The Public Discourse about Islam in Germany

Transcription

THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE ABOUT ISLAM
IN GERMANY
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author:
Katharina Rothe
September 2010
Main Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Kemper
Second Supervisor: Dr. M. E. Spiering
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1
CHAPTER 1
Development and characteristics of the German discourse on Islam......................................... 5
CHAPTER 2
Image of Islam in the German political parties ........................................................................ 15
Between “Leitkultur“ and “Multi-Kulti“ – The image of Islam of CDU/CSU, SPD
and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen ........................................................................................ 16
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) .................... 16
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) ............................................................... 26
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen ................................................................................................ 30
Discourse on Islam in the extreme right-wing parties (Pro Köln, Pro NRW,
Pro Deutschland and NPD) ......................................................................................... 34
CHAPTER 3
Issues of contestation regarding Muslim immigrants in Germany ......................................... 44
The mosque building controversy ................................................................................ 46
The headscarf debate ................................................................................................... 53
Honour killings ............................................................................................................. 62
Homophobia among Muslim immigrants .................................................................... 66
Islamic religious education .......................................................................................... 70
CHAPTER 4
Islam criticism vs. Islamophobia - Public Islam critics .......................................................... 76
CHAPTER 5
Representation of Islam in the German media ........................................................................ 85
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 91
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 96
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................. 119
ii
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Online Questionnaire Survey “Muslime in Deutschland” .................................... 119
Figure 2: Bar chart depicting the gender of the respondents ................................................ 123
Figure 3: Bar chart depicting the age group of the respondents ........................................... 123
Figure 4: Frequency of regular contact with non-Muslim citizens (in percent) .................... 124
Figure 5: Perceptions of hostility towards Muslims among the German
non-Muslim population (in percent) ...................................................................... 128
Figure 6: Freedom of religious practice for Muslims (in percent) ........................................ 131
Figure 7: Perceptions of unequal treatment of Muslims in comparison to citizens of other
faiths (in percent) ................................................................................................... 131
Figure 8: Election posters of anti-Islam party Pro NRW for the state election in North-Rhine
Westphalia in May 2010 .......................................................................................... 135
iii
INTRODUCTION
“Fears of Eurabia: How much Allah can the old continent bear?“1, “Mekka Deutschland - Die
stille Islamisierung”2 or “Dschihad vor unserer Haustür”3. Headlines like these reach us with
increasing frequency in recent years. Hardly a week passes without a new report about the
allegedly growing and threatening influence of Islam in the West and the presumed
incompatibility of Islam with basic values of Western culture. Ranging from an “International
Burn-a-Koran-Day” to Mohammed cartoons, minaret ban, terrorist attacks, anti-mosque
protests, burqa ban to the recent “Sarrazin debate”4, issues related to Islam and the integration
of Muslim immigrants in European societies are discussed frequently in the political arena, in
public debates and the media. Due to the growing Muslim populations in Europe the topic
“Islam” is en vogue and regularly preoccupies public opinion, notably since the terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. This is also the case in
Germany, where the number of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries rose from
two million in 1990 to more than four million Muslims today.5
In recent decades Germany has become more culturally and religiously diverse, above all as a
result of Muslim immigration. This religious plurality represents a new challenge for the
German society, which is traditionally shaped by Judaeo-Christian values and now has to deal
with Islam, which, compared to other religions, does not have a long tradition in Germany.
The enduring and active presence of Muslims in the country consequently regularly provokes
debates about the role of Islam in German society. In particular areas where Islam claims
visibility in the public sphere and becomes an integral part of the everyday culture,
symbolized for instance through the Islamic headscarf or the mosque with minarets, lead to a
rising awareness of Islam in society and can spark vehement controversial discussions. This
1
Spiegel Online (2009): “Fears of Eurabia – How much Allah can the old continent bear?”, in: Spiegel Online
International, 11.12.2009. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,666448,00.html>
(Accessed 08.09.2010)
2
Der Spiegel (2007): Mekka Deutschland - Die stille Islamisierung, 13/2007, 23.06.2007
3
Nina Baumann (2008): “BND- Chef Uhrlau: „Dschihad vor unserer Haustür“, in: Focus Online, 24.03.2008.
Web page <http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-chef-uhrlau_aid_266664.html> (Accessed 26.08.2010)
4
More information about the “Sarrazin debate” will follow on pp.29-30 of this dissertation.
5
Sonja Haug; Stephanie Müssig; Anja Stichs (2009): “Muslim Life in Germany - A study conducted on behalf
of the German Conference on Islam”, in: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Web page
<http://www.bamf.de/cln_180/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/Forschungsberichte
/fb6-muslimisches-leben,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/ fb6-muslimisches-leben.pdf> (Accessed
12.06.2010), p.11
1
growing visibility often causes reservations towards the relatively “new” religion and evokes
fears of alienation and supposed “creeping Islamisation” among the German population.
In the public discourse on Islam in Germany many different societal actors are involved and
contribute significantly to shaping the public image of Islam. This thesis is intended to
examine the German discourse on Islam by taking into account different sectors of public life
and by analyzing statements about Islam made by politicians, intellectuals and opinion leaders
in the public sphere or the media. In this context it is important to explore the reasons and
motives for anti-Islamic discourse and the widespread unease with Islam in the German
society. As I will attempt to show in the following, we do not witness one homogeneous,
linear discourse about Islam in Germany, but a diversity of different, partly contradictory
discourses, notably with regard to controversial issues like the Islamic headscarf or Islamic
religious education. A general problem in the debates about Islam is the difficult distinction
between criticism of Islam and Islamophobia seeing that the limits between provocation and
defamation are very fluid.
The leading questions addressed in the pages ahead are the following: What are the
characteristics of the mainstream public discourse about Islam and Muslims in Germany?
Have Islamophobic attitudes and anti-Islamic rhetoric become more socially acceptable in
Germany in recent years, especially after 9/11? What influences do media and politics have in
the public discourse about Islam and on the image of Islam prevailing in the German society?
This dissertation will address these questions by starting off with mapping out the
development of the German discourse on Islam over the last decades and defining the
characteristics of the image of Islam. I will first provide some background information and
facts and figures on Germany’s Muslim population, followed by an overview about the recent
history of Muslim immigration in Germany from the post-war era until the present day. The
second chapter focuses on the perceptions of Islam as expressed in the political arena. In this
context the diverging approaches and attitudes towards Islam of the major German political
parties as well as far right populist parties are analyzed. This ranges from the multiculturalist
approach of the Green Party to the anti-Islamic polemics of the right-wing populist parties
Pro Köln, Pro NRW and Pro Deutschland, who have particularly focused their propaganda on
the alleged “Islamisation” of Germany and Europe. The major issues of contestation
regarding Muslim immigrants which have dominated the public debates about Islam in recent
years and which express the wider society’s negative attitude towards the religion and its
2
followers are unfolded in more detail in the third chapter. These include the controversies
about the construction of mosques, the headscarf debate, the phenomenon of honour killings,
homophobia among Muslim immigrants as well as the discussions about the introduction of
Islamic religious education in German public schools. In the following part the controversial
anti-Islamic rhetoric of public Islam critics in Germany will be analyzed by elaborating on the
way in which they frequently blur the line between legitimate criticism of Islam and
Islamophobia. I conclude by assessing the impact of the German mainstream media on the
public image of Islam by focusing on the way in which Islam is presented in the media
coverage.
Evidence gathered by several studies over the last few years indicates that since the events of
9/11, Muslims in Germany as well as in other European countries have been seriously
affected by an increasingly hostile social climate.6 Therefore a lot of academic literature
focusing on the phenomenon of Islamophobia and the “image of Islam as the enemy” has
been published in recent years, while previously the focus of academic works had been
mainly on Muslim communities rather than on German attitudes towards them. In this
dissertation I make extensive use of Thorsten Gerald Schneiders’ anthology Islamfeindlichkeit
– Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwinden which offers a collection of essays dealing with
the various facets of Islamophobia in Germany. Another major secondary literature source
used is the anthology Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa edited by Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and
Levent Tezcan which covers the public discourse about Islam in several European countries
with a particular focus on Germany, in academic articles by scholars from various disciplines.
The publications by the neo-Nazi experts Alexander Häusler and Hans-Peter Killguss deal
with the way the Feindbild Islam is constructed within the German right-wing populist parties
(Pro NRW, Pro D and Pro Köln) and the far right NPD in their anti-Islam propaganda. Given
the fact that many events referred to in this dissertation are relatively recent, I included a
considerable number of press articles from leading German newspapers and magazines like
Die Welt and Der Spiegel in my sources, which provide a wealth of information on issues
central to the public debates on Islam in latest years. With regard to primary sources I used
official documents from the political parties under scrutiny, the German government (e.g.
from the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)
as well as from Muslim organizations in Germany.
6
For instance the study Perceptions of Discrimination and Islamophobia – Voices from Members of Muslim
Communities in the European Union published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
(EUMC) in 2006.
3
When analyzing the discourse about Islam in Germany it is also important to look at the
reactions of Muslims to the growing Islamophobia in the German public and political domain.
Since the majority of the literature I found on the topic of Islam deals with the discourse about
Muslims and Islam, but hardly any study7 offers an insight into the perceptions of Muslims in
Germany themselves, I decided to start my own “experiment”, designed to complement my
analysis of the public discourse on Islam. In order to find out how Muslims living in Germany
perceive the attitudes of the German society towards Islam, I conducted an online
questionnaire survey entitled “Muslime in Deutschland” focusing on Muslim voices, which
included sixteen questions covering the major topics dealt with in this thesis. The survey,
which received very positive feedback, had a total number of 420 participants, of whom the
great majority were female. In the appendix of this thesis I provide a detailed evaluation of
the survey results, including an explanation of the way of distribution and the methodology
used, an overview of the survey questions in English and German with the corresponding
charts to the closed questions, as well as the respondent characteristics. Within the chapters I
occasionally refer to the Muslim reactions from the responses on my survey.
7
note: There are a number of studies on Muslim perceptions in the whole European Union (like the abovementioned survey by the EUMC), but none is focussing only on Muslims in Germany in particular.
4
CHAPTER 1
Development and characteristics of the German discourse on Islam
According to the latest estimates by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees from 2009
there are currently between 3.8 and 4.3 million8 Muslims living in Germany, constituting
between 4.6 and 5.2 per cent of the total population of 82 million. The number has more than
doubled in the past twenty years and immigration from predominantly Islamic countries
continues to increase and with it the Muslims’ societal and political significance in the
German society.9 Islam today represents the second largest religion in Germany after the
Christian Churches.10 The dominant group by far are citizens of Turkish descent11, who
constitute 63 per percent of the Muslim population in Germany, followed by Muslim
immigrants from Southeast Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and from South/Southeast
Asia. More than 90 percent of the Muslims living in Germany are thus of non-Arabic origin.
Germany’s Muslim population is highly heterogeneous not only in ethnic, national or
linguistic terms but also in denominational terms. Sunni Muslims form the largest
denominational group (74 percent), followed by Alevis, Shiites, Ahmadis, Sufis and Ibadis.12
Approximately 45 percent13 of the Muslims with migration background living in Germany
have obtained German citizenship, most of them being former Turkish nationals.14
For a long time only a very small number of Muslims (less than 1 percent) was living in
Germany. The first wave of Muslim immigration started in the 1960s in post-war Germany
during the Wirtschaftswunder, when the German industry recognized a shortage of labour in
West Germany, and the government initiated a state-controlled work migration, hiring so-
8
note: These numbers refer only to Muslims with a migrant background, ethnic Germans who have converted to
Islam are not covered in these data since their number is unknown as no such register is being kept according to
the Federal Ministry of the Interior.
9
Haug; Müssig; Stichs (2009), “Muslim Life in Germany”, pp.11-13
10
Mark Bodenstein (2010): “Organisational Developments towards Legal and Political Recognition of Muslims
in Germany”, in: Axel Kreienbrink; Mark Bodenstein (eds.) (2010): Muslim Organisations and the State –
European Perspectives. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, p.56
11
note: According to the “Migrationsbericht 2008” of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees there has
been a net migration loss with regard to Turkey in the last couple of years, thus more Turkish people actually
migrated from Germany than immigrated to it. In 2008 the number of Turkish immigrants to Germany has been
the lowest since 1983. This contradicts the alleged “mass immigration” of Muslims often claimed by extreme
right-wing politicians, seeing that Turkish immigrants constitute the majority of the Muslim population in
Germany (cf. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2010): Migrationsbericht 2008. Web page
<http://www.bamf.de/cln_180/nn_443284/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/Migrati
onsberichte/migrationsbericht-2008.html> (Accessed 19.08.2010)
12
Haug; Müssig; Stichs (2009), “Muslim Life in Germany“, pp.11-13
13
This means between 1.7 and 2 million people.
14
Haug; Müssig; Stichs (2009), “Muslim Life in Germany“, p.75
5
called “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) from Italy, former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Tunisia, and
above all from Turkey.15 This labour migration between the years 1955 and 197316 raised the
number of foreigners living in Germany to four million.17 The Turkish migrants, who mostly
came from the country’s rural and underdeveloped Eastern areas, soon became the largest
group of “Gastarbeiter” in Germany. Most “guest workers” intended to work for only a few
years in Germany and then return home, hence the term “guest worker”.18 However,
eventually, when they were granted the right to apply for unlimited residency after having
worked for more than five years in Germany, many of them stayed and reunited with their
families in their adopted country. During the 1970s, as a result of family reunifications, the
number of Turkish migrants in Germany grew especially high, reaching 1.5 million people.
This development had not been anticipated by the German authorities and was generally not
much appreciated by the German population, who was worried about the foreigners claiming
more and more living space. However, although many of the “guest workers” permanently
settled in Germany, mostly around the industrial areas of the large Western German cities, the
government was still reluctant to acknowledge that Germany had become an immigration
country. The illusion that the foreign workers would one day return to their countries of origin
was maintained until the late 1990s. Therefore for a long time no attempts were made to
integrate Islam and Muslims, considering it merely as a “Gastarbeiterreligion”, which laid the
foundations for the development of the often criticized Muslim “parallel society”.19
The prevalent view with regard to integration of the Muslim “guest workers” was thus that
there were no new Germans that needed to be integrated into the German society.
Consequently little was done in the way of recognizing the immigrants’ cultural claims.20 In
particular Turkish immigrants, as the biggest Muslim community in Germany, were looked at
with a certain suspicion and hostility since they seemed to behave in “foreign ways” due to
15
Thomas Petersen (2007): “Increasingly Uneasy: Germans’ Attitudes towards Islam.”, in: Public Opinion Pros
(An
Online
Magazine
for
the
Polling
Professional),
No.
3/2007.
Web
page
<http://www.publicopinionpros.norc.org/features/2007/mar/petersen_printable.asp> (Accessed 09.06.2010);
note: The recruitment agreement with Turkey was signed in the year 1961.
16
In this year the German government ordered a recruitment stop for “guest workers” due to oil crisis of 1973 in
order to limit the number of foreigners in Germany (cf. Günther Lachmann (2006): Tödliche Toleranz – Die
Muslime und unsere offene Gesellschaft. München: Piper Verlag GmbH, p.23).
17
Lachmann (2006), Tödliche Toleranz, p.29
18
Petersen (2007),“Increasingly Uneasy: Germans’ Attitudes towards Islam.”
19
Gerdien Jonker (2005): “From ‘Foreign Workers’ to ‘Sleepers’: The Churches, the State and Germany’s
‘Discovery’ of its Muslim Population”, in: Cesari, Jocelyne; McLoughlin, Seán (eds.): European Muslims and
the Secular State. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.113-114
20
Sawitri Saharso (2007): “Headscarves: A Comparison of Public Thought and Public Policy in Germany and
the Netherlands”, in: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 1743-8772, Vol. 10, Issue
4/2007
6
their different religious and cultural traditions like Islamic (halal) slaughter, different clothing
and the position of Muslim women. Their appearance and way of life prompted defamations
(e.g. “Kümmel-Türke”) and disdain among the German population.21 In propaganda
campaigns the Turkish “guest workers” were defamed in leading German newspapers which
published sensational articles about their alleged criminality.22 In the 1990s after the reunification of Germany public outrage against the growing number of foreigners culminated
in ‘pogroms’ against Turkish families. Arson attacks were carried out by right-wing
extremists in Hoyerswerda (in 1991), Rostock and Mölln (in 1992), and Solingen (in 1993),
which led to the deaths of several Turkish “guest workers” and/or their family members as
well as Turkish refugees. These racist and xenophobic attacks made it inevitably clear that
Germany had not accepted the ‘foreign’ presence of the Muslim immigrants living within its
society.23
It is notable that unlike in the current discourse about Islam in Germany, in the 1970s and
1980s, and mostly even until 9/11, Turkish and other migrants from Islamic countries were
rarely stigmatized as ‘Muslims’ by neither politicians nor the public at large but rather labeled
by their ethnic origins as ‘Turks’ or ‘Moroccans’.24 There was thus a shift in the general
perception of immigrants with Muslim background to Muslims with an immigration
background in the aftermath of 9/11.25 The xenophobic discourse about Turkish and other
Muslim immigrants from the 1980s and 1990s with all the negative connotations of the term
“foreigner” is now being transferred onto the term ‘Muslim’.26
From 1998 onwards however, the dialogue and communication between Muslims and nonMuslims in the German society and with it the image of Muslim immigrants gradually began
to change when the new government formed by Social Democrats and Greens, which had a
more multicultural and less ethno-cultural approach to immigration, changed integration
politics. This included a major reform of the German Nationality Act in 2000 which
21
Lachmann (2006), Tödliche Toleranz, p.21; Jonker (2005), “From ‘Foreign Workers’ to ‘Sleepers’”, p.114
Jonker (2005), “From ‘Foreign Workers’ to ‘Sleepers’”, p.113
23
Y. Michal Bodemann; Gökçe, Yurdakul (2009): “Deutsche Türken, jüdische Narrative und Fremdenangst:
Strategien der Anerkennung“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.211; Lachmann (2006), Tödliche
Toleranz, pp.34-41, p.44
24
Werner Schiffauer (2007): “Der unheimliche Muslim – Staatsbürgerschaft und zivilgesellschaftliche Ängste“,
in: Wahlrab-Sahr, Monika; Tezcan, Levent (eds.) (2007): Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa. Soziale Welt,
Sonderband 17. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p.115
25
Bodenstein (2010), “Organisational Developments”, p.56
26
Dieter Oberndörfer (2009): “Einwanderung wider Willen“, in: Schneiders, Thorsten Gerald (ed.) (2009):
Islamfeindlichkeit – Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwinden. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, p.128
22
7
introduced new legislation on citizenship27 making it easier for former “guest workers” and
their families to obtain German citizenship and paving the way for a structural integration
policy.28 Furthermore for the first time since Muslim immigrants had arrived in Germany
through the influx of labour migration, government departments actually sought to establish
official contact with Muslims organizations, as the German Churches had already done since
the 1970s. This was aimed at finding ways to co-operate on integration matters and to become
better informed about the different Muslim migrant organizations existing in Germany.29
What originally had only been the “Gastarbeiter-Problem” now had become the problem of
integrating Islam. The Social Democrats’ and Greens’ different approach to Muslim
immigrants also brought about a change of mentality towards Muslims in the German
majority society.30
In recent decades the growing Muslim immigrant population settling in Germany changed the
image of German society permanently. Since this change is irreversible and the influence of
Islam in the public sphere has become increasingly visible, consequently debates about
Muslim life have become more frequent in Germany among politicians, academics, as well as
among the public at large. These debates about Islam are rarely characterised by great
neutrality. In particular considering that even after fifty years of immigration from Muslim
countries, integration of Muslim citizens into the German society has not proved overly
successful, which according to Lachmann is a result of the government’s failed integration
policies that led to the appearance of “parallel societies”.31 The term “Parallelgesellschaft”
(“parallel society”), which Bassam Tibi defines as cultural and social segregation of
immigrants from the majority society, has become a major catch-word in the context of the
integration debate regarding Muslim immigrants and is frequently brought up by Islam critics,
politicians and the media.32
27
Birth right through blood (ius sanguinis) was complemented with birth right through land (ius soli).
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (2004): “Guest Workers into Germans? The Politics of Citizenship in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1960-2000”, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, 02.09.2004, p.2
29
30
Martin Engelbrecht (2010): “Through the Maze of Identities: Muslims in Germany trying to find their way
between religion, traditionalism, nationalism and the question of organisation”, in: Kreienbrink; Bodenstein
(eds.) (2010), Muslim Organisations and the State, p.155; Navid Kermani (2009): Wer sind wir? Deutschland
und seine Muslime. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 798. München: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, p.143
31
Lachmann (2006), Tödliche Toleranz, p.9, 58
32
Bassam Tibi (2006): “Europa und seine islamischen Enklaven – Welche Voraussetzungen müssen für ein
gemeinsames Leben in einer Zivilgesellschaft erfüllt werden? Die These von der Europäisierung des Islam“, in:
Altermatt, U.; Delgado, M.; Vergauwen, G. (eds.) (2006): Der Islam in Europa- Zwischen Weltpolitik und
Alltag. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer GmbH, p.43; Andrea Janßen; Ayça Polat (2006): “Soziale Netzwerke
28
8
The mainstream public discourse in Germany is characterized by a predominantly negative
image of Islam. Especially in the course of the last years prejudices against Islam and
Muslims have increased in Germany. Often a lack of knowledge about this relatively “new”
religion in Germany coupled with indifference of the non-Muslim German population lead to
generalizations and stereotypical simplifications falling on fertile ground.33 Islam is
frequently associated with religious fundamentalism, oppression of women, honour killings,
headscarves and the sharia. In other words with features that are incompatible with core
Western liberal and democratic values. These categorical suspicions against Muslims and the
undifferentiated image of Islam characterized by blatant misconceptions thus lead to a
stigmatization of Islam and Muslims. Anti-Muslim prejudices and irrational fears against
Islam are commonly referred to as Islamophobia.34
Islamophobia35 is defined by Steffen Kühnel and Jürgen Leibold as aversive attitudes towards
Muslims, their culture and Islamic symbols and practices.36 The broad spectrum of motives
for anti-Islamic discourse includes inter alia fears of alienation, integration problems of
Muslims, perception of Islam as a threat to the Enlightenment’s achievements like gender
equality and freedom of speech, and the fear of terrorism.37 The two scientists Kühnel and
Leibold from the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research in Conflict and Violence (IKG) at the
University of Bielefeld, who conduct a long-term study on “group focused enmity” in Europe
since 2002, argue that Islamophobia is not independent from xenophobic attitudes, but rather
seems to be a specific component of xenophobia. They assume that Islamophobia will
increase in Germany in the coming years with growing religious and cultural tensions
türkischer Migrantinnen und Migranten“, in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte 1-2/2006. Web page <http://www1.bpb.de/files/AQ6PWB.pdf> (Accessed 30.11.2010)
33
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2009): ECRI Report on Germany (fourth monitoring
cycle). Web page <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Germany/DEU-CbC-IV-2009019-ENG.pdf> (Accessed 05.01.2010); Aiman A. Mazyek (2010): “Über Islamkritiker, Islamhasser und die
Islamkonferenz-Kritik“, in: islam.de, 19.03.2010. Web page <http://islam.de/15570.php> (Accessed 19.07.2010)
34
Heiner Bielefeldt (2009): “Das Islambild in Deutschland. Zum öffentlichen Umgang mit der Angst vor dem
Islam“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.167
35
The first time that the issue of Islamophobia was comprehensively tackled and the term Islamophobia became
known to the public at large was in 1997. In this year the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia of
the (British) Runnymede Trust (an independent research and social policy agency) published a report entitled
“Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”. Since then the term has been used increasingly in the media, in
political circles and even by Muslim organizations (cf. Runnymede Trust, The (1997): Islamophobia – A
Challenge to us all. Summary. Web Page <http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/
pdfs/islamophobia.pdf> (Accessed 20.06.2010); Bielefeldt (2009), “Das Islambild in Deutschland“, p.183
36
Steffen Kühnel; Jürgen Leibold (2007): “Islamophobie in der deutschen Bevölkerung: Ein neues Phänomen
oder nur ein neuer Name? Ergebnisse von Bevölkerungsumfragen zur gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit
2003 bis 2005“, in: Monika Wohlrab-Sahr; Levent Tezcan (eds.) (2007): Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa. Soziale
Welt, Sonderband 17. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p.135
37
Bielefeldt (2009), “Das Islambild in Deutschland“, pp.168-169
9
between the Muslim minority society and the non-Muslim majority population.38 This
assumption is based on the results of their survey on Islamophobia, conducted between 2003
and 2005, which unveiled that 34 percent of Germans “feel like foreigners” in their own
society due to the strong Muslim presence in the country and more than half of the
respondents claimed they would prefer not living in a neighbourhood that is heavily populated
by Muslims.39 Moreover, the survey showed that almost one out of three German citizens has
racist attitude patterns and one out of four thinks that it would be better to stop Muslim
immigration to Germany entirely claiming that there are “too many Muslims” in the country.
In this context it is however not always clearly distinguishable if the discrimination of Muslim
immigrants is primarily connected to their religion or occurs on grounds of their ethnocultural background.40
According to Navid Kermani, Iranian-German author and expert in Islamic Studies, the major
problem with respect to the integration debate about Muslim immigrants is the simplified
reduction of the Muslim population to one homogeneous “Muslim” mass without taking into
account the immigrants’ ethno-cultural, social and educational backgrounds. Religion does
not operate in a vacuum and Islam becomes a scapegoat for everything, being held
accountable for many (social) problems like unemployment, the supposed mass immigration
of foreigners, deficits in education as well as lacking integration. In Kermani’s opinion this
blanket connection of Islam with social and political issues of immigration and integration
problems leads to a biased emotionalisation and culturalisation of the public debate.41 Despite
the diversity within Muslim communities in Germany Muslim immigrants are generally
simply reduced to “The Muslims” and treated under the single label of “Islam” regardless of
the branch of Islam they belong to (Sunni, Alevi, Shia etc.) and without differentiating
between orthodox Muslims, Islamists and secular Muslims.42 Inspite of the efforts of some
actors promoting a constructive inter-faith dialogue and intercultural exchange who call for a
differentiated approach to Islam, an accurate distinction is rarely made between Islam
(religion) as such and fundamentalist activities by radical Muslims. Although only a small
38
Kühnel; Leibold (2007), “Islamophobie in der deutschen Bevölkerung“, pp. 151-152
Jürgen Leibold (2009): “Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Islamophobie – Fakten zum gegenwärtigen Verhältnis
genereller und spezifischer Vorurteile“, in: Schneiders (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.150
40
Mario Peucker (2009): “Islamfeindlichkeit – die empirischen Grundlagen“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009),
Islamfeindlichkeit, p.155
41
Kermani (2009), Deutschland und seine Muslime, p.19
42
The Turkish SPD politician Lale Akgün calls these secular Muslims “Ramadan Muslims“ who are as religious
as the “Weihnachtschristen” (cf. Ahmet Senyurt (2008): “Muslime und Zuwanderung – Integrationspolitische
Defizite und Pauschalisierungen”, in: Häusler; Killguss (eds.) (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.63)
39
10
minority of Germany’s Muslims support or propagate fundamentalist ideologies and
violence.43
In the German public arena religion traditionally plays a relatively strong role given the fact
that Germany is not a laicistic state, but characterized by a principle of tight co-operation
between church and state institutions. This also has an impact on the way in which religious
plurality is dealt with in the public sphere. The increasing visibility of Islam in Germany
represents a challenge to the predominately Christian German society and regularly illustrates
the limits of tolerance of the mainstream society towards religious and ethnic minorities in the
country.44 In public debates Islam is generally presented as the ‘Other’, that means it is either
regarded as the ‘alien’ monolithic religion from the Orient or stands for the authoritarianism
of pre-modern ways of life which is incompatible with the values and norms of the
enlightened Judaeo-Christian Occident. By highlighting the dichotomy between the West
(‘us’) and the Muslim ‘Other’ (‘them’) based on generalizations and stereotyping, antiMuslim racism and discrimination are encouraged and the perception of civilizations as static
opposing blocs with irreconcilable characteristics is strengthened.45
Public opinion about Islam has become strikingly worse in recent years, in particular after the
September 11 attacks, which marked a milestone in the debate about Islam. Migrants from
Muslim countries were suddenly stigmatized as potentially dangerous people to be feared and
Islam was suspected of breeding terrorism and extremism.46 This social climate change in the
attitudes towards Muslims was enhanced by the fact that the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center were partly planned and carried out by Muslim students based in Hamburg,
which in the aftermath of 9/11 consequently led to Muslim communities being viewed with
increasing suspicion due to fears and security concerns about “home-grown terrorism”.47
43
Alexander Häusler; Peter Killguss (eds.) (2008): Feindbild Islam. Rechtspopulistische Kulturalisierung des
Politischen. Dokumentation zur Fachtagung am 13. September 2008, Beiträge und Materialien 1 der Info- und
Bildungsstelle gegen Rechtsextremismus. Köln: Selbstverlag, p.3; Bundesministerium des Innern (2007c):
Muslime in Deutschland - Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion und Einstellungen zu Demokratie,
Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt – Ergebnisse von Befragungen im Rahmen einer
multizentrischen Studie in städtischen Lebensräumen. Paderborn: Bonifatius GmbH, Vorwort
44
Effie Fokas (2007): “Introduction”, in: Aziz Al-Azmeh; Effie Fokas (eds.) (2007): Islam in Europe - Diversity,
Identity and Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.8
45
Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.3; Khallouk, Mohammed (2010): “Von der Kollektivaversion
gegen Islam- Facettenreichtum der Islamfeindlichkeit in Deutschland im öffentlichen Bewusstsein“, in: islam.de,
28.01.2010. Web page <http://islam.de/15280.php> (Accessed 23.02.2010)
46
David Motadel (2007): “Islam in Germany”, in: Euro-Islam. Web page <http://www.euro-islam.info/countryprofiles/germany/> (Accessed 19.07.2010)
47
Bundesministerium des Innern (2007c): Muslime in Deutschland, p.9
11
Another case of “homegrown terrorism” in Germany, which sparked much public debate,
were the so-called “Sauerland cell” terrorists.48
Various empirical studies confirm the observation that Islamophobia and generalized
skepticism towards Muslims have significantly increased in recent years. According to an
opinion poll on the attitudes of German citizens towards Islam conducted by the Institut für
Demoskopie Allensbach, which was published in May 2006 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 91 percent of all respondents equate Islam with violence and discrimination of
women, whereas in an earlier survey from 2004 it had been 85 percent. Furthermore 83
percent of the respondents associate Islam with fanaticism, 62 percent consider it as backward
and conservative, 71 percent think that Islam is intolerant and a majority of 60 percent regards
Islamic faith as being incompatible with democracy and Western culture and civilization.49
The dominant image of Islam in the public discourse is thus strongly anxiety-provoking and
shaped by deep-rooted prejudices and resentments. For many non-Muslim German citizens it
is thereby irrelevant if marginal phenomena like honour killings, social problems, forced
marriages or terrorist acts are actually related to the religion of Islam itself or if they are rather
culturally-based traditions. It is simply assumed that these practices are a direct consequence
of Islamic beliefs and thus seen as characteristic for Muslims.50
It should be noted that anti-Islamic attitudes and negative stereotypes about Muslims are
widely spreading among Germans in all segments of the society regardless of their political
and religious beliefs or social and educational backgrounds. As Bielefeldt notes, since 9/11
non-Muslim citizens show an increased readiness to express these biased views and fears
regarding Islam in public. It has thus become more socially acceptable to criticize Islam
publicly and negative discourse about Islam is no longer a fringe phenomenon limited to
right-wing groups, but found its way into all political camps and the society at large.51
48
The “Sauerland cell“ terrorists were a small group of German-born converts to Islam and German Turks who
had allegedly planned terrorist attacks on US Army bases in Germany, as well as other facilities such as airports,
bars and restaurants. They were arrested in 2007 in the Sauerland area in Western Germany after having been
monitored by the police for several months (cf. Deutsche Welle (2009): ““Sauerland cell“ trial opens in
Duesseldorf“, in: dw-world.de, 22.04.2009. Web page <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4197848,00.html>
(Accessed 14.09.2010)).
49
Elisabeth Noelle; Thomas Petersen, (2006): “Eine fremde bedrohliche Welt. Die Einstellung der Deutschen
zum Islam. Eine Dokumentation des Beitrags in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung Nr. 114 vom 17. Mai“, in:
Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach.
50
Mohammed Shakush (2009): “Der Islam im Spiegel der Politik von CDU und CSU – Aspekte einer
komplizierten Beziehung”, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.365
51
Bielefeldt (2009), “Das Islambild in Deutschland“, p.169
12
However, according to theologian Thomas Naumann this deep-rooted aversion towards Islam
and widespread mistrust of Muslims is neither a new phenomenon nor a typically German one
which only emerged after the 9/11 attacks or the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. It rather
derives from historical European fears and enemy stereotypes of Islam. These fears developed
due to the expansion of Islam after historical events like the Muslim conquests or the Turkish
Wars which have shaped the European negative perception of Islam for centuries and are
marked by clichéd notions of tensions between the Christian Europe and the Ottoman Muslim
‘Other’. They now re-surface as a result of the growing presence of Muslims in Germany and
not least due to Islamist terrorism in the West. Islamic expansion is thereby equated with
religious coercion and thus represents a threat to the Judaeo-Christian Occident. Hence the
September 11 attacks were only the trigger but not the actual cause of the currently reemerging fear of Islam in Germany.52
As a result of the predominantly negative image of Islam, which is characterizing the
mainstream discourse on Islam, Muslims in Germany feel that they are constantly placed
under general suspicion of being radical and violent and have to prove their peaceful
convictions and dissociate themselves clearly from terrorists and Islamism. Especially since
the September 11 attacks, Muslims feel increasingly pigeonholed and vilified as terrorists and
as a consequence often retreat into their Muslim “parallel societies”. Some Muslims who
participated in my survey even see notable parallels between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism
and compare the alleged “schleichende Muslimverfolgung” to the persecution of Jews in the
Nazi era.53
Due to the growing Islamophobia among the German population Muslims are frequently
faced with socio-economic marginalization and discrimination in daily life caused by deeprooted anti-Muslim prejudices.54 Even though Islamophobic assaults are still relatively rare in
Germany compared to other European countries, there are still occasional reports about
overtly anti-Islamic insults or attacks in the public sphere.55 In this respect particular those
52
Thomas Naumann (2010): “Feindbild Islam – Historische und theologische Grüne einer europäischen Angst“,
in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, pp.22-23
53
Survey - Muslime in Deutschland, 18.07.2010-23.08.2010. Web page <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/
fragebogen_muslime_de> (not accessible online anymore, but see appendix for more details); note: A vast
majority of 79.8 percent of the respondents confirmed a rise of Islamophobia since the September 11 attacks.
54
Two thirds of the survey participants reported to already have been subjected to discrimination on the basis of
their faith, for instance on the labour market or with regard to access to decent housing. (cf. Survey - Muslime in
Deutschland).
55
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (2006): “Muslims in the European Union –
Discrimination and Islamophobia”, in: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 18.05.2007. Web page
<http://www.integration-in-deutschland.de/cln_110/nn_284176/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Integration/
13
who are ‘visibly Muslim’ like women wearing headscarves are in a vulnerable position and
more likely to be exposed to verbal abuse and hostility by different societal actors in the
public sphere and in professional life, as stated in many of the responses in my survey.56
Similar to the Islamophobic violence in the Netherlands after the murder of Theo van Gogh in
2004 several arson attacks were carried out on mosques in Germany.57 The vulnerability of
Muslims to physical violence and harassment on the basis of Islamophobic motives can even
lead to extreme forms like in the murder case of the young Egyptian woman Marwa AlSherbini, who was brutally killed in a courtroom in Dresden on 1 July 2009 by a 28-year old
Russian-German. He had been sued for slander by Al-Sherbini after having insulted her as
“terrorist” and “Islamist bitch” and attacking her by pulling her veil off on a playground one
year previous to the murder. This Islamophobic and xenophobic incident led to a controversial
public debate and widespread outrage among Muslims, especially in the victim’s native
country Egypt, about the increasing Islamophobia and latent racism at the centre of German
society.58 The German government and the media reacted to this obviously Islamophobic
crime with a lot of hesitation and delay, which was widely criticized by Muslim organizations
as well as the Central Council of Jews in Germany and sparked anti-German protests across
the Islamic world.59
Downloads/Sonstiges/muslims-europe-d-ip,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/muslims-europe-dip.pdf> (Accessed 09.06.2010)
56
Survey - Muslime in Deutschland
57
Peucker (2009), “Islamfeindlichkeit – die empirischen Grundlagen“, p.161
58
Steffen Winter (2009): “The Marwa Al-Sherbani Case. Investigators believe Killer ‘hated Non-Europeans’
and Muslims”, in: Spiegel Online International, 02.09.2009. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,646292,00.html> (Accessed 16.06.2010)
59
Andrea Dernbach; Martin Gehlen (2009): “Islamophobie ist kein Phantom“, in: Zeit Online, 07.07.2009. Web
page <http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/28/islamophobie-ist-kein-phantom> (Accessed 03.02.2010)
14
CHAPTER 2
The image of Islam in the German political parties
Islam and Muslims have by now become an integral part of the political debate in Germany.
However, the German political parties’ positions towards Islam are ambivalent and
inconsistent in many respects. The growing Muslim population altered the social structure of
the German society and since many Muslim immigrants changed from their status of
‘foreigner’ by attaining German citizenship and with it the right to vote they consequently
represent potential electorate for the political parties in the country. At the same time in some
segments of the non-Muslim population there is a fear of a gradual entrenchment of Islam in
Germany which sometimes leads to strong defensive reactions against Islam and Muslims.
Consequently, the more a party relies on voters from these segments of society the more
difficult the balancing act becomes between integration and dissociation of Muslims.60 The
respective party’s policies on Islam are therefore often formulated in an ambiguous manner
and statements made by politicians about issues regarding Islam often reflect very divergent
positions, even within the same political party.61 Without doubt in the political arena
discussions concerning the integration of Germany’s Muslims have heated up considerably in
the last decades, in particular since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.62
In the following I will analyze the approaches and attitudes towards Islam of some of the
major German political parties, namely the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the
Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. In contrast to that the discourse on Islam of the right-wing populist
parties Pro Köln, Pro NRW, Pro Deutschland and the far right nationalist party NPD will be
examined subsequently.
60
Shakush (2009), “Islam im Spiegel der Politik von CDU und CSU“, p.363
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2009d): Parteien antworten auf ZMD-Wahlprüfsteine,
15.09.2009. Web page <http://www.zentralrat.de/13944.php> (Accessed 10.06.2010)
62
61
15
Between “Leitkultur“ and “Multi-Kulti“ – The image of Islam of
CDU/CSU, SPD and Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU)
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a centre-right Christian-based, non-denominational
People’s party and part of the current government coalition headed by Chancellor Angela
Merkel, and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), which together form
the CDU/CSU grouping in the German Bundestag, have a traditionally rather conservative
loyal support base. Given the fact that Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon in Germany,
which came with the guest workers in the 1960s and is only raising major public awareness as
a new religion in German society since the 1990s, it is not surprising that the conservative
circles of CDU and CSU have difficulties accepting this change and are characterized by an
ambivalent relationship to Islam. Muslim immigrants challenge the Christian-based parties to
a particular degree. They alter the German social structure not only in ethnic terms but in
particular through their different religion, thus affecting two core aspects of the conservative
mind-set simply through their mere existence: the traditional ethnic structure and the
religious, traditionally Christian character of the German society.63
For a long time the conservative politicians of the CDU and CSU have categorically denied
that Germany has turned into an immigration country. Only since the beginning of the new
millennium, thus only after four decades of Muslim immigration, the CDU acknowledges this
fact but still emphasises that Germany is not a “classic immigration country” in its draft on
immigration policy Zuwanderung steuern und begrenzen - Integration fördern published in
2001.64 As far as Islam in Germany is concerned the same document states that the Christian
church is assigned a specific responsibility for advancing the Muslim-Christian inter-faith
dialogue, which has so far often been characterized by prejudices and mutual lack of
knowledge about the respective other religion. The Islamic faith is generally not seen as an
obstacle to integration as long as it is an enlightened version of Islam, and the construction of
prestigious Islamic places of worship as well as burial grounds should be authorized in
accordance with legal provisions. The CDU is furthermore in favour of the introduction of
Islamic religious instruction in German language in the country’s public schools with teachers
63
Shakush (2009), “Islam im Spiegel der Politik von CDU und CSU“, pp.363-364
CDU Deutschlands (2001): Zuwanderung steuern und begrenzen. Integration fördern. Beschluss des
Bundesausschusses der CDU Deutschlands vom 7. Juni 2001 in Berlin. Web page
<http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/070601_zuwanderung_steuern.pdf> (Accessed 23.06.2010)
64
16
educated in German universities in the discipline “Islamische Religionspädagogik” and
imams are to be directly trained in Germany. Even though the conservative Christian
Democrats urge to always clearly differentiate between Islam and Islamism65, reality shows
that this is not always put into practice in the public discourse neither by politicians nor the
general public.66
In its Party Manifesto the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) emphasises that
Germany is a “European cultural nation, characterised especially by Christian-Jewish
tradition and the Enlightenment”.67 Islam is not mentioned at all as part of the national
identity and Germany’s culture, despite the growing Muslim population in the Federal
Republic, clearly showing the status it has compared to the occidental Christianity and
Judaism, which are obviously considered more important.68 With remarkable consistence the
role Islam has played in European history is completely ignored. Also the incumbent
Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) frequently speaks of the Judaeo-Christian values and the
humanist culture that have shaped Europe69, and emphasises that in the German culture “we
celebrate Christian holidays, not Muslim holidays”.70 The conservative Christian Democratic
Party nevertheless tries to encourage Muslim citizens, in particular those with Turkish origin,
to become members of the CDU by emphasising its political principles including especially
social values like family, religion, solidarity and education which are also of great importance
to many Muslims in Germany.71 In this context the Deutsch-Türkisches Forum was founded
in 1997 as a platform for collaboration between German CDU politicians and those of Turkish
origin on the issue of integration policy.72
Within the framework of the national debate on the future directions and criteria for the
German immigration policy in the year 2000, the ultraconservative CDU politician Friedrich
65
CDU Deutschlands (2001), Zuwanderung steuern und begrenzen
Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.3
67
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2008): Freedom and Security – Principles for Germany – Party Manifesto of the
Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), Agreed during the 21st Party Congress in Hanover, 3th-4th
December 2007. Web page <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_13533-544-2-30.pdf?080423105009> (Accessed
21.06.2010)
68
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2008), Party Manifesto of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU)
69
Sabine Kebir (2008): “Muslimisches Selbstverständnis und Kulturalisierung des Politischen“, in: Häusler;
Killguss (eds.) (2008): Feindbild Islam, p.53
70
Motadel (2007), “Islam in Germany”
71
CDU Deutschlands (2010): Die CDU Deutschlands – offen für türkischstämmige Bürger. Web page
<http://www.hosgeldiniz.cdu.de/index.htm> (Accessed 24.06.2010)
72
Deutsch-Türkisches Forum der CDU (2010): Unsere Ziele. Web page <http://www.dtf-online.de//
index.php?page=unsere-ziele> (Accessed 24.06.2010)
66
17
Merz coined the term deutsche Leitkultur73 (German dominant culture). He demanded that
immigrants and their children should adopt the basic ‘German’ values and norms which are
shaped by the Judaeo-Christian-occidental civilization, thus assimilate to the German
Leitkultur. Even though the freiheitliche deutsche Leitkultur has been defined by Merz as
culture of tolerance and cooperation based on human dignity and (gender) equality74, the
connotations of the CDU’s declared belief in a German dominant culture reflect a widespread
feeling of unease among the political elite about dealing with the growing cultural-religious
plurality in the country, in particular with regard to Muslim immigrants. This anxiety is
regularly expressed in political debates through the resurgence of conservative policies and
normative models of culture.75 Although a number of CDU members have distanced
themselves from Merz’s suggestions, the term Leitkultur entered the CDU’s programmatic
language very quickly. The mono-cultural concept of Leitkultur has caused a national
controversy and is highly contested by the opposition parties (left of the CDU) as well as by
Muslim organizations as it suggests a national superiority of German culture towards the
cultures of the minority societies and promotes assimilation instead of integration. It is seen as
particularly discriminatory towards Muslims due to the emphasis on the Leitkultur’s JudaeoChristian heritage. The Federal Advisory Board for Foreigners accused Merz of “intellectual
arson” through representing minority cultures as a threat to German culture.76 Despite all
criticism however, the CDU continues to use the term in political debates about immigration
and integration and meanwhile also extreme right-wing parties have included it in their antiIslamic propaganda repertoire.77
73
The term Leitkultur was first introduced by German-Syrian sociologist and political scientist Bassam Tibi in
1998 in his book Europa ohne Identität, referring however to a European Leitkultur rather than a German one.
According to Tibi this core culture is based on Western values like democracy, secularism, Enlightenment,
human rights and civil society. His idea thus represents a European-occidental identity not based on a one-sided
religious definition which stands in contrast to the CDU’s concept of Leitkultur which is specifically defined as
being based on Christian-occidental values, hence rather obstructive to integration (cf. Thomas Wolters (2000):
Was ist Leitkultur, 21.12.2000. Web page <http://www.was-ist-leitkultur.de/wasistleitkultur.htm> (Accessed
29.06.2010); Liz Fekete (2009): A Suitable Enemy – Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe. London &
New York: Pluto Press).
74
Friedrich Merz (2000): “Einwanderung und Identität“, in: Welt Online, 25.10.2000. Web page
<http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article540438/Einwanderung_und_Identitaet.html> (Accessed 29.06.2010)
75
RP Online (2000): “CDU will ‘Leitkultur‘ definieren - Ausländerbeirat wirft Merz ‘geistige Brandstiftung‘
vor“, in: Rheinische Post Online, 01.11.2000. Web page <http://www.rp-online.de/politik/Auslaenderbeiratwirft-Merz-geistige-Brandstiftung-vor_aid_253526.html> (Accessed 29.06.2010); Schirin Amir-Moazami
(2005): “Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus: A German Case Study”, in: Journal of Contemporary
European Studies, 13:3, p.283
76
RP Online (2000), “CDU will ‘Leitkultur‘ definieren“
77
Nicola Brüning; Olaf Opitz; Wolfgang Stock (2000): “CDU - Leitkultur trifft den Nerv“, in: Focus Online, Nr.
45/2000,
06.11.2000.
Web
page
<http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-leitkultur-trifft-dennerv_aid_186805.html> (Accessed 29.06.2010)
18
In many public statements by CDU or CSU politicians verbal attacks against Islam and
stigmatizations of Muslims are expressed.78 In his keynote address at the CSU party
convention in 2007 Edmund Stoiber, at that time prime minister of the federal state of Bavaria
and CSU party leader, advocated tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities but at the
same time warned against a “cultural self-abandonment” (“kulturelle Selbstaufgabe“) with
regard to Islam. He defended his opinion that minarets should not be higher than church
towers79 and stated “[u]nser Land soll auch im Jahr 2020 geprägt sein von Kirchtürmen und
nicht von Minaretten“.80 Also CDU politician Hans-Jürgen Irmer, member of the state
parliament of Hessen, triggered heavy criticism among the public at large as well as among
politicians after his recent statement “Der Islam ist auf die Eroberung der Weltherrschaft
fixiert. Wir brauchen nicht mehr Muslime, sondern weniger.”, which was declared as a racist
and outrageous faux pas by the opposition parties. Due to enormous public pressure he later
officially apologized for his comments.81
Stereotypes and generalizations about Muslim women surfacing in the public debates were
even incorporated into CDU policies. With regard to integration policy the CDU resolution
Im deutschen Interesse: Integration fördern und fordern, Islamismus bekämpfen! states:
“Besondere Anstrengungen sind erforderlich, um die aus dem islamischen Kulturkreis nach
Deutschland zugewanderten Frauen und Mädchen in unsere Gesellschaft zu integrieren. […].
Wir wollen, dass Zwangsverheiratung ein Strafbestand wird.“82 This wrongly suggests that
most Muslim girls and women are threatened by forced marriages even though there are no
official data about the exact number.
An issue sparking a major national controversy in the debate about Islam in Germany, was the
so-called Gesprächsleitfaden für Einbürgerungswillige, dubbed “Muslim Test“ or
“Gesinnungstest” by its opponents, which the Christian Democrat-led federal government of
Baden-Württemberg introduced on 1 January 2006. These “discussion guidelines” are based
78
Harry Luck (2007a): “CSU-Parteitag – Stoiber kämpft bis zuletzt”, in: Focus Online, 28.09.2007. Web page
<http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/stoiber/csu-parteitag_aid_134318.html> (Accessed 23.06.2010)
80
Harry Luck (2007b): “Stoiber pocht auf Betreuungsgeld”, in: Focus Online, 01.09.2007. Web page
<http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/stoiber/union_aid_131447.html> (Accessed 23.06.2010)
81
Christoph Schmidt Lunau (2010): “Muslimische Ministerin - Eklat um Özkan im hessischen Landtag“, in: Zeit
Online, 29.04.2010. Web page <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2010-04/oezkan-irmer> (Accessed
30.06.2010)
82
CDU Deutschlands (2004): Im deutschen Interesse: Integration fördern und fordern, Islamismus bekämpfen! –
Beschluss C34 des 18. Parteitags der CDU Deutschlands vom 6-7.12.2004, Düsseldorf. Web page
<http://www.hosgeldiniz.cdu.de/doc/duesseldorf_integration.pdf> (Accessed 24.06.2010)
79
19
on an idea of Interior Minister of Baden-Württemberg Heribert Rech and consist of 30
questions that can be put to Muslim applicants for naturalisation in an interview in order to
test their moral concepts and fundamental attitude to the German Basic Law in case the
authorities have doubts if the immigration candidate will pledge allegiance to the free
democratic order.83 The Ministry of the Interior however explicitly stated that the interview
definitely has to be conducted with naturalisation applicants of the 57 Islamic states belonging
to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference84 as well as for citizenship applicants of
Muslim faith originating from other than these 57 countries. As for the reason for the
introduction of the “Muslim Test” the Ministry justified its decision referring to findings from
studies of the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv Deutschland according to which a section of 21 per
cent of the Muslim population in Germany believes that the German Basic Law is not
compatible with the Koran. This fact leads to doubts if the condition of a “innere Hinwendung
zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (“inner devotion”) set out in the new German nationality
law in force since 2000 can be fulfilled by the Muslim applicant.85 According to Rech
Muslims often have insufficient knowledge of the German Basic Law due to their origin,
different values and religion. The guidelines are therefore considered rather as a contribution
to integration than intended to discriminate against the Muslim applicants for citizenship.
After the events of September 11 it has become even more relevant to avoid the formation of
a Muslim “parallel society”.86
The questions test attitudes towards gender equality, democracy, freedom of expression,
homosexuality, terrorism and violence against women, thus pandering to popular stereotypes
of Muslims. The “discussion guidelines” include questions like the following: “How do you
view the statement that a woman should obey her husband, and that he can beat her if she
doesn’t?”, “You learn that people from your neighbourhood or from among friends or
acquaintances have carried out or are planning a terrorist attack. How do you react?”, “Some
83
Ray Furlong (2006): “German ‘Muslim test’ stirs anger”, in: BBC News, 10.02.2006. Web page
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4655240.stm> (Accessed 28.06.2010)
84
The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), established in 1969, is an inter-governmental organization
uniting 57 member states from four different continents (including Turkey, Afghanistan, Morocco etc.), which
acts as the “collective voice of the Muslim world”. (cf. Organisation of the Islamic Conference (2009): About
OIC. Web page <http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52> (Accessed 28.06.2010))
85
Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg (2006): Oettinger und Rech halten an Gesprächsleitfaden für
Einbürgerungsbehörden
fest,
11.01.2006.
Web
page
<http://www.innenministerium.badenwuerttemberg.de/de/Meldungen/112430.html> (Accessed 24.06.2010)
86
Netzwerk Migration in Europa e.V. (2006): “Deutschland: Streit um Einbürgerungsleitfaden“, in: Migration
und
Bevölkerung,
Vol.
1,
February
2006.
Web
page
<http://www.migrationinfo.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=060101> (Accessed 15.06.2010)
20
people hold the Jews responsible for all the evil in the world, and even claim they were
behind the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York. What is your view of this claim?”,
“In Germany several politicians publicly came out as homosexuals. What do you think of the
fact that homosexuals hold public positions in Germany?”.87 It is particularly controversial
that the conservative and staunch Christian CDU politicians question a Muslim’s attitude
regarding homosexuality and consider it part of the free democratic order since the CDU itself
has a critical opinion of homosexuality not accepting same-sex couples as equal to
“association between man and woman” as stated in its Party Manifesto.88 The applicant’s
answers, which are recorded and have to be signed by the candidate, can lead to a rejection of
the application for naturalisation by the authorities. In case citizenship is granted and the
applicant’s subsequent behaviour demonstrates that he/she provided false information in the
test, it can even be withdrawn again afterwards.89
Rech’s “discussion guidelines” were explicitly targeting Muslims, in particular discriminating
against Germany’s large Turkish community, and not intended to be used for all applicants
for naturalisation. This caused a lot of criticism by Muslim organizations, human rights
groups and by politicians from the opposition. Muslim immigrants criticized that these
questions “put all Muslims under a general suspicion of terrorism and insinuate that they’re
not interested in the values of the German constitution”.90 The “Muslim test” has also been
strongly attacked as discriminatory by the Greens, who tabled a motion in the Bundestag
condemning these new measures, which was however rejected. Apart from BadenWürttemberg’s neighbouring federal state Hessen no other state has introduced these
“discussion guidelines” so far. In Hessen however they are aimed at all applicants for
naturalisation, not specifically at Muslims.91 Nevertheless among the general public, the new
measures achieved a relatively broad level of acceptance, seeing that 76 percent of Germans
agreed with their use according to opinion polls.92 Following many controversial discussions,
87
Daniel Sturm (2006): “Fragen an einbürgerungswillige Muslime in Baden-Württemberg“, in: Welt Online,
04.01.2006. Web page <http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article188598/ Fragen_an_einbuergerungswillige_
Muslime_in_Baden_Wuerttemberg.html> (Accessed 17.06.2010)
88
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2008), Freedom and Security – Principles for Germany – Party Manifesto of the
CDU
89
Sturm (2006), “Fragen an einbürgerungswillige Muslime in Baden-Württemberg”
90
Furlong (2006), “German ‘Muslim test’ stirs anger”
91
Anna Reimann (2006b): “’Muslim-Test’ – Liberaler Doppelpass im Bundestag“, in: Spiegel Online,
19.01.2006. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/0,1518,396185,00.html> (Accessed 28.06.2010)
92
Furlong (2006), “German ‘Muslim test’ stirs anger”
21
a compromise was finally found after which the contested “Muslim test” was abolished and
all German federal states agreed on the same criteria for naturalisation.93
Inspite of the CDU’s difficult relationship to Islam in the year 2006 the party sent a positive
signal showing its willingness to engage with the country’s Muslims in a constructive manner.
In order to advance its goal of institutionalizing the official dialogue between the German
state and the Muslim communities in Germany on a broad basis, the Christian Democrats, on
the initiative of former Federal Minister of the Interior Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, launched the
German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz - DIK) on 27 September 2006 with the
motto “Muslims in Germany – German Muslims”.94 It is aimed at creating a forum for better
understanding, more dialogue and long-term cooperation between representatives of the
German government and Muslims living in Germany with the goal of improving the religious
and social integration of Germany’s Muslim population and preventing the development of
“parallel societies”.95 According to the German Ministry of the Interior “[t]he conference is
based on an understanding of integration which recognizes cultural and religious differences
while requiring the complete acceptance of the principles of Germany’s liberal democracy” as
enshrined in the Constitution.96
Regarding the question, who represents Muslims in Germany, the DIK includes in its dialogue
not only representatives from the five largest Muslim umbrella organizations97, but also ten
so-called “secular Muslims”, thus Muslim citizens with a cultural Islamic background from
different areas of public life who have no affiliation to any of the Islamic organizations.98
Among these “secular Muslims” are for instance the orientalist Navid Kermani or the
93
Jocelyne Cesari (2006): Securitization and religious divides in Europe. Muslims and the West after 9/11: Why
the term Islamophobia is more a predicament than an explanation. Web page <http://www.euroislam.info/ei/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/securitization_and_religious_divides_in_europe.pdf>
(Accessed
15.09.2010), p.153
94
Axel Kreienbrink; Nilden Vardar (2010): “Introduction“, in: Kreienbrink; Bodenstein (eds.) (2010): Muslim
Organisations and the State, p.7; Bundesministerium des Innern (2007b): German Islam Conference (DIK)Muslims in Germany – German Muslims
95
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2009a): Antworten der Christlich Demokratischen Union
Deutschlands (CDU) und der Christlich-Sozialen Union in Bayern (CSU) auf die Fragen des Zentralrates der
Muslime in Deutschland e.V. Web page <http://zentralrat.de/files/zmd/wp09cdu.pdf> (Accessed 25.06.2010)
96
Federal Ministry of the Interior (2007): The German Conference on Islam (DIK). Web page
<http://www.eu2007.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_1026714/Internet/Content/Themen/Deutsche__Islam__Konferenz
/DatenUndFakten/Islamkonferenz__Kurzinfo__en.html> (Accessed 05.06.2010).
97
The main Muslim organizations in Germany are the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the
Islamic Council, the DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union), the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIKZ) and the
Alevite Community in Germany (cf. Bundesministerium des Innern (2007a): Brief Information about the German
Conference
on
Islam.
Web
page
<http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/127198/
publicationFile/14087/Zeitung_2_DIK_en.pdf> (Accessed 10.04.2010)).
98
Bundesministerium des Innern (2007b), German Islam Conference (DIK)
22
German-Turkish Islam critic Necla Kelek.99 The participation of the latter has been
particularly criticized by many Muslim respondents in my survey, who think that Islam critics
like Kelek should not have a seat in the Conference.100 The German state on the other hand is
represented by 15 federal, regional and local government representatives from different
political camps.101 The working and discussion groups in the Conference focus on key issues
regarding Muslim life in Germany and integration, such as inter alia Islamic religious
instruction, gender equality, treatment of religious symbols, the construction of mosques, the
unbiased media coverage of Islam as well as the threat from extremist tendencies within
Islam.102
After the first meeting of the Islam Conference in 2006, Wolfgang Schäuble declared in his
government statement: “Islam ist ein Teil Deutschlands und Europas. Der Islam ist Teil
unserer Gegenwart und unserer Zukunft”. This statement made him the first German Interior
Minister to acknowledge that Islam is an integral part of the German society and marked a
revolutionary turn in the so far one-sided political discourse about the identification of
German civilization on the basis of the Judaeo-Christian heritage.103 The Islamic associations
participating in the Conference initially considered Schäuble’s initiative as a great progress
for the constructive dialogue between the German state and its Muslim citizens. The fact that
for the first time the German state wanted to talk with Muslims instead of talking about them
was regarded as a first step towards a genuine Islam policy of the German government.104
However, it is hardly surprising that the Islam Conference faces criticism despite all good
intentions. Member of the German parliament and the SPD party’s former Commissioner on
Islam Lale Akgün for instance considers the Conference as superfluous and discriminatory
99
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2007): “Teilnehmerliste 2. Plenum Deutsche
Islamkonferenz“,
in:
Die
Bundesregierung,
02.05.2007.
Web
page
<http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2007/05/Anlagen/2007-05-02-zweiteislamkonferenz,property=publicationFile.pdf> (Accessed 14.08.2010); note: For this year’s Conference of Islam
Germany’s new Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière appointed ten new Muslim individuals as “secular
Muslim” representatives while the former participants nominated by Schäuble had to vacate their seats in the
Conference. Among the new participants are for example the political scientist and author Hamed Abdel-Samad
and the Islamic scholar Dr Armina Omerika (cf. Deutsche Islamkonferenz (2010b): New members of German
Islam Conference’s plenary, 18.05.2010. Web page <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/nn_1917164/
SubSites/DIK/EN/DieDIK/NeueTeilnehmer/neue-teilnehmer-node.html?__nnn=true> (Accessed 15.09.2010)).
100
101
Bundesministerium des Innern (2007b), German Islam Conference (DIK); Markus Kerber (2010):
“Furthering Muslim Self-Organisation: The Task of the German Islam Conference“, in: Kreienbrink; Bodenstein
(eds.) (2010): Muslim Organisations and the State, pp.69-72
102
Kerber (2010), “Furthering Muslim Self-Organisation”, pp.69-72
103
Kermani (2009), Deutschland und seine Muslime, pp.140-141
104
Lale Akgün (2009): “Schäubles Extrabehandlung grenzt Muslime aus – Interview mit Lale Akgün und Aiman
Mazyek“,
in:
Die
Welt,
25.06.2009.
Web
page
<http://www.laleakguen.de/Schaubles_Extrabehandlung_grenzt_Muslime_aus.html> (Accessed 14.06.2010)
23
towards Muslims as it isolates and segregates them through the special treatment of Islam
with regard to other religious communities in Germany such as Buddhists or Jews for which
there are no specific conferences. This implies in her eyes, that the government still considers
Islam as a “foreign religion” which needs to be integrated. She furthermore criticizes that the
DIK is mixing issues of politics and religions and suspects the initiation of the Conference to
be merely driven by party-political interests of Merkel and Schäuble since more and more
Muslims in Germany become eligible to vote due to naturalisation and thus represent
potential electorate for the CDU.105
Another major point of criticism voiced by many Muslim respondents in my survey is the
choice of participants in the Conference, a decision made exclusively by the German
government. The Federal Ministry of the Interior invites and also disinvites Muslim
organizations and individuals, while Muslims themselves do not have a say.106 This
circumstance has led to particular criticism by Muslim organizations and politicians before
this year’s Conference in May, the first one under the leadership of Germany’s new Interior
Minister Thomas de Maizière. He had officially disinvited the Islamrat für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V. from the Conference due to suspicions of Islamism of one
of its member organizations, the Islamic Community Milli Görüş.107 This prompted the
representatives of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) to boycott participating
in the latest Islam Conference as in their view the committee is entirely “prescribed by the
federal government” which seems to only want to include “Ja-Sager” and fails to lead a true
dialogue at eyelevel between the state and Muslims.108 This claim is in line with the opinions
of several Muslim participants in my survey who condemned the Islamkonferenz as a mere
“Showkonferenz”, “Wachsfigurenkabinett”, “Alibi-Veranstaltung” or “Scheindebatte”.
According to them it does not represent a true dialogue but instead a lot of monologues and
has so far failed to achieve any notable and concrete results.109
105
Akgün (2009),“Schäubles Extrabehandlung grenzt Muslime aus“
Survey - Muslime in Deutschland; (see also: Mustafa Yeneroğlu (2010): “Deutsche Islamkonferenz – Ein
Instrument des hegemonialen Diskurses gegenüber Muslimen?“, in: Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş e.V.
Web
page
<http://www.igmg.de/uploads/media/2010-03-17_stellungnahme_zur_dik2.pdf>
(Accessed
19.07.2010))
107
Islam.de (2010c): “Vertrauen verspielt und Konferenz abgewertet“, in: islam.de, 17.05.2010. Web
<http://islam.de/15851.php> (Accessed 06.09.2010)
108
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (2010): “ Islamkonferenz soll lebensnaher werden“, in: mdr.de, 17.05.2010. Web
page <http://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/7334728.html> (Accessed 19.07.2010); Ciğdem Akyol (2010): “The
German state and Muslims are reaching out to each other”, in: The German Times. Web page
<http://www.german-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32316&Itemid=12> (Accessed
01.07.2010)
109
106
24
Furthermore, Axel Ayyub Köhler, leader of the Central Council of Muslims, argues that the
Islam Conference “is not sufficient to solve the urgent social problems and concerns that have
arisen between Muslims, politicians, and the population.” According to him discussions about
Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims should be included in the Conference’s
agenda, and not only issues like Islamist extremism and gender inequality, which seem to be
of higher priority for the German state representatives.110
Even though the Islamkonferenz was not intended to become a “dialogue of the elite” among
state and Muslim representatives111, it has been repeatedly criticized by many Muslims for its
lacking dialogue at a grassroots level failing to include “average Muslim citizens” in the
negotiations. In this regard a major obstacle in the discourse on Islam is the fact that on the
Muslim side the debates are almost exclusively led and dominated by the rather conservative
Islamic organizations. The majority of the moderate or “secular Muslims” living in Germany
however do not have a say, considering that less than 25 percent of all Muslims feel that their
interests are represented unreservedly by the Muslim umbrella organization represented in the
German Islam Conference. The majority of the Muslims who are not part of the official
Islamic associations thus stay mostly excluded from the public debate about Islam in
Germany.112
According to a representative survey of the Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für
Integration und Migration (SVR) from 2010 almost half of the Muslim citizens in Germany
are not aware of the existence of the German Conference on Islam while among non-Muslims
the Conference is far better known. This is partly due to the high media exposure of this
domestic policy event in the German press, which has turned the Conference into a media
spectacle while Muslims themselves are not really involved in the process as a result of the
lacking grassroots approach.113 The same observation is also confirmed in the results of my
own survey Muslime in Deutschland according to which 26.5 percent of the respondents had
never heard of the German Conference on Islam before.114
110
Chuck Penfold (2010): “Second German Islam Conference begins amid criticism”, in: dw-world.de,
17.05.2010. Web page <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5579950,00.html> (Accessed 09.06.2010)
111
Bundesministerium des Innern (2007a): Brief Information about the German Conference on Islam
112
Bodenstein (2010), “Organisational Developments“, p.61; Fiete Stegers (2006): “Muslime fühlen sich unter
Generalverdacht - Studie belegt negatives Islam-Bild in Deutschland“, in: tagesschau.de, 07.12.2006. Web page
<http://www.politik.de/forum/medien/160440-studie.html> (Accessed 08.08.2010); Survey - Muslime in
Deutschland
113
Islam.de (2010b): DIK –”alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen“ und Muslime bleiben Ausländersache. Web page
114
25
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
As can be noted in the following the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) has not
always a clear relationship with Islam either. The SPD distances itself from the term
Leitkultur rejecting the Leitkultur debate which was launched by the CDU emphasising that a
concept of “global monoculture” is not compatible with the party’s idea of freedom, equality
and cultural pluralism. Unlike the CDU the Social Democrats acknowledge the influence of
Arabic culture and Islam on the Judaeo-Christian traditions on which the German (or
European) culture is based.115 Despite this statement in the party’s basic programme however,
Gerhard Schröder, former Chancellor and party leader of the SPD declared in 2003:
“Deutschland ist ein säkularisierter Staat. Wir sind beeinflusst von drei großen Traditionen:
Der griechisch-römischen Philosophie, der christlich-jüdischen Religion und dem Erbe der
Aufklärung. Das hätte ich in dieser Ausprägung gerne in die EU-Verfassung bekommen.“116
In the context of the German parliamentary elections in 2009 the Central Council of Muslims
in Germany asked the major political parties questions about their approach to Islam. The
answers were intended to help Muslim voters make their electoral choices.117 The Social
Democratic Party stated not to have an explicit policy towards Islam, just as it is the case for
other denominations, since unlike the CDU the SPD is not based on any religion. Instead they
rely on the co-operation with Muslim associations and migrant organizations to develop
concepts for shaping a free and democratic society in which all citizens can equally
participate irrespective of their origin, religion and culture. Similar to the Christian Democrats
the SPD is in favour of establishing chairs in Islamic religious education at German
universities for the basic and advanced training of Islamic teachers and advocates Islamic
religious instruction in German language in primary and secondary schools for Muslim
pupils. Educational institutions run by Muslim organizations are welcomed as a place for
exchange about their faith, interests and concerns, where language courses can be attended
and vocational qualifications obtained. These institutions are seen as an important
contribution for the integration of Islam in the German society.118
115
SPD (2007): Hamburger Programm – Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands.
Berlin: SPD-Parteivorstand
116
117
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2009d), Parteien antworten auf ZMD-Wahlprüfsteine
118
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2009b): Antworten der SPD auf den Fragenkatalog des
ZMD – Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. Web page <http://zentralrat.de/files/zmd/wp09spd.pdf>
(Accessed 25.06.2010)
26
As far as Islamic symbols like the Islamic headscarf are concerned the SPD has a very
tolerant approach and unlike the CDU/CSU generally opposes a ban on headscarves in order
to avoid discrimination against Muslim women and not putting them under general
suspicion.119 The respect for the dignity of Muslim women and their right to religious
freedom, which includes the Islamic headscarf, are considered as crucial. However, at the
same time the SPD strongly discourages the misconception that women must veil themselves
for the sake of honour as every girl and woman has the right to lead a self-determined life;
gender equality in all spheres of society is seen as a priority. Stating that Islam is part of the
German society the Social Democrats emphasise the importance of the equal participation of
Muslims in social, political and economic life in Germany. For the inter-faith dialogue and the
peaceful co-existence of all people in Germany the contribution of Muslims living in
Germany is thus seen as indispensable.120
The party’s more tolerant attitude towards Islam in Germany seems to be appreciated by
Muslim citizens, which is reflected in their voting behaviour. According to a study conducted
by the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv121 a large part of the Muslim population in Germany (35.5
percent in 2009, 52 percent in 2007) are SPD voters due to the party’s more liberal approach
to integration compared to the conservative CDU, and because it is a classical labour party,
which is particularly important for the first-generation Muslim immigrants who are former
“guest workers”. Another reason is the huge popularity of former SPD Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder especially among Turkish immigrants.122
Prejudices against Muslims and the increasing Islamophobia in the German public arena in
recent years are viewed with great concern; therefore the Social Democrats are determined to
actively fight any form of discrimination, right-wing extremism or xenophobia, as the party
has continuously emphasised since the change of government in 1998.123 In order to tackle the
problem the SPD executive committee has set up the project Starke Demokratie which is
119
Nevertheless, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) pronounced himself in favour the headscarf ban
(see also Chapter 3 on the headscarf debate).
120
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (2009b), Antworten der SPD
121
The Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv interviewed 1500 Muslims about their electoral decisions. Around 1.1
million Muslim citizens are estimated to be eligible voters.
122
MiGAZIN (2009): “Muslime würden Rot-Grün wählen“, in: MiGAZIN Migration in Germany, 21.08.2009.
Web page <http://www.migazin.de/2009/08/21/muslime-wurden-rot-grun-wahlen/> (Accessed 15.07.2010)
123
Taher Neef (2009): “Das Superwahljahr - heute mit der SPD und dem Bundesabgeordneten Sebastian Edathy:
„Ich beobachte seit einigen Jahren eine wachsende Islamfeindlichkeit““, in: islam.de, 17.08.2009. Web page
<http://islam.de/13668.php>
27
intended to deal with prejudices and fears towards Islam and Muslims through cooperation
with Muslim associations and migrant organizations.124
Since for many years the German government (especially the CDU-led government in the
Kohl-era) had refused to consider Germany an immigration country, politicians consequently
had not shown a great interest in Islam and Germany’s Muslim population either. This
changed after September 11. In the face of the perceived danger, some month after the 9/11
attacks the German Red-Green government, realizing that it did not know much about
Germany’s Muslims, began acquiring its own knowledge about the Muslim minority through
internal working and discussions groups on Islam in the ministries between civil servants,
Church officials and scholarly experts of Islam. These measures were intended to stimulate
the dialogue between state and Muslims as well as civil society initiatives and at the same
time strengthen the state’s control over Muslim communities. However, barely any Muslims
participated in the discussion forums.125
The Social Democrats set up political dialogue circles and platforms to discuss topics like
standards for religious education, including Islamic education, while the Greens organized
workshops with Muslims to find out their point of view. Even though the two parties’
approaches to Islam were characterized by pragmatism and a “cautious friendliness”, as
Gerdien Jonker puts it, the seeking for dialogue with Islam marked the beginning of a more
genuine engagement with Muslims in Germany.126 Nevertheless it was the CDU which
initiated the Islam Conference in Germany, although the SPD is more engaged in integration
policy.
In spite of all well-intended tolerance towards Islam also the Social Democratic Party is not
spared from Islamophobic rhetoric either. Former Berlin senator and (still) Bundesbank board
member Thilo Sarrazin, who is a member of the SPD, caused a controversy when he publicly
criticized Germany’s large Muslim population in an interview with Lettre International
magazine in 2009 saying that “[e]ine große Zahl an Arabern und Türken […] hat keine
produktive Funktion, außer für den Obst- und Gemüsehandel, und es wird sich auch
vermutlich keine Perspektive entwickeln”. This is supposedly the case for 70 percent of the
Turkish and 90 percent of the Arabic population of Berlin. He went even further in his antiMuslim discourse stating ”[i]ch muss niemanden anerkennen, der vom Staat lebt, diesen Staat
124
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (2009b), Antworten der SPD
Jonker (2005), “From ‘Foreign Workers’ to ‘Sleepers’”, pp.120-121
126
Ibid, p.118
125
28
ablehnt, für die Ausbildung seiner Kinder nicht vernünftig sorgt und ständig neue kleine
Kopftuchmädchen produziert.“ In Sarrazin‘s view Muslim children are “underclass citizens”
referring to their often low educational level and he proclaimed “Türken erobern Deutschland
genauso wie die Kosovaren das Kosovo erobert haben: durch eine höhere Geburtenrate“.127
These disparaging statements were highly criticized by his fellow party members as well as
by opposition parties, in the media and by Muslim organizations as they are
counterproductive to integration and merely play into the hands of right-wing parties who
with pleasure make use of this anti-Muslim rhetoric for their own propaganda purposes. The
central bank’s president distanced himself from Sarrazin’s comments and indirectly urged
him to resign from the board. Despite the public outrage however, many Germans (51
percent) agree with Sarrazin’s assertion that the majority of Turkish and Arabic immigrants in
the country are neither willing nor able to integrate.128
Recently Thilo Sarrazin has been making headlines again through controversial theses about
the failed integration and supposed shortcomings of Muslim immigrants in his new book
Deutschland schafft sich ab – Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen, which was published in
August this year and has by now become a bestseller. In his disputed book Sarrazin argues
that Muslim immigrants make Germany “dumber” due to their allegedly “lower IQs”,
undermine German society and sponge off the welfare state due to their disproportionally
high use of social welfare benefits.129 In his view Muslim immigrants represent an existential
threat to German culture and Germany’s future, gradually turning it into a largely Muslim
country: “Ich möchte, dass auch meine Urenkel in 100 Jahren noch in Deutschland leben
können, wenn sie dies wollen. Ich möchte nicht, dass das Land meiner Enkel und Urenkel zu
großen Teilen muslimisch ist, dass dort über weite Strecken türkisch und arabisch gesprochen
wird, die Frauen ein Kopftuch tragen und der Tagesrhythmus vom Ruf der Muezzine
bestimmt wird. Wenn ich das erleben will, kann ich eine Urlaubsreise ins Morgenland
127
Lettre International (2009): “Klasse statt Masse – Thilo Sarrazin im Gespräch“, in: Lettre International, No.
86, pp. 197-201. Web page <http://www.pi-news.net/wp/uploads/2009/10/sarrazin_interview1.pdf> (Accessed
23.02.2010)
128
Islam.de (2009): Thilo Sarrazin – Der neue Typ Deutschlands?. Web page <http://islam.de/14294.php>
(Accessed 28.01.2010)
129
Spiegel Online (2010): “Pitfalls in bid to expel Muslim critic - Sarrazin turns into Migraine for Social
Democrats”,
in:
Spiegel
Online
International,
13.09.2010.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,717251,00.html> (Accessed 15.09.2010); Deutsche Welle
(2010): “Central banker sets off a storm with controversial book release”, in: dw-world.de, 31.08.2010. Web
page <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5955963,00.html> (Accessed 02.09.2010)
29
buchen.“130 In a series of interviews and talk shows about his book Sarrazin defended his
controversial statements about Muslims and race, making even more inflammatory remarks
claiming that “all Jews share a specific gene” which sparked widespread outrage in Germany
and abroad.131
Through the publication of his book and his polemical public statements Sarrazin polarized
opinion in Germany. On the one hand in the media he was called a “demagogue”,
“provocateur” or “racist” and accused of inciting hatred and “proliferating stereotypes”. He
was also heavily criticized for his provocative rhetoric by politicians from all mainstream
political parties, including Chancellor Angela Merkel who condemned his book as being
“stupid and pointless” and defence minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg declaring that
“Sarrazin had overstepped the borders of provocation”.132 Among large sections of the
German population however, Sarrazin’s theses are met with widespread approval. According
to a representative survey of the Emnid-Institut, conducted beginning of September, 18
percent of Germans would vote for a political protest party headed by Thilo Sarrazin. Many
Germans support him, because in their eyes “he says what many people think” about the
alleged integration problems of Muslims in Germany.133 Due to enormous public pressure and
the Bundesbank’s official request to dismiss him, Sarrazin has now agreed to stand down
from his post in the board of the German Central Bank at the end of September 2010. The
SPD has meanwhile also started proceedings to expel him from the party.134
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen can be considered as the party with the most tolerant approach
towards Islam among the established political parties analyzed here. The Green Party has a
multiculturalist approach with regard to immigration, which signifies a culture of respect,
130
Thilo Sarrazin (2010a): Deutschland schafft sich ab – Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen. München:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, p.308
131
Michael Woodhead (2010): “’All Jews share a certain gene’”, in: Mail Online, 30.08.2010. Web page
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1307188/Jews-share-certain-gene-German-banker-ThiloSarrazin-sparks-outrage.html> (Accessed 03.09.2010)
132
Deutsche Welle (2010), “Central banker sets off a storm with controversial book release”; Woodhead (2010),
“’All Jews share a certain gene’”
133
Taz.de (2010): “Potenzial für Protestpartei- 18 Prozent würden Sarrazin wählen“, in: taz.de, 06.09.2010. Web
page <http://www.taz.de/1/politik/deutschland/artikel/1/18-prozent-wuerden-sarrazin-waehlen/> (Accessed
14.09.2010)
134
Spiegel Online (2010), “Pitfalls in bid to expel Muslim critic”
30
tolerance and difference towards other religious and ethnic groups. Through the Greens the
term “Multi-Kulti“ was coined in Germany, but none of the other parties shares their
multicultural dream they have been promoting for decades. In particular the CDU/CSU’s
mono-cultural vision of German society through its Leitkultur concept is considered to be
strongly working against the multicultural society in the country, segregating religious and
ethnic minorities by attributing different statuses to the country’s religions.135 The Greens’
multicultural laissez-faire policy is often blamed by Islam critics and right-wing politicians as
being the major cause for the development of the Muslim “parallel society” since it is said to
rather encourage multicultural co-existence than integration due to its “misguided
tolerance”.136
Claudia Roth, one of the chairpersons of the German Green Party, defends her party’s ideal
rejecting claims of the conservative and radical right-wing parties that “Multi-Kulti” is over
and failed. According to the Greens, Germany’s future lies in ethno-cultural and religious
pluralism and not segregation and mono-culture. This vision requires improved inter-religious
and intercultural dialogues instead of clashes of cultures and religions. Thus, the Greens
intend to democratically realize the multi-cultural reality in the German society and further
integration instead of assimilation.137
In its election manifesto from 2009 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen calls for a better integration of
Islam in all spheres of the German society and for legal equality of Islamic faith granting it
the same rights like the Christian Churches and the Jewish community. The aim is thus full
participation of Muslims in society with all rights and obligations that other non-Muslim
citizens have. The Green Party’s Islam policy is further characterized by much tolerance
towards religious symbols like headscarves and places of worship.138 Nevertheless, also the
Greens approach to Islam is not always consistent. On the one hand Claudia Roth rejects the
CDU/CSU’s claim that German should be spoken in mosques, which she considers as an
obstacle to integration, but on the other hand argues in support of the training of imams in
Islamic Studies in German universities and speaks in favour of the introduction of Islamic
135
Claudia Roth (2004): “Multikulturalität – Begriffsklärungen aus gegebenem Anlaß“, in: Kulturaustausch,
Vol.
4/04.
Web
page
<http://www.claudia-roth.de/interviews-reden-und-artikel/artikel/inhalt/
multikulturalitaet_begriffsklaerungen_aus_gegebenem_anlass/einzelansicht/?tx_fesearchintable_pi1[sTable]=tt_
content&tx_fesearchintable_pi1[sUID]=42656> (Accessed 30.06.2010)
136
137
Roth (2004), “Multikulturalität“
138
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2009a): Aus der Krise hilft nur Grün – Bundestagswahlprogramm 2009 Bündnis
90/Die Grünen. Web page <http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Wahlprogramm/
BTW_Wahlprogramm_220609_inhalt.pdf> (Accessed 25.06.2010), pp.150-151
31
religious education in public schools, both issues equally advocated by the Christian
Democrats.139
While taking the fears and prejudices of the majority society towards Islam seriously the
Greens strongly oppose Islamophobia, discrimination and segregation of Muslims and are
determined to actively fight any assault on religious freedom by right-wing parties. Sweeping
defamations about Muslims in the public sphere and the media are said to only serve to fuel
fears and create enemy stereotypes, which is counterproductive to all integration efforts and
for the inter-faith dialogue. According to the Green politicians the fight against Islamophobia
should therefore be integrated into the political agenda of the Federal government.140 At the
same time they expect Muslim organizations to take a strong stand against anti-Semitism,
actively engage for the freedom of change of religion, for full right to self-determination for
women, and to condemn discrimination and violence against homosexuals.141
Cem Özdemir, son of a Turkish guest worker family, first Member of the Bundestag of
Turkish descent and since 2008 co-chairman of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, criticized that four
years after its inauguration the CDU-initiated Islam Conference, which is principally
considered a good and constructive initiative for the dialogue between the German state and
Islam, has so far failed to produce any concrete policy changes or clear directions for Muslims
to follow with regard to integration. According to Özdemir there is need for a roadmap stating
specific requirements Muslim organizations have to fulfill in order to obtain full recognition
as a religious community and achieve naturalisation and integration of Islam into the German
society.142 Özdemir, a “secular Muslim” who calls himself “anatolischer Schwabe” and
“Inländer”143 due to his hybrid Turko-German identity, is very popular among Turkish
immigrants, which has increased the support base of the Green Party in recent years. The
election of a German of Turkish descent as one of the leaders of a German political party was
understandably hailed as an important milestone in German politics.144
139
Roth (2004), “Multikulturalität“
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2009c): Antworten von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen auf die
Wahlprüfsteine
des
Zentralrats
der
Muslime
in
Deutschland
e.V.
Web
page
<http://zentralrat.de/files/zmd/wp09gruen.pdf> (Accessed 25.06.2010)
141
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2009a), Bundestagswahlprogramm 2009
142
Cem Özdemir (2010): “Islamkonferenz muss endlich konkrete Ergebnisse bringen“, in: Bündnis 90/Die
Grünen, 16.05.2010. Web page <http://www.oezdemir.de/themen/migration_integration/3315118.html>
(Accessed 14.06.2010)
143
Özlem Topcu (2010): “Porträt Cem Özdemir“, in: Deutsche Islamkonferenz, 23.02.2010. Web page
MedienPolitik/Oezdemir/
<http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1875050/SubSites/DIK/DE/
oezdemir-node.html?__nnn=true> (Accessed 05.08.2010)
144
MiGAZIN (2009), “Muslime würden Rot-Grün wählen“
140
32
Similar to the SPD the Greens acknowledge the influence Islamic philosophy and civilization
have had on European history and culture. They believe that the presence of Islam and
Muslims and the normal social intercourse with them is part of the reality in the immigration
country Germany and therefore try to build bridges between the different segments of the
population through dialogue and integration of the minority groups.145
The media are urged to report with greater equity about the topic of Islam as media coverage
is often potentially scandalous and with negative connotations. A differentiated approach to
Islam taking into account the everyday life of Muslims living in Germany is therefore
required. Through active participation in all spheres of public life Muslim citizens would be
able to counteract the much criticized “parallel society”.146 This also becomes clear in the
party’s campaign for recruiting new members entitled Mit dir wird’s was which is addressed
specifically to people with migration background encouraging them to engage in politics. In
the campaign flyer several Muslim members of the Green Party are portrayed, including
women with a headscarf, which stresses the party’s liberal approach towards Islam and
Islamic symbols.147
The previous analysis has shown that the established political parties all seem to have a rather
pragmatic approach to Islam. Some aspects regarding Muslim life in Germany which are
frequently linked to Islam such as cases of domestic violence and oppression of women
within Muslim families in Germany, including honour killings and forced marriages, as well
as the international Islamist terrorism cross-party generally lead to a greater distance towards
the religion which is reflected in the parties’ policies on Islam.148 As can be seen by the
examples above, Islam-critical and stereotypical discourse is no longer limited only to
(extreme) right-wing circles but has partly found its way into the political discourse of the
mainstream democratic parties.
145
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in der Bremischen Bürgerschaft (2009): Leitlinien einer grünen Islampolitik in
Bremen,
02.02.2009.
Web
page
<http://www.gruene-fraktion-bremen.de/cms/default/dokbin/268/
268192.islampapier.pdf> (Accessed 15.07.2010)
146
Ibid.
147
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2009b): “Raus aus der Nische Ran an die Macht! Gleiche Rechte für
Einwanderinnen. Mit dir wird’s was“; in: Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş e.V.. Web page
<http://www.igmg.de/uploads/media/Mit_dir_wirds_was.pdf> (Accessed 16.07.2010)
148
33
Discourse on Islam in the extreme right-wing parties (Pro Köln, Pro NRW, Pro
Deutschland and NPD149)
All across Europe, extreme right parties increasingly focus their propaganda on populist and
racist campaigns against Islam, seeing in it a formula for success in view of the current
topicality of Islam in the public arena and the media.150 In the following I will analyze the
discourse on Islam of the German extreme right parties by focusing on the right-wing populist
parties Pro Köln, Pro NRW and Pro Deutschland since their anti-Islamic activities have
attracted a great deal of attention throughout the German and even European media. However,
also radical right-wing parties like the NPD have discovered the topic of Islamophobia for
themselves and compete with the populist parties for supremacy over the issue.151
The two demonstrative examples of German right-wing populist parties are the so-called
Bürgerbewegung Pro Köln and Pro NRW, which have specifically focused their party
programmes on the alleged “creeping Islamisation” of German cities through the increasing
visibility of Islam in the German public sphere, in particular opposing the building of
mosques. The so-called citizens’ initiative Pro Köln was founded in 1996 by former members
of the extreme right-wing parties NPD and REP Markus Beisicht, Manfred Rouhs and Bernd
Schöppe.152 The first German anti-Islamic party is a local spinoff of the extreme right-wing
party German League for People and Homeland (Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat
(DLVH)), which was dissolved some years later.153
The citizens’ movements clearly do not intend to have an objective discussion about the issue
of Islam in Germany but rather instrumentalise the mosque building controversy for their
purposes in their campaigns in order to deliberately stir up resentments and fears of
“alienation” and against Islam among the German population. According to neo-Nazi expert
149
As a demonstrative example for German right-wing extremist parties I chose to focus on the National
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), since it is the most active of the three big radical right-wing parties in
Germany with regard to the discourse about Islam, despite being the smallest in terms of party members. The
other two parties are the DVU (Deutsche Volksunion) and the REP (Republikaner) (cf. Armin Pfahl-Traughber
(2006): “Rechtsextremistische Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“, in: Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 04.09.2006. Web page <http://www.bpb.de/themen/F793P0,0,0,Rechtsextremistische_Parteien_
in_der_Bundesrepublik_Deutschland.html> (Accessed 02.07.2010)).
150
Alexander Häusler (2008): Rechtspopulismus in Gestalt einer „Bürgerbewegung“ – Struktur und politische
Methodik von PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND. Düsseldorf: LAGA NRW, p.8
151
Jürgen Peters (2008): “Rechtspopulismus in Gestalt einer Bürgerbewegung“, in: Häusler; Killguss (2008):
Feindbild Islam, p.26
152
Bürgerbewegung pro Köln e.V. (2010): Geschichte. Web page <http://www.aktuell.prokoeln.org/?page_id=94> (Accessed 05.07.2010)
153
Andrea Brandt; Guido Kleinhubbert (2008): “New Front for the German Far Right – Anti-Islamic Party is
Playing
with
Fear”,
in:
Spiegel
Online
International,
03.01.2008.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,526225,00.html> (Accessed 03.02.2010)
34
Alexander Häusler they try to present themselves as an “anti-Islam party”, as an alternative to
the established parties, but in fact only use their criticism of Islam opportunistically in order
to attract voters and gain more influence in local politics.154As Markus Beisicht, co-founder
and chairman of Pro Köln and Pro NRW, confirmed in an interview with the right-wing
weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit, the anti-mosque-building citizens’ initiatives are more a
right-wing party project under the guise of a citizens’ movement. Due to the fact that
Islamisation and fear of Islam have become crucial topics for the German public at large and
in the media, they picked it up and were initially surprised themselves about the positive
response among the population. Through their criticism of Islam they have, as Beisicht puts it,
claimed a “market niche” on a communal level and thus reached voters who wouldn’t have
elected them otherwise, which has been relatively successful, especially in big cities like
Cologne.155 In the local government elections of North-Rhine Westphalia in 2004 Pro Köln
obtained 4.7% of the votes and is since then represented in Cologne’s City Council with four
seats (since Councilman Hans-Martin Breninek from the REP joined the party, it even holds
five seats).156
Pro Köln can be seen as the starting point which led to the foundation of other right-wing
populist “pro” movements like for example Pro München or Pro Oberhausen. In the state of
North Rhine-Westphalia alone about a dozen Pro Köln spinoffs are already preparing local
anti-Islamisation campaigns; where no mosques are being planned, the party just fights the
existing ones.157 The right-wing populist parties explicitly dissociate themselves from the far
right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) claiming that there are too many
extremists in it, and misleadingly call themselves citizens’ initiative claiming to have a
bottom-up approach. The fact that they purport merely being a local patriotic and ultrademocratic movement makes them more successful at the grassroots level but also more
dangerous than the old right-wing extremist parties since populism is used as a disguise for a
right-wing protest movement against Islam in Germany.158 Despite their alleged distance to
154
Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.5; Häusler (2008), Methodik von PRO NRW und PRO
DEUTSCHLAND, p.5
155
Moritz Schwarz (2008): “Der Kampf um den Islamisierungskongreß ist zur Kraftprobe gegen die Political
Correctness geworden - „Wir sind die Stimme der Bürger““, in: Junge Freiheit, 16.09.2008.
Web page <http://www.jungefreiheit.de/Single-News-Display-Link-Rec.268+M53155117e9b.0.html>(Accessed
02.07.2010)
156
Häusler (2008), Methodik von PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND, p.12, note: In the local elections in
2009 Pro Köln was even more successful, obtaining 5,36% of the votes (cf. Stadt Köln - Der Oberbürgermeister
(2009):
Kommunalwahl
2009.
Web
page
<http://www.stadtkoeln.de/wahlen/kommunalwahl/2009/wahlpraesentation/ index.html?ansicht=4&> (Accessed 13.09.2010)
157
Häusler (2008), Methodik von PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND, p.20
158
Karin Priester (2008): “Populismus als Protestbewegung”, in: Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.15
35
the NPD however, Pro Köln top officials have cultivated links to the radical right for years
and are frequently seen together on demonstrations and other political events. In March 2003
for example the citizens’ initiative demonstrated against mosque building projects in KölnChorweiler and Köln-Mülheim with the support of the NPD and militants of neo-Nazi groups
belonging to the “Freie Kameradschaften”.159
Dominant themes on Pro Köln’s and Pro NRW’s agenda are Islam, Islamism and
immigration. In their propaganda campaigns the right-wing populist parties link blatant
racism and xenophobia with Islamophobia by putting Islam under general suspicion in
polemical statements about the alleged Islamisation of Europe (“Muslim immigration
tsunami” or “multiculturalism is the Trojan Horse of Islam”).160 In the right-wing political
discourse religious issues are thus intermingled with immigration issues and politically
motivated violence, i.e. immigrant equals Muslim which equals Islamist, deliberately failing
to make a distinction between Islam and Islamism. In this way racist clichés about Muslim
immigrants are turned into cultural stereotypes and create a sort of culturally-trimmed antiIslamic racism.161 According to sociologist and historian Karin Priester the far right
instrumentalisations of the subject of Islam increase a social climate of fear and prejudices,
which has a negative impact on the co-existence of the German majority society with the
Muslim minority society.162
In contrast to the rather proletarianized far right extremists the right-wing populist movements
have mostly middle-class members like lawyers (e.g. Pro Köln co-founder Beisicht) or
entrepreneurs.163 It is of crucial importance for Pro Köln’s strategy to shake off the
stigmatization of being extreme right-wing. Therefore defectors from the CDU, like former
ultraconservative CDU member Jörg Uckermann, who join the Pro Köln movement, are
highly appreciated.164 Nevertheless Pro Köln has been listed as a far-right organization in the
annual report of 2006 of the North Rhine-Westphalia branch of the Office for the Protection
159
Peters (2008), “Rechtspopulismus in Gestalt einer Bürgerbewegung“, p.25; Häusler (2008), Methodik von
PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND, p.27
160
Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.4; Frank Decker; Marcel Lewandowsky (2009): “Populismus Erscheinungsformen, Entstehungshintergründe und Folgen eines politischen Phänomens“, in: Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, 04.06.2009. Web page <http://www.bpb.de/themen/85B6F3,0,Populismus.html> (Accessed
03.06.2009)
161
Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, p.4; Decker; Lewandowsky (2009), “Populismus“
162
Priester (2008), “Populismus als Protestbewegung”, p.16
163
Ibid.
164
Nadine Trentmann (2008): “Populisten auf dem Vormarsch“, in: Welt Online, 13.04.2008. Web page
<http://www.welt.de/wams_print/article1896571/Populisten_auf_dem_Vormarsch.html> (Accessed 22.02.2010)
36
of the Constitution (‘Verfassungsschutz’)165, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, and the
movement’s anti-mosque campaign is under observation because its “generalizing and
sweeping defamation of foreigners is suspected of violating human dignity.”166
The central issue of contestation is Cologne’s district Ehrenfeld where Germany’s largest
mosque is planned to be built. Pro Köln has led a fierce campaign against this central mosque
presenting it as a symbol of hostile land appropriation of the urban district of Cologne and of
“creeping Islamisation”, as well as a symbol for the Muslim “parallel society” and Turkish
mass immigration.167 The party’s concept of playing on fears of a supposed Muslim invasion
proved quite successful in some segments of Cologne’s population considering that the
initially rather small alleged anti-mosque citizens’ initiative by now has more than 500
members, collected 20,000 signatures for its anti-mosque petition168 and won more than 5
percent of support in the last local elections.169
The image of Islam as the enemy additionally serves as ideological link between the far right
parties in the whole of Europe, which now unite under the banner of anti-Islamisation.
Together with other European right-wing populist parties like the Belgian Vlaams Belang, the
Austrian FPÖ, the French Alsace d’Abord, Pro Köln founded an initiative called Cities
against Islamisation. According to Markus Beisicht “Islamisation” is not just a local problem
but a phenomenon which concerns us all, whether in Cologne, Vienna, Berlin, London, Paris,
Stockholm or Rome.170 The organization’s aim is to coordinate the campaigns of the
participating movements in the fight against Islamisation, organize demonstrations together,
and exchange information. The initiative’s Charter, which has been translated into five
different languages, concludes that “Islam is more of a social order rather than a religion”,
which is based on the Sharia and the Umma and thus incompatible with the values of the
165
Pro Köln has instigated a legal appeal against this decision, which was however rejected by the intelligence
agency (cf. Gabriele Nandlinger (2009): “Rechtsdemokratisch, rechtspopulistisch, rechtsextrem? – Was Pro
Köln und Pro NRW eint“, in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 03.06.2009. Web page
<http://www.bpb.de/themen/95JGA7,0,Rechtsdemokratisch_rechtspopulistisch_ rechtsextrem.html> (Accessed
03.06.2010).
166
Anna Reimann (2007): “‘We Want the Cathedral, Not Minarets’ - Far-Right Mobilizes against Cologne
Mega-Mosque”,
in:
Spiegel
Online
International,
19.06.2007.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,489257,00.html> (Accessed 01.07.2010)
167
Peters (2008), “Rechtspopulismus in Gestalt einer Bürgerbewegung“, p.26
168
The neo-Nazi expert Alexander Häusler claims that these petitions are merely misused by Pro Köln and Pro
NRW to collect addresses for their own election purposes and propaganda since anyone who signs them is placed
on anti-immigrant mailing lists, a charge the populist parties categorically deny (cf. Häusler (2008), Methodik
von PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND, p.6).
169
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2009): ECRI Report on Germany; Bürgerbewegung
pro Köln e.V. (2010), Geschichte; Stadt Köln - Der Oberbürgermeister (2009): Kommunalwahl 2009
170
37
European societies. Cities against Islamisation strongly opposes the institutionalization of
Islam in Europe, which is said to hamper integration of the Muslim communities into Western
society.171
In September 2008 Pro Köln and Pro NRW organized a controversial “anti-Islamisation
congress” with the motto “Nein zur Islamisierung Deutschlands – Nein zur Kölner
Großmoschee” to which representatives of far-right groups from all around Europe like Front
National, Lega Nord, Vlaams Belang and FPÖ were invited. The Congress, which is a
demonstrative example of how the extreme right instrumentalizes the topic of fear of
Islamism in its propaganda campaign, aroused much public and media attention. However,
due to an enormous number of anti-right counter-protesters who blocked it, the event turned
out to be a disaster for the organizers and had to be stopped. This however did not discourage
the populist parties from planning another conference the following year.172
Prior to the second anti-Islamisation congress in 2009 Pro Köln and Pro NRW released an
Islam-critical film entitled Hat Pro Köln doch Recht?Der Antiislamisierungskongress- Was
Medien und Politik verschweigen, which was widely called the “German Fitna” due to its
obvious parallels to Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam film. Besides showing shocking images of
violence committed to non-Muslims in Islamic countries in order to “demonstrate to the
people of Cologne what Islamisation really means”, Pro Köln criticizes the violent resistance
to its first anti-Islamisation congress seeing it as intolerance and persecution of minorities, i.e.
the “peaceful supporters of Pro Köln”, which was tolerated by police and local authorities not
shying away from even drawing parallels to the persecution of Jews under the Nazi regime.173
According to chairman Markus Beisicht the populists planned on distributing DVDs with the
film in schools in North Rhine-Westphalia in order to raise awareness of the threat of
Islamisation especially among young people and invite them to support Pro Köln’s cause at
the anti-Islamisation congress, a fact which triggered a lot of controversy.174
171
Cities against Islamisation (2010): Charter for ‘Cities against Islamisation’. Web page
<http://www.citiesagainstislamisation.com/En/2/> (Accessed 07.07.2010)
172
Tomas Sager (2009): “Viel heiße Luft. Die europäischen Rechtspopulistentreffen von Pro Köln“, in:
Bundeszentrale
für
politische
Bildung,
04.06.2009.
Web
page
<http://www.bpb.de/themen/LFWHP0,0,Viel_hei%DFe_Luft.html> (Accessed 03.06.2010)
173
Adams (2009): “Pro Köln Movie: “The German Fitna”, in: The International Free Press Society, 07.04.2009.
Web page <http://www.internationalfreepresssociety.org/2009/04/pro-koln-movie-the-german-fitna/> (Accessed
05.06.2010)
174
Marc Felix Serrao (2009): “Rechtsradikale mit Davidsstern“, in: Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 01.04.2009. Web
page <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/werbevideo-von-pro-koeln-rechtsradikale-mit-davidstern-1.393410>
(Accessed 06.08.2010)
38
In an attempt to export the successful model of the local anti-Islam citizens’ initiative to a
regional level and extend its influence by participating in the state elections in 2010, the
Bürgerbewegung Pro NRW (Pro North Rhine-Westphalia), which is stemming from Pro
Köln, was founded in 2007. It was established by Pro Köln’s co-founder Markus Beisicht in
North Rhine-Westphalia, the federal state with the biggest Muslim population in Germany.175
In the same year the activists of Pro NRW announced a statewide anti-Islamisation campaign
including different initiatives against the construction of mosques and minarets.176
In the context of this year’s state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia Pro NRW demanded in
its party programme inter alia to restrict immigration and stop Islamisation, and called for the
immediate expulsion of so-called Islamic “preachers of hate” as well as for the fight against
Turkish and Arabic “parallel societies”. According to Pro NRW Muslims gradually conquer
non-Islamic countries like Germany through a “demographic jihad” aimed at turning them
into Islamic countries within a few decades.177 The party’s election campaign commercial is
entirely focused on the “Islamic threat” within the German society, portraying mosques as a
symbol of political Islam where hatred against people of other faiths is fomented and which
are on top of that supposedly funded by German taxpayers (see figure 8).178
The self-proclaimed “anti-Islam party” furthermore started a petition in June this year for a
ban on headscarves in Germany entitled “Wir haben nichts zu verschleiern”. They regard the
veiling of women in Islam as an offence to human dignity, which should not be tolerated in
Germany. It is said to represent a regression into the Dark Ages and shows complete contempt
for the activities of all defenders for human rights. With this petition the party pretends to
defend the “poor” oppressed Muslim women by promoting alleged gender equality, but in fact
merely utilizes the headscarf as a symbol for Islamism and the supposed backwardness of
Islam, for which there is no place in the enlightened German society.179
Since 2005 there is another right-wing populist party named Bürgerbewegung Pro
Deutschland (Pro D), which was initiated by Pro Köln co-founder M. Rouhs and other Pro
175
According to the study “Muslim Life in Germany” by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees there
are currently 33 percent of Muslims living in the densely populated state of North-Rhine Westphalia (cf. Haug;
Müssig; Stichs (2009), “Muslim Life in Germany”, p.311).
176
Häusler (2008), Methodik von PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND, pp.18-19
177
Bürgerbewegung Pro NRW (2010b): Wahlprogramm der Bürgerbewegung pro NRW zur Landtagswahl am
9.Mai 2010. Web page <http://www.pro-nrw.net/wp-content/uploads/programm-rgb.pdf> (Accessed 09.08.2010)
178
Bürgerbewegung Pro NRW (2010a): Pro NRW Wahlwerbespot zur Landtagswahl NRW 2010. Web page
<http://www.pro-nrw.net/?page_id=511> (Accessed 03.06.2010)
179
Bürgerbewegung Pro NRW (2010d): “Wir haben nichts zu verschleiern“, 18.06.2010. Web page
<http://www.pro-nrw.net/?p=1612> (Accessed 01.07.2010)
39
Köln or right-wing extremist REP (Die Republikaner) members in an attempt to export the
Pro Köln model to a national level.180 Similar to the other “pro” movements the party claims
to have a bottom-up approach stressing its closeness to the people and presenting itself as a
liberal democratic alternative to the “old”, mainstream parties for German citizens. Focal
points of the party’s Islam policies are the campaigns “Islamisierung? Nein danke!” and
“NEIN zur Aufnahme der Türkei in die EU!”.181
Pro Deutschland strongly opposes the multicultural policies of the ruling parties
(“Altparteien”) which are said to tolerate supposedly “intolerant Islamic ideologies” based on
Koran and Sharia that are a threat to “our” democracy and lead to ethnic and religious
“parallel societies”.182According to the author Max Eichenhain, whose article on
multiculturalism is published on the Website of Pro Deutschland, the majority of Germans
and other Europeans reject Muslim “mass immigration”. The multicultural society, which in
his eyes is a failure and dangerous for the German society, is said to be the ideal of Christianinfluenced atheist left-wing intellectuals.183 Unlike the mainstream political parties the Pro
Deutschland movement does not acknowledge that Germany is already an immigration
country but warns that it should not become one.184 Until now Pro Deutschland has not yet
gained great political importance as a federal “pro” movement, unlike Pro Köln and Pro NRW
on a local level.185
Is it hardly surprising that the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany
(NPD), whose policies are traditionally based on racist, xenophobic, nationalistic and antiSemitic principles, does not spare Islam and Muslims either since anything “threatening” the
“German culture” is regarded as an enemy. Populist and racist campaigns against “The Islam”
are currently considered as the formula for success for the party’s nationalistic propaganda
due to the issue’s topicality in the media and the public sphere. While formerly (in the 1990s)
180
Jürgen Peters; Alexander Häusler (2008): “Bürgerbewegung pro Deutschland (Pro D)“, in: Netz gegen Nazis,
22.04.2008. Web page <http://www.netz-gegen-nazis.de/artikel/buergerbewegung-pro-deutschland-pro-d>
(Accessed 07.07.2010)
182
Bürgerbewegung
pro
Deutschland
(2010):
Programm.
Web
page
<http://www.prodeutschland.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=26> (Accessed 22.02.2010)
183
Max Eichenhain (2010): “Die Ideologie des Multikulturalismus”, in: Bürgerbewegung pro Deutschland,
17.02.2010.
Web
page
<http://www.pro-deutschland.net/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=238:die-ideologie-des-multikulturalismus&catid=1&Itemid=2> (Accessed 22.02.2010)
184
Bürgerbewegung pro Deutschland (2010), Programm
185
A. Speit; S. Puschner (2010): “Die rechten Bettler – Pro-Deutschland in Berlin“, in: taz.de, 18.07.2010. Web
page <http://www.taz.de/1/politik/deutschland/artikel/1/die-rechten-bettler/> (Accessed 13.09.2010), note: Pro
D party leader Manfred Rouhs recently stated to the newspaper die tageszeitung after Pro Deutschland’s party
convention in Berlin in July this year, that the populist party currently has only around 350 members in the
whole of Germany.
181
40
their blatant racism was shown in slogans like “Ausländer raus” they are now wrapping it in
populist slogans pretending to defend the German Leitkultur and the Christian Occident
against Islamisation, thus combining racism with Islamophobic resentments, as Häusler puts
it.186 The far right nationalist party also strongly opposes the “Multi-Kulti experiments” of the
Greens and wants to stop the alleged mass immigration, which is considered as being the
major cause for the development of the Islamic “parallel society”.187
Similar to Pro Köln and Pro NRW the National Democratic Party regularly organizes
campaigns against the supposed Islamisation and foreign domination in Germany. In the year
2008 for example the NPD in North Rhine-Westphalia started a joint campaign with the
German People’s Union (DVU) entitled “Deutsche wehrt Euch - Gegen Überfremdung,
Islamisierung und Ausländerkriminalität”, in which they called for a demonstration in
Bochum (NRW). In particular referring to the growing Muslim population in Germany they
argue: “In allen Teilen Deutschlands erwehren sich standhaft Deutsche der Islamisierung ihrer
Heimatstädte. Sie handeln für die schweigende Mehrheit. Nationale Politik ist die einzige
Alternative zu diesem Multikulti-Wahn“.188
The radical right-wing party just recently advocated the abolition of the CDU-initiated Islam
Conference, which it considers as “inländerfeindlich”, and criticized the government’s policy
as appeasement towards radical “Islam lobbyists”.189 The latter is referring to the abovementioned criticism voiced by participating Muslim organizations before this year’s Islam
Conference.190
In order to enhance the credibility and power of its arguments the NPD also makes use of the
polemical rhetoric of politicians of the established, non-right-wing parties like SPD politician
Thilo Sarrazin, quoting his above-mentioned statements about the social and educational
problems of Muslim immigrants191, and of Islam critic Necla Kelek who stated that Islam tries
to be the Leitkultur not only for the Muslim minority but also for the German majority
186
Häusler (2008), Methodik von PRO NRW und PRO DEUTSCHLAND, p.8
NPD Landesverband NRW (2008): “Deutsche wehrt Euch - Gegen Überfremdung, Islamisierung und
Ausländerkriminalität“, in:
NPD NRW. Web page <http://www.auslaenderstopp-nrw.de/> (Accessed
10.04.2010)
188
NPD Landesverband NRW (2008), “Deutsche wehrt Euch“
189
Markus Pohl (2010): “NPD-NRW fordert Abschaffung der ‚Islamkonferenz‘“, in: Nationaldemokratische
Partei Deutschlands, 22.03.2010. Web page <http://www.npd.de/html/714/artikel/detail/1190/> (Accessed
01.07.2010)
190
Akyol (2010), “The German state and Muslims are reaching out to each other”
191
Pohl (2010), “NPD-NRW fordert Abschaffung der ‚Islamkonferenz‘“
187
41
society.192 In a similar vein the NPD refers to statistics drawn from studies conducted by the
federal government (like Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland), universities and press articles
in reputable German media like Der Spiegel or Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung according to
which immigrants with a Muslim background have the lowest level of education among the
foreigners living in Germany. In the eyes of the right-wing extremists these reports and
statistics confirm that the majority of the Muslims in Germany are “bildungsloses
Subproletariat” who only depend on social welfare benefits. In a very discriminatory,
demagogic manner Muslims are condemned wholesale as violent and bigoted people, who
make the lives of the non-Muslim German population unbearable, insulting them as
„Schweinefleischfresser“ and “infidels” and turning German public schools, especially in the
major German cities like Berlin, Frankfurt or Cologne, into “zones of some kind of
schoolyard sharia”.193 194
Like in the populist parties’ approach towards Islam, mosques and minarets are regarded as
the ultimate symbol of Islamisation. Islamic symbols are rejected out of hand by the NPD
with mosques being derogatorily called “muselmanische Glaubenskaserne” in the party’s
press releases.195 In this context the National Democrats called for a minaret ban to be
included in the German constitution, which would however contradict the right for religious
freedom guaranteed by the German Constitution which includes the construction of mosques
with minarets. The NPD however argues that minarets are nothing more than ornaments and
thus not necessary for religious practice. The motion on the minaret ban put forward by the
far right party was opposed by all the other parties. With regard to the issue of mosque
building in Germany NPD politician Holger Apfel, NPD-chairman of the state parliament in
Saxony, proclaimed: “Wir wollen auch künftig das vertraute Glockengeläut der Dresdner
Frauenkirche oder der Kreuzkirche hören - und nicht das Plärren eines Muezzins, der vom
192
Thorsten Thomsen (2010): “Islamisierung stoppen - Minarett-Verbot ins Grundgesetz!“, in:
Nationaldemokratische
Partei
Deutschlands,
21.01.2010.
Web
page
<http://www.npd.de/html/1064/artikel/detail/1103/> (Accessed 01.07.2010)
193
194
The NPD press release specifically refers to the case of the “Rütli secondary school” in Berlin Neukölln,
where 83 percent of the students have a non-German background, mostly being of Turkish and Arabic descent.
In 2006 the teachers and the school principal wrote an open letter to the Berlin Senate asking for the school to be
closed down due to the complete breakdown of discipline caused by the enormous violence and aggressiveness
among the students which rendered teaching almost impossible. The case sparked a national debate about
integration of immigrant youth, who often speaks insufficient German, as well as about Germany’s education
system and school violence. The NPD however presents the Rütli School not as an exception but as the typical
example for a German school (cf. Mark Young (2006): “Letter from Berlin - Germany’s School of Hard
Knocks”,
in:
Spiegel
Online
International,
05.04.2006.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,409876,00.html> (Accessed 04.07.2010))
195
Thomsen (2010), “Islamisierung stoppen“
42
Minarett seine Glaubenssoldaten in die Kasernen der muslimischen Landnahme ruft![…]“.196
This comment shows striking parallels to Edmund Stoiber’s above-mentioned statement about
mosques in Germany, merely in a different wording.
In all of the far right party’s Islamophobic statements it is simply asserted, that all integration
and social problems of Muslims as well as the increased propensity to violence among
second- and third-generation migrants are directly linked with their religion. Islam is
furthermore not regarded a religion but a political means for cultural conquest and takeover of
foreign territory; therefore the differentiation between Islam and Islamism that the moderate
German political parties call for is considered as not necessary.197
196
197
Thomsen (2010), “Islamisierung stoppen“
43
CHAPTER 3
Issues of contestation regarding Muslim immigrants in Germany
The enduring and growing presence of Muslims in Germany and the rising visibility of Islam
in the public sphere have increasingly caught the attention of wide parts of the public opinion
and triggered a number of heated discussions about the role of Islam in state and society,
often leading to violent oppositions. Public debates about Islam seem to be en vogue seeing
that this religion presents an ideal target for criticism. Due to the change of civic status of
many Muslim immigrants from ‘foreigner’ to ‘citizen’ they naturally aspire to societal and
political participation in the civil society, which often leads to fears among German nonMuslim citizens of losing control of key issues of the German society.198 This comprises the
demand for better consideration of their religious needs in the public arena (e.g. in schools
and professional life) which includes inter alia the construction of Islamic places of worship
and the introduction of Islamic religious education in German schools.199
However, these demands often lead to a vehement ideological battle about the visibility of
Islam in the German society, in particular focusing on Islamic symbols like the headscarf,
mosques or minarets, with Muslims often being accused of trying to achieve the parallel
establishment of a separatist Muslim society and the gradual implementation of the Sharia in
Europe. Unlike many other religious minority groups in Germany, Muslims are thus
confronted with an extraordinary lack of solidarity and support from the majority society,
which often leads to unequal treatment of Islam compared to other religions.200 This
observation is confirmed in the results of my survey Muslime in Deutschland in which 42.5
percent of the respondents stated to feel strongly disadvantaged compared to members of
other religious faiths, notably Christian and Jewish citizens.201
In this context a term often used is that of Muslim “parallel society”. The very Islam-critical
author Günther Lachmann writes in his book Tödliche Toleranz – Die Muslime und unsere
offene Gesellschaft on the topic of the Muslim “Parallelgesellschaft“: “Wer auch immer aus
198
Werner Schiffauer (2006): “Enemies within the gates – The debate about the citizenship of Muslims in
Germany”, in: Modood, T.; Triandafyllidou, A.; Zapata-Barrero, R. (eds.): Multiculturalism, Muslims and
Citizenship - A European Approach. Oxon: Routledge, p.94
199
Faruk Şen; Aydın Hayrettın (2002): Islam in Deutschland. München: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, pp.118-119
200
Motadel (2007), “Islam in Germany”; Amir-Moazami (2005), “Muslim Challenges to the Secular
Consensus”, p.267
201
44
einem muslimischen Land nach Berlin gekommen ist, sucht die Stadtteile, in denen die
Glaubensbrüder und Glaubensschwestern sind, und bleibt dort wohnen. Die Menschen richten
sich ihre eigene Welt ein, mit eigenen Supermärkten, Gemüsehändlern, Teestuben, mit dem
eigenen Sportverein, den Koranschulen und Moscheen. […] Die Heimat der Muslime ist das
Ghetto.“202 According to Heiner Bielefeldt, Director of the German Institute for Human
Rights, Lachmann however completely neglects the fact that this ghettoization is involuntary
and mainly caused by financial and social reasons. Bielefeldt maintains that the often less
wealthy immigrant families settle in the lowest priced neighbourhoods not out of religious
and cultural “otherness” or out of interest for closed religious and cultural community
building, but because they cannot afford to live elsewhere. Complex processes of social
segregation are thus simplified to religio-cultural conquest.203
More and more aspects regarding Muslim life in Germany have become topics of public
debate since they seem to challenge the presumably Judaeo-Christian or secular values
entrenched in the German society. Given that the Germany has traditionally not defined itself
as an immigration country and migrants were mostly excluded from political participation for
a long time, Muslim immigrants are still widely regarded as a ‘foreign’ group with ‘foreign’
customs on the German territory.204 According to Werner Schiffauer, expert in comparative
cultural and social anthropology, Germany is therefore currently witnessing a moral panic
focusing on the Muslim immigrant resulting from the realization that Germany has become a
society of immigration and that Muslim immigrants have become active citizens claiming
their rights from within the society and are thus no longer “guest workers” and outsiders who
stay out of the public sphere. This changing power-relationship consequently stirs up fears
about the impact immigration will have on the political and societal culture in Germany.205 It
therefore comes as no surprise that particularly those aspects of Islamic presence in Germany
which are more perceptible and which involve Muslim communities making claims within the
public sphere more easily lead to controversies.206
These contentious issues regarding Muslims in Germany often unite people from different
political camps and from all sections of society in the public debates. The ways in which the
presence of Islam and the Muslims’ cultural differences are represented in public discussions
202
204
Amir-Moazami (2005), “Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus”, p.269
205
Schiffauer (2006), “Enemies within the gates”, p.94
206
203
45
play a crucial role for shaping the perceptions of the majority society on the issues under
scrutiny. It is important to note that religious and cultural arguments are frequently
intermingled in the public debates about Islamic symbols.207
The fears and reservations towards Islam existing among the German non-Muslim population
are often instrumentalised by national politicians and public Islam critics in polemical
discussions in an attempt to deliberately marginalize the Muslim immigrant communities and
well-meaning, tolerant and Islam-friendly politicians and citizens. While before the terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 unsettling questions regarding Islam were
generally rather avoided, since September 11, 2001 it has become more socially acceptable to
challenge and criticize Muslims and Islam publicly. The public debates on the following
issues of contestation are good examples of how after 9/11 the state’s and civil society’s
perceptions of Muslims have taken a decisive turn setting in motion a chain of anti-Islamic
prejudices and rumours which often connect terrorists to ‘ordinary’ Muslim communities and
Islamism to Islam.208
This chapter is dedicated to aspects of Muslim life in Germany which have led and still lead
to controversies and thus constitute a major part of the public debates about Islam in the
country. I will focus on the five most important and controversial issues of contestation which
have dominated the public discourse in recent years, namely the mosque building controversy,
the headscarf debate, honour killings, homophobia among Muslim immigrants as well as
Islamic religious education.
The mosque building controversy
While the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right of Muslim
congregations to build mosques, thus placing them on a par with churches and synagogues by
jurisdiction, protests by parts of the German population and activist groups against the
construction of new mosques in German towns and communities have become more frequent
in recent years. In contrast to the national headscarf debate or discussions about Islamic
religious education, mosque building is a local issue of contestation, mostly staying limited to
207
Marcel Johannes Marie Maussen (2009): Constructing Mosques – The governance of Islam in France and the
Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR), p.15
208
46
the towns and districts where the mosque is planned to be built.209 According to the
Allensbach Institute 56 percent of the German respondents were in favour of a ban on mosque
building in Germany in the year 2006, arguing that in some Islamic countries the building of
churches is not allowed, therefore Muslims do not deserve tolerance either since their religion
is “intolerant” towards other faiths.210
Only since the beginning of the 1990s public conflicts about the visibility and audibility of
mosques have become part of the public discourse about Islam in Germany. However, already
since the beginning of Muslim immigration in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s the Turkish
and other Muslim “guest workers” started gathering in prayer rooms (only three mosques
existed in 1970).211 According to a survey from the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv Deutschland
in 2008 there were around 2,600 Islamic places of worship in the whole Federal Republic, the
majority of them being provisional prayer halls in hidden back courtyards and former factory
buildings, and only 206 mosques of the classical type with minarets or domes.212 An
additional 120 mosques were either in the planning stages or under construction.213
In many cases these so-called “backyard mosques”, which are usually rented by the mosque
organizations, are largely hidden from public view and thus remain unnoticed by the nonMuslim residents. However, when Muslim congregations leave their backyards and
temporarily converted buildings (factories, canteens etc.) to construct new, representative
mosques in order to have a more dignified place of worship and at the same time signal their
intention to be a permanent part of the German society and cityscape, Islam suddenly
becomes visible in the public sphere. This often arouses fears and provokes reservations and
hostile reactions among the local population. The desire to build a representative mosque with
all its architectonical features (including dome and minaret), which shows an invigorated selfconfidence of Muslims, often becomes the subject of dispute at a local level in towns and
communities on the grounds of supposed traffic problems and parking problems due to the
large influx of Muslim worshippers, as well as noise emission, size and location of the place
209
Deutsche Islamkonferenz (2010c): Recommendations of the German Islam Conference on mosque
construction. Web page <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1883012/SubSites/DIK/EN/
Moscheen/AG2Moscheebau/ag2-moscheebau-node.html?__nnn=true> (Accessed 01.07.2010)
210
Noelle; Petersen (2006), “Die Einstellung der Deutschen zum Islam“
211
Jörg Hüttermann (2007): “Konflikt um islamische Symbole in Deutschland: Asymmetrien der
Konfliktkommunikation”, in: Wohlrab-Sahr; Tezcan (eds.) (2007), Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa, p.202
212
Compared to this there were only three mosques in 1970 and around 1,500 in 1990.
213
Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv Deutschland (2008): “Koordinierungsrat vertritt Mehrheit der Muslime Jahresumfrage des Jahres 2007 des Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv-Deutschland (Amina-Abdullah-Stiftung)“, in:
Nachrichten 2008. Web page <http://www.islamarchiv.de/akver/in_online.html> (Accessed 19.07.2010)
47
of prayer or the height of the minarets.214 At the same time the symbolic dimension in the
conflict about mosque construction should be taken into account: a mosque symbolizes
permanent presence of Islam in Germany and its approval by the authorities implies
acceptance of Islam and Muslims in the German society, facts which often lead to opposition
among the residents in the neighbourhoods concerned.215
In the public debates about the controversial issue of mosque construction, which are
recurrently characterised by culturalising prejudices, differing positions among the German
non-Muslim population become distinguishable. On the one hand proponents of mosques in
Germany call for tolerance, religious freedom, respect and recognition towards Islam arguing
that the building of mosques represents an important step for societal, religious and cultural
integration of Islam and Muslims in Germany216 since “[w]o Menschen sich zu Hause fühlen,
da bauen sie ihre Gotteshäuser”.217 On the other hand opponents express their fears of
expansion of Islam in Germany, of “being quietly infiltrated by the Turks”218 leading to an
alienation of German towns, which is connected with concerns about extremism, terror and
religiously motivated violence. Many claim the building of mosques to be a demonstration of
power by Muslims towards the Judaeo-Christian occidental society which is said to rather
hinder integration than benefit it. These ethno-culturally motivated fears and resentments are
frequently instrumentalised by extreme right-wing parties and citizens’ initiatives like Pro
Köln in order to polemicise against the alleged Islamisation of Germany.219
This became particularly clear in the above-mentioned prominent example of the mosque
project for Germany’s largest mosque in the district Cologne-Ehrenfeld for the city’s 120,000
Muslim citizens, which sparked fierce protests among local residents, far right parties, the
churches and well-known public Islam critics like Ralph Giordano and Necla Kelek. Since the
plans to build this central mosque were announced in 2007, Pro Köln mobilized against the
214
Şen; Hayrettın (2002): Islam in Deutschland, pp.102-103
Janbernd Oebbecke (2006): “Moscheebaukonflikte und der Beitrag des Rechts“, in: Rüdiger Robert; Norbert
Konegen (2006) (eds.): Globalisierung und Lokalisierung. Zur Neubestimmung des Kommunalen in
Deutschland. Münster: Waxmann, p.280
216
Kornelia Sammet (2007): “Religion oder Kultur? Positionierungen zum Islam in Gruppendiskussionen über
Moscheebauten“, in: Wohlrab-Sahr; Tezcan (eds.) (2007), Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa, p.192; Deutsche
Islamkonferenz (2010c), Recommendations on mosque construction
217
Claudia Keller; Johannes Radke (2010): “Kreuzberger Moschee – Gotteshaus für alle“, in: Der Tagesspiegel,
22.05.2010. Web page <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/gotteshaus-fuer-alle/1843590.html> (Accessed
15.07.2010)
218
Charles Hawley (2010a): “Germany’s Very Own Minaret Debate Turns Nasty”, in: Spiegel Online,
05.02.2010. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,676156,00.html> (Accessed
01.07.2010)
219
215
48
implementation of the building project with a vociferous anti-mosque campaign by collecting
20,000 signatures from local residents in a petition against the disputed Islamic place of
prayer and through regularly organizing anti-mosque demonstrations.220 The prestigious
mosque was declared a symbol of the Islamisation and alienation of Cologne and for Turkish
mass immigration.221 The group’s campaign received strong support from right-wing activists
from across Europe like Vlaams Belang or Front National. The fact that the mosque dispute
raging in Cologne-Ehrenfeld came not only from the extremist fringe but also from the centre
of the German society with many local residents rejecting the construction of the mosque
because they consider Cologne a Christian city and are afraid of the “land grab on foreign
territory”222, illustrates the difficulty many Germans have coming to terms with the change in
society with Islam becoming increasingly visible in the public arena. On the other side,
several hundred citizens as well as far-left counter-demonstrators voiced their support for the
mosque construction and joined the heated debate about the Grand mosque.223
The clash further escalated when Jewish writer and Holocaust survivor Ralph Giordano
demanded to stop the construction of the mosque arguing “[e]s gibt kein Grundrecht auf den
Bau einer Großmoschee.“224 He viewed the central mosque in Cologne-Ehrenfeld as a symbol
for the preservation of an anti-integrative identity and as a “declaration of war”. For him the
Muslims’ claim for building such a central mosque is evidence for the failure of integration of
Muslim immigrants since they continue to live in their “parallel society”. Against this
backdrop the Pro Köln activists made efforts to enlist Giordano for their cause, which he
however vigorously resisted dubbing the populist party the “lokale Variante des
zeitgenössischen Nationalsozialismus, die, wenn sie könnte, wie sie wollte, mich in eine
Gaskammer sperren würde.”225 Despite all the controversial debates however, in which the
local media played their role by whipping up the atmosphere, the project finally won the
approval of the Cologne City Council with only the conservative CDU226 and Pro Köln voting
220
Canan Topcu (2009): “Mosques in Cologne-Ehrenfeld and Duisburg-Marxloh”, in: Deutsche Islamkonferenz,
18.06.2009. Web page <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_110/ nn_1883012/SubSites/DIK/EN/
Moscheen/DuisburgKoeln/duisburg-koeln-node.html?__nnn=true> (Accessed 01.07.2010)
221
222
Ralph Giordano (2007): “Nicht die Moschee, der Islam ist das Problem“, in: Cicero –Magazin für politische
Kultur, issue 10/2007. Web page <http://www.cicero.de/97.php?ress_id=4&item=2125> (Accessed 23.02.2010)
223
Carolin Jenkner (2008a): “Controversial Cologne Construction – Go-Ahead for Germany’s Biggest Mosque“,
in: Spiegel Online International, 29.08.2008. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/0,1518,575170,00.html> (Accessed 03.02.2010)
224
225
Giordano (2007), “Der Islam ist das Problem“
226
Cologne’s Mayor Fritz Schramma (CDU) voted against his own party in favour of the mosque construction.
49
against the mosque building.227 The foundation stone was finally laid in November 2009 and
the construction of the new mosque, which is entirely financed by private donations, is
planned to be finished by 2011.228
The DITIB umbrella organization (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs)229, which is
responsible for the Ehrenfeld mosque project, has often been criticized for its lacking
transparency and insufficient public relations concerning the mosque plans, which is said to
have been one of the main reasons for the anti-mosque protests. It should however be noted
that the DITIB launched a public architectural competition for the construction of the place of
worship, which was won by a German, non-Muslim architect who comes from a family of
church master builders and who will now build a mosque for Cologne’s Muslims.
Furthermore public hearings with local residents were organized by the Islamic organization
to inform about the construction plans and an advisory committee was founded comprising
representatives from political parties (CDU, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and FDP),
churches, local associations, as well as from Cologne’s Jewish community. Yet, these
measures were only set up after the protests had started, which could have been prevented
through more transparency and inclusion of the local community in the project from the
beginning.230
Also in the German capital Berlin the first project for the building of a new mosque for the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Association in the Eastern district Heinersdorf-Pankow led to great
opposition by the locals, of whom 90 percent were in favour of a ban of the mosque. In a
petition signed by 6,000 citizens, they expressed their concern about “an Islamic-Ahmadiyya
parallel society, which would have the goal of overturning our liberal-democratic order.”231
227
Shakush (2009), “Islam im Spiegel der Politik von CDU und CSU“, pp.371-372
Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. (2008): Zentralmoschee – Köln Ehrenfeld. Web page
<http://www.zentralmoschee-koeln.de/detail1.php?id=14&lang=de> (Accessed 15.04.2010)
229
The DITIB (Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği) is the biggest Turkish Sunni organization in Germany,
comprising around 900 mosque communities in the country. It was founded in 1984, has its headquarters in
Cologne and is directly linked to the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs in Ankara, therefore cannot be
considered an independent Muslim umbrella organization. The imams and religious teachers employed in the
DITIB mosques are sent from Turkey for five or six years and then return there. Consequently they generally
have very limited or no German language skills, which proves to be a handicap for the dialogue with the nonMuslim population living in the surroundings of the mosque and thus hamper the integration of the mosque
community in the respective communal area (cf. Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V.
(2010): Gründung und Struktur; Michael Kiefer (2008): “Islam und Integration – Versäumnisse, Barrieren und
Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten“, in: Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild Islam, pp.21-22)
230
Bekir Alboğa (2008): “Diskussion um den Moscheebau in Köln“, in: Häusler; Killguss (2008), Feindbild
Islam, pp.41-42
231
Michael Scott Moore; Jochen-Martin Gutsch (2006): “East Berlin’s First Mosque – The Muslims are
coming“,
in:
Spiegel
Online
International,
28.12.2006.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,456751,00.html> (Accessed 22.07.2010)
228
50
After the issuing of the building permit by the local authorities a local clash of cultures broke
out involving numerous demonstrations against and in favour of the mosque and even an
arson attack being carried out on the place of worship under construction. In October 2008 the
mosque was finally inaugurated but the conflict with the local residents still continues.232
Apart from all these fierce anti-mosque protests however, there are also positive, noncontroversial examples of mosque construction like Germany’s biggest mosque, the Merkez
Central Mosque, which was inaugurated in the industrial district of Duisburg-Marxloh in
2008 and is widely praised by politicians and church representatives as a model example for
successful integration of Islam in Germany. Jürgen Rüttgers, at the time prime minister of
North Rhine-Westphalia, even demanded “[w]ir brauchen mehr Moscheen in diesem Land,
aber nicht in den Hinterhöfen, sondern sichtbar, erkennbar”.233 In contrast to the cases in
Berlin and Cologne there were hardly any protests by local residents and no citizens’
initiatives were founded to oppose the mosque project in Duisburg. The reason for this lies in
the focus on transparency and dialogue of the cooperative mosque community which
organized regular meetings for local non-Muslim citizens and community leaders where
critical questions could be asked and fears and reservations openly expressed and
discussed.234 This dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim fellow citizens is further
enhanced through the yearly held “Day of the Open Mosque”.235236 The Duisburg-Marxloh
mosque building includes a local inter-confessional community meeting centre for the whole
district, which was financed through the state while the mosque was entirely funded by
private donations. Due to the peaceful construction period compared to other mosque building
232
Ferda Ataman; Katharina Peters (2008): “Moschee-Eröffnung in Ostberlin – Schrein des Anstoßes“, in:
Spiegel Online, 16.10.2008. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,584686,00.html>
(Accessed 03.02.2010)
233
Carolin Jenkner (2008b): “Moschee- Eröffnung – Warum das Wunder in Marxloh funktioniert“, in: Spiegel
Online, 26.10.2008. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,586613,00.html> (Accessed
03.02.2010)
234
Ibid.
235
Deutsche Islamkonferenz (2009): Fragen erwünscht – Tag der offenen Moschee in Duisburg-Marxloh,
19.10.2009. Web page <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/nn_1375092/SubSites/DIK/DE/Moscheen/
TOMMmarxloh/t-o-m-marxloh-inhalt.html> (Accessed 13.09.2010)
236
In 1997 the Central Council of Muslims initiated the “Open Day at the Mosque” which is since then
organized annually on 3rd October, a day chosen deliberately to show that the self-image of Muslims is part of
the German unity and to express their solidarity with the German society as a whole. In order to enhance the
dialogue with non-Muslim fellow citizens and give an insight into Muslim life in Germany up to 1,000 mosque
communities all over Germany invite to mosque tours, podium discussions, bookstalls and folklore and answer
questions about their religion and community activities (cf. Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD)
(2007): Tag der offenen Moschee. Web page <http://www.islam.de/2583.php> (Accessed 14.08.2010)).
51
projects in Germany, Elif Saat, chairperson of the mosque and community centre, described it
as the “Wunder von Marxloh” during the inauguration ceremony.237
In connection with the mosque building controversy the construction or ban of minarets and
the call for prayer by the Muezzin play a significant role in the debate. Minarets are often
regarded as a “symbol for Islam’s quest of power”238 or a mere provocation of the German
population and statements like “We want the Cathedral here, not Minarets”239 are frequently
voiced by opponents of minarets. Despite the constitutional right to building Islamic places of
worship including minarets, there are generally restrictions concerning their height which
should not exceed that of the surrounding church towers in order to preserve the primacy of
Christianity symbolically with regard to the cityscape.240 Some right-wing groups and citizens
even called for banning minarets in Germany altogether, being particularly encouraged after
the Swiss minaret ban in 2009. According to a recent survey by the German news magazine
Der Spiegel, 45 percent of the Germans would vote in favour of a minaret ban if a minaret
referendum like in Switzerland was held in Germany.241
Along with minarets the call for prayer by the muezzin, which is usually broadcast from the
minaret according to Islamic tradition, often leads to conflicts with the local non-Muslim
population, notably when the muezzin’s chants are amplified through loudspeakers. Besides
complaints about noise nuisance from locals living in the vicinity of the mosques the call for
prayer is perceived as “alien” and as a threat to the predominantly Christian-based religious
and cultural German traditions. In public discussions the muezzin’s call to prayer is often
compared to bell-ringing of churches by Muslim citizens who claim equal rights for
Christians and Muslims, while non-Muslims regard the ringing of bells as a familiar sound in
Germany, which does not always have a religious purpose242, unlike the chants of the
muezzin.243 Due to public pressure and recurrent opposition from the German population, the
237
Jenkner (2008b), “Moschee- Eröffnung – Warum das Wunder in Marxloh funktioniert“; Topcu (2009),
“Mosques in Cologne-Ehrenfeld and Duisburg-Marxloh”
238
Hawley (2010a), “Minaret Debate”
239
Reimann (2007), “‘We Want the Cathedral, Not Minarets’”
240
Şen; Hayrettın (2002), Islam in Deutschland, p.104
241
Charles Hawley (2010b): “International Right-Wingers gather for EU-wide minaret ban”, in: Spiegel Online
International, 26.03.2010. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,685896,00.html>
(Accessed 01.07.2010)
242
For instance the secular function of ringing of the church clock.
243
Barbara Gartner (2006): “Der Islam im religionsneutralen Staat. Die Problematik des muslimischen
Kopftuchs in der Schule, des koedukativen Sport- und Schwimmunterrichts, des Gebetsrufs des Muezzins, des
Schächtens nach islamischem Ritus, des islamischen Religionsunterrichts und des muslimischen
Bestattungswesens in Österreich und Deutschland.“, in: Janbernd Oebbecke (ed.) (2006): Islam und Recht, Band
4. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, pp.191-193
52
mosque organizations often relinquish the call to prayer from the minaret from the outset and
only broadcast it directly inside the mosque in the prayer hall or over the radio.244
The headscarf debate
In recent years the Islamic headscarf245 has become one of the most hotly disputed items of
clothing in Europe. Also in Germany one of the most complex and controversial issues of
contestation in the public discourse about Islam is the still ongoing debate on the legitimacy
of the Islamic headscarf in public institutions, in particular in state schools in Germany.
Despite the fact that only a relatively small percentage of Muslim women in Germany are
actually wearing a headscarf. However, the increasing demands for recognition by young
veiled Muslim women who were born and raised within the German society and their active
participation in public spaces have made the issue more ‘visible’ and consequently raise
questions about religious tolerance and constitutional rights in relation to the diasporic
Muslim population. One of the fundamental questions posed in the debates about this
controversial piece of clothing is: What does a headscarf actually stand for?246
There is a tendency to present veiled Muslim women as either a victim of the patriarchal,
archaic male-dominated Islamic society or as an Islamist militant. The true motives for a
woman’s choice to wear a headscarf, which are far more complex than that, may however be
different and remain largely unaddressed in the public debates.247 Even though there are cases
in which the headscarf is worn as a political symbol to show the dissociation from Western
secular values and the principle of gender equality, veiled women cannot be wholesale
condemned as having fundamentalist attitudes.248 Other motives of a Muslim woman for
voluntarily wearing a headscarf can be inter alia preserving her identity in the diaspora and at
the same time respecting the traditions of her family, indicating her unavailability for sex or
244
Jenkner (2008b), “Moschee-Eröffnung in Marxloh”
note: I use the terms “(Islamic) headscarf” and “veil” interchangeably, hereby not refering to a full-face or
full-body veil but an ordinary headscarf which covers the hair and the neck of Muslim women but leaves the face
clear. Moreover, in accordance with the terminology used in scholarship with regard to the wearing of
headscarves in the Muslim world, I will also employ the term “veiling”.
246
Amir-Moazami (2005), “Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus”, p.267; Şen; Hayrettın (2002), Islam
in Deutschland, p.100
247
Saharso (2007), “Headscarves: Comparison Germany and the Netherlands”
248
Gartner (2006), “Der Islam im religionsneutralen Staat“, p.119
245
53
simply expressing her religious orientation.249 The negative discourse on the Islamic
headscarf is also reflected in the responses to my survey in which many female Muslims
stated to feel being placed by the majority society into the role of the victim of the oppressed,
uneducated and dependant Muslim woman. The fact that many Germans automatically
assume that they are forced to wear the headscarf results in many young Muslim women who
wear it out of religious conviction feeling offended and upset.250
The strong symbolic importance of a veil explains why the headscarf debate stirs up so many
fears.251 For the German majority society one of the defining issues regarding the presumed
backwardness of Islam is the subordinate position of the “veiled Muslim women”. The
headscarf is often perceived as a symbol of oppression of women, which contradicts the
Western ideal of emancipation and gender equality, and is consequently considered
incompatible with the constitutional rights. Moreover, through simplifications in the public
discourse and in the media a headscarf-wearing woman often becomes a symbol for
‘foreigner’ or ‘stranger’.252 When this “foreignness” however self-confidently appears in the
public sphere, as a teacher in German schools or as a civil servant in other public institutions,
it suddenly starts becoming problematic and is regarded as a symbolic threat.253
The question of whether or not, and to what extent the Islamic headscarf is a tolerable
religious sign in public institutions has become a central topic in the discussions about the
role of Islam in the German society. The wearing of a veil by Muslim women employed in
state schools typically raises concerns about state neutrality in matters of religion and
worldview.254 It generally represents a conflict between the teacher’s claim to freedom of
religious practice, the educational authority of parents with regard to religion and the
“negative religious freedom” of pupils, thus their right to a neutral classroom environment.
The latter implies the fear of religious influence and ideological indoctrination of the pupils if
249
Robert A. Kahn (2006): “The Headscarf as Threat? A Comparison of German and American Legal
Discourses”,
in:
bepress
Legal
Series,
Paper
1504.
Web
page
<http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6834&context=expresso> (Accessed 08.08.2010)
250
251
Hans Michael Heinig (2005): “Religionsfreiheit oder Neutralitätsgebot? - Das Kopftuch in der
rechtsstaatlichen und juristischen Debatte“, in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 28.06.2005. Web page
<http://www1.bpb.de/themen/SQH1C3,0,0,Religionsfreiheit_oder_Neutralit%E4tsgebot.html>
(Accessed
08.03.2010)
252
253
254
This means that the state should not identify with any particular ideology or religion in order to secure that all
citizens have equal rights for performing and expressing their personal beliefs, which is a precondition for
religious and cultural plurality.
54
they are confronted every day with the sight of an authority figure wearing a headscarf, which
can potentially lead to conflicts with the children’s parents and thus justifies a restriction of
the teachers “positive religious freedom”.255 Empirical studies confirm that 60.2 percent of
German non-Muslim parents would not register their child in a school where a Muslim
teacher wearing a headscarf gives lessons.256
The most prominent example for the headscarf debate in Germany is the long court case of
the young Muslim elementary school teacher Fereshta Ludin, which triggered an intensive
and emotional national dispute and was thematised in the media for a long time. The issue of
the religious headgear became extremely topical and controversial with actors from all parts
of society getting involved in the discourse, including politicians, church representatives, the
media, Islam critics as well as Muslim organizations.257
The public debate started in 1998 when Ludin, a Muslim woman of Afghan descent who
became a German citizen in 1995, applied as a teacher at the upper school authority in
Stuttgart in the state of Baden-Württemberg who refused to employ her in civil service
because she was not prepared to take off her headscarf while teaching. She therefore brought
her case to court going from one judicial authority to the next over several years to fight for
her right to wear the headscarf, supported by the leftist teachers’ trade union, Milli Görüş and
the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, but her appeals were turned down every time on
the grounds that the wearing of the veil made her unfit for the job of a public school
teacher.258 Annette Schavan (CDU), at the time Minister for education and cultural affairs of
the state of Baden-Württemberg, justified her decision of opposing Ludin’s application,
arguing that the headscarf does not only represent a religious but also a political symbol as
well as a symbol of “cultural segregation” and a part of the history of the oppression of
women. As a civil servant, a teacher should therefore not be allowed to wear the religious
headgear during class since it would breach the neutrality duty of the state and touch upon the
negative religious freedom of the pupils.259 Furthermore Schavan claimed that “[t]he wearing
255
Joseph Marko (2006): “Das islamische Kopftuch in der Rechtsprechung europäischer Höchstgerichte“, in:
Urs Altermatt; Mariano Delgado; Guido Vergauwen (eds.) (2006): Der Islam in Europa- Zwischen Weltpolitik
und Alltag. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer GmbH, p.55
256
Bundesministerium des Innern (2007c), Muslime in Deutschland, p.32
257
Schiffauer (2006), “Enemies within the gates”, p.104
258
Alice Schwarzer (2003): “Ludin- Die Machtprobe”, in: EMMA- das politische Magazin für Frauen,
July/August 2003. Web page <http://www.emma.de/hefte/ausgaben-2003/juliaugust-2003/editorial/> (Accessed
26.06.2010)
259
Amir-Moazami (2005), “Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus”, p.268; Fekete (2009), A Suitable
Enemy, p.97
55
of the headscarf is not part of the religious duties of a Muslim woman. This is recognizable
for example, in that a majority of Muslim women worldwide do not wear the headscarf”, an
information she had received by the political scientist Bassam Tibi who himself is of Muslim
background and acted as a political adviser in the Ludin case.260 Another concern raised was
that, apart from the possible (unintended) religious influence on pupils of other faiths, Mrs.
Ludin’s headscarf would make Muslim schoolgirls who do not veil feel uncomfortable and
could cause a considerable pressure to adapt.261
On the other hand Ludin herself stressed that the headscarf belongs to her religious identity
basing her arguments on her fundamental right to religious freedom and the right for freedom
of vocational choice, which would be infringed through a ban on headscarves.262 In 2003 after
Ludin’s long legal battle the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany’s highest court, contrary
to the previous courts finally ruled that the mere fact of a schoolteacher wearing a headscarf
and the possible religious conflict arising from that do not per se violate the Constitution and
cannot be forbidden on the basis of the existing laws, thus ruling in favour of Fereshta Ludin.
The judgment weighed freedom of religion against neutrality in schools, leaving the decision
to the parliaments of the respective federal states, which are responsible for the school system,
to adjust their laws to either generally allowing or generally forbidding teachers to wear
religious garb if they find it necessary. The banning of headscarves thus has to be supported
by state law.263
The Federal Constitutional Court’s decision, which triggered a major national controversy,
caused ten of the sixteen German federal states in former West Germany264 that were
dominated by the CDU or the CSU to develop legal provisions concerning headscarves for
teachers in public schools or occasionally also for employees in public services.265 The
forerunner was the state of Baden-Württemberg where a headscarf ban was passed right after
the Constitutional Court judgment in the Ludin case with a law forbidding “all expressions of
political, religious or secular convictions that can endanger the neutrality of the state or peace
at school” which is however only applied to the headscarf whereas the display of Christian
260
Kahn (2006), “The Headscarf as Threat?”
262
Ibid.
263
Bundesverfassungsgericht (2003): Urteil BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 vom 3.6.2003. Web page
<http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html> (Accessed 07.07.2010)
264
In none of the Eastern federal states a ban on Islamic headscarves has been neither discussed nor issued so
far.
265
261
56
educational and cultural symbols will continue to be admissible.266 Many actors involved in
the discourse, particularly the conservative CDU/CSU politicians, thus often apply double
standards to Islamic and Christian or Jewish symbols in German classrooms emphasising the
Judaeo-Christian character of the German society and allowing religious symbols deriving
from Christianity (i.e. crucifix, habit of nuns) and Judaism (i.e. Jewish kippa) while banning
the Islamic symbols. This unequal treatment and its de facto legal enshrinement
unsurprisingly lead to a lot of dispute and legal complaints by Muslim citizens as it violates
the principle of equality between all religions and clearly reflects the CDU’s concept of the
primacy of Leitkultur.267 The constant shift in the discourse from the reference to “neutrality”
with regard to religion to the explicit emphasis on the Christian-occidental background of the
German society is rather striking.
Roland Koch, former CDU prime minister of the federal state of Hessen, welcomed the
headscarf ban in his state with the words “Deutschland ist kein religiös völlig neutrales Land,
sondern eines, das in Verantwortung vor dem christlichen Gott gegründet worden ist.”268
However, also some of the SPD politicians are opposed to the Islamic headscarf worn by
teachers at public German schools, such as former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who stated
“[m]eine Ansicht ist klar: Kopftücher haben für Leute im staatlichen Auftrag, also auch für
Lehrerinnen, keinen Platz. Aber einem jungen Mädchen, das mit Kopftuch zur Schule geht,
kann ich das nicht verbieten”.269
Proponents of the headscarf on the other hand argue that many educated, professionally active
Muslim women wear the headscarf as a sign of self-emancipation and self-expression which
completely contradicts the common stereotypical image of the uneducated, backwards,
oppressed Muslim women often prevailing in the perceptions of many German non-Muslims.
A ban on headscarves therefore would not add to the women’s autonomy but on the contrary
rather limit their freedom of vocational choice forcing them to choose between career
progression and the expression of their faith. Chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in
266
Saharso (2007), “Headscarves: Comparison Germany and the Netherlands”, note: After this law was passed
Ludin finally decided to give up her judicial struggle (cf. Amir-Moazami (2005), “Muslim Challenges to the
Secular Consensus”, p.269).
267
268
269
Ibid, p.369
57
Baden-Württemberg Riad Ghalaini criticized the ban on headscarves as constituting a
hindrance to integration by placing all Muslim women under general suspicion.270
Among the supporters of the Islamic headscarf is also Marieluise Beck (B90/Die Grünen),
former Federal Commissioner for migration, refugees and integration, who warned of a
“demonization” of the headscarf through a ban which would “push Muslim women into the
hands of Islamic fundamentalists” by isolating them from the rest of society.271 Therefore, in
reaction to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2003 Beck together with CDUpolitician Rita Süßmuth initiated a petition against the expulsion of veiled teachers from state
schools entitled Religiöse Vielfalt statt Zwangsemanzipation! Aufruf wider eine Lex Kopftuch,
which was signed by a number of prominent women from across the political and cultural
spectrum and mentions the diversity of meanings that the headscarf has in the German
context.272 They emphasised their position with the slogan “Entscheidend ist, was im und
nicht was auf dem Kopf ist!“.273 In response to this petition a group of migrant women with
Muslim background opposing the headscarf in public schools published an open letter in the
newspaper taz which stressed that religion should be a private affair, emphasising the
neutrality principle of the state and that those who “under the influence of the Islamists”
chose to wear the headscarf in public life should not be eligible for civil service.274
In a similar vein two Muslim members of the German Bundestag Ekin Deligöz and Lale
Akgün, both of Turkish origin and not wearing headscarves themselves, openly called on
Muslim women in Germany to take off the headscarf (“Kommt im Heute an, kommt in
Deutschland an. Ihr lebt hier, also legt das Kopftuch ab”) in an appeal published in Bild am
Sonntag in October 2006. In the aftermath they received numerous defamatory letters and
even death threats from Islamists and were denigrated in Turkish newspapers. Both women
270
Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş e.V. (IGMG) (2009): Justizminister fordert generelles Kopftuchverbot
in öffentlichen Einrichtungen. Web page <http://www.igmg.de/nachrichten/artikel/2010/05/26/justizministerfordert-generelles-kopftuchverbot-in-oeffentlichen-einrichtungen.html?_html_html_html_html=>
(Accessed
07.07.2010)
271
BBC (2004): “Viewpoints: Europe and the headscarf“, in: BBC News, 10.02.2004. Web page
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3459963.stm#Alice> (Accessed 05.06.2010)
272
Yasemin Karakasoglu (2005): “Vielfalt statt Zwangsemanzipation! Aufruf wider eine Lex Kopftuch“, in:
Bundeszentrale
für
politische
Bildung.
Web
page
<http://www.bpb.de/themen/XUDYWD,0,0,Religi%F6se_Vielfalt_statt_Zwangsemanzipation!.html> (Accessed
06.06.2010)
273
Goethe-Institut/Quantara.de (2004): “Das Kreuz mit dem Kopftuch“, in: Quantara.de, 10.03.2004. Web page
<http://de.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-548/_nr-14/_p-1/i.html> (Accessed 08.08.2010)
274
Yasemin Karakasoglu (2004): “Für Neutralität in der Schule – Offener Brief“, in: Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung. Web page <http://www.bpb.de/themen/VKZXQL,0,0,F% FCr_Neutralit%E4t_
in_der_Schule.html> (Accessed 06.06.2010); Kahn (2006), “The Headscarf as Threat?”
58
consider the Islamic headscarf not as a mere religious symbol but as a politically
instrumentalised signal symbolizing the oppression of women and patriarchy and insist on
their right for freedom of speech despite the Islamists’ malicious campaign.275
Ekin Deligöz, who is a member of the German Green Party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen276 and
who stands for an enlightened, European version of Islam, was declared the “German Hirsi
Ali” by a Turkish newspaper and has been placed under police protection following the death
threats, which however did not stop her from continuing to defend her opinion in the
headscarf debate. According to her a woman can still be a “good” Muslim without wearing a
headscarf, an opinion shared by many progressive Muslim women in Germany. Many Muslim
organizations like the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and Milli Görüş backed
Deligöz against the Islamists’ threats of violence, even though they mostly did not share her
arguments against the headscarf.277 Lale Akgün is of the opinion that the wearing of any
religious or political symbols (including the Christian cross) by teachers should be generally
banned in public schools.278
The main concern of those opposing the headscarf is the supposed “missionary” character of
veiling, hence the “secrets” Muslim women allegedly conceal under their headscarf.279 The
fear that political Islam will endanger and undermine the liberal German state is an opinion
shared by the prominent feminist Alice Schwarzer, who calls the Muslim headscarf the “flag
of Islamic crusaders” which has been a symbol of segregation for a quarter of a century280
and even went so far as to associate the veil with the swastika in one of her articles.281 The
fear of political implications of veiling is combined with the claim that the headscarf is
forcibly imposed on women, when Schwarzer argues that “[t]he headscarf threatens the
Enlightenment’s achievements” and represents a step back from gender equality, something
275
Susanne Rost (2006): “Die Muslime ringen um ein Symbol”, in: Berliner Zeitung, 28.10.2006. Web page
<http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2006/1028/tagesthema/0014/index.html>
(Accessed 20.06.2010)
276
Ekin Deligöz is the deputy leader of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestag faction. (cf. Ekin Deligöz (2010):
Über mich. Web page <http://www.ekin-deligoez.de/ueber-mich/> (Accessed 21.06.2010)
277
Rost (2006), “Die Muslime ringen um ein Symbol”; Per Hinrichs (2007): “Interview zum Kopftuch – Streit ‘Wir
müssen
Tabus
brechen”,
in:
Spiegel
Online,
24.04.2007.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,467451,00.html> (Accessed 20.06.2010)
278
Ulrike Putz (2003): “Ein ‘Ja’ wäre ein Dammbruch gewesen”, in: Spiegel Online, 24.09.2003. Web page
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,267013,00.html> (Accessed 21.06.2010)
279
280
Alice Schwarzer (2003b): “Ludin- Die Machtprobe”, in: EMMA- das politische Magazin für Frauen,
July/August 2003. Web page <http://www.emma.de/hefte/ausgaben-2003/juliaugust-2003/editorial/> (Accessed
26.06.2010)
281
59
women had long fought for.282 Those who criticized Alice Schwarzer’s view regarding the
Islamic veil, like for instance Marieluise Beck, were judged by her as “traitors of the feminist
cause”.283 In the Ludin case Alice Schwarzer demonized the Muslim teacher in a smear
campaign. She extremely emotionalized and personalized the issue by proclaiming that Ludin
“demands tolerance for intolerance” and wondering if the Sharia is creepingly being
implemented in Germany in the name of “tolerance”. In public discussions and in the media
coverage Ludin’s name became synonymous with Islamism.284 In this debate the headscarf
became a symbol for intolerance and inequality and therefore represented the total opposite of
the democratic, tolerant and egalitarian society the Federal Republic of Germany considers
itself.285 According to a survey conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach in 2004,
67 percent of the Germans were in favour of the headscarf bans introduced in several German
states and only 15 percent opposed it.286
Unlike the controversy about the headscarf of public school teachers, the veiling of pupils and
students in state educational institutions has not become a contentious issue yet.287 Only in
exceptional cases this can stir up public debates like in the example of a high school in Bonn,
where in 2006 two 18-year-old Muslim students with Turkish and Kurdish background were
suspended from school for wearing a niqab288 in class on the grounds of having “disturbed the
school peace”. It was considered that the full body and face veil hampered communication
between student and teacher, which is essential in a pedagogical relationship, and makes the
identification of the completely veiled students very difficult. The decision of the young
Muslim girls to wear a niqab was regarded by teachers, fellow pupils and the school director
282
BBC (2004), “Viewpoints: Europe and the headscarf“
Fekete (2009), A Suitable Enemy, p.95
284
Schiffauer (2006), “Enemies within the gates”, p.105; Alice Schwarzer (2003a): “Islam - Die Machtprobe“,
in: Spiegel Online, No. 26/2003, 23.06.2003. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-27442210.html>
(Accessed 05.03.2010)
285
Werner Schiffauer (2007): “Der unheimliche Muslim – Staatsbürgerschaft und zivilgesellschaftliche Ängste“,
in: Wohlrab-Sahr; Tezcan (eds.) (2007), Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa, p.123
286
Renate Köcher (2004): “Die Herausforderung durch den Islam als Chance. Eine Dokumentation des Beitrags
in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung Nr. 293 vom 15. Dezember 2004“, in: Institut für Demoskopie
Allensbach
287
Gartner (2006), “Der Islam im religionsneutralen Staat“, pp.156-157
288
A niqab is a type of face-veil which leaves a little slit for the eyes, but can also be worn with a separate eyeveil. It is generally worn together with a headscarf and a full-body cloak (cf. BBC (2010): “The Islamic veil
across Europe”, in: BBC News, 15.06.2010. Web page <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5414098.stm> (Accessed
14.09.2010)). In the case of the two Muslim girls in Bonn, the media had previously mistakenly reported that
they had worn a burqa. Due to the resemblance of niqab and burqa the two types of veils are hard to distinguish
by non-Muslims and are therefore often used interchangeably in the public discourse.
283
60
as a deliberate provocation and as a symbol for female oppression and fundamentalism.289
The German intelligence service even investigated them on presumed links to the
controversial Saudi Arabian sponsored König-Fahd-Akademie290 in Bonn, a suspicion
however which proved to be unfounded.291 The Muslim pupil’s temporary suspension from
the school was equally supported by many politicians such as Wolfgang Thierse (SPD) and
applauded by the media.292 Meanwhile the conflict could be solved as one of the girls left the
school by the end of the school year (2006) while the other one agreed on leaving her niqab at
home and attending classes again, without being fully veiled.293
Nevertheless, some of those opposed to the headscarf call for a general ban on headscarves in
public institutions, for teachers and employees in public services as well as for students.
Among these critics is the above-mentioned controversial SPD politician Thilo Sarrazin who
considers the headscarf a political and not a religious symbol, which has no place in German
class rooms.294 In a similar vein the German-Turkish Islam critic Necla Kelek is in favour of
prohibiting the veil in primary schools arguing that there is no religious justification for
children wearing headscarves. She accused those who force little girls to wear a headscarf of
abusing religious freedom.295 In 2009 Minister for Justice in the state of Baden-Württemberg
Ulrich Goll (Liberal Party FDP) called for a general ban on headscarves for all civil servants
in accordance with the principle of state neutrality.296
289
Michael Stepper (2006): “Schule sperrt Burka-Trägerinnen aus“, in: Focus Online. Web page
<http://www.focus.de/schule/schule/psychologie/schulgewalt-special/
bonn_aid_108279.html>
(Accessed
02.02.2010)
290
The King Fahd Academy, a private Arab-language school for children of Arab diplomats, came under
investigation by the German authorities in 2003 for alleged ties to Islamist and the terrorist network Al Qaeda
and was threatened to be shut down. It is however still operating today (cf. Deutsche Welle (2003): “Authorities
to close Muslim School in Bonn”, in: dw-world.de, 11.10.2003. Web page <http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,,994052,00.html> (Accessed 14.09.2010)).
291
Wolfgang Günter Lerch (2006): “Streit über verhüllte Schülerinnen beigelegt“, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 10.05.2006. Web page <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/
Doc~EEF6163168D044820B49EE59FA7990D05~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> (Accessed 14.09.2010)
292
Stepper (2006), “Schule sperrt Burka-Trägerinnen aus“
293
Lerch (2006): “Streit über verhüllte Schülerinnen beigelegt“, note: The girl who returned to the school had
not even worn a headscarf before she came to school in a niqab.
294
Jens Bauszus et al. (2009): “Thilo Sarrazin – Kopftuchverbot im Unterricht“, in: Focus Online, 12.12.2009.
Web
page
<http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/thilo-sarrazin-kopftuchverbot-im-unterricht_aid_
462429.html> (Accessed 28.11.2010)
295
Mariam Lau (2006): “Islam-Kritikerin Kelek: ‚Wir brauchen ein Kopftuchverbot an Grundschulen‘“, in: Welt
Online,
26.09.2006.
Web
page
<http://www.welt.de/politik/article155551/Islam_Kritikerin_Kelek_
Wir_brauchen_ein_Kopftuchverbot_an_Grundschulen.html> (Accessed 10.06.2010)
296
Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş e.V. (IGMG) (2009), Justizminister fordert generelles Kopftuchverbot
61
From the examples discussed it becomes clear that the Islamic headscarf has undoubtedly
become more contested over the past years, but the headscarf debate has as yet not resulted in
a general ban on veils in Germany. It can be noted that the German public opinion in the
headscarf debate is far from unified and so is the policy reaction to the religious headgear.
The last word in the headscarf debate has not been spoken yet and it is very likely that the
debates will re-emerge in the future due the continuously growing number of teachers of
Muslim faith (including many German converts), amongst whom many will most likely be
fighting for their right to teach wearing a headscarf in public educational institutions.297
Honour killings
Another gender-related contentious topic in the public discourse about Islam is the
phenomenon of crimes in the name of ‘honour’. The so-called honour killings also occur in
Germany among immigrant communities, mainly in big metropolitan areas and in large cities
with a high Muslim population.298 These crimes are said to be on the rise in Germany in latest
years, but exact numbers are unknown as the issue remains largely hidden from public view
and due to the fact that some honour-related crimes are recorded as simple homicides,
domestic violence or disguised as suicides. According to an inquiry of the Federal Criminal
Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) on honour-related crimes in Germany, 55 cases of
suspected honour killings (including attempted murders) have been recorded between January
1996 and July 2005, of which 48 had female victims. The majority of these murders in the
name of ‘honour’ occur within the Turkish immigrant population, the largest foreign group in
the country. Despite protests and much debate by the German public the killings unfortunately
continue at the same rate. The motive for these crimes was in all cases the alleged dishonour
brought to the respective family by their female relative caused by different actions like
intended or actual divorce of the partner, refusal of an arranged marriage, a relationship the
family disapproved of, an extra-marital affair or the woman’s Westernized lifestyle, the latter
motive being dominant in the cases of honour killings in Germany reported on in the German
mainstream media.299 The preservation or restoration of the family ‘honour’, by force if
297
Rana Husseini (2009): Murder in the Name of Honour – The true story of one woman’s heroic fight against
an unbelievable crime. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, p.xiii
299
Bundeskriminalamt (2006): “Presseinformation zu den Ergebnissen einer Bund-Länderabfrage zum
Phänomenbereich ‘Ehrenmorde in Deutschland‘“, in: Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) Wiesbaden. Web page
<http://www.bka.de/pressemitteilungen/2006/060519_pi_ehrenmorde.pdf> (Accessed 12.07.2010), note: The
298
62
necessary, is generally the duty of the men. The main perpetrators of honour killings in most
cases are the victim’s father, (ex-)husband, brother, cousin or uncle, who are chosen by the
family to carry out the murder.300
The phenomenon however, which is a global one and not restricted to Islamic communities, is
not new in Germany. It has been common for many years but used to be considered a taboo
subject for a long time leading to a lack of awareness among the German public. Cases of
honour-related murder and violence have recently started to become increasingly visible and
prompt questions about gender inequality among Muslims and the lack of integration of
Muslim immigrant women in the German society.301 The often emotionally charged and
partially moralizing approach to the issue of gender-based violence against Muslim women
with migration background is often used in public and political debates to emphasise the
alleged backwardness and violent nature of Islam. Regardless of the fact that crimes in the
name of ‘honour’ are rather based on socio-cultural patriarchal traditions than on religious
ones. The topic is often instrumentalised by segments of the majority society, politics as well
as the media to encourage prejudices against Muslim migrants and attribute violence as well
as gender inequality misleadingly to specific ethnic minorities. Social and political scientist
Monika Schröttle maintains that these polarized portrayals and discourses subtly obscure the
problems of domestic violence and gender issues in the German non-Muslim majority society.
At the same time they create the impression that mainly females with migration background
from Islamic countries are victims of domestic violence and that accordingly most Muslim
men are perpetrators of (domestic) violence.302
Schröttle’s criticism is also reflected in the Muslim reactions in my survey in which several
respondents pointed out that in a case of domestic violence within a Turkish or other Muslim
family in Germany, resulting in the death of a female family member, everyone in the public
number of unreported cases of honour killings is suspected to be much higher since many honour-related crimes
are not detected as such. Furthermore, honour killings of Muslim women from Germany which are committed
outside the country are not listed in the German police records.
300
Husseini (2009), Murder in the Name of Honour, p.xi
301
Deutsche Welle (2004): “Europe Grapples with ‘Honor Killings’”, in: dw-world.de, 23.06.2004. Web page
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1244406,00.html> (Accessed 12.07.2010)
302
Monika Schröttle (2009): “Gewalt gegen Frauen mit türkischem Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland –
Diskurse zwischen Skandalisierung und Bagatellisierung“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit,
pp.269-270; note: It should however be noted that research on domestic violence against women in Germany,
conducted on behalf of the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend in 2004, has shown
that even though gender-related violence is an issue for all females in Germany, women with a migration
background, in particular Turkish women, suffer disproportionately (cf. Anna Korteweg; Gökçe Yurdakul
(2009): “Islam, gender, and immigrant integration: boundary drawing in discourses on honour killing in the
Netherlands and Germany”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 02/02/2009, p.222).
63
arena and the media speaks of “honour killing”. If however the same crime occurs in a
German, non-Muslim family it is merely called a “Familiendrama” (family tragedy).303
The public debate about violence against Muslim women in the name of ‘honour’ and forced
marriages was triggered in 2005 by the honour killing of Hatun Sürücü, a 23-year-old
German-Kurdish woman originally from Erzurum in Turkey. She was shot dead at a bus stop
in Berlin by her brother because she had tarnished the family clan’s ‘honour’ through her
Western, “immoral” lifestyle.304 In fact Hatun Sürücü merely wanted to live like a normal
German woman, namely emancipated, free and Western, without a headscarf, a lifestyle her
family disapproved of. Therefore she was sent back to Turkey and forced to marry her cousin
at the age of sixteen. After the birth of their son she fled the country with her child, found
sanctuary in a women’s shelter in Berlin and divorced her husband against the will of her
parents. In Germany she rebuilt her life, obtained her high school diploma and started a
vocational training.305
Hatun’s honour killing shocked the German public and subsequently prompted a public
debate about the backward and patriarchal culture and traditions of the Muslim immigrant
communities and brought the topic of honour killing on the title pages of Germany’s leading
newspapers.306 This was further enhanced when a few days after the crime several young male
students of Kurdish and Turkish origin at a high school in the suburb Berlin-Neukölln near
the crime scene endorsed the brutal homicide during a class discussion on the murder saying
that it was justified and Hatun only had herself to blame for her “death sentence” because “the
whore lived like a German”, which also shows the Muslims youths’ perception of Germans,
notably German women.307After these statements the high school’s director Volker Steffens
made the students’ reactions public in an open letter, warning students and parents that the
school would not tolerate these kinds of inciting statements.308
Since the murder of Hatun Sürücü the topic of honour killing in Germany increasingly attracts
media attention with the phenomenon being treated as an extreme example of the differences
between the Muslim immigrant minority society and the German majority society. Hence in
303
Frank Hauke; Ulrike Plewnia; Britta Weddeling (2005): “Eine Frage der Ehre“, in: Focus, No. 9, 2005. Web
page <http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/verbrechen-eine-frage-der-ehre_aid_211902.html> (Accessed
29.01.2010)
305
Husseini (2009), Murder in the Name of Honour, p.197
306
Korteweg; Yurdakul (2009), “Islam, gender, and immigrant integration”, p.233
307
Hauke; Plewnia; Weddeling (2005), “Eine Frage der Ehre“
308
304
64
the media discourse a sharp boundary between the German, modern ‘us’ and the traditional
and backwards Muslim immigrant ‘them’ is constructed using ethno-national as well as
religions explanations for gender-related violence against Muslim women.309 This dominant
discourse is however contradicted by most Muslim organizations and many Turkish women
like German-Turkish journalist and writer Hatice Akyün who argues that “issues like honour
killing represent neither Islam nor Turkish ethno-nationality”, given that the Koran does not
say anything about honour killings. The acts of violence against women are said to be based
on deep-rooted traditions from backward regions in Turkey.310 Anthropologist Werner
Schiffauer on the other hand considers the occurrence of honour killings in Western societies
not as an ancient tradition but rather as a reaction to integration problems of third- and fourthgeneration young male Turkish immigrant gangs who re-establish the old and traditional
concept of ‘honour’.311 They instrumentalize the alleged “preservation of ‘honour’” by
controlling their sisters and other girls from their Muslim immigrant community, who are
often better integrated in Germany than the juvenile males, for instance by mobbing young
Turkish women if they do not wear a headscarf, as has been reported from schools in Berlin
Kreuzberg. In Schiffauer’s view the young migrants’ experiences of economic exclusion,
social discrimination and the pressure for cultural adaptation in the German society thus lead
to a re-ethnisation and a new self-image of the young men who increasingly display being a
Turk or an Arab, thus intentionally mark their minority position in the German society and
consider themselves as “deutsche Ausländer”. The term ‘honour’ is thus merely misused by
the male immigrant youth to justify violence against and oppression of women in their
communities.312
The public debates about honour killing started again after the murder of the 16-year-old
Afghan immigrant Morsal Obeidi by her brother in 2008 in Hamburg. Morsal was ambushed
in a parking lot by her older brother Ahmad, who stabbed her twenty times. Her murderer
reportedly told the police that he killed his sister because she had dishonoured the family by
having become too comfortable with Western life seeing that she did not cover her hair with a
headscarf, wore Western clothing and make-up, in other words because she wanted to live
309
Korteweg; Yurdakul (2009), “Honour killing in the Netherlands and Germany”, p.219, p.229
Ibid., p.232
311
Hauke; Plewnia; Weddeling (2005), “Eine Frage der Ehre“
312
Werner Schiffauer (2005): “Schlachtfeld Frau – „Deutsche Ausländer““, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung,
25.02.2005. Web page <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/deutsche-auslaender-schlachtfeld-frau-1.804443>
(Accessed 14.09.2010); Heide Oestreich; Sabine am Orde (2005): “Eine Lust am Schaudern“, in: taz.de,
17.10.2005. Web page <http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archiv/?dig=2005/10/17/a0186> (Accessed 14.09.2010)
310
65
like a normal German teenager.313 Young Muslim women like Morsal are constantly torn
between two worlds, between their families’ desire to preserve their traditional Afghan or
Turkish lifestyle and their own desire to live like their non-Muslim friends in Germany.
Before the crime the young German-Afghan girl had been repeatedly threatened and abused
by her male relatives as they considered her way of life, her ideas of freedom and selfdetermination incompatible with their family’s traditions and socio-cultural moral concepts.314
On more than one occasion she had sought the protection of a child and youth welfare agency
in Hamburg to escape domestic violence. Morsal’s murder unleashed a public outcry and
prompted calls among the German population for urgent action to better protect oppressed
women within immigrant communities from honour-related violence. This is in line with the
demand of Seyran Ateş, a Muslim feminist of Kurdish descent who is renowned for her work
as a lawyer in trials against forced marriages and honour killings carried out against Turkish
women, who urges the German society to vehemently take action against such ‘honour’
crimes by awareness-raising and information campaigns about the issue of ‘honour’ in
schools, among the civil society, police and jurists, and most of all in the immigrant families
themselves.315
One example of an initiative intended to tackle the issue of honour-related crimes and
increase the public visibility of this phenomenon is a campaign against violence in the name
of ‘honour’ with the slogan “Ihre Freiheit, seine Ehre” which the Ministry for Integration of
the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia has launched in cooperation with migrant
organizations and well-known public figures such as the feminist Alice Schwarzer and
journalist Sabine Christiansen.316
Homophobia among Muslim immigrants
The relationship between homosexuality and religiousness is generally a rather problematic
one, but particularly with regard to Islam. In recent years the problem of homophobia among
young men from Muslim immigrant communities has attracted increased public attention as it
313
Barbara Hans (2008): “Ehrenmord an Morsal O. – ‘Was hat ihn nur so weit gebracht?‘“, in: Spiegel Online,
22.05.2008. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/0,1518,554619,00.html> (Accessed
14.07.2010)
314
315
Hans (2008), “Ehrenmord an Morsal O.“
316
Anna Reimann (2006a): “Für die Freiheit seiner Schwester kämpfen- Kampagne gegen Ehrenmorde“, in:
Spiegel Online, 24.11.2006. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,450243,00.html>
(Accessed 29.01.2010)
66
illustrates the clash of values between the host society and the society of origin of Muslim
immigrants and their lack of integration in the social, economical and political life in
Germany in a very blatant manner.317 Islam is considered as a pre-modern and backward
religion which leads to the clash between the traditionalist, conservative and authoritarian
Turkish, North African and Arabic culture and the secular, modern and liberal European
culture.318
Even though homophobia is also common among German male adolescents, the public
danger for homosexuals emanates notably from young males of Turkish and Arabic descent
of whom the majority have homophobic attitudes and behavioural patterns. They are said to
be disproportionately strongly involved in homophobically motivated hate crimes and verbal
attacks.319 According to Bastian Finke, project manager of the gay anti-violence project
Maneo in Berlin, 39 percent of the reported homophobic crime in Berlin is committed by
young men with an Islamic cultural background. However, since many cases of antihomosexual assaults remain unreported the number is estimated to be even higher.320 This is
becoming increasingly problematic due to the fact that many districts in large German cities
like Berlin, Frankfurt or Hamburg with a high proportion of homosexuals (so-called “gay
neighbourhoods”) are also often inhabited by a high number of Muslim citizens, of whom 81
percent are said to have reservations about homosexuality. Their co-existence is thus
frequently characterised by violent conflicts. As a consequence homosexuals feel increasingly
threatened and are afraid to manifest their homosexuality openly.321
Activists from the Lesbian and Gay Federation (LSVD) and many others regard Islam as the
major cause for the Turkish and Arabic youth’s intolerance and homophobic attitudes since
homosexuality is seen as a sinful and perverted deviation from the norm, as a moral disease or
aberration in Islamic tradition and is even punishable by death in some Islamic countries.
Therefore Muslim teenagers see homosexuals as a decadent and unmanly negative spin-off of
317
Bernd Simon (2010): “Respekt und Zumutung bei der Begegnung von Schwulen/Lesben und Muslimen“, in:
Bundeszentrale
für
politische
Bildung,
17.05.2010.
Web
page
<http://www.bpb.de/themen/7ZKF7E,0,0,Respekt_und_Zumutung_bei_der_Begegnung_von_SchwulenLesben_
und_Muslimen.html> (Accessed 15.06.2010)
318
Juno Parrenas (2004): “The Freedom to Be Named Racist”, in: Lesbian News, January 2004, Vol. 29, Issue 6
319
Alexander Zinn (2004): “Clash of Cultures? Über das Verhältnis türkisch- und arabischstämmiger
Jugendlicher zur Homosexualität und Homosexuellen”, in: Lesben- und Schwulenverband in Deutschland
Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. (eds.): Muslime unter dem Regenbogen – Homosexualität, Migration und Islam. Berlin:
Querverlag GmbH, p.232
320
Jan Feddersen (2003): “Was guckst du? Bist du schwul?“, in: taz.de, 08.11.2003. Web page
<http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archiv/?dig=2003/11/08/a0081> (Accessed 19.07.2010)
321
Simon (2010), “Begegnung von Schwulen/Lesben und Muslimen“
67
Western culture and consider attacking them as legitimate according to Islam. Apart from the
Islamic fundamentalist moral concepts concerning homosexuality, another contributing factor
to the homophobic attitudes are the patriarchal and authoritarian family structures and values
the young men grow up with in the Muslim communities, which attribute a major importance
to family honour and manliness and consider same-sex relationships as inferior and unmanly,
hence forbidden.322 Therefore, homosexuality in their own Muslim immigrant communities is
denied by many young men of Turkish and Arabic origin and in case it becomes openly
‘visible’ it is perceived as a provocation, which often brings about fatal consequences for
homosexual Muslim immigrants.323
However, in the political discourse and debates about integration the issue of homophobia
among Muslim immigrants and the ensuing problems for homosexuals remain largely a taboo
subject for reasons of political correctness. Journalist Jan Feddersen maintains that instead of
trying to tackle the problem, politicians like Berlin’s former senator for integration and social
affairs Heidi Knake-Werner urge people not to replace one evil by another by facing
homophobia with Islamophobia and putting all Muslims under general suspicion of having
homophobic attitudes and perpetuating the criminal, violent and anti-gay young Muslim
stereotype.324 However, if the existing problems are negated or ignored by mainstream
politics, right-wing populists are furnished with a fit occasion to use the theme of homophobia
among Muslim immigrants for their Islamophobic propaganda and instrumentalise it against
Muslims. Moreover, the taboo on the subject leads homosexuals to the feeling of being
defenselessly exposed to discrimination and violence which often results in anti-Islamic
resentments.325 This is likely to change since Germany has its first openly gay foreign
minister and vice-Chancellor in the person of Guido Westerwelle since the end of 2009.
Sociologist and chairman of the LSVD Alexander Zinn criticizes that unlike in the public
discourse in the German majority society the issue of homophobia remains widely a taboo
subject within the immigrant communities, therefore the Muslim youths’ anti-gay attacks do
not meet any opposition in their social environment, a circumstance that implicitly encourages
them.326 Another point of criticism is the lack of willingness and interest for dialogue on the
part of the Muslim organizations with associations for homosexuals like the above-mentioned
322
Zinn (2004), “Clash of Cultures?”, pp.232-233
Jan Feddersen (2007): “Homophobie-Studie – Wer ist hier -phob?“, in: taz.de, 27.09.2007. Web page
<http://www.taz.de/?id=alltag-artikel&art=5259&no_cache=1&src=SE> (Acecssed 19.07.2010)
324
Ibid.
325
Zinn (2004), “Clash of Cultures?”, p.249
326
Ibid., p.245
323
68
LSVD in order to raise awareness among young Muslims to dismantle prejudices against gays,
achieve mutual respect and work against “gay-bashing”.327
A major national controversy was triggered when the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat
congregation published a contentious article entitled Glücksschwein oder arme Sau? in its
youth magazine in 2007, in which the suspicion about a supposed connection between the
increased tendency to homosexuality in Western societies and the consumption of pork was
expressed. The author of the article claims that “humans are what they eat” and this aphorism
relates to the alleged effects of pork consumption on human moral behaviour, because a
shameless animal like a swine shapes or enhances the development of certain behaviours of
the consumer. In order to support her argumentation she refers to statements made by the
former spiritual leader of the Ahmadiyya, Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad, about the higher
visibility of homosexuality in the West which is allegedly connected to the consumption of
pork meat.328
The Lesbian and Gay Federation (LSVD) expressed great criticism of this controversial
claim. Chairman Alexander Zinn warned that even though homosexuality is considered as
decadent, sinful or as a disease in many religions, it becomes dangerous however, if religious
fanatics use it for propaganda against gays and lesbians. Islamist fundamentalists increasingly
stir up hatred against homosexuals employing homophobic rhetoric ranging from equating
gays with pigs even up to calls for murder, which often has an influence on the Muslim
immigrant youth’s behaviour and attitudes if the young people are brought up with such
conceptions of the world.329 The homophobic “Schweinefleisch macht schwul” debate was
also heavily criticized by politicians such as Volker Beck of the Green Party, who denounced
the statement as contemptuous of human life and asked the Ahmadiyya congregation leaders
to distance themselves from the social discrimination of homosexuals and condemn
homophobically motivated violence. However, despite all criticism the Ahmadiyya
community defended and reconfirmed its controversial claim.330
327
Leonie Wild (2008): “Tag der offenen Moschee – Homosexuelle und Muslime im Monolog“, in: Spiegel
Online, 03.10.2008. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,582117,00.html> (Accessed
03.02.2010)
328
Welt Online (2007): “Schweinefleisch macht schwul“, in: Welt Online, 15.04.2007. Web page
<http://www.welt.de/politik/article811416/Schweinefleisch_macht_schwul.html> (Accessed 21.07.2010)
329
Welt Online (2007), “Schweinefleisch macht schwul“
330
Oliver Haustein-Teßmer (2007): “Grüne verurteilen Attacke gegen Schwule“, in: Welt Online, 16.04.1007.
Web <http://www.welt.de/politik/article813007/ Gruene_verurteilen_Attacken_gegen_Schwule.html> (Accessed
21.07.2010)
69
Islamic religious education
Although Islam has constituted the second-largest religious community in Germany after
Christianity for the last three decades it did not play a role in the national education sector
until recently. Up until the late 1980s Islam was considered a non-indigenous “alien religion”,
which was granted no place in the public educational arena by policy makers. Consequently
the religious education of Muslim children and adolescents remained the responsibility of the
immigrants’ countries of origin, mainly Turkey and Morocco, whose consulates and
embassies organized native-language Islamic education, which was not part of the German
schools’ regular curriculum. Only at the end of the 1990s the federal states’ ministries of
education and cultural affairs gradually acknowledged the necessity and importance of the
introduction of Islamic religious education for the prospect of educational integration of
Islam.331 There is currently an ongoing controversy about the introduction of Islamic religious
education in Germany, which is to be established as a regular school subject, next to
Protestant and Catholic religious education, in a number of German states.
According to article 7, paragraph 3 the German Constitution guarantees religious education as
a regular subject in public schools, with all confessional courses being subject to free choice
of the pupils.332 It is thus in principle also open to Islamic denominational religious
instruction, but has until recently only been put into practice by the Christian churches under
government supervision due to their special status as public corporations. Despite their
constitutional right, the Muslims’ claim for the introduction of Islamic religious education in
state schools has generated much public controversy recently, with opponents arguing that
these rights only apply to the religions traditionally present within Western Europe, thus
excluding Islam.333
The long-term neglect of appropriate integration policies by the government has led to many
integration problems, especially in the field of education. Therefore Islamic religious
instruction is considered to be one of the key issues with regard to integration of Muslim
immigrants in Germany. However, not the government alone is to blame for the shortcomings
in the education sector and the lacking integration of Muslims in Germany, but also the
Muslim organizations active in Germany did not contribute a lot to enhance the dialogue with
331
Kiefer (2008), “Islam und Integration”, p.20
Deutscher Bundestag (2010): Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
<http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gg/gesamt.pdf> (Accessed 25.06.2010)
333
Motadel (2007), “Islam in Germany”
332
Web
page
70
the German authorities as many of them, like for example the Turkish DITIB, are directly
dependent on their respective countries of origin and thus reflect their interests to a
considerable degree. Due to the direct influence of the Turkish state the DITIB for instance
had a rather reluctant attitude regarding Islamic religious education in German language as it
was maintained that Turkish Islam can only be correctly conveyed in Turkish language. The
language problem thus constitutes another contentious point in the public debate as the state
has defined German as the official language of instruction.334
This development represents a significant change for German Muslims and their relationship
to the German society, marking an important step with regard to integration.335 The possibility
for children of Muslim faith to receive Islamic religious studies lessons in German at state
schools represents an opportunity to demonstrate young Muslims that Islamic life-style and
Western culture are indeed compatible and that the integration of Islam into the German
school system does not necessarily imply giving up one’s cultural and religious identity. Pilot
projects for Islamic education have been running for some years now in several German
federal states on a trial basis, mostly in Western Germany as they have a considerably higher
Muslim population.336 It must however be differentiated between denominational and nondenominational Islamic religious studies trials in schools. While non-denominational religious
education (“Islamkunde” or “Islamunterricht”) teaches pupils neutral facts about the religion
and is implemented without any involvement of the Islamic associations, denominational
instruction (“Islamischer Religionsunterricht”) constitutes regular religious education in the
sense of article 7, paragraph 3, and is taught by teachers of Muslim faith. So far there has
been no consistent approach by the federal states with regard to Islamic religious instruction
since education matters are decided on a regional level.337
The German federalism thus hinders the introduction of a centralized system of Islamic
education in the whole of Germany with some Länder introducing non-denominational
instruction and others denominational religious education. It is however the stated aim of the
various federal state governments to introduce Islamic religious instruction as a regular part of
the school curriculum in the long term.338 As first state North Rhine-Westphalia launched the
334
Kiefer (2008), “Islam und Integration”, pp.21-22
Engelbrecht (2010), “Through the Maze of Identities”, p.162
336
337
Mark Chalîl Bodenstein (2009): “Islamic religious education trials in schools“, in: Deutsche Islam Konferenz.
Web page <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1883354/SubSites/DIK/EN/ ReligionBildung/
Schulversuche/schulversuche-node.html?__nnn=true> (Accessed 10.07.2010)
338
Bodenstein (2009), “Islamic religious education trials in schools“
335
71
school pilot project entitled “Islamic Studies in German” at the start of the academic year
1999/2000, which was developed as a forerunner for proper Islamic religion class without any
participation of Muslim groups. The experiment proved highly successful among the Muslim
pupils and was welcomed by Muslim parents wherever it has been made available.339 The
positive attitude of Muslims towards Islamic religious instruction was also confirmed in my
survey, which revealed that a great majority of the respondents (88.2 percent) are in favour of
its introduction in German schools.340
Another core factor constituting an obstacle for the development and implementation of the
curriculum for Islamic religious instruction is the lack of a homogeneous Muslim organ as a
representative of the whole Muslim community, which the federal governments could cooperate with corresponding to the principle of subsidiarity. Appropriate dialogue partners
however are the prerequisite for defining the theological principles on which the curriculum
of Islamic religious instruction within the German education system will be based, which has
so far been mostly done without the inclusion of representatives from Muslim groups. This
proves to be rather problematic considering the denominational plurality of Islam and taking
into account that the majority of the Muslims341 living in Germany are not members of any of
the Muslim umbrella associations in the country with whom the state could arrange these
matters.342 However, the common aim of religious education in public schools has strongly
furthered the organizational structure of Muslim groups in Germany resulting in the formation
of the Koordinierungsrat der Muslime Deutschland (KRM)343 in 2007 which unites the main
Islamic organizations in the country.344 Many of the regional governments are nevertheless
339
Michael Kiefer (2009): “Islamkunde in Nordrhein-Westfalen und der Schulversuch islamischer
Religionsunterricht in Baden-Württemberg im Vergleich – Einblicke in die Rahmenbedingungen und in die
Praxis der Unterrichtsmodelle“, in: Irka-Christin Mohr; Michael Kiefer (eds.) (2009): Islamunterricht Islamischer Religionsunterricht – Islamkunde – Viele Titel – ein Fach?. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp.97-98
340
341
According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior only 10 to 15 percent of the Muslims in Germany are
members of one of the umbrella organizations represented in the German Conference on Islam (cf.
Bundesministerium des Innern (2007b): German Islam Conference (DIK)- Muslims in Germany – German
Muslims).
342
343
In order to fulfill the demand of the German federal and regional politicians for a central representative on the
Muslim side and to speak with one voice regarding the topics of integration and extremism the Coordination
Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland – KRM) was newly formed in
2007. The umbrella group combines four of the leading Muslim organizations in Germany, namely the DITIB,
the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the Islamic Council, and the Association of Islamic Culture
Centres (VIKZ). The Koordinierungsrat does however still not represent the Islamic community as a whole and
the KRM’s public relations and lack of transparency often lead to criticism and public debates (cf. Bodenstein
(2010), “Organisational Developments”, p.60).
344
Bodenstein (2010), “Organisational Developments”, p.60
72
seeking ways to incorporate Muslim associations in the school trials for Islamic education by
means of round tables or steering groups.345
Due to the diversity of Islam and Islamic organizations in Germany not only moderate
Muslim associations which recognize the secular free democratic order fight for the right to
conduct religious education lessons in state-run schools, but also organizations which are
publicly suspected of conveying anti-constitutional values and having direct or indirect links
to Islamist groups, like for instance the Islamic Community of Milli Görüş. This contributes
to fuelling fears and prejudices among the non-Muslim population regarding the introduction
of Islamic religious instruction in public schools.346 Also politicians like Lale Akgün express
their concern that the curricula are to be determined by the Muslim organizations which in
general predominantly represent rather conservative and orthodox beliefs.347
Proponents of Islamic religious education in society and politics consider it a significant
means for a successful civil-societal implementation of Islam in Germany. This religious
education, taught in German language, is intended to act as a counterbalance to the traditional
unsupervised afternoon Koran schools of the Islamic congregations, in which classes are
mostly conducted in Arabic or Turkish and are separated by gender, and which are often
publicly suspected of having a fundamentalist approach, imparting and encouraging anticonstitutional values348 and anti-integrative concepts. With the introduction of Islamic
religious instruction in German public schools the way for a “national” Islam is to be paved
and the justice gap between Christians and Muslims can finally be closed. However, the
debates about integration and Islamic education are often influenced by party policy,
consequently making the whole issue rather complex.349 Opponents like the left-wing party
Die Linke consider religious education as a task of the parents and not the state.350
In principle most political and social actors in Germany, including the Christian churches, are
in favour of the educational integration of Islam and demand the introduction of Islamic
religious education. However, the joint declarations of intent of state actors and Muslim
345
Kiefer (2009), “Islamkunde in Nordrhein-Westphalen“, pp.97-98
347
Lale Akgün, (2008): Religionsunterricht an öffentlichen Schulen. Web page <http://www.laleakguen.de/
Religionsunterricht_an_oeffentlichen_Schulen.html> (Accessed 20.06.2010)
348
such as gender inequality before the law.
349
Jamal Malik (2009): “Vorwort“, in: Mohr; Kiefer (2009) (eds.), Islamunterricht, pp.7-8
350
Christiane Jacke (2008): “Schäuble will islamischen Religionsunterricht”, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 13.03.2008.
Web
page
<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/deutschland/schaeuble-will-islamischen-religionsunterricht/
1188166.html> (Accessed 06.06.2010)
346
73
associations cannot obscure the fact that they pursue different objectives. On the one hand
politicians, notably particular former Interior Minister and chairman of the German
Conference on Islam Wolfgang Schäuble, advocate Islamic religious instruction with a statesupervised curriculum primarily as an instrument for the prevention of extremism.
Furthermore he emphasises the integrative function of Islamic education in German language,
which allows young Muslims to learn the bases of their religion in the language of the
majority society enabling them to properly engage in dialogue in the pluralistic German
society.351 For the Islamic associations on the other hand the demand for Islamic religious
instruction at state-run schools constitutes part of their struggle for public recognition of Islam
as a religious community in Germany on an equal footing with Christianity and Judaism. The
establishment of regular Islamic religious instruction would be tantamount to the
institutionalization of Islamic religious communities at a national level.352
In the context of the development of Islamic religious instruction as a regular subject in public
schools the related university training for teachers of Islamic religious courses must be
provided by the state. So far there is a shortage of competent instructors, although German
universities are gradually introducing teacher training programmes in Islamic religious
education, like the University of Münster which pioneered in setting up a study course on
Islamic religious teaching in 2005. The goal was to promote more equal treatment of Muslims
at schools with regard to other religious communities.353 According to political scientist
Mohammed Shakush the establishing of Islamic religious education in universities and
schools is strongly supported by the conservative CDU and CSU in order to assure that
confessional religious education is not abolished completely and replaced by philosophy or
ethics class.354
The following example from a school in Bremen illustrates the reservations and hostile
attitudes many Germans have towards the introduction of Islamic education in public schools,
which can lead to unreflected fears of cultural alienation. The city-state Bremen introduced
non-denominational Islamic Studies (“Islamkunde”) in 2003 on a trial basis in a school centre.
The classes are taught in German by a teacher with a Turkish background who developed the
351
Michael Kiefer; Irka-Christin Mohr (2009): “Islamwissenschaftliche Thesen zum islamischen
Religionsunterricht“, in: Mohr; Kiefer (eds.) (2009), Islamunterricht, p.206; Veysel Özcan (2002):
“Deutschland: SPD und CDU für staatlich organisierten Islamunterricht“, in: Netzwerk Migration in Europe e.V.,
Oktober 2002. Web page <http://www.migration-info.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=020804> (Accessed 06.06.2010)
352
Islam.de (2010a): Der Staat kann die Inhalte des Islam-Unterrichts nicht bestimmen, 05.02.2010. Web page
<http://www.islam.de/15323.php> (Accessed 23.02.2010)
353
Ibid.
354
74
curriculum herself in co-operation with the Ministry of Education without any involvement of
the Muslim umbrella organizations. Due to the successful implementation and great
popularity the Islamic Studies class enjoyed among the pupils and parents, the local education
authority decided to expand the pilot scheme to three other schools with a high proportion of
Muslim pupils. This however was met with a lot of resistance from the teachers of one of the
schools. They started a petition against the introduction of Islamic studies at their school
which was signed by two-thirds of the teaching staff who justified their opposition with the
concern over the growing Islamism which could be fostered through the lessons. Further
arguments put forward were the one-sided empowerment of Muslims and the consequently
unequal treatment of other religious communities as well as the enhanced attractiveness of the
school for Muslim pupils which would lead to an increased departure of high-achieving, nonMuslim students and thus deteriorate the school’s performance levels to a considerable extent.
The conflict was clearly triggered through Islamophobic attitudes and stigmatizing
stereotypes prevailing among the teaching staff as well as a lack of factual information about
the character of the project of Islamic Studies.355
355
Yasemin Karakaşoğlu (2009): “Islam als Störfaktor in der Schule“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009),
Islamfeindlichkeit, pp.298-301
75
CHAPTER 4
Islam criticism versus Islamophobia – Public Islam critics
In the current heated public debates about the role of Islam in the German society, public
Islam critics like Ralph Giordano, Alice Schwarzer, Udo Ulfkotte, Günther Lachmann, Necla
Kelek and Mina Ahadi play a pivotal role. Insisting on their right to freedom of expression
they often blur the line between provocation and defamation or Islam criticism and
Islamophobia.356 Under the cloak of legitimate criticism of religion, demagogic views and
verbal attacks against Muslims are frequently conveyed, leading to the defamation of the
whole Muslim community in Germany. The German Islam critics form a very well-linked
circle and hold each other in high esteem supporting and frequently referring to each others’
statements in interviews, debates and publications and using similar Islamophobic rhetoric in
the increasingly polarized debates. Their true motives for vilifying the Islamic religion and its
believers however often remain vague.357
One is tempted to assume that the Islam critics do not have the necessary theological
knowledge and academic background with regard to Islam to be in a position to criticize the
religion and its believers from an expert’s point of view. However, an academic debate about
Islam in Germany and the integration of the Muslim minorities does not seem to be their
intention. In the opinion of political scientist and Islamic Studies scholar Thorsten Gerald
Schneiders the Islam critics rather want to stir up fears about the alleged “Muslim threat” in
the Western society through the use of polemics while academically well-founded and
objective criticism unfortunately is rather scarce. Due to the media however, which regularly
provide them a platform as columnists or interview guests, as well as through their
Islamophobic publications, the self-proclaimed “experts on Islam”, as Schneiders puts it, have
a major influence in the public discourse on Islam by shaping the negative public image of
Islam as a backwards and threatening religion and strengthening the latent fears and
resentments towards Islam. On the other hand the German scholar maintains that publications
which portray a more differentiated image of Islam and try to mediate have much less
influence on the people’s views of Islam. Islamophobic incitement and enmity towards Islam
thus now seem to have become more socially acceptable, also among public intellectuals.358
356
Thorsten Gerald Schneiders (2009): “Die Schattenseite der Islamkritik“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009),
Islamfeindlichkeit, p.403; Bielefeldt (2009), “Das Islambild in Deutschland“, p.187
357
Schneiders (2009), “Die Schattenseite der Islamkritik“, p.403
358
Ibid.
76
According to Aiman Mazyek, secretary-general of the Central Council of Muslims in
Germany, the so-called “Muslim bashing” by Islam critics, who instrumentalise and abuse
their criticism of Islam by portraying ordinary Muslims as “Sharia monsters”, turns Muslims
into scapegoats for social, integrational and other problems which have nothing to do with
Islam.359
The Islam critics do not get tired of constantly defaming Islam as a backward and barbaric
religion. Typical terms and expressions often found in Islam critical publications are inter alia
“Eurabia”, “Großmoschee”, “schleichende Islamisierung”, “Gutmenschen” or “falsche
Toleranz der Deutschen”. Through the perfidious and biased stringing together of stereotype
and prejudiced negative examples regarding Islam as well as simplifications of facts, a
discriminatory and biased image of the whole Muslim community is created.360 It is also quite
striking that in many Islam-critical publications the authors do not clearly differentiate
between Muslims and Turks, or immigrants and foreigners, thus intermingling ethno-cultural
and religious traditions and identities. Since Muslims of Turkish descent represent the biggest
group of immigrants in Germany, many migration and integration problems are automatically
associated with them. Generalizations like Necla Kelek’s statement “[t]ürkische Eltern
arrangieren Ehen. Das heißt, dass eine Importbraut ins Land, in den Haushalt kommt […]“361
or Günther Lachmann’s claim “[d]ie Muslime wollen unter sich bleiben“362 are just some
examples.
In many publications central facts, which would relativize Islam-critical arguments, are
deliberately concealed or distorted with the German public being systematically fed
disinformation about Muslims in order to create the enemy stereotype Islam. Journalist
Günther Lachmann for example complains in his overtly Islamophobic book Tödliche
Toleranz – Die Muslime und unsere offene Gesellschaft, which shows the German flag being
cut by the Islamic crescent on its cover, that German jurisprudence has been influenced by the
Sharia and religious rules in the past. He hereby refers explicitly to a ruling of the Federal
Constitutional Court from 2002 with regard to halal slaughter by which Muslims “to the
dismay of all animal rights activists” were accorded the right to exemption from animal
protection legislation in respect of their religious beliefs. He intentionally fails to mention
359
Mazyek (2010), “Über Islamkritiker, Islamhasser und die Islamkonferenz-Kritik“
361
Alexander Mathé; Ina Weber (2006): “Ihr schützt eure Kinder nicht! Necla Kelek“, in: Wiener Zeitung,
02.09.2006.
Web
page
<http://www.wienerzeitung.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID
=4664&Alias=wzo&cob=246217&Page15308=13> (Accessed 29.07.2010)
362
360
77
however, that the Jewish religious community in Germany had already been granted the same
rights for a long time.363
Jewish writer and Holocaust survivor Ralph Giordano, who emerged as one of the leading
opponents in the fight against the construction of the above-mentioned central mosque in
Cologne-Ehrenfeld, expresses serious doubts that Islam can be modernized and reformed and
that it is compatible with democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, pluralism and gender
equality.364 He was therefore particularly outraged when the secretary-general of the Central
Council of Muslims in Germany Aiman Mazyek openly declared that Sharia and the German
Constitution are compatible, which led Giordano to ask for him to be expelled from the
country. In this context he employed the term taqiyya365, which he describes as the Koransanctioned permission for Muslims to dissimulate and lie towards unbelievers or so to speak
“geheiligte Schizophrenie” in order to hide their true intentions.366 As Schneiders maintains,
through these pseudo-scientific statements about Muslim theology, which Giordano
frequently uses in interviews and publications, he tries to appear as an expert on Islam and
provides a knockout argument to stifle constructive debates.367
Even though Ralph Giordano emphasised not to be an “anti-Muslim guru” or a
“Türkenschreck”, he insists at the same time on his frequently repeated statement „Nicht die
Migration, der Islam ist das Problem“368 sweepingly characterizing Islam as a totalitarian
religion and calling the Koran a “Lektüre des Schreckens”.369 According to him the
integration of the Muslim minority in Germany is a failure, which is said to be mainly the
fault
of
the
“Multi-Kulti-Illusionisten”,
the
“Beschwichtigungsdogmatiker”,
the
“Gutmenschen”, the “Sozialromantiker” and the “xenophilen Einäugigen” who merely talked
about integration for the last thirty years but failed in successfully implementing an
363
Lachmann (2006), Tödliche Toleranz, pp.68-69; Schneiders (2009), “Die Schattenseite der Islamkritik“, p.413
Giordano (2007), “Der Islam ist das Problem“
365
The concept of taqiyya actually refers to the Shia practice of concealing one’s true religious beliefs for fear of
persecution (cf. David Waines (2003): Introduction to Islam. 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, p.321)
366
Humanistischer Pressedienst (2008): “Eröffnungsrede Ralph Giordano, Kritische Islamkonferenz, 31. Mai
2008“, in: hdp.de, 02.06.2008. Web page <http://hpd.de/node/4706> (Accessed 10.06.2010); Islamisches
Zentrum Schwerin e.V. (2006): Taqiyya. Web page <http://iz-sn.de.tl/Taqiyya.htm#> (Accessed 16.08.2010)
367
Nimet Seker (2010): “An Outlet for Suppressed Intolerance”, in: Qantara.de, 09.07.2010. Web page
<http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-1073/i.html> (Accessed 28.08.2010)
368
Humanistischer Pressedienst (2008), “Eröffnungsrede Ralph Giordano”
369
Markus Gerhold (2009): “Islam-bashing für jedermann”, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.335
364
78
appropriate immigration policy. He is also one of the founders of the Critical Islam
Conference (Kritische Islamkonferenz) which held its first congress in 2008.370
Giordano has moreover emerged as a vigorous critic of women wearing burqas or chadors
calling them “human penguins” and explaining that he regards the history of Islam as a
history of the degradation of women.371 Fully veiled women as well as the Muslim call to
prayer supposedly “disturb his aesthetic sensibilities”. As he wrote in his autobiography: “I
don’t want to meet burqas or chadors on German streets nor do I do want to hear the call of
the muezzin from towering minarets”.372 Due to his repeated defamations of Muslims and the
Islamic faith he has received numerous hate e-mails and death threats, which he however
considers being part of the daily life of Islam critics.373
In the public discourse about Islam in Germany also critics with a Muslim background like
Necla Kelek and Mina Ahadi have their share in the debates, often being appointed as
spokespersons and experts on Islam by politicians (e.g. as participants in the Deutsche
Islamkonferenz). Since they were born in an Islamic milieu or lived there for some time they
can report first-hand about Muslims, which however does not automatically legitimize them
to make qualified theological statements about the religion of Islam.374
Many Muslims, who participated in my survey, as well as scholars criticize that authors like
sociologist Necla Kelek generalize personal, negative experiences like her own childhood in
Turkey and her youth as a Muslim immigrant in Germany, humiliated and oppressed by her
own father presenting them in her book Die fremde Braut375 as if they were representative for
the whole Turkish-Islamic community in Germany. Kelek’s criticism focuses particularly on
the repression of women in the Muslim community including forced and arranged marriages
as well as domestic violence.376 In her negative portrayal of the circumstances in some
370
Phoenix.de (2007): “Das Kreuz mit dem Halbmond – Zwischen Leitkultur und Multikulti, 29.
Aschaffenburger Gespräche“, in: Phoenix, 08.12.2007. Web page <http://www.phoenix.de/160340.htm>
(Accessed 23.06.2010)
371
Elke Durak (2007): “Die Geschichte des Islam ist eine einzige Entwürdigung der Frau“, in: Deutschlandfunk,
23.05.2007. Web page <http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/interview_dlf/627848/> (Accessed 10.07.2010)
372
Grieshaber, Kirsten (2007): “Tempers flare in German mosque dispute“, in: The Washington Post,
04.07.2007.
Web
page
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/04/
AR2007070400814_pf.html>; Micha Brumlik (2009): “Das halbierte Humanum. Wie Ralph Giordano zum
Ausländerfeind wurde“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.473
373
Phoenix.de (2007), “Das Kreuz mit dem Halbmond - Aschaffenburger Gespräche“
374
375
For this book and her commitment Kelek was honoured with the Geschwister-Scholl Prize for intellectual
independence.
376
Survey - Muslime in Deutschland; European Stability Initiative (2010): Necla Kelek. Web page
<http://www.esiweb.org/ index.php?lang=tr&id=322&debate_ID=1&slide_ID=6> (Accessed 13.07.2010)
79
Turkish families or communities she fails to mention that there are many Turks in Germany
who are in favour of freedom, democracy, and Enlightenment and automatically relates all
existing problems like violence, social or educational problems to Islam. Despite the criticism
about the subjectivity shaping her statements about Islam her opinion is highly respected and
appreciated by many politicians, who invoke her for instance for the development of BadenWürttemberg’s “Muslim test”377, which she pled for, and made her a member of the German
Islam Conference, as already noted above.378 Her personal experience with integration as a
member of the Muslim minority seems to give Kelek an authentic voice and thus makes her
more credible in the public discourse about issues related to Islam.379
Necla Kelek regards the influence of Islamic values on most Turkish migrants as the cause for
the failed integration into German society arguing that “[a]n individual Muslim can be
integrated into German society. Islam cannot. This is not possible because of Sharia.”380
However, she insinuates that Muslims are not willing to integrate even though some authors
maintain that there are surveys showing that the opposite is the case and that rather the
reluctant attitude towards Muslims prevailing in the German majority society is hindering to
their integration.381 According to Schneiders in many of her books she conveys the false
impression that all devout Muslims have fundamentalist attitudes and believe Germans to be
impure because they eat pork and are not circumcised. Kelek’s repeated criticism of Islam has
triggered a controversy among German intellectuals who published an open letter in which
they accused her of working “unscientifically” and using her personal story to stir up
prejudices against Islam for the success of her publications.382 This opinion is shared by more
than half of Muslims who responded to my survey. They accuse Kelek of presenting herself
as a “model Muslim”, even though she is supposedly not a practicing Muslim, and of
stigmatizing the whole Muslim community through her false assertions about Islam.383
The human rights activist Mina Ahadi, who is of Iranian origin and now lives in exile in
Germany after having been sentenced to death in her home country, renounced her Islamic
377
Kelek called the Gesprächsleitfaden für Einbürgerungswillige a „Pasha test“ since the questions expose the
problems of the patriarchal role of men in Islam (cf. Necla Kelek (2006): “Der Pascha-Test”, in: taz.de,
16.01.2006. Web page <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2010-03/pro-nrw-duisburg?page=1> (Accessed
09.08.2010)
378
379
Birgit Rommelspacher (2009): “Islamkritik und antimuslimische Positionen – am Beispiel von Necla Kelek
und Seyran Ateş“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.48
380
European Stability Initiative (2010), Necla Kelek
381
Rommelspacher (2009), “Necla Kelek und Seyran Ateş“, pp.438-439
382
383
80
faith and founded the Central Council of ex-Muslims (Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime, ZdE) with
like-minded supporters in Cologne in the year 2007, after which she received numerous death
threats forcing her to live under police protection.384 As apostasy is considered a mortal sin in
Islam many ex-Muslims generally remain hidden out of fear. The foundation of the ZdE and
its campaign “Wir haben abgeschworen” thus represent a major breach of taboo in the debates
about Islam. The Council wants to stand up against political Islam and the German
governments’ policy of cultural relativism. It is also very critical of some of the Muslim
umbrella organizations in Germany arguing that they are anti-integrationist, anti-secular and
represent only political Islam and not the majority of the Muslims in Germany, therefore
should not be considered as appropriate dialogue partners by the German government.385 As a
reaction to the government-initiated Islam Conference, which they criticize for not having
achieved the integration of Islam in the German society and instead playing into the hands of
Islamists, the members of the Central Council of ex-Muslims launched the Critical Islam
Conference (Kritische Islamkonferenz) in 2008 with the motto “Aufklären statt Verschleiern”
together with other Islam-critical institutions and individuals like Ralph Giordano.386
Mina Ahadi is concerned about the fact that criticism of Islam is supposedly becoming more
and more a taboo in Germany because the non-Muslim population is intimidated by the
Muslims’ reactions and prefers to not publicly show Islam-critical films or publish Mohamed
cartoons.387 She furthermore stated in different interviews that just like other religions Islam is
misogynist and intolerant and cannot be reformed.388 According to her, political Islam, which
she compares to fascism, is gradually gaining ground in the Occident and fundamentalist
attitudes are characteristic for all Muslims.389 In a similar vein journalist Alice Schwarzer
even goes so far as to draw parallels between the supposed aspirations to power of the
384
Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime e.V. (2010a): “Kurzbiografie Mina Ahadi“, in: ZdE. Web page <http://www.exmuslime.de/indexArchiv.html> (Accessed 06.06.2010)
385
Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime e.V. (2010b): “Wir haben abgeschworen“, in: ZdE. Web page <http://www.exmuslime.de/download/Broschuere_Ex_muslime.pdf> (Accessed 06.06.2010)
386
Kritische Islamkonferenz (2008): “Aufklären statt verschleiern“. Web page <http://www.kritischeislamkonferenz.de/index08.htm> (Accessed 19.06.2010)
387
Sina Vogt; Mina Ahadi (2008): “Warum ich dem Islam abgeschworen habe“, in: Welt Online, 24.02.2008.
Web
page
<http://www.welt.de/kultur/article1716683/Warum_ich_dem_Islam_abgeschworen_habe.html>
(Accessed 10.06.2010)
388
Dirk-Oliver Heckmann (2010): “Religion ist aber nicht die Hauptidentität von Menschen“, in: Mina Ahadi.
Web page <http://www.minaahadi.com/indexfa-Dateien/page0001.htm> (Accessed 20.06.2010)
389
Hannelore Crolly (2007): “Der Islam ist vergleichbar mit dem Faschismus”, in: Welt Online, 09.08.2007.
Web page <http://www.welt.de/politik/article1093836/Der_Islam_ist_vergleichbar_mit_dem_Faschismus.html>
(Accessed 10.06.2010)
81
Islamists in the present with the beginning of Nazi rule in Germany in 1933 proclaiming “Die
Islamisten meinen es so ernst wie Hitler”. Statements like this border on demagogy.390
Similar to Kelek feminist Alice Schwarzer is concerned that the West’s hard-earned
emancipatory achievements concerning gender equality are threatened through Islamism due
to the oppression of women, the headscarf debate and honour killings. Since the 1980s
Germany has allegedly “imported” the Middle Ages and has turned into the hub of Islamic
terrorism in Europe. According to the journalist the key to integration and emancipation of the
Muslim minority community is thus the position of Muslim women in society.391
Islam critics like Schwarzer, Kelek and Giordano claim that many Germans in fact have antiMuslim resentments but do not dare publicly expressing them for reasons of political
correctness and due to fear of being accused of racism and intolerance which according to
them results from the guilt complex on account of the Holocaust still present among
Germans.392 Alice Schwarzer for instance states in an article in Der Spiegel about the difficult
contact between Germans and Muslim women and the growing influence of Islam: “Nachdem
die Nazis alles Fremde verteufelt haben, wollen die Kinder nun alles Fremde lieben, mit fest
verschlossenen Augen.”393 Schneiders argues that by calling on the Germans not to recoil
from the achievements of individual rights and liberties and enlightened Western thinking the
Islam critics intend to allay these alleged fears and to encourage them to openly express their
reservations about Islam and not tolerate the intolerance of Muslims any longer.394
The terror expert and former journalist Udo Ulfkotte, dubbed the “German Wilders” by the
media, often appears on German television as an expert on Islam.395 Since a couple of years
he is frequently warning of the development of an “Eurabia” and the decline of the Occident
due to the “tsunami of Islamisation” in Europe. Ulfkotte is enormously successful with his
Islamophobic propaganda literature, the latest being his new book SOS Abendland – Die
390
Frank Schirrmacher (2006): “Die Islamisten meinen es so ernst wie Hitler“, in: FAZ.net, 04.07.2006. Web
page
<http://www.faz.net/s/RubCF3AEB154CE64960822FA5429A182360/Doc~EF6816D734A5C42
A8A352CBB10367B7FA~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> (Accessed 10.06.2010)
391
Ibid.
392
393
Michaela Schießl; Caroline Schmidt (2004): “Augen fest verschlossen“, in: Der Spiegel, No.47/2004,
15.11.2004. Web page <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-36625727.html> (Accessed 18.07.2010)
394
395
Laurens Bovens (2007): “German Wilders attacks Islam”, in: Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 13.06.2007.
Web
page
<http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/wil070613-redirected>
(Accessed 03.08.2010)
82
schleichende Islamisierung Europas.396 Like many other Islam critics he considers Islam to be
incompatible with the secular Western society stating that “Muslims are different; they are
from a different tradition. This is clearly demonstrated at many schools in […] Germany by
the extent to which children are willing to use violence. Muslims are in many ways different
from Europeans.”397 In the context of crimes committed by persons with Muslim immigrant
background he pejoratively and with ostentation speaks of “our immigrated friends” or “our
fellow citizens” and ridicules the followers of the “religion of peace”.398
In 2006 the neo-conservative Ulfkotte founded the German right-wing organization
Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa which aims at counteracting the “creeping Islamisation” of
Germany and Europe and promoting the preservation of the community of values of the
Judaeo-Christian European culture.399 Due to the organization’s alleged increasingly rightwing extremist tendency400 however, the publicist left Pax Europa two years after its
foundation declaring it had become a “Plattform für Rechtsradikale Radaubrüder”.401 But he
has even bigger plans and works on the formation of an anti-Islamic political party which is to
defend Christian values in Germany and Europe against what he regards as the increasing
influence of radical Islam and to push back special rights for Muslims, inter alia with regard
to polygamy402, slaughtering, co-educational sport or swimming instruction at school or
separate opening hours in swimming pools for Muslims.403 He also operates the Website Akte
Islam with the motto “Für Europa – Gegen Eurabien” which publishes the latest news about
crimes and misconducts supposedly committed all over the world by people with Islamic
background. The material is presented in a polemical and Islamophobic manner and according
to Ulfkotte this information cannot be found in the national German media for reasons of
396
Udo Ulfkotte (2010): Bücher. Web page <http://www.ulfkotte.de/3.html> (Accessed 10.07.2010)
Bovens (2007), “German Wilders attacks Islam”
398
399
Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa e.V. (2010): Der Verein. Web page <http://www.buergerbewegung-paxeuropa.de/verein/index.php> (Accessed 14.07.2010)
400
Pax Europa had published 12 Islamophobic cartoons (in the style of the controversial Danish Mohamed
cartoons) on the Internet showing Muslims as pigs, pedophiles and terrorists, which Ulfkotte denounced as being
racist and in the style of the anti-Semitic Nazi newspaper Der Stürmer. He distanced himself from the
publications saying that they unnecessarily provoke Muslims and discredit objective criticism of Islam (cf. Till
Stoldt (2008): “‚Stürmer-Stil‘: Publizist Ulfkotte verlässt islamkritische Bewegung“, in: Welt Online,
02.12.2008. Web page <http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article2813789/Stuermer-Stil-Publizist-Ulfkotteverlaesst-islamkritische-Bewegung.html> (Accessed 10.06.2010).
401
Stoldt (2008), “‚Stürmer-Stil‘: Publizist Ulfkotte verlässt islamkritische Bewegung“
402
Ulfkotte claims that polygamy is tolerated in the German health insurance system despite the fact that it is
officially forbidden in Germany, given the fact that Muslim men are allowed to co-insure their multiple wives,
which Ulfkotte regards as unacceptable (cf. Jan-Philipp Hein (2007): “Neokonservatives Projekt – Autor
Ulfkotte
plant
anti-islamische
Partei“,
in:
Spiegel
Online,
16.03.2007.
Web
page
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,472151,00.html> (Accessed 03.02.2010).
403
Hein (2007), “Neokonservatives Projekt”
397
83
political correctness.404 The biased reporting of negative issues and the very offensive,
inflammatory and Islamophobic language including terms like “Mekka-Betrüger”, “TerrorScheich” or “Moslem-Bande” are used to emphasise the alleged threat Muslims represent to
“our” Western, Judaeo-Christian-based culture.405
As an extreme form of Islamophobia Islam-bashing on the Internet has become a widespread
phenomenon. Especially the Weblog Politically Incorrect (PI News), which claims to be proAmerican, pro-Israeli and against the mainstream and stands for the fight against the
Islamisation of Europe, publishes articles and comments defaming Muslims and Islam on a
daily basis. It has grown very popular among Islamophobic people and provides a platform
for Islamophobic and defamatory comments like “Der Islam ist eine freiwillige
Geisteskrankheit” or “Islam ist […] mit einem Wort: barbarisch“406 and Muslim worshippers
are described as “goat fuckers”, “veiled sluts”, “god-damned camel driver” or “dirty
Muslim”.407 The authors of PI News frequently refer to statements made by the abovementioned critics of Islam and promote the support for other European Islam-critical public
institutions and figures like Geert Wilders.408 In its guidelines Politically Incorrect dares to
make the prophetical statement that due to the cultural expansion and demographic
development in two to three decades Germany’s approximately 82 million inhabitants will
have to live in a dominantly Islamic social order which will be based on Sharia and Koran and
no longer on the Basic Law and on human rights.409
404
Akte Islam (2010): Aktuelle Nachrichten aus dem islamischen Kulturkreis. Web page <http://www.akteislam.de/3.html>(Accessed 10.07.2010)
405
Sabine Schiffer (2009): “Grenzenloser Hass im Internet“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit,
pp.346-347
406
Politically Incorrect (2010): PI News. Web page <http://www.pi-news.net/> (Accessed 22.02.2010);
407
Erich Follath (2010): “Germany is becoming Islamophobic – The Sarrazin Debate”, in: Spiegel Online
International, 31.08.2010. Web page http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,714643,00.html>
(Accessed 04.09.2010)
408
Politically Incorrect (2010), PI News
409
Politically Incorrect (2009): Leitlinien gegen den Mainstream. Web page <http://www.pi-news.net/leitlinien/>
(Accessed 22.02.2010)
84
CHAPTER 5
Representation of Islam in the German media
When analyzing the public discourse on Islam in Germany, it is important to also look at the
media portrayal of Muslims and their faith considering that in modern society the significance
of the media as information source in everyday life has grown dramatically in previous years.
Media interest in the topic of Islam has been increasing considerably since the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, further fuelled by the events of 9/11. The position of Islam in the German
society is currently one of the most controversially discussed subjects in the German print and
broadcast media.410 Almost daily there are new media reports about Islam and Muslims.
Aside from accounts of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks these are for the most part
reports about the “problems” of Muslim fellow citizens.411
For the last 1400 years Islam has had a bad press in the West, tainted with stereotypes and
generalizations, and the German media generally have not broken with this tradition but rather
frequently revitalize the old idea of the dichotomy between the Christian Occident and the
Islamic Orient, hence the Clash of Civilizations. The majority of the media coverage on Islam
reflects the negatively coined and biased century-old Islam image still prevailing in the
West.412 In general, Muslims are portrayed as a threat to the Christian Western society, and
Islam is associated with violence, terrorism, the oppression of women, backwardness, and
intolerance with marginal phenomena like honour killings and forced marriages being
portrayed as typical specifics of Islam. Consequently Muslims symbolize the ‘Other’ and are
perceived with suspicions and fears in the predominantly one-sided media coverage.413 The
media portrayal of Islam thus represents a good reflection of the public discourse about Islam
in Germany, resembling a sort of “enlightened Islamophobia”.414
410
Detlef Thofern (1998): Darstellungen des Islams in DER SPIEGEL. Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung
über Themen und Bilder der Berichterstattung von 1950 bis 1989. Socialia, Bd. 26. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac,
p.2
411
Frank Wagner (2009): “‘Die passen sich nicht an‘ – Exkurs zur sprachlichen Darstellung von Muslimen in
Medienberichten“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.323
412
Kai Hafez (2009b): “Mediengesellschaft – Wissensgesellschaft? Gesellschaftliche Entstehungsbedingungen
des Islambildes deutscher Medien“, in: Schneiders (ed.) (2009), Islamfeindlichkeit, p.100
413
Sabine Schiffer (2004): Die Darstellung des Islams in der Presse – Sprache, Bilder, Suggestionen. Eine
Auswahl an Techniken und Beispielen, Inaugural-Dissertation. Erlangen: Philosophische Fakultät II der
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität, p.4; Mohammed Khallouk (2010): “Von der Kollektivaversion gegen IslamFacettenreichtum der Islamfeindlichkeit in Deutschland im öffentlichen Bewusstsein“, in: islam.de, 28.01.2010.
Web page <http://islam.de/15280.php> (Accessed 23.02.2010)
414
Kai Hafez; Carola Richter (2008): “Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF“, in: Deutsche Islam Konferenz,
26.09.2008. Web page <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_110/nn_1402952/SharedDocs/Anlagen/
85
Within the media arena Islam is commonly presented as one monolithic bloc and the 1.2
billion Muslims world-wide, who have different traditions and socio-cultural backgrounds,
are depicted as one homogeneous mass with aggressive, sexist, and conservative attitudes.415
Muslims are widely reported to be the subject of generalizations and frequent associations
with terrorism in both print and broadcast media, with increasing frequency since the attacks
of September 11. Terms like “islamischer Terror”, “Moslem-Extremist” or “islamistischer
Attentäter” etc. regularly appear in German newspapers, used interchangeably, which shows
the lack of distinction made in the German press between Islam and radical Islamism.
Furthermore the metaphor of disease is sometimes applied to Muslims when Islamism is
referred to as “Krebsgeschwür”, which implies the idea of Islamic threat and eradication.416
With regard to reports about crime in the media it can be noted that in case the offender is a
Muslim this will definitely be mentioned, whether it is relevant to the issue at hand or not,
while this method is not applied to offenders with another religious background in a similar
manner. According to media researcher Sabine Schiffer that kind of stigmatizing (racial)
profiling reminds of forms of anti-Semitic propaganda once applied to Jewish citizens in the
twentieth century.417
Moreover, on TV news as well as in newspapers the topic of “foreigners” is often peppered
with images of women in headscarves, which further strengthens the idea that “Islam equals
strangeness” and is a foreign issue.418 This is illustrated for instance in the cover story of the
Der Spiegel issue 47/2004 entitled “Allahs rechtlose Töchter – Muslimische Frauen in
Deutschland” which shows the image of a veiled Muslim woman completely dressed in black
of whom the face is not visible.419 All of this does not exactly benefit the integration of
Muslim women who feel increasingly misunderstood instead of “rescued”. In the press
coverage rarely any discussion on Islam takes place without bringing up the issue of headscarf
which is represented as one of the ultimate symbols of Islam, whereas successful Muslim
DE/DIK/Downloads/Sonstiges/hafez-richter-islambild-ard-u-zdf-dik,templateId=raw,property=
publicationFile.pdf/hafez-richter-islambild-ard-u-zdf-dik.pdf> (Accessed 03.02.2010)
415
Schiffer (2004), Die Darstellung des Islams in der Presse, p.2
416
Sabine Schiffer (2005): “Der Islam in deutschen Medien“, in: Muslime in Europa, Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Vol. 20/2005, 17.05.2005
417
Ibid.
418
Ibid.
419
Schießl; Schmidt (2004), “Augen fest verschlossen“
86
women, like the Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, are mostly shown without a
headscarf.420
In the German media Islam is generally demonized through mostly negative portrayals about
controversial events and customs from the Islamic world while positive, unspectacular or
neutral phenomena related to Islam are predominantly ignored, true to the motto only bad
news is good news. This becomes very obvious in the example of the police investigations
carried out in German mosques in the aftermath of 9/11. Announcements of these
investigations made the headlines and were always placed on the front pages of German
newspapers, while reports on the failure of the searches to produce any results since the
suspicions turned out to be groundless, were always hidden somewhere in the inside of the
newspaper or completely absent. This created the impression that mosques harbour a potential
threat and changed the perception of mosques in the public, construing them rather as a place
of conspiracy than a place of worship.421 This tendency to “deliberately Islamophobic media
coverage”422 was also criticized by the vast majority of participants in my survey. In this
respect several Muslim respondents complained about the unequal treatment of negative
themes and events in Muslim communities as compared to the Christian Churches in the
media discourse. The examples named were the recently discovered child abuse scandals in
the Catholic Church or the terrorist acts of Christians in Northern Ireland which are much less
reported on than comparatively smaller crimes or events in the Muslim world, which are
generally media-hyped on a large scale.423
Media coverage of Islam is dominated by reports on contentious issues like the controversies
about mosque building, the ban of headscarves, honour killings, forced marriages or the
introduction of Islamic religious education in German schools with the aim of fuelling fears of
alienation and ethnic-religious resentments among the media consumers. Conflict-free and
constructive inter-faith dialogues between church and mosque congregations for example are
most widely disregarded.424
420
Schiffer (2005), “Der Islam in deutschen Medien“
Ibid.
422
423
424
Martin Spetsmann-Kunkel (2007): “’Mekka Deutschland’ – Islamophobie als Effekt der SpiegelBerichterstattung – Eine Diskursfragmentenanalyse”, in: Deutsche Islam Konferenz. Web page
<http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1318760/SharedDocs/
Anlagen/DE/DIK/Downloads/
Sonstiges/drspetsmann-kunkel__mekkadeutschland, templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/drspetsmannkunkel_mekkadeutschland.pdf> (Accessed 10.06.2010)
421
87
Opinion leading magazines like Der Spiegel have a major influence on the media discourse on
Islam seeing that Islam-related topics which the magazine picks up generally spark public
debates while themes which are not reported on usually do not arouse much public interest. In
2007 for example the magazine’s front cover title “Mekka Deutschland - Die stille
Islamisierung“425 and the accompanying article “Haben wir schon die Scharia?” alluded to the
threat scenario of the alleged “creeping Islamisation“, a topic often discussed lately in the
public sphere.426 A later report in Der Spiegel entitled “Angst vor Eurabien” played on the
same fears of the expansion of Islam prevailing in the European majority society.427 Der
Spiegel is said to show the tendency to particularly frequently associate Islam with the
classical negative stereotypical themes in its media coverage on the Muslim faith.428Another
leading article in the weekly newsmagazine Focus from the year 2004 with the title
“Unheimliche Gäste. Die Gegenwelt der Muslime in Deutschland. Ist Multi-Kulti
gescheitert?”, clearly emphasises the uneasiness and fears many non-Muslim Germans have
towards Muslims and their “parallel society”.429
Immediately in the days after the terrorist attacks on New York’s World Trade Center
rumours spread that the leaders of the terrorists of 9/11, who had been studying in German
universities, had been supported by mosque associations. In the aftermath of 9/11 the media,
who are unfamiliar with the diversity within the Muslim population and the differences
between the various Islamic associations, published a list of Muslim organizations in
Germany which did not take into account their different orientations failing to distinguish
between pious congregations and Islamist groups such as Hizbollah, Hamas and Hizb alTahrir. Suddenly most mosque organizations were suspected of being breeding grounds for
terrorists and extremists. Gerdien Jonker claims that the German Office for the Protection of
the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) was one of the only institutions that had observed the
425
Der Spiegel (2007), Mekka Deutschland - Die stille Islamisierung; note: The title page image conveys a
threatening atmosphere, depicting a dark sky with the Islamic crescent and star above the Brandenburger Gate.
This cover image was met with a lot of criticism in the German media landscape.
426
Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt et al. (2007): “Haben wir schon die Scharia?“, in: Der Spiegel, 13/2007,
26.03.2007
427
Andrea Brandt; Marco Evers et al. (2009): “Angst vor Eurabien“, in: Der Spiegel, 50/2009, 07.12.2009. Web
page
<http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=68073988&aref=image040/2009/12/05/ROSP
200905001120116.PDF&thumb=false> (Accessed 03.02.2010)
428
Thofern (1998), Darstellungen des Islams in DER SPIEGEL, p.3, pp.129-131
429
Focus (2004): Unheimliche Gäste. Die Gegenwelt der Muslime in Deutschland. Ist Multi-Kulti gescheitert?,
Nr. 48, 22.11.2004
88
different Islamic organizations which are active in Germany, therefore knew about their
different orientations and could have set the record straight. This however did not happen.430
The Islamic Community of Milli Görüş, a large Turkish grassroots movement which operates
323 well-frequented local mosque communities in Germany431, has been monitored by the
German Office for Protection of the Constitution for many years with suspicion of antidemocratic, Islamist activities. Milli Görüş was publicly accused in the media of supporting
terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11.432 It rapidly became a generally accepted view that Milli
Görüş “presents itself as a religious community but, under this cloak, in reality it unfolds
economic and political activities which raise doubts about its harmlessness”.433
In particular the tabloid press started condemning other pious Muslim communities wholesale
as possible suspects for terrorism and it did not take a long time before the credibility of all
Muslim organizations in Germany was called into question in the public arena. In light of the
‘global terrorist’ threat unfortunately scarcely any distinction was made between Islam and
Islamism in Germany, with Muslims suddenly globally being misrepresented as a danger to
the Western society. The fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists, including the leader Muhammad
Ata, had been studying at German universities, thus that Germany had been harbouring
“sleepers” terrified many people in Germany.434
However, not only in the print media the biased reporting prevails. A recent study about the
Islam image in the public television broadcasters ARD and ZDF conducted in 2005 and 2006
reveals that since the events of September 11 in more than 80 percent of all television
contributions and programmes on the topic of Islam themes carrying negative connotations
like terrorism, international conflicts, religious intolerance, fundamentalism, oppression of
women, integration problems, and human rights violations were dominant. Only around 20
percent deal with the everyday life of Muslim migrant families or Islamic piety as such, which
430
Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş e.V. (IGMG) (2010): Organisational Structure. Web page
<http://www.igmg.de/verband/islamic-community-milli-goerues/organisational-structure.html?L=%20/
phprojekt/lib/config.inc.php?path_pre> (Accessed 25.06.2010)
432
The Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs e.V., which has currently 29.000 members, has been labeled the
biggest ‘Islamist organization‘ in Germany by the ‘Verfassungsschutz’ (cf. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
(2009): Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009 – Vorabfassung. <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/publikationen/
verfassungsschutzbericht/vsbericht_2009/> (Accessed 25.06.2010)).
433
434
Gerdien Jonker (2005: p.119) uses the term ‘sleepers’, referring to the potential terrorists who have not yet
been active and are quietly studying and living in Germany without anyone realizing the imminent danger they
represent. In the aftermath of 9/11 all students from Muslim countries studying at German universities were
scrutinized and their web-sites closed down to prevent future terrorist attacks.
431
89
are however mostly broadcast late at night and not during prime time. Hence they remain
unseen by the majority of the German public and therefore deprive media consumers of the
chance to learn about the normal life of their Muslim neighbour.435 The main problem in the
news coverage of Islam is thus the narrow choice of topics and the biased and strong imagery.
Despite the fact that the majority of Muslims in Germany are moderate Muslims and terrorism
is only a minority phenomenon, it nevertheless plays a pivotal role in the media reports about
Islam.436
As becomes clear from the examples mentioned above the often stigmatizing and unbalanced
reporting about Muslim communities and Islam in the media plays a decisive role in shaping
the Islam image in the public discourse about Islam in Germany and for the strengthening of
anti-Muslim sentiments among the media recipients, especially since the majority of Germans
do not have much direct contact with Muslims. At the same time however the mass media are
equally influenced by the political discourse on Islam, by the opinions of public Islam critics
and by the century-old negative Islam image still prevailing in the public sphere.437
435
Hafez; Richter (2008), “Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF“
The dominant Islam-related images include veiled women, self-flagellation of Iranian Shiites, the Kaaba in
Mecca, and ritual slaughter of animals (cf. Thilo Guschas (2009): “Das Islambild in deutschen Medien“, in:
Deutsche Islam Konferenz, 14.01.2009).
437
Hafez (2009b), “Mediengesellschaft – Wissensgesellschaft?“, p.107
436
90
CONCLUSION
Muslims have resided for almost five decades in Germany and Islam has by now become the
second-largest religion in the country. Nevertheless, the continuous and often controversial
public debates about integration of Muslim immigrants and the rising visibility of their
religion indicate that the German society still has difficulties coming to terms with the
country’s increasing religious and cultural plurality. Islamophobic tendencies, which are not
just a typical German phenomenon but can be perceived in all countries in Europe, have
considerably increased in the last decade.438
In the German public discourse the topic of Islam is largely tainted with resentments and fears
with many people failing to make a clear distinction between Islam as a religion, Islamism as
an ideology and Islamist terrorism. This undifferentiated image and the largely negative
public perception of Islam in the wider society, often lead to discrimination and segregation
of people with a Muslim family background, regardless of whether they are actively
practicing their religion or just have a cultural Islamic background. This represents a major
challenge for German integration policy. Although the German society has meanwhile
accepted the fact that Germany has de facto turned into an immigration country, the
relationship between the majority society and Muslim immigrants continues to be
characterized by the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy which is often drawn in public debates.
Islam is thus still widely regarded as a “foreign religion” by many Germans and Muslim
citizens are often treated as “foreigners” and frequently asked “when they go home”, although
many of them were born in Germany. Consequently Muslims feel increasingly stigmatized
and excluded from mainstream society, as stated by many participants in my survey.439
As pointed out in the beginning of this dissertation, different societal actors influence the
public discourse on Islam in Germany and contribute significantly to shaping the public
image of the religion and its believers. In this regard we can often witness a diversity of
different, partly contradictory discourses. In other words, actors who are involved in the
debates about Islamic religious education for instance, come from different circles than those
who call for a stop to immigration from Muslim countries.
438
A great number of survey respondents reported that they had already been asked “when they will go back to
their country”, which was perceived as particularly frustrating and irritating by those who had grown up in
Germany and/or were born there and who consider Germany as “their home”(cf. Survey - Muslime in
Deutschland).
439
91
The various examples of anti-Muslim rhetoric and attitudes examined in this thesis have
shown that hostility towards Muslims and Islamophobic discourse are no longer isolated
occurrences. They have indeed become more socially acceptable in mainstream society in
recent years, notably since the events of September 11. Having been formerly mainly
restricted to the right-wing fringe and radical public critics of Islam, Islamophobic attitudes
can nowadays be observed in all spheres of public life and are widespread in large parts of the
German society, irrespective of political preferences, social class or educational level. This
increasingly hostile social climate towards Muslims is fed by events such as 9/11, the murder
of Theo van Gogh, or the terrorist attacks of Madrid and London as well as by socioeconomic problems in the “Muslim ghettos”, which are perceived as being directly linked to
Islam. As a consequence Muslims are forced to systematically display anti-terrorism positions
or a commitment to freedom of expression because of the widespread suspicions by the
majority society that Muslims commonly endorse this kind of radical behaviour.440
In view of the discussed policies and statements concerning Islam in the political arena it
becomes clear that the mainstream political parties, with exception of the Green Party, have a
rather ambivalent relationship to Islam. On the one hand they promote policies encouraging
integration of Islam in the German society and dialogue with the Muslim minorities, like for
instance through the introduction of Islamic religious education and through the German
Islam Conference. On the other hand prejudices, stereotypes and clichés about Islam and
Muslims are increasingly propagated in political debates, stirring up anti-Islamic resentments
among the German population. This becomes particularly perceptible in controversial
discussions about Islamic symbols like the headscarf, the threat of fundamentalist Islamism,
or in integration debates about Muslim “parallel societies” and their supposedly failed
integration. An extreme form of anti-Islam discourse could be observed in the radical rightwing (populist) parties analyzed in this dissertation. The different protagonists of the extreme
Right have focused their Islamophobic and defamatory propaganda specifically on the new
Feindbild Islam and on the alleged threat of a “creeping Islamisation” of German society
through Muslim immigrants and the growing influence of Islam in the public sphere.
Muslim immigrants and their increasing demands for equal participation in the social, cultural
and political domains have revitalized the debate about the role of religion in the German
state and the expression of religious identity in public life. Conflicts seem to arise whenever
440
92
Muslims and Islam become visible in the everyday culture of German society and in the
public arena, which represents a challenge to the predominately Christian German society.
This includes controversial debates about Islamic symbols like the headscarf, which is often
interpreted as having political implications symbolizing female submission rather than being a
symbol of religious practice, as it was illustrated by the case example of public school teacher
Fereshta Ludin. Attempts to build mosques are often faced with resistance from the local nonMuslim population as they manifest the permanence of Muslim life in Germany which leads
to fears of alienation through the growing influence of Islam and the concern that a mosque
could foster the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The analysis has furthermore shown the
difficulty of introducing Islamic religious instruction in German public schools, which is
hampered by the lack of a homogeneous Muslim representative, analogue to the Christian
Churches. It has so far not resulted in the introduction of a centralized system of Islamic
religious education in the whole Federal Republic. Two issues that have attracted increased
public attention and are frequently used to draw the boundary between the traditionalist, premodern and authoritarian Muslim culture and the secular, liberal and enlightened European
culture are the gender-related issue phenomenon of honour killing and the problem of
homophobia among young men from Muslim immigrant communities.
The public discourse about Islam in Germany often appears to be at a crossroads between
criticism of Islam and Islamophobia, which makes it difficult to differentiate between
constructive, reasonable criticism and instrumentalised criticism and defamation. This line is
often deliberately blurred by public intellectuals like Ralph Giordano or Necla Kelek, whose
critical opinions on Islam and Muslims are regularly published in the German media. With
their frequent anti-Islamic statements these public Islam critics contribute to a great extent to
the formation or reproduction of Islamophobic attitudes and anti-Muslim sentiments among
the society at large, leading many people in the majority society to think that “Islam is the
problem”441, as Ralph Giordano likes to emphasise.
The assessment of the impact of the media on the public discourse led to the conclusion that
the generally negative attitude towards Muslims and Islam held by large sections of the civil
society is mainly a result of the biased and prejudiced media coverage about Islam. Despite
occasional enlightened and differentiated reporting on Islamic issues, the majority of the mass
media coverage has an Islamophobic basic structure linking Islam with negative topics like
terrorism, violence, fundamentalism or oppression of women, representing it as a political
441
Seker (2010), “An Outlet for Suppressed Intolerance”
93
ideology and producing or reproducing anti-Muslim stereotypes and prejudices. At the same
time the media show a lack of interest in Islam as a religion and in the social, cultural and
denominational diversity of the Muslim population. A balanced media reporting on Islam thus
seems to be rather the exception, which has a major influence on the public image of Islam
prevailing in the German society.
Islam seems to have become one of the greatest challenges for the German society due to the
government’s long-term neglect of integrating Islam and Muslims in the German society
which has enhanced the development of “parallel societies”. Only in the last decade
awareness of the need for conscious integration efforts for the Muslim communities rose as,
after the September 11 attacks, failed integration policies were identified as a problem. The
integration debate was stirred up again recently through the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s
new book Deutschland schafft sich ab442, which brought the topic of integration problems of
Muslim immigrants back to the table in the political arena. Leading politicians recognized
mistakes made in the past and called for a renewed integration debate.443
The existing empirical evidence of anti-Islamic attitudes in the German society strengthens
the assumption that Islamophobia and hostility towards Muslims among Germans are likely to
increase further in the coming years.444 Therefore it is essential that national measures for
effectively tackling the problem of Islamophobia in Germany are implemented by the
government, which so far has not been considered a crucial issue to be solved at a national
level.445 A start would be to include the issue of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim discrimination
in the agenda for the next Islam Conference, as it was already demanded by the Central
Council of Muslims for this year’s conference.
The analysis has shown that there is a need for more differentiation and objectivity in the
public debates about Islam. The negative impact of more than a decade of pejorative and
polarizing Islamophobic discourse in the public sphere, in the political arena and the mass
media cannot be rolled back without a massive collective public effort in the future. To that
extent, the initiation of the Islamkonferenz certainly has symbolic value as a forum for
dialogue and marks a first important step towards genuine integration of Islam in Germany.
However, the sole recognition that “Islam is a part of Germany” is not enough; there is
442
Sarrazin (2010a), Deutschland schafft sich ab – Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen
N24 (2010): “Sarrazin bricht Integrationsdebatte los“, in: N24.de, 03.09.2010.
<http://www.n24.de/news/newsitem_6306032.html> (Accessed 17.09.2010)
444
Kühnel; Leibold (2007), “Islamophobie in der deutschen Bevölkerung“, pp. 151-152
445
Cesari (2006): Securitization and religious divides in Europe, p.184
443
Web
page
94
undoubtedly a need for more constructive dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. In
this regard, Muslim organizations play a pivotal role but also the participation of moderate
(individual) Muslims in public debates about Islam should be strongly encouraged.
In 2006, shortly after the start of the first Islam Conference, Wolfgang Schäuble stated:
“Muslims are welcome in Germany. […] Muslims are no longer a foreign population group in
Germany but have become an integral part of our society. […] I hope that the German Islam
Conference will succeed not only in finding practical solutions but also in creating more
understanding, sympathy, peace, tolerance, and above all, more communication and diversity
and thereby contribute to enriching our country.”446 Now it is time that these words are turned
into deeds.
446
Deutsche Islamkonferenz (2010a): From an initiative to a common goal, 09.03.2010. Web page
<http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1917124/SubSites/DIK/EN/DieDIK/Hintergrund/
hintergrund-node.html?__nnn=true> (Accessed 17.09.2010)
95
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Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2009d): Parteien antworten auf ZMDWahlprüfsteine, 15.09.2009. Web page <http://www.zentralrat.de/13944.php> (Accessed
10.06.2010)
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. (ZMD) (2007): Tag der offenen Moschee. Web
page <http://www.islam.de/2583.php> (Accessed 14.08.2010)
Zinn, Alexander (2004): “Clash of Cultures? Über das Verhältnis türkisch- und
arabischstämmiger Jugendlicher zur Homosexualität und Homosexuellen”, in: Lesben- und
117
Schwulenverband in Deutschland Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. (eds.): Muslime unter dem
Regenbogen – Homosexualität, Migration und Islam. Berlin: Querverlag GmbH, pp. 226-259
118
APPENDIX
SURVEY - MUSLIME IN DEUTSCHLAND
Figure 1: Online Questionnaire Survey - Muslime in Deutschland
119
120
121
Evaluation of the Survey Results - Muslime in Deutschland
Within the framework of my MA Thesis about the public discourse on Islam in Germany I
found it essential to consider both sides of the coin and look at how German Muslims
perceive the discourse about Islam and how they react to the growing Islamophobia in the
German public and political domain. I therefore conducted an online survey focusing on
Muslim voices in order to find out how Muslims living in Germany perceive the attitudes of
the German society towards Islam.
The results shown here draw on data collected from my survey entitled “Muslime in
Deutschland” which was conducted in the period between 18 July and 23 August 2010. It was
carried out on a basis of anonymity to ensure frank and open responses. The survey questions,
of which half were open and half closed questions, cover different topics that are dealt with in
my thesis. This includes Islamic religious education, the influence of the media in the
discourse on Islam in Germany, freedom of religious practice, public Islam critics, the
German Conference on Islam, as well as the general attitude of non-Muslims towards Islam
and Islamophobia.
The respondents were approached either through e-mail or personally. In this regard I
contacted different mosque congregations throughout Germany, Muslim (umbrella)
organizations like DITIB, Islamrat, SCHURA - Rat der islamischen Gemeinschaften in
Hamburg e.V. and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Deutschland, Muslim women’s
organizations like HUDA - Netzwerk für muslimische Frauen e.V. and Aktionsbündnis
muslimischer Frauen e.V. as well as individual Muslim respondents I found through personal
contacts. Thanks to the publication of the survey link on the website of the HUDA women’s
association and the help of organizations and individuals, who forwarded the survey further to
their members and/or friends, a total number of 420 Muslim respondents participated in the
questionnaire survey. Among those were 74.5 percent female respondents and 25.5 percent
male respondents (figure 2), comprising Muslims with migration background as well as
German converts to Islam. Furthermore it should be noted that the survey participants were
predominantly young (figure 3) and educated Muslims, which is mainly owing to the
methodology of the survey, i.e. conducting of the survey on the Internet as well as the types of
survey questions asked. The vast majority of the respondents (84.9 percent) stated to have
122
regular social contact with non-Muslim Germans, whereas only 1.7 percent rarely have any
direct contact with persons of German origin (figure 4).
Figure 2: Gender of respondent
Figure 3: Age group
123
Figure 4: Regular contact with non-Muslim German citizens
Given the relatively small sample of respondents and considering the diversity existing within
the Muslim population in Germany in denominational and in ethnic terms, the survey cannot
claim to be representative of Muslim opinion in Germany. Moreover, the replies to the eight
open questions varied largely in length and detail, ranging from very detailed answers with
personal views or suggestions to others of rather fragmentary character. Nevertheless the
survey results provide a valuable insight into some personal perceptions, individual opinions
and experiences of Muslim citizens regarding acts of Islamophobia, discrimination, inequality
and prejudices towards Muslims and Islam in the German society. The overall feedback I
received on my survey was very positive. Several respondents expressed their interest in
seeing the results of the survey for their own work in Muslim associations.
124
Survey questions - German version and English translation
1. Angaben zur Person:
1. Personal data:
(männlich
(male
weiblich)
female)
2. Altersgruppe:
2. Age group:
(<18; 18-25; 26-64; 65+)
(<18; 18-25; 26-64; 65+)
3. Wie lange leben Sie schon in Deutschland? / Sind Sie in Deutschland geboren?
3. Since when do you live in Germany? / Where you born here?
4. Aus welchem Land stammt Ihre Familie?
4. What is your family’s country of origin?
5. Haben Sie regelmäßigen Kontakt zu Deutschen (Nicht-Muslimen)? (Ja, Nein, Gelegentlich)
5. Do you have regular contact with non-Muslim German citizens? (Yes, No, Occassionally)
6. Wie empfinden Sie den alltäglichen Umgang der Nicht-Muslime mit den Muslimen in
Deutschland?
6. How do you perceive the general attitude of non-Muslims towards Muslims in Germany?
7. Stimmen Sie der folgenden Aussage zu?
Die Deutschen lehnen Muslime ab.
(Ja, Teilweise, Nein, Weiß nicht)
7. Do you agree with the following statement?
Germans are hostile towards Muslims
(Yes, Partly, No, I don’t know)
8. Stimmen Sie der folgenden Aussage zu?
(Ja, Teilweise, Nein, Weiß nicht)
In Deutschland können Muslime ihre Religion frei ausüben.
8. Do you agree with the following statement?
(Yes, Partly, No, I don’t know)
In Germany Muslims can practice their faith freely and openly.
9. Fühlen Sie sich als Muslim in Deutschland benachteiligt gegenüber Bürgern anderer
Glaubensrichtungen (Christen, Juden etc.)? Wenn ja inwiefern? (Ja, Manchmal, Nein, Weiß
nicht)
9. Do you feel disadvantaged as a Muslim in Germany compared to citizens of other religious
faiths (Christians, Jews, etc.)? If so, in what way?
(Yes, Sometimes, No, I don’t know)
10. Fühlen Sie sich persönlich in Ihrem Glauben angegriffen durch öffentliche islamfeindliche
Äußerungen von Islamkritikern wie Ralph Giordano, Thilo Sarrazin oder Necla Kelek?
10. Do you feel personally provoked in your faith through public Islamophobic statements by
Islam critics like Ralph Giordano, Thilo Sarrazin or Necla Kelek?
125
11. Inwiefern hat sich seit dem 11. September 2001 das Klima im Umgang der deutschen
Nicht-Muslime gegenüber Muslimen geändert? (Werden Muslime mehr als vor dem 11.
September kritisiert und diskriminiert?)
11. In what way do you perceive a climate change in the attitudes of German non-Muslims
towards Muslims since 9/11? (Are Muslims more discriminated and criticized since
September 11?)
12. Was halten Sie von der Deutschen Islamkonferenz, die von der Bundesregierung 2006 ins
Leben gerufen wurde? Fördert sie Ihrer Meinung nach den Dialog zwischen Muslimen und
Nicht-Muslimen in Deutschland?
12. What do you think of the German Conference on Islam, which has been launched by the
Federal Government in 2006? Does it encourage the dialogue between Muslims and nonMuslims in Germany in your opinion?
13. Finden Sie, dass in der Öffentlichkeit, vor allem in den Medien, klar zwischen Islam und
(radikalem) Islamismus unterschieden wird?
13. Do you think that in the public sphere, particularly in the media, a clear distinction is
always made between Islam and (radical) Islamism?
14. Was halten Sie von der Einführung islamischen Religionsunterrichts in deutscher Sprache
an öffentlichen Schulen?
14. What do you think of the introduction of Islamic religious education in German language
in public schools?
15. Welchen Einfluss haben Ihrer Meinung nach die Medien (z.B. Zeitungen und Fernsehen)
auf das Islambild der deutschen Bevölkerung? Ist die Berichterstattung zu einseitig negativ?
15. What is the influence of the media (e.g. newspapers and TV) on the image of Islam in the
German society? Is the reporting too biased and negative?
16. Sind Sie persönlich schon einmal Opfer von Diskriminierung geworden aufgrund Ihrer
Religion? (z.B. durch Tragen eines Kopftuchs, etc.)
16. Have you already experienced anti-Muslim discrimination on the basis of your faith?
(e.g. due to wearing a headscarf, etc.)?
Themes that are mentioned in the questionnaire responses include the headscarf debate,
honour killings, oppression of women, forced marriages, terrorism (suicide bombers),
Islamophobia in the media and among the public at large, Islamic religious education, the
German Conference on Islam and discrimination in daily (private and professional) life due to
their Islamic faith.
126
Perceptions of Islamophobia and Discrimination
As far as the general attitude of non-Muslim German citizens towards Muslims and Islam is
concerned, a large proportion of the respondents (36.5 percent) perceive it as predominantly
negative and tainted with prejudices. Respondents regret the lack of interest in the religion of
Islam and Islamic customs among the German non-Muslim population. According to them
there is a great lack of understanding in public and political discussions about the diversity
within and between the Muslim communities; Muslim citizens are being reduced to one
homogeneous mass. Many survey participants (44.8 per cent) stated that the attitudes and
opinions of non-Muslims towards Islam are neither fully negative nor positive, but vary
depending on different factors such as the respective persons’ social class, educational
background and age, as well as geographical aspects (different attitudes in rural areas or in
cities; more discrimination was perceived in former East Germany than in West German
towns with larger Muslim populations like Cologne etc.). In this regard a considerable
number of respondents made a clear distinction between non-Muslims in their immediate
environment in private and professional life (acquaintances, friends, work colleagues etc.) and
non-Muslims in general from the public at large whom they do not know personally. While
the former are said to mostly have a positive and tolerant attitude towards Islam and show
more interest, the latter were generally perceived as being prejudiced, skeptical and rather
distanced towards Islam and Muslims.
According to many respondents Islam is still largely perceived as an “alien religion” by many
Germans and consequently Muslims are treated with a hostile attitude (figure 5) and often
rejected as “foreigners” or asked “when they go back to their country” despite the fact that
many of them were born in Germany and have German citizenship. Especially those born in
Germany feel increasingly frustrated to be constantly asked to ‘integrate’ and still not being
fully accepted as part of the German society no matter how hard they try. Some respondents
asserted that non-Muslim Germans actually mean ‘assimilation’ when they talk about
‘integration’ stating that Germans want Muslims to be like them, i.e. eating pork, drinking
alcohol etc. Only 18.7 percent of the respondents consider the general attitude of Germans
towards Islam as principally tolerant, normal or even friendly and open.
127
Figure 5: Hostility towards Muslims among the German non-Muslim
population
Social climate change in attitudes towards Muslims post 9/11
Due to the predominantly negative image of Islam characterizing the mainstream discourse on
Islam, many Muslims feel that they are under intense scrutiny, particularly since the
September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington which changed the social climate
regarding Islam considerably in the last nine years. The events of 9/11 marked a milestone in
the German debates about Islam and the Germans’ attitudes towards Muslims. 79.8 percent of
the Muslim respondents confirmed a rise of Islamophobia among Germans and stated to have
been increasingly subjected to discrimination on the basis of their faith. The vast majority of
the respondents feel that they are constantly placed under general suspicion of being terrorists
or being sympathetic to terrorism and having violent tendencies. They complain about always
having to prove their peaceful convictions and being asked to dissociate themselves clearly
from terroristic acts and Islamism. Some of the participants reported that “ordinary” Muslims
have to respond to questions like: “Warum tun Moslems sowas?” or “Sind sie auch ein
Fundamentalist?” which makes them feel increasingly pigeonholed and vilified as terrorists
and fundamentalists. A few respondents even see notable parallels between Islamophobia and
anti-Semitism and compare the alleged “schleichende Muslimverfolgung” to the persecution
128
of Jews in the Nazi era. Only a small proportion of the survey participants (3.2 percent)
perceive the change of the social climate after 9/11 in a positive way, stating that the interest
in Islam among non-Muslims has grown with more and more people asking for information
about Islamic customs and traditions. 8.1 percent noticed no deterioration of the situation
since 9/11 claiming that Muslims had already been subjected to discrimination before the
terrorist attacks.
Personal experiences of anti-Muslim discrimination and racism
The survey also clearly shows an increase in incidents of everyday hostility towards Muslims
in the German society given that two-thirds of the Muslim respondents reported to already
have been subjected to some form of discrimination on the basis of their faith.447
Muslims frequently experience discrimination in daily life from different societal actors,
ranging from implicit and explicit verbal abuse (insults, pejorative comments, name-calling or
anti-Muslim jokes), hostile looks, difficulties in access to employment and decent housing up
to physical assaults which occasionally occur as well. Examples for anti-Muslim (verbal)
violence given by the respondents included Muslim women being insulted as
“Terroristenschlampe” or “Kopftuchschlampe” with some even being spit on their
headscarves, and men called “Frauenmörder”. Moreover several respondents stated that they
had been looked at suspiciously in public and were even confronted with Islamophobic
comments when carrying a large suitcase or bag in public transport due to fears they might
carry a bomb in it. In general, respondents pointed out that those who are more visibly
Muslim like veiled women or men with beards or Islamic dress are more likely to face
discrimination and hostility. However, also those who are not visibly Muslim are
discriminated against, for example due to their Muslim name etc.
As regards discrimination Muslim women wearing an Islamic headscarf are in a particularly
vulnerable position being frequently exposed to unequal and unfair treatment in professional
life, thus facing exclusion and/or discrimination. A great number of female survey
respondents stated that their job or internship applications have either been rejected out of
hand due to their headscarf; some who started wearing a headscarf have consequently been
dismissed by their employers. Especially employment in skilled jobs (e.g. teachers) is said to
447
In some cases it is not clearly distinguishable if the discrimination Muslims are facing is racial or ethnic
rather than religious discrimination.
129
be particularly difficult to find, but even in semi- and unskilled jobs (e.g. cleaner) several
respondents claimed having been forced to take off their headscarf during work. As stated by
one of the female participants, employers often justify their rejection of Muslim employees
who wear a headscarf by saying “Das Kopftuch schreckt die Kunden ab, ich selber habe damit
keine Probleme!“. Also in other sectors of public life Muslim women face discrimination due
to the headscarf: One female participant for instance reported that she was banned from
entering a local supermarket because of her niqab while another one experienced
discrimination in the field of education when her marks were suddenly lowered by her High
School teachers after she started wearing a headscarf at the age of 17.
From the survey responses it becomes clear that many female respondents feel being placed
by the majority society into the role of the victim of the oppressed, uneducated and dependant
Muslim woman by the majority society. Several young women reported that they feel
offended and upset about the fact that most people automatically assume that they are forced
to wear their headscarf although they do so out of religious conviction. In this regard they feel
that the non-Muslim German citizens rather talk about them than with them, failing to include
them in the public debates.
Unequal treatment of Muslims in comparison to citizens of other faiths
As far as freedom of religious practice is concerned 30.1 percent of the Muslim respondents
agree with the statement “In Germany Muslims can practice their faith freely and openly.”
while 58.6 percent consider their ‘undisturbed practice of religion’ as partly restricted in
certain respects in Germany. Only a minority of 11 percent of the respondents perceive a great
restriction of their freedom of religious practice, which is guaranteed by the German
Constitution (figure 6).
Nevertheless, many Muslims in Germany (42.5 percent of the survey participants) feel
strongly disadvantaged compared to members of other religious faiths (especially Christians
and Jews), while 39.7 percent perceive the unequal treatment compared to other religious
groups only in some fields of public life (figure 7). In this regard many respondents referred
to the unequal treatment of religious symbols and clothing (especially the Islamic headscarf
for women or the beard for men as opposed to Christian or Jewish symbols) in professional
life, Islamic slaughter as compared to Jewish slaughter, Islamic religious education in German
130
public schools, Islamic holidays, as well as the obstacles put in the way by the majority
society regarding the construction of mosques (no mosques in city centres etc.). Merely 15.6
percent do not perceive any difference in the treatment of Muslims as compared to Christian
and Jewish citizens.
Figure 6: Freedom of religious practice for Muslims
Figure 7: Unequal treatment of Muslims in comparison to citizens of other faiths
131
Public Islam critics
A majority of the respondents (66.5 percent) feel personally offended or provoked in their
faith by the Islamophobic statements of public Islam critics like Necla Kelek, Ralph Giordano
or Thilo Sarrazin, while one third stated to be rather indifferent to the criticism of their
religion. The latter either refer to the right to freedom of expression which also includes
criticism, or they simply do not take the Islam critics seriously since they supposedly do not
know the “real” Islam. Among those respondents who feel personally offended by the
statements of public critics of Islam, many are particularly annoyed by Necla Kelek. They
criticize that she presents herself as a “model Muslim” claiming to be an expert on Islam even
though she is according to them not a practicing Muslim, but in fact just wants to promote
herself (and her books) at the expense of Muslims in general and Islam. Many argued that
Kelek is intermingling Turkish cultural traditions with Islam and in this way stigmatizes the
whole Muslim community with her allegedly false accusations, notably with regard to
violence against and oppression of Muslim women.
Islamic religious education
The great majority of the respondents (88.2 percent) are in favour of the introduction of
Islamic religious education in German public schools. They consider it principally as a good
idea for enhancing the (interfaith) dialogue, for integration of Islam in Germany and for
offering their children the possibility to learn about their religion in the German language.
However, despite the approval several concerns were raised with regard to the Islamic
religious education expressing the fear of possible “wrong instruction”. These included
among others the following questions: “Who will decide on the curriculum, the state or the
Muslim organizations?”; “Who will be teaching the children, only (qualified) Muslim
teachers or also non-Muslims?”; “Will there be only one sort of Islamic religious instruction
based on Sunna and the Koran or will there be different curricula according to various
denominations within Islam?”. On the other hand 10.4 percent of the survey participants are
opposed to the introduction of Islamic religious education, claiming that non-Muslims decide
about the curricula and control the teachers, some also refer to the diversity within Islam
which makes one homogeneous Islamic education impossible in their eyes.
132
Deutsche Islamkonferenz
In regard to the question if the government-initiated German Conference on Islam encourages
the dialogue between German Muslims and the majority society, a vast majority of 57.3
percent of the respondents take a negative stance towards it, accusing the Conference of being
too politicized, superficial and merely serving the CDU’s party propaganda. In their opinion
the Conference was theoretically a good idea, but has been poorly implemented and seems to
be intended to achieve assimilation rather than integration of Muslims in Germany. Several
survey participants therefore called the Islamkonferenz a mere “Showkonferenz”,
“Wachsfigurenkabinett”, “Alibi-Veranstaltung” or “Scheindebatte” which does not represent
a dialogue but instead a lot of monologues and has so far failed to achieve any notable results.
The dialogue at eyelevel between the state and Muslims in Germany is supposedly missing
since it is more talked about Muslims than with them. This is in line with the criticism voiced
by different politicians from the SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen as well as several Muslim
organizations.
Another major point of criticism made by the Muslim respondents is the fact that the choice
of participants in the Conference is the sole responsibility of the German government while
Muslims themselves are not involved in the decision-making process. A considerable number
of Muslims do not feel their interests being represented by the rather conservative Muslim
umbrella organizations participating in the German Islam Conference who do not reach the
masses of the “average Muslim”, thus have no influence at a grassroots level. The majority of
the Muslims who are not part of the official Islamic associations thus stay mostly excluded
from the public debate about Islam in Germany. Furthermore, many respondents especially
criticize the participation of Islam critics (like Necla Kelek) who the government supposedly
invites as “Islam experts”, but who in their eyes should not have a seat in a Conference on
Islam.
Surprisingly a relatively large proportion of the survey participants (26.5 percent) are not even
aware of the existence of the German Conference on Islam while among non-Muslims the
Conference seems to be far better known. This is partly due to the high media exposure of this
domestic policy event in the German press, while Muslims themselves are not really involved
in the process due to the missing grassroots approach. Merely 16.2 percent of those who know
the German Conference on Islam consider it a good initiative for enhancing the dialogue
between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany.
133
Influence of the media in the discourse on Islam
The vast majority of the survey participants (88.9 percent) consider the mainstream German
media as being the major factor for shaping the negative image of Islam in the German
discourse on Islam and for the growing Islamophobia among Germans. The media are
criticized for focusing predominantly on sensational reporting with regard to Islam (like
honour killings, suicide bombers etc.) and deliberately conveying a negative and biased
stereotypes about Islam, even including lies about Muslims and their traditions. In the opinion
of many of the respondents this deliberately Islamophobic media coverage verges on
demagogy. Cultural traditions and religion are said to be frequently intermingled in the media
reporting and double standards are applied to many topics. The same applies to the unequal
treatment of negative themes and events in the Muslim communities as compared to the
Christian Churches. Several Muslim respondents named the examples of the recently
discovered child abuse scandals in the Catholic Church or the terrorist acts of Christians in
Northern Ireland which are much less reported on than comparatively smaller crimes or
events in the Muslim world which are generally media-hyped on a large scale. In this regard it
was also repeatedly mentioned that no “ordinary” Christian is ever asked to distance
himself/herself from the scandals or terrorists in Northern Ireland whereas it is generally
expected from Muslims to distance themselves from any terrorist act. There was a general
consensus among the respondents concerning the total lack of distinction between Islam and
Islamism in media reporting as well as public opinion, which confirms the above-mentioned
arguments. In contrast to this, only 3.5 percent consider the media coverage of Islam as
neutral or differentiated.
134
Anti-Islam campaign by the extreme right-wing populist party Pro NRW
Figure 8: Election posters of the anti-Islam party Pro NRW for the state election in
North-Rhine Westphalia in May 2010448
448
Source: Bürgerbewegung Pro NRW (2010c): “Werbemittel“, in: pro-nrw.net. Web page <http://www.pronrw.net/?page_id=30> (Accessed 03.06.2010)
135

The Public Discourse about Islam in Germany

Transcription

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