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Journal of Motor Behavior, 2005, Vol. 37, No. 1, 10–20
Duration of Mentally Simulated Movement:
A Review
A. Guillot
C. Collet
Centre de Recherche et d’Innovation sur le Sport
Université Claude Bernard Lyon I
Villeurbanne, France
ABSTRACT. The authors review studies of mentally simulated
movements. In automatic or cyclical movements, actual and motor
imagery (MI) durations are similar. When athletes simulate only
dynamic phases of movement or perform MI just before competing, however, environmental and time constraints lead to an underestimation of actual duration. Conversely, complex attentiondemanding movements take longer to image. Finally, participants
can modify the speed of MI voluntarily when they receive specific instructions. To complete the available data, the authors compared imagined and actual durations in tennis and gymnastics.
Results showed systematic and disproportionate overestimation of
actual duration. The authors found a relationship between complex
motor skills and MI duration. They discuss the factors leading to
over- and underestimation and the hypotheses that could be tested.
central processes are involved in both patterns of behavior.
If a mental image depicts spatial extent, then the metric
properties of object surfaces may be explicit in visual
images (Denis & Kosslyn, 1999). As shown by Kosslyn
(1973) in a simple image-scanning paradigm, more time
should thus be required to scan longer distances across
images. As reviewed in the following discussion, such
results have been reported. However, motor imagery experiments have provided evidence that temporal equivalence
between imagined and actual movements is not systematic
and may be affected by several factors.
Key words: mental chronometry, motor imagery, sport, temporal
characteristics
Visual Scanning and Mental Rotation Experiments
In mental scanning experiments, participants are required to learn a visual configuration comprising several
objects, each at a specific location. Participants then have to
mentally scan the distance separating those objects and to
indicate when scanning has been completed. Visual scanning of an actual configuration and mental scanning of the
visual image of that configuration result in very similar
chronometric patterns (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978).
Similar relationships occur when mental scanning of representations is extracted from verbal descriptions; such
images have structural and metric properties similar to
those extracted from perception (Denis & Cocude, 1989,
1992, 1997; Denis, Goncalvez, & Memmi, 1995). Such
results have also revealed that individuals require more
time to explore longer distances. That relationship depends,
I
s the time needed for mentally simulated actions close to
that required for actual performance? Although that is
often the case, there are some contexts in which it is not. For
that reason, new studies directed at clarifying the factors
that cause the inconsistent findings should be performed.
Individuals do not perceive time as such, but changes or
events in time and their temporal relations (spatial distances
and other relations between objects). The term mental
chronometry refers to the time course of information processing by the nervous system (Posner, 1978). In many
early research studies, investigators have addressed motor,
attention, and perceptual and psycholinguistic reaction
times, but in some studies of prolonged mental activities
such as mental calculation, chronometric methods were
used (see Groen & Parkman, 1972). For example, Landauer
(1962) showed that overt and implicit recitations of the
alphabet take almost the same length of time; times for
speaking aloud or thinking the same series of letters or
numbers were similar. Landauer concluded that the same
Correspondence address: A. Guillot, Centre de Recherche et
d’Innovation sur le Sport, Université Claude Bernard Lyon I –
UFR STAPS, 27-29 boulevard du 11 Novembre 1918, 69622
Villeurbanne Cedex, France. E-mail address: aymeric.guillot@
univ-lyon1.fr
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Motor Imagery Duration
moreover, on participants’ visuospatial abilities (Cocude,
Mellet, & Denis, 1999): Participants with high visuospatial
capabilities obtained a significant time–distance correlation
coefficient, whereas those with poorer abilities formed
images with no real structural properties. Experimental
data derived from mental rotation tasks have led to the same
conclusion (Amorim et al., 2000; Amorim & Stucchi, 1997;
De’Sperati & Stucchi, 1997; Shepard & Feng, 1972; Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz, 1998;
Wohlschlager & Wohlschlager, 1998). Generally, when
participants are asked to judge whether objects or body segments that differ in orientation are spatially congruent, their
reaction times increase with angular discrepancy. To succeed in such a task, participants must master an internal
rotation, which implies reorientation of the rotated objects
or body segments in relation to each other.
mechanical costs associated with concurrent response
options during motor preparation (Johnson, Corballis, &
Gazzaniga, 2001). Petit, Pegna, Mayer, and Hauert (2003)
found that MI of a moving body segment took longer than
mental representation of an object of another nature, with
no anatomical constraints. By comparing the length of time
for individuals’ mental rotation of their hand or foot into
awkward target postures, Parsons (1987) previously found
that the durations of MI and movements along biomechanically plausible trajectories were consistent. In that way,
Parsons (1994, 2001) showed that mental rotation times for
the hand were very close to corresponding actual rotation
times. Accordingly, when the picture of a hand with a given
orientation was presented, the time to determine its side
(right or left) was close to the time for actual movement into
that orientation.
The Case of Motor Imagery (MI)
Temporal Equivalence Between MI
and Motor Performance
MI is defined as mental representation of movement with
no concomitant production of muscular activity to implement the movement (Denis, Chevalier, & Eloi, 1985). MI
may involve the whole body or be limited to part of the
body, thus requiring body representation as the generator
of acting forces and not only of the effects of those forces
on the external world (Jeannerod, 1994). Athletes commonly use MI to improve motor task performance
(Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994; Feltz & Landers, 1983;
Roure et al., 1999). According to Feltz and Landers, combining mental and physical practice is more efficient than,
or is at least equal to, physical execution, when there is no
decrease in total physical performance time. Mental practice leads to rehearsal of a skill and to the opportunity to
codify parts of the skill into meaningful cognitive units
(Driskell et al.). However, Roure et al. (1999; Roure et al.,
1998) provided evidence that the characteristics of mental
training and execution must be close. In a volleyball task,
they observed that MI led to improved performance, but
that the benefit of mental training was not transferred, even
in a close (but different) motor sequence. Although MI
resembles representations involving mental manipulation
of visual images (e.g., mental scanning or mental rotation),
it should be distinguished from such mental activity. One
unique aspect of MI relates to the temporal characteristics
of mental images.
When participants are required to grasp an object or to
think about grasping it, MI may contribute to solving the
problem of movement selection, a major component of the
construction of the premotor plan (Johnson, 1998, 2000).
MI duration may be influenced by variables affecting
motor-performance duration. Specifically, the time required
to select a grip increases as a function of the angular distance to the location of the selected posture along the shortest biomechanically plausible trajectory. According to Jeannerod (1995, 1999) and Johnson (2000), the imagined
movement obeys the biomechanical constraints of the represented movement. One may use MI to evaluate the bioJanuary 2005, Vol. 37, No. 1
Highly Automatic Movements
One influencing factor on MI accuracy is the duration of
mental simulation. By comparing the temporal organization
of graphic movements executed actually or mentally, Decety and Michel (1989) showed that mental and actual temporal organization of movements were similar and involved
the same planning program. Watson and Rubin (1996),
using a line-drawing task, confirmed that MI preserved the
temporal order. Likewise, Papaxanthis, Pozzo, Skoura, and
Schieppati (2002) found that the duration of imagined
movement was similar to that of actual movement in a
drawing task, although the variability of imagined movement duration increased in comparison with that of actual
performance. Similarly, in visually guided pointing tasks,
the speed of imagined motor performance was found to be
highly correlated with the speed of actual movement.
According to Sirigu (1996), the critical frequency with
which participants failed to hit imaginary targets and real
targets was the same. Maruff and Velakoulis (2000) found
that the durations of both real and imagined performance in
a visually guided pointing task were equivalent in healthy
participants, but not when participants were required to
simulate injury. On the basis of those converging results,
one can conclude that in highly automatic movements, such
as writing, reaching, and grasping, MI duration and motor
performance are systematically close.
Complex Motor Skills: Cyclical Activities
In the absence of specific instructions, the speed at
which a movement or series of movements is performed
usually correlates with its MI (Boschker, Bakker, & Rietberg, 2000; Gould & Damarjian, 1996; Nideffer, 1985;
Weinberg & Gould, 1995). By comparing the actual time
taken to walk toward targets placed at various distances
with the time for mental simulation of walking to the same
targets, Decety, Jeannerod, and Prablanc (1989) showed
11
A. Guillot & C. Collet
that mental walking times and the times measured in the
actual walking condition were closely similar. Papaxanthis,
Pozzo, et al. (2002) recently confirmed that temporal
equivalence. Results from Berthoz (1996) and Ghaëm et al.
(1997) also accord with such previous findings. In the
study by Barr and Hall (1992), MI duration and the actual
movement duration were found to be similar in top elite
rowers, indicating a relationship between expertise level
and MI. In the same way, McIntyre and Moran (1996a,
1996b) showed that MI duration of a slalom course was
similar to actual paddling times in a canoe–kayak competition. Durations of MI and actual action (500-m skating
sprint) were shown by Oishi, Kasai, and Maeshima (2000)
to be very close to each participant’s personal-best performance (from 35–38 s). In those studies, athletes were
instructed to imagine that they were in an actual competition. The same comparison was made with a new and unfamiliar task (pedalo): Again, a high correlation between
actual and MI durations was found (Munzert, 2002). The
time taken for execution and mental simulation of closed
and cyclical movements such as walking or rowing are thus
assumed to be based on common mechanisms.
Such results confirm that MI does not depend on a completed premotor plan (Jeannerod, 1994) but instead may be
involved in the programming process itself. Those convergent findings also support functional equivalence between
MI and motor preparation (Mellet, Petit, Mazoyer, Denis, &
Tzourio, 1998). Papaxanthis, Schieppati, Gentili, and Pozzo
(2002) showed that both inertial and gravitational constraints were accurately incorporated in the timing of MI,
which appeared therefore to be functionally close to programming and performance of actual movement.
Overestimation of Movement Duration
MI Duration Increases With Task Difficulty
With regard to results obtained by Kosslyn et al. (1978)
in a visual scanning task, several authors (Mitchell & Richman, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981; Richman, Mitchell, &
Reznick, 1979) have argued that action duration generally
increases because of individuals’ tacit knowledge of what
will happen when they walk mentally over longer distances.
In the mental imagery condition, temporal invariance may
have thus resulted from a strategy of replication of the temporal sequence recorded in the actual condition. However,
Finke and Pinker (1982) and S. K. Reed, Hock, and Lockhead (1983) showed that the increase could not be
explained by tacit knowledge. Their results were consistent
with the hypothesis that participants really do scan spatial
images in the mental scanning task and do not rely on scanning times to estimate lengths. According to Jeannerod
(1994), that question is not easily answered because one
must determine the cues used to identify the duration of a
mental event. It has been found in numerous studies, however, that it takes longer to simulate a difficult movement.
Decety and Lindgren’s (1991) participants had to imagine
12
writing a sentence and drawing a Necker’s cube with either
their right, dominant hand or their left hand while also hopping around a square on either their right or left foot.
Results revealed that the sensation of effort increased across
the trials, and a correlation was established between the difficulty of imagining the task and the subjective sensation of
effort. In the study by Decety et al. (1989), movement time
increased linearly as a function of task difficulty, in accordance with Fitts’s (1954) law. That finding was confirmed
by Decety and Jeannerod (1996), who showed that the time
needed to imagine oneself walking through a gate was
affected by both the gate’s distance from the starting point
and its width. Duration thus increased as a function of task
difficulty (Jeannerod, 1995, 1999). Cerritelli, Maruff, Wilson, and Currie (2000) also used the conventional, visually
guided pointing task to investigate the speed–accuracy
tradeoff that occurs as target size is varied for both real and
imagined performances. For both the no-load and load conditions (external load of 2 kg), the speed–accuracy tradeoff
conformed to Fitts’s law (actual and imagined performances). The duration of imagined movements increased
significantly (by 30%) with the added load. Those results
are in accordance with the findings of both Decety and
Jeannerod (1996) and Maruff et al. (1999). Force and timing components of imagined movements may be assembled
independently and immediately in response to current task
demand characteristics.
To evaluate the impact of an external load on the duration
of actual and mental movements, Decety and Boisson
(1990) and Decety et al. (1989) required participants carrying a 25-kg weight in a rucksack to walk as accurately as
possible and to imagine walking to targets at various distances. Participants did not replicate the close time estimation they experienced during actual performance. Actual
walking times were identical to those obtained in a previous
study (Decety et al., Experiment 1), whereas duration
increased significantly in the mental mode (by 30% or
more). During the mental task, however, participants did not
use the increase in encoded force to overcome resistance
because they did not actually walk. Because participants
were blindfolded during the experiment, their performance
may have reflected changes in memory function or in visuospatial representation. Furthermore, Corcos (1994) indicated that if the weight was attached to participants’ limbs
rather than placed on their backs, actual movement might be
slowed down in the same way as imagined movements.
That possibility should be confirmed experimentally. In a
visually guided pointing task, Cerritelli et al. (2000) confirmed that the force and timing components of imagined
movements were assembled independently and immediately in response to current task demand characteristics. That
independence was also shown when a weight was attached
to the limb that individuals imagined moving when performing a motor-sequencing task. The duration of imagined
movements increased significantly (by 30%) as compared
with the motor task. Contrary to the study by Decety et al.,
Journal of Motor Behavior
Motor Imagery Duration
participants were not blindfolded for that experiment and
were able to use visual feedback to adjust their MI effort.
Thus, although Gottlieb, Corcos, and Argawal (1989) found
that attaching additional inertial weight to the upper limb
slowed down actual movements, Cerritelli et al. did not. The
results of Cerritelli et al. reflected a change in force calculation, as was suggested by Decety et al.
Duration of Rapid and Complex
Attention-Demanding Movements
Investigators attribute simulation of action and preparation before execution to the same motor representation system (Jeannerod, 1994). Despite that finding, in few studies
have the durations of both simulated and actual movements
been shown to be similar when participants imagined a
complex attention-demanding movement as if they were
actually performing it during a competition. In a golfputting task, Coello and Orliaguet (1992) showed that MI
duration was disproportionately overestimated in comparison with the time actually required to perform it. Participants also felt that the time taken increased with movement
amplitude. Furthermore, the authors found that overestimation increased simultaneously with the ball–target distance, whereas actual movement time was constant. Those
results confirm findings by Beyer, Weiss, Hansen, Wolf,
and Seidel (1990). In their study, 8 swimmers sitting in a
resting position were required to imagine their own swimming movements over a distance of 100 m in their preferential style. The duration of imagined swimming was
shown to be dependent upon the swimming style but
remained 25% longer than actual swimming time.
Although Collet, Dittmar, and Vernet-Maury (1999)
showed that elite weightlifters underestimated the complete duration of the snatch, they found that the duration of
the execution phase was overestimated: When all successive stages of the movement (including its preparation)
were mentally performed, preparation and concentration
phases were underestimated. However, the results showed
that the duration of execution phases was often overestimated in MI (up to 15%). Finally, Calmels and Fournier
(2001) observed that MI durations of the most difficult
gymnastics figures were 10% longer than those of actual
movements. Their findings concurred with those of a number of previous studies showing that difficult actions take
longer to image (Decety, Philippon, & Ingvar, 1988; Georgeopoulos, Lurito, Petrides, Schwartz, & Massey, 1989).
Thus, in mental simulation of rapid and complex attentiondemanding movements, athletes seem to have greater difficulty in preserving the temporal aspects of the movement.
One may postulate that image accuracy is a more important
aspect than is temporal invariance. C. L. Reed (2002)
found, furthermore, that the temporal aspects of MI were
not a uniformly shifted version of the temporal aspects of
motor production, and hypothesized that one should also
consider the processing constraints imposed by the visual
and working memory systems.
January 2005, Vol. 37, No. 1
Underestimation of Movement Duration
Influence of Image Content
Comparison of durations of mental and actual movements (tying a knot) have shown that mental representation
was shorter than actual execution time (Annett, 1988).
Vieilledent (1996) compared the durations of mental
rehearsal and execution of a locomotion task in climbing.
Imagined movement times were shorter than were execution times; that finding differs from previous results (Decety & Boisson, 1990; Decety & Jeannerod, 1996; Decety et
al., 1989). However, because participants had to imagine
themselves moving as accurately as possible and at a constant speed, the study by Vieilledent revealed the difficulty
of simulating movements that integrate difficult variations
of postural constraints. Moreover, because participants simulated only the dynamic phases of the task and not the static phases, they underestimated the time spent on imagined
movement. In shooting, the marksmen’s concentration phase
is based on mental rehearsal of the shot; mental rehearsal has
been found to determine the accuracy of the forthcoming
shot (Deschaumes-Molinaro, Dittmar, & Vernet-Maury,
1991, 1992). Results showed that MI duration was shorter
than actual movement time. It is a fact that participants
imagine shooting parameters and all proprio- and exteroceptive information usually associated with them in successive stages, as if they were in a competition. It is advisable,
however, to hold the arm and pistol steady during the concentration phase, but that steadiness cannot be maintained
over a long period of time. That may explain why the
sequence of stages is visualized faster during imagined
shooting than during actual shooting. Time differences were
also found in skydiving (Barthalais, 1998). During a set
free-fall, the skydiving team had to perform a series of predetermined formations as quickly as possible. Although
mentally simulated times were very close to those recorded
during skydiving for the best competitors, the athletes visualized the series of figures faster. Again, those results reveal
a relationship between expertise level and MI; elite athletes
were the most accurate with respect to MI duration. We analyze that relationship later in this article.
Perceived Difficulty of Task and Temporal Constraints
In a review, Driskell et al. (1994) indicated that mental
imagery might be affected by the intrinsic characteristics of
the task being imaged. Difficult transformations of objects
take more time to complete (Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992).
Likewise, task difficulty is thought to influence the relative
duration of mental representation of action (Decety et al.,
1989; Jeannerod, 1995, 1999). Participants represent the
easier parts even faster (Calmels & Fournier, 2001). Mental
execution of an entire gymnastics floor routine performed
by 12 elite female gymnasts was found to be shorter than
the actual time required to perform the routine (Calmels &
Fournier). Gymnasts frequently use imagery just before a
competition (White & Hardy, 1998). It is no surprise that in
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A. Guillot & C. Collet
such conditions of time constraint, gymnasts accelerate the
rhythm of routine imagery. Competition offers participants
less time than training does. Munroe, Giacobbi, Hall, and
Weinberg (2000) had previously shown that MI duration
was especially underestimated during a competition. The
gymnasts in Calmels and Fournier’s study also indicated
that imagery helped them to relax. Participants endeavored
to review the entire floor routine within a limited time to
control competitive anxiety. Finally, MI duration was shorter than actual execution when the skill was perceived as
being easy to perform. That finding favors the notion that
one should determine participants’ levels of skill. Conversely, MI duration was longer than in actual performance for
the more difficult figures. Those results confirm that skill
complexity and time constraints influence MI duration.
Influence of Expertise Level
According to Unestahl (1983), top Swedish skiers were
able to ski a course mentally in a time very close to the actual time taken. Deschaumes-Molinaro et al. (1991, 1992)
found that the best marksmen’s timing of mentally simulated actions closely approximated actual concentration and
movement times. Similarly, Barthalais (1998) and C. L.
Reed (2002) observed that the best skydivers and springboard divers were the most accurate, from the time viewpoint, in imagining themselves, as accurately as possible,
performing as if they were in a competition. Those results
concur with the finding of Denis, Chevalier, and Eloi (1989)
and Isaac (1992) that less experienced athletes had greater
difficulty in representing accurate movement. The transfer
between imagery and actual movement may be facilitated if
movement durations are similar (Nideffer, 1985). However,
the perceived difficulty of the task may be considered an
important factor influencing imagined movement duration.
Depending on their expertise level, athletes are to a greater
or lesser degree aware of the technical complexity of a
movement. The best competitors may perceive a movement
as being easy to perform, whereas novice or intermediate
level athletes may consider the same movement difficult.
Thus, when instructed to represent the movement as accurately as possible, elite athletes appear to be the most accurate; they preserve the actual temporal organization of
movement. In springboard diving, C. L. Reed explained,
intermediate divers had considerable knowledge of how to
perform, but their performance was not fully automatic.
Thus, their time to assemble dive components for visualized
performance could be relatively longer than that of expert
divers, for whom component assembly was automatized.
Novice divers clocked relatively shorter visualization times
because they had less schematic knowledge about the dives
to be assembled.
Finally, variations in experimental procedures can
explain differences between MI and motor-performance
durations. Athletes can simulate actions as accurately as
possible, as if they were actually in competition, or just
imagine them without time constraints. Instructions to per14
form mental representation of action may thus influence the
temporal organization of MI and should be very precisely
stated.
Experiment: Duration of Mentally Simulated
Movement in Tennis and Gymnastics
In our review of available literature dealing with durations of mentally simulated movement, we have found
inconsistent results: Although MI duration closely mirrors
duration of motor production in highly automatic (reaching,
grasping) and cyclical movements such as walking or rowing, it can be under- or overestimated (perhaps with the
exception of the best competitors). Many factors have been
shown to influence the temporal organization of MI. Among
those factors, skill complexity and environmental constraints seem to influence MI statistically. To complete the
data, we compared durations of actual movements and MI
in a tennis task and a gymnastics floor routine. We asked
highly skilled tennis players (n = 10) and gymnasts (n = 10)
to represent a series of movements in their own sports activity (10 trials). As references (10 trials), we recorded durations of actual movements. Tennis players were asked to
serve in the left service area, then to place themselves close
to the net and perform a volley. Gymnasts were asked to
perform the most difficult series of figures they were able to
do (at least round-off, flic-flac, and back acrobatics [tucked
or stretched backward salto]).
We hypothesized that the time to put together the components of those rapid attention-demanding movements for
visualized performance might produce relatively longer
imagined than physical movement durations. To test that
hypothesis, we required participants to imagine themselves
performing movement during a competition, as closely and
accurately as possible, without any actual body movement.
Upon initiation of the first body movement and at the end of
the MI sequence, the athletes pressed a button with the
thumb of their dominant hand, to start and stop the timer,
respectively. Durations were found to be systematically
longer during MI sessions than during actual performance
in both tennis and gymnastics (p < .01; Figure 1). Participants indicated that they tried to build images as accurately
as possible. In accordance with Munroe et al. (2000), one
can assume that in the absence of time constraints, more
time was available to build up a clear representation of
movement. One may therefore conclude that in complex
skills, image accuracy is more important than temporal
characteristics. Moreover, in our study, MI sessions were
performed during training; whereas in the study by Calmels
and Fournier (2001), the imagery took place just before the
competition and mental image duration was therefore
slowed down. Thus, the present results confirmed that
chronometric differences between MI and action are affected both by time constraints and skill complexity. Moreover,
in the absence of environmental constraints, when athletes
are instructed to imagine themselves performing in competition, movement duration is not the predominant aspect
Journal of Motor Behavior
Motor Imagery Duration
25.00
actual performance
motor imagery
20.00
Duration (s)
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
action stages could not have caused the speed-specific
interference effects. According to Rushall and Lippman,
the procedures and elements of mental training and the
participant’s intention may have caused the inconsistent
results: MI may be performed during skill-learning or performance enhancement. Whereas the differences can, at
least partially, be explained by that theory, other factors
such as temporal characteristics of movement, task difficulty, environmental constraints, or accuracy of mental
images should be considered. Hall, Mack, Paivio, and
Hausenblas (1998) and Martin, Moritz, and Hall (1999)
argued that, depending on the situation, athletes should be
advised to use mental picture characteristics differentially
(e.g., by reducing the speed of the mental picture to elicit
retention of a mental component or a more accurate mental picture). Consequently, instructions referring to MI
duration must be explicit so that mental work components
can be adapted to athletes’ aims.
Contributions of Cognitive Neuroscience Data
Tennis
Gymnastics
FIGURE 1. Movement duration in actual practice and motor
imagery. Athletes were required to imagine a series of complex movements. Movement duration was systematically
overestimated (p < .01) during motor imagery sessions in tennis (serve–volley) and gymnastics (floor routine). Participants indicated that they aimed to visualize body movements
as accurately as possible, as if they had actually performed
the movements. Image accuracy was thus more important
than were temporal movement characteristics.
because athletes try first to generate accurate images. Skill
complexity influences the temporal organization of MI, and
accurate images are therefore generated at a slower speed.
Voluntary Modification of MI Duration
Participants or environmental constraints can modify the
speed at which a movement or series of movements is voluntarily performed. A tennis player may have very fast
images during a match because the time to engage is limited (Munroe et al., 2000). Conversely, the same tennis
player may have very slow images during training sessions, when the time available to provide for more accurate
movement control is longer. Slow-motion imagery has a
negative effect on free-throw shooting performance in top
female basketball players (Kobayashi, 1994). Rushall and
Lippman (1998) confirmed that finding. Boschker (2001;
Boschker et al., 2000) found that participants who imagined a sequential motor action at low speed (in comparison
with a baseline test) showed a reduction in actual movement speed during the retention test. Similarly, participants who imagined a motor act at a faster speed showed
an increase in speed during the retention test (although the
effects were less pronounced because imagining a motor
action at a fast rate is more difficult). The results of a second experiment confirmed that verbal rehearsal of motor
January 2005, Vol. 37, No. 1
Investigators have used mental chronometric tasks in
cognitive neuroscience to study the mechanisms underlying
cognitive processes (Menon & Kim, 1999). Understanding
the neural correlates of goal-directed action, whether executed or imagined, has thus been an important domain of
cognitive brain research since the advent of functional
imaging studies in which functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography were
used (Decety et al., 1994; Lotze et al., 1999; Roth et al.,
1996). Brain-mapping techniques bring precise anatomic
localization of cerebral structures involved in both imagined
and executed movements. Neurological data have provided
converging evidence that imagined and executed movements share the same neural substrate (for reviews, see Mellet et al., 1998; Thompson & Kosslyn, 2000). Other studies
emphasize particularly the involvement of several motorrelated areas during MI, such as (a) supplementary, prefrontal, and premotor areas (Decety et al., 1994; Deiber et
al., 1998; Naito et al., 2002; Porro, Cettolo, Francescato, &
Baraldi, 2000); (b) cerebellum and basal ganglia (Decety,
Sjoholm, Ryding, Stenberg, & Ingvar, 1990; Li, 2000;
Naito et al.); and even (c) the primary motor cortex (Lotze
et al., 1999; Porro et al., 2000; Roth et al.). However, the latter structure was not always found to be activated (Decety
et al., 1988; Deiber et al.). There are also similarities
between actual and imagined movements at the peripheral
level: The same autonomic nervous system pattern has been
observed during both MI and motor performance
(Deschaumes-Molinaro et al., 1991, 1992), and autonomic
activation increases in proportion to mental effort (Decety,
Jeannerod, Durozard, & Baverel, 1993; Decety, Jeannerod,
Germain, & Pastene, 1991; Wang & Morgan, 1992; Wuyam
et al., 1995). MI and actual movement thus share many
properties. Lafleur et al. (2002) showed that cerebral plasticity occurring during incremental acquisition of a footsequence learning task was reflected in the same brain
15
A. Guillot & C. Collet
TABLE 1. Simulated Movement Duration
Study
Task
Findings
Similar actual and imagined movement durations
Barr & Hall (1992)
Berthoz et al. (1996)
Decety et al. (1989), Experiment 1
Decety & Michel (1989)
McIntyre & Moran (1996a, 1996b)
Munzert (2002)
Oishi et al. (2000)
Papaxthantis, Pozzo, et al. (2002)
Unestahl (1983)
Watson & Rubin (1996)
Rowing
Walking
Drawing
Walking
Canoe, Kayak
Pedalo
Skating
Walking, Drawing
Skiing
Drawing
Motor imagery preserved the temporal characteristics
of movement. Durations of simulated movements
were similar to those recorded during actual
performance The timing of execution and mental
simulation of highly automatic and cyclical movements were based on common mechanisms.
Barthalais (1998)
Deschaumes-Molinaro et al. (1991, 1992)
Skydiving
Shooting
Although simulated movement was underestimated
when compared with actual performance, the best
athletes simulated the action mentally at a tempo
very close to the actual time.
Reed (2002)
Springboard diving
Elite divers' timing of mentally simulated movements
closely approximated actual performance.
Underestimation of actual movement duration during motor imagery
Simulated movement duration was underestimated
because athletes represented only dynamic phases of
the task.
Vieilledent (1996)
Climbing
Barthalais (1998)
Reed (2002)
Skydiving
Springboard diving
In accordance with results of previous studies by
Denis et al. (1989) and Isaac (1992), the less experienced athletes had more difficulty in representing the
movement accurately: They simulated the series of
figures faster.
Collet et al. (1999)
Deschaumes-Molinaro et al. (1991, 1992)
Weightlifting
Shooting
Participants were required to mentally simulate
preparation, concentration, and execution phases.
Preparation and concentration phases were underestimated. Participants imagined finding optimal conditions of preparation more rapidly during motor
imagery than during actual performance.
Calmels & Fournier (2001)
Munroe et al. (2000)
Gymnastics
Golf
Softball
Swimming
Tennis
Track
Volley-ball
Wrestling
Because participants often used motor imagery just
before the competition, simulated movement duration was underestimated when compared with actual
duration. That time constraint was the main cause
invoked by participants to justify accelerating the
rhythm of imagery.
(table continues)
regions during MI. That result provides additional evidence
that actual execution and MI share a common neural substrate, and extends the relationship further to different levels of performance on a motor skill learning task. However,
activation of many similar brain areas during MI and actual
16
performance does not guarantee that all aspects of actual
and imagined movements, for example, duration, are similar (Papaxanthis, Schieppati, et al., 2002). Thus, the relationship between actual and imagined movements is complex. In fact, the temporal equivalence between imagined
Journal of Motor Behavior
Motor Imagery Duration
TABLE 1. (Continued)
Study
Task
Findings
Overestimation of actual movement duration during motor imagery
Calmels & Fournier (2001)
Ceritelli et al. (2000)
Decety & Boisson (1990)
Decety & Jeannerod (1996)
Decety & Lindgren (1991)
Decety et al. (1989), Experiment 2
Decety et al. (1988)
Gymnastics
Pointing
Walking
Walking
Writing, Drawing
Walking
Drawing
Coello & Orliaguet (1992)
Collet et al. (1999)
Guillot & Collet (2004; present results)
Golf putting
Weightlifting
Tennis, Gymnastics
Mental representation duration of rapid and complex
attention-demanding movements was overestimated
when compared with actual performance.
Beyer et al. (1990)
Swimming
Duration of imaged swimming remained longer than
actual swimming.
Reed (2002)
Springboard diving
Participants did not reproduce the close time estimation that they experienced during actual performance.
Simulated movement duration increased with task
difficulty.
Intermediate-level divers' durations for assembling
dive components for visualized performance were
longer than the durations for actual performance.
Note. A relationship between complex motor skills and temporal characteristics of imagined movements can be seen in the results of the cited
studies: Durations of highly automatic and cyclical movements were similar to those recorded during actual movement. When motor imagery
was performed just before a competition, representation was influenced by environmental and time constraints and duration was underestimated. Conversely, difficult actions and rapid movements took longer to image.
and actual movements has not been consistently reported in
the literature. Those distinctions are consistent with the
findings of neuroimaging studies: Overlapping but also different neurophysiological substrates have been found in
such studies. One limitation of many neuroimaging studies
is that cerebral maps are static representations of the
dynamic activity of the brain. Advances in single-event
fMRI have now opened up possibilities for the study of temporal processing in the brain on the second and subsecond
time scales and for the study of spatial processing of information on the submillimeter scale (Menon & Kim, 1999).
Investigators may exploit the temporal dimension of fMRI
for chronometric studies and use it to examine sequential
neural substrates in various regions. Involvement of specific cortical areas and their relative order may thus be discerned during all successive stages of MI. The data may
help us to advance hypotheses concerning differences
between MI and motor-performance duration.
Conclusion
To summarize, according to the nature and temporal
characteristics of the task, MI duration may closely approximate actual movement times. Therefore, in highly automatic activities such as reaching, grasping, and writing a
signature, or in cyclical movements (such as walking, running, or rowing), MI duration is similar to that recorded
during motor performance. However, participants may also
January 2005, Vol. 37, No. 1
under- or overestimate actual durations (Table 1). When
movement representation is influenced by environmental
constraints, such as performing MI during a competition,
just before action, the duration is underestimated. Similarly,
when athletes imagine long preparation and execution periods successively, such as in shooting, they have greater difficulty in representing actual duration. Underestimation of
actual duration is also observed when athletes do not represent the entire sequence of movement but instead focus their
representation on particular aspects of movement. However,
the best athletes appear to be the most accurate with respect
to duration in representing motor sequences. Conversely,
MI duration was found to increase with skill complexity.
Finally, in rapid and complex attention-demanding movements (golf-putting, gymnastics floor routine, and tennis
serve), participants systematically overestimate MI duration. Overestimation may appear in the mental rehearsal of
other similar rapid movements; however, that hypothesis
should be experimentally tested.
The nature of instructions given to athletes is also an
important factor that may influence MI duration. Depending on the instructions provided, the participant’s aims can
explain the differences between MI and motor-performance
durations. Athletes may thus simulate motor performance as
if they were actually in a competition, thus preserving the
temporal organization of movement, or they can decide to
generate very accurate images without time constraints.
17
A. Guillot & C. Collet
The present review can be considered a starting point
for further, more extensive research on MI and motorperformance durations. Because elite athletes are the most
accurate with respect to imagined motor sequence duration, it would be interesting to compare MI and motorperformance durations within larger groups of athletes in
a longitudinal study; that comparison would enable us to
evaluate the influence of learning and automatization
phases on MI accuracy. In future work, investigators will
also have to determine the components of mental training
that could lead to improvements in image accuracy and
preservation of the temporal equivalence between MI and
actual durations. The equivalence between MI and actual
durations should be useful for predictive aspects of mental
rehearsal. However, underestimation of actual duration
during MI may also reflect a learning stage of performance in which physical performance or the integration of
cognitive and physical performance is still developing. In
methods for training MI to fit actual performance time in
those cases, one would need to accommodate the ongoing
developments. Finally, experiments combining mental
chronometry and fMRI may make it possible to compare
imagined and actual duration, on the one hand, and to analyze intensity and spatial distribution of functional activation at a cortical and subcortical levels during MI, on the
other. Knowledge of the order in which structures are activated may help to advance hypotheses concerning differences between imagined and actual durations.
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Submitted June 23, 2003
Revised October 20, 2003
Second revision February 5, 2004
Journal of Motor Behavior