Review no. 77

Review no. 77
Press Review
16—30 September 2014
Table of Contents
Pages
Terrorism in Africa
- Glossary of extremists in Mideast and Africa
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Algeria
- Jund al-Khalifa: The IS-linked group that shot into the spotlight
- Un Français enlevé près de Tizi Ouzou
- SITUATION AUX FRONTIÈRES AVEC LA LIBYE ET LE MALI
- Eric Denécé, directeur du CF2R, au Temps d’Algérie : «Les groupes terroristes financés,
formés et armés par le Qatar, l'Arabie saoudite, la Turquie et les Etats-Unis»
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Cameroon
- Boko Haram expanding from Nigeria to Cameroon
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CAR
- International Analysis — Central African Republic: Should the World Pay Attention?
- «Sangaris va adapter son dispositif à l’arrivée de la Minusca»
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Kenya
- Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home
- Why Youth Are Turning to Radicalism
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Mali
- Carte interactive - Mali : la Minusma et les forces françaises en terrain miné
- HECATOMBE AU SEIN DU CONTENGENT TCHADIEN AU MALI : On aurait tort de ne pas écouter Deby
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Mauritania
- Lutte d'influence entre forces jihadistes
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Nigeria
- Analysis: Shekau killed several times, still a danger to Nigeria
- Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit: A Case For Full Autonomy
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Somalia
- Etats-Unis : quelle stratégie contre les shebab en Somalie ?
- Al-Shabab Is a Major Threat to Security in Somalia
- Critical Security review – Somalia, After Death of Alshabaab leader
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Tunisia
- TRAC Focus on Africa: Foreign Jihadist Foot Print
- Pourquoi les djihadistes s'appellent tous Ansar al-charia
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Terrorism in the World
France
- Menaces terroristes: 30 pays à risque
- Menaces contre la France : "L'EI a décidé d’exporter le conflit en Occident"
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Indonesia
- The Islamic State Comes to Indonesia
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Iraq
- The Islamic State: The Case for Expanding the Air War
- The Jihadists' Promise: Power over Death
- Daesh-État islamique : la guerre des noms a commencé
- Le Conseil de sécurité appelle à un effort international pour appréhender les chefs de l'EIIL
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Switzerland
- Switzerland: Land of Jihad
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Syria
- What Arab partners will get in return for strikes on Syria
- To Stop ISIS in Syria, Support Aleppo
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Turkey
- What Ally?
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UK
- More Taxpayer Funds Go to Extremist Charities
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USA
- OBAMA’S ‘WAR ON TERROR': A SOUTH ASIAN VIEW – ANALYSIS
- Why Obama “Must” Bomb ISIS
- FBI Terror Threat Assessment makes no mention of Islam
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Terrorism in Africa
Glossary of extremists in Mideast and Africa
September 19, 2014
FILE- This undated image posted by the Raqqa Media Center, a Syrian opposition
group, June 30, 2014, which has been verified and is consistent with other AP reporting, shows fighters from the al-Qaida linked Islamic State group during a parade in Raqqa, Syria. President Barack Obama presses ahead with his campaign to
diminish and defeat Islamic State group extremists in Iraq and Syria, but the list of
radical Islamic elements the United States and many of its coalition allies are
fighting does not stop there. (AP Photo/Raqqa Media Center- File)
President Barack Obama presses ahead with his campaign to diminish and eventually defeat Islamic State group extremists in Iraq and Syria, but the list of radical
Islamic elements the United States and many of its coalition allies are fighting does
not stop there. Violent radicals inspired by al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden pepper
the map from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic.
A look at the organizations presenting the most serious threats from South Asia to
the Middle East and Africa.
SYRIA and IRAQ
ISLAMIC STATE GROUP: Originally al-Qaida in Iraq, it is known by various names:
the Islamic State in Syria, or ISIS; the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant, or ISIL;
and the newest moniker, the Islamic State, based on its ambition to create a caliphate, or Islamic empire, in the ancient territory that now comprises much of the
Middle East. Led by Iraqi militant Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, it stormed into the Syrian
civil war in 2012, seeking to oust President Bashar Assad and was initially wel-
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comed by other rebels for its experienced fighters. Known for its brutality, the Islamic State group found other anti-Assad rebels turning against it in part because it
appeared bent on taking over the rebel movement to create the caliphate. AlQaida's central command ejected it from the network for its clashes with other rebels, but it has thrived, backed by foreign fighters from Chechnya, Europe, the U.S.
and around the Arab world. The group is headquartered in the northern Syrian city
of Raqqa and commands areas near the northern city of Aleppo and a large stretch
of territory in northern and western Iraq.
ISLAMIC FRONT: The Obama administration's search for moderate anti-Assad rebels to support in Syria has been complicated by this alliance of seven powerful
conservative and ultraconservative Islamic groups that merged in late November.
The Islamic Front wants to bring rule by Shariah law in Syria and rejects the U.S.backed Syrian National Coalition but cooperates with some of their fighters on the
ground. They are the strongest force battling the Islamic State group.
NUSRA FRONT: Al-Qaida's branch in Syria, which along with the Islamic Front has
been the toughest against the Islamic State militants. It has also been one of the
most effective forces against Assad's troops, using suicide bombers to back its
fighters. Once a mix of Syrian extremists and foreign jihadis, it saw many of its nonSyrian fighters defect to the Islamic State group over the past two years.
KHORASAN GROUP: While the Islamic State group is getting the most attention
now, this mix of hardened jihadis from Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Europe is
affiliated with the Nusra Front and may pose a more direct and imminent threat to
the United States. Its members did not go to Syria principally to fight Assad but
were sent by al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to recruit Europeans and Americans who have better ability to penetrate airline and immigration security. U.S. officials say Khorasan militants are working with bomb-makers from al-Qaida's Yemen
affiliate.
YEMEN
AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: Still considered the al-Qaida network's
greatest threat to U.S. territory, the group is based in bin Laden's ancestral home. It
hatched the failed "underwear bomber" plot to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner on
Christmas 2009 and attempted to ship explosive devices into the U.S. on cargo
planes in 2010. Despite repeated U.S. drone strikes and Yemeni military operations,
AQAP remains a challenge to both the government and the West.
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA
AL-QAIDA: Led by Egyptian al-Zawahri since U.S. special forces killed bin Laden,
core al-Qaida is no longer the force it was. Militant infighting, particularly with the
Islamic State group, and 13 years of fighting on its home turf in Afghanistan has
blunted its reach, although it still claims attacks and the allegiance of affiliates.
AFGHAN TALIBAN: Led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, it's held responsible for nu-
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merous strikes on international forces in Afghanistan, including attacks on foreign
troops by insurgents dressed as, and in some cases, members of the Afghan military. Attempts to negotiate with the Taliban have failed to date.
HAQQANI NETWORK: The Pakistan-based extremist group allied with al-Qaida is
accused of staging numerous cross-border attacks from its base in North Waziristan, Pakistan, including the 19-hour siege at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in September 2011. During the Reagan administration, members of the Haqqani network
were considered freedom fighters for their efforts to oust the Soviet army from Afghanistan.
PAKISTANI TALIBAN: Along with the allied Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida, it has used
North Waziristan as a base for carrying out attacks across the porous border with
neighboring Afghanistan for years. The group is a loose network of local militant
groups who want to overthrow Pakistan's government and install a harsh brand of
Islamic law.
QAIDA AL-JIHAD IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: Zawahri said this month that alQaida would expand its reach into India, which has a large Muslim minority, with
this group. Many believe the announcement to be a publicity stunt as analysts do
not believe it has additional capabilities.
SOMALIA and EAST AFRICA
AL-SHABAB: Al-Qaida's affiliate in Somalia stormed a shopping mall in Kenya last
year, killing at least 67 people. A U.S. airstrike on Sept. 1 killed its leader and two
other officials; the group has sworn revenge. Just last weekend, authorities in
Uganda said they arrested 19 people in connection with a terrorist plot that may
have been intended as retaliation. In 2010, al-Shabab claimed responsibility for
bomb attacks that killed at least 76 people watching a World Cup final in the Ugandan capital of Kampala.
WEST and NORTH AFRICA
BOKO HARAM: This al-Qaida-linked group grabbed the world's attention by kidnapping more than 300 schoolgirls in Nigeria in April and continues to stage attacks on
schools and other civilian targets. Although once very active in Nigeria's neighbors,
it has largely started to cement control of territory in northern Nigeria after announcing in August it was creating an Islamic caliphate.
AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB: Allied with AQAP, this group operates in the
Sahel region, an arid strip of land including the Sahara desert across West Africa
that touches Algeria's south. The group began as an Islamic insurgency in Algeria
and became linked to al-Qaida in 2006. Its militants have prowled the vast terrain,
particularly in Mali, to kidnap people and seek ransom to fund their activities.
French and West African forces drove them out of a fledgling Islamic state in northern Mali last year, but it remains a threat.
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ANSAR AL-SHARIA: One of several militias formed from rebel brigades that fought
Libyan forces in the 2011 uprising that ousted Moammar Gadhafi. The group is accused of being involved in the 2012 attack on the U.S. mission and annex in Benghazi. It's been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets, assassinations
and attempted assassinations of security officials and political figures in eastern
Libya.
http://news.yahoo.com/
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Algeria
Jund al-Khalifa: The IS-linked group that shot into the spotlight
2014-09-25
Algerian troops carry out search operations in the eastern Tizi Ouzou region where French hiker
Herve Gourdel was kidnapped.
Seated on a blanket flanking the hostage, the two hooded militants averted their
gazes from the camera, cradling their assault rifles and staring down through
most of the video clip.
When one of the captors issued a threat to execute the hostage within the next
24 hours if their demands were not met, the statement in Arabic was read without any of the rhetorical flourishes of seasoned jihadist figures. The second militant in the video seemed overweight.
But appearances hardly mattered. The Jund al-Khalifa in Algeria had captured a
Frenchman hiking in the northeastern Tizi Ouzou area and this was their spectacular media moment.
In a video released Monday night, barely 24 hours after Frenchman Hervé
Gourdel was kidnapped, the 55-year-old hostage pleaded with French President
François Hollande to “do everything” to get him out of this horrible situation.
Halting oratorical skills or a little militant corpulence could not negate the significance of the message. Gourdel’s abduction marked the first time a Westerner
was kidnapped by an Islamic State-linked group outside Syria.
The Jund al-Khalifa fi Ard al-Jazayer – variously translated as Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria or Caliphate Soldiers of Algeria – had shot from obscurity into
the international jihadist spotlight.
A little-known group that split from al Qaeda’s North African branch, Al Qaeda in
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the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Jund al-Khalifa announced its allegiance to the
Islamic State organisation in a statement released on September 13. The leader of
the group, Abdelmalek Gouri, who goes by the nom de guerreKhaled Abu Suleiman, said he had broken away from AQIM because the al Qaeda branch had
“deviated from the true path”.
“At first sight, this group seems to have emerged from nowhere, a new organisation. But in fact that’s not true,” explained Wassim Nasr, FRANCE 24’s expert on
jihadist groups. “Abdelmalek Gouri is well known to the Algerian intelligence services, he is wanted for several terrorist acts. These militants are familiar figures
and now, with this kidnapping, they have proved their operational capabilities.”
Breaking away from al Qaeda
Originally an AQIM brigade that operated around Algeria’s Tizi Ouzou area, the
group “approached Islamic State in March, when differences began to publicly
appear between the two major jihadist movements," said Romain Caillet, a researcher at the Paris-based IFPO (Institut Français du Proche-Orient), in an interview with FRANCE 24’s French language TV station.
At that time, the Islamic State group was known as ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant) and the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, had not yet rebranded
the territory under his control as an Islamic caliphate.
Baghdadi, who declared himself “the caliph of all Muslims” in June, fell out with al
Qaeda in 2013 over his decision to expand his group’s operations into Syria.
By the time the Jund al-Khilafa formally declared its allegiance to the Islamic State
group in September, a number of breakaway groups were abandoning al Qaeda
affiliates in Yemen and Africa to join the new jihadist superpower that had seized
control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria.
AQIM itself is no stranger to splinter groups. One of the group’s most notorious
commanders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, broke away from al Qaeda’s North African
branch in 2012 to form al-Mouwakoune bi-Dimaa (“Those Who Sign with Blood”).
Months later, Belmokhtar gained notoriety when his group staged a deadly attack
on a southern Algerian gas facility in January 2013, which ended in a bloodbath
with 38 people – including British and Norwegian nationals – killed.
But while Belmokhtar has pledged allegiance to al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri,
the leader of Jund al-Khilafa, the latest AQIM breakaway group, swore loyalty to
Islamic State militants. "You have, in the Islamic Maghreb, men – if you order
them, they will obey you," declared Abu Suleiman in the September communiqué.
The new group trying to make some noise
The announcement was largely overlooked or dismissed by most terror experts,
who noted that AQIM has mostly operated in the remote, hardscrabble Sahel region of Africa rather than Algeria, a gas-rich regional power.
"The new group will try hard to make some noise, but it will be very difficult to
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execute big terrorist actions as Algerian security forces have knocked out most of
the armed groups in Algeria," security analyst Anis Rahmani told the Reuters news
agency shortly after Jund al-Khilafa swore loyalty to the Islamic State organisation.
The latest kidnapping and subsequent high-profile video statement has proved the
experts wrong.
Coordination between Iraq and Algeria
The timing of Gourdel’s abduction has also raised eyebrows among terrorism experts.
The Frenchman was kidnapped on Sunday evening, according to Algerian news reports, and the video claiming the abduction appeared just hours after the Islamic
State group issued an audio statement calling on Muslims worldwide to kill citizens
of nations that have joined the fight against the jihadist group in Iraq.
In a nearly 42-minute audio statement released online late Sunday, Islamic State
group spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani called on followers to “kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an
Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging
war” against the jihadists.
A portion of Adnani’s speech was quoted in the Jund al-Khilafa video released
Monday night.
“It proves that there’s a real coordination between the jihadist chiefs in Iraq and
this group in Algeria,” said Nasr. “This proves their operational capacity and it
shows that there are still jihadists in this region of Algeria and they are still active –
even if we don’t hear much about them.”
Since the end of the brutal 1990s Algerian civil war, the state’s security forces have
been engaged in ongoing counter-terror operations against jihadist threats across
the vast North African nation.
The violence may have declined since the end of the civil war, when the Algerian
security forces led a brutal, murky counter-terror operation that Algerians call “the
dirty war”. But the 2013 attack on the In Amenas gas facility in southern Algeria
and the latest kidnapping has proved that the jihadist threat remains in some of
Algeria’s remote Saharan areas as well as the rugged Atlas Mountains of the Kabylie region, where Gourdel was kidnapped.
While the Islamic State group’s extraordinary gains have attracted thousands of
foreign jihadists, Gourdel’s abduction raises the alarming prospect of splinter
groups linked to the Islamic State militants attacking Western nationals and interests, thousands of miles away from the battle zone in Syria and Iraq.
http://www.france24.com/
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Un Français enlevé près de Tizi Ouzou
le 22-09-2014
Capture d'écran de la vidéo de revendication diffusée ce lundi
Un groupe lié aux jihadistes de l'Etat islamique (EI) a revendiqué ce lundi dans une
vidéo, authentifiée par le ministère des Affaires étrangères, le rapt d'un Français en
Algérie et menacé de l'exécuter dans les 24 heures si la France n'arrêtait pas ses
frappes contre l'EI en Irak.
Les ravisseurs du Français, le groupe jihadiste algérien Jund al-Khilafa, « les Soldats
du Califat », menacent de l'exécuter en cas de nouveaux raids en Irak. Le Quai d'Orsay confirme, lundi soir, l'authenticité de la vidéo. Cette vidéo, d'un peu moins de
quatre minutes, commence par le message d'Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi appelant à la
mort des ressortissants des pays participants à la coalition formée pour combattre
l'organisation État islamique.
Au bout de deux minutes, apparaît l'image du Français, assis par terre, encadré de
deux hommes armés aux visages masqués par un chèche noir. Après un message
en arabe, l'otage, lunettes sur le nez, lit un message adressé à François Hollande. Il
y décline son identité : Hervé Gourdel, né à Nice le 12 septembre 1959, guide de
haute montagne. Il précise être arrivé en Algérie le 20 septembre. Il affirme être
aux mains d'un groupe armé dirigé par un certain Jund al-Khilafa qui demande que
le président français n'intervienne pas en Irak.
« Ne rien céder »
Une heure avant la publication de cette vidéo, le ministère des Affaires étrangères
avait confirmé qu'un Français a bien été enlevé en Kabylie dimanche soir. Selon
plusieurs médias algériens, il faisait partie d'un groupe de randonneurs algériens,
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qui ont été relâchés par les ravisseurs. Le kidnapping a eu lieu entre Bouira et Tizi
Ouzou dans le massif des Ouacifs. C'est une zone connue pour être un maquis où
se trouvent des islamistes.
François Hollande était en vol pour New-York losqu'il a appris l’enlèvement de
l’otage français en Algérie et c’est donc de l’avion présidentiel qu’il a appelé le
Premier ministre algérien : la coopération est totale entre Paris et Alger pour tenter de retrouver Hervé Gourdel. Une cellule d'opérations spéciales a été mise en
place dans la région et le ministre de l'Intérieur algérien a annoncé dans la soirée
que les recherches pour retrouver ce Français étaient toujours en cours. « Tout
est mis en œuvre en concertation étroite avec les autorités algériennes pour obtenir la libération de notre compatriote. Mais il ne faut pas cacher que la situation
est extrêmement critique », a prévenu le chef de la diplomatie française Laurent
Fabius. « L’attitude de la France est constante dans ce domaine: nous essayons de
faire le maximum pour libérer les otages, et en l’espèce cet otage. Mais un groupe
terroriste ne peut pas infléchir la position de la France », a-t-il par ailleurs averti.
« C’est notre sécurité qui est en jeu et il n’est pas question de céder, si peu que ce
soit, aux menaces des terroristes. »
En première ligne face avec les Etats-Unis face à l’organisation de l’Etat islamique
la France se sait exposée. Elle sait qu’elle peut payer son engagement mais c’est
bien la fermeté qui prévaut : de la même manière que la France officiellement ne
paie pas de rançon pour ses otages. Un discours difficile à entendre pour les familles reconnaissait il y a quelque temps François Hollande qui a appris la gravité
depuis qu’il est président. « C’est dur, ce n’est pas facile » reconnaissait-il jeudi
dernier lors de sa conférence de presse.
Qui sont les Soldats du califat ?
Jund al-Khilafa est une dissidence d'Aqmi qui n'a d'existence formelle que depuis
quelques jours. Mi-septembre, dans un communiqué, ce groupe islamiste conduit
par Abdelmalek Gouri, alias Khaled Abu Souleimane, prêtait officiellement allégeance à l'organisation de l'Etat islamique. Mais la dissidence formelle du chef
d'Aqmi en Kabylie, Gouri Abdelmalek, remonte à la mi-juillet. Un processus qui
résulte du conflit ouvert que se livrent al-Qaïda et les jihadistes de l'Etat islamique depuis le mois de mars.
« Aqmi est en perte de vitesse, en particulier en Algérie, et ça peut leur donner un
nouveau départ de se revendiquer de l'organisation Etat islamique », estime Romain Caillet, chercheur sur les questions islamistes. Combien sont-ils ? Difficile de
le dire. Mais une choses est sûre, le kidnapping d'Hervé Gourdel est la première
action d'envergure de ces dissidents sous l'appellation Soldats du califat.
Qui sont les Soldats du califat ?
Le groupe qui a capturé l'otage français est membre d'un groupe terroriste appelé « les Soldats du califat » - Jund al-Khilafa - une dissidence d'Aqmi qui n'a d'exis-
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tence formelle que depuis quelques jours. Mi-septembre, dans un communiqué,
ce groupe islamiste conduit par Abdelmalek Gouri, alias Khaled Abu Souleimane,
prêtait officiellement allégeance à l'organisation de l'Etat islamique. Mais la dissidence formelle du chef d'Aqmi en Kabylie, Gouri Abdelmalek, remonte à la mijuillet. Un processus qui résulte du conflit ouvert que se livrent al-Qaïda et les jihadistes de l'Etat islamique depuis le mois de mars.
« AQMI est en perte de vitesse en particulier en Algérie et ça peut leur donner un
nouveau départ de se revendiquer de l'organisation Etat islamique », estime Romain Caillet, chercheur sur les questions islamistes. Combien sont-ils ? Difficile de
le dire. Mais une choses est sûre, le kidnapping d'Hervé Gourdel est la première
action d'envergure de ces dissidents sous l'appellation Soldats du califat.
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140922-algerie-francais-enleve-pres-tizi-ouzou/
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SITUATION AUX FRONTIÈRES AVEC LA LIBYE ET LE MALI
Bouteflika réunit le Haut Conseil de sécurité
22 Septembre 2014
Cette réunion intervient dans un contexte régional explosif
Le Chef de l'Etat, a présidé,hier à Alger, une importante réunion sur la situation sécuritaire aux frontières méridionales et orientales de l'Algérie.
«M.Abdelaziz Bouteflika, président de la République, a tenu ce dimanche 21 septembre, une réunion sur la situation sécuritaire à nos frontières méridionales et
orientales et sur les efforts que déploie l'Algérie pour faciliter l'avènement de la
paix et de la stabilité au Mali et en Libye», indique un communiqué de la présidence de la République.
«Cette réunion a vu la participation de hauts responsables civils, militaires et des
services de sécurité, dont M.Abdelmalek Sellal, Premier ministre, et M.Ahmed Gaïd
Salah, vice-ministre de la Défense nationale, chef d'état-major de l'Armée nationale
populaire», précise la même source. Cette réunion intervient dans un contexte régional explosif marqué, notamment par la dégradation de la situation sécuritaire en
Libye, en proie à des combats meurtriers entre milices rivales. Malgré le chaos qui
règne en Libye, l'Algérie (de par son principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires internes d'un pays) refuse d'entendre parler d'une intervention étrangère dans ce
pays. Elle l'a fait entendre récemment à Washington lors de la rencontre LamamraKerry.
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Le secrétaire d'Etat américain, John Kerry, avait annoncé à cette occasion la tenue
d'une «réunion restreinte» sur la Libye, se contentant d'annoncer qu'elle aura lieu
à New York.
Le ministre algérien des Affaires étrangères, Ramtane Lamamra, avait annoncé de
son côté que «la Libye et le Mali, pays voisins immédiats de l'Algérie, où le terrorisme et l'instabilité règnent, sont au centre de l'action diplomatique immédiate et
que l'Algérie apportera, bien sûr, sa contribution à la solution d'autres questions au
-delà de nos frontières». Cette déclaration de M.Lamamra s'inscrit dans une dynamique qui est en train d'être créée. Cette importante réunion de sécurité à Alger
intervient aussi quelques jours après la visite du chef d'état-major de l'armée française, le général Pierre De Villiers, le 13 septembre dernier.
La France qui a écarté les Djihadistes du Mali, n'écarte pas de son côté une action
militaire en Libye et l'Algérie s'inquiète de l'infiltration d'extrémistes sur son territoire.
Elle vient de se joindre au front contre le Daesh en procédant aux premières
frappes aériennes contre l'Etat Islamique au nord de l'Irak.
La situation au Mali, au Moyen-Orient et la montée en puissance de Daesh inquiètent également l'Algérie qui appuie la coalition internationale menée par les EtatsUnis contre ce mouvement terroriste. Selon plusieurs médias et sites d'informations, l'Armée nationale aurait dépêché plus de 3000 soldats supplémentaires aux
limites frontalières avec la Tunisie et la Libye suite aux informations faisant état de
projets d'attaques terroristes contre des cibles stratégiques du pays, notamment
les champs pétrolifères dans le Grand Sud algérien.
Selon des sources sécuritaires algériennes citées par des médias nationaux et
étrangers, l'alerte au niveau de ces frontières a été élevée à son plus haut niveau
suite aux renseignements soutirés des terroristes arrêtés sur le sol tunisien dans le
courant de la semaine dernière selon lesquels des individus appartenant à Al Qaîda
au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) ont décidé de créer un groupe qui activera sous la
houlette de la nouvelle organisation terroriste l'Etat Islamique (EI) plus connue sous
le nom de Daesh.
http://www.lexpressiondz.com/
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Eric Denécé, directeur du Centre français de recherche sur le renseignement (CF2R), au Temps d’Algérie : «Les groupes terroristes financés, formés et armés par le Qatar, l'Arabie saoudite, la Turquie et les
Etats-Unis»
20-09-2014
Le Temps d'Algérie : Certains pays du Moyen-Orient ont, des années durant,
armé et financé «Daech» et le «Front Al Nosra» pour détruire la Syrie et l'Irak.
Aujourd'hui, ces mêmes pays font partie de la «coalition internationale» de
lutte contre ces organisations terroristes. Comment expliquez-vous ce
«retournement de veste» ?
Eric Denécé : La raison est que leurs «poulains» échappent à leur contrôle et se
retournent désormais contre eux.
C'est pourquoi l'Arabie saoudite et la Jordanie, en particulier, se sentent menacées. D'une part parce que Daech est à leurs frontières et les qualifie de régimes
impies, et d'autre part parce qu'il nuit à leur influence au sein du monde sunnite,
ce que ne peut accepter Ryad. Doha est plus en retrait sur ce dossier. Mais pour
les pétromonarchies qui financent les terroristes dans le monde entier, ceux-ci
n'ont d'intérêt que s'ils obéissent à leurs sponsors. Ils sont combattus dès qu'ils
cherchent à s'affranchir.
Quels sont les buts recherchés par les Etats-Unis dans cette «coalition» contre
Daech ?
Les Etats-Unis n'agissent que pour défendre leurs intérêts nationaux, ce qui recouvre plusieurs aspects. D'abord, ils souhaitent que le Moyen-Orient, dont ils
sont en train de redessiner la carte sans l'aval des Etats, ni des populations locales, garde une certaine stabilité.
Ensuite, ils interviennent pour assurer la sécurité de leurs alliés locaux (Arabie
saoudite, Jordanie, Israël). Enfin, ils cherchent aussi à contenir la poussée des
groupes djihadistes, afin qu'elle n'aille pas au-delà de ce qui leur paraît être utile
pour leur politique régionale.
N'oublions pas que Washington est doublement responsable de la situation actuelle : d'une part, en raison de l'invasion illégale de l'Irak en 2003, qui a, entre
autres, donné naissance au groupe d'Al-Zarkawi, précurseur de l'Etat islamique,
d'autre part, en raison du retrait total des troupes américaines alors que le pays
n'était pas encore stabilisé. Cela a été une formidable «porte ouverte» pour
Daech.
Une dissension a été annoncée au sein d'Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique
(Aqmi), donnant naissance à une nouvelle organisation terroriste appelée «Djound Al Khilafa» qui a déjà annoncé son allégeance à «Daech». Pourquoi maintenant et pourquoi la région du Sahel ?
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Je ne crois pas que ces événements en Afrique du Nord ou du Sahel soient à l'origine de cette scission. Je pense que l'Etat islamique, par son avancée rapide, ses
«victoires» récentes et sa politique active de communication est devenu beaucoup plus dynamique et attractif pour les djihadistes du Maghreb.
D'où le fait que certains quittent les groupes affiliés à Al-Qaïda pour le rejoindre.
Surtout, il ne faut pas oublier que Daech paie ceux qui collaborent avec lui. Ainsi,
l'appât du gain est également un facteur tout à fait déterminant. Nous savons
tous que ceux qui tuent et kidnappent au nom de l'Islam sont en réalité de notoires criminels.
Comment qualifiez-vous le refus des Etats-Unis et de la France de coopérer avec
l'Etat syrien contre Daech ?
Les pays occidentaux, au premier rang Paris et Washington, n'ont cessé de se
tromper dans leur évaluation des «révolutions» arabes, notamment de la situation syrienne. Cela provient à la fois d'une erreur d'analyse, d'un aveuglement et
de l'influence exercée par certains alliés moyen-orientaux (Turquie, Qatar, Arabie
saoudite). Tous ceux qui croyaient que Bachar ne tiendrait que quelques mois se
sont magistralement fourvoyés.
Aujourd'hui, la France et les Etats-Unis sont prisonniers de leur logique : ils sont
allés trop loin pour faire volte-face et reconnaître leurs erreurs ; ils savent qu'ils
seront ridiculisés aux yeux du monde s'ils ouvraient des négociations avec Damas.
Aussi, plutôt que de faire preuve de réalisme et de pragmatisme, ils s'enferrent
dans leur logique et veulent toujours «la peau» de Bachar, quitte à faciliter le développement de l'Etat islamique, que leur politique au cours des trois dernières
années a considérablement renforcé.
Les «djihadistes» libyens, tunisiens et ceux d'autres pays du Maghreb arabe,
partis faire le «djihad» au sein d'organisations criminelles dont Daech, Al Qaïda
et le Front Al Nosra, en Syrie et en Irak, constituent-ils un danger à leur retour
dans leurs pays respectifs ?
Oui, évidemment, c'est un risque majeur pour la sécurité de tous les pays concernés. Nous pourrions le comparer à ce qui s'est passé après 1989, après le départ
des Soviétiques de Kaboul, quand les Afghans sont rentrés chez eux de l'Algérie
au Pakistan et ont contribué à déstabiliser les Etats d'Afrique du Nord et du
Moyen-Orient de l'intérieur. C'est pour cela qu'à mon sens il est nécessaire de les
fixer et de les détruire en Syrie et en Irak. Dans cette perspective, la coopération
de Téhéran et de Damas est indispensable.
Ne croyez-vous pas que cette «coalition anti-Daech» pourrait être utilisée par
les Etats-Unis pour effectuer des frappes contre l'armée syrienne et l'affaiblir
dans le but de faciliter l'avancée de ce qui est appelé l'opposition armée ?
C'est tout à fait possible, car Washington a désespérément besoin de la victoire
qu'elle n'a pas obtenue l'an dernier, et qu'elle n'obtiendra ni en Irak, ni en
Ukraine. D'ailleurs, les Américains, à travers la crise ukrainienne, cherchaient à
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faire payer à Moscou son interposition, en septembre dernier, alors que la Maison-Blanche (et son fidèle auxiliaire français) était décidée à bombarder la Syrie…
sans aucune preuve tangible de la responsabilité de Damas dans l'utilisation
d'armes chimiques. Toutefois, les Russes et les Iraniens veillent au grain. Une telle
action entraînerait des conséquences catastrophiques pour la région.
Certains pays du Moyen-Orient, dont l'Arabie saoudite et la Turquie) et des
pays occidentaux, dont les Etats-Unis, ont délibérément contribué à armer les
organisations terroristes comme Daech et le Front Al Nosra…
C'est une évidence. Ces groupes ont été directement financés, formés et armés
par le Qatar, l'Arabie saoudite et la Turquie, mais aussi les par Etats-Unis, qui ont
reconnu avoir formé 8000 combattants islamistes en Jordanie, où se trouvaient
les camps d'entraînement. De plus, par leur politique de soutien à l'opposition
syrienne, la France et le Royaume-Uni ont également une responsabilité indirecte.
Parmi ces Etats, celui qui semble le moins enclin à modérer son «soutien» à l'Etat
islamique demeure la Turquie. Cet Etat est en train de devenir l'un des problèmes
majeurs de la région : il n'accepte aucune action contre Daech, permet aux terroristes de passer par ses frontières, continue à s'acharner contre Damas…
Les contradictions turques sont en train de s'afficher au grand jour : un pays
membre de l'Otan, candidat à l'entrée dans l'Union européenne qui est dirigé par
un gouvernement appartenant au mouvement des Frères musulmans et soutenant les djihadistes et dont le chef d'Etat (Erdogan) est en train de modifier la
Constitution pour s'arroger plus de pouvoir…
Une «rupture» entre Al Qaïda et Daech a été évoquée. Croyez-vous à ce scénario ?
Selon moi, il s'agit davantage d'un passage de relais entre deux groupes terroristes relevant d'une même idéologie extrémiste que d'une rupture.
Certes, il existe une rivalité entre les hommes, qui aiment occuper le devant de la
scène ou profiter des fonds que leur distribuent les pétromonarchies du Golfe
persique. Les objectifs et la stratégie de l'internationale djihadiste n'évoluent
pas : il s'agit toujours de l'idéologie néfaste issue des penseurs des Frères musulmans.
Entretien réalisé par Mounir Abi
http://www.letempsdz.com/content/view/131453/1/
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Cameroon
Boko Haram expanding from Nigeria to Cameroon
September. 22, 2014
Associated Press/Photo by Jossy Ola
Locals patrol the streets to defend against Boko Haram in Maiduguri,
Nigeria, near the Cameroon border
The terror that Boko Haram continues to inflict on Nigeria has spilled into neighboring Cameroon in the form of refugees and direct attacks from the radical Islamist
group.
Cameroon’s military fought with Boko Haram militants Sept. 6, killing 100 of them
who had crossed into the country to attack the town of Fotokol, Cameroon state
media outlets said. The army forced the rest of the fighters back into Nigeria’s Borno state, the birthplace of Boko Haram.
For nearly three weeks in August, Boko Haram controlled the Cameroon village of
Ashigashia before the military was able to retake it, Voice of America reported.
The Islamic extremists have increased attacks on villages and towns in Cameroon,
burning down schools and kidnapping or murdering civilians. As in Nigeria, the
group has targeted Christians, looting and even burning down a pastor’s home,
World Watch Monitor said. In one town, two church elders were beheaded.
“The assailants attack in the night, when the army is no longer patrolling in the vil-
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lages. They enter the houses of Christians and strip them of their properties,” a
community leader told World Watch Monitor. “Several churches were ransacked,
and valuables such as musical instruments were destroyed or taken away.”
In early August, Boko Haram killed 25 people in Cameroon, including Pastor Jean
Marcel Kesvere of Lutheran Brethren Church of Cameroon, Mission Network News
said. Kesvere worked with World Mission. Greg Kelley, executive director of World
Mission, told Mission Network News that although they mourned Kesvere’s death,
the work he began would continue because the people he rooted in Christ aren’t
giving up.
“They continue to rejoice in the Lord and know that He is in control despite the persecution. They continue to pray for other people to step in and fill the gap,” Kelley
said.
Even before fighting crossed the border, the influx of refugees from northeast Nigeria, where Boko Haram declared an Islamic caliphate, had taken a toll on Cameroon.
“Boko Haram poses a regional threat far beyond its proven capability to perpetrate
acts of terror outside of Nigeria’s porous borders. Already, by targeting Christian
and moderate Muslim communities across northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram has
forced tens of thousands of Nigerians to flee to neighboring countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad—none of which are prepared to handle refugee populations
upwards of 10,000—or face the sword,” said Cameron Thomas, the regional manager for Africa with International Christian Concern.
The Christian community especially has tried to care for refugees, but is running
out of resources, according to church leaders.
‘'The action of our churches has initially consisted of providing the refugees … with
food, shelter, and medicines. But now, the capacity of our churches is overwhelmed, as their number has increased up to threefold,” the Rev. Samuel Heteck
told World Watch Monitor. Heteck is part of the crisis committee created by the
Council of Protestant Churches in the far North.
Heteck said that after a year of assistance, resources were depleted and “help and
generosity of our brethren from abroad has been slow to appear.”
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
http://www.worldmag.com/
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CAR
International Analysis — Central African Republic: Should the World
Pay Attention?
SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 11:37 AM0 COMMENTSVIEWS: 28
Op-Ed by Steve McDonald — The Mark News
As the world focuses on the atrocities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a
far more brutal scenario has been unfolding some 2,500 miles directly south of Damascus. Situated in the sub-Sahel region of Africa, the poverty-stricken former
French colony of the Central African Republic (CAR), torn throughout its postcolonial history by coups and rebellions, has had its latest coup deteriorate into an
orgy of intercommunal violence, which has increasingly taken on interreligious connotations as groups have broken into Muslim and Christian camps.
Since December 2013, an estimated 5,200 persons have died, according to an Associated Press count. At least 398,000 Central Africans are refugees in neighboring
countries, and another 528,000 are internally displaced. Death tolls are undoubtedly higher, as no one knows what has happened in remote neighborhoods of Bangui,
the capital, or outlying cities like Bossangoa in the west or Bangassou or Obo in the
east.
Beyond the growing death toll and levels of disruption that the world has ignored
for two years is the fact that the CAR is increasingly playing out on sectarian lines
and is attracting attention from other radical Islamist groups like Boko Haram in
Nigeria. Al-Minbar Jihadi Media Network, an Islamist website, has called for the assassination of French President François Hollande in order to “support the vulnerable in the Central African Republic.”
Muslims make up only 15 percent of the population in the CAR, and were historically integrated throughout the general population, with many families containing
members of both religions. How did this become an inter-sectarian struggle?
A clue is in the CAR’s recent political history, starting with the only democratic election it has ever held (1993), which brought to power Ange-Félix Patassé, a Christian. He was overthrown by General François Bozizé in 2003. Bozizé, also a Christian, was pushed into a power-sharing arrangement in 2013 by a group called Séléka, a ragtag coalition of mostly Muslim militias out of Chad and Sudan, some of
whom had helped him into power in 2003 and had ties to Chadian President Idriss
Déby.
The power-sharing government quickly failed, and Séléka forced the installation of
the first Muslim president, Michel Djotodia. Djotodia came to power by promising
position and wealth to power brokers around Bozizé, and because he had the backing of Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries who were at the core of Séléka.
This last transition took place as Séléka poured into Bangui in March 2013. Bozizé
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fled to Chad and Djotodia took office. Besides the political change this brought,
Séléka began attacking Christian enclaves in Bangui. Some reports say it did so with
the encouragement of Chadian and Nigerian soldiers who came in as peacekeepers
backed by French forces, but were known to be militant Muslims. Central African
Christians also accused Burundian and Rwandan troops of supporting the Muslim
militias. Reports abound of the atrocities that began to unfold.
As a result, a new movement formed in Bossangoa, 200 miles north of Bangui. Originally a local auto-defense group of citizen militias that had been around for years,
it was made up of Christians and named itself “anti-balaka.” In the local language,
Sango, the name literally means “anti-machete.” Figuratively, it means indestructible.
Anti-balaka took the offensive, and by January 2014, the country was in a fullfledged civil war and Muslims were fleeing the Central African Republic in the tens
of thousands. Hundreds were being hacked to death in Bangui, Bossangoa, and
elsewhere. Convoys of hundreds of vehicles packed with people and their belongings could be seen driving down the main avenue and out of Bangui daily.
Amnesty International accused anti-balaka militants of attempting an “ethnic
cleansing” of Muslims. John Ging, director of operations for the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, warned that the conflict had
“all the elements that we have seen elsewhere, in places like Rwanda and Bosnia.
The elements are there, the seeds are there, for a genocide.”
Since March, political developments in the CAR have done little to stem the violence. A tentative late July ceasefire fell apart after only a couple of days. In January, parliament elected an interim president, former mayor of Bangui Catherine
Samba-Panza, who then appointed the first Muslim prime minister, Mahamat Kamoun. But the Séléka fighters have rejected him and are refusing to join the unity
government. Killing is still rampant throughout Bangui and other towns.
This week, UN peacekeeping forces are preparing to go into the CAR to take over
from the existing Africa Union peacekeepers, who are supported by the French and
deeply distrusted by most Central Africans. About 2,000 troops fall short of the almost 7,000 authorized in April by the UN, but the rest are expected by early 2015.
Significantly, the command will fall on the UN, which should stem some of the support shown by AU forces to different factions.
Interim President Samba-Panza, in the meantime, is visiting Washington to tell her
story, and attending the UN General Assembly – at the secretary general’s invitation – to appeal for global support.
There may be a narrow window of opportunity for the country to overcome the
cycle of intercommunal killings and the breakdown of law and order. Indigenous
efforts are underway to stop the violence and promote tolerance at the grassroots
level, with Christian and Muslim religious leaders, along with local and international
22
non-governmental organizations, working to promote community dialogue.
Hopefully the new peacekeeping forces will have full international support to secure the neighborhoods and districts. The arrival of U.S. forces this week to help
reopen the American embassy is a good sign that international attention may not
be as absent in the future as it was over the past two years. If this conflict can be
brought back from the brink of a full-scale Jihad-type uprising that attracts international Islamist support, then the community of nations now threatened by ISIS in
the Middle East will be much better off.
Steve McDonald is currently a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center
in Washington, DC, where he also is a consultant to the Africa Program. McDonald
has spent over forty years living and working in and on Africa, as a diplomat, nonprofit and non-governmental organization leader, and conflict resolution specialist.
He has contributed to numerous books, articles and press accounts on Africa, which
he continues to do along with working on post-conflict transitions in countries like
Burundi, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
http://www.peruviantimes.com/
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«Sangaris va adapter son dispositif à l’arrivée de la Minusca»
19-09-2014
Soldat français de la force Sangaris dans le quartier musulman du PK5 de Bangui, samedi 31 mai 14
L’opération Sangaris, conduite par la force militaire française en Centrafrique, ne
cesse pas avec l’arrivée des casques bleus de la Minusca en Centrafrique. Le chef
d’état-major de Sangaris, le colonel Cédric du Gardin, le réaffirme aujourd’hui. Dans
l’interview qu’il a accordée aux envoyés spéciaux de RFI à Bangui, le numéro 2 de la
force française explique que Sangaris va modifier la répartition géographique de
ses effectifs et de son matériel, mais que la force est maintenue et que son mandat
reste le même.
Est-ce que Sangaris va partir avec l’arrivée de la Mission de maintien de la paix
des Nations unies en Centrafrique, la Minusca ?
Cédric du Gardin : Non, Sangaris ne va pas partir avec l’arrivée de la Minusca. Sangaris va adapter son dispositif à la nouvelle donne qu’il y a avec l’arrivée des
casques bleus. Nous étions déjà en appui, puis en soutien de la Misca [la force africaine, ndlr]. Nous allons donc perpétuer cette mission avec la Minusca. On va
s’adapter au déploiement qui est prévu par la Minusca. Ce déploiement s’opère
actuellement majoritairement dans Bangui et dans l’Ouest. Dans Bangui, nous restons présents comme nous le sommes actuellement. Dans l’Ouest, petit à petit, la
Minusca s’installe à notre place, notamment à Bouar par exemple, dans les prochains jours, ce qui nous permet à nous non pas de partir, mais de pouvoir déplacer
nos efforts bien plus à l’est, dans le couloir central pour pouvoir appuyer ce déploiement progressif de la Minusca.
De quelle manière est-ce que Sangaris va coopérer avec la Minusca ?
Sangaris coopère déjà avec la Minusca depuis plusieurs semaines puisque nous les
24
appuyons dans le domaine logistique. Vous n’êtes pas sans savoir que la logistique
onusienne est énorme. Donc nous l’appuyons quotidiennement sur l’aéroport de
Mpoko pour décharger les mastodontes que sont les Antonov 124, surtout les convois logistiques qui arrivent du Cameroun. Il y a des convois escortés, il y a des convois à faire rentrer. Il y a une fluidité à assurer sur cet axe puisque ce sont des convois de plus de 500 camions. C’est énorme. Nous aidons également des différents
contingents en leur prêtant des matériels puisque nous avons repeint, re-préparé
des camions, des véhicules blindés au profit de différents contingents. Donc toute
la partie logistique est déjà en marche. Pour la partie des opérations, au fur et à
mesure que les bataillons se déploient et qui nous demandent leur aide, nous venons sur place pour leur amener notre aide et notre connaissance du territoire.
Concrètement, comment cela se passe-t-il ?
A Bouar, on est dans une situation où tout est apaisé, qui est saine, qui est gérable.
A partir de ce moment-là, les troupes de l’ONU arrivent. On va prendre le cas des
Bangladais. On se « colocalise » avec eux un certain temps. On leur fait prendre
connaissance de la zone, prendre connaissance des gens, prendre connaissance des
us et des coutumes. Et une fois qu’ils sont autonomes, on leur laisse la place. Et
nous, on bascule vers un autre effort pour pouvoir préparer l’arrivée des contingents suivants.
Est-ce que le travail de Sangaris vient surtout en appui de la Minusca pour son
déploiement ou est-ce que sur des interventions, par exemple, si vous êtes sollicités par la Minusca, vous pouvez également vous projeter sur telle ou telle zone ?
Les deux. Effectivement, s’il y a un problème sécuritaire qui demande à ce que je
les renforce, je viendrai les renforcer. Au même titre que ce que l’on faisait déjà
avec la Misca. Un exemple : il y a une menace sur les populations dans telle ou telle
ville, ils estiment qu’ils n’ont pas les moyens de faire face à un groupe armé ou à
une certaine situation. En nous le demandant, on viendra les renforcer pour pouvoir toujours continuer à maintenir ce palier sécuritaire acceptable et les aider à
pouvoir gérer la situation sur le terrain. L’avantage, c’est qu’ils vont être nombreux.
Ils vont quand même être 10 000, plus les policiers. Donc ils vont avoir une capacité
de maillage du pays qui va quasiment être doublée par rapport à celle de la Misca.
Effectivement, nous, on vient sur leur appel pour pouvoir amener la plus-value
quand ils auront besoin de nous. On est toujours beaucoup plus mobiles qu’eux. Et
à partir de ce moment-là, on peut leur amener cette plus-value.
Est-ce qu’avec l’arrivée de la Minusca, le mandat de Sangaris a changé ?
Il va évoluer sur le terrain en fonction de son déploiement. Mais les principes restent les mêmes : la force reste impartiale, elle fait appliquer les mesures de confiance là où elle est déployée et elle garantit un palier minimum sécuritaire pour
que les populations puissent vivre normalement. Soit ça se fera ensemble sur différents points quand la Minusca me demandera de lui apporter notre concours, soit
ça se fera de manière autonome si j’ai besoin de me mettre dans les intervalles
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parce qu’elle ne peut pas occuper tel ou tel point.
Les mesures de confiance qui signifient qu'aucun groupe armé ne peut se promener en ville avec ses armes ?
Avec ses armes, à part quelques cas. Je vous rappelle que ces mesures de confiance
ont été signées par tous les acteurs de la Centrafrique à plusieurs reprises, au mois
de décembre, janvier et février. Donc elles sont reconnues par toutes les factions
présentes. Certaines personnes peuvent se déplacer d’un point A à un point B avec
des armes, mais de manière générale, personne ne peut se déplacer en ville ou
dans les intervalles [ainsi].
Sur quel calendrier Sangaris se projette pour une réduction du dispositif, voire un
retrait de Centrafrique ?
Sangaris n’a pas de calendrier. Quand vous êtes en soutien ou en appui, vous vous
mettez au tempo des unités que vous soutenez. Vous connaissez le tempo actuel
des Nations unies. Normalement jusqu’à la fin décembre, on devrait avoir tous les
contingents qui seront arrivés. Les Nations unies ont annoncé qu’elles seraient
complètement opérationnelles au mois d’avril. On va essayer de suivre leur tempo
pour pouvoir les mettre en place.
Et la réflexion sur une éventuelle réduction du dispositif viendra plus tard ?
Elle viendra en fonction de la façon dont la Minusca s’est déployée et des effets
qu’elle a atteints sur le terrain.
http://www.rfi.fr/
26
Kenya
Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home
25 Sep 2014
OVERVIEW
One year after the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Al-Shabaab is more entrenched and a graver threat to Kenya. But the deeper danger is less in the long established terrorist cells that perpetrated the act – horrific as it was – and more in
managing and healing the rising communal tensions and historic divides that AlShabaab violence has deliberately agitated, most recently in Lamu county. To prevent extremists from further articulating local grievances with global jihad, the Kenyan government – including county governments most affected – opposition politicians and Kenyan Muslim leaders, must work together to address historical grievances of marginalisation among Muslim communities in Nairobi, the coast and the
north east, and institutional discrimination at a national level, as well as ensuring
that counter-terrorism operations are better targeted at the perpetrators and do
not persecute wider ethnic and faith communities they have purposefully infiltrated.
The present context is serving only to lose further hearts and minds. Instead of closing ranks as they managed – just – in the aftermath of Westgate, Kenya’s political
elites have bought into the deadly discourse of ethnic and religious recriminations.
Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya means that the threat is
both imminent and deep. The absence of a common Kenyan Muslim agenda and
leadership has meant little resistance to the extremist message.
The late 2011 military intervention in Somalia to create a buffer against a spillover
of insecurity has hastened the expansion of Al-Shabaab’s campaigns into the homeland. The intervention’s strategic calculations in relation to (southern) Somalia may,
in the long run, be vindicated. But the impact on domestic security has been severely underestimated, or at least the ability of internal security agencies to disrupt and
respond to terrorist attacks without, as the April 2014 Usalama Watch operation
did, further alienating communities whose cooperation and support is vital in the
fight against terrorism. Yet the blame should lie less in the weaknesses of the country’s institutions than in the unwillingness of political leaders to put aside partisan
divisions. And because partisan divisions almost inevitably translate into communal
strife, playing politics with terrorism compounds an already volatile situation.
While the successful drone attack against the Al-Shabaab Emir Ahmed Abdi Godane
on 1 September has removed the organisation’s key strategist, not least in extending the jihad beyond Somalia, the inevitable jockeying for position within AlShabaab will have implications for Kenyan operatives as they seek to maintain their
relevance with the new leadership. A further offensive by the Somalia government
27
and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), squeezing Al-Shabaab’s territorial
presence in south-central Somalia, also risks high-impact attacks elsewhere – including in Kenya – as a demonstration of the insurgents’ continued potency.
This briefing updates and builds upon previous Crisis Group analysis and recommendations especially in Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation (25 January 2012).
The briefing also refers to the transition to devolved government and how
longstanding issues relating to the provision of security, regional marginalisation
and accommodating minority representation are yet to be fully addressed; these
will be explored in a forthcoming series of products on devolution in Kenya.
To prevent a further deterioration of security and deny Al-Shabaab an ever greater
foothold, the Kenyan government, opposition parties and Muslim leadership
should:
clearly acknowledge the distinct Al-Shabaab threat inside Kenya without conflating it with political opposition, other outlawed organisations or specific
communities;
put further efforts into implementing and supporting the new county government structures and agencies, to start addressing local grassroots issues of
socio-economic marginalisation;
carefully consider the impact of official operations such as Operation Usalama
Watch, and paramilitary operations of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)
when they appear to target whole communities, and allow for transparent
investigations and redress where operations are found to have exceeded
rule of law/constitutional rights and safeguards;
implement the recommendations of the 2008 (“Sharawe”) Presidential Special
Action Committee (finally tabled with the 2013 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation report) to address institutional discrimination against Muslims (eg, issuance of identity cards and passports) and better (proportional) representation of Muslims in senior public service appointments; and
facilitate Muslim-driven madrasa and mosque reforms, which should entail review and approval of the curriculum taught; mosques vetting committees
need to be strengthened in areas where they exist and put in place where
they are absent.
Nairobi/Brussels, 25 September 2014
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Kenya: Why Youth Are Turning to Radicalism
17 September 2014
Injustices at the hands of Kenyan police, frustration and economic and social marginalisation are pushing many youths into the arms of Islamist radicals, according to
a research paper by Africa's Institute for Security Studies.
It especially cites perceived collective punishment of Muslims and claims of extrajudicial killings of 'problematic' individuals, most notably radical Muslim scholars, as
propelling youth towards a radical agenda.
The paper, titled Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council, said the Kenyan government and politicians face a crisis of
confidence and legitimacy among young men who have joined the two organisations.
"In other words, if the government wants to present an option to unconventional
political participation, it needs to create the necessary political space to permit the
expression of political frustrations and interests, other than through the use of violence," the paper published early this month on its website said.
The report cites President Uhuru Kenyatta's statement that local officials and political opponents were behind the Mpeketoni attacks mid-June, saying that increased
the politicisation of security and affected government response to terrorism. Al
Shabaab claimed responsibility for the various attacks in which around 60 people
died.
Instead of attempting to bring people together, politicians are harnessing political
divisions for their own ends, which further threatens national unity, it said.
"As a result, the Kenyan leadership has not stepped in to address growing
radicalisation when firm action could still have prevented the current radicalisation
process and increase in attacks in Kenya. Instead, local conditions have enabled
growing frustrations to become worse, enabling al Shabaab to strengthen its foothold in Kenya," it reads.
The Institute for Security Studies, established in 1991, does independent research,
provides expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance. It is based in Pretoria, South Africa, and has offices in Nairobi and
elsewhere.
The 28-page report was written by Anneli Botha, a senior researcher on terrorism
at ISS in Pretoria. She has worked in the South African police Service's Crime Intelligence Unit since 1993.
29
The findings are based on interviews with Kenyan and Somali-Kenyan individuals -95 men associated with al Shabab and 45 others linked with the outlawed MRC.
Researchers interviewed 46 relatives of people associated with al Shabaab and five
relatives of individuals associated with MRC.
The report said Muslim youth join extremist groups as a counter reaction to what
they see as a government-imposed "collective punishment" driven by the misguided perception that all Muslims and Kenya Somali nationals are potential terrorists.
As long as Kenyan citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic/religious identity that
is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will increase, the author said.
Interviewees cited what they called injustices at the hand of Kenyan security forces,
specifically collective punishment, as single most powerful factor driving them to
join the two groups.
"Of even more concern are claims of extra-judicial killings of 'problematic'
individuals, most notably radical Muslim scholars. The reality is, however, that the
'elimination' or assassination of such leaders or scholars has radicalised and recruited dozens if not hundreds to the ranks of extremist organizations, ensuring a new
wave of radicalism and collective resolve among their members, ultimately indicating that threats of violence or imprisonment are rarely effective deterrents," the
report said.
Mass arbitrary arrests, heavy-handed responses and racial and religious profiling
are counterproductive as these measures push affected communities to see the
need to defend themselves, driving individuals to extremism, it said.
"An effective counter terrorism policy and strategy should appreciate the broader
context in which violent actions or attacks occur and seek to meaningfully and nonviolently attend to the problems thrown up by this context," it said.
Addressing and breaking down these perceptions extends beyond the responsibility
of the police, according to the report. Author Botha said the process requires the
entire Kenyan government to initiate dedicated strategies to build a united national
identity.
http://allafrica.com/
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Mali
Carte interactive - Mali : la Minusma et les forces françaises en terrain
miné
25/09/2014
Des soldats de la Minusma dans le nord du Mali. © AFP
Ces dernières semaines, les jihadistes du nord du Mali ont fait de l'utilisation des
mines et engins explosifs improvisés leur mode d'action privilégié. Grâce à notre
carte interactive, découvrez où ces armes discrètes et dévastatrices ont infligé
d'importants dégâts dans les rangs des forces internationales.
Rarement N'Djamena avait officiellement haussé le ton de la sorte. Vendredi 19
septembre, le gouvernement tchadien publiait un communiqué virulent dans lequel il s'insurgeait que ses soldats "servent de bouclier aux autres forces de la Minusma (la force de l'ONU au Mali, NDLR) positionnées plus en retrait". La veille,
cinq d'entre eux perdaient la vie et trois autres étaient gravement blessés au passage de leur véhicule sur un engin explosif improvisé (EEI) dans les environs
d'Aguelhok, au nord du Mali.
Cet attentat visant les Casques bleus tchadiens est le troisième en deux semaines.
Les 2 et 14 septembre, deux attaques similaires, dans la même région, avaient respectivement fait quatre et un mort, ainsi que de nombreux blessés.
Le phénomène n'est certes pas nouveau. Avant même le début de l'opération Serval, en janvier 2013, les groupes terroristes avaient dissimulé des mines ou des engins explosifs improvisés dans le désert malien, poussant les forces françaises à
prendre leurs précautions dans leur reconquête du Nord. Mais depuis le mois de
juin, les militaires français et ceux de la Minusma ont noté une nette recrudescence
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de ce mode d'action. Ainsi, selon un bilan fourni par l'ONU, 21 Casques bleus ont
été tués par des engins explosifs au Mali depuis le début de la mission, en juillet
2013. Plus de la moitié d'entre eux – onze, dont dix Tchadiens - ont perdu la vie
entre le 30 juin et le 18 septembre dernier.
"Saboter le processus de paix"
"Il n'y a guère de doutes : cette escalade est liée à la reprise des négociations entre
le gouvernement malien et les groupes armés à Alger, affirme Radia Achouri, la
porte-parole de la mission onusienne. Les terroristes veulent saboter le processus
de paix." À Paris, on confirme cette tendance mais on se montre moins bavard sur
le sujet."Nous avons été touchés trois fois au mois d'août par des mines dans les
environs de Kidal, Aguelhok et Tessalit, glisse une source au ministère de la Défense. Heureusement, nous n'avons déploré aucun blessé et enregistré que des dégâts mineurs."
Malgré les dures frappes subies lors de Serval, les groupes jihadistes sont encore
actifs dans le nord du Mali, menant régulièrement des actions de guérilla contre
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leurs ennemis. "L'usage de mines ou d'engins explosifs improvisés rentrent parfaitement dans cette logique, décrypte Laurent Touchard, expert militaire et collaborateur de Jeune Afrique. Ils permettent de faire de gros dégâts, à distance, et de
semer une certaine terreur."
Ces armes redoutables sont généralement enfouies sous terre en pleine nuit par les
terroristes, qui les placent sur les routes empruntées par les convois onusiens ou
français, et parfois même à quelques centaines de mètres seulement des camps de
la Minusma.
>> Lire aussi Comment les jihadistes vont mener la guérilla dans le Nord-Mali
Autres victimes : les civils
Fabriqués à partir d'explosifs civils ou militaires (obus, roquettes, bombes aériennes…), dont les charges peuvent monter jusqu'à 1,5 tonne, les EII sont souvent
déclenchés à distance grâce à des téléphones portables. Contrairement aux Français, les Casques bleus ne sont pas dotés de systèmes de brouillage et sont donc
beaucoup plus vulnérables face à cette menace. Les mines ont aussi tendance à se
multiplier ces dernières semaines dans le désert malien. Provenant de Libye ou du
Tchad, elles sont nettement plus simples d'utilisation : il "suffit" de creuser un trou
et d'y dissimuler la mine. La moindre pression exercée en surface fait ensuite exploser sa charge.
Les soldats de la Minusma et les Français ne sont pas les seules victimes de cette
augmentation du nombre d'engins explosifs dans le nord du Mali. Plusieurs soustraitants maliens travaillant pour la mission onusienne ont été blessés en juin et
septembre près d'Aguelhok. Et le week-end dernier, dans la nuit du 18 au 19 septembre, deux civils ont été tués dans la même zone, après que leur véhicule ait sauté sur une mine.
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
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HECATOMBE AU SEIN DU CONTENGENT TCHADIEN AU MALI : On aurait tort de ne pas écouter Deby
22 Septembre 2014
Parmi les pays qui ont accouru au chevet du Mali pour l’aider à mater les barbus de
tous poils qui sévissaient dans le Nord du pays, le Tchad est manifestement celui
qui a payé le plus lourd tribut en termes de pertes en vies humaines. L’attaque de
ce jeudi 18 septembre 2014, sur l’axe Aguelhok-Tessalit, qui a fait cinq morts et
trois blessés graves au sein du contingent tchadien et qui intervient après bien
d’autres, a certainement été la goutte d’eau qui a fait déborder le vase.
Même le chef de file de l’opposition a rejoint le gouvernement pour accabler
l’ONU
Le gouvernement tchadien en a profité pour pousser un coup de gueule en direction de l’ONU. Le ministre de la Communication et porte-parole du gouvernement,
Hassan Sylla Bakary, n’est pas allé avec le dos de la cuillère pour charger la mission
de l’ONU au Mali en ces termes : « Le gouvernement tchadien constate avec regret
que son contingent éprouve des difficultés énormes pour assurer sa logistique, sa
mobilité et son alimentation ». Sans évoquer explicitement les pertes que l’armée
tchadienne a subies au Mali, ces propos pourraient s’apparenter à un ras-le-bol.
Même le chef de file de l’opposition, Saleh Kebzabo dont on sait qu’il n’est pas
tendre à l’égard de Deby, a, cette fois-ci, rejoint le gouvernement pour accabler
l’ONU. Les mots employés pour le faire cachent mal le dépit : « Où sont les autres
contingents ? » L’opposition et le pouvoir ne sont donc pas contents de l’ONU et ils
le font savoir de manière univoque et ce, sur un ton comminatoire. Ce coup de
sang des Tchadiens peut se justifier au regard des raisons suivantes.
D’abord, les soldats tchadiens sont pratiquement les seuls parmi les contingents
africains, à être positionnés dans l’épicentre du sanctuaire des djihadistes au Mali.
Les autres contingents sont certes présents au Nord-Mali, mais ils sont loin de
l’antre du lion. Dans ces conditions, l’on devrait s’attendre à ce que l’ONU accordât
au contingent tchadien un traitement à la hauteur du risque encouru.
On peut être tenté de dire qu’Idriss Deby sera entendu
Ensuite, l’on peut avoir l’impression que la traque des djihadistes au pays de Modibo Keita est d’abord l’affaire des Tchadiens, alors que c’est moins leur guerre que
celle du Mali et de ses voisins. La colère du Tchad est d’autant plus justifiée que
pendant qu’il perd de manière récurrente ses soldats sur le théâtre des opérations,
le président du Mali semble plus préoccupé par son confort personnel en achetant
un avion à coût de milliards de F CFA, que par le sort de ces soldats venus de loin
pour l’aider à faire le ménage. Dans le même registre, l’on pourrait s’indigner de
l’attitude de l’armée malienne qui s’est notamment illustrée sous le règne du Général Sanogo dans des querelles byzantines de privilèges et de galons, pendant que
les soldats venus d’ailleurs, en particulier les Tchadiens, offraient leur poitrine aux
34
balles des djihadistes dans le septentrion malien.
Cela dit, il faut dire que le contingent tchadien est victime de sa réputation d’être
une armée de combattants aguerris par leurs multiples expériences des terrains
sahéliens et désertiques, acquises dans le cadre des nombreuses guerres que le
pays a livrées et gagnées contre les troupes de Kadhafi à propos de la bande d’Aouzou. Il faut ajouter à cela les récurrentes guerres civiles que le pays a connues, depuis pratiquement François Tombalbaye jusqu’à Idriss Deby. De ce fait, l’on peut
affirmer que le Tchad a une expertise de la guerre et une capacité d’adaptation au
relief du Nord-Mali que les autres contingents n’ont pas. C’est pourquoi l’on peut
être tenté de dire que Idriss Deby sera entendu, car l’ONU ne prendrait pas le
risque de se priver de sa contribution dans la lutte contre les djihadistes au NordMali. Déjà, son représentant dans ce pays, Bert Koenders, veut calmer le jeu en
promettant de discuter avec la partie tchadienne. Idriss Deby est certes un dictateur qui régente le Tchad depuis 1990, mais c’est aussi un guerrier précieux, indispensable à la France et à l’ONU dans leur croisade contre les barbus dans cette partie de l’Afrique.
http://lepays.bf/
35
Mauritania
Lutte d'influence entre forces jihadistes
19/09/2014
L'avenir des groupes terroristes en Afrique est lié au sort des jihadistes de l'Etat
islamique (EIIL).
Dans un contexte de crainte que l'Etat islamique (EIIL) ne tourne désormais son
attention vers l'Afrique, les divergences entre les groupes terroristes dans la région
sahélo-saharienne se creusent chaque jour un peu plus.
Des califats auto-proclamés
surgissent ça et là.
L'exode a débuté le 24 août,
lorsque le groupe nigérian Boko Haram s'est déclaré "libéré
du chemin pris par al-Qaida"
et annoncé la naissance d'un
califat islamique conforme à la
ligne adoptée par le projet
d'Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi en Syrie et en Irak.
en otages sur le champ gazier
d'In Amenas, en Algérie.
Le groupe terroriste de Mokhtar Belmokhtar a pris le 16
janvier 2013 des dizaines de travailleurs
36
La même chose s'est reproduite vendredi 12 septembre. Un groupe terroriste algérien inconnu a annoncé qu'il quittait al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) et
prêtait allégeance à l'Etat islamique (EIIL).
" jound l- hilafa en lgérie" Les soldats du califat en lgérie a pr té allé
geance au groupe d'Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Dirigé par Abdelmalek El Gouri (alias
Khaled Abou Souleiman), ce groupe armé se compose de membres de cellules
dormantes d'AQMI dans le centre de l'Algérie.
Mais il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une cellule inconnue originaire des régions centrales de l'Algérie. La branche maghrébine d'al-Qaida est divisée entre ceux qui
considèrent al-Baghdadi comme leur nouveau leader, et ceux qui demeurent fidèles à l'étendard de l'organisation al-Qaida Central, dirigée par Ayman alZawahiri.
Et bien que le chef d'AQMI Abdelmalek Droukdel alias bou Moussaab bde
louadoud) ait refusé de reconnaître l'Etat islamique, préférant renouveler son
allégeance à al-Qaida, d'autres figures influentes au sein de son organisation semblent préférer al-Baghdadi.
Ce refus de Droukdel d'apporter son soutien à al-Baghdadi place AQMI dans une
position différente de celle des autres groupes jihadistes au Maghreb et au Sahel.
Et ce refus pourrait avoir d'autres conséquences.
"Nous allons assister à une guerre interne au sein d'al- aida au Maghreb isla
mique, qui profitera à l'EIIL", a écrit le quotidien algérien L'Expression dans un
éditorial.
L'EIIL commence déjà à faire sentir sa présence au Maghreb.
Vendredi dernier, le Maroc a démantelé une cellule terroriste de l'Etat islamique
qui recrutait des jihadistes pour les envoyer combattre en Syrie et en Irak.
Ce groupe, dirigé par un professeur d'école primaire, envisageait de faire plus que
du simple recrutement pour la Syrie et l'Irak, a indiqué le ministère marocain de
l'Intérieur.
Il envisageait également d'organiser des attaques à l'intérieur du royaume.
La Libye, le dernier thé tre d'al-Qaida
Selon le spécialiste du terrorisme Syed Ahmed Ould Atefal, l'influence de l'EIIL ne
fait qu'amplifier les divergences entre les différentes branches d'al-Qaida.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias "Laaouar") fait désormais figure d'opposant réel au
leader d'al-Qaida, Abdelmalek Droukdel.
Laaouar pourrait être tenté de forger une alliance avec des groupes dissidents,
notamment dans la mesure où il a récemment perdu certaines personnalités importantes de son groupe, estime Ould Atefal.
Meherig Jafar, un ressortissant algérien, était l'un des principaux dirigeants de la
37
brigade El Mourabitoune de Laaouar lorsqu'il a été pris la semaine dernière au
Mali.
Les forces de sécurité maliennes ont parlé de lui à l'AFP comme d'un "gros poisson".
Selon certaines informations, Belmokhtar, qui est probablement le terroriste le
plus dangereux au Sahel, dirigerait ses opérations de recrutement criminel et jihadiste depuis le sud de la Libye.
L'ascendance de Belmokhtar place Droukdel dans la position d'un leader régional
ayant perdu le contrôle qu'il exerçait sur les groupes qui lui étaient auparavant
affiliés.
Lorsque Belmokhtar a passé une alliance avec le Mouvement pour l'unicité et le
jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), cela a été perçu comme une déclaration
d'indépendance vis-à-vis de Droukdel.
Belmokhtar a tenté d'affirmer sa présence, tirant le tapis sous les pieds d'AQMI
en organisant plusieurs opérations terroristes, dont celle contre le complexe gazier d'In Amenas en Algérie et d'autres visant des unités de l'armée tunisienne.
Le directeur du journal Tahalil, Isselmou Ould Mustapha, spécialiste des mouve
ments jihadistes et du terrorisme, affirme ne pas être surpris de voir les divergences entre Laaouar et Droukdel aller si loin.
"Laaouar en veut à
MI de lui avoir refusé une fonction importante au sein du
groupe, en dépit de son expérience antérieure, de son ambition et de sa capacité
à recruter de jeunes combattants", explique ce journaliste.
Mais les deux barons du terrorisme algérien n'en ont pas encore au point où ils
tenteront de s'assassiner mutuellement, ajoute-t-il.
L'analyste Abderrahim al-Ansari souligne pour sa part une autre différence : la
priorité de Droukdel est le jihad contre les gouvernements du Maghreb, pas en
Syrie ni au Levant.
"Laaouar ne reconna t plus l'autorité de rou del, et il agit donc à l'encontre des
désirs de ce dernier et tente de créer une aile maghrébine parallèle à celle de
Droukdel", explique Sid Ahmed Ould Tfeil, analyste et spécialiste de l'idéologie
des groupes salafistes.
"L'autre raison est le penchant de Laaouar vers le jihad global transfrontalier, au
vu de son expérience antérieure en Afghanistan", ajoute-t-il.
Ce n'est qu'une affaire de temps avant que Belmokhtar ne rallie officiellement
l'EIIL, estime-t-il.
" ien que Laaouar n'ait pas encore pr té allégeance à l' IIL et soit encore, au
moins ostensiblement, fidèle à Ayman al-Zawahiri, il attend en réalité le bon moment pour renoncer à cette allégeance", explique Ould Tfeil.
38
Belmokhtar "tente désormais, par le biais de ses relations étroites avec Ansar alSharia en Libye, d'obtenir un morceau de la Libye où il pourra déclarer son nouvel
émirat, qu'il baptisera l'Emirat islamique du Grand Maghreb", explique cet analyste à Magharebia.
" ès qu'il sera en mesure de le faire, il se proclamera émir, renoncera à al- aida
et prêtera allégeance à l'EIIL."
Quant à la Libye, certains mettent en garde en expliquant que ce pays sans loi
constituera le prochain front.
Selon l'universitaire algérien Mohamed Ahmed Baghdad, "la Libye est aujourd'hui
le véritable théâtre de la bataille pour la suprématie entre les branches d'al-Qaida
et les groupes jihadistes mondiaux ; et cela laisse planer une menace sur la formation d'une nouvelle carte de la région du Sahel dans un avenir proche."
" l- aida pourrait bien dispara tre et tre remplacée par un IIL plus radical",
conclut-il.
http://magharebia.com/
39
Nigeria
Analysis: Shekau killed several times, still a danger to Nigeria
September 26 2014
Shekau: died several times
Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, or a man claiming to be him, has
been killed at least three times so far, according to the military, yet each time he
apparently returns in the group’s numerous jihadist videos.
Dead or alive, he appears to be fuelling violence which rights groups say is killing
more people than at any time during Boko Haram’s five-year-old reign of terror in
the north of the 175 million-strong state.
Officials say Shekau may be a name adopted by leaders of various wings of Boko
Haram, raising the possibility the death of one may make others more amenable to
negotiating an end to the fighting and release of 200 schoolgirls whose kidnap in
April caused an international outcry.
The last time the military said he was dead a year ago, a man looking similar to
Shekau but slightly fatter continued to appear in videos issuing threats and taunting
authorities.
The Islamist insurgents have killed thousands of people, many of them civilians,
since launching an uprising in 2009, and abducted hundreds of children in a tactic
reminiscent of Ugandan rebel Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa.
Shekau’s face has often appeared on video claiming attacks.
Now Nigeria’s military says this video imposter — real name Bashir Mohammed —
40
has died in fighting in the town of Kondugu, prompting the question whether there
is another Shekau lookalike ready to continue the fight in Africa’s top economy.
An alternative possibility is that Shekau is not dead.
“The Nigerian army has claimed on multiple occasions to have killed Shekau and it’s
been disproved,” said Ben Payton, senior Africa analyst at UK-based risk consultancy Maplecroft.
Shekau took over when Boko Haram’s founder and spiritual leader Mohammed
Yusuf was killed in policy custody in 2009.
“BRAND NAME”
It is not possible to verify whether or not the videos are of the same person or more
than one, but the man in later videos that the military said was Bashir Mohammed
had a plumper, rounder face, his nose was wider and his bridge less defined.
His talk was even more bellicose and maniacal than the original Shekau, with statements vowing to kill all pagans and saying he was against the ideology of the whole
world.
The old Shekau was often quite sombre; the new one has a menacing laugh. And he
only appeared after the alleged death of the real Shekau in August last year.
“The name Shekau has become a brand name for the terrorists’ leader,” military
spokesman Major-General Chris Olukolade said on Thursday, an acknowledgment
that however many Shekaus they kill, the violence is unlikely to end.
By contrast, the death of Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in battle in 2002 ended
a quarter century of civil war in Angola.
“Even if Shekau has been killed … Boko Haram is much bigger than one individual. It
has multiple units that operate with a fair degree of autonomy,” said Payton.
But if it is true that Nigerian forces have inflicted heavy casualties in the past few
days on a faction of the militants, as Boko Haram sought to hold territory it declared
to be an “Islamic state” two months back, the others might turn out to be slightly
more moderate.
The military said on Wednesday more than 130 Boko Haram Islamist fighters had
surrendered, and a man posing as the group’s leader in numerous videos had been
killed in clashes, although it often claims successes that are impossible to independently verify.
“It’s very likely that there’s two or three Shekaus and the commanders of different
factions decided to all use the name,” said Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram expert at the
Jamestown Foundation.
“Possibly, that leaves … an opportunity to capitalise on the death of this Shekau and
start talks with various (other) members of Boko Haram.”
Reported by Reuters
http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/-
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Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit: A Case For Full Autonomy
September 24, 2014
The scourge of money laundering and terrorism in virtually every part of the
globe today, is a matter of very serious concern not only to world leaders but also
to the entire human race. Since the early nineties, what started as isolated incidents of suicide bombings largely in the Middle East, has increasingly grown in
leaps and bounds and has now become a monster threatening to consume planet
earth in its entirety.
Although following this monstrous attack, the whole world rose as a single body
to fight the menace of international terrorism and notwithstanding the death of
its leader, terrorism has continued to rear its ugly head every now and then in
different parts of the globe. Countries such as Somalia the home base of the Al
Shabab terrorist group, Afghanistan the unofficial head quarters of Al Qaeda, Pakistan, Mali where the Islamic Maghreb holds sway and lately Nigeria where the
Islamic terrorist group, Boko Haram has turned most part of the North Eastern
part of the country and else where, into vast killing fields. Since 2009, over 5000
lives were said to have been lost to the activities of the vicious boko haram group
in Nigeria.
Boko Haram in Nigeria has steadily grown from a rag tag group that it was when it
first reared its ugly head in 2007, under the leadership of the late Mohammed
Yusuf, who was allegedly murdered extra judicially in police custody, into a sophisticated fighting machine, conquering and taking territories with apparent
ease and bombing selected targets at will. Behind the emergence and growing
sophistication of the terror group, is no doubt a well heeled and complex web of
multilateral funding, running into billions of dollars. That means that the terrorists enjoy very robust support of wealthy well connected individuals, groups and
organisations facilitated through well thought out money laundering schemes for
the financing of their terrorist activities.
Consequently it is very clear to every discerning mind that the most effective way
of tackling terrorism would be the unmasking of those persons who provide the
financial backing that these evil persons rely upon to finance their terrorist activities. Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria [HURIWA] has joined forces
with over 24 non-governmental bodies to carry out advocacy campaign in support of the National Assembly to pass into law this executive bill that is well
thought out by the President Good luck Jonathan-led administration to create an
independent Financial Intelligence center to fully track and prosecute sponsors of
terrorism and other heinous crimes against the Nigerian State and Nigerian People. The Emergence Of Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit.
It is against the foregoing background that the world, through the United Nations,
came up with the formation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘the global
coordinating body for Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism (AML / CFT) efforts’ and has also been described as the ‘international
42
standard setter on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism as
well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its recommendation 29, requires that
Countries should establish a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that would serve as a
national centre for the receipt and analysis of (a) Suspicious Transaction Reports
and (b) other information relevant to Money Laundering, associated predicate
offences, terrorism financing and for the dissemination of the result of that analysis to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), Anti Corruption Agencies (ACAs)and other AML /CFT stakeholders otherwise known as Competent Authorities.
The United Nation’s Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) also made a similar
provision under its Article 14 to the effect that ‘…Countries shall consider the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to serve as a national centre for
the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential
money laundering’.
In the late 1990s, Nigeria was viewed negatively by the International Community
as a pariah state that appears not to be cooperating in the global war against
money laundering and financing of terrorism, not having the legal frame work to
tackle the twin monster money laundering and financing of terrorism. As a matter
of fact Nigeria was blacklisted as a non cooperating nation by the FATF.
It was therefore in the light of the foregoing pressure by the International Community spear headed by the FATF, that the then President Olusegun Obasanjo
established the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) as a unit domiciled in
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in June 2004 although it became
operational in 2005.
The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) is therefore the Nigerian arm of the
global financial intelligence units, domiciled within the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC), as an autonomous unit and operating in the African
Region.
Consequently the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit had to seek and obtain the
membership of the Egmont Group, ‘…the global body responsible for setting
standards on best practices for FIUs and is made up of more than 135 financial
intelligence units from 135 jurisdictions’.
Functions Of The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (Nfiu).
–Izuagba, a reseacher and public affairs analyst, wrote in from Lagos
Like all other FIUs all over the world, the NFIU has the following core mandates to
wit:
1). Receipts and analysis of financial disclosure by way of Currency Transaction
Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs).
2). Dissemination of Intelligence generated there from to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs),Anti Corruption Agencies (ACAs), otherwise referred to as Competent
43
Authorities.
3). Coordination of Nigeria’s Anti Money Laundering and Combating Financing of
Terrorism (AML / CFT) regime which are critical elements in President Jonathan’s
transformation agenda.
4). It also serves as the correspondent office for the Inter-Governmental Action
Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA).
5). It is also responsible for the provision of guidelines (through the relevant Regulatory Authorities) to Reporting Entities regarding intelligence on all Anti Money
Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML / CFT).
6). It develops standards and procedures for the receipt analysis and dissemination of Financial Intelligence to Law Enforcement Agencies( LEAs) and Anti Corruption Agencies (ACAs).
7). It performs onsite and offsite examination of Reporting Entities that is, Financial Institutions and Designated non Financial Institutions.
8). It enforces compliance with legal and regulatory regimes o Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML / CFT) in Nigeria.
9). Respond to global best practices by collaborating with other FIUs world wide
such as through its membership of the Egmont Group and GIABA.
Legal Framework For The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit.
The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit draws its powers from the following legislations to wit:
1) Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MLPA) 2011 as amended in 2012.
2) Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 as amended in 2013.
3). Economics and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act 2004
These Laws vested the following powers in the NFIU namely;
1). The receipt of Suspicious Transaction Reports from Reporting Entities or made
voluntarily by any persons pursuant to Section 6 of the MLPA 2012 as amended.
2). The receipt of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) relating to financial transactions from Reporting Entities within 72 hours pursuant to Section 14 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011 as amended.
3). The receipt of reports the transfer to or from a foreign Country of funds or securities exceeding $10,000 USD or its naira equivalent pursuant to Section 2 of
the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 as amended.
http://leadership.ng/opinions/
44
Somalia
Etats-Unis : quelle stratégie contre les shebab en Somalie ?
le 26-09-2014
Ces Somaliens apprennent à la radio le nom du successeur du leader des shebabs, Ahmed Ali Godane, récemment tué par las Américains. Mogadiscio, 6 septembre 2014. FP/Mohamed b
diwahab
Appels sur l'actualité fait le point sur la lutte antiterroriste en Somalie. La mort du
chef des shebab, Ahmed Abdi « Godane », tué le 1er septembre lors d'une frappe
aérienne américaine, a été qualifiée de « perte majeure du point de vue symbolique
et opérationnel pour la plus importante des entités affiliées à al-Qaïda » à la Maison
Blanche.
Mais les shebab, qui avaient promis de se venger, ont répliqué, le 8 septembre, par
un attentat-suicide qui a fait 12 morts et une trentaine de blessés au nord de Mogadiscio, et revendiqué cette attaque qui visait l’Amisom, la force de l'Union africaine. Et quelques jours plus tard, en Ouganda, les autorités affirmaient avoir déjoué un attentat d’ampleur.
Quels liens ont les shebab avec les autres mouvances islamistes ? Reçoivent-ils
leur soutien financier ?
Reprenons l’histoire récente. En 2009, une vidéo annonçait l’allégeance des shebabà Oussama Ben Laden. Or celui-ci a longtemps refusé une union formelle entre
al-Qaïda et al-Shabaab, préoccupé par l’extrême-violence du mouvement, y compris envers les musulmans. En décembre 2009, une attaque kamikaze contre l’hôtel
Shamo, à Mogadiscio, ciblant une cérémonie pour des étudiants en médecine, avait
par exemple créé l’effroi. A la mort de Ben Laden, Zawahiri, qui leur était beaucoup
plus favorable, a favorisé l’union formelle qui a été revendiquée au début de l’an-
45
née 2012. Depuis le début de l'année 2014, les données ont considérablement
changé avec l’offensive de l’organisation Etat islamique dans une partie de la Syrie
et de l’Irak. Un vaste terrain, des armes sophistiquées, une propagande active : autant de paramètres qui rendent un rapprochement potentiellement attractif. Début
septembre, le successeur d’Ahmed Godane a été nommé en quelques jours, ce qui
peut laisser croire que les consultations n’ont pas été exhaustives. Ahmed Omar,
alias Abu Ubaidah, est présenté comme un fidèle des fidèles de Godane, issu d’un
clan minoritaire. Récemment, le mouvement a réitéré son allégeance à al-Qaïda,
mais selon les spécialistes, celle-ci est contestée et des divivsions pourraient naître,
car des éléments prôneraient une alliance avec l’organisation Etat islamique, correspondant d’ailleurs plus, par son extrémisme et sa grande violence, à l’action passée des shebab. Quant à Boko Haram, au Nigeria, les deux mouvements ont été en
contact, mais rien juqu'à présent qui soit allé au-delà ou qui ait montré qu’ils ont
coordonné leur tactique jusqu’à maintenant.
La mort de Godane a fait la Une aussi à la télé.
Quelle est la stratégie des Etats-Unis en Somalie pour lutter contre le retour des
shebab au pouvoir ?
Début septembre, Barack Obama a pris en exemple le Yémen et la Somalie dans ce
qu’il nomme des tactiques réussies pour venir à bout des terroristes - c’est-à-dire
frappes aériennes et soutien d’alliés locaux. Une déclaration qui a surpris, parce
que la Somalie a longtemps été synonyme d’humiliation et d’échec pour les EtatsUnis : en octobre 1993, des soldats américains avaient été tués et leurs corps traî-
46
nés dans les rues de Mogadiscio. Les Etats-Unis sont restés longtemps traumatisés
par cet échec. En 2005, un soutien financier à des chefs de guerre locaux pour former une alliance contre le terrorisme et lutter contre l’avancée des tribunaux islamiques s’était conclu par une défaite cuisante... La stratégie américaine est donc
passée, comme l’a souligné Obama, par des frappes aériennes – celles qui ont tué
Ahmed Godane au début de ce mois, celles qui ont tué Ayro en 2007 ou Nabhan en
2009 - et par le soutien à bout de bras d’institutions qui restent fragiles et extr me
ment corrompues. Il faut noter qu’en juillet dernier, des responsables américains
ont reconnu que depuis 2007, plus d’une centaine de leurs forces spéciales étaient
présentes – jusqu’ici dans le plus grand secret. Une présence limitée, qui s’accompagne d’un soutien à l’armée nationale somalienne et aux services de renseignements. Les Etats-Unis ont mis en place le « groupe Alpha » des forces spéciales, qui
interviennent sur les opérations délicates, les attaques terroristes. Mais au final, les
raids aériens, les drones ne paralysent pas vraiment les shebab. A ce jour, ces derniers ont surtout perdu de grandes agglomérations en raison de l’avancée au sol
des troupes africaines de l’Amisom, mais leur capacité opérationnelle reste intacte,
malgré la mort de Godane et ils peuvent frapper où ils veulent en Somalie et dans
la région.
Un soldat somalien sur la scène de l’attentat-suicide perpétré par les shebab contre
l'Amisom en représailles de l’assassinat de leur chef. Mogadiscio, 8 septembre
2014 Reuters/Feisal Omar
http://www.rfi.fr/hebdo/
47
Al-Shabab Is a Major Threat to Security in Somalia
A Somali soldier runs near the scene of a deadly blast in Mogadishu April 14, 2013.
The North-Eastern African country of Somalia is infamous for its ongoing civil war,
social turbulence and widespread piracy. The country is also home to one of the
most radical and hard-core Islamist groups in the region.
Islamist group al-Shabab, meaning “The Youth” in Arabic, has emerged as a wing of
the now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts which controlled the southern part of Somalia in 2006.
Designated as terrorist organization by the US and UK, Al-Shabab maintains strong
presence in rural areas in Somalia’s south and operates in the capital of Mogadishu
and Kismayo port. The group imposed a strict version of Sharia law in areas under
its control, as it advocates the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi version of Islam. Many practices of the organization are highly questionable even among radicals, says Dr.
Petrus de Kock, Senior Researcher at the South African Institute of International
Affairs in Cape Town, South Africa.
“So, they are quite hard-liners in terms of interpreting the Holy Quran and also
Islamic law, and that inspires the military endeavor to fight against the forces that
would want to reestablish the state in Somalia because the state itself seems as a
threat to the Islamic system, so I think that also forms a part of the struggle of AlShabab, at least – their ideology,” Petrus de Kock said.
In February 2012, Al-Shabab “pledged obedience” to al-Qaeda. Experts say that
many Al-Qaeda fighters fled to Somalia after the organization was forced to retreat
from Afghanistan and Pakistan following the killing of Osama Bin Laden by US spe-
48
cial forces. Over the last years, al-Shabab has become more violent and fierce in its
terror campaign. In September 2013, the group attacked the Westgate mall in Kenya’s capital Nairobi, leaving more than 60 people killed and more than 170 injured.
It is increasingly difficult to address such security threats as al-Shabab uses guerilla
tactics and surprise attacks, says John Omiti, Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis.
“I think the more concerted efforts we have, especially to assist Somali
government, people would be back to their normal lives – this drought and fighting
the warlords – and have an inclusive government in Somalia itself. I am not a politician, but I think until we have a stable government in Mogadishu, the threat from
al-Shabab will remain and it depends on how government can put more resources
particularly for peacekeeping,” John Omiti said.
There has been no major advance against al-Shabab by the Somali army and the
African Union forces since late 2012. Intelligence reports say many al-Shabab militants are now leaving Somalia to join the ranks of the Islamic State organization
that has recently seized parts of Iraq and Syria. With the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East, the threat of pan-Islamist movements spreading to other
regions is now more real than ever.
http://en.ria.ru/
49
Critical Security review – Somalia, After Death of Alshabaab leader
Sep 18, 2014
United States said the strike inside Somalia on 01/9 had been targeted to Alshabaab leader but reality is that they did not know whether he had been killed or
not in the attack. However, around 4-5 days later US pentagon held press brief by
confirmed that AL-shabaab leader and the co-founder of al-Shabaab has been
killed. As all knows, Al-Shabaab is fighting to topple Somalia’s western-backed government and regularly launches bombings and gun attacks against state targets and
civilians. Godane’s death could now lead to an internal power struggle. The air raid
came days after African Union (AU) troops and Somali government forces launched
an offensive called “Operation Indian Ocean”, a major offensive aimed at seizing
key ports from al-Shabaab and cutting off one of their key sources of revenue: multi
-million dollar exports of charcoal. AU forces were targeting Shabaab on several
fronts, with Ugandan troops leading the offensives against the main port of
Barawe, south of the capital, Mogadishu.
After AL-shabaab confirmed the death of the leader, they immediately named a
new leader. The unanimously selected leader who known Ahmad Umar Ubaidah
had reported been elected undisclosed location as result they also stated that it
remains aligned with al-Qaida, according to the Site intelligence group, that monitors statements by Islamic militant groups. But immediately, there had been speculation that al-Shabaab would be shaken by power struggle over the selection of a
new leader and that perhaps the Somali rebels would change alliance and become
allied to the Islamic State group.
The leader, who was known as Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr and was the spiritual leader of
the al-Qaida-linked mujahidin, had US offered a reward of up to $7m (£4.3m) for
any information leading into his catch. Godane had publicly claimed al-Shabaab
was responsible for last year’s deadly Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya, that
left 67 people dead according to allegations. But soon after the death of the leader,
Somalia’s government said that it has credible intelligence al-Shabaab is planning
attacks in retaliation for Godane’s death.
Al-Shabaab has vowed to revenge the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia. Kenyan troops went into Somalia in October 2011 to fight al-Shabaab, which is blamed
for cross-border attacks and kidnappings of westerners on Kenyan soil.
Kenya later became part of the African Union force that is bolstering Somalia’s
weak UN-backed government against al-Shabaab’s Mujahidiin which ideally aided
Al-Shabaab to gain support inside Kenya.
The impact to the organization by the killing of Al-shabaab leader has brought several questions including how this will affect the organization’s strategy. there is already a concerns in the ruling arrangements of Alshabaab leader which various
people whether they are in the cell or outside and suggested that he has been in
50
place a system of dictatorship which allow for him to control all governing branches
of the Mujahidiins and such kind of ruling system don’t stay longer with great face
of loss by involved parties. Other most important point to understand is how it will
influence in the horn of Africa region in terms of security and threats that they
could have been pose which ultimately is to shape their capacity.
However following with the lost of reputations since they have been pulled out
from Somali capital of Mogadishu, this will look may be a other significant loss to
the already weakened ALshabaab Mujahidiin as they loss strong and superior leader although the last year rival and internal power struggle led to loss other their
important people and disadvantaged Shabaab for their experienced of battlefield
commanders who would have been valuable in seeing the organization through the
troubles that it now faces after the death of the leader.
However, the expressions concerning to the security in the local and regional, the
capacity would still be there to continue regular assaults and eliminations whereas
the most likely scenario indicates AS is to turning out to be a weak and could start
fighting in each other as they keep on losing the control in the battle increase. On
the other hand, the current speculations and analysis are signifying that AS would
be shaken by power struggle over the selection of the leader and that would perhaps change the alliance and could become allied to the Extremist State groups operating in Syria and Iraq and this new stage might call up a new fresh engagements
and back up from the those revolutionaries.
The security in the region will continue facing challenges posed by threats from ALshabaab even if the leader has been killed even though the general observations
from different ideas entail power struggle within Alshabaab leaders still could make
possible to fall in apparent way. But not in the short to medium term diplomacy
indicate the instantaneous loss of Alshabaab and security to someway made improvements as unpredictability to Somalia in the base of Al-shabaab is potentially
remain high within line to the threats from left elements of Alshabaab Mujahidiins.
The significant to the domestic security situations will maintain to the subject of
innovative attacks aimed at manipulation to the political situations however, the
role of al-Shabaab in Somalia may not receive a great deal of attention comparing
to the past couple of years. Al-Shabaab strongly opposing efforts by the AMISOM
forces for working with the Somali Federal Government, to fashion the national
harmony in Somalia.
The large-scale insecurity caused by the fighting in most significant part of south
central Somalia need yet to be fully understood on its widespread conditions. Despite the loss of the leader, violence between SFG and Al-shabaab militant groups
is to hold back to the civil society. Nevertheless, it’s still though after the loss of
the leader, there is significant fragmentation of the shabaab that can make hinder for them to execute active plans, in view of the fact that any understanding
reached with shabaab leaders may or may not influence the behaviour of individ-
51
ual cells.
After this period, the security situations are to still look under pressure to keep operating despite continues forces from AU troops. The implications after death of
Godane will have different affiliations in the region – horn of Africa which outward
the emerging of conversely the young Jihadist possibly to disconnect into their
main control and pursue to involve more frequent violence and further to occupy a
prominent places in the region to insist on the divergence that exist which needs to
be an alert and address to its fundamental realities and approaches to the security
in the region otherwise to be a question on what security does in the political
struggle in regard to the progressive concerns.
They tend to demonstrate that the nation-state model to promoted security in the
post conflicts in Somalia could still be under question mark. Though with the deteriorated principles from ALshabaab Mujahidiins concerning with the national politics,
cultural unity, and economic homogeneity have still to continue to convey further
challenges against the expected results of stability and peace in Somalia and wider
in the region. Regardless of Alshabaab undermined, the precedent and current
pitfalls in terms of the distribution of power and economic benefits have among
the Somali stakeholders which can be another subject to facilitate further tension
and should brought a new security dilemma.
The high militarisation inhabitants in the region are basis for continued violent conflicts and furthered insecurity. These include human rights atrocities, child conscription and the collapse of state infrastructure. Where there is no discussion
among multiple issues of accountability, flexibility, legitimacy and stability in the
region in wider range. The geophysical conditions, resource scarcity, poverty, socioeconomic inequalities and ethnic hostilities, militarisation, competition for state
power, and also the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies are considerable
factors to potentially influence in any kind of peace adult.
At the end, the picture on the topic of the role of moral principles and conceptions
of the progress regarding security development in Somalia remains critical and
these will more complicates by discoursing in such significant of human security.
This will visioning and shape the radical critiques to say failure of state followed by
neglected to provide for the well-being of populations and attempted to reformulate security to focus on the rights and needs of the people rather than to safeguarding for government remains argue. By convincing to understand how traditional approaches will contribute to the politics and security as of which against
currents issues on the ground will continue hedging. The imperative concerns that
need to develop understanding poli-tics in line with security which still lays interceptive context of specific to recognize and interrogating of the role differ-ences in
security to communicate the effects of the different settings could supplementary
be an apprehension.
http://www.somalicurrent.com/
52
Tunisia
TRAC Focus on Africa: Foreign Jihadist Foot Print (Foreign Fighters and
Supporting Cell Structure)
53
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/
54
Pourquoi les djihadistes s'appellent tous Ansar al-charia
le 06/10/2012
Manifestation de salafistes à Tunis le 17 septembre 2012.
Reuters/Zoubeir Souissi
Une nouvelle tendance émerge dans le monde du djihadisme.
Au lieu d’adopter un nom original, les groupuscules optent de plus en plus pour
«ansar», «défenseurs» en arabe.
Et ils se font souvent appeler «Ansar al-charia» (défenseurs de la loi islamique);
cette dénomination exprime leur volonté d’établir des Etats islamiques.
Ces groupuscules partagent certes le même nom et la même idéologie, mais ils ne
disposent pas d’une structure unifiée de commandement, et n’ont même pas de
chef commun —contrairement au commandement central d’al-Qaida (ou ce qu’il
en reste) — qui serait basé au Pakistan.
Ils se battent dans des régions différentes, et utilisent des méthodes différentes —
mais pour la même cause. C'est là, une approche mieux adaptée aux incertitudes
nées des soulèvements arabes.
Ansar al-charia, un nom à la mode
L’appellation Ansar al-charia s’est invitée dans l’actualité au lendemain de la récente attaque du consulat américain de Benghazi (Libye): l’organisation locale Katibat Ansar al-charia (bataillon des défenseurs de la charia, Ndlr) a été accusée de
l’avoir fomentée (ce qu’elle nie).
De nombreux journalistes semblent avoir confondu l’Ansar al-Charia de Benghazi
avec une autre organisation libyenne du même nom, basée à Derna.
55
En réalité, c’est au Yémen que l’appellation a gagné en popularité -—et ce depuis
la fondation, en avril 2011, du groupe-écran Ansar al-charia par al-Qaida dans la
péninsule arabique (AQPA), branche locale —puissante et ambitieuse— de l’organisation terroriste.
Le nom est peut-être né des réflexions d’Oussama Ben Laden, qui envisageait de
donner une nouvelle image à al-Qaida.
Dans les documents prélevés au sein de la base de l’ex-chef d’al-Qaida, Ansar Alcharia ne figure par dans la liste des exemples de noms potentiels.
Plus récemment, l’un des idéologues djihadistes les plus influents, Shaykh Abou al
-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, a donné son aval à cette nouvelle vague de groupuscules
Ansar al-charia.
Shinquiti, qui est d’origine mauritanienne, a publié un article à la mi-juin:
«Nous sommes Ansar al-charia.»
Il appelle les musulmans à établir leurs propres «dawa» (prédications, Ndlr) Ansar
al-charia dans leurs pays respectifs, avant de s’unir pour former un conglomérat.
Précisons néanmoins que la plupart des groupes Ansar al-charia se sont formés
avant cette intervention. Les plus importants d’entre eux sont basés au Yemen,
en Tunisie et en Libye; de nouvelles versions, d’importance plus modeste, ont
aussi vu le jour en Egypte et au Maroc.
Le djihad multipolaire
L’essor de ces organisations témoigne d'un déclin du djihad international unipolaire d’al-Qaida —qui a dominé la dernière décennie— et d'un retour à une djihadosphère multipolaire semblable à celle des années 1990.
A une différence près —et elle est de taille: l’idéologie qui anime les groupes djihadistes d’aujourd’hui est plus homogène.
Dans les années 1990, l’approche et l’action des djihadistes se cantonnaient à
leur sphère locale; aujourd’hui, nombre de terroristes développent un discours
international tout en agissant à l’échelle locale.
Par ailleurs, ces groupes plus récents sont plus disposés à fournir des services et
des structures de gouvernance aux peuples musulmans.
Il est crucial d’établir une distinction entre ces différents groupes, afin de mieux
comprendre le nouveau paysage du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du Nord: mieux
comprendre aussi la trajectoire des nouvelles organisations salafistes et dji
hadistes (qui n’ont pas toutes adopté les stratégies et les tactiques d’al-Qaïda).
Il n’existe certes aucun lien (formel ou opérationnel) connu entre ces organisations disparates, mais il est possible qu’elles tentent de se rapprocher à l’avenir
affinité idéologique, objectifs similaires .
Il est toutefois trop tôt pour voir en elles une entité unique. Voici un guide des
56
organisations ayant adopté ce nom.
Ansar al-charia au Yémen
Les autres groupes Ansar Al-charia n’ont aucun lien opérationnel répertorié avec al
-Qaida, mais Ansar al-Charia au Yémen (ACY) est au cœur du projet de changement
d’image d’AQPA.
En avril 2011, Shaykh Abu Zubayr Adil ben Abdullah Al-Abab, principale figure religieuse d’AQPA, a fait état de ce changement pour la première fois, expliquant:
«Ansar al-charia est le nom que nous utilisons pour nous présenter dans les régions
où nous désirons expliquer le sens de notre action et la nature de nos objectifs.»
Depuis, le groupe s’est mué en acteur local de premier plan dans le sud du Yémen,
où, à la fin du printemps 2011, il a conquis des territoires dans les gouvernorats
d’Abyan et de Shabwa pour y fonder un émirat islamique.
Il ne l'a abandonné qu’en juin 2012, à la suite d’une contre-offensive orchestrée
par le gouvernement yéménite et les milices locales —soutenue par des attaques
aériennes américaines.
ACY a alors été chassé des zones urbaines, mais il n’a pas disparu et reviendra sans
doute à la charge.
La plus grande réussite d’ACY fut sa capacité à fournir divers services, comblant le
vide créé par le gouvernement —qui ne peut (ou ne veut) remplir son rôle.
Dans ses bulletins d’information et sa série de vidéos intitulée Regard sur les évènements diffusée via son service de presse, la Madad News Agency l’ CY se vante
d’avoir assuré la fourniture en électricité et en eau ainsi que la sécurité, la justice et
l’éducation.
Le maintien de l’ordre assuré par ACY était certes fondé sur une interprétation restreinte et stricte de la charia, mais il incarnait une structure de gouvernance, et, de
ce fait, était relativement populaire.
Le message extrémiste d’ACY ne soulève peut-être pas l’enthousiasme dans des
villes comme Azzan ou Zinjibar, mais des citoyens en proie à la détresse pourraient
néanmoins se réjouir du retour du groupe.
Ansar al-charia en Tunisie
En mars 2011, après la chute du president Zine El-Abdine Ben Ali, le gouvernement
de transition a gracié des prisonniers politiques et des personnes accusées de terrorisme.
Sayf Allah ben Hussayn (mieux connu sous le nom d’Abou Iyyadh Al-Tunisi) était
parmi eux; il avait co-fondé le Groupe combattant tunisien en fghanistan, groupe
qui avait facilité l’organisation de l’assassinat d’Ahmad Shah Messud, deux jours
avant les attaques du 11-Septembre.
A sa sortie de prison, Abou Iyyadh organisa la première de ses conférences
57
aujourd’hui annuelles ; c’est ainsi qu’ nsar al-charia en Tunisie
CT vit le jour.
En 2011, la conférence n’avait attiré que quelques centaines de participants; on en
a compté plus de dix mille en 2012. On peut en conclure que sa popularité a grandi,
mais qu’elle demeure néanmoins marginale.
Depuis sa création, ACT est animé par une idéologie schizophrénique: il appelle le
peuple à suivre la «véritable» voie de l’Islam en Tunisie, tout en incitant les individus à rejoindre le djihad en terre étrangère.
ACT n’a pas revendiqué les attaques qui ont récemment visé l’ambassade, mais il
semble qu’un grand nombre de ses membres aient —à tout le moins— participé
aux manifestations.
L’ACT a trempé dans plusieurs actions salafistes plus agressives, qui affectent la Tunisie depuis un an et demi —on peut notamment citer le «jour de colère» qui a suivi la diffusion du film Persepolis par une cha ne locale.
Plusieurs membres de l’ACT ont participé aux attaques contre l’ambassade américaine de Tunis et l’école américaine voisine. Comme ACY, ACT a offert divers services dans un grand nombre de villes tunisiennes: eau, vêtements, cadeaux du ramadan…
Ansar al-charia en Libye
En Libye, plusieurs groupes utilisent une variante de l’appellation Ansar al-Charia.
Parmi les groupes les plus influents, on peut notamment citer Katibat Ansar alCharia à Benghazi (ACB), considéré comme le principal suspect des attaques du
consulat, et Ansar al-charia à Derna (ACD), plus secrète, dirigée par Abou Sufyan
ben Qumu (ancien détenu de Guantánamo).
Les deux organisations ont vu le jour après la mort de l’ex-dirigeant libyen, Mouammar Kadhafi, mais elles ne sont pas liées.
ACB a annoncé sa création en février 2012 , et il est dirigé par Muhammad AlZahawi, ancien détenu d’Abou Salim, l’infâme prison de Kadhafi.
ACB a organisé une conférence en juin, et espère en faire un rendez-vous annuel;
l’évènement a attiré un millier de participants, parmi lesquels les membres de milices plus modestes, qui appellent toutes à la mise en œuvre de la charia par le gouvernement libyen.
A l’image de l’ansar al-charia tunisien, ACB rend des services à la population locale.
Les membres d’ACB ont dégagé et réparé des routes, ont aidé le peuple pendant le
ramadan, et assuraient il y a peu la sécurité dans un hôpital de Benghazi.
Le groupe admet avoir détruit des sanctuaires et des tombes soufies à Benghazi,
mais il tente de s’attirer le soutien d’une catégorie bien spécifique de la population
en défendant une interprétation des plus strictes de l’Islam, tout en aidant la communauté à faire face aux besoins les plus pressants.
58
Les déclarations du groupe ont évolué: elles sous-entendaient d’abord que certains
de ses membres avaient participé à l’attaque à titre individuel, puis ont nié en bloc
toute implication.
ACB semble donc comprendre qu’elle a dépassé les bornes, et tente visiblement de
sauver sa réputation.
Ansar al-charia en Egypte et au Maroc
Contrairement aux organisations du Yémen, de Tunisie et de Libye, Ansar al-Charia
en Egypte (ACE) n’a pas annoncé sa création en tant que groupe organisé sur le terrain —et la création du groupe marocain n’a été annoncée que récemment.
Pour l’heure, ACE n’a utilisé l’appellation Ansar al-charia qu’en ligne, dans les docu
ments relayés par la Al-Bayyan Media Foundation, liée à l’idéologue djihadiste
Shaykh Ahmad Ashush.
Ce dernier a récemment diffusé une fatwa appelant à l'assassinat des créateurs du
film L'innocence des musulmans.
Voilà bien longtemps qu’Ashush est impliqué dans le mouvement djihadiste: il a
participé au djihad antisoviétique dans les années 1980, et a appartenu au Djihad
islamique égyptien (JIE).
Il a été arrêté au début des années 1990 lors d’un coup de filet antiterroriste visant
cent-cinquante membres du JIE, et ne fut libéré qu’après la chute du régime d’Hosni Moubarak.
Si l’on en croit les éléments qui sont en notre possession, il est trop tôt pour qualifier ACE de groupe à part entière.
Ansar al-Charia au Maghreb (ACM) est une organisation naissante, uniquement intéressée par la prédication (dawa). Dans sa première —et unique— déclaration,
ACM affirme ne pas être affilié aux groupes du Yémen, de Tunisie, de Libye et
d’Egypte.
La raison d’être d’ACM est de prêcher la parole et la loi de Dieu, de fournir une aide
économique et sociale aux démunis, de dénoncer la décadence de l’Occident - et
d’arracher la société aux griffes de ce dernier.
Et tout comme l’ensemble des groupes radicaux utilisant l’appellation Ansar AlCharia, il serait sage de la surveiller avec la plus grande vigilance.
AARON Y. ZELIN (Traduit par Jean-Clément Nau)
Foreign Policy
http://www.slateafrique.com/
59
Terrorism in the World
France
Menaces terroristes: 30 pays à risque
23/09/2014
Une carte du Sahel diffusée le 22 septembre 2014 sur le site du Quai d'Orsay. En
orange, les pays où les déplacements sont déconseillés sauf raison impérative. En
rouge, les pays où les déplacements sont fortement déconseillés. - © Quai d'Orsay
Le Quai d'Orsay a appelé les Français à renforcer leur vigilance dans une trentaine
de pays, notamment au Maghreb et dans toute la région sahélienne.
C'est une conséquence directe de l'enlèvement d'un ressortissant français en lgé
rie, dimanche, et des menaces des jihadistes. Les Français résidant ou étant amenés à se déplacer dans une trentaine de pays ont été appelés à "la plus grande prudence" après les menaces de l'Etat islamique (également appelé "Daesh" visant les
ressortissants occidentaux et notamment français, a indiqué le ministère français
des Affaires étrangères, lundi.
Consignes aux ambassades
A la demande du chef de la diplomatie Laurent Fabius, le Quai d'Orsay a transmis
cette consigne à ses ambassades "dans une trentaine de pays" qui l'ont répercutée
auprès des Français y habitant ou en séjour, notamment au Maghreb, au MoyenOrient et en Afrique subsaharienne, a-t-on ajouté de même source.
"Les Français installés dans les pays concernés ont été invités à se signaler au con
60
sulat de France le plus proche si ce n'est pas déjà fait. Les Français de passage sont,
quant à eux, invités à se faire connaître en s'inscrivant en ligne" via le système
Ariane du ministère, a indiqué le Quai d'Orsay dans un communiqué.
Maghreb et Sahel
Au Maghreb, la consigne a notamment été diffusée au Maroc, en Algérie et en Tunisie. Les pays comme le Yémen, le Mali et les autres faisant partie de la bande sahélienne figurent aussi parmi les tats où les Français sont concernés par la con
signe, a-t-on précisé au ministère français des Affaires étrangères.
Sur le site internet du ministère, pour le Maroc, il est ainsi écrit que "dans le contexte de l'intervention contre Daesh de la coalition internationale, les Français résidant ou de passage dans le pays sont invités à renforcer leur vigilance". En Tunisie,
autre exemple, l'ambassade de France a appelé lundi ses ressortissants à "la plus
grande prudence" en raison des menaces formulées par l'Etat islamique (EI).
"Suite aux dernières menaces visant les Français, l'ambassade appelle à la plus
grande prudence et à une vigilance renforcée", est-il indiqué dans un SMS envoyé
par la représentation diplomatique. L'ambassade n'a pas fait état de menaces spécifiques contre les intérêts ou les citoyens français en Tunisie.
Lundi, l'organisation Etat islamique a appelé les musulmans à tuer des citoyens,
notamment américains et français, des pays formant la coalition internationale
mise en place pour combattre le groupe jihadiste en Irak et en Syrie.
Le Quai d'Orsay recommande aux Français de renforcer leur vigilance dans une
trentaine de pays, notamment dans la zone sahélienne.
http://www.bfmtv.com/
61
Menaces contre la France : "L'EI a décidé d’exporter le conflit en Occident"
22/09/2014
© AFP | Des jihadistes de l'EI.
La France est désormais directement dans le viseur des jihadistes de l’organisation
de l’État islamique qui ont appelé, lundi, les musulmans à tuer des Français et des
Occidentaux, "partout et n’importe comment". Décryptage.
L’organisation de l’État islamique (EI) a déclaré la guerre à la France et à l’Occident.
Abou Mohammed al-Adnani, le porte-parole de ce groupe jihadiste qui sévit en Syrie et en Irak, a appelé dans un message audio les musulmans à tuer partout et "de
n'importe quelle manière des infidèles ", des Français, des Américains, des Australiens et des Canadiens. Soit des ressortissants des principaux pays de la coalition
internationale contre l’EI. Cet appel intervient quelques jours après les premiers
raids aériens menés par la France contre des cibles de cette organisation ultraradicale dans le nord de l'Irak.
Fustigeant cet "appel au meurtre", le ministre français de l'Intérieur, Bernard Cazeneuve, a réagi aux menaces proférées par l’EI, lors d'une brève conférence de
presse place Beauvau lundi 22 septembre, en affirmant que "la France n'a pas
peur". "M me si le risque zéro n'existe pas, nous prenons aujourd'hui 100 % de
précautions", a-t-il indiqué.
Wassim Nasr, journaliste à France 24 et spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes, décrypte l’ampleur et la portée de cette menace.
La France a été désignée comme une cible prioritaire par l’EI. Pourquoi ?
Wassim Nasr : La France est clairement devenue une cible privilégiée des jihadistes
62
de l’EI en réponse directe aux raids aériens de l’armée française qui ont visé un site
de l’EI en Irak. Pour les jihadistes, ces bombardements ont changé la donne et la
France est considérée, de la même manière que les États-Unis, comme l’ennemi
mortel des jihadistes.
Il s’agit d’un changement de stratégie radical, car jusqu’ici, l’EI se contentait d’appeler ses sympathisants occidentaux à venir rejoindre ses rangs en Syrie et en Irak.
Or dans ce message audio, l’EI les appelle pour la première fois à passer à l’action
en Occident. Ainsi, les Français et plus généralement les Occidentaux de confession
musulmane sont priés de défendre l’État islamique chez eux, à domicile, en assassinant par tout moyen des civils ou des militaires non musulmans. C’est une évolution importante de leur méthode et c’est surtout une menace sérieuse pour la
France car n’importe qui, aujourd’hui, pourra suivre cette consigne et agir n’importe où au nom de l’EI.
Comment faut-il interpréter un tel message ? Quel est le but de l’EI ?
L’idée principale, derrière ce message, c’est que les jihadistes veulent faire savoir
que la guerre ne va pas se limiter à la Syrie et à l’Irak, comme l’ont décrété les puissances occidentales. Ils veulent définir eux-mêmes le théâtre de cette confrontation avec les Occidentaux. En envoyant un tel message, qui consiste finalement à
dire "nous avons décidé d’exporter le conflit chez vous", ils indiquent qu’il s’agit
désormais d’une guerre transfrontalière. Le but est de créer un sentiment de psychose et de suspicion au sein des sociétés occidentales dans le but d’y créer des
troubles et d’alimenter un climat de terreur suffisant afin que les opinions publiques se retournent contre leurs gouvernements.
Comment les services de renseignements peuvent-ils faire face à une telle menace ?
Il s’agit d’un travail difficile puisque par définition il est question d’une menace
diffuse et dématérialisée qui s’adresse à qui veut l’entendre, sans qu’aucune cible
précise ne soit désignée. Ce qui fait qu’à l’échelle de la France, Paris n’est pas la
seule ville à être sous la menace, comme lorsque le danger était incarné par AlQaïda, qui misait sur des attentats qu’elle voulait spectaculaires. En effet, l’EI appelle à frapper partout où il est possible de le faire, à chaque coin de rue, et avec
les moyens à disposition.
En outre, les individus les plus dangereux, susceptibles d’agir en loups solitaires, ne
sont pas ceux qui sont actuellement présents en Syrie et en Irak, et qui cherchent à
y rester pour y mourir en martyr. Ceux-là sont presque tous déjà pistés et identifiés
par les services occidentaux. Non, les plus dangereux sont ceux qui n’ont pas encore franchi le pas et qui par définition sont très difficiles à surveiller puisqu’ils ne
sont pas connus par les renseignements.
http://www.france24.com/fr/
63
Indonesia
The Islamic State Comes to Indonesia
17 September 2014
The world's largest Muslim country is a vast recruiting ground for radical jihadists.
But the government has done a surprisingly good job of containing the Caliphate - so far.
JAKARTA, Indonesia — One day in July, worshippers gathered in a small mosque on
the outskirts of Malang, a mid-sized Indonesian city, to learn about the achievements of the latest Sunni insurgency halfway across the world. The meeting, which
was organized by Ansharul Khilafah, a local hardline Islamic organization, came one
month after fighters from the Islamic State (IS) made headlines after routing Iraqi
security forces in Mosul. During the event, the hosts showed a video highlighting
IS's military gains in Iraq and Syria, and distributed Islamic propaganda magazines.
Aji Prase, a local who attended the event, worried that IS was growing in the region. "We don't want Malang to be [IS] headquarters, because this would only
bring violence here," he told the Indonesian newspaper the Jakarta lobe.
By September, it had become clear that Prase's worries would not be realized. After
local authorities learned about the July event, they reported it to the regional government and Jakarta. Police began monitoring the mosque to ensure there would
be no more IS events, and when supporters of Ansharul Khilafah attempted to
stage a meeting at a different Malang mosque in late July, the mosque's administrators turned them away, and called IS a "radical group." The tone in Malang had
been set; by early August, Nahdlatul Ulama, the most prominent Muslim organization in the area, condemned IS and announced a program to "prevent radicalization."
64
As IS battles for territory in the Middle East, the group is also fighting for hearts and
minds in Indonesia. In recent months,
IS propaganda, urging Indonesians to support the militants' cause in the Middle
East, has spreadthroughout the archipelago
IS propaganda, urging Indonesians to support the militants' cause in the Middle
East, has spreadthroughout the archipelago via social media and local radical
groups. The government has responded decisively. In early August, Jakarta enlisted
Indonesia's most respected Muslim authorities to denounce the organization, and
has banned Youtube videos that endorse the jihadis. Outgoing President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono has been outspoken in rejecting the group -- he banned it,
called it "embarrassing" to Islam, and arrested Indonesians suspected of providing
support for IS.
In late August, the government tightened security around Borobudur, the world's
largest Buddhist monument, after intelligence suggested that militants linked to IS
were targeting it. On Sept. 13, Indonesian police arrested seven suspected militants, including four foreigners, onsuspicion that they were linked to IS. So far, the
government's efforts seem to have been surprisingly effective: Jakarta estimates that there are only 60 Indonesian fighters for IS.
From Southeast Asia to Western Europe, governments are increasingly concerned
about the growing number of radicalized Muslim youth traveling to fight with IS
and other insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq. The British government estimates that
some 500 of its citizens -- including the suspected killer of the American journalists
James Foley and Steven Sotloff -- have joined militant groups in the Middle East.
Anestimated 300 Australians are on the frontlines in the region. Worried that fighters will return home and commit acts of terror, governments across the globe are
scrambling to intercept potential combatants.
Indonesia, though, is at particular risk. The Southeast Asian nation of roughly 250
million people has the world's largest Muslim population, and more Muslim men
under the age of 30 than any nation except Pakistan. Nearly 80 percent of the
country's Internet users are pluggedinto social media -- which is the main venue
where IS works to recruit them.
The country is also contending with its own version of homegrown radicalism. Sunni extremist groups have carried out dozens of domestic acts of terror, including
the 2002 bombing on the tourist island of Bali, which killed more than 200 people,
mostly foreigners. These organizations have also been implicated in brutal attacks
on religious minorities, attacking churches, Shiite mosques, and Buddhist temples.
There has been a steady uptick in the number of these attacks: The Jakartabased Setara Institute, which monitors religious violence in Indonesia, documented
220 religiously motivated attacks in 2013, up from 91 cases in 2007.
But the Islamic State is a particularly potent threat. In July, a recruitmentvideo, fea-
65
turing a charismatic Indonesian named Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi fighting with
the Islamic State in Syria, trended on social media, encouraging Indonesians to join
the jihad. On July 14, newspapersreported that prominent Indonesian extremists -most notably Abu Bakar Bashir, the influential leader of the radical group Jamaah
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) -- swore oaths to IS.
Indonesian law enforcement officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity,
report that over the last few months, these radical Islamic groups have been aggressively recruiting on behalf of IS across the country. Organizations that support
IS "have held events in over 50 cities [throughout Indonesia] to get funds, with a
secret motive to attract young able-bodied young men to Syria," a high-level law
enforcement official said. "They are focusing on solidifying their strength in Indonesia."
By early August, however, Jakarta began to counter the new group's popularity. IS
supporters were arrested and the YouTube recruitment videos were taken down.
The government announced that training programs would be implemented in
mosques and Islamic boarding schools throughout the country so that young Indonesians could identify and reject IS propaganda. The Ministry of Religious Affairs,
which oversees the country's religious institutions, began mobilizing the leaders of
major Muslim organizations to reject the group. Dr. Din Syamsuddin, chairman of
the Indonesian Ulema Council, the country's highest clerical body, condemned IS,
saying that "[t]here is no obligation in the Quran for Muslims to set up an Islamic
state or a caliphate." Local preachers from areas where IS has a presence joined in
the condemnations. "They are threatening Islam as a religion," Muhammad Iqbal
Bahari, a cleric based just outside of Jakarta, told a local news site in September.
"Their place is not here."
The injunctions by religious leaders have dissuaded many youth from joining the
movement, says Rasyid, the head of a Muslim student organization in Malang. Devout, but also social media savvy, young Indonesians involved in student religious
groups would seem to be the ideal target for recruitment. But according to Rasyid,
who declined to provide his last name, now that the nation's Muslim leadership
has condemned IS, nobody in his organization supports it.
And while the roughly 60 Indonesians fighting with IS in Iraq and Syria all have links
to extremist groups back home, the government has pressured well-known local
radical groups to distance themselves from IS. Mochammad Achmad, the acting
leader of JAT -- the extremist Muslim group whose jailed founder recently declared his support for the caliphate -- has said that he will leave JAT and form a
new organization, along with his 3,000 members, to avoid being considered part of
IS. Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), another domestic radical group, released a statement on August 10 saying that it does not support IS, and opposes the killing of
"fellow Muslims."
This is the case of the dog that didn't bark," said David Malet, associate director
66
of the Melbourne School of Government in Australia and author of Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts. "You've had [thousands] of foreign
fighters in Iraq the last three and a half years, and just a couple dozen Indonesian
fighters."
Though the numbers are low, Indonesian law enforcement officials worry they
won't stay that way. "You can't compare how dangerous the situation is for Indonesian and Western nations," the high-level law enforcement official said. His worries
echo those of Andreas Harsono, the Indonesia researcher at Human Rights Watch,
who says that IS propaganda greatly appeals to Indonesian militants. "Many Muslims dream of seeing an Islamic caliphate. The fact that hardline Indonesian militants like Bashir have pledged support for IS says a lot about the power of symbolism of the group."
The IS threat is still nascent and the group's influence could grow in the archipelago. But, so far, the government's efforts seem to have resonated. By educating the
nation's youth and marshalling moderate Muslim voices, the government has undercut the influence of IS and those loyal to it. Rasyid said that no members of his
organization would join IS now that Muslim leaders have explained how violent the
jihadi group is. "The Islamic State" in Indonesia, Rasyid said, "will not grow."
In July, IS supporters targeted Emilia Az, the coordinator of OASE, an organization
that represents Shiite women in Indonesia. They harassed her in the streets and
sent her threatening text messages. Then, in August, after the government banned
IS, she noticed that the text messages local extremists sent her were missing a key
prop. "Now when they send me threatening messages on Blackberry, they have
stopped posing with ISIS flags," she said. It's still far from an ideal situation, but it's
an improvement. "The ban has had an effect," she said. "The movement is really
slowing."
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
67
Iraq
The Islamic State: The Case for Expanding the Air War – Cordesman
September 25, 2014
Editor’s Note:
In a report this week the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy, Dr. Anthony Cordesman,
has presented the case for expanding
the ongoing air war against the Islamic
State.
“..These risks combine with the military
necessity to support the President’s decision to escalate the air war, and to escalate it further in the future. The United States needed to act far more decisively than it had to date, it could not
afford to wait for either political or military reasons, and the risks were certain
to grow if it did not take stronger military action.”
This is the latest addition to a vast collection of insightful and comprehensive assessments produced by Dr. Cordesman.
SUSRIS is pleased to have assembled many of his reports and briefings for your reference.
The Islamic State: The Case for Expanding the Air War
by Anthony H. Cordesman
September 23, 2014
No action the United States and President Obama takes can eliminate the fact that
the campaign against the Islamic State involves major risks, many of which are beyond U.S. control:
he ck o r i unit . The uncertain change in the Iraqi government, the high risk
it may not be able to bring its Sunnis back into a workable government and the
divisions between Arab and Kurd.
he ck o n e ecti e mi o r i round orces. The steadily increasing evidence
that the Iraqi Forces are militarily ineffective, that nearly half may need to be
written off and the other half will take months to years to be effective. The uncertain ability to bring back Sunnis into a new National Guard. The grave weaknesses in the Kurdish peshmerga caused by a lack of training, equipment, and
the near bankruptcy of the Kurdish Regional Government.
68
he e kness o moder te ri n o osition orces nd the risk th t ss d nd
ri
s mist e tremist orces ike the
usr ront i ene t rom ir
cks on the s mic t te in ri . There is no good option for Syria, only a
least bad one, and efforts to try to build a moderate political and military opposition will probably take years and only succeed if the Assad government
and other opposition factions largely self-destruct.
he uncert in ro e o
ies. Some regional allies like Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE, and European allies like Britain and France can be counted on if
the US shows it is truly committed and will listen as well as lead. Qatar seem to
be shifting away from Islamist causes and towards the alliance, but this is uncertain. Turkey and Erdogan stick out as a de facto non-ally, still willing to play
games with the Islamic State in order to limit pressure from the Kurds and
keep up pressure on Assad.
Pressure nd o ortunism rom ussi r n nd to some e tent hin . Russia
and Iran can be counted on to try to use the crisis to support Assad, embarrass
the United States, and advanced their own interests and influence in spite of
the threat they face from the Islamic State. China’s role is more uncertain.
ck o c e r intern tion su ort nd cohesi e e orts to h t the o o
mone nd o unteers nd tr de and the broader lack of any cohesive effort
by Islamic states and main stream Islam to confront the ideological and politic
challenge of Islamist extremism. The UN meeting may help, and key states like
Saudi Arabia and Egypt have stepped up their efforts to deal with the religious
challenge, but the civil and religious aspects of the alliance remain weak.
Once all of that is said, however, these risks combine with the military necessity to
support the President’s decision to escalate the air war, and to escalate it further
in the future. The United States needed to act far more decisively than it had to
date, it could not afford to wait for either political or military reasons, and the risks
were certain to grow if it did not take stronger military action.
here
s hum nit ri n necessit . Quite aside from strategy and warfighting,
people matter. The crisis with Turkey’s Kurds and other Syrians, and the continuing murders of the innocent required decisive action.
he s mic t te s ins h d s o ed ut it
s sti
innin in s ite o . . c ose
ir su ort nd dded d isors nd e ui ment tr ns ers. It was still making
limited gains on the Western fringes of Baghdad, putting major pressure on the
Iraqi Kurds and creating a humanitarian nightmare for Syria’s Kurds. Air and
cruise missile power were the only way to compensate for the current weaknesses of local ground forces, and check the humanitarian disaster along the
Syrian Turkish border.
sc
tin the ir
r
s the on
in the risk o re in on e k r
to
ck the s mic t te ithout t k
i nd orces nd ein seen s t kin t k
69
in sides.Even a massive rise in U.S. military aid would have taken months to
have a major impact on Iraq’s forces before they were cleaned up and reorganized, and could easily have led to the forces getting such aid using it for sectarian or ethnic gains. Moreover, this level of U.S. action shows the new Iraqi
government it has a real incentive to reach a national consensus and the United
States will react accordingly.
itin to use str te ic nd interdiction
cks in ri nd r
e the s mic
t te more o ortunit to dis erse nd m de the . . e ort seem e k nd
uncert in. The United States had not reported on the details of its air strikes to
date, but it was clear that most were close air support, designed to reduce Islamic state pressure on threatened towns and forces, or attack advancing Islamist State forces.
he ch n e in the n ture o the ir nd missi e c m i n
s critic to m kin it
e ecti e. Using air and missile power to degrade and cripple the Islamic State
requires a massive interdiction bombing campaign to attack its entire military
structure, and precision strategic bombing to attack its leadership and its key
sources of money and communications. It requires targeted attacks on all centers where foreign volunteers operate, and the same kind of broad bombing
campaign that took place in Libya to deny it the ability to move forces with
heavy weapons, armor, and “technicals.” Moreover, the long the United States
waited, the more time the Islamic State had to disperse key military assets and
embed its leaders and forces in the civilian population.
sc
tin no sho ed the nited t tes
s re
serious. It was critical for the
United States to prove that this time it actually meant what it said. The United
States had to prove it would really act. It was critical to reducing the distrust
coming out of previous U.S. indecisiveness over Syria, withdrawal from Iraq,
and Arab concerns the United States was tilting towards Iran. It meant leadership and decisiveness.
sc
tin no sho ed the nited t tes h d re re ion
nd orei n
ies. Action by a key European ally like France—and by key Arab allies like Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—showed the U.S. effort to create an
alliance was real, ended the Islamist State’s ability to claim that the fight was
fought by foreign and crusader forces, and effectively showed that this was an
international effort, not simply a U.S. one.
t e ecti e
reem ted the de te in the
. Syria, Russia, (and Iran and China?)
can still complain, but the United States has already forced the issue of using
enough force to have some chance of success, and complaints about a lack of
consultation with the Assad government and American unilateralism are not
more likely to be seen as obstructions in the broader and vital effort to create
more unity in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamic State and the broader threat posed by terrorism and religious and ethnic extremism.
70
t ut re
ressure on uncert in ies ike
t r nd urke . Qatar seems to be
changing and to understand that backing Islamist extremist causes will not protect it from the reality that such causes do not see any moderate Arab or Islamic regimes as anything other than illegitimate and a target, but the US has put
needed pressure on the regime. Turkey needs to see that it is isolated, that its
façade of alliance needs to be replaced with the reality, and it cannot play the
Islamic State off against the Kurds or Assad without real pressure from the United States and other neighboring states.
It should be stressed that this is only a beginning in a campaign that may well take
years, where lasting success is uncertain, and there are certain to be reversals and
times when pursuing the least bad option means aiding one threat at the cost of
another. It is unclear that preempting the UN will lead to any cohesive action by
that body, and it is unclear how decisive the air campaign that follows will be. But
the Congress, the American people, and the world have seen the United States
take a key step forward and it should be recognized as such.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private,
tax-exempt institution focusing
on international public policy
issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS
does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views,
positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author
(s). © 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Comments and possible additions to this report would be greatly appreciated and
should be sent to acordesman gmail.com.
© 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
http://susris.com/
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The Jihadists' Promise: Power over Death
September 23, 2014
Jihadi violence serves not only to advance the terrorist's delusion of immortality,
but also to add, however perversely, an apparent and desperately needed erotic
satisfaction, using religion as the justification.
Persuasive promises of immortality -- the desperate hope to live forever -- underlie
virtually all major religions.
Washington and Jerusalem should finally address what needs to be done in addition to military remediation -- reinforcing efforts to convince these terrorists that
their expected martyrdom is ultimately just an elaborate fiction.
Even after witnessing several beheadings and mass executions, American and
Western strategists dealing with Jihadist terror still miss the key point. Whatever
the particular terrorist group of the moment -- the Islamic State [IS or ISIS], Hamas,
al-Qaeda, or some other kindred terror organization -- the core struggle is never
really about territory, geography, or democracy. Always -- in Iraq, Afghanistan Syria, or Gaza -- this enemy seeks something far more important and compelling. In
essence, Jihadi violence serves not only to advance the terrorist's delusion of immortality, but also to add, however perversely, an apparent and desperately needed erotic satisfaction, using religion as the justification.
This core point is not difficult to understand. Persuasive promises of immortality -the desperate hope to live forever -- underlie virtually all major religions. Yet this
point remains neglected or misunderstood in Washington, Jerusalem, and all other
Western capitals.
The Jihadi terrorist claims to "love death," but in his or her mind, that "suicide" is
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anything but final. Ironically, these Islamist terrorists aim to conquer mortality by
"killing themselves." The would-be killer has been promised that death will represent just a trivial and momentary inconvenience, a minor detour on just one more
glorious "martyr's" fiery trajectory toward a life everlasting, in Paradise.
How can one ever hope to counter such a seductive promise? How can any promise
compete with the incomparable promise of immortality?
The answer has little or nothing to do with currently envisioned applications of military force, whether as so-called "boots on the ground," or as aerial bombardments.
If the problem of IS and other terrorist groups were just military, the associated
threat could be solved by military acts. But as Islamist violence is expected to lead
to promised martyrdom, the Jihadist terrorist will not be deterred by any threats of
military reprisal.
In both conception and execution, Jihadist terror has little to do with land or politics or strategy. Rather, it is a routinely predictable and repetitive expression of
"sacredness through violence" --- taking pleasure in inflicting harm on assorted
"unbelievers," and then justifying it as doctrinally-based religious belief. This expanding network of carefully planned and staged homicides represents a current
form of religious fervor: religious sacrifice, agrotesque practice that stems from pre
-modern Islamic customs, which conveniently link each blessed suicide's
"martyrdom" with a selected victim's ritual slaughter.
What about diplomatic solutions? As such sacrificial violence expresses "death for
Allah", there can never be any room for meaningful negotiations. For America and
the West, there will never be any advantages to concessions or compromises, especially if they are sequential.
There also should never be any expectations of reciprocity. If, for example, Israel
were to offer any further territorial surrenders to Hamas, the Palestinian Authority,
or Islamic Jihad, there could be no plausible hope for any suitablequid pro quo. The
surrenders would be for nothing. In all likelihood, they will only be encouraged and
strengthened by repeated and one-sided territorial surrenders and prisoner exchanges, such as the sorts of concessions made regularly (and foolishly) by Israel.
The connection between Islamist sacrifice and political violence has a long history,
including links to ancient Greece. There, Plutarch's Sayings of Spartan Mothers revealed the model female parent as one who had reared her sons expressly for
civic sacrifice.
The deepest roots of all Jihadist terror -- whether from Iraq, Syria, "Palestine" or
elsewhere -- originate, at least in part, from contemporary cultures that enthusiastically embrace similar views of sacrifice.
To us, in the West, these hopes may sound silly. Still, in this particular sphere of
world politics, there can be no greater power -- or illusion -- than power over
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death.
Martyrdom operations, based upon a long-codified Muslim scripture, have been
associated with Jihad since the beginnings of Islam. Jubilant, celebratory invocations for this twisted and prohibited-by-international-law species of warfare can be
found in the Koran and also in the Hadith, the presumptively authoritative acts and
sayings of Muhammad.
For the U.S., Europe, and Israel, the security implications of any doctrine fusing religion, erotic passion, and violence warrant a closer look.
The implications for policy mean that our current and projected wars, including the
well-intentioned presidential plan to "degrade" and "destroy" IS, are partially beside the point. Those responses are directed more at the symptoms of a pathology
than replacing the underlying disease itself. Regrettably, they are unlikely to make
any substantial dent in Jihadist thinking. Any effect on the desire of Jihadists to inflict harm may be only minimal.
A really good strategy needs to begin at the conceptual or psychological level. It is
actually the Jihadists' fear of death that leads them to suicide, always in the hope
that any short-term "dying" -- the vainglorious fantasy that "martyring" themselves
-- will enable them to live forever in Paradise, and as beloved heroes on Earth.
While Washington and Jerusalem seek "peace" -- an end to bloodshed -- as their
overriding objective, these faith-driven adversaries appear to see "peace" as merely a pretext. Their real objective is jihadist victory over "unbelievers," on the
blessed road to a global caliphate.
This asymmetric view puts us all at a grievous disadvantage. While our Jihadist foes
get ready for Paradise, by the slaughter of "infidels," our own political leaders seem
to remain blithely unaware of -- or in denial about -- their enemies' fusion of sacredness with violence.
Among more "normal" conflict scenarios, America, Europe and Israel now need to
consider mega-threats of both unconventional war and unconventional terrorism.
Faced with determined adversaries -- who are not only willing to die, but who actively seek their own "deaths" in order to live forever -- Washington and Jerusalem
should finally address the what needs to be done in addition to military remediation.
Sustained and selective armed force against IS and related Jihadist targets is certainly necessary and appropriate. However, it is also important to remind our leaders that force always needs to be combined with reinforcing efforts to convince
these terrorists that their expected martyrdom is ultimately just an elaborate fiction.
Jihadists, in killing Americans, Israelis, and all other "unbelievers," may not even
intend to commit evil, so much as to do themselves and Allah good -- and to do so
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with an absolute purity of heart. In their view, waging Holy War can never be
shameful; it can only be heroic.
Going forward, our main task should be to systematically undermine these fantasies and doctrinal "underpinnings." In conjunction with the recommended nuanced
persuasions of military firepower, it can be done.
Louis René Beres is a Professor of International Law in the Department of Political
Science at Purdue University.
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/
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Daesh-État islamique : la guerre des noms a commencé
22/09/2014
Ou pourquoi la France veut effacer l'expression "État islamique", au profit de l'acronyme arabe "Daesh", pour qualifier les djihadistes en Syrie et en Irak.
Un employé gouvernemental indonésien efface le drapeau de l'organisation État
islamique
peint sur un mur de la ville de Surakarta City. © AGOES RUDIANTO / CITIZENSIDE
La France est une pionnière. lle est en effet le premier pays à avoir adopté officiel
lement l'appellation "Daesh" pour désigner l'État islamique, organisation djihadiste
qui a proclamé en juillet un califat à cheval sur l'Irak et la Syrie. "Le groupe terro
riste dont il s'agit n'est pas un État, il voudrait l'être, mais il ne l'est pas", a déclaré
mercredi Laurent Fabius au perchoir de l'Assemblée nationale. "Je vous demande
de ne plus utiliser le terme d'État islamique, car cela occasionne une confusion
entre islam, islamistes et musulmans. Il s'agit de ce que les rabes appellent aesh
et que j'appellerai pour ma part les égorgeurs de Daesh."
Depuis le 9 septembre, tous les communiqués du Quai d'Orsay et de l'Élysée portent cette mention. Que signifie-t-elle ? Daesh n'est autre que l'acronyme arabe de
Dowlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq wa Belaad al-sham, comprenez l'État islamique en Ira
et au Levant (pays bordant la côte orientale de la mer Méditerranée). Créée en
2004, au lendemain de l'intervention américaine en Ira , l'organisation djihadiste
est née sous les traits d'al-Qaida en Mésopotamie. En 2006, elle englobe plusieurs
groupes d'insurgés et devient l'État islamique en Irak.
"Connotation péjorative"
En difficulté face aux forces américaines et aux milices sunnites, l'organisation, dirigée depuis 2010 par l'Irakien Abou Bakr al-Bagdadi, trouve un second souffle à la
faveur du conflit syrien, qui lui permet d'étendre son influence dans la région. Elle
devient en 2013 l'État islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL). Contrairement aux
autres groupes djihadistes, son but est de rétablir le califat islamique (tombé en
1924 d'Ira au Liban, en passant par la Jordanie et la Palestine. Commentant la
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spectaculaire percée de l'organisation djihadiste en Syrie, ce sont des opposants
syriens qui évoquent pour la première fois le terme "Daesh" sur le plateau de la
chaîne d'information saoudienne Al-Arabiya.
"Cette appellation a été ensuite institutionnalisée par les cha nes opposées à ce
groupe, car elle ne contient pas les termes "État" ni "islamique", et possède une
connotation péjorative", explique Wassim Nasr, journaliste spécialiste des questions djihadistes à France 24. "En effet, l'acronyme Daesh ressemble au mot arabe
daes "celui qui écrase du pied" , mais aussi au terme dahes "celui qui sonne la dis
corde"), en référence aux batailles de Dahes wal Ghabra (entre 608 et 650 après J.C.) au cours desquelles les tribus arabes se sont entretuées avant d'être unies par
l'islam."
Couper la langue
Depuis son apparition en 2013, le nom Daesh fait enrager les djihadistes, d'autant
que l'utilisation d'acronymes est extrêmement rare dans le monde arabe. À Mossul, plusieurs habitants ont d'ailleurs affirmé en juin à Associated Press avoir été
menacés de se faire couper la langue s'ils prononçaient ce mot. À l'époque, le mot
Daesh est encore relativement inconnu en France, les journalistes désignant le
groupe sous l'acronyme EIIL (État islamique en Irak et au Levant). Même chose
dans les pays anglo-saxons, où l'on parle d'ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and in Syria) ou
d'ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and in Levant).
Mais la donne change dès juillet 2014. Après avoir mis en déroute l'armée irakienne, l'EIIL proclame un califat allant de la province d'Alep, au nord de la Syrie, à
celle de Diyala, à l'est de l'Irak. Et devient l'État islamique (EI). À sa tête, le "calife
Ibrahim", nouveau nom du chef djihadiste irakien Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, appelle
les musulmans du monde entier à rejoindre son État. "Dans chaque territoire conquis, l'organisation met en place une administration ainsi que des institutions embryonnaires, comme des tribunaux religieux, un Conseil de la vie, et des services
sociaux", explique Romain Caillet, chercheur et consultant sur les questions islamistes au cabinet NGC Consulting. "Les djihadistes se greffent sur l'ancienne administration. Tous les fonctionnaires qui acceptent de leur prêter allégeance restent à
leur poste." Et l'expert de conclure : "Si leur État n'est pas reconnu par l'ONU et ne
bat pas sa propre monnaie, il ne possède pas moins d'institutions que l'Afghanistan
à l'époque des Talibans."
"Ennemi de l'Islam" (John Kerry)
Comme jadis en Afghanistan, cet État islamique autoproclamé applique une version
ultra-rigoriste de la charia. Ses combattants multiplient les exactions contre tous
ceux qui refusent de s'y plier - notamment les minorités yézidis et chrétiennes
d'Irak -, forçant des dizaines de milliers d'entre eux à la fuite. Un "nettoyage ethnique" condamné par l'ONU qui pousse les États-Unis à intervenir en bombardant
les positions djihadistes dès le 9 août. En représailles, l'EI décapite deux journalistes
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américains et un humanitaire anglais, choquant le monde entier et renforçant la
détermination de Barack Obama à en venir à bout.
"Ce groupe se fait appeler État islamique mais il faut que deux choses soient
claires : ISIL n'est pas islamique", s'est insurgé le 10 septembre le président américain. "Aucune religion ne cautionne le meurtre d'innocents et la majorité des victimes de l'ISIL sont des musulmans. ISIL n'est certainement pas un État. Il était auparavant la branche d'al-Qaida en Irak." Son secrétaire d'État John Kerry propose
donc un nouveau nom : "L'ennemi de l'Islam". Mais pas "Daesh", pourtant si cher à
la France. "Le choix du gouvernement français est tout à fait logique", estime le
spécialiste Romain Caillet. "En utilisant "Daesh", la France choisit un terme partial
et frontal, car il est en guerre contre cette organisation."
Objectivité
Mais qu'en est-il des journalistes qui traitent des crises en Irak et en Syrie ?
L'Agence France Presse (AFP) a tranché. Sur le blog Making of, la directrice de
l'information de l'AFP, Michèle Léridon, explique pourquoi son agence de presse
n'utilise plus "État islamique". Tout d'abord car "il ne s'agit pas d'un véritable État,
avec des frontières et une reconnaissance internationale". Mais aussi parce que
"les valeurs dont se réclame cette organisation ne sont en rien islamiques". u
Point, nous parlerons plus volontiers d'"organisation État islamique" mais pas de
" aesh". Pour ne pas servir la propagande des djihadistes tout en conservant notre
objectivité de journaliste.
http://www.lepoint.fr/
78
Le Conseil de sécurité appelle à un effort international pour appréhender les chefs de l'EIIL
Le Secrétaire d’Etat américain, John Kerry (à droite), dont le pays préside le Conseil de sécurité en
septembre, et le Ministre français des affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius, lors d’une réunion du
Conseil sur l’Iraq.
19 septembre 2014 – Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a condamné ven
dredi les attaques perpétrées en Iraq, en Syrie et au Liban, par l'État islamique
d'Iraq et du Levant (EIIL) et les groupes armés associés, et il a demandé à la communauté internationale d'appuyer les efforts du nouveau gouvernement iraquien
pour renforcer encore les institutions démocratiques, et lutter contre le terrorisme.
Dans une déclaration présidentielle adoptée aujourd'hui, le Conseil a exprimé sa
consternation face aux tueries, enlèvements, viols et tortures commis par l'EIIL à
l'encontre de très nombreux Iraquiens et nationaux d'autres États, ainsi que face
au recrutement et à l'emploi d'enfants par ce groupe.
"Le Conseil prie instamment la communauté internationale de renforcer et d'élar
gir, dans le respect du droit international, l'appui qu'elle fournit au gouvernement
iraquien dans sa lutte contre l'EIIL et les groupes armés qui lui sont associés. Il se
félicite de la tenue de la Conférence internationale sur la paix et la sécurité en
Iraq, le 15 septembre 2014 à Paris, ainsi que de la réunion au sommet consacrée
à la lutte contre la menace mondiale créée par les combattants terroristes étrangers qu'il va lui-même tenir le 24 septembre prochain", a déclaré le Conseil.
Le Conseil a également souligné que ceux qui ont commis des violations du droit
humanitaire international ou des violations des droits de l'homme doivent ré-
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pondre de leurs actes, en notant qu'une partie de ces actes pourraient constituer
des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l'humanité.
Le Conseil a demandé "au gouvernement iraquien et à la communauté internationale de s'employer à faire en sorte qu'ils soient tous traduits en justice."
Lors de la réunion du Conseil, le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général pour
l'Iraq, Nickolay Mladenov, a expliqué que le nouveau gouvernement iraquien
d'union nationale faisait des progrès en vue de restaurer la sécurité dans le pays,
tout en essayant de renforcer les relations entre les communautés ethniques et
religieuses et en élaborant des politiques pour contribuer à la paix sociale et à la
cohésion.
« L'Iraq fait face à un danger sans précédent avec l'avancée de l'EIIL », a prévenu
M. Mladenov, en expliquant qu'il attendait de la communauté internationale et des
Nations Unies des mesures qui neutralisent cette menace.
Le Représentant spécial a rappelé que l'EIIL et les groupes armés affiliés avaient
pris le contrôle de grandes parties du nord et de l'ouest de l'Iraq, étant doté
d'armes et d'importantes ressources financières et naturelles.
« La Mission des Nations Unies en Iraq a observé la stratégie de terreur de cette
organisation, qui se poursuit même après la chute de Mossoul. Son contrôle sur de
larges territoires tant en Iraq qu'en Syrie, combiné à leur idéologie animée par la
haine, la peur et le nihilisme, ont fait de l'EIIL un danger évident pour l'unité de
l'Iraq et une menace à la sécurité régionale et internationale », a indiqué le Représentant spécial.
M. Mladenov a rappelé que 1,8 million d'Iraquiens avaient été déplacés depuis janvier, dont 850.000 ont trouvé refuge dans la région du Kurdistan. Avec l'hiver qui
approche, il a souligné la nécessité de prendre des mesures cruciales. Il a parlé de
l'immense effort humanitaire déployé par les Nations Unies, qui tentent en outre
de porter secours à 650.000 personnes se trouvant toujours dans les zones de conflit.
« Rien que la nuit dernière, 10.000 familles supplémentaires de la province de Diyala ont été contraintes de fuir leurs maisons. La crise humanitaire n'est pas seulement dans le nord du pays, mais partout dans le pays », a-t-il déclaré.
http://www.un.org/
80
Switzerland
Switzerland: Land of Jihad
September 2 , 2014 at 5:00 am
Al-Qaeda will once again become legal in Switzerland in 2015 because a further
extension of the ban of the group is not possible under Swiss Law.
" It is debatable whether Switzerland possesses an adequate legal framework to
mitigate this jihadist threat." om tin errorism enter
t est Point.
Another factor obstructing an o cial ban appears to be bureaucratic confusion.
Swiss authorities are impeding progress by "blocking" each other. erner eitun
If the NDB's estimates are correct, they would imply that—in terms of percentage—there are now more Swiss jihadists in Syria than French jihadists, even
though France has the largest Muslim population in Europe.
"IS shows us that modern terror threats can only be combatted through prevention." hom s urter President o the tion ecurit ommission.
Swiss lawmakers have filed a motion calling on the Swiss Parliament formally to
ban the jihadist group Islamic State [IS] from operating in Switzerland.
The measure—signed by more than 40 politicians from across the political spectrum—is in response to newrevelations that the IS has established a network of
cells inside Switzerland to raise money and recruit fighters for the jihad in Syria and
Iraq.
The jihadist cells are primarily focused on providing financial, logistical and propaganda support to help the IS establish an Islamic theocracy in the Middle East, according to a report published by the Swiss newspaper Neue Z rcher Zeitung (NZZ)
on September 21.
But terrorism analysts are warning that the cells could easily be used to perpetrate
terror attacks inside Switzerland.
According to the NZZ, Swiss authorities are investigating at least three Iraqi nationals who are the alleged ringleaders of IS activities in Switzerland.
In response to the report, the Swiss public prosecutor's office confirmed that it is
currently investigating at least 20 separate cases involving jihadist operations in
Switzerland, including at least four directly related to the jihad in Syria.
"According to the information available to date, people who travelled to a conflict
zone were assigned to radical groups, after their individual skills and fighting potential were evaluated," said Jeannette Balmer, a spokeswoman for the prosecutor's
office. She added that the investigations were slow-going because of the difficulties
involved in locating the Swiss jihadists.
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Balmer declined to give more details about the 20 investigations on the grounds of
official confidentiality.
In a September 7 interview with the newspaper SonntagsZeitung, Chief Federal
Prosecutor Michael Lauber said he was "worried" about the fact that Swiss jihadists
are travelling to Syria and Iraq to join organisations like the IS. He said that his
office is currently investigating four individuals "on suspicion of supporting a criminal organization and providing funding for a terrorist group."
Lauber also revealed that Switzerland does not maintain a "blacklist" of names of
people to check who return to Switzerland—possibly because Swiss authorities do
not seem to know how many Swiss jihadists there actually are.
About 40 Swiss jihadists have left Switzerland to participate in holy wars around the
world, including 15 who have traveled to Syria, according to the 2014 annual report of the Swiss intelligence agency, Nachrichtendienst des Bundes (Federal Intelligence Service, NDB).
This number is far higher than previous estimates, and especially worrisome considering the relative size of the Muslim community in Switzerland. The Muslim population of Switzerland is estimated to number between 350,000 and 400,000, or
around 5 of the total Swiss population of 8 million.
If the NDB's estimates are correct, they would imply that—in terms of percentage—there are now more Swiss jihadists in Syria than French jihadists, even though
France has the largest Muslim population in Europe.
In June, the newspaper Basler Zeitung asked the NDB to clarify the numbers contained in its annual report. Theresponse was:
"As of May 2013: 20 Jihad travelers from Switzerland, of which seven have been
confirmed. As of May 2014: 40 Jihad travelers, of which 13 have been confirmed.
Of the 15 Jihad travelers to Syria, five have been confirmed. 'Confirmed' means
that the information has been verified by two intelligence sources."
The reason for the discrepancy remains unclear, but part of the problem may be
attributed to Swiss legal restrictions on the government's surveillance powers.
Swiss law currently prohibits Swiss intelligence from monitoring most domestic telephone and Internet communications. The restrictions were put into place after
the so-called Secret Files Scandal (Fichenaff re) in 1989, when it was revealed that
the Swiss federal authorities had secretly and illegally put in place a system of mass
surveillance of the entire population.
In April 2014, the Swiss Parliament decided to postpone an initiative to rewrite the
law that governs the NDB's intelligence-gathering activities after several lawmakers
on the influential National Security Commission of theFederal Council opposed giving the agency more surveillance powers.
The parliamentary initiative to ban the IS in Switzerland is also running into re-
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sistance.
Although neighboring Germany banned the IS on September 12, the Swiss Federal
Council—the seven-member executive council which constitutes the federal government of Switzerland and serves as the collective head of state—says it sees no
immediate need for action.
According to Swiss law, an organization can only be banned if it presents an
"imminent serious disturbance of internal and external security," criteria which the
Federal Council says are not currently met.
The president of the National Security Commission, Thomas Hurter, disagrees: "IS
shows us that modern terror threats can only be combatted through prevention."
Another factor obstructing an official ban appears to be bureaucratic confusion.
According to a legal analysisentitled, "Banning the Islamic State: But How?" published by the newspaper Berner Zeitung on September 17, Swiss authorities are impeding progress by "blocking" each other:
"Before the Federal Council can even consider a ban, it needs to obtain an official
request from a government agency. But it is not clear which agencies should do so.
The intelligence service referred us to the Federal Office of the Police, the Federal
Office of the Police referred us to the Department of Defense, the Defense Department referred us to the Federal Office of Justice, and from there we were referred
back to the intelligence service."
During modern Swiss history, only two organizations have ever been banned for
endangering the country's security: the National Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler in
1936, and al-Qaeda after the terrorist attacks of 2001.
According to the Berner Zeitung, the ban on al-Qaeda was imposed by the Federal
Council by means of the Emergency Law (Notrecht). Since then, the ban has been
renewed every three years. The existing ban will expire in 2015, but because a further extension is not possible under the Emergency Law, al-Qaeda will once again
become legal in Switzerland.
Meanwhile, an in-depth analysis of the jihad scene in Switzerland, published in July
2014 by the United States Military Academy at West Point, states:
"The presence of an undetermined number of its citizens and residents fighting in
Syria is a relatively new phenomenon for Switzerland. It demonstrates that Switzerland suffers from radicalization dynamics similar to its neighbors, albeit on a smaller scale.
"Moreover, the issue of foreign fighters might be particularly problematic for Switzerland, whose legislation does not possess extensive and precise provisions covering the phenomenon. As of July 2014, Swiss authorities have not filed any criminal
cases against individuals suspected of having fought in Syria, including [cases] in
which evidence of ties to jihadist activity is strong."
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The report concludes that it is "debatable whether Switzerland possesses an adequate legal framework to mitigate this [jihadist] threat."
Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based atestone Institute. He is also
Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based rupo de Estudios Estratégicos Strategic Studies roup. Follow him on Facebookand on Twi er.
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/events.php
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Syria
What Arab partners will get in return for strikes on Syria
25 September 2014
Much of the analysis of the US-led attacks on IS has been from the American end
of the telescope. But how does it look from that of its Arab allies?
The decision by the president of the United States, Barack Obama, to launchmissile
and air strikes against Islamic State (IS) and the al-Qaeda affiliate “Khorasan” in Syria draws the US ever closer to yet another prolonged military confrontation in the
region.
But there’s a difference this time—the participation of a coalition of Arab states,
variously offering diplomatic, intelligence and military support. So far, the partner
states have been named as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Bahrain and Jordan.
From Washington’s perspective, the importance of Arab participation is obvious: a
synchronised display of high-level multinational co-operation is clearly meant to
head off the usual criticism of the often unilateral nature of US foreign policies. This
is of particular importance for Obama, who has invested considerable capital over
the years in distancing himself from the Bush administration’s war in Iraq. As he
put it in his brief statement announcing the strikes, “The strength of this coalition
makes it clear to the world that this is not America’s fight alone.”
The White House clearly hopes that the participation of Arab partners will undermine that radical Islamist narrative of “the West versus Islam” and instead reframe
the conflict as another chapter in the decades-old struggle between the vast moderate Muslim majority and a tiny minority of radicals. But, aside from these explicit
American goals, Obama’s new Arab partners have interests of their own.
Regional rivals: Saudi and Qatar
Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia can hope to shift
attention away from the criticism of their attitude to Islamist extremism. Over the years, they
have been charged not only with supporting
radical Islamists in Syria but also with allowing
their religious elites to propagate a version of
Islam open to easy manipulation at the hands of
radical jihadist recruiters.
Both countries will also hope that weakening
the radical Islamists of IS will help moderate elements of the Syrian opposition regain the initiative against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Some among the elites of Riyadh and Doha
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might even be hoping Washington will realise the threat of IS will never be extinguished while Assad’s regime remains in place—and that Obama will see the job is
finished.
Finally, Saudi Arabia in particular clearly has to be concerned with preventing the
success of an organisation which aims to establish the perfect “Islamic state”. IS’s
claim to ultimate leadership of the world’s Muslim community as put forward by its
leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, is a direct challenge to the Saudi claim for global religious leadership based on King Abdullah’s role as “custodian of the two holy places” in Mecca and Medina.
Saudi authorities are fully aware that al-Baghdadi’s radical Islamist fringe project
has attracted followers from Saudi Arabia, with recent estimates putting the number at up to 1,000. As Nawaf Obaid and Saud al-Sarhan have pointed out, Saudi
Arabia is the ultimate target for any “serious” radical Islamist organisation, whether
IS now or al-Qaeda in years past.
Al-Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula (which consists not just of Yemeni Islamists but
also Saudi Islamists), driven out by Saudi counter-terrorism measures over the last
decade, is now beginning to mutter words of approval and support toward
IS. Riyadh will be deeply concerned about the spectre of being engulfed in an arc of
Islamist instability to its south and north.
Trouble at home: Bahrain and the UAE
Like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain can also use their involvement in
the campaign against IS to demonstrate their value as strategic assets to the
US. Often belittled as “security importers” for relying on American protection to
counter the threat posed by Iran, governments in these countries can now prove
that they can make their own contributions to regional security. But their involvement in the anti-IS coalition feeds into a broader narrative of tackling a general Islamist threat—one that has long threatened to destabilise them at home.
For their part, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been very outspoken critics of what
they saw as a lack of US stamina in supporting authoritarian allies such as Hosni
Mubarak in Egypt during the early days of the Arab Spring. They have also both
raised the alarm over the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they see a direct
threat to their own domestic integrity.
Irrespective of the exact nature of the ideological linkages between moderate and
radical Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood’s politicised version of Islam sees the
Gulf monarchies as antithetical to the notion of a just Islamic society. By joining
forces against IS, then, the ruling families in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are clearly hoping to drive home their vision of a monolithic Islamist threat to both protective Western governments and their own restive populations.
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Bahrainis mark the third anniversary of the Arab Spring protests.
Don’t forget us: Jordan
Meanwhile, often-overlooked Jordan can use its participation in the anti-IS alliance
to once again prove its relevance as a strategic regional partner for the US.
Jordanians are not just dealing with a refugee crisis created by the meltdown in
Syria and Iraq. They also have first-hand experience of the disastrous human costs
of the radical ideology which drives IS: in late 2005, supporters of Abu Musab azZarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (a splinter from which later formed the backbone of IS), attacked a number of hotels in Jordan’s capital Amman, killing 60.
Just recently, Jordanian authorities arrested a number of individuals suspected of
involvement with IS. The Jordanian security services also enjoy one of the best
track records of any regional intelligence agency in infiltrating radical Islamist
groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq. This expertise, plus the training facilities where
Western special forces can train members of the moderate Syrian opposition,
might well prove crucial for international efforts to deal with both IS and the Assad
regime.
Trade-offs
In the end, the Arab partners in general will still expect concrete returns for offering their Western allies not just diplomatic coverbut also serious military and intelligence support. Most pressingly, it’s very likely that these governments will expect
Washington to take their views on board when it negotiates a more permanent
deal with Tehran over Iran’s nuclear programme. Ever since the announcement of a
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preliminary deal between the two sides, the Gulf monarchies have made clear their
displeasure at the apparent US eagerness to bring Iran back in from the cold without sufficient heed to Arab concerns.
Vision: Barack Obama and King Abdullah II of Jordan.
Washington’s Arab allies will hope that the Arab states' participation in strikes
against IS will make Western audiences more willing to tolerate or even support
“wars on terror” at home in the Middle East—in which, all too often, moderate Islamists and secular liberals get caught up.
But the endurance of authoritarian rule is a major root cause of the Middle East’s
chronic instability. It it would be all too easy for the West to let it continue unmolested in return for help with the crisis at hand—however badly that help is needed.
Washington must not fall into that trap.
Lars Berger does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any
company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant
affiliations.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/
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To Stop ISIS in Syria, Support Aleppo
14 September 2014
President Obama’s speech last week signaled a likely expansion into Syria of American airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, yet offered little indication
of an immediate strategy to halt ISIS’ gains there. The administration’s first focus
thus remains on Iraq, while familiar pledges to work with regional allies and increase support to moderate rebels in Syria — if Congress approves sufficient funding — appear divorced from the urgency of the situation on the ground.
Though Western attention is drawn to Iraq, it is Syria that has witnessed the most
significant ISIS gains since June. It is Aleppo, Syria’s largest metropolitan area, that
presents ISIS’ best opportunity for expanding its claimed caliphate. An effective
strategy for halting, and eventually reversing, ISIS’ expansion should begin there,
and soon.
Stopping ISIS requires addressing the problems that enabled its rise. Among other
factors, like lax Turkish border controls, ISIS has profited from the sectarian politics
and indiscriminate military tactics of autocrats in Baghdad and Damascus. With Iranian support, these leaders have worked systematically to prevent the emergence
of credible, moderate Sunni alternatives.
The Syrian opposition’s Western and regional allies have inadvertently aided that
effort, as their blend of tough talk and weak, poorly coordinated support has undermined the Syrian rebels whom, ostensibly, they back. ISIS has exploited the resulting vulnerabilities among its Sunni competitors by combining the allure of empowerment to those who join with the threat of brutal punishment to any who resist.
These dynamics are on display in Aleppo. Even as ISIS forces in eastern Syria fight to
evict the regime from its remaining outposts there, the government of President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus has concentrated on defeating the mainstream,
non-jihadist opposition. Regime forces, backed by indiscriminate aerial bombardment, continue to encircle the rebels who control the eastern half of the city.
Meanwhile, just 15 miles to the north, ISIS is fighting the same poorly organized
and underequipped rebel factions. ISIS’ strategic objective is to capture valuable
ground that can serve as a gateway to the heart of rebel-held territory in the country’s northwest. The killing last week of several senior leaders in the rebel organization Ahrar al-Sham, a key adversary of ISIS, may ease its path.
Given Aleppo’s strategic and symbolic importance as a rebel stronghold, the very
viability of mainstream anti-Assad forces in northern Syria is at stake in this battle
on two fronts. The vital significance of this is that it is they who must take the lead
on the ground in rolling back ISIS gains in Syria.
Among all who have fought ISIS since it emerged in 2003 (as Al Qaeda in Iraq), local
Sunni insurgents have the most promising record. It was Sunni fighters who routed
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the organization in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, and in northwestern Syria early this
year. Other forces on hand — what remains of the Syrian and Iraqi Armies, and the
pro-Assad, Shiite and Kurdish militias — lack the necessary credibility with local
populations to take and hold ground within ISIS’ main areas of control.
Without effective support, the opposition in Aleppo faces defeat. There are two
ways of preventing that.
The first would be through a local cease-fire between regime and rebel forces in
Aleppo. Regime forces would have to agree to withdraw from recently captured
areas where they pose an immediate threat to the rebels’ one remaining supply
line into the city. A deal like this would enable the rebels to shift resources to the
fight against ISIS.
A local cease-fire would require a fundamental shift in the Assad regime’s strategy:
Instead of prioritizing the defeat of the mainstream opposition, it would have to
train its fire exclusively on ISIS. That is highly unlikely. The best hope for such dramatic change can come only through pressure from Iran and Russia, if they wish
their Syrian ally to be part of the solution to the ISIS problem rather than one of its
causes.
Failing that, the only alternative is for the mainstream opposition’s backers
(including, but not limited to, the United States) to rapidly increase and improve
their support to the rebels in greater Aleppo. That would entail funding, ammunition and anti-tank weapons, as well as improvements in cooperation among the
backers themselves. Besides greater American investment in the process, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey must make coordination a higher priority than their respective relations with rebel groups.
The international partners must also work together to create incentives for pragmatic behavior and political engagement among rebel factions, while punishing indiscriminate tactics, sectarian rhetoric and criminal actions. One useful effect could
be to strengthen the position of nonideological groups within the rebel balance of
power.
The risks of boosting support to rebels are well known. Arms supplies might leak to
Al Nusra Front, a jihadist group that has proved important to mainstream rebels as
a tactical ally against the Assad regime and ISIS forces. Worse, matériel might even
end up in ISIS’ hands, should its gains continue. Barring a significant de-escalation
in the regime’s war against anti-ISIS rebels, however, there is no palatable alternative — airstrikes alone will not stop ISIS in Syria.
If mainstream opposition is defeated in Aleppo, ISIS will expand westward. And by
appearing to be the sole Sunni force capable of sustaining war against the regime,
ISIS will win still more recruits. There may be no second chances: As America is
finding in Iraq, credible Sunni partners in the fight against the jihadis, once lost, are
not easily replaced.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
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Turkey
Turkey: What Ally?
September 22, 2014
The Turkish government "frankly worked" with the al-Nusrah Front, the al-Qaeda
affiliate in Syria, along with other terrorist groups.
The Financial Task Force, an international body setting the standards for combating
terrorist financing, ruled that Turkey should remain in its "gray list."
While NATO wishes to reinforce its outreach to democracies such as Australia and
Japan, Turkey is trying to forge wider partnerships with the Arab world, Russia, China, Central Asia, China, Africa and -- and with a bunch of terrorist organizations,
including Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Ahrar al-Sham and the al-Nusrah Front.
Being NATO's only Muslim member was fine. Being NATO's only Islamist member
ideologically attached to the Muslim Brotherhood is quite another thing.
Last week, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel,
were in the Turkish capital, one after the other, to ask for Turkey's contribution to a
coalition of allies in a U.S.-led war on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS, aka
The Islamic State].
"The friend of my enemy is my... frenemy?" U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shakes hands
with the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, before a bilateral meeting on the
sidelines of the NATO Summit in Newport, Wales, Sept. 4, 2014. (Image source: U.S. State
Dept.)
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Not only will Ankara take no military action, it will also forbid the U.S. from using a
critical U.S. air base in southern Turkey to conduct strikes against the jihadist terrorists, the Turks told Messrs. Kerry and Hagel.
Earlier during the week, Turkey also abstained from signing a communiqué which
Arab nations penned, seeking stronger action against ISIS.
Some call Turkey "a U.S. frenemy," others refer to it as "NATO's Qatar." Unsurprisingly, on Sept. 9 the U.S. Congress delivered its staunchest warning to date that
Turkey and Qatar could face financial and other penalties if they continue to support Hamas and other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations.
Jonathan Schanzer, of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said
that Congress could start exploring alternatives to the U.S. air base at al-Udeid in
Qatar. Echoing that view, the Wall Street Journal claimed in its Sept. 13 editorial that it is the "unavoidable conclusion" that the U.S. needs to find a better regional ally than Turkey to fight ISIS, and suggested that the Incirlik air base in southern
Turkey should be moved somewhere else, perhaps to Iraqi Kurdistan. The Wall
Street Journal argued that the Turkish government, a member of NATO, long ago
stopped acting like an ally of the U.S. or a friend of the West.
Meanwhile, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone said that the
Turkish government "frankly worked" with the al-Nusrah Front—the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria—along with other terrorist groups. It is an open secret that Ankara also
looked the other way as foreign radical groups used Turkey as a transit point on
their way to Syria and Iraq.
Ironically, on the exact day as the Turks were telling American dignitaries, "We are
sorry, but don't count us in," the Transatlantic Trends Survey 2014 revealed that
Western institutions still matter for Turks.[1]
Turks have a confused mind about their six decade-long alliance with the West.
After twelve years of systematic indoctrination by their government that their
country is on a fast journey to revive its glorious imperial past, the Turks believed
that it would soon be "Turkey's rules" first in their region, rather than elsewhere.
Sadly, they had to wake up to regional realities instead: Their country is the only
one in the world without ambassadors in Jerusalem, Damascus and Cairo; and at
various degrees of cold wars with several countries in its vicinity. Its citizens are
high-value currency in the Middle East's hostage market. The abduction of 49 Turks
-- diplomats and their family members, including the consul general -- on June 11 in
Mosul, northern Iraq has made the wannabe regional power itself a hostage to ISIS
too. The safe return of the hostages on September 20 does not mean that Turkey
has freed itself from captivity: Ankara, fearing a wave of terrorist attacks on its soil,
cannot openly clash with ISIS.
Despite a slight improvement in the Turks' perceptions of the West and its institutions, it is, once again, "directionless Turkey." The Americans pretend to be disap-
92
pointed by their part-time ally. They looked "shocked." They should not be. As
NATO official Michael Ruehle once reminded us, Noah's rule is: "Predicting rain
does not count, building arks does."
Under the Islamist rule of former Prime Minister, now President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey was already on a path to become a challenge to NATO. That journey
of "fading likeminded-ness" did not begin last week. Turkey's case has been quite
conspicuous since 2009 when then-Foreign Minister, now Prime Minister, Ahmet
Davutoglu took the helm of foreign policy.
Taking refuge from the August heat at Alexei Kosygin's Kremlin banquette back in
cold war-stricken 1965, Turkish Prime Minister Suat Hayri Urguplu said that he was
"very pleased to be witnesses to the gradual and confident development of mutual
understanding with the Soviet Union." The next day, an Istanbul daily commented
that: "Improvement of Turkey's relations with the Soviets is fine on one condition:
that we always remain an ally of the United States and in NATO."
Forty-two years after, in 2007, some bigwigs in Turkey's security bureaucracy began
weighing the merits and demerits of a non-aggression pact with Russia.
Two years after that, in April 2009, military teams from Turkey and Bashar alAssad's Syria crossed the border and visited outposts during joint military drills.
That was the first time a NATO army was exercising with Syria's.
In September 2010, Turkish and Chinese air force aircraft conducted joint exercises
in Turkish airspace. That, too, was the first time a NATO air force was conducting
military exercises with China's.
In 2011, a Transatlantic Trends survey revealed that Turkey was the NATO member
with the lowest support for the alliance: just 37 (down from 53 in 2004, but up
to 49 this year).
The same year, before finally providing NATO forces with limited logistical support,
Turkey's then-Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now President, angrily asked:
"What business can NATO have in Libya?" Also in 2011, the Turkish government
announced plans eventually to build a ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers. Military experts were left pondering which city could be the potential target:
London? Moscow? Tel Aviv? Brussels?
In 2012, Turkey joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] as a dialogue
partner. (Other dialogue partners are Belarus and Sri Lanka; observer nations are
Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia). Since then, Erdogan has, at least a
few times, publicly said that Ankara would abandon its quest to join the European
Union if it were offered full membership of the SCO.
In September 2013, Turkey announced that it had selected a Chinese company (on
a U.S. sanctions list) for the construction of its first long-range air and anti-missile
defense architecture. Turkish officials claimed that local engineering would make
the Chinese system inter-operable with the U.S. and NATO assets deployed on
Turkish soil.
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It took the Turks a year, dozens of warnings from NATO's HQ and hundreds of visits
to warn Ankara that a Chinese air defense system could not be made interoperable with U.S. or NATO assets. It also took threats of putting Turkish firms on
the same U.S. sanctions list before they reversed course and started talks with a
European bidder.
At the beginning of this year, the Financial Act Task Force, an international body
setting the global rules and standards for combating terrorist financing, ruled that
Turkey should remain on its "gray list." Once again, Turkey was the odd one out:
the only NATO member country on the gray list (the others are Algeria, Ecuador,
Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen).
Experts have since warned that troubling questions remain about Ankara's relationships with Iranian gold traders, Hamas leaders, al-Qaeda in Syria and persons designated under the U.S. sanctions regime.
All that was enough to make Turkey a bizarre ally: It is a NATO member in which
only a third of the nation supported membership merely three years ago; its air
force engages in exercises with China's air force; the government commissions a
Chinese company on a U.S. sanctions list to build a NATO-inter-operable air defense
architecture. Meanwhile Turkey seeks full membership in SCO while remaining on
an international list of potential terrorist sponsors -- sharing this list with, among
others, Syria and Yemen.
It is true that Turkey's position is convergent with NATO's on Ukraine; and that Turkey has other converging interests as well, such as preserving the stability of the
global commons: air, sea, space.
But while NATO wishes to reinforce its outreach to like-minded democracies (such
as Australia and Japan), Turkey is trying to forge, though often unsuccessfully, regional and wider partnerships with the Arab world, Africa, Russia, China, Central
Asia and the Caucasus -- and with a bunch of terrorist organizations including Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Ahrar al-Sham and the al-Nusrah Front.
With all those credentials, Turkey remains only a part-time ally of the West, and
NATO's odd-one-out.
In all reality, for its Western partners, Turkey is a portmanteau of ally and antagonist. Being NATO's only Muslim member for several decades was fine. Being NATO's
only Islamist member ideologically attached to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas
is quite another thing.
Burak Bekdil, based in Ankara, is a Turkish columnist for the H rriyet Daily News
and a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
The survey found that 45 of Turks -- a 10 percentage point increase from 2013
-- described their opinion of the EU as favorable. For the first time since 2010, a
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majority of Turks (53 , or up eight percentage point from 2013) thought that EU
membership would be good for their country. Turkey was also slightly less likely
than in the past to prefer unilateralism: 33 of Turkish respondents said that Turkey should act alone on international matters (down five percentage points since
2013) while 28 said that Turkey should work with the EU (up seven percentage
points since 2013).
Turks were also more positive on NATO, with 49 saying it remained essential to
their security -- a 10 percentage point increase from 2013 and the highest level of
support measured since 2005. When asked what NATO should be doing, Turks
were divided. Fifty-seven percent supported its role in the territorial defense of Europe; a 42 percent plurality opposed its operating out of area, and a 47 plurality
opposed its providing arms and training to other countries.
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org
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UK
UK: More Taxpayer Funds Go to Extremist Charities
September 22, 2014
British politicians seem to be trapped in an endless debate over how to curb both
violent and non-violent extremism within the Muslim community.
A truly useful measure might be to end the provision of state funding and legitimacy to terror-linked extremist charities.
The British government is, incredibly, still continuing to fund charitable UK-based
organizations with links to the Muslim Brotherhood, terrorist groups and domestic
extremism. Simultaneously, lawmakers seem to be having trouble thinking of ways
to tackle extremism and terrorist incitement within Britain's Muslim communities.
In early 2014, the Department for Communities and Local Government provided a
grant of £18,000 ($29,000) to the Muslim Charities Forum [MCF], a charitable body
and umbrella group for a number of leading Islamist charities, most of which are
members of the Union of Good, a fundraising body established by the Muslim
Brotherhood to raise money for the terror group Hamas.
The MCF is made up of nine member organizations, all of which stand accused of
funding terror or promoting extremism:
Human Appeal International – a UK-registered charity accused by
the CIA and FBI of being "a fundraiser for Hamas." The charity is
a proscribed "Hamas-affiliated" organisation in Israel, and both the US Internal Revenue Service and State Department consider it to be a terror-funding entity.
Human Appeal International has often promoted extremist preachers in Britain. In
2011, for instance, the charity hosted an event with Haitham al-Haddad, an Islamist
preacher who regards Jews as "enemies of god, and the descendants of apes and
pigs" and has stated that, "Allah's law [will] govern the whole earth, and for no other law to remain."
Islamic Relief – an enormous British charity, which, in 2012, raised over £100 million [over $160 million].
Islamic Relief has received donations from terror-connected Yemeni charities, such
as the Charitable Society for Social Welfare, which was established by the USdesignated terrorist and "Bin Laden loyalist" Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani.
In Gaza, Islamic Relief's branches have supported Hamas-run institutions, including
the Islamic University of Gaza and the Al-Falah Benevolent Society.
Islamic Relief's Directors have included Ahmed Al-Rawi, the former President of the
Muslim Brotherhood's chief lobby group in Britain, who, in 2004, signed a declaration in support of jihad against British and American forces in Iraq.
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Between 2011 and 2014, the British Government granted £1.5 million of taxpayers'
money to Islamic Relief's UK branch.
Human Relief Foundation – a charity named by the leading Middle Eastern news-
The charity Orphans in Need has promoted preachers such as Zahir Mahmood, pictured above,
who has claimed that, "Hamas are not terrorists; they're freedom fighters, they're defending
their country." (Image source: tune.pk video screenshot)
paper ulf News as a key part of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood's network of
charitable support in the UK.
Human Relief officials include senior members of Al Islah, a United Arab Emiratesbased branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Human Relief Foundation has promoted extremist speakers, including Abdurraheem Green, an Islamist preacher who has spoken of a "Jewish stench" and
claimed it is permissible to beat women to "bring them to goodness."
Islamic Help – a charity that funds the Islamic Society of Gaza, a Hamas-run organization of which leading officials have included Ahmad Bahr, a senior Hamas leader
who has said: "Oh Allah, vanquish the Jews and their supporters. Oh Allah, count
their numbers, and kill them all, down to the very last one."
After the US invasion of Iraq, Islamic Help established an office within Baghdad's
Abu Hanifa Mosque, which was, at the time, a stronghold for the Sunni terrorist
insurgency.
Muslim Aid – a charity established by activists from Jamaat-e-Islami, the subcontinental cousin of the Muslim Brotherhood. Founding members included Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin, the British Muslim community leader recently convicted by
the Bangladesh war crimes tribunal for his involvement in the mass-murder of
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teachers and intellectuals during the 1971 Liberation War.
In 2010, The Daily Telegraph reported that Muslim Aid had funded charities connected to Palestinian terror groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These funds included
a grant of £13,998 to the al-Ihsan Charitable Society, designated by the U.S. government as a "sponsor of terrorism."
Muslim Hands – an Islamic charity that raised £13 million in 2013. Muslim Hands'
chairman, Musharaf Hussain,stated in 2010 that it is a "wise cause" to fight nonbelievers "because they are tyrants," and encouraged Muslims to "take part in this
jihad."
In Gaza, Muslim Hands has funded a number of Hamas charitable fronts.
Orphans in Need – a newly-established charity, which has promoted preachers
such as Zahir Mahmood, who hasclaimed that, "Hamas are not terrorists; they're
freedom fighters, they're defending their country."
The charity's CEO, Tufail Hussain, has expressed support for the Al Qaeda
"recruiter," Shaker Aamer. Orphans in Need funds the Gaza-based Palestinian Welfare House, the Director of which, Jomah Al Najjar, has claimed that anti-Zionist
Jews, such as Neturei Karta, cannot be trusted because "Jews will always be Jews."
Al Najjar has called for Israel to be "wiped off the map," and has attributed the success of Hamas's terror activities to the piety of its fighters.
READ Foundation – a charity whose "partners" include the World Association of
Muslim Youth and the Qatar Charitable Society, both of which have funded Hamas.
In addition, the READ Foundation has promoted a number of extremist speakers at
its fundraising events. These speakers include Uthman Lateef, who has expressed
support for Al Qaeda terrorists; and Sulaiman Gani, a Muslim chaplain with links to
Hizb ut-Tahrir, who has voiced backing for convicted terrorist Aafia Siddiqui, described by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller as "an al-Qaeda operative and
facilitator."
In spite of these activities, in 2013, the British government granted £189,550 to the
READ Foundation.
Al-Imdaad Foundation – a South African charity, the British branch of which has
previously partnered with Viva Palestina, the pro-Hamas charity established by
George Galloway and that included Hamas activists among its staff.
One of Al-Imdaad's trustees, Qari Ziyaad Patel, has written and sung
a nasheed [Islamic song] in praise of the Taliban.
In 2012-13, Al-Imdaad's British branch raised over £400,000 for the IHH, a Turkish
charity widely accused offunding terrorism and that publicly supports Hamas. AlImdaad UK has also given over £50,000 (over $80,000) to the Zamzam Foundation,
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a Somali charity run by the Saudi-funded Somali Muslim Brotherhood.
In addition, events organized by Al-Imdaad UK have included speakers such as
Maulana
Sulaimaan
Ravat,
a
South
African
preacher
who
has propagated conspiracy theories that Jews overthrew Libya's dictator, Colonel
Gaddafi, in order to steal Libya's oil reserves.
It is not just the government that affords credibility to Islamist charities; Jewish
community charities have also offered their partnership. On September 3, Islamic
Relief hosted an event with World Jewish Relief to "show solidarity with the people
of Iraq." At the event, Rabbi Laura Janner-Klausner, who heads the British Jewish
community's Reform movement, spoke alongside Ibrahim Mogra, the assistant
general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, an organization run by activists
from the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami.
Mogra has previously refused to share a platform with an Ahmaddiyah Muslim, an
impressively moderate sect of Islam, and one which Islamist movements regard as
heretical. Mogra was, however, apparently happy to share the platform with Azzam
Tamimi, an academic described as Hamas's "special envoy" to the UK.
British politicians and the media seem to be trapped in an endless debate over the
question of curbing both violent and non-violent extremism within the Muslim
community. The government appears to be stuck for good ideas – it most recently announced that it would send jihadists returned from Syria to "deradicalisation
classes." Instead, a truly useful measure might be to end the provision of state
funding and legitimacy to terror-linked extremist charities.
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/
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USA
OBAMA’S ‘WAR ON TERROR': A SOUTH ASIAN VIEW – ANALYSIS
SEPTEMBER 20, 2014
By Institute of South Asia Studies
For a politician who built his 2008 presidential campaign on a no-war platform, it is
a painful decision to reverse a course he has diligently sought to pursue. On 10 September 2014, a day before the 13th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
American President Barack Obama committed himself to another war. This was
done in a televised address to his nation. He made a sober assessment of the situation created not only for his country but for the entire international community by
the new threat from an Islamic extremist movement that had morphed several
times since the United States invaded Iraq under the direction of President George
W Bush.
President Obama delivers statement on ISIL. Screenshot from White House video.
President Bush had launched two wars during his first term but left both unfinished
as he handed the reins of power to his successor, Barack Obama. Bush had sent
American troops into Afghanistan in October 2001 to punish the Taliban regime that
then governed from Kabul for having provided support and sanctuary to Osama bin
Laden and his terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda. It was bin Laden’s organisation that
planned and launched the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September
2001 that claimed almost three thousand lives. Less than two years later Bush sent
American troops to Iraq to achieve an objective that remains unclear to this day.
Both wars in many ways contributed to the rise of Islamic extremism. Its latest manifestation is something called the “Islamic State”, also known as the “Islamic Caliphate”. The latter term signifies the movement‟s ambitions that embrace the Mus-
100
lim lands beyond Iraq and Syria, the two countries where the “Islamic State” is currently lodged.
Bush’s two wars have left an impression on world history that will remain for decades to come. Thousands of American lives were lost and tens of thousands of Iraqis and Afghans were killed. These wars and their aftermath, by various counts,
have caused more than a couple of trillion US dollars. By pulling out his country’s
troops from Iraq and by beginning the process of withdrawal from Afghanistan,
President Obama had hoped to bring to an end this particular episode in American
history. But that has not happened since the chain of events relating to these two
wars has resulted in the spread of conflict to other places including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria. The original Al Qaeda created franchises in many
places in Asia and Africa. In July 2014 its nominal head Ayman al- Zawahiri announced that a new chapter had now been founded in South Asia that would focus
on the sub-continent‟s large Muslim populations.
According to Saeed Naqvi writing for India Today, “desperate Muslim youth may at
that stage be in search for a rallying force, but I find it difficult to believe that Zawahiri kind of Islam will have burgeoning clientele in India. The danger will arise when
muscular forces like the ISIS, with their mastery of the new media technology begin
to reach out to pockets of agitated Muslims on social networks. That would be dangerous because the turmoil in West Asia is a regular part of the Arab and Western
media diet. They have some understanding of issues arising from their different
perspectives. On foreign affairs Indian audiences have no sources of information
other than that is doled out to them by outsiders”.2
Some of the “morning after” commentary following President Obama’s address
missed the real import of the message he was giving. We can read five meanings
into it, all of considerable significance for the countries of South Asia. The subcontinent after all has one of the largest concentrations of Muslim populations in
the world. Even more important, the region has 83 million of the 200 million people who belong to the Shia sect of Islam. It is this group that is the particular target
of the “Islamic State” as it has shaped up in Iraq and Syria.
Among the more thoughtful comments in the American press following the delivery
of the speech was by E J Dionne Jr., the columnist who contributes regularly to The
Washington Post. “Over the last decade, Americans” views on foreign policy have
swung sharply [from] support for intervention to profound mistrust of any military
engagement overseas. Over the same period, political debates on foreign affairs
have been bitter and polarized, defined by the question of whether the invasion of
Iraq was a proper use of the nation’s power or a catastrophic mistake. This contest
for public opinion has taken place in the shadow of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
For understandable reasons, the United States was thrown off- balance by the horrific events of 13 years ago, and we have never fully recovered”.3 Another gruesome event – the beheading of two American journalists, James Foley and Steven
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Sotloff, with videos of their execution displayed on social media sites – is another
course-changing event for the leadership groups and citizens of the United States.
There are five elements in the strategy laid out in President Obama’s short address
on 10 September 2014 that need to be noticed, in particular by those who are
watching the unfolding of these events from the South Asian angle. The first refers
to the promise that America will not put troops on the ground in this latest declaration of war. Using ground troops has always led to long-wars for which the American public has no longer any appetite. Operating from the air, the America will like
other nations to set their troops on the ground. America‟s big disappointment was
that Pakistan refused to send its grounds troops to eliminate the safe-havens from
which several terrorist groups were giving a hard time to the Americans fighting in
Afghanistan. Effectively, Islamabad left the fight against terrorism on its own territory to the American drones which were used extensively for three years. It was
only after it dawned on the Pakistani establishment that the extremist presence in
the country’s tribal areas had become an existential threat to the Pakistani state
itself that the Pakistan Army launched an operation called Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan. Moreover, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may take two years beyond the declared target of end- December 2014.
Second, there will be greater reliance on airpower to achieve the stated objectives.
The US will use bombers and fighters more sparingly since they inflict heavy collateral damage that creates enormous resentment among those who get hurt. It is
these people who then become willing recruits for causes such as those espoused
by the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”. Instead, there will be much greater reliance
on drones, a weapon that got its full operational test in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
But the drones are successful only when they are operated on the basis of sound
intelligence. This can only be provided by the locals, and that means working with
the governments operating in the area. This is the third part of the Obama strategy.
This is a new kind of war being waged in the countries where the governments are
basically friendly towards the United States. This, by and large, was the case when
the use of drones was at its peak. However, a friendly government which backs the
US efforts must be fully representative of all – or nearly all – segments of the population. To use the new jargon from political science, it must be “inclusive”. That certainly was not the case in Iraq where the administration of Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki was avowedly pro-Shia. This political orientation threw many Sunnis into the
extended ISIS arms. It was only after a new government took office in Baghdad that
President Obama felt some comfort that his condition of political inclusiveness
might be met and that the alienation of the Sunni population from the Shiadominated central government might be reduced.
The fourth element is the pursuit of aggressive multilateralism but not of the type
practised by President George W Bush. President Obama is working on putting together groups of countries that will include some major Muslim states. US Secre-
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tary of State John Kerry has visited various Middle Eastern capitals now to drum up
support for the new American war. His efforts have yielded some results. Ten Arab
nations led by Saudi Arabia announced during the American diplomat’s visit that
they would join Washington in a strategy to first debase and then destroy ISIS. Turkey also indicated its support for the effort. According to one assessment, the “[US]
administration believes that it needs clear support of Sunni regimes in the region to
prevent ISIS from framing the conflict as a clash between Islam and the west”.4 It
was for this reason that in his speech President Obama said the US could not take
the place of Arab nations in securing their region. The cooperation of the Saudis is
of critical importance since they espouse the form of Islam that is closest to the one
advocated by the ISIS. With the co-option of the Muslim states by the US, the
world’s Muslim populations will not see Obama’s war in the terms spelled out by
Samuel Huntington in his enormously influential book, The Clash of Civilizations.
The fifth element of the strategy is the clear message from the United States that
ultimately the responsibility for dealing with the scourge of extremism rests with
the countries that have become or are likely to become its victims. In justifying his
war that will be fought by the American military mostly from the air, President
Obama drew a parallel between his approach in the areas that have succumbed to
the ISIS and his approach towards Yemen and Somalia. That was a wrong comparison since these two are weak states that don’t have the capacity to deal with dissatisfaction that has led to the spread of extremism. Iraq and Syria have the potential of becoming strong states once again. What is also wrong is to suggest, as VicePresident Joe Biden put it a couple of days before President Obama spoke, that the
US would follow the ISIS “to the gates of hell”. If America has learned a lesson from
its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan it is that the push towards the gates of hell
can be made only by the political systems that are in place in the countries that are
likely to succumb to the pressures of extremism.
As Emile Simpson, a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, who
had done a tour of duty in Afghanistan as an infantry officer, wrote: “The lessons of
the past decade suggest that a clearly bounded extension of US military action
means taking responsibility at most for the initial phase, not the permanent defeat
of ISIS, in which the west should only play a supporting role. The alternative is to
commit to a long fight, removing the pressure on regional states to act. Anyone advocating that would have to believe that the western publics are prepared to bear
the cost. They are not”.5
For South Asia, the war against the ISIS is not a distant war. There are elements in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan who would be prepared to adopt the ISIS ideology
and its techniques if it is able to consolidate its hold over the areas in which it has
established itself. India too has to worry since it has a large Muslim population with
a significant Shia population, one of the targets of Sunni extremism.
1. Mr Shahid Javed Burki is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South
Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of
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Singapore. He can be contacted at sjburki gmail.com. Opinions expressed in this
paper, based on research by the author, do not necessarily reflect the views of
ISAS. During a professional career spanning over half a century, Mr Burki has held a
number of senior positions in Pakistan and at the World Bank. He was the Director
of China Operations at the World Bank from 1987 to 1994 and the Vice President of
Latin America and the Caribbean Region at the World Bank from 1994 to 1999. On
leave of absence from the Bank, he was Pakistan‟s Finance Minister, 1996-97.
2. Saeed Naqvi, “Can Ayman Zawahiri have the desired effect on India?”, India Today, 8 September, 2014.
3. E.J. Dionne Jr., “The new politics of foreign policy”, The Washington Post, 11 September, 2014, p. A19.
4. Geoff Dyer and Richard McGregor, “Arab states back Obama against ISIS”, Financial Times, 12 September, 2014, p 1.
5. Emile Simpson, “Fight Isis but do not chase them to the gates of hell”, Financial
Times, 12 September 2014, page 11.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/
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Why Obama Must Bomb ISIS
by STEVE BREYMAN
Every national peace group (large and small, new and old, religious and secular)
opposes Barack Obama’s war against ISIS in Iraq, and its recent extension to Syria.
Their opposition extends to Obama’s Congress-sanctioned arming of “moderate”
Syrian rebels (for which legislators found half a billion dollars).
The anti-war movement’s antagonism is sturdy and reasoned. It’s based on irrefutable historical, political, economic and cultural analysis focused on the past thirteen years of bloody, wasteful, failed war on Afghanistan and Iraq, Pakistan and
Yemen, Libya and Somalia. Find some here, here, and here.
The groups don’t merely oppose more war. They also advance positive agendas of
alternatives to bombing. United for Peace and Justice (an umbrella coalition under
which many US peace groups cohere) recommends five “better choices”: (1) make
diplomacy and humanitarian assistance the priority; (2) seek improved relations
with Iran to end the fighting in the region; (3) work through the United Nations to
halt the flow of financing and weapons to ISIS; (4) re-start UN-directed negotiations
to end the civil war in Syria; (5) mobilize to solve the real problems in the region—
poverty, hunger, drought, joblessness.
David Swanson of World Beyond War (and Secretary of Peace in theGreen Shadow
Cabinet) has these suggestions as to what “What to Do About ISIS”: (1) stop bombing; (2) stop shipping arms; (3) be skeptical of humanitarian claims; (4) apologize to
ISIS leader al-Baghdadi for brutalizing him in Abu Ghraib; (5) make restitution for
damages inflicted on Iraq; (6) apologize for advancing war in Syria; (7) begin withdrawing US forces from overseas; (8) work through the United Nations; (9) have the
US join the International Criminal Court, etc.
Sound as this advice is, policymakers are unable to take it. For Obama, Congress
and the Pentagon, there is no alternative to airstrikes on the Islamic State, and to
arming Syrian rebel moderates. Add the structure of US national security policy—its
institutions, practices and tools—to alliances with authoritarian regimes, past mistakes and ‘policy momentum,’ corporate power, the ideologies and worldviews of
officials, and the lack of genuine American democracy. The sum of these addends
restricts decision-makers’ options to war, and more war.
Consider the five-point program—”How to Combat ISIS Without Bombs”—put forward by Win Without War (WWW; another coalition that includes Global Exchange,
Pax Christi, Tikkun, Peace Action, Greenpeace, NOW, and numerous other groups):
Hit ISIS economically
Crack down on ISIS’s weapons supply
Address political grievances of local populations
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Lead a multinational international response
Provide humanitarian aid.
Like the recommendations above, policies predicated on these alternatives are
vastly superior to blind plunging ahead with airstrikes and weapons deliveries.
Each, however, runs up against deep-grained US foreign policy standard operating
procedures and non-military options foreclosed by past mistakes.
ISIS’s Finances
To “hit ISIS economically” requires cracking down on those who finance the organization and the banks that store the loot. The War on Terror spawned several new
offices to restrict the funding of designated terrorist organizations and individuals
across DC in the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Commerce and Treasury. This effort (unlike that aimed at Mexican drug cartels) made some inroads (it’s
hard to independently know how significant), but not without bogus “material support for terrorism” charges being leveled against several charitable organizations
and generous individuals. In the face of strong paper regulations forbidding banks
to service terrorists and other organized criminals, Wall Street averages about a
major scandal a year since 9/11.
Two factors complicate the mission of squeezing terrorist finances: (1) considerable
funding for jihadi groups comes from individual citizens of erstwhile US allies in the
Persian Gulf (a problem dating from the proxy war against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan), although there’s little or no evidence that ISIS is dependent on foreign donors; and (2) ISIS is to a large extent self-financing.
US efforts to get Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil sheikdoms to shut down the money funnel have run into obstacles at the very highest levels of government; presidents and secretaries of state are unwilling to jeopardize relations with the hydrocarbon kingdoms over the matter. ISIS’s wealth (some estimates have it as high as
$500 million) is the result of kidnappings for ransom, robberies, protection rackets,
and illicit sales of Syrian and Iraqi oil. The group is said to demand 10-20 of receipts from businesses in the towns and cities it controls.
Win Without War suggests targeting the “Turkish, Iraqi, and other oil dealers who
are purchasing the oil on the black market“—a sensible course of action—but Turkish authority (let alone US) does not extend far along its 750 mile border with Syria
and Iraq where smuggling of all sorts has been a way of life for decades (Turkey’s
war against its Kurds made licit livings difficult to make). And the estimates of $1-2
million per day for ISIS coffers from oil sales appear wildly overblown.
Restrict ISIS’s Weapons Supply
Win Without War wisely recommends that President Obama pressure Turkey to
restrict the flow of weapons and foreign fighters across its border with Syria.
Obama recently talked with the new Turkish president about doing just that. And
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he convinced the UN Security Council to criminalize participation in armed jihad.
But as with crude oil smuggling—and the trafficking of contraband over the USMexico border—attempts to interdict the flow of militants and weaponry across
long, rugged international boundaries against the efforts of determined professional smugglers leads to hugely expensive, frequently brutal, only partially effective,
metastasized and militarized border control-industrial complexes. Consider too
that weapons (and oil) smuggling is highly lucrative and leads to official corruption
and the obstacles become clear.
That considerable heavy US weaponry—including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery—already fell into Islamic State’s hands following the Iraqi Army’s
humiliating defeat in Mosul (and more recent defeats in Anbar) at the hands of
what were once lightly armed extremists did not deter Obama or his bipartisan
supporters on Capitol Hill from deciding to send more lethal assistance, and to train
handpicked Syrian rebels in its use. They were not deterred either by the
knowledge that some unknown but nontrivial number of formerly “moderate” Syrian insurgents now fight for ISIS and other non-preferred networks.
Cruise missile attacks and bombing sorties (including by the boondoggle F-22, it’s
first use “in combat”) appear to politicians and bureaucrats the superior option;
they supply deep gratification for those who see them as legitimate tools, that
sense of satisfaction anti-smuggling efforts experience rarely.
Local Political Grievances
Win Without War would have Obama attempt to heal the wounds inflicted on Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis by their Alawite and Shi’a dominated governments so as to deprive ISIS of local support. They point to the “Anbar Awakening”—where the US
Army used suitcases of $100 bills to sway tribal militia leaders from their support of
al Qaeda in Iraq—as a model.
The US invasion and occupation of Iraq, de-Baathification, and bungled reconstruction paved the way for Shi’a dominance of Iraqi politics. Washington appears to understand the need for the Iraqi political system to fairly include Sunnis. This is why
John Kerry engineered the replacement of Nouri al Maliki by Haidar al Abbadi. But
years of support for the sectarian al-Maliki whose policies deeply alienated Iraqi
Sunnis and Kurds will not be easy to undo. And the prospects for resolution of the
Syrian civil war, called for by WWW, seem lower at present than they did earlier
this year at the failed peace talks in Montreux.
Washington can’t even sort out its own “local political grievances;” fixing the mess
it made of Iraqi politics is inconceivable. It’s far easier just to bomb the bastards.
Multilateral International Response
WWW suggests building a coalition that would reduce the recruitment of Westerners to ISIS rather than one that supports US airstrikes against the militants. The
peace activists understand ISIS thrives because of conflicts in Syria and Iraq “fueled
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by foreign interests,” and thus urge Obama to involve “all the parties including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others.”
The War on Terror-Industrial Complex prefers to spy on “radical” imams and
mosques to reforming its foreign policy or engaging with communities from which
potential Western jihadis come. US foreign policy has worked to isolate Tehran
since 1979, ratcheting up the pressure of sanctions periodically as during the last
few years over Iran’s nuclear research program. John Kerry can’t make up his mind
whether to include Iran in the anti-ISIS coalition; he shut Iran out of the Paris conference he organized but then backtracked within a day or two muttering about a
possible role for Iran against the Wahabis.
Humanitarian Aid
WIW recognizes that the Obama administration has provided more assistance to
Syrian refugees than any other government. But US aid has been no where close to
what’s needed to meet the needs of the millions—1.4 million in tiny Lebanon
alone—short of food, clothing, shelter, medicine and schools. Elected national
Americans leaders are always able to find enough money to wage war, but never
able to find enough to alleviate misery.
The US did next to nothing on its own to aid the starving Palestinians in
the Yarmouk refugee camp outside Damascus. And the US has failed to support the
democratic Self-Administration Zones in northern Syria, even though as Michael
Beer of Nonviolence International reports, these “autonomous governments are
secular, have a 40 percent quota for women in leadership positions, and are committed to a united Syria and a pluralist Syria.”
At the same time, US humanitarian aid is considerably greater than that provided
by its Gulf Arab coalition partners. Rather than solicit support for its bombing campaign, the US ought to cobble together sufficient donors to meet the needs of the
innocents displaced by war in Iraq and Syria.
Conclusion
Barack Obama and the US Congress just made the same mistake in regard to Islamic State that George Bush and the US Congress made regarding al Qaeda following
9/11: they ‘declared war’ on a smallish bunch of brutal criminals thereby elevating
their status and opening the flood gates of recruitment after being attacked by the
Great Satan. They stepped right into the trap set for them by al Baghdadi: the beheading videos were designed to elicit a violent response from Washington. It
worked: ISIS is now the organization of choice for aspiring jihadis.
Obama and Congress are unable to choose diplomacy and humanitarian aid over
war with ISIS for several interrelated reasons. First, most of those who make and
implement US national security policy have distorted and fantastical
worldviews. They believe the US can act as both world policeman and benign
hegemon. They justify most any level of violence and collateral damage in service
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to policy ends—”destroy ISIS”—impossible to achieve. They see US bombs as problem solvers, and disregard all contradictory evidence.
Second, today’s policy has implications—some very long lasting—for tomorrow’s,
as yesterday’s has for today’s. Policies gather momentum and lose malleability over
time. Policies enroll supporters, generate enormous sums for contractors, and
shunt aside dissenters. Decisions made, weapons bought, money spent, bureaucracies shaped during the War on Terror echo into the future. US policy has become
little more than a New Enemy Creation Process. Even if Obama (and it’s clear he
does not) or the next president wanted to make a clean break, to finally bring an
end to the War on Terror, it would, and will be, a very difficult undertaking.
Third, the failure of Congress and the American people to rein in presidential war
making powers, to challenge even the serial illegal actions of successive presidents,
reduces the prospects for the stem to stern overhaul of US policy necessary to follow the sane advice of peace groups. Fourth, the interests vested in the War on
Terror-Industrial-Complex represent some of the most powerful political-economic
actors in the country; their hold over policy cannot be underestimated.
Surprise as to the lopsided authorization for Obama’s direct war against ISIS and
indirect war against al Assad evaporates in light of this analysis. Reasonable observers may have thought that thirteen years of experience, pain, shame and waste
would be sufficient to at least teach officials what to avoid this time. Yet here they
go again complete with deployment of “boots on the ground” regardless of the
president’s claims to the contrary.
te e re m n is author of Movement enesis and Why Movements Ma er. He is
a former William C. Foster Visiting Scholar Fellow at the US State Department.
Reach him at breyms rpi.edu
http://www.counterpunch.org/
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FBI Terror Threat Assessment makes no mention of Islam
September 20, 2014
The Washington Free Beacon obtained a copy of the 2013 FBI National Threat Assessment for Domestic Extremism. The 60-page report is interesting for what it
says. And for what it doesn’t say.
To the latter point, there is a glaring omission: no mention of Islamic terrorism. Instead, the report singles out as terror threats “anti-government militia groups and
white supremacy extremists, along with ‘sovereign citizen’ nationalists, and anarchists…violent animal rights and environmentalist extremists, black separatists, anti
- and pro-abortion activists, and Puerto Rican nationalists.”
It’s amazing (and not in a good way) that the report lists all these different groups
yet manages to avoid singling out the greatest threat to our national security: Islamic terror.
We are living in some crazy times, people.
We are allowing increasing numbers of Muslims into this country. We are allowing
imams to preach hate in mosques in cities and towns across America. We are allowing Americans who fight for ISIS to return to the United States with no consequence. We are behaving like dhimmis on multiple fronts, from being apologists for
Islam to elected officials who embrace sharia law to Muslim abuse of the justice
system (lawfare) and on and on.
Dhimmitude, Exhibit A, is this FBI document. While it avoids any mention of Islam
or Muslims, it does single out black separatist groups, as the Washington Free Beacon continues:
On black separatists, the report warned that “high-profile racially charged crimes or
events” could lead to an expansion of black separatist groups. The report identified
three such groups as the New Black Panther Party, the Israelite Church of God in
Jesus Christ, and the Black Hebrew Israelite group as extremists under FBI scrutiny.
…the report warned that radical black activists could “reinitiate violence at the
historically high levels seen for the movement during the 1970s, when bombings,
assassinations, hijackings, and hostage-takings occurred.”
“Such a scenario could occur as an extreme response to perceptions of devolving
racial equality or perceptions of racially-motivated police brutality, or raciallybiased injustice, oppression, or judicial rulings…Indicators include increased weapons procurement, reports of sophisticated plots, and development of an explosives
capability.”
Black extremist groups may also seek “stronger ties to foreign governments in exchange for financial resources,” the report said.
The report was written before the racial unrest in Ferguson, Mo. However, it men-
110
tions that black separatist extremists stepped up threats against law enforcement
officers, the U.S. government, and non-blacks following the Trayvon Martin
shooting in 2012.
“FBI investigations reveal black separatist extremists engaged in financial crimes,
and drug and weapons trafficking, possibly to finance activities and maintain access
to weapons.”….
This attention to radical black groups is interesting. I certainly don’t think such
groups come near the threat of Islamic terror, but taken as a whole there are areas
of overlap including institutionalized hate, notions of supremacy, violence, and
rampant anti-Semitism.
The Washington Free Beacon continues:
FBI intelligence sources reported that “Of a sample of 50 credible violent threat intelligence reports analyzed for this assessment, nearly 60 percent expressed lethal
violence as an ultimate goal”…. (snip)
The Bureau anticipates an increase in activity by animal rights and environmental
extremists…Additionally, a similar level of activity is expected this year for anarchist, anti-government militias, white supremacy, and sovereign citizen extremists.
For abortion extremism, the report says violence prone groups fall into two categories, “anti-abortion” and “pro-choice,” but notes the primary threat of abortion extremism comes from lone individuals, not groups.
Puerto Rican nationalist extremists were described as “followers of Marxist-Leninist
ideology,” have targeted the U.S. government for destabilization, and are seeking
to create an independent island nation.
The FBI estimates domestic extremists caused more than $15 million in financial
loses in 2012 and 2013, mainly through animal rights and environmental activities
that targeted U.S. agriculture.
OK. Let’s pause a moment and review: The FBI has identified animal rights activists
and Puerto Rican nationalists among those that pose a serious threat to America.
Say what? While I find animal rights activists to be pretty obnoxious, it’s news to
me that they should be high on our radar as a terror threat.
Meanwhile, I found references to black separatist groups ironic since we have a
Justice Department turning a blind eye to threats made by the Black Panthers as
recently as last month when they lead a chant calling for the death of Officer Wilson in addition to other relatively recent threats where there were no consequences when they were physically intimidating, publically threatening to commit murder, and inciting others to violence. See here, here, here,here, here, here, here,
and here.
The Washington Free Beacon continues (bolding is mine):
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The FBI’s most recent national threat assessment for domestic terrorism makes no
reference to Islamist terror threats, despite last year’s Boston Marathon bombing
and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting—both carried out by radical Muslim Americans.
Instead, the internal FBI intelligence report concluded in its 2013 assessment published this month that the threat to U.S. internal security from extremists is limited
to attacks and activities by eight types of domestic extremist movements—none
motivated by radical Islam. (snip)
“The FBI categorizes Islamic extremists and individuals inspired by Islamic extremist
groups as International Terrorism,” he said. “Even though Ft. Hood and Boston
were domestic incidents, the ideology and motivation of those behind them had
international elements.” (snip)
The Obama administration in 2009 adopted a new policy that substituted the vague
term “violent extremism” as a replacement for terrorism. (snip)
The report left out all references to the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon, which killed three people and injured some 264 others….(snip)
The FBI report also made no direct reference to the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, by
radicalized Army Maj. Nidal Hasan. The mass shooting left 13 dead and more than
30 injured.
Former FBI Agent John Guandolo said…“It should not surprise anyone who follows
the jihadi threats in the United States that the FBI would not even include ‘Islamic
terrorism’ in its assessment of serious threats to the republic in an official report,”
Guandolo said.
“Since 9/11, FBI leadership—as well as leaders from Department of Homeland
Security, the State Department, CIA, Pentagon, and the National Security Council—
relies on easily identifiable jihadis from the Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas, al Qaeda
and elsewhere to advise it on how to deal with ‘domestic extremism.’”
Patrick Poole, a domestic terrorism expert, also was critical of the report’s omission
of U.S. Islamist extremism, blaming “politically correct” policies at the FBI for the
problem. (snip)
“These politically correct policies have already allowed Americans to be killed at
Fort Hood and in Boston,” he added
Guandolo said the failure to recognize the domestic Islamist threat had allowed domestic jihadist groups and their sympathizers to shape U.S. government create policies that do not acknowledge jihad as the root cause for the current global chaos.
An example, he said, is that the FBI has appointed a domestic Muslim Brotherhood
and Hamas support organization leader to an FBI advisory council at the Washington headquarters.
Additionally, the FBI is failing to train agents and analysts on the Muslim Brother-
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hood network in the United States, Guandolo said.
“The FBI, no matter how diligent its agents are in their pursuit of ‘terrorists’, will
never defeat this threat because its leaders refuse to address or even identify it,”
he said. “This level of negligence on the part of the FBI leaders and their failure to
understand the jihadi threat 13 years after 9/11 is appalling.”
Poole said the failure of the FBI to understand the domestic Islamist threat led to
the U.S. government categorizing the 2009 Fort Hood shooting Army Maj. Nidal Hasan as “workplace violence.”
“In the case of Fort Hood, the FBI was monitoring Maj. Hasan’s email
communication with al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki but the FBI headquarters dismissed it because they were talking about ‘religious’ subjects,” Poole said.
“In the Boston bombing case the FBI cleared Tamerlan Tsarnayev with nothing
more than a house visit after receiving a tip from Russian intelligence, and never
making the connection that he was attending a mosque founded by an imprisoned
al Qaeda financier and previously attended by two convicted terrorists,” Poole added.
As a result “we have more than a dozen dead Americans killed here at home because of these politically correct FBI policies, and with threats emerging from all
corners this doubling-down on political correctness when it comes to Islam is undoubtedly going to get more Americans killed,” he added.
The domestic threat assessment is the latest example indicating the FBI has been
forced by Obama administration policies from focusing on the domestic terror
threat posed by radical Islamists.
Rep. Louie Gohmert (R., Texas) said in a 2012 House floor speech that the FBI was
ordered to purge references to Islam, jihad, and Muslims in its counterterrorism
“lexicon” guidelines for its reports.
As a result, the FBI is hamstrung from understanding the threat of terrorism from
groups like al Qaeda that have declared jihad, or holy war, on the United States,
Gomert said.
…the vast majority of U.S. Islamic organizations were identified in recent U.S.
terrorism trials as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent group for the Palestinian terror group Hamas. Thus, these groups are aligned with the same objectives
as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al Qaeda, and others….
“Our FBI is not teaching their agents and analysts this information; they are not
sharing it with local and state law enforcement officials; and they are not investigating and pursuing the very individuals and organizations which are supporting
and training jihadis in America,” Guandolo said.
Guandolo said former FBI director Robert Mueller testified to Congress that he was
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unaware that the Islamic Society of Boston was the organization behind the radicalization of the Tsarnaev brothers. “That tells you all we need to know about the
FBI’s leadership about the threat here in America from the Islamic Movement—
they are clueless,”….
This is what gets innocent people killed.
To read more about this report, Robert Spencer has an excellent piece, here.
The Washington Free Beacon obtained a copy of the 2013 FBI National Threat Assessment for Domestic Extremism. The 60-page report is interesting for what it
says. And for what it doesn’t say.
To the latter point, there is a glaring omission: no mention of Islamic terrorism. Instead, the report singles out as terror threats “anti-government militia groups and
white supremacy extremists, along with ‘sovereign citizen’ nationalists, and anarchists…violent animal rights and environmentalist extremists, black separatists, anti
- and pro-abortion activists, and Puerto Rican nationalists.”
It’s amazing (and not in a good way) that the report lists all these different groups
yet manages to avoid singling out the greatest threat to our national security: Islamic terror.
We are living in some crazy times, people.
We are allowing increasing numbers of Muslims into this country. We are allowing
imams to preach hate in mosques in cities and towns across America. We are allowing Americans who fight for ISIS to return to the United States with no consequence. We are behaving like dhimmis on multiple fronts, from being apologists for
Islam to elected officials who embrace sharia law to Muslim abuse of the justice
system (lawfare) and on and on.
Dhimmitude, Exhibit A, is this FBI document. While it avoids any mention of Islam
or Muslims, it does single out black separatist groups, as the Washington Free Beacon continues:
On black separatists, the report warned that “high-profile racially charged crimes or
events” could lead to an expansion of black separatist groups. The report identified
three such groups as the New Black Panther Party, the Israelite Church of God in
Jesus Christ, and the Black Hebrew Israelite group as extremists under FBI scrutiny.
…the report warned that radical black activists could “reinitiate violence at the
historically high levels seen for the movement during the 1970s, when bombings,
assassinations, hijackings, and hostage-takings occurred.”
“Such a scenario could occur as an extreme response to perceptions of devolving
racial equality or perceptions of racially-motivated police brutality, or raciallybiased injustice, oppression, or judicial rulings…Indicators include increased weapons procurement, reports of sophisticated plots, and development of an explosives
114
capability.”
Black extremist groups may also seek “stronger ties to foreign governments in exchange for financial resources,” the report said.
The report was written before the racial unrest in Ferguson, Mo. However, it mentions that black separatist extremists stepped up threats against law enforcement
officers, the U.S. government, and non-blacks following the Trayvon Martin
shooting in 2012.
“FBI investigations reveal black separatist extremists engaged in financial crimes,
and drug and weapons trafficking, possibly to finance activities and maintain access
to weapons.”….
This attention to radical black groups is interesting. I certainly don’t think such
groups come near the threat of Islamic terror, but taken as a whole there are areas
of overlap including institutionalized hate, notions of supremacy, violence, and
rampant anti-Semitism.
The Washington Free Beacon continues:
FBI intelligence sources reported that “Of a sample of 50 credible violent threat intelligence reports analyzed for this assessment, nearly 60 percent expressed lethal
violence as an ultimate goal”…. (snip)
The Bureau anticipates an increase in activity by animal rights and environmental
extremists…Additionally, a similar level of activity is expected this year for anarchist, anti-government militias, white supremacy, and sovereign citizen extremists.
For abortion extremism, the report says violence prone groups fall into two categories, “anti-abortion” and “pro-choice,” but notes the primary threat of abortion extremism comes from lone individuals, not groups.
Puerto Rican nationalist extremists were described as “followers of Marxist-Leninist
ideology,” have targeted the U.S. government for destabilization, and are seeking
to create an independent island nation.
The FBI estimates domestic extremists caused more than $15 million in financial
loses in 2012 and 2013, mainly through animal rights and environmental activities
that targeted U.S. agriculture.
OK. Let’s pause a moment and review: The FBI has identified animal rights activists
and Puerto Rican nationalists among those that pose a serious threat to America.
Say what? While I find animal rights activists to be pretty obnoxious, it’s news to
me that they should be high on our radar as a terror threat.
Meanwhile, I found references to black separatist groups ironic since we have a
Justice Department turning a blind eye to threats made by the Black Panthers as
recently as last month when they lead a chant calling for the death of Officer Wilson in addition to other relatively recent threats where there were no consequenc-
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es when they were physically intimidating, publically threatening to commit murder, and inciting others to violence.
The FBI’s most recent national threat assessment for domestic terrorism makes no
reference to Islamist terror threats, despite last year’s Boston Marathon bombing
and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting—both carried out by radical Muslim Americans.
Instead, the internal FBI intelligence report concluded in its 2013 assessment published this month that the threat to U.S. internal security from extremists is limited
to attacks and activities by eight types of domestic extremist movements—none
motivated by radical Islam. (snip)
“The FBI categorizes Islamic extremists and individuals inspired by Islamic extremist
groups as International Terrorism,” he said. “Even though Ft. Hood and Boston
were domestic incidents, the ideology and motivation of those behind them had
international elements.” (snip)
The Obama administration in 2009 adopted a new policy that substituted the vague
term “violent extremism” as a replacement for terrorism. (snip)
The report left out all references to the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon, which killed three people and injured some 264 others….(snip)
The FBI report also made no direct reference to the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, by
radicalized Army Maj. Nidal Hasan. The mass shooting left 13 dead and more than
30 injured.
Former FBI Agent John Guandolo said…“It should not surprise anyone who follows
the jihadi threats in the United States that the FBI would not even include ‘Islamic
terrorism’ in its assessment of serious threats to the republic in an official report,”
Guandolo said.
“Since 9/11, FBI leadership—as well as leaders from Department of Homeland
Security, the State Department, CIA, Pentagon, and the National Security Council—
relies on easily identifiable jihadis from the Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas, al Qaeda
and elsewhere to advise it on how to deal with ‘domestic extremism.’”
Patrick Poole, a domestic terrorism expert, also was critical of the report’s omission
of U.S. Islamist extremism, blaming “politically correct” policies at the FBI for the
problem. (snip)
“These politically correct policies have already allowed Americans to be killed at
Fort Hood and in Boston,” he added
Guandolo said the failure to recognize the domestic Islamist threat had allowed
domestic jihadist groups and their sympathizers to shape U.S. government create
policies that do not acknowledge jihad as the root cause for the current global chaos.
An example, he said, is that the FBI has appointed a domestic Muslim Brotherhood
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and Hamas support organization leader to an FBI advisory council at the Washington headquarters.
Additionally, the FBI is failing to train agents and analysts on the Muslim Brotherhood network in the United States, Guandolo said.
“The FBI, no matter how diligent its agents are in their pursuit of ‘terrorists’, will
never defeat this threat because its leaders refuse to address or even identify it,”
he said. “This level of negligence on the part of the FBI leaders and their failure to
understand the jihadi threat 13 years after 9/11 is appalling.”
Poole said the failure of the FBI to understand the domestic Islamist threat led to
the U.S. government categorizing the 2009 Fort Hood shooting Army Maj. Nidal Hasan as “workplace violence.”
“In the case of Fort Hood, the FBI was monitoring Maj. Hasan’s email
communication with al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki but the FBI headquarters dismissed it because they were talking about ‘religious’ subjects,” Poole said.
“In the Boston bombing case the FBI cleared Tamerlan Tsarnayev with nothing
more than a house visit after receiving a tip from Russian intelligence, and never
making the connection that he was attending a mosque founded by an imprisoned
al Qaeda financier and previously attended by two convicted terrorists,” Poole added.
As a result “we have more than a dozen dead Americans killed here at home because of these politically correct FBI policies, and with threats emerging from all
corners this doubling-down on political correctness when it comes to Islam is undoubtedly going to get more Americans killed,” he added.
The domestic threat assessment is the latest example indicating the FBI has been
forced by Obama administration policies from focusing on the domestic terror
threat posed by radical Islamists.
Rep. Louie Gohmert (R., Texas) said in a 2012 House floor speech that the FBI was
ordered to purge references to Islam, jihad, and Muslims in its counterterrorism
“lexicon” guidelines for its reports.
As a result, the FBI is hamstrung from understanding the threat of terrorism from
groups like al Qaeda that have declared jihad, or holy war, on the Untied States,
Gomert said.
…the vast majority of U.S. Islamic organizations were identified in recent U.S.
terrorism trials as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent group for the Palestinian terror group Hamas. Thus, these groups are aligned with the same objectives
as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al Qaeda, and others….
“Our FBI is not teaching their agents and analysts this information; they are not
sharing it with local and state law enforcement officials; and they are not investi-
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gating and pursuing the very individuals and organizations which are supporting
and training jihadis in America,” Guandolo said.
Guandolo said former FBI director Robert Mueller testified to Congress that he was
unaware that the Islamic Society of Boston was the organization behind the radicalization of the Tsarnaev brothers. “That tells you all we need to know about the
FBI’s leadership about the threat here in America from the Islamic Movement—
they are clueless,”….
Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/
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