Direct Democracy vs. Democracy by Representation in the Middle

Direct Democracy vs. Democracy by Representation in the
Middle East
Zvi Bar'el1
Abstract
"We are not Syria, we do not transfer our regime from father to son" said
Egyptian president Hosni Mubark when he was faced with his opposition
criticism over his apparent decision to transfer his responsibilities to his son
Gamal.
But it was exactly this kind of opposition which had driven Mubarak to
amend some articles in the Egyptian constitution, amendments that may
pave the way for more candidates to run for presidency.
How, then, can we define the Egyptian "democratic" structure? Indeed it has
a parliament, but it is under the president's control, its public opinion was
always considered as irrelevant, yet it forced the president to listen to it and
to act accordingly.
The Egyptian case is just an example for an alternative structure of regimepublic relationship. We can detect similar structures in most Arab and
Islamic states where the formal democracy is substituted by "direct
democracy". Perhaps its roots could be traced in the 7th century Caliph
Mu'awiya's famous saying, "I do not apply my sword where my lash
suffices, nor my lash where my tongue is enough. And even if there be one
hair binding me to my fellow men, I do not let it break. When they pull, I
loosen, and if they loosen, I pull."
In these states a different parallelogram of forces takes place. The regime
has to work its way between "liberals" and "religious" factors, between
traditional and global forces rather than between competing opposition
political parties.
In my paper I argue that this "other" form for regime-public relations should
also be considered as part of "democracy-scape". This argument addresses
the question of "what do we want from democracy" rather than "what is the
right democracy".
I believe that watching and analyzing some Middle Eastern cases along the
line of my arguments way stimulate some thoughts about the scope of
democracy.
Key words: Middle East, New Media, Democracy, Paralleogram of forces
1. Introduction
The essentialist axiom concerning democracy in the Middle East claims
that democracy and Middle East is inherently an oxymoron.
As the geo-political definition of the Middle East is still debated, I would
like to suggest here that the Western use of the term “Middle East” implies
that there is a monolithic entity, based on one or several essentialist
2
common denominators, and it subscribes to the notion that these common
denominators are the result of Arabic- Islamic 'genetics'. This definition
dictates not just an anticipated common behavior and beliefs of the
individual but also the nature of states in this area. In other words: such
people create such states and not the opposite.
Yet, rulers in this area although supporting a vague Pan-Arab notion are not
contradicting the Western essentialist perception. Hosni Mubarak in Egypt
or Bashar Assad in Syria have addressed the question of democracy in their
countries along the following lines: every country has to have its own
definition of democracy in accordance with its own culture. According to
these leaders culture in this sense is what fits the rulers, as the sole
interpreters of and designers of the public's will. As if to say 'we, the leaders
know what a good Arab is, what a good Muslim is and who is a good
citizen'. Hence, they in effect adopt the very definition of the West of the
characteristics of the Middle East.
In order to break the "coalition of essentialists" which exists between the
West and Arab rulers I suggest to consider using the term 'direct democracy'
as a tool to understand the relations between regimes and their publics in
Muslim states.
2. Paralleogram of forces
For that purpose the following parallelogram can be useful to describe
the structure of power in most Muslim states.
It consists of 4 pillars: The regime, the religious state's institutes, the liberals
and the public.
To maintain stability, in other words, to reduce the fear of the ruler from his
own citizens rather than from the foreign enemy this parallelogram has to be
always balanced. By this I mean that the ruler has to maintain “good
relations” with the forces that credit them with legitimacy. When one of the
pillars tends to stretch its limits the ruler reacts in two ways: appeasements
and/or tight control up to a degree of "owning" these pillars. Nationalizing
the media or al-Azhar, the highest religious institute in Egypt, in the early
sixties is one example for this kind of practice, where the ruler has adopted
tight control as a means to regulate the balance of powers. On the other
hand, allowing al-Azhar to control religious and by extension, moral
censorship, over literary and artistic production is an example for
appeasement.
Balancing the parallelogram of forces was easily achieved when rulers in
many Arab countries were able to maintain a closed arena for their ruling
practice. By this I mean an arena that could efficiently filter external
influence, either from other Middle Eastern or from Western sphere.
The result was that media knew its limits and so did the religious institutes,
thus the threat of the 'unhappy citizens' rebelling against the regime could be
avoided or at least be limited to a bearable level.
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3. The New Media effect
This model is now shattered due mainly to what we may define as the
media revolution which threatens the very existence of that parallelogram of
forces.
The term media in the Middle East is demanding a new definition. It is not
anymore just the print press owned by the ruler, or the national radio and
TV stations. Nor is it the nationalized cinema production. Since the early
nineties it is an open sphere. LBC, MBC, Abu-Dhabi satellite TV, Rutana,
and of course al-Jazeera are not just supra-national, inter-Arab stations, they
are symbols of that revolution which have three new characteristics:
1. It operates according to professional journalistic criteria: i.e what is
new, interesting and important will be filtered into the screen. Now
with one important change: it is not what is important interesting
and new for the ruler, but to the public.
2. The target public of the new media is vague and sometimes
unknown. By and large editors have to assume that they are
catering to the whole Arabic speaking population and not to a
particular, nationally defined audience. This criterion dictates a
new kind of coverage, one that takes into consideration a wider
common denominator of interests, Middle Eastern or even global
rather than locally confined, Jordanian Qatari or Moroccan.
3. Editors and managers of such stations have to report to a new kind
of owners. These are businessmen rather than kings or presidents,
shareholders and not ideologues. In other words, the new media
have to make money.
These new criteria when applied on what Stuart Hall describes as the
communicative process, i.e. production, circulation, use, and reproduction,
demonstrate the dimensions of the Arabic media revolution in its entirety. 2
To paraphrase on Appadaurai’s terminology, it creates an 'Arabic-media
scape'.
This is not to say just that the new media is received now in the whole
Middle East, speaks Arabic and construct common cultural components
which are above and beyond the local.
The most significant change that the new media revolution has brought
about in the area is the creation of a new pillar in the parallelogram of
forces. It is becoming, and in some places it has already become a power of
its own, a power that has to be tended to by the regime, and has the same
standing as religion, liberal forces or the public itself.
4
This power stands above any particular country’s legal system. It has direct
line to the public, it cannot be appeased or bribed by local governments, it
has its own agenda, derived from its owner agenda and it has the potential to
define the nature of the local power that be.
The validity and the relevance of censorship in time of supra-national
satellite TV are less important. What is crucial for rulers is how to reconcile
the idea of 'One Arab Nation' or at least one Arab culture, or the Arab
imagined community, with the multitude of Arabic cultures that flood the
local spheres. This dilemma needs to be addressed by rulers for practical
reasons; most importantly it intimidates their governability. Since the new
media reveals new secrets about the misconduct, diversity in culture, even
differences in language, the different extent of freedom practiced in
different states, and of course the different standards of living, rulers will
have to supply a new set of answers to their citizens.
4. Media vs. Religion
The new media is affecting also the way religion is received and
perceived.
As long as the 'chain of religious command', say in Egypt or Saudi Arabia,
was established by the state, the parameters of religious conduct were
negotiated between the ruler and “his” religious institute, ensuring, thus, the
balance of the parallelogram of forces. Competitors, like radical movements
– let alone terror organizations motivated by religious argumentations- were
brutally crushed. Yes, the Sharia is the major source of legislation, but what
part of the Sharia, the extent of its flexibility, its interpretation and finally
its implementation were decided by the state. In other words, religion as a
governing tool is the ruler’s monopoly.
But what is the state’s mufti or the head of al-Azhar in Egypt, the head of
Dar al Ifta in Saudi Arabia or the state’s mufti in Syria to do, when Sheikh
Yusuf al-Qardawi, the most prominent religious scholar and orator who has
no State's affiliation, from within the living room TV set, contradicts the
state’s mufti or the local TV preacher whose airtime is allocated to him by
the state?
In several cases the head of al-Azhar had to change his judgment due to
harsh criticism by al-Qardawi in al-Jazeera or other scholars in different
parts of the Middle East. Any Muslim who disagrees with his rulings can
seek another fatwa – religious ruling- elsewhere. Many do, as Qatar-based
cleric Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi emerging as Saiid Tantawi, the head of alAzhar, main rival in terms of influence. The two have clashed on many
issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of women. 'AlAzhar used to represent the moderate Islamic mind and it was respected all
over the world' says Fahmi Howeidi, a Cairo- based commentator.3 'It is no
longer what it used to be. When it is seen as an institution that represents the
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government instead of the Muslim people, there is the danger that people
will look for leadership elsewhere' he warned.
If in earlier times clashes between Qardawi and Tantawi were confined to
the scholars’ domain, with the new media it is not only part of the public
domain, it takes immediate effect.
But this competition is not merely between two scholars. It is between the
state’s religious institute and a supra-national competitor using a supranational tool, the satellite TV, that local government cannot negotiate with.
The new media does not stop there. There are over 600 satellite stations in
the Arab world, about 30 of which are dedicated only to religious content,
but many of them include a daily religious program lasting an hour or more.
Since stations, including religious ones are supposed to make money, they
realize that popular preachers are moneymakers in terms of rating. Thus,
each regular station tends to have its own preacher or to share preachers
with other stations.
This is a new sphere that has yet to be researched for its impact on religious
conduct in the Islamic world. It is important to find out to what extent it
shatters the ability of rulers to keep their national religious institute relevant.
In fact, to what extent their religious legitimacy in their own states may be
determined by preachers, muftis or scholars from other countries or worse
yet, from the virtual sphere.
5. Liberals vs. State
The next pillar in the parallelogram of forces, which is affected by the
new media, is that of the liberals. By liberals I mean the sector of
intellectuals, professionals, writers, journalists, politician who do not ascribe
any religious value to their activities, and in general all those who believe
that “the state is for all and the religion belongs to god” (al din lilah waalwatan liljami'i)4. This group derives its importance from what we may call
here the Western hegemony over concepts of democracy. This is not
confined just to the ways and means by which intellectuals in the West view
democracy, rather, it is connected to the fashion by which Western powers,
most notably the United States are forcing these definitions through local
regimes.
A case in point in Egypt would be that of Ayman Nour the former leader of
"al-Ghad" ("Tomorrow") party who set an example, not only for state
harassment but more importantly, to the Western intervention in what was
believed to be until lately a forbidden area for outsiders. Ayman Nour was
stripped of his parliamentary immunity and arrested on January 29, 2005.
He was charged with forging Powers of Attorney to secure the formation of
the el-Ghad party. Nour vehemently denied the charges.
The arrest, occurring in an election year, was widely criticized by
governments around the world as a step backwards for Egyptian democracy.
Few seem to regard the charges as legitimate.
6
In February 2005, the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
abruptly postponed a visit to Egypt, thus demonstrating U.S. displeasure at
the jailing of Nour, who was reported to have been brutally interrogated.
That same month, the government announced that it would open elections to
multiple candidates.
In March 2005, following a strong intervention in Cairo by a group of
Members of the European Parliament led by Vice-President Edward
McMillan-Scott (UK, Conservative), Nour was freed and began a campaign
for the Egyptian presidency. In June 2005, Rice addressed democracy in the
Middle East at the American University in Cairo. She stated:
'There are those who say that democracy leads
to chaos, or conflict, or terror. In fact, the opposite is
true. … Ladies and Gentlemen: Across the Middle East
today, millions of citizens are voicing their aspirations
for liberty and for democracy …demanding freedom for
themselves and democracy for their countries. To these
courageous men and women, I say today: All free nations
will stand with you as you secure the blessings of your
own liberty'5
Nour was the first runner-up in the 2005 presidential election with 7% of the
vote according to government figures and estimated at 13% by independent
observers, although no independent observers were allowed to monitor the
elections.
On December 24, 2005 he was sentenced to five years in jail. On the day of
Nour's guilty verdict and sentencing, the White House Press Secretary
released the following statement denouncing the government's action:
' The conviction of Mr. Nour, the runner-up in Egypt's 2005
presidential elections, calls into question Egypt's commitment
to democracy, freedom, and the rule of law... The United
States calls upon the Egyptian government to act under the
laws of Egypt in the spirit of its professed desire for increased
political openness and dialogue within Egyptian society, and
out of humanitarian concern, to release Mr. Nour from
detention'.6
This kind of American pressure could under different circumstances play
into the hands of Egyptian liberals whose demands from the Egyptian
regime are similar to the American ones. Yet, the problem with the
American pressure is exactly that: it is an American pressure. It is an effort
to impose democracy from outside. This is unacceptable even by liberals
who spent years in jail. Democracy, from their point of view can be
achieved either top-to-bottom or bottom-to top but not outside-to-top or
outside-to- bottom as this would be tantamount to national treason either by
the state or by the public.
7
Nour's case is interesting because it had involved the new media in a way
that could not be perceived just a few years ago. Having learned the lessons
of the potential power wielded by Arab satellite TV, the Egyptian security
forces have been engaging in a rather savage repression campaign against
television cameramen and journalists who tried to cover the demonstrations
against Nour's arrest.
Creating a parallel world of discourse and operation is far from being
perfect. Not just because this new media is controlled by businessmen who
in many cases have close relations with the state, and sometimes, like in the
case of al-Arabiya, they are part of the ruling family, but because the supranational media is by definition too remote from the localities.
Into this lacuna enters the blogosphere, YouTube and the talkbacks. This
new space is growing daily and encompasses now tens of thousands of
active participants. Governments in the Middle East are well aware of their
impact.
It is too tempting to start measuring the influence that the new media-sphere
has on governments and rulers in the Middle East and the contribution it has
democratization. Suffice is to notice that there is a flow of informal
knowledge between individuals in a fashion that never occurred before. This
flow of information creates common knowledge in two important aspects:
The diversity of life style, culture and language in the Middle East, and the
differences in ruling styles in different Arab states.
6. Common knowledge
These areas of common knowledge are not limited anymore to a certain
elite that has the ability to purchase and handle computers, or has access to
the Internet. The public is a full partner, thus complying with the definition
of direct democracy practiced by what Negri defines as multitudes. 7
Media spheres, be it local, national, supra-national or international, are not
autonomous and so are local democracies. They are interconnected and
influence each other. They operate in different layers, which are
interconnected as well. They seem to act collectively but in fact they act
simultaneously. In this respect one can argue that even state controlled
media are part of the network since it has to react to the other media’s
output.
If so, where does in put the individual Muslim state and where does it locate
democracy?
Middle Eastern states are wrongly perceived by the West to work
collectively, subscribe more or less to similar ideologies, and seem to
cherish the same values, but in reality cultivate local particular identities.
But these local identities cannot be defined anymore as state-built. As more
parts of the local societies develop 'congruent knowledge' of their
counterparts in other Arab states, local regimes have to adapt to the 'new
8
knowledge' and adopt it as if it was its own, or risk losing the claimed
monopoly over the design of local identity or the local shape of 'their' kind
of democracy.
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Notes
1
Dr. Zvi Bar'el is the Middle Eastern affairs analyst for Haaretz daily in
Israel. Lecturer at Sapir Academic College (Ashkelon, Israel); a senior
research fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University and
a research fellow at the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem. His forthcoming book is about defining democracies in the
Middle East (Hakibutz Hameuhad, Israel)
2
Hall, Stuart Et.al (eds.)Culture Media Language.New York Routledge
1980.
3
Howeidi, Fahmi in an interview to the Irish Times 30 June 2006.
4
Saad Zghlul coined this phrase during the Egyptian revolution of 1919.
5
Condoleezza Rice speaking at the American University in Cairo 20 June
2005.
6
White House press release. 24 December 2005.
7
Hardt, Michael, Negri,Antonioi. Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age
of Empire. New York: The Penguin Press. 2004