Report - European Union Institute for Security Studies

23 septembre 2003
Nicole GNESOTTO
Le Directeur
NOTE POUR LE HAUT REPRESENTANT
STRATEGIE DE SECURITE DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE
Compte rendu du séminaire sur les menaces,
Rome, 19 septembre 2003
« Identifying and understanding threats »
Organisé par Aspen Italia, en coopération avec l’IAI, le CeMiSS, et avec le soutien de la
présidence italienne de l’UE, le premier séminaire de discussion sur le document de Javier
SOLANA a réuni à Rome, le 19 septembre, une soixantaine de personnalités, tant officielles
qu’académiques : cette rencontre fut l’occasion d’un débat extrêmement sérieux et
constructif sur l’identification des menaces affectant la sécurité de l’Union.
On trouvera ci-joint une synthèse générale des débats, ainsi qu’une fiche de compte-rendu
pour chacun des trois ateliers - terrorisme, prolifération, failed states.
Deux principales conclusions
- Le document de Javier Solana a fait l’objet d’un soutien unanime. Tous les intervenants ont
salué la qualité du texte et approuvé sa brièveté, sa philosophie générale, sa structure. Tous
ont considéré qu’il s’agissait d’un développement très important pour l’action internationale
de l’Union. Plusieurs propositions de modifications ou d’ajouts ont été émises pendant les
débats, mais personne n’a revendiqué l’objectif d’une modification radicale de l’esprit ou de
l’économie générale du document.
- Une très large majorité de participants a néanmoins insisté sur l’importance des menaces
traditionnelles (« old threats »), par rapport aux nouvelles menaces identifiées dans la
première partie du document.
Synthèse des propositions émises durant le séminaire
* L’ancien et le nouveau : de façon quasi consensuelle, les intervenants ont insisté sur le fait
que les nouvelles menaces (terrorisme, prolifération) ne remplacent pas les anciennes. Elles
s’y ajoutent. Le défi pour l’Union est donc de combiner les agendas post-1989 (conflits
nationaux et ethniques) et post-2001 (terrorisme et prolifération).
* Importance des conflits nationaux et ethniques : parmi les menaces traditionnelles, une
large majorité de participants a insisté sur le fait que les conflits nationaux et les conflits
ethniques restent la plus grande source de guerres et d’instabilités dans le monde (Kosovo,
Kurdes, Israël/Palestine, Afrique, Inde/Pakistan etc). Ces conflits peuvent avoir des
dimensions de terrorisme ou de prolifération, mais l’origine est d’abord un conflit entre
nations : c’est à cet égard que l’engagement préventif est impératif. Et ces menaces
traditionnelles ne sont pas réductibles à la notion de « failed states ».
1
* Le terme de « failed states » est trompeur. Il a été considéré comme inapproprié par une
majorité de participants.
* Les menaces diffuses : certains participants ont souhaité qu’une attention soit donnée aux
menaces contre les « infrastructures de la globalisation », qu’il s’agisse des sources
d’énergie ou des réseaux informatiques.
* Les réponses : tous les intervenants ont insisté sur la nécessité de concevoir l’outil militaire
comme l’un des éléments d’une gamme beaucoup plus vaste d’instruments. Tous ont insisté
sur la nécessité pour l’Union de développer une approche politique, globale,
multidimensionnelle à l’égard des menaces affectant sa sécurité. Le partenariat avec les
Etats-Unis fut considéré comme essentiel. Toutefois, plusieurs participants ont souligné
l’absence, dans le texte, de référence au désarmement, et souhaité que ce terme soit rétabli
dans le nouveau document (comme objectif ou comme outil disponible).
* Le Moyen Orient a fait l’objet d’une attention particulière :
- Plusieurs participants ont noté que le texte était trop centré sur le conflit israelopalestinien. Une approche plus large leur semblait nécessaire, que ce soit sur le plan
géographique (le concept du « Greater Middle East » fut plusieurs fois invoqué pour
penser ensemble les cas de l’Irak et du Moyen orient), ou sur le plan conceptuel
(nécessité de prendre en compte un « global agenda » incluant les dimensions de
crises économiques, sociales, religieuses).
- A cet égard, plusieurs formules ont été proposées pour prendre en compte le défi de
« l’islam radical » et agir auprès des sociétés civiles : « promote reform and
democracy in civil society » ; « preventive engagement in reforming civil society » ;
« the objective is not democracy first, but pluralism » ; « democratization as a long
process » ; « support moderate reform-minded moslems ».
* Autres zones : l’Afrique et la Russie ont également été mentionnées. En Afrique, l’objectif
pourrait être de « translate national presence into European presence ». Pour la Russie, il a
semblé insuffisant qu’elle soit citée au passage et sur le même plan que la Chine et l’Inde.
Points ayant fait l’objet d’un débat
Deux points ont fait l’objet d’approches plus différenciées entre les participants:
- la qualification de la prolifération comme « single most important threat to peace and
security ». Un certain nombre de participants ont émis des doutes sur la pertinence
d’une telle qualification, proposant plutôt de relativiser la prolifération comme
« « principal » ou « major » threat to peace and security ».
-
L’équilibre entre l’approche globale et l’approche régionale au sein du document.
Certains participants privilégiaient la dimension régionale de l’action extérieure de
l’Union, en insistant sur le « new neighbourhood », les Balkans ou la Russie et en
souhaitant inscrire dans le document une approche plus géographique. D’autres ont
considéré que la différenciation géographique ne convenait pas à ce type de
document et qu’il était essentiel de conserver l’équilibre entre le rôle global
(terrorisme, prolifération) et le rôle régional de l’Union.
2
ANNEXES
A) Workshop on Terrorism
Points of consensus
- A global threat: there was a basic consensus that terrorism has become a major, global
threat. It is not only a US concern. Post-11/9 terrorism is different in scope and its
“ideological” dimension. But it is much more than the al-Qaeda phenomenon : if
cyberterrorism may be somewhat exaggerated, “Weapons of Mass Disruption” may be
employed at a lower, more primitive level (electricity, water, basic infrastructure). And
terrorism is also capable of disrupting political process and influencing conventional conflicts
(Algeria, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine).
- Link with regional conflicts: the group agreed that terrorism has to be looked at in a broader
political context, as it is rooted in unresolved national conflicts. Hamas is a cause and a
consequence of Middle East violence. Terrorism is rooted not so much in poverty as in
political hopelessness.
- A strategy rather than a war: the notion of war does not make it possible to identify a clear
strategy nor clear political objectives. The group agreed that there is no ‘quick fix’ against
terrorism, certainly not a purely military one: “military action does not solve problems, it may
even end up creating new ones”. The EU needs to develop a long-term, multifaceted
strategy. At the institutional level, terrorism is not purely an ESDP issue : linkage between
internal and external security is a condition of efficiency, bringing the Justice and Home
Affairs instruments to the forefront of any EU policy. At the geographical level, the EU ought
to concentrate on the greater Middle East, giving more attention and support to reformminded forces in the Arab countries. The purpose of an EU security strategy cannot be to
preserve the political status quo in the region, but to aim at creating basic conditions for
pluralism.
Debate
Two interrelated issues were a source of divisions within the group :
- The distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism: there was a lively discussion on the
differences between nationally rooted terrorism and the al-Qaeda type phenomenon,
together with a debate on the links between the two. The only agreement was on the need to
condemn all terrorist acts in all forms, while diversifying the responses to the different kinds
of terror. “Solidarity for all victims, but targeted responses and strategies”.
- An attempt at definition: some participants wanted to see in the document a definition of
terrorism, but this was not agreed on.
Proposals for the new draft
- The wording has to be carefully reviewed, as the present document focuses too much on
al-Qaeda.
- More should be said and done in dealing with the financing of terrorism (where the EU
could have also a comparative advantage)
- Terrorism does not target only the US and Europe. The document could take into account
the fact that “Islamic societies are also victims”.
3
B) Workshop on WMD proliferation
General context : a problem of credibility
Several participants stressed the credibility issue: WMD proliferation is a very serious threat,
but recent developments (absence of WMD in Iraq, US Congress decision on small nuclear
weapons) could give the impression, at least to the wider public, that this threat has been
somewhat overestimated or not very well described. On the other hand, there is also a
credibility issue if the document goes to the opposite extreme of complacency and
underestimates the seriousness of the issue. The wording of the new draft must take this
problem into careful consideration.
Points of consensus
Several points were agreed during the discussion:
- Disaggregate the threat: there was a large consensus among participants that the overall
picture, regarding proliferation, was not that black. Non-proliferation strategies have been a
success during the last 20 years. So the paradox is the following : the global trend is
positive, but a small number of states (two, three ?) are following a very negative path and
becoming very dangerous.
- Differenciate between WMD: Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons do not create the
same level of concern and do not follow the same patterns of proliferation. Even if the EU
needs a comprehensive doctrine against prolifération, it has also to elaborate specific
strategies for each kind of threat.
- Keep the multilateral approach as a priority: NPT is a success story, including for Iran, as of
today.
- Address the security concerns of the states: all participants agreed that proliferation is
rooted in unresolved political regional disputes. Prevention must adress this.
- Intelligence sharing between EU members is essential to common analysis and policies.
- Consider the need to develop a EU homeland security policy.
Debate
Two issues were not agreed on:
- the use of military pre-emption against suspected facilities. Two participants suggested that
multilateralism could not be enough, and that the EU could envisage using, or supporting the
use of military pre-emptive strikes by the US. It was countered that between tolerance and
pre-emption, a third strategy ought to be developed based on “strong and well dosed
prevention”.
- the issue of protecting Europe with a NATO missile defence system: it was suggested that
the priority for the EU was a serious homeland security policy, and that the perceptions of our
southern neighbours had to be taken into account.
- a third issue, the link between state and non-state actors, was discussed but inconclusively.
The possibility of terrorist groups acquiring WMD was seriously considered, but some
participants stressed the fact that suspected proliferators are also very authoritarian states : it
is unlikely that they would release WMD materials to groups that they cannot control.
Proposals for the new draft
Two specific proposals were made, but not discussed:
- an inspection capability at the multilateral level (a permanent UN inspection team ?)
- the need to consider giving some negative security guarantees, in order to deter some
states from proliferating.
4
C) Workshop on failed states and organised crime
Points of consensus
- The title is misleading. There was a basic agreement within the group that the title of this
section in the Solana’s document (“failed states and organised crime”) confuses three
different kinds of problems. The new draft must draw some distinctions:
a) a distinction has to be made between failed states and organised crime. Obviously, there
is a link between the two, but organised crime is also a major phenomenon in very solid
and democratic states within the EU.
b) The notion of failed states is too simplistic: failed states like Somalia are fairly
exceptional. Most of the problems emanate from “weak”, “dysfunctioning” or “failing”
states.
c) The notion of “failed or failing states” does not encompass the problems of national or
ethnic conflicts, which are a major threat to European security.
- Failing states are also a threat to their region: the contagion of failure is obvious in Africa
and the Balkans. The EU needs to go beyound isolated responses and deal with them in a
regional context.
- Deal with corruption: as it is a sub-issue of organised crime and weak states.
- Define a threat assessment: one of the key issues for the EU is to decide when a weak or
failed state (41 in the world) might become a “threat” to EU security and interests. Some
mechanisms, both political and economic, could help the EU to set its answers.
- Deepen the link between internal and external security: Europe is both a base and a target
for organised crime, terrorism and other threats. State-building around Europe helps improve
the security of our own citizens. Ministries (and EU services) of internal and external affairs
must develop a more coherent strategy.
- Insist on strategic partnership: with Russia, when weak or failed states are in the Eastern
neighbouhood of the EU ; with multilateral organisations, when they are more distant.
Debate
Two issues were fiercely debated:
- The geographical focus: several participants stressed the need for a EU priority in its
neighbourhood, notably its Eastern neighbourhood, if only to gain greater legitimacy in
European public opinion. Others did not deny this geographical concern, but insisted on the
need to keep the balance between the regional and global dimension of EU security strategy.
Some agreement could be reached that geography does not constrain the threats, but does
constrain our responses and instruments (the levers are greater in the neighbourhood).
- Conditionality: there were no divisions within the group on the need to include conditionality
in the different economic instruments the EU could use to help states from failing. But the
debate was short on practical solutions. The key question is how to strengthen conditionality
with some coercive instruments, while bearing in mind that, in some cases, sanctions have
also “boosted” organised crime…
Proposals for the new draft
- Change the title of this section: “weak states, organised crime, diffuse threats”(?)
- Add something on “diffuse threats”, like environmental disaster, AIDS, attacks against
the “infrastructure of globalisation” etc.
- Announce that the EU Security Strategy will be followed by specific Action Plans (with a
geographical focus) or policy papers/doctrine on structural issues (aid and conditionality).
5