Session 1 : Ideological Background of the Constitution

Transcription

Frédérique Ferrand (France)
Session 1 : Ideological Background of the Constitution,
Constitutional Rules and Civil Procedure
1.1 Keynote Speech on general aspects of the topic
Prof. Frédérique Ferrand,
Tenured Professor, University Jean Moulin Lyon 3, France
International Association of Procedural Law Seoul Conference 2014
1
Session 1 : Ideological Background of the Constitution, Constitutional Rules and Civil
Procedure
Frédérique Ferrand
Keynote Speech
Constitution and Civil Proceedings
Summary
I.
Introduction
II.
Constitution and Access to the Court
A. Access to a Court of First Instance
B. Is There a Constitutional Right to a Mean of Recourse?
III.
Constitution and Course of Civil Proceedings
A. Institutional Constitutional Procedural Guarantees
B. Functional Constitutional Procedural Guarantees
IV.
Constitution and Transnational Dialogue or Conversation Between Courts
V.
Conclusion
I. Introduction
« Une bonne Constitution ne peut suffire à faire le bonheur d’une nation. Une mauvaise
peut suffire à faire son malheur »1 : A good constitution is not enough to make the
happiness of a nation. A bad one can be enough to make its misfortune. This sensible
statement made by a famous French professor of constitutional law (Guy Carcassonne)
shows what important role the basic, fundamental law of a country often plays.
Concept of Constitution - What is a constitution? What are its form, aims and contents?
The concept of a constitution goes back to ancient Greece. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), in
his work of political philosophy Politics2 defines the constitution in the following way:
“« one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common
buiness of them all. This community is the constitution3; the virtue of the citizen must
therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member ». A constitution can be
described as the supreme law of the land. It is mostly located at the top of the legal
system and all laws, decrees and orders must be consistent with its principles. However,
this highest ranking may be challenged with regard to international treaties4, especially
1
Guy CARCASSONNE, La Constitution, Paris, Seuil, coll. Points, 1996, p. 33.
ARITOTLE, Politics, transl. by Benjamin JOWETT, Univ. of Adelaide, webedition published by
eBooks@Adelaide.
3
The first sentence of Aritotle’s book Politics contains the following statement: « Each state is a
community of some kind » (book 1, first sentence, p. 1).
4
With regard to the ranking of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in Italy and Spain,
see Charlotte GIRARD, « Ce qu’appliquer la Convention en droit interne veut dire – Le rôle des doctrines
nationales », in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ont-ils
constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, pp. 125 et seq. On the ranking of EU law and of
the ECHR in France, Germany and Austria, see Christophe de ARANJO, Justices constitutionnelles et
2
2
those relating to a regional economic institutional integration such as the European
Union5, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled several times on the ground of
the precedence principle6. On the other hand, since the entry into force of the Lisbon
justices européennes des droits de l’homme, Étude comparée France-Allemagne, Brussels, Bruylant ed.,
2009, pp. 189 et seq and pp. 343 et seq. In France, according to the Constitution, in the domestic legal
order, the prevailing norm is the constitution (see e.g. Cass. Ass. Plén., 2 June 2000, No 99-60274 : « la
suprématie conférée aux engagements internationaux ne s’appliquant pas dans l’ordre interne aux
dispositions de valeur constitutionnelle ») ; international treaties rank before national statutes. In
Germany, in the domestic legal order, the highest norm is the Basic Law (constitution), then 2° the
general rules of international law and EU law; 3° federal statutes and international conventions such as
the ECHR. The main difference between France and Germany is the ranking of the ECHR (2° in France
as an international treaty, 3° in Germany).
5
See e.g. the decision given by the French Constitutional Council, 19 November 2004, 2004-505 DC,
Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe; see also 27 July 2006, No 2006-540 DC, Loi relative
au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information (« 19. Considérant, en premier lieu,
que la transposition d'une directive ne saurait aller à l'encontre d'une règle ou d'un principe inhérent à
l'identité constitutionnelle de la France, sauf à ce que le constituant y ait consenti ». The Italian Corte
costituzionale (sentenza No 232/1989, 21 April 1989) has ruled that primacy of EU law does not apply to
fundamental constitutional principles. Also the German Bundesverfassungsgericht hold that the Basic
Law has priority over EU law where the “Verfassungsidentität” is at stake, see BVerfG, 22 November
1986, 2 BvR 197/83, Solange II, BVerfGE 73, pp. 339 et seq. Before the change of case law contained in
the Solange II judgment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had ruled (29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, Solange I,
BVerfGE 37, pp. 271 et seq.) that the European Community “stills lacks, in particular, a codified
catalogue of fundamental rights, the substance of which is reliably and unambiguously fixed for the future
and a decision as to whether, at the time in question, the Community law standard with regard to
fundamental rights generally binding in the Community is adequate in the long term measured by the
standard of the Basic Law with regard to fundamental rights”; “As long as this legal certainty … is not
achieved in the course of the further integration of the Community, the reservation derived from Article
24 of the Basic Law applies”.
6
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that according to the precedence principle, European
law is superior to the national laws, even to those of constitutional origin. The precedence principle
applies to all European acts with a binding force. Therefore, Member States may not apply a national rule
which contradicts to European law. The ECJ enshrined the precedence principle in the Costa v. Enel case
of 15 July 1964 (case 6/64). Since the ECJ has ruled that national constitutions should also be subject to
the precedence principle (ECJ, 17 December 1980, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, case 11/70, No 3 : « in fact, the law stemming from the
treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national
law, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal
basis of the community itself being called in question. Therefore the validity of a community measure or
its effect within a member state cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either
fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a national
constitutional structure »), it is a matter for national judges not to apply the provisions of a constitution
which contradict European law. However, since the Maastricht treaty introduced a provision stating that
the Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States (see now Art. 4.2. TEU and infra
under IV), the ECJ has several times referred to the relevance of particular constitutional requirements in
Member States in order to justify an exception, see e.g. ECJ, 6 September 2006, C-88/03, Portuguese
Republic v. Commission of the European Communities; 13 October 2004, C-36/02, Omega Spielhallenund Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn; 8 September 2010, C409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH v. Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim. See also Leonard F.M.
BESSELINK, « National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon », Utrecht Law Review, Vol.
6, Issue 3, Nov. 2010, p. 46 : “once, as a result of what some metaphorically call a ‘dialogue’ of courts, it
has emerged that a certain rule of principle belongs to that identity, the ECJ proves to be sensitive to this
identity”.
3
Procedure
treaty, Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires the Union to
“respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive
of regional and local self-government »7.
Constitution has been defined as containing “the most important rules for the state,
which means those which determine the form of the state and of its government”8. The
powers of the constitutional organs (Parliament, government etc.) are organised as well
as the relationships between the state and the citizens. Besides establishing the
institutions of government and the manner in which they function toward each other and
toward the people, a constitution may also set forth the rights of the individual and a
government's duty to respect those rights. Jürgen Habermas, a famous German
philosopher, makes a distinction between a liberal and a republican conception of a
constitution: in the republican conception, a constitution aims at founding and justifying
the sovereignty of a State, whereas the liberal view gives the constitution the function of
limiting power (Macht)9. In a State under the rule of law (É tat de droit, Rechtsstaat),
there should be no arbitrary power, and individual rights should be respected. A
constitution is at the same time a political and a legal act since it does not only regulate
the distribution of powers but also gives a political orientation towards specific values
in a specific geographical and human space unit. Due to this specific nature, the national
constitution “should only be done for the nation to which one wants to adapt it’ and has
been compared to “a garment that, if well made, should only fit one person”10. If we
adhere to this metaphor, we then must admit that a constitution is an “evolving body” 11
that may be adapted by judicial interpretation or by process of amendment.
Can There Be a Transnational Constitution? The Examples of the Failed Project of
a European Constitution of the European Union and of the European Convention
on Human Rights 12 – Attempts have been made to enact a Treaty establishing a
7
For more details, see Leonard F.M. BESSELINK, « National and constitutional identity before and
after Lisbon », Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue 3, Nov. 2010, pp. 36-49.
8
Georges VEDEL, Manuel de droit constitutionnel, Paris, 1949, p. 112, reed. Paris, Dalloz, 2002.
9
Jürgen HABERMAS, « Une constitution politique pour notre société mondiale pluraliste ? », in Jürgen
HABERMAS, Entre naturalisme et religion. Les défis de la démocratie, Paris, coll. Nrf Essais, Gallimard,
2008, p. 275.
10
Comparison made during the 19th century by the French emperor Napoleon III (1808-1873). : « Une
constitution doit être faite uniquement pour la nation à laquelle on veut l’adapter. Elle doit être comme un
vêtement qui, pour être bien fait, ne doit aller qu’à un seul homme ».
11
This is probably what the former State President Charles DE GAULLE meant by stating that “une
Constitution, c’est un esprit, des institutions, une pratique” (Press conference of 31 January 1964: “A
constitution, it is a spirit, institutions, a practice”). Comp. Benjamin CONSTANT, Ecrits politiques,
Paris, Gallimard, Folio Essais, 1997, p. 385 : « Tant qu’on n’a pas essayé une constitution par la pratique,
les formes sont une lettre morte : la pratique seule en démontre l’effet et en détermine le sens ». For an
analysis of Constant’s political philosphy (constitutionalism as a limited government), see Jean-Philippe
FELDMANN, « Le constitutionnalisme selon Benjamin Constant », Revue française de droit
constitutionnel 2008/4, p. 675-702.
12
See the American analysis of the European « constitutionalism », e.g. Eric STEIN, « Lawyers, Judges
and the Making of a Transnational Constitution », American Journal of International Law, vol. 75, No 1,
p. 1981; Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER/Walter MATTLI, « Revisiting the European Court of Justice »,
4
Constitution for Europe, commonly referred to as the European Constitution. This
Treaty created a consolidated constitution of the European Union, and was supposed to
replace the European Union Treaties with a single document. Signed in October 2004 by
representatives of 25 Member States, it was then ratified by 18 of them. The French and
Dutch people rejected the Treaty respectively in May and June 2005 by referendum,
which halted the ratification process. Later, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in
December 2007 and came into force on 1st December 2009; it did not make any
reference to a European Constitution (this terminology had caused reservations and
partly great unconcealed hostility), though it contained many of the changes originally
placed in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe13. In a less ominous manner
for the people hostile to a European Federation, these changes were formulated as
amendments to the existing treaties so that “les apparences étaient sauves” (appearances
were kept up). The failed Treaty incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (signed in Nice in December 2000) that gained therefore full legal
effect. The Lisbon Treaty also gave force to the Charter albeit by referencing it as an
independent document rather than by incorporating it into the treaty itself 14. As we will
see later, the Charter contains important procedural guarantees which are “addressed to
the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law”15. There could
have been a European Constitution that would have formalised the federal nature of the
European Union. The project failed, but those main profound changes that had been
planned were subsequently incorporated in a formally different way in the major reform
act named the Treaty of Lisbon. The ECJ itself often refers to the European Treaties as a
“basic constitutional charter” 16 and to the review by the ECJ as “ a constitutional
guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system »17. According
International Organization, vol. 52, No 1, Winter 1998, p. 177-209; Alec STONE, The Judicial
Construction of Europe, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.
13
See Nicolas MOUSSIS, « Le Traité de Lisbonne : une constitution sans en avoir le titre », Revue du
Marché Commun 2008, pp. 161 et seq. See also Koen LENAERTS, Piet VAN NUFFEL and Robert
BRAY; Constitutional Law of the European Union, 3rd ed. 2011, Sweet & Maxwell.
14
See Article 6.1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU): « The Union recognises the rights, freedoms
and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000,
as adapted at Strasburg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties ».
15
Article 51.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. On this issue, see ECJ, 26
February 2013, C-399/11, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal; 26 February 2013, C-617/10, Å klagaren contre
Hans Å kerberg Fransson ; 6 March 2014, C-206/13, Crucinao Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia, Europe May
2014, Comm. No 190.
16
See also Ninon COLNERIC, « European Constitution », in Jürgen BASEDOW/Klaus HOPT/Reinhard
ZIMMERMANN/Andreas STIER, The Max Planck Encylopedia of European Private Law, VoL. 1,
Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 2012, p/ 572-577 : « The EEC Treaty albeit concluded in the form of an
international agreement, nonetheless constituted the constitutional charter of a community based on the
rule of law ».
17
See e.g. ECJ, 2 September 2008, joint cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission: « In this connection it is to be borne in
mind that the Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its
institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the EC
Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the
Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the institutions » (No 281) ; « The review by the Court of
the validity of any Community measure in the light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the
5
Procedure
to the ECJ, the general principles of Community law do therefore have constitutional
status18.
In legal literature, some also see the European Convention on Human Rights as a certain
European Constitution binding on those States which are members of the Council of
Europe. The European Court of Human Rights itself has defined the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as an “instrument constitutionnel de l’ordre
juridique européen » (constitutional instrument of the European legal order) in its
decision Loizidou v. Turkey of 23rd March 1995 (application No 15318/89). However,
this formulation has not often been used again by the Court meaning it can be
considered that « son usage relève plus du registre symbolique qu’autre chose »19 (its
use is more of symbolic nature than anything else). This reference of the European
Court of Human Rights to the Convention as a « constitutional instrument » probably
follows from the conviction of the judges of this court that their role as supranational
judges is to guarantee a European and universal identity20. This issue of safeguarding an
identity explains why some European justices such as former President Luzius
Wildhaber21 see in the European Court of Human Rights a constitutional court22, one
which applies the Convention on Human Rights as a kind of safety device designed to
correct any errors which have slipped through the filter of national constitutional bodies.
Therefore, it has been argued that the European Court of Human Rights should not
concentrate on individual decisions bur rather on landmark cases aiming to keep
common minimal standards and even increase the general level of protection of human
expression, in a community based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC
Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement » (No
316) ; ECJ, 23 April 1986, case 294/83 Les Verts, European Court Report (ECR)1986.1339. See also
Antoine VAUCHEZ, « L’Europe et son nom de code – Paradigme constitutionnel et formation d’un
nouveau centre politique », in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de
l’homme ont-ils constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, pp. 239-256.
18
ECJ, 15 October 2009, case C-101/08, Audiolux and Others, European Court Report (ECR)
2009.I.09823. See also Armin VON BOGDANDY and Jürgen BAST (eds), Principles of European
Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. 2010, Oxford, Hart Publishing.
19
Marie-Elisabeth BAUDOIN, « Consonances et dissonances dans le discours européen des droits de
l’homme violationnistes et étatistes : la définition du rôle du juge européen », in Stéphanie HENNETTEVAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ont-ils constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles,
Bruylant, 2011, p. 80, footnote 54.
20
Marie-Elisabeth BAUDOIN, prec., p. 90.
21
Luzius WILDHABER, « A constitutional future for the European Court of Human Rights », Human
Rights Law Journal , vol. 23, nos 5-7, 2002, pp. 161-165.
22
See Luzius WILDHABER, « ‘Constitutionnalisation’ et ’juridiction constitutionnelle’ : le point de
vue de Strasbourg », in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de l’homme
ont-ils constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, pp. 92 et seq. (p. 95 : « Plutôt que de
sauver une démocratie dans une affaire exceptionnelle, la Cour EDH a contribué à fortifier les
démocraties grâce à la ‘normativité’ de son action continue. Elle a décidé le même genre d’affaires que
les Cours constitutionnelles nationales sur la base de principes similaires. … A cause de cette similitude,
certains auteurs – y compris moi-même – ont qualifié la Cour EDH de ‘cour quasi-constitutionnelle’, sui
generis »).
6
rights in all Europe23. Such a mission would be “constitutional” within the meaning of
“ruling on issues for reasons of public order in the general interest”. The issue of
« constitutionalization »24 has also been raised in view of safeguarding the authority of
the European Court which is threatened by the high number of individual complaints it
cannot deal with within a reasonable time-frame25. Should the Convention on Human
Rights be subject to an individualistic approach or is a “more constitutional’ (i.e.
abstract) one preferable? The opinions are far from unanimous. The Convention has a
strong normative role und should be placed at the top of the hierarchy of norms. Thus,
as one scholar suggested26, the term “constitutional” which has been increasingly used
in the past few years could simply refer to a symbolic and rhetorical proposal
performing the function of an identification and unification instrument of the European
Court’s members.
Constitutional Values and Preamble of the Constitution - The values that are the
basis for a constitution are sometimes stated in a preamble to the Constitution, as in the
Spanish Constitución of 27 December 1978 : “ Garantizar la convivencia democrática
dentro de la Constitución y de las leyes conforme a un orden económico y social justo.
Consolidar un Estado de Derecho que asegure el imperio de la ley como expresión de la
voluntad popular.
Proteger a todos los españoles y pueblos de España en el ejercicio de los derechos
humanos, sus culturas y tradiciones, lenguas e instituciones27 » or in the preamble to
the French Constitution of 4th October 1958 : « Le peuple français proclame
solennellement son attachement aux Droits de l'homme et aux principes de la
souveraineté nationale tels qu'ils ont été définis par la Déclaration de 1789, confirmée
et complétée par le préambule de la Constitution de 1946, ainsi qu'aux droits et devoirs
23
Luzius WILDHABER, « Place de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme dans le paysage
constitutionnel européen », XIIth Conference of the European constitutional courts, Brussels, 13-17 May
2002, p. 5.
24
See Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ont-ils
constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011 ; Olivier DE FROUVILLE, « Le paradigme de la
constitutionnalisation vu du droit international », in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc
SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ont-ils constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, pp. 193215. For a different opinion, see Jean-Marc SOREL, « Le paradigme de la constitutionnalisatin vu du
droit international (2) : le côté obscur de la force », in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc
SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ont-ils constitutionnalisé le monde ?, pp. 217-238.
25
Luzius WILDHABER, « ‘Constitutionnalisation’ et «’juridiction constitutionnelle’ : le point de vue de
Strasbourg », prec., p. 96.
26
Marie-Elisabeth BAUDOIN, prec., p. 92.
27
« Guarantee democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the laws, in accordance with a fair
economic and social order. Consolidate a State of Law which ensures the rule of law as the expression of
the popular will. Protect all Spaniards and people of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their
culture and traditions, languages and institutions », translation provided by the website of the Spanish
Congreso,
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingl
es_0.pdf.
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Procedure
définis dans la Charte de l'environnement de 200428 ». Many constitutions do not only
mention human rights (derechos humanos, droits de l’homme, Menschenrechte) in their
preamble, but even dedicate to them a specific part such as the German Grundgesetz of
23rd May 1949 which starts with a Part 1 dealing with the Grundrechte. This was a
strong political statement of the hierarchy of values in the newly founded Federal
Republic of Germany. The same applies to the Spanish Constitution enacted about three
years after Franco’s death, of which the first Title reads “ De los Dereches y Deberes
Fundamentales” (Fundamental Rights and Duties) and deals more specifically in
Chapter 2 with “Derechos y Libertades” (Rights and Liberties). The constitution is thus
a tool which protects people. The Italian constitution (Costituzione della Repubblica
italiana) of 27th December 1947 also contains a first part called “Rights and duties of
citizens” (Rapporti civili, art. 13-28)29. The same applies to the Brazilian constitution30.
By contrast, the American constitution of 1787 did not initially contain a part dedicated
to the rights and duties of the people. It originally comprised only a few articles
delineating the frame of government. After its coming into force in 1789, it was
amended several times and the first ten amendments (Bill of Rights) address major
people’s rights, setting rules for indictment by grand jury, protecting the right to due
process, and prohibiting self-incrimination and double jeopardy (5th Amendment),
protecting the right to a fair, speedy and public trial by jury, including the rights to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted by witnesses, to
obtain witnesses and to retain counsel (6th Amendment) and stating the right to trial by
jury in certain civil cases (7th Amendment)31. The 14th Amendment, adopted in 1868,
extended the due process clause to the individual states whereas the 5th Amendment had
made this clause applicable to the federal government32.
Form of the Constitution - The form of the Constitution may vary from one
jurisdiction to another. It can be codified or not. In England for example, Magna Carta
(Great Charter) was issued on 15 June 1215 in Latin of course and was the first
document imposed upon a King of England by a group of his subjects in an attempt to
limit his powers by law and protect their rights. During the second half of the 19th
28
« The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of
national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the
Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and to the rights and duties as defined in the Charter for the
Environment of 2004 », translation provided by the website of the French Constitutional Council,
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_juillet2008.pdf.
29
See also the Swiss constitution of 18 March 1999, Title 2, Art. 7-36.
30
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 5 October 1988, Title 2, Fundamental rights and
guarantees.
31
« In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law ».
32
The due process clause encompasses procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural
due process is the guarantee of a fair legal process when the government seeks to burden a person's
protected interests in life, liberty, or property. Substantive due process is the guarantee that the
fundamental rights of citizens will not be encroached on by government.
8
century most but not all of its clauses were repealed33. Magna Carta was described by
Lord Denning as "the greatest constitutional document of all times “. In 2005, Lord
Woolf called it the "first of a series of instruments that now are recognised as having a
special constitutional status"34. Magna Carta was the first constitutional Act, and it has
been asserted that it influenced parts of the American constitution35. Unlike many other
countries, the United Kingdom has no single constitutional document; sometimes it is
for this reason said to have an "unwritten" constitution (unwritten because not
originating in a single document, although many written laws have been instrumental in
its creation). At the end of the 18th century, the American and the French Revolutions
led to the first written constitutions. The constitution can be a sole document as in
Germany (Grundgesetz) or a set of several constitutional Acts. It can refer - this is e.g.
the case in France – to other written documents, thus giving them constitutional value.
In the French preamble, the reference to the “Declaration of 1789 36 , confirmed and
complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946” leads to the inclusion of the
human rights guaranteed in these instruments in the so-called “bloc de
constitutionnalité”37. Some of these rights and liberties will prove very important for
criminal and civil proceedings.
Values are at Stake in Proceedings - Criminal or civil procedure is no longer seen as a
mere technical matter. Procedural law is often built upon values that a State wishes to
promote. One is for example the equal treatment between all citizens or individuals, and
therefore also between litigants.
With regard to civil procedure, several issues may have a close relationship with
individual rights guaranteed by a national constitution. The first one is access to court
(II) which can then be divided between access to a court of first instance and possible
right to a mean if recourse. Constitutional values may also play an important rule during
the course of civil proceedings; in this respect, the key words are fair trial (procès
33
Three clauses currently remain part of the law of England and Wales, in particular Clause 29 (“No
Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but
by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either Justice or Right »). The last sentence of this clause was invoked in 2009 by an
English Member of Parliament to oppose a planned change in the statutory regulation of court fees.
34
Other important English instruments having constitutional status are for example the Habeas Corpus
Act (1679), the Petition of Right (1628), the Bill of Rights (1689), and the Act of Settlement (1701).
35
The United States Supreme Court has e.g. in its decision Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967) mentioned Magna Carta as an antecedent of the Sixth Amendement’s right to a speeding trial
(« We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first
articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was
written, ‘We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right ‘ »), see
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=386&invol=213
36
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (Declaration of Human and Civic Rights) which has
become the written basis of many decisions rendered by the French Constitutional Council relating to
criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, see Régis FRAISSE, “L’article 16 de la Déclaration, clé de
voûte des droits et libertés”, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel n°44, July 2014, pp. 9 et seq.
37
See Bernard CHANTEBOUT, Droit constitutionnel, 29th ed. 2012, Paris, Sirey, p. 599.
9
Procedure
équitable, faires Verfahren, due process of law, derecho a un proceso equitativo) which
encompasses many features of the proceedings such as the right to be heard, the
independence and impartiality of the court and also the issue of publicity of the
proceedings (III). These two main aspects of constitutional procedural rights (access to
court and fair trial) are to be examined not only in the light of constitutional provisions
since in many States, the Constitutional court and/or the civil courts have taken action in
order to promote those rights through judicial interpretation. At a final stage (IV), this
presentation will deal with a topic which has become of central importance in the last
decades, due to the increase of international instruments aiming to protect human rights
(such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 ratified by 47 European
States38 or the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 applying in 23 States of
Central and South America 39 ) and to create regional economic, political and legal
organisations such as the European Union. What is nowadays the interplay between
national constitutions and regional or even international instruments? What are the
respective roles of domestic, regional and international courts in the protection of
procedural rights? Is there a transnational dialogue between the actors of that protection?
What about possible conflicting provisions and/or case law? These difficult issues have
become essential in judicial practice.
II. Constitution and Access to the Court
Rights would remain purely theoretical if the individual (or legal entities) were not in a
position to defend them before an institution (normally a court). The concept of access
to justice has been developed by scholars (especially by the great Italian professor
Mauro Cappelletti40 whose name has been chosen for the IAPL-prize rewarding the best
work published on a procedural law subject) but also in the extensive case law of the
European Court of Human Rights as a prerequisite to a fair trial followed from Article 6
ECHR. Access to justice refers to the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy
through formal or informal institutions of justice, and in conformity with the standards
of human rights. When this access is provided before courts or tribunals, it is more
precisely called access to court. It is a fundamental human right as set out in Article 8 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law”); it is also a means of protection of other
rights. Therefore, it is not surprising to find in many national constitutions a provision
guaranteeing in a more or less general way access to a court. In the United Kingdom,
fundamental norms have been injected which « regulate the entire practice of civil
38
See http://www.Strasbourg-europe.eu/pays-membres,44987,fr.html.
See the state of ratifications under http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm.
40
See e.g. Mauro CAPPELLETTI (ed.), Access to Justice and Welfare State, Florence, European Univ.
Institute, 1981.
39
10
justice »41. Thus, the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the European Convention of
Human Rights (especially art. 6 para 1 which concerns the basic aspects of access to
court and fair procedure). Access to court requires a fair and efficient system for
providing justice; equal access is also crucial to the proper functioning of society and
raises the issue of the availability of legal aid in favour of the most disadvantaged (A).
By contrast, few constitutions provide for a right to a mean of recourse and this issue is
then left to the legislator (B). In Europe, as we will see, this is in line with the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the guarantees enshrined in
Article 6 ECHR.
A. Access to a Court of First Instance
Lady Brenda Hale, Supreme Court Justice, emphasised in her 2011 Sir Henry Hodge
Memorial Lecture, the need to maintain effective access to court: « Courts are and
should be a last resort but they should be a last resort which is accessible to all, rich
and poor alike »42. This quotation underlines two major aspects of the right to access to
court: the legal possibility to seize a civil court and the effective accessibility without
regard to the financial resources of the litigants.
Some Examples in National Constitutions – Many national constitutions do indeed
guarantee a right to access to court. Article 29a of the Swiss constitution of 18 March
1999 (Guarantee of access to the courts) states, for instance, that “In a legal dispute,
every person has the right to have their case determined by a judicial authority”.
However, “The Confederation and the Cantons may by law preclude the determination
by the courts of certain exceptional categories of case”. Article 24 of the Spanish
constitution of 1978 provides that “1. Every person has the right to obtain the effective
protection of the Judges and the Courts in the exercise of his or her legitimate rights
and interests, and in no case may he go undefended. 2. Likewise, all persons have the
right of access to the ordinary judge predetermined by law […]”. According to the
Italian constitution (Article 24), “Everyone can take judicial action to protect individual
rights and legitimate interests” 43 . In Germany, the Grundgesetz does not expressly
guarantee the right to access to court. However, the German constitutional court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht)44 has constantly ruled that a constitutional right to effective
legal
protection
(Recht
auf
Gewährung
effektiven
Rechtsschutzes,
Justizgewährungsanspruch45) follows from Article 2 para 1 in connection with Article
41
N. Andrews, « Nurturing Civil Justice », in Festschrift Rolf Stürner, Band 2, Tübungen, Mohr Siebeck,
2013, p. 1402.
42
Equal Access to Justice in the Big Society, 27 June 2011, quoted by N. ANDREWS, « Nurturing Civil
Justice », p. 1396.
43
Comp. Art. 5, XXXV Brazilian constitution.
44
The Bundesverfassungsgericht ist the highest institution in the judicial branch, „co-equal with the
legislative and executive branches of the German government“, see Peter L. MURRAY/Rolf STÜRNER,
German Civil Justice, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 2004, p. 62.
45
On the dimension of Justizgewährleistung in German civil proceedings, see Alexander BRUNS, „Die
zivilprozessuale Dimension des Justizgewährleistung“, in Festschrift Rolf Stürner, Vol. I, Tübingen, Mohr
Siebeck ed., 2013, pp. 257-271.
11
Procedure
20 para 3 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)46. According to Article 2 para 1, “Every
person has the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate
the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order of the moral law”; Article
20 para 3 guarantees the rule-of-law principle47 (Rechtsstaatsprinzip). According to the
German constitutional court, the fundamental rights secured by the Basic Law can only
perform their function in the constitutional order if they can be effectively realised
through judicial proceedings that will be guaranteed (Rechtsverwirklichung durch
Verfahren). The influence of the German Federal constitutional court on criminal and
civil procedure is huge. By means of the Verfassungsbeschwerde ("constitutional
complaint") any person may allege that their constitutional rights have been violated48.
Although only a small fraction of these complaints are actually successful (about 2%)49,
they allow the German constitutional court to develop the protection of fundamental
procedural rights. It has even been asserted by a German scholar50 that “constitutional
case law is probably the most current procedural legislation”. The French constitution
of 1958 does not expressly guarantee the right to access to court. The Constitutional
council, however, has made use of Article 16 of the Declaration of Human and Civic
Rights of 1789 (which reads: “Any society in which no provision is made for
guaranteeing rights or for the separation of powers, has no Constitution”) to give
constitutional value to the right to an effective legal remedy before court (droit à un
recours juridictionnel effectif”)51 and to several other procedural rights52 so that Article
46
See e.g. German Fed. Const. court(BVerfG), 2 March 1993, 1 BvR 249/92, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (NJW) 1993, p. 1635. For more recent decisions, see German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG),
18 July 2013, 1 BvR 1623/11, NJW 4/2014, p. 205 ; 3 March 2014, 1 BvR 2534/10, NJW 25/2014, p.
1796.
47
Art. 20 para 3: « The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the
judiciary by law and justice ».
48
When all other remedies are exhausted, the plaintiff can file a constitutional complaint with the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and allege, for instance, that a court judgment is in violation of the
Constitution 1° by virtue of the procedure with which the court decision was reached, 2° by reason of the
law on which the judgment is based or 3° by reason of some finding or reasoning of the judges, see Peter
L. MURRAY/Rolf STÜ RNER, German Civil Justice, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 2004, p. 64.
49
The workload of the Federal Constitutional court had increased considerably so that in 1993 panels of
three judges (Dreierkammern) were established within both senates of eight judges. The panels of three
judges, acting unanimously, may summarily dismiss a constitutional complaint as unfounded or may grant
the relief requested, see §§ 83b and 93c of the law relating to the Federal Constitutional court
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, BVerfGG) and Peter L. MURRAY/Rolf STÜ RNER, German Civil
Justice, p. 65.
50
Peter GILLES, « Zum Bedeutungszuwachs und Funktionswandel des Prozessrechts », Juristische
Schulung (JUS) 1981, p.405.
51
See e.g. Const. Council (CC), 23 July 1999, no 99-416 DC, Loi portant création d'une couverture
maladie universelle; 27 July 2006, No 2006-540 DC, Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins
dans la société de l’information, § 11 ; 29 September 2010, No 2010-38 QPC, M. Jean-Yves G. (Amende
forfaitaire et droit au recours), § 3 ; 30 July 2010, No 2010-19/27 QPC, É poux P. et autres (Perquisitions
fiscales) ; 26 November 2010, No 2010-71 QPC, Mlle Danielle S. (Hospitalisation sans consentement) ;
13 May 2011, No 2011-129 QPC, § 4 ; 17 June 2011, No 2011-138 QPC, § 4.
52
Const. Council (CC), 27 July 2006, No 2006-540 DC, Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits
voisins dans la société de l’information, § 11. This required first the Constitutional Council to incorporate
the Preamble of the Constitution of 1958 and therefore the Preamble of 1946 as well as the Declaration of
Human and Civic Rights of 1789 to which the Preamble of 1958 refers, into the so called « bloc de
constitutionnalité », which was done by decision 71-44 DC, 16 July 1971, Liberté d’association.
12
16 has been described as the “cornerstone” of rights and liberties in France 53. More
precisely, between March 1959 and March 2010, Article 16 was relied upon 70 times,
and led to 2 réserves d’interprétation (reservations with regard to the constitutional
interpretation of a statutory provision)54 and to the repealing of 17 statutory provisions.
On the 1st of March 2010, the reform act creating the "application for a priority
preliminary ruling on the issue of constitutionality" (so-called Question prioritaire de
constitutionnalité, QPC, priority question of constitutionality) came into force. The
QPC is the right for any person who is involved in legal proceedings before a court to
argue that a statutory provision infringes rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the
Constitution. From the 1st of March 2010 until the 1st of March 2014, Article 16 was
invoked more than 150 times, and led to 18 réserves d’interprétation, to the seizing of
the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (question préjudicielle)55 and to
the repealing of 38 statutory provisions 56 . Therefore, the absence of an express
constitutional provision concerning access to court does not prevent national judges
from recognizing this fundamental procedural right, since it is a condition for the
exercise of all other procedural rights. This has been clearly and repeatedly ruled by the
European Court of Human Rights.
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 8 (1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights – The American Convention on Human
Rights signed in San Josi, Costa Rica, 22nd November 1969 contains an Article 8
securing the right to a fair trial57, and more precisely to a hearing with due guarantees58.
53
Régis FRAISSE, « L’article 16 de la Déclaration, clef de voûte des droits et libertés », Les nouveaux
cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, No 44, 2014, pp. 9-21. Article 16 of the Declaration appears as a
« guarantee of rights » in the decision given by the Constitutional Council (CC), 21 January 1994, No 93335 DC, Loi portant diverses dispositions en matière d’urbanisme et de construction.
54
Réserves d'interprétation aim to give an orientation compatible with the Constitution with regard to an
application of the statutory provision without repealing the challenged norm.
55
Const. Council (CC), 4 April 2013, No 2013-314 QPC, M. Jeremy F.
56
R. FRAISSE, prec., p. 14. The « success story » of the QPC is described in Olivier DUTHEILLET
DE LAMOTTE, “A french legal success story : the ‘Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’”, available
on the website of the Constitutional Council, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/documentation/contributions-et-discours/2012/a-french-legal-success-story-thequestion-prioritaire-de-constitutionnalite.115542.html. According to the author, « Concrete review is
based on real life. It is based on real cases, on the actual implementation of the law. It rules on the
constitutionality of a statute as it is applied, and not as it could or should be applied».
57
Art. 8.1. : « Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable
time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the
substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his
rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature”.
58
The American Convention on Human Rights, which has never been ratified by the United States and
Canada, also contains an Article 25 (Right to judicial protection) stating that “1. Everyone has the right to
simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the
state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons
acting in the course of their official duties. 2. The States Parties undertake: a. to ensure that any person
claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the state; b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and c. to ensure that the
competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted ». This provision has almost the same
content as Art. 13 ECHR (Right to an effective remedy) : “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
13
Procedure
One of its strongest advocates, the former President of the Inter-American Court of
Human rights Cançado Trindade, has several times insisted upon the need to “enlarge
further the material content of jus cogens, so as to encompass likewise the right of
access to justice and thus fulfil the pressing needs of protection of the human person” 59.
One of the most important provisions in the European Convention is its Article 6 para 1
that guarantees a right to a fair trial. This provision has been interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights in an extensive and pragmatic manner: the right to a
fair trial cannot be granted if the access to court is not secured. Therefore, in the
landmark case Golder v. The United Kingdom of 197560 (and repeatedly in many other
decisions), the Strasburg Court held that “The principle whereby a civil claim must be
capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally "recognised"
fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle of international law
which forbids the denial of justice. Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) must be read in the light
of these principles » (§ 35 of the judgment) 61 . « It would be inconceivable, in the
opinion of the Court, that Article 6 para. 1 should describe in detail the procedural
guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that
which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to
a court. The fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of
no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings ». “It follows that the right of access
constitutes an element which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 1» (§ 36).
Many other judgments followed62, insisting again and again on the necessary guarantee
of effective access to court. However, the right to access to a court is not absolute.
According to the Strasburg Court, it may be “subject to limitations since the right of
access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State. In this respect, the
Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although the final decision
as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court. It must be
satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is
impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity ».
59
Antonio Augusto CANCADO TRINDADE, « The Expansion of the Material Content of Jus Cogens:
The Contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, in Dean SPIELMANN, Marialena
TSIRLI and Panayotis VOYATZIS, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, un instrument
vivant, Mélanges en l’honneur de Christos L. Rozakis, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, pp. 37 et seq.
60
ECtHR, 21 February 1975, applic. No 4451/70.
61
According to the ECtHR , « Were Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) to be understood as concerning
exclusively the conduct of an action which had already been initiated before a court, a Contracting State
could, without acting in breach of that text, do away with its courts, or take away their jurisdiction to
determine certain classes of civil actions and entrust it to organs dependent on the Government. Such
assumptions, indissociable from a danger of arbitrary power, would have serious consequences which are
repugnant to the aforementioned principles and which the Court cannot overlook ».
62
For a very recent decision, see ECtHR, 14 January 2014, Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom,
applic. Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06: “§ 186. Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any legal
dispute (“contestation” in the French text of Article 6 § 1) relating to his civil rights and obligations
brought before a court”.
14
not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved”63.
What is the effect of such a judgment on the Contracting States? Article 46 of the
Convention provides that Contracting States undertake to abide by the Court's final
decision64. To date, the Court has decided consistently that under the Convention it has
no jurisdiction to annul domestic laws or administrative practices which violate the
Convention. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is charged with
supervising the execution of the Court's judgments and oversees the Contracting States'
changes to their national law in order that it is compatible with the Convention, or
individual measures taken by the contracting state to redress violations. Judgments by
the Court are binding on the respondent state concerned65.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – In the context of
Europe, there is a profusion of provisions guaranteeing the litigants procedural rights.
Even before the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union became legally
binding when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009, the European
Court of Justice regularly referred to this Charter. Since 1974, it also regularly refers66
to the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as to the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States. To date, Article 6.3 of the Treaty on European Union
63
Ibid. See also e.g. ECtHR, 29 June 2011, Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], applic. No. 34869/05, §§ 46-47;
3 March 2005 (dec.), Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia, applic. No. 60861/00, §§ 66 and
68.
64
On the other hand, advisory opinions of the European Court of Human Rights are non-binding.
65
See Art. 46 ECHR on the binding force and execution of judgments given by the Strasburg Court,
especially paras 1 and 2: « 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of
the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to
the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution ». If the Committee of Ministers considers
that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may,
after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two thirds of the
representatives entitled to sit on the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has
failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph 1 (para 4) and if the Court finds a violation, « it shall refer
the case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken » (para 5).
66
ECJ, 14 May 1974, Nold KG v. Commission, case 4/73, ECR, p. 491, was a first step : « § 13. As the
court has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the
observance of which it ensures. In safeguarding these rights, the court is bound to draw inspiration from
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which
are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the constitutions of those states.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the
framework of community law ». Then the ECJ made direct reference to the ECHR (ECJ, 28 October 1975,
Rutili v. Ministre de l’Intérieur, case 36/75; 21 September 1989, Hoechst AG v. Commission, cases 46/87
and 227/88. Only later, in the 1990s, the ECJ has directly quoted the ECtHR’ case law (see e.g. ECJ, 17
December 1998, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission, case C-185/95: in this decision, following the
case law of the Strasburg Court, the ECJ rules that the reasonableness of the duration of the procedure
before the court of first instance must be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case
and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of
the applicant and the competent authorities. A procedural irregularity of that kind justifies, as an
immediate and effective remedy, first, annulment of the judgment of the court of first instance in so far as
it set the amount of the fine imposed for the infringement found and, second, determination of that
amount by the Court of Justice at a level which takes account of the need to give the applicant reasonable
satisfaction.
15
Procedure
(TEU) stresses that “3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general
principles of the Union's law ». Article 6.1 TEU also provides that the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union has the « same legal value as the Treaties ».
The European Union must also accede to the European Convention of Human Rights
(Article 6.2). The Charter contains an Article 47 on the « Right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial »67 stating guarantees very similar to those provided in Article 6 para 1
ECHR. The Charter, thus, goes even further by requiring that “Legal aid be made
available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to
ensure effective access to justice » (Article 47.3).
Is There a Constitutional Right to Legal Aid? – Some national constitutions68 do
indeed guarantee legal aid. For example, Article 24, para 3 of the Italian constitution is
generous and provides that “the indigent are assured, through appropriate institutions,
the means for action and defence before all levels of jurisdiction”. The Federal
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation contains a similar provision (Article 29 para
369). Nothing of this kind is mentioned in many other constitutions such as in France70
or Germany. However, the German Federal Constitutional court has constantly71 held
that Article 20 para 1 of the Basic Law (defining the Federal Republic of Germany as a
“democratic and social federal state”, demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat)
requires that the financially disadvantaged enjoy a judicial protection more or less
identical to the better-off72; sometimes, the Court’s decisions also use other provisions
67
Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union : « 1. Everyone whose rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. Everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established
by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented ».
68
Comp. Art. 24 para 2 of the Spanish Constitution: all persons have the right « to the defence and
assistance of a lawyer ».
69
Art. 29 para 3: « Any person who does not have sufficient means has the right to free legal advice and
assistance unless their case appears to have no prospect of success. If it is necessary in order to
safeguard their rights, they also have the right to free legal representation in court ».
70
In France, the principle according to which justice if free of charge (principe de gratuité de la justice)
is enshrined in Law Act No 77-1468 of 30 December 1977. However, this does not apply to lawyers’ fees
(except where the law provides for legal aid). The Constitutional council has nevertheless admitted that
statutes could impose on the litigants – even on those benefiting from legal aid – some very low fees
(droits de plaidoirie, less than 10 euros), see CC, 25 November 2011, No 2011-198 QPC, M. Albin R.).
Also the so-called contribution pour l’aide juridique (35 euros) and the contribution of 150 euros to pay
in appellate proceedings do not infringe the right to effective access to court (CC, 13 April 2012, No
2012-231/234 QPC, M. Stéphane C. et autres). Those two contributions which were time-limited have
been abolished.
71
See already German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 22 January 1959, 1 BvR 154/55, BVerfGE 9, pp. 124
et seq. [130 et seq.]; 12 January 1960, 1 BvL 17/59, BVerfGE 10, p. 264 [p. 270]; 6 June 1967, 1 BvR
282/65, BVerfGE 22, pp. 83 et seq. [p. 86].
72
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 7 April 2000, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2000, p.
1937 ; 10 March 1990, 2 BvR 94, 802, 887, 997, 1094, 1158, 1247, 1274, 1439, 1513/8,NJW 1991, p. 413.
See also German Federal Court of Justice, 3rd civil chamber, 26 October 1989, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 109, p. 168. This does not only apply to legal aid in
16
of the Basic Law such as Article 3 (equality before the law) 73 or Article 19 para 4 (right
to recourse to the courts) to support its reasoning and to refuse any « Rechtswegsperre »
(court access barriers)74. This case law has a great impact on civil proceedings. In most
states, however, the existence of legal aid and the requirements to be met are subject to
statute and not secured by the constitution. In France for example, the Constitutional
Council does not give constitutional value to the right to legal aid as such75. However, it
held that legal aid and right to effective access to court are connected, and that the costs
of judicial proceedings may prevent citizens from bringing a law suit76, and therefore
concluded that legal aid is an important feature of the right to effective access to court77.
Moreover, for the states that are members of the Council of Europe78, a duty to provide
legal aid in civil proceedings is imposed in some circumstances by the case law of the
Strasburg Court according to which (as stated in the famous case Airey v. Ireland
dealing with a judicial separation proceeding 79 ), in complex litigation, it is “most
improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey’s position […] can effectively present his or her
proceedings (Prozesskostenhilfe) but also to legal aid before any proceeding (Beratungshilfe), see
German Fed. Const. court(BVerfG), 30 June 2009, 1 BvR 470/09, Zeitschrift für das Gesamte
Familienrecht (FamRZ) 2009, p. 1655.
73
E.g. German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 14 April 2003, 1 BvR 1998/02, NJW 2003, p. 2976.
74
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 4 February 1997, NJW 1997, p. 2103. Ordinary courts shall not
overextend the legal conditions required to enjoy legal aid, see e.g. German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG),
14 April 2003, NJW 2003, p. 2976. The German constitution allows legal aid to depend on the sufficient
prospect of success of the case (hinreichende Aussicht auf Erfolg) and on the absence of abuse of process;
however, the requirement of prospect of success should not be overextended, see German Fed. Const.
court (BVerfG), 14 April 2003, 1 BvR 1998/02, NJW 2003, p. 2976. For other examples, see German Fed.
Const. court(BVerfG), 11 March 2010, 1 BvR 365/09, NJW 2010, p. 1657 (§ 17 : « Die Prüfung der
Erfolgsaussicht soll allerdings nicht dazu dienen, die Rechtsverfolgung beziehungsweise
Rechtsverteidigung selbst in das summarische Prozesskostenhilfeverfahren zu verlagern und dieses an die
Stelle des Hauptsacheverfahrens treten zu lassen (vgl. BVerfGE 81, 347 <357>). Prozesskostenhilfe darf
insbesondere dann nicht versagt werden, wenn die Entscheidung in der Hauptsache von der Beantwortung
einer schwierigen, bislang ungeklärten Rechtsfrage abhängt (vgl. BVerfGE 81, 347 <359>; BVerfGE 2,
279 <281>) »; German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 11 March 2010, 1 BvR 3031/08, NJW 2010, p. 1658 ;
29 December 2009, 1 BvR 1781/09, NJW 2010, p. 987.
75
Const. Council (CC), 9 June 2011, No 2011-631 DC, Loi relative à l’immigration, § 88 ; 25
November 2011, No 2011-198 QPC, M. Albin R. (Droits de plaidoirie) : « Le Conseil n’a pas reconnu de
valeur constitutionnelle au droit à l’aide juridictionnelle en tant que tel. Mais, en s’assurant que ce droit
n’a pas été méconnu pour juger qu’il n’est pas porté d’atteinte substantielle aux droits de personnes à un
recours effectif, il établit implicitement mais nécessairement un lien entre les deux ».
76
Const. Council (CC), 25 November 2011, No 2011-198 QPC, M. Albin R. (Droits de plaidoirie).
77
Ibid. The new statutes of 29 December 2010 had stated that litigants enjoying legal aid should pay the
“droits de plaidoiries” (about 9 euros). The Constitutional Council held that this amount is “relatively
modest” and that therefore the new provision is not unconstitutional.
78
In the European Union, see the rights provided by Art. 47.3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
(« Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is
necessary to ensure effective access to justice ») and, with regard to legal aid to be granted to legal
entities, ECJ, 22 December 2010, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, case
C-279/09: “the principle of effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter …,
must be interpreted as meaning that it is not impossible for legal persons to rely on that principle and that
aid granted pursuant to that principle may cover, inter alia, dispensation from advance payment of the
costs of proceedings and/or the assistance of a lawyer”.
79
ECtHR, 9 October 1979, Airey v. Ireland, applic. No 6289/73.
17
Procedure
own case” so that “the possibility to appear in person before the High Court does not
provide the applicant with an effective right of access and, hence, that it also does not
constitute a domestic remedy whose use is demanded by Article 26”, § 24). Since the
Convention “ is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as
regards those areas with which it deals ” and despite the absence of any provision on
legal aid in civil proceedings80 in the Convention, the Strasburg Court held that Article
6 para 1 « may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer
when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court either
because legal representation is rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of
certain Contracting States for various types of litigation, or by reason of the complexity
of the procedure or of the case » (§ 26)81. The Convention or – more precisely the
Strasburg Court – supplements through its creative and far reaching interpretation the
national constitutions and/or statutes.
Access to Justice versus Access to Court? - Nowadays, many governments tend to
promote access to “justice” rather than direct access to court. The ADR-groundswell
that started in the United States of America in the 1970s and has now reached Europe is
based on the assumption that justice can be rendered by other means than state civil
proceedings and that ADR can enhance the access to justice for citizens. ADRmechanisms belong to a contractual justice82, to a horizontal justice. This tendency has
been analysed in France by a sociologist (Michel Maffésoli 83 ) who underlines the
changing relationships between people and the institutions. People tend to refuse the
hierarchical link to an institution located above (such as a court) and to prefer a
horizontal relationship to solve their conflicts. A kind of private, contractual
management of conflict tends to be preferred. Although the ADR-mechanisms should
not generally be criticised, it is nevertheless necessary to be conscious of some possible
dangerous excesses that could lead to a “vanishing trial” 84 already asserted in the
80
For criminal proceedings, see Art. 6 para 3 (c) ECHR .
In a cautious manner, the Strasburg Court adds, however, that « It would be erroneous to generalize
the conclusion that the possibility to appear in person before the High Court does not provide Mrs. Airey
with an effective right of access; that conclusion does not hold good for all cases concerning ‘civil rights
and obligations’ or for everyone involved therein. In certain eventualities, the possibility of appearing
before a court in person, even without a lawyer’s assistance, will meet the requirements of Article 6 para.
1 (art. 6-1); there may be occasions when such a possibility secures adequate access even to the High
Court. Indeed, much must depend on the particular circumstances » (§ 26).
82
See e.g. Loïc CADIET, « « Les conventions relatives au procès en droit français - Sur la
contractualisation du règlement des litiges », in Accordi di parte e processo, Quaderni della Rivista
trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, Milan, Giuffrè ed., 2008, p. 7-35.
83
Michel MAFFESOLI, Le temps revient, Formes élémentaires de la postmodernité, Paris, Desclée de
Brouwer ed., 2010, p. 39 et seq. (« Le remplacement de la verticalité par l’horizontalité est le
dénominateur commun de tous les phénomènes sociétaux contemporains », p. 39).
84
See Marc GALANTER, « The Vanishing Trial : An examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts », Journal of Empirical Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 2004, p. 459-570 (p.
460 : « Plausible causes for this decline include a shift in ideology and practice among litigants, lawyers,
and judges. Another manifestation of this shift is the diversion of cases to alternative dispute resolution
forums ») ; Thomas STIPANOWITCH, « ADR and the Vanishing Trial : The Growth and Impact of
Alternative Dispute Resolution », Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2004, p. 843-912.
81
18
United States (the trial as an « endangered species in our courts »85). This phenomenon
often occurs to the detriment of the weakest parties such as consumers, which has,
however, not prevented the European Union from enacting a directive and a regulation
on consumer ADR86 because « Ensuring access to simple, efficient, fast and low-cost
ways of resolving domestic and cross-border disputes which arise from sales or service
contracts should benefit consumers and therefore boost their confidence in the
market » (Recital 4 of the Directive), “Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) offers a
simple, fast and low-cost out-of-court solution to disputes between consumers and
traders » (Recital 5). However, the European legislator is well aware of the danger of
the “vanishing trial” since Recital 45 of the Directive on Consumer ADR adds that “The
right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial are fundamental rights laid
down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Therefore, ADR procedures should not be designed to replace court procedures and
should not deprive consumers or traders of their rights to seek redress before the courts.
This Directive should not prevent parties from exercising their right of access to the
judicial system. In cases where a dispute could not be resolved through a given ADR
procedure whose outcome is not binding, the parties should subsequently not be
prevented from initiating judicial proceedings in relation to that dispute ». One should
also, as the European Directive requires, make sure that the fundamental (in some
countries constitutional) procedural principles (fair trial) are not ignored in ADRprocesses87.
B. Is There a Constitutional Right to a Means of Recourse?
Most of the national constitutions as interpreted by the national constitutional or
ordinary courts do not guarantee a right to a means of recourse, but only the right to
access to court for one hearing. The issue of means of recourse is then left to the
85
Patricia LEE REFO, « The Vanishing Trial », Journal of the Section of Litigation, American Bar
Association, Vol. 3°, No. 2, Winter 2004, p. 2-4: “Alternative dispute resolution, in all of its permutations,
also contributes to the declining trial rates. The trend toward privatization of dispute resolution is well
documented, though anything approaching meaningful statistics is hard to come by. Virtually every
consumer contract now requires that the consumer waive her rights to adjudicate any dispute in court,
and courts have enforced such arbitration clauses ». She concludes in the following manner: « The
vanishing trial may be the most important issue facing our civil justice system today? It deserves our
continued attention ».
86
Directive 2013/11/EU of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on Consumer ADR),
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), L 165/63, 18 June 2013 ; Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013
of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on Consumer ADR), Official Journal of the European
Union (OJEU), L 165/1, 18 June 2013.
87
On this topic, see Loïc CADIET, « Procès équitable et modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits », in
Mireille DELMAS-MARTY/Horatia MUIR-WATT/Hélène RUIZ-FABRI (eds), Variations autour d’un
droit commun – Premières rencontres de l’UMR de droit comparé de Paris, Société de législation
comparée, 2002, pp. 89-109.
19
Procedure
legislator. This is, for example, the position taken in France and in Germany. In France,
the Constitutional council denies any constitutional value to the right to (a first) appeal
which is not a “principe général du droit”88. However, the constitutional principle of
equality before justice would be infringed if the right to appeal would depend on one of
the parties to the proceedings 89 or on the delay of the court in rendering their
judgment 90 . The German Bundesverfassungsgericht has also ruled that where the
legislator provides for a means of recourse, the access to the review proceedings must
abide by the general principle of equality91.
In Germany, in fact, the Federal Constitutional court held that the constitutional right to
access to justice in Germany does not entail a general right to appeal 92. A right to appeal
does not follow either from Article 103 para 1 (right to be heard) or from Article 19 para
4 (right to recourse to court in case of violation of a person’s right by public authority)
of the Basic Law. Nevertheless, in an important ruling of 2003 93 , the Karlsruhe
Constitutional court held that a procedural legislation which does not provide for a
means of recourse where a court seriously infringes the right to be heard (rechtliches
Gehör) enshrined in Article 103 para 1 of the Basic Law, violates the rule-of-law
principle as well as Article 103. This ruling means a considerable change in the
constitutional case law and admits that the German constitution grants protection
against the judge94. The German legislator had to create a specific legal redress, which
is contained in § 321a95 of the Code of civil procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO) for
civil proceedings (Anhörungsrüge) and was then extended to all other kinds of
proceedings by Law Act of 9 December 200496. It is still disputed whether this legal
88
Const. Council (CC), 19-20 January 1981, No 80-127 DC, Loi renforçant la sécurité et protégeant la
liberté des personnes.
89
Const. Council (CC), 19-20 January 1981, No 80-127 DC, Loi renforçant la sécurité et protégeant la
liberté des personnes.
90
Const. Council (CC), 18 January 1985, No 84-183 DC, Loi relative au redressement et à la liquidation
judiciaires, Recueil Dalloz (D.) 1986, pp. 427 et seq., with obs. Renoux.
91
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 11 June 1980; 1 PBvU 1/79, BVerfGE 54, p. 277 (293).
92
See e.g. German Fed. Const. court(BVerfG), 18 September 1952, BVerfGE 1, p. 433 (p. 437); 30
October 1990, 2 BvR 562/88, BVerfGE 83, p. 24; 30 April 2003, 1 PBvU 1/02, BVerfGE 107, pp. 395 et
seq. (especially pp. 401 et seq.). Looking forward to the future of means of recourse in Germany, see
Christoph Althammer, « Die Zukunft des Rechtsmittelsystems », in Alexander BRUNS/Joachim
MÜ NCH/Astrid STADLER, Die Zukunft des Zivilprozesses, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 87-10.
93
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), Plen. Ass., 30 April 2003, NJW 2003, p. 1924 ; Monatsschrift für
Deutsches Recht (MDR) 2003, p. 886. See Konrad REDEKER, « Verfahrensgrundrechte und
Justizgewährungsanspruch », NJW 2003, p. 2956 ; Hans-Friedrich MÜ LLER, Abhilfemöglichkeiten bei
der Verletzung des Anspruchs auf rechtliches Gehör nach der ZPO-Reform, NJW 2002, p. 2743 ; Tanja
POLEP et Hartmut RENSEN, Die Gehörsrüge (§ 321a ZPO), Berlin, de Gruyter ed., 2004. Egon
SCHNEIDER, « Gehörsrüge des § 321a ZPO – Anhörungsrüge, Ausnahmeberufung,
Ausnahmebeschwerde, Willkürverbot », MDR 2006, p. 969.
94
See Andreas VOßKUHLE, « Bruch mit einem Dogma: Die Verfassung garantiert Rechtsschutz gegen
den Richter », NJW 2003, p. 2193. The caseload of the Constitutional court is very high; with the ruling
of 2003, the Court requires the ordinary courts to first correct their own mistakes, see Micha
BLOCHING/Alexander KETTINGER, « Verfahrensgrundrechte im Zivilprozess – Nun endlich das
Comeback der auβerordentlichen Beschwerde ? », NJW 2005, p. 860.
95
This provision was introduced in the ZPO by the important Reform Act of 27 July 2001.
96
Anhörungsrügengesetz, BGBl. 2004, I, p. 3320. See Jürgen TREBER, “Neuerungen durch das
Anhörungsrügengesetz”, NJW 2005, p. 97 ; Hartmut RENSEN, “Die Gehörsrüge nach In-Kraft-Treten
des Anhörungsrügengesetzes”, MDR 2005, p. 181.
20
redress may also cover violations of other procedural rights. An alleged violation of the
constitutional right to access to justice – or of any other procedural right guaranteed by
the Grundgesetz - may be asserted by a constitutional complaint
(Verfassungsbeschwerde) with the Bundesverfassungsgericht once all ordinary appeals
have been exhausted. The Spanish constitution also provides –“when appropriate”97 for a constitutional complaint (recurso des amparo) in order to assert a citizen’s claim to
protect the liberties and rights recognised in certain provisions of the Constitution 98.
Due to the great attraction of the constitutional complaint, Spain - just as Germany did
in 1993 -, however, reformed and restricted in 2007 the conditions to be met to make a
recurso de amparo admissible99.
England is another country which does not guarantee a right to a means of recourse in
civil proceedings. The central idea is that the first instance judgment should be final and
that access to appeal requires a permission (CPR 52.3) which is not often granted 100.
The same applies to a final appeal and the Strasburg Court has ruled in 2000 101 that
Article 6 para 1 ECHR is not infringed when the decision granting or denying this
permission does not contain reasons.
Nor is there in Europe any formal human rights obligation to create an appeal system102.
The European Court of Human Rights has held in several decisions that in civil
proceedings, Article 6 para 1 of the Convention (ECHR) does not guarantee a right to a
mean of recourse against the first instance ruling103. The « right to a court, of which the
97
Art. 53.2 Spanish constitution: « Any Citizen may assert his or her claim to protect the liberties and
rights recognised in Article 14 and in Section 1 of Chapter Two by means of a preferential and summary
procedure in the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by submitting an individual appeal for
protection to the Constitutional court ». See also Art. 162 para 1 (b) stating who is eligible to lodge a
recurso de amparo (individual, corporate body…).
98
Art. 14 (equality before the law) and Section 1 of Chapter (Fundamental rights and public liberties).
99
Ley orgánica no 6/2007 of 24 May 2007 (Ley Orgánica 6/2007, de 24 de mayo, por la que se modifica
la Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional, LOTC), Art. 50 para 1 (point b
added by the new Ley 6/2007) of the LOTC: “« El recurso de amparo debe ser objeto de una decisión de
admisión a trámite. La Sección, por unanimidad de sus miembros, acordará mediante providencia la
admisión, en todo o en parte, del recurso solamente cuando concurran todos los siguientes requisitos: a)
Que la demanda cumpla con lo dispuesto en los artículos 41 a 46 y 49. b) Que el contenido del recurso
justifique una decisión sobre el fondo por parte del Tribunal Constitucional en razón de su especial
trascendencia constitucional, que se apreciará atendiendo a su importancia para la interpretación de la
Constitución, para su aplicación o para su general eficacia, y para la determinación del contenido y
alcance de los derechos fundamentales”. This reform aims to reduce the caseload of the Tribunal
constitucional and leads to an objectification of the recourse. It gives the Constitutional court more
discretion to evaluate the “especial transcendencia constitucional” of the recurso de amparo lodged by a
person (see decision 155/2009 of 25 June 2009 in which the Court defines the concept of “especial
transcendencia constitucional”). In 2012, only 209 recursos de amparo were admitted and 7 341 were
refused by orders that did not contain any reasoning, see Marc CARILLO, “La réforme de l’amparo en
Espagne: un nouveau certiorari?, Constitutions Jan. March 2014, pp. 60-63.
100
Neil ANDREWS, On Civil Processes, I, Cambridge, Intersentia ed., 2013, No 15.13 et seq.
(“benefits of restricting appeals”) and No 15.15 ; “the civil trial is already a luxury: a fortiori an appeal
should be regarded as exceptional; a fortissimo a second appeal is quite exceptional”.
101
ECtHR, 11 July 2000, Nerva v. United Kingdom, applic. No 42295/98.
102
For an English decision quoting case law of the ECtHR, see Ebert v. Official Receiver [2001] 3 All
ER 942, 946, at [12], CA.
103
ECtHR, 17 January 1970, Delcourt v. Belgium, applic. No 2689/65, Série A no 11, p. 14 (§ 25-26 :
« L’article 6 de la Convention n’astreint pas les États contractants à créer des cours d’appel ou de
21
Procedure
right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by
implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are
concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State104, which enjoys a
certain margin of appreciation in this regard ». However, if the national legislations do
provide for means of recourse but lay down limitations, “these limitations must not
restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very
essence of the right is impaired; lastly, such limitations will not be compatible with
Article 6 § 1 if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued”105.
With regard to final appeals, the Strasburg Court takes the same position and holds that
the specific features of Supreme Courts may justify restrictions to the access to final
appeal 106 and more specifically filter procedures 107 as far as the restrictions do not
cassation. Néanmoins, un É tat qui se dote de juridictions de cette nature a l’obligation de veiller à ce que
les justiciables jouissent auprès d’elles des garanties fondamentales de l’article 6 » ; ECtHR, 24 May
2006, Liakopoulou v. Greece, applic. No 20627/04, § 18.
104
See e.g. ECtHR, 23 October 2006, Levages Prestations Services v. France, applic. No 21920/93:
Given the special nature of Court of Cassation's role, the ECtHR accepts that the procedure followed in
Court of Cassation could be more formal, especially as in proceedings with compulsory representation the
parties would be represented by a member of the Conseil d'É tat and Court of Cassation Bar. Moreover,
final appeal to Court of Cassation had been made after the applicant company's claims had been heard by
both a commercial court and a court of appeal, each of which had had full jurisdiction.
105
ECtHR, 17 January 2006, Barbier v. France, applic. No 76093/01, Recueil Dalloz (D.) 2006, 1208,
obs. Deferrard and Durtette; ECHR, 15 February 2000, applic No 38695/97, Garcia Manibardo v. Spain;
31 July 2001, Mortier v. France, applic. No 42195/98. See also ECtHR, 24 April 2008, Kemp v.
Luxemburg, applic. No 17140/05: in this case, the ECtHR has held that “la limitation imposée au droit
d’accès des requérants à un tribunal n’a pas été proportionnelle au but de garantir la sécurité juridique et
la bonne administration de la justice » (No 60) ; 21 January 2014, Valchev and others v. Bulgaria, applic.
Nos 47450/11, 26659/12 and 53966/12 : As a result of the pre-selection procedure introduced by the 2007
Code, in the period 2010-12 only some 20% of appeals on points of law to the Supreme Court of
Cassation in civil and commercial cases had been admitted for examination, relieving that court of the
task of dealing with the merits of a considerable number of cases with a view to allowing it to concentrate
on its core task of giving judgments elucidating and making uniform the application of the law. Similar
rules governing access to the highest appeal courts existed in other Contracting States such as Albania,
Armenia, Finland, France, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. In those
circumstances, the Court was satisfied that the limitation on the admissibility of appeals on points of law
in civil cases to the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation had pursued a legitimate aim. The manner in
which that limitation was set out in the 2007 Code was within the State’s margin of appreciation. The
relevant provision of the Bulgarian 2007 Code had been challenged before the Constitutional Court,
which had held that, although somewhat vague, it was as a whole not unconstitutional, and that the
manner of its application would be a question of case-law and judicial practice. In an apparent response to
that ruling, the Supreme Court of Cassation had issued a binding interpretative decision in which it had
sought to clarify, as much as possible, the intended manner of application of that provision. In the cases of
each of the applicants, the respective panels of the Supreme Court of Cassation had found, in fully
reasoned decisions, that the appeals on points of law had not met the criteria set out in the 2007 Code.
Given that before reaching the Supreme Court of Cassation the applicants’ cases had been examined by
two levels of court with full jurisdiction, the restriction on the applicants’ right of access to a court had
not been disproportionate and had not impaired the very essence of that right.
106
See e.g. ECtHR, 10 February 1998, Higgins v. France, applic. No 20124/92.
107
See e.g. ECtHR, 28 January 2003, Burg v. France, applic. No 34763/02.
22
infringe the right to a court in its substance108 and the Supreme Court has not obviously
wrongly appreciated the situation109.
Some national constitutions, however, do guarantee a right to a review of the first
instance judgment. Article 15 of the Macedonian constitution provides for example for a
right to appeal 110 . In Italy, the right to lodge a final appeal before the Corte di
cassazione is formulated in Article 111 para 7 of the Constitution (“Appeals to the Court
of cassation in cases of violation of the law are always allowed against sentences and
against measures on personal freedom pronounced by ordinary and special courts”)111.
On the other hand, the right to a first appeal has no constitutional value in civil
procedure112. Article 111 is the reason for the very high number of final appeals in Italy
which have brought the Corte di cassazione into a dramatic situation due to the
overwhelming caseload the Court is unable to process, in spite of several new statutory
provisions such as Article 360bis of the Code of civil procedure which aims to facilitate
the dismissal of the “ricorso”. Recomendation No. R(95) 5 of the Council of Europe
concerning the introduction and improvement of the functioning of appeal systems and
procedures in civil and commercial cases113 also promotes in Article 1, a) “in principle”
the right for “any decision of a lower court to be subject to the control of a higher
court”.
Ⅲ. Constitution and Course of Civil Proceedings
When the access to court is provided, civil proceedings can start. The fundamental
constitutional principles to be respected during the course of the proceedings are of two
kinds: institutional (A) and functional (B) guarantees.
108
ECtHR, 24 May 2006, Liakopoulou v. Greece, applic. No 20627/04.
ECtHR, 21 March 2000, Dulaurans v. France, applic. No 34553/97.
110
See T. ZOROSKA-KAMILOVSKA, “Reforms of civil enforcement systems in the countries of
Southeastern Europe: From common traditions to different concepts”, Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess
International (ZZPInt) 17 (2012), p. 315 et seq. and more specifically p. 340. For the Czech Republic, see
Paul MARTENS, « Les principes constitutionnels du procès dans la jurisprudence récente des juridictions
constitutionnelles européennes », Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel No 14, May 2003.
111
See Roberta TISCINI, Il recorso straordinario in cassazione, Turin, Giappichelli ed., 2005. See also
Serge GUINCHARD et alii, Droit processuel, Droits fondamentaux du procès, Paris, Dalloz, 7th ed. 2011,
n°331-2.
112
The same applies in French law. According to the French Constitutional council, « le principe du
double degré de juridiction n’a pas, en lui-même, valeur constitutionnelle » (CC, 12 February 2004, No
2004-491 DC, Loi complétant le statut d'autonomie de la Polynésie française ; 14 May 2012, No 2012243/244/245/246 QPC, Société Yonne républicaine et autre). By contrast, it has ruled in some cases that
the interdiction of any final appeal (pourvoi en cassation) is not in compliance with the Constitution, CC,
14 June 2013, No 2013-314 QPC, M. Jeremy F. (decision related to criminal proceedings). The right to a
final appeal is, however, not absolute and proper administration of justice can justify restrictions (CC, 17
December 2010, No 2010-62 QPC, CGT-FO et autres) which shall be stated by the legislator and not by
governmental decree.
113
See http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/8290.
109
23
Procedure
A. Institutional Constitutional Procedural Guarantees
Right to a “Lawful” Judge - The first institutional guarantee often provided by
national constitutions is the right to a “lawful judge” (juge naturel, gesetzlicher Richter).
According to Article 101 para 1 of the German Grundgesetz, “Extraordinary courts
shall not be allowed. No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge”.
This requires that the court having jurisdiction and the judge be determined in advance
according to abstract criteria114. German case law is very strict in this respect and there
is no doubt that the practice of many other jurisdictions in this respect would not meet
the requirements laid down by the Karlsruhe Constitutional court115. Article 24 para 2 of
the Spanish constitution secures for all persons the “right of access to the ordinary
judge predetermined by law”. The Italian constitution also provides that “no one may
be moved from the normal judge pre-established by law”116. In Switzerland, “any person
whose case falls to be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard by a
legally constituted, competent, independent and impartial court” 117 . By contrast, in
France, as in many other procedural matters, the Constitution does not explicitly
mention this right118. According to the Constitutional Council, it can only be indirectly
protected by the principle of equality before the law enshrined in the Declaration of
Human and Civil Rights119. It is clearly noticeable that countries which have suffered
114
See Thomas ROTH, Das Grundrecht auf den gesetzlichen Richter, Berlin, Duncker et Humblot,
2000; Mirko MÖLLER, „Der gesetzliche Richter im Zivilprozess – Anwaltliche Wahl- und
Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten“, NJW 2009, pp. 3632 et seq. See also Serge GUINCHARD et alii, Droit
processuel, Droits fondamentaux du procès, 7th ed. 2012, Paris, Dalloz ed., No 314 ALL.
115
The principle of gesetzlicher Richter shall apply to any national court, German Fed. Const.
court(BVerfG), 20 March 1956, 1 BvR 479/55, BVerfGE 4, p. 412 (417 et seq.); 8 February 1967, 2 BvR
235/64, BVerfGE 21, p. 139 (144); 21 January 1971, 2 BvR 507/69, BVerfGE 30, p. 165 (168); 10 July
1990, 1 BvR 984/87; 1 BvR 985/87, BVerfGE 82, p. 286. The lawful-judge-principle is infringed when a
case is “arbitrarily” (willkürlich) allocated to a single judge of the court and not to a bench, German Fed.
Const. court (BVerfG), 18 September 2003, MDR 2004, p. 43. With regard to the predetermination of the
case-reporter within a court bench, see also the less demanding position of the German Fed. Const. court
(BVerfG), Plen. Ass., 8 April 1997, 1 PBvU 1/95, BVerfGE 95, p. 322 (330 et seq.), which has prompted
criticism (Thomas ROTH, Das Grundrecht auf den gesetzlichen Richter, op. cit., pp. 35 et seq.). More
flexible with regard to a specific procedural issue (36, para 1, no 3 ZPO), see German Fed. Const.
court(BVerfG), 12 November 2008, 1 BvR 2788/08, NJW 2009, p. 907: the requirement of a general and
clear provision predetermining the competent court does not exclude some margin of appreciation in a
specific situation (begrenzter Spielraum) as far as an independent judge designates the competent court.
116
Art. 25 para 1 Italian Constitution (“Nessuno può essere distolto dal giudice naturale precostituito
per legge ».
117
Art. 30 para 1 of the Swiss Constitution. Ad hoc courts are prohibited.
118
The droit au juge naturel was stated by Art. 16 and 17 of Law Act of 16 and 24 August 1790 during
the French Revolution. It was then enshrined in several constitutions (1791, 1795, 1848…) but not in the
current one of 1958.
119
Constitutional council (CC), 23 July 1975, No 75-56 DC, Loi modifiant et complétant certaines
dispositions de procédure pénale : « § 4 : […] « le principe d'égalité devant la justice qui est inclus dans
le principe d'égalité devant la loi proclamé dans la Déclaration des Droits de l'homme de 1789 et
solennellement réaffirmé par le préambule de la Constitution » ; § 5. « Considérant, en effet, que le
respect de ce principe fait obstacle à ce que des citoyens se trouvant dans des conditions semblables et
poursuivis pour les mêmes infractions soient jugés par des juridictions composées selon des règles
différentes ». See also Constitutional council (CC), 29 August 2002, No 2002-461 DC, Loi d’orientation
24
from a fascist political regime such as Germany, Italy, Portugal of Spain have anchored
the lawful-judge-principle in their new constitutions whereas in France, the allocation
of the cases within a court are still an issue of judicial organization leaving great
discretion to the president of the court, as long as equality before justice and impartiality
of the court are not infringed120.
It can be argued that a national highest court not referring a disputed issue of Union law
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary ruling concerning would infringe
the right to a lawful judge 121 . Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) requires namely that “where any such question [of Union law]
is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall
bring the matter before the court”. The same could be asserted where national law
requires a bench of a court (such as a highest court) to forward the case to another bench
(e.g. to the Chambre mixte122 or the Assemblée plénière123 before the French Court of
cassation of before the Großer Zivilsenat124 for the German Bundesgerichtshof)125. The
et de programmation pour la justice: § 23 « Considérant que, si le législateur peut prévoir des règles de
procédure différentes selon les faits, les situations et les personnes auxquelles elles s'appliquent, c'est à la
condition que ces différences ne procèdent pas de discriminations injustifiées et que soient assurées aux
justiciables des garanties égales, notamment quant au respect du principe des droits de la défense, qui
implique en particulier l'existence d'une procédure juste et équitable »
120
See Emmanuel JEULAND, “Le droit au juge naturel et l’organisation judiciaire”, Revue française
d’administration publique 2008/1, no 125, pp. 33-42 : According to this scholar, in France, the « droit au
juge naturel » is « incertain » and « relève du ‘bricolage’ textuel et jurisprudentiel ».
121
See ECtHR, 8 April 2014, applic. 17120/09, Dhabi v. Italy : violation of Art. 6 ECHR because the
Italian Corte di cassazione had refused to refer a question to the ECJ for preliminary ruling without
giving reasons. National courts whose decisions are not amenable to appeal under domestic law are
required to provide reasons based on the exceptions laid down in the case-law of the ECJ for their refusal
to refer a preliminary question to that court on the interpretation of EU law. They should therefore set out
their reasons for considering that the question was not relevant, or that the provision of EU law in
question had already been interpreted by the ECJ, or that the correct application of EU law was so
obvious as to leave no room for reasonable doubt. See also German Fed. Const. court(BVerfG), 8 April
1987, 2 BvR 687/85; 9 November 1987, 2 BvR 440/87, Europäische GrundRechte-Zeitschrift 1988, p.
109.
122
See Art. L. 431-5 of the Code on judicial organisation (Code de l’organisation judiciaire, COJ): the
case shall be submitted to the Chambre mixte if the vote of the judges of the bench is equally divided or if
the General prosecutor requests the case be decided by the Chambre mixte.
123
See Art. L. 431-6 and L. 431-7 COJ.
124
The Großer Zivilsenat shall rule on the contested legal issue if a civil bench wants to deviate from a
decision of another civil bench of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), see § 132 para 2
GVG : « (2) Will ein Senat in einer Rechtsfrage von der Entscheidung eines anderen Senats abweichen,
so entscheiden der Große Senat für Zivilsachen, wenn ein Zivilsenat von einem anderen Zivilsenat oder
von dem Großen Zivilsenat, der Große Senat für Strafsachen, wenn ein Strafsenat von einem anderen
Strafsenat oder von dem Großen Senat für Strafsachen, die Vereinigten Großen Senate, wenn ein
Zivilsenat von einem Strafsenat oder von dem Großen Senat für Strafsachen oder ein Strafsenat von
einem Zivilsenat oder von dem Großen Senat für Zivilsachen oder ein Senat von den Vereinigten Großen
Senaten abweichen will“.
125
See Egon SCHNEIDER, « Verletzung der Vorlagepflicht », MDR 2000, pp. 10 et seq. Comp. German
Fed. Const. court (BverfG), 3 March 2014, 1 BvR 2534/10, NJW 25/2014, p. 1796 (the appellate court
should not have refused to examine the appeal in a case relating to a complex issue of EU law. The
existence of such complex issue would even justify the permission to further appeal brought before the
Federal Court of Justice).
25
Procedure
German Federal Constitutional court as a Hüter der Verfassung (protector of the
constitution) has ruled on this issue several times126 and holds that the lawful-judgeprinciple is infringed only when the court’s behaviour cannot merely be seen as having
been a simple mistake, but constitutes a real “arbitrary measure”127.
Independence and Impartiality of the Court – Independence and impartiality are
essential for a fair trial. They are enshrined in numerous international instruments such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10th December 1948 (Art.10), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 10 December 1966 (Art. 14 para
1), the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 (Art. 8) 128 , the European
Convention on Human Rights (Art. 6 para 1) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (Art. 47). These concepts have given rise to extensive case law by
the European Court of Human Rights129. Whereas independence relates to other powers
than the judicial (e.g. with regard to the government, the legislator or the parties),
impartiality is linked with the internal organization and functioning of the court and the
judge’s personal qualities. Independence is therefore a “status” whereas impartiality is a
“virtue” 130 . However, as the two concepts are difficult to dissociate, they are often
scrutinized together131.
Independence and impartiality are also often constitutional guarantees either directly
enshrined in the national constitution 132 or imposed by the interpretation of the
constitutional courts133. In France, in a rather odd way, Article 64 of the constitution
provides that “The President of the Republic shall be the guarantor of the independence
of the Judicial Authority”134. The Constitutional council makes sure that judges (juges
du siège, not public prosecutors) are irremovable135. According to Article 97 para 1 of
126
See e.g. German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 26 February 1954, 1 BvR 537/53, BVerfGE 3, p. 363 ;
11 May 1965, 2 BvR 259/63, BVerfGE 19, p. 43.
127
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 30 June 1970, BVerfGE 29, p. 49.
128
See Art. 8.1: “1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in
the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his
rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature”.
129
See e.g. ECtHR, 18 June 1971, De Wilde et allii v. Belgium, No 2832/66; 2835/66; 2899/66; 22
October 1984, Sramek v. Austria, No 8790/79; 24 November 1994, Beaumartin v. France, No 15287/89.
130
See Serge GUINCHARD et alii, Droit processuel, Droits fondamentaux du procès, 7th ed. 2012,
Paris, Dalloz ed., No 340.
131
See the recent decision given by the ECtHR, 9 January 2013, Volkov v. Ukraine, No 21722/11:
violation of Art. 6 para 1 (impartial and independent tribunal, fair hearing and tribunal established by law)
and Art. 8 para 1 (respect for private life).
132
See e.g. Art. 30 of the Swiss constitution : “Judicial proceedings. 1. Any person whose case falls to
be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard by a legally constituted, competent,
independent and impartial court. Ad hoc courts are prohibited”.
133
See e.g. German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 9 May 1962, 2 BvL 13/60, BVerfGE 14, p. 56 (69); 27
March 1974, 2 BvR 38/74, BVerfGE 37, p. 57 (65).
134
The independence of the judicial authority is also secured by Art. 65 of the French constitution which
establishes a Conseil supérieur de la magistrature (High Judicial Council).
135
Const. council (CC), 26 January 1967, No 67-31 DC, Loi organique modifiant et complétant
l'ordonnance n° 58-1270 du 22 décembre 1958 portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature;
21 February 1992, No 92-305 DC. See also the decision stating the independence of commercial courts,
CC, 4 May 2012, No 2012-241 QPC, EURL David Ramirez, D. 2012, p. 1626 with obs. Fricero.
26
the German Grundgesetz, “Judges shall be independent and subject only to the
law” 136 .The same applies in Italy: Article 104 of the constitution states that “The
Judiciary is a branch that is autonomous and independent of all other powers”. This
independence is guaranteed by the High Council of the Judiciary (Art. 104 and 105)137.
According to the French Constitutional Council, impartiality of the court 138 should
normally prevent a court from acting on its own motion (“s’auto-saisir”)139, i.e. “to start
spontaneously proceedings at the end of which the court renders a decision having res
judicata effect”. However, this prohibition is not absolute, which means that except in
criminal matters, the legislator can provide for exceptions on condition that they are
justified by reasons of general interest and that specific guarantees are established in
order to ensure compliance with the principle of impartiality140.
Publicity – Publicity of proceedings provides a twofold guarantee: first, the guarantee
to the parties that the judge will be neutral and the proceedings objective, and second, a
guarantee to the public that they can be informed141 and see how justice is done. The
principle of publicity is not enshrined in all national constitutions; it is often regulated
by statutes. Several constitutions do contain this guarantee aiming to make the exercise
of judicial power verifiable by any citizen and to strengthen the impartiality of the court.
This is for instance the case in Article 90-1 of the Austrian constitution; Article 120 of
the Spanish constitution; Articles 88 and 89 of the constitution of Luxembourg, Article
121 of the Dutch constitution, Article 206 of the Portuguese or Article 30 of the Swiss
constitution. By contrast, publicity of proceedings is in France solely a so-called
« principe général du droit »142.
136
Para 2 states that judges appointed permanently to full-time positions may be involuntarily dismissed,
permanently or temporarily suspended, transferred or retired before the expiration of their term of office
only by virtue of judicial decision and only for the reasons and in the manner specified by the laws.
137
The law also ensures the independence of judges of special courts, of state prosecutors of those
courts, and of other persons participating in the administration of justice (Art. 108 para 2 Italian
constitution). According to Art. 107 para 1, “judges may not be removed from office; they may not be
dismissed or suspended from office or assigned to other courts or functions unless by a decision of the
High Council of the Judiciary […]”.
138
According to the Constitutional council (see e.g. CC, 7 December 2012, No 2012-286 QPC, Pyrénées
services et autres), « le principe d’impartialité est indissociable de l’exercice de fonctions
juridictionnelles ».
139
Const. council (CC), 7 December 2012, No 2012-286 QPC, Société Pyrénées services et autres
(Saisine d’office du tribunal pour l’ouverture de la procédure de redressement judiciaire, Art. L. 631-5
Commercial Code) ; 7 March 2014, No 2013-368 QPC, Société Nouvelle d’exploitation Sthrau hôtel
(Saisine d’office du tribunal pour l’ouverture de la procédure de liquidation judiciaire, Art. L. 640-5
Commercial Code). Those decisions are based on Art. 16 of Declaration of Human and Civic Rights.
140
Const. council (CC), 7 December 2012, No 2012-286 QPC, Société Pyrénées services et autres, Rec.
4.
141
See Karel KLIMA, « The Phenomenon of the European Court of Human Rights’ Influence on the
Constitutional Systems of the Council of Europe Member States », Czech Yearbook of International Law,
vol. V, 2014, p. 202.
142
Régis de GOUTTES, « La recherche de principes de procédure communs aux É tats membres de
l’Union européenne, l’application de l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme », II.,
Le procès, Système continental, pp. 121-140, in Les principes communs d’une justice des États de
l’Union européenne, Conf. 4-5 Dec. 2000, Cour de cassation, Paris, Doc. française 2001, p. 125.
27
Procedure
The right to a “fair trial” (droit au procès équitable143, Recht auf faires Verfahren, diritta
a un equo processo, derecho a un proceso equitativo) 144 features institutional and
functional aspects. In the United States, it is well known as due process of law145. The
institutional aspects relate to independence and impartiality of the court having
jurisdiction; the court must be established by law. The functional aspects encompass the
right to take part in the hearing, to be informed, to receive notice of the procedural
documents and disclosure of the evidence presented to the court, and equality of arms.
The right to a fair trial is expressly enshrined in some national constitutions 146. If not, it
has often been regarded as a constitutional right by the national constitutional courts147.
B. Functional Constitutional Procedural Guarantees
The Right to Take Part in the Hearing, to Have Access to Relevant Information
and Evidence and to Receive Notice of Procedural Documents – The writ of
summons and the statement of claim must be served on the defendant to ensure an
adversarial trial and to give him the opportunity to take part in the hearing 148 . The
competent authorities must take the requisite steps to inform the defendant of the
existence of the trial 149 . In civil proceedings, each party defends their claims and
143
See Const. Council (CC), 30 September 2011, No 2011-168 QPC, M. Samir A. : Art. 16 of the
Declaration of Human and Civic Rights 1789 secures « le droit des personnes intéressées à exercer un
recours juridictionnel effectif, le droit à un procès équitable, ainsi que le principe du contradictoire ».
144
See e.g. ECtHR, 27 April 2010, applic. No 16318/07, Moretti ad Benedetti v. Italy, Procédures June
2010, Comm. No 231, with obs. Fricero (requirement that the adoption proceedings be fair and that the
judgment contain reasons).
145
For differences between “procès équitable” (fair trial) and “due process of law”, see Elisabeth
ZOLLER, “Procès équitable et due process of law”, D. 2007, pp. 517-523. See also Abdelkrim
MAAMOURI, Droit au procès équitable et Due Process of Law, É tude comparée : É tats-Unis, France et
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Éd. universitaires européennes, 2011. Fair trial and due
process of law are both concepts of "fundamental fairness." In 1934, the United States Supreme Court
held that due process is violated "if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental", Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934). It includes an individual's right to be adequately notified of charges or proceedings,
the opportunity to be heard at these proceedings, and that the person or panel making the final decision
over the proceedings be impartial in regards to the matter before them, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 267 (1970)
146
See e.g. Art. 20-4 of the Portuguese constitution; Art. 8, 20-1, 26 and 87 of the Greek constitution;
Art. 111 of the Italian constitution and Art. 24-2 of the Spanish constitution.
147
See e.g. German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 8 February 1967, 2 BvR 235/64, BVerfGE 21, p. 139:
according to the Constitutional court, the right to an impartial court follows from Art. 101 para 1
Grundgesetz (right to a lawful judge); 14 May 1985, 1 BvR 370/84, BVerfGE 69, p. 381 (385 et seq.); 18
January 2000, 1 BvR 321/96, BVerfGE 101, p. 397 (404); 18 July 2013, 1 BvR 1623/11, NJW 4/2014, p.
205: “Aus Art. 2 I iVm Art. 20 III GG wird als ‘allgemeines Prozessgrundrecht’ der Anspruch auf ein
faires Verfahren abgeleitet”. See also Leo ROSENBERG/Karl Heinz SCHWAB/Peter GOTTWALD,
Zivilprozessrecht, 17th ed. 2010, Munich, Beck ed., § 1, No 30. Also in England and Wales, the principle
of impartiality has been stated by case law. For France, see Const. council (CC), 27 July 2006, No 2006640 DC, Loi relative aux droits d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information, x§ 11.
148
See German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 21 March 2006, 2 BvR 1104/05, FamRZ 2006, p. 763.
149
ECtHR, 4 March 2014, Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey, No 7942/05 and 24838/05: failure to take
sufficient steps to identify address for service in civil proceedings (violation of Art. 6 para 1 ECHR
because the requisite steps had not been taken to inform the applicants of the proceedings against them
28
allegations and disputes the claims and allegations of the other. Therefore, they must
have access to all procedural documents and to the evidence produced by the other party;
they must also be granted the opportunity to express themselves before court, and the
court must take into account the parties’ submissions150. In France, these guarantees are
provided for in the Code of civil procedure; however, the Constitutional Council has
given constitutional value to the “right of defense” (droits de la defense) 151 which
necessarily implies the so-called “principe contradictoire”152. In Germany, according to
Article 103 para 1 of the Grundgesetz, every party shall be entitled to a hearing in
accordance with the law (rechtliches Gehör) 153 . The Bundesverfassungsgericht has
interpreted very extensively this provision which enshrines a “prozessuales Urrecht des
Menschen”154. The court must clear in clearly state in advance which factual and legal
aspects are relevant for its decision (prohibition of so-called surprise decisions,
Ü berraschungsentscheidungen). The duty of the court to structure the proceedings
follows from the constitutional principles of material equality in legal protection (Art. 3
para 1 of the Basic Law) and from the social state principle (Art. 20 para 1) 155 . In
and the latter had not had the opportunity to appear at a new trial, despite the fact they had not waived
their corresponding right).
150
This is very clear in the constitutional case law of Germany and Switzerland, see Alfred KOLLER,
« Der Gehörsanspruch im erstinstanzlichen Zivilprozeß ; verfassungsrechtliche Minimalanforderungen »,
p. 230, https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/export/DL/57392.pdf. For Germany, see Wolfram WALDNER,
Aktuelle Probleme des rechtlichen Gehörs im Zivilprozeβ, Erlangen, 1983; Der Anspruch auf rechtliches
Gehör, Köln, O. Schmidt ed., 2000; Rudolf WASSERMANN, « Zur Bedeutung, zum Inhalt und zum
Umfang des Rechts auf Gehör », DRiZ 1984, pp. 425 et seq.; R. WIMMER, « Die Wahrung des
Grundsatzes des rechtlichen Gehörs – Dauerauftrag für das Bundesverfassungsgericht », DVBl. 1985, pp.
773 et seq. See also the PhD recently published by Peter Philipp GERMELMANN, Das rechtliche Gehör
vor Gericht im europäischen Recht, Baden-Baden, Nomos ed., 2014.
151
See also Art. 24.1 of the Spanish constitution; Art. 20 of the Swiss constitution: “General procedural
guarantees 1. Every person has the right to equal and fair treatment in judicial and administrative
proceedings and to have their case decided within a reasonable time. 2 Each party to a case has the right
to be heard”.
152
See Const. Council (CC), 29 December 1984, No 84-184 DC, Loi de finances pour 1985, § 36; 29
December 1989, No 89-268 DC, Loi de finances pour 1990 : « le principe du caractère contradictoire de
la procédure est le corollaire du principe des droits de la défense ». The principe contradictoire follows
from Art. 16 of the déclaration of Human and Civic Rights 1789, CC, 30 March 2006, No 2006-535 DC,
Loi pour l’égalité des chances.
153
See German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 26 February 1954, 1 BvR 537/53, BVerfGE 3, p. 359 (365);
7 October 1980, 1 BvL 50, 89/79, 1 BvR 240/79, BVerfGE 55, p. 72 (94) : the parties have a Recht auf
Aüßerung
2 BvR 96/60, BVerfGE 11, p. 218 (220) ; 14 July 1998, 1 BvR 1640/97,
BVerfGE 98, p. 218 (263): the court has the Pflicht zur Berücksichtigung.
154
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 9 July 1980, 2 BvR 701/80, BVerfGE 55, p. 1 (6). According to
the Karlsruhe court, the “rechtliches Gehör” is strongly connected with Art. 1 para 1 GG (human dignity)
and with the rule-of-law principle (Rechtsstaatsprinzip). For a comparison with Austria, see Peter Philipp
GERMELMANN, Das rechtliche Gehör vor Gericht im europäischen Recht, pp. 117 et seq. In Austria,
the right to be heard is not enshrined in the constitution; however, the ECHR has the same rank as the
constitution and the constitutional court may scrutinize the compliance with the ECHR (Art. 144
Bundesverfassungsgesetz). The same applies to the EU-Charter of Fundamental Rights, see Austrian
Const. court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), 14 March 2012, EuGRZ 2012, pp. 331 et seq.
155
According to German Fed. Const. Court (BVerfG), 18 July 2013, 1 BvR 1623/11, NJW 4/2014, p.
205, “das Verfahren muss so gestaltet werden, wie die Parteien des Zivilprozesses es vom Gericht
erwarten dürfen. Das Gericht darf sich nicht widersprüchlich verhalten, darf aus eigenen oder ihm
zuzurechnenden Fehlern oder Versäumnissen keine Verfahrensnachteile ableiten”.
29
Procedure
England, the right to be heard follows from several principles such as natural justice156,
audi alteram partem157, duty to act fairly or procedural fairness. To some extent, their
contents can be compared with the German constitutional case law related to the
“rechtliches Gehör”158. A comparative study reveals that national courts – especially
constitutional courts – have made an extensive interpretation of the constitution in order
to protect essential procedural principles159. The “right to be heard” is closely linked
with equality of arms in proceedings.
Equality of Arms – The European Court of Human Rights has imposed an “equality of
arms” (égalité des armes, Waffengleichheit) in civil proceedings 160 on the ground of
Article 6 para 1 ECHR : “ It is clear that the requirement of ‘equality of arms’, in the
sense of a ‘fair balance’ between the parties, applies in principle to such cases [civil
proceedings] as well as to criminal cases […]. as regards litigation involving opposing
private interests, ‘equality of arms’ implies that each party must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present his/her case - including his evidence - under
conditions that do not place him/her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his/her
opponent”161. Numerous national constitutional courts162 also require the parties be put
on an equal footing and often infer the equality of arms from a general constitutional
156
See e.g. Axa General Insurance Ltd & Lord Advocate & Ors (Scotland) [2011] USSC 46 (12 October
2011), [2011] 3 WLR 871, § 61.
157
See Principal Reporter v. K. & Ors (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 56 (15 December 2010) [2011] 1 WLR
18, § 14.
158
Peter Philipp GERMELMANN, Das rechtliche Gehör vor Gericht im europäischen Recht, pp. 138 et
seq.
159
See Paul MARTENS, « Les principes constitutionnels du procès dans la jurisprudence récente des
juridictions constitutionnelles européennes », Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel No 14, May 2003. For
Switzerland, see Alfred KOLLER, « Der Gehörsanspruch im erstinstanzlichen Zivilprozeß;
verfassungsrechtliche Minimalanforderungen », prec., pp. 229-242; see e.g. for an arbitrary interpretation
of a procedural act, German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 8 August 2013, 1 BvR 1314/13, NJW 5/2014, p.
291.
160
ECtHR, 23 October 1996, Ankerl v. Switzerland, No 17748/91 : 38. « La Cour a pour tâche de
rechercher si la procédure envisagée dans son ensemble a revêtu un caractère ‘équitable’ au sens de
l’article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). Elle rappelle à ce titre que l’exigence de ‘l’égalité des armes’, c’est-à-dire d’un
‘juste équilibre’ entre les parties, vaut aussi dans les litiges opposant des intérêts privés: ‘l’égalité des
armes’ implique alors l’obligation d’offrir à chaque partie une possibilité raisonnable de présenter sa
cause - y compris ses preuves - dans des conditions qui ne la placent pas dans une situation de net
désavantage par rapport à son adversaire (voir l’arrêt Dombo Beheer B.V. précité, p. 19, paras. 32-33).
Une différence de traitement quant à l’audition des témoins des parties peut donc être de nature à
enfreindre ledit principe ». The court had heard under oath a witness presented by the other party and
refused to hear the applicant’s wife as a witness. See also ECtHR, 27 October 1983, Dombo Beheer v.
The Netherlands, No 14448/88.
161
ECtHR, 27 October 1983, Dombo Beheer v. The Netherlands, No 14448/88, No 33. In that case, it
was incumbent upon the applicant company to prove that there was an oral agreement between it and the
Bank to extend certain credit facilities. Only two persons had been present at the meeting at which this
agreement had allegedly been reached, namely Mr van Reijendam representing the applicant company
and Mr van W. representing the Bank. Yet only the person who had represented the Bank was permitted to
be heard. The applicant company was denied the possibility of calling the person who had represented it,
because the Court of Appeal identified him with the applicant company itself.
162
See e.g. French Const. Council (CC), 23 July 2010, No 2010-15/23 QPC, Région LanguedocRoussillon et autres: « le principe des droits de la défense, qui implique en particulier l'existence d'une
procédure juste et équitable garantissant l'équilibre des droits des parties ».
30
provision on equality. In France for instance, Article 6 of the Declaration of Human and
Civic Rights 1789 states that the law “shall be the same for all, whether it protects or
punishes”163. This provision combined with the general guarantee contained in Article
16 (“Any society in which no provision is made for guaranteeing rights or for the
separation of powers, has no Constitution”) is interpreted by the Constitutional Council
as ensuring not only the right to a “recours juridictionnel effectif” but also the “principe
d’égalité devant la justice”164. This trend towards the expansion of the constitutional
principle of equality165 regarded as a fundamental right can also be observed in Austria,
Belgium, Germany and Italy166, and is probably due to the fact that the principle of
equality has a special place within the fundamental rights since it is at the same time a
fundamental right and a necessary condition for the exercise of other fundamental rights.
In Italy, the Constitution provides for detailed procedural rights: “Jurisdiction is
implemented through due process regulated by law. All court trials are conducted with
adversary proceedings and the parties are entitled to equal conditions before an
impartial judge in third party position. The law provides for the reasonable duration of
trials” (Art. 111 paras 1 and 2)167; “Defense is an inviolable right at every stage and
instance of legal proceedings” (Art. 24 para 2). In Germany, the principle of equality is
enshrined in Article 3 of the Basic Law. According to the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the principle of equality of arms (Waffengleichheit) between
the parties is a constitutional procedural requirement168. Equality of arms may in some
cases lead to a “right to evidence” or to a right to produce before court evidence
infringing the right of the other party to privacy169.
163
See also Art. 14 of the Spanish Constitution.
See e.g. Const. Council, 14 May 2012, No 2012-243/244/245/246 QPC, Société Yonne Républicaine
et autre.
165
See e.g. French Const. Council (CC), 14 October 2010, No 2010-54 QPC, Union syndicale des
magistrats administratifs (juge unique). According to the Constitutional Council, some differences in
treatment between litigants might be justified by the goal of proper administration of justice (objectif de
valeur constitutionnelle de bonne administration de la justice), which has constitutional value, CC, 3
December 2009, No 2009-595 DC, Loi organique relative à l'application de l'article 61-1 de la
Constitution. For an analysis of what « bonne administration de la justice » encompasses, see Justice &
Cassation 2013, pp. 13-94.
166
Ferdinand MELIN-SOUCRAMANIEN, « Le principe d’égalité dans la jurisprudence du Conseil
constitutionnel. Quelles perspectives pour la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité ? », Cahiers du
Conseil constitutionnel, No 29, Oct. 2010, according to whom « Pour bon nombre de juridictions
constitutionnelles, le principe d'égalité, en raison de sa plasticité, de sa double nature particulière de
droit fondamental en soi et de condition d'exercice des autres droits fondamentaux, joue indéniablement
le rôle de principe ‘à tout faire’ ».
167
According to Article 111, the law shall provide for the reasonable duration of trials and all judicial
decisions shall include a statement of reasons. The reasonable duration of civil proceedings is also
required by case law of the German Constitutional court, see e.g. Const. court (BVerfG), 16 December
1981, 1 BvR 898/79; 1 BvR 1132/79 etc., BVerfGE 88, p. 128 (124); 20 June 1995, 1 BvR 166/93,
BVerfGE 93, p. 99 (197 et seq.).
168
Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 19.06.1973, 1 BvL 39/69; 1 BvL 14/72, BVerfGE 35, p. 263 (279); 15
March 2004, 1 BvR 1591/03, NJW 2004, p. 2079.
169
See e.g. ECtHR, 10 October 2006, L.L. v. France, applic. No 7508/02; 13 May 2008, N.N. and T.A. v.
Belgium, applic. No 65097/01, D. 2009, p. 2714, obs. Vasseur ; RTD civ. 2008, p. 650, obs. Marguénaud ;
JCP 2008, I, 167, No 13, obs. Sudre. See also Art. 24.2 of the Spanish constitution (right to the “use of
evidence appropriate to their defense”); German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 9 October2002, 1 BvR
1611/96, NJW 2002, p. 3618 (3624).
164
31
Procedure
Reasonable Duration of Trials – Only a few national constitutions do indeed secure
the right to a reasonable duration of trials. This is the case in the Italian constitution
(Art. 111 para 2) as well as in the Spanish one (Art. 24.2)170. The ECHR also provides
that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time”. Many
of the complaints to the Strasburg Court relate to excessively slow proceedings. On this
legal ground, the Strasburg Court has frequently condemned many states, especially
Italy. Between 1959 and 2012, the Court has delivered 5 037 judgments holding that the
right to a reasonable duration of trial had been infringed by national courts171.
All these fundamental procedural rights which have been touched upon would not be so
flourishing had there not been national courts to assert them (ordinary or constitutional
courts172), to extend them by way of a creative interpretation that has gone in some
cases so far that the question was raised whether one could speak of a “gouvernement
des juges” (government by the judges?)173. Judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes introduces an institutionalized dialogue between the ordinary courts and the
constitutional court174. As a matter of fact, in some countries175, this dynamic, creative
and expanding interpretation of the fundamental procedural rights has been seen to be
necessary in order to strengthen the national constitution and avoid its decay especially
with regard to the growing competition between national procedural guarantees and
international or European instruments of protection of human rights such as the
European Convention on Human Rights and its Article 6 para 1 which enjoys a very
extensive and evolutive interpretation by the Strasburg Court176. Here we are of course
170
“2. Likewise, all have the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law; to defense and
assistance by a lawyer; to be informed of the charges brought against them; to a public trial without
undue delays and with full guarantees; to the use of evidence appropriate to their defense […]”.
171
Annual Report 2012, European Court of Human Rights, p. 159. Italy was condemned in 1 171 cases,
followed by Turkey (531), Greece (437), Poland (418), Ukraine (286), France (281) and Slovenia (229).
In 2012, Italy was condemned in only 16 cases (Greece in 34, Turkey in 38, Ukraine in 27), see Annual
Report 2012, pp. 154 et seq. In several states such as Germany, specific legislation has been induced by
the judicature of the ECtHR on legal protection within reasonable time (for Germany, see the new §§ 198202 of the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG, introduced by Gesetz über den Rechtsschutz bei überlangen
Gerichtsverfahren und strafrechtlichen Ermittlungsverfahren of 24 November 2011 after the Strasburg
Court’s decision of 2 September 2010, Rumpf v. Germany, applic. No 46344/06).
172
The decisions given by the Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) are binding on public
authorities and all administrative and judicial bodies. They are not subject to appeal. The authority of res
judicata is not vested solely in the operative part but also in the reasons, which constitute the necessary
support for the operative part. The same applies to the judgments rendered by the German Federal
Constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). On the creation of constitutional courts, see Tom
GINSBURG, “Constitutional Law and Courts”, in David S. CLARK (ed.), Comparative Law and Society,
Edward Elgar ed., 2012, pp. 290-309.
173
See for a critical view of such « gouvernement des juges », Georges VEDEL, « Excès de pouvoir
administratif et excès de pouvoir législatif », (I), Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, No 1, Dec.
1996 : « Le gouvernement des juges commence quand ceux-ci ne se contentent pas d’appliquer ou
d’interpréter les textes, mais imposent des normes qui sont en réalité des produits de leur propre esprit ».
174
Regarding the new French situation since the coming into force of the QPC (question prioritaire de
constitutionalité), see P. Deumier, « La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité et le dialogue primordial
des juges français », Revue internationale de droit processuel 2012, n°1, pp. 127-144.
175
This is e.g. the case in France, see Régis FRAISSE, prec., pp. 15 et seq.
176
See Lord Leonard HOFFMANN, “The Universality of Human Rights”, LQR 125 (2009), pp. 416432 (p. 428): ”the proposition that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ is the banner under which the
32
touching upon the delicate issue of the relationships between constitution and
international instruments, and of transnational dialogue between courts.
Ⅳ. Constitution and Transnational Dialogue or
Conversation177 Between Courts178
This presentation has tried to describe the profusion of instruments of constitutional or
para-constitutional nature that secure fundamental procedural rights. Fundamental rights
are a favourable ground for the circulation of legal models in a vertical as well as
horizontal way. Especially in Europe, there are several strata: national constitutions,
national statutes, EU law 179 with the Charter of Fundamental Rights being legally
binding with the same value as the European Treaties, and the ECHR. The drawback is
that this creates not only a possible competition between norms, but also possible
cacophony180 in case law since there are numerous actors181 in the field of human rights
which include several procedural rights. Admittedly, states have to abide by “the
constitutional principles enshrined in the ECHR”182, by final judgment of the ECtHR in
the cases to which they are parties183 and by case law of the ECJ. However, the actors
Strasburg Court has assumed power to legislate what they consider to be required by ‘European public
order’”.
177
See Monica CLAES, Maartje DE VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING
(eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj, Intersentia, 2012. The
authors prefer the use of the term « conversation » instead of dialogue because the number of actors is
usually greater than two and because the term « conversation » encompasses also communications which
have a more informal character (see p. 4).
178
See Laurent SCHEECK, « Le dialogue des droits fondamentaux en Europe, fédérateur de loyautés,
dissolvant de résistances?“, in Emmanuelle BRIBOSIA/Laurent SCHEECK/Amaya UBEDA DE
TORRES (eds), L’Europe des cours : loyautés et résistances, Brussels, Bruylant ed., 2010, pp. 19-63.
179
Originally, the Treaties did not mention fundamental rights. The Single European Act (1986)
affirmed for the first time that Member States were “determined to work together to promote democracy
on the basis of fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the
[ECHR] and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice”. The Treaty on
the European Union included the respect of fundamental rights in its Art. F, para 2. Today, Art. 6 TEU
gives the Charter legally binding force, states that the EU shall access to the ECHR and that
« fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States shall constitute general principles of EU law”.
180
See e.g. the divergence between the ruling of the German Constitutional court and the decision given
by the ECtHR in the case Elsholz v. Germany (ECtHR, 13 July 2000, applic. No 25735/94).
181
See Laurent SCHEECK, prec., p. 19: « espace multi-acteurs des droits de l’homme en Europe ».
182
Karel KLIMA, « The Phenomenon of the European Court of Human Rights’ Influence on the
Constitutional Systems of the Council of Europe Member States », Czech Yearbook of International Law,
vol. V, 2014, p. 185: “Case law of the ECtHR contributes to the juridization and constitutionalisation of
the Convention”.
183
The main difference between the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is that the
ECtHR can be seized by an individual complaint of a natural or legal entity, whereas before the Inter-
33
Procedure
on the European stage are numerous so that consistency must be a crucial concern. Also
the “turn to constitutional pluralism”184, presented as a “third way between the absolute
primacy od EU law and the unconditional supremacy of national constitutions”
necessitates conversations between the judicial guardians of the different legal orders185.
A dialogue186 and a cooperation between not only national and European courts, but
also between the EJC and the ECtHR is needed in order to ensure that the Member
States are not put in an untenable situation of being bound by conflicting decisions. This
is why the President of the German Constitutional court, Andreas Voßkuhle, has used
the formula „Europäischer Verfassungsgerichtsverbund” (European constitutional
courts’ compound) 187 . Does this “dialogue” which takes place unify the different
loyalties at stake and “dissolve resistance” 188 ? Is it possible to go from “chaotic
pluralism” to “orderly pluralism”?189 The situation of national constitutional courts is
indeed complicated. They are all concerned with their legitimacy, just as the European
American Court of Human Rights, only the Commission and the States Parties to the Convention are
empowered to submit cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. In addition,
in order for a case against a State Party to be brought before the Court, the State Party must recognise the
jurisdiction of the Court. Individual citizens of the OAS Member States are not allowed to take cases
directly to the Court. The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was established by virtue of
Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted by Member States of the then
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1998. The Protocol came into force on 25 January 2004 after it
was ratified by more than 15 countries. The Court has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to
it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the
Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. The Court may
receive complaints and/or applications submitted either by the African Commission of Human and
Peoples’ Rights or State parties to the Protocol or African Intergovernmental Organizations. NonGovernmental Organizations with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights and individuals from States which have made a Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court
can also institute cases directly before the Court. As 2014, only seven countries had made such a
Declaration. The Court delivered its first judgment in 2009.
184
See also D. THYM, « Attack or retreat? Evolving themes and strategies of the judicial dialogue
between the German Constitutional court and the European Court of Justice », in Monica CLAES,
Maartje DE VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING (eds), Constitutional
Conversations in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj, Intersentia, 2012, p. 246 who uses the formula
« pluralist multi-level constitutionalism ».
185
Monica CLAES, Maartje DE VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING (eds),
Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 3.
186
One of the modalities that have been used for a few years by the ECtHR to engage conversations
with national courts and states is the pilot judgment procedure.
187
Andreas VOßKUHLE, „Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund“, Neue Zeitschrift für
Verwaltungsrecht 29 (2010), pp. 1-8.
188
See Laurent SCHEECK, « Le dialogue des droits fondamentaux en Europe, fédérateur de loyautés,
dissolvant de résistances?“, in Emmanuelle BRIBOSIA/Laurent SCHEECK/Amaya UBEDA DE
TORRES (eds), L’Europe des cours : loyautés et résistances, Brussels, Bruylant ed., 2010, pp. 19-63.
189
See Olivier DE FROUVILLE, « Le paradigme de la constitutionnalisation vu du droit international »,
in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ/Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ont-ils
constitutionnalisé le monde ?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, p. 193-215 : « comment développer davantage,
notamment, les pratiques de ‘coordination’, d’harmonisation’ voire même d’’unification’ par ‘hybridation’
qui permettent, sans prétendre faire prévaloir un ordre juridique sur un autre, de passer d’un pluralisme
chaotique à un ‘pluralisme ordonné’ ?» ; Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, Les forces imaginantes du droit
(II), Le pluralisme ordonné, Paris, Seuil ed., 2006.
34
and International Courts are. Their legal argumentation is coupled with political
rhetoric190.
The ECJ and the ECtHR have sometimes been called “judicial activists”191. Both have
played an essential part in the “constitutionalisation” of fundamental rights in Europe.
Little by little, the ECJ has made reference in its rulings to the ECHR and to the
Strasburg case law, which has even in some instances led to a change of the ECJ’s case
law192. The Strasburg court especially has contributed to the “imperialism”193 of Article
6 ECHR194 by developing a teleologic interpretation method leading to “constructive
dynamism”195 and to a certain ius commune196. It uses two techniques to extend the
scope of the Convention: first, the theory of the “elements that are necessarily
inherent”197 in the rights protected by the Convention and second, the theory of the
“positive obligations of the contracting states”198. With regard to the interplay between
national courts and the European Convention on Human Rights, it has been
ascertained199 that the difficulties have arisen more in the field of procedure than in
substantial law and that procedure is subject to an incredible promotion. However, it
cannot be doubted that even if the national Constitutional courts and the ECtHR carry a
different control 200 , the case law of the second has a significant influence 201 on the
190
Constance GREWE, “Les droits de l’homme ont-ils constitutionnalisé le monde? Conclusions
générales”, », in Stéphanie HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ and Jean-Marc SOREL, Les droits de l’homme ontils constitutionnalisé le monde?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, p. 280.
191
See the criticism expressed by the President of the Belgian Constitutional court, Marc BOSSUYT,
“Rechterlijk activisme in Straatsburg”, Rechtskundig Weekblad, 2013-2014, No 19, pp. 723-733.
192
See e.g. ECJ, 18 October 1989, 374/87, Orkem v. Commission. See also Laurent SCHEECK, prec.,
according to whom both European courts are bound by a « strategic interdependence » leading to « crossfertlisation » ; « Les droits de l’homme participent à la dynamique de constitutionnalisation par petits pas
du régime politique européen ».
193
Frédéric SUDRE, « La recherche de principes de procédure communs aux É tats membres de l’Union
européenne, L’application de l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Rapport
introductif », in Les principes communs d’une justice des États de l’Union européenne, Conference of 4-5
December 2000, Cour de cassation, Paris, Documentation française, 2001, p. 29 : « on a pu dénoncer
l’’impérialisme’ de l’article 6 et dire de cette disposition qu’elle était une convention dans la Convention
– et se présente sous une ‘ondoyante diversité’ ».
194
According to F. Sudre (prec., p. 49), “« En mettant l’accent sur l’effectivité du droit à un procès
équitable et sur son importance dans une société démocratique, le juge européen invite à dépasser la
distinction entre droit formel et droit substantiel, entre droits de procédure et droits fondamentaux pour
concevoir le droit du procès comme un véritable droit fondamental qui assure l’effectivité des autres
droits substantiels, comme un véritable ‘droit de sauvegarde’ des droits de l’homme ».
195
Frédéric SUDRE, prec., p. 30.
196
Frédéric SUDRE, prec., p. 35.
197
See e.g. ECtHR, 26 May 2011, Legrand v. France, applic. No 23228/08, § 35. By using this
technique, the ECtHR could secure the right to effective access to court (which is not expressly enshrined
in Art. 6 para 1 ECHR) and the right to enforcement of judgments.
198
See e.g. ECtHR, 6 November 2008, Leela Förderkreis e.V. and others v. Germany, applic. No
58911/00.
199
Constance GREWE, prec., p. 282.
200
Patrick SPINOSI, “Quel regard sur la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel sur le procès
équitable?”, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, No 44, 2014, pp. 24-34, who describes a
« dialogue sans paroles » between the French Constitutional council and the ECtHR.
35
Procedure
decisions rendered by the first 202 . The emergence of European legal orders has, for
instance, led the French Constitutional council to an expanding interpretation of the
Constitution. Had it kept a literal interpretation, the French Constitution would have
been enfeebled 203 . In Switzerland, when the constitution was amended in 1999,
numerous procedural guarantees that the Bundesgericht had followed from Article 4
(principle of equality) in a creative interpretation were expressly formulated in Articles
29 et seq. of the new constitution204. The Spanish Tribunal constitucional that is bound
by Article 10 para 2 of the constitution (according to which “Provisions relating to the
fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution shall be construed in
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties
and agreements thereon ratified by Spain »205) is probably the constitutional court that
is most influenced by the ECJ’s and ECtHR’s case law206.
201
For an interesting decision of the German Fed. Const. court relating to the influence of the judgments
given by the ECtHR on the interpretation of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), see Fed. Const. court
(BVerfG), 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, Görgülü: the binding to law and justice (Art. 20 para 3 GG)
includes consideration of the guarantees provided by the ECHR and of the decisions of the ECtHR in the
context of methodologically justifiable interpretation of the law. The failure to consider a decision of the
Court may violate fundamental rights in connection with the rule of law. When considering decisions of
the ECtHR, the state bodies must include the impact on the national legal system in their application of
the law. Comp. BVerfG, 26 March 1987, 2 BvR 589/79; 2 BvR 750/81; 2 BvR 284/85, BVerfGE 74, pp.
358 et seq.
202
See e.g. the reaction of the German Fed. Const. court to a ECtHR’s decision (17. December 2009,
applic. No. 19359/04, M. v. Germany) against the German law of “Sicherungsverwahrung”, (BVerfG), 4
May 2011, 2 BvR 2365/09, 2 BvR 740/10, 2 BvR 2333/08, 2 BvR 1152/10, 2 BvR 571/10, NJW 2011, p.
1931; see also ECtHR, 15 July 1982, Eckle v. Germany, applic. No 8130/78 (right to trial within
reasonable time) and the explicit reference to this decision by BVerfG, 24 November 1983, 2 BvR 121/83.
For France, see Olivier DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTTE, “L’influence de la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme sur le Conseil constitutionnel”, www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil.../cedh_130209_odutheillet.pdf. The French Constitutional council refuses to
control whether a French statute complies with the ECHR. In France, the ECtHR’s case law has had an
influence on the consecration of the right to fair trial by the Constitutional council, see P. SPINOSI, prec.,
p. 24 (“consécration tardive »). In 2005, the Constitutional council has established an autonomous
constitutional principle of fair trial (procès équitable) which follows from Art. 16 Declaration of Human
and Civic Rights 1789.
203
See Régis FRAISSE, prec., p. 15: The Constitutional council could not « se recroqueviller sur une
interprétation littérale de son bloc de constitutionnalité sans affaiblir la Constitution qu’il a pour mission
de faire respecter ».
204
See Peter Philipp GERMELMANN, Das rechtliche Gehör vor Gericht im europäischen Recht, pp.
119 et seq.
205
Comp. Art. 16.2 of the Portuguese constitution: « The provisions of this Constitution and of laws
concerning fundamental rights shall be interpreted and construed in accordance with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ».
206
See Jean-François FLAUSS, « Principes généraux du droit communautaire dans la jurisprudence des
juridictions constitutionnelles des É tats membres », in Jacques BOURRINET (ed.), Droits nationaux,
droit communautaire, Hommage à L. Dubouis, Doc. Française, 2000, p. 54. See also the declaration
1/2004 of 1 December 2004 of the Tribunal constitucional in which the role of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights is highlighted as a source of interpretation of the Spanish constitutional rights.
36
In 2012207, the President of the ECtHR, Sir Nicolas Bratza, aware of the “increasing
number of binding legal instruments laying down fundamental rights within the
European Union legal system – and the risk of confusion which goes with it”, expressed
“the need for an external mechanism capable of providing legal certainty as to the
minimum protection standard applicable in the field” and supported the accession of the
European Union to the ECHR208 which is now required by Article 6.2. TEU209. Will the
accession of the European Union to the Convention enhance the coherent application of
human rights – and more precisely procedural rights - in Europe? Probably210, because
this will mean that EU law could be submitted to external scrutiny and that the Court of
Justice would be bound by the judicial precedents of the Court of Human Rights's case
law, avoiding issues of conflicting case law between these two courts211. However, it
will be a long time before the accession of the European Union to the ECHR comes into
force212 since it will require the signatures of all 47 Member States of the Council of
Europe and the ratification by their national parliaments213.
Constitutional courts that used to be reluctant214 to refer some questions to the ECJ for
preliminary rulings 215 , are now changing their behaviour 216 , which proves their
207
Annual Report 2012 European Court of Human Rights, p. 36.
On this issue, see Vassilios SKOURIS, “First thoughts on the forthcoming accession of the European
union to the European Convention on human rights”, in La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme,
un instrument vivant, Essays in Honour of Christos L. Rozakis, Brussels, Bruylant ed., 2011, pp. 555-569:
the establishment of an external mechanism of control of the protection of fundamental rights in the EU
by the ECtHR will “undoubtedly enhance the protection of fundamental rights in the EU” but “raises
several issues on both a procedural and substantive level”. See also Martin KUIJER, “The accession of
the European Union to the ECHR: A gift for the ECHR’s 60th anniversary or an unwelcome intruder at
the party?, Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 3:4, pp. 17-32, available at :
amsterdamlawforum.org/article/download/240/428.
209
However, such accession shall not affect the EU’s competences as defined in the Treaties.
210
For a positive answer, see Gil Carlos RODRIGUEZ IGLESIAS, quoted by M. KUIJER, prec., p. 23
(the accession of the EU to the ECHR « would reinforce the uniformity of the system for the protection of
fundamental rights in Europe »).
211
For examples of such conflicting case law, see ECJ, 8 February 2000, C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free
Zone) v. Aruba. In the absence of accession of the EU to the ECHR, the frequency of diverging
interpretations might well increase since the EU has its own human rights instruments (especially the
Charter).
212
In April 2013, negotiators of the 47 Council of Europe Member States and the European Union have
finalised the draft accession agreement of the European Union to the European Convention on Human
rights. The EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg has to give its opinion on the text.
213
In the EU, the Council shall unanimously adopt the accession agreement after receiving the
European Parliament’s consent. The Council decision has then to be approved by each EU-member state
according to their constitutional rules.
214
Except the Belgian Constitutional court, see C. C. VAN DE HEYNING, „The European perspective:
from lingua franca to a common language“, in Monica CLAES, Maartje DE VISSER, Patricia
POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING (eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe,
Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj, Intersentia, 2012, p. 193.
215
See for Spain M. GONZALEZ PASCUAL, « Mutual recognition and fundamental constitutional
rights. The first preliminary reference of the Spanish Constitutional court », in Monica CLAES, Maartje
DE VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING (eds), Constitutional Conversations
in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj, Intersentia, 2012, pp. 161 et seq. Commenting the first referral
of the Tribunal constitucional for preliminary ruling to the ECJ in the case Malloni, this author
acknowledges that theTribunal « sets aside its usual autism and opens up a direct complex and structured
208
37
Procedure
willingness to dialogue with the European court. Now and again, there has, however,
been some resistance coming from national constitutional courts to the EU-law and the
ECJ’s case law217. On certain issues, some Member States such as Germany218 have
threatened to partially stop the application of Union law which would endanger their
“national constitutional identity”219 and argued that the core of constitutional provisions
poses an ultimate limit to the primacy of EU law in the domestic legal order 220. Since
the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon, Article 4.2 TEU requires namely that the
Union “respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional,
inclusive of regional and local self-government”. What does this precisely mean221? Of
dialogue » with the ECJ (p. 163). See also M. CLAES, « Negotiating constitutional identity or whose
identity is it anyway ? », in Monica CLAES, Maartje DE VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine
VAN DE HEYNING (eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj,
Intersentia, 2012, p. 211.
216
See e.g. for the Spanish Tribunal constitucional, ECJ, 26 February 2013, C-399/11, Malloni; for the
French Conseil constitutionnel, see CC, 4 April 2013, No 2013-314P, QPC, D. 2013, p. 1479 and ECJ, 30
May 2013, Jeremy F. v. Premier Ministre, C-168/13 (European arrest warrant, referral for preliminary
ruling to be dealt with under the urgent procedure). Also the Austrian, Belgian and Italian constitutional
courts as well as the court of Luxemburg have referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling, see Christope de
ARANJO, Justices constitutionnelles et justices européennes des droits de l’homme, Étude comparée
France-Allemagne, Brussels, Bruylant ed., 2009, p. 205.
217
See Antonio TIZZANO, « La protection des droits fondamentaux en Europe: la Cour de Justice et les
juridictions constitutionnelles nationales », Revue du droit de l’Union européenne, No 1, 2006, pp. 14 et
seq.
218
See D. THYM, « Attack or retreat? Evolving thèmes and stratégies of the judicial dialogue between
the German Constitutional court and the European Court of Justice », in Monica CLAES, Maartje DE
VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING (eds), Constitutional Conversations in
Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj, Intersentia, 2012, pp. 235-249.
219
German Fed. Const. court (BVerfG), 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (decision relating to the Treaty of
Lisbon). The inviolable core content of the German constitutional identity relates to Article 23 paras 1 and
3 in conjunction with Article 79 para 3 of the Basic Law (GG). According to Art. 79 para 3 GG (eternity
clause), constitutional amendments may not infringe the core guarantees of humpan dignity, democracy,
the rule of law, republicanism and the welfare state as well as the basic features of intra-German
federalism. Traditionnally, issues related to the protection of fundamental rights were the core of many
conversations between national constitutional courts and the ECJ. Yet, more recently, constitutional
identity of the Member States has become an emerging topic. See also Polish Const. court, K 23/09, 24
September 2010; Czech Const. court, Pl. US. 19/08, 26 November 2008. The European warrant arrest has
led to decisions of several national constitutional courts in this respect. See also the decision issued by the
French Constitutional council, CC, 27 July 2006, No 2006-540 DC, Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux
droits voisins dans la société de l'information; see F.-X. MILLET, « The French Constitutional Council
and the CJEU : Between splendid isolation, communication and forced dialogue », in Monica CLAES,
Maartje DE VISSER, Patricia POPELIER and Catherine VAN DE HEYNING (eds), Constitutional
Conversations in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portlandj, Intersentia, 2012, pp. 255 et seq. In France, the
core of constitutional identity certainly encompasses indivisibility of the Republic, laïcité and the right to
asylum, see F.-X. MILLET, prec., p. 257.
220
See, howver, the « softer » decision rendered by the German Federal Constitutional court in the
Honeywell case, BVerfG, 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, BVerfGE 126, p. 286 ; see also D. THYM, prec., p.
240.
221
For suggestions, see Leonard F.M. BESSELINK, « National and constitutional identity before and
after Lisbon », Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue 3, Nov. 2010, pp. 36-49, who compares (pp. 43 et seq.)
the former Art. 6.3 TEU in the Maastricht version and the new Art. 4.2. after the Lisbon treaty “very
wordy formulation in the Lisbon version”.
38
course, substantively, the ECJ is not in position to determine “what is or what is not part
of the constitutional identity of a Member State” 222 . Article 4.2. probably urges a
“relationship of cooperation”223 between national courts and the ECJ: the constitutional
court would determine what belongs to the national constitutional identity224 whereas
the ECJ would assess the meaning of the EU law in the specific case225. The resistances
mentioned did, however, not relate to civil procedural issues.
Ⅴ. Conclusion
In our world of ever-growing complexity, fundamental procedural principles and rights
– often of constitutional origin and nature – have gained a leading role since they are
such an essential and necessary condition for the exercise of other fundamental rights.
Their growing constitutional and/or fundamental nature can be acknowledged with
satisfaction. Procedure has become a “noble subject matter”. In this regard, the crucial
influence of international instruments cannot be overlooked or denied. One can even
talk about a “constitutionalism compound” (constitutionalisme composé 226 ), which
encompasses in Europe national constitutions, EU-law and the ECHR. In numerous
jurisdictions, a dynamic and expanding interpretation of constitutional procedural rights
has been undertaken by constitutional or even ordinary courts in order to strengthen the
national constitution and avoid its decline, especially because of the growing
competition227 between national procedural guarantees and international or European
instruments of protection of human rights. If the winners of the competition are
effective access to court and fair trial placed equal first, who can complain?
222
Ibidem, p. 45.
The German Federal Constitutional court (BVerfG) expressly used this expression in its important
Maastricht decision of 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, pp. 155 et seq. See also
Spanish Tribunal constitucional, Decl. 1/2004, 13 December 2004: “constant dialogue with the authorised
jurisdictional instances […] for the authentic interpretation of the international agreements that contain
declarations of rights”.
224
Comp. D. THYM, prec., p. 244, according to whom the switch of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
towards the protection of constitutional identity represents a « change of strategy ».
225
Ibidem. Comp. C. VAN DE HEYNING, „The European perspective: from lingua franca to a
common language“, prec., pp. 201 et seq. Where a constitutional issue is at stake, the ECJ mostly does
not consider its constitutional status and translates the debate into EU language, see C. VAN DE
HEYNING, p. 193. For a case in which the ECJ relied on Art. 4.2 TEU to accept constitutional arguments
as legitimate derogations from EU law, see ECJ, 22 December 2010, C-208/08, Sayn-Wittgenstein v.
Landeshauptmann von Wien.
226
See Christophe de ARANJO, Justices constitutionnelles et justices européennes des droits de
l’homme, Étude comparée France-Allemagne, Brussels, Bruylant ed., 2009, p. 373.
227
According to Christophe de ARANJO, Justices constitutionnelles et justices européennes des droits de
l’homme, Étude comparée France-Allemagne, p. 379, the relationship between constitutional and
european law shoud not be of hierarchical nature : « Ces droits ne cohabitent pas en vertu d’un principe
hiérarchique, mais dans une relations d’interdépendance et de complémentarité ».
223
39
Procedure
List of Abreviations
ADR
Alternative Dispute Resolution
BGH
Bundegerichtshof, German Federal Court of Justice
BVerfG
Bundesverfassungsgericht, German Constitutional Court
CC
Conseil constitutionnel, French Constitutional Council
CPC
Code of civil procedure
D.
Recueil Dalloz
ECHR
European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR
European Court of Human Rights
EuGRZ
Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift
EU
European Union
JCP
Jurisclasseur Périodique (Semaine Juridique)
MDR
Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht
NJW
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
Rép. Dalloz Procédure civile
Répertoire Dalloz de Procédure civile
RTDCiv
Revue trimestrielle de droit civil
ZEuP
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht
ZZPInt
Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess International
40
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45

Session 1 : Ideological Background of the Constitution

Transcription

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