How different were the political/economic landscaptes of

Transcription

Sarah Merette
EH590 – October 20th 2010
How different were the political/economic landscaptes of Tonkin and
Cochinchina (1900-1940)?
This paper aims to show the differences in the colonial policy affecting Tonkin and Cochinchina.
Indeed, though both regions were part of the Indochinese Union, they were not governed in the
exact same way: Cochinchina‟s high dependence on international commerce called for a
different political approach, mainly in terms of property rights and taxation system than Tonkin‟s
highly domestic economy. We will first outline the colonial policy of Indochina and briefly show
key differences in the economic context of the two regions. Because colonial policy generally
revolves around maximizing revenue, we will then study property rights and the taxation system
of French Indochina, emphasizing the differences between Tonkin and Cochinchina. To
conclude, we will show how this paper relates to the remainder of this PhD project: namely that
Cochinchina and Tonkin were two very different economies during French colonial rule.
1) What is the colonial policy of Indochina and how does its general structure differ
between Tonkin and Cochinchina?
The original aim of French colonial policy in Indochina was to encourage „economic
development‟ albeit to the benefit of the metropolis. This policy is known as the „mise-en-valeur‟.
This traditionally implied encouraging foreign investment, French imports, exports of cheap
primary material and foodstuffs and the development of plantations of high value agricultural
goods such as rubber, tea, coffee… However, the reason these policies jump to mind is that they
generally are necessary to ensure stable state revenue so that colonies do not require constant
loans from the metropolis. Between 1900 and 1940, there were 22 different general governor of
Indochina. Their main responsibility was, through mise-en-valeur, to ensure that the colonies
could run themselves based on their own tax base.
Of these twenty-two governors, the most important was Paul Doumer. He governed
Indochina between 1897 and 1902. During these five years, he designed the fiscal regime of
Indochina as it stood until the end of French rule in 1954. Doumer was sent to Indochina to
redress the financial problems of Indochina, seen by the metropolis as constantly requiring loans.
His programme for Indochina is a seven part program1:
 To organize a general government for the union and local administration for each
province;
 To remediate to the financial problems and build sustainable fiscal resources;
 To improve the physical infrastructure of the Union;
 To encourage production and commerce;
 To improve Indochina‟s defences;
 To finish pacifying Tonkin;
 To expand French influence in the Far East.
1
Amaury Lorin. Paul Doumer, gouverneur general de l’Indochine (1897-1902). Paris: l‟Harmattan, 2004. P.61
He built the Indochinese general government with its many centralized organs, mainly the
quintessential revenue machines of the Indochinese state: the excise boards of salt (1897), opium
(1899) and rice alcohol (1902)2. The result of Doumer‟s reforms was that taxes nearly doubled in
the five years he was in charge. The problem with Doumer‟s program is that it went against the
pre-established Cochinchinese autonomy: the creation of a general budget cut Cochinchina‟s
local budget by three quarters3. This situation created so many problems that Cochinchina even
attempted to separate from the Indochinese Union. This, however, went against Doumer‟s
program and Cochinchina had to remain part of the union. Doumer‟s program remained the
cornerstone of French colonial policy in Indochina: the aim was economic development to
favour stable fiscal revenue.
Even by 1928, when Governor Pasquier arrived in Indochina, this was his central
responsibility: Pasquier‟s job as the new governor general is to continue the programme of the
„mise-en-valeur‟ of Indochina4. In 1928, 80 new anonymous societies were opened in Indochina,
either European or indigenous and this led to an increased investment of 8 254 994$ 5
encouraging the economic development of the colony6. However, Pasquier recognized the need
for greater political participation by the indigenous population7. Pasquier introduced changes in
the colonial policy to include a certain social assistance to the indigenous population: he felt it
was time to intervene actively for a work of social assistance and organization8.
Minor changes had previously crept in the administration with preceeding governors. For
example, in 1918, Albert Sarraut, the governor, believed that a greater degree of indigenous
representation in the government would be beneficial. However, this remained a highly elitist
system as even indigenous applicants holding diplomas were only able to postulate for more
prestigious employment in the civil service if they had been naturalised as French9. It was not
until 1926 under Varrennes that the situation improved. Nonetheless, there are some differences
in this respect between Tonkin and Cochinchina. Indeed, Cochinchina, as of 1880, had a superior
council made up of 6 indigenous and 12 Europeans. By 1932, indigenous representation was the
same proportion of European representation. This council had budgetary and financial
responsibilities, as well as administrative ones. It also contributed to manage private domain,
public works and domain, concessions10… In Tonkin, the situation was different, there were less
indigenous members and the assembly was only consultative11.
By 1930, the great depression was starting to be felt in Indochina and economic concerns
overshadowed concerns of equal representation. There was a depreciation of rice and rubber
prices, a weak metal market and a reduction of the money in circulation in the economy. This
also resulted in a reduction of imports and of investment12. Moreover, the Indochinese currency,
2
Ibid, 79
Ibid, 72
4
BIB AOM/21235/1930 P.112
5
Ibid P,111
6
$ stands for the Indochinese piastre, the local currency
7
Ibid, P.115
8
Ibid, P.114
9
INDO GGI 66695, 66696 & 65597; Roger Pinto. Aspects de l’Evolution Gouvernementale de l’Indochine
Francaise. Paris: Etudes Indochinoises & Extreme-Orientales, 1946. 18-19
10
Pinto, op.cit. 45
11
Ibid, 47
12
BIB AOM/21235/1930 P.111
3
the piastre, was a silver standard currency. As such, rapidly decreasing silver prices resulted in a
devalorisation of the value of the piastre and hence a diminution in the purchasing power of
Indochina and an appreciation in the costs of goods13. On November 16th, 1929 the exchange of
piastre to francs was 1 to 10 and then the whole system went to gold exchange and the piastre
was valued at 655 milligram of gold, 10 francs14. This had different impact on the two regions:
Cochinchina‟s mindset towards agriculture and commerce was dependent on steady export
income as well as lower import prices 15. In the case of Tonkin, export revenue from mining
products were important but maintaining a peaceful political environment was more important to
ensure continued French governance.
As we can see, the colonial policy in general for Tonkin and Cochinchina was united under
a similar aim: ensuring adequate fiscal revenue and encouraging economic development to the
benefit of the metropolis. However, practically the policies were not always the same: fiscal
contributions and indigenous representation differed. In the following section, we will look in
more detail at the differences in the colonial context leading to policy decisions in Tonkin and
Cochinchina.
1.1) What is the context in which political and economic decisions are made in
Tonkin and Cochinchina?
The residents of each province wrote reports to the general governor of Indochina. In these, each
resident was expected to report how easily tax collection had been, if there had been any
political trouble, economic difficulties. Conversely any positive circumstances should be
acknowledged.
Between 1900 and 1940, the Tonkinese superior resident emphasized a number of
recurring themes:
 When the crops are bountiful, the region was politically quiet; when crops were not as
successful as expected, political trouble was bound to occur16
 Rebellion against the main excise boards and black market were recurring themes that
seemed to link Chinese merchants and indigenous public officials17
 Weather related crop failure led to growing expenditure on public works18
 Because of exchange rate difficulties (silver standard) and of the Great Depression,
agricultural production tended to focus on production for domestic use within Tonkin19.
The Cochinchinese consul reported some similar trends such as resistance against the
excise boards, but there were some significant differences:

13
When international commercial circumstances are difficult, political resistance tends to
occur20
BIB AOM/21235/1930 P.117-118
Ibid, 349-351
15
Ibid, 603
16
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Résidence Superieure au Tonkin. Rapport Politique: 1901, 1911, 1914;
1902, 1903, 1905, 1906, 1928, 1932
17
Ibid, 1903, 1904, 1912, 1914
18
Ibid, 1905, 1909
19
Ibid, 1919, 1931
20
Gouvernement de la Cochinchine: Cabinet du Gouverneur. Rapport Politique de Cochinchine: 1904, 1909
14



The main difficulty of tax collection tended to come from European settlers or from the
expansion of cultivable land resulting in floating agrarian workers21
Local market places were expanded as part of public works because of high demand22
Economic crises resulted in a diversification of crops23
Indeed, as we can see, in Cochinchina good commercial conditions are a prerequisite for
political stability. In Tonkin however, political stability depends on domestic factors such as crop
success. Moreover, tax collection in Cochinchina tends to be difficult when commerce is
booming, whereas in Tonkin tax collection success depends on political agitation. Additionally,
it is the responsibility of the local government in Cochinchina to improve marketability of
production whereas in Tonkin, public works are necessary due to weather difficulty. Finally,
whereas international economic difficulties result in Tonkin closing itself from the rest of the
world; in Cochinchina, it stimulates diversification of production to ensure stable gains from
international commerce. Indeed, the Superior Resident of Tonkin himself acknowledges:
The Cochinchinese, who a few years ago, were fearful of commerce, are now
understanding its importance. But in Tonkin, the indigenous peoples believe that
the administration should help them in their attempt to boycott Chinese
commerce24
Based on these key differences between the two regions, we can understand why the
colonial policies would differ. Since the main aim of France‟s colonial policy in Indochina is to
encourage economic development at the benefit of the metropolis then the differences in
circumstances affecting the two regions calls for different approaches. In Cochinchina, policies
should ensure that international commerce is not inhibited by any political problems and
domestic institutions should facilitate production expansion. In Tonkin however, because the
region is politically unstable, the administration needs to ensure domestic conditions guarantee
stable crops to provide stable fiscal revenue. As we will see in the following sections, these
differences are reflected in the property rights and taxation systems of French Indochina.
2) What are property rights like and how do they differ between the two regions?
Before the beginning of French rule, land was organized in three types of property rights: the
emperor who owned everything that was not owned by anyone else, villages with communal
land, and land owned by families25. Property rights were registered in the „dia-bo‟, which was an
indigenous cadastral matrice maintained by the emperor for fiscal reasons. Unfortunately,
because it was fiscally motivated, it was not always accurate and the French authorities decided
to draw up a more precise and accurate cadastral matrice. This proved too difficult and tedious
21
Ibid: 1905, 1906, 1923
Ibid: 1910, 1913
23
Ibid: 1912, 1937
24
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Résidence Superieure au Tonkin. Rapport Politique du 2ème trimester:
1919. Translated from “les cochinchinois qui il y a quelques annees avaient le degout et la peur du commerce
commencent a comprendre l‟importance qu‟il y a peur eux a faire un effort en ce sens. Mais au Tonkin les indigenes
exprimerent l‟opinion que les pouvoirs publics devaient les aider dans leur tentative de boycottage du commerce
chinois”
25
59(4): Ministère des Colonies. Gouvernement général de l‟Indochine. Le Régime de la Propriété foncière en
Indochine: ce qui a été fait – ce qu’il faudra faire. Rapport Présenté à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies par A.
Boudillon Inspecteur de l‟enregistrement et des domaines chargé de mission. Paris: Emile Larose, libraire-éditeur,
1915., 14-15
22
for the French authorities and it was never completed. As such, property rights throughout the
Indochinese union were difficult to justify26.
Because the dia-bo was not always accurate and because the French cadastral matrice was
very incomplete,27 it was possible for land already owned to be given out as a concession, as
ownership could not be proved. This difficulty in proving ownership meant land could be given
out to new agrarian entrepreneurs and the result was a substantial number of lawsuits being filed
from indigenous farmers28. However, this proved to be the case only in Cochinchina and not in
Tonkin where land ownership for indigenous farmers was more rarely contested. Concessions
were uniquely for French nationals or protégés29. The state used the concession regime in order
to bring about economic development: the ambition of the state and of the colonial authority was
to develop „rich‟ cultures through concessions such as coffee, tea, cotton or silk worm30.
Tonkin and Cochinchina, whilst both belonging to the Indochinese Union are not the same
type of colonial territory: Cochinchina is a direct colony, but Tonkin is simply a protectorate.
This difference results in a different judicial organization between the two regions. In Tonkin, all
indigenous inhabitants are under indigenous law and only Europeans are held under French
jurisdiction. In Cochinchina, however, because of its status as a colony, the distinction was
blurred and indigenous people, depending on their association with European colons can be held
under French jurisdiction. For example because Cochinchina is a colony indigenous people are
considered French and are therefore liable to French law. Nonetheless they are generally tried
according to indigenous laws though if these contradict French laws, sentences can be amended.
In Tonkin, a protectorate, there remains indigenous trials overseen by mandarins31.
The system was complicated and the separateness of the two regions affirmed by the
presence of two separate appeal courts: one in Hanoi and one in Saigon32. The presence of these
two judicial systems was difficult for commercial enterprise, particularly in Tonkin where the
rules were more distinct between Europeans and Indigenous. In Cochinchina, the French
mortgage system was implemented alongside the indigenous system creating some conflicts;
however because of Cochinchina‟s status as a colony, indigenous people were encouraged to
simply use the French mortgage system to prove ownership33. In Tonkin, if an individual was
indigenous and thus under the old Annamite legislation, he did not have access to the French
mortgage system resulting in an inability to obtain credit using land as a collateral34.
We can see from this basic outline of the property rights system in Indochina that there
were differences in ease of proving land ownership and obtaining credit using land as collateral
between Tonkin and Cochinchina. Though in both cases a mix of traditional and French
jurisdiction complicated property rights; because of Cochinchina‟s status as a colony, the
26
Ibid, 30 & 93
Alexandre Deroche. France Coloniale et Droit de Propriete: Les Concessions en Indochine. Paris: L‟Harmattan,
2004. 101
28
Ibid, 119
29
Ibid, 187
30
Ibid, 173
31
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques. Annuaire Statistique de l‟Indochine.
I volume 1913-1922. Hanoi: Imprimerie d‟Extrème-Orient, 1927. p. 88
32
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l‟Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de
l‟Indochine. II volume 1923-1929. Hanoi: Imprimerie d‟Extrème-Orient, 1931. p.115
33
Boudillon. Op.cit. 35
34
BIB SOM C//7529, 8
27
indigenous population could more easily resolve the problems between dual jurisdiction than in
Tonkin. The rationale behind these differences links to the previous sections. Cochinchina‟s
dependence on international commerce required a flexibility in the dual justice system so that
land could act as collateral. Moreover, even if concessions did encroach on already owned
property, conceded land generally contributed significantly to the revenue from trade (as these
developed into cash crop plantations) and thus lawsuits from potential previous occupiers were
the accepted trade-off. However, in Tonkin, the maintenance of a fully indigenous land property
right system maintained traditional ownership structures. Basic property rights differed between
the two regions and it is likely this influenced differences in the taxation system. In the following
section, we will investigate these differences.
3) How can we understand the taxation system and public finances of Indochina as a
whole, and of Tonkin and Cochinchina individually?
In October 1911, Doumer‟s program of the unification of all budgets was achieved: the general
budget was set up for expenditure on works and services common to all Indochinese regions;
expenditure for the general government; debt service; contribution to the metropolis; colonial
inspection; the administration of customs and excise boards; and the post and telegraph services.
The budget‟s funds came from the products of the customs, excise boards and some indirect
contributions 35 . Local budgets however, obtain their funds from direct taxation and are used
exclusively for local services 36 . According to Henri Guermeur, an economist in the early
twentieth century, Annam-Tonkin often behaved as a prodigual son, constantly requiring
additional loans to meet its budget demands37. Before the establishment of the general budget,
these loans would come from France. After the general budget, most of Annam-Tonkin‟s deficits
were financed by Cochinchina.
The taxation system is similar in style for both Tonkin and Cochinchina. Indeed, both have
different taxes for rice fields and for fields of other crops. However, the tax rates differ
significantly. The table below outlines the main indigenous taxes for cultivable land:
Table 1.1: Cultivable Land Taxes 1900-1940, piastres per hectare
Source: Annuaire Statistique 1913-1922
Tonkin
Cochinchina
Rice fields
3 classes
6 classes
from 2.4 to 4.5
from 0.1 to 2
Other crops
4 classes
before 1921
After 1921
from 0.3 to 6
3 classes
4 classes
from 0.48 to 2.76
from 0.6 to 3
As we can see, taxes were significantly higher in Tonkin than they were in Cochinchina. In
fact, the tax rates in Tonkin is set per mau, where three mau is a hectare. This difference in initial
classification suggests that land parcel in Tonkin are smaller than they are in Cochinchina. This
would help explain the higher tax rate. The other reason tax rates for crops would be higher in
35
TH462 Fall Mamadou. Investissements Publics et Politique Economique en Indochine 1898-1930 (La Commune
Vietnamienne dans la Mise en Valeur de l‟Indochine), UER Geographie Histoire Sciences de la Societe. Paris 19841985. P. 74
36
Ibid, p. 75
37
Henri Guermeur. Le Regime Fiscal de l’ Indochine. Paris L‟Harmattan, 1990. (first edition: Hanoi-Haiphong:
Imprimerie de l‟Extrème-Orient, 1909). P.48-49
Tonkin is due to the possibility of double cropping. Finally, in Cochinchina, as we saw in the
previous parts, the emphasis of the administration policies was on encouraging commercial
ventures. As such, lower taxes would encourage more large scale production.
The table below outlines other direct taxes:
Table 1.2: Some Direct Taxes, 1900-1940. Piastres per year
Source for taxes on patents and European incomes: Annuaire Statistique 1913-1922
Source for taxes on indigenous incomes: Tonkin: Guermeur 1990, 103-107; Cochinchina:
Guermeur 1990, 108
Tonkin
Cochinchina
Fixed
Proportional
Fixed
Proportional
Taxes on Patents
from 1 to
from 1/30 to 1/12
0.24 to 1500
1/30 of value
4000
of value
Taxes on
European
Income
From 10 to 150 (as long as income is
higher than 1200$)
From 10 to 60
NonTaxes on
Registered
registered:0.5$
Indigenous
1
Income
3
0.5
As we can see, direct taxes are also very different between the two regions: patent taxes
tend to be higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, but taxes on European income and on
indigenous income is higher in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. Interestingly, in Tonkin there are
two tax brackets for indigenous peoples: indeed there are registered and non-registered tax
payers. Non-registered tax payers are given a discounted tax rate provided they can justify it to
the mandarin of their village. Non-registered tax payers are not entitled to vote and are subject to
increased responsibility for the village (mainly corvee work) but are given other rights, such as
use of communal lands. Tax payers are given identity cards they must travel with. Mandarins in
the villages are rewarded proportionally to the number of cards given out and therefore this
encourages a wider tax base. In Cochinchina, the system is different: since there are less small
land-owners, the tax rate is lower and equal for all indigenous peoples.
Overall, it appears that taxes in Tonkin are higher than they are in Cochinchina. This is
very possible based on the previous few sections‟ analysis. Indeed, Cochinchina‟s dependence on
commerce implies high customs revenue. If taxes on agricultural production (i.e. land taxes)
were too high, this would discourage large scale production for international commerce.
Tonkin‟s dependence on successful domestic crops suggest that it was in the interest of the
colonial administration to obtain taxes through land and income tax.
4) Conclusion
The thesis of this short paper is that Cochinchina and Tonkin experienced different colonial
policies because their economic context differed. The general colonial policy of French
Indochina was that of a „mise-en-valeur‟, that is economic development. The reason for this
emphasis on development was that it ensured stable fiscal revenue. Indeed, the French
government wanted to ensure that through its colonial policy, Indochina would stop to demand
loans and grants from the French government. To this end, general governors such as Paul
Doumer, set up the general Indochinese budget and high customs rate and excise boards to
ensure enough funds for the maintenance of the entire Union. Unfortunately, the response from
these reforms were unfavourable from Cochinchina who felt it contributed more than it received.
Nonetheless, the apparatus set in place by Doumer was used until the end of French rule in
Indochina. Even through the economic crisis of the 1930s, the aim of the Indochinese
administration remained on ensuring stable revenue, even if it required stabilization of the
Indochinese currency.
Though the aim did not change, the approach of the government differed between Tonkin
and Cochinchina because these regions were facing different economic circumstances. Reports
by the superior residents of each region clearly show that the politically instability of Tonkin
threatened the steady intake of fiscal revenue. To avoid problems, the administration had to
ensure that crops were sufficiently successful to ensure subsistence of the domestic economy.
However, in Cochinchina, the only threat to stable fiscal revenue was problems in international
trade. As such, the administration had to ensure that the conditions for international commerce
were propitious: improving and expanding market places, ensuring decent terms of trade…
Property rights in the two regions reflected this different approach of the colonial
administration. In both regions indigenous people were technically under traditional Annamite
jurisdiction whilst Europeans and other foreigners were under French jurisdiction. In reality,
because Cochinchina was a colony, most of the indigenous population was considered
naturalized French and therefore all could use the French mortgage system and obtain credit
using land as collateral. This was propitious to encourage agricultural production, and by
extension, commerce. In Tonkin, a protectorate, the dual system ensured that indigenous land
remained under traditional legislation and therefore domestic production patterns remained
untouched, appeasing political instability. In addition, the government granted generous numbers
of concessions to French nationals in Cochinchina as a way to encourage plantations of cash
crops such as rubber. Though the cadastral matrices were equally incomplete in Tonkin, the
government restricted the number of concessions given out, to ensure political stability.
Nonetheless, because Tonkin still had to provide sufficient fiscal revenue, we can see that
tax rates were significantly higher than they were in Cochinchina, both in terms of land tax rates
and income tax rates. This confirms that though the aim of French colonial policy was the same
for both regions, the actual implementation of the policy differed because there were different
circumstances to take into account.
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





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
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

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
















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trimester 1909.
trimester 1910.
trimester 1911.
Cochinchine Française: Secrétariat du Gouvernement. Rapport economique de la
Cochinchine du 3ème trimestre 1912.
Gouvernement de la Cochinchine: Cabinet du Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du 3ème
trimester 1919.
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Gouvernement de la Cochinchine, Cabinet du
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du premier trimester 1923.
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du premier trimester 1926.
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique mensuel du mois de Juin 1927.
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique mensuel du mois de Juillet 1928.
Gouverneur. Incidents de Cochinchine Mai-Juin 1930.
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du Mois de Juin 1931.
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du Mois de Septembre 1932.




Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Gouvernement de la Cochinchine, Cabinet
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du Mois d‟Avril 1934.
Gouverneur. Situation Politique au cours du Mois de Juin 1935.
Gouverneur. Rapport Politique du mois de Juillet 1936.
Gouvernement de la Cochinchine: Cabinet du Gouverneur. Rapport Politique
Cochinchine Juin/Juillet 1937.
du
du
du
de
Tonkin:

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



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Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Résidence Superieure au Tonkin. Rapport
Politique des mois de Juillet et Août 1901.
Protectorat de l‟Annam et du Tonkin: Résidence Superieure. Rapport politique mois de
Juillet et Août 1902.
Protectorat de l‟Annam et du Tonkin: Résidence Superieure. Rapport politique mois de
Juillet et Août 1903.
Politique des mois de Septembre et Octobre 1905.
Politique des mois de Juillet 1908.
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Résidence Superieure au Tonkin. Rapport sur la
situation Politique du Tonkin au 2ème trimester 1909.
Politique du 2ème trimester 1919.
Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Résidence Superieure au Tonkin. Extraits des
rapport sur la situation au Tonkin durant le 2ème trimestre 1926.
Situation Politique du Mois de Juillet 1927.
Mensuel sur la Situation Politique du Tonkin Fevrier-Mars 1928.






Gouvernement Général de l‟Indochine: Résidence Superieure
Politique Mensuel du mois de Juillet 1930.
Mensuel sur la Situation Politique au Tonkin Août 1931.
Mensuel sur la Situation Politique au Tonkin Juillet 1932.
Mensuel sur la Situation Politique au Tonkin Juillet 1935.
Politique du Tonkin au cours du mois de Juillet 1936.
Politique du Tonkin au cours du mois de Juillet 1937.
INDO GGI//65956 &65957: Documents on expenditure on public works
INDO GGI// 66695 & 66696: Documents on Indigenous Representation
au Tonkin. Rapport
au Tonkin. Rapport
au Tonkin. Rapport
au Tonkin. Rapport
au Tonkin. Rapport
au Tonkin. Rapport

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