FACTS Database with hazardous materials used for industrial safety

FACTS
Database with hazardous materials used for industrial safety
maintained by the Department of Industrial Safety of TNO
Coded Accident Abstract
Identification
Type
Class
Abstr
Abstr
Address
Adate
Time
Activ
Loctn
Surr
Surr
Value
*****
Extended abstract english
Extended abstract french
Gb
1989
Text
-
Roadtransport
Industrial area/Estate/Park
Residential quarter
Nearby-objects/Places
0930
Emergency stop
Fireworks, factories & offices
Value
Human-failure
Text
Badly packed fuseheads
Value
Wrong-package
Drive
Vehicle
Wrong-labelled/Marked
Text
Over a speed ramp/Hump
Van
Not labelled conform un
Modified to carry explosives
7e+3/Kg
780/Kg
Fuseheads
4
Steel
Badly packed in rusty boxes
Of fuseheads by impact
Minor
Rear roller shutter
Blue, later thick yellow
0936
Warned the fire brigade said
Fire was a tanker fire
Placed rescue vehicle behind
Cause
Type
Cause
Description
Type
Occur
Occur
Eqinv
Occur
Eqappl
Qcont
Load
Chem
State
Chem
State
Eqinv
Eqmade
Occur
Occur
Occur
Eqdm
Occur
Occur
Occur
Time
Occur
Occur
Occur
Eqinv
Eqmade
Height
Time
Occur
Eqinv
Depth
Diam
Occur
Eqinv
Eqdm
Explosives
Solid
Fuzes, detonant, type a
Solid
Box
Wrong-package
Ignition
Explosion
Smoke-emission
Emergency-stop
Fire
Wrong-action
Wrong-action
Fire fighting/Emergency
response
Wall/Shell/Hull
Detonation
Crater
Blast-wave/Shock-wave
Fragment
Roof
Brick
2/m
0945
Of explosives
0.6/m
3/m
Shrapnel
-
Accident Nr.
10042
Eqdm
Eqdm
Eqdm
Area
Occur
Fatals
Injurs
Text
Text
Wndng
Treatm
Lesson
Cost
Cost
Photo
Window
Building
Vehicle
Evacuation
Fireman/Firefighter
Citizen/Resident
Fireman/Firefighter
Wound
Hospital
Loss-of-property
Fine (penalty)
20
100
1.6/Km
Nearby factories and offices
1
107
96
11
Cuts
84
See extended abstract
3e+6 gb pounds
342000 gb pounds
2
Scene
Type
Scene
Scene
Value
Text
Explosion of van carrying commercial explosives
Caused blast wave, evacuation and 108 casualties
EXTENDED ABSTRACT ENGLISH
An explosion in which a fireman was killed and at least 107 injured, was due to badly
packed fuseheads and rusty metal boxes used to carry them.
The accident began when fusehead combs in a box were ignited by the jolting of the
vehicle carrying them as it passed over a speed ramp on entering the yard at the
industrial estate. The fire started when a box of fusehead combs in the lorry was
ignited by impact, as the lorry
drove over a speed hump. Crewed by a driver and an attendant who had been
employed for 13 months and 11 years respectively, the van was carrying 780/kg of 4
different Class 1.1 high explosives, 750 detonators and 12400 fuseheads in 4 boxes.
The fuseheads comprised 10000 Vulcan individual fuseheads in 1 box and 2400 of the
Cerium type in 3 boxes. The Cerium fuseheads were supplied uncut on combs with 20
heads per comb.
The shock, caused by the driving over the speed ramp, produced a minor explosion in
the load compartment which blew the rear roller shutter door on the vehicle outwards.
The driver and attendant noticed blue smoke coming from the rear of the van, quickly
parked and warned people at an adjacent factory that the vehicle contained commercial
explosives.
An emergency call made by a worker at 0936 hours mistakenly reported the incident as
a 'tanker fire' but a second call at 0939 hours clearly referred to explosives being on
board. This information was relayed to the fire brigade rescue vehicle which reached
the yard at 0941 hours. The leading fireman on this vehicle was also told by one of the
crew that the van, which by now was issuing forth thick yellow smoke, contained
detonators. The rescue vehicle, which was parked behind a brick wall for safety, was
joined by 2 fire tenders.
The leading fireman decided that water should be played on the burning explosives van
to provide more time for evacuation of the surrounding buildings. The firemen from 1 of
the tenders had moved out beyond the protection of the wall, ready to direct water
from a nozzle onto the van, when the explosives detonated en masse. The 2 men were
standing 15/meter from the van at the time and 1 was struck on the head by shrapnel
and died shortly afterwards.
Nearly all members of both fire crews were injured to varying degrees. At least 107
people were injured, of whom 84 received hospital treatment and 2 were admitted to
intensive care.
The explosives firm was fined 250000 GB pounds for van blast and ordered to pay
92000 GB pounds costs.
Cause
The root cause of the fire was traced to packages of cerium type fusehead combs
which, as packed, were much more susceptible to impact ignition than permissible. The
packaging in use was not an authorised package either in the companies specifications
or the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) product authorisation or packaging
approval process. The package had developed as a result of informal customer liaison
and internal packaging change decisions.
Lessons learned (recommendations)
a)
Operators should develop systems to ensure that all activities involved in transporting
explosives are safe and that they meet the requirements of the relevant regulations.
These should include proper classification and labelling and correct packing of
explosives;
b)
safety and quality systems should apply not only to new or modified products but
should also include a periodic review of established ones;
c)
transport crews should be kept informed about changes in circumstances such as new
products among their load and their training should include measures needed when
carrying specific products and mixed loads;
d)
all transport of explosives should be preplanned to include measures to ensure that
explosives in different compatibility groups are prevented from coming into contact with
each other if their packaging is degraded through fire or minor explosions.
EXTENDED ABSTRACT FRENCH
A 9h45, un v??hicule transportant pr??s de 800 kg d???explosifs explose alors qu???il
effectue un demi-tour sur le site d???une entreprise dans la zone industrielle o?? il
s???est ??gar??. Le camion, sp??cialement am??nag?? pour transporter jusqu????? 5 t
d???explosifs, effectue 2 livraisons (7h15 et 8h) puis se dirige vers une usine de
fabrication d???artifices. Arriv?? dans la zone industrielle, le chauffeur se rend compte
qu???il s???est tromp?? de route ; il passe un dos d?????ne pour entrer sur le parking
d???une entreprise de la zone, afin de faire ?? tour. Le gardien de l???entreprise et les
deux chauffeurs d??tectent de la fum??e puis des flammes dans le chargement du
camion. Ils arr??tent le v??hicule, pr??viennent les pompiers et font ??vacuer le site.
Les mesures sont toutefois insuffisantes et des personnes assistent au d??veloppement
du sinistre depuis l???entr??e sur site et les b??timents alentour. 12 minutes plus tard,
la cargaison d??tone, provoquant la mort d???un pompier qui se trouvait ?? 15 m. Plus
d???une centaine de personnes sont bless??es, 87 seront hospitalis??es, dont 2 dans un
??tat grave. Les dommages aux b??timents et voitures proches sont consid??rables et
des bris de vitres sont recens??s jusqu????? 1 200 m. Un crat??re de 3,5 m de rayon et
de 46 cm de profondeur marque l???emplacement du camion. Le passage du v??hicule
sur le dos d'??ne a provoqu?? la chute d???un emballage de t??tes d'amor??age de type
peigne pour feux d???artifices, entra??nant leur allumage puis la propagation du feu au
reste du chargement (d??tonateurs + explosifs civils), jusqu????? l???explosion.
L???emballage ??tait non-conforme et dangereux: nombre excessif par boite, pr??sence
de composition et de rouille dans les boites en m??tal. L???exploitant est condamn?? ??
une amende de 250000 livres pour infraction ?? la loi britannique (Health and Safety at
work act 1974).