Court File No.: 36162 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON
Transcription
Court File No.: 36162 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON
Court File No.: 36162 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO) BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Appellant - AND HAMIDREZA SAFARZADEH-MARKHALI Respondent - AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION (ONTARIO), WEST COAST PRISON JUSTICE SOCIETY, JOHN HOWARD SOCIETY OF CANADA, AND ABORIGINAL LEGAL SERVICES TORONTO INC. Interveners FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION (Pursuant to Rules 37 and 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada) _____________________________________________________________________________ STOCKWOODS LLP 77 King Street West, Suite 4130 Toronto, Ontario M5K 1H1 FASKEN MARTINEAU DUMOULIN LLP 55 Metcalfe St., Suite 1300 Ottawa, ON K1P 6L5 Nader R. Hasan Gerald Chan Justin Safayeni Tiffany O’Hearn Davies T: 416-593-7200 F: 416-593-9345 E: [email protected] Yael Wexler T: 613- 236-3882 F: 613- 230-6423 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association ORIGINAL TO: SUPREME COURT OF CANADA The Registrar 301 Wellington Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0J1 COPIES TO: Attorney General of Ontario 720 Bay Street, 10th Floor Toronto, Ontario M7A 2S9 Burke-Robertson, LLP 441 MacLaren Street, Suite 200 Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2H3 Roger A. Pinnock T: 416-326-4575 F: 416-326-4656 E: [email protected] Robert E. Houston, Q.C. T: 613-236-9665 F: 613-235-4430 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen Agent for the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen Presser Barristers 6 Adelaide Street East, 5th Floor Toronto, Ontario M5C 1H6 Supreme Advocacy LLP 340 Gilmour Street, Suite 100 Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0R3 Jill R. Presser Andrew Menchynski T: 416-586-0330 F: 416-977-8513 E: [email protected] Marie-France Major T: 613-695-8855 F: 613-695-8580 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Respondent, Hamidreza Safarzadeh-Markhali Agent for the Respondent, Hamidreza Safarzadeh-Markhali Attorney General of Canada Centennial House 301-310 Broadway Avenue Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 0S6 Attorney General of Canada 50 O’Connor Street, Suite 500, Room 557 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8 Sharlene Telles-Langdon Kathryn Hucal T: 204-983-0862 F: 204-984-8495 E: [email protected] Christopher M. Rupar T: 613-670-6290 F: 613-954-1920 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, The Attorney General of Canada Agent for the Intervener, The Attorney General of Canada Russel Silverstein & Associate 100-116 Simcoe Street Toronto, Ontario M5H 4E2 Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street P.O. Box. 446, Stn. A. Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Russell Silverstein Ingrid Grant T: 416-977-5334 F: 416-596-2597 E: [email protected] Matthew Estabrooks T: 613-233-1781 F: 613-563-9869 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) Agent for the Intervener, Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) Polley Faith LLP 80 Richmond Street West Suite 1300, The Victory Building Toronto, Ontario M5H 2A4 Conway Baxter Wilson LLP 1111 Prince of Wales, Suite 401 Ottawa, Ontario K2C 3T2 Andrew S. Faith Jeffrey Haylock T: 416-365-1602 F: 416-365-1601 E: [email protected] Colin S. Baxter T: 613-780-2012 F: 613- 688-0271 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, John Howard Society of Canada Agent for the Intervener, John Howard Society of Canada Hunter Litigation Chambers Law Corporation 2100 - 1040 West Georgia Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6E 4H1 Greenspon, Brown & Associates 331 Somerset Street West Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0J8 Greg J. Allen Kenneth K. Leung T: 604-891-2400 F: 604-647-4554 E: [email protected] Marisa E. Victor T: 613-288-2890 F: 613-288-2896 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, West Coast Prison Justice Society Agent for the Intervener, West Coast Prison Justice Society Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto 415 Yonge Street Suite 803 Toronto, Ontario M5B 2E7 Community Legal Services-Ottawa Carleton 1 Nicholas Street Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7B7 Jonathan Rudin Emily Hill T: 416-408-4041 F: 416-408-4268 Charles McDonald T: 613-241-7008 F: 613-241-8680 E: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc. Agent for the Intervener, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc. i TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I: STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 PART II: THE BCCLA’S POSITION ON THE QUESTION IN ISSUE 1 PART III: STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 2 I. A Sentence Is Grossly Disproportionate if It Does Not Serve any Legitimate Sentencing Objective 2 II. Section 719(3.1) Does Not Advance any Legitimate Sentencing Objective 4 A. The Operation and Effects of Section 719(3.1) 5 1. Sentencing Disparities for Identically Situated Offenders 5 2. Tying the Hands of the Sentencing Court 6 3. The Trigger for Section 719(3.1) Is Tied to Socio-Economic Status 6 4. Dis-Incentivizing Accused Persons From Seeking Bail 7 B. These Effects Do Not Advance Any of the Objectives of Sentencing III. Conclusion: S. 719(3.1) Stands in the Way of Rational Sentencing 7 10 PART IV: SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS 10 PART V: NATURE OF THE ORDER REQUESTED 10 PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 11 PART VII: LEGISLATION CITED 14 1 PART I: STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (the “BCCLA”) accepts the facts as set out in the parties’ facta and takes no position on disputed facts. PART II: THE BCCLA’S POSITION ON THE QUESTION IN ISSUE 2. Section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code1 creates a sub-class of offenders who are punished more harshly than similarly situated offenders. This additional punishment does not flow from the offender’s moral blameworthiness, but is triggered by a decision of the bail court made when little is known about the offender, her/his circumstances, or the offence. Disadvantaged minorities and the poor will overwhelmingly comprise the sub-class affected by s. 719(3.1). 3. In the present case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario struck down s. 719(3.1) on the ground that it violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 The Court held that the impugned provision violates the requirement of proportionality of process in sentencing and results in grossly disproportionate sentences. In so doing, the Court held that proportionality of process (as distinct from proportionality in the result) is not only a principle of sentencing, but also a principle of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter. 3 4. Although the BCCLA agrees that proportionality of process is a principle of fundamental justice, the BCCLA confines its submissions to the issue of whether s. 719(3.1) is grossly disproportionate under s. 7 of the Charter. 5. Under the well-established jurisprudence of this Court, a punishment is grossly disproportionate if it serves none of the legitimate objectives of sentencing reflected in s. 718 of the Criminal Code.4 Section 719(3.1) serves none of these legitimate objectives. To the contrary, it creates a structural impediment against proportionate sentencing, which undermines the purposes and principles of sentencing and, in reasonable hypothetical cases, will result in grossly disproportionate sentences. 1 Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11. 3 R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627 (Book of Authorities (“BA”), Tab 32). 4 R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at p. 1068, citing Professor Tarnopolsky, “Just Deserts or Cruel and Unusual Punishment? Where Do We Look for Guidance?” (1978) 10 Ottawa L. Rev. 1 (BA, Tab 33). 2 2 PART III: STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT I. 6. A SENTENCE IS GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE LEGITIMATE SENTENCING OBJECTIVE IF IT DOES NOT SERVE ANY The case law under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter identifies various ways to measure “gross disproportionality”.5 The Respondent’s submissions on gross disproportionality focus on the disconnect between the objectives of the Truth in Sentencing Act6 (“TISA”) and the means chosen by Parliament as reflected in s. 719(3.1).7 We focus on another aspect of gross disproportionality: a sentence — or a process leading to a sentence — will be grossly disproportionate if it serves none of the legitimate objectives of sentencing. This measure of gross disproportionality is closely tied to the related concepts of “arbitrariness” and “rational connection” (between ends and means). 8 Accordingly, unless a sentencing provision is rationally connected to the objectives of sentencing, it violates ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter. 7. Under s. 718 of the Criminal Code, Parliament has identified a series of legitimate sentencing objectives that reflect the utilitarian goals of sentencing. Denunciation (s. 718(a)) posits that a sentence should communicate society’s condemnation of the offence committed.9 General and specific deterrence (s. 718(b)) mean that the sentence can be used to discourage the offender and others from engaging in similar criminal conduct.10 The goal of separation ((s. 718(c)) is to separate offenders from society where it is necessary to protect the community.11 Rehabilitation (s. 718(d)) is premised on the notion that an offender can be cured of criminal tendencies, and mandates individualized sentences fit for the offender. 12 The objectives of reparations (s. 718(e)) and providing a sense of responsibility in the offenders (s. 718(f)) 5 The same standard of gross disproportionality applies under both ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter: R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 160 (BA, Tab 21). 6 Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c. 29. 7 See Respondent Factum, paras. 62-67. 8 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para. 83 (a law is arbitrary where there is “no rational connection between the object of the law and the limit it imposes on life, liberty or security of the person)”; see also Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3 at para. 85 (Ont. C.A.). 9 Clayton Ruby, Gerald Chan, & Nader R. Hasan, Sentencing, 8th ed (Toronto: Lexis, 2012), at §1.18 (BA, Tab 46); R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 81 (BA, Tab 23). 10 Ruby, supra note 9 at §1.21 (BA, Tab 46); R. v. (B.W.); N.(B.V.), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941, at para. 2 (BA, Tab 7). 11 Ruby, supra note 9, at §1.41 (BA, Tab 46). 12 Ibid., at §1.45 and 1.46 (BA, Tab 46). 3 introduce restorative justice into the principles of sentencing, and address the implications of the impugned conduct on the offender and the community at large.13 8. Some of these objectives — such as rehabilitation or the restorative justice principles — may push a sentence in a downward direction, 14 whereas other objectives — such as general deterrence and denunciation — might push a sentence upward. The appellate courts have offered guidance on how to weigh these sometimes competing sentencing objectives. In some cases, such as for a youthful first-time offender, rehabilitation and individual deterrence are the primary concerns, while denunciation and general deterrence have little or no role to play. 15 In other cases, such as those involving firearms, denunciation and general deterrence may play a greater role.16 A sentencing court has considerable discretion in how it chooses to apply the sentencing objectives in s. 718, and is ordinarily constrained only by the fundamental principle of proportionality. 17 Despite that discretion, a sentence must promote at least one of the legitimate objectives of sentencing set out in s. 718.18 9. If a sentence does not promote at least one of the legitimate purposes of sentencing, then it is not only disproportionate, but also grossly disproportionate, and thus constitutes a violation of ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter. This is well-established constitutional doctrine. In R. v. Smith, for instance, this Court held that a sentence will be grossly disproportionate if, among other things, it “has no value in the sense of some social purpose such as reformation, rehabilitation, deterrence or retribution.”19 In R. v. Latimer, similar reasoning led to a different result: this Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the 10-year parole ineligibility period for second-degree murder because the ineligibility period was “consistent with” the sentencing objective of denunciation. 13 Ibid., at §3.237 (BA, Tab 46). The Attorney General of Canada argues that s. 719(3.1) serves the goal of rehabilitation by ensuring that recidivists serve longer prison sentences and receive rehabilitative programming. However, this Court has held that imprisonment does not advance rehabilitation: R. v. Gladue,[1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at paras. 54-57 (BA, Tab 13); R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 20 (BA, Tab 30); see also, Ruby, supra note 9, at §1.46, 1.49 and 1.50-1.55 (BA, Tab 46). 15 R. v. Priest, [1996] O.J. No. 3369, at para. 17(Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 29); R. v. Brown, 2015 ONCA 361, at para.5 (BA, Tab 6); R. v. Thurairajah, 2008 ONCA 91, at paras. 41-42 (BA, Tab 37); R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, at para. 55 (BA, Tab 16). 16 R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, at para. 198, aff’d 2015 SCC 15 (BA, Tab 26). 17 Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 718.1; R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 42 (BA, Tab 25). 18 Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 718 (“…imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives…” (emphasis added)). 19 Smith, supra note 4, at p. 1068 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 33). 14 4 Given the basis for the Court’s holding, the sentence would presumably have been unconstitutional if it was not consistent with at least one of the Code’s sentencing objectives.20 10. In other words, if a punishment is not rationally connected to any of the goals of sentencing, then it serves no legitimate purpose. It is therefore arbitrary and gratuitous. A gratuitous punishment is the sine qua non of a grossly disproportionate punishment. 11. A rational connection between a sentencing objective and the punishment is a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for a law to pass constitutional muster. Even where such a rational connection is made out, a sentence will still be grossly disproportionate if it is grossly excessive in relation to what would have otherwise been a proportionate sentence.21 12. The rational connection test is generally a low bar. This is because certain sentencing objectives (i.e., general deterrence and denunciation) are rationally connected to most sentences — even exceedingly long ones. For example, a twenty-year prison sentence for a parking ticket is rationally connected to the goal of general deterrence and denunciation (indeed, what better way to send a strong denunciatory message that society abhors parking violations?).22 13. This does not, however, render the rational connection test meaningless. This test forces the parties and the Court to articulate the applicable sentencing objectives and explain how the sentence will promote at least one of them. This analytical exercise may reveal that a provision does not promote any of the legitimate objectives of sentencing. In such rare cases, any increase in punishment due to the provision is gratuitous and violates ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter. II. 14. SECTION 719(3.1) DOES NOT ADVANCE ANY LEGITIMATE SENTENCING OBJECTIVE Although it is rare for a sentencing provision not to be rationally connected to at least one of the objectives of sentencing, s. 719(3.1) is one such provision. It triggers a cascading set of consequences that serves to aggravate sentences for no legitimate sentencing purpose. 20 R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 86 (BA, Tab 19); see also R. v. Wiles, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895, at para. 9 (BA, Tab 40); R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at p. 337 (BA, Tab 20); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 44 (BA, Tab 24). 21 See R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at paras. 40, 45 (BA, Tab 26); Smith, supra note 4, at pp. 1071, 1073 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 33). 22 Applying similar reasoning, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the death penalty as well as “three strikes laws”: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 186-187 (1976) (BA, Tab 3) (upholding death penalty statute on the ground that it is rationally connected to the goal of general deterrence); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, at 2830 (2003) (BA, Tab 2) (upholding sentence of life without parole for 25 years for property offence). 5 A. The Operation and Effects of Section 719(3.1) 15. Section 719(3.1) creates an automatic tax on the sentence for anyone who is denied bail “primarily because of a previous conviction” (which is very different from simply providing that a previous conviction is an aggravating factor).23 It provides that offenders who are detained pending trial because of a previous criminal conviction are ineligible to receive enhanced 1.5:1 pre-trial custody credit at sentencing.24 Section 515(9.1) requires that the bail court endorse the record to reflect that bail was denied primarily because of a criminal conviction, thereby triggering the application of s. 719(3.1) in the event that the accused is convicted.25 16. As a result, s. 719(3.1) ties the offender’s sentence to a decision made by the bail court and augments an offender’s sentence for reasons that are unconnected to the factors that typically determine sentencing — i.e., the offence, the circumstances of the offence, and mitigating and aggravating factors that go to the offender’s moral blameworthiness.26 This increase in punishment does not advance any of the legitimate objectives of sentencing. Instead, it leads to the following four consequences, which are fundamentally at odds with sentencing principles. 1. Sentencing Disparities for Identically Situated Offenders 17. Section 719(3.1) creates sentencing disparities for offenders who are otherwise identical in terms of moral blameworthiness. It increases the sentence for offenders who receive a s. 515(9.1) endorsement by denying them the enhanced credit that they might otherwise receive — regardless of the fact that such offenders suffer the same consequences from pre-trial custody as those who remain eligible for enhanced credit.27 18. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario demonstrated with numerical examples, 28 this structural impediment will mean that two identical offenders, with identical criminal records, who commit an identical offence, could spend significantly different overall amounts of time in 23 Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 719(3.1). Ibid., s. 719(3.1). 25 Ibid., s. 515(9.1). 26 Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 90-101 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32). 27 Those consequences are that pre-trial custody time does not count towards parole eligibility and statutory release, and local detention centres do not provide educational, retraining or rehabilitation programs to accused persons in pre-trial custody: see R. v. Summers, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at para. 22 (BA, Tab 36). 28 Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 92-93 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32). 24 6 custody if one of them has a s. 515(9.1) endorsement entered by the bail court. This disparity is not due to any difference in moral blameworthiness; it arises solely because of s. 719(3.1). 2. Tying the Hands of the Sentencing Court 19. Not only does s. 719(3.1) bind the sentencing court’s hands, but it does so based on a decision made at a time when very little is known about the offender, her/his circumstances, or the offence. These are the very factors that ordinarily (and should) drive sentencing outcomes. 29 20. It is one thing to adjust a sentence upward or downward where the sentencing court has the benefit of a record of facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt (after a full trial or a Gardiner hearing).30 But s. 713(3.1) binds a sentencing court’s discretion — based on factors that may not even be related to moral blameworthiness — at a time where little of the factual record is known. There will surely be instances where, if the bail court knew everything the sentencing court eventually came to know about the offender and the circumstances of the offence, the bail court would not have denied bail and triggered the application of s. 719(3.1). 3. The Trigger for Section 719(3.1) Is Tied to Socio-Economic Status 21. Further, denial of bail is often linked to factors that have nothing to do with issues that matter on sentencing, such as the offender’s moral blameworthiness. In the ordinary case, the bail court may detain an accused pending trial only if the Crown has justified detention on primary grounds (risk of flight), secondary grounds (risk of committing a criminal offence while on bail) or tertiary grounds (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice). 31 22. For many accuseds, the Crown will have at least some concern under these grounds. Such concerns, however, are typically mitigated by having a surety and a plan of release. Those offenders with a support system (i.e., family or friends who can pledge money, serve as sureties, or provide accommodations) tend to obtain bail. By contrast, those without a support system are 29 Gary Trotter, The Law of Bail In Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2015), pp. 9-11-9-12 (BA, Tab 45); R. v. Kovich, 2013 MBPC 68, at paras. 38-40, 50 (BA, Tab 18); R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2012 ONCJ 494, at para. 19 (BA, Tab 31); Ruby, supra note 9, at § 2.13-2.14 (BA. Tab 46). 30 See R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368, at pp. 405, 414-7 (BA, Tab 12) (proof beyond reasonable doubt of aggravating facts). 31 Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 515(10); R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 4 (BA, Tab 14); R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, at paras. 1-2 (BA, Tab 35). 7 more likely to be detained pending trial. It is no surprise, then, that the poor and members of disadvantaged groups are more likely than other Canadians to be detained pending trial. 32 23. The denial of bail is already partly a function of poverty and pre-existing socio-economic disadvantage. Under s. 719(3.1), this injustice is compounded by making it count against the accused first at the bail hearing, and then again at the sentencing phase. 4. Dis-Incentivizing Accused Persons From Seeking Bail 24. Another pernicious collateral consequence of s. 719(3.1) is that it serves as a powerful disincentive against seeking bail. While accused persons are constitutionally entitled to a bail hearing under s. 11(e) of the Charter, they face a difficult dilemma. If they seek and obtain bail, then all is well. But if bail is denied and the bail court endorses the record pursuant to s. 515(9.1) (thereby triggering s. 719(3.1)), then the accused will be punished more harshly upon conviction than they otherwise would have been, because they will no longer be eligible for enhanced pre-trial custody credit. This disincentive will lead some people who might otherwise have obtained bail to instead waive their constitutional right to a bail hearing and remain in pretrial custody rather than risk receiving the Scarlet Letter of the s. 515(9.1) endorsement.33 25. All accused persons have the right to a bail hearing. But the effect of s. 719(3.1)) is to disincentivize a subclass of accused persons from seeking bail, thereby increasing the number of people who spend time in pre-trial custody.34 Disadvantaged groups will feel the sting of this disincentive more severely because, as noted above, members of these groups are less likely to succeed in obtaining bail and are therefore more likely to receive a s. 515(9.1) endorsement. B. These Effects Do Not Advance Any of the Objectives of Sentencing 26. The above-described consequences flowing from the operation of s. 719(3.1) result in sentences over and above what would otherwise be a proportionate sentence in reasonably foreseeable cases. This arbitrary and inflationary effect does not serve any of the legitimate purposes of punishment. Where an upward adjustment in sentence is not rationally connected to any legitimate purpose of punishment, it is gratuitous and thus grossly disproportionate. 32 See Summers, supra note 27, at paras. 66-67 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 36) (noting that “Aboriginal people are more likely to be denied bail, and make up a disproportionate share of the population in remand custody”); Trotter, supra note 29, pp. 9-18; 1-55 (BA, Tab 45). 33 See Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at para. 95 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 32). 34 Trotter, supra note 29, p. 9-12 (BA, Tab 45). 8 27. Section 719(3.1) does not promote rehabilitation or the restorative justice principles enshrined in s. 718. In fact, it undermines these goals by limiting the sentencing court’s ability to take them into account in crafting proportionate sentences. Although s. 718(c) suggests that separating the offender from society may be a legitimate goal of sentencing, it also makes clear that separation is a legitimate goal only where a court finds that incarceration is necessary.35 Section 719(3.1) undermines that discretion. 28. Section 719(3.1) lengthens the sentences of a sub-class of offenders, thereby rendering punishment harsher for that group of offenders. The goals most often associated with harsh criminal sanctions are general deterrence and denunciation. 36 As noted above, even a lengthy mandatory minimum is more connected to these sentencing objectives than s. 719(3.1).37 A mandatory minimum sentence sends a denunciatory message that even the “best offender” (i.e., at the low end of moral blameworthiness) for a given offence must serve time in custody. To the extent that general deterrence actually works (a matter disputed by social science evidence),38 would-be offenders are likely to be deterred by the presence of a mandatory minimum sentence. 29. By contrast, s. 719(3.1) does not even promote denunciation or general deterrence. The message is so unclear and heavily qualified as to be devoid of any meaning, much less a denunciatory one. Even the most sophisticated would-be offender is unlikely to understand that if you (1) have a criminal record, and (2) are charged with a criminal offence, and (3) fail to satisfy the bail court that you should be released on bail pending trial, and (4) the bail court endorses the record pursuant to s. 515(9.1), and (5) you are ultimately convicted of the offence, and (6) there is a mandatory minimum at play (thereby precluding the trial judge from adjusting 35 Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 718(c); Ruby, supra note 9, § 13.1 (BA, Tab 46); Proulx, supra note 14, at para. 17 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 30); Gladue, supra note 14, at para. 40 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 13). 36 See R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260, at para. 261 (BA, Tab 5); R. c. Mantha, 2001 CarswellQue 3858, at paras. 143-44 (Que. C.A.)(BA, Tab 22); R. v. Bates, [2000] O.J. No. 2558 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 4); Thurairajah, supra note 15, at para. 41 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 37); R. v. Wells, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 44 (BA, Tab 39). 37 Nur, supra note 21, at para. 115 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 27); R. v. Wust, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, at para. 21 (BA, Tab 41); Morrisey, supra note 20, at paras. 44-45, 55 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 24). 38 See generally, Ruby, supra note 9, § 1.25-1.34 (BA, Tab 46); Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, “The Political Attractiveness of Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001), 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287, at p. 291 (BA, Tab 43); Travis Pratt et al, “The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis” in Kristie Blevins, Francis Cullen and John Wright, eds., Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006) 367, at pp. 367-370, 383-385 (BA, Tab 44); Nur, supra note 16, at paras. 113-115 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 27); Proulx, supra note 14, para. 107 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 30); R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, at para. 159-160, leave to S.C.C. refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 491 (BA, Tab 9); R. v. H. (C.N.), [2002] O.J. No. 4918, at para. 35 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 15); But see R. v. Song, 2009 ONCA 896, at paras. 7-10 (BA, Tab 34); R. v. Tran, 2010 ABCA 317, at para. 12 (BA, Tab 38). 9 the sentence downward to properly reflect proportionality), then you will be punished more harshly than someone who is equally as blameworthy as you. This message is dense, convoluted, and ultimately incomprehensible for any would-be offender. 30. Similarly, the principle of general deterrence presumes that individuals make rational decisions based on perceived consequences.39 From the perspective of the criminally accused, the cascading set of qualifications required to trigger s. 719(3.1) renders its consequences far too remote to be meaningful. The effect of s. 719(3.1) is not a clear consequence that flows automatically from unlawful conduct; rather, it is a hidden consequence that creeps up on offenders, particularly those worst-equipped to deal with the hidden collateral consequences of our sentencing regime. 40 31. Neither s. 719(3.1), nor the TISA as a whole, appear to be aimed at promoting any of the s. 718 objectives. The Appellant’s factum does not suggest that s. 719(3.1) advances any valid sentencing objective, nor was the Court below able to identify any such objective. Rather, the Court below found that the purpose of s. 719(3.1) (and TISA as a whole) was to reduce the availability of enhanced credit and thereby disincentivize accused persons from prolonging time spent in pre-sentence custody.41 Even this objective, as the Court of Appeal explained, is unrelated to the means chosen in s. 719(3.1).42 As this Court determined in R. v. Summers, enhanced credit is not some windfall available to offenders who drag on proceedings; rather, it is a necessary correction to account for lost remission and harsh pre-trial conditions. 43 32. In any event, even if there were a rational connection between the goal (disincentivizing offenders from delay) and the means chosen to achieve that goal (s. 719(3.1)), this is not enough for s. 719(3.1) to pass constitutional muster. Parliament has broad discretion to pass legislation to incentivize and disincentivize all manner of behaviour. But where the purpose or effect of legislation is to increase a sentence for offenders or a class of offenders, then that legislation must, at a bare minimum, promote a legitimate sentencing objective. 39 Pratt, supra note 38, at p. 367 (BA, Tab 44); Ruby, supra note 9, § 1.35 (BA, Tab 46); Katelyn Carr, “An Argument Against Using General Deterrence as a Factor in Criminal Sentencing” (2013-2014), 44 Cumb. L. Rev. 249, at pp. 255-256 (BA, Tab 42). 40 Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 94-96 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32). 41 Ibid, at para. 54. 42 Ibid., at paras. 112-114. 43 Summers, supra note 27, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 36). 10 III. CONCLUSION: S. 719(3.1) STANDS IN THE WAY OF RATIONAL SENTENCING 33. Similar offenders should be sentenced similarly, except to the extent that they are different.44 This idea is the Golden Thread that runs through our law of sentencing, and it reflects the principles of proportionality, parity and individualization.45 The differences that justify disparate sentences are the aggravating and mitigating factors, which go to moral blameworthiness and reflect Parliament’s judgment as to the relative seriousness of the offence.46 34. Section 719(3.1) creates an artificial, arbitrary and automatic tax on sentence for someone whose personal circumstances prevented them from getting bail. As a result, the poor and others suffering from a socio-economic disadvantage will bear the brunt of s. 719(3.1), for reasons that will often have nothing to do with factors that ought to matter at sentencing. The Appellant attempts to downplay the pernicious effects of s. 719(3.1) as “a natural by-product of our bail system….”47 To the contrary, s. 719(3.1) creates an unnatural by-product by inflating sentences in a manner that is divorced from moral blameworthiness, targets the poor and the vulnerable, and leads to grossly disproportionate sentences unmoored from the legitimate objectives of sentencing. Section 719(3.1) creates distinctions where there should be no difference. PART IV: SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS 35. The BCCLA does not seek costs and asks that none be awarded against it. PART V: NATURE OF THE ORDER REQUESTED 36. The BCCLA respectfully requests leave to present oral argument for no more than 10 minutes at the hearing of this appeal. All of which is respectfully submitted this 20th day of October, 2015. ___________________________________ NADER R. HASAN / GERALD CHAN / JUSTIN SAFAYENI / TIFFANY O’HEARN DAVIES Stockwoods LLP Counsel for the BCCLA 44 _____________________________ YAEL WEXLER Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP Agent for the BCCLA Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 718.2(b); Ruby, supra note 9, § 2.39 (BA, Tab 46); Summers, supra note 27, at paras. 59-61 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 36); Nur, supra note 21, at para. 41 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 27); Morrisey, supra note 20, at paras. 75-76 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 24); Beauchamp, supra note 36, at paras. 276-280 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 5); R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 78-79 (BA, Tab 17); R. v. Flowers, 2010 ONCA 129, at paras. 10-11 (BA, Tab 11); R. v. Courtney, 2012 ONCA 478, at paras. 3-4 (BA, Tab 8). 45 R. v. Pham, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 6-10 (BA, Tab 28); Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 76-80 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32). 46 Ruby, supra note 9, at § 5.1 (BA, Tab 46); R. v. Fice, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742, at paras. 21-22 (BA, Tab 10). 47 Factum of the Appellant, at para. 37. 11 PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Authority Cited Paragraph(s) Cases Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 6 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1952 12 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), 1976 U.S. LEXIS 82 12 R. v. Bates, [2000] O.J. No. 2558 28 R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260, [2015] O.J. 1939 28, 33 R. v. Brown, 2015 ONCA 361, [2015] O.J. No. 2655 8 R. v. (B.W.); N. (B.V.), 2006 SCC 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941 7 R. v. Courtney, 2012 ONCA 478, [2012] O.J. No. 3087 33 R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, [2011] O.J. No. 4022 28 R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742 33 R. v. Flowers, 2010 ONCA 129, [2010] O.J. No. 644 33 R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368 20 R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 8, 27 R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 21 R. v. H. (C.N.), [2002] O.J. No. 4918 28 R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, [2007] O.J. No. 3395 8 R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 33 R. v. Kovich, 2013 MBPC 68, [2013] M.J. No. 417 19 R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 9 R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 9 R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 6 12 Authority Cited Paragraph(s) R. c. Mantha, 2001 CarswellQue 3858 (Que. C.A.) 28 R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 7 R. v. Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 9, 28, 33 R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 8 R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 91, [2013] O.J. No. 5120 8 R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 11, 28, 33 R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739 33 R. v. Priest, [1996] O.J. No. 3369 8 R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 8, 27, 28 R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2012 ONCJ 494, [2012] O.J. No. 3563 19 R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627, [2014] O.J. No. 4194 3, 6, 16, 18, 24, 30, 31, 44 R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 5, 9, 11 R. v. Song, 2009 ONCA 896, [2009] O.J. No. 5319 28 R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 21 R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575 17, 22, 31, 33 R. v. Thurairajah, 2008 ONCA 91, [2008] O.J. No. 460 8, 28 R. v. Tran, 2010 ABCA 317, [2010] A.J. No. 1224 28 R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 28 R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895 9 R. v. Wust, 2000 SCC 18, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455 Secondary Sources Katelyn Carr, “An Argument Against Using General Deterrence as a 30 Factor in Criminal Sentencing” (2013-2014), 44 Cumb. L. Rev. 249 13 Authority Cited Paragraph(s) Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, “The Political Attractiveness of 28 Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001), 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287 Travis Pratt et al, “The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta- 28, 30 Analysis” in Kristie Blevins, Francis Cullen and John Wright, eds., Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006) 367 Gary Trotter, The Law of Bail In Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 19, 22, 25 2015) 14 PART VII: LEGISLATION CITED Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c 11 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 7. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale. 12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected 12. Chacun a droit à la protection contre tous to any cruel and unusual treatment or traitements ou peines cruels et inusités. punishment. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; 718. Le prononcé des peines a pour objectif essentiel de contribuer, parallèlement à d’autres initiatives de prévention du crime, au respect de la loi et au maintien d’une société juste, paisible et sûre par l’infliction de sanctions justes visant un ou plusieurs des objectifs suivants : a) dénoncer le comportement illégal; b) dissuader les délinquants, et quiconque, (b) to deter the offender and other persons de commettre des infractions; from committing offences; c) isoler, au besoin, les délinquants du reste (c) to separate offenders from society, where de la société; necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and d) favoriser la réinsertion sociale des délinquants; e) assurer la réparation des torts causés aux victimes ou à la collectivité; (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in f) susciter la conscience de leurs offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm responsabilités chez les délinquants, done to victims and to the community. notamment par la reconnaissance du tort qu’ils ont causé aux victimes et à la collectivité. 15 718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. 718.01 Le tribunal qui impose une peine pour une infraction qui constitue un mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de dix-huit ans accorde une attention particulière aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion d’un tel comportement. 718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1), section 270.01 or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence. 718.02 Le tribunal qui impose une peine pour l’une des infractions prévues au paragraphe 270(1), aux articles 270.01 ou 270.02 ou à l’alinéa 423.1(1)b) accorde une attention particulière aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion de l’agissement à l’origine de l’infraction. 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the 718.1 La peine est proportionnelle à la gravité gravity of the offence and the degree of de l’infraction et au degré de responsabilité du délinquant. responsibility of the offender. 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall 718.2 Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger also take into consideration the following compte tenu également des principes suivants : principles: (a) la peine devrait être adaptée aux (a) a sentence should be increased or circonstances aggravantes ou atténuantes liées reduced to account for any relevant à la perpétration de l’infraction ou à la situation aggravating or mitigating circumstances du délinquant; sont notamment considérées relating to the offence or the offender, and, comme des circonstances aggravantes des without limiting the generality of the éléments de preuve établissant : foregoing, que l’infraction est motivée par des préjugés ou (i) evidence that the offence was de la haine fondés sur des facteurs tels que la motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la langue, race, national or ethnic origin, language, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l’âge, la colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical déficience mentale ou physique ou l’orientation disability, sexual orientation, or any other sexuelle, similar factor, (ii) que l’infraction perpétrée par le (ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s délinquant constitue un mauvais traitement de son époux ou conjoint de fait, spouse or common-law partner, (ii.1) que l’infraction perpétrée par le (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under délinquant constitue un mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de dixthe age of eighteen years, huit ans, 16 (iii) evidence that the offender, in (iii) que l’infraction perpétrée par le committing the offence, abused a position of délinquant constitue un abus de la confiance de trust or authority in relation to the victim, la victime ou un abus d’autorité à son égard, (iii.1) evidence that the offence had a (iii.1) que l’infraction a eu un effet significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, important sur la victime en raison de son âge et de tout autre élément de sa situation including their health and financial situation, personnelle, notamment sa santé et sa situation (iv) evidence that the offence was financière, committed for the benefit of, at the direction of (iv) que l’infraction a été commise au or in association with a criminal organization, profit ou sous la direction d’une organisation or criminelle, ou en association avec elle, (v) evidence that the offence was a (v) que l’infraction perpétrée par le terrorism offence shall be deemed to be délinquant est une infraction de terrorisme; aggravating circumstances; b) l’harmonisation des peines, c’est-à-dire (b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar l’infliction de peines semblables à celles infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions offences committed in similar circumstances; semblables commises dans des circonstances (c) where consecutive sentences are semblables; imposed, the combined sentence should not be c) l’obligation d’éviter l’excès de nature ou unduly long or harsh; de durée dans l’infliction de peines (d) an offender should not be deprived of consécutives; liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be d) l’obligation, avant d’envisager la appropriate in the circumstances; and privation de liberté, d’examiner la possibilité (e) all available sanctions other than de sanctions moins contraignantes lorsque les imprisonment that are reasonable in the circonstances le justifient; circumstances should be considered for all e) l’examen de toutes les sanctions offenders, with particular attention to the substitutives applicables qui sont justifiées circumstances of aboriginal offenders. 718.21 A court that imposes a sentence on an dans les circonstances, plus particulièrement en organization shall also take into consideration ce qui concerne les délinquants autochtones. 718.21 Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger the following factors: à toute organisation en tenant compte également des facteurs suivants: (a) any advantage realized by organization as a result of the offence; the a) les avantages tirés par l’organisation du fait de la perpétration de l’infraction; b) le degré de complexité des préparatifs (b) the degree of planning involved in carrying out the offence and the duration and reliés à l’infraction et de l’infraction elle-même et la période au cours de laquelle elle a été complexity of the offence; 17 commise; (c) whether the organization has attempted c) le fait que l’organisation a tenté de to conceal its assets, or convert them, in order to show that it is not able to pay a fine or make dissimuler des éléments d’actif, ou d’en convertir, afin de se montrer incapable de restitution; payer une amende ou d’effectuer une (d) the impact that the sentence would have restitution; on the economic viability of the organization d) l’effet qu’aurait la peine sur la viabilité and the continued employment of its économique de l’organisation et le maintien en employees; poste de ses employés; (e) the cost to public authorities of the e) les frais supportés par les administrations investigation and prosecution of the offence; publiques dans le cadre des enquêtes et des (f) any regulatory penalty imposed on the poursuites relatives à l’infraction; organization or one of its representatives in f) l’imposition de pénalités à l’organisation respect of the conduct that formed the basis of ou à ses agents à l’égard des agissements à the offence; l’origine de l’infraction; (g) whether the organization was — or any g) les déclarations de culpabilité ou pénalités of its representatives who were involved in the commission of the offence were — convicted dont l’organisation — ou tel de ses agents qui a of a similar offence or sanctioned by a participé à la perpétration de l’infraction — a fait l’objet pour des agissements similaires; regulatory body for similar conduct; h) l’imposition par l’organisation de (h) any penalty imposed by the organization on a representative for their role in the pénalités à ses agents pour leur rôle dans la perpétration de l’infraction; commission of the offence; i) toute restitution ou indemnisation imposée (i) any restitution that the organization is ordered to make or any amount that the à l’organisation ou effectuée par elle au profit organization has paid to a victim of the de la victime; offence; and j) l’adoption par l’organisation de mesures (j) any measures that the organization has en vue de réduire la probabilité qu’elle taken to reduce the likelihood of it committing commette d’autres infractions. a subsequent offence. 730. (1) Where an accused, other than an organization, pleads guilty to or is found guilty of an offence, other than an offence for which a minimum punishment is prescribed by law or an offence punishable by imprisonment for fourteen years or for life, the court before which the accused appears may, if it considers it to be in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest, instead of 730. (1) Le tribunal devant lequel comparaît l’accusé, autre qu’une organisation, qui plaide coupable ou est reconnu coupable d’une infraction pour laquelle la loi ne prescrit pas de peine minimale ou qui n’est pas punissable d’un emprisonnement de quatorze ans ou de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité peut, s’il considère qu’il y va de l’intérêt véritable de l’accusé sans nuire à l’intérêt public, au lieu de 18 convicting the accused, by order direct that the accused be discharged absolutely or on the conditions prescribed in a probation order made under subsection 731(2). le condamner, prescrire par ordonnance qu’il soit absous inconditionnellement ou aux conditions prévues dans l’ordonnance rendue aux termes du paragraphe 731(2). (2) Subject to Part XVI, where an accused who has not been taken into custody or who has been released from custody under or by virtue of any provision of Part XVI pleads guilty of or is found guilty of an offence but is not convicted, the appearance notice, promise to appear, summons, undertaking or recognizance issued to or given or entered into by the accused continues in force, subject to its terms, until a disposition in respect of the accused is made under subsection (1) unless, at the time the accused pleads guilty or is found guilty, the court, judge or justice orders that the accused be taken into custody pending such a disposition. (2) Sous réserve de la partie XVI, lorsque l’accusé qui n’a pas été mis sous garde ou qui a été mis en liberté aux termes ou en vertu de la partie XVI plaide coupable ou est reconnu coupable d’une infraction mais n’est pas condamné, la sommation ou citation à comparaître à lui délivrée, la promesse de comparaître ou promesse remise par lui ou l’engagement contracté par lui demeure en vigueur, sous réserve de ses dispositions, jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit rendue à son égard en vertu du paragraphe (1) à moins que, au moment où il plaide coupable ou est reconnu coupable, le tribunal, le juge ou le juge de paix n’ordonne qu’il soit mis sous garde en attendant cette décision. (3) Where a court directs under subsection (3) Le délinquant qui est absous en (1) that an offender be discharged of an offence, the offender shall be deemed not to conformité avec le paragraphe (1) est réputé ne have been convicted of the offence except that pas avoir été condamné à l’égard de l’infraction; toutefois, les règles suivantes (a) the offender may appeal from the s’appliquent : determination of guilt as if it were a conviction a) le délinquant peut interjeter appel du in respect of the offence; verdict de culpabilité comme s’il s’agissait (b) the Attorney General and, in the case d’une condamnation à l’égard de l’infraction à of summary conviction proceedings, the laquelle se rapporte l’absolution; informant or the informant’s agent may appeal b) le procureur général ou, dans le cas de from the decision of the court not to convict the offender of the offence as if that decision poursuites sommaires, le dénonciateur ou son were a judgment or verdict of acquittal of the mandataire peut interjeter appel de la décision offence or a dismissal of the information du tribunal de ne pas condamner le délinquant à l’égard de l’infraction à laquelle se rapporte against the offender; and l’absolution comme s’il s’agissait d’un (c) the offender may plead autrefois jugement ou d’un verdict d’acquittement de convict in respect of any subsequent charge l’infraction ou d’un rejet de l’accusation portée contre lui; relating to the offence. c) le délinquant peut plaider autrefois (4) Where an offender who is bound by the conditions of a probation order made at a time convict relativement à toute inculpation when the offender was directed to be subséquente relative à l’infraction. discharged under this section is convicted of an 19 offence, including an offence under section 733.1, the court that made the probation order may, in addition to or in lieu of exercising its authority under subsection 732.2(5), at any time when it may take action under that subsection, revoke the discharge, convict the offender of the offence to which the discharge relates and impose any sentence that could have been imposed if the offender had been convicted at the time of discharge, and no appeal lies from a conviction under this subsection where an appeal was taken from the order directing that the offender be discharged. (4) Lorsque le délinquant soumis aux conditions d’une ordonnance de probation rendue à une époque où son absolution a été ordonnée en vertu du présent article est déclaré coupable d’une infraction, y compris une infraction visée à l’article 733.1, le tribunal qui a rendu l’ordonnance de probation peut, en plus ou au lieu d’exercer le pouvoir que lui confère le paragraphe 732.2(5), à tout moment où il peut prendre une mesure en vertu de ce paragraphe, annuler l’absolution, déclarer le délinquant coupable de l’infraction à laquelle se rapporte l’absolution et infliger toute peine qui aurait pu être infligée s’il avait été déclaré coupable au moment de son absolution; il ne peut être interjeté appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité prononcée en vertu du présent paragraphe lorsqu’il a été fait appel de l’ordonnance prescrivant que le délinquant soit absous.