelles adoptées par
les entreprises concernées.
Les organisations de base créées se réfèrent essentiellement aux
trois modèles suivants:
A.
Le modèle coopératif
Les organisations relevant de ce groupe respectent l'ensemble des
principes coopératifs, tels que définis par les textes du BIT et de
l'Alliance Cooperative Internationale. Reconnues intialement sous
l'appellation de: Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit (COOPEC), ces
organisations demeurent aujourd'hui les plus nombreuses et les plus
répandues sur l'ensemble du continent africain. En restant
respectueuses de ces grands principes, des formes variées ont pu
315
progressivement apparaltre, qui ne se distinguaient qu'au niveau des
simples mácanismes opératoires. Ainsi, et au cours de ces dernières
années, on a eu tendance, pour les qualifier, a utiliser un terme que l'on
voulait plus généraliste, en préfèrant les reconnaItre comme " structures
mutualistes d' épargne et de credit".
Le modèle mutualiste
Ce modèle se distingue du précédent, par au moms trois caractéristiques essentielles. Premièrement, les organisations relevant de ce
groupe ne prévoient pas de s'appuyer au depart sur un capital social.
Deuxièmement, leurs operations se fondent principalement sur un principe de cotisations ou d'épargne fixe obligatoire. Et, troisièmement,
elles n'assurent aucune distribution de l'excédent éventuel apparu, qui
est automatiquement intégré a la structure mutualiste.
Davantage que les organisations de type coopératif, les organisations de type mutualiste se sont fractionnées, en adoptant des caractéris-.
tiques d' organisation et de fonctionnement très différenciées. On peut
ainsi répertorier sous ce modèle: les banques villageoises ou cornmunautaires, les groupements a caution solidaire (dérivés de l'expérience développée au Bangla-desh a travers les Grameen Banks), les
mutuelles de solidarité, etjusqu'aux tontines, elles aussi très répandues
dans toute l'Afrique, avec les tontines mutuelles (associations rotatives
d'epargne) et les tontines commerciales (fonds d'épargne mobiles).
Le modèle "capitaliste"
Un troisième modéle s 'est récemment aj outé aux précédents, avec
la mise en place dans certains pays africains, d'associations de services
financiers.
316
Le développeinent des structures definancement communautaires en Afrique
4.
ESSAI DE TYPOLOGIE DES OPERATEURS DANS
LE SECTEUR FINANCIER
Presentation des Operateurs dans le Secteur financier
Institutions bancaires
Publiques
I Banques dve1oppement
Banques commerciales
Privées
Hypothécaires
Commerciales
Internationales
Nationales
Organismes parapublics
Sociétés
Fonds spéciaux
Structures de
financeinent
Décentralisées (SFD)
Structures de
financernent
1ntermdiaires (SF1)
Spécialisées (credit
direct)
Avoletcrédit
ONG
Projets
Structures de
financement
Communautaires (SFC)
Secteur Economie
sociale
Modéle "capitaliste"
Associations de Services
Financiers (AS F)
Modéle "coopératif'
Cooperatives d'epargne
et do credit (COOPEC)
Modéle "mutualiste"
Banques villageoises
(BY)
Mutuelles de solidarité
(MS)
Groupements a caution
solidaire (type
Grameen)
Tontines
317
Princip ales caractéristiques des SFC
ASF
COOPEC
I
I
BY
MS
CCS
I
Tontines
Nb.
membres
Illimité
Illimité
Limité (2050)
Limité
Type
membr.
P. pliysiques
et morales
P. physiques
et morales
P. physiques
P. physiques
P. physiques
P. physiques
Béii.
Membres
seuls
Membres et
usagers
Membres
seuls
Membres et
non
membres
Membres
seuls
Membres
seuls
Votes iés a
1 homme/
1 voix
Decision
collective
1 homme/
1 voix
Decision
collective
Decision
collective
I respons.
I respons.
Sur fonds
services
Mode décis.
nb. actions
Limité (5-
Limité
10)
Org.
respons.
Directeur
Comités
spécialisés
Différents
respons.
DiffCrents
respons.
Démarrage
Sur fonds
propres
Sur fonds
propres
Stir fonds
extérieurs
Sur fonds
propres
extCrieurs
Stir fonds
propres
Prop.
épargne
Individuelle
lndividuelle
Individuelle
Groupe
Groupe
Groupe
Credit aprês
Cpargne
Credit aprCs
Cpargne
Credit avant
epargue
Credit après
épargne
Credit avant
épargne
Credit après
epargne
Varies
Varies
Egaux
Varies
Egaux
Egaux
Doss. Credit I
oui
oul
non
non
non
non
Gar, credits
Tous t es
Tous t ,es
Caut. solid.
Diff t 'es
Cant, solid.
Duff. t
Resp.
défaill.
Individuelle
lndividuelle
Collective
Collective
Collective
Collective
Obligatoire
Encore rare
Inexistants
Inexistants
Encore rare
Inexistants
I
oui
oui
oui
oui
non
non
C. rCseaux
I
oui
oui
oui
oui
oui
non
Comptabilite
I
Pos, credit
Mont.
credits
Liens ay.
Bq.
Refinancem.
Etats synth.
318
I
Complete
oui
I
Complete
oui
I
Simpliflee
oui
I
Simplifiee
non
I
Inexistante
non
I
es
lnexistante
non
Le développement des structures dejmnancement coinmunautaires en Afrique
5.
L'IMPORTANCE DES STRUCTURES DE FINANCEMENT
DE TYPE COMMUNAUTAIRE
Les structures de financement de type communautaire rassemblent aujourd'hui des populations extrémement importantes dans toute
l'Afrique. Les chiffres suivants en font illustration:
Li
Bénin: en Juillet 1996, la Fédération des Caisses d'Epargne et de
Credit Agricole Mutuel, dénombrait plus de 166.000 sociétaires
Côte d'Ivoire: en 1997, le réseau des CREP (Caisse rurale d'épargne
et de prêt) - COOPEC, comptait déjà plus de 50.000 sociétaires
Sénégal: en 1997, le réseau du credit mutuel comptait déjà plus de
40.000 sociétaires
Mali: en 1997, le réseau des caisses villageoises, comptait déjà plus
de 41.000 membres, en ayant rassemblé une épargne totale
(comptes courants et dépôts a terme) de l'ordre de 207 millions de
FCFA
iliti
Congo-Brazzaville: Au debut 1997, le réseau des cooperatives
d'épargne et de credit comptait déjà plus de 60.000 sociétaires
LI
L
Togo: en 1995, la Fédération des Unions Cooperatives d'Epargne et
de Credit comptait déjà plus de 60.000 sociétaires
Burundi: en 1995, le réseau des cooperatives d'épargne et de credit
constitué, rassemblait déjà, pour une centaibe de points de services,
un total de 95.000 sociétaires, en ayant rassemblé une épargne total
de quelque 13 millions de Dollars US
Cameroun: en 1997, la Cameroun Cooperative Credit Union
League (CAMCCUL), rassemblait déjà plus de 75.000 sociétaires
U Malawi: en 1996, la Smaliholder Agricultural Credit Administration intéressait un total de plus de 3 00.000 membres, répartis a trayers des groupes de 25 a 35 personnes.
319
A ces plus importants chiffres, doivent encore être associés les
multiples experiences de portée plus réduite, qui peuvent cependant
chaque fois, rassembler plusieurs milliers de sociétaires (TaImako au
Niger, CVECA au Burkina-Faso, Mutuelle d'epargne et de credit des
femmes en Côte d'Ivoire...)
Parallèlement et comme déjà mentionné, on a assisté an cours de
ces dernières années, au développement de nouvelles structures organisationnelles: quelque 350 banques villageoises ont ainsi déjà été promues dans une douzain e de pays africains, grace a l'appui d'organisations
comme Finca International, World vision, Catholic Relief Services...
De leur côté, le modèle de groupements a caution solidaire a pu
également s'implanter dans différents pays, a travers notamment, les
efforts de certains programmes de cooperation (ACOPAM an Burkina
Faso, Cooperation allemande au Niger...), la récente mise en oeuvre du
programme Microstart du PNUD (Maroc, Côte d'ivoire...), et l'exportation du modèle Grameen Banks, a partir de la Grameen Trust, dans différents pays africains.
Enfin, les plus récentes associations de services financiers ont
commence a émerger dans différents pays, tels que: le Bénin, la Cameroun, l'Afrique du Sud...
La premiere banque de données sur les systèmes financiers décentralisés publiee en 1997 par Ia Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest, avec l'appui d'un projet du BIT, reprenait les chiffres globaux
suivants encore incomplets se rapportant aux seules structures de
financement de type communautaire des pays concernés qui avaient Pu
être enquêtées:
Le nombre de caisses d' épargne et de credit avait double en deux
ans (décembre 1993- décembre 1995), enpassantde: 1.136 à2.282;
Le nombre de membres de ces caisses avait plus que double sur
cette même période, en passant de: 309.000 a 646.000;
320
Le développernent des structures dejInancernent communautaires en Afrique
Li
L'épargne collectée a travers ces caisses est passée sur cette mêrne
période, d'un total de: 11 milliards, a un total de 29 milliards de
FCFA;
L
Les flux de credits octroyés a travers ces caisses sont passes sur
cette même période, d'un total de: 6 milliards, a un total de 22 milliards de FCFA.
6.
LES ACTUELLES CONTRAINTES S'OPPOSANT AU
DEVELOPPEMENT DU SOUS-SECTEUR
6.1
L'insuffisance des cadres légaux et reglementaires
Jusqu'à la fin des années 80, ii n'existait pratiquement aucun
cadre legal et aucun dispositifréglementaire, s'appliquant aux différents
types de structures de financement communautaires, hors le cas des
legislations cooperatives, traitant, dans leurs dispositions, du cas spécifique représenté par les cooperatives d' épargne et de credit.
Actuellement, et malgré certaines initiatives récentes, comme
dans le pays de l'TJIMOA, et en Afrique du Sud qui a déjà pu adopter des
lois spécifiques couvrant le champ d'intervention des différents types de
structures de financement décentralisées, cette rnême contrainte reste
observée dans laplupart des pays.
En 1993, les 8 pays de la zone de l'Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine adoptaient une legislation commune censée couvrir les interventions des différentes structures de financernent décentralisées operant
sur leur territoire. Ce nouveau cadre juridique, pour une part, s 'adressait
directement aux institutions mutualistes d'épargne et de credit, tout en
prévoyant certaines dispositions particulières qui devaient s ' appliquer, a
travers Ia signature de conventions, aux autres types de structures de firnancement décentralisées.
Bien qu'offrant l'avantage de pouvoir disposer, dans les pays concernés, d'un premier cadre législatif uniflé, resultant d'un exercice de
321
concertation a de multiples niveaux, le texte adopté demeure encore
insatisfaisant. Pour une part, ii retenait des plafonds d'intérêts, qui
étaient jugés comme trop faibles par de nombreuses structures de
financement, qui ne pouvaient, sur ces bases, parvenir au niveau de capitalisation recherché. D'autre part, ii prévoyait de confier la responsabil-
ité des indispensables fonctions d'audit régulier devant intéresser ces
structures, a des organismes spécialisés, dont les interventions se
révèlaient trop coüteuses pour le plus grand nombre des institutions
financières concemées.
Dans ces conditions, ii était naturel d'observer que de très
nombreuses structures de financement de type communautaire
choisissaient de rester en dehors de ce nouveau cadre legal Ainsi, au 31
décembre 1995, et sur le total des 71 plus importantes structures
d'épargne et de credit operant dans ces différents pays, plus de la moitié
étaient trouvées comme n'ayant pas encore adressé leur dossier de
régularisation auprès des instances mises en place.
6.2
Les faiblesses organisationnelles
La plupart des structures de financement communautaires qui ont
été mises en oeuvre, demeurent encore très jeunes et faiblement expéri-
mentées. Biles ont rarement Pu bénéficier des appuis techniques,
suffisamment soutenus dans la durée, leur permettant d'atteindre le
niveau de professionnalisation recherché.
Ces structures offrent encore le plus souvent des services financiers peu diversifies, limités a l'ouverture de comptes d'epargne a vue,
et a l'octroi de credits sur lesquels s'applique im taux d'intérêt unique.
Les pratiques de taux d'intérêts différenciés, les techniques de plans
d'épargne - education et logement -, les services de dépôts a terme, et
de micro assurance restent encore non connus du plus grand nombre.
Les systèmes de gestion mis en place demeurent également encore
peu performants, us n'assurent pas ainsi pas toute la transparence des
operations requise, et ne facilitent pas la prise des decisions et actions
322
Le développeinent des structures definancement communautaires en Afrique
permettant a l'entreprise d'atteindre pleinernent ses objectifs de croissance et d'expansion.
6.3
Le manque de capitalisation et de coordination des
experiences
Les informations précises relatives aux différentes experiences en
matière de micro finance développées par ces structures, manquent
généralement. Si des chiffres sont trouvés disponibles, les éléments
d'inforrnation d'ordre plus qualitatif, tels que les raisons de 1' approche
adoptée, les pratiques opérationnelles courantes, les mécanismes
internes de gestion, de prise de decision Ct de contrôle, les strategies de
réponse aux problèrnes rencontrés, et les lecons tirées des operations
réalisées, font le plus souvent défaut.
Souvent fortement localisées, Ct restant toujours faiblement documentées, les experiences développées demeurent peu connues et trop
isolées. Les relations et échanges d'informations avec d'autres mouvements demeurent encore très rares. Les responsables de ces structures
opèrent ainsi par empirisme, en ne pouvant se référer a d'autres cas
d'expériences pourtant pertinentes, o'i elles auraient Pu disposer d'enseignements utiles leur permettant d'arnéliorer leur efficacité, de diversifier leurs services et d'accroItre leurs performances.
6.4
Les carences an niveau de la formation
Un important deficit en matiêre d'effort d'inforrnation et de formation reste observe au niveau de la plupart de ces structures. Quand
elles ont Pu bénéficier de certaines assistances techniques extérieures,
des guides ont Pu être produits, mais us ont été destinés le plus souvent
aux responsables directement impliqués dans les fonctions d'organisation comptable et de gestion.
Un ensemble de besoins demeure ainsi non couvert, avec l'absence de documents pédagogiques traitant, par exemple, de l'éducation
a l'épargne, de mécanismes d'informations réguliers des membres, de
323
systèmes de gestion et de contrôle interne adéquats..., et l'absence d'informations régulières des membres sur tous les aspects du fonctionnement et des réalisations de l'entreprise.
Appuyés par la production de supports adaptés, ces efforts de formation et d'information restent pourtant seuls susceptibles d'assurer les
effets de professionnalisation et d'appropriation recherchés, garants de
la durabilité de ces experiences sur le long terme.
7.
LES STRATEGIES DE REPONSE ADAPTEES AU
CONTEXTE ACTUEL
En réponse a ces différentes contraintes, le Consultative Group for
Assisting the Poorest (CGAP), mis en place par la Banque Mondiale et
auquel participent les plus importantes organisations internationales et
organismes spécialisés, a récemment engage des programmes de formation en collaboration avec les institutions régionales africaines
suivantes:
l'Institut Supérieur Panafticain d'Economie Cooperative
(ISPEC) au Bénin, pour les structures de financement
décentralisées de l'Afrique Francophone;
le Regional Enterprise Development Institute (REDI) en
Tanzanie, pour les structures de financement décentralisées
de l'Afrique Anglophone.
Ces premieres actions, engagées seulement depuis 1997, restent
davantage focalisées sur des formations financières de haut niveau,
destinées aux directeurs financiers et comptables des plus importants
réseaux (mesure des taux de défaillance, production d'états financiers
détaillés, normes de contrôle interne, procedures d'audit extérieur...), en
n'ayant ainsi aucun rapport avec les besoins de formation ressentis par
les principaux acteurs de base.
324
Le développement des structures dejInancement communautaires en 4frique
Des actions d'appuis spécifiques nécessitent donc d'être initiées
rapidement, en réponse aux différentes contraintes observées. Celles-ci
devraient s'attacher dans un premier temps aux principaux aspects
suivants:
le besoin de favoriser, a partir de la constitution de véritables
réseaux, les meilleurs échanges d'expériences, la fertilisation
croisée et les synergies envisageables. . . en favorisant ainsi le proces-
sus de développement durable engage au niveau de ces diverses
experiences encore souvent très jeunes;
ii]
le besoin d'élargir le cadre de référentiel technique, en mettant en
parallèle les autres experiences africaines (anglophone, lusophone...), ainsi que de 1'Amerique Latine (avec son réseau déjà très
dense de banques viilageoises, ses experiences de reconversion
d'ONG, en véritables banques des pauvres BANCOSOL ), des
CaraIbes (avec son réseau déjà très développé de credit unions, avec
ses experiences d' articulation entre des opérateurs multiples - Haiti
...), et de l'Asie (avec ses experiences plus nombreuses d'intervention directe des institutions bancaires dans la micro finance...);
Li
le besoin d'appuyer la production et Ia diffusion de documents de
formation adaptés aux besoins des différents responsables et publics
concernés, assurant l'effet d'appropriation des experiences conduites, et permettant de conserver sur le plus long terme, l'esprit et
les valeurs qui inspiraient au depart, la mise en place de ces structures de financement communautaires.
Ces différentes actions pourraient être facilement initiées a partir
de nouveaux partenariats instruits, associant les structures et mouvements visés, des universités étrangères, des universités ou centres de
formation africains, et le Centre de Turin.
Ces nouvelles interventions sont davantage une question de
volonté et d'engagement, en ne faisant pas appel a des financements
importants. Simples et peu coflteuses, elles peuvent cependant entralner,
325
pour le plus grand nombre, les meilleurs effets de développement durable recherchés.
Pour sa part, le programme STEP est déjà impliqué dans cette
recherche-action, et prep are actuellement différents documents d' analyse simples, et des modules de formation en relation directe avec les
besoins exprimés au travers de différents réseaux de cooperatives
d'épargne et de credit et de banques villageoises.
L' espoir que nous formulons en achevant ce bref exposé, est d' avoir Pu faire partager notre intime conviction que le secteur de la micro
finance, plus particulièrement représenté a travers les structures de
financement de type communautaire, représente bien aujourd'hui le
secteur le plus porteur de développement et d'espoir pour les millions
d'africains déjà associés aux initiatives déjà en cours, et les millions
d'autres qui restent en attente de nouvelles interventions qui devront
encore être mises en oeuvre pour répondre a leurs besoins essentiels.
Si c'est le cas, des actions concretes et adaptées pourront être
identifiées et se matérialiser rapidement au profit des considérables
populations concernées.
SUMMARY
In Africa after the crisis of public development banks, the first
microcredit institutions created in favour of the poor took the form of
cooperatives. The first significant experience took place in Rwanda at
the end of the 70s. Saving and credit cooperatives are still now the most
widespread form of micro credit all over Africa.
Since the end of the 80s a new interest for microcredit has been
shown by main donors: they attached less importance to a complete
respect of cooperative principles and they supported new kinds of financial community-based organizations, such as village banks, mutual aid
associations and Grameen's type groups.
326
Le développement des structures dejInanceinent communautaires en 4frique
The different microcredit realities represent today the most important organized sector in Africa, although the system of legal regulation is
not yet sufficient, with a few exceptions.
Most of these financial structures are still weak as far as financial
services, clearness of operations and professional staff training are
concerned.
The big agencies for multilateral aid, in the framework of CGAP
programmes, are presently carrying out innovatory training programrnes; it is necessary for them to be extended up to the members of
microfinance organizations, which, furthermore, have to be helped to go
over their isolation and to link up by network for an exchange of experiences and mutual information.
327
D. Socio-political
Aspects
Grassroots Development and Participation
in Policy Negotiations: Bridging the
Micro-macro Gap in Senegal
NORA MCKEON
Grassroots Development and Participation in Policy Negotiations
1.
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this workshop on "rural development from below"
responds to the widely felt need for a corrective to the top-down
approaches which have dominated development practice up until
recently. It highlights, too, the fact that post-structural adjustment Africa
offers a propitious setting for such alternatives, profiting from the space
opened up by State retrenchment and the fact that the market is not so
well developed as to pre-empt all new opportunities.
A caveat might be in order, however. In a region like Africa which
has been strongly subject to exogenous determination, simply inverting
the apparent direction of development is not enough. Local organizations are prime ingredients of today's dominant development paradigm,
potentially just as much at home with a vision in which Western-style
civil society and democracy constitute the unquestioned socio-political
model as with one which valorizes diversity. This workshop offers an
occasion to distinguish between donor-driven experiences and ones in
which self-determination weighs more heavily.
Senegal is an interesting terrain for observation in this regard: a
State with 35 years of civic freedoms to its credit, and 25 of experimentation with decentralization, confronts an autonomous farmers' movement boasting over two decades of history. Both the level of engagement
between rural peoples' organizations and official institutions and the degree of self-awareness with which it is being charted are more pro-
nounced than in many other African countries. FAO has been a
privileged observer of this interface since 1990, when it began to help
farmers' organizations prepare for a national forum on the future of
Senegalese peasant agriculture, and is now engaged with the farmers'
movement and the government in a capacity-building programme aimed
at enhancing their dialogue.
This paper will trace briefly the history of agricultural policy and
of the farmers' movement in Senegal up to the '90s. It will highlight the
changes introduced with the forum and the creation of a single national
333
federation of rural peoples' organizations in 1993. It will describe the
capacity building programme and, finally, it will present stakeholder
perceptions of their changing roles, drawing on material which is currently being collected for a case study within the programme.
2
EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN
SENEGAL
With independence in 1962 the government of Senegal inherited
an economy heavily dependent on a single agricultural product, ground-
nuts. Agricultural policy over the following years aimed at a rapid
increase in production and productivity of export crops through the
introduction of agricultural packages foreign to the milieu, without concern for the impact on the natural resource base. The production programmes' implementation required expensive and heavily hierarchical
structures which made no provision for farmer participation. Producers'
margin for reflection and autonomous organization was further reduced
by the establishment of government-promoted cooperatives and producers' groups which farmers could not snub, although they were driven by
needs and objectives extraneous to the rural world, since they were the
main channel through which credit, inputs and technical support could
be obtained.
The period of booming prices for major export commodities was
followed by one of decline in prices on the world market from 1975 on,
aggravated by two successive severe droughts. By the end of the '70s the
government of Senegal was close to bankruptcy. The adjustment credit
agreement it signed with the International Monetary Fund in 1983 was
accompanied by the promulgation of a "New Agricultural Policy"
(NAP) in 1984, which foresaw the dismantling of the parastatal development societies; liberalization of prices; reduction of credit, extension
and other services and the elimination of subsidies for input purchase;
"responsabilization" of peasants, whose organizations were expected -
334
along with the private sector - to take over the functions and services
which the State was abandoning.
By 1988 the effects of reduced producer prices and increased cost
of inputs was making itself felt in declining production and productivity.
Concerned by this trend, the government requested FAO to help it assess
the impact of structural adjustment on the agricultural sector in order to
prepare for negotiation of the Agricultural Structural Adjustment Programme (ASAP), which was then on the drafting board. The assessment
culminated in a major seminar held in Dakar in May 1990 which concluded, rather enigmatically, that "the solution of the producers' prob-
lems should be sought in a diversified series of measures which will
enable the establishment of new relations between peasants' organizations and the structures which are intended to support them"1. Yet of
some 50 organizations invited to participate in the seminar, not one represented the peasants.
3.
THE GROWTH OF AN AUTONOMOUS PEASANT
MOVEMENT
During the 1970s, autonomous village-based associations began
to spring up alongside of the State-promoted cooperatives, stimulated
by the drought and the food crisis. Women and their associations played
a key role in this movement, given their primary responsibility for
ensuring family food security. Initially organized around collective food
production, the groups progressively reached out to upstream and downstream activities - input procurement, processing and marketing - going
beyond the village dimension. As the need to organize within a broader
framework asserted itself, they began to federate at district and regional
level until, in 1976, nine regional associations created a national federation. The government recognized this structure in 1978 but with the
name "Federation of Senegalese NGOs" (Fédération des ONGs
1
"Actes du Seminaire sur I 'Impacte de I 'Ajusternent Structure! sur le Secteur Agricole
Sénégalais", Daka,: rnai 1990, p. 39.
335
Sénégalaises - FONGS) since any reference to farmers would have
risked encroaching on the primacy of the official cooperative union.
The FONGS worked to reinforce the nascent rural association
movement and enhance the farmers' sense of identity through training
programmes, exchange visits and collective reflection and action on
common problems. A particularly innovative initiative was the development of the Bxchange, Training and Support Programme (Programme
d'Echange, de Formation et d'Appui - PEFA), a system of horizontal
training based on an assessment of member associations' strengths,
needs and complementarities2. The drought of the mid '80s and the
introduction of the NAP stimulated the federation to intensify its action.
Contacts with government services were reinforced and more ambitious
national activities were undertaken, such as a programme of cereal
banks and "triangular" exchanges between village associations in areas
of surplus and deficit production. With the interruption of governmentsponsored rural credit, the FONGS studied ways of assisting its members to procure inputs and equipment through savings and credit programmes. In 1988, using members' savings complemented by support
from Northern partners, the FONGS bought into the Caisse nationale de
credit agricole du Sénégal (CNCAS) and became a share-holder with a
credit line of 200 million FCFA.
By the time of the 1990 seminar the FONGS had expanded to
include 24 regionally-based associations throughout the country
totalling over 2 thousand village groups with an active membership of
about 400.000. It was estimated that some 1.5 million people were
affected by association activities at grassroots level, out of a total
population of 7.5 million. Yet despite the government's exhortations for
the "responsabilization" of rural people, the FONGS was not being
invited to participate in the policy negotiations which were taking place.
It was clear that the farmers' organizations themselves would have to
take the initative to win recognition. To do so they needed to develop
2 FONGS, "Le Programme d'échanges, d'appui et deformation de Ia FONGS (PEFA) ", Thiès,
1995.
336
their understanding of the crisis Senegalese agriculture faced and their
own alternative proposals to bring to the negotiating table.
4.
THE NATIONAL FORUM A1ND THE NATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR RURAL DIALOGUE AND
COOPERATION3
In 1991 the FONGS sought support from FAO to help its members
analyse the difficulties they were experiencing at micro level and how
they related to the constrictions which structural adjustment was impos.
ing at macro level. Although FAO had been in contact with the farmers'
movement in Senegal for over a decade through its NGO programme
this was the first time that its mainstream technical units were challenged to respond directly to a non-State actor's request for technical
assistance in policy analysis. The experience has been invaluable in
terms of allowing the Organization to concretely test out the perils and
rewards of a more pluralistic pattern of interaction.
The first step was the preparation of a paper documenting the
impact of structural adjustment on agriculture from the viewpoint of
small farmers, submitted to the government in July 1991, in the thick of
the ASAP negotiations. The second phase initated with a study of peasant reactions to the withdrawal of State services and of innovative initiafives undertaken by peasant associations to cope with the situation. The
resulting document4 was discussed with the FONGS' membership down
to the level of the constituent village groups. This capillary process of
grassroots reflection proved to be indispensable in helping rural people
bridge the "micro-macro" gap and prepare for participation in a
FONGS-organized national forum on the theme "What Future for
3 See N. McKeon, "National Forum 'What future for the peasants ofSenegal?': a case study in
FAO/NGO cooperation". Rome, FAQ, 1993; and 0. Ndiaye, "The Construction of the Senegalese
Farniers 'Movement: The Contribution and Role ofthe CNCR", in Peoples' Empowerment: Grassroots Experiences in Africa, Asia andLatin America. Rome, fRED Nord, 1997, pp. 253-322.
4 Jean-Marc von der Weid, "Rapport de la mission FAQ/FONGS sur l'impact de la politique
d 'ajusten1ent structw'el en milieu rural senégalais ", Rone, April 1992.
337
Senegal's Peasants?"The Forum took place in January 1993, little more
than a month prior to the national elections in order to take full advan-
tage of political attentiveness to the humours of the scattered but
numerically significant rural electorate. It brought together some 300
participants representing the three principal categories of actors among
whom dialogue was sought: the peasant movement, government and
donors. Its objectives were to present the FONGS' analysis of the
impact of the NAP on peasant agriculture and on the environment and its
proposals for the future, and to reflect on the establishment of an appropriate framework for dialogue and negotiation.
In the farmers' analysis the NAP had exposed the failure of the
agricultural development model applied in Senegal. Based on illconsidered exploitation of natural resources and relying on chemical
inputs to boost productivity5, it had been maintained under artificial
conditions of State services and subsidies that were now being withdrawn. Although the FONGS did not have a full-fledged substitute proposal, its member groups were experimenting with elements of an
alternative oriented towards diversification of crops and greater integration between agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry. Their goal was
an integrated approach to agricultural development which made economic, social and environmental sense at the level of the household, the
village, the agro-ecological zone ("le terroir"), in contrast to the prevailing tendency to think in terms of"filières" (the chain of individual crops,
from production to marketing). This represented an effort to win official
recognition for the logic which governs peasant farmers' "systemic"
strategies of multipurpose agricultural development.In political and
institutional terms, the Forum's most significant result was to set the
stage for the creation of a platform bringing together all of the national
federations which could claim to represent some sector of the rural
population, the National Council for Rural Dialogue and Cooperation
(Cons eu national de concertation et de cooperation rurale - CNCR). The
5 Particularly pernicious in the Groundnut Basin, the largest agricultural region in Senegal,
where monoculture and the deforestation required to introduce animal traction have
drastically compromised the soil fertility. Fertilizer consumption in the Basin droppedfranz
75, 000T in 1980 to 25,000 Tin 1990.
338
strategic choice was to join forces with the National Union of Agricultural Cooperatives and the other farmers' structures originally established on State initiative, in order to create a single, authoritative
interlocutor. This step was taken at Thiès on 17 March 1993 by seven
national federations of farmers, stockbreeders, fishworkers, horticulturalists and rural women6. They were joined in 1995 by two federations of
forestry workers, bringing membership to over 3 million.
5.
BUILDING CAPACITY TO DEFEND
DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW
Over the past five years the CNCR has become a full participant in
a range of programmes and policy fora. One recent step has been the
first project funded from FAO's own Regular Programme formulated in
partnership with a national farmers' federation. It is co-funded and executed by the FONGS, which has overall responsibility for training
within the CNCR. The project aims at strengthening peasant organizalions' capacity to analyse agricultural policy and formulate and defend
their own proposals; assisting them to define a strategy of sustainable
agriculture which reflects the interests of small producers and the logic
of their family farms; helping them to analyse the impact of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT on small-scale agriculture and to identify potential
new opportunities.
This joint initiative is situated within a situation of change at all
levels:
1
a world context of globalization, liberalization and privatization
which accentuates poverty in marginalized countries and sectors of
the population, strongly conditions developing countries' margin of
manoeuver and brings non-State actors to the fore;
6
"Thiès Declaration", in N. McKeon, op. cit.
339
a process of "democratization" in many countries accompanied by
rapid institutional transformation accenting decentralization, which
is full of promise but not easily controlled by local people in the
short term;
J
divergent views about how the roles of different actors should
evolve within this context. Civil society capacity building and
stakeholder negotiation are looming large in development coopera-
tion programmes, but these programmes reflect implicit socio-
political visions which are often assumed to be universally
applicable;
evolving roles of international organizations, whereby the United
Nations system - including FAO - is opening up channels of dialogue and cooperation with a range of non-State actors;
H far-reaching changes in the situation of the small farmers in Senegal
and in the kinds of services they need from their organization.
Since the capacity building programme provides a good vantage
point for charting responses to these challenges a case study is being
prepared as the process evolves7, with farmer organization leaders and
Ministry of Agriculture representatives to ensure stakeholder participation in the reflection. In particular, the study is seeking to:
clarify key concepts often used with different meanings, such as
civil society, capacity building, participation, partnership;
r
draw lessons to feed reflection on various actors' roles in agricultural development in countries like Senegal, how their relations are
evolving, and how best to promote negotiation and cooperation
among them;
identify success factors in civil society capacity-building initiatives
and issues to be considered when seeking to promote similar experiences elsewhere;
7 The project implementation is scheduled to run from September 1997 through May 1999.
340
0 discuss the role of international organizations and other external
partners in this context.
Four major themes are being tracked, selected because they are
central to the project's objectives and to the context of change in which it
is situated:
Fora and modalities of dialogue and negotiation. One project
aim is to help farmer organizations improve the quality of their participation in policy and programme negotiation. The study is exploring fora
and modalities which facilitate dialogue at both national and decentralized levels by analysing the concrete experience of farmer movement
participation in the current negotiation of the Agricultural Structural
Investment Programme (ASIP - see section 6 below).
Agricultural competitivity and sustainability. Helping the
peasant movement to formulate its own strategy of sustainable agricultural development is another project objective. A central problem is reconciling improved family farm competitivity in the marketplace with
sustainable resource management and food security. This issue is related
to the key challenge which the FONGS and its member associations are
facing in terms of their very identity as peasant organizations: how to
maintain the attention to socio-cultural relations 'and values which has
traditionally characterized the "generalist" associations in Senegal, as
compared with single crop or function organizations, while at the same
time developing a new capacity to respond to their members' economic
aspirations. The study will seek to synthesize the results of reflection on
this issue conducted in the context of the project.
Articulating relations between the apex and the base. Ensuring
accountability to grass-roots membership is a perenial challenge for
peoples' organizations. The FONGS' recently established Regional
Coordinations and the overall process of decentralization underway in
Senegal open perspectives for improved communication with and control by the base membership. The study will verify whether the methodology adopted by the project - centered on capacity building for a core
of peasant leaders and technicians situated mainly in the Regional
341
Coordinations - does have the intended impact in terms of improved
services to village-based associations and more effective articulation of
local people's interests in policy discussions.
Stakeholder perceptions. The study is following the evolution of
different actors' perceptions of their changing roles and responsibilities
in agricultural development and of their capacity to understand each
others' viewpoints and interests. Based on discussions with farmer
movement representatives an initial delineation of their perceptions is
presented in synthesis in the following section. It will be amplified and
extended to cover the government, local authorities and FAO during the
course of the project.
6.
MAPPING STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS
The national context
No longer directly involved in the production, processing and
marketing of agricultural products, the State is having to learn to dia
logue with the entities which are assuming reponsibility for these functions and take their views into account in setting the rules of the game.
On their side, farmers have to realize that they can no longer count on
the State's direct support, and learn to negotiate their interests with the
government and the private sector in a free market setting.
These new attitudes have not yet been assimilated. The mechanisms by which dialogue and negotiation can take place effectively have
not been established. The actors concerned have not yet acquired all of
the capacities they require. Nor do they necessarily share the same prior-
ity preoccupations. While the government and major funders tend to
take an institutional approach, the preoccupations of the farmers'
organizations are often more practical and concrete. The farmers' movement is also understandably concerned to maintain the organizations it
has built up over the past years, which have permitted it to impose its
presence on the national scene, whether or not these jibe with what is
342
coming off the drawing board now that a team of experts has been
charged with redrawing the institutional map. The capacity of national
entities and local groups to manage the process is key to its success. Yet
donor prompting weighs heavily, and the very pace of change militates
against popular control.
The dominant trend of privatization and liberalisation is perceived
with ambivalence by most actors. For government services it implies a
loss of power that is not easy to accept. The farmers' movement appreciates the greater space and freedom to organize, but feels that too little is
being done to guarantee the interests of small producers - and the food
security of the country's citizens - against those of individual economic
operators. As one speaker stated at the FONGS General Assembly in
December 1997, "Businessmen are invading the rural world and the
associations are not prepared to deal with this new situation".
Decentralization is another trend which evokes both hopefulness
and misgivings. A document prepared by the CNCR in November 19978
welcomes decentralisation but notes that it does not suffice to reduce the
tension that surrounds resources and power. To do so requires acceptance by all parties of a logic of improving the resource base and ensur-
ing transparency of distribution mechanisms. The associations
represented at the FONGS General Assembly bemoaned the proliferation of decentralized bodies to which farmers' organizations need to
refer in order to obtain access to resources. The dialogue, they pointed
out, is complicated by the fact that the process of election or cooptation
to these bodies obeys a logic of politics rather than one of development.
One witness noted a certain confusion in Senegal among political
processes, government, even the State itself, and the dominant party. In
his view this also favours a logic of clientelism and a tendency on the
part of citizens to consider that the name of the game is either to exploit
the system or to subvert it. "Although that was an appropriate reaction
under colonialism", the informant continued, "it is not any more since
'the system' is ours now, and it is up to us to make it work."
8 "Décentralisation et accès aux ressources: roles des organisations paysannes ".
343
Grassroots Organizations, Decentralization and Rural Deyelopment
Among the various negotiating processes that are experimenting
with ways of taking stakeholder views into account, the World Bank-led
preparation of the Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP),
currently underway, is the object of particular interest because of its
impact on overall investment in the agricultural sector. In theory, the
ASIP should be based on an identification of imbalances among regions
and sectors that need to be corrected, and of constraints encountered by
all actors. It should represent a consensus among these actors, the government, and the external partners, with the government guaranteeing
the context for consultation.
In reality this kind of participatory negotiation is easier to describe
than to enact. At a workshop held in Malawi in November 1997 to
exchange experience in formulating ASIPs in Africa, Senegal was the
only country represented where meaningful participation by representatives of farmers' organizations was taking place. Even in Senegal, how-
ever, the process is a fragile one, subject to deviation by a range of
factors including luke-warm political commitment; insufficient preparation on the part of both government and non-State actors to play their
new roles and lack of tested methodologies or experience to rely on;
pressure of party politics; donor conditionalities; the fact that the decentralized authorities are only now being put in place and it is not yet clear
how to achieve a balance between regional autonomy and the overall
national framework.
The peasant movement
The peasant movement in Senegal is in an extremely dynamic
phase The CNCR has brought together under a single umbrella the three
main currents of rural organizations in the country: the State-established
cooperatives, which have been left essentially to their own devices,
bereft of government support, with the advent of structural adjustment;
the autonomous peasant associations federated nationally in the
FONGS; and the "groupements d'intérêt économique" (GIE) introduced with structural adjustment and privatization policies to facilitate
access to resources by small groups of farmers and entrepreneurs.
344
Despite this formal regrouping, however, the respective roles and identities of these configurations of the peasant movement are still very much
in the process of being redefined.
National council for rural dialogue and cooperation (CNCR)
The CNCR's very success, in the five years since its establishment, in obtaining recognition as an indispensable interlocutor on all
questions concerning the rural milieu has created problems for the management of its responsibilities. Under-staffed and under-equipped, the
CNCR is overwhelmed with dossiers that need to be analysed and followed. The fact that it groups all of the national federations which can
claim to represent rural people has undoubtedly enhanced its negotiating power. However, the disparity among its members in terms of history, representativity, quality of leadership and organizational strength
creates another order of difficulties.
Challenges which the CNCR is confronting include the need to
build up a body of technical support; to train a larger number of farmer
leaders capable of defending technical dossiers and serving as focal
points for sensitizing the member organizations of the CNCR to the
common interests of rural people; to stimulate its less representative
members to build transparency and accountability into their structures;
to cement the internal cohesion of the CNCR by demonstrating that it
obtains real benefits for its members. The most basic requirement is an
effective communications system which ensures that information circu-
lates and that feedback from the base reaches leaders engaged in
national-level negotiations.
In responding to these challenges the CNCR has drawn on the
FONGS' human resources and legitimacy. It has established a technical
support unit composed of competent national experts and is identifying
leaders to be trained in each member federation. A "ResearchDevelopment unit" based in the CNCR has been established with the
Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research (Institut senégalais de
recherche agricole - ISRA), the Institute of Food Technology (Institut de
345
technologie alimentaire - ITA), and the newly re-organized extension
services. Itis setting up decentralized committes in each agro-ecological
region to identify and respond to farmers' problems.
The CNCR is trying to mobilize the peasant movement's own
resources through a restructured credit system based on a network of
farmers' savings and loans associations. The constitution of a national
fund to cope with natural calamities and to enable the movement to "buy
into" strategically important services that are now in the process of privatization is also foreseen. A farmer movement-controlled organization,
the Senegalese Association for the Promotion of Small Grassroots
Development Projects (Association senégalaise pour la promotion de
petits projets de développement a la base - ASPRODEB), has been cre-
ated to supervise the use of public finance intended to promote local
rural development activities. Originally established to deal with the bal-
ance of loans granted by the World Bank and IFAD some years ago,
ASPRODEB is now extending its range to handle new funding and is a
strong candidate to channel those components of the ASIP which will be
directed to rural productive initiatives.
A key moment in the CNCR's legitimatization as representative of
the peasant movement was its decision in June 1996 to withdraw from
all national negotiation fora because the government was stalling on
implementing agreed measures of importance to small holder
agriculture, including a reduction in the interest rate on agricultural
credit. In February 1997, in the face of the Council's continued
intransigence, the President of the Republic agreed to receive a CNCR
delegation and subsequently ensured that the agreed measures were put
into effect.
Federation of NGOs of Senegal (FONGS)
The FONGS, for its part, is explicitly undergoing a period of deep
self-questioning with a view to redefining its identity and role - and that
of its member associations - in the changing environment in which they
find themselves.
346
The FONGS has benefitted over the past 5 years from a flexible
and intelligent form of programme support9. In this context twenty of its
member associations undertook an institutional evaluation which diagnosed a crisis of identity. In an era characterised by a transition from the
ideals of community solidarity on which the associations had originally
been based to greater concern for individual economic advancement and
concrete improvements in living conditions, the associations seemed
disoriented, their leaders isolated from their milieu and from their own steadily aging - base, unable to define viable economic strategies.This
process of self-evaluation led to the identification of five strategic lines
of action: development of economic and financial activities in rural
areas; transformation of production systems and protection of natural
resources; women and the process of political and economic development; improved living conditions; institutional and organizational
capacity building. Bach association has formulated its own multi-phase
strategic plan, identif'ing priority actions which it is ready to undertake
immediately and those for which more research and building alliances
with other actors may be required.
The four-year programme'° which the FONGS has just negotiated
with its financial partners aims at stimulating this process of renewal by
providing effective support services to the associations and by helping
to create a favourable policy environment at regional and national levels. The major institutional mechanisms foreseen are:
Li
Regional Coordinations, which already exist but require reinforcing;
Li
six technical support units to be created at national level.
The FONGS General Assembly in December 1997 reaffirmed the
priority attached to meeting requests for services from the base. In the
past, it was acknowledged, less attention has been paid to economic
9 Funded by a consortium ofEuropean NGOs ('SOS-Faim ofBelgium, IPSI ofItaly, NOVIB of
the Netherlands), the European Union and the Swiss Development Cooperation.
10 "Approche stratégique de renforcement des capacitds d'action de développenient des
associations menibres de Ia FONGS 1998-2001".
347
problems because efforts were concentrated on building a movement
strong enough to make itself heard at national level. The structure of the
FONGS was also more suited to political participation than to meeting
technical and economic needs. Key issues in the effort towards renovation include the following.
Decentralization of the FONGS is essential to move the federation closer to its members and ensure that the peasant movement brings
its weight to bear on the current process of regionalization of political
decision-making and allocation of public resources. Delegates at the
Assembly testified to the fact that the FONGS Regional Coordinations
are having a real impact in terms of better circulation of information.
"The associations have more control over the FONGS... Before there
was a gap between the FONGS and the associations... Now the level of
participation is better... By women especially, since the Regional Coordinations are closer to home..."
The Regional Coordinations, participants agreed, are also considerably improving cooperation between FONGS member associations
and other actors, and the degree to which the peasant movement is recognized and represented within the various decentralized structures that
are being created. "The Regional Coordinations have become important
fora for exchange... Now for the first time the other actors can see peasant organizations discuss, decide and implement... It has become clear
that the peasant organizations are indispensable partners in all rural
development initiatives, and this has led to a multiplication ofcoop eration among actors."
However, delegates underlined that much more needs to be done
in terms of building alliances with others. Problem areas include:
difficulties of communication at local level;
insufficient information about available public resources and about
the attributions of the myriad decentralized structures that are currently being established;
rivalry among peasant organizations in the same region;
348
Ii difficult relations between peasant associations and some Presidents of the Rural Communities, which control the allocation of
decentralized public resources.
A major challenge for the FONGS is to use the Regional Coordi-
nations as platforms for lobbying and sensitizing the decentralized
structures.The dialectic between the political system and the peasant
movement - the majority of the electorate - is delicate. "Many Rural
Communities don't have any coherent development plan - they are
political playing grounds. Our people have to join these structures, but
with the capacity of proposing and defending measures in our interests...
As it is now many association leaders get themselves elected, but they
don't have a clear mandate..."
Redefining the base. With the decentralization of decisionmaking, the same strategic issues of negotiating power and representativity that led to the creation of the CNCR are being posed at regional
level. The Regional Coordinations are of necessity reaching out beyond
the member associations of the FONGS to rural society at large, and this
seems to be the route to follow in the future.
Redefining membership is also important in terms of the priority
now placed on productive and economic activities. The basic economic
unit in rural Senegal is the family farm, and promotion of socially, culturally and ecologically-sensitive family farming, as opposed to singleminded commercial agriculture, is one of the most important planks in
the platform of the FONGS and the CNCR. Yet the family farm is not the
basic membership unit of the FONGS associations, and often not all of
the key actors in the family unit are members of the local association.
Increased focus on the family farm should also highlight an issue which
the FONGS has already prioritized but which continues to be explosive,
that of the place of women in economic and political development.
Professionalization of services. For the FONGS to respond to its
present membership's demands and gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the rural
world at large it needs to build up its capacity to offer or procure quality
professional services. This it is seeking to do through the introduction of
349
needs identification from the local level on up to the regional and the
establishment of central technical units. The FONGS is commited to
working towards financial autonomy, which can only be achieved if the
quality of the services it offers incites farmers to pay for them and members to keep up with their dues.
Technical assistance, of course, is not neutral. The farmers' movement has expressed a socio-political and environmental vision, but to
translate it into concrete action requires an effective strategy of sustainable agricultural development. The strategic reflection taking place in
the FAO/FONGS project is expected to help clarify this important queslion. For the moment the relationship between the FONGS' institutional
strategy and its development strategy is still somewhat hazy.
A related and delicate question is that of clarifying the distinction
between political leadership of the federation and the economic and
technical support services it offers. A resolution adopted by the General
Assembly after discussion with donor partners points in this direction by
requiring the FONGS and its members to cover themselves all expenses
related to the functioning of the association in the future, reserving outside support exclusively for programmes.
Strategic monitoring and communication. Underlying all this
process of transformation are two related priorities: developing an ongoing capacity for strategic monitoring of the economic, social and
political context within which the peasant movement is situated, and
building an effective system of horizontal and vertical communication.
The latter involves not just the "hardware" but also a question of conceptual frameworks and language. How to establish dialogue with government and financial partners in terms they can understand without
loosing touch with the realities of local life and the language and metaphors people use to talk about them?
The future of the peasant movement
The challenges the FONGS is facing are also open questions for
the CNCR and the peasant movement at large, and for the external part-
350
ners who are accompanying them. Maintaining a healthy relationship
between the apex and the base of the peasant movement is an issue to
which several partners draw attention. While recognizing the importance of influencing the macro-economic policies that condition rural
life, some feel that national platforms risk escaping from the control of
the base and prefer approaches to structuring the peasant movement that
privilege concrete activities at the grassroots level. Others point to the
distance that tends to be created between the leaders involved in national
negotiations and the base, and the risk that the national federations may
go further in the direction of sharing responsibility with government for
negotiated consensus than their membership are ready to understand
and accept. These partners emphasize the importance of balancing
improved capacity for national negotiation with strengthened ability of
local farmers to face, at their level, the economic, agro-ecological and
land tenure challenges they will be confronting over the coming years.
The relationship between the CNCR, the FONGS and their members is also a key element in visions of the future expressed from within
the movement. Speaking with historical perspective, some leaders sug-
gest that the FONGS had become a "giant with clay feet" before the
creation of the CNCR enabled it to concentrate its attention on the base
and get on with decentralisation. They feel confident that things are
moving in the right direction, with the CNCR operating at national level
and the FONGS enlargening its outreach at regional and local levels.
Others, however, wonder if real strategic agreement can be achieved
among organizations as different as the member federations of the
CNCR.
One respondant spoke of the restructuring of the peasant world as
a long-term process. His vision was of a basic organisation on generalist
lines representing social and cultural values as well as economic concerns (FONGS), with the CNCR playing a political role of national rep-
resentation and negotiation and the other member federations of the
CNCR perhaps evolving into specialized technical services available to
peasant organizations on a payment basis. Other leaders emphasize the
importance of laying a solid economic basis for a sustainable peasant
351
movement. Their vision includes ensuring greater security and flexibility for the family farm economy by introducing drought resistant crops
suited to self-consumption and marketing. Farmers should win control
of the chain through small-scale processing units for local use and contractual arrangements with national industries and external markets. A
national fund for the development of peasant agriculture should be set
up, fed not by external loans afflicted with donor conditionalities but by
a share in the proceeds of marketing small holders' products. Selfsufficiency and responsibilization are key words in this vision, breaking
away from the aid mentality that has done such damage to peasant
identity.
Common to all perceptions is a realization that the restructuring of
the peasant movement is very much a dynamic work-in-progress, and
that it is up to the peasant organizations themselves to call the shots. In
the words of one leader, "There's no development if people are not
allowed to take responsibility for their own choices".
SOMMAIRE
Le Senegal a comparativement une longue histoire de décentralisation, de auto-determination et de organisations autonomes des agriculteurs. A l'époque du colonialisme et au debut du postcolonialisme, le Senegal a eu, dans le secteur agricole, aussi bien un
plan de développement centralisé et de haut en bas, que les rigides
organisations parastatales. A cause de la crise financière du Gouvernemelt central a la fin de 1970, l'Etat a dü accepter les programmes d'ajustement structurel et introduire une nouvelle politique agricole.
A la suite de la crise an cours des années '70 des associations
autonomes locales ont commence a se constituer a côté des cooperatives
de l'Etat. Les femmes ont eu un role determinant dans ce mouvement
qui, a l'origine, avait été organisé autour de la production collective de
nourriture, mais aprês ii s'est étendu progressivement aux activités qui
se développent en arnont et en aval. Commence dans les villages, cc
352
mouvement s ' est en suite fédéré a niveau départemental et regional
jusqu'à 1976 quand une fédération nationale - Fédération des ONGs
Sénégalaises (FONGS) - a été créée. Une des actions le plus importantes mises a l'ordre dujour par la Federation (FONGS) a été l'affermissement de l'identité des agriculteurs, moyennant des programmes de
formation, echange de visites, réflexions collectives et actions sur les
problèmes communs. En 1990 le numéro de membres a augmenté
jusqu'à 400.000 a peu près; ce chiffre représente plus de 2.000 groupes
locaux d'une extrémité a l'autre du pays.
De toute facon, le Gouvemement n'avait pas envie de reconnaltre
Ia Fédération des ONGs Senégalaises comme son partenaire dans les
negotiations politiques et ii était clair que les associations des agricul-
teurs auraient dü prendre eux-rnêrne l'initiative pour se faire reconnaltre. A l'aide de FAO on a pose les jalons d'un forum national et du
Conseil National de Concertation et Cooperation Rurale (CNCR). Le
forum lui-même, avec 300 participants sortis du mouvement pays an, du
gouvernement et des donneurs, s'est tenu en 1993. Son but prirnaire était
celui de presenter l'analyse de la Fédération (FONGS) concernante
l'impact de SAP sur l'agriculture et l'habitat des villages. Dans la rnême
année la Fédération (FONGS) réunissait ses forces avec l'Union Nation-
ale des Cooperatives Agricoles et d'autres structures agricoles originairement créées par initiative de l'Etat.
Le Conseil National (CNCR) est maintenant devenu - avec
l'approbation du Gouvemement - un participant a plein droit a une
gamme de programmes et de "fora" politiques. Ses activités visent a
assister les organisations paysannes autant bien pour définir une
stratégie d'agriculture soutenable que pour renforcer leur capacité
d'analyser la politique agricole, formuler et défendre leurs propres
objectifs. Le mouvement paysan Sénégalais est actuellement plein de
dynamisme qui se manifeste en autre par une crise d'identité. Depuis
son origine, qui se posait comme une reaction et une alternative a la
politique officielle, ii est maintenant devenu partie de la machine
politique négociatrice. Les nouvelles fonctions et le travail a niveaux
plus élevés demandent une nouvelle habilité et perspective. Dans une
353
époque caractérisée par la transition des ideals de la solidarité
communautaire sur laquelle les associations originairement se
fondaient, vers un plus grand intérêt pour le développement économique
individuel, la Fédération (FONGS) semble être des fois un peu
désorientée et incapable de définir des strategies économiques vitales. Ii
sera de nouveau essentiel d'amener la Fédération plus proche de ses
membres pendant que le processus de 1'ajustement structurel et de Ia
modernisation continuera.
354
Jeux d'acteurs autour du
développement institutionnel'
TARIK DAHOU
1 Ce travail a été effectué dans le cadre d 'Un doctorat de Sciences Sociales au Centre d 'Etudes
Africaines de 1 'EHESS sous la direction de Jean Copans. Je rernercie Ebrima Sail dii
CODESRIA, Philippe Lavigne Delville du GRE7 Abdou Salam Fall de I 'IFAN et Babacar
Sail de I 'EHESS pour leur lecture critique de ce texte.
Jeux d'acteurs autour du développement institutionnel
Les programmes de développement institutionnel se sont
multiplies au cours des dernières années, spécialement dans la phase de
libéralisation des politiques agricoles. On met désormais l'accent sur
une meilleure gestion des ressources par des organisations de
producteurs détachées des services de 1'Etat.
La vision de la Banque Mondiale, qui est a l'initiative de nombreux programmes, est fortement marquee par une conception deterministe des changements organisationnels, oi l'organisation s'adapte de
facon mécanique a son enviroimernent. La pression exercée par les institutions publiques, marchandes ou civiques, tout spécialement pour une
activité specifique et concurrentielle, rend plus efficaces les procedures
de l'organisation (Israel).
En réalité, contrairement a ce point de vue structurofonctionnaliste, les dynamiques de normes diffusées par l'intervention
dans le développement sont tributaires des négociations entre les acteurs
au niveau local. Ce niveau a donc été choisi pour observer les pratiques
de manipulation des normes de développement2. La position de chercheur a permis de mettre àjour toute une série d'interactions, difficiles a
remarquer pour un intervenant aussi bien pour des motifs de temps que
d'implication dans l'action (Lavigne Delville). Ces interactions
montrent que les normes d'action collective demeurent tributaires de
logiques marquees par les dynamiques sociales extérieures a l'organisation. Noire étude de cas porte sur l'introduction de la mécanisation dans
un collectifvillageois, activité specifique et soumise a concurrence. Les
dynamiques de ce groupement paysan seront présentées chronologique-
ment, en deux phases, et interprétées par les theories économiques et
sociologiques du développement institutionnel afin d'en firer des implications en ternie d'appui.
2 Dans cet article ce ferine fail référence aux nornies de gestion techniques et économiques
élaborées par les intervenantspourguider les comportements dans / 'organisation issue dzine
action de développernent.
357
La region du delta du fleuve Senegal, zone pilote dans les expéri-
ences de "professionnalisation de l'agriculture"3 pour les systèmes
irrigués, représente un cadre d'étude tout a fait indiqué pour cette problématique. Après l'échec retentissant de la vulgarisation agricole, les
cooperatives encadrant les agriculteurs sur des terres aménagées par
l'Etat ont été transfonnées en sections villageoises, dans le cadre de la
Nouvelle politique agricole qui implique un désengagement de l'Etat.
Depuis une quinzaine d'années, la SAED4 et l'ISRA5 ont appuyé Ia
professionnalisation des sections. Ces dernières se sont peu a peu
autonomisées par rapport a la SAED, qui prenait autrefois en charge
tous les aspects de la fihière. Bien que fédérées en unions, ce sont des
unites décentralisées avec une gestion autonome - entièrement prise en
charge par les paysans -, qui s'occupent désormais de Ia négociation du
credit auprès de la Caisse nationale de credit agricole (CNCA), de la distribution de l'eau et des intrants, de l'itinéraire technique, de la commer-
cialisation du produit et du remboursement. Depuis l'effort de
mécanisation encourage par les bailleurs, elles gèrent du materiel agri-
cole, notamment des moissonneuses batteuses et des tracteurs. Elles
bénéficient, pour cet ensemble d'activités, d'une aide6 émanant des
unions chargées de prélever la redevance hydraulique sur les aménagements publics.
3 Le terme de professionnalisation recouvre en grande partie une volonté de dffiision des
norn1es marchandes au niveau local. II s 'agit d 'orienter les comportements des acteurs
économiques vers des coniportements marchands y con2pris dans les spheres privée et
familiale. Même si certaines conceptions élargissent Ia notion a Ia transformation socioéconomique des modes de gestion du terroir par les paysans, / 'objectif reste identique
difJiiser les normes de gestion inarchandes a tous les niveaux de decision des acteurs,
exploitation et organisation.
4 Société d'Aménageinent et d'Exploitation des terres du Delta dufleuve Senegal, de Ia vallée
dufleuve Senegal qui a etC chargée, par/es bail/curs bilatéraux et multilatéraux, de Ia mission
de dCléguer progressivement ses prerogatives mix organisations paysannes et d 'assurer
désormais unefonction de mise en relation et de suivi-C valuation de ces organisations.
5 Institut Sendgalais de Recherches Agricoles.
6 Cette aide est non ne'gligeable: I 'union peut octroyer aux sections le coat hydraulique a credit
ou les semences qu 'el/c produit et realise des achats groupés d'intrants pour diminuer Ic
credit de campagne des sections.
358
L'appui consiste principalement en des formations procurées par
la SAED, I'ISRA et les différentes agences de cooperation étrangères
afin d'apporter aux paysans la rnaItrise du marché. Pour atteindre cet
objectif, les organisations rurales doivent tendre vers une spécialisation
poussée des fonctions de services agricoles, et disposer de surcroIt d'une
autonomie financière propre a éviter toute intermediation dans l'accès
du paysannat au marché7. Des formations ont été réalisées, afin de constituer des " staffs " tecimiques et de structurer les organisations en
bureaux avec des procedures comptables et des règles de contrôle financier8. Le but est d'arriver a terme a une salarisation de cadres ruraux qui
offriraient des services rémunérds aux exploitants. Cependant, cette
logique semble encore bien éloignée du fonctionnement reel des
groupements.
La mécanisation a connu un développement important depuis dix
ans avec la creation de la CNCA. Pour améliorer l'utilisation des matériels, des formations en gestion et en maintenance ont été réalisées par
1'ISRA, et des manuels de procedures rediges par la SAED. Les mdicateurs de performances techniques et économiques, obtenus a partir
des cahiers de bord et d'entretien foumis aux utilisateurs des machines,
étaient destinés a faciliter la gestion des paysans. D'après les rapports
des personnels (Kante), ces formations ont negligé les aspects organisa-
tionnels. Ii est intéressant de suivre le processus d'appui a la gestion
d'une moissonneuse batteuse dans une section villageoise de Diawar,
choisie par l'ISRA dans le cadre de son programme d'aide a la gestion
de plusieurs matériels agricoles.
Ce village offre l'avantage d'une relative homogénéité de peuplement puisqu'il ne regroupe que des wolofs et qu'aucune famille castée
n'y reside. Diawar compte environ 2000 habitants formant trois clans
matrilinéaires et d'autres families ayant plus tardivement occupé le
7 Ce discours sert zinc volonté de désengagenient quI conduit souvent a 1 'essor de nouvelles fornies de dépendance dans / 'accès aux ressources dii monde marc hand pour le paysan.
8 La SAED tente actuellement de meltre en place un centre deprestationpour les organisalions
paysannes qui serait susceptible de réaliser des audits comptables at financiers pour
permettre zinc mel//cure gestion.
359
village. Deux des clans constituent des lignages historiquement influents, au sein desquels les rois du Waalo choisissaient leurs femmes: il
s'agit des njess et des tejjeg. Le troisième clan, les jinlax, reconnu
comme fondateur du village, pretend lui aussi être issu d'un important
lignage, sans que les différents ouvrages ou documents historiques sur le
Waalo n'en apportent la preuve.
Les rapports entre les individus sont fortement structures par la
parenté. Toute relation est rapportée a un ensemble d'obligations réciproques ou de positions d'autorité dans le lignage d'appartenance. Les
relations politiques forment d'autres regroupements: les clans politiques
du PS9, deux tendances rivales, sont scindés en fonction du leader supporte. Un groupe d'opposition affilié au PDS'° s'est aussi formé dans le
village. La superposition des clans politiques aux clans familiaux est
imparfaite, même si les leaders s'appuient sur leurs relations parentales
pour constituer leur clientele politique. Les mécanismes de la dette forment des chaInes de créanciers-débiteurs, la rareté des ressources pour
1' irrigation ayant fait naItre des dépendances dans l'exploitation productive. Ces rapports économiques, spécialement dans l'actuel contexte de
tarissement du credit, s'imbriquent dans les relations familiales - oii les
prestations et contre prestations revêtent une grande importance - ou
politiques - étant donné les logiques de clientele -. Tous ces liens font,
en definitive, émerger des clans structures autour d'un leader et regroupant toute une série de dépendants. L'univers villageois est ainsi constitue de multiples hierarchies dominées par des acteurs determinants dans
les decisions.
Le village est divisé en deux principaux clans: l'un rassemblé
autour du chef de village, et 1' autre autour du président des anciennes
cooperatives et de l'actuelle Union des organisations paysannes de
Boundoum" dont font partie les sections villageoises de Diawar. Les
9
Peril Socialiste, parli dit président au poztvoir et majoritairernent représenté dans les
communautés rurales oft I 'on altribue les terres.
10 Parti Ddrnocratique Senegalais, principal parti d'opposition.
11 Le périniètre de Boundourn étant un casier de 3000 ha regroupant sept villages alnénagé par
Ia SAED.
360
modes d' organisation du collectif de gestion du materiel d'une section,
dirigé par le dernier clan cite, ont été observes de 1996 a 1998.
1.
LE PARADIGME ECONOMIQUE
1.1
Une nouvelle richesse
Entre 1989 et 1991, I'ISRA et la SAED dispensèrent des
formations-suivi pour la gestion d'une moissonneuse batteuse, les personnels étant charges de veiller a la bonne tenue des cahiers de performances pour rentabiliser au mieux la gestion et ainsi rembourser le credit.
Afin d'organiser le travail de la machine, un bureau fut formé par les
paysans, comprenant un président, le président de la section et de
l'union, un trésorier et un jeune gestionnaire,également gestionnaire de
la section. Ce dernier ftt choisi pour son instruction - censée lui permettre de manipuler aisément des modes de gestion complexes'2 - et ses
bonnes relations avec les représentants de la banque. A la demande des
paysans, un règlement intérieur fut adopté'3, qui accordait les prérogatives de fixation du tarif de prestation au bureau et celies de l'établisse-
ment du programme de travail a un comité de gestion compose du
bureau et des chefs de groupement de la section'4 (de vieux paysans au
pouvoir décisionnel important). L'obligation pour les membres de
recourir a la moissonneuse de la section pour leurs travaux de récolte sur
les aménagements publics avait été incluse dans le règlement. Pendant
deux ans, la bonne gestion produisit assez de bénéfices pour rembourser
12 Laprogrammation et Ic suivi du travail coinprenant les calculs du paiement des intérêts et de
I 'ainortisseinent.
13 II est difJIcile de savoir s 'ii résultait de négociations entre les membres OU Si les
personnels de 1 'ISRA 1 'avaient rédigé pour les paysans. Peu d 'inform ations ont dté
fournies, aussi bien de Ia part des paysans que de 1 'ISRA, concernant Ia facon dont ce
réglementa été adopté.
14 La section est divise'e en groupements des exploitants appartenant a une même mail/c
hydraulique. Ces groupemcnts servent a organiser Ia distribution de I 'eau sur Ic réseau de
1 'arnénagement.
361
l'emprunt et permettre l'acquisition en 1992 d'une deuxième moissonneuse, toujours sur credit de la CNCA'5.
L'essentiel de la gestion du materiel était entre lies mains d'une
famille, tout était décidé par le président et le gestionnaire, qui faisait
figure de fils pour lui'6. Leur deux concessions sont étroitement liées par
I' alliance - le fils du président des OP de Boundoum a épousé la sceur du
jeune gestionnaire - qui forme désormais une famille. Celle-ci possède
en commun une société effectuant de la prestation de services, au moyen
d'une moissonneuse et d'un tracteur - acquis grace a un credit CNCA en
1992 - et d'une usine de décorticage de riz.
Ce clan avait progressivement écarté des postes stratégiques ceux
qutil ne contrôlait pas. Le conducteur, neveu du président de l'union des
OP de Boundoum, qui devait noter les déplacements de la machine sur
un carnet de bord pour des motifs techniques (économie des charges de
déplacements), flit écarté pour s'être plaint de la mauvaise gestion. On
choisit pour le remplacer un cadet, le fils du président de l'union, qui
devait poser moms de problèmes'7. La tenue d'un carnet de bord par le
conducteur flit alors abandonnée. Par ailleurs, le trésorier et oncle du
gestionnaire, bien qu'il ait cédé a une reprise, s'opposa aux signatures
de cheques en blanc18 et perdit a son tour sa place.
En 1994, le gestionnaire flit critique pour les deficits issus des
deux moissonneuses, les paysans destituèrent le président et
réclamèrent un "règlement intérieur solide". Le gestionnaire rejeta cette
initiative sous prétexte que le travail de gestion n'était pas rémunéré, et
céda sa place a un membre de sa tendance politique afin d'apaiser le
ISLe prix de Ia moissonneuse, intérêts compris, alteignail Ic montant de 22 millions defrancs
CFA, et les annuités versées étaient de 5 millions.
16 Après liii avoir été conflé par son père.
I? La relation pere/fils ext beaucoup plus marquee par I 'autorité que Ia relation oncle/neveu
(A. B. DIOP,).
IS Le gestionnaire a/jail chercher en son nom les credits pour son GIE (fonder un Groupement
d'intCrêt Cconomique, sur simple presentation de stat uts, permet d'accCder au credit bancaire,) et liii apportaitses intrants au moment de Ia campagne. Son manque deform ation pour
nCgocier des credits conduisait a cc qu i/ soil dépendant dii gestionnaire pour lefinancement
de ses campagnes.
362
Jeux d'acteurs autour du ddveloppement institutionnel
conflit. Ces deux gestionnaires purent occuper une position privilégiée
auprès du futur député de la zone grace a l'argent tire de ce materiel.
Plusieurs tonnes de riz évacuées par les gestionnaires de la machine a La
rizerie du futur député, alors que cette dernière n'était pas agréée par La
CNCA, ne furent j amais payées a la section. De ce fait, le bureau devint
aux yeux des membres simples une tontine réservée aux dirigeants.
En juin 1996, une reunion houleuse eut lieu a Diawar entre les
membres de la section, au cours de laquelle les deux gestionnaires furent
accuses de détournements. Ces derniers en attribuèrent la responsabilité
au pointeur, appartenant a une autre famille, du fait de son role straté-
gique: ii accompagnait la machine dans ses déplacements, notait les
quantités de riz moissonnées et les ramenait au magasin. Le pointeur se
défendit grace aux données de son camet de bard, sans jamais les produire, pour expliquer que les responsables ne géraient pas bien le matériel, mais l'absence de magasinier ne permit pas de faire la lumiêre sur
les faits.
Le frère de Pancien trésorier l'a convaincu de ne pas aller plus loin
dans la condamnation et de ne rien dire des malversations, sous prétexte
qutune telle révélation aurait été susceptible d'éclater leur famille. Le
frère du trésorier, opposant politique appartenant au PDS, obtint la gestion de ce materiel puisquil condamnait depuis longtemps les pratiques
des leaders paysans. Le nouveau président voulut investir l'ancien ges-
tionnaire, en tant que responsable-crédit, pour pouvoir bénéficier des
bonnes relations qutil entretenait avec les banquiers. Contre l'avis
d'autres membres du bureau ii pensait pouvoir facilement le contrôler
car c'était son neveu agnatique'9.
Suite a la mauvaise gestion du materiel agricole, ayant conduit a
d'importants deficits, Ia section se subdivisa en cinq. Deux sections
devaient désormais gérer une moissonneuse, et trois autres sections la
deuxième. Pour mieux étudier l'évolution des règles, l'organisation des
deux premieres sections a été suivie, car ceux qui géraient auparavant le
materiel en faisaient partie.
19 Fils dufrere.
363
Ces nouvelles organisations de gestion du materiel décidèrent de
transformer leurs modes d'action afin d'éviter les problèmes passes. Les
theories économiques du développement institutionnel offrent une
bonne explication de l'innovation organisationnelle permettant d'analyser ces changements.
1.2
De iiouvelles règles
L' économie institutionnelle constitue un cadre intéressant pour
comprendre l'orientation du changement dans les normes organisation-
nelles des collectifs paysans. La théorie des coüts de transaction
développée par Williamson montre qu'au gem du marché l'information
imparfaite, la rationalité limitée sont autant de facteurs impliquant des
coflts de transaction pour des acteurs atomisés; aussi l'organisation naItelle d'une possibilité de baisse des coüts de transaction20. L'opportunité
de baisse de ces coüts explique aussi le changement des règles dans
1' organisation.
De nouveaux processus de decision avaient été envisages pour
faire baisser les coüts de transaction. Le pourcentage prélevé sur la
récolte pour rémunérer la machine lors de son passage dans les parcelles
représentait une charge d'exploitation trop élevée, un taux de 20% ne
s'imposait plus une fois la dette acquittée. Ce taux n'étaitpas crucial sur
les aménagements publics, puisque les bénéfices du travail de la
machine devaient profiter aux exploitants de la section. Cependant,
maintenir un taux faible représentait un enj eu important pour infléchir le
taux de la prestation sur les terrains privés des membres, oi d'autres
prestataires pouvaient moissonner. Le gestionnaire décidait seul du tarif
appliqué par le collectif, puis on réunissait en Assemblée genérale les
membres pour les en informer. Cette procedure profitait au gestionnaire
qui possédait sa propre moissonneuse sur financement CNCA et pouvait
ainsi mieux rentabiliser son materiel. Désormais les taux de prestation
20 Les coats de transaction représentent les coüts defonctionnen2ent d 'un système d 'échange ci,
plus prdcisément, dons Ic cadre d'une économie de marché, cc qu 'ii en coite de recourir au
marché pour procéder a I 'allocation des ressources ci transférer des droits de propriété.
364
Jeux d'acleurs autour dii développement institutionnel
seront fixes en assemblée générale, ce qui fera baisser les coüts a 16%. Ii
appartiendra dorénavant aux membres des sections de participer au
choix du tarif pour qu' ii ne soit pas trop coüteux de recourir au marché
de la prestation.
L'absence de processus de decision élargis pour la programmation
entraInait également d'importants coflts de transactions. Le programme
de passage de la moissonneuse dans les parcelles n'était décidé que par
le gestionnaire, conduisant souvent a une rentabilisation en dehors du
village. Des retards de récolte pour les membres de la section en résultaient, ce qui diminuait les rendements de leurs champs. La programmation devrait maintenant être effectuée par 1'Assemblée generale, afin
d'éviter que des membres de la section ne pâtissent d'un passage tardif
des machines dans leurs parcelles. Cette mesure était d'autant plus cruciale que les machines sont désormais peu nombreuses dans la region.
Selon North, autre théoricien de l'économie institutionnelle, les
institutions économiques sont performantes dans l'organisation du
commerce a longue distance, quand elles garantissent la confiance dans
les transactions et diminuent ainsi les coüts de contrôle et ceux lies aux
asymétries informationnelles au sein du marché. Quand l'expansion du
commerce se heurte a des problèmes institutionnels nuisant au
renforcement des contrats et au problème d'agence2' ces difficultés
peuvent être surmontées grace a des innovations institutionnelles telles
qu'un système de mesure, des droits et des garanties. Les droits de
propriétés et les méthodes comptables sont des institutions essentielles a
l'économie de marché qui incitent les organisations volontaires a
améliorer leurs modes de coordination lors de l'essor et de la
complexification des transactions.
Une des premieres initiatives discutées par les paysans après la
destitution de l'ancien bureau fut de prévoir des contrats de prestation
21 Ce que recouvre Ia théorie de / 'agence, entendue dans son sens Ic plus large, est I 'analyse des
règles développées pour s 'assurer de la conformité des comportetnents avec les objectj/
déjInis par / 'action collective. Gette théorie va plus loin que la théorie des contrats pour
analyser / 'agence dans les organisations.
365
dans les cas oii la moissonneuse travaille en dehors des périmètres du
village. Cette mesure veillait a renforcer les contrats dans un contexte oi
la libéralisation a conduit a beaucoup d'abus, et représentait un moyen
de contrôle a distance du travail pour éviter les problèmes de
détournements passes. Les paysans cherchaient ainsi a améliorer
l'agence en contrôlant l'activité du chauffeur et du pointeur a distance.
La délégation de l'autorité a une seule personne sans aucun contrôle sur sa fonction, parce qu'elle avait conduit a des comportements
opportunistes, fut remise en cause. Etant donné les difficultés survenues
dans l'utilisation de l'argent, ii fut décidé que les postes de pointeur et de
gestionnaire ne devraient plus incorporer les fonctions d'achat de pièces
et de vente du riz récolté. Les nouveaux dirigeants créèrent un poste de
"dépensier"22 qui devait récupérer les quantités récoltées par la machine
et les commercialiser pour l'achat de pièces détachées. Le pointeur
n'aurait plus désormais comme role que de noter les quantités avant de
les évacuer et de prévenir le dépensier en cas de panne. Cette separation
des postes visait a augmenter le contrôle par la pression sociale et mieux
comptabiliser les flux (ces initiatives avaient pour objectif de mieux
contrôler l'activité et dépassaient les principes de gestion bases sur des
calculs de ratios heures de travail des hommes/heures de travail de la
machine). Les roles et fonctions furent mieux définis qu' auparavant,
alors qu'ils n'étaient spéciflés ni par les statuts, ni par les reglements.
Cette precision des roles, qui s'accompagnait d'une division du travail
plus poussée, devait permettre de rendre l'activité plus efficace.
Toujours pour améliorer l'agence, une faible rémunération des
tâches est apparue afin de développer les mécanismes incitatifs et limiter les ddtournements. Ce contrôle et cette rémunération des tâches
reviennent certes a augmenter les coüts de transaction internes a l'organisation. Ostrom a mis en evidence les coüts de transaction émergents
de 1' action collective et met en garde contre leur sous-estimation qui a
pour effet la disparition de règles institutionnelles. Cependant un tel
22 Cc poste avait étd imagine par les paysans.
366
contrôle permet de limiter les comportements defree riding23; de mêrne
la division du travail, si elle implique des coüts de coordination plus
importants, rend l'information sur les prix et les coüts plus accessible
pour une stratégie commerciale. L'effet qui en résulte est d'augmenter
les gains du marché, grace a la baisse des coüts de transaction, de facon
supérieure aux coüts de contrôle demeurant negligeables dans des petits
groupes.
1.3
L'environnement institutionnel
L'économie institutionnelle a connu un certain succès et oriente
désormais la conception de nombreux programmes de développernent.
Cependant, les changements organisationnels sont souvent analyses par
les opérateurs de développement comme découlant üniquement des
pressions et incitations externes distillées par l'environnement, sans
prise en compte des dynamiques sociales internes qui influencent pour
beaucoup le fonctionnement de l'organisation.
Le collectif de gestion est né d'une intervention extérieure; les
regles organisationnelles d'origine ntavaient pas de pertinence particuhere aux yeux des membres, en dehors du fait de se conformer aux prescriptions des organismes de développement. Méme si les paysans ont
été a l'initiative d'un règlement intérieur, on ne s'y référait pas dans
1' action. On pourrait des lors supposer que les acteurs ne se rendent pas
compte de l'intérêt des questions institutionnelles et, partant, ne sauraient apprécier Fimpact de telles transformations sur l'efficacité de leur
activité.
En fait, confrontés a certaines difficultés ou impasses dans Faction
collective, les paysans ont su tirer profit du cadre institutionnel qui leur
était propose et apporter une série de changements organisationnels
pour améliorer les modes de coordination. Même s'ils butent parfois sur
des difficultés de conception de nouvelles regles, les paysans perçoivent
l'intérêt du développement institutionnel. Leur laboratoire ne peut être
23 Comporternent opportuniste qui conduit a bénéjIcier des avantages produit par I 'action
collective sans en supporter les coats.
367
que l'action, ce qui comporte un certain nombre d'aléas dans Pinnovation des règles. us ont toutefois mis en ceuvre de nouveaux processus de
decision (qui diminuaient les coUts de transaction) et des règles de contrôle (pour abaisser les coüts d'opportunité issus dufree riding) que n'avaient pas prévu l'encadrement, surtout préoccupé par la diffusion de
principes techniques.
L'innovation organisationnelle ne saurait être le privilege des
experts en développement, ainsi que le prouve l'exemple de ce collectif
villageois. Les acteurs sont capables de trouver leurs propres solutions
organisationnelles aux problèmes qu'ils rencontrent; l'apprentissage
organisationnel ne peut être réalisé que par les individus menant l'action. La société paysanne est animée d'intenses discussions concemant
les formes de contrôle, au cours desquelles les normes familiales de la
cooperation et celles d'une entreprise sont comparées et vivement
débattues. Les nouveaux contextes et enjeux de l'action collective sont
autant de nouvelles formes de cooperation qui questionnent les rapports
sociaux au sein du village. C'est pourquoi le rythme d'innovation de ces
règles peut ne pas toujours s'accorder avec celui des réformes
économiques imposées par les bailleurs.
L' économie institutionnelle insiste sur des incitations matérielles
- liées a la baisse des coüts de transactions - comme facteur d'efficacité
des organisations. L'origine de la predominance de ce type d'incitations
dans les programmes de développement institutionnel provient sans
doute de là. Cependant cela peut paraItre assez réducteur pour expliquer
la diffusion de nouvelles capacités dans ces contextes24. Un cadre iistitutionnel25 englobant les organisations est important pour les rendre plus
2411 est intdressant de voir ace sujet Ic travail de Widner qui critique les theories du choix rationnel
dans I 'explication de I 'essor des organisalions civiques en milieu rural ivoirien. Dc mCme Ostrorn
soul igne la phiralitC des incitations quipeuvent générer des règles d 'action collective efficaces.
25 North ins/ste beaucoup sur un cadre jurid/que régulant les transactions: cela est a nos ycux
important pour fournir une base solide aux controls. Cependant cela nous paralt moms
determinant pour Ia regulation interne de ces organisations. Même si les malversations ont Cté
nombre uses dans les organisationspaysannes de Ia region le ncours a la loi reste marginal, non
seulementparce qua leurs auteurs font part/c d'une clientèlepolitique de l 'apparel! d'Etat, ma/s
aussiparce qua Ia regulation des confiits denieure interne dans cette société paysanne,
368
Jeux d 'acteurs autour du développeinent institutionnel
efficaces. Mais, ii ne faudrait pas, comme c'est le cas a l'heure actuelle,
limiter l'intervention a des pressions économiques -tel le rationnement
du credit-, auquel ne seraient plus eligibles que les groupements ayant
montré leur conformité a des critères de gestion financière. Développer
les incitations économiques en réorganisant une fihière an point d'augmenter le revenu du producteur serait aussi d'un assez faible impact, si
cette mesure n'était accompagnée de différentes formes d'appui.
Ii est determinant d'apporter un appui a l'innovation dans les
rêgles pour structurer davantage ces organisations. Les nombreuses
institutions de développement (parapubliques, émanant d' organisations
internationales ou d'agences de cooperation, ONG...) constituent un
cadre institutionnel a méme de remplir cette fonction. L'appui doit être
conçu en termes financiers afin de supporter les coflts de transactions
internes, avant qu'ils ne soient couverts par les gains issus de l'amélioration de l'activité. Mais ii doit également consister en un appui informationnel pour permettre aux paysans d'être inventifs dans la definition de
l'allocation de l'autorité ou dans les procedures de coordination et de
contrôle.
2.
LE PARADIGME POLITIQUE
2.1
Des jeux de pouvoir...
L'évolution de cette organisation, après les nouvelles dispositions,
va désormais être présentée a partir d'une analyse des conflits pour
apprehender les obstacles aux changements organisationnels. Les dissensions entre les acteurs proviennent d'une vision différente de l'organisation. Le gestionnaire tente de faire adopter une gestion
entrepreneuriale26 favorable a une rentabilisation de ses propres
machines, tandis que les membres dont les capacités productives sont
26 Nous entendons ici une vision de / 'organisation corntne action collective dont / 'objectifest de
dégager le rnaxi,nurn de bénéfices d 'une activité éconornique.
369
moms importantes défendent une gestion coopérativiste27 de
1' organisation.
L'analyse stratégique, développée par Crozier et Friedberg, est
particulièrement pertinente pour étudier le conflit et les ressources qui y
sont employees. File repose sur une axiomatique de l'intérêt: les acteurs
développent des strategies destinées a servir leur intérêt au sein de l'organisation qui ne fait qu'imparfaitement système, tant la diversité des
intérêts nécessite des ajustements constants. Les auteurs insistent sur la
maItrise de zones d'incertitudes, surtout l'environnement de l'organisation, comme enjeu stratégique dans les relations de pouvoir. Au sein des
organisations paysannes la manipulation des institutions marchandes,
difficilement accessible a tous, est l'objet d'une competition entre les
leaders pour asseoir leur pouvoir. Le gestionnaire d'une part sécurisait
l'accès a des prêts pour le materiel et a des pièces détachées, qu'il pouvait obtenir a credit, et d'autre part distribuait des credits de campagne a
beaucoup d'expioitants du village après avoir constitué des GTE en leur
nom, étant donné leur anaiphabétisme.
Les luttes entre le bureau et le gestionnaire autour de la fixation du
taux de prestation de Ia moissonneuse sont une bonne illustration des
conflits organisationnels. Ce dernier, après avoir été nommé au poste de
responsable de credit, chercha malgré tout a imposer un taux de 20%. Ii
retint une pièce, invoquant sa défectuosité et son remplacement pro-.
chain, pour empêcher le travail de la machine. Ii bloqua ainsi le fonctionnement du materiel, pendant plusieurs jours de récolte, afin que les
membres des sections acceptent le principe d'un taux de 20%. Les membres du bureau, appartenant a une catégorie paysanne plus modeste,
s'obstinèrent a maintenir le taux a 16 %. et ainsi réduire les charges de
récolte. Le gestionnaire, contraint de ceder, rendit Ia pièce et le materiel
put tourner avec de bons rendements.
Les dynamiques des conflits qui ont parcouru par la suite l'organisation peuvent être mieux décrites par l'analyse de réseaux qui a pour
27 A I 'inverse une organisation cooperative ne recherche pas une rentabilisation maximale de
I 'activitd éconornique mais plutôt I 'apport d 'un service an inoindre coilt a ses membres.
370
Jeux dacteurs autour du développement institutionnel
avantage de montrer Ia diversité des ressources et des relations
mobilisées en dehors de l'organisation. D'après Lazega, cette analyse
vise a observer "(...)Ies modalités de conversion d'une position centrale
en contrôle de ressources. La seconde [prioritéj consiste a explorer les
modalités de contrôle et de pressions indirects par le biais de manipulation de relations". Bien que privé d'un poste stratégique dans l'organisation, le gestionnaire a pu mobiliser des relations pour servir ses intérêts,
grace a la place centrale qu'il occupe dans l'acquisition des ressources
marchandes et par ses alliances parentales et politiques.
Les nouveaux dirigeants, représentants du parti d'opposition et
désireux de montrer une bonne gestion, se sont divisés sur le role que
devrait tenir le gestionnaire, le président voulait le maintenir dans le
bureau, du fait de ses capacités d'intermédiation avec les banquiers et
les fournisseurs, tandis que le dépensier voulait Pen exciure. Le dépensier, responsable de l'autre section du collectif, n'acceptait pas sa pré-
sence dans le bureau car us étaient opposes politiquement et
partageaient un différend28.
Le dépensier pour avoir un meilleur contrôle sur la gestion proposa sonjeune frère en tant que pointeur. Ce dernier fut nommé par l'assemblée, mais destitué par les chefs de groupement a la demande du
gestionnaire. Le premier chef obtenait ainsi un regard important sur la
gestion du collectifpuisque le magasinier29, choisi en tant que pointeur,
était un dépendant de sa concession. Quant au deuxième, ii se rangea
derriere cette decision étant le frère du président de l'union. Le dépensier voulut alors s'opposer au cumul des postes de magasinier et de
pointeur et tenta de faire nommer son j eune frère magasinier, mais on
lui rétorqua qu'il ne pouvait occuper ce poste car ii n'était pas membre
28 Le responsable de credit avait sabordé une de ses campagnes, après lui avoir finance Ic
depart, en ne lul octroyantpas les intrantspromis. Pour affirnier saforce aux membres du village, ii exigea ensuite auprès du chefde village le remboursement immédiat de cette dette, qui
luifiitpaye' auprix dune dette a unparent.
29 Le magasinier et Ic président dii collectfexploitent en general ensemble, en dehors des
Ic credit n 'étant plus accordé sur les terrains privés les
aménagements publics
regroupements permettent de diversijler les sources de financement.
371
du collectif30. Les postes de pointeur et de magasinier restèrent entre les
mains de la méme personne.
Les conflits s'intensifièrent lors des reunions: le responsable de
credit menaça d'abandonner son poste. Le président, soucieux de conserver le recours qu'il représentait aussi bien pour l'organisation que
pour lui-même, retira alors au dépensier sa fonction et prit seul l'initiative d'abandonner toute la gestion au pointeur. Le dépensier voulu alors
provoquer une Assemblée Générale pour retrouver son poste, et décida a
son tour de conserver chez lui une pièce de la machine achetée pour
reparation.
Après l'arrêt du materiel pendant plusieurs jours, le président,
soucieux d'éviter une A.G., décida de faire intervenir les oncles maternels du dépensier afin qutil restitue la pièce. Face aux exigences de ses
oncles qui appartenaient a la section et n'acceptaient pas le prejudice, ii
ne se démonta pas et garda la pièce. Le président parvint a ses fins en faisant intervenir un membre de la section qui avait une forte autorité
morale - ii est âgé et supplée I'imam. Le dépensier finit par ceder sans
obtenir 1'A.G. qu'il souhaitait devant l'insistance de cet homme très
respecté.
En fin de campagne les tensions s'apaisèrent après que le
responsable de credit ait décidé de se consacrer exciusivement a la
gestion de ses machines. On remit le poste de dépensier a son ancien
détenteur, le pointeur conserva sa fonction et celle de magasinier. Un
nouveau trésorier et un commissaire aux comptes furent choisis après
que le dépensier l'ait réclame. Mais le " vieux " commissaire aux
comptes, nommé alors qu'il était absent du village, ne put jamais
exercer son travail du fait de son anaiphabétisme.
30 II n 'était entré dans les sections que plus tard, au moment de / 'a,nénagement de nouvelles
terres obtenant une parcelle dufait de la constitution récente de son ménage, et n 'avait donc
pas cot/se pour / 'apport dii credit ayantpernzis / 'acquisition de la moissonneuse.
372
Jeux d'acteurs autour dz développement institutionnel
2.2
...à une structure de pouvoir
On peut constater a la suite de ces evolutions qu'une organisation
n'est jamais indépendante de la distribution du pouvoir dans le champ
social oit elle s'implante. Son fonctionnement depend pour une grande
part des équilibres de pouvoir et de leur transformation. Ce sont alors les
rapports de concurrence et la modification des alliances qui changent les
règles de l'organisation ou parfois les annihilent.
Lors de Ia campagne suivante les procedures établies ne furent
toujours pas respectées. Le dépensier, pour contrecarrer une coalition
capable de détourner des quantités importantes de riz puisqu'une seule
personne détenait les postes stratégiques de magasinier et de pointeur,
prit l'initiative de donner aux conducteurs des carnets de bord, inutilisés
depuis l'éviction de l'ancien conducteur. Lors du depart de la campagne
le pointeur, se rendant compte de l'utilisation du carnet par les conducteurs, leur présenta une telle procedure comme un manque de confiance, et un dépassement de leur fonction. Par peur de représailles31, ils
abandonnèrent ce carnet en arguant de sa perte auprès du dépensier.
Le dépensier ne produisit alors plus de factures; le nouveau
trésorier n'étant informé d'aucun mouvement de fonds, aucune dépense
ne ftit plus justifiée. De mëme au lieu d'acheter un boItier de moissonneuse, que lui conseillait le mécanicien, le dépensier porta le materiel en
reparation a plusieurs reprises et dépensa de fortes sommes pour un
boItier tombant systématiquement en panne. Ii flit alors soupçonné
d'avoir fait ce choix pour piocher dans cet argent. D'autre part les
procedures de contrôle au moyen de carnets n'étant pas suivies, cela
entraIna de nouveaux litiges autour de la disparition d'un certain nornbre de sacs de riz.
31 Les conducteurs tenaient a leurposte car i/s bénéficiaient d 'un salaire. Dc plus le gestionnaire
détenant beaucoup de materiel agricole, plutôt rare dans Ia region, entretenir de bonnes
relations avec lui perniet une diminution de I 'incertitude quant a I 'accès aux machines a des
moments importants. D 'autre part son poste de responsable de Ia section etson alliance avec 1
président de I 'union quifedere toutes les sections luipermettait depouvoir menacer certains de
retrmt de terre.
373
Etant donné les problèmes de coordination, le bureau fut dissous,
car incapable de produire un bilan. Les deux chefs des sections
retournèrent Ia gestion de la moissonneuse a l'ancien gestionnaire qui
déclara la machine hors d'etat pour cette campagne. Alors que seul une
pièce manquait pour son fonctionnement, le gestionnaire démonta des
pièces pour les affecter a son propre materiel.
Ainsi, son positionnement dans les cercies politiques, sa proximité des institutions marchandes, son alliance avec le deuxième notable
du village, son materiel agricole ont permis au gestionnaire de se rendre
incontournable. Tant qu'il demeurait a ce poste, aucun contrôle sérieux
des tâches n'a Pu se concrétiser. Une fois desengagé de la gestion, une
certaine rémunération et un meilleur contrôle se sont profiles, rnême si
ce contrôle fist de courte durée étant donnée l'âpreté des conflits qu'il
attisait a distance. Cette analyse de réseaux nous permet d'observer que
la notion de contrôle est toujours tributaire d'une repartition des ressources. Les acteurs sont capables, grace aux ressources dont us disposent, d'échapper au contrôle ainsi que nous avons pu le voir dans
notre exemple: Ia remise de deux postes a un même individu, la nomination d'un commissaire n'ayant pas les compétences pour exercer son
travail ou différents types de pressions.
L'ensemble des réseaux de pouvoir forme une structure particulièrement résistante aux changements, les evolutions dans les regles sont
touj ours tributaires des rapports de forces. L'analyse des nuds de
pouvoir et de l'articulation des .intérêts est tout a fait essentielle pour
bien définir les éventuels blocages et les leviers de l'intervention dans
une perspective d'appui institutionnel. L'innovation organisationnelle
doit tenir compte de l'equilibre des forces pour transformer la regulation
d'une organisation.
Le parti pris du politique, s'il montre la pesanteur des phénomènes
de pouvoir, ne doit pas cantonner a l'inaction. Les transformations dans
les modes de regulation peuvent être effectifs même s'ils ne transforment pas radicalement les structures de pouvoir en place. Elaborer des
systèmes de contrôle internes a ces organisations nécessite que des
374
Jeux d 'acteurs au/our du développement institutionnel
individus exercant ce contrôle bénéficient de certaines ressources, sans
quoi ii devient vide de sens. Ou alors ii convient d' apporter de nouvelles
ressources32 a ceux qui sont censés l'exercer.
2.3
Une pluralité de normes
Ces dynamiques montrent combien ii est difficile d'apporter des
réformes institutionnelles qui représentent un enjeu aussi important
qu'une nouvelle technologie ou de nouvelles ressources. Le simple fait
d'instaurer un nouveau processus de decision remet en cause des intérêts, économiques, politiques ou de statut, de méme, contrôler ou évaluer une activité peut créer des conflits de normes.
Ii est important d'adopter un point de vue constructiviste, plus a
même de rendre compte des recompositions sociales s'opérant dans le
monde rural actuel, confronté a de nouveaux enjeux, et des tensions
internes des organisations paysannes L'approche des "mondes" de Bol-
tanski et Thèvenot en ne différenciant pas des types de regulation
montre comment a travers des compromis peuvent se chevaucher des
normes différentes33 et nous permet de voir que l'univers social des
organisations influence considérablement leur dynamique.
32 II est i,nportant de prendre ce terme dans son acception Ia plus large afin de ne pm' réduire Ic
cha,np de possibilités d'application du contrôle. certains jeunes ayant les capacités
intellectuelles pour exercer un contrôle financier ne Ic pouvaientfaire, étant donné / 'obligation
de deférence du cadetface a / 'aIné. Tandis que certains ames ayant une autorité morale forte ne
pouvaient exercer un tel contrôle car i/s man quaient deformation. Plutôt que de choisir unjeune
pour effectuer cette tCche iie vaut-il pm' n2ieux former un ainé aux règles de Ia coniptabilité?
33 Dans cc travail, Ic monde marchand nest qu 'Un monde parmi d'autres "concernant las
for;iies de coordination et de 1 'organisation de I 'action ". Les mondes marchand, inspire,
domestique, civique, industriel ci de I 'opinion servent tous de legitimation de 1 'action. Les
situations de crise et de de'voilement des mondes par Ia just flcation conduisent a
I 'e'tablissement de nouveaux compromis entre les mondes, bases sur des principes dejustice.
Les acteurs mettent en evidence les defauts de I 'action, et chacun e'met des critiques pouvant
combiner des valeurs de p/usieurs mondes pour renzettre en cause d'autres valeurs afin de
conserver leur état de grandeur oh y accede,: Las niothfications dam' les règles de I 'action
collective résultent de tels ajustements, les règles et procedures propres a une organisation
pouvant être assimilCes a un ensemble de valeurs qui definit Ia culture organisationnelle. Les
;'emises en cause des compromis peuvent donner naissance a une nouvelle culture
organisationnelle si l'ancien compromis n 'est pas ref ustUlé dans l'épreuve.
375
Dans le contexte du Sénégal rural le monde marchand est sans
cesse imbrique avec les autres pour servir le compromis au sein des
organisations. Une place importante est accordée au monde inspire ainsi
que nous l'a montré l'intervention du second de l'imam pour la restitution de la pièce. Le monde domestique est souvent invoqué pour justifier
le don de sacs de riz récolté par la machine a des parents dans Ia difficulté alors qu'ils devaient servir au fond de roulement, 1' entraide paren-
tale est alors opposée a la rentabilisation marchande. De même le
pouvoir de i'aInesse, issu des règles familiales, peut être invoqué pour
mettre en place des forme de contrôle de l'activité. Dans ce terroir le
monde "civique" est fortement hiérarchisé et base sur les principes de
l'oligarchie, mais n'en sert pas moms le compromis Ainsi les "vieux"
notables appartenant a des families influentes sont determinants dans les
decisions et les nominations. Le monde de 1' opinion tient également une
grande place étant donné l'importance des logiques de clientele politique. Les logiques marchandes se juxtaposent a d'autres logiques dans
la regulation des organisations puisque les individus sont influences par
toute une série de normes dans leur univers quotidien.
Les programmes de développement institutionnels essaient de
déleguer la direction des organisations a des individus "professionnels"
pour qu'ils soient les artisans d'une institutionnalisation des règles de
gestion. L'entreprise est alors, d'après ce paradigme marchand, gouvernée conjointement par une regulation formelle ou de contrôle, et une
regulation informelle ou autonome (Reynaud). Cependant pour ces
organisations cooperatives rurales, ainsi que le prouve notre exemple,
cette dichotomie ne saurait être validée. La regulation informelle peut
aussi être une regulation de contrôle pour servir les intérêts des dingeants ou lorsque la regulation de contrôle ne suffit pas.
Ii n'existe pas des acteurs qui soutiennent l'institutionnalisation
des procedures et d'autres qui Ia rejettent. Ii est inutile d'essayer d'identifier un "paysan entrepreneur" qui chercherait a faire adopter des
logiques institutionnelles aux "paysans traditionnels". Les acteurs
manipulent toutes les normes a leur disposition pour servir leurs intérêts,
et guider 1' action collective qu' ii s' agisse des normes du développement
376
Jeux d 'acteurs autour du développement institutionnel
ou des normes propres a la société locale. Ceux qui contournent les
procedures organisationnelles ne sont pas forcément les moms compétents a manipuler le cadre institutionnel. Ii peut s 'agir des paysans qui
tirent le plus profit de la professionnalisation mais dont la logique, si elle
était poussée jusqu'au bout, pourrait affaiblir leur pouvoir.
La professionnalisation ne peut être a elle seule un vecteur de
l'esprit civique au sein des organisations paysannes. Ii appartient aux
intervenants d'amener les responsables a s'inscrire dans d'autres règles
du jeu dans les organisations afin de répondre davantage aux objectifs
collectifs. Se limiter a accorder une légitimité économique pour gérer
une organisation ne résout pas certains problèmes de l'action collective.
Les principes de légitimité peuvent être élargis a la promotion du
développement, a lajustice, ou a la conformité aux prescriptions de l'islam. Fonder la légitimité des leaders sur de telles sources d'autorité est
envisageable plus particulièrement lorsqu'elle conduit a conforter un
capital symbolique ou d'influence pour les détenteurs du pouvoir.
Ii est important de souligner la diversité des normes orientant les
processus de decision, denomination, ou de contrôle comme nous avons
Pu l'observer, afin que les développeurs les prennent en compte dans
leur programme de développement institutionnel. La construction de
règles d'action stabilisées doit inclure cette pluralité de normes pour
donner naissances a des institutions durables.
3.
RETOUR SUR LES PRATIQUES
Le detour par les theories doit conduire a identifier les paradigmes
dans les différentes conceptions du développement institutionnel et
remettre en cause les pratiques.
La théorie des incitations donne une explication intéressante des
dynamiques des organisations au sein du marché. En effet, l'innovation
organisationnelle peut-étre valablement analysée comme le résultat
d'une volonté de reduction des coüts de transaction et d'amélioration de
377
Fagence dans Faction collective. L'étude des motivations économiques
des acteurs est un préalable essentiel pour la réussite d'une innovation34.
Cependant l'approche dconomique du développement institutionnel
conçoit les dynamiques de règles comme un ordre spontané, ce qui n'est
sans doute pas étranger a l'étude du marché comme institution par les
économistes. Les roles et les institutions sont ici censés s'autonomiser
mécaniquement de leur environnement social par le simple fait d'incita-
tions macro-économiques. L' elaboration d'un cadre institutionnel
adapté influencerait les organisations locales au point d'acquerir
d'elles-mêmes les capacités qui permettraient leur essor et leur efficacité au sein du marché.
La conception sociologique du développement institutioimel permet de mieux apprehender le caractère diachronique des dynamiques
organisationnelles et de montrer les difficultés d'orienter ces changements, constamment soumis a des négociations entre acteurs au niveau
local. Ces négociations sont le plus souvent latentes, et, en l'absence de
procedures de reglements négociés, les conflits ne peuvent trouver de
resolution. Les affrontements d'intérêts annihilent bien souvent les
regles organisationnelles mises en place et paralysent les organisations
ou gaspillent leurs ressources. Le dévoilement du conflit possède une
dimension intégratrice non négligeable; loin de paralyser l'action ii per-
met la rencontre des intérêts et leur mise en négociation entre les
porteurs de ces intérêts. La conception de modes de resolution des conflits facilite La mise en négociation des normes et réduit les freins a l'in-
novation (Elwert G.). Le paradigme politique est ainsi essentiel a
intégrer pour une démarche de développement institutionnel afin que
l'intervention conduise a la naissance ou au renforcement des règles
améliorant la communication et la regulation des conflits. Ceci revêt une
grande importance pour parvenir a des organisations davantage intégrées et avec de solides modes de coordination.
34 C'ette thdorie ne per/net de comprendre toutes les motivations d 'une strategic. Les recours
mCme s 'us apparaissaient mineurs, dont les villageous pouvaient se couper en effectuant un
contrôle sur les activitCs du gestionnaire, repre'sentaient a leurs yeux zinc perte non
négligeable. La prise en compte de Ia "misc sociale " 'G'hauveau, Lavigne 1996) per/net
d 'a/Icr plus loin dons I 'analyse des motivations.
378
Jeux d'acteurs autour du développement institutioniwl
Ii est également utile de completer les programmes de développement institutionnel par des interventions prenant en compte l'environne-
ment de ces organisations au niveau local. La diversité des types de
contrôles sociaux et modes de regulation dans le contexte rural actuel35
peut sembler une difficulté dans l'élaboration de règles d'action stabilisées pour structurer des groupements paysans. Cependant c'est en
prenant en compte une telle diversité que peut émerger des règles d'action collective donnant naissance a des organisations cohérentes pour
que ne subsiste pas un décalage entre des regles technico-économiques
affichées et une multitude d'autres regles sous-jacentes a l'action.
Des la mise en place de cadres organisationnels pour gérer les
aspects techniques d'une intervention doit être effectué un travail de
réflexion avec les paysans concernant les règles de l'action collective: la
légitimité nécessaire aux différents types de fonctions, les questions
d'autorité et d'agence, les formes de contrôle social et de sanctions. Un
cadre organisationnel ne peut servir de guide aux pratiques que si ii est
défini par les acteurs eux mêmes afin de prendre en compte leurs intérêts
et les normes de cooperation préexistantes. Cela ne doit pas conduire a
un conservatisme, très souvent une innovation technique nécessite une
transformation de telles normes pour gérer des interactions nouvelles.
Toutefois les normes de cooperation présentes dans le milieu d'intervention doivent rester un point de depart pour construire des règles d'action
auxquelles se conforment les acteurs.
Une telle approche nécessite d'adopter une démarche plus aléatoire et processuelle et d' effectuer un suivi rapproché au niveau local
des groupes pour que chacun puisse trouver son propre equilibre. Le
principe de négociation devient alors le point de depart d'un appui
organisationnel: d'une part la négociation du cadre organisationnel
entre les intervenants et les utilisateurs d'un tel cadre, d'autre part la
auveau (1997) Ia dffiision des normes marchandes par lespolitiques
de développement institutionnel nefait qu ajouter a IaproIfération de normes au niveau local,
qu 'elle se donnait pour objectif de renipIacer
35 A ins! que I 'évoque J P.
379
négociation entre les acteurs pour établir des équilibres entre les différents intérêts et des processus de reglement des conflits
Un autre préalable serait d'élaborer avec l'ensemble des
categories paysannes des outils de gestion maItrisables par tous, ce qui
est determinant pour 1' autonomie des organisations locales. L'excès de
professionnalisation entre en contradiction avec l'autonomisation des
groupements des lors que les outils techniques sont trop complexes pour
empêcher Ia dépendance des exploitants vis a vis des leaders paysans36.
Ii doit exister des "traducteurs" des cadres institutionnels mis en place
apportant une comprehension élargie a tous les paysans des liens aux
institutions marchandes et étatiques pour qu'ils négocient mieux leur
rapport avec ces institutions. Plutôt que de résulter d'arrangements
circonstanciés par la regulation de l'incertitude, la relation d'ouverture
du monde rural au monde du développement pourrait alors être
construite collectivement et ainsi mener a une réelle autonomie
paysanne.
REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES
Barry B., Le royaume du Waalo, Karthala, 1985.
Boltanski L., Thévenot L., De lajustfication, Gallimard, 1994.
Chauveau J.P., Lavigne Delville P., Communiquer dans l'affrontement.
La participation cachée dans les projets participatfs ciblés sur
les gmupes ruraux de'favorisés, communication au colloque
"ONG et développement: du Nord aux Suds", Bordeaux, 1996.
Chauveau J.P., La prolferation de normes, de règles et d'institutions:
point de vue de la recherche et point de vue du développement,
36 Cette manipulation des normes brouille les cartes en ne décryptant pas les enjeux reels. Les
leaders paysans di: Delta dufleuve SCnégal jouent Ia carte de laprofessionnalisation car el/c
sert leur intérêts en tant qu 'exploitants ayant des capacités productives adaptées a cc cadre
institutjo,rnel. La professionnalisation peut entrer en conflit avec Ia logique d 'exploitations
fam i/ia/es sans que davantage de coherence ne puisse être trouvée du fait de cette niauvaise
representation des dfferents inte'rêts paysans.
380
programme développement institutionnel, document interne
GRET, 1997.
Crozier M., Friedberg E., L 'acteur et le système, Le Seuil, 1977.
Diop A.B., Lafamille wolof , Karthala, 1985.
Elwert G., Strangers, innovations and modes of self-regulated
transformation, paper for the program in agrarian studies, Yale
University, 1997.
Israel A., Le développement institutionnel, L'harmattan, 1996.
Kante S., Résultats du suivi des moissonneuses batteuses de la section
de Diawar, Document de travail ISRA, 1993.
Lavigne Delvilie P., A quoiservent les Sciences Sociales dans lesprojets
de développement rural? Points de vue d'un agent double,
Bulletin de l'APAD, 1998.
Lazega E., Analyse de réseaux et sociologie des organisations, Revue
Francaise de Sociologie vol.XXXV, 1994.
North D.C., Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 5, 1991.
Olivier de Sardan J.P., Anthropologie et Développement, Karthala,
1995.
Ostrom E. Crafting institutions for self-governing irrigation systems,
ICS 1992, traduction et synthèse de Lavigne Delville P. pour interréseaux, 1996.
Reynaud J.D., Les regulations dans les organisations: regulation de
contrôle et regulation autonome, Revue Francaise de Sociologie
vol. XXIX, 1988.
Widner J., Explaining the rise of civic associations in rural Côte
d'Ivoire, paper for the program in agrarian studies, Yale
University, 1993.
381
Williamson O.E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York
Free Press 1985.
SUMMARY
Along the Senegal river (in the homonymous country), the management of the irrigation systems realized by SAED at the end of the
Sixties, and the responsibility of technical assistance has been progressively handed over, starting from the middle of the Eighties (New Agricultural Policy), to farmer organizations.
In this case-study is examined the introduction of agricultural
mechanization (in particular a combined harvester) in a wolof village of
the Delta.
The evolution of the working rules of the farmer organization is
analysed by field observation (from 1996 to 1998), and interpreted in the
light of institutional development economic and sociological theories.
It is meant to show that, contrary to the structural-functionalist
point of view, the dynamics of the rules of organizations are influenced
by actors' negotiations at local level. These collective action rules
depend on logics connected to social dynamics outside the organization.
Institutional development programs' promoters should consider
the plurality of social, political and religious norms that can influence
decision-making procedures. The construction of effective rules for
grassroots' organizations must pay attention to this plurality of noniis to
allow the appearance of sustainable institutions.
382

GRASSROOTS` ORGANIZATIONS, DECENTRALIZATION AND

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