Bi-weekly Press Review 1-15 February 2016

Review no. 109
Press Review
1—15 February 2016
Table of Contents
African Union
- The AU Strongly Condemns the Terrorist Attack in Nigeria
Terrorism in Africa
- Al-Qaeda affiliate menaces Africa
- Standing up to Terror in Africa
- Terrorisme en Afrique : Le regard d’un spécialiste
- L'Afrique doit lutter sur internet contre les groupes jihadistes
- Interpretations of terrorism and legends of globalization
Egypt
- Abdel Fattah al-Sissi : « Sans action, le danger terroriste ne peut que s’étendre. Et il s’étend »
Libya
- Un troisième front contre l'Etat islamique en Libye ?
- Opinion: Next anti-'IS' front will be Libya
Nigeria
- Here's what one of the world's deadliest jihadist groups really believes
- News Analysis: If Boko Haram is not in Nigeria, where is Sambisa Forest?
- Should America be involved in Nigeria? 36
Somalia
- Somalia: A Legitimate Government Is the Only Antidote to Al-Shabaab Terror in Somalia
- Al-Shabaab preys on poor youth with promises of cars and wives
Life after Al Shabbab's attack on El-Adde: How will Kenya respond?
Pages
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5
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10
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19
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26
31
36
38
40
Terrorism in the World
- Terror: The globalisation of extremism
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France
- Terrorisme : la France et la Belgique renforcent leur coopération
Iraq
- Understanding Youth Radicalization in the Age of ISIS: A Psychosocial Analysis
Mexico
- Of Cartels and Jihadists: Misconceptions and Provocative Suggestions
Pakistan
- Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad
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54
62
67
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USA
- Drafting girls and turning Americans into terrorists
- Fact Check: Is most U.S. terrorism homegrown?
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African Union
Press Release
THE AFRICAN UNION STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE TERRORIST ATTACK IN NIGERIA
Addis Ababa, 1 February 2016: The Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, strongly condemns the terrorist attack on a
village near Maiduguri, in north eastern Nigeria, on Saturday, 30 January 2015, by
elements of the Boko Haram terrorist group, which left at least 65 people dead and
136 injured.
The Chairperson of the Commission expresses AU’s solidarity with the Government
and people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. She pays her condolences to the bereaved families and wishes speedy recovery to all the injured.
She reiterates the AU’s determination, through the Multinational Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) that was established by the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Benin to eliminate the Boko Haram terrorist group.
She commends the (MNJTF) for its relentless efforts in the fight against the Boko
Haram terrorist group and calls for stronger global cooperation in the efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, in line with various AU and international instruments.
The Chairperson reiterates the appeal made by the AU Peace and Security Council,
at its 571st meeting held at the level of Heads of States and Government on 29 January 2016, for AU Member States and international partners to sustain their collective
efforts towards effective combatting of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa,
while addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of this phenomena.
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Terrorism in Africa
Al-Qaeda affiliate menaces Africa
FEBRUARY 01 2016
Vehicles on fire outside Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on January
15 during a siege by gunmen allied to al-Qaeda. Picture: REUTERS
ONCE described as weak and defeated, a resurgent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(Aqim) has proved its critics wrong by demonstrating that it is still a major threat to
governments and civilians in North and West Africa.
Aqim and its affiliates have conducted two major attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso
in the past three months, proving political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli right
when he said it was better to utterly defeat an opponent lest they come back stronger
than before to retaliate.
The Ouagadougou attack was the first major operation by an al-Qaeda affiliate in
Burkina Faso. This indicates the group is slowly extending its reach beyond its comfort zone of Mali and Niger, where it has been operating for the past three years.
In 2012, Aqim and other jihadist groups participated in the insurgency of northern
Mali, with the aim of overthrowing the Malian government. The attempted coup was
thwarted when French forces intervened and dispersed the jihadists into the Sahel.
Yet, despite the initial success of the French military operation, sporadic jihadist attacks in Niger and Mali had been on the increase since 2013. Members of Aqim
went into hiding as the group’s influence declined, which led to the assumption that
it had been defeated following the French intervention.
5
...
WHILE Aqim went incognito and there were only a few sporadic attacks, another
jihadist faction, al-Mourabitoun, became the prominent face of terror in Mali and the
surrounding regions.
Al-Mourabitoun is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (right) a veteran of the Afghan jihad.
The group’s operations initially consisted of the illegal trafficking of narcotics and
kidnappings for ransom. From 2013, however, al-Mourabitoun began conducting
attacks against Malian and United Nations peacekeepers and targeting restaurants
frequented by foreign nationals.
Within a short time, the group was perceived by the US state department as one of
the greatest threats to US interests in the Sahel. Then in November, almost three
years after they conducted a joint and failed operation to overthrow the Malian government in a coup, al-Mourabitoun and Aqim besieged the Radisson Blu hotel in
Bamako. Satisfied with the success of their mission, al-Mourabitoun merged with
Aqim on December 5 — a month later, they conducted their first attack.
...
THE Ouagadougou attack was the first major operation by al-Qaeda in Burkina Faso. At a time when al-Qaeda Central is being put under pressure by the advance of
Islamic State (IS) as the predominant jihadist force, the Burkina Faso incursions
demonstrate that al-Qaeda still remains a threat in Africa.
This raises the question why Burkina Faso was targeted. In the aftermath of the
French military intervention in northern Mali in 2013, a regional organisation to
strengthen co-operation on security in the Sahel was created. This organisation,
known as the G5 Sahel, consists of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso.
These countries resolved to tackle the issue of terrorism in the region with the help
of the French military. Being part of the G5 Sahel made Burkina Faso a target of
militant Islamists, who were waiting for the right moment to strike; the right moment turned out to be January 15. Gunmen attacked a hotel and restaurant in Ouagadougou, resulting in the deaths of 30 people, most of them foreigners.
In retrospect, several lessons can be learned from the Burkina Faso tragedy, of
which two are quite crucial. First, a significant development from the attacks in
Burkina Faso is the resurgence of Aqim in West Africa.
The merger between Aqim and al-Mourabitoun illustrates the dangers that cooperation between jihadist groups pose to any country or region. Within that alliance, Aqim appears to be responsible for the organisational and propaganda aspects,
while al-Mourabitoun is delegated to conduct offensives — as was the case in Bamako and later in Ouagadougou.
With its newly found strength, Aqim now has its sights set on expansion into West
Africa.
Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri admonished his IS counterpart last September for instigating dissent among jihadist communities worldwide.
With the fissure between al-Qaeda and IS widening, and reconciliation between
them in the near future looking highly unlikely, al-Qaeda definitely wants to main-
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tain its dominance in Africa, with al-Shabaab in the east and a resurgent Aqim in the
west.
Second, it is quite evident that military intervention alone as a counterterrorism
measure is not sufficient and can lead to the opposite of what was intended.
When the jihadist groups dispersed into the Sahel in 2013 after the French intervention — dubbed Operation Serval — many commentators hailed the mission as a success and concluded that the jihadist group (Aqim and affiliates) were defeated.
After Serval, the French launched a new mission, Operation Barkhane, to build on
their prior success in the Sahel region. However, jihadist groups began to regroup
during that period.
THE French military was faced with the Herculean task of patrolling large swathes
of the Sahel. It was only a matter of time before the French and local security forces
were incapable of preventing sporadic attacks around Mali. This failure culminated
in the Radisson Blu hotel siege in Bamako and later the Ouagadougou incursion.
Incidentally, Ouagadougou is host to one of the French regional military bases.
It is becoming vital that military intervention is accompanied by other counterterrorism measures, including countering jihadist ideologies, curbing youth unemployment and tackling the grievances of members of the population whose needs are not
being met by their governments.
But this is no easy task. Preventing terrorism is a process; it cannot be achieved
overnight. It is a process that requires effort, patience and dedication on the part of
governments and civil society.
In addition, the fight against terrorism requires a holistic approach that targets the
social, political and economic factors that lead to insurgency.
The failure to realise this will provide the perfect opportunity for groups such as
Aqim and its affiliates to reorganise and expand their reach — at the expense of
more innocent victims.
• Chelin is as an independent conflict analyst
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2016/02/01/al-qaeda-affiliate-menaces-africa
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STANDING UP TO TERROR IN AFRICA
From January 2015 until now, more than a dozen African countries have suffered
terror attacks and have accumulatively lost thousands of innocent lives to the violence propagated by extremist groups. Serial attacks on Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon
and the recent debut in Burkina Faso show that terrorism is strong and spreading
consistently across Africa and only a united African effort can effectively curb this
growing threat. But despite the collective suffering in the tragedy, African countries
are yet to band together against these ideologically similar and operationallycooperative insurgent groups. Yet, it is only by standing together—in intelligence
sharing, operational cooperation and moral support—that Africa stands a chance of
defeating this scourge of terrorism.
After making 2015 a very bloody year for Africa, terror groups continued where
they left off this past January. The past week was the bloodiest so far this year in
Boko Haram’s campaign of violence with the militants launching back to back attacks on Cameroon and Nigeria killing nearly 200 people. First, the terrorist group
hit a market on Sunday, in northern Cameroon with multiple suicide bombings killing about twenty-five persons and injuring over sixty others. Days later, the group
struck again, this time in Chibok (where they abducted over 200 girls from in 2014)
and then followed with attacks in Maiduguri, on Saturday, where not fewer than 85
people were confirmed dead in the outskirt village of Dalori. This wave of attacks
follows another, earlier in the month, where the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) invaded a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing about thirty people.
While there have been initiatives to create an African coalition against terrorism,
most of those efforts have been limited, underfunded and lacking implementation.
One of the most concrete steps taken in the African fight against terrorism is the reorganization of theMultinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by the Lake Chad Basin
countries, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and (non-member) the Republic of Benin. The mandate of the coalition is to stamp out the Boko Haram extremist group
which has waged a bloody insurgency in Nigeria and carried out several attacks on
its Lake Chad neighbours. But the MNJTF is quite limited in its scope of operations;
“It will not be deployed in Nigeria, but along Nigeria’s outside borders within neighbouring countries,” wrote Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, the Office Head of the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division of the Institute of Security Studies for
Africa, at the institution of the Task Force. “For those who continue to worry about
the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls and other victims of terrorist acts perpetrated by
Boko Haram, the details of the MNJTF deployment come as a major disappointment. The MNJTF appears largely out of sync with what would have been needed
on the ground, in Nigeria, to eliminate the threat posed by Boko Haram.”
Théroux-Bénoni suggested that a more robust coalition, in the format of the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for
the elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), or the African-led international support mission to Mali (AFISMA) would have been a better alternative,
and the current situation of the crisis buttresses her point. While the Nigerian military has made tremendous progress in recapturing virtually all territory previously
seized by Boko Haram, it continues to struggle with stopping cross-border attacks
from the group (the same with Cameroon and its other Lake Chad Neighbours)
while the whereabouts of the over 250 kidnapped Chibok girls—rumoured to have
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been taken out of Nigeria—remain unknown. These challenges require more multinational cooperation than the MNJTF is currently offering. The Nigerian government recently announced plans to redeem its astounding funding pledge to the
MNJTF, a recognition of the need to strengthen the Task Force. However, funding
alone will not be enough for the coalition to achieve its objective, it also needs
more intelligence sharing and security cooperation amongst the countries involved.
Apart from the MNJTF and other multinational coalitions fighting specific incountry insurgencies, such as AMISOM in Somalia and AFISMA in Mali, there are
no other institutionalised coalition efforts against terrorism in Africa. The attack in
Mali and then in Burkina Faso, by the same group—and without local roots—show
just how international terrorism has become in Africa and that it can only be defeated by a similar international response. The recent meeting between Kenya and Nigeria’s presidents Uhuru Kenyatta and Muhammadu Buhari, in which they discussed
combatting terrorism and radicalization, is a step in the right direction, but there are
so many more steps that need to follow that.
Perhaps creating an African version of the Interpol or a NATO-style coalition; whatever form it may take, would help as African countries need a multinational continent-wide institution with a serious focus on terrorism. Continuing to treat terrorism
solely as an internal problem underestimates the potential of international terrorism
in Africa. These extremist groups largely see themselves as members of a global jihad against states and organised government, it is high time African states responded to such threats, not just as individual nations but also in the broad perspective of
protecting Africa.
http://venturesafrica.com/features/standing-up-to-terror-in-africa/
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Terrorisme en Afrique : Le regard d’un spécialiste
Mamadou Aliou Barry Géopolitologue, spécialiste des questions de défense et de sécurité en
Afrique, président de l’Observatoire national de
la démocratie et des droits de l’homme, apporte
un éclairage sur le terrorisme qui menace l’Afrique. Un phénomène auquel la Guinée n’est pas à l’abri. Entretien.
Quelle lecture faites-vous des actes perpétrés
par des terroristes en Afrique de l’ouest ?
Aliou Barry : D’abord il faut souligner que
l’Afrique de l’Ouest est une zone géographique
qui est vulnérable au terrorisme et au financement du terrorisme pour plusieurs raisons. La
sous-région ouest-africaine souffre d’instabilité
politique, de violence ethnique et communautaire, de corruption endémique, de pauvreté galopante et de taux élevé de chômage
et de sous-emploi, particulièrement chez les jeunes. Les terroristes et les groupes
terroristes exploitent aujourd’hui ces conditions négatives, notamment en rapport
avec les jeunes. Le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement
(PNUD) a, dans son rapport de 2011 sur l’indice du Développement Humain, classé
13 des 15 pays de la CEDEAO parmi les pays ayant un faible développement humain. Aussi, la mauvaise gouvernance et des institutions publiques faibles et caporalisées sous-tendent la plupart des défis de développement humain dans la sousrégion.
Il faut noter aussi que la plupart des frontières en Afrique de l’Ouest sont poreuses et
il existe beaucoup d’espaces non gouvernés aux alentours des différentes frontières.
Tous les pays de la sous-région manquent de capacité pour contrôler efficacement
les frontières, ce qui constitue une vulnérabilité pouvant être exploitée par des
groupes terroristes pour y établir des bases d’entrainement de leurs membres et pour
transporter et distribuer des armes à travers la sous-région.
Un regard de la géopolitique du continent montre que les actes terroristes n’affectent
pas tout le continent. Au cours des récentes décennies, certaines des attaques les plus
persistantes et les plus sanglantes ont eu lieu en Afrique du Nord, surtout en Algérie, pays affaibli dans les années 90 par une guerre civile qui a donné naissance à des
groupes comme Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) qui opèrent maintenant au
-delà des frontières de ce pays et jusqu’en Iraq.
L’Afrique de l’Est a aussi connu quelques incidents dramatiques. Dans le Nord de
l’Ouganda, l’Armée de résistance du seigneur, qui se proclame groupe chrétien fondamentaliste, fait sienne les méthodes terroristes.
Mais c’est la Somalie, qui a soulevé les plus grandes inquiétudes au niveau interna-
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tional étant donné la puissance de groupes armés, notamment les shebabs perçus
comme hostiles aux intérêts occidentaux.
L’Afrique de l’Ouest a quant à elle, connu relativement moins d’actes terroristes, à
l’exception du Nigéria et des pays du Sahel comme le Mali, la Mauritanie, le Niger
et le Tchad où AQMI est actif. Pendant les guerres civiles des années 90 en Sierra
Leone et au Libéria, des intermédiaires libanais impliqués dans le trafic de diamants
ont pu alimenter Al-Qaida avec une partie de leurs profits, explique Gani Yoroms,
chargé de cours à l’école de guerre du Nigéria.
L’Afrique australe a jusqu’ici été le théâtre de peu d’actes de terrorisme en dehors
de quelques attentats à la bombe en Afrique du Sud dont certains sont attribuables à
des groupes d’extrême-droite du pays. Mais il semble établi que des ressortissants de
la région se sont joints à des groupes terroristes à l’étranger.
Mais il faut souligner que les attaques contre des civils innocents par des groupes
rebelles aussi bien que par des troupes gouvernementales n’ont rien de nouveau dans
les conflits armés en Afrique; mais ce sont les attentats presque simultanés contre les
ambassades américaines au Kénya et en Tanzanie en 1998, qui firent des centaines
de victimes africaines et plusieurs victimes étrangères, qui ont mis en lumière la vulnérabilité du continent africain aux activités des réseaux terroristes internationaux
comme Al-Qaida.
Cette montée du terrorisme dans la sous-région est le fait de groupes terroristes particulièrement actifs. On peut citer : la branche maghrébine de la mouvance AlQaida, Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), le Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le
Djihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO et de la secte nigériane Boko Haram. Chacun de ces mouvements, représentent le visage de l’islamisme radical et du terroriste en Afrique de l’Ouest. Les liens qui s’établissent et se renforcent progressivement entre ces différents groupes portent les germes d’une menace particulièrement
dangereuse et difficile à combattre pour notre sous-région. La situation dans le Nord
-Mali et le vide institutionnel et sécuritaire qui la caractérise depuis le coup d’état du
22 mars 2012 à Bamako constitue aujourd’hui un facteur aggravant.
Selon vous que faut-il faire pour juguler le terrorisme en Afrique de l’ouest ?
L’Afrique devait engager des efforts plus importants pour combattre le terrorisme
sur le continent
Les États africains ont leurs propres raisons de réagir à ces menaces, cependant
après les dramatiques attentats du 11 septembre 2001, de nombreux pays se sont
sentis contraints d’adopter rapidement des lois antiterroristes draconiennes et de signer de nouveaux accords de coopération militaire avec les États-Unis et les pays
européens.
Mais, l’opinion qui prévaut en Afrique est que la campagne internationale contre le
terrorisme initialement inspirée par les pays occidentaux a été conçue sans aucun
apport des Africains. Au Nigéria, les tentatives initiales pour introduire des lois antiterroristes ont soulevé des critiques particulièrement vigoureuses dans les États du
Nord du pays à majorité musulmane. Comme le souligne à juste titre Boubacar
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Gaoussou Diarra, directeur du Centre africain d’études et de recherche sur le terrorisme, je cite : « Comment devons-nous, en tant que sociétés démocratiques
et respectueuses des droits de l’homme, assurer notre protection collective et combattre avec efficacité cette forme de violence intolérable ? »
L’Union africaine a promulgué en 2002 un Plan d’action sur les moyens de prévenir
et de combattre le terrorisme en Afrique. Ce plan ne se limite pas aux dispositions
précédentes qui concernaient essentiellement l’action de détection et de répression
pour traiter également des causes sous-jacentes de la violence terroriste, il demande
aux États signataires de promouvoir une politique de réduction de la pauvreté, d’aide
aux populations déshéritées et marginalisées qui peuvent constituer des terrains de
recrutement fertiles pour les groupes terroristes.
Combattre le terrorisme en Afrique de l’Ouest exige aussi une plus étroite coordination entre les pays africains et ses partenaires internationaux. C’est ainsi que dans la
région du Sahel, les pays voisins commencent à mieux coordonner les actions qu’ils
engagent contre AQMI. L’offensive de l’armée malienne contre ce groupe a bénéficié de renseignements fournis par les autorités algériennes
Une meilleure coordination entre les gouvernements ouest-africains est cruciale, toutefois ces efforts exigent un financement plus important que celui dont ils
bénéficient actuellement. Mais il est tout aussi essentiel, que les États ouestafricains et les organismes internationaux ciblent mieux la société civile ouestafricaine et ses associations nationales membres.
Trop souvent, les dirigeants ouest-africains ont tendance à considérer les activités
antiterroristes comme étant du ressort exclusif de l’État, tandis que les forces de sécurité traitent souvent les informations s’y rapportant comme relevant de secret défense. Ceci prive les autorités nationales d’une précieuse source d’information à savoir le grand public, ce qui rend plus difficile l’instauration d’un climat de
confiance auprès du public envers l’action antiterroriste des autorités des différents
pays de la sous-région.
En effet, la société civile ouest-africaine et les associations nationales peuvent aider
à renforcer les efforts de l’UA. Elles peuvent aussi souligner l’importance de la protection des droits de l’homme et la nécessité de porter assistance aux communautés
les plus vulnérables et les plus marginalisées. En échangeant des informations avec
la société civile et en cherchant à l’impliquer, les États renforceraient ainsi leur sécurité.
Une meilleure coordination entre les gouvernements ouest-africains est cruciale, toutefois ces efforts exigent un financement plus important que celui dont ils
bénéficient actuellement. Mais il est tout aussi essentiel, que les États et les organismes internationaux ciblent mieux la société civile africaine et ses associations.
Par ailleurs, l’Afrique de l’ouest devra engager une lutte contre les facteurs qui favorisent la propagation du terrorisme, notamment par le biais de la résolution et de la
prévention des conflits, la promotion du dialogue entre les religions et les différents
groupes culturels, la lutte contre l’exclusion sociale et le soutien à une bonne gouvernance. Renforcer les moyens dont disposent les États pour prévenir et lutter
contre le terrorisme. Et, la protection des droits de l’homme et de l’état de droit de-
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vra être la base fondamentale de la lutte antiterroriste.
Comme le soulignait à juste titre M. Ban Ki-Moon, le Secrétaire général de
l’ONU, « le terrorisme nuit à tous les pays, petits et grands, riches et pauvre. Il prélève un tribut sur des êtres humains de tout âge, de tous revenus, de toute culture et
de toute religion. Il porte un coup contre tout ce que représentent les Nations Unies.
La lutte contre le terrorisme est notre mission commune »
A votre avis la Guinée serait-il menacé par les terroristes ?
Bien évidemment, la Guinée n’est pas à l’abri de ce phénomène de terrorisme vu sa
proximité géographique avec le Mali et surtout vu l’émergence des courants religieux wahhabite et salafiste dans notre pays. Pour s’en convaincre, il suffit de regarder la recrudescence de certains lieux de prière (musulmane et chrétienne) à travers
tout le pays. Aussi, la grande misère qui sévit au niveau d’une frange importante des
couches sociales notamment des jeunes est aussi un terreau favorable pour un recrutement des candidats pour rejoindre les mouvements extrémistes.
A votre avis les Mauritaniens arrêtés dans la préfecture de Boké étaient-ils en
mission en Guinée, où étaient-ils de passage ?
Il m’est difficile de répondre à cette question, car je n’ai pas tous
les éléments d’information. Néanmoins, il reste clair qu’avec la porosité de
nos frontières, le manque de moyens adéquats d’information et de renseignements
des forces en charge de notre sécurité et le fait que la Guinée est partie prenante à la
lutte contre les mouvements rebelles au Nord du Mali, nous ne sommes pas à l’abri
d’actes terroristes, loin s’en faut.
Que suggérez-vous aux autorités politiques du pays, afin d’éviter d’éventuels
actes de terrorisme sur le sol guinéen ?
Le gouvernement guinéen devra assurer une vraie coordination entre les différents
services de police et de gendarmerie qui travaillent dans le domaine de la lutte
contre le terrorisme. Il faudra mettre en place une vraie Direction des Renseignements Intérieurs et Extérieurs et doter cette Direction de tous les moyens financiers,
humains et techniques car, la lutte contre le terrorisme exige la mise en place d’un
système performant d’alerte et d’information.
Mais la compréhension et l’analyse du phénomène du terrorisme sont indispensables
pour venir à bout de ce phénomène. C’est pourquoi avec des spécialistes de la question, nous allons proposer au gouvernement guinéen, sans nous faire trop d’illusions, la mise en place d’un vrai Centre guinéen d’analyse du terrorisme qui sera une
antenne du Centre africain d’études et de recherche sur le terrorisme basé à Alger. Ce Centre devra être un organisme interministériel à utilité publique sous la tutelle du ministère de la Sécurité et de la protection civile.
Il travaillera sur mandats, provenant des secteurs institutionnel et privé. Le Centre
diffusera, de manière publique ou ciblée, ses informations, ses études et les résultats
de ses recherches en matière d’analyse de risque du terrorisme et des radicalisations
en Afrique de l’ouest. Le Centre aura pour objectifs de :
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Constituer le premier centre d’analyse dans le domaine de l’analyse du terrorisme
et des radicalités dans la sous-région ;
Favoriser la recherche sur le terrorisme et les radicalités et les stratégies de réponse, notamment l’analyse opérationnelle de l’organisation et de l’implantation
des activités terroristes en Afrique de l’ouest ;
Constituer une capacité unique d’analyse et d’information sur la
riste et les radicalités ;
menace terro-
Constituer la plus grande plate-forme d’information sur le terrorisme et les radicalités en Afrique de l’ouest ;
Constituer une force de proposition à l’égard des pouvoirs publics et des institutions ouest africaines et favoriser la coopération internationale et l’échange
d’informations en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme et le financement du terrorisme.
Les tâches essentielles du Centre seront de rechercher, acquérir, traiter, et transmettre toute information relevant de son domaine de compétence. Le Centre aura
pour ambition de transmettre sa vision des thématiques liées aux multiples manifestations du terrorisme et des radicalisations en Afrique de l’ouest.
Le Centre exécutera des mandats de recherche, d’investigation, d’analyse et de
formation en matière d’analyse de risque du terrorisme et des radicalisations en
Afrique de l’ouest.
Il aura son centre de documentation, le centre établira, maintiendra et mettra constamment à jour une documentation opérationnelle, méthodologique et didactique utilisable dans les formations, cours et autres séminaires liés au terrorisme et des radicalisations en Afrique de l’ouest qu’il entend proposer.
Le centre participera à des conférences et séminaires spécialisés de haut niveau.
Il ambitionne également de générer en son nom propre un, voire plusieurs événements d’importance liés à la lutte contre le terrorisme et des radicalisations en
Afrique de l’ouest. (Organisation de conférences, colloques, séminaires).
Le centre élaborera, diffusera et communiquera des informations sensibles et pertinentes dans son domaine de compétence au gouvernement, institutions nationales,
internationales, sous régionales et aux ONG.
Il publiera, de manière ciblée et dans des supports médiatiques de qualité, certains
résultats de ses recherches opérationnelles et le produit de ses analyses en matière
du terrorisme et des radicalisations en Afrique de l’ouest.
http://guinee7.com/2016/02/04/terrorisme-en-afrique-le-regard-dun-specialiste/
14
L'Afrique doit lutter sur internet contre les groupes jihadistes
Par AFP le 13 février 2016
Menacée par les jihadistes au Sahel et le groupe islamiste nigérian Boko Haram,
l'Afrique doit mener une lutte complexe sur internet pour contrer les radicaux qui
se servent de la toile comme d'un outil de propagande et de recrutement, estiment
des experts.
Les jihadistes comme Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) à qui s'est rallié le
groupe Al-Mourabitoune ayant notamment revendiqué les attentats au Burkina,
sont très actifs dans la bande sahélienne. Boko Haram, responsable d'attentats
ayant fait plusieurs milliers de morts au Nigeria depuis 2009, frappe désormais au
Cameroun, au Tchad et au Niger.
Et les groupes jihadistes sont "ultra-connectés", comme le soulignent les experts
présents à Abidjan cette semaine pour une conférence sur la cybersécurité et la cyberdéfense dans l'espace francophone.
"Ce sont des questions extrêmement importantes pour le présent mais aussi pour
les décennies à venir", analyse le député Pierre Oulatta, colonel à la retraite et président de la Commission sécurité et défense de l'Assemblée nationale ivoirienne.
"L'Afrique est menacée, martèle-t-il. Bamako (20 morts en novembre), Ouagadougou (30 morts le 15 janvier) sont là pour le démontrer".
- Téléphonie et 3G "Internet est un fabuleux outil et les terroristes comme tout un chacun peuvent
l'utiliser pour diffuser leurs idées, recruter, informer voire désinformer. Ils peuvent
préparer des actes, s'organiser, les revendiquer (...) Ils peuvent utiliser internet en
complémentarité avec le monde criminel" pour acheter des armes ou blanchir de
l'argent, rappelle Solange Ghernaouti, de l'université de Lausanne et spécialiste en
cybersécurité, soulignant que les jihadistes "ont montré qu'ils maîtrisaient les technologies".
"L'Afrique se numérise. Il y a une ultra-connectivité, avec notamment la téléphonie et la 3G dans les grandes villes mais aussi dans les campagnes. La surface d'attaque augmente", estime le lieutenant de vaisseau Julien Dechanet, "officier cyber"
français pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest.
"Les groupes type Boko Haram et Aqmi sont très présents sur les réseaux sociaux,
ils utilisent ces médias plutôt en phase de recrutement", précise-t-il. Les recruteurs
préfèrent ces canaux pour échanger des vidéos, souvent par téléphone, et les disséminer en Afrique, aux magazines comme ceux de l'Etat Islamique.
Et le recrutement des jeunes est assez simple, selon le militaire: "Quelques centaines de dollars, un téléphone. Pas plus de 150.000 CFA (220 euros) et ils deviennent des combattants".
15
Pour communiquer entre eux et échapper à la surveillance, les jihadistes "utilisent
le +Darknet+ (la face cachée de l'internet), le facebook russe qui est beaucoup plus
permissif (Vkontakte), les forums de discussion de jeux vidéos et d'autres moyens
encore", explique-t-il.
- Afrique pas outillée Contrer les jihadistes "nécessite de surveiller les réseaux, les serveurs. On peut
alors savoir qui est potentiellement visé, qui est sur les réseaux et on pourra les
+fliquer+", dit-il. La mise en place de ces structures de surveillance en Afrique est
toutefois difficile car il faut des moyens.
"Il manque parfois des ressources humaines. Mais cela a tendance à changer dans
le bon sens", analyse l'officier français.
"L'Afrique n'est pas outillée, elle a besoin de renforcer sa coopération avec les pays
qui ont la technologie", regrette Pierre Oulatta. Le groupe Etat islamique "a des ramifications en Afrique. Ils profitent du fait que nos pays ne peuvent contrôler de
manière efficace les réseaux informatiques", souligne le député ivoirien.
Le colonel Guelpetchin Ouattara, spécialiste cyber du ministère ivoirien de l'Intérieur, se veut rassurant. "On n'est pas au niveau de la police américaine, mais on a
des outils qui correspondent à cette menace. Les dispositions sont prises depuis
bien longtemps, bien avant" les récents attentats.
"Les services de police partout dans le monde se disent démunis.... Nos obligations
c'est de faire des mutations pour s'adapter aux nouvelles menaces. Notre niveau de
réponse est à la hauteur de la menace", conclut-il.
Selon plusieurs experts, un des axes de travail doit être l'assèchement des flux financiers vers les groupes jihadistes. Ceci "n'est pas un mirage. Al Capone s'est fait
avoir sur le plan fiscal", rappelle Mme Ghernaouti. "Mais, ce n'est pas l'une ou
l'autre (méthode pour contrer les jihadistes), ce sont des +et+, des conjonctions de
plusieurs actions. Il faut aussi de la sensibilisation des jeunes, l'éducation, offrir des
perspectives économiques", explique-t-elle.
http://www.notretemps.com/internet/l-afrique-doit-lutter-sur-internet,i106351
16
Interpretations of terrorism and legends of globalization
Monday, 15 February 2016
Terrorism has not only dominated our reality but it has also prompted several studies
to research its roots and search for the energy that has helped it survive for the centuries Muslims have lived through. Terrorism gained its vitality by riding the wave
of modernity for 30 years now and found its way into leftist and resistance movements as their goals intersected.
As discussions on globalization surged, the political interpretation of terrorism also
expanded and turned into a global manifestation. Among these interpretations is the
correlation between a solution to the Palestinian conflict and an end to terrorism.
However, the thesis linking terrorism and globalization was the most common in
some ideological studies about violence and terrorism.
The globalized interpretation of terrorism was tempting to Islamists. They thought it
was a cognitive breakthrough to free them of responsibility and hold the U.S. and
the West accountable for al-Qaeda’s emergence as a result of what happened in Afghanistan, Hamas’s emergence as a result of not resolving the Palestinian cause, and
Hezbollah’s emergence as a resistance movement that protects civilians from Israel.
This is how Islam has been interpreted on radical websites for 20 years now. Some
Western thinkers and philosophers' analyses intersect with these interpretations. For
example, we can take what Paul Di Michele said in the book "Islam, Globalization
and Terrorism" which he co-authored, where he warned that one cannot understand
the current wave of terrorism and violence without linking them to globalization.
In the same book, Olivier Mongin discusses the concept of conflicting identities and
globalization. He says that the notion that they led to a wave of violence only enhanced the concept of a "war of cultures." This imposed itself after the Gulf War
during the 1990s. Mongin added that this notion suggests that threats are always perceived as being from a foreign source.
A third world problem?
All these theories about the globalized interpretation of terrorism are no longer of
any value or use because not taking the ideological attachment to terrorism into consideration is a waste of time. It is also an attempt to practice ideological reprimand
by generalizing the economic and political analysis of terrorism and evoking civil
disputes, resistance movements and demands for liberation in the Middle East and
other third world countries. French professor Olivier Roy thinks that terrorism is a
case of globalization, and is originally a "third world phenomenon."
Terrorism is the weapon of criminals, and it's not the product of an empire or an
economic party but the product of the teachings available at hand.
Fahad Suleiman Shoqiran
In May 2007, Algerian scholar and thinker Mohammad Arkoun delivered a lecture
on Islam and its confrontation of European challenges. He analyzed violence by referring to globalization. He said: "Violence, unlike what the Western media claims,
does not only stem from extremists and fundamentalists, but also from the West and
its allies. The violence of Western globalization is the strongest, considering the
17
West's tyrannical power." Although Arkoun is an exceptional historian in the modern history of Muslims as he's brave when it comes to condemning the guarded energies which terrorism attains support from, he practiced his favorite hobby of critique
and launched "a war on all fronts."
Arkoun cannot consider globalization to be the driving force behind terrorism and
the base of religious violence because he'd be denying his other major research and
work in Applied Islamology.
Author Ali Harb has engaged in this debate as in his recently-published book
"Terrorism and its makers," he condemns the globalized interpretation of terrorism.
He says that he disagrees with Olivier Roy "who thinks that the jihadist organizations are a result of globalization and not a result of political Islam." He adds that the
belief that jihadist organizations are a result of globalization "is an opinion based on
overlooking the ideological base of the jihadist project which is a translation of the
fundamental ideas which Islamist movements planted in people's minds." He has
thus responded to Roy's book "The failure of political Islam."
With the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the same analyses
re-emerged. The Muslim Brotherhood's interpretation of ISIS’s emergence revolves
around the "government suppression" of the Arab Spring and state “conspiracies”
against the MB running for elections. Others however consider that ISIS is a product
of the technological revolution. Some analysts believe that ISIS is part of a Western
conspiracy, while others think it's a Baathist conspiracy.
At the end of the day, religious lectures and fatwas (religious edicts) dissect these
organizations better than any other interpretations. If experts continue to try to solve
mysteries, understand vague root causes and looking into secret intelligence documents on the emergence of terrorist organizations, then Muslim societies - which
failed to confront certain organizations in the past - will also fail to confront any other organization later. Terrorism is not the weapon of the powerful as American philosopher Noam Chomsky puts it. Terrorism is the weapon of criminals, and it's not
the product of an empire or an economic party but the product of the teachings available at hand. It has been rearranged in a repugnant, bloody manner which has now
backfired on Muslims all over again.
This article was first published in Asharq al-Awsat on Feb. 11, 2016.
______________________
Fahad Suleiman Shoqiran is a Saudi writer and researcher who also founded the Riyadh philosophers group. His writings have appeared in pan-Arab newspaper Asharq
al-Awsat, Alarabiya.net, among others. He also blogs on philosophies, cultures and
arts. He tweets @shoqiran
Last Update: Monday, 15 February 2016 KSA 15:15 - GMT 12:15
http://english.alarabiya.net/
18
Egypt
Abdel Fattah al-Sissi : « Sans action, le danger terroriste
ne peut que s’étendre. Et il s’étend »
13 février 2016 Jeune Afrique
Terrorisme, projets pour l'Égypte, Libye, Syrie, rapports avec l'Occident... Le président égyptien évoque longuement tous ces sujets dans la grande interview qu'il a
accordée à "Jeune Afrique".
Sauveur providentiel pour ses partisans (nombreux), tyran putschiste pour ses opposants (acharnés), le président Abdel Fattah al-Sissi laisse encore perplexe dans
les chancelleries et les rédactions occidentales.
Que veut-il ? Jusqu’où ira-t-il ? Et où mène-t-il l’Égypte ?, se demande-t-on alors
qu’une répression sans précédent s’abat depuis deux ans sur les Frères musulmans
mais aussi sur les mouvements militants gauchistes et libéraux qui avaient fait la
révolution du 25 janvier 2011. Le second sursaut révolutionnaire du 30 juin 2013,
qui a chassé les islamistes du pouvoir, n’a-t-il pas adjoint les impératifs de sécurité
et d’ordre aux revendications de 2011? interjette-t-on dans l’entourage présidentiel. Pour marquer le nouveau départ de l’Égypte sur une base qu’il veut stable, le
raïs héritier des pharaons et des sultans multiplie les grands projets, et a déjà mené
à bien le réaménagement du canal de Suez en un temps record.
Le nouvel homme fort du Caire veut aussi rendre à l’Égypte sa position éminente
sur la scène diplomatique régionale et internationale. Et, à l’heure où les crises politiques plongent le Moyen-Orient dans un marasme prolongé, l’Afrique attire
toute son attention.
Les 20 et 21 février prochain, le président accueillera ainsi à Charm el-Cheikh des
centaines de décideurs économiques et politiques du continent, dont de nombreux
chefs d’État, pour le forum Africa 2016. C’est dans ce contexte que Jeune
Afrique a eu l’occasion d’une interview d’une heure et demie dans le palais prési-
19
dentiel d’Al-Orouba.
Une Égypte forte, au coeur de l’Afrique
Au cours de ce long entretien, Abdel Fattah al-Sissi a d’abord évoqué sa vision de
l’Afrique où « l’Égypte doit revenir en force et redevenir ce qu’elle a déjà été, un des
piliers de l’action africaine commune ». Puis il a exposé son analyse de la situation et
de l’action à mener chez le voisin libyen en faillite, s’interrogeant à l’heure où les
rumeurs d’intervention occidentale s’intensifient « pourquoi nous en remettre à
l’Otan sans avoir cherché à exploiter toutes les solutions internes de ce pays ? ». Car,
constate-t-il à propos des chaos syriens et irakiens où l’Occident tente de mettre bon
ordre en s’investissant diplomatiquement et militairement, « les résultats ne sont pas
du tout à la hauteur des moyens déployés ».
Comme la Libye, la Syrie et l’Irak, mais aussi le Yémen, la Somalie, le Mali, le Nigéria et l’Europe elle-même, l’Égypte fait face au fléau jihadiste et son chef de répéter inlassablement que « le terrorisme nous touche tous et nous devons y faire face
ensemble sans attendre qu’il s’invite à l’intérieur de nos frontières ». Et c’est, pour ce
général à la retraite, dans ce contexte qu’il « faut savoir faire la part entre objectifs de
sécurité et droits de l’homme ».
Prudentes sur certains sujets, percutantes sur d’autres, parfois à comprendre entre les
lignes, ses réponses laissent penser son engagement total pour son pays et son peuple
qu’il s’agit, il le répète avec conviction, « de protéger et de rendre heureux ».
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/302044/politique/abdelfattah-al-sissi-sans-action-ledanger-terroriste-ne-peut-que-setendre-et-il-setend/
20
Libya
Un troisième front contre l'Etat islamique en Libye ?
Par 2 février 2016
Federica Mogherini (UE) salue John Kerry (Etats-Unis) à l'ouverture du sommet des ministres des
Affaires étrangères destiné à s'accorder dans la lutte contre l'Etat islamique, mardi à Rome. Photo
Alberto Pizzoli. AFP
Après l'Irak et la Syrie, les pays membres de la coalition contre l'EI réunis à Rome évoquent une possible future intervention en Libye, où prospère le groupe jihadiste.
Un troisième front contre l'Etat islamique en Libye ?
L’implantation croissante de l’Etat islamique (EI) en Libye, notamment autour de la
ville de Syrte, à 450 kilomètres à l’est de Tripoli, inquiète de plus en plus les pays
occidentaux. Réunis à Rome pour faire le point de la situation en Irak et en Syrie, les
23 pays de la coalition contre l’EI ont évoqué aussi de possibles futures opérations
sur ce nouveau terrain même si à en croire le ministre français des Affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius, «il n’est pas question que nous intervenions en Libye». En
fait, la condition préalable reste la formation en Libye d’un gouvernement légitime
d’union nationale accepté aussi bien par le pouvoir de Tobrouk que par celui de Tripoli à même de demander formellement une telle intervention et de lui donner ainsi
un cadre légal. A la suite d’un accord négocié par l’ONU, le 17 décembre un Premier ministre Fayez al-Serraj a été désigné mais il n’a toujours pas réussi à former
une équipe. Il y a urgence car le péril jihadiste se précise et de nouveaux volontaires
arrivent, y compris des pays occidentaux, pour renforcer les quelque 3 000 à 5 000
combattants de l’EI déjà présents.
21
«Ils sont là sur près de 300 kilomètres de côtes et ils se répandent. Ils sont à 350
kilomètres à peine de l’ile italienne de Lampedusa et lorsque le beau temps va arriver il y a des risques réels de passages de combattants», relevait dimanche le ministre français de la Défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian. Le chaos libyen, avec deux Parlements, deux gouvernements et les milices faisant régner leur loi un peu partout
dans le pays est un terreau fertile pour le mouvement jihadiste.
L'EI avait tenté tenté dans un premier temps de s’implanter à l’est, dans la région de
Derna, longtemps fief islamiste, avant d’en être chassé en juillet par les troupes du
général Haftar proche du pouvoir de Tobrouk. L'organisation a alors a jeté son dévolu sur la ville de Syrte, le dernier bastion de la résistance kadhafiste, où les tribus
sont avides de revanche aussi bien sur les Occidentaux que sur les milices voisines,
notamment celle de Misrata, qui eurent un rôle clé dans l’insurrection de 2011.
C’est un emplacement stratégique car il menace les principales zones pétrolières du
pays et il contrôle une bonne portion de littoral. La crainte d’une «grande Somalie
au bord de la Méditerranée» avancée par Rome inquiète d’un effondrement du régime au moment où l’Otan se décidait à intervenir est en train de devenir réalité.
«Nous ne laisserons pas la situation se dégrader comme en Syrie ou en
Irak», assurait déjà fin janvier Ashton Carter, le secrétaire d’Etat américain à la Défense. Mais s’ils semblent décidés à pousser pour un «troisième front» contre l’Etat
islamique, les Américains veulent cette fois rester en retrait même si des hommes
de leurs forces spéciales sont déjà en reconnaissance sur le terrain. Il en est de
22
même pour les Français et les Britanniques. Une future intervention serait probablement avant tout aérienne, voire avec des drones, mais il devrait y avoir aussi en appui des commandos au sol y compris pour aider les forces libyennes. Les Italiens,
l’ancienne puissance coloniale, comptent bien en revanche jouer un rôle clé en coordonnant voire en assurant le commandement d’une opération en Libye, pays stratégique au carrefour du Maghreb et du Sahel qui, en devenant un fief de l’EI, déstabilise encore un peu plus une région déjà hautement explosive.
http://www.liberation.fr/
23
Opinion: Next anti-'IS' front will be Libya
The successes of the anti-IS coalition in Iraq and Syria are forcing the terror organization toward Libya. The West will have no choice but to take up the fight there,
says Max Hofmann.
First, the good news: Some 10,000 airstrikes are having an effect. The coalition
against "Islamic State" (IS), has been able to recapture large swaths of land in Iraq
and Syria - and more importantly - the cities of Tikrit and Ramadi in Iraq, and Kobani on the Turkish-Syrian border. The coalition is attempting to repair infrastructure,
clear mines, secure land, rebuild schools and reinstate a semblance of everyday life
with all its might.
Now, the bad news: If the coalition is to truly eradicate the terror organization, it
will have to do all that and more once again - this time in Libya.
Waiting for a unity government
The coalition's strategy certainly isn't perfect: For instance, it lacks ground troops.
And the situation, especially in Syria, is so complex that the countries participating
are far from having accomplished their mission. Nevertheless, the combination of
international airstrikes and local ground forces - trained by countries from the alliance - is functioning well enough to drive many "IS" fighters into Libya. There, the
terrorists have found a country in chaos, and thus, perhaps fertile terrain. Furthermore, Libya offers many sources of finance for "IS," above all, human trafficking.
And if things go their way, also control of Libya's enormous oil fields.
24
DW's Max Hofmann
The coalition's official plan is to establish a unity government as quickly as possible,
in order to stop the deadly fragmentation that is destroying the country. In Rome, US
Secretary of State John Kerry said he was optimistic that such a government would
soon exist. Behind the scenes, however, the British, Italians and others continued to
discuss military options. They have no other choice.
Whether in support of a unity government, or under the banner of the United Nations: Successfully fighting "IS" in Libya will only work if a plan similar to that in
Iraq and Syria is executed. Still, the complexity of the situation in Libya could present altogether new challenges: There is no unified army to train, it is full of rival
factions that are becoming ever more entrenched, and there is no national infrastructure for the coalition to rebuild.
Big gamble for Europe
Looking the other way is not an option. Because what is on the line in Libya could
be far more dangerous than what Europe faced in Syria. What are 17 million potential war refugees in Syria when compared to the African continent, home to more
than one billion people? Libya is already a gateway for all those who long to escape
destitution, war or dictators. When springtime comes, the inflatable boats, overloaded with migrants, will once again be launched from Libya's shores.
That means: regardless of whether the unity government in Libya comes or not - the
coalition will have to open a second front against "IS." One could most easily read
this between the lines of comments made by Italian representatives at this week's
meeting of foreign ministers in Rome. That will not please the citizens of many coalition countries, especially those in Germany. But the deployments in Iraq and Syria
have made one thing clear: Unfortunately, diplomatic efforts must be flanked by a
military component. Otherwise, there is no defeating "IS."
http://www.dw.com/
25
Nigeria
Here's what one of the world's deadliest jihadist groups really believes
Jossy Ola/APPeople stand outside burnt houses following an attack by the Islamic
militant group Boko Haram in Gambaru, Nigeria on May 11, 2014.
The Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram killed at least 86 people in a series of attacks earlier this week.
The attack, in which the group firebombed villages and reportedly burned several
children to death, is the latest demonstration of the brutality of a group that's killed
over 15,000 people in the past 14 years, and has emerged as one of the deadliest terror organizations on earth.
Every terrorist group inhabits its own moral universe, following a value system and
worldview that compels it to kill.
But Boko Haram's atrocities are heinous enough to upend the claim that terrorist violence stems from something that can be rationalized or comprehended.
The group kidnapped over 200 girls from a school in northeastern Nigeria in April
of 2014,massacred as many as 2,000 villagers during a single attack along the shores
of Lake Chad in January of 2015 and may have used a 10-year-old girl as a suicide
bomber in July of 2015.
Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to ISIS in March of 2015, seems to exist on
the edges of human depravity, outside of any comprehensible moral system.
26
But that's not the case. In an important new Brookings Institution study, Georgetown
University scholar Alex Thurston gives a compelling analysis of Boko Haram's ideology and worldview.
Through an analysis of the group's literature and the statements of top Boko Haram
leaders, Thurston shows that the organization's ideology has remained remarkably
consistent since its founding in 2002, with the group using a "combination of exclusivsm and grievance" to justify "violence toward the Nigerian state, other Muslims,
and Christians."
Here's what that means.
Boko Haram attacks and safe haven as of mid-2015
Boko Haram vs. everybody else
As Thurston notes, Boko Haram wasn't the first Salafist, or ultra-conservative reformist Islamic movement to gain traction in northern Nigeria.
It set itself apart through its opposition not just to western norms and secular government, but also through its ideological hostility towards nearly every other Islamic
27
group in the region, regardless of its political or social orientation.
Simply, Boko Haram "consider themselves the only genuine representatives of Sunni Islam," Thurston writes, and "consider themselves arbiters of who is a true Muslim."
For Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram founder who died in Nigerian government
custody amid a 2009 crackdown against the group, "loyalty to Islam meant rejecting
democracy and Western-style education."
He believed that "'ruling by other than what God revealed' is equivalent to polytheism," and that "democracy positions the people as an authority in rivalry with God."
AP Photo/Lekan OyekanmiNigerian soldiers man a checkpoint in Gwoza, Nigeria,
in April 2015, when the town was newly liberated from Boko Haram.
One crucial difference between Yusuf's ideas and other strands of Salifism was his
belief that Muslims are obligated to act against western or secular authority, and that
they "needed to confront the fallen society surrounding them." Quietism is just not
an option within the Boko Haram worldview, which views even passive acceptance
of the status quo as an unforgivable crime.
As Thurston notes, Boko Haram's novel interpretation of Islam — which is more
extreme and far more activist than other strands of Nigerian Salafism — was enabled through a "'fragmentation of sacred authority' in Northern Nigeria." The region's Sufi orders, or mystical sects, as well as its system of traditional authority
shared among a group of centuries-old emirates in the country's Muslim north, had
seen their influence wane in the decades leading up to Boko Haram's rise.
Boko Haram didn't just attempt to surpass the Sufi orders and emirs. It actively re-
28
jected and turned on them, even assassinating the Emir of Gowa in May of 2014.
Boko Haram, savior of Nigeria's Muslims
Of course, plenty of other other religious movements around the world have viewed
themselves as the only true embodiment of spiritual and doctrinal purity — and
Boko Haram has been more brutal than almost all of them. The group's victim complex, which is central to both its ideology and its self-image, helps explain why.
As Thurston writes, "Boko Haram's leaders tell a provocative story about what it
means to be Muslim in Nigeria."
Yusuf had argued that "The government of Nigeria ... has been built to attack Islam
and kill Muslims," After Yusuf's death, his successor, Abubakr Shekau, cast Boko
Haram's struggle as a fight for basic religious liberty in the face of an aggressive
central government, saying in a 2012 speech that the government is "fighting us for
no reason, because we’ve said we’ll practice our religion, we will support our religion and stand on what God has said," according to Thurston.
Nigeria, which is the most populous country in the world with an even demographic
split between Muslims and Christians, has a fraught regional and sectarian politics that lends just enough credence to these claims to make them seem plausible to
possible recruits.
Certainly Yusuf's 2009 death increased Boko Haram's sense that it was being specifically persecuted by the authorities — which, according to Boko Haram's moral
framework, meant that virtually the only true Muslims in northern Nigeria were being singled out and attacked as well. As Thurston's analysis shows, the group still
maintains that it's fighting for the survival of Islam in Nigeria against a host of forces attempting to exterminate it.
Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, pledges allegiance to ISIS caliph AlBaghdadi.
29
Thurston's analysis leads to a number of distressing conclusions. Boko Haram's rise,
and its brutality, doesn't stem from the political or economic situation in northern
Nigeria, or even from the influence of outside groups like Al Qaeda or ISIS.
Instead, it was driven by an ideology that cropped up organically in Nigeria — an
ideology that reflects a coherent theory of religion, reality, and politics.
It's a worldview that tries to answer fundamental questions about the individual's
role in society, the nature of an ideal state, and the relationship between religious
imperatives and earthly action.
Like ISIS, another jihadist group whose worldview exhibits a certain jarring coherency, Boko Haram is sustained through a set of ideas — something that might allow Africa's most brutal jihadist group to survive even after it loses its remaining
safe havens around Lake Chad.
TA screen shot of a video released by Boko Haram shows kidnapped Nigerian
school girls.
http://www.businessinsider.com/worldview-of-boko-haram-2016-2
30
News Analysis: If Boko Haram is not in Nigeria, where is
Sambisa Forest?
Feb 8 2016
Intercepted Boko Haram terrorists
The Nigerian political-military establishment wants Nigerians to believe that Boko
Haram has been technically defeated, flushed out of Nigeria’s territory.
But each day the Boko Haram militants raid one Nigerian village after another, killing scores as it happened in Dalori, one wonders where the hell the insurgents were
coming from. From Chad or Niger or from Cameroon?
Senator Baba Kaka Bashir Garbai (Borno Central) has now debunked the pervasive
propaganda: Boko Haram, he said are still occupying more than half of Borno
State. Indeed, the senator on sympathy visit to Dalori, said most shockingly, that
only three local council areas are safe from Boko Haram attacks, because of heavy
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military presence.
“There is an assumption that most of the local governments in Borno are recaptured
from the Boko Haram. In reality this is not true in the real sense,” Garbai said.
“Apart from Maiduguri Metropolis, Kwaya Kusar and Bayo these are the three
LGAs that are safe,” Senator Garbai stated.
These areas, according to the senator, are only safe due to the strong military and
police presence which maintains “law and order”.
Senator Garbai went on to lament that areas such as Mobbar, Kala Balge, and Abbadam LGAs are 100 percent occupied by the insurgents.
In addition, there are several areas that are partially under the thumb of Boko Haram, according to the senator.
The Defence Headquarters (DHQ) in a swift response tried to deflate Garbai’s statement, repeating the propaganda that Boko Haram has indeed been knocked down in
Borno and other parts of the Northeast.
Sambisa Forest which Rabe says is 80 kilometres, understates the enormity of
the size. The forest, which is 60 kilometres southeast of Maiduguri, is 60,000
square kilometres or 23,000 square miles. The forest straddles four states in
the north east, Yobe, Borno, Gombe and Bauchi. In Borno, it is administered
by four LGAs, Askira/Uba in the south, by Damboa in the southwest, and by
Konduga and Jere in the west. It is not a coincidence that Boko Haram attacks
are deadly in all these council areas, especially Damboa and Konduga.
But in revealing that the only battle ground left is in the Sambisa Forest, the about
80 kilometres swathe of thick bush that is the sect’s stronghold, the Defence Headquarters unwittingly buttressed Garbai’s disclosure that a large part of Borno is still
under Boko Haram stranglehold.
Brigadier Gen. Abubakar Rabe , DHQ spokesman said: “What is left is Sambisa
Forest. That is the last battle ground with the
insurgents.
Brig. General Abubakar Rabe: Boko Haram decimated but in Sambisa Forest
“ This Forest is about 80kilometres but I believe
very soon, we will overrun the Forest and rout
out the insurgents. We will certainly send them
packing from the Sambisa Forest.”
“For anyone to make a claim that half of Borno
State is under the insurgents is not helping the
military. It is just to get media attention. We
have decimated Boko Haram. This is the reality”, Rabe told The Nation newspaper.
Sambisa Forest which Rabe says is 80 kilometres, understates the enormity of the size. The
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forest, which is 60 kilometres southeast of Maiduguri, is 60,000 square kilometres
or 23,000 square miles. The forest straddles four states in the north east, Yobe, Borno, Gombe and Bauchi. In Borno, it is administered by four LGAs, Askira/Uba in
the south, by Damboa in the southwest, and by Konduga and Jere in the west. It is
not a coincidence that Boko Haram attacks are deadly in all these council areas, especially Damboa and Konduga.
At least we now know from Garbai’s statement and DHQ’s response that Boko Haram insurgents are still on Nigeria’s territory, living fine in Sambisa, from where
they plot the bombings and raids of unprotected Nigerian communities and make
forays into neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad.
And until Nigeria is able to confront the insurgents in their Sambisa den, it may not
be ‘technically’, right to say that Boko Haram has been ‘technically’ defeated.
On the contrary, the insurgents are still a potent force capable of inflicting great
damage on the hapless villagers, whose homes and lives they destroy wantonly.
Nigeria still has a lot of work to do in combating the insurgency. We agree
with Rabe that it is not the duty of the military alone. It is a pan-Nigerian burden,
our collective nightmare.
http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2016/02/news-analysis-if-boko-haram-is-not-innigeria-where-is-sambisa-forest/
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Should America be involved in Nigeria?
February 9, 2016
The Washington Post recently released a moving piece on the death of 86 children
burned alive by the Boko Haram, Nigeria’s homegrown Islamic extremists. The sixyear onslaught by the group has killed over 20,000 people and driven 2.5 million
from their homes. Feelings of anger and sadness are natural reactions to a piece like
this, followed by resentment for world powers not getting involved.
The natural reason as to why the U.S. has not gotten involved would be the lack of
petroleum in the northern part of the country. However, there’s much more to the
situation than the lack of tangible resources we can pilfer from the region.
This is one case where, despite the empathy we may have for the senseless victims,
any intervention by the U.S. would and should be deemed in a negative light.
To begin with, the U.S. did ask the Nigerian government if they wanted military aid
in their fight following a social media campaign headed by Michelle Obama with the
hashtag, #BringBackOurGirls. The government hesitated at first and then rejected
the idea. Several months later, the government asked for help again following a series of attacks in major cities, and Secretary of State John Kerry stated that intervention might occur following an analysis of the elections in the region.
However, after the election voted in Muhammadu Buhari, the first time an incumbent president had lost reelection in the country’s history, no intervention was given
to the region. While corruption was leveled as a possible reason for the lack of force,
there are multiple other factors at work, which has cautioned us from turning the
biggest economic country into another Iraq/Afghanistan.
The government, for one, is a big problem. The change of incumbents is a step in the
right direction in terms of replacing a man charged with war crimes and who oversaw a nation with experienced 12,000 deaths as a result of political violence. This is
a nation we have yet to see strive to spend the money that it most certainly has in
fighting terror. Both Algeria and Angola have spent more militarily than Nigeria,
where ill-equipped soldiers have deserted in the thousands fighting an ideological
cause. Before Buhari was elected, Nigeria relied on the neighboring country of Chad
to fight the group as it placed security in spots to hold the delayed elections.
This isn’t a country with a low GDP and no manpower to fight an organization. It’s
a country, much like that of Iraq or Afghanistan, which has refused to fight it. It’s
refused to invest in communities where infrastructure and education is desperately
needed and is an easy picking ground for supporters of an alternative, extreme option. Until then, does the U.S. need to involve itself in a cause with no direction?
When discussing any human rights violations and terrorism around the world, there
is a crossroad in the course of action to be taken. Are we the world’s police force or
should we be focusing on injustices on the home front? Maybe, it’s time to put down
the big stick.
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- See more at: http://www.torchonline.com/opinion/2016/02/09/should-america-be-involved-in-nigeria/
#sthash.KXIjh8Y1.dpuf
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Somalia
Somalia: A Legitimate Government Is the Only Antidote to
Al-Shabaab Terror in Somalia
1 February 2016
ANALYSIS By Wachira Maina
The Al Shabaab raid on the KDF camp at El-Adde is the fourth attack on Amisom
forces in Somalia in twelve months.
In June 2015, the militants killed 70 Burundian soldiers in Lego, south of Mogadishu; in September they killed another 50 Ugandan soldiers in Janale District to the
southwest.
Earlier they had ambushed and killed dozens of Ethiopian soldiers. Ethiopia, like
Kenya, did not release casualty figures. The response of other troop contributing
countries is likely to echo Kenya's: A splenetic venting, a surge in force numbers
and an increase in sorties against suspected Al Shabaab camps.
In military terms, this may even cripple the insurgent group.
However, even if Amisom militarily degrades Al Shabaab, the prolonged presence
of foreign troops in Somalia will inevitably seed another anti-Kenya group because
the country has unresolved and deep-seated grievances with Kenya -- and Ethiopia.
This is what history teaches.
Al Shabaab was an effectual and fringe off-shoot of the more moderate Islamic
Courts' Union, ICU when Ethiopia invaded in 2006. By adroitly exploiting Somalia's
deep historic hostility to Ethiopia, it was able to mobilise Somali nationalism and
recruit thousands of youth. If that prognosis is correct, it is time for Kenya and
Amisom to redefine their Somalia mission.
As they do so, they will benefit immensely from reading the October 2015 Report of
the Monitoring Group on Somalia to the UN Security Council. It is a treasure trove
of information and candid analysis.
The report makes three points clear: One, ineptitude and corruption have drained the
vitality of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, TFG, and destroyed the
scant legitimacy it originally enjoyed.
Second, some members of Amisom -- principally Kenya and Ethiopia -- have territorial ambitions that undermine Amisom's mission in Somalia and seem likely to
spawn Somali resentment sooner rather than later.
Third, Al Shabaab has morphed faster and become much more tactically flexible
than those fighting it. Unfortunately, inability to defeat Al Shabaab in one fell
swoop will compel Amisom to stay in Somalia longer, which makes it harder for it
to fulfill its mission and risks inflaming Somalia's famously incandescent nationalism.
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The first point is that security and stability cannot be restored in Somalia by a terminally weak, incompetent and corrupt government. And the details in the report show
that the TFG is all three.
It is now nearly four years since the TFG was established. Its only real success -with the help of Amisom -- has been to reverse Al Shabaab's territorial gains.
Other crucial reforms have stalled. Under the 2012 Provisional Constitution, Somalia was to have had elections later this year but mid last year, the country's Federal
Parliament -- where votes are traded for cash through a graft-fuelled network of fixers -- agreed to a sweetheart deal with the executive that elections should be postponed, ostensibly because violence and turmoil make a credible election impossible.
Not in good faith
It is a case of the TFG profiting from its own omissions: It has not implemented the
Provisional Constitution in good faith. Of the nine independent commissions that the
TFG is obliged to establish, only four had been established by the end of 2015.
The critically important Provisional Constitution Review and Implementation Commission was set up two years too late, in 2014. It has since been hobbled by official
antipathy, chronic under-funding and since May last year, when its chair resigned in
frustration, is increasingly bereft of effective leadership.
So much for the constitutional difficulties: The report also makes it clear that corruption is so deeply embedded, the TFG just cannot deliver essential services or win
hearts and minds.
Corrupt payments run up and down the system: Government revenues are funnelled
to unauthorised bank accounts, bypassing the Treasury Single Account; withdrawals
to fund government agencies are often made in cash and informal payment systems
are not regulated.
For instance, a total of $1.8 million of port rehabilitation funds were transferred
from the UNDP in 2014 to a Mogadishu Port account at the Central Bank of Somalia.
In seven days, $1.7 million was withdrawn in cash. The Monitoring Group says that
it has evidence that "the then minister for ports and marine transport, Yusuf Maalim
Amin 'Baadiyow' and the then director general, Abdullahi Ali Nur, likely misappropriated the funds.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201602011272.html
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Al-Shabaab preys on poor youth with promises of cars and
wives
By FRED MUKINDA
Al-Shabaab militants in Elasha Biyaha, Somalia, on February 13, 2012. According
to new information gathered from detained terror suspects, the militia lures Kenyan
youth with promises of cars and wives. PHOTO | AFP
In Summary
Police say syndicate has roots in Mombasa and tentacles in Isiolo, Nairobi and Lamu
counties.
The information came from four terror suspect detainees.
A primary school in Likoni, Mombasa is at the centre of the investigation because of
the terror suspects teaches there.
The four were arrested in Madogo area, near Garissa en route to Somalia.
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Police say they have unearthed an Al-Shabaab recruitment network that lures youths
with promises of cash, cars and wives.
They say the syndicate has roots in Mombasa and tentacles in Isiolo, Nairobi and
Lamu counties.
Police say four young men arrested recently gave details of the network to detectives
after interrogation.
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Idris Sadalla Iddi, Mohamed Ahmed Fadhili, Issa Noor Abdullahi and Abdulhafidhi
Issa Faraj were arrested last month but the court allowed police to detain them as
investigations went on.
A primary school in Likoni, Mombasa is at the centre of the investigation because
Fadhili teaches there.
The four were arrested in Madogo area, near Garissa. Police say they planned to
travel to Mandera before entering Somalia and joining Al-Shabaab camps.
“The syndicate is linked to Ramadhan Kufungwa. He has been on the police list of
most wanted criminals. He is hiding in Somalia,” a government report says.
Kufungwa fled Kenya when his photos were circulated by police with calls for information that would lead to his arrest.
Security agents say they suspect that he donates money to the school.
Idriss stayed in the school in December.
POVERTY
The boarding school is known for admitting children from poor backgrounds and
charges only Sh500 per pupil per term.
Children whose parents cannot afford the fee are allowed to study for free.
“Most of the school’s expenses are funded through donations and authorities think
the help comes from Al-Shabaab sympathisers and the pupils targeted for radicalisation,” the report adds.
“The vulnerable children are easy prey, given that few people would be curious and
wary of what they are taught. Investigations continue on this institution.”
Kufungwa is also wanted after investigations linked him to the June 2014 killing of
Sheikh Idriss in Mombasa.
“He was also behind a spate of violent robberies in Mombasa that were carried out
by members of his cell so as to raise money for Al-Shabaab activities. He coordinates recruitment of youths and facilitates their movement to Somalia as well as
providing logistical support to militia in Boni Forest,” an earlier police report said.
Jeshi Ayman, a faction of Al-Shabaab has set up camps in Boni Forest in Lamu,
prompting a massive security operation.
“Investigations on the four, which started earlier revealed they were in contact with
facilitators in Somalia and had made arrangements to travel there through Mandera.
As part of the incentive to join Al-Shabaab the boys were promised, money, cars and
wives,” the latest report says.
Investigators said Fadhil and Idriss were the initial targets of recruitment.
Later on, they brought in the other two.
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Shabaab-lure-youth-with-cars-and-wives//1056/3071238/-/tmiqm1z/-/index.html
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Life after Al Shabbab's attack on El-Adde: How will Kenya respond?
3 February 2016
On 15 January 2016, a Kenyan Defence Force base at El-Adde in the Gedo
region of Somalia was attacked and overrun by Al-Shabaab. News still remains sketchy, though it is increasingly certain this is the costliest day in Kenya’s proud military history. By DICKIE DAVIS and GREG MILLS.
According to Kenya’s Defence Chief General Samson Mwathethe, a massive vehicle-borne improvised explosive device triggered the Al-Shabaab attack on the ElAdde KDF camp. While the exact number of Kenyan troops involved has not been
divulged, it is estimated to have been a company strength base, around 150 men.
Given the size of the initial explosion, General Mwathethe has called for patience
in identifying the victims. Al-Shabaab’s haul from the attack appears to include
Armoured Personnel Carriers, Land Rovers, trucks, as well as weapons and ammunition, suggesting that the camp was completely overrun.
It is a tragic event for Kenya, for the armed forces and particularly for the families
of the soldiers involved. In war such hard knocks are not uncommon, they are the
price of conflict; to prevail it is important that lessons are learnt and reforms made.
Four pointers stand out in the circumstances:
First, ther e might be a temptation to keep a hold on the casualty figur es, for a
number of reasons, including the impact on domestic inter-ethnic relations, or the
reflection on the competency of those involved. But warfare is as much about perception as it is about reality, and Al-Shabaab have gained much from their quick
release of images. Bad news generally does not get better and in the absence of
information people make it up to be generally worse than it is. The Kenyan government needs to get accurate information into the public domain as soon as the
families of the casualties have been informed.
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Second, the public reaction will depend on how the government responds to this
event. The best that could come out of it is that it is seen as the event that catalysed
improvements. There needs to be an immediate lessons-learned process identifying
quick wins – generally changes to tactics and procedures – and, even more importantly, a longer term analysis that evaluates the overall security capability. The
Colombian military, to take an example from another counter-insurgency campaign, used its humiliation in Mitu in 1998, when FARC guerrillas overran an Army battalion and Police unit, killing 150 personnel and capturing more than 40 soldiers, to reorganise. Mitu was evidence of the strength of their foe and the relative
weakness of the Colombian state, a realisation that led to a rapid increase in the
size of the armed forces and better equipment, improved intelligence collection
and fusion, and inter-operability between the army, air force, navy and marines,
and police.
Third, owner ship of the pr oblem – in essence, the threat posed by radical Islam
to Kenya from both without and within – and the solution. This is not the military’s problem alone. Again, the lesson from Colombia is the need for a whole of
government approach, including the treasury, social services, foreign ministry, police, intelligence services, and the military. Ultimately, for example, some hard
resource choices will have to be made as to where and on which equipment and
people money is to be spent. The foreign ministry will have to play its part in acquiring international support to fund, train and equip the security forces. The
toughest choice overall will likely be about the size of the military. Given Kenya’s
long borders and its missions in Somalia and South Sudan, it seems that the current size of the KDF at 24,000 troops is just too small, and that too much of its $1
billion budget is not spent in the right areas.
The fourth and final pointer is to evaluate Kenya’s strategy in Somalia. To be sustainable, any military action has to be led or, at least, paralleled by local political
developments. There remain intrinsic problems with governance in Somalia, stemming from the historical impossibility of governing Somalis, from without and
within. Once a basis of social stability and consensus, the clan system is now routinely a source of power and control outside of government.
So far both President Uhuru Kenyatta and General Mwathethe have reiterated
Kenya’s commitment to the AMISOM Somali operation. This should however not
obscure the importance of using the El-Adde attack to conduct a thorough review
of Kenyan tactics, capabilities and the overall strategy to contain the threat posed
by radical Islamic groups. DM
Davis, who retired from the British Army last year after 32 years of service as a
Major General, and Dr Mills are with the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation. Both have extensive experience in Afghanistan, and are the joint authors
recently of ‘A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence’ (Hurst, London).
Photo: A member of the Kenya Defence Forces yawns as they attend prayers to
pay their respects to the Kenyan soldiers serving in the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), who were killed in El Adde during an attack, at a memorial
mass at the Moi Barracks in Eldoret, January 27, 2016. Al Shabaab, which is
aligned with al Qaeda, said its fighters killed more than 100 Kenyan soldiers when
they overrun the base in El Adde, also known as Ceel Cadde, near the Kenyan
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border, on Jan 15. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya.
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-02-03-life-after-al-shabbabs-attackon-el-adde-how-will-kenya-respond/
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Terrorism in the World
Terror: The globalisation of extremism
A surge in Isis-claimed attacks suggests the ideology is extending its
influence to Asia
©AFP
Indonesian armed police secure Jakarta after attacks on the capital in mid-January
Gunmen hunting foreigners kill a Japanese farm expert in northern Bangladesh and
an Italian aid worker in the capital Dhaka. Shia Muslims are targeted in a bomb blast
in Pakistan that kills 24. In Indonesia, eight people are slain in an assault on civilians
around a Starbucks café at a Jakarta shopping mall. A bomb explodes at a popular
Hindu shrine in Bangkok, leaving 20 dead, including five Chinese tourists.
Terror attacks such as these in recent months — some claimed by Isis or its adherents — suggest that the Sunni Islamist extremist group and its violent, ultraconservative ideology are successfully extending their influence to Asia from the
Middle East and Europe.
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web
In a world of instant connections via the internet and social media, the growing popularity of the Isis brand among young Asian Islamists should be no surprise.
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Asia is home to about 1bn Muslims, nearly two-thirds of the world total, and has
undergone waves of radicalisation in earlier decades.
The jihad that drove Soviet forces out of Afghanistan in 1989, backed by the US and
Saudi Arabia, notoriously spawned the Islamist Taliban regime in Afghanistan and
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.
The first decade of the new millennium saw the Indonesian Bali bombings of 2002,
which killed more than 200, and the attack launched from Pakistan on the Indian
city of Mumbai in 2008.
The fact that it has happened before, however, only heightens the anxiety
among Asian and western governments about the latest, continent-wide surge in Islamist militancy — fuelled as it is by online recruitment campaigns and backed by a
plethora of local extremist groups whose leaders are impressed by Isis and its wars
in Syria and Iraq.
A risk analysis by consultancy IHS said the Isis terror attacks in Paris last November
are continuing to drive south Asian Islamist factions, including the remnants of alQaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and the Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, into the
arms of Isis.
Such groups would not receive much direct help from Isis and would rely on their
own capabilities to keep attacking foreigners, government and military installations
and religious minorities, Omar Hamid wrote in the report.
“However, due to the enthusiasm generated by the Paris attacks among jihadis, an
increase in the number of attacks on these targets is highly likely over the next six
months,” he said.
Western governments are particularly concerned about Russia and central Asia, an
important source of the foreign fighters who join Isis in the Middle East, and see
radicalisation in other parts of Asia as well.
“Asia-wide, it’s more of a concern than people think for the governments concerned,” says one western official. “You’ve essentially had the globalisation of Islamic radicalisation, the Daesh [Isis] brand . . . though you still have a range of local
brands.”
The slew of terrorist killings, including the Jakarta attacks and the hacking to death
of liberal writers on the streets of Bangladesh, may finally lay to rest the notion that
Asian Muslims are somehow less prone to radicalisation than their co-religionists in
the Middle East.
While it is true that Indonesian Islam, for example, is often coloured by Hindu and
other pre-Islamic traditions, that has not stopped puritanical Sunni groups such as alQaeda and Isis from finding eager recruits to murder innocents of any age or religion.
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South Asia, with Hindu-majority India at its heart, is home to millions of mystical,
music-loving Sufis and has Muslim traditions as varied, tolerant and syncretic as
those of Indonesia.
Yet in Pakistan, nearly 60,000 civilians, security force personnel and militants have
been killed in terror attacks and government crackdowns since 2003. Almost all the
victims were Muslims.
Indonesia
Tolerant nation wary of extremist trends
New leaders keen to demonstrate their reach to groups such as Isis
Equally, it is hard to think of any country in Asia — except perhaps the Himalayan
kingdom of Bhutan — that has not been affected by the rise of Isis and seen at least
some of its citizens migrate to Syria or Iraq to fight for the organisation.
The Indian Ocean archipelago of the Maldives, a destination for wealthy tourists, is
thought to have contributed about 200 Isis fighters, one of the largest contingents as
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a share of national population, according to the Soufan Group.
Domestic factors
Radicalisation is probably made easier by the tendency of Asia’s Muslim-majority
governments and societies such as Malaysia and Pakistan to impose or adopt progressively more conservative rules. Neither increased conservatism nor the novel
appeal of Isis, however, mean that Asian Muslims are a monolithic group fated to
become ever more radical.
An examination of leading Asian countries shows they are buffeted by an array of
influences, including ethnic separatism and political disputes as well as Islamism,
religious bigotry and deep-rooted anti-western sentiment.
In some, Isis is only the latest actor to join in long-running extremist campaigns. In
Afghanistan, for example, where a western-backed government under President
Ashraf Ghani is struggling to ensure security, Isis is vying for influence with the
Taliban, al-Qaeda and other Sunni groups.
There are signs that established groups in Pakistan have sought to form alliances
with Isis. Had a militant group not cited revenge for “the killings of innocent Muslims in Syria” as the reason for its December 13 bomb in the mainly Shia town of
Parachinar, the attack would have been just another example of sectarian carnage.
But Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has for months been suspected of trying to become a branch
of Isis.
“LeJ is trying hard to become enrolled in Daesh. They want money and weapons,”
says one intelligence official.
©Getty
Kashmiri Muslim protesters display the Isis flag during november rallies in Srinagar
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India detained 14 suspected Isis sympathisers shortly before the arrival of François
Hollande, the French president, in New Delhi last week. With 170m Muslims India
has one of the religion’s largest national populations, but they are rarely regarded as
extremists and only a few dozen are thought to have left for Syria.
“Most of the Indians whom we know were attracted to Daesh were brought to our
attention by their own family or community,” Shivshankar Menon, a former national
security adviser, said in a recent speech. “What should worry us is the fact that 10
years ago we could say proudly that there was no Indian in al-Qaeda. Today we can
no longer say so.”
And in Bangladesh, two strands of Islamic militancy have been prominent over the
past year. First, a group known as Ansarullah Bangla Team, an al-Qaeda affiliate,
has murdered five liberal writers and atheists and circulated a hit list with many
more names. Second, Isis claimed various shootings and bombings that killed foreigners, policemen and Shia Muslims and boasted of “the revival of jihad in Bengal”.
Last month, Singapore announced it had arrested 27 Bangladeshi men who were
working on construction sites for supporting the ideology of al-Qaeda and Isis.
©AFP
Onlookers gather following a December suicide bomb blast at an Ahmadiyya
mosque in Bangladesh
Meanwhile, Malaysian authorities say they have frustrated several plots and are concerned by the number of nationals who have gone to fight with Isis. The ruling United Malays National Organisation has also sought to bolster support among rural voters by emphasising its Islamic credentials.
Eager alliance
In short, Isis may indeed have Asia in its sights. The latest issue of its magazine
Dabiq talks of Islam conquering or reconquering “the cow-worshipping Hindus and
atheist Chinese” from “Khurasan”, an imagined Islamic land centred on Afghanistan
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and western Pakistan.
But Asia is not yet as important for Isis as its embattled Middle East heartland or the
temptingly vulnerable and nearby nations of Europe.
Asian militants, in fact, sometimes seem more eager to associate themselves with
Isis than overburdened Isis leaders are to co-opt them. Isis is only one of many extremist Sunni groups in Asia, and its ideologues spend much of their time attacking
organisations such as the Taliban that are ideologically almost indistinguishable
from itself.
“Extremism is a spectrum in this part of the world and it is very difficult to draw the
line,” says Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group. “I don’t think Isis central
is interested in Southeast Asia. I think Indonesians in Isis based in Syria are interested in showing they can put the region on the map.”
Few analysts think Asian countries face immediate threats to their existence from
Islamist radicals. Indeed, it was just such a threat to the stability of Pakistan from its
homegrown Sunni extremists that persuaded the armed forces to launch operations
against the militant groups they had helped to establish. Islamabad has, however,
been less willing to abandon the jihadis it finds useful: those destabilising neighbouring India and Afghanistan.
Like Indonesia and several other Asian countries, Pakistan can now boast of some
successes in suppressing violent radicals who want to attack their fellow citizens .
And, with the notable exception of Afghans and Pakistanis, most Asians can assume
they are as safe as Europeans from attacks by Isis or its fellow extremists. Unfortunately — after the attacks of Paris, Istanbul, Bangkok and Jakarta — that is small
comfort.
China
Groups include: East Turkestan Islamic Movement
Beijing has stepped up its response to an insurgency in the northwestern region of
Xinjiang, home to 10m Muslim Uighurs, since a 2014 knife attack in Kunming. It
blames such attacks on ‘separatists’
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Regional picture: Local groups are being influenced by Islamist networks
Pakistan
Groups include: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan
TTP works directly to carry out attacks as well as through many affiliated groups;
one intelligence official says LeJ is trying ‘very hard to become enrolled in Daesh
[Isis]’
Afghanistan
Groups include: Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The government is struggling to rein in lawlessness, with the spillover felt in Pakistan to the south, and central Asia and China to the north and east
India
Groups include: Indian Mujahideen
Only a few dozen of the country’s 170m Muslims are thought to have travelled to
Syria to fight. But India detained 14 suspected Isis sympathisers in New Delhi last
week
Bangladesh
Groups include: Ansarullah Bangla Team, Jam’atul Mujaheddin Bangladesh
49
Ansarullah Bangla Team, an al-Qaeda affiliate, has killed liberal writers and atheists while groups linked to Isis have claimed responsibility for a spate of recent
attacks
Thailand
©AFP
A suspect in August’s Bangkok shrine attack is escorted by Thai commandos
Groups include: National Revolutionary Front
A long-running insurgency by predominantly Muslim ethnic Malays has claimed
thousands of lives. Ethnic Uighurs from China were suspected of involvement in
an August attack on a shrine in Bangkok
Indonesia
Groups include: Jemaah Islamiyah, East Indonesia Mujahidin
Despite the recent Jakarta attack the number of serious terrorist incidents remains
small. But the authorities fear that returning fighters could revive local extremist
groups
Malaysia
Groups include: Katiba Nusantara
Malaysian authorities say they have frustrated a spate of terror plots but are concerned by the number of nationals who have left the self-styled moderate Muslim
country to fight with Isis in Syria and Iraq
Philippines
Groups include: Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front
There are fears the restive southern island group of Mindanao will ‘become a safe
haven for everybody else in the region fleeing and an arms supplier’, says a security analyst
50
Additional reporting by Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad, Joseph Allchin in Dhaka,
Michael Peel in Bangkok, Jeevan Vasagar in Kuala Lumpur and Tom Mitchell in
Beijing
The aftermath of a December attack in Parachinar, northern Pakistan
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a181bbda-c8e1-11e5-be0bb7ece4e953a0.html#axzz40tsY4N54
51
France
Terrorisme : la France et la Belgique renforcent leur coopération
01 février 2016 à 23h52
« © Sipa Press
Deux mois et demi après les attentats de Paris et de Saint-Denis, la France et la Belgique ont décidé de renforcer leur coopération en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme.
Plusieurs mesures concrètes ont été évoquées.
La France et la Belgique avancent main dans la main. Les deux pays souhaitent renforcer leur coopération en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme suite aux attentats de Paris
et de Saint-Denis survenus en novembre 2015. Parmi les auteurs présumés de ces attaques, certains avaient vécu dans l’agglomération bruxelloise.
En visite à Bruxelles avec les ministres de la Justice et de l’Intérieur, le Premier ministre français a évoqué les moyens de renforcer la sécurité, tout en mettant en garde
contre la puissance de la menace terroriste. Au titre des « décisions concrètes », Manuel Valls a cité l’échange de policiers et d’officiers de liaison et le renforcement de la
coopération de la police transfrontalière « même si, notamment dans le domaine de la
lutte contre la criminalité, elle est déjà de très bonne qualité ».
Devant la presse, aux côtés de son homologue belge Charles Michel, le Premier ministre a aussi évoqué l’affectation d’un magistrat de liaison à l’ambassade de France à
Bruxelles ainsi qu’une « action concertée » en matière de lutte contre la radicalisation.
Et de préciser : « Nous avons également convenu d’intensifier les échanges d’informations, déjà intenses, entre services. Il faudra pour cela exploiter pleinement les capacités des outils des outils bilatéraux et européens existant ».
Préparation des attentats. L’enquête sur les attaques du 13 novembre a révélé l’existence d’une filière à Molenbeek, un quartier de Bruxelles présenté comme une plaque
52
tournante du djihadisme et une base arrière à la préparation d’attentats. Plusieurs auteurs des attaques, dont Abdelhamid Abaaoud, considéré comme l’organisateur des
opérations, avaient la nationalité belge ou résidaient dans le pays. Pointées du doigt en
France, les autorités belges ont régulièrement pris ces derniers mois la défense de leurs
services de renseignement, qui n’ont pas réussi à mettre la main sur Salah Abdeslam à
son retour en Belgique.
Malgré les failles, Charles Michel estime que la coopération en matière de sécurité
entre la France et la Belgique « fonctionne plutôt bien ». « Les échanges sont les plus
systématiques possibles, des équipes d’enquête conjointes sont en place », explique-t-il
dans le quotidien Le Monde. « Nous voulons toutefois prendre des engagements plus
opérationnels et plus concrets ». Et de poursuivre : « Nous pouvons aussi améliorer
notre lutte conjointe contre la radicalisation. »
Pas de risque zéro. Depuis le 13 novembre, une dizaine de personnes ont été interpellées en Belgique pour leur implication présumée dans ces opérations revendiquées par
l’Etat islamique. Au niveau européen, les gouvernements et le Parlement de l’Union
européenne se sont mis d’accord début décembre sur la création d’un fichier
« PNR » (Passenger Name Record) conservant la trace des déplacements en avion des
voyageurs. Dans un entretien accordé en fin de journée à la chaîne RTL-TVI, les deux
dirigeants ont souligné l’importance de la pression, rappelant en chœur que « le risque
zéro n’existe pas. » « La menace, je veux le rappeler, est à un niveau sans précédent »,
a dit Manuel Valls, alors que le gouvernement français doit examiner mercredi le projet
de prolonger de trois mois l’état d’urgence en France.
(avec Reuters)
http://www.lopinion.fr/
53
Iraq
Understanding Youth Radicalization in the Age of ISIS: A
Psychosocial Analysis
12 February 2016
By Kumar Ramakrishna
Mojpe/Pixabay
This article was originally published by E-International Relations on 11 February 2016.
In December 2015, Malaysian police reported that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had set up camps in Kazakhstan and Syria to train and indoctrinate children
as young as two years old to become militants. It was alleged that the camps were
training children from all over the world in the use of firearms, as well as immersing
them in what one senior Malaysian police officer called a ‘ false jihad’.
While the Kazakh ambassador in Singapore swiftly issued a rebuttal of the Malaysian claim, it is worth noting nevertheless that news is available – including apparently video evidence produced by ISIS itself- of Kazakh children being trained by ISIS.
More generally, terrorism researchers have confirmed that ISIS ‘actively recruits
children’ to engage in ‘combat, including suicide missions’ (Stern and Berger 2015:
54
210). In any case, Southeast Asian authorities were hardly surprised at the latest allegations of ISIS targeting youth for Islamist indoctrination. Since September 2014, it
has been known that ISIS has set up a Southeast Asian unit of Malay-speaking militants, drawn from mainly Indonesia but also Malaysia. According to some estimates,
the unit called Katibah Nusantara (KN), or the Malay Archipelago Unit, held sway
amongst 450 Indonesian and Malaysian fighters and their families in the Syrian/Iraq
region, as of November 2015 (Arianti and Singh, 2015).
Of particular interest, KN has apparently set up the Abdullah Azzam Academy for
the education and military training of children of Malaysian and Indonesian fighters.
The medium of instruction is in the Malay language, and KN appears desirous of
training a new generation of Malay-speaking militants indoctrinated from childhood
to be committed to ensuring that the so-called ISIS Caliphate, inaugurated by its titular leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi in June 2014, eventually encompasses Malayspeaking Southeast Asia as well. In March 2015, moreover, a two-minute video
emerged via ISIS social media sources in which ethnic Malay-looking children were
seen training with weapons. The video declared that these children will ‘finish all
oppressors, disbelievers, apostates’. The underlying message to Southeast Asian
governments was unmistakable: ‘These children will be the next generation of fighters. You can capture us, kill us, we will regenerate, no matter how hard you try’.
Terrorism scholars agree in this connection that from the ISIS perspective, ‘[l]
eadership decapitation is significantly less likely to be effective against organizations that prepare children to step into their fathers’ shoes’ (Stern and Berger, 2015b:
211).
ISIS is hardly unique in targeting youth – especially young males – for indoctrination. Its ideological parent Al Qaeda sought to radicalize youth into its virulent varieties of Islamist extremism as well. The British MI5 warned in 2007 that Al Qaeda
and its affiliates were seeking to radicalize children as young as 15 into mounting
terror attacks in the United Kingdom. In like vein the former Director of the US
Central Intelligence Agency warned that Al Qaeda was seeking to radicalize western
youth for the purpose of mounting terror attacks in the West. Some estimates suggest that youth between 15 and 18 years of age comprise 20 percent of all suicide
bombers (Samuel, 2011:109-113). As we shall see, youth are particularly susceptible
to radicalization into violent extremism of the ISIS and similar ills, for a variety of
reasons. This article will first examine widely accepted definitions of the term
‘youth’. It will then examine, drawing on a number of disciplinary perspectives, a
few key intertwined factors – neurological, psychological, family and social – that
impact the degree to which youth are rendered susceptible to the seductive ideological appeals of ISIS and the like, and ultimately radicalize into violent extremism. I
shall then end the article by briefly suggesting ways to mitigate the relative vulnerability of youth to the highly professionalized and seductive Facebook, Twitter and
YouTube propaganda of ISIS.
‘Youth’ Defined – and How ISIS ‘Unleashes’ Them
That ISIS seems keen on targeting young children and youth for recruitment into
either active militant serving on the frontlines in Syria and Iraq, or so-called ‘lone
wolves’ carrying out terrorist acts inspired but not necessarily orchestrated by the
organization, is evident enough. A brief definitional discussion is warranted at this
juncture before proceeding further. The term ‘youth’ is interpreted differently across
55
national and institutional jurisdictions – and at times even within the latter. While
the United Nations Secretariat and the World Bank both define ‘youth’ to refer to
individuals between 15 and 24 years old, the Denmark Youth Council establishes
the age range of individuals considered to be youth more expansively – as between
15 to 34 years of age (Ramakrishna, 2015: 115). The African Union further extends
this latter definition of youth by a year, to age 35. Within the UN system itself,
UNICEF’s Convention on the Rights of the Child broadly defines the term ‘youth’
as a ‘child until 18’ while the UN Habitat identifies an age range from 15-32 years.
In any case, as mentioned, quite apart from the children in training camps that have
been featured in ISIS propaganda videos, the ISIS message has clearly resonated
with youth that are older, as evidenced by a cursory glance at newspaper headlines
on lone wolf attacks in the second half of 2014 and throughout 2015. In September
2014, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani – in response to the Obama administration’s launching of airstrikes a month earlier to stem the terrorist army’s
seemingly inexorable advance in Iraq – issued via social media a call upon ISIS supporters worldwide to engage in so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks in Western coalition
capitals. This appeared to be deadly effective: two months after al-Adnani’s call, a
25-year old ISIS-inspired lone wolf, Martin Roulea, ran over two Canadian soldiers
in a Montreal parking lot before being killed by police. In January 2015, 20-year old
Christopher Cornell was arrested by the FBI for a plot to open fire on US government officials and the Israeli embassy. He claimed to have been acting on behalf of
ISIS. Six months later, during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, al-Adnani urged
ISIS supporters to turn it into ‘a month of disasters, defeats and disgrace for the
kuffar [infidels] everywhere’. Subsequently, in the Tunisian tourist resort of Port el
Kantaoui near the coastal city of Sousse, 20-year old Rafik el Chelly shot dead 37
mainly Western civilians near the beachside Rui Imperial Hotel (Ramakrishna,
2015).
Youth have featured heavily in lone wolf incidents in Australia as well. In September 2014 an 18-year-old male was killed by police after he had stabbed two counterterrorism police officers in Melbourne. In April 2015, several teenagers were arrested on suspicion of plotting an ISIS-inspired assault on police at a Veterans’ Day ceremony. This particular plot even had a transnational dimension: Australian authorities revealed that the alleged mastermind of this plot was a 14-year-old British boy
operating ‘from his bedroom in northwestern England’. A month later, again in Melbourne, police arrested a 17-year-old for being implicated in a plot to detonate three
homemade pipe bombs.
Youth and Radicalization into Violent Extremism: A Preliminary Psychosocial
Analysis
Why are youth so heavily represented amongst militants radicalized by ISIS? While
some argue that the role of social media is crucial in understanding how ISIS attracts
today’s tech savvy youth, in reality the Internet, though not unimportant, is merely
an accelerant of the radicalization process (Homeland Security Institute 2009: 6).
What makes youth vulnerable actually reside off-line in a real world context; to
properly elucidate this assertion would require more space than is permissible in this
article. Nevertheless, insights from several disciplines offer us some preliminary answers.
Neurological Factors
56
To start with, neurologically youth are pretty unique as their brain development proceeds in a rather uneven fashion. Specifically, during the teenage years the prefrontal cortex that guides reasoning and self-control develops more gradually than the
amygdala – the center of human emotions. This helps explain why teenagers between 18 and 20 years of age often appear to many an exasperated parent as impulsive and rash (Leong, 2011). Second, the amygdala-driven and rather intense emotional turbulence that many teens more or less experience at regular intervals is not
without implications. It suggests a certain psychological instability that expresses
itself frequently in a quest for absolute cognitive certainty – which violent fundamentalist groups like ISIS conveniently appear to offer. In sum, youth are anything
but regular folk: they are actually in a ‘tumultuous biological, cognitive, social and
emotional transition to adulthood’ (Ramakrishna, 2015:116). It is precisely this process of transition that renders youth to be akin to psychological putty in the hands of
skilled extremist ideologues.
The Family Context
The essential psychological vulnerability of youth arising from neurological factors
is further influenced by the immediate family context. British psychiatrist Russell
Razzaque in this respect has argued that the ‘the initial parental bond’ is utterly crucial for the healthy emotional development of youth (2008: 80-83). He asserts that
‘just as oxygen deprivation can impair growth or cause damage to the unborn child,
so lack of attachment and emotional deprivation can harm the growing infant and
stunt his psychological development’. Razzaque warns that a youth growing up
without a stable role model in the immediate family context ‘will see things in a
very different light from the way adults do, even as he grows older’. This requires
elaboration. Psychologically speaking, it has long been understood that ‘our personality, character, thoughts, and feelings are shaped by our early childhood experiences’, and central to the process of ego and identity formation until even well into
adulthood is as noted the ‘early and influential parent-child dyad’ (Jones, 2008:
119). Hence those youth who, because of a deeply dysfunctional relationship with
early parental figures, possess ‘fragile senses of identity and unhealthily developed
egos’, they would lack the utterly important ‘inner strength and personal stability
required to endure life’s ordinary trials and tribulations’ (Alper, 2006:173-4). A
weak and/or dysfunctional immediate family context, therefore, could well render a
youth ‘desperately hungry’ for ‘external objects that claim to be perfect and ideal’,
and that supposedly offer ‘that necessary sense of connection to something of value’
that can ‘buttress his self-esteem’ (Jones, 2008: 133-4). This is the point where for
instance ISIS extremist ideologues can strike home with their social media appeals.
The adverse impact of a poor family background is no exaggeration. In Saudi Arabia
as one instance, it was found that many who had grown up in homes of relatives
‘without their parents present’ were in need of attention, as their ‘personal and social
problems’ appeared to ‘contribute to radicalization’ (International Peace Institute,
2010: 9).
The Social Milieu
Another factor that plays an instrumental role in at times rendering youth susceptible
to ISIS extremist appeals for example is the wider social milieu within which they
and their immediate families are embedded. Of special concern are Muslim communities or sub-cultures that are relatively insulated from the wider polity and have
been beset by a range of political, historical and socioeconomic setbacks that have
57
generated a sense of alienation vis-a-vis dominant out-groups. In some cases, such
‘countercultures’ – not just in the Middle East but including poorly integrated migrant communities in the West or elsewhere– may share a generalized perception
that their communities are facing political and socioeconomic marginalization – or
worse (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 12). In a broadly similar way, the aforementioned
training camps for children ISIS has apparently set up can be considered as seminal
‘cultures of violence’, that are ‘a crucial part of understanding religious terrorism’ (Jones, 2008: 120). Youth that are immersed in their formative years in such
stressed communities rarely emerge unscathed. From a neurological perspective,
growing up immersed in a countercultural milieu characterized by interactions and
experiences that heighten out-group prejudice has a significant impact on their highly plastic youthful brains. Specifically, within the hippocampus, a part of the ancient
limbic system of the brain, strong emotional reactions to experiences of social and
economic discrimination or worse at the hands of out-groups – as well as repeated
exposure to negative out-group stereotyping – cannot but be stored as long-term
memory (Johnson, 2004: 8); (Wilson, 1999: 116-17); (Newberg and Waldman,
2006: 32).
Freud elaborated on this process with his concept of so-called critical periods. During such periods the unique architecture of a youth’s hippocampus stabilizes in a
relatively enduring way. Hence when such critical and brief windows close, the
youth’s learned habits, beliefs and attitudes become relatively resistant to change;
put another way, once certain neural pathways are laid down, they become entrenched (Doidge, 2008: 52-3); (Ridley, 2004: 167-70). In essence, therefore, youth
who come of age within cultures of hatred ‘tend to be self-righteous, prejudicial and
condemnatory toward people outside their groups’, whilst possessing an especially
pronounced ‘‘us versus them’ mentality that many will carry throughout their lives’
– shaped in no small part as well by ‘the stories’ they have ‘heard and read while
growing up’(Newberg and Weldman, 2006: 121).
The Middle East offers one illustration of how culturally sanctioned out-group prejudice can be socialized into youth: ‘hatred for Jews and Zionists’ is widespread in
the mainstream and social media and even in textbooks for children as young as
three years old, ‘complete with illustrations of Jews with monster-like qualities’. In
short, Jews are painted as ‘bloodsuckers who attack the Palestinians’ (Ali 2013: 37).
Not entirely surprising perhaps then that in one Palestinian refugee camp in the Gaza
Strip a Hamas official informed the terrorism scholar Scott Atran in 2004 that ‘our
youth are running into martyrdom’ (Atran 2010: 353). So generalized and pervasive
was the countercultural hatred of Israelis that one young man very matter-of-factly
discussed with Atran the ‘costs and benefits of a roadside versus suicide bombing’, a
topic that appeared normal within the ‘group’s moral frame’ (2010: 355). Even more
remarkable was the little boy kicking a frayed soccer ball near the border crossing at
Bayt Lahiyah who assured Atran that ‘he wanted to die a shaheed, killing Israelis’ (2010: 356). It is thus not hard to see how immersion in a countercultural milieu
characterized by deep out-group hatred and prejudice can – in tandem with the neurological, psychological and family factors just discussed – erode the ability of
youth to withstand the siren call of violent extremist ideologues, like those that currently promote the seductive ISIS narrative across various social media platforms.
Conclusion: Promoting Good Families via Good Societies
The United Nations Secretary-General recently inaugurated his Plan of Action for
58
Preventing Violent Extremism, which inter alia, identified the importance of strategies of preventing radicalization into violent extremism to complement securityoriented counter-terrorist approaches. He specifically identified youth, moreover, as
a critical global resource that had to be protected against the deleterious pull of virulent extremist ideologies. By way of conclusion, the foregoing analysis of the unique
psychosocial attributes of youth suggests that at a minimum, a suite of policies guided perhaps by the principle of promoting ‘good families via good societies’ may represent a way forward to cope with the youth radicalization problem. A ‘good family’
here is defined as one possessing a strong parent-child dyad at its core. As seen this
helps foster healthy and normal ego and intellectual development in youth (Jones
2008: 119-20). What the eminent psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott (2006:148-9, 2368) termed ‘ordinary good homes’ are needed to nurture youth capable of navigating
the adolescent journey from emotional dependence on parents to mature adult independence in the context of a democratic society – with its emphasis on inter-ethnic
and inter-religious tolerance.
However good families presuppose the prior and enabling existence of the good political and socioeconomic governance provided by what Ervin Staub considers as
good societies (Staud 2005: 76). Apart from programs addressing the poverty that
‘creates stress and negatively affects parenting’, good societies construct ‘cultural
and societal institutions in a manner that helps adults and children fulfill their needs
in constructive ways’ and leverages upon the ‘resulting potential and inclinations’ to
further promote inclusiveness instead of out-group ‘devaluation’ and
‘discrimination’ (Staub, 2005). Moreover, the good-family/good- society relationship is mutually reinforcing as well: strong and stable families help ‘build commitment to mainstream values in the larger social system’; hence Wills and Resko reiterate the importance of ‘social policies that are ‘friendly’ toward children and families’ so as to ensure that parents are empowered ‘to act supportively’. This is needed
they tellingly add, to generate salutary ‘long-range effects in terms of pro-social behavior’ (in Miller, 2005: 419-36). In sum, a suite of policies that promote good families via good societies would arguably go a long way to enhance the preventive capacity of communities to discourage youth recruitment into violent extremism
(Ozerdem and Podder 2011: 71). If, as the UN Secretary-General recently warned,
the world ignores the need to ‘harness the idealism, creativity and energy of young
people’ in the struggle against ISIS and its ilk, the prognosis for the future will be
that much bleaker. The hearts and minds of today’s youth therefore, is one battlespace
that
we
‘need
to
reclaim’
(Report
of the UN Secretary-General, 2015).
References
Ali, Ayaan Hirsi (2013), “Raised on Hatred”, New Perspectives Quarterly, 30 (2),
pp. 37-9.
Alper, Matthew (2006) The “God” Part of the Brain: A Scientific Interpretation of
Human Spirituality and God, Naperville: Sourcebooks.
Arianti, V. and Jasminder Singh (2015) “ISIS’ Southeast Asia Unit: Raising the Security Threat”, RSIS Commentary CO 15220, Available: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis
-publication/icpvtr/co15220-isis-southeast-asia-unit-raising-the-security-threat/
#.Vlkcv2DFH-Y (November 28, 2015).
59
Atran, Scott (2010) Talking to the Enemy: Violent Extremism, Sacred Values and
What it Means to be Human, London: Allen Lane.
Doidge, Norman (2008)The Brain that Changes Itself: Stories of Personal Triumph
from the Frontiers of Brain Science, London: Penguin.
Ellie, B and Nur Laiq (2010) A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and
Counterterrorism, New York: International Peace Institute. Available:http://
www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf,
(November 20, 2015).
Johnson, Steven (2004) Mind Wide Open: Why You Are What You Think, London:
Penguin.
Jones, James W. (2008) Blood that Cries Out from the Earth: The Psychology of
Religious Terrorism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Juergensmeyer, Mark (2000) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence updated edition with a new preface, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Leong, Goh Chee (2011) “How, What and Why: Understanding Them – A Psychological Overview of the Youth”, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for CounterTerrorism (SEARCCT) Symposium on the Dynamics of Youth and Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Newberg, Andrew and Mark Robert Waldman (2006) Why We Believe What We Believe: Uncovering our Biological Need for Meaning, Spirituality and Truth, New
York: Free Press.
Ozerdem, A. and S. Podder (2011) “Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating
Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism”, Journal of Strategic Security, 4 (4),
pp. 63-80.
Ramakrishna, Kumar. (2015) “The Paris Attacks: Ramping Up of Islamic State
‘Indirect
Strategy?’”
Eurasia
Review,
Available:
http://
www.eurasiareview.com/18112015-the-paris-attacks-ramping-up-of-islamic-stateindirect-strategy-analysis/(November 20, 2015).
Ramakrishna, Kumar. (2015) Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: the
Power of the Manichean Mindset, Singapore, Springer.
Report of the UN Secretary-General: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism
(2015) Available: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/456/22/
PDF/N1545622.pdf?OpenElement(November 20, 2015).
Ridley, Matt (2004) The Agile Gene: How Nature Turns on Nurture, New York: Perennial.
Samuel, Thomas K.(2011) “The Lure of Youth into Terrorism”, SEARCCT’s Selection of Articles, Vol. 2, pp. 109-113.
Staub, Ervin, (2005) ‘Basic Human Needs, Altruism, and Aggression’, in The Social
Psychology of Good and Evil, A.G. Miller (ed.), New York and London: The Guildford Press.
60
Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger (2015) ISIS: The State of Terror, New York: Ecco.
The Internet as a Terrorist Tool for Recruitment and Radicalization of Youth (2009)
Washington
D.C:
Homeland
Security
Institute,
Available:http://
www.homelandsecurity.org/docs/reports/internet_radicalization.pdf (January 12,
2016).
Wills, Thomas. A. and Jody A. Resko. (2005) ‘Social Support and Behavior Toward
Others’. In A.G Miller (ed.). The Social Psychology of Good and Evil, New York
and London: The Guildford Press.
Wilson, E.O.(1999) Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, New York: Vintage
Books.
Winnicott, Donald W. (2006) The Family and Individual Development – With a
New Introduction by Martha Nussbaum, London and New York: Routledge.
Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of Policy Studies at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. He is an expert in counterterrorism with a focus on radicalisation. Elements of this analysis are based on his book Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: the Power of the Manichean Mindset (2015).
For more information on issues and events that shape our world, please visit ISN
Security Watch or browse our resources.
http://isnblog.ethz.ch/security/understanding-youth-radicalization-in-the-age-of-isis-a-psychosocialanalysis
61
Mexico
Of Cartels and Jihadists: Misconceptions and Provocative
Suggestions
Written by David Martínez-Amador*
Monday, 08 February 2016
US Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom
In this analysis of the similarities between Islamic terrorist groups and Mexican
cartels, David Martínez-Amador explores how the strategy to confront the former
has influenced that of the latter.
During the six-year presidency of Felipe Calderón, Mexican intelligence agencies
underwent a leverage process unprecedented in Mexico-United States bilateral relations. The hope (and hope it was) was to finally build an atmosphere allowing for
the sharing of data without the usual distrust. Ultimately it happened, but under the
guidelines proposed by the United States. Although it was frustrating, it brought
about a homogenization in the strategy against drug trafficking. And this was serious.
What do I mean?
In concrete terms, I mean the United States applied in Mexico the same methods,
procedures, and tactics it uses to address the Middle East: the strategy known as
"Suppression of High Value Targets." The US military seeks to nullify the heads of
terrorist organizations, similar to the strategy in Mexico of decapitating cartel leadership. By the end of Calderon's six-year administration, this strategy resulted in 25
out of 37 criminals being "taken out of circulation" (nine killed and 16 detained). It
is this strategy, originally designed for the volatile situation in the Middle East,
which we should thank for the mutation of large cartels into highly volatile microorganizations.
62
This article was originally published by Plaza Pública. It was translated, edited for clarity, and reprinted with permission, but it does not necessarily reflect
the views of InSight Crime. See Spanish original here.
In the design of the "suppression of high value target" strategy, the US attempted to
frame the Mexican insecurity phenomenon into pre-existing parameters in which it
did not fit. One of these references was the dynamic used for the al-Qaeda organization. As expected, using these references in a rigid and literal way led to the overlooking of differences that resulted in devastating effects.
The Original Model
The US military operation in Afghanistan, "Operation Enduring Freedom," was supposed to eliminate the "visible heads" of jihadist organizations, hopefully generating
such a level of systemic stress in the groups that it would be practically impossible
for them to continue operating both inside and outside of Afghanistan.
Some of this was also transferred and written into the Mérida Initiative without noting -- as we have pointed out -- that the environment in which al-Qaeda operated
was substantially different from that of the criminal environment in Mexico. Until
that time, 2005, the Mexican criminal mosaic was stable and multipolar: it had clear
leadership, respected routes, and territorial autonomy. On the other hand, the jihadist
mosaic had always maintained a structurally hyper-competitive environment.1 The
Mexican criminal organizations had never lived in a context of hyper-competitive
violence. But thanks to fragmentation, the forms of drug violence entered a spiral
not only of competition but also of "constant renewal." Websites like the famous
Blog del Narco were a reflection of how even the discussion of drug trafficking
in Mexico came to discuss the genre "narco-snuff."
In essence, all of this was a direct product of the intellectual frameworks used to understand new generation conflicts -- characterized by the asymmetry between sides - which called for the application of military force. Anyone who has attended training seminars conducted by the US Southern Command or the US Northern Command -- in which Mexico participates as an equal member -- will notice this. More
than a decade after the September 11 attacks, it is clear that jihadist terrorism and
drug trafficking did not have similar traits.
The Scenario Changes
The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino forced the word "terrorism" to appear yet
again in the public discourse. What is not new this time are the solutions that are being suggested. The Obama administration has been careful not to use the term
"radical Islam," and to avoid a US invasion of Syria. There are multiple reasons for
this, but it is perhaps Jeffrey Sachs who said it best when he explained the concept
of BlowBack Terrorism: "The terrorism boomerang effect is a terrible, unintended
result of repeated military action, covert or overt, by Europe and the United States,
throughout the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia,
aimed at overthrowing governments and installing regimes amenable to Western interests."
If the FBI and other law enforcement and national security agencies believe they
63
will never face an enemy that is impossible to infiltrate and manipulate, I think that
day has come.
Therefore, while military operations -- on the ground, covert, or by the use of drones
-- continue, the West should be prepared to face the results of the boomerang effect.
New Models
This is where the current counter-terrorism model can learn some lessons from the
experience of combating cartels, because we must recognize that what happened in
San Bernardino is a brutal failure of US intelligence agencies. Although the popular
conservative outcry in the United States is to close the borders
with Mexico and Canada, the reality is that the terrorist attack was the result of individuals who should have easily appeared on the radar.
If the FBI and other law enforcement and national security agencies believe they
will never face an enemy that is impossible to infiltrate and manipulate, I think that
day has come.
A simple example: After 2001, the intelligence unit of the New York City Police
Department published a document entitled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. It aimed to lay out characteristics of the process of radicalization in
the Muslim population in the United States, assuming that these are homogeneous
processes and require a center of worship. This is where an error -- one of many -occurred in the strategy. A more orthodox religious practice does not necessarily
mean radicalization (e.g., practices such as growing a beard or changing the style of
dress). On the contrary, in using the Islamic principle of "taqiyya," entire cells of
jihadists have gone unnoticed in the West because they drink alcohol, eat pork, dress
in western style, and associate with non-Muslim women. Some of this applied to the
September 11 Saudi hijackers.2
Suffice it to say that the same religious practices can also be modified. One of the
perpetrators of the slaughter in San Bernardino, Syed Farook, although radicalized in
his religious practice, appears to have stopped going to a mosque for nearly two
years.
The previous does not make sense if one does not know that the preaching and worship of radical forms of Islam -- like "tarfirismo" and "wahabismo" -- can be performed in private homes, and not necessarily only in a mosque. The radicalism of
young Muslims living in the Parisian "banlieue," the neighborhoods on the outskirts
of the big cities of France, has taught us this.
The behavior of these new radical jihadist groups is beginning to resemble the dynamics of the new cells of organized crime: there is no hierarchy, no clear leadership, and we talk about small cells without direct membership to the large, known
organizations. More than 32 mini-cartels operate in Mexico without being directly
linked to the remnants of the big cartels, although that does not mean that they do
not interact. Syed Farook and his wife (the two responsible for the San Bernardino
attack) were recruited directly by ISIS, did not travel to Syria to join the effort of the
Islamic State, but they sympathized with their actions. ISIS, in fact, did not dismiss
the advertising of or the product of terror. In both cases, the key is the outsourcing of
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the actors.
Mapping these cells can be incredibly difficult for any intelligence agency. At least,
with regard to the case of gangs and mini-cartels, individual monitoring is not necessary because some organizational leadership remains. But this new profile of jihadist
(in cases like the French with a list of 11,000 people) is not only unmanageable but
constantly forces the creation of profiles based on racial prejudice.3 There will be
those who think that these structures can be infiltrated in the same way that security
agencies have infiltrated gangs and cartels. But unlike the cartels, in these radical
Islamic groups there is a political ideology and religious conviction. And it is not
easy to penetrate. If we add the fact that the new profile of a terrorist is called lone
wolf, there is little you can actually do.
Celerino Castillo was a DEA agent who infiltrated various criminal groups
in Peru,Guatemala, and Mexico. He concluded: "Drug trafficking can never be
stopped." I think that the same must be said about Islamic terrorism.
A Way Out?
We are facing a complex spiral of violence. If at one point the possibility that states
negotiate with the cartels is raised, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that at some
point, during this exhausting and foolish war against terrorism, it will be necessary
to negotiate with the Islamic State. The proposal may seem farfetched, but Jonathan
Powell -- former chief of staff during Tony Blair's administration and former member of the negotiating team in the peace process with the Irish Republican Army, and
the current special envoy of the British government in Libya -- articulates it in a
very interesting manner in the text, "Terrorists at the Table: Why Negotiating Is the
Only Way to Peace."
More than a decade after the September 11 attacks, it is clear that jihadist terrorism
and drug trafficking did not have similar traits.
The current strategy is useless if we really suppose it is possible to win militarily
without opening communication channels. A prolonged war again produces an occupation scenario. If it were possible to militarily humiliate ISIS, the possibility of dialogue would be opened after. Or not?
The United States has done that with the Colombian cartels, Mexicans, with the Italian mafia, and with the Mexican Mafia in California prisons. It has negotiated with
Sunni tribes who initially supported the Abu Musab Zarqawi insurgency (achieving
the expulsion of this insurgency from Iraqi territory). We need to remember that the
Israelis themselves have negotiated with the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas. It's not about
winning but containing.
Absurd? Maybe. But as the strange Plan Yinón states,4 ISIS is an artificial creation
by the United States to maintain a Middle East that is burned, fragmented, and divided. Perhaps the United States can decide that it is time to negotiate with its own creation.
Endnotes
[1] Some academic scholars that study Islam, like John Esposito ("Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam"), believe that the hyper-competitive nature of the jihadist
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organizations is actually a product of constant and recurring intervention of Western foreign policy, which serves to override ideological differences between different factions and provide a common goal. In this goal, the greater amount of terror
that can be generated is welcome, even if it comes come from doctrinally different
groups.
[2] In the interest of intellectual honesty, it is important to note that the principle of
"taqiyya" is originally a doctrinal element that is not directed toward the act of terrorism. Historically, Shiite Muslims live between the majority Sunni (almost 90
percent of the Muslim world) and, to avoid persecution, they learned to hide some
of their specific religious practices. That is why taqiyya is understood as a
"deception" to save ones life. The use that members of jihadist groups use it for is
illegitimate, similar to how the original principal of jihad has been distorted. For a
better understanding of Islamic principles in their original sense it is worth reading
John Esposito's "Islam: The Straight Path." Esposito is an Islamic scholar, and professor of International Relations and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University.
[3] In response to the text prepared by the intelligence section of the NYPD for
tracking and mapping of Muslim communities, the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC) created a document to make clear the mistakes committed
by the authorities.
[4] There is a lot of controversy surrounding the so-called Yinon Plan. However,
serious internationalists like Alfredo Jalife-Rahme have brought it to the discussion table. It is a long and complex document. You can view it here.
*This article was originally published by Plaza Pública. It was translated, edited
for clarity, and reprinted with permission, but it does not necessarily reflect the
views of InSight Crime. See Spanish original here.
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/of-cartels-and-jihadistsmisconceptions-and-provocative-suggestions
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Pakistan
Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad
FEB. 6, 2016
The funeral of Saeed Jawad Hossini, 29, who was killed in a Taliban suicide attack
in Kabul in January.CreditShah Marai/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
TUNIS — PRESIDENT ASHRAF GHANI of Afghanistan has warned in several
recent interviews that unless peace talks with Pakistan and theTaliban produce results in the next few months, his country may not survive 2016. Afghanistan is barely standing, he says, after the Taliban onslaught last year, which led to the highest
casualties among civilians and security forces since 2001.
“How much worse will it get?” Mr. Ghani asked in a recent television interview. “It
depends on how much regional cooperation we can secure, and how much international mediation and pressure can be exerted to create rules of the game between
states.”
What he means is it depends on how much international pressure can be brought to
bear on Pakistan to cease its aggression.
Critics of the Afghan leadership say it’s not Pakistan’s fault that its neighbor is falling apart. They point to the many internal failings of the Afghan government: political divisions, weak institutions, warlords and corruption.
But experts have found a lot of evidence that Pakistan facilitated the Taliban offensive. The United States and China have been asking Pakistan to persuade the Taliban
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to make peace, but Afghanistan argues that Islamabad has done nothing to rein in the
Taliban, and if anything has encouraged it to raise the stakes in hopes of gaining influence in any power-sharing agreement.
This behavior is not just an issue for Afghanistan. Pakistan is intervening in a number of foreign conflicts. Its intelligence service has long acted as the manager of international mujahedeen forces, many of them Sunni extremists, and there is even
speculation that it may have been involved in the rise of the Islamic State.
The latest Taliban offensive began in 2014. United States and NATO forces were
winding down their operations in Afghanistan and preparing to withdraw when Pakistan decided, after years of prevarication, to clear Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters
from their sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal area of North Waziristan.
The operation was certainly a serious endeavor — Taliban bases, torture chambers
and ammunition dumps were busted, town bazaars were razed and over one million
civilians were displaced.
But the militants were tipped off early, and hundreds escaped, tribesmen and Taliban
fighters said. Many fled over the border to Afghanistan, just at the vulnerable moment when Afghanistan was assuming responsibility for its own security. Ninety
foreign fighters with their families arrived in Paktika Province that summer, to the
alarm of Afghan officials.
Further along the border in Paktika Province, Taliban fighters occupied abandoned
C.I.A. bases and outposts. A legislator from the region warned me that they would
use the positions to project attacks deeper into Afghanistan and even up to Kabul.
Some of the most devastating suicide bomb attacks occurred in that province in the
months that followed.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the Haqqani network, the most potent branch of the Taliban, moved from North Waziristan into the adjacent district of Kurram. From there
it continues to enjoy safe haven and conduct its insurgency against American, international and Afghan targets.
Pakistan regards Afghanistan as its backyard. Determined not to let its archrival, India, gain influence there, and to ensure that Afghanistan remains in the Sunni Islamist camp, Pakistan has used the Taliban selectively, promoting those who further its
agenda and cracking down on those who don’t. The same goes for Al Qaeda and
other foreign fighters.
Even knowing this, it might come as a surprise that the region’s triumvirate of violent jihad is living openly in Pakistan.
First, there’s Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, and second in
command of the Taliban. He moves freely around Pakistan, and has even visited the
Pakistani intelligence headquarters of the Afghan campaign in Rawalpindi.
Then there is the new leader of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour,
who has openly assembled meetings of his military and leadership council near the
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Pakistani town of Quetta. Since he came to power last year, the Taliban has mounted
some of its most ambitious offensives into Afghanistan, overrunning the northern
town of Kunduz, and pushing to seize control of the opium-rich province of Helmand.
Finally, Al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, enjoys sanctuary in Pakistan — one
recent report placed him in the southwestern corner of Baluchistan. He has been
working to establish training camps in southern Afghanistan. In October, it took
United States Special Operations forces several days of fighting and airstrikes to
clear those camps. American commanders say the group they were fighting was Al
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, a new franchise announced by Mr. Zawahri that
has claimed responsibility for the killings of bloggers and activists in Karachi and
Bangladesh, among other attacks.
Pakistan denies harboring the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and points out that it, too, is a
victim of terrorism. But many analysts have detailed how the military has nurtured
Islamist militant groups as an instrument to suppress nationalist movements, in particular among the Pashtun minority, at home and abroad.
Perhaps most troubling, there are reports that Pakistan had a role in the rise of the
Islamic State.
Ahead of Pakistan’s 2014 operation in North Waziristan, scores, even hundreds, of
foreign fighters left the tribal areas to fight against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Tribesmen and Taliban members from the area say fighters traveled to Quetta,
and then flew to Qatar. There they received new passports and passage to Turkey,
from where they could cross into Syria. Others traveled overland along well-worn
smuggling routes from Pakistan through Iran and Iraq.
The fighters arrived just in time to boost the sweeping offensive by ISISinto Iraq and
the creation of the Islamic State in the summer of 2014.
If these accounts are correct, Pakistan was cooperating with Qatar, and perhaps others, to move international Sunni jihadists (including 300 Pakistanis) from Pakistan’s
tribal areas, where they were no longer needed, to new battlefields in Syria. It is just
another reminder of Pakistan’s central involvement in creating and managing violent
jihadist groups, one Pakistani politician, who spoke on the condition of anonymity
when talking about intelligence affairs, told me.
This has been going on for more than 30 years. In 1990, I shared a bus ride with
young Chinese Uighurs, Muslims from China’s restive northwest, who had spent
months training in Pakistani madrasas, including a brief foray into Afghanistan to
get a taste of battle. They were returning home, furnished with brand-new Pakistani
passports, a gift of citizenship often offered to those who join the jihad.
Years later, just after Osama bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan, I interviewed a guerrilla commander from the disputed region of Kashmir who had spent
15 years on the Pakistani military payroll, traveling to train and assist insurgents in
Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan.
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In 2012 I came across several cases where young clerics, fresh graduates from the
Haqqania madrasa in Pakistan, returned to their home villages in Afghanistan, flush
with cash, and set about running mosques and recruiting and organizing a band of
Taliban followers.
I visited that madrasa in 2013. It is the alma mater of the Afghan Taliban, where
many of the leaders of the movement were trained. The clerics there remained adamant in their support for the Taliban. “It is a political fact that one day the Taliban
will take power,” Syed Yousuf Shah, the madrasa spokesman, told me. “We are experts on the Taliban,” he said, and a majority of the Afghan people “still support
them.”
The madrasa, a longtime instrument of Pakistani intelligence, has been training people from the ethnic minorities of northern Afghanistan alongside its standard clientele of Pashtuns. The aim is still to win control of northern Afghanistan through
these young graduates. From there they have their eyes on Central Asia and western
China. Pakistani clerics are educating and radicalizing Chinese Uighurs as well,
along with Central Asians from the former Soviet republics.
No one has held Pakistan to account for this behavior. Why would Pakistan give it
up now?
Carlotta Gall is the author of “The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 20012014” and currently the North Africa correspondent for The New York Times.
A version of this news analysis appears in print on February 7, 2016, on page SR6 of
the National edition with the headline: Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International
Jihad. Today's Paper|Subscribe
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/sunday/pakistans-hand-in-the-rise-ofinternational-jihad.html
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USA
Drafting girls and turning Americans into terrorists
February 12, 2016
Breitbart.com recently reported, "President Barack Obama's administration is now
deliberating whether to direct women to sign up for the Selective Service, because of
its progressive preference for gender-blind policies. The administration has already
forced the military to assign willing and unwilling women to combat tasks, where
they are required to carry heavy loads, to quickly recover from routine injuries and
to be engaged in direct combat."
But Barack Obama is not the only one supporting the idea of drafting America's
young women into the armed forces (should the draft be reinstated). Republican
presidential candidates Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, and Marco Rubio have also signed
on.
"The Republican establishment hopefuls in the 2016 race want the government to
make women sign up for the modern version of the emergency military draft.
"Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), Jeb Bush, and Gov. Chris Christie all offered support
during Saturday night's ABC News' 2016 debate for a federal mandate that would
force young women to register for the Selective Service System.
"The Selective Service System was formed in 1917 and keeps a database on male
U.S. citizens who are available for military conscription in some future emergency.
Women are currently exempted, thanks to a 1981 Supreme Court decision that declared Congress' men-only rule did not thwart the Fifth Amendment requirement of
equal treatment.
But the 1981 Supreme Court decision notwithstanding, the U.S. government is seriously considering making America's young women eligible for the draft. A PBS report states, "The government is deliberating whether to propose Selective Service
changes that would make women eligible for the military draft, the White house said
Friday, a day after the Pentagon said it would no longer bar women from combat
jobs.
"The Defense Department has prepared an analysis of how the Pentagon change
could affect the U.S. Military Selective Service Act, said White House spokesman
Josh Earnest.
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"'We're going to work with Congress to look at that analysis, to review it, to get others' opinions and determine if additional reforms or changes are necessary in light of
this decision,' Earnest said."
The report concludes, "The Selective Service Act requires eligible men to register
for the draft when they turn 18 or face fines. Registrants can be called up for compulsory service until they are 26 years old, though none have been drafted in decades.
"Carter has previously said he supports a review of the draft based on the growing
role women play in the military."
The idea of placing women in combat and now possibly drafting women into the
armed services is the mark of a nation that has truly lost its way.
My daughter is above draft age, but my granddaughters aren't; and I can promise
you that it will be a cold day in Hades before my daughter and son-in-law allow
their girls to be drafted. If our government really wants to create a resistance movement in this country, just start telling mommas and daddies that their daughters are
going to be drafted into war. For starters, begin by asking our combat veterans if
they are willing to offer their daughters to the horrors of war.
You can rest assured that the daughters of Barack Obama, Jeb Bush, Chris Christie,
and Marco Rubio will never know one day of combat – law or no law
Yes, I realize that countless American wives and mothers valiantly defended their
homes and families when under attack – whether from the French or British in Colonial America or from Indians on the trail west – but are we now prepared to force
our young women into combat on foreign shores? What a horrible thought
Our government is counting on America's technological superiority on the sea and in
the air as the impenetrable wall of protection for our country. Therefore, they feel
free to use our military for social radicalization. But one day we are going to face a
REAL enemy (as opposed to the phony ones we have been fighting for the past
umpteen years), and when we do, we are going to learn once again that REAL wars
are won face to face and man to man. And when that day comes, God help us if our
armed forces have already filled half or more (there are more girls than boys, you
know) of its combat ranks with young girls.
I shudder just thinking about it.
And on another note: I am on record as warning the American people that a "war on
Islam" could quickly become a catalyst for big-government toadies to use the same
definitions and protocols against the American people.
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It didn't take long to be proven right.
Countless television and radio talk shows, Internet blog sites, and churches all across
America have spent the last two or three years regurgitating a hate-filled, antiMuslim message. Both Donald Trump and Ted Cruz have repeatedly injected the
anti-Muslim message into their presidential campaigns. Tens of thousands of pastors
and thousands of "conservative" talking heads have made anti-Muslim vilification a
daily staple. And of course, the solution to the Muslim problem is...you guessed it:
MORE GOVERNMENT.
Since early 2014, U.S. laws have become very broad and very strict in prosecuting
anyone who is connected or associated with alleged Islamic terrorists. People who
are convicted of providing "material support" (federal prosecutors are able to define
that phrase in just about any way they want to) face median sentences of over fifty
years in prison.
John Carlin, the Justice Department's chief of national security, recently said in a
Reuters news interview that his counter-terrorism team, including a recently hired
counsel, is taking "a thoughtful look at the nature and scope of the domestic terrorism threat" and helping to analyze "potential legal improvements and enhancements
to better combat those threats."
The Reuters interview continues saying, "The counsel, who was appointed last October and has not been named publicly, will identify cases being prosecuted at the state
level that 'could arguably meet the federal definition of domestic terrorism,' a Justice
Department official said.
"That would give the department a direct role in more domestic extremism cases."
The report began by stating, "The U.S. Justice Department is considering legal
changes to combat what it sees as a rising threat from domestic anti-government extremists, senior officials told Reuters, even as it steps up efforts to stop Islamic State
-inspired attacks at home.
"Extremist groups motivated by a range of U.S.-born philosophies present a 'clear
and present danger,' John Carlin, the Justice Department's chief of national security,
told Reuters in an interview. 'Based on recent reports and the cases we are seeing, it
seems like we're in a heightened environment.'"
In other words, the U.S. Justice Department wants to start treating American citizens
who are deemed to be "domestic terrorists" in the same way that Islamic terrorists
are being treated.
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Not coincidentally, the featured article in the current issue of Newsweek magazine is
entitled "Right Wing Extremists Are A Bigger Threat Than ISIS." Of course, in the
jaded world of the publishers of Newsweek, the SPLC, and scores of liberal think
tanks and news outlets, there is no such thing as "Left Wing Extremists."
And prominently displayed in the Newsweek article is a large photograph of LeVoy
Finicum, the man who was recently shot by an Oregon state police officer (or officers) for allegedly reaching for a handgun after having resisted arrest on a remote Oregon highway. Finicum – along with Ammon Bundy and about twenty others – had
illegally mounted an armed occupation of a group of empty buildings on a national
wildlife refuge outside the small town of Burns in protest over continued mistreatment of western farmers and ranchers by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
Unfortunately, the death of Mr. Finicum has served to fuel more anti-government
passions with comparisons to Waco and Ruby Ridge abounding – which, in my
opinion, such comparisons do not exist. All this does is to play right into the hands
of a U.S. Justice Department already looking for an excuse to pull American citizens
– especially "right wing" Christians (albeit Bundy and Finicum both claimed Mormonism) – into the same category as Islamic terrorists.
To say that we Americans are living in jeopardous days is an extreme understatement. Very understandably, the American people are increasingly distrustful of their
government, their news media, and even their future. We desperately need cool
heads and wise hearts to peacefully and successfully navigate these troubled waters.
And what we need most is leadership from America's pulpits. But it's the lack of
pastoral leadership that has mostly created this mess to begin with. The good news is
America's pastors could help lead our country out of this morass. If only they would.
© Chuck Baldwin
http://www.renewamerica.com/
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Fact Check: Is most U.S. terrorism homegrown?
Kelcie T Grega and Emily L. Mahoney,
. MST February 1, 2016
(Photo: handout )
THE MEDIA: Internet
WHO SAID IT: M. Zuhdi Jasser
TITLE: President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy
THE COMMENT: “First of all, most attacks against the homeland have been done
by homegrown terrorists.”
THE FORUM: On-camera interview with 12 News (KPNX), published online on
Dec. 7
WHAT WE'RE LOOKING AT: Whether more attacks against the U.S. have been
committed by American citizens or permanent residents than foreign terrorists.
ANALYSIS: Jasser defines homegrown terrorism as being carried out by people
radicalized while living in the U.S. for an extended period.
One example of homegrown terrorism is the Boston Marathon bombing in April
2013, which authorities say was carried out by two brothers who were brought to the
U.S. as children after their parents were granted visas and asylum.
In contrast, one suspect in the San Bernardino mass shooting, Tashfeen Malik — a
legal, permanent resident — arrived in the U.S. in July 2014, and officials suspect
she had been radicalized before she entered the country.
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Peter Bergen, co-director of Arizona State University’s Center on the Future of
Warand author of “United States of Jihad.” told AZ Fact Check in an email that every deadly act of jihadist terrorism in the U.S. since 9/11 has been carried out by an
American citizen or legal permanent resident. “The other cases involving the refugees involve much lesser charges, such as conspiring to support a terrorist group and
the like,” he said.
According to widely referenced data collected by New America, a Washington,
D.C., research center, 397 U.S. citizens have launched extremist attacks in the U.S.
since 2001, compared with 39 legal residents, 10 refugees and eight visa holders.
Thirty-seven attackers were listed as having unknown or “other” citizenship status.
Individuals were counted as extremists if they have been indicted on or convicted of
terrorism-related crimes, or had been killed and “widely and credibly reported” as
having extremist motives, according to New America’s website.
David Schanzer, director of the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security at Duke University, said he agrees with Jasser’s assessment, and that the vast majority of terrorist attacks in the U.S. have been conducted by people who have lived
here at least five years.
“Since 9/11 we’ve had much tighter border controls, we’ve been very successful at
keeping pressure on Al-Qaeda abroad through military actions, surveillance, a tightening of their finances (and) drone strikes, so that it has been very difficult for them
to plan sophisticated attacks that would require them to bring people in from outside
the U.S.,” he told AZ Fact Check. “Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS have preferred to inspire people who are already here to engage in violence. … They probably think it’s
easier to do that than to bring operatives in from outside who have a much higher
likelihood of getting caught.”
Although the expert consensus appears to support Jasser’s claim that most attacks on
the homeland have been carried out by “homegrown terrorists,” there is still a question about which acts should be defined as terrorism.
The FBI defines “international terrorism” as violent acts that violate federal or state
law and are meant to intimidate the civilian population or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. It also occurs primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
“Domestic terrorism” occurs primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.,
according to the FBI definition.
But David Rothenberg, co-director of ASU’s Center on the Future of War, said there
is no single agreed-upon definition of terrorism. Terrorism “is a judgment call, not
just a description,” he told AZ Fact Check.
In June, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine African-American churchgoers during a
prayer service at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, S.C.,
with the goal of igniting a race war. Although Roof faces hate-crime charges rather
than terrorism charges, some would argue his actions were domestic terrorism.
“If we think of Charleston, it plays much differently than just an act of violence,”
Rothenberg said. “It still fits the bill of domestic terrorism.”
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Robert Dear faces charges related to a November mass shooting that killed three
people and injured nine others at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs.
Jasser said this could be considered an act of terrorism because “it had a political
motive with the goal to inspire fear into people (he) disagreed with.”
BOTTOM LINE: Although definitions of terrorism vary, experts and data support
Jasser’s claim that since 9/11 “most attacks against the homeland have been done by
homegrown terrorists.”
THE FINDING: Four stars: True
Sources: Local Islamic leaders react to Trump’s call to refuse muslims entry to
US on 12 News, San Bernardino shooter Tashfeen Malik: What we know on
CNN,Homegrown Extremism 2001-2015 on International Security, Definition of
Terrorism in the U.S. Code
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While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives
to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the
ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness,
or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights,
title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.
It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors
and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its
publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that
of the African Union Commission (AUC),
Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and
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favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.
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