From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack: wars of pacification

III
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11
bomb attack: wars of pacification
and war on terror crossed memories
Connecting memories of wars of pacification
and war on terror
Didier Danet & Jean-Paul Hanon
Introduction
Reacting to the 9/11 bomb attack, President Bush and his
government have devised a form of political military intervention they named “War on terror” directed against Afghanistan
and then Iraq 1.
This apparently new type of war 2 was a change in the nature
of the US way of war if we consider that the dominant doctrine
was based on short operations, few military and civilian casualties
1. Among others: Badie Dina, “Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror:
Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 6(4), 2010, 277-296;
Boyle Michael J., “The war on terror in American grand strategy”, International
Affairs, 84(2), 2008, 191-209; Byman Daniel, Michael Scheuer, Anatol Lieven
and W. Patrick Lang, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on ‘Terror’”, Middle East
Policy, 12(1), 2005, 1-24; Hayden Patrick, Tom Lansford and Robert P. Watson,
America’s War on Terror, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003; Lewis Michael et al.,
The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective, OUP USA, 2009.
2. Malis Christian, Strachan Hew and Danet Didier, La guerre irrégulière,
Economica, 2011.
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and therefore a soft impact on the political, social and human
consequences of war.
However, for European and particularly French observers,
the very principles of the war on terror are smelling of those
enforced by the colonial empire all along a series of wars of
pacification which took place at the end of the 19th century
and at the beginning of the 20th century in Algeria, Morocco,
the Island of Madagascar. In this regard, the pacification wars
led in Algeria during the first half of the 20th century can be
seen as a study case.
These pacification operations wagged by France are sharing
with the US war on terror similar goals: repressing all forms
of radical contestation against its colonial policy wether they
disrupt the internal order in the colony or the whole international colonial system, or both.
Just as the war on terror, those “pacification operations”
where a mix of military and police techniques and tactics (law
and order, crowd control, eradication of the protester leaders,
forced interrogatories) and various development policies intended
to maintaining the domestic order, the empire survival and,
above all, permeating the society of the targeted country with
the adequate set of national values.
Against this historical context and, if you assume that the
pacification wars wagged by France and the war on terror
enforced by the United States share common grounds, traits
and practices, can’t it be drawn from the past French experience
some highlights which could be useful for the US actors still
engaged in the war on terror 3. Are the historical, geographical,
military, cultural backgrounds so different that any parallel
would appear anachronic, outdated of superficial? Conversely,
are we not right to think that the direct connection between
French anti-subversive doctrine and the US counterinsurgency
strategy (the later deriving from the former) is a key element
3. Ouellet Éric and Pierre Pahlavi, “Guerre irrégulière et analyse institutionnelle :
le cas de la guerre révolutionnaire de l’armée française en Algérie”, Guerres mondiales
et conflits contemporains, 235, 2009, 131.
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack183
to understand what we will name here the question of “the
guilty memory” that the US may have to face, given the very
traumatic aspects induced or caused by the principles and
techniques of the war on terror?
Cant’ we take advantage of this linkage to better understand not only the process but also the military, social political
effects of counterinsurgency operations? Most important
aren’t the traumatic effects of wars of pacification and those
of counterinsurgency operations, led in the name of the war
on terror, enshrined in a history of violence for both countries, Algeria and Iraq, a history of violence which has its own
dynamic that these two not so different strategies have even
more accelerated.
If we consider that it took the French people nearly half
a century to get more conscious of the memorial aspects of
the Algerian war 4, it could also be interesting to consider that
this experience might usefully highlight an underlying process
of fragmented memory which could similarly affect, to some
extent, the US society.
Beyond anachronism and artificiality, the fundamental
question remains: how the US military and civilian society are
going to address that notion of “guilty memory”? Will it be
different from the French experience? Certainly yes but, in this
case, to what extent and on what fundamental grounds? Can’t
we imagine from today a specific pattern of this memory in
the process which would remain to be built?
Today we do not intend to answer the full scope of these
questions, given the length of time we have. However, to
formulate a first answer, we will first return to the military,
political and social dimensions of the pacification wars led by
the French armed forces in Algeria and how they construct
4. Stora Benjamin, La gangrène et l’oubli : La mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie, Paris,
Éditions La Découverte, 2005; Manceron Gilles and Hassan Remaoun, D’une rive à
l’autre : l’Algérie, Syros la Découverte, 1993; Stora Benjamin, “La France et l’Algérie
dans les pièges de la mémoire”, in L’Europe et ses passés douloureux, Recherches, Mink
G. and Neumayer L., 2007, 39-49.
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our memory. Second, we will ask ourselves the way this experience could be passed on to make it valuable (for the US military
and civilian society).
II. Wars of pacification
and war on terror:
old song for all seasons war
1. War on terror: a new politico-military logic…
Unless classical wars waged by States having opposite interests,
the war on terror is primarily fought against non state actors. It
does not mean that the war on terror is not waged against States
(Afghanistan and Iraq are indeed telling examples), but it means
that the State, as previous main actor, should be eventually
considered as a side or a secondary actor. Afghanistan and Iraq
as States were certainly defeated quickly but the war is still on.
Therefore, clarifying the ambiguous interplay between
States, non state actors and the population, as simple as it may
appear remains important. In Afghanistan, the actual target
is so called terrorist groups, immersed into the population
and the State was only targeted as such because it was said to
provide terrorist groups with some support 5. But, as a matter
of fact, the State is only a collateral actor. Conversely, in Iraq
the State has actually been designated by the Bush administration as a terror State under the false pretext of detaining
and deploying weapons of mass destruction and an alleged
link with Al Qaeda. Once the lie has become obvious and the
unsaid motives of the attack been clear for the Iraqi population,
resistants and religious groups of all kind have been this time
the focus of the war; hence, the massive destruction of civilians
(more that one hundred thousand) trapped between the US
forces and the activist groups. In both cases, the population
5. Boyle Michael J., “The war on terror in American grand strategy”, International
Affairs, 84(2), 2008, 191-209; Acharya, Amitav., “State Sovereignty After 9/11:
Disorganised Hypocrisy”, Political Studies, 55(2), 2007, 274-296.
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack185
is the primary target and therefore the primary location of a
memory in the process 6.
It remains to be said that both wars have broken out an
expended in the wake of a long tradition of violence, a tradition
of violence which, according to President Bush, contradicted
the universal set of values of the United States.
This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s
neighbours and against Iraq’s people. This regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and
our friends and it had aided, trained and harboured terrorists including
operatives of Al Qaeda.
The United States with other countries will work to advance liberty
and peace in that region… The power and appeal of human liberty is
felt in every life and every land and the greatest power of freedom is to
overcome hatred and violence 7.
As a result, the war on terror is far different from the fight
against terrorism 8. The latter results only to police short-term
actions in order to protect the population. The former, the
war on terror, will be on the contrary translated into complex
military, police, civilo-military operations conducted not only
on overseas theatres but also on the domestic soil. The war on
terror just like the pacification wars, the anti-subversive operations, the low intensity conflict (“wars for all seasons”) are
wedged without limit of time and just like all those past wars
it has also for objectives to enforce social, economic, political
principles ensuring law and order in the inside and peace and
security in the outside.
6. According to NGO Iraq Body Count, 110 000 civilian people were killed
during the war: [www.iraqbodycount.org].
7. George Bush’s war ultimatum speech, 2003, March 17th, [http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq].
8. Hanon Jean-Paul, “Militaires et lutte antiterroriste”, Cultures & Conflits,
n° 56(4), 2004, 8-8.
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2. … Rooted into past anti-subversive war
The war on terror is not just about destroying a hostile structure but rather about establishing the conditions of a peace based
on the values of a western liberal society (this is also another
meaning of wining the “Hearts and minds 9”). However, melting
war on terror and counterinsurgency operations on behalf of
a “Hearts and minds” strategy has some drawbacks reminding
of disastrous past experience and for the same reasons.
Just like in Algeria
The moral and physical destruction of hostile groups in Iraq
has occurred against a past context of relentless war (Iran) and
domestic repression.
There has been a deliberate confusion between insurgent
groups and the population to merge them into the notion of
“potential adversaries” or “unlawful warriors 10”.
This overall suspicion has justified the practice of forced
interrogatories or torture, legitimised by the US government
in the name of protection of its interests and population 11.
The practice of counterinsurgency doctrine as a tactic against
terror has given the terrorist groups a coherence, a substance,
9. On the limits of “Hearts and Minds” Strategy: Peters R., “The hearts-and-minds
myth”, Armed Forces Journal, 144, 2006, 34-38 (H&M is a “catch-all” concept);
Bennett H., “The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in
British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18(4),
2007, 638-664 (Repression is an effective policy in couterinsurgency); Freedman L.,
“The changing forms of military conflict”, Survival, 40(4), 1998, 39-56; Freedman
L., The transformation of strategic affairs, Routledge, 2006 (Hearts and Minds are
often opposed); Hoffman F. G., “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?”, Parameters,
37(2), 2007, 71; Metz S. and Millen R., Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the
21st century: reconceptualizing threat and response, Strategic Studies Institute US
Army War College, 2004. (In Iraq of Afghanistan, insurgents do not really need
population support.)
10. Robben Antonius C. G. M., “Chaos, mimesis and dehumanisation in Iraq:
American counterinsurgency in the global War on Terror”, Social Anthropology,
18(2), 2010, 138-154.
11. Bellamy compares Iraq (US), Northern Ireland (UK) and Algeria (France).
Bellamy Alex J., “No pain, no gain? Torture and ethics in the war on terror”,
International Affairs, 82(1), 2006, 121-148.
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack187
a status they did not have nor they did not claim for and they
should not have had anyway.
The reinvention of war has been a constant and compulsory
process to justify the war on terror and eventually to find an
outcome to the conflict.
All things which have resulted in revivifying a past history of
sufferings and bitterness through an updating of all the factors
which are going to nourish the constant reinvention of war
through shared torments.
Therefore the link between pacification operations of the
past and war on terror appears conspicuous:
– First, the doctrines, techniques and practices applied according
to a counter-subversive logic are driven by short-term effectiveness constraints 12.
– Second, the enforcement of these doctrines, techniques and
practices inevitably imply breaches of all the laws enacted to
reduce the suffering of the belligerents and the population 13.
The historical and doctrinal linkage is even more conspicuous if you consider that the new counter-insurgency strategy
enforced in Iraq is derived, if not simply borrowed, from a
long legacy of anti-subversive warfare doctrine devised by
12. Goya Michel, “L’innovation pendant la guerre américano-sunnite en
Irak (2003-2007)”, in La guerre irrégulière, Malis C., Strachan H. and Danet D.,
Economica, 2011, 293-302.
13. See for example the general condemnation of the US concept of “unlawful
combatant”: Camus Colombe, “La lutte contre le terrorisme dans les démocraties
occidentales : État de droit et exceptionnalisme”, Revue internationale et stratégique,
66, 2007, 9; Szurek Sandra, “Guantanamo : le camp dans la “guerre contre le
terrorisme”?”, in Le retour des camps; Gill T. and Van Sliedregt E., Autrement, 2007,
118-129; “Guantánamo Bay: A Reflection On The Legal Status And Rights Of
‘Unlawful Enemy Combatants’”, Utrecht Law Review 1(1), 2005, 28-54; Hoffman M.
H., “Terrorists Are Unlawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction
with Implications for the Future of International Humanitarian Law”, Case W. Res.
J. Int’l L., 34, 2002, 227; Mofidi M. and Eckert A. E., “Unlawful Combatants or
Prisoners of War: The Law and Politics of Labels”, Cornell Int’l LJ, 36, 2003, 59;
Paust J. J., “War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War”, Yale
J. Int’l L., 28, 2003, 325.
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a number of English 14 or French officers like Gallieni 15 and
Liautey 16 at the end of the 19th century, Trinquier 17, Gallula 18
and Aussaresses 19 who engaged in colonial wars in Indochina
and Algeria. The works, experiences and doctrines of the later
were then passed on to US and South American officers to
be readapted to low intensity conflicts in the seventies and to
counter-insurgency operations lately 20. In short, the French
experience of colonial wars should be considered as a major
source of the current US counter-insurgency strategy as exemplified in the 2006 FM 3-24 21.
This being said, to fully understand that new strategy of
counter-insurgency means returning to the pacification operations led more than half a century ago in Algeria and would
allow to take some distance with the present experience of
counter-insurgency in Iraq or in Afghanistan. Beyond the
already said geographical, historical and cultural differences, the
question raised here remains how the US military and civilian
14. Callwell C. E., Small wars: their principles and practice, Printed for HM
Stationery off., by Harrison and sons, Thompson, 1903; S.R.G.K., Defeating communist insurgency: The lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, FA Praeger New York, 1966; Kitson
F., Low intensity operations: subversion, insurgency, peace-keeping, Stackpole Books
Harrisburg PA, 1971; Gwynn S.C.W., Imperial Policing, Macmillan and Co, 1934.
15. Gallieni J. S., Rapport d’ensemble du général Galliéni sur la situation générale
de Madagascar, Imp. des Journaux officiels, 1899 (reprint: Paris, Lavauzelle, 1920).
16. Lyautey L.H.G., Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), Paris,
A. Colin, 1920.
17. Trinquier Roger, Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency,
Praeger Publishers, 1964.
18. Galula David, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-58, Praeger Publishers, 1963;
Galula David, Contre-insurrection : Théorie et pratique, Economica, 2008.
19. Aussaresses Paul, The Battle of the Casbah: terrorism and counter-terrorism
in Algeria 1955-1957, Enigma, 2006; Aussaresses Paul, Services spéciaux Algérie
1955-1957 : Mon témoignage sur la torture, Perrin, 2001; Aussaresses Paul and
Madeleine Sultan, Je n’ai pas tout dit: Ultimes révélations au service de la France,
Éditions du Rocher, 2008.
20. Robin Marie-Monique, Escadrons de la mort, l’école française, Éditions La
Découverte, 2008; Ranalletti Mario, “Aux origines du terrorisme d’État en Argentine”,
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, 105, 2010, 45.
21. Petraeus D. H., Amos J. F. and Nagl J. A., The US Army and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007.
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack189
society is going to deal with the notion of “guilty memory” that
has permeated large parts of the French society all along the
years (in an unsaid manner). Quite differently it seems, but if
past war experiences of that kind can be helpful to invent less
painful ways to live with memories of war, comparisons are
worth being tried.
III. The memorial dimensions
of pacification operations in Algeria
1. The military memorial dimension
When the US government decided to draw its inspiration
from the French pacification war model, it has also taken
for granted a political military process whose weaknesses, if
not obvious at first glance, are nonetheless infectious. These
weaknesses will be all the more difficult to overcome since the
military at large will have to reconcile a general discourse on
“winning the Hearts and minds” of the population with a long
deployment on the Iraqi soil, massive killings of civilians and
the extensive use of forced interrogatories as well as DNA tests
on large segments of the population said to prevent potential
terrorist attacks or to control movements of Iraqi people.
In this regard, if we turn to the past experience of wars of
pacification in Algeria, the general use of systematic control
of inferiorized population 22, psychological indoctrination 23,
forced interrogatories and torture 24 by the French Army to deter
any form of collaboration with terrorist groups has resulted in
22. Rigouste Mathieu, “L’ennemi intérieur, de la guerre coloniale au contrôle
sécuritaire”, Culture et conflits, 67(3), 2007, 157-174.
23. Villatoux Marie-Catherine, “Traitement psychologique, endoctrinement, contre-endoctrinement en guerre d’Algérie : le cas des camps de détention”, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 208, 2002, 45; Villatoux Paul,
“L’institutionnalisation de l’arme psychologique pendant la guerre d’Algérie au
miroir de la guerre froide”, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 208, 2002,
35; Thénault Sylvie, “Personnel et internés dans les camps français de la guerre
d’Algérie”, Politix, 69, 2005, 63. Consulted on November 16, 2011.
24. Périès Gabriel, “Conditions d’emploi des termes interrogatoire et torture
dans le discours militaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie”, Mots, 51, juin 1997, 41-57.
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the political silencing of the French armed forces which still now
makes difficult and even impossible any debate on this issue.
If we add that this unsaid, unexpressed guilty conscience was
compounded by the three hundred thousand “Harkis” (Algerian
suppletive troops) the French Army left behind unarmed, 60 000
of them were killed by the new Algerian power later on. Still
today, the very weak political influence of the military in France
is to be related with the memorial effects of the harsh practices
which still go deep into the French political and military culture.
However, the memorial effects of torture as self evident
and routine practices not only did affect the military as a
political body but also large groups of population: 1,2 million
conscripts have served in Algeria for more than seven years,
30 000 “Harkis” have succeeded in migrating to France. As
for the conscript soldiers, the recalling of the trauma they
have suffered is all the more spectacular that it remains largely
ignored by the population and, as a consequence, when it
comes to the public attention through the media, it stirs
considerable emotion 25. The consequence of this is that a
whole people, once they have returned to civilian life, have
constantly reinvented the war of Algeria. A dissymetrical
process of reinvention since that population had meddled into
more than one million “French citizens from Algeria” forced
to migrate also to France in 1962.
2. The political memorial dimension
The scope or the shadow of the pacification operations led in
Algeria is extending well beyond the time and the place of their
conduct. The extreme level of violence resulting from acts of
25. Vittori Jean-Pierre, Nous, les appelés d’Algérie, Éditions Ramsay, 2007;
Rotman Patrick, L’ennemi intime, Points, 2007; Anonyme, “En Algérie, j’étais
contre la torture… mais j’étais là”, Ouest France, 2006, 16 novembre; Jauffret JeanCharles, Soldats en Algérie, Autrement, 2000; Branche R., “La dernière génération
du feu? Jalons pour une étude des anciens combattants français de la guerre d’Algérie”, Histoire@ Politique (3), 2007, 6-6; Bantigny L., “Temps, âge et génération à
l’épreuve de la guerre : La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli des appelés en Algérie”, Revue
historique (1), 2007, 165-179.
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack191
terror and counterinsurgency operations have caused enduring
fractures within the population and persistent hatred between
ethnic 26, religious 27 and social 28 groups which are disruptive
of the social material 29.
Firstly, in France the “Harkis” have been for a long time
confined in camps in the south of France because the political
authorities were fearing that they would support the dissentive
movements contesting the power in Algeria. This is only very
recently that the “Harkis” have been recognised as a full part
of the French population and acquire genuine citizenship.
In Algeria however, the different governments in power still
continue to consider the “Harkis” as suppletive troops having
betrayed their country and have constantly objected to their
return to Algeria. The “Harki” issue cannot be viewed as a side
matter. They are part of a much larger community in Algeria
who has supported the French government and still remains
excluded from the Algerian society. Therefore, building a
common history on the myth of a unified muslim community
turns out to be in practice impossible.
Secondly, we already said that the long standing practice
of violence under the form of bomb attacks, interrogatories,
torture, repression has its own dynamic and fosters an habit of
violence which is certainly a key to understand the particular
ferocity of the rebel movements in the nineties echoed by a
similar violence coming from the police and the military in
charge of repressing them.
26. Alidières Bernard, “La guerre d’Algérie en France métropolitaine : souvenirs
‘oubliés’”, Hérodote, 120, 2006, 149.
27. Lacoste Yves, “La question coloniale”, Hérodote, 120, janvier 2006, 5-27.
28. Valette Jacques, “Un contre-maquis durable de la guerre d’Algérie”, Guerres
mondiales et conflits contemporains, 208, 2002, 7.
29. Stora Benjamin, “Maroc-Algérie. Retour du passé et écriture de l’histoire”,
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, 68(1), 2000, 109-118.
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3. The memorial effects on the French society
In France, the war of pacification in Algeria has also caused
enduring fractures still difficult to address nowadays 30. Conscripts
and professionals soldiers, Algerian migrants (2,5 million) that
have become French since, Algero-French migrants, Harkis, all
have different memories and sometimes opposite interpretations
of the trauma they are still suffering from 31. That memorial
fracture has induced social and cultural marginalization of
certain groups which makes it impossible to create spaces for
mediation or more simply spaces for an exchange of memories
which must be considered as essential for reconciliation.
As time is passing by, the actors who had directly participated
in the conflict have been replaced by generations nourished by
public and family memories and discourses 32. This transmission
of memory between generations has transformed Algeria into
a dreamland and not the land as it is. This new generation is
both too French to be accepted and recognised by the Algerian
authorities and too Algerian in France to be fully accepted in
all their social, cultural and political dimensions. The deadlock
caused by the transmission of different memories of sufferings produces forms of protest supported by pressure groups
which are entering a permanent competition for memory. To
some extent, in France the issue of integration of these young
30. Ribas D., “Destins de la fracture algérienne dans la mémoire française”,
Revue française de psychanalyse, 72(4), 2008, 1069-1080; Grandmaison O. L. C.,
“Passé colonial, histoire et ‘guerre des mémoires’?”, Multitudes (3), 2006, 143-154.
For a wishful thinking of a common history: Thénault Sylvie, “France-algérie pour
un traitement commun du passé de la guerre d’indépendance”, Vingtième Siècle.
Revue d’histoire, 85, 2005, 119.
31. Savarese Éric, “Mobilisations politiques et posture victimaire chez les militants
associatifs pieds-noirs”, Raisons politiques, 30, n° 2, 2008, 41. In South of France,
the end of war celebration is often controversial: Penin Pierre, “Commémoration
bousculée”, Sud Ouest, Pyrénées Atlantique Pays Basque edition, rub. Bayonne
2010 March 20; Cudel Manuel, “Ainsi vont les cérémonies à Béziers”, Midi Libre,
Béziers, 2009 March 27; Thiolay Boris, “Le mémorial de la discorde”, L’Express,
rub. News, 2007, November 22.
32. Vidal D., “De l’histoire coloniale aux banlieues”, Mémoires/Histoire (1),
2006, 176-185.
From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack193
generation and that of colonial wars under the form they have
been wagged are absolutely intertwined.
4. The Memorial Effects on French Politics in Africa
The weight, if not the load, of the war of pacification in
Algeria has also an impact on the international relations each
time that France is entering a period of crisis or conflict, particularly when the crisis is developing in a former colony. The
ghost of war in Algeria is systematically called to the memory
of the French military and the political body by the opponent.
That was the case in the 80s Rwanda 33 and more recently in
Ivory Coast 34.
As a matter of fact, it is the whole post-colonial international
relations between France and Africa which is permeated by the
memory of the Algerian conflict. The dynamic of the Algerian
memory and the sufferings attached to it provide the collective
matrix for all foreign relations with North and West African
countries.
Once again, can we draw lessons from the French experience
of wars of pacification namely in Algeria which could be useful
or at least highlight the memorial effects that the war in Iraq
and in Afghanistan will inevitably have or may have. Reasons for
cautiousness in our judgment are obvious since no war resembles
to another. Nonetheless, it seems to us that the French case
of war in Algeria is worth being studied for a main reason: its
historical depth makes it easier the general comprehension of
the memorial consequences of counterinsurgency wars and war
on terror which resort to the same techniques and processes,
not to mention the same culture.
33. For example: Cantier François and Delfour Jean-Jacques, “Rwanda, le déni
français”, Liberation, 2001 june 20.
34. For example: Zecchini Laurent, “Les blessures de l’armée française”, Le
Monde, rub. TRO, 2006, January 6; Irondelle B., “L’armée française et l’éthique
dans les conflits de post-guerre froide”, Critique internationale (4), 2008, 119-136.
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Some potential memorial effects regarding the war in Iraq
From a military point of view, the conflict in Iraq has claimed
the lives of nearly 4 500 soldiers and caused 33 000 wounded
servicemen and women. In total, more than 300 000 soldiers,
not to mention the considerable manpower provided by Private
Military Corporations, have been committed to Iraq for long
and repeated periods of time. Which means that in the future,
the United States will have to deal on its soil with a large population engaged in a particularly traumatic type of war? Those
traumas of war will be amplified by the number of tours of
duty, their length and the nature of the wounds received. The
practice of winning “Hearts and minds” has mainly consisted
in collaborating with a religious group against another. It
remains to be seen how the Iraqi population will be affected by
this once the US troops have withdrawn. How the US Army
is going to manage its image in the Muslim world remains an
entire question. Let’s say that the war in Libya constitutes a first
answer. These issues have been deemed sufficiently important
for a return to a renewed ethical teaching in the US forces and
academies.
From a social point of view, regarding Iraq, the United
States may have to deal with Iraqi migration should the country
be affected by new rivalries between religious groups after
the departure of the US forces. On the domestic side, a large
proportion of Latinos have joined up frontline troops just like
the Marine Corps or the Paratroopers 35. These soldiers who
have spilled their blood for the US may have the right to be
recognised in accordance with their sacrifice.
From a political point of view, the election of President
Obama may appear as a response to an image which has been
35. Curtis Katherine J. and Collin F. Payne, “The Diffential Impact of Mortality
of American Troops in the Iraq War: the Non Metropolitan dimension”, Demographic
Research 23, n° 2, 2010, 41-62; Fischer Hannah, “US Military Casualty Statistics:
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From the battle of Alger to the 9/11 bomb attack195
largely tarnished on the international scene according to a 2008
poll. Much will depend in the future on how he is going to
assume the memorial aspects of the war in Iraq, something the
French political body has never really been capable of doing.
To finally conclude, the war on terror and its ancestor, the
war of pacification, both question the particular traumatic consequences of war processes and strategies which deliberately seek
for the moral and physical destruction of the opponent. They
also question what we have called the “dissymetry of memories”
and a hardening of this memory by young generations. These
wars say also a lot on what the different actors must assume
if we do not want that the imaginary borders of the memory
give birth to a memorial blurring made of false dreams, regrets,
wounds... and fragment the social body and material.