Issue 26 - Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Office of the DPP
Issue 26
THE MONTHLY
EDITORIAL TEAM
Mrs Sulakshna
Beekarry-Sunassee
Principal State
Counsel
Miss Anusha Rawoah
State Counsel
Mrs Zaynah Essop
State Counsel
Mr. Ashley Victor
Public Relations
Officer
LEGAL UPDATE
NEWSLETTER
JULY 2013
EDITORIAL
SUB-COMMITTEE
Mr. Nitish Bissessur,
Mr. Toshan Rai
Bundhun,
Mr. Yashvind Kumar
Rawoah
Legal Research
Officers
“To No One Will We Sell
To No One Deny Or Delay Justice”
Chapter 40, Magna Carta 1215
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Inside this issue:
Editorial
3
The Re-Trial of criminal cases: The Winds of Change
4
The DPP special guest speaker for the first LLM graduation ceremony at UOM
7
Première Conférence Judiciaire de l’Océan Indien
8
Conférence Judiciaire de l’Océan Indien, Saint Denis, La Réunion
9
The Criminal Law Update Unit and Victim and Support Unit
11
5th Meeting of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa for the Eastern and Southern Africa Regions 12
Training course on cybercrime for prosecutors and investigators
13
Plaidoyer pour l’élargissement du champs d’application de l’abus de confiance
14
Corporate Criminal Liability: Is the element of Mens Rea Important?
16
Case Summary for June 2013
18
Press Communiqué Issued by the ODPP on 1st July 2013
22
Issue 26
2
EDITORIAL
Dear Readers,
Welcome to the July 2013 issue of the ODPP newsletter, a publication in which we endeavor each month to give
you an insight into the events and activities at the Office.
This month the DPP shares his vision on retrial in criminal cases, an issue of interest where it is alleged that a
miscarriage of justice has occurred. Report on the DPP Satyajit Boolell SC‟s lecture at the UOM Graduation
ceremony for LLM students on 21st June 2013. During the same period, the Deputy DPP Mr Iqbal Maghooa went
to Reunion Island for a judicial conference on which he reports in this issue. His presentation during the event on
“L’évolution du Droit Pénal Mauricien” is also reproduced.
This issue of the newsletter introduces the Criminal Law Review being launched by the ODPP‟s Law Update Unit
as from January 2014 and gives an update on the current work and assignments of the ODPP‟s Victim and witness Support Unit. We also bring to you résumés of law officers‟ participation at the 5th Meeting of the High Level
Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa for the Eastern and Southern Africa Regions and the UNDOC Cybercrime Workshop in Nairobi, Kenya.
Our contributors from the research team bring you their thoughts on the need to widen the ambit of the offence of
embezzlement under Mauritian Law, as well as the evolution of the law on Corporate Criminal Liability.
We wish you a pleasant reading and look forward to your comments on [email protected].
Mrs Sulakshna Beekarry-Sunassee
Principal State Counsel
Issue 26
3
The Re-Trial of criminal cases: The Winds of Change
By: Satyajit Boolell SC, DPP
Section 10(5) of the Constitution provides that no person who shows that he
has been tried by a competent Court for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for any other criminal offence of which he could
have been convicted at the trial of that offence except upon the order of a superior Court
in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal. The
law against double jeopardy, better known as autrefois acquits and autrefois convict,
does not allow a person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence to be retried
for the same offence. The rationale is simple to understand. Once the criminal justice
process has come to an end, including the hearing of an appeal, there can be no retrial.
Had there been no finality to a criminal case, the Supreme Court would be inundated with
applications from detainees of Beau Bassin prison to have their cases reopened. And
the prosecution would do the same for cases where there have been acquittals.
Are there exceptions?
Not in Mauritius but in UK for instance the law has been amended to provide exceptionally for the
possibility of a retrial. In Mauritius the law offers to an appellant the possibility to adduce fresh evidence during the
course of an appeal under section 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act (CAA) in the interests of justice especially
where highly probative evidence was not available at the time of trial. This provision of the CAA basically armed
the appellate court with “powers to rectify miscarriages of justice” as the overriding interest to see that justice prevails.
In 2004 before the Supreme Court, the accused parties
in the Amicale case made an ancillary
application under section 11 of the CAA, to adduce further evidence which included a tape and its transcript of
the recording of a phone conversation between M.A. Thupsee and Fazil Sumodhee which they alleged may
buttress their appeal and establish their innocence. The full bench of the Supreme Court constituted of the then
Chief Justice Pillay, JJ Matadeen and Caunhye, considered the scope of section 11 referring to the relevant
paragraph in the English case of R v Parks and endorsed the views expressed by Parker CJ:
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The Re-Trial of criminal cases: The Winds of Change
By: Satyajit Boolell SC, DPP
“It is only rarely that this court allows further evidence to be called, and it is quite clear that the principles upon
which this court acts must be kept within narrow confines, otherwise in every case this court would be in effect
asked to effect a new trial. As the court understands it, the power under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act,
1907, is wide. It is left entirely to the discretion of the court, but the court in the course of years has decided the
principles upon which it will act in the exercise of that discretion. Those principles can be summarized in this way:

First, the evidence that it is sought to call must be evidence which was not available at the trial.
 Secondly, and this goes without saying, it must be evidence relevant to the issues.
 Thirdly, it must be evidence which is credible evidence in the sense that it is well capable of belief; it is not for
this court to decide whether it is to be believed or not, but evidence which is capable of belief.
 Fourthly, the court will, after considering that evidence, go on to consider whether there might have been a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the appellant if that evidence had been given together with the other evidence at the trial” (the underlining is ours).
These principles are today recognized as “the guiding principles” for courts when deciding whether to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.
Applying those principles the court reached the conclusion that they could not see how the contents of the
original tape and transcript of the recording of the phone conversation were both relevant and credible under the
second and third principles enunciated in Parks.
Turning down the application, the court observed that “M.A. Thupsee had already deposed as a witness
at the trial of the applicants, had been lengthily cross-examined before the jury as to the various versions he had
given to the Police and at the preliminary enquiry and at the end of the day the jury came to a verdict after
considering his evidence.
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The Re-Trial of criminal cases: The Winds of Change
By: Satyajit Boolell SC, DPP
To make matters worse for the applicants, from our reading of the transcript of the alleged phone conver sation
between M.A. Thupsee and Fazil Sumodhee who, it must be underlined (a) is the brother of the applicants, (b) is
not by any means a disinterested person but one with a purpose of his own to serve, (c) had been prosecuted for
sequestrating M.A.Thupsee on three counts together with another brother and (d) had been accused by the
Police, together with other members of his family, of interfering with M.A.Thupsee when the latter was a
witness both at the preliminary enquiry and at the Assizes, it would appear that M.A.Thupsee and Fazil Sumodhee
were negotiating so that M.A.Thupsee could yet again change his version and clear the applicants on payment of
an appropriate sum of money ranging from Rs 500,000 to Rs 200,000.”
The effect of the judgment of full bench of the Supreme Court meant that the convicted parties in the
Amicale Case had exercised all means of legal redress available to them and the process had come to its finality.
As the law stands at present it is not possible for either the DPP or a convicted person to apply for review
or retrial. However, in some jurisdictions for instance UK, the law has been amended to cater for situations where
“fresh and compelling evidence” not available at time of trial tend to show that an acquittal was tainted or a
conviction was unsafe. In countries where the law has already been amended a retrial in a case where a person
has been wrongly acquitted or convicted in court, is however rare and exceptional
What is fresh and compelling evidence?
The legislator in UK defines fresh evidence as “evidence that was not adduced in the proceedings in
which the person was acquitted or convicted” and should be understood to mean that it was not available at the
time of trial and could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained. It will depend on the facts and circumstance of each case obviously. Examples include evidence obtained as a result of development in forensic science for instance contact DNA. Evidence is compelling on the other hand if it is reliable, substantial and highly
reliable. If in a murder case the issue was one of identity and subsequently after acquittal the new evidence establishes the identity of the suspect, then it can be said that the evidence is compelling.
I am of the considered view that we should go down this route eventually to remedy any miscarriage of
justice. It can only buttress the public confidence in our criminal law system. But it would be wise in order to prevent any abuse that a Criminal Law Review Commission be instituted to act as a screening body in all cases
where a convicted parties or victims‟ family alleged any miscarriage of justice.
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The DPP special guest speaker for the first LLM graduation ceremony at UOM
Ashley Victor, Public Relations Officer
The University of Mauritius (UOM) Trust, in collaboration with the University of Lancashire (UCLAN), held their first
LLM graduate ceremony in June. Twenty students obtained their postgraduate degree in International Business Law
during the ceremony where the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Satyajit Boolell SC, was the special guest
speaker.
The DPP reminded the new postgraduates that they are expected to observe the highest ethical standards
of their profession. He explained that the corporate responsibility agenda raises fundamental questions about the
balance between lawyers‟ ethical responsibilities to individual clients, and their broader responsibilities to serve the
interests of Justice.
In his speech, Mr Boolell explained the importance of the Rule of Law as being the fundamental essence of
our society. He said : “The rule of law has both procedural and substantive aspects - a legal system with an independent and impartial judiciary; laws that are clear, accessible and in accordance with the Constitution and Human
Rights; and an efficient court system which protects contractual, property, and human rights and provides for judicial review of government action.” The DPP added that “the new transnational commercial law cannot evolve in an
international climate unless it is consistent with the rule of law model.” He also stated that Mauritius has to offer a
“transparent and democratic political system, efficient bureaucracy, and developed public institutions free from corruption and cronyism.”
“Be you ever so high, the law is above you.” The wise words of Thomas Fuller, English churchman and historian of the 17th century, are still quoted by many jurists around the world. The powers of the DPP pursuant to
section 72(6) of the Constitution provides that in the discharge of his functions the DPP shall not be subject to the
direction or control of any person or authority. Mr Boolell is of the view that this is yet another feature which is fundamental to the rule of law. He reminded the new postgraduates that the Office of the DPP work independently.
Among other speakers were the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the UCLAN Dr Graham Baldwin, his Excellency the British High Commissioner Nick Leake, the Pro-Chancellor of the UOM Prof. Jugessur and the Vice-Chancellor of the
UOM Prof. Rughooputh.
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Première Conférence Judiciaire de l’Océan Indien
Me. M. I.Maghooa Adjoint au DPP
J‟étais en mission à la Réunion du 20 au 22 juin 2013 pour la première Conférence
Judiciaire de l‟Océan Indien regroupant les plus hautes autorités judiciaires des îles de la
zone: Madagascar, la Réunion, l‟île Maurice, les Comores et les Seychelles. Nous avons été
accuellis par M. Dominique FERRIERE, le Premier Président de la Cour d‟Appel de SaintDenis.
L‟objectif principal de cette conférence était de promouvoir la création d‟un réseau
judiciaire de l‟Océan Indien, permettant aux juges et procureurs ainsi que d‟autres acteurs judiciaires de la zone, d‟échanger des idées sur leurs préoccupations communes aux fins de faciliter des modes de coopération judiciaire et les
demandes d‟entraide judiciaire en matière pénale. En amont, mệme s‟il existe des différences réelles entre les systèmes judiciaires et juridiques de ces îles de l‟Ocean Indien sur le plan procédural, il faut toutefois admettre qu‟il existe des similitudes sur le fond, en particulier en droit pénal et en droit civil, l‟héritage
commun des « codes Napolé-
on ».
Lors de la conférence, j‟ai eu l‟occasion de faire une présentation sur l‟évolution du droit pénal mauricien et
la procédure pénale mauricienne. J‟ai aussi élaboré sur le statut, pouvoirs et attributions du Directeur des Poursuites
Publiques avant d‟envisager ses limites.
Ladite conférence s‟est concrétisée par la signature solennelle d‟une charte, qui perenise l‟objectif de la conference, par les réprésentants des hautes autorités judiciaires.
Issue 26
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Conférence Judiciaire de l’Océan Indien, Saint Denis, La Réunion
Article par: Me. M. I.Maghooa Adjoint au DPP
INTRODUCTION
L‟histoire du Droit Pénal mauricien nous démontre que les règles de fond du Droit criminel de notre pays
présentent des similitudes avec celles du Droit Pénal français.
Cette similitude des droits faciliterait sans doute la création d‟un réseau judiciaire de l‟Océan Indien
permettant aux magistrats, juges et procureurs de la zone d‟échanger des idées sur leurs préoccupations communes
afin de faciliter des modes de coopération judiciaire et les demandes d‟entraide judiciaire en matière pénale.
On analyse, de prime abord, (1) l‟évolution du droit pénal mauricien ; (2) une étude de la procédure pénale
mauricienne; (3) le statut, les attributions et les pouvoirs du Directeur des Poursuites Publiques (DPP) ; (4) avant de
voir ses limites.
L’EVOLUTION DU DROIT PENAL MAURICIEN 1
Datant de 1715, l‟Ile Maurice est une colonie française et en 1766, par ordonnance du roi concernant l‟organisation de la justice, celle-ci est rendue au nom du roi tant en matières civiles que criminelles. A cette période, l‟Ile-deFrance était dotée d‟une loi pénale inégale, arbitraire et rigoureuse telle qu‟en France.
Néanmoins, la Déclaration des Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen (DDHC 1789) a apporté une touche humaine au
Droit pénal notamment dans son article 8: le principe de légalité des peines veut qu‟une personne soit punie qu‟en
vertu d‟une loi établie et promulguée antérieurement. Le 7 août 1793, l‟assemblée coloniale de l‟Ile-de-France adopta
la DDHC et le code pénal français de 1791. Le pays est doté de son premier code criminel. Ce qui fut une heureuse
coïncidence c‟est que la DDHC 1789 fut solennellement approuvée par l‟assemblée coloniale dans les locaux actuels
de la Cour suprême de Maurice.
Cependant, la prise de l‟Ile-de-France en 1810 par les Anglais a eu une répercussion sans précédent sur la
législation alors en vigueur car aux termes du Traité de Capitulation, le conquérant anglais s‟engagea à respecter les
lois et coutumes existantes. C‟est en effet le code pénal de la révolution qu‟appliquèrent les juges de sa Majesté le roi
d‟Angleterre dans la nouvelle colonie britannique. Mais, le Secrétaire d‟Etat aux colonies (ayant une notion libérale
du droit contemporain) ne voyait point de non-conformité du droit anglais et français dans sa finalité. L‟administration
de l‟Ile promulgua le 14 aout 1838 un nouveau code pénal rédigé en français et en anglais (code basé sur le code
pénal français de 1810 revu et amendé par la loi française de 1832).
Mais, le droit pénal mauricien actuel a hérité, au cours du temps, des législations d‟inspiration anglo-saxonne
dans certains domaines. A titre d‟exemple, la ‘Companies Act ’ régissant ,en grande partie, le droit de l‟entreprise et
la ‘Prevention of Corruption Act ’ concernant les délits en matière de corruption.
LA PROCEDURE PENALE MAURICIENNE
La procédure pénale mauricienne se caractérise par un système accusatoire. Le procès y est conçu comme
un affrontement contradictoire, public et largement oral entre l‟accusation et la défense. Il s‟agit pour le juge d‟arbitrer
entre les intérêts contradictoires des parties. Ce système régit l‟ordre juridictionnel mauricien.
En matière de preuve, il incombe à la poursuite d‟établir les faits incriminés de la charge au delà de tout
doute raisonnable. Cependant, les droits fondamentaux du prévenu doivent être respectés. Par exemple, l‟accusé
doit bénéficier de la présomption d‟innocence qui est régie par notre Constitution. Celle-ci garantit également au prévenu un procès équitable dans son article 10. Autrement dit, l‟accusé doit être jugé devant une juridiction indépendante et impartiale qui doit prononcer un jugement dans un délai raisonnable. Il faut aussi noter que notre système
juridique privilégie le concept de la légalité des preuves par opposition aux systèmes juridiques se manifestant par le
principe de la liberté des preuves.
1
Extrait de, LE VENCHARD, CODE ANNOTES DE L‟ILE MAURICE, CODE PENAL(Edition 1994)
Issue 26
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Conférence Judiciaire de l’Océan Indien, Saint Denis, La Réunion
Article par: Me. M. I.Maghooa Adjoint au DPP
STATUT, ATTRIBUTIONS ET POUVOIRS DU DIRECTEUR DES POURSUITES PUBLIQUES
2
La Constitution prévoit, dans son article 72, le statut, les pouvoirs, et attributions du DPP. La Constitution
se contente de prévoir que le DPP pourra, quand cela lui parait opportun, intenter des poursuites, continuer celles qui
auraient déjà été intentées par quelqu‟un d‟autre, stopper tout procès pénal avant le prononcé du jugement – et
même après le jugement, s‟il y a appel et que l‟accord du demandeur a été obtenu.
En effet, le DPP n‟a pas, en droit mauricien, l‟exclusivité ou le monopole d‟intenter des procès. Tout comme
en Angleterre, n‟importe quel citoyen peut déposer une plainte contre un ou plusieurs autres citoyens. Toutefois le
DPP exerce un contrôle sur les procès auxquels il peut mettre fin.
Certaines lois affectant plus particulièrement le maintien de l‟ordre public prévoient que l‟autorisation du DPP
est nécessaire pour poursuivre des infractions définies par ces lois. Citons pour mémoire la Public Order Act, l’Official Secrets Act, Prévention of Corruption Act. Dans ces cas le DPP exerce personnellement un contrôle sur
l‟opportunité des poursuites.
Le DPP jouit d‟un pouvoir totalement discrétionnaire. Aucune obligation ne lui est faite d‟intenter une action
s‟il ne l‟estime pas souhaitable. Cette disposition devait garantir l‟indépendance et la liberté de décision du DPP. S‟il
fallait résumer en un mot le rôle du DPP, du moins tel qu‟il est pratiqué, on dirait volontiers qu‟il consiste principalement à vérifier d‟abord si les éléments d‟une infraction sont réunis, l‟apprécier en conséquence, s‟il faut mettre en
marche la machine judiciaire, ou si au contraire il faut l‟arrêter tout en privilégiant l‟intérêt général. Il faut toutefois
admettre que le DPP n‟a pas de pouvoir d‟enquête comme le disposerait le juge d‟instruction en France. Le DPP
décide de poursuivre ou pas en fonction d‟une enquête soumise préalablement.
LES LIMITES A CE POUVOIR.
Le principe du pouvoir discrétionnaire du DPP connait une atténuation dans la mesure où une personne, qui
peut justifier d‟un intérêt suffisant (locus standi), peut demander une révision judiciaire contre la décision de nonpoursuite du DPP. Autrement dit, l‟initiative des poursuites appartenant au DPP, il décide de poursuivre ou de ne
pas poursuivre en prenant en considération les éléments nécessaires de l‟enquête et l‟intérêt général. Néanmoins,
cette décision de non-poursuite est susceptible de recours.
Donc, deux cas de figure s‟offre à nous: D‟une part, le DPP décide d‟engager des poursuites contre une personne auprès d‟une juridiction compétente et par conséquent, le prévenu peut être acquitté ou cette juridiction peut
prononcer un arrêt permanent de poursuites suivant le déroulement du procès. D‟autre part, par l‟utilisation de son
pouvoir discrétionnaire, le DPP peut ne pas engager une poursuite. Mais cette décision de ne pas poursuivre est
susceptible d‟un recours aux fins d‟une révision judiciaire. Ce recours est assujetti à la condition déterminante de l‟intérêt à agir du demandeur.
2
Extrait de l‟article, LE DIRECTEUR DES POURSUITS PUBLIQUES 1978, MLR, REVUE DU DROIT ET JURISPRUDENCE MAURICIENNE. Par Cyrille De Labauve D‟Arifat
Issue 26
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The Criminal Law Update Unit and Victim and Support Unit
Rawoah Yashvind Kumar– Legal Research Officer
The Criminal Law Review Update Unit
This Unit was created by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Satyajit Boolell, SC with the aim
of publishing a digest of all important cases for the Year 2013. The editorial committee of the Mauritian
Criminal Law Review has already been constituted for that purpose.
Every year, Mauritian Courts as well as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council produce a rich
and diverse judgments covering criminal justice in all its aspects. These judgments represent open invitations for lawyers to analyse, criticise and comment. Yet, year in and year out, these interesting judgments
receive little attention save for the annual reporting in the Mauritius Reports.
The Criminal Law Review will have a different objective that of keeping criminal lawyers abreast
of developments in the Criminal Law and Case Law. The initiative is challenging and interest has already been expressed by identified contributors, which should make the task easier.
The 1st issue of the Criminal Law Review will be launched in January 2014
WATCH OUT FOR THE CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW!!!
Victims and Witnesses Support Unit (VWSU)
The VWSU are busy working on the following publications:
 Cybercrime
 Wildlife
 Domestic Violence
The purpose of the above mentioned publications is to create awareness and to tackle new developments in law in relation to Cybercrime, Wildlife and Domestic Violence. These are the next themes calling for attention after the launch of „Tanya so Zistwar‟ on sexual abuse on children.
Issue 26
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5th Meeting of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows
from Africa for the Eastern and Southern Africa Regions
Jean-Michel AH SEN, Ag Principal State Counsel
The fifth meeting of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa for the Eastern and Southern
Africa Regions was held in Lusaka, Zambia on the 18th of June 2013. The said panel was established by the
Unit-
ed Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on the 18th of February 2012 following a resolution of the 4th
Joint Annual Meetings of the ECA/AU Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in
Africa in March 2011. The consultations were chaired by H.E Thabo Mbeki, Former President of the Republic of
South Africa.
Illicit financial flows out of Africa have become a matter of major concern because of the scale and negative
impact of such flows on Africa‟s development and governance agenda. Over the past 39 years ( 1970-2008), Africa
has lost over US$ 854 billion in terms of illicit financial flows. It makes a yearly average of US$ 22 billion. The
situation is getting worst, the annual average illicit financial flow for the past years, 2009 onwards, is estimated to be
around US$ 50 billion.
The draining of the foreign exchange reserves, reduction in tax collection, cancelling out of the investment
inflows and more importantly the worsening of poverty are the results of illicit financial outflows. The mandate of the
High Level Panel is to promote better analysis and understanding of the nature and dimensions of illicit financial
flows from Africa and assessing its impact on continental development. One of the main objectives of the Panel is to
facilitate increased collaboration and cooperation amongst African countries, Regional Economic Communities and
external partners. Issues such as money laundering, corruption and tax evasion were raised during the consultation.
The major outcomes of the regional consultation are:
 Increased knowledge on the issue of Illicit Financial flows and its adverse effects on Africa in general and on the
East and Southern African Countries;
 Enhance policy disclosure on Illicit Financial Flows;
 Sensitize major stakeholders to ensure that they can claim ownership and devise means and strategies to combat Illicit Financial Flows in their national jurisdiction.
Issue 26
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Training course on cybercrime for prosecutors and investigators
By: Yusra Nathire-Beebeejaun, Temporary State Counsel
Upon the initiative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a training course on
“Cybercrime for Prosecutors and Investigators”, was organized from the 10 th to the 14th of June 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya. The training was held in the UN complex and welcomed participants from eight different countries, namely Kenya,
Tanzania, Zanzibar, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Seychelles and Mauritius.
The Office was represented by Rishi Hardowar and myself. We also had two Mauritian investigators from the
CCID Cybercrime Unit.
Over the five days, we had the opportunity to listen to eminent speakers. Professor Gregory Carlton is a brilliant forensic expert and lecturer from the USA. He has worked on numerous cases and shared with us his court experiences. He is usually the one who will provide the main evidence for the prosecution, which is the forensic examiner‟s report. The report is drawn up after examination of the data retrieved from the suspect‟s computer system.
In the US, forensic examiners‟ reports are prepared using a computer programme called Encase. We received two days‟ training on how to use the Encase tool from Craig du Plooy, a Consultant at Encase.
Another distinguished speaker was Adam Palmer, Senior Expert in Cybercrime and former US Navy prosecutor. He was also the Legal Director for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), an NGO
dedicated to combating internet crimes against children. He imparted to us his rich experience as a cybercrime prosecutor, especially on how to admit and present the computer evidence in court.
We also had a presentation from Cristian Perrella who works for Facebook. He talked mainly on the types of
crime which take place on facebook and the proactive measures adopted by the latter to detect and identify these offenders. Mr Perrella also stated that Facebook would disclose information on its users to authorities from other countries solely in accordance with the Facebook terms of service and applicable US law. This request for disclosure must
be made as per the Mutual Legal Assistance procedure.
Michael Katundu, Director of the Communications Commission of Kenya, gave a guest lecture on how Kenya
implemented the cybercrime laws.
The training ended with a mock trial where each country team had to do the examination in chief of the forensic expert, an opening and a closing statement.
Issue 26
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Plaidoyer pour l’élargissement du champs d’application de l’abus de confiance
Article par: Nitish Toolsee Bissessur Legal Research Officer sous la direction de Me. Ram
Rammaya Ag. Senior State Counsel, Me. Nadiya Jeewa Ag. Senior State Counsel et Me. Yorgesh
Bhookun State Counsel.
A l‟aube du 21ème siècle, le Droit Pénal est sujet à de constantes évolutions. Comme l‟énonce Me Robert
Badinter « la loi pénale ne doit pas
ệtre
figée ». Dans le mệme sens,le champ d‟application de l‟abus de
confiance est réduit par les 7 contrats nommément definis (louage,dépôt,mandat,nantissement prệt à usage, travail
salarié ou non-salarié) par l‟ancien article 408 du code Pénal français de 1810 devenu article 333 du Criminal Code
Mauricien. Ainsi, dans certains cas, mệme si les éléments constitutifs de l‟infraction d‟abus de confiance sont
réunis(acte matériel de détournement,un préjudice et l‟élément intentionnel), l‟absence de la « condition préalable »
qu‟est le contrat spécial donne lieu à l‟acquittement du prévenu ou à l‟impossibilité des poursuites pénales.
Cependant, la définition de l‟abus de confiance a été profondément modifiée par le code pénal français
actuel(1994). En effet, l’article 314-1 du code pénal actuel définit l‟infraction comme « le fait par une personne de
détourner, au préjudice d’autrui, des fonds, des valeurs ou bien quelconque qui lui ont été remis et qu’elle a
acceptés à charge de les rendre, de les représenter ou d’en faire un usage déterminé ». Cette nouvelle rédaction
entraine un élargissement du domaine de l‟infraction, car la liste limitative des contrats qui conditionnait l‟existence
de l‟infraction a disparu. La jurisprudence française va encore élargir le domaine d‟application de l‟infraction dans un
arrệt de la chambre criminelle datant du 18 octobre 2000 qui affirme que « l’abus de confiance peut se réaliser en
dehors d’un cadre contractuel lorsque la chose a été remise en vertu d’une disposition légale ou règlementaire ».
Pourtant, au niveau local, l‟ordre juridictionnel est resté figé sur la définition de l’article 408(anc,code pénal). Or, la
modification française de 1994 mérite la plus haute considération Pratique[1] et Juridique[2] dans le contexte local.
1.CONSIDERATION PRATIQUE
Le vol, l‟abus de confiance, l‟escroquerie sont tous des appropriations frauduleuses. Ces infractions, mệme
si elles se distinguent par leurs modes opératoires, poursuivent la mệme finalité: atteinte à la propriété d‟autrui. Au
vu de ce constat, la section 128 du ‘Distict and Intermediate Court Act’ dispose que si la réunion des éléments
constitutifs permet une qualification juridique d‟abus de confiance alors que la personne était poursuivi pour vol,
ladite personne ne doit pas ệtre acquittée mais peut ệtre condamnée pour abus de confiance. Cette requalification
peut avoir lieu d‟une façon réciproque. L‟idée qui en découle c‟est que l‟intérệt protégé est l‟atteinte au droit de
propriété. Donc, le fait de renfermer l‟abus de confiance dans le “cercle des sept contrats spéciaux”ne trouve pas de
justification pratique car l‟atteinte à la propriété peut avoir lieu en dehors du cadre des sept contrats nommés. A titre
d‟exemple, le contrat d‟échange (Lebon v State,1977 MR 295), le contrat de service, le contrat de transport,..
Puis, il faut toutefois noter que mệme si l’Article 333 du criminal code donne une interprétation très large de
la notion de « biens quelconques » en visant « any goods or valuables », donc comprenant biens incorporels
(Exemple :le détournement d‟un numéro de carte bancaire),l‟obligation de l‟existence d‟un des sept contrats limite le
champs d‟application dudit article (Govinden v The State,2011 SCJ 121)
Issue 26
14
Plaidoyer pour l’élargissement du champ d’application de l’abus de confiance
Article par: Nitish Toolsee Bissessur Legal Research Officer sous la direction de Me.
Ram Rammaya Ag. Senior State Counsel, Me. Nadiya Jeewa Ag. Senior State Counsel et Me. Yorgesh
Bhookun State Counsel.
2.CONSIDERATION JURIDIQUE.
Les limites juridiques précises de l‟abus de certains contrats spéciaux conduisent aux difficultés d‟incrimination sur le terrain d‟abus de confiance. Tel est le cas du mandat mis en corrélation avec le travail non-salarié.
Pourtant, il n‟existe aucune différence de fond quant à l‟application du régime general des obligations aux deux
types de contrats.
 La question du mandat mis en corrélation avec le travail non-salarié.
La conséquence du caractère représentatif du mandat est que ce contrat ne peut avoir pour objet,à titre
principal que l‟accomplissement d‟actes juridiques. Or, “un travail salarié ou non salarié” nous met en présence d‟un
acte materiel pour autrui mais en aucun cas d‟un acte juridique (GARÇON, Code Pénal annoté, Edition 1959, Art
408,note 447).
L‟abus du mandat se trouve dès lors dans les limites juridiques précises.
Suivant cette
argumentation, plusieurs décisions judiciaires condamnant le prévenu pour „abus de mandat‟ ont été cassées par la
Cour suprệme car celle-ci a estimé qu‟il n‟existait point de condition préalable pour constituer un abus de
confiance. Autrement dit, faute du pouvoir représentatif du mandataire et son absence d‟autonomie conduisaient
à l‟inexistence du contrat de mandat et par conséquent, l‟inexistence d‟acte juridique. Les arrệts, Gungabissoon v
State 2011 SCJ 128 ;Poonye v State,2007 SCJ 267; Nilmony v State,2007 SCJ 173, Moorly v State 2012 SCJ
239 caractérisent des difficultés de qualification du contrat sur les faits .
 Indifférence des contrats nommés ou innommés pour la constitution d’un abus de confiance.
La règle qui gouverne la théorie générale des contrats est le consensualisme mais pas le
formalisme. D‟ailleurs, les conditions qui régissent la formation du contrat sous le code civil sont uniquement les
règles de fond(art.1108 et suivant :consentement, capacité, objet et cause licite) mais en aucun cas,les règles de
forme. Suivant cette argumentation, l‟inexécution frauduleuse de certaines obligations (consensuelles ou formelles)
est réprehensible pénalement sous le chef d‟abus de confiance.Or,les obligations qui découlent d‟un acte juridique
visent aussi bien les contrats nommés que les contrats innommés Le législateur français a, ainsi, voulu élargir le
champs d‟application de l‟abus de confiance en 1994 en dépassant le sphère formaliste des contrats spéciaux. Un
élargissement semblable serait souhaitable au niveau local.
Issue 26
15
Corporate Criminal Liability: Is the element of Mens Rea Important?
Article by: Bundhun Toshan Rai, Legal Research Officer
In criminology, corporate crime refers to crimes guilty of the offence of involuntary wounds and blows by
committed either by a corporation or by individuals acting negligence in breach of section 239(1) (2) of the Criminal
on behalf of a corporation or other business entity. A Code inasmuch as there was no evidence of negligence
corporation in our context would mean a business entity laid against the Accused.”
having a separate legal personality from the natural
The Judge of the Supreme Court rightly noted
persons that manage its activities.
To have legal
that section 239 and that of the charge sheet shows that
personality means to be capable of having legal rights
someone in the drafting section must have used his
and duties within a certain legal system, such as to enter
personal logic and not the logic of the law. CEB is not a
into contracts, sue, and be sued. Legal personality is a
human person but a corporate body. Had the law relating
prerequisite to legal capacity, the ability of any legal
to a corporate body been applied, the information would
person to amend (enter into, transfer, etc.) rights and
have had to comply with the requisites of section 44 of
obligations.
the Interpretation and General Clauses Act: stating
Corporate Criminal liability differs from one that, at the time of the commission of the offence,
jurisdiction to another. For the sake of this article we whoever appeared on behalf of the CEB was concerned
shall restrict ourselves to the application of corporate in the management of the CEB; or purporting to act in
criminal liability in the European context and its possible that capacity. In fact, the information ignores the
application in Mauritius.
existence of section 44 entirely.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters across
Both French law and English law have wrestled
Europe has become an essential element in ensuring the with the difficulties before they have arrived at a solution
effective operation of each Member State's criminal by way of legislation, which is only recent. Mauritian law
justice system.
Based on the principle of mutual could derive immense benefit from the two laws.
recognition of judgments and judicial decisions by EU
Under the English common law, criminal
countries, it was in this frame that the Maastricht Treaty
responsibility is engaged where both the actus reus (faits
was signed in 1992.
matériels ) of the offence and the mens rea (intention
At domestic level, the case of CEB v State [2010
criminelle )of the offender are found to be established.
SCJ 75] is worth citing here. The appellant, CEB, was
The English Courts handed down one landmark decision
charged for involuntary wounds and blows by negligence
in the case of A-G’s Reference (No. 2 of 1999) [2000] 3
in breach of section 239(1)(2) of the Criminal Code.
All ER 182, CA. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the prinThe CEB was represented at the trial and entered a plea
ciple that although evidence of the defendant‟s state of
of Not Guilty. After hearing the witnesses, the learned
mind is not a prerequisite to a conviction, a corporate
Magistrate of the Intermediate Court convicted the
defendant cannot be convicted of the crime of
appellant on the basis that the charge under section 239
manslaughter by gross negligence in the absence of
(1)(2) of the Criminal Code was proved & sentenced the
evidence establishing the guilt of an identified human
CEB to pay a fine of Rs6,000. The CEB made an appeal
individual which guilt can be attributed to that corporate
to the decision of the Intermediate court to the Supreme
defendant.
Court on the basis that:
Similarly, The Corporate Manslaughter and
“The Honorable Magistrate erred in her
assessment of the evidence on record and failed to Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was recently enacted in
appreciate that the Prosecution had failed to prove the UK. In short, the Act provides for the offence of corbeyond reasonable doubt that the Accused has been porate manslaughter based on a liability where the prosecution will have to prove that:
Issue 26
16
Corporate criminal Liability: Is the element of Mens Rea Important?
Article by: Bundhun Toshan Rai, Legal Research Officer
will have to prove that:
For that reason, then, one could not prosecute a
corporate body under its general law. If criminal liability
was envisaged against corporate bodies, it could only be
 A qualifying organization
possible by virtue of an express provision of a legislative
text. The law continued to adopt the principle that:
 Which owed a relevant duty of care to the victim
 Caused the death of the victim; and
«Sauf lorsque la loi en dispose autrement, nul n’est
 That this death was attributable to a “gross breach:” responsable que de son propre fait (Crim. 23 nov. 1994:
that is, conduct falling far below what could Bull. crim., n. 376)»
reasonably have been expected of the organization
in the circumstances; and
French law came up in 2000 with a specific text:
loi n. 647 of 2000 to provide for criminal liability of
 That the way in which the organization's activities corporate bodies. It reads:
were managed or organized by its senior
management constituted a substantial element in the «Les personnes morales, à l’exclusion de l’Etat, sont
responsables pénalement, selon les distinctions des
gross breach
articles 121-4 a 121-7 et dans les cas prévus par la loi ou
On the other hand in relation to France the le règlement, des infractions commises, pour leur
doctrine as well as jurisprudence refers to corporate compte, par leurs organes où représentants.»
criminal liability as «l’épineuse question
responsabilité pénale de la personne morale. »
de
la
Both French Law and English Law have today
imposed criminal liability on corporations by legislative
Criminal Liability is recognized in French law by text, French law as from year 2000 and English law by
virtue of Article 121-1 of the French Criminal Code judicial interpretation since 2000 followed by legislative
which stipulates that:
text since 2007. The application of the principles therein
« Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son propre is still in an early phase of development, much of which
would prove immensely useful to Mauritian law. The fact
fait. »
that the criminal law of Mauritius draws its substantive
The basic rule of personal liability was also
law based from French law and its law of evidence from
responsible for the development of the doctrine of «fusion
English Law would yet add another dimension to the
-absorption» in French law whereby only human persons
issue.
could be criminally culpable for their negligent acts and
omissions but not corporate bodies for which they were
acting. Thus, in French law :
«Aux termes de l’article 121-1 du Code pénal, nul n’est
responsable pénalement que de son propre fait; il
s’ensuit, dans le cas où une société, poursuivie pour
blessures involontaires, fait l’objet d’une fusionabsorption, que la société absorbante ne peut être
déclarée coupable, l’absorption ayant fait perdre son
existence juridique à la société absorbée (Crim. 20 juin
2000; Bull, crim., n. 237; D. affaires 2001, p. 853, note H.
Matsopoulou).»
Issue 26
17
Case Summary for June 2013
By: Rawoah Yashvind Kumar, Legal Research Officer
DPP v NATCHEDY J L S (2013) SCJ 291
GARNI J L v THE STATE (2013) SCJ 274
Hon. Judges A.R. Hajee Abdoula and P. Fekna
Hon Judges E. Balancy and S. Peeroo
Betting activity (Bookmaker) without holding a licence –
The Respondent was prosecuted before the District Court of Interpretation - Appeal
Plaines Wilhems (Rose Hill) for the offence of driving motor This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of
vehicle with alcohol concentration above prescribed limit, in Pamplemousses finding the appellant guilty of having unlawfully
breach of section 123 F(1)(a)(3) 5 and 52 of the Road Traffic carried on a betting activity (Bookmaker) without being the
holder of a licence, and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs
Act. The Respondent pleaded not guilty.
250,000 and Rs 100 as costs, in breach of sections 15 (1) (5) and
Facts
The Respondent was stopped by a police officer due to that he 30 (5) of the Horse Racing Board Act 23/03. He pleaded not
was driving in a zigzag manner on the road. On carrying out a guilty and was represented by Counsel.
Road Traffic Act- roadside breath test apparatus- Appeal
breath test with him, it turned out to be positive. The
Respondent was then taken to the nearby hospital by the
police officer for a blood test. The sample of blood was sent to
the FSL for examination and a report was filed. The police
officer in charge also confirmed that the ethylometre
apparatus (blood test apparatus) was not approved by the
Minister.
On Appeal
Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant carried out an
activity which the legislator intended to prohibit by law.
According to him, the appellant did not “receive or negotiate
bets on the basis of fixed odds on the result of a horse race” since
he neither fixed the odds nor kept the bets when the horses lost
The Learned Magistrate dismissed the case against the but lost them to the bookmaker
Respondent, taking into consideration the decision in the case On the other side, learned State Counsel for the respondent
of Couronne v. State (2010) SCJ 440, whereby it was held that submitted that it is the activity that the appellant carried out in
if the blood test device is not properly approved by the public involving several persons that the Act sought to sanction
minister, the result of the test, being positive, is invalid. This under section 15 (5). He referred to the case of R (on the
also makes the subsequent blood specimen given ineffective. application of William Hill Organisation Ltd) v Horserace
Following the decision of the Learned Magistrate, the Director Betting Levy Board (Association of British Bookmakers and
of Public Prosecutions made an appeal against it based on the others, interested parties) *2012+ EWHC 2039 (William Hill)
where it was stated that “a bet is ‘received’ by someone who
following grounds:
accepts bets (i.e, a bookmaker) when the punter approaches
Because the Learned Magistrate was wrong to conclude that
him and places his bet with him”.
the result of the blood specimen was ineffective and cannot
be relied upon since having been obtained subsequent to a The above quoted extract from William Hill (Supra) also consists
breath test carried out by a device not approved by the of the following sentence: “… But a person who made bets, but
did not receive or negotiate them, would not be a bookmaker,
Minister.
even if he did so in the course of his business”.
Because the Learned Magistrate failed to give due weight to
the established scientific evidence on record, namely the FSL Held
The Court considered that it will not be right to give an
report, in deciding to dismiss the charge.
expansive interpretation to the wording of the Act as has been
Held
done by the learned Magistrate, to mean that a person who
The decision of the full bench of the Supreme Court in the
places bets with a bookmaker on behalf of somebody else would
case of Sunkur & Anor v. The State of Mauritius & Ors (2013)
be a bookmaker even if he does not benefit from the
SCJ 185 was relied upon to hold that even if the breathalyser
transaction. In the light of the above conclusion, the Judges held
test were faulty for lack of prescribed equipment at the time,
that the learned Magistrate erred in finding the appellant guilty
the one essential test which carries probative value is the
of the offence charged. The Court accordingly allowed the
blood test carried at the Forensic Science Laboratory.
appeal and quashed the conviction and sentence.
The Court accordingly allowed the appeal.
Issue 26
18
Case Summary for June 2013
By: Rawoah Yashvind Kumar, Legal Research Officer
The applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Judicial
Hon. Y. K. J. Yeung Sik Yuen Chief Justice, Hon., N. Matadeen, Committee of the Privy Council against a judgment of the
Supreme Court which allowed an appeal by the respondent
SPJ & Hon. Judge, P.Fekna
from a judgment of the Intermediate Court and quashed the
Court of Criminal Appeal - Severity of the sentence
sentence of a fine of one hundred and fifty thousand rupees
inflicted upon the applicant and substituted for it a sentence of
Facts
three years’ penal servitude. The Court also ordered the time
The appellant was prosecuted before the Criminal Division of spent on remand to be deducted from that period.
the Supreme Court pursuant to an information containing six The application for leave was grounded both under section 81
counts. The charge under count 1 was for the offence of (1) (a) of the Constitution and under section 81(2) (b) of the
“possession of dangerous drugs for the purpose of Constitution coupled with section 70A of the Courts Act.
distribution”, namely 234.7 grams of heroin. It was further The applicant had two previous convictions for possession of
averred that, in view of the circumstances of the case, the heroin, for which he was given a fine, and one previous
accused was a trafficker. The remaining five charges related to conviction for selling heroin, for which he was sentenced to two
the offence of organising the delivery of dangerous drugs. The years’ imprisonment. The Court found that the issues do not
accused had pleaded not guilty to all six counts and was raise any question of such great general public importance that
represented by counsel. He was found guilty under count 1 and it ought to be submitted to the Judicial Committee. In the cirthe remaining five charges were dismissed.
cumstances, leave was refused and the application was disVEERASAMY S v THE STATE (2013) SCJ 286
The learned Judge imposed a sentence of 28 years penal missed with costs.
servitude after having considered the severity of the offence.
STATE v RAMJANE F. (2013) SCJ 259
On Appeal
Hon. J. Benjamin. G. Marie Joseph, Judge
A number of grounds of appeal were raised but they were all
dropped at the hearing of the appeal, save and except the one Murder- Guilty plea
questioning the severity of the sentence. Learned counsel The accused stands charged with having on 18/08/07
addressed the Court on the implications of the case of committed the crime of murder by criminally and wilfully and of
Callachand & anor v The State of Mauritius *2008 UK PC 49+ his malice aforethought kill one Bibi Nazeemah Bocus, in
which, according to him, requires a mathematical deduction of breach of sections 216, 217 and 221(1)(a) of the Criminal
Code. The accused pleaded guilty to the charge.
the time spent on remand from the sentence passed.
Held
For the reasons which are set out in Liyyakat Ali Polin v The
State of Mauritius (2013) SCJ 106 the Judges are of the view
that the decision in Callachand does not impose a requirement
whereby a failure by the trial court to carry out an arithmetical
deduction at the time of sentencing would necessarily lead to
allowing another deduction for time spent on remand by the
appellate court. It suffices that, when passing sentence, the
trial court was fully aware of the time spent on remand by the
accused party and had expressly stated that that factor had
been taken into account.
The accused admittedly assaulted the victim with the clear
intention of killing her and that he used an appropriate weapon
and exercised the violence required for that purpose. The crime
was committed some time after the coming into force of Act
No. 6 of 2007, which amended the law to provide for the
harsher punishment of penal servitude for life or penal
servitude for a term not exceeding 60 years.
Therefore, in light of the circumstances in which the crime was
committed, the court sentenced the accused to undergo penal
servitude for 35 years, from which would be deducted the 2109
days he had spent on remand.
SABAPATHEE S. v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (2013)
SCJ 246
Hon. K.P. Matadeen, SPJ & Hon. S. Bhaukaurally, Judge
Application for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council
Issue 26
19
Case Summary for June 2013
By: Rawoah Yashvind Kumar, Legal Research Officer
STATE v RUGHOO R (2013) SCJ 268
STATE V BOTHA JOHANNES JURIE (2013) SCJ 256
Hon. J. Benjamin. G. Marie Joseph, Judge
Hon. Judge P. Fekna
Manslaughter – Guilty Plea
Dangerous drugs importation- Attempt to possess
The accused stood charged with having on 18/02/08
committed the crime of manslaughter by criminally and wilfully
killing one Bidwantee Etwaree, in breach of sections 215 and
223(3) of the Criminal Code. He pleaded guilty.
The accused stood charged with the offence of attempting to
possess drugs for the purpose of delivery in breach of sections
30(1)(f)(ii), 41(3)(4), 47(2) and 47(5)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs
Act coupled with sections 2 and 45 of the Interpretation and
General Clauses Act. It was averred that on or about 5 March
2009, the accused attempted to possess 471.7 grams of heroin
which had been imported into Mauritius by one Marisca
Scannell, but which attempt failed through circumstances
independent of his will. The accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
In assessing the sentence to pass in the present matter, the
Judge took note of the fact that the accused has committed the
serious crime of manslaughter in circumstances, which, in his
own version, indicates that he was under the influence of
alcohol and allowed himself to be carried away by his anger.
The Court held that the whole conduct of the accused called for
a punishment that would send the proper signal to society and
particularly to potential offenders along the same lines. In the
light of the foregoing observations and after taking into account
his timely guilty plea and the fact that he cooperated fully with
the authorities and has expressed remorse, the Court
sentenced the accused to undergo 30 years penal servitude,
from which would be deducted the whole time spent on
remand in this matter, and to pay Rs 1,000 as costs.
STATE v ROOMALDAWO A (2013) SCJ 285
Hon. J. Benjamin. G. Marie Joseph, Judge
Manslaughter – Guilty Plea
The accused stood charged with the crime of manslaughter, in
that on or about the 10th November, 2009, he criminally and
wilfully killed one Mrs Lachumaman Cunniah, in breach of
sections 215 and 223(3) of the Criminal Code. Upon his plea of
guilty, the Court found him guilty as charged.
In a brief statement from the dock, the accused begged for
excuse and expressed remorse for what he did. In considering
the appropriate sentence to pass in this matter, the Court took
note of the fact that the accused found no better means than
killing the victim, a defenceless old lady, to prevent her from
calling for help after noticing the presence of his friend. After
having killed the lady, his friend and himself went on to commit
the larceny which they had planned. The Court sentenced the
accused to undergo penal servitude for 30 years, from which
would be deducted the 1237 days he had spent on remand, and
to pay Rs 1000 as costs.
Issue 26
Marisca Scannell arrived in Mauritius on Wednesday 4 March
2009 from South Africa by flight SA 190. The flight landed at
16:30 hrs and she was immediately stopped and profiled by the
ADSU officers. Upon continuous surveillance exercises and
investigation, the Police officers were informed that Marisca
Scannell had swallowed a total number of 41 pellets in all
containing a total of 471.7 grams of heroin and also the identity
of the person to whom the drugs were destined was revealed.
The Court found accused guilty and sentenced him to undergo
33 years penal servitude (remand period of 1520 days to be
deducted) and to pay a fine of Rs 300,000.
STATE v SOOKNAUTH S (2013) SCJ 271
Hon. J. Benjamin. G. MARIE JOSEPH, Judge
Murder
The accused was originally charged with the offence of murder.
The prosecution agreed to his offer to plead guilty to the
reduced charge of manslaughter and the information was
amended accordingly. The accused thus pleaded guilty to
having on or about the 1st February, 2008 criminally and
wilfully killed one Jayraj Jeea, in breach of sections 215 and 223
(3) of the Criminal Code. The court therefore, found the
accused guilty as charged.
Having regard to the observations and after taking into account
the mitigating factors in his favour, namely, his timely guilty
plea, the fact that he readily confessed, his family
commitments and remorse shown in Court, The Court
sentenced the accused to undergo 30 years penal servitude,
from which shall be deducted the 235 days he had spent on
remand, and to pay Rs 1,000 as costs.
20
Case Summary for June 2013
By: Rawoah Yashvind Kumar, Legal Research Officer
KORIMBOCUS M.S. v STATE OF MAURITIUS (2013) SCJ 257
Hon.K.P. Matadeen, SPJ & Hon. A.A. Caunhye, Judge
Application for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council
This is an application for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against a judgment of the Supreme
Court dismissing an appeal by the applicant from a judgment of
the Intermediate Court finding the applicant guilty of the
offences of sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of
sixteen (on two counts) and abducting a minor. The Court
sentenced him to undergo five years’ penal servitude under
each of the two counts of the first offence and three years’
penal servitude for the second offence.
 Because the Learned Magistrate has failed to safeguard
the rights of the appellant to a fair trial the more so that
the appellant was inops concilii.(without legal counsel)
 Because the Learned Magistrate has failed to adequately
consider the guilty plea and clean record of the appellant
prior to sentencing.
 Because the appellant’s constitutional right to a fair trial
under section 10 of the Constitution has been infringed.
 Because the sentence is manifestly harsh and excessive.
Section 301 of the Criminal Code which deals with the offence
of larceny provides that:
“Any person who fraudulently abstracts anything not belonging
to himself shall commit larceny and be liable, on conviction, to
The application was grounded under both section 81(1)(a) of imprisonment and to a fine not exceeding 100,000 rupees”.
the Constitution and section 81(2)(b) coupled with section
70A of the Courts Act.
Taking into account the age of the appellant at the time of the
It was held that the Supreme Court was neither called upon to commission of the offence and the circumstances in which the
make nor has made any final decision on any question as to the offence was committed, the Judges came to the conclusion that
interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, the application a term of 4 months imprisonment imposed by the Learned
as grounded under section 81(1)(a) of the Constitution could Magistrate was indeed manifestly harsh and excessive.
not succeed.
With regard to the application as grounded under section 81(2) They accordingly, in the exercise of their powers under S. 96(2)
(b) of the Constitution, the only ground that was pressed was of the District and Intermediate Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction)
the one challenging the sentence as being manifestly harsh and Act, amend the sentence and substitute for the term of 4
excessive. In the circumstances the Court was not prepared to months imprisonment imposed by the Learned Magistrate a
say that the appeal raises questions which by virtue of their fine of Rs 10, 000.
great general public importance should be submitted to the
The appeal was otherwise dismissed.
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
In the circumstances, leave was refused and the application
was set aside with costs.
FREDERIC L A S v THE STATE (2013) SCJ 276
Hon. A.R. Hajee Abdoula, Judge & P. Fekna, Judge
Larceny & Possession of stolen property *Appeal+
The appellant was prosecuted before the District Court of
Pamplemousses under two counts of an Information with
Larceny and Possession of Stolen Property in breach of sections
40 and 301 of the Criminal Code. Upon the appellant entering a
plea of guilty under count 1, the Learned Magistrate dismissed
the alternative count 2 against the appellant and proceeded.
Thought of the Month
“The smallest of actions is always
better than the noblest of
intentions.”
The appellant made an appeal against the sentence on no less
than seven grounds which read as follows:
 Because the Learned Magistrate has failed to consider
compelling mitigating factors prior to sentencing.
 Because the Learned Magistrate was wrong to hold that a
custodial sentence was warranted in the circumstances.
 Because the Learned Magistrate has failed to hear
sufficient evidence before inflicting a custodial sentence.
Issue 26
― Robin S. Sharma
21
Press Communiqué
Issued by the ODPP on 1st July 2013
Jean Roland Boutanive 33, was prosecuted before the Intermediate Court on a charge of wilfully and
unlawfully having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 16 in April 2007, in breach of Section 249(4) of
the Criminal Code.
The accused pleaded guilty and Senior Magistrate Raj Seebaluck gave him a conditional discharge with a
cash surety of Rs 40 000 and to be of good behaviour for a period of 2 years. The Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions has appealed against the sentence of the Intermediate Court (Criminal Division) this 1st July 2013 on
the following grounds:
The Learned Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the legal requirements of Section 197(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act before imposing the conditional discharge.
The sentence imposed by the Learned Magistrate defeats the aim of the legislator to protect minors by
providing a stiff sentence for the offence.
The Learned Magistrate did not give sufficient consideration to the serious nature of the offence and the other
factors relevant for the sentencing such as inter alia :
 The age of the victim compared to that of the accused;
 The fact that the victim was a school girl at the time;
 The motivation of accused who was a married man at the time.
The Learned Magistrate was unduly lenient by not imposing a custodial sentence
Ashley Victor – Public Relations Officer
The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Note: Please visit our website www.dpp.gov.mu for the PDF version of the communiqué in French and
English.
Issue 26
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