SIMON JACQUES - Supreme Court of Canada

File #35226 / 35231
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC )
File No. 35226:
BETWEEN:
IMPERIAL OIL
Appellant
- and -
SIMON JACQUES;
MARCEL LAFONTAINE, AUTOMOBILE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA;
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS OF CANADA
Respondents
(Styles of cause continued on interior pages)
_____________________________________________________________________________
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
______________________________________________________________________________
Deborah Calderwood/Megan Stephens
Crown Law Office - Criminal
720 Bay Street, 10th Floor
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 2K1
Tel: (416) 326-2276/3060
Fax: (416) 326-4656
[email protected]/
[email protected]
Counsel for Intervener AG Ontario
Robert Houston
Burke-Robertson
70 Gloucester Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0A2
Tel: (613) 236-9665
Fax: (613) 235-4430
[email protected]
Ottawa Agent for Intervener AG Ontario
-ii- and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO;
COUCHE-TARD INC.;
ALIMENTATION COUCHE-TARD INC., DÉPAN-ESCOMPTE COUCHE-TARD INC.;
CÉLINE BONIN;
RICHARD BÉDARD;
CAROLE AUBUT;
ULTRAMAR LTD.;
LUC FORGET;
JACQUES OUELLET;
PÉTROLES THERRIEN INC., DISTRIBUTIONS PÉTROLIÈRES THERRIEN INC.;
IRVING OIL INC./IRVING OIL OPERATIONS LTD.;
OLCO PETROLEUM GROUP;
COOP FÉDÉRÉE, ROBERT MURPHY, GARY NEIDERER;
9142-0935 QUÉBEC INC., 9131-4716 QUÉBEC INC., GROUPE DENIS MONGEAU INC.;
FRANCE BENOÎT;
RICHARD MICHAUD;
LUC COUTURIER;
GUY ANGERS;
PHILIPPE GOSSELIN & ASSOCIÉS LTD.;
ANDRÉ BILODEAU, CAROL LEHOUX, CLAUDE BÉDARD, STÉPHANE GRANT;
PÉTROLES CADRIN INC., DANIEL DROUIN;
PÉTROLES GLOBAL INC./GLOBAL FUELS INC.;
PÉTROLES GLOBAL (QUÉBEC) INC./GLOBAL FUELS (QUEBEC) INC.;
PROVIGO DISTRIBUTION INC.;
CHRISTIAN PAYETTE;
PIERRE BOURASSA;
DANIEL LEBLOND;
DÉPANNEUR MAGOG-ORFORD INC.;
2944-4841 QUÉBEC INC.;
SOCIÉTÉ COOPÉRATIVE AGRICOLE DES BOIS-FRANCS;
GESTION ASTRAL INC., LISE DELISLE;
134553 CANADA INC.;
GARAGE LUC FECTEAU ET FILS INC., STATION-SERVICE JACQUES BLAIS INC.,
9029-6815 QUÉBEC INC., GARAGE JACQUES ROBERT INC.;
GÉRALD GROULX STATION SERVICE INC., SERVICES AUTOGARDE D.D. INC.,
9010-1460 QUÉBEC INC.;
ARMAND POULIOT, JULIE ROBERGE, STATION-SERVICE POUILIOT
ET ROBERGE S.E.N.C.;
9038-6095 QUÉBEC INC.;
9083-0670 QUÉBEC INC., GESTION GHISLAIN LALLIER INC.;
2429-7822 QUÉBEC INC.;
2627-3458 QUÉBEC INC.;
9098-0111 QUÉBEC INC.;
2311-5959 QUÉBEC INC.,
-iiiGAZ-O-PNEUS INC.;
C. LAGRANDEUR ET FILS INC.;
UNIVERSITY GALT SERVICE INC.;
VALÉRIE HOUDE, SILVIE FRÉCHETTE, ROBERT BEAURIVAGE;
9011-4653 QUÉBEC INC., PÉTROLES REMAY INC., VARIÉTÉS JEAN YVES PLOURDE
INC. AND 9016-8360 QUÉBEC INC.
Interveners
File No. 35231:
BETWEEN:
COUCHE-TARD INC., ALIMENTATION COUCHE-TARD INC., DÉPAN-ESCOMPTE
COUCHE-TARD INC.;
CÉLINE CONIN;
RICHARD BÉDARD;
ULTRAMAR LTD.
PÉTROLES THERRIEN INC., DISTRIBUTION PÉTROLIÈRES THERRIEN INC.;
IRVING OIL OPERATIONS LTD.;
OLCO PETROLEUM GROUP INC.;
COOP FÉDÉRÉE, ROBERT MURPHY, GARY NEIDERER;
9142-0935 QUÉBEC INC., 9131-4716 QUÉBEC INC., GROUPE DENIS MONGEAU INC.
Appellants
- and SIMON JACQUES;
MARCEL LAFONTAINE, AUTOMOBILE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC;
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS OF CANADA;
FRANCE BENOÎT;
RICHARD MICHAUD;
GUY ANGERS;
PHILIPPE GOSSELIN & ASSOCIÉS LTÉE.;
ANDRÉ BILODEAU, CAROL LEHOUX, CLAUDE BÉDARD, STÉPHANE GRANT;
PÉTROLES CADRIN INC., DANIEL DROUIN;
PÉTROLES GLOBAL INC./GLOBAL FUELS INC.;
PÉTROLES GLOBAL (QUÉBEC) INC./GLOBAL FUELS (QUEBEC) INC.;
PROVIGO DISTRIBUTION INC.;
CHRISTIAN PAYETTE;
PIERRE BOURASSA;
DANIEL LEBLOND;
DÉPANNEUR MAGOG-ORFORD INC.;
-iv2944-4841 QUÉBEC INC.;
SOCIÉTÉ COOPÉRATIVE AGRICOLE DES BOIS-FRANCS;
GESTION ASTRAL INC., LISE DELISLE;
134553 CANADA INC.;
GARAGE LUC FECTEAU ET FILS INC., STATION-SERVICE JACQUES BLAIS INC.,
9029-6815 QUÉBEC INC., GARAGE JACQUES ROBERT INC.;
GÉRALD GROULX STATION-SERVICE INC., SERVICES AUTOGARDE D.D. INC., 90101460 QUÉBEC INC.;
ARMAND POULIOT, JULIE ROBERGE, STATION-SERVICE POULIOT ET ROBERGE
S.E.N.C.;
9038-6095 QUÉBEC INC.;
9083-0670 QUÉBEC INC., GESTION GHISLAIN LALLIER INC., 2627-3458 QUÉBEC INC.;
2429-7822 QUÉBEC INC., UNIVERSTY GALT SERVICE INC.;
9098-0111 QUÉBEC INC.;
2311-5959 QUÉBEC INC., GAZ-O-PNEUX INC.;
C. LAGRANDEUR ET FILS INC.;
VALÉRIE HOUDE, SYLVIE FRÉCHETTE, ROBERT BEAURIVAGE;
9011-4653 QUÉBEC INC.;
PÉTROLES REMAY INC.;
VARIÉTÉS JEAN-YVES PLOURDE INC.;
9016-8360 QUÉBEC INC.;
CAROLE AUBUT;
LUC FORGET;
JACQUES OUELLET
Respondents
- and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
Intervener
B. Katelanos/P. Hamelin/P. Legault
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
37ième étage
1, Place Ville-Marie
Montréal, Québec
H3B 3P4
Tel: (514) 878-9641
Fax: (514) 878-1450
[email protected]
Counsel for Appellant Imperial Oil
Guy Régimbald
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
26th floor
160 Elgin Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 1C3
Tel: (613) 786-0197
Fax: (613) 563-9869
[email protected]
Ottawa Agent for Appellant Imperial Oil
-vP. LeBel/N. Guimond/G. Paquette/G. Gadler/C. Lalancette
Ève Lapoint
Bernier Beaudry, avocats
Noël & Associés
300 - 3340, rue de la Pérade
111, rue Champlain
Québec, Québec
Gatineau, Québec
G1X 2L7
J8X 3R1
Tel: (418) 652-1700
Tel: (819) 771-7393
Fax: (418) 652-8688
Fax: (819) 771-5397
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for Respondent Simon Jacques,
Ottawa Agent for Respondent Simon Jacques
and Marcel Lafontaine, Automobile Protection
and Marcel Lafontaine, Automobile Protection
Association
Association
P. Blair/D. Jobin/A. Gingras/J. Lacroix/É. Landry-Therriault
Pierre Landry
Chamberland, Gagnon
Noël & Associés
1.03 - 300, boul. Jean-Lesage
111, rue Champlain
Québec, Québec
Gatineau, Québec
G1K 8K6
J8X 3R1
Tel: (418) 649-3524, x. 42635
Tel: (819) 771-7393
Fax: (418) 646-1656
Fax: (819) 771-5397
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for Respondent AG Quebec
Ottawa Agent for Respondent AG Quebec
Stéphane Hould/Denis Pilon
Directeur des poursuites pénale du Canada
22ième étage, Portage I
50, rue Victoria
Gatineau, Quebec
K1A 0C9
Tel: (819) 994-2834
Fax: (819) 997-5747
[email protected]
Counsel for Respondent AG Canada
Counsel for Respondent DPP Canada
Louis-Martin O’Neil/Jean-Philippe Groleau
Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP
26ième étage
1501, avenue McGill Collège
Montréal, Québec
H3A 3N9
Tel: (514) 841-6400
Fax: (514) 841-6499
[email protected]
Counsel for Couche-Tard Inc. and Alimentation
Couche-Tard Inc., Dépan-Escompte Couche-Tard Inc.
François Lacasse
Directeur des poursuites pénale du Canada
12ième étage
160, rue Elgin
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0H8
Tel: (613) 957-4770
Fax: (613) 941-7865
[email protected]
Ottawa Agent for Respondent AG Canada
Ottawa Agent for Respondent DPP Canada
Guy Régimbald
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
26th Floor
160 Elgin Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 1C3
Tel: (613) 786-0197
Fax:(613) 563-9869
[email protected]
Ottawa Agent for Couche-Tard Inc. and
Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc.,
Dépan-Escompte Couche-Tard Inc.
-viL. Belleau/A. Mignault/L. Jobin
Bureau 1400
507, Place d’Armes
Montréal, Québec
H2Y 2W8
Tel: (514) 940-0334
Fax: (514) 940-0336
[email protected]
Counsel for Céline Bonin
L. Bélanger/C. Plante/J. Girard
Stikeman Elliott LLP
Bureau 4000
1155 Boul René-Lévesque
Montréal, Québec
H3B 3V2
Tel: (514) 397-3078
Fax: (514) 397-3578
[email protected]
Counsel for Ultramar Ltd.
Pascale Cloutier/Fadi Amine
Miller Thomson Pouliot
31e étage
1155, boul. René-Lévesque Ouest
Montréal, Québec
H3B 3S6
Tel: (514) 871-5486
Fax: (514) 875-4308
[email protected]
Counsel for Pétroles Therrien Inc., Distributions
Pétrolières Therrien Inc.;
France Benôit; Richard Michaud
Sylvain Lussier/Elizabeth Meloche
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP
2100 - 1000, rue de la Gauchetière quest
Montréal, Québec
H3B 4W5
Tel: (514) 904-5377
Fax: (514) 904-8101
[email protected]
Counsel for Irving Oil Inc./Irving Oil Operations Inc.
-viiÉ. Vallières/S. Elbaz/R. April-Giguère
McMillan LLP
2700 - 1000 Sherbrooke St. W.
Montreal, Quebec
H3Z 3G4
Tel: (514) 987-5068
Fax: (514) 987-1213
[email protected]
Counsel for Olco Petroleum Group Inc.
Michel Chabot/Hugo Poirier
Gravel Bernier Vaillancourt
Édifice Iberville Trois
500 - 2960, boul. Laurier
Québec, Québec
G1V 4S1
Tel: (418) 656-1313
Fax: (418) 652-1844
[email protected]
Counsel for Philippe Gosselin & Associés Ltd.;
André Bilodeau, Carol Lehoux, Claude Bédard,
Stéphane Grant
Julie Chenette/Sébastien Pierre-Roy
Chenette, Boutique de litige Inc.
1400 - 1155, rue University
Montréal, Québec
H3B 3A7
Tel: (514) 877-4228
Fax: (514) 397-4064
[email protected]
Counsel for Coop fédérée, Robert Murphy,
Gary Neiderer
M. Jolin/M. Masson/F. Vil
Langlois Kronström Desjardins
Complexe Jules Daillaire, T3
2820, boul. Laurier, 13e étage
Québec, Québec
G1S 1C1
Tel: (418) 650-7000
Fax: (418) 650-7075
[email protected]
Counsel for 9142-0935 Québec Inc., 9131-4716
Québec Inc., Groupe Denis Mongeau Inc.
-viiiRoxanne Hardy
402, rue Notre-Dame Est
Montréal, Québec
H2Y 1C8
Tel: (514) 788-3510
Fax: (514) 798-0614
[email protected]
Counsel for Luc Couturier; Luc Forget
Jean-Rémi Thibault
Arnault Thibault Cléroux
2e étage
250, Place d’Youville
Montréal, Québec
H2Y 2B6
Tel: (514) 285-2727
Fax: (514) 285-2728
[email protected]
Counsel for Guy Angers; Jacques Oulellet
Daniel O’Brien/Pierre Grégoire
O’Brien Avocats s.e.n.c.r.l.
600 - 140 Grande-Allée Est
Québec, Québec
G1R 5M8
Tel: (418) 648-1511
Fax: (418) 648-9335
[email protected]
Counsel for Pétroles Cadrin Inc., Daniel Drouin
David Quesnel
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
37e étage
1 Place Ville-Marie
Montréal, Québec
H3B 3P4
Tel: (514) 392-9433
Fax: (514) 876-9033
[email protected]
Counsel for Pétroles Global Inc./Global Fuels Inc.;
Pétroles Global (Québec) Inc./ Global Fuels
(Québec) Inc.
-ixR. Charbonneau/T. Tremblay/A. Merminod
Borden Ladner Gervais LLP
900 - 1000 rue de la Gauchetière Ouest
Montréal, Québec
H3B 5H4
Tel: (514) 954-2518
Fax: (514) 954-1905
[email protected]
Counsel for Provigo Distribution Inc.
Richard Morin
Les avocats Morin et Associés Inc.
30, rue de la Gare
Saint-Jérome, Québec
J7Z 2B8
Tel: (450) 436-8166
Fax: (450) 436-6321
[email protected]
Counsel for Carole Aubut
Mark J. Paci/Amanda Alfieri
Pateras & Iezzoni
2314 - 500, Place d’Armes
Montréal, Québec
H2Y 2W2
Tel: (514) 284-0860
Fax: (514) 843-7990
[email protected]
Counsel for Richard Bédard
D. Desjarlais/G. Soulière/J. Philippe
Lamarre Linteau & Montcalm
900 - 1550, rue Metcalfe
Montréal, Québec
H3A 1X6
Tel: (514) 396-5005, x. 7133
Fax: (514) 396-0220
[email protected]
Counsel for Christian Payette
-xJean Berthiaume/Richard Mallette
Avocats
3365, rue Masson Est
Montréal, Québec
H1X 1R5
Tel: (514) 521-2144
Fax: (514) 525-0182
[email protected]
Counsel for Pierre Bourassa
Jo-Anne Demers/Jean-Olivier Lessard
Clyde & Cie Canada s.e.n.c.r.l.
1700 - 630, boul. René-Lévesque Ouest
Montréal, Québec
H3B 1S6
Tel: (514) 843-3777
Fax: (514) 843-6110
[email protected]
Counsel for Daniel Leblond
G. Cotnam/G. Allen/É. Bilodeau
Stein Monast s.e.n.c.r.l.
300 - 70, rue Dalhousie
Québec, Québec
G1K 4B2
Tel: (418) 640-4447
Fax: (418) 523-5391
[email protected]
Counsel for Dépanneur Magog-Orford Inc.
Charles Gosselin
Gosselin Girard avocats
105 - 155, rue Principale Ouest
Magog, Québec
J1X 2A7
Tel: (819) 843-3321
Fax: (819) 843-3324
[email protected]
Counsel for 2944-4841 Québec Inc.
-xiClaude Brulotte
250, rue Notre-Dame Est
Victoriaville, Québec
G6P 4A1
Tel: (819) 752-5454
Fax: (819) 752-2929
[email protected]
Counsel for Société coopérative agricole des Bois-Francs
Maryse Carrier/Jean-François Côté
Côté Carrier & Associés
3107 avenue des Hôtels
Québec, Québec
G1W 4W5
Tel: (418) 650-2285
Fax: (418) 656-0183
[email protected]
Counsel for Gestion Astral Inc., Lise Delisle
Benoît Lapoint/Maxime Nasr
Belleau Lapointe, s.e.n.c.r.l.
B-10 - 306, Place d’Youville
Montréal, Québec
H2Y 2B6
Tel: (514) 987-6673
Fax: (514) 987-6886
[email protected]
Counsel for 134553 Canada Inc.
Jean-Claude Chabot/Claudia Marie Chabot
Les avocats Chabot et associés
104 - 754, rue Notre-Dame Est
Thetford Mines, Québec
G6G 2S7
Tel: (418) 338-2181
Fax: (418) 338-6998
[email protected]
Counsel for Garage Luc Fecteau et fils Inc.,
Station-Service Jacques Blais Inc., 9029-6815
Québec Inc., Garage Jacques Robert Inc.
-xiiStéphane Reynolds
Monty Coulombe
200 - 234, rue Dufferin
Sherbrooke, Québec
J1H 4M2
Tel: (819) 566-4466, x. 590
Fax: (819) 565-2891
[email protected]
Counsel for Gérald Groulx Station Service Inc.,
Services Autogarde D.D. Inc., 9010-1460 Québec Inc.
Pierre Paradis/Anne-Marie Lessard
Paradis Dionne
257, rue Notre-Dame Sud
Thetford Mines, Québec
G6G 5T6
Tel: (418) 338-2138
Fax: (418) 338-8457
[email protected]
Counsel for Armand Pouliot, Julie Roberge,
Station-Service Pouliot et Roberge s.e.n.c.
Marcel Després
Després, Goulets, Avocats
1013, rue Belvédère Sud
Sherbrooke, Québec
J1H 4C6
Tel: (819) 823-2000
Fax: (819) 823-8057
[email protected]
Counsel for 9038-6095 Québec Inc.
Sylvain Beauregard/Claude A. Roy
Roy Gervais Beauregard
300 - 1097, rue Notre Dame Ouest
Victoriaville, Québec
G6P 7L1
Tel: (819) 751-1907
Fax: (819) 751-2050
[email protected]
Counsel for 9083-0670 Québec Inc.,
Gestion Ghislain Lallier Inc.;
2627-3458 Québec Inc.
-xiiiSimon Letendre
Therrien Couture Avocats s.e.n.c.r.l.
100 - 337, rue Dufferin
Sherbrooke, Québec
J1H 4M6
Tel: (819) 563-8888
Fax: (819) 563-2898
[email protected]
Counsel for 2429-7822 Québec Inc.;
Universy Galt Service Inc.
Guy Plourde
Plourde Côté avocats
296, rue Sherbrooke
Magog, Québec
J1X 2R7
Tel: (819) 847-2747
Fax: (819) 843-2531
[email protected]
Counsel 9098-0111 Quebec Inc.
Pierre Lessard
Avocats
101 - 390, rue King Ouest
Sherbrooke, Québec
J1H 1R4
Tel: (819) 564-1988
Fax: (819) 564-3038
[email protected]
Counsel for 2311-5959 Québec Inc., Gaz-O-Pneus Inc.
Jean Beaudry
Jean Beaudry & Associés
47, rue Laurier
Magog, Quebec
J1X 2K2
Tel: (819) 843-4603
Fax: (819) 847-3871
[email protected]
Counsel for C. Lagrandeur et fils Inc.
-xivMaxime Bernatchez
Dubé Bernatchez, Avocats
165, rue Wellington Nord
Sherbrooke, Québec
J1H 5B9
Tel: (819) 563-0333
Fax: (819) 563-0155
[email protected]
Counsel for Valérie Houde, Sylvie Fréchette,
Robert Beaurivage
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL:
9011-4653 Québec Inc., Pétrole Remay Inc., Variétés Jean Yves Plourde Inc. and 9016-8360 Québec
Inc.
CONTENTS
Page
Part I: Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Part II: Points in Issue.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Part III: Brief of Argument.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A.
The purpose of Part VI of the Criminal Code is to protect privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B.
Section 193 does not prohibit production of intercept content in civil discoveries.. . . . . . . . . 6
C.
Assessments of whether intercept content should be produced in civil discovery
regimes must take place within the Wagg-framework.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.
Careful balancing of relevant factors must occur where production is sought
from a party in possession of the intercept content. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(i)
The right of discovery is now engrained in the civil litigation process. . . . . . . 9
(ii)
Discovery rights must be balanced against the public interest in
non-disclosure when the documents sought include the fruits of a
criminal investigation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(iii) The rationale underlying the Wagg regime is sound and should
be adopted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(iv)
A variety of factors should be considered when balancing disclosure
rights against the public interest in intercepted conversations.. . . . . . . . . . . . 14
(v)
Conditions could be imposed to address remaining concerns where
production is warranted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
(vi)
Disputes should be resolved by the best placed arbiter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.
A different approach is required where a party is seeking production of intercept
content from a third party.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
D.
Art. 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied constitutionally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Part IV: Submissions on Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Part V: Order Requested. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Part VI: Authorities Cited
Part VII: Statutory Provisions
PART I – STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Overview
1. At issue in these appeals is whether private communications, intercepted pursuant to an
authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code,1 can be ordered produced for civil discovery. The
appellants contend that s. 193 of the Criminal Code prohibits such production and only allows
disclosure of intercept content2 to combat crime or protect national security. They further argue that
provincial rules of civil procedure allowing production of intercept content intrude into the federal
government’s exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and are thus unconstitutional.
2. The Attorney General of Ontario3 intervenes in these appeals, as of right, on the question of the
constitutionality of art. 402 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure.4 Ontario submits that the
constitutionality of art. 402 C.C.P. turns on the proper interpretation of s. 193, which, in turn, must be
guided by the purpose of Part VI of the Criminal Code, namely the protection of privacy. The offence
provision in s. 193 (generally prohibiting use and disclosure of intercept content) applies to the use and
disclosure of all intercept content. As such, production for discovery purposes can only occur if it falls
within the exemptions from criminal liability set out within ss. 193(2) and (3). Ontario agrees with the
respondents that s. 193(2)(a), on its own or in combination with s. 193(3), allows for the possibility that
intercept content could be produced for civil discoveries. Where such production is sought, however –
be it directly from one of the parties or directly from the state as a third party – the Crown and police
(and possibly other persons) must be given an opportunity to weigh in on the public and privacy
interests at stake before production can occur. Ontario submits that the Wagg framework adopted by
the Ontario Court of Appeal should govern this process.5 Given that s. 193(2)(a) allows for the
disclosure of intercept content in civil proceedings, including at the stage of discoveries, art. 402 C.C.P.
does not offend the division of powers set out under s. 91 and s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.6
B. Facts
3. Ontario takes no position on the facts.
1
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Ontario uses “intercept content” to refer to private communications intercepted lawfully under Part VI, without
consent (to interception, use or disclosure), including summaries and references in relation thereto.
3
Hereinafter Ontario.
4
R.S.Q., c. C-25 [hereinafter C.C.P.] This rule parallels provincial rules of civil procedure across the country,
including Rule 30.10 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 [hereinafter R.C.P.].
5
See D.P. v. Wagg (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 229 (C.A.) [hereinafter Wagg (C.A.)]; D.P. v. Wagg (2002), 61 O.R. (3d)
746 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Wagg (Div. Ct.)].
6
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
2
2
PART II – POINTS IN ISSUE
4. On September 23, 2013, the Chief Justice stated the following constitutional question:
Does art. 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, apply constitutionally having
regard to the legislative authority of Parliament under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867?
5. It is the position of the intervener, Ontario, that art. 402 of the C.C.P. can apply constitutionally to
authorize the production of intercept content for civil discovery purposes in limited circumstances.
PART III – BRIEF OF ARGUMENT
A. The purpose of Part VI of the Criminal Code is to protect privacy
6. While private conversations can be casual, innocuous or routine exchanges, that is not always the
case. Private communications may be deeply personal in nature.
People freely and spontaneously
express themselves in conversations with friends, family, lovers, colleagues or business associates
when they believe no one else is listening. They may reveal deep secrets, ideas, attitudes, fears,
passions and vulnerabilities that they would never want permanently recorded or shared with anyone
other than the intended recipient. They expect that the words, once spoken, will be retained, if at all,
only as personal memories. The interception of these conversations has a serious impact on privacy
interests – both for those whose communications are targeted for interception as well as third parties
who, while not targeted, have their conversations recorded without their knowledge or consent.
7. This Honourable Court has repeatedly emphasized that the protection of private communications is
critical in a free and democratic society. As Justice La Forest explained in R. v. Duarte, “[I]t has long
been recognized that this freedom not to be compelled to share our confidences with others is the very
hallmark of a free society”.7 The potential risks to privacy posed by electronic surveillance have also
been recognized by this Court on numerous occasions. This Court has cautioned that “one can scarcely
imagine a state activity more dangerous to individual privacy than electronic surveillance to which, in
consequence the protection accorded by s. 8 should be more directly aimed”8 and that “[w]iretapping
7
8
R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 at para 41.
R. v. Duarte, supra at para. 19 per La Forest J.
3
is highly intrusive.
It may affect human relations in the sphere of very close, if not intimate,
communications even in the privacy of the home.”9
8. Because of the intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, this Court has held that its use must be
carefully circumscribed and regulated. As Justice La Forest explained:
The reason for this protection is the realization that if the state were free, at its sole discretion, to
make permanent electronic recordings of our private communications, there would be no
meaningful residuum to our right to live our lives free from surveillance. The very efficacy of
electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any
expectation that our communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at the
whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made of our words
every time we opened our mouths might be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one
in which privacy no longer had any meaning. As Douglas. J., dissenting in the United States v.
White, [401 U.S. 745 (1971)], put it, at p. 756: “Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveller of
human privacy ever known”. If the state may arbitrarily record and transmit our private
communications, it is no longer possible to strike an appropriate balance between the right of the
individual to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude on privacy in the furtherance of its
goals, notably the need to investigate and combat crime.10
9. Parliament has also recognized the importance of protecting the privacy of Canadians, while at the
same time allowing for the interception of private communications where necessary for criminal
investigations. Part VI of the Criminal Code, which was brought into force in 1974 with the passage of
the Protection of Privacy Act,11 “was adopted to fill a troubling statutory void by establishing a
comprehensive regime for the regulation of electronic surveillance.”12 Part VI is the code Parliament
has chosen to govern the interception of private communications – and their subsequent disclosure or
use. As its name suggests, the Act’s raison d’être was to protect privacy. This fact was emphasized by
the then Minister of Justice, Otto Lang, when he introduced the Act to the House of Commons:
This bill is important because it recognizes in a formal way the importance of privacy in our
Canadian life … [I]n this bill, for the first time at a federal level, the right of privacy is
recognized expressly in a protection of privacy act. We are all familiar with the deep felt belief
that privacy and individuality are of fundamental importance to our own democratic way of life.
With the growth of electronic devices which make it possible to hear or intercept conversations
and communications without awareness of that interception by the persons participating in that
conversation, we have had an increase in the problem of protection of privacy and an increase of
the problem of the security of the people in this country, as well as their ability to converse with
9
R. v. Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992 at para. 21 per LeBel J.
R. v. Duarte, supra at para. 22.
11
S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
12
Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 20.
10
4
the knowledge that it is a private matter and not one which is being overseen or overheard by
other persons.
…
The main thrust is to make it an offence to engage in electronic, electro-magnetic and similar
eavesdropping or interception of conversations to protect privacy in a fundamental way by the
creation of that offence, and then only to allow certain very narrow exceptions to that main
point.13
10. Recently, in R. v. Telus Communications Co., this Court reaffirmed that Part VI is a “scheme to
protect private communications” and, more pointedly, that “Parliament’s intention in Part VI [is] to
protect an individual’s right to privacy in his or her communications”.14
11. The provisions within Part VI are true to its purpose. Although Part VI allows for interceptions of
private communications for the narrow purpose of combatting serious crime, extensive safeguards are
included in the scheme to minimize intrusions on privacy.15 Canadian appellate courts have found
these safeguards essential to the constitutionality of Part VI.16 These safeguards speak to the fact that
the scheme is intended to operate under a veil of confidentiality and that any intrusions on privacy that
are not properly authorized will be subject to severe sanction. For example, s. 184 of the Criminal
Code not only prohibits the interception of private communications but criminalizes it. Section 187
explicitly provides that the authorization packets for electronic surveillance remain confidential
(including affidavit materials relied upon for the application and any intercept content included or
summarized therein); these materials are to be kept in sealed packets in the custody of the court.17
Section 193 – the provision directly implicated by these appeals – criminalizes the use and disclosure
of the fruits of interceptions, recognizing both the confidential nature of intercept content and that
13
House of Commons Debates, 29th Parl. 1st Sess., Vol. 4 (7 May 1973) at 3471-3472 (Hon. Otto Lang) [emphasis
added].
14
R. v. Telus Communications Co., [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 3 and 36 [hereinafter Telus]. This Court’s
concerns about privacy are reflected in other recent decisions: R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60 and R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1
S.C.R. 253.
15
The safeguards have recently been summarized by this Court in Telus, supra at paras. 27-30 (per the majority)
and para. 121 (per the dissent).
16
See, for example, R. v. Finlay and Grellette (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 632 (C.A.) at paras. 73-82.
17
This Court has held that accused persons are automatically entitled to access to the packet under section
187(1.4): see Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505. Non-accused targets are not, however,
entitled to automatic access. In Michaud v. Quebec, supra, at para. 59, a majority of this Court held that before
the packet can be unsealed for a non-accused target, the applicant must preliminarily demonstrate the
authorization was unlawful (fraud or wilful non-disclosure). See also La Forest and Sopinka JJ, writing in dissent,
at para. 109.
5
dissemination can further impact privacy rights.18
The majority of this Court has found that these
safeguards “illuminate Parliament’s intention that a higher degree of protection be available for private
communications. Part VI has broad application to a number of technologies and includes more
rigorous safeguards than other warrant provisions in the Code.”19
12. The presumptively confidential nature of the wiretap regime is not unique to Canada. Wiretap
schemes in both the United States and the United Kingdom are similarly animated by the need to
protect privacy. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, “Although Title III authorizes invasions of
individual privacy under certain circumstances, the protection of privacy was an overriding
congressional concern”.20 Indeed, in the U.K., the authorization and use of electronic surveillance are
almost exclusively limited to investigative purposes; they cannot be admitted to prove an offence in
criminal proceedings.21
13. Section 193 must be understood and interpreted against this backdrop – namely the presumptively
confidential nature of Part VI, and its dominant purpose of protecting privacy interests.
18
The
In the United States, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, underscored this concern,
explaining: “[T]he disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy
than the interception itself.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 582 U.S. 514 at 533 (2001).
19
Telus, supra at para. 31 [emphasis added].
20
See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 at 48-50 (1972) for an overview of the U.S. “Title III” legislation
(Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522) (1968), which was
the model for Canada’s Protection of Privacy Act, supra. U.S. Federal law does not provide for production of
intercept content in the course of civil discoveries where only the state – and neither party – is in the possession
the materials sought. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently ordered production in the context of a civil
enforcement proceeding where the defendant had received criminal disclosure of intercept content that the
plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission, did not have: S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F. Supp. (3d) 159 (2d
Cir. 2010). See also Andrew P. Atkins, “New Methods of Financial White-Collar Criminal Investigation and
Prosecution: The Spillover of Wiretaps to Civil Enforcement Proceedings” (2013) 33:2 Pace L. Rev. 716 at 728.
21
The authorization and use of wiretaps and electronic surveillance in the U.K. is governed by the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (U.K.), c. 23 (RIPA). The purpose of RIPA is to ensure that investigations are
conducted in accordance with human rights. Interceptions are authorized in limited circumstances where
necessity and proportionality have been demonstrated. Once obtained, interceptions are subject to strict
safeguards limiting handling, use, storage and disclosure. When no longer necessary for authorized purposes,
they must be destroyed. Intercept content cannot generally play any role in legal proceedings; it generally cannot
be adduced into evidence: s. 17 RIPA. It can only be disclosed to the prosecutor (who only sees it if it was
justifiably retained for specifically authorized purposes) to ensure fairness in the prosecution and not for any other
purposes, including cross-examination. Disclosure to a trial judge also occurs only exceptionally where it is
essential to the interests of justice. Nothing permits intercept content, or the fact of interception, to be disclosed to
the defence or used by civil litigants (except in limited circumstances where there is an allegation that the
interception was illegal). See U.K., Home Office, Interception of Communications Code of Practice (London:
The Stationary Office, 2002) for a full discussion of the operation of RIPA.
6
confidential character of the scheme also drives the analysis in relation to when and how such
intercepts can be disclosed in the context of civil proceedings.
B. Section 193 does not prohibit production of intercept content in civil discoveries
14. Section 193 makes a critical contribution to the Part VI scheme. It governs the use or disclosure of
all intercept content regardless of the context in which such material may be sought.22 Broadly
speaking, s. 193 criminalizes use and disclosure, subject only to narrow exceptions. That it is intended
to apply to all intercept content is supported by the nature of the Part VI scheme as a self-contained,
mini-code, governing the interception of private communications and their subsequent disclosure or
use. It is also supported by the unqualified and unambiguous language of the section and the purpose
of Part VI. None of the parties dispute the application of s. 193 to the present context.
15. Given that s. 193 applies to the disclosure and use of all intercept content, the question in this
appeal is whether production for civil discovery purposes falls within one of the narrow exceptions
provided for under ss. 193(2) or (3). If not, production in this context would constitute an offence.
16. Of the six exceptions from criminal liability set out in s. 193(2), three reflect the compelling need to
protect those who use or disclose intercepted communications, in the course of their duties, for the
purpose of ongoing criminal investigations, particularly vis-à-vis criminal organizations.23
These
exceptions are entirely consistent with the Part VI regime, further the public interest in criminal
investigation, and justify the controlled curtailment of privacy rights under Part VI. Of the remaining
exceptions, s. 193(2)(c) protects those persons fulfilling notice obligations under the Criminal Code
and s. 193(2)(d) protects those engaged in activities incidental to interceptions (relating to the
operation, servicing or monitoring of public telephone or other communication services). Protecting
these individuals from prosecution is essential to the effective operation of Part VI.
22
On this point, Ontario disagrees with the recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court Justice rendered in the
context of a media request for access to intercept content contained within an Information to Obtain (“ITO”)
within a sealed search warrant application. In that case, the judge found that s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code was a
complete code for determining access to intercept content within ITOs and that s. 193, and Part VI, was nothing
more than tangentially informative. See R. v, Globe and Mail Inc., 2013 ONSC 6836 at para. 20. It is Ontario’s
position that s. 193 governs all requests for disclosure of intercept content, regardless of whether it is contained
within an ITO.
23
See for example ss. 193(2)(b), (e) and (f).
7
17. The remaining exception is s. 193(2)(a), the meaning of which lies at the core of these appeals. It
provides that disclosure may be made “in the course of or for the purpose of giving evidence in any
civil or criminal proceedings or in any other proceedings in which the person may be required to give
evidence on oath”. It is Ontario’s position that s. 193(2)(a) must be interpreted in a conservative
manner, having regard to the spirit that animates of Part VI. That said, s. 193(2)(a) must also be
interpreted with an eye to other important principles that guide the resolution of legal disputes,
including the importance of the search for truth. Indeed, this Court has found that the search for truth
can trump important privacy interests in different contexts. 24
18. Ontario rejects the appellants’ contention that s. 193(2)(a) only authorizes the disclosure of
intercept content in the context of criminal proceedings for the purpose of fighting crime or protecting
national security. The appellants’ interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of section
193(2)(a) and, for the reasons developed by the respondents to these appeals,25 it should be rejected.
On its plain wording, s. 193(2)(a) cannot be said to prohibit the disclosure or use of intercept content in
the context of giving evidence in civil proceedings or any other proceeding in which a person may be
required to give evidence under oath, including production for discovery.26 It exempts those who
would do so from criminal liability. This is consistent with the recognized need for fair and efficient
resolution of legal proceedings in different contexts; the appellants’ proposed interpretation could well
stifle the search for truth in important legal proceedings.27 Ontario agrees with the respondents that s.
193(2)(a) opens the door to the possibility of production in the context of civil discoveries.28
19. However, the conclusion that s. 193(2)(a) opens the door to the possibility of ordering intercept
content produced at discoveries does not mean that the use and disclosure of intercept content becomes
24
See for example R. v. O’Connor, [1995], 4 S.C.R. 411; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668; Juman v. Doucette,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 157.
25
In particular, Ontario adopts the arguments of the Director of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada at para.
52-75, Factum on Couche-Tard Inc. et al. (35231).
26
The important distinction between production at the discovery stage and admissibility at trial must not be
forgotten.
27
An overly strict interpretation, like that advanced by the appellants, would also bar the use of intercept content
in matters that involve pressing public interests, such as child welfare or professional disciplinary proceedings.
See, for example, Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.R., 2005 ONCJ 19; Children’s Aid Society of
the District of Thunder Bay v. S.D., 2011 ONCJ 100; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Canada (Attorney General)
(2008), 89 O.R. (3d) 209 (S.C.J.); Canada (Procureur Général) v. Charbonneau, 2012 QCCS 1701 (ordering
RCMP to disclose intercept content in the context of a commission of inquiry).
28
Where Stinchcombe disclosure of intercept content has occurred under s. 193(2)(a), further disclosure could
also be permitted under s. 193(3): R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
8
unrestricted. Disclosure of intercept content must remain off-limits except where applicable legislation
and common law rules, interpreted in a manner consistent with the spirit of Part VI, allow.29
C. Assessments of whether intercept content should be produced in civil discovery regimes must
take place within the Wagg-framework
20. This matter proceeded as a request for production of intercept content in the possession of a third
party (the Competition Bureau and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada) under art. 402 C.C.P.
However, the only materials sought by the applicants were those that had been disclosed in the course
of the criminal proceedings and were thus in possession of the defendants, or at least some among
them.30 Ontario submits that where the intercept content sought is in the possession of a party to the
civil proceedings (in this case, the defendants), the request for production should be made directly to
that party and should take place within the analytical framework prescribed by Wagg.
21. Although the search for truth, and the equities associated with having litigants on equal footing with
respect to relevant information, may favour production of intercept content where one party to the
litigation is already in possession of the material sought (as was the case here), Ontario submits that
this Court should recognize that there remains, in this context, a heightened need to assess the various
social values and public interests at play before production of intercept content occurs (whether by
court order or on consent). Careful consideration should be given in every case to both competing
interests and the presumption of confidentiality at the heart of the Part VI scheme. Where production is
ordered (or made on consent), conditions with respect to editing, timing and costs may also be
appropriate. Where any of these matters need to be litigated before the court, the best-placed arbiter
should resolve the dispute.
22. Where the intercept content is not in the possession of any party to the litigation but is sought
directly from the state (Crown or police) as a third party,31 Ontario submits that there must be a much
heavier onus on the party seeking production. Ontario explores this third party production context
below, in broad strokes, not to suggest the Court adopt a particular test but to underscore important
29
In the criminal context, for example, the Crown’s function in fulfilling its Stinchcombe obligations must be
taken to be immune from criminal liability by virtue of subsection 193(2)(a) as no other exemption would apply.
30
Jugement de la CSQ sur requête pour ordonner à un tiers de donner communication de l’écoute éléctronique
(l’honorable Dominique Bélanger, j.c.s.), 28 juin 2012 [hereinafter Jugement de la CSQ], Appellants’ Record,
Vol. 1, p. 5ff at para. 66.
31
In Ontario, the rules refer to an application for production from a “non-party”:R.C.P. R. 30.10
9
differences between the party to party and third party contexts. In so doing, Ontario cautions the Court
against adopting any broad test that might inadvertently impact on this other, highly distinguishable,
context, which Ontario says was not truly at play in this case.
1. Careful balancing of relevant factors must occur where production is sought from a party in
possession of the intercept content
(i)
The right of discovery is now engrained in the civil litigation process
23. Production and discovery have become an integral part of the civil litigation process. More than
twenty years ago, in R. v. Stinchcombe, Justice Sopinka recognized that the element of surprise, which
had once been “one of the accepted weapons in the arsenal of the adversaries … has long since
disappeared” and been replaced by full discovery of documents and oral examination of parties and
witnesses.32 This change stemmed from an “acceptance that justice was better served when the element
of surprise was eliminated from the trial and the parties were prepared to address issues on the basis of
complete information of the case to be met.”33 Although Ontario appellate courts have emphasized
that “[t]he consistent tendency in this province has been to broaden and not circumscribe the right of
discovery”,34 there has been a recent shift away from allowing discovery of “as much relevant
information as possible”35 towards discoveries rooted in “proportionality”.36
24. Relevance remains the primary factor for determining disclosure and production in the civil
discovery context. As Justice Sopinka explained in Stinchcombe, “the search for truth is advanced
32
Stinchcombe, supra at 332.
Ibid.
34
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 54 citing Reichmann v. Toronto Life Publishing Co. (1988), 28 C.P.C. (2d) 11 (Ont.
H.C.J.), motion for leave to appeal to Divisional Court dismissed (1988), 29 C.P.C. (2d) 66 (Ont. H.C.J.) at 14.
35
Ontario v. Rothmans Inc., 2011 ONSC 2504 at para. 161.
36
Proportionality was incorporated into Ontario R.C.P. R. 1.04(1.1) and R. 29.2 in 2010, as recommended by the
Honourable Mr. Coulter Osborne: see Ministry of Attorney General, Civil Justice Reform Project: Summary of
Findings & Recommendations by the Honourable Coulter A. Osborne, Q.C. (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney
General, 2007) [Civil Justice Reform Project]. Under R. 29.2.03, courts faced with disputes over production of
documents (both in the hands of parties and non-parties) shall consider the reasonableness of the time required for
production; associated expenses; potential prejudice; potential interference with the orderly progress of the action;
ready availability of other sources of information; and whether production would result in an excessive volume of
documents being produced. The introduction of proportionality into the R.C.P. stemmed from the concern that the
justice system was under severe strain because cases were taking too long and costing too much. See, for
example, Javitz v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., 2011 ONSC 1332 at paras. 27-29; Abrams v. Abrams, 2010 ONSC
2703 at para. 70; Rothmans, supra at paras. 160-162. This Court has also recently affirmed the importance of
proportionality in civil litigation. As Karakatsanis J. explained, “[S]ummary judgment rules must be interpreted
broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims”:
Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para. 5 [emphasis added].
33
10
rather than retarded by disclosure of all relevant material.”37 Consistent with this principle, civil rules
of procedure across the country provide that parties to a dispute must disclose the existence of all
relevant documents.38 Unless they are privileged, these documents must also be produced to the other
side.39 This exchange of relevant information not only enhances the search for truth but is also rooted
in concerns about fairness insofar as it places parties on an equal footing. As the Court of Appeal
stated in Wagg, “Where the party in possession of the Crown brief has access to the materials, fairness
will generally dictate that they be produced to the other side”.40
(ii) Discovery rights must be balanced against the public interest in non-disclosure when the
documents sought include the fruits of a criminal investigation
25. Notwithstanding the relatively liberal approach that has been taken to the production of relevant
material in civil discoveries, Canadian appellate courts have recognized that relevance alone is not a
sufficient criterion for determining disclosure and production in civil discovery regimes where the
documents being sought include the fruits of a criminal investigation, even if they are in the possession
of a party to the dispute. In Ontario, the Court of Appeal mandated in Wagg that in all cases where the
documents sought through discovery include a Crown brief, an additional screening process is required
to assess whether the documents are subject to privilege, public interest immunity or, more generally,
“whether ‘there is a prevailing social value and public interest in non-disclosure in the particular case
that overrides the public interest in promoting the administration of justice through full access of
litigants to relevant information.’”41 The balancing of interests mandated by Wagg has been endorsed
in many Canadian jurisdictions, both explicitly and implicitly.42
37
Stinchcombe, supra at para. 15.
See, for example, R.C.P. R. 30.02(1).
39
See, for example, R.C.P. R. 30.02(2), subject to a contrary order being made under R. 29.2. See also
McLachlin J. (as she then was) discussing common law principles underlying the recognition of privilege from
disclosure: A.M. v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 at para. 19.
40
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 51. This was a key consideration for Justice Bélanger in this case: Jugement de la
CSQ, supra at para. 70.
41
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 17 citing Wagg (Div. Ct.), supra at para. 51 [emphasis added].
42
The Wagg regime has been explicitly endorsed and adopted by courts in British Columbia, Nova Scotia and
Quebec. See, for example, Huang (litigation guardian of) v. Sadler, 2006 BCSC 559 at paras.18-19; Vaughne
Realty (2005) Ltd. v. Leblanc, 2012 NSSC 261 at paras. 6-12; Jugement de la CSQ at para. 16 and 72. Those
jurisdictions that appear to have implicitly endorsed a balancing like that proposed in Wagg include Alberta,
Saskatchewan and the Federal Court of Appeal. See, for example, Jackson v. D.A., 2005 ABQB 702 at paras. 28
and 42; Lastiwka v. TD Waterhouse Investor Services (Canada) Inc., 2004 ABQB 740 at paras. 9-10; S.W. v. E.B.,
2012 SKQB 108 at paras. 16-23; Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2004 FCA 287 at paras. 45-50.
38
11
(iii) The rationale underlying the Wagg regime is sound and should be adopted
26. In Wagg, the plaintiff in the civil proceeding was seeking production of the Crown brief in the
possession of the defendant. The defendant had obtained the brief as a result of the disclosure process
in criminal proceedings in which he was the accused, but refused to produce it to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff moved to compel production. The Master refused to order production on the grounds that the
brief was not relevant. The plaintiff appealed and Jurianz J. (as he then was), finding the brief was
relevant, ordered it produced. On appeal to the Divisional Court, the Court found that “a blanket rule
requiring production on the simple grounds of relevance goes too far” and did not adequately account
for an assessment of the “public interest consequences” associated with disclosure of the Crown brief.43
Instead, the Divisional Court proposed a new screening process, which was adopted in whole by the
Court of Appeal. This new process mandated the following:

the party in possession or control of the Crown brief must disclose its existence in the party’s
affidavit of documents and describe in general terms the nature of its contents;

the party should object to produce the documents in the Crown brief until the appropriate
state authorities have been notified, namely the Attorney General and the relevant police
service, and either those agencies and the parties have consented to the production, or on
notice to the Attorney General and the police service and the parties, the Superior Court of
Justice has determined whether any or all of the contents should be produced;

the judge hearing the motion for production will consider whether some of the documents are
subject to privilege or public interest immunity and generally whether ‘there is a prevailing
social value and public interest in non-disclosure in the particular case that overrides the
public interest in promoting the administration of justice through full access of litigants to
relevant information’.44
27. In explaining the need for this process, both courts explored at some length why documents in a
Crown brief must be subject to heightened scrutiny prior to production. First, the contents of a Crown
brief are compiled by the Crown “in the exercise of its policing and prosecutorial functions, using the
force of the state to do so, for the public purpose of prosecuting the accused and protecting the public
against the commission of crime.”45 A Crown brief can contain any number of different documents,
including witness statements or incident reports, much of which could implicate privacy interests.
Importantly, those who gave their statements to the police – whether voluntarily or under compulsion –
did so for the purpose of a criminal investigation and not a civil dispute. Justice Rosenberg emphasized
that the House of Lords found this to be one of the key policy reasons for recognizing an implied
43
Wagg (Div. Ct.), supra at para. 19.
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 17 citing Wagg (Div. Ct.) at para. 51.
45
Wagg (Div. Ct.), supra at para. 22.
44
12
undertaking rule respecting criminal disclosure materials.46 As Lord Hoffman explained in Taylor v.
Serious Fraud Office:
Many people give assistance to the police and other investigatory agencies, either voluntarily or
under compulsion, without coming within the category of informers whose identity can be
concealed on grounds of public interest. They will be moved or obliged to give the information
because they or the law consider that the interests of justice so require. They must naturally
accept that the interests of justice may in the end require the publication of the information or at
any rate its disclosure to the accused for the purposes of enabling him to conduct his defence.
But there seems to me no reason why the law should not encourage their assistance by offering
them the assurance that, subject to these overriding considerations, their privacy and
confidentiality will be respected.47
28. Both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal also found that, in addition to these privacy
interests, there may be documents in a Crown brief over which the Crown could claim public interest
immunity, privilege, or, more broadly speaking, that it is not in the public interest to be produced.48
The parties to a civil proceeding may have nothing to gain from protecting these interests – and may
not even be aware of their existence.49
In order to ensure that these interests are given due
consideration, additional screening of production requests by Crown and police is necessary. It may
also be appropriate for interested third parties to be notified.50
29. The concerns that led the courts to mandate this additional screening process are amplified in cases
where the documents sought from the Crown brief include intercept content. Unlike those who provide
witness statements during the course of a traditional criminal investigation, those whose private
communications are intercepted by the state have not knowingly assisted in the investigation. As
46
Although the Court of Appeal in Wagg declined to decide whether an implied undertaking exists with respect to
Stinchcombe disclosure given to an accused in the context of criminal proceedings, Ontario urges this Court to
formally recognize such an undertaking, which has been endorsed by the recommendations of the Martin
Committee Report, by Ontario appellate jurisprudence and other lower court decisions. Ontario submits that,
having regard to the privacy and other interests routinely engaged in Crown disclosure, an implied undertaking
that Stinchcombe disclosure will only be used by counsel, and the accused, for the purposes of defending against
the criminal charges will always be appropriate. See Wagg (C.A.), supra at paras. 29-47, citing Martin Committee
Report at para. 35, R. v. Trotta (2004), 23 C.R. (6th) 261 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16; R. v. Mohammed (2007), 152
C.R.R. (2d) 129 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Basi, 2011 BCSC 314; Hedley v. Air Canada (1994), 23 C.P.C. (3d) 352
(Ont. Gen. Div.) at paras. 32-34, 37.
47
Taylor v. Serious Fraud Office, [1998] 4 All E.R. 801 (H.L.) at para. 36.
48
See Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 46. Admittedly, where Stinchcombe disclosure has already been made,
materials would have typically been vetted for public interest immunity or privilege. This consideration may thus
be more applicable in the third party context, where only the state is in possession of the material in question. The
broader public interest considerations may dominate the analysis where the records sought are in possession of a
party.
49
Wagg (Div. Ct.), supra at para. 23.
50
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 79.
13
discussed above, individuals have a high expectation of privacy when they communicate with friends,
family and associates. Part VI recognizes that these privacy interests can only give way to the state’s
need to investigate crime in limited circumstances and with appropriate prior authorization. Even when
the state is authorized to intercept communications, there is a high likelihood that the conversations of
innocent third parties will also be captured, leading to the potential violation of their privacy rights.51
30. Another potential concern when ordering intercept content produced in civil discoveries is that the
content may reveal both “the focus of the police investigation in a particular case, as well as the general
modus operandi of police electronic surveillance.”52 This risk is particularly acute in cases where the
criminal investigation has not been completed.53
31. Similarly, in cases such as this, where the civil discovery process has begun but criminal
proceedings are ongoing, disclosure of intercept content could interfere with the outcome of criminal
proceedings. There may be legitimate concerns about tainting witnesses.54 There may also be a need
for materials to be re-vetted for civil discoveries to ensure that all third parties’ privacy interests are
protected. As addressed further below, vetting may involve a significant amount of work that could
draw key resources away from the ongoing prosecution. Indeed, the facts in this case help bring home
the scope of work involved in such a project. The judge’s order for production required the Crown to
vet more than 5,000 previously disclosed intercepted conversations for third party interests.55
32. Given the particular policy concerns that arise in the context of disclosing intercept content, the
Wagg screening process is essential. Ontario therefore submits it should be adopted by this Court. It
provides a clear opportunity for the Crown and police (and any other notified party) to weigh in and
either consent to the production requested, or provide the court hearing the motion with the information
necessary to assess the appropriate balance between production and the countervailing public interest.56
51
See, for example, Michaud, supra at para. 109 (dissenting opinion, but endorsed by the majority at para. 67).
See also R. v. Guess, 2000 BCCA 547 at paras. 17-19: “In a great many of these investigations, a large mass of
material, much of it irrelevant and often concerning people and matters unconnected to the investigation will
come into existence”.
52
Michaud, supra at para. 66.
53
Typically Stinchcombe disclosure will not have been made where doing so would compromise an ongoing
investigation.
54
Jugement de la CSQ, supra at paras. 78-80; Children’s Aid Society of the District of Thunder Bay, supra at
paras. 54-55.
55
Jugement de la CSQ, supra at para. 98.
56
Rosenberg J.A. opined that “most of these issues will be resolved on consent without court intervention”: see
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 51. Where the documents sought include intercepts, consent may be less routine.
14
Relevance cannot be the sole basis for determining production in these types of cases. Such an
approach would be unfaithful to the animating spirit of Part VI.
(iv) A variety of factors should be considered when balancing disclosure rights against the public
interest in intercepted conversations
33. A myriad of factors may be important when assessing whether the protection of the public interest
or social values in intercepted conversations will outweigh the normal imperative of production in the
civil discovery process in any given case. The details with respect to which factors may be applicable
will need to be worked out in the context of concrete situations on a case by case basis. The balancing
assessment does not lend itself to bright line rules. However, given the unique nature of intercept
evidence, there are a number of factors that will likely need to be considered routinely. They include
the following.
Relevance: It must be clear that the intercept content is truly relevant to an issue in dispute. The
fact that the intercept content was disclosed to one of the parties pursuant to the Crown’s
Stinchcombe obligations in a criminal proceeding does not necessarily mean it will be relevant to
the civil dispute.57 Much will depend on the congruence between the civil action and the issues
at stake in the criminal proceeding.58 The onus should be on the party in possession of the
intercepts to disclose in the affidavit of documents only that which is truly relevant to the issues
in dispute.59
Privacy interests: Degree of relevance should be weighed against the extent to which ordering
production would impact privacy interests.60 As noted, persons whose communications were
intercepted did not consent and the impact on their privacy rights may be further amplified by
disclosing their communications. The extent to which the content is personal or intimate may tip
the scales – especially where relevance is not particularly high. Commercial or professional
interactions may not warrant the same degree of protection as more intimate, personal
communications.
57
Indeed, it bears emphasizing that the Stinchcombe standard requires that “[w]hile the Crown must err on the
side of inclusion, it need not produce what is clearly irrelevant”: Stinchcombe, supra at para. 20 [emphasis
added].
58
In this case, where the civil litigant is seeking to recover damages for consumers from the price fixing scheme
that led to criminal charges, there is obviously significant overlap in terms of relevance between the two
proceedings. This will not always be the case, however.
59
The burden of screening for relevance should not be imposed on the Crown or police since they cannot be
expected to be alive to the issues in dispute in the civil proceedings. It would also unreasonably shift costs that
should be borne by a private party to the public purse.
60
See, for example, the analysis undertaken by Justice Pardu in Law Society of Upper Canada, supra at paras. 5962.
15
Otherwise available: Alternative sources of information relevant to the same issue may justify
the refusal of a production request. If it is later determined that this other material is not the
“informational equivalent” of the intercepts, the party could renew its request.61
Public interest in the proceedings: The importance of the issues in dispute may also factor into
the balancing. For example, in child protection cases, courts have put the interests of children
ahead of other concerns relating to privacy interests or even potential harms to criminal
proceedings.62 Other cases may fall at the opposite end of the spectrum.
Impact on ongoing investigations/prosecutions: If either the criminal investigation or
prosecution is ongoing, production could well undermine the process. In these cases, it would be
appropriate for the state to argue that the request is premature.63 Ontario submits that it would
only be in rare cases that raise public protection concerns – such as child protection or
professional disciplinary proceedings where patient or client safety was engaged – where
production should take place prior to the conclusion of criminal proceedings.64
Costs associated with vetting and production: It may be that the costs associated with further
review and vetting, or production itself, of intercept content renders production unduly onerous
and costly. This may tip the scales in cases of borderline relevance.65
Whether documents already adduced in open court: If the intercept content has already been
publicly disclosed, the privacy concerns related to production under the civil discovery regime
might well be lessened.66
61
Under R.C.P. R. 29.2.03(1)(e) , the fact that the information is available from another source is a basis for
refusing to order production. This consideration was endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ontario
(Attorney General) v. Stavro (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 39 (C.A.) in the context of enumerating the factors that a judge
should consider on a motion to compel production of documents from a non-party. Given the sensitive nature of
intercept content, this consideration should be applicable when this is the information being sought. The factors
identified by the Court of Appeal as relevant in the non-party context include “the importance of the documents to
the litigation”; “whether discovery of the defendants with respect to the issues to which the documents are
relevant is adequate and if not, whether responsibility for that inadequacy rests with the defendants”; and “the
availability of the documents or their informational equivalent from some other source which is accessible to the
moving parties”: see Stavro, supra at para. 15.
62
See, for example, Children’s Aid Society of the District of Thunder Bay, supra; Catholic Children’s Aid Society
of Toronto, supra.
63
See, for example, Wong v. Antunes, 2009 BCCA 278 at para. 25.
64
If the Court chooses to order production in these situations, it must, at the very least, consider imposing a
condition limiting counsel and experts to reviewing materials at this stage, and not the actual parties who might
become witnesses in the criminal proceedings.
65
In Tele-Mobile Company v. Ontario, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305 at para. 67, this Court held that a production order
could be denied on the basis of the unreasonable burden it imposes. In Ontario, a court can refuse to order
production under R. 29.2.03(1)(b) where the associated expenses would be unjustified.
66
See, for example, Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, supra at para. 5. As Justice Rosenberg opined in
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 52, “[T]he parties and the state agents should agree to produce any information in the
Crown brief that was used in court in the course of the criminal prosecution, subject to some interest of
superordinate importance”. This approach is consistent with cases bearing upon the “open court” principle: see,
e.g., Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 and R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442.
16
Other factors: Any number of other factors may be relevant to the assessment of whether
intercept content should be produced, depending on the particular facts in the case, including:
public safety, protection of sources and police informants, protection of Charter rights and
freedoms, and protection of the integrity of the administration of the criminal justice system.67
The impact on the orderly progression of the action68 or the sheer volume of the materials69 may
also be a legitimate basis for refusing to order production.
(v) Conditions could be imposed to address remaining concerns where production is warranted
34. If, after considering all of these factors, a decision is made that the balancing assessment requires
that the party in possession of the intercept content should produce it in the context of civil discoveries,
there may still be a need to impose conditions. In particular, any remaining concerns about these types
of factors should be addressed by imposing conditions relating to editing, timing of disclosure70 and the
use that could be made of the intercept content.71 Conditions allowing for cost-recovery by the state for
vetting and, more generally, for responding to the production request, may also be appropriate.
72
Conditions such as these may help address public interest and privacy concerns. Indeed, the possibility
of imposing such conditions should factor into the assessment, in the first place, as to whether the
documents should be produced.
67
See Blank, supra at para. 47 where the Court reviews these factors in the context of an access to information
request.
68
R.C.P. R. 29.2.03(1)(d)
69
R.C.P. R. 29.2.03(2)
70
The Crown has the discretion to delay disclosure, even in criminal cases: see R. v. Stinchcombe, supra at para.
20. A condition could be imposed requiring production to take place after the conclusion of criminal proceedings.
71
Conditions could also be imposed with respect to the use that can be made of the materials produced (e.g.,
limiting the persons with whom the materials can be shared to avoid tainting witnesses and adversely affecting a
criminal prosecution). Although the implied undertaking rule – whether at common law or under provincial rules
of procedure such as Ontario’s rule 30.1.01(3) – would apply to production made in the course of civil
discoveries, the nature of intercept content justifies the imposition of more stringent conditions, tailored to ensure
privacy interests are afforded maximum protections.
72
The state is not a party to the proceedings and has no interest in the outcome. All reasonable costs incurred
should therefore be covered by the party seeking production (unless the court orders otherwise). This is consistent
with Ontario’s rule 30.10(5), which provides for presumptive cost recovery where production requests are made
of non-parties. It is also consistent s. 57 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. F.31, authorizing the recovery of fees to cover the costs of producing information when access is sought.
Justice Rosenberg acknowledged the potential costs to the “system” that may result from the Wagg approach in
Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 50. Ontario’s post-Wagg experience shows this concern was well warranted as the
number of requests increase dramatically each year.
17
(vi) Disputes should be resolved by the best placed arbiter
35. Where the state or an interested third party opposes production, or there is a dispute about
conditions sought by a party, the matter will need to be litigated before the court.73 In such cases,
Ontario proposes that the matter should proceed before the arbiter best placed to consider the most
pressing factors in dispute. If the primary dispute is over relevance to the civil proceedings, it would be
preferable for the trial or case management judge assigned to the civil case to hear the motion. Where
concerns relate to the potential impact on an ongoing criminal prosecution, a judge assigned to the
criminal case would be best suited to assess any impact of production on those proceedings.74
2. A different approach is required where a party is seeking production of intercept content from
a third party
36. Ontario submits that a fundamentally different, and highly restrictive, approach must be adopted for
cases where production of intercept content is sought directly from the state as a third party.
The
Wagg factors, identified above, would take on a heightened importance in this context, weighing
heavily against any order for production. This is so for several reasons.
37. First, unlike the case where the intercept content is in possession of a party to the dispute, the
fairness concern, rooted in the fact that one party is not on equal footing to the other, simply does not
arise.75
As such, that otherwise important counterbalance to the need to protect of privacy is
eliminated.76
38. Second, both provincial legislatures enacting rules of civil procedure and appellate courts have
recognized the inequities associated with requiring third parties, with no interest or stake in litigation,
73
A court order is not necessary where the state (and any interested third parties) have consented to production.
See Wagg (C.A.), supra at para. 79.
74
See, by way of analogy, Toronto Star Newspapers Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General), (January 8, 2014)
Toronto (O.C.J.) at paras. 12-18 where the provincial court judge was seen as best placed to make a determination
concerning the timelines for production of ITOs following the Superior Court of Justice’s decision that the order
for production should be issued. See also R. v. McNeil, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 at para 44; Stinchcombe, supra at 340;
R. v. Stavro, supra at para.11.
75
This is consistent with Ontario’s position that, in fact, the application in this case is properly characterized as a
party to party request for production.
76
In Ontario, both appellate and superior court decisions have found that, where a third party is seeking to inspect
seized items under s. 490(15) of the Criminal Code, privacy interests justify the imposition of a high threshold for
access. Those seeking access must show that it is “necessary in order to advance [a] legal interest or concern in
some concrete and required fashion”: R. v. Khattak, 2013 ONSC 7098 at para. 16. See also R. v. Backhouse
(2005), 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (C.A.) ata paras. 91-116; Obégi Chemicals LLC v. Kilani, 2011 ONSC 4636.
18
to expend valuable time and resources to assist private litigants in resolving their disputes. In Ontario,
for example, an applicant seeking production of records from a third party must not only establish
relevance to a material issue but also demonstrate that it “would be unfair to require the moving party
to proceed to trial without having discovery of the document”. 77 The Ontario Court of Appeal has held
that production from third parties should only be ordered in “exceptional cases”.
As the Court
explained:
Save in the circumstances specifically addressed by the Rules, non-parties are immune from the
potentially intrusive, costly and time-consuming process of discovery and production. By its
terms, rule 30.10 assumes that requiring a party to go to trial without the forced production of
relevant documents in the hands of non-parties is not per se unfair.78
39. Even where the onerous test under the applicable rules of procedure has been met, the court’s
authority to order production, in Ontario, remains discretionary. As Professors Walker and Sossin
explain, the limit on requiring production from third parties has been the countervailing norm in
Canada against the trend toward the expanding discovery process between the parties.79
40. The resources required to respond to a third party production request for intercept content could be
extraordinary. Intercept content in this type of application will not likely have been reviewed and
vetted for disclosure. A request for production by a third party could thus trigger a detailed review of
extensive intercept content that may not, otherwise, be subject to vetting.80
This task could be
enormous. Intercept content, by its nature, tends to be voluminous. In this case, some 220,000
communications were intercepted.81 Canadian cases show that intercepts in a single investigation can
number in the hundreds of thousands, or even exceed 1 million, only a small percentage of which may
be relevant to issues in litigation. These same cases speak to the weight of the task of vetting
intercepts.82 Screening these materials, may require experienced Crown counsel and police to abandon
77
R.C.P. Rule 30.10. This onus may have to be satisfied before the Crown expends any time and resources in the
review and editing of material sought.
78
Stavro, supra at para. 12; Tetefsky v.General Motors Corp, 2010 ONSC 1675, aff’d 2011 ONCA 246.
79
Janet Walker & Lorne Sossin, Civil Litigation (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 167-168.
80
This situation would typically arise in the context of investigations where no charges have not been laid (and
may or may not be laid at some future date). It could also arise where there is a lack of significant overlap
between the criminal and civil proceedings, meaning what was relevant in the criminal context will not
necessarily be relevant in the civil action.
81
Jugement de la CSQ, supra at para. 66.
82
In Michaud v. Quebec, supra at para. 66, the Supreme Court recognized that, in many cases, “the disclosure of
surveillance tapes (and available transcripts) will represent an enormous undertaking involving production of
dozens, if not hundreds, of hours of recorded conversations” and would likely require “considerable police
supervision” to ensure the tapes are properly edited. In R. v. Chan, 2003 ABQB 759 at paras. 33-34, the Crown
19
other important work for months on end to fulfill this function, adversely impacting investigations or
prosecutions. Although not easily quantifiable, the cost to the criminal justice system – and the public
purse more generally – would be substantial.83
41. Finally, third party production requests must be carefully restricted to avoid delaying or derailing
the civil proceedings themselves.84 As mentioned above, the expansion of the discovery process as
between the parties in the e-discovery era has given rise to concerns about the prohibitively high
expenses associated with civil litigation and related access to justice problems.85 Allowing for greater
discoveries of materials in the hands of third parties – particularly intercept content – would only
exacerbate those problems.
42. For these reasons, Ontario submits that a much more onerous standard would have to apply where
production of intercepts is sought directly from the state as a third party and cautions this Court against
inadvertently opening the door to orders for production in this context. 86
and police were required to review almost 300,000 narrative logs relating to intercepted calls in 5 languages (85%
of which were in neither English, nor French). Transcripts were prepared for 4,246 calls, with work done by 8
monitor-translators. The hard copy of the narrative extended to approximately 200,000 pages. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the charges were stayed under s. 11(b). See also Charbonneau, supra involving 1.5 million
intercepts obtained in the context of a significant police project (over 8,000 of which were subject to Stinchcombe
disclosure). See also Toronto Star., supra at paras. 30-31 where the court accepted that months would be needed
to properly vet intercept and other ITO content before Stinchcombe and media disclosure occurred. As the Court
stated at para. 27, “I accept that the exercise of protecting the identity of numerous confidential informants in
dozens of court documents comprising thousands of pages simply cannot be done with anything less than the
utmost care and diligence.”
83
In Tele-Mobile, supra at paras. 53 and 67, this Court recognized that where the financial consequence of a third
party production order are “so burdensome that it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to expect
compliance”, the third party may be exempted from it - even in the criminal context where there is a general duty
to assist in the administration of justice. In recognition of the unfairness of imposing costs on a third party,
Ontario’s rules include a presumption that reasonable costs incurred by the non-party will be covered (unless
ordered otherwise): see R.C.P. R. 30.10(5). See also R.C.P. R. 29.2.03(1)(b) and 29.2.03(2) where production can
be refused on the basis of expenses or volume of materials.
84
R.C.P. R. 29.2.03(1)(d).
85
See, e.g., Task Force on the Discovery Process in Ontario, Report of the Task Force on the Discovery Process
in Ontario (Toronto: Task Force on the Discovery Process in Ontario, 2003); British Columbia Justice Review
Task Force, Effective and Affordable Civil Justice: Report of the Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the
Justice Review Task Force (Victoria: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2006); Civil Justice Reform Project,
supra; Javitz, supra; Rothmans, supra.
86
Notably, civil litigants’ requests of the state for disclosure of wiretaps, made pursuant to U.S. Title III
legislation, have been rejected by U.S. courts. In In re Application of National Broadcasting Co. v. United States
Department of Justice, 735 F. Supp. (2d) 51 at 54-55 (2d Cir. 1984), the 2nd Circuit held that Congress did not
intend to turn Title III into a general civil discovery mechanism and did not intend that Title III would “make the
fruits of wiretapping broadly available to all civil litigants who show a need for them”.
PART VI – AUTHORITIES CITED
Para(s)
A.M. v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Abrams v. Abrams, 2010 ONSC 2703. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 582 U.S. 514 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2004 FCA 287. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 33
Canada (Procureur général) c. Charbonneau, 2012 QCCS 1701. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 40
Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.R., 2005 ONCJ 19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 33
Children’s Aid Society of the District of Thunder Bay v. S.D., 2011 ONCJ 100.. . . . . . . 18, 31, 33
D.P. v. Wagg (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 229 (C.A.). . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35
D.P. v. Wagg (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 746 (Div. Ct.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 26, 27, 28
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Hedley v. Air Canada (1994), 23 C.P.C. (3d) 352 (Ont. Gen. Div.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Huang (litigation guardian of) v. Sadler, 2006 BCSC 559. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
In re Application of National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Department of Justice,
735 F. Supp. (2d) 51 (2d Cir. 1984).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Jackson v. D.A., 2005 ABQB 702. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Javitz v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., 2011 ONSC 1332. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 41
Juman v. Doucette, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Lastiwka v. TD Waterhouse Investor Services (Canada) Inc., 2004 ABQB 740. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
-iiLaw Society of Upper Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) (2008),
89 O.R. (3d) 209 (S.C.J.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 61
Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 3.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11, 29, 30, 40
Obégi Chemicals LLC v. Kilani, 2011 ONSC 4636. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Ontario v. Rothmans Inc., 2011 ONSC 2504. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Stavro (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 39 (C.A.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 38
R. v. Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
R. v. Backhouse (2005), 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
R. v. Basi, 2011 BCSC 314. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
R. v. Chan, 2003 ABQB 759. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
R. v. Finlay and Grellette (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 632 (C.A.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R. v. Globe and Mail Inc., 2013 ONSC 6836. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
R. v. Guess, 2000 BCCA 547.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
R. v. Khattak, 2013 ONSC 7098. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
R. v. McNeil, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
R. v. Mohammed (2007), 152 C.R.R. (2d) 129 (Ont. S.C.J.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 23, 24, 30, 34
-iiiR. v. Telus Communications Co., [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11
R. v. Trotta (2004), 23 C.R. (6th) 261 (Ont. C.A.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Reichmann v. Toronto Life Publishing Co. (1988), 28 C.P.C. (2d) 11 (Ont. H.C.J.). . . . . . . . . . 23
S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F. Supp. (3d) 159 (2d Cir. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
S.W. v. E.B., 2012 SKQB 108. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Taylor v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, [1998] 4 All E.R. 801 (H.L.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Tele-Mobile Company v. Ontario, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 40
Tetefsky v.General Motors Corp, 2010 ONSC 1675 aff’d 2011 ONCA 246 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Toronto Star Newspapers Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General) (8 January 2014),
Toronto (Ont. C.J.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 40
Vaughne Realty (2005) Ltd. v. Leblanc, 2012 NSSC 261. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Wong v. Antunes, 2009 BCCA 278. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Texts and Articles
Atkins, Andrew P., “New Methods of Financial White-Collar Criminal Investigation
and Prosecution: The Spillover of Wiretaps to Civil Enforcement Proceedings” (2013)
33:2 Pace L. Rev. 716. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Walker, Janet & Sossin, Lorne, Civil Litigation (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Parliamentary Debates and Government Documents
British Columbia Justice Review Task Force, Effective and Affordable Civil Justice:
Report of the Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the Justice Review Task Force
(Victoria: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
House of Commons Debates, 29th Parl. 1st Sess., Vol. 4 (7 May 1973) (Hon. Otto Lang). . . . . . . 9
-ivMinistry of Attorney General, Civil Justice Reform Project: Summary of Findings &
Recommendations by the Honourable Coulter A. Osborne, Q.C. (Toronto: Ministry
of the Attorney General, 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 41
Task Force on the Discovery Process in Ontario, Report of the Task Force on the Discovery
Process in Ontario (Toronto: Task Force on the Discovery Process in Ontario, 2003). . . . . . . . 41
UK, Home Office, Interception of Communications Code of Practice (London:
The Stationary Office, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
-vPART VII – STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 402
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 30, Vict. c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 184, 187, 193, 487.3, 490(15)
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 57
Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (U.K.), c. 23
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, rules 1.04, 29.2, 30.02, 30.10
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194,
R. 1.04, 29.2, 30.02, 30.10
ENGLISH VERSION
FRENCH VERSION
GENERAL PRINCIPLE
PRINCIPE GÉNÉRAL
1.04 (1) These rules shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, most expeditious
and least expensive determination of every
civil proceeding on its merits. R.R.O. 1990,
Reg. 194, r. 1.04 (1).
1.04 (1) Les présentes règles doivent recevoir
une interprétation large afin d’assurer la
résolution équitable sur le fond de chaque
instance civile, de la façon la plus expéditive
et la moins onéreuse. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194,
par. 1.04 (1).
PROPORTIONALITY
PROPORTIONNALITÉ
(1.1) In applying these rules, the court shall
make orders and give directions that are
proportionate to the importance and
complexity of the issues, and to the amount
involved, in the proceeding. O. Reg. 438/08,
s. 2.
(1.1) Lorsqu’il applique les présentes règles,
le tribunal rend des ordonnances et donne des
directives qui sont proportionnées à
l’importance et au degré de complexité des
questions en litige ainsi qu’au montant en jeu
dans l’instance. Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 2.
MATTERS NOT PROVIDED FOR
SILENCE DES RÈGLES
(2) Where matters are not provided for in
these rules, the practice shall be determined by
analogy to them. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r.
1.04 (2).
(2) En cas de silence des présentes règles, la
pratique applicable est déterminée par
analogie avec celles-ci. R.R.O. 1990, Règl.
194, par. 1.04 (2).
(3) Revoked: O. Reg. 231/13, s. 2.
“Party and Party” Costs
(3) Abrogé : Règl. de l’Ont. 231/13, art. 2.
Dépens «partie-partie»
(4) If a statute, regulation or other document
refers to party and party costs, these rules
apply as if the reference were to partial
indemnity costs. O. Reg. 284/01, s. 3.
“Solicitor and Client” Costs
(4) Si une loi, un règlement ou un autre
document mentionne des dépens partie-partie,
les présentes règles s’appliquent comme s’il
s’agissait de la mention de «dépens
d’indemnisation partielle». Règl. de l’Ont.
284/01, art. 3.
Dépens «procureur-client»
(5) If a statute, regulation or other document
refers to solicitor and client costs,
(5) Si une loi, un règlement ou un autre
document mentionne des dépens indemnity
these rules apply as if the reference were to
substantial costs. O. Reg. 284/01, s. 3.
procureur-client, les présentes règles
s’appliquent comme s’il s’agissait de la
mention de «dépens d’indemnisation
substantielle». Règl. de l’Ont. 284/01, art. 3.
RULE 29.2 PROPORTIONALITY
DISCOVERY
RÈGLE 29.2 PROPORTIONNALITÉ DANS
L’ENQUÊTE PRÉALABLE
IN
DEFINITION
DÉFINITION
29.2.01 In this Rule,
29.2.01 La définition suivante s’applique à la
présente Règle.
“document” has the same meaning as in clause
30.01 (1) (a). O. Reg. 438/08, s. 25.
«document» S’entend au sens de l’alinéa
30.01 (1) a). Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 25.
APPLICATION
APPLICATION
29.2.02
This Rule applies to any
determination by the court under any of the
following Rules as to whether a party or other
person must answer a question or produce a
document:
29.2.02 La présente Règle s’applique à toute
décision du tribunal, en vertu de n’importe
laquelle des Règles suivantes, sur la question
de savoir si une partie ou une autre personne
doit répondre à une question ou produire un
document :
1. Rule 30 (Discovery of Documents).
1. La Règle
documents).
2. Rule 31 (Examination for Discovery).
2. La Règle 31 (interrogatoire préalable).
3. Rule 34 (Procedure on Oral Examinations).
3. La Règle 34 (procédure de l’interrogatoire
oral).
4. Rule 35 (Examination for Discovery by
Written Questions). O. Reg. 438/08, s. 25.
30
(communication
des
4. La Règle 35 (interrogatoire préalable par
écrit). Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 25.
CONSIDERATIONS
QUESTIONS À EXAMINER
GENERAL
DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES
29.2.03 (1) In making a determination as to
whether a party or other person must answer a
question or produce a document, the court
shall consider whether,
29.2.03 (1) Lorsqu’il décide si une partie ou
une autre personne doit répondre à une
question ou produire un document, le tribunal
examine ce qui suit :
(a) the time required for the party or
other person to answer the question or
produce the document would be
unreasonable;
a) la question de savoir si le temps
requis pour que la partie ou l’autre
personne réponde à la question ou
produise le document est
déraisonnable;
(b) the expense associated with
answering the question or producing
the document would be unjustified;
b) la question de savoir si les frais
associés à la réponse à la question ou
à la production du document sont
injustifiés;
(c) requiring the party or other person
to answer the question or produce the
document would cause him or her
undue prejudice;
c) la question de savoir si le fait
d’exiger que la partie ou l’autre
personne réponde à la question ou
produise le document lui causera un
préjudice indu;
(d) requiring the party or other person
to answer the question or produce the
document would unduly interfere with
the orderly progress of the action; and
d) la question de savoir si le fait
d’exiger que la partie ou l’autre
personne réponde à la question ou
produise le document entravera
indûment le déroulement ordonné de
l’action;
(e) the information or the document is
readily available to the party
requesting it from another source. O.
Reg. 438/08, s. 25.
e) la question de savoir si
l’information ou le document est
facilement accessible à la partie qui en
fait la demande auprès d’une autre
source. Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 25.
OVERALL VOLUME OF DOCUMENTS
VOLUME GLOBAL DE DOCUMENTS
(2) In addition to the considerations listed in
subrule (1), in determining whether to order a
party or other person to produce one or more
documents, the court shall consider whether
such an order would result in an excessive
volume of documents required to be produced
by the party or other person. O. Reg. 438/08,
s. 25.
(2) Outre les questions mentionnées au
paragraphe (1), lorsqu’il décide s’il doit
ordonner à une partie ou à une autre personne
de produire un ou plusieurs documents, le
tribunal examine si une telle ordonnance
aurait pour effet d’exiger que la partie ou
l’autre personne produise un volume excessif
de documents. Règl. de l’Ont. 438/08, art. 25.
SCOPE OF DOCUMENTARY DISCOVERY
PORTÉE DE LA COMMUNICATION DES
DOCUMENTS
DISCLOSURE
DIVULGATION
30.02 (1) Every document relevant to any
matter in issue in an action that is or has been
in the possession, control or power of a party
to the action shall be disclosed as provided in
rules 30.03 to 30.10, whether or not privilege
is claimed in respect of the document. R.R.O.
1990, Reg. 194, r. 30.02 (1); O. Reg. 438/08,
s. 26.
30.02 (1) Un document pertinent à l’égard
d’une question en litige dans une action et qui
se trouve ou s’est trouvé en la possession
d’une personne, sous son contrôle ou sous sa
garde est divulgué conformément aux règles
30.03 à 30.10, que l’on invoque ou non un
privilège à l’égard de ce document. R.R.O.
1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.02 (1); Règl. de
l’Ont. 438/08, art. 26.
PRODUCTION FOR INSPECTION
PRODUCTION À DES FINS D ’EXAMEN
(2) Every document relevant to any matter in
issue in an action that is in the possession,
control or power of a party to the action shall
be produced for inspection if requested, as
provided in rules 30.03 to 30.10, unless
privilege is claimed in respect of the
document. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 30.02
(2); O. Reg. 438/08, s. 26.
(2) Un document pertinent à l’égard d’une
question en litige dans une action et qui se
trouve en la possession d’une partie, sous son
contrôle ou sous sa garde est produit à des fins
d’examen sur demande, conformément aux
règles 30.03 à 30.10, sauf si l’on invoque un
privilège à l’égard de ce document. R.R.O.
1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.02 (2); Règl. de
l’Ont. 438/08, art. 26.
INSURANCE POLICY
POLICE D ’ASSURANCE
(3) A party shall disclose and, if requested,
produce for inspection any insurance policy
under which an insurer may be liable,
(3) Une partie divulgue et, sur demande,
produit à des fins d’examen, une police
d’assurance aux termes de laquelle l’assureur
peut être tenu :
(a) to satisfy all or part of a judgment
in the action; or
a) soit, de payer, en tout ou en partie,
un jugement rendu dans l’action;
(b) to indemnify or reimburse a party
for money paid in satisfaction of all or
part of the judgment,
b) soit, d’indemniser ou de rembourser
une partie des sommes qu’elle a
payées à la suite de l’exécution, totale
ou partielle, d’un jugement.
but no information concerning the insurance
policy is admissible in evidence unless it is
relevant
Toutefois, aucun renseignement concernant
cette police d’assurance n’est admissible en
preuve à moins qu’il ne soit pertinent à l’égard
to an issue in the action. R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
194, r. 30.02 (3).
d’une question en litige dans l’action.
R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.02 (3).
SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS
AND CORPORATIONS CONTROLLED BY PARTY
FILIALES ET PERSONNES MORALES
APPARTENANT AU MÊME GROUPE OU
CONTRÔLÉES PAR UNE PARTIE
(4) The court may order a party to disclose all
relevant documents in the possession, control
or power of the party’s subsidiary or affiliated
corporation or of a corporation controlled
directly or indirectly by the party and to
produce for inspection all such documents that
are not privileged. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r.
30.02 (4).
(4) Le tribunal peut ordonner à une partie de
divulguer tous les documents pertinents qui
se trouvent en la possession, sous le contrôle
ou sous la garde de l’une de ses filiales,
d’une personne morale appartenant au même
groupe ou d’une personne morale que cette
partie contrôle directement ou indirectement,
et de produire, à des fins d’examen, tous les
documents qui ne sont pas privilégiés.
R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.02 (4).
PRODUCTION
WITH LEAVE
PRODUCTION D’UN DOCUMENT
EXIGÉE D’UN TIERS AVEC
AUTORISATION
FROM
NON-PARTIES
ORDER FOR INSPECTION
ORDONNANCE
D ’EXAMEN
30.10 (1) The court may, on motion by a
party, order production for inspection of a
document that is in the possession, control or
power of a person not a party and is not
privileged where the court is satisfied that,
30.10 (1) Le tribunal peut, sur motion d’une
partie, ordonner la production, à des fins
d’examen, d’un document non privilégié qui
se trouve en la possession, sous le contrôle ou
sous la garde d’un tiers s’il est convaincu :
(a) the document is relevant to a
material issue in the action; and
a) que le document est pertinent à
l’égard d’une question en litige
importante dans l’action;
(b) it would be unfair to require the
moving party to proceed to trial
without having discovery of the
document. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r.
30.10 (1).
b) qu’il est injuste d’exiger que
l’action soit instruite sans que le
document soit communiqué à l’auteur
de la motion au préalable. R.R.O.
1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.10 (1).
DE PRODUCTION À DES FINS
NOTICE OF MOTION
AVIS DE MOTION
(2) A motion for an order under subrule (1)
(2) La motion est présentée sur préavis :
shall be made on notice,
(a) to every other party; and
a) à chaque autre partie;
(b) to the person not a party, served
personally or by an alternative to
personal service under rule 16.03.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 30.10 (2).
b) au tiers, par voie de signification à
personne ou selon un des autres modes
de signification directe prévus à la
règle 16.03. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194,
par. 30.10 (2).
COURT MAY INSPECT DOCUMENT
POUVOIR
DU
TRIBUNAL
D ’EXAMINER
LE
DOCUMENT
(3) Where privilege is claimed for a
document referred to in subrule (1), or where
the court is uncertain of the relevance of or
necessity for discovery of the document, the
court may inspect the document to determine
the issue. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 30.10 (3).
(3) Si l’on invoque un privilège à l’égard d’un
document visé au paragraphe (1) ou que le
tribunal doute que sa communication soit
pertinente ou nécessaire, le tribunal peut
l’examiner afin de résoudre la question.
R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.10 (3).
PREPARATION OF CERTIFIED COPY
ÉTABLISSEMENT
D ’UNE
COPIE
CERTIFIÉE
CONFORME
(4) The court may give directions respecting
the preparation of a certified copy of a
document referred to in subrule (1) and the
certified copy may be used for all purposes in
place of the original. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194,
r. 30.10 (4).
(4) Le tribunal peut donner des directives
quant à l’établissement d’une copie certifiée
conforme d’un document visé au paragraphe
(1). La copie tient lieu de l’original à toutes
fins. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 30.10 (4).
COST OF PRODUCING DOCUMENT
FRAIS DE PRODUCTION DU DOCUMENT
(5) The moving party is responsible for the
reasonable cost incurred or to be incurred by
the person not a party to produce a document
referred to in subrule (1), unless the court
orders otherwise. O. Reg. 260/05, s. 5.
(5) L’auteur de la motion assume les frais
raisonnables qu’a engagés ou que doit engager
le tiers pour produire un document visé au
paragraphe (1), sauf ordonnance contraire du
tribunal. Règl. de l’Ont. 260/05, art. 5.(b) to
the person not a party, served personally or by
an alternative to personal service under rule
16.03. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 30.10 (2).