OK Dommage UK

Transcription

OK Dommage UK

Sommaire
I.
LES SYSTEMES DE REPARATION DU DOMMAGE CORPOREL ...........................................................3
A.
1)
2)
B.
1)
2)
II.
METHODOLOGIE ET ORGANISATION DE L’INDEMNISATION DU DOMMAGE CORPOREL .......................11
A.
LES REGLES FONDAMENTALES ................................................................................................................11
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
B.
C.
1)
2)
3)
4)
D.
1)
2)
3)
III.
LA PROTECTION SOCIALE ..........................................................................................................................3
L’assurance publique ........................................................................................................................3
Les prestations sociales....................................................................................................................3
LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE........................................................................................................................5
Le régime de droit commun ..............................................................................................................5
Les régimes spéciaux .......................................................................................................................8
La réparation intégrale ....................................................................................................................11
La personnalisation de la réparation...............................................................................................11
La restauration fonctionnelle...........................................................................................................11
L’évaluation des préjudices matériels .............................................................................................12
La prise en compte du préjudice moral...........................................................................................12
L’EXPERTISE MEDICALE...........................................................................................................................12
L’EVALUATION JURIDIQUE ET MONETAIRE DES PREJUDICES INDEMNISABLES ................................................................... 14
Les titres de préjudices ...................................................................................................................14
L’évaluation par les juridictions de droit commun ...........................................................................15
Le jugement d’indemnisation ..........................................................................................................16
La constatation et l’évaluation dans le système de sécurité sociale....................................................................17
LE RECOURS DES TIERS-PAYEURS ...........................................................................................................17
L’administration sociale...................................................................................................................18
L’employeur.....................................................................................................................................19
Les perspectives de développement...............................................................................................20
ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................................22
ANNAEXE I : Supreme Court Act 1981 .............................................................................................................22
ANNEXE II : Consumer Protection Act 1987 (c.43)...........................................................................................22
ANNEXE III : Courts Act 2003..............................................................................................................................29
ANNEXE IV : Health and safety at work etc; Act 1974.........................................................................................36
ANNEXE V : Road Traffic Act 1988 .....................................................................................................................37
ANNEXE VI : Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 .....................................................................41
ANNEXE VII : Social security (Recovery of benefits) Act 1997…….……60
ANNEXE VIII : Damages Act 1996…………………………………...……..81
ANNEXE IX : Vaccine damage payments Act 1979……………………….89
ANNEXE X : Fatal accidents Act 1976………………………………….…..97
ANNEXE XI : Emploers’liability (Compulsory insurance) Act 1969……..101
ANNEXE XII : Occupiers’liability Act 1984…………………………..……105
ANNEXE XIII : Occupiers’liability 1957……………………………………108
ANNEXE XV : Law reform (contributory negligence) Act 1945………...112
ANNEXE XVI : Third parties (rights against insurers) Act 1930………..115
ANNEXE XVII : Tables actuaires d’Ogden………………………………..118
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TEXTES DE REFERENCE
−
Supreme Court Act 1981
−
Consumer Protection Act 1987 (c.43)
−
Courts Act 2003
−
Health and safety at work etc. Act 1974
−
Road Traffic Act 1988
−
Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992
−
Social security (Recovery of benefits) Act 1997
−
Damages Act 1996
−
Caccine damage payments Act 1979
−
Fatal accidents Act 1976
−
Emploers’liability (Compulsory insurance) Act 1969
−
Occupiers’liability Act 1984
−
Occupiers’liability 1957
−
Law reform (contributory negligence) Act 1945
−
Third parties (rights against insurers) Act 1930
3
I. LES SYSTEMES DE REPARATION DU
DOMMAGE CORPOREL
Un dommage corporel fait intervenir différents systèmes d’assurance : la protection sociale (au titre de l’assurance maladie et accident du travail) et les systèmes
fondés sur la responsabilité. Ils fournissent des prestations variées qui sont distribuées à
chaque victime selon le régime qui lui est applicable. Il s’agit, soit d’un régime relevant
de la protection sociale (A), soit d’un régime fondé sur la responsabilité civile (B)
A. LA PROTECTION SOCIALE
Elle se compose de l’assurance publique, administrée par l’Etat, et de la protection spécifique offerte aux salariés contre les conséquences des dommages liés à leur
activité professionnelle.
1) L’assurance publique
L’organe de l’assurance primaire est l’Etat lui-même, plus précisément le ministère du travail et des pensions (Department of Work and Pensions alias DWP).
Les soins médicaux primaires sont administrés gratuitement par le Service national de santé (National Health Service). Toute personne victime de dommage corporel
peut ainsi bénéficier, sans débours préalable, du premier secours et éventuellement
d’un traitement en établissement hospitalier, voire de consultations médicales postérieures.
La victime portant des séquelles de longue durée ou permanentes peut en outre
bénéficier d’une des trois prestations suivantes, indépendamment de ses revenus :
l’allocation pour perte d’autonomie (disability living allowance, DLA), l’allocation
d’assistance (Attendance allowance), l’allocation de soin pour invalidité (invalid care
allowance).
2) Les prestations sociales
La protection sociale consiste en un ensemble de prestations offertes à la victime au titre des soins médicaux (a) ou de la compensation des pertes de revenus (b).
a) Au titre des soins médicaux
L’allocation
allo
owance, DLA).
L’allocation pour perte d’autonomie (disability living all
DLA). - Le DLA est servi
sous la forme de paiements périodiques, à des montants fixes dont le niveau dépend de
la gravité de l’incapacité. Un premier volet à trois taux est destiné à couvrir les frais
d’assistance à la vie quotidienne (aide à se laver, aide à la préparation des repas, etc.).
4
Un second volet comprenant deux taux est consacré au financement d’une aide à la
mobilité1. Une personne grièvement handicapée peut bénéficier des deux.
L’allocation
L’allocation d’assistance (attendance allowance) - Cette allocation est versée pério-
diquement aux handicapés âgés de plus de 65 ans et ayant besoin des services d’une
personne pour les garder et les veiller.2
b) Au titre des pertes de revenus
La particularité du système britannique est que l’indemnité destinée à compenser l’incapacité de travail est mise à la charge de l’employeur pendant une durée maximale de vingt huit semaines. C’est « l’indemnité de maladie » (Statutoriy sick pay,
pay, SSP), (ce
système introduit pour lutter contre les « fausses maladies » fait l’objet d’un traitement
fiscal favorable réservé aux petites entreprises). Dès lors que l’incapacité excède vingt
huit semaines, le relais est pris par l’Etat, qui assure au salarié « l’indemnité d’incapacité »
(Incapacity benefit),
benefit , qui est liquidée selon un barème qui dépend de la durée de
l’incapacité. Cette prestation est aujourd’hui étendue à certains jeunes qui n’ont jamais
travaillé.
A ces indemnités peut s’ajouter l’allocation pour soins à handicapé (In
(Invalid care alallowance).
wance). - Il s’agit d’une prestation versée à la victime indirecte d’un accident, lorsque
celle-ci se trouve obligée de consacrer au moins 35 heures par semaine à garder un malade ou un handicapé.3
L’allocation de subside (Income support).
support).- Prestation de dernier recours pour assurer
à toute personne démunie des ressources minimales dont elle a besoin pour se loger et
pour se nourrir, « l’Income support » est calculé selon un barème qui dépend de l’âge et
de la condition familiale de l’intéressé4.
L’indemnité d’incapacité pour dommages industriels (Industrial injuries disablement bebenefit). - Cette indemnité a été créée en 1897 pour assurer un revenu régulier à toute per-
sonne handicapée suite à un accident du travail. Elle est payable de droit dès lors que
l’infirmité est due à un accident du travail, sans qu’il y ait lieu de prendre en considération les ressources personnelles ni les besoins de l’intéressé. Le montant du paiement
est déterminé selon un barème dépendant de la gravité de l’infirmité, cette dernière
étant évaluée, si nécessaire, par des experts médicaux.5
1
Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 ss. 71 – 76.
2
Ibid ss. 64 – 67.
3
Ibid. s. 70.
Ibid. ss.124-127 et 134-137 ; un guide officiel existe en ligne : voire
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/ifpa/techguides/2004/is20_apr.pdf
4
5
Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s.94.
5
B. LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE
On distingue le système de droit commun (1) et les régimes spéciaux (2).
1) Le régime de droit commun
a) La nécessité d’une faute
Le droit anglais ne comporte pas de disposition législative équivalente des articles 1382 et s. du Code civil français ; ses règles fondamentales régissant la responsabilité civile sont d’origine purement jurisprudentielle. Il n’empêche que ces règles,
obligeant à réparer tout dommage causé à autrui, conduisent à des résultats comparables à ceux du droit français. La réparation incombe au responsable du dommage,
même si la loi de 1930 sur les droits des tiers à l’encontre des assureurs (Third Parties −
Rights Against Insurers − Act), reconnaît à la victime une action directe contre l’assureur
éventuel du responsable devenu insolvable. Dans l’intérêt de la victime, la loi oblige certaines catégories de personnes, particulièrement exposées à causer un dommage à autrui, à souscrire une assurance pour garantir leur solvabilité ; c’est la finalité de
l’assurance des automobilistes6 et des employeurs7 notamment.
La faute indispensable à la responsabilité peut être intentionnelle ou non intentionnelle. A moins de s’être trouvée en situation de légitime défense, une personne qui
en blesse intentionnellement une autre est civilement responsable (tort of battery).
Quant à la faute non intentionnelle, elle peut prendre l’une ou l’autre de deux formes :
soit la négligence, soit le « comportement illégal » (entraînant la responsabilité dite « the
tort of breach of statutory duty »)8
Une des caractéristiques du droit anglais est que toute violation de la loi
n’engage pas automatiquement la responsabilité civile ; en particulier, les tribunaux ne
retiennent la responsabilité du fait d’une violation de la loi (the tort of breach of statutory duty) que dans les cas où ils estiment que le législateur entend infliger cette sanction
à quiconque viole la règle qu’il a posée. Par conséquent, une demande d’indemnisation
peut être rejetée si, selon l’interprétation du tribunal, la sanction prévue par le législateur est uniquement la responsabilité pénale.9
Statistiquement, la plupart des dommages mortels et des atteintes corporelles
moins graves sont occasionnés par des accidents de la circulation, des accidents du travail ou des accidents domestiques. Les accidents de la circulation sont en général sanctionnés par la responsabilité du fait de la négligence (tort of negligence). Il en est de
même des accidents domestiques en vertu de deux lois sur la responsabilité des occupants (Occupiers’ Liability Acts de 1957 et de 1984). Les accidents de travail enga-
6
Road Traffic Act 1988 ss.143 à 145.
7
Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.
8Par
exemple, la loi sur la santé et la sécurité au travail (Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) impose des
obligations générales aux employeurs, dont la non observation est pénalement punissable, mais pour
laquelle toute poursuite civile est expressément exclue ; par contre, l’employeur peut être civilement responsable pour la non observation du règlement détaillé créé dans le cadre de cette loi (s 47).
9
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s.130 (6)-(8).
6
gent la responsabilité de leur auteur tant du fait d’une négligence (tort of negligence)
que du fait d’une d’une violation de la loi (breach of statutory duty).
b) Le lien de causalité
Quel que soit le régime invoqué, la responsabilité n’est retenue que si un lien de
causalité est établi entre le fait fautif et le dommage. Pour sa défense le responsable
peut invoquer un fait de la victime ou d’un tiers en prétendant que ce fait a ‘’rompu la
chaîne de causalité’’. Jusqu’en 1945, les tribunaux s’étaient montrés sévères à l’égard
de la victime ; que sa négligence fautive fût grave ou légère, elle exonérait l’auteur du
fait dommageable. Depuis la réforme de 194510, la responsabilité partagée est admise :
la victime négligente obtient généralement une indemnité réduite, son action
n’échouant totalement qu’en cas de négligence extrême de sa part.
c) En cas de pluralité de responsables
Ils sont solidairement tenus à la réparation du dommage : chacun d’eux peut
être poursuivi en réparation de tout le dommage, tout en jouissant d’un recours contre
les autres à raison de leur contribution respective à la réalisation de ce dommage.
A la différence du droit français, cependant, le législateur anglais n’a pas, malgré des réclamations récurrentes de l’opinion publique, élaboré un régime spécial organisant la prise en charge des dommages liés aux accidents de la circulation ou aux
accidents médicaux. En ces matières n’existe qu’une législation de portée limitée (rendant obligatoire l’assurance des automobilistes d’une part, et couvrant les dommages
causés par les praticiens du service public médical, d’autre part).
En pratique, la quasi totalité du contentieux élevé sur des cas de dommages
corporels est portée devant les juridictions civiles. La compétence des juridictions pénales en matière d’indemnisation de dommage corporel consécutif à une infraction est
limitée. Elle est même écartée dans la plupart des cas d’infractions routières11. De plus,
ces tribunaux calculent le montant de l’indemnité comme celui d’une amende, c’est-àdire en tenant compte de la solvabilité du condamné. Le plus souvent, la victime d’un
accident attend l’issue de la poursuite pénale pour déclencher l’action civile, l’intérêt
étant que dans la poursuite civile ultérieure une présomption de culpabilité pèse sur le
défendeur.12
d) Les créanciers de réparation
Le bénéfice de la protection n’est pas réservé à l’assuré ; il est dans certains cas
étendu à certains de ses proches. Il va de soi que les conditions d’accès aux prestations
destinées à réparer les suites d’un dommage varient selon la qualité du bénéficiaire,
victime directe ou victime indirecte.
10
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
11
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s.130 (6)-(8).
12
Civil Evidence Act 1968 ss.11 and 13.
7
La victime directe. - La victime directe d’un dommage causé par autrui est
exposée à une série de difficultés pour faire valoir son droit à réparation :
− la difficulté d’établir la faute lorsque le cas d’espèce n’est pas soumis à une
présomption de responsabilité absolue ;
− la difficulté d’établir le lien de causalité selon la technique de la probabilité
(on the balance of probabilities), qui conduit à affirmer qu’il faut une probabilité de plus
de 50% pour que le dommage corporel soit la conséquence du comportement fautif du
responsable présumé. La victime est encore plus en difficulté s’il est probable que le
dommage résulte de causes multiples qui ne seraient pas toutes imputable au présumé
responsable. La nécessité d’établir un lien de causalité de plus de 50% peut nuire à la
victime demanderesse, même lorsque les faits donnent à croire qu’elle a été privée, du
fait de la négligence du défendeur, d’une chance d’éviter le dommage. Ainsi, si le dommage s’est produit après qu’un médecin négligent ait omis de diagnostiquer en temps
utile un cancer grave, pour lequel la possibilité d’une guérison n’aurait été que de 20%.
Selon une jurisprudence controversée mais encore en vigueur, la victime ne peut avoir
gain de cause dans une telle situation13.
Par contre, les règles applicables au lien de causalité sont favorables à la victime hypersensible. En vertu de la règle dite « du crâne de coque d’œuf » (egg-shell skull
rule), la victime qui subit un dommage exceptionnellement grave en raison de sa faiblesse physique obtient une indemnisation pour la totalité de son préjudice.
Les victimes indirectes. - Les victimes indirectes se rangent dans deux grandes catégories selon qu’elles subissent les conséquences du fait dommageable dans
leur être ou dans leur patrimoine.
Cas des préjudices psychiques - Dans le premier groupe, la victime indirecte se
définit comme la personne qui subit un traumatisme psychique du fait du décès ou de la
blessure de la victime directe. Sur cette question s’est construite une jurisprudence complexe, dont les grandes lignes sont les suivantes :
- pour prétendre à une indemnité à titre de victime indirecte, il faut avoir été réellement malade, la simple détresse n’ouvrant pas droit à une indemnité ;
- on distingue entre la victime ‘’primaire’’ (la personne physiquement présente
à l’accident et qui s’en trouve traumatisée) et la victime ‘‘secondaire’’, qui n’était pas
témoin de l’accident.
En règle générale la victime primaire réussit, tandis que la victime secondaire
est déboutée.
Cas des préjudices économiques - Les victimes indirectes de la seconde catégorie
sont les personnes qui supportent une perte économique consécutive à un dommage
corporel subi par une autre,. Traditionnellement, de telles victimes n’obtiennent pas de
réparation, en vertu de la règle qui refuse la compensation des pertes purement économiques occasionnées par des fautes non intentionnelles. Or la victime directe qui avait
subi une incapacité de travail consécutive au dommage corporel obtenait une indemnité
13Gregg
v Scott [2003] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 105 (à l’heure actuelle, en appel à la House of Lords : un revirement futur est possible).
8
pour sa perte de revenu. Reprenant une solution dont l’origine remonte au XIXème, la loi
de 1976 sur les accidents mortels (Fatal Accidents Act 1976) a établie une exception en
faveur des parents dépendant de la victime tuée dans un accident survenu du fait de la
négligence d’autrui. La portée de cette disposition exceptionnelle est en principe limitée
aux accidents mortels, le préjudice économique des victimes indirectes demeurant exclu
de toute indemnisation si la victime directe n’a subi qu’une incapacité de travail et survit. On note cependant quelques revirements acrobatiques de la jurisprudence14, qui
atténuent l’application de l’exclusion des victimes indirectes.
Cas du préjudice moral - En règle générale la victime indirecte ne peut pas obtenir d’indemnisation pour un préjudice purement moral, telle la tristesse provoquée par le
décès de la victime principale. Cependant, en 1982 la loi sur les accidents mortels (Fatal
Accidents Act) fut modifiée pour autoriser le conjoint et les père et mère d’un défunt à
demander une somme forfaitaire actuellement fixée à 10000 £15.
2) Les régimes spéciaux
Nombreuses sont les dérogations au droit commun de la responsabilité. Elles
sont le plus souvent conçues dans l’intérêt de la victime, notamment pour lui rendre la
procédure plus simple ou pour lui assurer une meilleure protection. Ces régimes exceptionnels se rencontrent dans les domaines les plus divers.
a) Quant aux conditions de la responsabilité
Les régimes spéciaux les plus simples n’écartent que très partiellement les règles du droit commun, souvent en aggravant les conditions de la responsabilité de
l’auteur. C’est le cas notamment de
− la responsabilité du fait de substances radioactives16 ;
− la responsabilité du fait d’objets tombés d’un avion ou de l’avion lui-même17 ;
− la responsabilité du fabricant du fait de ses produits défectueux, prévue par
la loi sur la protection du consommateur18 (l’essentiel des dispositions de ce texte rappelle les articles 1386-1 et s. du Code civil français) ;
− la responsabilité du gardien du fait de l’animal dangereux dont il a la
19
garde ;
− la responsabilité de l’employeur du fait du salarié à l’occasion de ses fonctions (vicarious liability). Cette responsabilité n’a pas de base législative, elle est
d’origine purement prétorienne. En théorie, le salarié est solidairement responsable
avec son employeur. Lorsque l’employeur est l’Etat, le paiement de l’indemnité est assuré par son ministère de tutelle, sauf le cas de la responsabilité d’un policier, où le paiement est assuré par le chef de la force de police en question.
Principalement en accordant à la victime une somme pour le permettre de rembourser le membre de
sa famille qui s’occupe d’elle : Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350.
14
15
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 s.1A.
16
Nuclear Installations Act 1965.
17
Aviation Act de 1982 s. 76(2.
18
Consumer Protection Act de 1987.
19
Cf. Animals Act de 1971.
9
D’autres régimes spéciaux, plus étoffés, organisent la prise en charge de la victime même dans des circonstances où le seul droit commun ne pourrait lui donner satisfaction. C’est notamment le cas de la garantie automobile et de l’assurance
dommage médical.
La garantie
garantie automobile du syndicat des
des compagnies d’assurance.
d’assurance. - Lorsqu’un accident
est occasionné par un automobiliste non-assuré, la responsabilité civile de dernier est
prise en charge, quasi-officieusement et sans base législative, par un syndicat de compagnies d’assurance, le Motor Insurers’ Bureau, alias MIB. Il n’existe pas d’organe équivalent pour les accidents de travail.
L’assurance
L’assurance dommage du service public médical.
médical. - Pour les dommages occasionnés
par la faute d’un membre du corps médical public, la responsabilité est assumée par le
Service national de la Santé. Le litige est traité par un organe qui s’appelle la National
Health Service Litigation Autority (alias NHSLA). Toutefois, ce dispositif de garantie ne
couvre pas la responsabilité du fait des médecins généralistes des secteurs public et
privé, tenus de souscrire eux-mêmes une assurance spécifique.
b) Quant aux prestations avancées à la victime
Le propre des régimes spéciaux est d’accorder à la victime un statut de faveur
se traduisant le plus souvent par des prestations supplémentaires indemnisant de manière plus généreuse leur préjudice. La situation favorable de ces groupes est due au fait
que certains groupes ont su attirer spécialement l’attention du gouvernement ou du législateur qui leur a élaboré un régime spécifique. Objectivement, la faveur dont jouissent
ces victimes par rapport à d’autres n’est pas toujours justifiée.
L’indemnité de dommage vaccinal (Vaccine damages payment20). - Une somme
forfaitaire, actuellement de 100 000 £, est payable à toute personne ayant subi un
dommage corporel (ou moral) du fait d’une vaccination de routine contre certaines maladies (la rubéole, la polio, etc). Pour y avoir droit, la victime doit présenter un handicap
estimé à 60% au moins. Lorsqu’une infirmité de cette gravité est établie, le paiement se
fait intégralement : le handicapé à 60% obtient la même indemnité que si le préjudice
s’élevait à 100%. Les ressources personnelles n’entrent pas en ligne de compte pour la
liquidation de l’indemnité.
Le paiement spécial aux hémophiles ayant contracté le SIDA par transfusion de
sang contaminé. - Les personnes dans cette situation peuvent bénéficier d’un programme établi, officieusement et sans base légale, par le gouvernement. Sous certaines
conditions, la victime peut obtenir une somme forfaitaire de 20 000 £.
L’indemnité de violence criminelle (Criminal injuries compensation scheme). Une indemnisation est payable aux victimes d’actes de violence. Depuis 199521, cette
indemnisation est confiée à une commission spéciale (le Criminal Injuries Compensa-
Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, modifié par le Regulatory Reform (Vaccine Damage Payments
Act 1979) Order 2002, en vigueur le 16th June 2002.
20
21
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995.
10
tion Authority). Si les paiements étaient individualisés à l’origine, ils sont aujourd’hui
alloués selon un mode forfaitaire par souci d’économie et de rapidité.
11
II. METHODOLOGIE ET
ORGANISATION DE
L’INDEMNISATION DU DOMMAGE
CORPOREL
Sous ce titre, il y a lieu de présenter de prime abord les principes directeurs de
droit commun (A), ensuite le régime juridique de l’expertise médicale en tant que mode
de constatation du dommage corporel (B). Enfin seront présentées les règles applicables
à l’évaluation monétaire des préjudices indemnisables (C).
A. LES RÈGLES FONDAMENTALES
L’organisation et la méthodologie de la réparation obéissent à une série de principes fondamentaux qui sont notamment la réparation intégrale, la personnalisation de
la réparation, la récupération fonctionnelle, l’indemnisation du préjudice moral et
l’application d’un référentiel commun.
1) La réparation intégrale
Dans l’absolu, la réparation due à la victime doit être intégrale. L’ensemble du
dispositif mis en œuvre tant pour la constatation que pour l’évaluation des préjudices
doit tendre à cette fin. En conséquence, si la reconstitution physique n’est pas possible
pour mettre la victime dans la situation qu’elle aurait si le dommage corporel ne s’était
pas produit, les dommages et intérêts doivent être calculés dans le but de compenser la
diminution subie par la victime dans son être physique et mental.
2) La personnalisation de la réparation
Passage obligé de l’application de la réparation intégrale, la personnalisation
impose une approche subjective : tant pour la constatation des séquelles subies que
pour leur évaluation monétaire, les calculs reposent sur les données personnelles de la
victime mais non sur un standard. Le magistrat, tout comme l’assureur, part de la situation de la victime. Ainsi, si la victime se trouve en incapacité de travail, sa perte de revenu est évaluée à raison de ce que l’intéressé gagnerait s’il n’y avait pas eu de dommage.
La personnalisation conduit à un traitement juste mais inégal d’une victime à une autre : un avocat d’affaires prospère mais se trouvant réduit à un état végétatif à la suite
d’un accident obtiendra des dommages-intérêts beaucoup plus élevés qu’un éboueur
victime d’un dommage comparable.
3) La restauration fonctionnelle
Les frais médicaux et de réadaptation doivent être servis à la victime en tant
que de besoin pour la remettre dans la mesure du possible dans sa situation antérieure
au fait dommageable. Par exemple, si une personne qui avait une activité complexe
12
avant l’accident devient, sujette à de sérieux troubles de la mémoire du fait de cet accident, elle peut demander l’équivalent du prix d’un ordinateur portable pour l’assister
dans son organisation.
Si les séquelles de l’accident entraînent des dépenses supplémentaires pour la
victime, celle-ci peut en réclamer la prise en charge au responsable, sauf restriction légale. Dans une affaire récente, les tribunaux ont refusé d’accorder à la victime le prix
des cigarettes qu’elle fumait au-delà de sa consommation d’avant l’accident22.
4) L’évaluation des préjudices matériels
Pour les dommages matériels, la méthode en usage consiste d’abord à constater concrètement ce que la victime a réellement perdu ou perdra. Ensuite on en calcule
le coût de remplacement. L’exercice est relativement aisé, dans la mesure où il repose
sur la valeur marchande de la réparation.
5) La prise en compte du préjudice moral
La réparation intégrale par remise en état, par remplacement ou par paiement
de la valeur n’exclut pas une indemnité compensatrice du préjudice moral, de la douleur
ou de perte d’agrément. L’évaluation du préjudice moral est techniquement plus délicate. Elle repose sur des forfaits fixés, situation par situation, qui constituent le référentiel disponible à ce jour. On trouve dans deux classeurs (« Kemp and Kemp The Quantum
of Damages » et « Butterworths Personal Injury Litigation Service ») les différents montants applicables. Ces ouvrages contiennent la liste des décisions judiciaires
d’indemnisation, classées selon les organes traumatisés, les types de préjudice
d’agrément, de souffrance, etc. Ces éléments de référence sont en outre complétés par
des directives émises par le « Judicial Studies Board », organe officiel de formation des
magistrats. Il importe de souligner que malgré leurs qualités et leur utilité et l’usage qui
en est fait, ces ouvrages et directives ne constituent pas un outil scientifique parfait ; en
fin de compte, tout dépend de l’appréciation subjective du juge qui décide.
B. L’EXPERTISE MÉDICALE
Le système anglais n’a pas institué l’expert médical avec un statut légal spécifique comme en France. Dans une procédure tendant à l’indemnisation d’un dommage
corporel, l’expert est toujours une personne privée dont l’aide a été demandée par les
parties. Il a le statut de témoin (expert witness).
En règle générale, et surtout lorsque les sommes en jeu sont très importantes
ou quand le cas d’espèce est grave et complexe, il demeure de principe que chaque partie désigne son propre expert. Les questions techniques peuvent, de la sorte, être discutées et résolues par les experts des parties.
Cette organisation présente des inconvénients évidents : elle entraîne notamment des dépenses inutiles et elle ne garantit pas l’objectivité des rapports soumis aux
22
Eagle v Chambers (No.2)[2004] 1 WLR 3081
13
tribunaux. Pour y remédier, le nouveau Code de procédure civile (en vigueur depuis
1999) a introduit des aménagements importants. Actuellement, l’expert est formellement tenu, au-delà de son engagement contractuel envers la partie qui le paye, à
l’obligation d’aider le tribunal.23.
Dans son rapport, il a en outre l’obligation de certifier avoir identifié tous les
faits à portée de ses connaissances personnelles, de certifier exactes toutes ses constatations, et de certifier que ses conclusions constituent son opinion professionnelle réelle
et complète.24
Par ailleurs, une série de dispositions (pre-action protocol) s’imposent désormais dans la phase préparatoire du procès : des mesures sont, à différentes étapes,
prescrites aux parties qui sont incitées à désigner d’un commun accord un expert unique
(surtout dans des affaires de faible importance).
Le demandeur doit communiquer par lettre au responsable les détails du dommage appelant réparation ainsi qu’une liste d’experts qu’il propose à son choix25. Si le
défendeur choisit un des experts de la liste, le tribunal est assuré d’avoir à examiner une
seule expertise médicale. En cas de désaccord entre les parties, chacune d’elles peut
désigner son propre expert. Si le demandeur refuse alors d’être examiné par l’expert du
défendeur, le tribunal peut suspendre son action si une telle résistance lui paraît déraisonnable. De même, le refus déraisonnable de la défense d’accepter un seul expert
peut, comme tout autre comportement déraisonnable, être sanctionné à la fin du procès
lors de la détermination de la contribution aux dépens.
Si le litige n’est pas résolu par voie transactionnelle, l’affaire est déférée au tribunal. Le dossier doit comprendre notamment l’inventaire des préjudices (schedule of
loss) subis, les indemnités demandées ainsi que les modes de calcul afférents et le (ou
les) rapport(s) d’expertise. Un témoignage peut être versé au dossier. En tout état de
cause le tribunal exerce un pouvoir de contrôle pour assurer un juste équilibre entre les
frais exposés et l’indemnisation demandée26.
Le principal reproche adressé au système porte moins sur la fiabilité de
l’expertise que l’évaluation monétaire des préjudices par les tribunaux. Une étude organisée par la « Law Commission » en 1999 indiquait que les sommes allouées en compensation du préjudice moral consécutif aux lésions les plus graves étaient perçues par
l’opinion publique comme dérisoires. A la suite de ce rapport, la Cour d’appel a, dans un
important arrêt27, annoncé une révision à la hausse du barème judiciaire.
23
Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 35.3.
24
Practice Direction no. 35.
De ces experts il n’existe pas de liste officielle : toute personne expérimentée qui veut compléter ses
revenus par ce genre de travail est en principe libre de le faire. Les avocats cherchent leurs noms dans
des annuaires, les bases de données, et parfois le ‘télégraphe arabe’.
25
26
Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 32(1).
27
Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272
14
C. L’ÉVALUATION JURIDIQUE ET MONÉTAIRE DES
PRÉJUDICES INDEMNISABLES
Les modes de calcul pratiqués par les juridictions de droit commun (2) varient
en fonction des titres de préjudices (1).
1) Les titres de préjudices
Si la victime a dans l’absolu droit à une réparation intégrale, elle est en revanche soumise à l’obligation de comportement raisonnable (mitigate his loss) qui lui impose de ne pas exagérer ses exigences. La victime qui a perdu son emploi du fait de
l’accident doit, par exemple, faire des efforts raisonnables après sa guérison pour retrouver du travail ; il ne peut pas demander au responsable de le maintenir en état
d’oisiveté pour le reste de sa vie.
L’obligation faite à la victime de minimaliser sa réclamation a cependant une
limite : bien que l’Etat prévoie un traitement médical gratuit pour tout citoyen, la victime
a le droit d’y renoncer pour se faire soigner par un médecin ou un hôpital privé de son
choix, au frais du responsable (en réalité, de son assureur)28.
En conséquence du principe de réparation intégrale, aucune liste exhaustive des
préjudices occasionnés par un dommage corporel n’est en vigueur. Pour les préjudices
les plus courants, il y a cependant une terminologie bien connue qui s’emploie dans la
jurisprudence et dans la doctrine.
Préjudices économiques et préjudices non économiques - La distinction fonda-
mentale est celle qui oppose les préjudices économiques (pecuniary losses) et les préjudices non économiques (non-pecuniairy losses). Les premiers sont les préjudices dont
l’évaluation monétaire est théoriquement possible avec plus ou moins de précision. Les
seconds sont ceux qui ne sont pas susceptibles d’une telle évaluation, et pour lesquels le
tribunal peut seulement accorder une somme globale à la victime à titre de dédommagement tout en sachant que sa perte n’est pas compensable.
Les préjudices économiques se subdivisent en trois groupes : les « loss of income » (pertes de revenu), les « medical expenses » (dépenses de santé, frais de logement adapté, frais de véhicule adapté et tierce personne) et éventuellement les « funeral
expenses» (frais d’obsèques et de sépulture). Cette liste n’est pas exhaustive cependant ;
en principe, la victime a droit à l’indemnisation de toute forme de perte économique
qu’elle a subie.
Les préjudices non économiques (non-pecuniary losses, « pain and suffering,
and loss of amenity, en abrégé PSL) correspondent à l’ensemble des préjudices proposés sous ce titre dans le schéma élaboré par le groupe de travail commis par le Ministre
français de la Justice.
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 s.2(4). Cette règle, qui date de la création du National Health
Service dans la période après-guerre, est de plus en plus contestée.
28
15
Perte de revenu et préjudice moral des victimes par ricochet - Les préjudices des
victimes indirectes sont la perte de revenu (loss of dependency) d’un membre de la famille de la victime directe, le préjudice moral (bereavement damages) du père, de la
mère ou du conjoint de la victime prédécédée.
2) L’évaluation par les juridictions de droit commun
Pour les pertes économiques subies entre l’accident et le jugement29 la méthode d’évaluation est simple : le tribunal apprécie la perte annuelle (ou mensuelle) de
la victime (le multiplicande) et la multiplie par le nombre d’années (ou de mois) pendant
lesquels la perte a duré (le multiplicateur). Si par exemple le demandeur a été blessé
deux années avant la décision et que pendant ces deux années il a perdu 10 000 livres
de revenu par année, le tribunal multiplie 10 000 par le nombre deux pour aboutir à un
montant de 20 000 livres.
Les juridictions anglaises avaient coutume d’appliquer la même méthode pour
calculer les pertes économiques futures. Le tribunal essayait de faire une estimation du
nombre d’années durant lesquelles la perte pourrait persister. Pour les pertes futures, le
recours systématique à cette méthode conduit inévitablement à une surindemnisation si
la période est très longue, 30 ans par exemple, parce que 30 fois le salaire d’une personne donnerait une somme qui, investie, produirait une rente plus grande que le salaire
lui-même. Pour tenir compte de ce fait, les tribunaux réduisaient plus ou moins arbitrairement le multiplicateur et, généralement, refusaient de baser leur estimation sur une
période supérieure à 18 ans.
S’il est vraiment nécessaire de compenser les pertes économiques futures en
capital et non par une rente périodique, une méthode de calcul plus judicieuse serait de
demander le conseil d’un actuaire qui indiquerait la somme nécessaire à l’achat d’une
annuité correspondant au revenu perdu. En vue d’aider les tribunaux, un groupe de travail présidé par un avocat de renom, Sir Michael Ogden, a rédigé en 1984 une série de
tables actuaires spécialisées. Ces tables sont révisées régulièrement et sont actuellement publiée par le Government Actuary’s Department.30 En pratique, les avocats et les
assureurs en usent pour le calcul des dommages et intérêts destinés à réparer les préjudices économiques futurs.
Les tribunaux ont dû procéder par une indemnisation en capital pour les pertes
économiques futures, car à l’origine ils n’avaient pas pouvoir pour accorder une rente à
la victime. Ce n’est que depuis 1996 qu’ils peuvent attribuer une rente si les parties en
font la demande. En pratique cette solution est très peu utilisée ; les avocats, semble-t-il,
préfèrent les méthodes traditionnelles. En 2003 le Parlement a donc modifié la loi de
1996 pour permettre au tribunal d’imposer une telle solution aux parties31. Il reste que
la nouvelle loi n’est pas encore entrée en vigueur.
29
Qui sont appelés souvent special damages.
30
La version actuelle des Ogden Tables est disponible en ligne à l’adresse suivante :
http://www.gad.gov.uk/Other_Services/Compensation_for_injury_and_death.htm
31
Courts Act 2003 s.100 et seq.
16
En plus de ses pertes de revenu réelles, la victime d’un dommage corporel peut
obtenir, le cas échéant, une somme globale pour compenser la réduction de sa capacité
de travail, par exemple lorsque, après avoir un moment conservé son emploi, la victime
le perd et n’a plus qu’une chance réduite d’en trouver un autre.32
La doctrine analyse les préjudices non économiques (damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity) résultant du dommage corporel en distinguant notamment la
douleur, la souffrance et le préjudice d’agrément. En pratique, la plupart des victimes
cumulent ces préjudices et, sans qu’il y ait lieu de faire jouer la distinction théorique,
elles bénéficient d’un indemnisation pour l’ensemble dès qu’il est établi qu’elles en ont
subi un. Par exemple, les sommes allouées au titre du préjudice moral sont de l’ordre de
75000 £ pour la perte d’un bras entier, entre 30000 £ et 36000 £ pour celle d’un seul
œil. De telles sommes sont à première vue modestes, mais elles ne représentent qu’une
fraction de l’indemnisation puisque la victime les perçoit en sus de la compensation des
pertes économiques.
Enfin, l’indemnité est majorée des intérêts dont le taux est prévu à la section
132A de la loi de 1981 relative à la Cour suprême (Supreme Court Act 1981) et par des
directives connexes. Dans ces conditions, les intérêts s’accumulent avec le temps et
peuvent représenter une part importante de l’indemnité dans les affaires qui ont traîné
en longueur.
3) Le jugement d’indemnisation
Les jugements d’indemnisation de dommage corporel répartissent l’indemnité
entre les pertes économiques et le préjudice moral. Pour les premiers, le juge fait en
principe l’analyse des chefs de préjudice et des montants correspondants. Au contraire,
pour le préjudice moral, l’indemnisation est globale, sans distinction entre la douleur, le
préjudice d’agrément, etc.
Traditionnellement, le montant alloué est intangible : sitôt le jugement devenu
définitif, ce montant est insusceptible de révision tendant à prendre en compte un préjudice nouveau. Cette règle n’affecte pas le recours dont jouit la victime ; elle peut faire
appel du jugement si une situation nouvelle survient avant l’expiration du délai prescrit
pour cette action.
Pour parer au risque de sous-indemnisation dans l’éventualité de l’apparition
d’un préjudice nouveau, notamment après l’expiration du délai d’appel, une modification de l’article 32A de la Supreme Court Act de 1981 autorise depuis 1982
l’indemnisation provisionnelle. En vertu de cette disposition, une victime redoutant
l’apparition tardive de conséquences additionnelles du dommage peut demander au
juge de n’allouer de réparation que pour les préjudices actuels, et de lui réserver, son
jugement, la faculté d’intenter une nouvelle action si l’événement redouté vient à se
produire. Mais seule la victime qui les a expressément demandées peut bénéficier de
telles indemnisations provisionnelles et du droit de révision pour survenance d’un préjudice nouveau.
32
Smith v Manchester Corporation (1974) 17 Knight’s Industrial Reports 1.
17
Signalons enfin que la loi de 2003, permettant aux tribunaux d’imposer aux parties une rente périodique33, reconnaît en outre au Lord Chancellor le pouvoir, après
consultation, de modifier la loi pour permettre aux tribunaux de réviser une rente pour
prendre en compte un préjudice nouveau avéré, quand bien même l’éventualité d’un tel
préjudice n’avait pas été envisagé lors du procès.
4) La constatation et l’évaluation dans le système de sécurité
sociale
Dans un premier temps, la constatation du dommage corporel se faisait par un
médecin officiel, à l’examen duquel l’assuré était tenu de se soumettre. Critiqué comme
lourd et humiliant pour la victime, le système fut remplacé dans les années 1990 par un
nouveau système dit « d’auto-certification ». Désormais, l’assuré remplit simplement un
formulaire, donne des détails sur ses visites au médecin ou à l’hôpital, joint des pièces
justificatives et adresse le dossier à la Sécurité sociale. Une décision peut être prise par
un fonctionnaire sur ce dossier sans examen médical supplémentaire. En cas de doute,
l’avis d’un expert médical attaché au service peut être demandé et l’expert peut être
amené à examiner le demandeur. En principe, le fonctionnaire constate le dommage
corporel, en évalue la gravité et détermine le niveau de paiement auquel le demandeur
a droit selon le barème applicable. En cas de décision défavorable, le demandeur peut
faire appel devant le tribunal administratif composé de trois personnes dont une est
normalement un médecin.
Quoi qu’il en soit des droits de la victime, les sommes qui lui sont attribuées
par voie judiciaire ou transactionnelle sont en outre, en fonction de leur statut, exonérées ou passibles d’impôt34
D. LE RECOURS DES TIERS-PAYEURS
Les tiers-payeurs sont le plus souvent l’administration sociale et, dans certains
cas, l’employeur.
33
Courts Act 2003 s. 100 et seq.
34 Quant à la question du régime fiscal, il faut noter que les dommages-intérêts reçus en capital sont
exonérés d’impôt, tandis qu’un paiement sous forme de rente périodique est en principe imposable. En
1987, cependant, le Inland Revenue (fisc) décida que dans certaines conditions le paiement d’une rente
périodique peut être exonéré comme un paiement en capital. Cette décision a rendu économiquement
possible un arrangement dit « structured settlemen », en vertu duquel le débiteur divise le montant des
dommages-intérêts en deux parties. La première partie est immédiatement payée en capital pour compenser les pertes économiques avérées. La deuxième partie est versée par fractions périodiques exonérées d’impôt entre les mains de la victime. Cet arrangement favorable à la fois à la victime et à l’assureur
est d’usage courant dans les cas de dommage ayant entraîné une incapacité grave et permanente. Il doit
toutefois, pour sa validité, être formellement agréé par le tribunal, ce dernier étant tenu d’accorder son
agrément mais n’ayant pas le pouvoir de l’imposer aux parties contre leur gré. A la différence des paiements faits par le responsable du dommage ou par son assureur, les prestations du système de sécurité
sociale ne sont pas soumises à un régime fiscal fixe. Certaines prestations sont imposables mais d’autres
sont exonérées.
18
1) L’administration sociale
Depuis longtemps, le Service national de santé (NHS) dispose d’un recours, à
concurrence des frais de traitement dans un des hôpitaux nationaux, contre la personne
civilement responsable d’un accident de la circulation. Par une loi de 2003 non encore
en vigueur, ce droit a été généralisé pour permettre au NHS de se faire indemniser pour
n’importe quel accident par le responsable35. Toutefois, le traitement médical par le
NHS étant servi gratuitement à la victime, ce droit de recours ne s’exerce pas sur les
dommages-intérêts dus par le responsable à la victime. Concrètement, le recours du
NHS est mis en oeuvre par l’unité de recouvrement des indemnités du Ministère du travail et des pensions (Compensation Recovery Unit – CRU -, Department of Work and
Pensions).
A l’origine, l’Etat n’avait pas de droit de subrogation concernant les prestations
payées à la victime, bien que cette dernière, poursuivant le responsable, prenait de telles prestations en compte pour l’évaluation de ses demandes. En 1989, l’Etat s’est reconnu un droit de recours contre le civilement responsable. Le système d’origine fut
modifié huit ans après et les règles actuelles se trouvent dans la Social Security (Recovery of Payments) Act de 1997.
Le système opère principalement,
principalement, par l’interception effectuée à la diligence
du CRU,
CRU, des paiements destinés à la victime.
victime. Au cours du procès, les pertes de la victime sont calculées intégralement et sans tenir compte des prestations qu’elle a reçues,
mais leur paiement par le débiteur déclenche une obligation de la part de ce dernier de
rembourser à l’Etat les prestations qu’il a servies. Avant de payer la victime, le payeur
(qui est généralement l’assureur du responsable) est obligé d’obtenir du CRU une quittance. En pratique il est amené à désintéresser préalablement l’Etat en prélevant le
montant des prestations sociales sur les dommages-intérêts qu’il doit à la victime.
Avant 1997, le recours portait sur la totalité des dommages-intérêts, y compris
ceux couvrant le préjudice purement moral. Il pouvait donc facilement arriver que le recours de l’Etat absorbe complètement l’indemnité due à la victime. L’injustice du système a été critiquée à cet égard. Depuis la réforme de 1997, il y est remédié par une
règle atténuant l’obligation faite à l’assureur de rembourser les prestations sociales par
prélèvement sur les dommages-intérêts : un tel prélèvement ne peut plus, désormais,
porter sur les sommes attribuées au titre du préjudice moral. La préservation de
l’indemnité compensatrice du préjudice moral s’applique tant à l’indemnisation judiciaire qu’à l’indemnisation transactionnelle.
Si le montant des prestations remboursables excède celui de l’indemnité due à
la victime, le responsable ou son assureur doit payer la différence à l’Etat.
Certaines prestations ne sont pas remboursables par l’exercice du recours de la
NHS :
− les prestations servies plus de cinq ans après l’événement dommageable,
35
Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003, Part 3.
19
− en cas de transaction entre la victime et le responsable, toute prestation
payée après la transaction (l’intérêt de cette exclusion étant d’encourager les assureurs
à ne pas laisser traîner les négociations.)
Au total, le système ne fonctionne pas au détriment de la victime, puisque le
responsable doit, quoi qu’il advienne, lui payer les dommages-intérêts pour préjudice
moral, et qu’il doit également compléter le remboursement des prestations sociales à
l’Etat si le montant de ces dernières excède l’indemnité allouée au titre des préjudices
économiques.
La victime est d’autant plus protégée qu’il n’y a pas de risque d’insolvabilité du
civilement responsable, car l’assureur de ce dernier est tenu, en vertu de la loi de 1997,
d’honorer les obligations de son client tant à l’égard de la victime qu’envers l’Etat, nonobstant toute limitation stipulée dans la police d’assurance36. La loi de 1997 prévoit
que l’obligation de rembourser l’Etat est déclenchée par le paiement des dommagesintérêts à la victime, tout en fixant l’exigibilité au 14ème jour suivant le paiement fait à la
victime. Celle-ci est en outre préférée à l’Etat si les ressources du responsable ne suffisent pas à payer les deux. En cas d’insolvabilité du responsable ou de son assureur,
l’Etat ne jouit pas de privilège dans la liquidation.37
2) L’employeur
Cas où la victime est un salarié. - L’employeur qui a exécuté son obligation de
payer un salarié victime (statutory sick-pay) à la suite d’un accident qui l’a rendu provisoirement incapable de travail, n’a aucun recours contre la personne civilement responsable de l’accident. Il n’a pas de recours selon le droit commun, parce que sa perte
consiste en un préjudice « purement économique ». Le législateur, en imposant à
l’employeur l’obligation de payer l’indemnité de maladie pour les 28 premières semaines d’incapacité de travail, a omis de lui accorder le droit d’exercer un recours contre
l’auteur du dommage.
Cas où l’auteur est un salarié. – Les tribunaux ont coutume de retenir la responsa-
bilité in solidum de l’employeur pour le fait dommageable commis par son salarié dans
l’exercice de son activité professionnelle (vicarious liabilit). Il peut donc être amené à
faire des paiements à la victime sans attendre la décision (transactionnelle ou judiciaire)
d’indemnisation. La question est de savoir s’il peut, in fine par subrogation dans les
droits de la victime, voire en concours avec ce dernier, poursuivre son salarié en remboursement de ses débours. Bien que disposant d’un recours contre le salarié en pareil
cas, l’employeur ne l’exerce pas souvent en pratique. L’explication paraît simple : c’est la
même assurance de l’employeur qui garantit les risques liés à l’activité, qu’ils dépendent du fait de l’employeur lui-même ou de ses préposés.
Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 s.22. Il ne peut pas se prévaloir même une clause limitant le montant de sa responsabilité (!) ; l’article 22 (2) autorise le Ministre à valider par Règlement certaines clauses limitatives, mais à l’heure actuelle il ne l’a pas fait.
36
Avant 2002, l’Etat jouissait de certains privilèges en cas de liquidation, mais ils furent abolis par
l’Enterprise Act de 2002.
37
20
3) Les perspectives de développement
Dans la presse populaire, le critique principale qui est adressée au système
d’indemnisation du dommage corporel est la modestie de l’indemnité accordée au titre
du préjudice moral et, surtout, la modestie des droits reconnus aux parents d’un enfant
mineur tué dans un accident de la circulation. Les parents perçoivent en effet une
somme forfaitaire de 10 000 £, que les tabloïds n’hésitent pas à qualifier d’insultante.
Pour la doctrine, le principal défaut du système est son caractère aléatoire et
arbitraire. Il existe en effet deux niveaux d’indemnisation. D’un côté la victime peut, en
établissant la responsabilité civile d’une autre personne, prétendre à une indemnisation
qui est relativement généreuse : une réparation intégrale calculée sur la base de la situation particulière de la victime. D’un autre côté, une victime qui ne pourra pas se prévaloir du droit commun devra se contenter du système de sécurité sociale, système
beaucoup moins généreux qui ne garantit pas la réparation intégrale. L’assuré social
n’obtient que des paiements périodiques selon un barème fixe ignorant largement les
modes d’individualisation applicables en droit commun.
Le rejet d’une réforme globale.
globale.- Dans les années 1970 et 1980, des voix influentes
proposaient l’abandon de la responsabilité civile pour le dommage corporel non intentionnel, et son remplacement par un système de compensation automatique administré
par l’Etat, comme l’a fait la Nouvelle Zélande en 1972. Cette idée fut rejetée par la Pearson Commission38 et, aujourd’hui, elle ne semble pas réunir de partisans sérieux.
La création de régimes spéciaux de réparation.
réparation.- Dès les années 1930, une série de
projets ont été discutés en vue de créer un régime spécial d’indemnisation des victimes
d’accidents de la circulation. Certains de ces projets tendent à remplacer ou compléter
l’actuelle responsabilité du conducteur (qui dépend de la faute) par une responsabilité
stricte du propriétaire de l’automobile. D’autres, plus radicaux, proposent la création
d’un système d’indemnisation administré par l’Etat. A l’heure actuelle, aucun de ces
projets n’est activement discuté.
Quelques autres projets ont été conçus pour créer un nouveau régime pour
l’indemnisation des victimes d’accident médical. En 2003, le Chief Medical Officer,
conseiller en chef du gouvernement pour les affaires sanitaires, a publié un livre vert
intitulé Making Amends39 dans lequel il laisse planer l’idée d’un système de compensation administré par l’organe du Service national de santé (N H) chargé de l’instruction
des doléances des usagers concernant la qualité du service. Une consultation nationale
est actuellement en cours et pourrait aboutir à une réforme importante.
L’amélioration des modalités de l’indemnisation judiciaire.
judiciaire.- Pendant les années
1990, la Law Commission (commission permanente pour la réforme du droit) a publié
une série d’études sur différents aspects de l’indemnisation du dommage corporel. De
Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, Chairman Lord Pearson.
March 1978, Cmnd 7054.
38
39
Disponible en ligne à www.doh.gov.uk/makingamends
21
nombreuses modifications ont été proposées40 Certaines de ces propositions ont été
acceptées, comme celle d’augmenter les sommes accordées au titre du préjudice moral. La proposition la plus radicale concerne l’habilitation des tribunaux à prononcer des
dommages intérêts sous la forme de rente périodique. Comme nous l’avons vu, cette
proposition a été acceptée par le gouvernement, qui l’a consacrée dans une loi de 2003
non encore entrée en vigueur.
L’adaptation de la procédure civile.
civile.- Au fil des années, les récriminations contre les
coûts élevés et la lenteur de la justice civile, en particulier en matière de dommage corporel (s’agissant surtout de conséquences d’accidents médicaux), est devenue récurrente. Dans les années 1990, une grande réforme de la procédure civile a été faite dans
le but principal de rendre les frais de justice mieux proportionnés aux sommes en jeu. La
méthode choisie pour y parvenir consiste à accroître le contrôle du juge, qui a reçu de
nouveaux pouvoirs de direction et de contrôle du procès. En vigueur depuis avril 1999,
cette réforme a reçu un accueil favorable auprès des professionnels, mais des demandes persistantes appellent à des solutions plus radicales, au moins en ce qui concerne
l’indemnisation des victimes d’accident médical.
Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional Damages, Law Com. No 224 (1994); Liability for
Psychiatric Illness, Law Com. No. 249 (1998); Damages for Personal Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss, Law Com
No 257 (1999); Damages for Personal Injury: Medical, Nursing and Other Expenses; Collateral Benefits,
Law Com. No 262 (1999); Wrongful Death, Law Com No 263 (1999).
40
22
I I I . A NNE X E S
ANNAEXE I : SUPREME COURT ACT 1981
[32A Orders for provisional damages for personal injuries]
(nouvel article inséré par une loi de 1982)
[(1) This section applies to an action for damages for personal injuries in which
there is proved or admitted to be a chance that at some definite or indefinite time in the future
the injured person will, as a result of the act or omission which gave rise to the cause of action, develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in his physical or mental condition.
(2) Subject to subsection (4) below, as regards any action for damages to which this
section applies in which a judgment is given in the High Court, provision may be made by
rules of court for enabling the court, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, to award the
injured person—
(a) damages assessed on the assumption that the injured person will not develop
the disease or suffer the deterioration in his condition; and
(b)
further damages at a future date if he develops the disease or suffers the dete-
rioration.
(3) Any rules made by virtue of this section may include such incidental, supplementary and consequential provisions as the rule-making authority may consider necessary or
expedient.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed—
(a) as affecting the exercise of any power relating to costs, including any power to
make rules of court relating to costs; or
(b) as prejudicing any duty of the court under any enactment or rule of law to reduce or limit the total damages which would have been recoverable apart from any such duty.]
ANNEXE II : CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987 (C.43)
Part I
Product Liability
1 Purpose and construction of Part I
(1) This Part shall have effect for the purpose of making such provision as is necessary in order to comply with the product liability Directive and shall be construed accordingly.
23
(2) In this Part, except in so far as the context otherwise requires—
“dependant” and “relative” have the same meanings as they have in, respectively,
the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976;
“producer”, in relation to a product, means—
(a) the person who manufactured it;
(b) in the case of a substance which has not been manufactured but has been won
or abstracted, the person who won or abstracted it;
(c) in the case of a product which has not been manufactured, won or abstracted
but essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process having
been carried out (for example, in relation to agricultural produce), the person who carried out
that process;
“product” means any goods or electricity and (subject to subsection (3) below) includes a product which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or raw material or otherwise; and
“the product liability Directive” means the Directive of the Council of the European
Communities, dated 25th July 1985, (No 85/374/EEC) on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the member States concerning liability for defective products.
(3) For the purposes of this Part a person who supplies any product in which products are comprised, whether by virtue of being component parts or raw materials or otherwise,
shall not be treated by reason only of his supply of that product as supplying any of the products so comprised.
2 Liability for defective products
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Part, where any damage is caused
wholly or partly by a defect in a product, every person to whom subsection (2) below applies
shall be liable for the damage.
(2) This subsection applies to—
(a) the producer of the product;
(b) any person who, by putting his name on the product or using a trade mark or
other distinguishing mark in relation to the product, has held himself out to be the producer of
the product;
(c) any person who has imported the product into a member State from a place
outside the member States in order, in the course of any business of his, to supply it to another.
(3) Subject as aforesaid, where any damage is caused wholly or partly by a defect in
a product, any person who supplied the product (whether to the person who suffered the damage, to the producer of any product in which the product in question is comprised or to any
other person) shall be liable for the damage if—
24
(a) the person who suffered the damage requests the supplier to identify one or
more of the persons (whether still in existence or not) to whom subsection (2) above applies in
relation to the product;
(b) that request is made within a reasonable period after the damage occurs and at
a time when it is not reasonably practicable for the person making the request to identify all
those persons; and
(c) the supplier fails, within a reasonable period after receiving the request, either
to comply with the request or to identify the person who supplied the product to him.
(4) . . .
(5) Where two or more persons are liable by virtue of this Part for the same damage,
their liability shall be joint and several.
(6) This section shall be without prejudice to any liability arising otherwise than by
virtue of this Part.
3 Meaning of “defect”
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, there is a defect in a product
for the purposes of this Part if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are
entitled to expect; and for those purposes “safety”, in relation to a product, shall include safety
with respect to products comprised in that product and safety in the context of risks of damage
to property, as well as in the context of risks of death or personal injury.
(2) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) above what persons generally
are entitled to expect in relation to a product all the circumstances shall be taken into account,
including—
(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been marketed,
its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and any instructions for, or warnings
with respect to, doing or refraining from doing anything with or in relation to the product;
(b)
what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the prod-
uct; and
(c) the time when the product was supplied by its producer to another;
and nothing in this section shall require a defect to be inferred from the fact alone
that the safety of a product which is supplied after that time is greater than the safety of the
product in question.
4 Defences
(1) In any civil proceedings by virtue of this Part against any person (“the person
proceeded against”) in respect of a defect in a product it shall be a defence for him to show—
(a) that the defect is attributable to compliance with any requirement imposed by
or under any enactment or with any Community obligation; or
(b)
that the person proceeded against did not at any time supply the product to an-
other; or
25
(c) that the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say—
(i) that the only supply of the product to another by the person proceeded against
was otherwise than in the course of a business of that person’s; and
(ii) that section 2(2) above does not apply to that person or applies to him by virtue only of things done otherwise than with a view to profit; or
(d) that the defect did not exist in the product at the relevant time; or
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not
such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be
expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under
his control; or
(f) that the defect—
(i) constituted a defect in a product (“the subsequent product”) in which the product in question had been comprised; and
(ii) was wholly attributable to the design of the subsequent product or to compliance by the producer of the product in question with instructions given by the producer of the
subsequent product.
(2) In this section “the relevant time”, in relation to electricity, means the time at
which it was generated, being a time before it was transmitted or distributed, and in relation to
any other product, means—
(a) if the person proceeded against is a person to whom subsection (2) of section 2
above applies in relation to the product, the time when he supplied the product to another;
(b) if that subsection does not apply to that person in relation to the product, the
time when the product was last supplied by a person to whom that subsection does apply in
relation to the product.
5 Damage giving rise to liability
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this Part “damage” means
death or personal injury or any loss of or damage to any property (including land).
(2) A person shall not be liable under section 2 above in respect of any defect in a
product for the loss of or any damage to the product itself or for the loss of or any damage to
the whole or any part of any product which has been supplied with the product in question
comprised in it.
(3) A person shall not be liable under section 2 above for any loss of or damage to
any property which, at the time it is lost or damaged, is not—
(a) of a description of property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or
consumption; and
(b) intended by the person suffering the loss or damage mainly for his own private
use, occupation or consumption.
26
(4) No damages shall be awarded to any person by virtue of this Part in respect of
any loss of or damage to any property if the amount which would fall to be so awarded to that
person, apart from this subsection and any liability for interest, does not exceed £275.
(5) In determining for the purposes of this Part who has suffered any loss of or damage to property and when any such loss or damage occurred, the loss or damage shall be regarded as having occurred at the earliest time at which a person with an interest in the
property had knowledge of the material facts about the loss or damage.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) above the material facts about any loss of or
damage to any property are such facts about the loss or damage as would lead a reasonable
person with an interest in the property to consider the loss or damage sufficiently serious to
justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (5) above a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—
(a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or
(b)
from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice
which it is reasonable for him to seek;
but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection to have knowledge of a
fact ascertainable by him only with the help of expert advice unless he has failed to take all
reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.
(8) Subsections (5) to (7) above shall not extend to Scotland.
6 Application of certain enactments
(1) Any damage for which a person is liable under section 2 above shall be deemed
to have been caused—
(a) for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, by that person’s wrongful
act, neglect or default;
(b) for the purposes of section 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
(Scotland) Act 1940 (contribution among joint wrongdoers), by that person’s wrongful act or
negligent act or omission;
(c) for the purposes of section 1 of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 (rights of
relatives of a deceased), by that person’s act or omission; and
(d) for the purposes of Part II of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 (damages
for personal injuries, etc Scotland), by an act or omission giving rise to liability in that person
to pay damages.
(2) Where—
(a) a person’s death is caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, or a person
dies after suffering damage which has been so caused;
(b) a request such as mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of section 2
above is made to a supplier of the product by that person’s personal representatives or, in the
27
case of a person whose death is caused wholly or partly by the defect, by any dependant or
relative of that person; and
(c) the conditions specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of that subsection are satisfied in relation to that request,
this Part shall have effect for the purposes of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 as if
liability of the supplier to that person under that subsection did not depend on that person having requested the supplier to identify certain persons or on the said conditions having been
satisfied in relation to a request made by that person.
(3) Section 1 of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 shall have effect for the purposes of this Part as if—
(a) a person were answerable to a child in respect of an occurrence caused wholly
or partly by a defect in a product if he is or has been liable under section 2 above in respect of
any effect of the occurrence on a parent of the child, or would be so liable if the occurrence
caused a parent of the child to suffer damage;
(b) the provisions of this Part relating to liability under section 2 above applied in
relation to liability by virtue of paragraph (a) above under the said section 1; and
(c) subsection (6) of the said section 1 (exclusion of liability) were omitted.
(4) Where any damage is caused partly by a defect in a product and partly by the
fault of the person suffering the damage, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
and section 5 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (contributory negligence) shall have effect as if
the defect were the fault of every person liable by virtue of this Part for the damage caused by
the defect.
(5) In subsection (4) above “fault” has the same meaning as in the said Act of 1945.
(6) Schedule 1 to this Act shall have effect for the purpose of amending the Limitation Act 1980 and the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 in their application in
relation to the bringing of actions by virtue of this Part.
(7) It is hereby declared that liability by virtue of this Part is to be treated as liability
in tort for the purposes of any enactment conferring jurisdiction on any court with respect to
any matter.
(8) Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the operation of section 12 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (rights to compensation for certain breaches of duties confined to rights
under that Act).
7 Prohibition on exclusions from liability
The liability of a person by virtue of this Part to a person who has suffered damage
caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, or to a dependant or relative of such a person,
shall not be limited or excluded by any contract term, by any notice or by any other provision.
8 Power to modify Part I
28
(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such modifications of this Part and
of any other enactment (including an enactment contained in the following Parts of this Act,
or in an Act passed after this Act) as appear to Her Majesty in Council to be necessary or expedient in consequence of any modification of the product liability Directive which is made at
any time after the passing of this Act.
(2) An Order in Council under subsection (1) above shall not be submitted to Her
Majesty in Council unless a draft of the Order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
9 Application of Part I to Crown
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, this Part shall bind the Crown.
(2) The Crown shall not, as regards the Crown’s liability by virtue of this Part, be
bound by this Part further than the Crown is made liable in tort or in reparation under the
Crown Proceedings Act 1947, as that Act has effect from time to time.
29
ANNEXE III : COURTS ACT 2003
2003 CHAPTER 39
Damages
100 Periodical payments
(1) For section 2 of the Damages Act 1996 (c 48) (periodical payments by consent)
substitute—
“2 Periodical payments
(1)
A court awarding damages for future pecuniary loss in respect of personal in-
jury—
(a) may order that the damages are wholly or partly to take the form of periodical
payments, and
(b) shall consider whether to make that order.
(2) A court awarding other damages in respect of personal injury may, if the parties
consent, order that the damages are wholly or partly to take the form of periodical payments.
(3) A court may not make an order for periodical payments unless satisfied that the
continuity of payment under the order is reasonably secure.
(4) For the purpose of subsection (3) the continuity of payment under an order is
reasonably secure if—
(a)
it is protected by a guarantee given under section 6 of or the Schedule to this
Act,
(b) it is protected by a scheme under section 213 of the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 (compensation) (whether or not as modified by section 4 of this Act), or
(c) the source of payment is a government or health service body.
(5) An order for periodical payments may include provision—
(a) requiring the party responsible for the payments to use a method (selected or
to be selected by him) under which the continuity of payment is reasonably secure by virtue of
subsection (4);
(b) about how the payments are to be made, if not by a method under which the
continuity of payment is reasonably secure by virtue of subsection (4);
(c) requiring the party responsible for the payments to take specified action to secure continuity of payment, where continuity is not reasonably secure by virtue of subsection
(4);
30
(d)
(a), (b) or (c).
enabling a party to apply for a variation of provision included under paragraph
(6) Where a person has a right to receive payments under an order for periodical
payments, or where an arrangement is entered into in satisfaction of an order which gives a
person a right to receive periodical payments, that person’s right under the order or arrangement may not be assigned or charged without the approval of the court which made the order;
and—
(a) a court shall not approve an assignment or charge unless satisfied that special
circumstances make it necessary, and
(b) a purported assignment or charge, or agreement to assign or charge, is void
unless approved by the court.
(7) Where an order is made for periodical payments, an alteration of the method by
which the payments are made shall be treated as a breach of the order (whether or not the
method was specified under subsection (5)(b)) unless—
(a) the court which made the order declares its satisfaction that the continuity of
payment under the new method is reasonably secure,
(b) the new method is protected by a guarantee given under section 6 of or the
Schedule to this Act,
(c) the new method is protected by a scheme under section 213 of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 (compensation) (whether or not as modified by section 4 of
this Act), or
(d)
the source of payment under the new method is a government or health ser-
vice body.
(8) An order for periodical payments shall be treated as providing for the amount of
payments to vary by reference to the retail prices index (within the meaning of section 833(2)
of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988) at such times, and in such a manner, as may
be determined by or in accordance with Civil Procedure Rules.
(9) But an order for periodical payments may include provision—
(a) disapplying subsection (8), or
(b) modifying the effect of subsection (8).
2A Periodical payments: supplementary
(1) Civil Procedure Rules may require a court to take specified matters into account
in considering—
(a) whether to order periodical payments;
(b) the security of the continuity of payment;
(c) whether to approve an assignment or charge.
31
(2) For the purposes of section 2(4)(c) and (7)(d) “government or health service
body” means a body designated as a government body or a health service body by order made
by the Lord Chancellor.
(3) An order under subsection (2)—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b)
Parliament.
shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of
(4) Section 2(6) is without prejudice to a person’s power to assign a right to the
scheme manager established under section 212 of the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000.
(5) In section 2 “damages” includes an interim payment which a court orders a defendant to make to a claimant.
(6) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland—
(a)
a reference to Civil Procedure Rules shall be taken as a reference to rules of
court, and
(b) a reference to a claimant shall be taken as a reference to a plaintiff.
(7) Section 2 is without prejudice to any power exercisable apart from that section.
2B Variation of orders and settlements
(1) The Lord Chancellor may by order enable a court which has made an order for
periodical payments to vary the order in specified circumstances (otherwise than in accordance with section 2(5)(d)).
(2) The Lord Chancellor may by order enable a court in specified circumstances to
vary the terms on which a claim or action for damages for personal injury is settled by agreement between the parties if the agreement—
(a) provides for periodical payments, and
(b)
expressly permits a party to apply to a court for variation in those circum-
stances.
(3) An order under this section may make provision—
(a) which operates wholly or partly by reference to a condition or other term of the
court’s order or of the agreement;
(b) about the nature of an order which may be made by a court on a variation;
(c) about the matters to be taken into account on considering variation;
(d)
of a kind that could be made by Civil Procedure Rules or, in relation to
Northern Ireland, rules of court (and which may be expressed to be with or without prejudice
to the power to make those rules).
32
(4) An order under this section may apply (with or without modification) or amend
an enactment about provisional or further damages.
(5) An order under this section shall be subject to any order under section 1 of the
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (allocation between High Court and county courts).
(6) An order under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument,
(b) may not be made unless the Lord Chancellor has consulted such persons as he
thinks appropriate,
(c) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament, and
(d) may include transitional, consequential or incidental provision.
(7) In subsection (4)—
“provisional damages” means damages awarded by virtue of subsection (2)(a) of
section 32A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 or section 51 of the County Courts Act 1984 (or,
in relation to Northern Ireland, paragraph 10(2)(a) of Schedule 6 to the Administration of Justice Act 1982), and
“further damages” means damages awarded by virtue of subsection (2)(b) of either
of those sections (or, in relation to Northern Ireland, paragraph 10(2)(b) of Schedule 6 to the
Administration of Justice Act 1982).”
(2) In section 329AA of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (c 1) (periodical payments)—
(a) for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) Periodical payments shall not for the purposes of income tax be regarded as
the income of any of the persons mentioned in subsection (2) below (and shall be paid without
deduction under section 348(1)(b) or 349(1)).
(1A) In subsection (1) “periodical payments” means periodical payments made pursuant to—
(a) an order of a court in so far as it is made in reliance on section 2 of the Damages Act 1996 (including an order as varied), or
(b) an agreement in so far as it settles a claim or action for damages in respect of
personal injury (including an agreement as varied).”,
(b) in subsection (3) for “if the agreement or order mentioned in that subsection
or a subsequent agreement so provides,” substitute “if the order, agreement or undertaking
mentioned in subsection (1A), or a varying order, agreement or undertaking, so provides or
permits,”,
(c) in subsection (6) after “claim or action for” insert “damages in respect of”,
(d) for subsection (7) substitute—
33
“(7) For the purposes of subsection (1A) above—
(a) the reference to an order of a court made in reliance on section 2 of the Damages Act 1996 includes an order of a court outside the United Kingdom which is similar to an
order made in reliance on that section,
(b) the reference to an agreement settling a claim or action includes a reference to
an agreement to make payments on account of damages that may be awarded in a claim or
action, and
(c) the reference to an agreement in so far as it settles a claim or action for damages in respect of personal injury also includes a reference to an undertaking given by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (being the company of that name incorporated on 14th June 1946 under
the Companies Act 1929), or an Article 75 insurer under the Bureau’s Articles of Association,
in relation to a claim or action in respect of personal injury.”, and
(e) omit subsection (8).
(3) In section 329AB(1) of that Act (statutory compensation) for “subsection (1)”
substitute “subsection (1A)”.
(4) In this section—
(a)
subsection (1) shall extend only to England and Wales and Northern Ireland,
and
(b) the remainder shall extend to the whole of the United Kingdom.
101 Periodical payments: security
(1) For sections 4 and 5 of the Damages Act 1996 (c 48) (enhanced protection for
structured settlement annuitant) substitute—
“4 Enhanced protection for periodical payments
(1) Subsection (2) applies where—
(a) a person has a right to receive periodical payments, and
(b) his right is protected by a scheme under section 213 of the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 (compensation), but only as to part of the payments.
(2) The protection provided by the scheme shall extend by virtue of this section to
the whole of the payments.
(3) Subsection (4) applies where—
(a) one person (“the claimant”) has a right to receive periodical payments from
another person (“the defendant”),
(b) a third person (“the insurer”) is required by or in pursuance of an arrangement
entered into with the defendant (whether or not together with other persons and whether be-
34
fore or after the creation of the claimant’s right) to make payments in satisfaction of the claimant’s right or for the purpose of enabling it to be satisfied, and
(c) the claimant’s right to receive the payments would be wholly or partly protected by a scheme under section 213 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 if it
arose from an arrangement of the same kind as that mentioned in paragraph (b) but made between the claimant and the insurer.
(4) For the purposes of the scheme under section 213 of that Act—
(a) the claimant shall be treated as having a right to receive the payments from the
insurer under an arrangement of the same kind as that mentioned in subsection (3)(b),
(b) the protection under the scheme in respect of those payments shall extend by
virtue of this section to the whole of the payments, and
(c)
no person other than the claimant shall be entitled to protection under the
scheme in respect of the payments.
(5) In this section “periodical payments” means periodical payments made pursuant
to—
(a) an order of a court in so far as it is made in reliance on section 2 above (including an order as varied), or
(b) an agreement in so far as it settles a claim or action for damages in respect of
personal injury (including an agreement as varied).
(6) In subsection (5)(b) the reference to an agreement in so far as it settles a claim or
action for damages in respect of personal injury includes a reference to an undertaking given
by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (being the company of that name incorporated on 14th June
1946 under the Companies Act 1929), or an Article 75 insurer under the Bureau’s Articles of
Association, in relation to a claim or action in respect of personal injury.”
(2) In section 6(1) of the Damages Act 1996 (c 48) (guarantee for public sector settlement) for the words “on terms corresponding to those of a structured settlement as defined
in section 5 above except that the person to whom the payments are to be made is not to receive them as mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of that section” substitute “on terms whereby the
damages are to consist wholly or partly of periodical payments”.
(3) In paragraph 1(a) of the Schedule to that Act (guarantee by Northern Ireland Department for public sector settlement) for the words “on terms corresponding to those of a
structured settlement as defined in section 5 of this Act except that the person to whom the
payments are to be made is not to receive them as mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of that section” substitute “on terms whereby the damages are to consist wholly or partly of periodical
payments”.
(4)
bankrupt—
Where an individual who has a right to receive periodical payments becomes
(a) the payments shall be treated for the purposes of the bankruptcy as income of
the bankrupt (but without prejudice to section 329AA of the Income and Corporation Taxes
Act 1988 (c 1)),
35
(b) neither the right to receive periodical payments, nor any property or arrangement designed to protect continuity of the periodical payments, shall form part of the bankrupt’s estate for the purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) or the Insolvency (Northern
Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 1989/2405 (NI 19)),
(c) an income payments order may not be made in respect of any part of the periodical payments identified (in the order or agreement under which the payments are made) as
relating wholly to expenditure likely to be incurred by or for the individual as a result of the
personal injury concerned,
(d) nothing in section 2 of the Damages Act 1996 (c 48) shall prevent a court
from making an income payments order (subject to paragraph (c)), and
(e)
agreement.
nothing in section 2 of that Act shall prevent entry into an income payments
(5) In subsection (4)—
“bankrupt” has the meaning given by section 381 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or Article 9 of the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 1989/2405 (NI 19)),
“income payments agreement” means an agreement under section 310A of that Act
or equivalent legislation for Northern Ireland,
“income payments order” means an order under section 310 of that Act or equivalent
legislation for Northern Ireland, and
“periodical payments” means periodical payments awarded or agreed, or in so far as
awarded or agreed, as damages for future pecuniary loss by—
(a) an order of a court made in reliance on section 2 of the Damages Act 1996
(including an order as varied), or
(b) an agreement settling a claim or action for damages in respect of personal injury (including an agreement as varied).
(a) subsections (1) to (3) shall extend to the whole of the United Kingdom, and
(b)
subsections (4) and (5) shall extend only to England and Wales and Northern
Ireland.
36
ANNEXE IV : HEALTH AND
AND SAFETY AT WORK ETC.
ETC. ACT 1974
CHAPTER 37
s 47 Civil liability.
(1) Nothing in this Part shall be construed—
(a) as conferring a right of action in any civil proceedings in respect of any failure to
comply with any duty imposed by 2 to 7 or any contravention of section 8; or
(b) as affecting the extent (if any) to which breach of a duty imposed by any of the
existing statutory provisions is actionable; or
(c) as affecting the operation of section 12 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965
(right to compensation by virtue of certain provisions of that Act).
(2) Breach of a duty imposed by health and safety regulations [...]shall, so far as it
causes damage, be actionable except in so far as the regulations provide otherwise.
(3) No provision made by virtue of section 15(6)(b) shall afford a defence in any civil
proceedings, whether brought by virtue of subsection (2) above or not; but as regards any duty
imposed as mentioned in subsection (2) above health and safety regulations [...]may provide
for any defence specified in the regulations to be available in any action for breach of that
duty.
(4) Subsections (1)(a) and (2) above are without prejudice to any right of action
which exists apart from the provisions of this Act, and subsection (3) above is without prejudice to any defence which may be available apart from the provisions of the regulations there
mentioned.
(5) Any term of an agreement which purports to exclude or restrict the operation of
subsection (2) above, or any liability arising by virtue of that subsection shall be void, except
in so far as health and safety regulations [...]provide otherwise.
37
ANNEXE V : ROAD TRAFFIC
TRAFFIC ACT 1988
1988 CHAPTER 52
Part VI
Third-Party Liabilities
Compulsory insurance or security against third-party risks
143 Users of motor vehicles to be insured or secured against third-party risks
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act—
(a) a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] unless
there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance
or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Part
of this Act, and
(b) a person must not cause or permit any other person to use a motor vehicle on
a road [or other public place] unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by
that other person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as
complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act.
(2) If a person acts in contravention of subsection (1) above he is guilty of an offence.
(3) A person charged with using a motor vehicle in contravention of this section
shall not be convicted if he proves—
(a) that the vehicle did not belong to him and was not in his possession under a
contract of hiring or of loan,
(b) that he was using the vehicle in the course of his employment, and
(c) that he neither knew nor had reason to believe that there was not in force in
relation to the vehicle such a policy of insurance or security as is mentioned in subsection (1)
above.
(4) This Part of this Act does not apply to invalid carriages.
144 Exceptions from requirement of third-party insurance or security
(1) Section 143 of this Act does not apply to a vehicle owned by a person who has
deposited and keeps deposited with the Accountant General of the Supreme Court the sum of
[£500,000], at a time when the vehicle is being driven under the owner’s control.
[(1A) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument substitute a
greater sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (1) above.
(1B) No order shall be made under subsection (1A) above unless a draft of it has
been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.]
38
(2) Section 143 does not apply—
(a) to a vehicle owned—
(i) by the council of a county or county district in England and Wales, [the
Broads Authority] the Common Council of the City of London, the council of a London borough [a National Park authority], the Inner London Education Authority, [the London Fire and
Emergency Planning Authority,] or a joint authority (other than a police authority) established
by Part IV of the Local Government Act 1985,
(ii) by a [council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994] in Scotland, or
(iii) by a joint board or committee in England or Wales, or joint committee in
Scotland, which is so constituted as to include among its members representatives of any such
council,
at a time when the vehicle is being driven under the owner’s control,
(b) to a vehicle owned by a police authority . . ., at a time when it is being driven
under the owner’s control, or to a vehicle at a time when it is being driven for police purposes
by or under the direction of a constable, or by a person employed by a police authority, . . ., or
[(ba) to a vehicle owned by the Service Authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service or the Service Authority for the National Crime Squad, at a time when it is
being driven under the owner’s control, or to a vehicle at a time when it is being driven for the
purposes of the body maintained by such an Authority by or under the direction of a constable,
or by a person employed by such an Authority;]
(c) to a vehicle at a time when it is being driven on a journey to or from any place
undertaken for salvage purposes pursuant to Part IX of the [Merchant Shipping Act 1995],
(d) to the use of a vehicle for the purpose of its being provided in pursuance of a
direction under section 166(2)(b) of the Army Act 1955 or under the corresponding provision
of the Air Force Act 1955,
[(da) to a vehicle owned by a health service body, as defined in section 60(7) of
the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 [by a Primary Care Trust established under section 16A of the National Health Service Act 1977][, by a Local Health Board
established under section 16BA of that Act] [or by the [Commission for Healthcare Audit and
Inspection]], at a time when the vehicle is being driven under the owner’s control,
(db) to an ambulance owned by a National Health Service trust established under
Part I of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 or the National Health
Service (Scotland) Act 1978, at a time when a vehicle is being driven under the owner’s control,]
[(dc) to an ambulance owned by an NHS foundation trust, at a time when the vehicle is being driven under the owner’s control,]
(e) to a vehicle which is made available by the Secretary of State to any person,
body or local authority in pursuance of section 23 or 26 of the National Health Service Act
1977 at a time when it is being used in accordance with the terms on which it is so made
available,
39
(f) to a vehicle which is made available by the Secretary of State to any local authority, education authority or voluntary organisation in Scotland in pursuance of section 15 or
16 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 at a time when it is being used in accordance with the terms on which it is so made available,
[(g) to a vehicle owned by the Commission for Social Care Inspection, at a time
when the vehicle is being driven under the owner’s control].
145 Requirements in respect of policies of insurance
(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Part of this Act, a policy of insurance must satisfy the following conditions.
(2) The policy must be issued by an authorised insurer.
(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, the policy—
(a) must insure such person, persons or classes of persons as may be specified in
the policy in respect of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the
death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the
use of the vehicle on a road [or other public place] in Great Britain, and
[(aa) must, in the case of a vehicle normally based in the territory of another member State, insure him or them in respect of any civil liability which may be incurred by him or
them as a result of an event related to the use of the vehicle in Great Britain if,—
(i) according to the law of that territory, he or they would be required to be insured in respect of a civil liability which would arise under that law as a result of that event if
the place where the vehicle was used when the event occurred were in that territory, and
(ii) the cover required by that law would be higher than that required by paragraph (a) above, and]
(b) must[, in the case of a vehicle normally based in Great Britain,] insure him or
them in respect of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the use of
the vehicle and of any trailer, whether or not coupled, in the territory other than Great Britain
and Gibraltar of each of the member States of the Communities according to
[(i) the law on compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of
vehicles of the State in whose territory the event giving rise to the liability occurred; or
(ii) if it would give higher cover, the law which would be applicable under this
Part of this Act if the place where the vehicle was used when that event occurred were in
Great Britain; and]
(c) must also insure him or them in respect of any liability which may be incurred
by him or them under the provisions of this Part of this Act relating to payment for emergency
treatment.
(4) The policy shall not, by virtue of subsection (3)(a) above, be required—
(a) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his
employment, of a person in the employment of a person insured by the policy or of bodily
injury sustained by such a person arising out of and in the course of his employment, or
40
(b) to provide insurance of more than £250,000 in respect of all such liabilities as
may be insured in respect of damage to property caused by, or arising out of, any one accident
involving the vehicle, or
(c) to cover liability in respect of damage to the vehicle, or
(d) to cover liability in respect of damage to goods carried for hire or reward in or
on the vehicle or in or on any trailer (whether or not coupled) drawn by the vehicle, or
(e) to cover any liability of a person in respect of damage to property in his custody or under his control, or
(f) to cover any contractual liability.
[(4A) In the case of a person—
(a) carried in or upon a vehicle, or
(b) entering or getting on to, or alighting from, a vehicle,
the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (4) above do not apply unless cover in
respect of the liability referred to in that paragraph is in fact provided pursuant to a requirement of the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.]
[(5) “Authorised insurer” has the same meaning as in section 95.]
(6) If any person or body of persons ceases to be a member of the Motor Insurers’
Bureau, that person or body shall not by virtue of that cease to be treated as an authorised insurer for the purposes of this Part of this Act [or the Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Act 1999]—
(a)
member, or
in relation to any policy issued by the insurer before ceasing to be such a
(b) in relation to any obligation (whether arising before or after the insurer ceased
to be such a member) which the insurer may be called upon to meet under or in consequence
of any such policy or under section 157 of this Act [or section 1 of the Act of 1999] by virtue
of making a payment in pursuance of such an obligation.
41
ANNEXE VI : SOCIAL SECURITY
SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
CONTRIBUTIONS AND
AND
BENEFITS ACT 1992
1992 CHAPTER 4
Part III
Non-contributory Benefits
63 Descriptions of non-contributory benefits
Non-contributory benefits under this Part of this Act are of the following descriptions, namely—
(a) attendance allowance;
(b) . . .
(c) [carer’s allowance] (with increase for adult . . . dependants);
(d) disability living allowance;
(e) guardian’s allowance;
Attendance allowance
64 Entitlement
(1) A person shall be entitled to an attendance allowance if he is aged 65 or over,
he is not entitled to the care component of a disability living allowance and he satisfies either—
(a)
the condition specified in subsection (2) below (“the day attendance condi-
(b)
the condition specified in subsection (3) below (“the night attendance condi-
tion”), or
tion”),
and prescribed conditions as to residence and presence in Great Britain.
(2) A person satisfies the day attendance condition if he is so severely disabled
physically or mentally that, by day, he requires from another person either—
(a)
frequent attention throughout the day in connection with his bodily functions,
or
(b) continual supervision throughout the day in order to avoid substantial danger
to himself or others.
(3) A person satisfies the night attendance condition if he is so severely disabled
physically or mentally that, at night,—
42
(a) he requires from another person prolonged or repeated attention in connection
with his bodily functions, or
(b) in order to avoid substantial danger to himself or others he requires another
person to be awake for a prolonged period or at frequent intervals for the purpose of watching
over him.
[(4) Circumstances may be prescribed in which a person is to be taken to satisfy or
not to satisfy such of the conditions mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) above as may be
prescribed.]
65 Period and rate of allowance
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Act, the period for which a person is
entitled to an attendance allowance shall be—
(a) a period throughout which he has satisfied or is likely to satisfy the day or the
night attendance condition or both; and
(b) a period preceded immediately, or within such period as may be prescribed,
by one of not less than 6 months throughout which he satisfied, or is likely to satisfy, one or
both of those conditions.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above a person who suffers from renal failure
and is undergoing such form of treatment as may be prescribed shall, in such circumstances as
may be prescribed, be deemed to satisfy or to be likely to satisfy the day or the night attendance condition or both.
(3) The weekly rate of the attendance allowance payable to a person for any period
shall be the higher rate specified in Schedule 4, Part III, paragraph 1, if both as regards that
period and as regards the period of 6 months mentioned in subsection (1)(b) above he has satisfied or is likely to satisfy both the day and the night attendance conditions, and shall be the
lower rate in any other case.
(4) A person shall not be entitled to an attendance allowance for any period preceding the date on which he makes or is treated as making a claim for it.
(5) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) above, provision may be made by
regulations for a person to be entitled to an attendance allowance for a period preceding the
date on which he makes or is treated as making a claim for it if such an allowance has previously been paid to or in respect of him.
(6) Except in so far as regulations otherwise provide and subject to section 66(1) below—
(a)
a claim for an attendance allowance may be made during the period of 6
months immediately preceding the period for which the person to whom the claim relates is
entitled to the allowance; and
(b) an award may be made in pursuance of a claim so made, subject to the condition that, throughout that period of 6 months, that person satisfies—
(i) both the day and the night attendance conditions, or
43
(ii) if the award is at the lower rate, one of those conditions.
66 Attendance allowance for the terminally ill
(1) If a terminally ill person makes a claim expressly on the ground that he is such a
person, then—
(a) he shall be taken—
(i) to satisfy, or to be likely to satisfy, both the day attendance condition and the
night attendance condition [for so much of the period for which he is terminally ill as does not
fall before the date of the claim]; and
(ii) to have satisfied those conditions for the period of 6 months immediately preceding [the date of the claim or, if later, the first date on which he is terminally ill] (so however that no allowance shall be payable by virtue of this sub-paragraph for any period
preceding that date); and
(b) the period for which he is entitled to attendance allowance shall be [so much
of the period for which he is terminally ill as does not fall before the date of the claim].
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above—
(a) a person is “terminally ill” at any time if at that time he suffers from a progressive disease and his death in consequence of that disease can reasonably be expected
within 6 months; and
(b) where a person purports to make a claim for an attendance allowance by virtue of that subsection on behalf of another, that other shall be regarded as making the claim,
notwithstanding that it is made without his knowledge or authority.
67 Exclusions by regulation
(1) Regulations may provide that, in such circumstances, and for such purposes as
may be prescribed, a person who is, or is treated under the regulations as, undergoing treatment for renal failure in a hospital or other similar institution otherwise than as an in-patient
shall be deemed not to satisfy or to be unlikely to satisfy the day attendance condition or the
night attendance condition, or both of them.
(2) Regulations may provide that an attendance allowance shall not be payable in
respect of a person for any period when he is a person for whom accommodation is provided—
(a) in pursuance
(i) of Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948; or
(ii) of paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 to the National Health Service Act 1977; or
(iii) of Part IV of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968; or
(iv) of section 7 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984; or
44
(b) in circumstances in which the cost is, or may be, borne wholly or partly out of
public or local funds, in pursuance of those enactments or of any other enactment relating to
persons under disability.
2(3)(d), (g), (5), 4.
70 [Carer’s allowance]
(1) A person shall be entitled to [a carer’s allowance] for any day on which he is engaged in caring for a severely disabled person if—
(a) he is regularly and substantially engaged in caring for that person;
(b) he is not gainfully employed; and
(c) the severely disabled person is either such relative of his as may be prescribed
or a person of any such other description as may be prescribed.
[(1A) A person who was entitled to an allowance under this section immediately
before the death of the severely disabled person referred to in subsection (1) shall continue to
be entitled to it, even though he is no longer engaged in caring for a severely disabled person
(and the requirements of subsection (1)(a) and (c) are not satisfied), until—
(a) the end of the week in which he ceases to satisfy any other requirement as to
entitlement to the allowance; or
(b) the expiry of the period of eight weeks beginning with the Sunday following
the death (or beginning with the date of death if the death occurred on Sunday),
whichever occurs first.]
(2) In this section, “severely disabled person” means a person in respect of whom
there is payable either an attendance allowance or a disability living allowance by virtue of
entitlement to the care component at the highest or middle rate or such other payment out of
public funds on account of his need for attendance as may be prescribed.
(3) A person shall not be entitled to an allowance under this section if he is under
the age of 16 or receiving full-time education.
(4) A person shall not be entitled to an allowance under this section unless he satisfies prescribed conditions as to residence or presence in Great Britain.
(5) . . .
(6) . . .
(7) No person shall be entitled for the same day to more than one allowance under
this section; and where, apart from this subsection, two or more persons would be entitled for
the same day to such an allowance in respect of the same severely disabled person, one of
them only shall be entitled and that shall be such one of them—
(a) as they may jointly elect in the prescribed manner, or
(b) as may, in default of such an election, be determined by the Secretary of State
in his discretion.
45
(8) Regulations may prescribe the circumstances in which a person is or is not to be
treated for the purposes of this section as engaged, or regularly and substantially engaged, in
caring for a severely disabled person, as gainfully employed or as receiving full-time education.
(9) [A carer’s allowance] shall be payable at the weekly rate specified in Schedule
4, Part III, paragraph 4.
(10) . . .
71 Disability living allowance
(1)
component.
Disability living allowance shall consist of a care component and a mobility
(2) A person’s entitlement to a disability living allowance may be an entitlement to
either component or to both of them.
(3) A person may be awarded either component for a fixed period or [for an indefinite period], but if his award of a disability living allowance consists of both components, he
may not be awarded the components for different fixed periods.
(4) The weekly rate of a person’s disability living allowance for a week for which
he has only been awarded one component is the appropriate weekly rate for that component as
determined in accordance with this Act or regulations under it.
(5) The weekly rate of a person’s disability living allowance for a week for which
he has been awarded both components is the aggregate of the appropriate weekly rates for the
two components as so determined.
(6) A person shall not be entitled to a disability living allowance unless he satisfies
prescribed conditions as to residence and presence in Great Britain.
72 The care component
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to the care component of a disability living allowance for any period throughout which—
(a) he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that—
(i) he requires in connection with his bodily functions attention from another
person for a significant portion of the day (whether during a single period or a number of periods); or
(ii) he cannot prepare a cooked main meal for himself if he has the ingredients; or
(b) he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that, by day, he requires from
another person—
(i) frequent attention throughout the day in connection with his bodily functions;
or
46
(ii) continual supervision throughout the day in order to avoid substantial danger
to himself or others; or
(c) he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that, at night,—
(i) he requires from another person prolonged or repeated attention in connection
with his bodily functions; or
(ii) in order to avoid substantial danger to himself or others he requires another
person to be awake for a prolonged period or at frequent intervals for the purpose of watching
over him.
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person shall not be entitled
to the care component of a disability living allowance unless—
(a) throughout—
(i) the period of 3 months immediately preceding the date on which the award of
that component would begin; or
(ii) such other period of 3 months as may be prescribed,
he has satisfied or is likely to satisfy one or other of the conditions mentioned in
subsection (1)(a) to (c) above; and
(b)
he is likely to continue to satisfy one or other of those conditions through-
out—
(i) the period of 6 months beginning with that date; or
(ii) (if his death is expected within the period of 6 months beginning with that
date) the period so beginning and ending with his death.
(3) Three weekly rates of the care component shall be prescribed.
(4) The weekly rate of the care component payable to a person for each week in the
period for which he is awarded that component shall be—
(a) the highest rate, if he falls within subsection (2) above by virtue of having satisfied or being likely to satisfy both the conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(b) and (c)
above throughout both the period mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) above and that
mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection;
(b) the middle rate, if he falls within that subsection by virtue of having satisfied
or being likely to satisfy one or other of those conditions throughout both those periods; and
(c) the lowest rate in any other case.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a person who is terminally ill, as defined in
section 66(2) above, and makes a claim expressly on the ground that he is such a person, shall
be taken—
(a) to have satisfied the conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(b) and (c) above
for the period of 3 months immediately preceding the date of the claim, or, if later, the first
47
date on which he is terminally ill (so however that the care component shall not be payable by
virtue of this paragraph for any period preceding that date); and
(b) to satisfy or to be likely to satisfy those conditions [for so much of the period
for which he is terminally ill as does not fall before the date of the claim].
(6) For the purposes of this section in its application to a person for any period in
which he is under the age of 16—
(a) sub-paragraph (ii) of subsection (1)(a) above shall be omitted; and
(b) neither the condition mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) of that paragraph nor any
of the conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(b) and (c) above shall be taken to be satisfied
unless—
(i) he has requirements of a description mentioned in subsection (1)(a), (b) or (c)
above substantially in excess of the normal requirements of persons of his age; or
(ii) he has substantial requirements of any such description which younger persons in normal physical and mental health may also have but which persons of his age and in
normal physical and mental health would not have.
(7) Subject to subsections (5) and (6) above, circumstances may be prescribed in
which a person is to be taken to satisfy or not to satisfy such of the conditions mentioned in
subsection (1)(a) to (c) above as may be prescribed.
(8) Regulations may provide that a person shall not be paid any amount in respect
of a disability living allowance which is attributable to entitlement to the care component for a
period when he is a person for whom accommodation is provided—
(a) in pursuance—
(i) of Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948 or paragraph 2 of Schedule 8
to the National Health Service Act 1977; or
(ii) of Part IV of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 or section 7 of the Mental
Health (Scotland) Act 1984; or
(b) in circumstances in which the cost is, or may be, borne wholly or partly out of
public or local funds, in pursuance of those enactments or of any other enactment relating to
persons under disability or to young persons or to education or training.
73 The mobility component
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to the mobility
component of a disability living allowance for any period in which he is over [the relevant
age] and throughout which—
(a) he is suffering from physical disablement such that he is either unable to walk
or virtually unable to do so; or
(b) he falls within subsection (2) below; or
(c) he falls within subsection (3) below; or
48
(d) he is able to walk but is so severely disabled physically or mentally that, disregarding any ability he may have to use routes which are familiar to him on his own, he cannot take advantage of the faculty out of doors without guidance or supervision from another
person most of the time.
[(1A) In subsection (1) above “the relevant age” means—
(a) in relation to the conditions mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of that subsection, the age of 3;
(b)
in relation to the conditions mentioned in paragraph (d) of that subsection, the
age of 5.]
(2) A person falls within this subsection if—
(a) he is both blind and deaf; and
(b) he satisfies such other conditions as may be prescribed.
(3) A person falls within this subsection if—
(a) he is severely mentally impaired; and
(b) he displays severe behavioural problems; and
(c) he satisfies both the conditions mentioned in section 72(1)(b) and (c) above.
(4) For the purposes of this section in its application to a person for any period in
which he is under the age of 16, the condition mentioned in subsection (1)(d) above shall not
be taken to be satisfied unless—
(a) he requires substantially more guidance or supervision from another person
than persons of his age in normal physical and mental health would require; or
(b) persons of his age in normal physical and mental health would not require
such guidance or supervision.
(5) Subject to subsection (4) above, circumstances may be prescribed in which a
person is to be taken to satisfy or not to satisfy a condition mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or
(d) or subsection (2)(a) above.
(6) Regulations shall specify the cases which fall within subsection (3)(a) and (b)
above.
(7) A person who is to be taken for the purposes of section 72 above to satisfy or
not to satisfy a condition mentioned in subsection (1)(b) or (c) of that section is to be taken to
satisfy or not to satisfy it for the purposes of subsection (3)(c) above.
(8) A person shall not be entitled to the mobility component for a period unless
during most of that period his condition will be such as permits him from time to time to
benefit from enhanced facilities for locomotion.
(9) A person shall not be entitled to the mobility component of a disability living
allowance unless—
49
(a) throughout—
(i) the period of 3 months immediately preceding the date on which the award of
that component would begin; or
(ii) such other period of 3 months as may be prescribed,
he has satisfied or is likely to satisfy one or other of the conditions mentioned in
subsection (1) above; and
(b)
he is likely to continue to satisfy one or other of those conditions through-
out—
(i) the period of 6 months beginning with that date; or
(ii) (if his death is expected within the period of 6 months beginning with that
date) the period so beginning and ending with his death.
(10) Two weekly rates of the mobility component shall be prescribed.
(11) The weekly rate of the mobility component payable to a person for each week
in the period for which he is awarded that component shall be—
(a) the higher rate, if he falls within subsection (9) above by virtue of having satisfied or being likely to satisfy one or other of the conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(a),
(b) and (c) above throughout both the period mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (9)
above and that mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection; and
(b) the lower rate in any other case.
(12) For the purposes of this section in its application to a person who is terminally
ill, as defined in section 66(2) above, and who makes a claim expressly on the ground that he
is such a person—
(a) subsection (9)(a) above shall be omitted; and
(b) subsection (11)(a) above shall have effect as if for the words from “both” to
“subsection”, in the fourth place where it occurs, there were substituted the words “the period
mentioned in subsection (9)(b) above”.
(13) Regulations may prescribe cases in which a person who has the use—
(a) of an invalid carriage or other vehicle provided by the Secretary of State under
section 5(2)(a) of the National Health Service Act 1977 and Schedule 2 to that Act or under
section 46 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 or provided under Article 30(1)
of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972; or
(b) of any prescribed description of appliance supplied under the enactments relating to the National Health Service being such an appliance as is primarily designed to afford a means of personal and independent locomotion out of doors,
is not to be paid any amount attributable to entitlement to the mobility component or
is to be paid disability living allowance at a reduced rate in so far as it is attributable to that
component.
50
(14) A payment to or in respect of any person which is attributable to his entitlement to the mobility component, and the right to receive such a payment, shall (except in prescribed circumstances and for prescribed purposes) be disregarded in applying any enactment
or instrument under which regard is to be had to a person’s means.
74 Mobility component for certain persons eligible for invalid carriages
(1) Regulations may provide for the issue, variation and cancellation of certificates
in respect of prescribed categories of persons to whom this section applies; and a person in
respect of whom such a certificate is issued shall, during any period while the certificate is in
force, be deemed for the purposes of section 73 above to satisfy the condition mentioned in
subsection (1)(a) of that section and to fall within paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (9) by
virtue of having satisfied or being likely to satisfy that condition throughout both the periods
mentioned in those paragraphs.
(2) This section applies to any person whom the Secretary of State considers—
(a) was on 1st January 1976 in possession of an invalid carriage or other vehicle
provided in pursuance of section 33 of the Health Services and Public Health Act 1968 (which
related to vehicles for persons suffering from physical defect or disability) or receiving payments in pursuance of subsection (3) of that section; or
(b) had at that date, or at a later date specified by the Secretary of State, made an
application which the Secretary of State approved for such a carriage or vehicle or for such
payments; or
(c) was, both at some time during a prescribed period before that date and at some
time during a prescribed period after that date, in possession of such a carriage or vehicle or
receiving such payments; or
(d) would have been, by virtue of any of the preceding paragraphs, a person to
whom this section applies but for some error or delay for which in the opinion of the Secretary
of State the person was not responsible and which was brought to the attention of the Secretary of State within the period of one year beginning with 30th March 1977 (the date of the
passing of the Social Security (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1977, section 13 of which made
provision corresponding to the provision made by this section).
75 Persons 65 or over
(1) Except to the extent to which regulations provide otherwise, no person shall be
entitled to either component of a disability living allowance for any period after he attains the
age of 65 otherwise than by virtue of an award made before he attains that age.
(2) Regulations may provide in relation to persons who are entitled to a component
of a disability living allowance by virtue of subsection (1) above that any provision of this Act
which relates to disability living allowance, other than section 74 above, so far as it so relates,
and any provision of the Administration Act which is relevant to disability living allowance—
(a) shall have effect subject to modifications, additions or amendments; or
(b) shall not have effect.
76 Disability living allowance—supplementary
51
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a person shall not be entitled to a disability living allowance for any period preceding the date on which a claim for it is made or treated as
made by him or on his behalf.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) above, provision may be made by
regulations for a person to be entitled to a component of a disability living allowance for a
period preceding the date on which a claim for such an allowance is made or treated as made
by him or on his behalf if he has previously been entitled to that component.
(3) For the purposes of sections 72(5) and 73(12) above where—
(a) a person purports to make a claim for a disability living allowance on behalf
of another; and
(b) the claim is made expressly on the ground that the person on whose behalf it
purports to be made is terminally ill,
that person shall be regarded as making the claim notwithstanding that it is made without his knowledge or authority.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Part V
Benefits for Industrial Injuries
General provisions
94 Right to industrial injuries benefit
(1) Industrial injuries benefit shall be payable where an employed earner suffers
personal injury caused after 4th July 1948 by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, being employed earner’s employment.
(2) Industrial injuries benefit consists of the following benefits—
(a) disablement benefit payable in accordance with sections 103 to 105 below,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule 7 below and Parts II and III of that Schedule;
(b) reduced earnings allowance payable in accordance with Part IV;
(c) retirement allowance payable in accordance with Part V; and
(d) industrial death benefit, payable in accordance with Part VI.
(3) For the purposes of industrial injuries benefit an accident arising in the course
of an employed earner’s employment shall be taken, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, also to have arisen out of that employment.
(4) Regulations may make provision as to the day which, in the case of night workers and other special cases, is to be treated for the purposes of industrial injuries benefit as the
day of the accident.
(5) Subject to sections 117, 119 and 120 below, industrial injuries benefit shall not
be payable in respect of an accident happening while the earner is outside Great Britain.
52
(6) In the following provisions of this Part of this Act “work” in the contexts “incapable of work” and “incapacity for work” means work which the person in question can be
reasonably expected to do.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Part VII
Income-related Benefits
General
123 Income-related benefits
(1) Prescribed schemes shall provide for the following benefits (in this Act referred
to as “income-related benefits”)—
(a) income support;
(b) . . .
(c) . . .
(d) housing benefit; and
[(e) council tax benefit].
(2) The Secretary of State shall make copies of schemes prescribed under subsection (1)(a), (b) or (c) above available for public inspection at local offices of [the Department
for Work and Pensions] at all reasonable hours without payment.
[Certains articles concernant housing benefit omis.....]
Income support
124 Income support
(1) A person in Great Britain is entitled to income support if—
[(a) he is of or over the age of 16;]
[(aa) he has not attained the qualifying age for state pension credit;]
(b) he has no income or his income does not exceed the applicable amount;
(c) he is not engaged in remunerative work and, if he is a member of a married or
unmarried couple, the other member is not so engaged; . . .
[(d) except in such circumstances as may be prescribed, he is not receiving relevant education;]
[(e) he falls within a prescribed category of person; . . .
(f) he is not entitled to a jobseeker’s allowance and, if he is a member of a married or unmarried couple, the other member of the couple is not[, and the couple are not,] entitled to an income-based jobseeker’s allowance][; and
53
(g) if he is a member of a married or unmarried couple, the other member of the
couple is not entitled to state pension credit].
(2), (3) . . .
(4)
Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is entitled to income support,
then—
(a) if he has no income, the amount shall be the applicable amount; and
(b) if he has income, the amount shall be the difference between his income and
the applicable amount.
(5) Where a person is entitled to income support for a period to which this subsection applies, the amount payable for that period shall be calculated in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(6) Subsection (5) above applies—
(a) to a period of less than a week which is the whole period for which income
support is payable; and
(b) to any other period of less than a week for which it is payable.
General
134 Exclusions from benefit
(1) No person shall be entitled to an income-related benefit if his capital or a prescribed part of it exceeds the prescribed amount.
(2) Except in prescribed circumstances the entitlement of one member of a family
to any one income-related benefit excludes entitlement to that benefit for any other member
for the same period.
(3) . . .
(4) Where the amount of any income-related benefit would be less than a prescribed amount, it shall not be payable except in prescribed circumstances.
135 The applicable amount
(1) The applicable amount, in relation to any income-related benefit, shall be such
amount or the aggregate of such amounts as may be prescribed in relation to that benefit.
(2) The power to prescribe applicable amounts conferred by subsection (1) above
includes power to prescribe nil as an applicable amount.
(3) . . .
(4) . . .
(5) . . . The applicable amount for a severely disabled person shall include an
amount in respect of his being a severely disabled person.
54
(6) Regulations may specify circumstances in which persons are to be treated as being or as not being severely disabled.
136 Income and capital
(1) Where a person claiming an income-related benefit is a member of a family, the
income and capital of any member of that family shall, except in prescribed circumstances, be
treated as the income and capital of that person.
(2) Regulations may provide that capital not exceeding the amount prescribed under
section 134(1) above but exceeding a prescribed lower amount shall be treated, to a prescribed
extent, as if it were income of a prescribed amount.
(3) Income and capital shall be calculated or estimated in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(4) A person’s income in respect of a week shall be calculated in accordance with
prescribed rules; and the rules may provide for the calculation to be made by reference to an
average over a period (which need not include the week concerned).
(5) Circumstances may be prescribed in which—
(a) a person is treated as possessing capital or income which he does not possess;
(b) capital or income which a person does possess is to be disregarded;
(c) income is to be treated as capital;
(d) capital is to be treated as income.
---------------------------------------------
Part XI
Statutory Sick Pay
Employer's liability
151 Employer’s liability
(1) Where an employee has a day of incapacity for work in relation to his contract of
service with an employer, that employer shall, if the conditions set out in sections 152 to 154
below are satisfied, be liable to make him, in accordance with the following provisions of this
Part of this Act, a payment (to be known as “statutory sick pay”) in respect of that day.
(2) Any agreement shall be void to the extent that it purports—
(a) to exclude, limit or otherwise modify any provision of this Part of this Act, or
(b) to require an employee to contribute (whether directly or indirectly) towards
any costs incurred by his employer under this Part of this Act.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, any agreement between an employer and an employee authorising any deductions from statutory sick pay which the employer is liable to pay
55
to the employee in respect of any period shall not be void by virtue of subsection (2)(a) above
if the employer—
(a) is authorised by that or another agreement to make the same deductions from
any contractual remuneration which he is liable to pay in respect of the same period, or
(b) would be so authorised if he were liable to pay contractual remuneration in respect of that period.
(4) For the purposes of this Part of this Act [a day of incapacity for work in relation
to a contract of service means a day on which] the employee concerned is, or is deemed in
accordance with regulations to be, incapable by reason of some specific disease or bodily or
mental disablement of doing work which he can reasonably be expected to do under that contract.
(5) In any case where an employee has more than one contract of service with the
same employer the provisions of this Part of this Act shall, except in such cases as may be
prescribed and subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, have effect as if the
employer were a different employer in relation to each contract of service.
(6) Circumstances may be prescribed in which, notwithstanding the provisions of
subsections (1) to (5) above, the liability to make payments of statutory sick pay is to be a
liability of the [Commissioners of Inland Revenue].
[(7) Regulations under subsection (6) above must be made with the concurrence of
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue.]
The qualifying conditions
152 Period of incapacity for work
(1) The first condition is that the day in question forms part of a period of incapacity
for work.
(2) In this Part of this Act “period of incapacity for work” means any period of four
or more consecutive days, each of which is a day of incapacity for work in relation to the contract of service in question.
(3) Any two periods of incapacity for work which are separated by a period of not
more than 8 weeks shall be treated as a single period of incapacity for work.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations direct that a larger number of weeks
specified in the regulations shall be substituted for the number of weeks for the time being
specified in subsection (3) above.
(5) No day of the week shall be disregarded in calculating any period of consecutive
days for the purposes of this section.
(6) A day may be a day of incapacity for work in relation to a contract of service,
and so form part of a period of incapacity for work, notwithstanding that—
(a)
it falls before the making of the contract or after the contract expires or is
brought to an end; or
56
(b) it is not a day on which the employee concerned would be required by that
contract to be available for work.
153 Period of entitlement
(1) The second condition is that the day in question falls within a period which is, as
between the employee and his employer, a period of entitlement.
(2) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a period of entitlement, as between an
employee and his employer, is a period beginning with the commencement of a period of incapacity for work and ending with whichever of the following first occurs—
(a) the termination of that period of incapacity for work;
(b) the day on which the employee reaches, as against the employer concerned,
his maximum entitlement to statutory sick pay (determined in accordance with section 155
below);
(c) the day on which the employee’s contract of service with the employer concerned expires or is brought to an end;
(d) in the case of an employee who is, or has been, pregnant, the day immediately
preceding the beginning of the disqualifying period.
(3) Schedule 11 to this Act has effect for the purpose of specifying circumstances in
which a period of entitlement does not arise in relation to a particular period of incapacity for
work.
(4) A period of entitlement as between an employee and an employer of his may
also be, or form part of, a period of entitlement as between him and another employer of his.
(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations—
(a) specify circumstances in which, for the purpose of determining whether an
employee’s maximum entitlement to statutory sick pay has been reached in a period of entitlement as between him and an employer of his, days falling within a previous period of entitlement as between the employee and any person who is or has in the past been an employer of
his are to be counted; and
(b)
direct that in prescribed circumstances an employer shall provide a person
who is about to leave his employment, or who has been employed by him in the past, with a
statement in the prescribed form containing such information as may be prescribed in relation
to any entitlement of the employee to statutory sick pay.
(6) Regulations may provide, in relation to prescribed cases, for a period of entitlement to end otherwise than in accordance with subsection (2) above.
(7) In a case where the employee’s contract of service first takes effect on a day
which falls within a period of incapacity for work, the period of entitlement begins with that
day.
(8) In a case where the employee’s contract of service first takes effect between two
periods of incapacity for work which by virtue of section 152(3) above are treated as one, the
period of entitlement begins with the first day of the second of those periods.
57
(9) In any case where, otherwise than by virtue of section 6(1)(b) above, an employee’s earnings under a contract of service in respect of the day on which the contract takes
effect do not attract a liability to pay secondary Class 1 contributions, subsections (7) and (8)
above shall have effect as if for any reference to the contract first taking effect there were substituted a reference to the first day in respect of which the employee’s earnings attract such a
liability.
(10) Regulations shall make provision as to an employer’s liability under this Part
of this Act to pay statutory sick pay to an employee in any case where the employer’s contract
of service with that employee has been brought to an end by the employer solely, or mainly,
for the purpose of avoiding liability for statutory sick pay.
(11) Subsection (2)(d) above does not apply in relation to an employee who has
been pregnant if her pregnancy terminated, before the beginning of the disqualifying period,
otherwise than by confinement.
“confinement” is to be construed in accordance with section 171(1) below;
“disqualifying period” means—
(a) in relation to a woman entitled to statutory maternity pay, the maternity pay
period; and
(b)
ance period;
in relation to a woman entitled to maternity allowance, the maternity allow-
“maternity allowance period” has the meaning assigned to it by section 35(2) above,
and
“maternity pay period” has the meaning assigned to it by section 165(1) below.
154 Qualifying days
(1) The third condition is that the day in question is a qualifying day.
(2) The days which are for the purposes of this Part of this Act to be qualifying days
as between an employee and an employer of his (that is to say, those days of the week on
which he is required by his contract of service with that employer to be available for work or
which are chosen to reflect the terms of that contract) shall be such day or days as may, subject to regulations, be agreed between the employee and his employer or, failing such agreement, determined in accordance with regulations.
(3) In any case where qualifying days are determined by agreement between an employee and his employer there shall, in each week (beginning with Sunday), be at least one
qualifying day.
(4) A day which is a qualifying day as between an employee and an employer of his
may also be a qualifying day as between him and another employer of his.
155 Limitations on entitlement
(1) Statutory sick pay shall not be payable for the first three qualifying days in any
period of entitlement.
58
(2) An employee shall not be entitled, as against any one employer, to an aggregate
amount of statutory sick pay in respect of any one period of entitlement which exceeds his
maximum entitlement.
(3) The maximum entitlement as against any one employer is reached on the day on
which the amount to which the employee has become entitled by way of statutory sick pay
during the period of entitlement in question first reaches or passes the entitlement limit.
(4) The entitlement limit is an amount equal to 28 times [the weekly rate applicable
in accordance with] section 157 below.
(5) Regulations may make provision for calculating the entitlement limit in any case
where an employee’s entitlement to statutory sick pay is calculated by reference to different
weekly rates in the same period of entitlement.
156 Notification of incapacity for work
(1) Regulations shall prescribe the manner in which, and the time within which, notice of any day of incapacity for work is to be given by or on behalf of an employee to his employer.
(2) An employer who would, apart from this section, be liable to pay an amount of
statutory sick pay to an employee in respect of a qualifying day (the “day in question”) shall
be entitled to withhold payment of that amount if—
(a) the day in question is one in respect of which he has not been duly notified in
accordance with regulations under subsection (1) above; or
(b) he has not been so notified in respect of any of the first three qualifying days in
a period of entitlement (a “waiting day”) and the day in question is the first qualifying day in
that period of entitlement in respect of which the employer is not entitled to withhold payment—
(i) by virtue of paragraph (a) above; or
(ii) in respect of an earlier waiting day by virtue of this paragraph.
(3) Where an employer withholds any amount of statutory sick pay under this section—
(a) the period of entitlement in question shall not be affected; and
(b) for the purposes of calculating his maximum entitlement in accordance with
section 155 above the employee shall not be taken to have become entitled to the amount so
withheld.
157 Rates of payment
(1)
[£66.15].
Statutory sick pay shall be payable by an employer at the weekly rate of
(2) The Secretary of State may by order—
[(a) amend subsection (1) above so as to substitute different provision as to the
weekly rate or rates of statutory sick pay; and]
59
(b) make such consequential amendments as appear to him to be required of any
provision contained in this Part of this Act.
(3) The amount of statutory sick pay payable by any one employer in respect of any
day shall be the weekly rate applicable on that day divided by the number of days which are,
in the week (beginning with Sunday) in which that day falls, qualifying days as between that
employer and the employee concerned.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[159A Power to provide for recovery by employers of sums paid by way of statutory
sick pay]
[(1) The Secretary of State may by order provide for the recovery by employers, in
accordance with the order, of the amount (if any) by which their payments of, or liability incurred for, statutory sick pay in any period exceeds the specified percentage of the amount of
their liability for contributions payments in respect of the corresponding period.
(2) An order under subsection (1) above may include provision—
(a)
as to the periods by reference to which the calculation referred to above is to
be made,
(b) for amounts which would otherwise be recoverable but which do not exceed
the specified minimum for recovery not to be recoverable,
(c) for the rounding up or down of any fraction of a pound which would otherwise result from a calculation made in accordance with the order, and
(d) for any deduction from contributions payments made in accordance with the
order to be disregarded for such purposes as may be specified,
and may repeal sections 158 and 159 above and make any amendments of other enactments which are consequential on the repeal of those sections.
“contributions payments” means payments which a person is required by or under
any enactment to make in discharge of any liability of his as an employer in respect of primary
or secondary Class 1 contributions; and
“specified” means specified in or determined in accordance with an order under subsection (1).
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make such transitional and consequential provision, and such savings, as he considers necessary or expedient for or in connection with the coming into force of any order under subsection (1) above.]

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