Post-Crisis Strategy: The Testament of the Defeat of Hannibal

Journal of Research in Information Technology, 01 (2013) 01-07
p-ISSN: 2356-5691 / e-ISSN: 2356-5721
© Knowledge Journals
www.knowledgejournals.com
Post-Crisis Strategy: The Testament of the Defeat of Hannibal
Anis Gnichia
a
Higher Institute of Computer Science and Management. University of Kairouan, BP 3100, Tunisia.
Tel.: ‫‏‬+216 96 76 30 81; fax: +612 7723 6632. E-mail address: [email protected] (Anis Gnichi)
Article history:
Received 5 January 2013; Received in revised form 26 March 2013.
Accepted 28 April 2013; Available online 30 April 2013.
Abstract
Business of the post-crisis is not identical to that of the pre-crisis. In an era of crisis, business strategy must
incorporate more than ever the new situation caused by the significant changes generated by the crisis. The more
difficult for a strategist is not to confront these changes, but to recognize them. In fact, the change in the business
world is not just innovation, creativity and development; it is especially destabilizing separation and renewal. Thus, a
crisis with a brutality comparable to that of 1929 suggests the introduction of a new strategic model to ensure
business growth. This crisis is an opportunity, a rewrite transition between two forms of business: it is regeneration!
As part of this contribution, we propose to think a post-crisis strategy based on the will of the defeat of Hannibal
Barca.
Keywords: Corporate strategy, Firm performance, Financial Crises, Business Administration.
© 2013 Knowledge Journals. All rights reserved.
"I will either find a way, or make one."
[Hannibal]
Crossing of the Alps, 218 B.C
1. Introduction
Strategist, conforming to Ramond (2006), knows
overcome of complexity, simplify complex situations,
get to the essence, find ways of solving the riddle and
the sense. It combines power of synthesis, coherence of
structuring, creative power and decisiveness. Bodinat
(2009) underlines that crises are getting back to basics.
An era of change, with its background of scandals,
upheavals and crises, is also an era where are
imperative problematics of which the outcomes are
sharp. It is an era convenient to fundamental revisions.
But if real dissolutions are missing is that there is use
of unfinished designs and incomplete analysis systems.
It is because is there a leap to an immediate solution
without exploring the range of possibilities. This is
what requires a reinterpretation of the crisis to build
paths of the post-crisis.
In the preamble of this contribution, we consider
the example of the reverse of Hannibal (2) to examine
the possibility of turning threats into opportunities (3).
The fact that our world is approaching a critical stage
in History, leading the development of paradigms of
the post-crisis (4) allow us to propose some ways of
thinking by calling for managerial sapience (5).
Considerable research has documented the
dynamic change of soil organic matter or SOC caused
by irrigation from ordinary river water (low-sediment
load water) or wastewater (Guo et al., 2006).
Comparatively little information is available on the
dynamic change of SOC stocks caused by irrigation
with sediment laden waters, especially studies on
changing SOC stocks via irrigation with Yellow River
water in China. The objectives of this study were to
evaluate the long-term effect of irrigation on increasing
SOC stocks and to reveal the special function of ISS
layer on soil carbon concentration throughout the
profile under different durations of irrigation with
sediment laden Yellow River water in the Ningxia
Irrigation Zone, China.
2. Hannibal, a pioneer of strategy
He is the son of the general Hamilcar Barca, great
enemy of Rome in the First Punic War. Audisio (1961)
writes that a Military historian Theodore Ayrault
Dodge once famously called Hannibal the "father of
strategy". He is, as reported by Machiavelli (cited by
Yinda, 2008), the one that was further praised among
all those who ranked armies in battle order. In line with
Dussourd (2005), magnanimous victor, Rome will
recognize the military genius of the man who very
nearly net stop its expansion. Four centuries after his
death, Emperor Septimus Severus, native of West
Africa, built a majestic grave in his memory. For
Chautard (2005), by his sense of strategic opportunity
and tactical genius, Hannibal remains one of the
greatest warriors in history.
A.Gnichi, 2013
From his father Hamilcar, Hannibal acquires
certain military capabilities and an inordinate hatred for
Rome : avenge his father, who was defeated by the
Romans, is the main motivation of his career. On the
basis of Dussourd (2005), analyzing with lucidity the
strengths and the weaknesses of the Carthaginian army
which he manages, he develops a simple strategy:
Carthage being lower than Rome compared to the sea,
so he must attack by land. To overcome the Roman
power, it seems necessary to entice new allies among
the nations conquered by Rome and to open new fronts
to prevent and divide the powerful Roman army. In
218 B.C, at the head of an army comprising 60,000
men and 37 elephants, he successively crossed the
Pyrenees and the Rhone with boats, and finally the
Alps to reach Italy. This feat, according to Chautard
(2005), considered impractical by the Romans proves
his remarkable mastery of logistics. Hannibal
succeeded to inflict heavy losses to his adversary on
several occasions, but refrain from taking Rome.
Pointing southern Italy, he beat the Romans in Cannes,
Apulia, on 2 August 216 BC.
During this battle, Hannibal practice oblique
attack
(obliqua
eruptio)
and
encirclement
(circumventio) in line with Colson (1999). Based on
Murawiec (2000), Hannibal made cede the center to
attract the Romans, who rushed into the hollow
created, to better be enveloped by the two wings of the
Carthaginian leader: this is the worst disaster in the
Louve where 50,000 Romans perished. This maneuver
is probably the most famous in military history: the
double wrap designed and built from the Carthaginian
General is a masterpiece of concentration. In this sense,
Machiavelli (cited by Yinda, 2008), found that if a
captain wants to fight by being almost sure of not being
routed, he must have his army in a place where he can
find a close and safe refuge either among marshes or
among mountains, or in a powerful city. Because in
this case he cannot be pursued by the enemy, while the
latter may be by him. Hannibal used this method when
fortune began to be opposite him and he began to dread
the valor of Marcellus.
Murawiec (2000) considers that asymmetric
warfare is not only guerrillas the war of weak to strong:
is the introduction of an element of rupture,
technological, strategic or tactical, an element that
changes the preconceived situation; is the use of a flank
or a reversal of weakness of the adversary. This is how
Scipio Africanus directly hit Carthage to force
Hannibal to leave Italy. According to Chautard (2005),
Hannibal was forced to leave Italy to rescue Carthage
threatened by the Romans and Scipio, but was defeated
at Zama in 202 B.C. After trying to achieve economic
recovery in Carthage, he was forced into exile under
the threat of the Romans to commit suicide by taking
poison in 183 B.C. A final Punic War, much shorter
than the previous (149-146 B.C.), takes place after the
attack by Carthage on his neighbor, the Numidian king,
02
an ally of Rome. At the end of a two-year siege, Rome
destroys Carthage and threw salt on ground so nothing
could ever grow there again. “Delenda carthago est”,
said the Roman senator Cato the Elder (234-149
B.C.)...
3. Turning threats into opportunities
The Romans were able to transform the threat of
Hannibal by his presence in Italy into an opportunity
by attacking Carthage. In line with Ramond (2006), get
to the point, look otherwise reality, collect an original
solution, even banned, make it simple, but effective are
the qualities of a good strategist. The strategist is all
but simplistic. He measures and integrates multiple
dimensions, he thinks systemically, he anticipates and
feels the warning signs, the underlying threats, the
potential risks.
Bron et al (2004) argue that the identification of
opportunities and threats by the decision maker is a
determinant of corporate strategy. Desreumaux et al
(2009) write that which is a threat or an opportunity
depends on the characteristics of the company which
conducts the analysis. A company can exactly acquire a
sustainable competitive advantage because it knew
how to have an opportunity where its competitors see
only a threat. Grünig et al (2004) consider than an
opportunity arises when a change in the environment,
especially in a market aligns with an actual or potential
force in the company. By against a threat occurs when
the developments of the environment cannot be
anticipated, because they stood against the weaknesses
of the company. According to Bron et al (2004),
opportunity means any external circumstance
conducive and enabling to the development of the
system and threat means any element from outside that
can be dangerous and jeopardizing the equilibrium of
the system.
For Cossette (2004), decision-making strategy is
not enclosed within a model whose steps are clearly
identified and sequential; blur, chance and even chaos
are sometimes dominant features. At the heart of this
process are the decision makers. Those who possess a
hierarchical cognitive structure leading them,
especially in their perception of the current situation,
that is to say, the internal and external factors they will
take into consideration and they will interpret it in a
particular way.
Their goals, interests, references, expectations and
other cognitions related to their patterns (which may be
converted at any time), can trigger and guide decisionmaking on the strategy formulation. Their goals,
interests, references, expectations and other cognitions
related to their patterns (which may be converted at any
time), can trigger and guide decision-making on the
strategy formulation. The same situation can be seen as
a problem by policy makers and as an opportunity by
others.
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Journal of Research in Information Technology
Fig. 1 : Paradoxes of the strategist (Adapted from Ramond, 2006: p.175)
Moreover, the binary logic that leads to see a
particular characteristic of the organization as strength
or a weakness and such characteristic of the
environment as a threat or an opportunity gives way to
a more nuanced approach: an event may well be both a
threat and an opportunity; a threat can also become an
opportunity. Tus Musso et al (2007) consider the
radical transformation of the telecommunications
sector could be an opportunity not only a threat to an
incumbent operator, provided to innovate better and
faster.
4. Crisis between significance and impact
Crisis is often defined as a threat. In fact, KovoorMistra (cited by Paquet, 2008) defines it as a serious
threat to the existence and the vital interests of the
company. For Libaert (2007), it is a serious threat to
the foundations or to the fundamental values of a
system, which, due to the urgency and uncertainty,
requires taking key decisions. This event threatens the
viability of organizations and is characterized by
ambiguity of causes, consequences and means of
resolutions and by the belief that decisions must be
made quickly. Kermarrec (2008) argues that the crisis
is the moment of reversal of the economic cycle which
stops the period of expansion and makes tip over the
economy to the depression. Giraud (2009) considers
that there is crisis when no one has response
convincingly to the problems that arise and that must
be resolved. The reading grids used until then provide
no more relevant answers to the new situations that
may have then called a crisis. There is crisis, when
there is an essential need for innovations. There crisis
when nobody really believes it is still possible to act as
before.
As stated in Bodinat (2009), the crisis of 2008 is
comparable to the 1929 brutality. Unemployment rises
to the speed of a tsunami. Stock exchanges collapsed.
The world financial system is in precarious balance,
with still considerable risks in spite of a first purge.
The world economy should be in a global recession in
2009 and 2010. Signs of recovery in spring 2009 are
more about autosuggestion than a real return to the
"normal", which no one knows when it will actually
occurred. Between 1929 and 1939, the cries of joy of
"resumption of economic growth" has been repeatedly
followed the death knell of relapse. Giraud (2009)
advance that our societies today face three types of
crises, the subprime crisis, the economic crisis and in
public finances. These crises act as variables of the
same action system, that is to say, they are causes and
consequences.
In keeping with Giraud (2009), it will be
necessary to write the word “crisis” in the plural, as it
seems that this is a set of crises that characterized the
first decade of this century. Financial crisis, crisis of
political
representation,
ecological
crisis,
unemployment crisis, state crisis... According to Pagé
(2009), our world is now entering a critical phase of its
history, leading to a break with ecological disorders,
food and financial crises and rising inequality are
strong clues.
04
A.Gnichi, 2013
Fig.2 : the three types of crisis of the society
5. Post-Crisis Paths : towards a managerial sapience
Bodinat (2009) underlines that the crisis
accelerates the development of the paradigms of the
post-crisis. Pagé (2009) advance that severe systemic
crisis will not find its solution without a profound
paradigm shift. In line with Bodinat (2009) the 2008
crisis is a demand crisis, first and then excessive
declining. It will stop when companies will be back to
basics: define precisely and efficiently produce a range
of products or services responding appropriately to real
needs. And if the world after the crisis is not the same
as the world before the crisis, it is less artificial, less
covetous, less immoral, better regulated, the offer
strategy will become the strategy of reference for all
companies.
The book of Berle and Means (1932) was
published in an economic context of great economic
depression where the 1929 crisis throws suspicion on
companies and on governors. According to Leener
(1909), when a crisis rages, the best adapted
companies, namely the most powerful, survive whereas
others disappear. As stated in to Tailleur (1965), at the
hours of crisis, and in the presence of a truth difficult to
face, only the strongest, the most skillful, the best
adapted survives. It is the law of the jungle in
consonance with Ziegler (2003). In a phase of
economic prosperity, corruption and negligence of
management are more easily forgiven. This is the final
verdict of the failed substructions of the management
of companies and its governance.
Often the word "sapience" (or also "wisdom") is
used to express different understandings of intelligence
concepts associated with a kind of prestige and
maturity. In fact, it appears disappointments and
"cases" of prestigious companies of the past as Lehman
Brothers, Enron, Arthur Anderson, Worldcom, and
others, that despite the maturity, experience,
intelligence and the power of their management, they
lacked a true sapience. Sapience and intelligence are
quite different. The sapience is a light that fills the
human soul, leading to a correct attitude and behavior,
allowing to distinguish suitable from reprehensible,
behaving in the best way and making the best choice in
order to meet the challenge of the value creation. For
Adler (2006), it is the knowledge of what is just and
true along with a good judgment in action. In some
managerial cases, the severity of errors of interpretation
and to show intellection may be serious; It engenders
some cases of failures which gain widespread
acceptance (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Pascale, 2001
and Portnoff, 2003).
Often, these cases are used to justify the
importance of proactivity insofar managers did not
perceive conceptual changes that transform their
businesses, their markets, the rules of the game They
have committed errors of vision. Foresight has been
lacking while it provides a reading grid to identify
signs of change in an early stage. This would mean,
conforming to De Jouvenel (1999), a construction,
often in tree form, of possible futures. Lebrun (2003)
explains that we need to renew with desire as a creative
force of future. But, as described by Joffre and
Aurégan (2002), the Enron case also shows evidence of
a boundless voluntarism to materialize its vision, an
intent beyond any strategic framework, beyond any
structured institutional framework: big egos, unbridled
megalomania by making the desired future happen, at
all costs including through manipulation allowing it to
weigh heavily on the deregulation of the energy
market. It only remained for it to play with the
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Journal of Research in Information Technology
accounting, financial, fiscal and ethical rules to ensure
that the strategic vision become reality. This shows that
the result of following desires leads to misguidance and
blinds on its own practices. Such an entity increases the
risk to know disasters quickly, while the reverse leads to
sapience. A management that becomes a slave of a future
as an object of desire loses quickly his powers of sapience
and is devoid of understanding and of the ability to
distinguish between good and bad. It is there evidence of a
lack of a real intellection. The question of intellection is
central. The sapience and strategic blindness are linked
to it closely.
We also distinguish the intellection of inaction.
While intellection is centered on the discernment of
meaning, enaction is centered on the production of
meaning. This refers to the constitution of the
environment by actors. It is a theory of Buddhist
inspiration that its founder Varela (see Ardoino et al,
2004) wants it as an intermediate response to the
debate between cognitivists and connectionists.
However, these two streams of thought now tend to
operate their merger. Certainly, for the proponents of
the enactment, perception, rather than being felt and
passive, becomes active, acquires its full two
meanings, the action and the product (result of action),
and substance of perceptual experience is determined
by what a person does, can do, is ready to do, wants to
do, or know how. Mais, cette perception ne permet
pourtant pas de saisir la valeur et le contenu. L'individu
est conditionné et manipulé dans sa perception. Il est
de la sorte fainéant et sans état d’âme. Par contre, le
fait de pouvoir distinguer entre l'erreur et la justesse est
l'indication de sapience qui se rend possible par
l'intellection. But, this perception does not nevertheless
allow to seize the value and the contents. The
individual is conditioned and manipulated in his
perception. He is so lazy and without state of soul. On
the other hand, the fact of being able to distinguish
between error and rightness is an indication of sapience
that is allowed by intellection.
Sapience engages not only the knowledge of a
person, but also its virtue. To improve corporate
management, strategic decision-making, coherence
between goals and actions; the managerial sapience is
required. Such sapience allows the company to define
its mission, to have a vision and a project, interact
appropriately with stakeholders to better allocate its
resources and skills. This is what we illustrate in Figure
4.
As stated in Burkart et al (on 2005), proceeding
an Arab – Greek legend, sapience has had only a
limited success, not to say a failure after the XIVth
century. Bergier and Thomas (1971) argue that our
civilization is the scene of a permanent war between
sapience and madness. Indeed, the rise of individualism
advocated by a Darwinist ideological bedrock rejected
any requirement of sapience to supplant it with a
market recipes of economic and/or political nature
(fascism, capitalism, communism, liberalism, Marxism,
etc.). Except that, as noted by Lippman (cited by Adler,
2006), to understand wisdom, it is necessary oneself to
be wise. The collapse of the humanist and materialistic
Backgrounds of these "isms" and the awareness of a
multitude of ecological, human and economic crises,
drive to a renewed interest for sapience.
Sense
Figure 4 : Sapience and managerial ambiguity
Fig.3 : Data, information, knowledge and sapience
Adler (2006) demonstrates that wisdom and the
audacity of hope are these values that drive employees
and organizations when faced with a difficult situation
and not just the result of an objective assessment of
reality. When the audaciousness is added to wisdom,
the action takes all its sense. This invites to develop
06
A.Gnichi, 2013
ways and means allowing the manager to improve its
decision-making
beyond
intelligence,
beyond
imagination and beyond emotion. This is how a
decision is never taken in an objective, honest and
rational manner. By developing his theory of bounded
rationality, Simon (quoted by Demailly, 2004) stressed
the ethical dimension of any decision including in the
professional field. Morin (2004) found that ethics must
mobilize intelligence to confront the complexity of life,
of the world, of ethics itself. It is a time of judgment
and which requires courage, because it will have to
assume the consequences of each choice.
Heir of the works of Simon, March (1988) notice
that the classic reading of relationships between
decision and action offers a completely erroneous
vision of reality: It always does require that at least that
directives and goals are (or can be) clear, that decisionmakers know what they want and what they want is
coherent, stable and without ambiguity. However, the
fuzziness is everywhere present in business.
Nevertheless, in uncertainty, we must act with reason.
Morin (quoted by Renaud-Coulon, 1994) recognizes
the need to adopt a strategy to move forward in
uncertainty and randomness. He added that the art of
war is strategic because it is a difficult art, which must
meet not only the uncertainty of the movements of the
enemy, but also uncertainty about what the enemy
thinks, including what he thinks we think. If the
formulation of the strategy by a manager is so little
clear is that it is not more accurate in his mind.
Requiring that strategies be clearer is equivalent to
assuming that decision-makers can arbitrarily choose
the level of clarity of a strategy. Devised by the
mathematician Zadeh, fuzzy logic is based on the
following principle: “It’s better to be relevant than to
be precise”. Indeed, in line with Bellman ans Zadeh
(1970 : p.B-141), “it may be argued that the main
distinction between human intelligence and machine
intelligence lies in the ability of humans -an ability
which present-day computers do not possess- to
manipulate fuzzy concepts and respond to fuzzy
instructions”. It has proved very powerful in several
fields of application including real-time control. The
development of this concept have provided means to
represent and manipulate imperfectly described
knowledge, vague or imprecise (see Rosental, 1998;
El-Shayeb, 19991 ; Jiménez-Candia, 20052). It is about
the establishment of an interface between data
described symbolically (with words) and numerically
(with figures). What we learn from this logic is that in
his decision, the manager uses observations and
knowledge. Except as stated in Bellman and Zadeh
(1970), the goals and/or the constraints constitute
classes of alternatives whose boundaries are not
sharply defined. Thus, observations may be imprecise
or uncertain, and knowledge is based on the collection
1
En Ligne.<http://laego.inpl-nancy.fr/uploads/media/TheseYasser.pdf>. [Date du dernier
accès : 14 février 2010].
2
En Ligne.<http://www.eici.ucm.cl/Academicos/L_Jimenez/paginas/tesis.pdf>. [Date du
dernier accès : 14 février 2010].
of information which should take into account the
uncertainty. The proposed approach will base on
distributions of contingencies allowing to sharpen the
sense of the links between feedforward, feedback and
interaction. Intellection in a quest for discernment of
meaning (inductive) then combines three criteria:
-
Performance (perfective)
Pertinence (abductive)
Consistency (deductive)
The challenge would be to encourage, guide
reflection, and turn the whole enterprise into a single
action in a harmonized way.
6. Conclusion
Discernment that supplies sapience is the
condition of consciousness towards impact of decisions
beyond vocations, phenomena and situations. For
managers, this is the first necessity. It brings together
all knowledge and techniques for the animation and
system management designed to mobilize and control
the ability of the organization to promote activities and
resources, through the capacity for discernment the
manager. Nothing new, as reported by Martinet and
Reynaud (2004), as Aristotle advised caution in human
affairs and called to turn away from chrematistics – or
avid accumulation of wealth – in favor of economic or art of managing the field in a good father. It is a
question to go to intimate things and intimate business.
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