Call for Papers-June 2017 - Institut des mondes africains

Callforpapers
Internationalconference
Propertyandenvironmentindevelopingcountries
OrganisedbyANRGovenpro
Paris,7-8June2017,NationalMuseumofNaturalHistory
Deadline:1January2017
Whatformsofpropertyaremosteffectivefortheconservationand/oreconomicexploitationof
environments—fromprivateownershiptoStateownership,throughvariouscollectiveformsof
ownership (communitaran or patrimonial)? This question has given rise to intense and
controversialtheoreticaldebatesinscholarlycircles(Coase1960;Hardin1968;Ostrom1990).
Weintendtousetheterm“environment/propertytheory”tocoverallthevarioustheoriesand
examinehowtheyareusedindevelopingcountriestoconstruct“resourceregimes”(Vatn2007,
2015). Our hypothesis is that rather than being monolithically imposed, these theories have
beenimplementedpragmaticallybyarangeofnationalandinternationalplayersattemptingto
adaptthemtolocalusagewithrespecttonaturalresources,butoftenwithnoknowledgeoflocal
conceptsofownershipandsharing.
The application of these theories has led to a reordering of property rights that should not be
seen merely as a uniform general trend towards the privatisation of nature. In the colonial
period, for example, the crucial point was admittedly the colonists’ appropriation of resources
(extensive land areas were held by farming, forestry and mining concessions as early as the
1920s), but even more the increasing role of the State, the constitution of colonial public
domains, the creation of technical services, all designed to transform indigenous forms of
exploitation of nature into development, known in the French colonies as mise en valeur
(Thomas2009;Chouquer2011).Similarly,currentcriticismoflandgrabbingasanewformof
colonisationandlandprivatisationbyforeigncompanies(Merlet2010;TNI2013)overlooksthe
legalnatureofsuchcontracts,whichofteninvolvethreeparties—internationallenders,private
investorsandland-owninggovernments—allofwhomclaimwithvaryingdegreesofsincerityto
beactingintheinterestoflocalcommunitiesandthecountry’seconomicdevelopment(Holmen
2015; Chouquer 2011). Other more insidious forms of land seizure consist of recognising
“customary” rights but making this recognition conditional on the maintenance of traditional
practices considered to favour the conservation of natural environments: that is the thinking
behind programmes of payment for environmental services (PES) (Kosoy and Corbera 2010).
Similarmanoeuvrescanbeseeninthedevelopmentprogrammesfundedbymajorlenderssuch
astheWorldBank.Theirloansareconditionalonmeasuresknownasenvironmentaloffsetsthat
leadtotheestablishmentofnewlandreservesfortheconservationofnature(Benabou2014).
The major international conventions on climate, biodiversity, the sea and waste management
also involve radical shifts of property rights in the countries of the Global South. Vast
concessions are increasingly granted to private operators on grounds that the players best
endowed with capital are able to meet international environmental commitments, and comply
with the production and reporting standards required by those commitments. This trend is
particularlyvisibleinthegrantingofmarineandfisheriesconcessions,whichinvokestandards
for the sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources, but have the major impact of excluding
localsmall-scalefisherfolk(Dahou,Elloumi,andMolle2013).
These major environmental conventions also give governments an incentive to define in legal
terms who the traditional beneficiaries are of a resource on the basis of the customary use of
local resources. The aim is to make them parties (legal, individual or collective entities) to
environmental conservation contracts (access, benefit sharing, REDD+, payments for
environmental services, etc.). Governments then grant them new property rights which upset
older arrangements for the ownership of natural resources (Thomas 2012, 2014; Clement and
Amezaga 2013; Dahou 2013). But at a time when access rights are becoming more important
thanexclusionrights(Rifkin2000;Joly2009),thesecontractsamountmoretoopeninguplocal
resourcesforglobalusethantoreservingaccesstolocalcommunities.Consequently,property
must be rethought as a “bundle of rights” and environmental governance via property rights
mustberepositionedwithinawiderfieldofsocialrelationshipsthatconstrainorallowpeople
tobenefitfromresourceuse(RibotandPeluso2003;Silva-Castanedaetal.2014).Seeninthis
way,landgrabbingisbasicallycontrolgrabbing,i.e.aprocesswherebythepowertocontrolland
andassociatedresources,suchaswater,mineralsandforests,iscapturedinordertocontrolthe
benefitsthatcomefromexploitingthem(McCarthy,Vel,andAfiff2012).Theformsofproperty
developed in post-collective situations are in this respect particularly interesting to analyse.
Theydonotnecessarilyproducethesamerelationsbetweenownership,theindividualandthe
State as those prevailing in liberal democracies (Verdery 1998). Property rights in these
countries clearly cannot have the same incentive effect for conservation policy as standard
theorywouldpredict.
However,althoughtheextentanddiversity(inscaleandobject)ofthisphenomenonareclearly
perceived, there is no scholarly research establishing a convincing link between
environment/property theories and the successive forms of environmental governance in
developing countries. The broad division into three periods (age of conservation by state
property and extension of the public domain; age of salvation by exclusive private ownership;
age of return to community governance) is unsatisfactory. It does not account for the various
waysinwhichduringagivenperiodofacountry’shistorytheformsofownershiphighlightedin
these theories actually occurred over time or for the complex uses of these theoretical
arguments in a given economic, social and cultural context. Here we must start again from an
empiricalanalysisofgroundrealities.
In the light of these observations, the «Property and environment in developing countries»
conference will for the first time bring together specialists in environmental history,
environmental economics, environmental anthropology, property law, etc., to provide a
comprehensive overview of the deployment of environment/property theories in the actual
governanceofresourcesandenvironmentsindevelopingcountries.Theintentionistoattracta
largenumberofpaperstoilluminateanddocumentthefollowingobjectives:
1. Gain a clearer vision of the history of the dissemination of these theories and the forms of
property they emphasise in the environmental policies of developing countries. Who are the
maininternationalplayers,whatlocalsupportdotheyhave,whatarethesourcesofthishistory,
etc.?
2. Compare these theoretical frameworks and the international instruments used to promote
themwiththeempiricalrealityofthevariousformsofpropertyinthesecountries.Focusonthe
diversity of ways the legal and administrative traditions of countries in the Global South
combine the major categories of private property, public domain, customary law, heritage and
collectiveproperty;
3. Examine the impact of implementing these theories in places moving towards the market
economy.Whatisthepoliticaleconomyofpropertyinthesetransitionalsituations(particularly
post-Communist)?Whataretheobservableeffectsintermsofenvironmentalconservation?
4. Examine the dialectic between the effective contraction of collective property and collective
rights in the management of the environment and the discourses that promote communitybasedmanagement,globalpublicgoods,andheritagevalues;
5. Describe the diversification of areas/topics to which environment/property theories are
applied: from the most territorial (such as land law, public domain, REDD mechanisms,
payments for environmental services) to the most dematerialised (such as new forms of
ownershipofgeneticresourcesandinformation,indigenousandlocalcommunities’rightsover
traditionalknowledge).
The deadline for submitting proposals is 1 January 2017. They should be sent
simultaneously by email to Frédéric Thomas ([email protected]) and Fabien Locher
([email protected]).EachsubmissionmustcomprisethreeseparatePDFdocuments:
1. An identification page with a 5-8-letter proposal acronym, the title of the paper, name(s) of
theauthor(s),affiliationandcontactdetails
2.Aproposalofatleast500butnotexceeding800words
3.AcurriculumvitaeofnomorethanonesideofA4
ProposalsmaybesubmittedinFrench,SpanishorEnglish.Eachproposalwillbeexaminedby
theorganisingcommittee,whichwillannouncethepapersselectedby15January2017.Selected
speakerswillhavetheirtravelandaccommodationcostscovered.
Themembersoftheorganisingcommitteeare
•
•
•
•
•
FrédéricThomas(UMRPalocIRD,MNHN)
SarahBenabou(UMRPalocIRD,MNHN)
TarikDahou(UMRPalocIRD,MNHN)
FabienLocher(UMRCRH,CNRS,EHESS)
ValérieBoisvert(UniversityofLausanne)
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