Intervener Directeur-Poursuite-Pénale-Canada

File Number: 36410
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA)
BETWEEN:
MATTHEW JOHN ANTHONY-COOK
Appellant
(Appellant)
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
(Respondent)
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
CRIMINAL LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION (ONTARIO)
BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION
L'ASSOCIATION DES AVOCATS DE LA DÉFENSE DE MONTRÉAL
Interveners
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(Pursuant to Rules 37 and 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)
Public Prosecution Service of Canada
David Schermbrucker and Monica McQueen
Suite 1400, Duke Tower
5251 Duke Street
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 1P3
Brian Saunders, Q.C.
Director of Public Prosecutions (Canada)
160 Elgin Street, 12th floor
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8
(per: François Lacasse)
Tel: (902) 426-2285
Fax: (902) 426-1351
E-mail: [email protected]
Tel: (613) 957-4770
Fax: (613) 941-7865
Email: [email protected]
Counsel for the intervener,
Director of Public Prosecutions
Ottawa agent for the intervener,
Director of Public Prosecutions
Micah B. Rankin
Jeremy Jensen
Jensen Law Corporation
620 Battle Street
Kamloops, British Columbia V2C 2M3
Tel: (250) 374-6666
Fax: (250) 374-7777
Email: [email protected]
Michael J. Sobkin
Barrister & Solicitor
331 Somerset Street West
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0J8
Tel: (613) 282-1712
Fax: (613) 288-2896
E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for the appellant
Ottawa agent the appellant
Mary T. Ainslie, Q.C.
Attorney General of British Columbia
6th Floor, 865 Hornsby Street
Vancouver, British Columbia V6Z 2G3
Tel: (604) 660-1126
Fax: (604) 660-1133
E-mail: [email protected]
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
Burke-Robertson
441 MacLaren Street Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2H3
Tel: (613) 236-9665
Fax: (613) 235-4430
E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for the respondent
Ottawa agent for the respondent
Howard Leibovich
Attorney General of Ontario
720 Bay Street 10th floor
Toronto, Ontario M5G 2K1
Tel: (416) 326-4600
Fax: (416) 326-4656
E-mail: [email protected]
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
Burke-Robertson
441 MacLaren Street Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2H3
Tel: (613) 236-9665
Fax: (613) 235-4430
E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for the intervener,
Attorney General of Ontario
Ottawa agent for the intervener,
Attorney General of Ontario
Joseph Di Luca
Erin Dann
Di Luca Barristers
116 Simcoe Street Suite 100
Toronto, Ontario M5H 4E2
Tel: (416) 868-1203
Fax: (416) 868-0269
E-mail: [email protected]
[email protected]
Colleen Bauman
Goldblatt Partners LLP
30 Metcalfe Street, Suite 500
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5L4
Tel: (613) 482-2463
Fax: (613) 235-3041
E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for the intervener,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
Ottawa agent for the intervener,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
Ryan D.W. Dalziel
Emily C. Lapper
Bull, Housser & Tupper LLP
1800 – 510 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, British Columbia V6M 0M3
Tel: (604) 641-4881
Fax: (604) 646-2671
E-mail: [email protected]
[email protected]
David P. Taylor
Power Law
1103 – 130 Albert Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5G4
Tel: (613) 702-5563
Fax: (613) 702-5563
E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for the intervener,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Ottawa agent for the intervener,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Lida Sara Nouraie
Walid Hijazi
Desrosiers, Joncas, Nouraie, Massicotte
500, Place d'Armes, bureau 1940
Montréal (QC) H2Y 2W2
Téléphone: 514-397-9284
Télécopieur : 514-397-9922
Courriel: [email protected]
Pierre Landry
Noël et Associés
111, Champlain Street
Gatineau (QC) J8X 3R1
Téléphone : (819) 771-7393
Télécopieur : (819) 771-5397
Courriel : [email protected]
Counsel for the intervener,
L'Association des avocats de la défense de
Montréal
Ottawa agent for the intervener,
L'Association des avocats de la défense de
Montréal
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................. 1
PART II – POSITION ON THE QUESTION IN ISSUE ............................................................... 2
PART III – ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 2
1. Resolution discussions are recognized as essential to the efficient and effective
administration of criminal justice in Canada............................................................................... 2
2. Joint submissions depend on a high degree of predictability as to the result, and thus
demand a high degree of deference by the sentencing judge ...................................................... 2
3. The procedure to be followed by a judge who considers departing from a joint
submission ................................................................................................................................... 4
4. The standard proposed by the DPP – “demonstrably unfit” – is workable and achieves a
principled balance between deference and discretion ................................................................. 6
a. Demonstrably unfit: a familiar sentencing concept .......................................................... 6
b. Scope of application of the “demonstrably unfit” standard .............................................. 7
5. The standard of “fitness” proposed by the respondent gives inadequate deference to the
parties’ joint submission.............................................................................................................. 8
6. The “public interest” standard from the Martin Committee Report is unhelpful................. 9
PART IV – SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS ............................................................................... 10
PART V – ORDER SOUGHT ...................................................................................................... 10
PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... 11
PART VII – TABLE OF STATUTES .......................................................................................... 14
PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) intervenes in this appeal, by leave of the
Court, in order to make submissions as to “the standard that a sentencing judge should apply
when deciding whether to accept or reject a joint sentencing submission.”1
2.
Negotiated guilty pleas, which result in joint submissions as to sentence, are crucial to the
efficient and effective working of front-line criminal justice in Canada.
As this Court
underscored in Nixon, plea resolutions “contribute to a fair and efficient criminal justice
system.”2 The Crown and defence parties to a joint submission depend heavily on a shared
prediction that the sentencing judge will accede to it. In almost all cases the joint submission will
be well within the established range and the judge will have no difficulty giving effect to it.
Judicial independence requires that the judge ultimately be able to depart from a joint
submission. In those rare cases where the sentencing judge is considering rejecting a joint
submission, the judge must advise the parties of her discomfort with the joint submission and
invite them to make additional submissions in support of it, including providing additional
information about the circumstances of the case which have caused the parties to come to a
resolution agreement. Where the judge decides to depart, she must provide cogent reasons.
3.
A standard which obliges the judge to accept and implement a joint submission unless it
would be “demonstrably unfit” (“manifestement non indiquée”) achieves the proper balance
between judicial independence and deference.
4.
This standard is the same as that applied by an appellate court when reviewing a sentence
imposed at trial. It is a standard well-known and well-understood in Canadian criminal law. It
reflects the codified and common law principles of sentencing, and the accepted range of
sentence. It shows an appropriately high degree of deference to the parties’ reasons for arriving
at a joint submission in order to resolve the case. The standard is workable for sentencing judges.
1
2
Order granting leave to intervene, per Cromwell J. dated January 29, 2016.
R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (“Nixon”), at ¶47.
PART II – POSITION ON THE QUESTION IN ISSUE
5.
The DPP submits that the standard a sentencing judge should apply when deciding
whether to reject a joint submission is: would the proposed sentence be demonstrably unfit?
PART III – ARGUMENT
1. Resolution discussions are recognized as essential to the efficient and effective
administration of criminal justice in Canada
6.
It is beyond debate that for some three decades now the criminal justice system in Canada
has accepted the legitimacy of resolution discussions.3 Many such discussions result in a “joint
submission”. This term is shorthand for a negotiated guilty plea by the accused to some, all or
lesser charges, in exchange for an agreed representation by the prosecutor and the accused as to
the sentence they both ask the judge to impose. Our system of criminal justice not only condones
and supports joint submissions, it also considers that they are necessary in order for the system to
function fairly and efficiently.4
2. Joint submissions depend on a high degree of predictability as to the result, and
thus demand a high degree of deference by the sentencing judge
7.
The principal attraction of a joint submission is a high degree of certainty in the outcome,
i.e. the parties’ confidence that the judge will accept it.5 Certainty of outcome, including an
expectation of a more favourable sentence, is a key quid pro quo in exchange for which the
accused agrees to plead guilty.6 There can also be other elements to the quid pro quo, such as the
prosecutor agreeing to reduce the charges, or to accept a guilty plea to only some of the charges
3
J.R. Omer Archambault et al, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada,
1987) (“Archambault Report”), at pp. 414-415; Ontario, Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on
Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions (Chair G.A. Martin) (Toronto, Queen’s Printer, 1993)
(“Martin Committee Report”), at pp. 327-328; Clayton C. Ruby et al, Sentencing, 8th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis,
2012) (“Ruby”), at pp. 69; Di Luca, J., “Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A
Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada” (2005), 50 Crim. L.Q. 14 (“Di Luca”), at pp. 40-55; Canada (Procureur
général) c. Obadia, 1998 CanLII 13044 (QC CA), at pp. 10-11; R. v. Oxford, 2010 NLCA 45 (CanLII) (“Oxford”), at
¶55-56.
4
Nixon, at ¶47; R. v. Thompson, 2013 ONCA 202 (CanLII) (“Thompson”), at ¶14; Di Luca, at pp. 23-25; Gregory
Lafontaine & Vincenzo Rondinelli, “Plea Bargaining and the Modern Criminal Defence Lawyer: Negotiating Guilt
and the Economics of 21st Century Criminal Justice” (2005), 50 Crim. L.Q. 108, at pp. 108-109, 111.
5
Martin Committee Report, at pp. 327-30; R. v. G.W.C., 2000 ABCA 333 (CanLII), (“G.W.C.”) at ¶17; R. v.
Sinclair, 2004 MBCA 48 (CanLII) (“Sinclair”), at p. 3; R. v. Cerasuolo, 2001 CanLII 24172 (ON CA),
(“Cerasuolo”), at ¶9.
6
Cerasuolo, at ¶8-9; R. v. B.O.2, 2010 NLCA 19 (CanLII) (“B.O.2”), at ¶18; Di Luca, at pp. 29-30.
and to withdraw others.7 Without a high measure of certainty in the outcome,8 the accused’s
incentive to plead guilty subsides and resolution discussions lose their impetus. On the part of
the prosecutor, an acknowledgement of guilt by an accused without trial where there is a
reasonable prospect of conviction helps ensure public confidence in the administration of justice
and saves scarce institutional resources.
8.
In practical terms, the judge must assume that the parties know the strengths and
weaknesses of the case, and that they are motivated to resolve the case because of circumstances
known to them but not necessarily known to the judge.9 These may include:
a. The prosecutor’s concerns related to admissibility of evidence, witness credibility,
or application of the law to the predicted findings of fact;
b. The prosecutor’s concern that a complainant is unwilling to testify or will be
adversely affected (“re-victimized”) by having to testify;
c. The defence lawyer’s assessment that although an acquittal is possible, the
prospect of a trial, conviction and a higher sentence is too risky;
d. Concerns on both sides about resources (cost, time and effort), as well as delay in
achieving an outcome;
e. Matters that may never become public, e.g. the accused’s co-operation with the
police, or the accused’s medical condition.
9.
These and other background circumstances, undisclosed to the judge, militate strongly in
favour of the judge reposing a great deal of trust in the parties’ interest in resolving the case, and
a presumption that the joint submission is appropriate.10 As this Court said in Nixon:
[53] …. When the accused pleads guilty, the circumstances of the offence and of
the offender are generally determined on the basis of agreed facts. This is
particularly so if the plea of guilty is entered pursuant to a resolution agreement.
All contentious issues will usually have been ironed out between the Crown and the
defence prior to the plea. Counsel certainly have an ethical obligation not to
mislead the court about those circumstances, but the fact remains that the judge is
7
Sinclair, at p. 5; Di Luca, at pp. 21-23.
Cerasuolo, at ¶8-9; G.W.C., at ¶17.
9
R. v. Druken, 2006 NLCA 67 (CanLII) (“Druken”) at ¶23; R. v. Cromwell, 2005 NSCA 137 (CanLII)
(“Cromwell”), at ¶19; B.O.2, at ¶15-17, 22; R. v. MacIvor, 2003 NSCA 60 (CanLII) (“MacIvor”), at ¶32; R. v.
Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII) (“Tkachuk”), at ¶34.
10
MacIvor, at ¶31-32; Oxford, at ¶78.
8
presented with the end product of the plea negotiations, not with the entire set of
circumstances or considerations that went into the mix.11
3. The procedure to be followed by a judge who considers departing from a joint
submission
10.
Any consideration of the standard to be applied by a judge in rejecting a joint submission
must include an examination of the process the judge should follow. In the face of the high
degree of deference she owes to the parties presenting a joint submission, the judge must alert the
parties to her concerns and must invite further information or submissions. Only then can she
depart from the joint submission on grounds set out in her reasons for sentence.
11.
The law is clear that if a judge has concerns about a joint submission and is considering
departing from its terms, she must advise the parties of her concerns and invite them to respond.
Failure to both advise and invite response is error of law justifying appellate intervention.12
12.
The judge should assume that counsel have negotiated the plea agreement competently
and in accordance with their professional obligations: to the public interest (in the case of the
prosecutor); and to the individual accused (in the case of the defence lawyer). Counsel are
officers of the court and are presumed to act according to the professional standards required of
them by their governing law societies and bar associations.13 The judge should assume that the
prosecutor has met his Stinchcombe disclosure obligation, has made a charge review decision to
prosecute and negotiate in accordance with applicable Crown policies14 and his role as quasiMinister of Justice,15 and has consulted as necessary, including with victims and other interested
11
Nixon, at ¶53.
R. v. Tsicos, 2006 CanLII 33849 (ON CA); Sideris c. R., 2006 QCCA 1351 (CanLII), at ¶10, 21; Tkachuk, at ¶3236; G.W.C., at ¶20, 26; Sinclair, at p. 7; B.O.2, at ¶74-82; Thompson, at ¶13-16; R. v. R.W.E., 2007 ONCA 461
(CanLII) (“R.W.E.”), at ¶33; R. v. G.P., 2004 NSCA 154 (CanLII) (“G.P.”), at ¶16, 19; R. v. Starratt, 2007 NSCA 21
(CanLII), at ¶14; R. v. Barrett, 2011 NLCA 5 (CanLII), at ¶12-15; Gagné c. R, 2011 QCCA 2387 (CanLII)
(“Gagné”), at ¶22; R. v. Cagnotti, 2009 ONCA 210 (CanLII), at ¶1.
13
Martin Committee Report, at pp. 287-288; Druken, at ¶12, 57-58; Federation of Law Societies Model Code of
Professional Conduct, 2014, section 5.1-8.
14
E.g.: PPSC Deskbook, “3.7 – Resolution Discussions”, http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fpssfp/tpd/p3/ch07.html.
15
Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16, at pp. 23-26; Michel Proulx & David Layton, Ethics and Criminal Law,
nd
2 ed. (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2015), at pp. 581-582.
12
parties. The judge should assume that defence counsel has given competent legal advice to the
accused and has obtained informed instructions.16
13.
The standard proposed by the DPP – that the sentence advanced by the joint submission
would not be “demonstrably unfit” – is specifically relevant to sentencing and will allow a judge
to articulate her concerns by reference to the purposes and principles of sentencing and to the
appropriate range of sentence established by the jurisprudence. This standard has the advantage
of providing the parties with tangible sentencing factors to refer to in their responses. Counsel
have a practical duty to address the judge’s concerns with enough relevant information to sustain
the joint submission.17 This will normally include submissions as to the principles of sentencing
and the established range, so that the public record can support the sentence. Exceptionally the
proposed sentence may be outside the normal range,18 and counsel may then need to provide the
judge with information about any circumstances of the case that justify such a sentence,19
recognizing that not all of the considerations leading to the resolution may be made public.20
14.
Where the judge, originally being disinclined to accede to the joint submission,21 and
having alerted the parties and provided them an opportunity to provide additional information, is
still disinclined, the judge must provide cogent reasons for her departure.22 Cogent reasons for
sentence along with the record must give the appellate court a sufficient basis upon which to
review the judge’s sentence, should an appeal be taken.
15.
No aspect of this procedure undercuts the sentencing judge’s independence.
The
Criminal Code provides – as it has since 189223 – that determination of sentence is within the
discretion of the judge.24 The Code also provides that the accused must know that the judge is
16
CBA Code of Professional Conduct 2009, ch. IX, §13, p. 67.
Druken, at ¶18; Cromwell, at ¶24, 68; G.P., at ¶8, 20; B.O.2, at ¶16-17; Oxford, at ¶32-33; R. v. Lavers, 2010
NLCA 73 (CanLII) (“Lavers”), at ¶14, 22.
18
R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, (“Nasogaluak”), at ¶44; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64,
(“Lacasse”), at ¶58-60.
19
Druken, at ¶18, 23, 30; B.O.2, at ¶16-17; Oxford, at ¶32-33; Lavers, at ¶14, 22; G.P., at ¶8.
20
MacIvor, at ¶32; Ruby, at §3.42, and cases cited at fn. 77 therein.
21
Sinclair, at p. 7; Tkachuk, at ¶32.
22
R. v. Knockwood, 2009 NSCA 98 (CanLII) (“Knockwood”), at ¶19; Sinclair, at pp. 2, 8; R. v. Sharpe, 2009 MBCA
50 (CanLII), at ¶46; Ruby, at §3.58; R. v. Geddes, 2005 MBCA 122 (CanLII), at ¶5.
23
Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2001), at p. 57.
24
Criminal Code, s. 718.3.
17
not bound by any agreement made between the accused and the prosecutor as to sentence.25
Judicial independence receives expression in the visibility of what occurs before the judge during
a sentence hearing, on the public record. Justice must be done in court, not in the hallway of the
courthouse.26 Unquestionably, judges have the ability to depart from a joint submission but there
should be a strong presumption that the parties’ joint submission is supported and justified.
Departure from a joint submission should be a rare occurrence but there must be some minimum
below which a proposed sentence becomes unacceptable.27
4. The standard proposed by the DPP – “demonstrably unfit” – is workable and
achieves a principled balance between deference and discretion
a. Demonstrably unfit: a familiar sentencing concept
16.
This Court has repeatedly held that on reviewing a sentence imposed at trial a court of
appeal should only intervene (1) if the sentencing judge erred in principle or (2) if the sentence
imposed is demonstrably unfit.28 This Court has clearly tied appellate review to the question
whether the impugned sentence comports with the codified and common law principles of
sentencing, and the established range of sentence for particular offences.29
17.
The standard of “demonstrably unfit” is a familiar concept in sentencing. Asking a
sentencing judge to consider whether a joint submission is demonstrably unfit is simply asking
the judge to look at the codified and common law principles of sentencing, as well as to the
jurisprudence on the accepted range of sentence for the offence(s) in question, and to determine
in the end whether in all the circumstances of the case before her the proposed sentence abuses
those principles30 or intolerably falls outside the appropriate range.31 For sentencing judges who
25
Criminal Code, s. 606(1.1)(b)(iii).
Archambault Report, at p. 409; Di Luca, at pp. 36-40.
27
Druken, at ¶19.
28
R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 (“Shropshire”), at ¶46; R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 (“M. (C.A.)”), at
¶90; R. v. McDonnell, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948 (“McDonnell”), at ¶17; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at
¶123-125; R. v. L.F.W., 2000 SCC 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 132, at ¶19; R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at
¶14-15; Nasogaluak, at ¶46; Lacasse, at ¶11, 39-41.
29
Shropshire, at ¶50; Lacasse, at ¶2, 53-55.
30
Nasogaluak, per LeBel J. at ¶43-44; R. v. J.C.N., 2005 SKCA 64 (CanLII), at ¶14-21; MacIvor, at ¶28- 30; R. v.
Lai, 1988 CanLII 4460 (NL CA), at ¶17. Examples of a judge rejecting a joint submission on this basis include: The
reasons for sentence in the case on appeal, AR, at pp. 14-15; R. v. Horne, 2009 ONCJ 341 (CanLII), at ¶34; R. v.
D.S., 2011 ONSC 3627 (CanLII) (“D.S.”), at ¶62, 73; R. v. Palantzas, 2009 CanLII 49328 (ON SC) (“Palantzas”), at
pp. 15-16.
26
apply sentencing principles every day in our criminal courts, the only additional task they must
perform is to determine whether the proposed sentence is “demonstrably unfit”, a threshold well
understood by them as well as by criminal law practitioners.
b. Scope of application of the “demonstrably unfit” standard
18.
The “demonstrably unfit” deferential standard should apply to any sentencing submission
jointly advanced by the parties that results from a quid pro quo negotiation between them,32
irrespective of the stage in the proceedings at which it is concluded. The most obvious situation
justifying the application of the standard will be where the parties advance a joint submission on
a guilty plea entered prior to trial and following plea bargaining.
19.
But that is not the only situation where the standard should apply. There are other
circumstances that will give rise to, and different stages of the proceedings at which, the parties
will advance a joint sentencing submission. For example, following the denial of a defence
application to exclude evidence, or the unexpected testimony of a Crown witness, the parties may
embark on negotiations culminating in a joint submission that is no less deserving of a high
degree of deference than an earlier resolution.
20.
The deferential standard will not apply, however, where the parties’ submissions made on
sentencing happen to coincide rather than being the product of a negotiated agreement between
them.33 This will usually be the case where, following a judicial finding of guilt, both sides
happen to argue for similar sentences.
21.
The sentencing judge must be made aware that the submissions advanced by the parties
constitute a true joint submission. In the vast majority of cases this will be obvious, but it is up to
the parties to make it explicit.34 As noted above, the judge may need to be informed of the
circumstances that underlie the joint submission bearing in mind that concessions made by the
31
Nasogaluak, per LeBel J. at ¶44; Cromwell, at ¶23. Examples of a judge rejecting a joint submission on this basis
include: R. v. Oliveros-Callejas, 2016 ONSC 142 (CanLII), at ¶24; D.S., at ¶63; Palantzas, at pp. 16-19.
32
Knockwood, at ¶16-17; R. v. A.N., 2011 NSCA 21 (“A.N.”), at ¶24.
33
R. v. Newman, 2009 NLCA 32, at ¶48-49; Knockwood, at ¶17.
34
Knockwood, at ¶17.
parties may take a myriad of forms, the details of which need not necessarily be divulged in open
court.35
22.
In that regard, some judgments affirm that “the clearer the quid pro quo, the more weight
should be given an appropriate joint submission by the sentencing judge”.36 To the extent that
this proposition can be understood as suggesting a polymorphous or “sliding scale” standard, it
should not be followed, as there should be only one standard.
The more appropriate
interpretation of that judicial pronouncement is that the more information the parties provide, the
better the understanding the sentencing judge will have of the agreement, and the better able she
will be to properly assess whether the joint submission is demonstrably unfit.
5. The standard of “fitness” proposed by the respondent gives inadequate
deference to the parties’ joint submission
23.
The respondent proposes that if the judge finds the joint submission would result in a
sentence that is “unfit”, the judge may depart from the joint submission. The respondent relies
heavily on the comments of Fish J.A. (as he then was) in Douglas, that:
[43] Whatever the language used, the standard is meant to be an exacting one.
Appellate courts, increasingly in recent years, have stated time and again that trial
judges should not reject jointly proposed sentences unless they are "unreasonable",
"contrary to the public interest", "unfit", or "would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute".37
24.
The standard of “unfit” proposed by the respondent simply does not show appropriate
deference to the joint submission. It is true that a sentencing judge is obliged to impose a “fit”
sentence; but in the context of a negotiated guilty plea, a joint submission by the parties deserves
enhanced recognition and great deference on the part of the sentencing judge. This Court has
repeatedly urged appellate courts not to upset a sentence on appeal if the appellate court considers
the sentence to be “unfit”, but only if it is “demonstrably unfit”.38 Contrary to the respondent’s
position39 the language used can and does make a difference.
35
MacIvor, at ¶32; Tkachuk, at ¶34; Dumont c. R, 2013 QCCA 576, at ¶13-14.
Sinclair, at ¶13; see also A.N., at ¶21; Gagné, at ¶21.
37
R. v. Douglas (2002), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 37 (Que. C.A.) (“Douglas”), at p. 45; Respondent’s Factum, at ¶18.
38
M. (C.A.), at ¶90; McDonnell, at ¶17; Lacasse, at ¶11, 41.
39
Respondent’s Factum, at ¶18-22.
36
6. The “public interest” standard from the Martin Committee Report is unhelpful
25.
The Ontario Attorney General’s Martin Committee, established in June 1991, comprised
senior members of the Ontario defence bar, prosecutors, and police. At the time it was not even
clear whether plea bargaining was a justifiable practice in the Canadian criminal justice system. 40
In its 1993 report the Committee approved of resolution discussions, and recommended that:
58. … a sentencing judge should not depart from a joint submission unless the proposed
sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, or is otherwise not in the
public interest.41
26.
The appellant and the other interveners adopt this standard. The DPP does not.
27.
The Martin Committee derived this standard from extant abuse of process doctrine42 in
the context of a prosecutor resiling from a plea agreement. 43
The Committee supported
adherence to plea agreements by the Crown,44 and considered that the opportunity for Crown
counsel to resile from a plea agreement should be “very rare”.45 The Committee considered that
“resolution agreements must not undermine the integrity of the court, or otherwise bring the
administration of justice into disrepute”,46 which led to it recommending that Crown counsel
could resile from a plea agreement on those terms.47 This language migrated into the very next
section of the Martin Committee Report dealing with courtroom procedures in plea negotiations,
including the acceptance of joint submissions.
28.
While concern for the reputation of the administration of justice is workable in the context
of Crown counsel resiling from a plea agreement, or concerning admission or exclusion of
evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, it cannot be transposed to sentencing. Those other
contexts involve decisions with “all or nothing” outcomes (resile from the agreement or not;
exclude the evidence or not) whereas sentencing is individualized, graduated and flexible. Many
40
Martin Committee Report, at pp. 275-278; Proulx & Layton, at p. 435.
Martin Committee Report, Recommendation 58; pp. 327-330, underlining added.
42
R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at p. 1667; R. v. MacDonald (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.), at
pp. 104-105.
43
Martin Committee Report, at pp. 312-315.
44
Martin Committee Report, at p. 313.
45
Martin Committee Report, at pp. 312-315, italics in original.
46
Martin Committee Report, Recommendation 53.
47
Martin Committee Report, at p. 314.
41
appellate courts have expressly endorsed the Martin Committee Report standard for rejecting a
joint submission, but none have explained why this is the right standard other than to point to its
strong tendency to promote judicial deference to the parties’ joint submission.48 The standard
proposed by the DPP equally achieves this level of deference.
PART IV – SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS
29.
The DPP does not seek any costs and requests that no costs be ordered against him.
PART V – ORDER SOUGHT
30.
Counsel for the DPP requests the opportunity to present 10 minutes of oral argument at
the hearing of the appeal.
All of which is respectfully submitted this 15 th day of March, 2016.
_________________________
David Schermbrucker and Monica McQueen
Counsel for the intervener Director of Public Prosecutions
48
Douglas, at para. 45; R. v. Steeves, 2010 NBCA 57 (CanLII), at ¶31; R. v. DeSousa, 2012 ONCA 254 (CanLII), at
¶15-22; R.W.E., at ¶25; Oxford, at ¶62.
PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16
Canada (Procureur général) c. Obadia, 1998 CanLII 13044 (QC CA)
Paragraphs Cited
12
3
Dumont c. R, 2013 QCCA 576 (CanLII)
21
Gagné c. R, 2011 QCCA 2387 (CanLII)
11, 36
R. v. A.N., 2011 NSCA 21 (CanLII)
18, 22
R. v. B.O.2, 2010 NLCA 19 (CanLII)
9, 11, 13
R. v. Barrett, 2011 NLCA 5 (CanLII)
11
R. v. Cagnotti, 2009 ONCA 210 (CanLII)
11
R. v. Cerasuolo, 2001 CanLII 24172 (ON CA)
R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659
R. v. Cromwell, 2005 NSCA 137 (CanLII)
7
27
8, 13, 17
R. v. D.S., 2011 ONSC 3627 (CanLII)
17
R. v. DeSousa, 2012, ONCA 254 (CanLII)
28
R. v. Douglas (2002), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 37 (Que. C.A.)
R. v. Druken, 2006 NLCA 67 (CanLII)
R. v. Geddes, 2005 MBCA 122 (CanLII)
R. v. G.P., 2004 NSCA 154 (CanLII)
R. v. G.W.C., 2000 ABCA 333 (CanLII)
23, 28
8, 12, 13
14
11, 13
7, 11
R. v. Horne, 2009 ONCJ 341 (CanLII)
17
R. v. J.C.N., 2005 SKCA 64 (CanLII)
17
R. v. Knockwood, 2009 NSCA 98 (CanLII)
R. v. L.F.W., 2000 SCC 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 132
14, 18, 20, 21
16
R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 SCR 163
R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64
16
13, 16, 24
R. v. Lai, 1988 CanLII 4460 (NL CA)
17
R. v. Lavers, 2010 NLCA 73 (CanLII)
13
R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500
R. v. MacDonald (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont.C.A.)
R. v. MacIvor, 2003 NSCA 60 (CanLII)
R. v. McDonnell, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948
R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206
R. v. Newman, 2009 NLCA 32 (CanLII)
R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 SCR 566
R. v. Oliveros-Callejas, 2016 ONSC 142
R. v. Oxford, 2010 NLCA 45 (CanLII)
16, 24
27
9, 13, 17, 21
16, 24
13, 16, 17
20
2, 6, 9
17
6, 9, 13, 28
R. v. Palantzas, 2009 CanLII 49328 (ON SC)
17
R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61
16
R. v. R.W.E., 2007 ONCA 461 (CanLII)
11, 28
R. v. Sharpe, 2009 MBCA 50 (CanLII)
14
R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227
16
R. v. Sinclair, 2004 MBCA 48 (CanLII)
7, 11, 14, 22
R. v. Starratt, 2007 NSCA 21 (CanLII)
11
R. v. Steeves, 2010 NBCA 57 (CanLII)
28
R. v. Thompson, 2013 ONCA 202 (CanLII)
R. v. Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII)
6, 11
8, 11, 14, 21
R. v. Tsicos, 2006 CanLII 33849 (ON CA)
11
Sideris c. R., 2006 QCCA 1351 (CanLII)
11
Secondary Sources
J.R. Omer Archambault et al, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach
(Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1987) (“The Archambault Report”)
CBA Code of Professional Conduct 2009, ch. IX, §13, p. 67
Joseph Di Luca, “Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute
Resolution? A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada” (2005) 50 Crim. L.Q.
14
Federation of Law Societies Model Code of Professional Conduct, 2014,
section 5.1-8
Gregory Lafontaine & Vincenzo Rondinelli, “Plea Bargaining and the
Modern Criminal Defence Lawyer Negotiating Guilt and the Economics of
21st Century Criminal Justice” (2005) 50 Crim. L.Q. 108
Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2001), p. 57
Ontario, Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge
Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions (Chair G.A. Martin)
(Toronto, Queen’s Printer, 1993) (“Martin Committee Report”)
PPSC Deskbook, “3.7 – Resolution Discussions”, http://www.ppscsppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/p3/ch07.html
Michel Proulx & David Layton, Ethics and Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto,
Irwin Law, 2015), at pp. 581-582 and 435-436.
Clayton C. Ruby et al, Sentencing, 8th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis,
2012)
6, 15
12
6, 7, 15
12
6
23
6, 7, 12, 25, 27
12
12, 25
6, 13, 14
PART VII – TABLE OF STATUTES
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, Sections 606, 675(1), 687, 718, 718.1, 718.2, 718.3, 822(6)
606 (1) An accused who is called on to plead 606 (1) L’accusé appelé à plaider peut s’avouer
may plead guilty or not guilty, or the special coupable ou nier sa culpabilité ou présenter les
pleas authorized by this Part and no others.
seuls moyens de défense spéciaux qu’autorise la
présente partie.
Conditions for accepting guilty plea
Acceptation du plaidoyer de culpabilité
(1.1) A court may accept a plea of guilty only
if it is satisfied that the accused
(1.1) Le tribunal ne peut accepter un plaidoyer
de culpabilité que s’il est convaincu que les
(a) is making the plea voluntarily; and
conditions suivantes sont remplies :
(b) understands
a) le prévenu fait volontairement le plaidoyer;
(i) that the plea is an admission of the essential b) le prévenu :
elements of the offence,
(i) comprend que, en le faisant, il admet les
(ii) the nature and consequences of the plea, éléments essentiels de l’infraction en cause,
and
(ii) comprend la nature et les conséquences de sa
(iii) that the court is not bound by any décision,
agreement made between the accused and the
prosecutor.
(iii) sait que le tribunal n’est lié par aucun accord
conclu entre lui et le poursuivant.
Validity of plea
Validité du plaidoyer
(1.2) The failure of the court to fully inquire
whether the conditions set out in subsection (1.2) L’omission du tribunal de procéder à un
(1.1) are met does not affect the validity of the examen approfondi pour vérifier la réalisation
plea.
des conditions visées au paragraphe (1.1) ne
porte pas atteinte à la validité du plaidoyer.
Refusal to plead
Refus de plaider
(2) Where an accused refuses to plead or does
not answer directly, the court shall order the (2) En cas de refus de plaider ou de réponse
clerk of the court to enter a plea of not guilty.
indirecte de l’accusé, le tribunal ordonne au
greffier d’inscrire un plaidoyer de nonAllowing time
culpabilité.
(3) An accused is not entitled as of right to Délai
have his trial postponed but the court may, if it
considers that the accused should be allowed (3) L’accusé n’est pas admis, de droit, à faire
further time to plead, move to quash or prepare
for his defence or for any other reason, adjourn
the trial to a later time in the session or sittings
of the court, or to the next of any subsequent
session or sittings of the court, on such terms
as the court considers proper.
remettre son procès, mais le tribunal, s’il estime
qu’il y a lieu de lui accorder un délai plus long
pour plaider, proposer l’arrêt des procédures,
préparer sa défense ou pour tout autre motif, peut
ajourner le procès à une date ultérieure de la
session ou à toute session subséquente, aux
conditions qu’il juge appropriées.
Included or other offence
Infraction incluse ou autre
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Act, where an accused or defendant pleads not
guilty of the offence charged but guilty of any
other offence arising out of the same
transaction, whether or not it is an included
offence, the court may, with the consent of the
prosecutor, accept that plea of guilty and, if the
plea is accepted, the court shall find the
accused or defendant not guilty of the offence
charged and find him guilty of the offence in
respect of which the plea of guilty was
accepted and enter those findings in the record
of the court.
(4) Nonobstant toute autre disposition de la
présente loi, le tribunal peut, avec le
consentement du poursuivant, accepter le
plaidoyer de culpabilité de l’accusé ou du
défendeur qui, tout en niant sa culpabilité à
l’égard de l’infraction dont il est inculpé,
s’avoue coupable d’une autre infraction se
rapportant à la même affaire, qu’il s’agisse ou
non d’une infraction incluse et, si ce plaidoyer
est accepté, le tribunal doit déclarer l’accusé ou
le défendeur non coupable de l’infraction dont il
est inculpé, déclarer l’accusé ou le défendeur
coupable de l’infraction à l’égard de laquelle son
Inquiry of court — murder and serious personal plaidoyer de culpabilité a été accepté et
injury offences
consigner ces déclarations au dossier du tribunal.
(4.1) If the accused is charged with a serious
personal injury offence, as that expression is
defined in section 752, or with the offence of
murder, and the accused and the prosecutor
have entered into an agreement under which
the accused will enter a plea of guilty of the
offence charged — or a plea of not guilty of the
offence charged but guilty of any other offence
arising out of the same transaction, whether or
not it is an included offence — the court shall,
after accepting the plea of guilty, inquire of the
prosecutor if reasonable steps were taken to
inform the victims of the agreement.
Obligation de s’enquérir — sévices graves à la
personne ou meurtre
(4.1) Dans le cas où l’accusé est inculpé d’une
infraction constituant des sévices graves à la
personne au sens de l’article 752 ou d’une
infraction de meurtre et où il a conclu un accord
avec le poursuivant en vertu duquel il inscrira un
plaidoyer de culpabilité à l’égard de l’infraction
dont il est inculpé ou, tout en niant sa culpabilité
à l’égard de cette infraction, il inscrira un
plaidoyer de culpabilité à l’égard d’une autre
infraction se rapportant à la même affaire, qu’il
s’agisse ou non d’une infraction incluse, le
Inquiry of court — certain indictable offences
tribunal est tenu, après avoir accepté le plaidoyer
de culpabilité, de s’enquérir auprès du
(4.2) If the accused is charged with an offence, poursuivant si des mesures raisonnables ont été
as defined in section 2 of the Canadian Victims prises pour informer les victimes de cet accord.
Bill of Rights, that is an indictable offence for
which the maximum
punishment is Obligation de s’enquérir — certains actes
imprisonment for five years or more, and that criminels
is not an offence referred to in subsection (4.1),
and the accused and the prosecutor have
entered into an agreement referred to in
subsection (4.1), the court shall, after accepting
the plea of guilty, inquire of the prosecutor
whether any of the victims had advised the
prosecutor of their desire to be informed if
such an agreement were entered into, and, if
so, whether reasonable steps were taken to
inform that victim of the agreement.
(4.2) Dans le cas où l’accusé est inculpé d’une
infraction, au sens de l’article 2 de la Charte
canadienne des droits des victimes, qui est un
acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement
maximal de cinq ans ou plus, autre qu’une
infraction visée au paragraphe (4.1), et où il a
conclu un accord visé à ce paragraphe avec le
poursuivant, le tribunal est tenu, après avoir
accepté le plaidoyer de culpabilité, de s’enquérir
auprès du poursuivant si une victime a avisé ce
Duty to inform
dernier de son désir d’être informée de la
conclusion d’un tel accord et, le cas échéant, si
(4.3) If subsection (4.1) or (4.2) applies, and des mesures raisonnables ont été prises pour ce
any victim was not informed of the agreement faire.
before the plea of guilty was accepted, the
prosecutor shall, as soon as feasible, take Obligation d’informer
reasonable steps to inform the victim of the
agreement and the acceptance of the plea.
(4.3) Si les paragraphes (4.1) ou (4.2)
s’appliquent et qu’une victime n’a pas été
Validity of plea
informée de la conclusion de l’accord avant
l’acceptation du plaidoyer de culpabilité, le
(4.4) Neither the failure of the court to inquire poursuivant doit, dans les meilleurs délais,
of the prosecutor, nor the failure of the prendre les mesures raisonnables pour ce faire et
prosecutor to take reasonable steps to inform pour aviser la victime de l’acceptation du
the victims of the agreement, affects the plaidoyer.
validity of the plea.
Validité du plaidoyer
(4.4) Ni l’omission par le tribunal de s’enquérir
auprès du poursuivant de la prise de mesures
raisonnables pour informer les victimes de
l’accord ni l’omission par ce dernier de prendre
de telles mesures ne portent atteinte à la validité
du plaidoyer de culpabilité.
Right of appeal of person convicted
Une personne condamnée a le droit d’interjeter
appel
675 (1) A person who is convicted by a trial
court in proceedings by indictment may appeal
to the court of appeal
675 (1) Une personne déclarée coupable par un
tribunal de première instance dans des
procédures sur acte d’accusation peut interjeter
appel, devant la cour d’appel :
(a) against his conviction
(i) on any ground of appeal that
involves a question of law alone,
a) de sa déclaration de culpabilité :
(i) soit pour tout motif d’appel
(ii) on any ground of appeal that
involves a question of fact or a question
of mixed law and fact, with leave of the
court of appeal or a judge thereof or on
the certificate of the trial judge that the
case is a proper case for appeal, or
(iii) on any ground of appeal not
mentioned in subparagraph (i) or (ii)
that appears to the court of appeal to be
a sufficient ground of appeal, with
leave of the court of appeal; or
(b) against the sentence passed by the trial
court, with leave of the court of appeal or a
judge thereof unless that sentence is one
fixed by law.
Powers of court on appeal against sentence
687 (1) Where an appeal is taken against
sentence, the court of appeal shall, unless the
sentence is one fixed by law, consider the
fitness of the sentence appealed against, and
may on such evidence, if any, as it thinks fit to
require or to receive,
(a) vary the sentence within the limits
prescribed by law for the offence of which
the accused was convicted; or
(b) dismiss the appeal.
comportant une simple question de droit,
(ii) soit pour tout motif d’appel
comportant une question de fait, ou une
question de droit et de fait, avec
l’autorisation de la cour d’appel ou de
l’un de ses juges ou sur certificat du juge
de première instance attestant que la
cause est susceptible d’appel,
(iii) soit pour tout motif d’appel non
mentionné au sous-alinéa (i) ou (ii) et
jugé suffisant par la cour d’appel, avec
l’autorisation de celle-ci;
b) de la sentence rendue par le tribunal de
première instance, avec l’autorisation de la
cour d’appel ou de l’un de ses juges, à moins
que cette sentence ne soit de celles que fixe
la loi.
Pouvoirs de la cour concernant un appel d’une
sentence
687 (1) S’il est interjeté appel d’une sentence, la
cour d’appel considère, à moins que la sentence
n’en soit une que détermine la loi, la justesse de
la sentence dont appel est interjeté et peut,
d’après la preuve, le cas échéant, qu’elle croit
utile d’exiger ou de recevoir :
a) soit modifier la sentence dans les limites
prescrites par la loi pour l’infraction dont
l’accusé a été déclaré coupable;
b) soit rejeter l’appel.
Effect of judgment
(2) A judgment of a court of appeal that varies
the sentence of an accused who was convicted
has the same force and effect as if it were a
sentence passed by the trial court.
Effet d’un jugement
(2) Un jugement d’une cour d’appel modifiant la
sentence d’un accusé qui a été déclaré coupable a
la même vigueur et le même effet que s’il était
une sentence prononcée par le tribunal de
première instance.
718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is 718 Le prononcé des peines a pour objectif
to protect society and to contribute, along with
crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the
law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and
safe society by imposing just sanctions that
have one or more of the following objectives:
essentiel de protéger la société et de contribuer,
parallèlement à d’autres initiatives de prévention
du crime, au respect de la loi et au maintien
d’une société juste, paisible et sûre par
l’infliction de sanctions justes visant un ou
plusieurs des objectifs suivants :
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm
done to victims or to the community that is a) dénoncer le comportement illégal et le tort
caused by unlawful conduct;
causé par celui-ci aux victimes ou à la
collectivité;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons
from committing offences;
b) dissuader les délinquants, et quiconque, de
commettre des infractions;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where
necessary;
c) isoler, au besoin, les délinquants du reste de la
société;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
d) favoriser la réinsertion sociale des
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to délinquants;
victims or to the community; and
e) assurer la réparation des torts causés aux
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in victimes ou à la collectivité;
offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm
done to victims or to the community.
f) susciter la conscience de leurs responsabilités
chez les délinquants, notamment par la
reconnaissance du tort qu’ils ont causé aux
victimes ou à la collectivité.
718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the 718.1 La peine est proportionnelle à la gravité de
gravity of the offence and the degree of l’infraction et au degré de responsabilité du
responsibility of the offender.
délinquant.
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 156; 1995, c. L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 156; 1995,
22, s. 6.
ch. 22, art. 6.
Other sentencing principles
Principes de détermination de la peine
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall 718.2 Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger
also take into consideration the following compte tenu également des principes suivants :
principles:
a) la peine devrait être adaptée aux circonstances
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced aggravantes ou atténuantes liées à la perpétration
to account for any relevant aggravating or de l’infraction ou à la situation du délinquant;
mitigating circumstances relating to the sont notamment considérées comme des
offence or the offender, and, without limiting circonstances aggravantes des éléments de
the generality of the foregoing,
preuve établissant :
(i) evidence that the offence was motivated (i) que l’infraction est motivée par des préjugés
by bias, prejudice or hate based on race,
national or ethnic origin, language, colour,
religion, sex, age, mental or physical
disability, sexual orientation, or any other
similar factor,
ou de la haine fondés sur des facteurs tels que la
race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la langue,
la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l’âge, la
déficience mentale ou physique ou l’orientation
sexuelle,
(ii) evidence that the offender, in (ii) que l’infraction perpétrée par le délinquant
committing the offence, abused the constitue un mauvais traitement de son époux ou
offender’s spouse or common-law partner,
conjoint de fait,
(ii.1) evidence that the offender, in (ii.1) que l’infraction perpétrée par le délinquant
committing the offence, abused a person constitue un mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une
under the age of eighteen years,
personne âgée de moins de dix-huit ans,
(iii) evidence that the offender, in (iii) que l’infraction perpétrée par le délinquant
committing the offence, abused a position constitue un abus de la confiance de la victime
of trust or authority in relation to the victim, ou un abus d’autorité à son égard,
(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a
significant impact on the victim,
considering their age and other personal
circumstances, including their health and
financial situation,
(iii.1) que l’infraction a eu un effet important sur
la victime en raison de son âge et de tout autre
élément de sa situation personnelle, notamment
sa santé et sa situation financière,
(iv) que l’infraction a été commise au profit ou
(iv) evidence that the offence was sous la direction d’une organisation criminelle,
committed for the benefit of, at the direction ou en association avec elle,
of or in association with a criminal
organization,
(v) que l’infraction perpétrée par le délinquant
est une infraction de terrorisme,
(v) evidence that the offence was a
terrorism offence, or
(vi) que l’infraction a été perpétrée alors que le
délinquant faisait l’objet d’une ordonnance de
(vi) evidence that the offence was sursis rendue au titre de l’article 742.1 ou qu’il
committed while the offender was subject to bénéficiait d’une libération conditionnelle ou
a conditional sentence order made under d’office ou d’une permission de sortir sans
section 742.1 or released on parole, escorte en vertu de la Loi sur le système
statutory release or unescorted temporary correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition;
absence under the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act shall be deemed to b) l’harmonisation des peines, c’est-à-dire
be aggravating circumstances;
l’infliction de peines semblables à celles
infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences semblables commises dans des circonstances
imposed on similar offenders for similar semblables;
offences committed in similar circumstances;
c) l’obligation d’éviter l’excès de nature ou de
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, durée dans l’infliction de peines consécutives;
the combined sentence should not be unduly
d) l’obligation, avant d’envisager la privation de
liberté, d’examiner la possibilité de sanctions
(d) an offender should not be deprived of moins contraignantes lorsque les circonstances le
liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be justifient;
appropriate in the circumstances; and
e) l’examen, plus particulièrement en ce qui
(e) all available sanctions, other than concerne les délinquants autochtones, de toutes
imprisonment, that are reasonable in the les sanctions substitutives qui sont raisonnables
circumstances and consistent with the harm dans les circonstances et qui tiennent compte du
done to victims or to the community should be tort causé aux victimes ou à la collectivité.
considered for all offenders, with particular
attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal
offenders.
Peines en général
long or harsh;
Punishment Generally
Degrees of punishment
718.3 (1) Where an enactment prescribes
different degrees or kinds of punishment in
respect of an offence, the punishment to be
imposed is, subject to the limitations
prescribed in the enactment, in the discretion
of the court that convicts a person who
commits the offence.
Discretion respecting punishment
Degré de la peine
718.3 (1) Lorsqu’une disposition prescrit
différents degrés ou genres de peine à l’égard
d’une infraction, la punition à infliger est, sous
réserve des restrictions contenues dans la
disposition, à la discrétion du tribunal qui
condamne l’auteur de l’infraction.
Appréciation du tribunal
(2) Lorsqu’une disposition prescrit une peine à
l’égard d’une infraction, la peine à infliger est,
sous réserve des restrictions contenues dans la
disposition, laissée à l’appréciation du tribunal
qui condamne l’auteur de l’infraction, mais nulle
peine n’est une peine minimale à moins qu’elle
ne soit déclarée telle.
(2) Where an enactment prescribes a
punishment in respect of an offence, the
punishment to be imposed is, subject to the
limitations prescribed in the enactment, in
the discretion of the court that convicts a
person who commits the offence, but no
punishment is a minimum punishment Emprisonnement à défaut de paiement d’une
unless it is declared to be a minimum amende
punishment.
(3) Lorsque l’accusé est déclaré coupable d’une
Imprisonment in default where term not infraction punissable à la fois d’une amende et
d’un emprisonnement et qu’une période
specified
d’emprisonnement à défaut de paiement de
l’amende n’est pas spécifiée dans la disposition
(3) Where an accused is convicted of an qui prescrit la peine à infliger, l’emprisonnement
offence punishable with both fine and pouvant être infligé à défaut de paiement ne peut
imprisonment and a term of imprisonment dépasser l’emprisonnement prescrit à l’égard de
in default of payment of the fine is not
specified in the enactment that prescribes l’infraction.
the punishment to be imposed, the
imprisonment that may be imposed in
default of payment shall not exceed the
term of imprisonment that is prescribed in
respect of the offence.
Certain sections applicable to appeals
Articles applicables aux appels
Appeal against sentence
Appel d’une sentence
822 (6) Where an appeal is taken under
subsection (4) against sentence, the appeal
court shall, unless the sentence is one fixed by
law, consider the fitness of the sentence
appealed against and may, on such evidence, if
any, as it thinks fit to require or receive, by
order,
822 (6) S’il est interjeté appel d’une sentence en
la manière prévue au paragraphe (4), la cour
d’appel considère, à moins que la sentence n’en
soit une que détermine la loi, la justesse de la
sentence dont appel est interjeté et peut, d’après
la preuve, le cas échéant, qu’elle croit utile
d’exiger ou de recevoir, par ordonnance :
(a) dismiss the appeal, or
a) rejeter l’appel;
(b) vary the sentence within the limits
prescribed by law for the offence of which
the defendant was convicted,
b) modifier la sentence dans les limites
prescrites par la loi pour l’infraction dont
l’accusé a été déclaré coupable;
and in making any order under paragraph (b),
the appeal court may take into account any
time spent in custody by the defendant as a
result of the offence.
en rendant une ordonnance en vertu de l’alinéa
b), la cour d’appel peut tenir compte de toute
période que le défendeur a passée sous garde par
suite de l’infraction.