Survey of Anti-Violence Workers on Technology Abuse 2012

Transcription

Survey of Anti-Violence Workers on Technology Abuse 2012
Safety Net Canada Summary Report
Survey of Canadian Anti-Violence Workers
on Technology Abuse 2012
OVERVIEW This is the first survey from Safety Net Canada, a national initiative of the British Columbia Society of Transition Houses (BCSTH.ca) and the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC.ca) at the University of Ottawa’s School of Law. Safety Net Canada addresses how technology impacts and can enhance safety, privacy, accessibility, autonomy, justice, and human rights for women, youth, and other survivors of family and domestic violence, sexual and dating violence, stalking, harassment, and abuse. Our first survey was a self‐administered online questionnaire that was adapted from the U.S. National Network to End Domestic Violence’s “Technology Survey.” Safety Net Canada addresses how technology impacts and can enhance safety, privacy, accessibility, autonomy, justice and human rights for women, youth, and other survivors of family and domestic violence, sexual and dating violence, stalking, harassment, and abuse. The goal of our Organizational Technology Practices Survey is to better understand the types of technology being used by programs that address Violence Against Women (VAW programs) and the types of technology practices or policies used or needed by these Canadian VAW Programs. From August to November 2012, our survey on technology abuse was disseminated electronically in French and English to front line anti‐violence workers in programs across Canada (e.g. sexual assault centres, women's shelters, and transition houses). We hoped to document the types of technology‐enabled domestic and sexual violence, stalking, harassment, and abuse that Canadian women, youth, and children are experiencing. We received 133 complete survey responses representing 10 Canadian provinces and territories. Analysis found that a majority of surveyed Canadian anti‐violence workers support women and youth who are being stalked, monitored, impersonated, and/or threatened through technology. These survey findings demonstrate the increasing prevalence across Canada of cyberstalking and other technology‐enabled abuse by perpetrators of domestic and family violence, sexual assault, and harassment. 1
SURVEY FINDINGS 1. Canadian province/territory where you work: Response Chart Percentage
British Columbia Manitoba Quebec Ontario 11%
Alberta 11%
Newfoundland and Labrador Nova Scotia Yukon 2%
Prince Edward Island 2%
New Brunswick 1%
36%
16%
14%
6%
3%
2. Type of program: Response Chart Domestic/Family Violence Sexual Assault Both Domestic/Family Violence and Sexual Assault Other, please specify Percentage
55%
5%
38%
8%
OTHER RESPONSES 1. Violence conjugale et multiples problématiques {domestic violence and other violence‐
related social issues} 2. Children Who Witness Abuse Program 3. Drop‐in centre for street engaged women 4. Seniors' abuse program 2
5. Women's Shelter 6. Childhood sexual abuse impact on adult women 7. Child sexual abuse/addiction 8. Supportive men’s program 9. Childhood sexual abuse 10. Children Who Witness Abuse Program 3. What is your role in the anti‐violence agency or program? Response Chart Percentage
Executive Director/Program Manager Frontline Worker (support women, adult survivors) Children's Support Worker (support children and youth) Administrative Staff 3%
Information Technology Staff 0%
Community Educator/Trainer 6%
Volunteer 1%
Other 8%
43%
40%
17%
OTHER RESPONSES 1. Coordonnatrice Clinique {Clinical Coordinator} 2. 1/2 time Children Who Witness Abuse Counsellor, 1/2 time Safe Home Coordinator 3. Program Manager 4. First Nations Support 5. Program Coordinator 6. Women's Outreach 7. Counsellor 8. Therapist 3
9. Manager 10. Police 11. Therapist 4. How many paid staff work in your anti‐violence program? The average number of paid staff is 18. 5. Email contact information: (optional) There were 112 responses to this question. 6. What have women and other survivors told you about the ways that perpetrators have (or are believed to have) misused technology? Response Chart Percentage
Intimidation and threats via technology (e.g. cell/mobile phone, texts, email) 98%
Hacked into woman's/survivor's accounts (e.g. email, social media) 72%
Impersonation (using email, online profiles or other technologies to pretend to be the survivor or someone the survivor knows, such as a friend) 69%
Hacked into the woman's/survivor's computer to monitor her online activities or extract information 61%
Distributed or posted pictures online of the woman/survivor without her consent 60%
Tracked the woman's/survivor's location via a GPS device or other location service (including showing up everywhere unexplained) 50%
Misused a cell/mobile phone to track or monitor calls, location, or other activities 49%
Used/hacked/monitored Instant Messaging accounts 46%
4
Misused Caller ID (e.g. to screen or identify calls, spoof other people's phone numbers to call or text threats and abuse. 44%
Tracked down a woman/survivor or her children using information the perpetrator found on the Internet 44%
Used a land‐line phone to monitor conversations (e.g. cordless phones) 35%
Distributed or posted videos online of the woman/survivor without her consent 31%
Installed computer monitoring software or hardware on her computer (e.g. spyware, keyloggers) 31%
Used hidden cameras or her laptop's webcam to secretly watch or record the woman/youth/survivor without consent (e.g. undressing, having sex) 31%
Used listening or recording devices to monitor conversations 29%
Tampered with or destroyed assistive technology (e.g. hearing aid, screen reader, TTY machine) 10%
Used VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) technology such as Skype or Google Talk to monitor or screen 9%
Other, please specify 3%
OTHER RESPONSES 1. Tracked down through public data or information brokers. 2. Breaches of judge's order to use email for exchange of kids by writing pages of put downs and accusations with the exchange info sandwiched in. Another abuse is taking bits of emails out of context to cut and paste a fake abusive email from victim, and using it against her in court. 3. Used social media to "out" survivor. "Sexting" sexually explicit messages when unwanted. 4. Drained joint bank account. 5
7. What kinds of assistance are women/survivors requesting around their own technology use? Response Chart Safety with cell/mobile phones (e.g. talking, texting) Percentage 82%
Safety and privacy with social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) 74%
Safety online (e.g. email, Web browsing, instant messages) 73%
Safety with computer use Safety and privacy planning around technology use 55%
Safety with location privacy (e.g. tracking cell/mobile phones, geo‐tagging) 55%
Safety and privacy with cameras, photos, videos (e.g. tags, removal, face recognition) Safety and accessibility with technology (e.g. assistive devices and services, website, hotline and shelter accessibility, relay services) Other, please specify 61%
40%
34%
3%
OTHER RESPONSES 1. Des programmes de sensibilisation et de prévention sur ces questions. {Prevention and awareness programs on these issues} 2. They are not asking; women tend to not think about it unless we bring it up. More education is needed. 3. Improved response by police services. 4. Email and phone breaches be taken seriously by RCMP. 6
8. What are some privacy and confidentiality concerns you have about using technology when working with or communicating with women/survivors? Response Chart Perpetrators might intercept the communication Percentage Support that is not face‐to‐face (e.g. lacks visual or verbal cues) might be misinterpreted or unclear 82%
69%
How we communicate or maintain information might negatively affect the privacy and safety of a woman/survivor and her children 62%
Someone else might intercept the communication 60%
Electronic communication might implicate our agency in ways that impact confidentiality (e.g. through a court order or a court case) 59%
Our agency has a confidential location that could be compromised Other, please specify 50%
5%
OTHER RESPONSES 1. Pictures taken with cell/mobile phones are posted on Facebook, etc. 2. Would be nice to be able to communicate with Ministry of Children and Family Development electronically, without concern. 3. Perpetrators might impersonate via relay or other non face‐to‐face communications. 4. Perpetrator harassing or threatening her so much that she returns to him for what she feels is safety for herself or her children or pets. 5. Victim contacted by perpetrator's lawyer by email and her answers being used against her in court. Victim thinks lawyers have legal authority. 7
9. Do you feel you need more information and resources to best respond to requests from women/survivors about technology? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
89%
11%
10. Are you aware of any complaints in your area involving technology‐facilitated abuse where a law enforcement response was requested? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
46%
54%
11. Was law enforcement in your community responsive to those complaints about abuse perpetrators misusing technology to harm? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
47%
8
53%
12. If you think law enforcement is not responsive or prepared to address technology abuse, what do you think is the reason? Response Chart Minimization of cases associated with violence against women 62%
Lack of resources to investigate technology‐
related cases and crimes 60%
Lack of awareness or understanding of technology and perpetrator misuse Lack of training about timely evidence collection regarding possible charges I don't know Other, please specify Percentage 54%
40%
21%
9%
OTHER RESPONSES 1. We have not had any problems with law enforcement not being responsive. 2. Too short‐staffed to have the time needed to do an investigation like this. 3. RCMP are not trained enough when it comes to anything to do with domestic violence—
definitely more continuous training is needed. 4. They say they have nothing to charge or hold him with, as he has not committed any real crime that has physically hurt her in any way. (Something violent has to happen first.) 5. Minimize the danger, as it is not physical in nature (yet). 6. Police are not overly concerned about the safety of women. 7. Again, this is related to men's experiences. 13. Would you like more resources to help you work with law enforcement on issues related to technology abuse? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
95%
5%
9
14. What are some ways technology is being used against women/survivors in court cases? RESPONSES Les femmes sont ''accrochées'' aux textos. Très difficile de faire cesser cette utilisation. {Women are attached to texting. It’s very difficult to stop this use.} Je besoin plus des moyens de protégé notre maison d'hébergement contre la mauvaise utilisation de la technologie. {I need more ways to protect our shelter against the misuse of technology.} L'utilisation des fonctions de localisation des applications comme Facebook nous préoccupe également. De plus, nous avons interdit l'utilisation des web cam dans la maison d'hébergement afin d'assurer l'anonymat des autres femmes de la maison qui pourraient passer derrière une femme utilisant cet outil. {The use of localization features in applications like Facebook also worries us. In addition, we have banned the use of webcams in the shelter to ensure the anonymity of the other women in the house who could pass behind a woman using this tool.} Voir point précédent.... {See previous point....} Retracer l'adresse IP lorsque les femmes sont sur Facebook ou Twitter....?? {Trace the IP address when women are on Facebook or Twitter....??} I had a male perpetrator look me up on Facebook (I have since deleted my account). I mostly work with children, so making things safer for kids online. Hacking email or social media accounts, sending threatening texts or voicemails, tracking women down with GPS or Internet access. Teenage girls posting photos of nude girl friends. Online dating and chat room services. Banking and credit card tracking systems. Women and children on social assistance system. I have some growing concern about computers being remotely accessed to record/watch the activities of abused women, as well as devices being placed/installed for the same purpose, and the number of websites that teach people how to do this. I think the biggest thing that I find is that perpetrators will continually text women and children with abusive messages. When they don't respond, they will up the amount of messages being sent and they often become more abusive. Even, in several cases, if they have changed their number, the perpetrator finds the new number and the harassment starts again. Police will not take this seriously and even after death threats were made against a woman and her children, she was told that unless he physically was there threatening her or caused her harm, that they couldn't do anything about it. Computer hacking; having a woman's privacy compromised. Any program technology that is available, such as GPS programs that are set up via Internet to 10
track women without their knowledge; voice‐altering programs so caller can disguise their voice, etc. Online dating—teens share lots of information. Online problems with credit cards. GPS tracking on cell/mobile phones that could compromise the transition house location. Some perpetrators have girlfriends text continual negative messages to inflame the victim. Sending info to a wrong number, email, fax tracking with GPS. Pictures on the Internet; use of medical files. Can add or delete anything, so that info can be tampered with. None of the info needs to be true. Once posted, you never know where it is, or who has it anywhere. Teens: cyberbullying. As long as there is a Wireless signal, clients are able to use laptops to access Facebook, email, etc. Clients will also borrow other people’s cell/mobile phones to contact or harass abuser. If someone "sexts" someone else something, the idea that some person, somewhere out there, may be able to access that. Facebook—women being contacted by their partners. I also worry about women who use Facebook while in our shelter as I wonder if their partners can use their status updates to GPS locate our shelter (if the women use their smart phones). The ability of a spouse to change their partner's password so easily. Accounts being hacked by partner. Facebook attacks and threats online. Use of the iPhone or other Internet media in the privacy of their own rooms by residents who don't "get" the importance of privacy of house location, resident's names, or possible danger that other residents and staff may be in, if disclosures are spread around. Some residents don't have danger of violence issues and are not facing as dangerous situations as others, and minimize the dangers. Difficulty for staff to stay on top of, explain, keep confidentiality, and monitor. It's very confusing and hard to present the information to clients, as it is also always shifting. Threats through email, texts. Spying devices such as cameras and recorders. Hacking into accounts. Retrieving information through companies. 11
15. What are some ways women/survivors have used technology to support their cases? RESPONSES Pour nous rejoindre via internet ou encore trouver nos coordonnées. {To reach us via the Internet, or find our contact information.} Les téléphones cellulaires, leurs comptes de banque en ligne, Facebook pour s'amuser et communique avec leurs réseau sociale. {Cell (mobile) phones, online banking, Facebook for fun and to communicate with their social network.} Elles utilisent les technologies tel Skype (sans webcam) afin de communiquer sans frais avec leur famille en région éloignée. De plus, nous invitons les femmes à préprogrammer le 911 sur leur téléphone cellulaire afin de pouvoir rapidement joindre les services d'urgence en cas de danger. {They use technologies such as Skype (without webcam) to communicate free of charge with their families in remote areas. In addition, we invite women to preprogram 911 on their cell (mobile) phones in order to quickly reach emergency services in case of danger.} Les systèmes d'alarmes. {Alarm systems.} Pour le moment, nous informons les femmes de certaines mesures de sécurités à utiliser sans avoir un discourt moralisateur, les informer est notre rôle. {For the moment, we inform women of certain security measures to use without moralizing discourses, our role is to inform them.} We give out old cell/mobile phones so women at least have 911 ability. To come together and discuss their experiences. Using text messages and emails to support child custody/access issues, as well as their applications for a "Restraining Order." Mainly using the information to validate threats and harassment. A woman [uses] Skype to share access of her child with her ex and this seems to work fine and keep all satisfied. A woman used her cell/mobile (phone) to record threats being made to her and her children. To find out where the perpetrator is so they can avoid that location and stay safe. Art, photography, story sharing, poetry shared through social media, that is anti‐violence related. First cell/mobile (phone) program designed to contact the local police services directly; cell phones that alert companies when the user is being shaken violently. Changing passwords regularly; clearing history. Getting information, contacting appropriate services, connecting with others in chat rooms, Twitter, etc. They are thinking of recording abusive, threatening situations, i.e. one victim recorded a threatening abusive incident while it was happening. This could be helpful when the man shows 12
up suited and polite and makes allegations of mental health disorders against the victim—that is if the JUSTICE SYSTEM would allow the evidence. I know of just basic; keeping text messages, voicemails, emails. They are keeping printed copies of threats and other evidence to support their case. Old cell/mobile phones can be used to place 911 calls. Receiving counseling via text, access services/referrals via Internet, look up shelter on smart phone, texting land lines. At libraries, we have installed firewalls. To show pictures of the abuser to shelter staff and to law enforcement. Documenting exact times. Communicating while away from abuser for a few moments. I don't know of any off‐hand, but would like to learn about them. Not much work with clients personally. I don't know, but would be interested in finding out new ways to help clients in regards to technology. Using privacy setting on their accounts. Turning off GPS, using other names in accounts. To stay connected more often. Hooking up to communal transition house computer and finding out from friends and relatives what's going on with abuser. Having spirits lifted with well wishers and loved ones. Finding resources for places to live, court issues, jobs, travel to another place, other transition houses and resources, etc. Cell/mobile phones—women are using Pay As You Go (although more expensive). Facebook—
they are putting up pics of artwork, etc. rather than pics of themselves and their children, and they are changing their "profile pics" on a regular basis. Networking, online support groups, much easier access to phone numbers and agency information if clients need it. Setting up strict privacy settings on their Facebook account; blocking numbers; sometimes keeping voicemail as an option for callers, but putting a system greeting on, or having someone else record a message, that throws the harasser off. Applications on telephones for protection. 13
16. What are some examples that you've seen in your community of technology evidence not being used or allowed by judges? RESPONSE Des policiers qui refusent de prendre une plainte pour harcèlement lorsqu'un conjoint appelle plusieurs fois par jour la femme (malgré un interdit de contact!) Des policiers qui refusent de prendre une plainte pour harcèlement lorsqu'un conjoint envoie des messages textes ET OU des emails à son ex conjointe. {Police refuse to take a complaint of harassment when a spouse calls a woman several times a day (despite a ban on contact!). Police refuse to take a complaint of harassment when a spouse sends text messages AND/OR emails to his ex‐spouse.} Ne peut utiliser les courriels comme preuve. Ne peut utiliser les médias sociaux (Facebook) comme preuve d'harcèlement, diffation, on dit à la femme de fermer son profil simplement... {Cannot use email as proof. Cannot use social media (Facebook) as evidence of harassment, defamation, women are simply told to close their account/profile...} Aucun exemple. Souvent ce n'est pas apporté en preuve par l'enquêteur. {No example. Often it is not brought as evidence by the investigator.} The woman did not have the correct date programmed into her camera, so the picture submitted for evidence was not allowed. It all depends on who the judge is. Some allow, some do not. Not using texts sent to woman by perpetrator. I am not aware of anything like this, though I am sure it does happen. Yes, same with recordings; who set up the recording device; who sent the messages; can't prove owner of [the] phone [that] sent texts. The above example is exactly what some women have experienced. At this point, these types of messages have assisted in gaining protection orders against the abuser. Camera tapings. Emails, voice threats left on answering machines. Damaging messages and pictures on Facebook. Pictures, emails, text messages. We do not attend court and do not have access to this info. My client brought several emails that showed the perpetrator had full knowledge and had consented to things he'd accused her of not doing/informing. She had highlighted the pertinent info but the judge said dismissively, "I'm not going to read all that." The fact that there is always reasonable doubt about who could have sent the email puts into 14
question any info as well as the timing of any email, no matter how it backs up her story. Sometimes the Crown feels that text messages and emails are disputable; they say the opposing party can say someone else sent them. Often the Crown will throw out a case because of bogus text messages stopping a woman from pressing charges. I have not seen this. Women have told me that the printed evidence is not being taken seriously though. Facebook was not allowed to be used in court to prove the time and date of someone who became friends [with a woman] a year after [she] claimed the man raped her. They became friends on Facebook after that, and it couldn’t be used as proof to support the defense, that the woman was telling lies. Police have stated that there is no way of proving who typed messages on an email account, especially if an account has been left open. Yes to that example—inadmissible evidence. But useful for court/judge deciding if there is a case for restraining orders, etc. Text messages were not accepted. This is what I have seen happen in court. 17. Are you seeing judges mandate technology use between perpetrators and survivors/women? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
40%
60%
18. Have women or other survivors been able to get civil legal recourse when a perpetrator has abused them through technology? Response Chart Yes No I don't know Percentage
8%
26%
15
70%
19. Have you or your program worked with women/survivors who have had technology included in their protection or restraining orders? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
54%
46%
20. What are some ways technology has been used against women, children, or other survivors in family law cases? RESPONSES Exemples nommés précédemment (question 14 et 16). {Examples named above (questions 14 to 16).} Utiliser des enregistrements vidéo pour incriminer la femme dans une situation que l'agresseur a manipulé pour que la femme ait l'air de l'agresseur. {Use video recordings to incriminate the woman in a situation that the attacker has manipulated so that the woman appears to be the perpatrator/wrongdoer.} Cases where parents/spouses/abusers secretly recorded telephone conversations, were encountered periodically in my 26 years as a Family Justice Counsellor. In my work with child survivors of domestic violence, not as yet. Drug facilitated sexual assaults posted on the Internet; torture of sex trade workers captured on video. Following any posting on Facebook, searching for any possible Internet‐friend connection for info. Past social media posts have been kept, and emails hacked and kept, to discredit woman's claim to custody; man pays all bills, etc.—electronically, an attempt to demonstrate he has paid for everything (even though the woman was contributing financially) and ultimately is better able to care for children, in order to gain custody of children or to argue he has invested more and therefore deserves more of shared assets. Using children/youth conversations or posts on social media (particularly Facebook) to show that the woman is a bad parent and the children are unsafe in her care (i.e. conversations about "What a wild party and you were sure wasted," is turned into "the woman is unable to supervise the children properly"); using children’s text messages against the mother (i.e. child is grounded by mom and turns around and tells dad the mom is "always mean" to them); perpetrator breaking into online diaries and using that against the youth to try and have them institutionalized for mental health reasons (i.e. fear of suicide). Perpetrators using social media to blame the victim by calling her integrity into question; using children's social media to bring the mother's parenting skills into question (e.g. the child is engaging in certain behaviours, therefore the mother is a poor parent and should not have custody). Secretly recorded conversations. 16
Used Facebook as evidence that his wife is not a decent woman. Deleting of all contacts in cell/mobile phone; sending messages using her cell/mobile phone. Social media posts have been followed and tracked, printed and dissected, often taken out of context, or from children's accounts. Facebook: haven't had experience where it was used against women in court, although women have been threatened with it. Facebook poses an ongoing problem for women as information (direct or indirect) is communicated and infiltrated by the abuser via Facebook. Not aware of this happening, but it probably does. Currently have a client on my caseload that is going through this, do not know what the outcome will be. Even though the judge was specific about the brevity and content of emails for child exchange, it opened a door for abuse. Text messaging and voicemail. 1. Took pictures or comments when she was upset or was drinking, to show unfitness as a parent and to question her mental stability. Actually showed these to the police, to take inappropriate actions against her. 2. In one case, recorded a conversation (her retort) after he had been goading and threatening her in a very mean and manipulative way, and when she was completely worn down. This response was completely under duress, but was taken out of context and used against her. Yes, the perpetrator can use social media and take it out of context to try to make something they are manufacturing, seem to be so. They also use it to defame the woman to her children, communicating with them and saying derogatory things. Woman pressed charges against abuser...case was thrown out because abuser said she had texted him...this was untrue, he managed to text himself from the Internet, stating it was from her—texting in family court, harassing mother who responds emotionally to these texts... and these responses are used against her in court. They are out context and are used to break down her character or creditability. The above example. These cases are confidential. However, all cases are referred to the Domestic Violence Unit with the RCMP on our reserve. Photos of victim in sexually explicit scenes to blackmail them into silence—texts and emails threatened to be used to "out" a gay client who is in the closet—leaving emails up on the screen of computer for children to discover. Posting messages on their children's Facebook page, which are directed toward the child's mother. See earlier response. Facebook posts or emails that can be taken out of context or generalized, can be used against women. Women have had arguments recorded without their knowledge and used against them in custody cases, as well as emails and pictures, and even sometimes Facebook posts. Abusers have secretly taken photos, posted them out of context, attempted to gather info when engaged with the children. Indirect contact (sometimes violating contact orders). 17
Abusive father posting nasty stories and abuse of the children's mother where the children can read it. Women residents have used the Internet and Skyped to the abuser from our transition house, compromising safety of the house and its residents, especially late at night. Using GPS to track down clients; using spyware on computers and phones to monitor emails, texts, phone calls, messages; using cell/mobile phone GPS to track down clients; using the information they gather to ambush or "crazy‐make" by figuring out clients' schedules and leaving a sign they've been there (moved furniture, left a note, changed locks, missing items, etc). See answers to Question 15. Pictures posted on social media. I have seen this happen; I have also had a few clients, and their children, who were videotaped without their knowledge. 21. What are some ways technology has benefited women/survivors in family law cases? RESPONSE Pour les cas de garde partagés, les communications pour l'enfant sont fait par courriels. Une trace des communications qui a dit quoi. {In cases of shared custody, communications concerning the child are done by email. This leaves a trace of "who said what".} Pour prouver le harcèlement subit par une femme ou le bris de conditions (de ne pas contacter madame). (Messages vocaux, messages textes ou messages électroniques.) {To prove the harassment suffered by a woman or breach of conditions (not to contact her). (Voice messages, text messages or emails.)} Exemples nommés précédemment (Question 15). {Examples previously provided (Question 15).} Enregistrer les messages vocaux, textes et emails que l'agresseur a envoyé à la victim. {Record voice messages, text messages and emails sent by the aggressor to the victim.} Physical proof of threats, etc. Where convicted offender is party to ongoing Family Relations Act proceedings and is required to wear an electronic monitoring device, risk of further harm to victim is sharply curtailed. This observation is based upon my career as Family Justice Counsellor. Absolutely. A woman kept her children's emails, noting the goings‐on when they were at dad's house. Saving threatening/harassing text or voicemail messages to provide to police. Threats through phone messaging/Facebook‐posting. At times the judge has allowed contact only through email. 18
I believe that had some of my clients pursued legal recourse for defamation or sought damages, they may have been successful for many had copious amounts of text messages, emails, video, and Facebook correspondence that would have supported their cases. Abusive text messages that were sent to the child by the perpetrator after the child asked if they could miss a visit to attend a b‐day party—using posts on social media sites by the perpetrator, that defamed the survivor —using posts that the perpetrator put on their children’s walls, that attacked the child/youth or other parent. A woman used her cell/mobile phone to record a threatening conversation; a woman saved threatening texts; a woman was able to prove that a No Contact Order was breached by calls and texts made to her cell/mobile (phone); a woman had a record of how many times her child called for help, when the child was with her abusive father. Having a record of threatening messages or emails. Copies of call logs, and texts, in some cases. Successful in keeping phone records when applying for a Protection Order under the Domestic Violence and Stalking Act. Most technology evidence is not presently accepted in court. I think in our day, sometimes technology is used to specify information, but is not always a determinant in cases of abuse. When a woman is able to show harassment or stalking through tracked calls, both for volume and escalation of content. For some, [it] has supported their case—emails to lawyers to do research; keeping track of access through emails. In some cases, having correspondence through email only has given documentation of lack of follow, but I am unaware of it being used as a means to get full custody or supervision. I have yet to have the JUSTICE SYSTEM allow this evidence. Text messages, emails and voicemail. I am sure there are examples, but I do not have personal experience with this other than when pictures have been taken of injuries to back up a history of assault. I do not know though if these pictures have ever passed the rules for evidence in court. As proof of abusive and harmful behaviour of perpetrator, by sharing emails and texts they and the children have received. Kept all text messages, Facebook, printing emails, date stamping information; keeping voicemail messaging. Saved emails and social media. Able to provide text messages, emails and Facebook messages to law enforcement. Able to 19
provide pictures of the abuser from the victim’s cell/mobile phone. To keep an accurate history of communication with ex‐spouse's threats, through email or texts. Has on occasion been helpful with being able to use the saved threatening emails and texts. Text messages. Having texts, emails, phone messages as examples of abuse. Documentation. Best is verbal phone messages or recorded conversations that police have listened to. Text messages and emails that were threatening. To get custody or protection orders. I am unaware of my clients' documenting through technology/any issues around this. 22. Would you like more information about legal protections and issues around technology and abuse? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
97%
3%
23. If your anti‐violence agency/program is involved in any community response teams or task forces, how are you using technology? Response Chart Percentage
We’d like more information on policies and practices to protect confidentiality, safety, and privacy when using or sharing technology in community partnerships with other agencies 68%
Our agency/program does not currently share the use of any technology with another agency 59%
We have discussed how technology use in a community partnership impacts the safety, privacy, and confidentiality of 39%
20
women/survivors Our agency/program is part of a community task force or coordinated community response team 29%
Our agency/program and another agency currently share the use of some technology (e.g. we use the same fax, wireless network, TTY machine, database, or network server, etc.) 13%
24. Do you safety plan with women and other survivors around their own technology use and how the perpetrator might misuse technology? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
84%
16%
If yes, what types of technology do you most often safety plan about? What are recent technology issues that women/survivors have been concerned about? RESPONSE Les cellulaires le chat. {Cell phone use, online chatting.} Cellulaire ordinateur Facebook est particulièrement dangereux et peu de femmes savent vraiment protéger leur intimate. {Facebook mobile computer is especially dangerous and few women really know how to protect their privacy.} Nous demandons aux de femmes désactiver le GPS sur leur téléphone cellulaire. {We ask women to disable the GPS on their cell phone.} Seulement ce que nous avons reçu de notre the Fédération de resources d’hébergement pour femmes violentées et en difficulté du Québec. Les téléphones cellulaires, la confidentialité, les codes pour les téléphones et aussi l'utilisation nos ordinateurs. {Only what we have received from our provincial association: Cell phones, privacy, codes for the phones, and also use of our computers.} Le s cellulaires, et tous les appareils électroniques qui sont munis d'un GPS. {Cell/mobile phones, and all electronic devices that are equipped with a GPS.} Les téléphones intelligents ayant des dispositifs GPS. Les cellulaires avec services de messages textes. L'utilisation des Web cam à l'intérieur de notre maison d'hébergement. Il est très difficile de gérer les possibilités que les conjoints retrouvent les femmes via les dispositifs GPS. {Smart phones with GPS devices. Cell phones with text messaging services. The use of webcams 21
inside our shelter. It is very difficult to manage (or prevent?) the possibility that spouses track women via GPS devices.} Cellulaire—Facebook—Ordinateur—Internet—Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo—GPS (sur cellulaire ou dans l'auto). {Cell/mobile phones—Facebook—Computer—Internet—Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo—
GPS (on cell/mobile phone or in car).} Information confidentielle sur les ordinateurs. {Confidential information on computers.} Le GPS dans le cellulaire les communications par cellulaire, texte, email les réseaux sociaux. {GPS in cell/mobile phones, communications by cell/mobile (phone), text, email, social networks.}
L'utilisation des téléphones cellulaires: fermé le GPS seulement. {The use of cell/mobile phones: only turn off the GPS.} Cell/mobile phones—turning off GPS, using call display, deleting call history, etc. Facebook—sexual or incriminating pictures. Cell/mobile phones and GPS used to track the woman. Use of their phones, in most cases...and email and Facebook accounts. Cell/mobile phone messages and texts saved to provide to police. Phone use, changing number, public computer use, deleting Facebook accounts or no updated postings, de‐installing GPS from vehicle. Awareness of perpetrator using technology against her. Number one for me is safety around computer and cell/mobile phone use (i.e. turn off Bluetooth devices, constantly change email passwords/addresses, turn off computer when not in use, etc.). Many women are concerned about their emails being hacked, being tracked through use of a cell/mobile phone, and their abusers using recording devices (visual and auditory). Also there are almost always complaints about abusers using cell/mobile phones to harass. Cell/mobile phones, computers. GPS in car; phone and computer information‐sharing programs on computer. Social media sights and texting are the two types I most commonly safety plan about, so using privacy settings, etc. With texting it is most often around "how do I get him to stop texting me." The new changes to Facebook were a concern for some women, as they didn't know how to change settings. Also, using webcams to videotape them in their home. Cell/mobile phone GPS, social media. Do some education around social media with youth. Cell/mobile phones, Facebook, chat sites. Suggest they block calls or change their phone number. Cell/mobile phones and GPS are what most women are concerned about. We see a huge lack of knowledge by our clients on what they should be concerned about. They think their conversations, locations, etc. are private. Cell/mobile phones and texting and social media, like Facebook. Cell/mobile phones and computers. Cell/mobile hhones and computers, e.g. Facebook/Twitter/texting. 22
Stalking; giving too much information. a) Cell/mobile phones, financial information (e.g. online banking), email accounts, any accounts the client has set up on the computer b) GPS in cell/mobile phones. Changing email addresses and cell phone numbers. Staying away from Facebook. Turning off GPS in cell/mobile phone. Turning off "find my iPhone" app. Spyware installed on her computer that gives him access to all her passwords, to all and any accounts. Phone, cell/mobile phone, and emails. Cell/mobile phones, computers. Concerned about GPS—not enough knowledge and info about this, I need more information about all of the technologies and their use/misuse in domestic violence/sexualized assault instances. I don't know what I don't know...I just know that it's a lot! Cell/mobile phone use; discussion around how information shared via social networking sites is easy to obtain. Cell/mobile phones, social media, mostly. First we try to establish what they use, or their familiarity with technology. Cell/mobile phones, email access to their email accounts. Bank/credit, ATM cards. Teens. Facebookprivacy settings. Cell/mobile phones, smart phones, computer usage (email, Facebook, Twitter), GPS use. Cell/mobile phone, email. Social media, cell/mobile phone. Email, Facebook, iPhone, geo‐tagging. I advise them to not respond to emails, phone messages; to block Facebook and to be vigilant about what they post. Facebook, cell/mobile phone, GPS, email. We do very basic stuff such as use of cell/mobile phone, text messaging, Facebook, emails. We attempt to do more when the offender is technology savvy. Have a handout we review with women re. erasing history, passwords and security, safety with smart phones, cameras, luring, cyberstalking, online dating, antivirus protection, social media, how to answer security questions, etc. Mostly they are concerned about accessing their whereabouts and those of their kids, accessing email info, tracking by their phones, access to their banking and resources. Cell/mobile phones and computers. One of our concerns is the voice‐changing apps that we see coming up, as well as GPS. Cell/mobile phones, social media. Cell/mobile phones, land lines, email, Internet, instant messaging, Facebook, and other social networks. Social networking, mostly. Most women I work with are not well trained in privacy settings or in what not to post publicly, and will unknowingly put too much detail in a posting. Some are also unaware that posting events can increase their risk of lethality. Email accounts. When women carry a cell/mobile phone that is bundled in a package with his phone and account, and he can monitor her activity. Safety plan about: Canceling or deactivating Facebook accounts, closing old email accounts, changing passwords, changing phone numbers. 23
Social media—Facebook and Twitter, email use, and GPS on cell/mobile phones. Social media and websites, text messages, and email. Cell/mobile phones, emails. Posting on Facebook, GPS tracking devices on cell/mobile phones. Faxing information out of shelter. Cell/mobile phones, email, Facebook or other social network. Facebook, email, cell phones. Cell/mobile phones. Issues regarding email communication. I discourage women who come to the shelter to communicate with their family via email with regards to their location, if they feel their partner can hack their email. Browsing safety (clearing history). Cell/mobile phone tracking devices. Changing passwords on social media and email sites. Internet safety and privacy settings on social media. Most often is cell/mobile phone use and social media. Email and Facebook. Facebook is a big concern. Safety plan regarding texting, social media (Facebook), instant messaging, email, cell/mobile phone and smart phone (GPS), texting, laptop webcam/Skype. Facebook and social media privacy. Importance of removing history/cookies on computer; importance of changing passwords on a regular basis; info about ability to turn GPS on/off in cell/mobile phones. Facebook, cell/mobile phones. Cell/mobile phones, GPS, texting, emails. Cell/mobile phones and tracking capability. Computer history/deletion. GPS, joint bank accounts and banking online, changing Facebook and email addresses, keeping Facebook available only to people you want to see it—considering how confidentiality is not always assured, even among relatives and friends. Keeping a low profile until some time has passed, especially when violent threats are happening; keeping in touch with supportive, confidential people. Social media such as Facebook, cell/mobile phones. Cell/mobile phones, GPS, Facebook. Concerns that computer may be hacked—how would you know—what do you look for that would indicate your computer has been compromised. Computers and cell/mobile phones. Both carry a lot of concerns for women/survivors because they're aware it is not secure. Email; Facebook, land line, cell/mobile phone; emergency cell/mobile phone; emergency shelter phone. Telephones and computers. Cell/mobile phones and social media. Cell/mobile phones. 24
25. Do you have concerns regarding privacy and confidentiality when using technology? Response Chart Yes No Percentage
76%
24%
26. What are other examples of technology misuse, concerns, issues that you would like to share with us? RESPONSE Les femmes sont ''accrochées'' aux textos. Très difficile de faire cesser cette utilization. {Women are attached (or “hooked”, although that seems more pejorative) to texting. Very difficult to stop this use.} Je besoin plus des moyens de protégé notre maison d'hébergement contre la mauvaise utilisation de la technologie. {I need more ways to protect our shelter against the misuse of technology.} L'utilisation des fonctions de localisation des applications comme Facebook nous préoccupe également. De plus, nous avons interdit l'utilisation des web cam dans la maison d'hébergement afin d'assurer l'anonymat des autres femmes de la maison qui pourraient passer derrière une femme utilisant cet outil. {The use of localization features on applications like Facebook also concerns us. In addition, we have banned the use of webcams in the shelter to ensure the anonymity of the other women in the house who could get behind a woman using this tool.} Voir point précédent. {See previous point.} Retracer l'adresse IP lorsque les femmes sont sur Facebook ou Twitter....?? {Trace the IP address when women are on Facebook or Twitter....??} I had a male perpetrator look me up on Facebook (I have since deleted my account). I mostly work with children, so making things safer for kids online. Hacking in email or social media accounts, sending threatening text or voicemail, tracking women down with GPS or Internet access. Teenage girls posting photos of nude girl friends. Online dating and chat room services. Banking, credit card tracking systems. Women and children in the social assistance system. I have some growing concern about computers being remotely accessed to record/watch the activities of abused women, as well as devices being placed/installed for the same purpose, and the number of websites that teach people how to do this. I think the biggest thing I find is that perpetrators will continually text women and children with abusive messages. When they don't respond, they will up the amount of messages being sent and they often become more abusive. Even, in several cases, if they have changed their number, the perpetrator finds the new number and the harassment starts again. Police will not take this seriously, and even after death threats were made against a woman and her children she was 25
told that unless he physically was there threatening her, or caused her harm, they couldn't do anything about it. Computer hacking; having a woman's privacy compromised. Any program technology that is available, such as GPS programs, that are set up via Internet to track women without their knowledge; voice‐altering programs so caller can disguise their voice, etc. Online dating—teens share lots of information online. Problems with credit cards. GPS tracking on cell/mobile phones that could compromise the transition house location. Some perpetrators have girlfriends text continual negative messages to inflame the victim. Sending info to a wrong number, email, fax tracking with GPS. Pictures on the Internet. Use of medical files. Can add or delete anything, so that info can be tampered with. None of the info needs to be true. Once posted, you never know where it is, or who has it anywhere. Teens: cyberbullying. As long as there is a Wireless signal, clients are able to use laptops to access Facebook, email, etc. Clients will also borrow other peoples' cell/mobile phones to contact or harass the abuser. If someone 'sexts' someone else something, the idea that some person, somewhere out there, may be able to access that. Facebook—women being contacted by their partners. I also worry about women who use Facebook while in our shelter, as I wonder if their partners can use their status updates to GPS locate our shelter (if the women use their smart phones). The ability of a spouse to change their partner's password so easily. Accounts being hacked by partner. Facebook attacks and threats online. Use of the iPhone or other Internet media in the privacy of their own rooms by residents who don't "get" the importance of privacy of house location, resident's names, or possible danger that other residents and staff may be in if disclosures are spread around. Some residents don't have danger of violence issues and are not facing as dangerous situations as others, and minimize the dangers. Difficulty for staff to stay on top of, explain, keep confidentiality, and monitor. It's very confusing and hard to present the information to clients, as it is also always shifting. Threats through email, texts. Spying devices such as cameras and recorders. Hacking into accounts. Retrieving information through companies. 26
27. What are some innovative ways that women/survivors are using technology? RESPONSE Pour nous rejoindre via internet ou encore trouver nos coordonnées. {To reach us via the Internet or find our contact information.} Les téléphones cellulaires, leurs comptes de banque en ligne , Facebook pour s'amuser et communique avec leurs réseau sociale. {Cell/mobile phones, online banking, Facebook for fun and to communicate with their social network.} Elles utilisent les technologies tel Skype (sans webcam) afin de communiquer sans frais avec leur famille en région éloignée. De plus, nous invitons les femmes à préprogrammer le 911 sur leur téléphone cellulaire afin de pouvoir rapidement joindre les services d'urgence en cas de danger. {They use technologies such as Skype (without webcam) to communicate free of charge with their families in remote areas. In addition, we invite women to preprogram 911 on their cell/mobile phones in order to quickly reach emergency services in case of danger.} Les systèmes d'alarmes. {The alarm systems.} Pour le moment, nous informons les femmes de certaines mesures de sécurités à utiliser sans avoir un discourt moralisateur, les informer est notre rôle. {For the moment, we inform women of certain security measures to use without moralizing discourses, our role is to inform them.} We give out old cell/mobile phones so women at least have 911 ability. To come together and discuss their experiences. Using text messages and emails to support child custody/access issues, as well as their applications for a "Restraining Order." Mainly using the information to validate threats and harassment. A woman uses Skype to share access of her child with her ex, and this seems to work fine and keep all satisfied. A woman used her cell/mobile phone to record threats being made to her and her children. To find out where the perpetrator is, so they can avoid that location and stay safe. Art, photography, story sharing, poetry shared through social media that is anti‐violence related. First cell/mobile phone program designed to contact the local police services directly; cell/mobile phones that alert companies when the user is being shaken violently. Changing passwords regularly; clearing history. Getting information, contacting appropriate services, connecting with others in chat rooms, Twitter. They are thinking of recording abusive, threatening situations, i.e. one victim recorded a threatening abusive incident while it was happening. This could be helpful when the man shows up suited and polite and makes allegations of mental health disorders against the victim—that is, if the justice system would allow the evidence. I know of just the basics: keeping text messages, voicemails, emails. They are keeping printed copies of threats and other evidence to support their case. 27
Old cell/mobile phones can be used to place 911 calls. Receiving counselling via text; access services/referrals via Internet; look up shelter on smart phone. Texting land lines. At libraries, we have installed firewalls. To show pictures of the abuser to shelter staff and to law enforcement. Documenting exact times—communicating while away from abuser for a few moments. I don't know of any off‐hand, but would like to learn about them. Not much work with clients, personally. I don't know, but would be interested in finding out new ways to help clients in regards to technology. Using privacy setting on their accounts. Turning off GPS; using other names in accounts. To stay connected more often. Hooking up to communal transition house computer and finding out from friends and relatives what's going on with abuser. Having spirits lifted with well wishers and loved ones. Finding resources for places to live, court issues, jobs, travel to another place, other transition houses and resources, etc. Cell /mobile phones—women are using Pay As You Go (although more expensive)—Facebook—
they are putting up pics of artwork, etc. rather than pics of themselves and their children, and they are changing their "profile pics" on a regular basis. Networking, online support groups, much easier access to phone numbers and agency information if clients need it. Setting up strict privacy settings on their Facebook account; blocking numbers; sometimes keeping voicemail as an option for callers, but putting a system greeting on or having someone else record a message that throws the harasser off. Applications on telephones for protection. 28. End of survey: Thank you for sharing your insights. Is there anything else you want to share? RESPONSE La confidentialité des addresses de nos maisons est difficile à préserver compte tenu de l'utilisation quotidienne des cellulaires, iPod, iPad, et portable. La seécurité des femmes est préoccupante pour celles en maison s d'hébergement ainsi que celles de nos intervenantes. {Preserving the confidentiality of our shelters is difficult due to the daily use of cell/mobile phones, iPods, iPads, and laptops. The security of women in the shelter is a concern, as well as the security of shelter workers.} Nous avons vraiment une méconnaissance des réels possibilités et dangers entourant l'utilisation des technologies (particulièrement les téléphones intelligents) par les femmes que nous aidons. {We are ignorant of real possibilities and dangers surrounding the use of technology (particularly 28
smartphones) by the women we serve.} La traduction des questions est parfois difficile à comprendre. Peut‐être aurais‐je eu plus de facilité à compléter le questionnaire en anglais. Aussi, j'ai l'impression que plusieurs questions se recoupent et donc qu'elles sont répétitives. J'espère avoir aidé à votre recherche! {The translation of the questions is sometimes difficult to understand. Maybe it'd been easier to complete the questionnaire in English. Also, I feel that several issues overlap and therefore they are repetitive. I hope I have helped in your research!} Merci à vous. Je serais intéressée à en connaître les résultats. {Thank you. I would be interested to know the results.} Nous aurons à mieux nous renseigner sur les façons positives de se servir de la technologie. {We will have to find more information about positive ways to use technology.} My perspective is affected by my own non‐acquaintance with technological advances, and associated potentialities for abuses, of the past decade or more. I have attended two sessions with BCSTH on social networking. Otherwise, I need to be better informed. I was fortunate to have taken one of the workshops that Cynthia Fraser offered at the BCSTH training forum last October re: violence and technology. Unfortunately I was unable to attend the "Take Back the Net" training she offered in Vernon on April 25, 2012. I, as well as my colleagues, would greatly appreciate another opportunity to attend. It seems that texts are replacing actual conversations and so there is more recorded than ever before—good news/bad news. Women are able to provide their cell/mobile phones as evidence rather than depending on lawyers to get records from cell/mobile phone providers. Facebook is proving to be a challenge with women who want to stay connected with family, but fail to recognize how this increases the risk to their safety. Technology plays such a huge part when stalking partners. It is very difficult to keep up with technology, but it always amazes me—the lack of information people have around the whole topic. It seems when you try to educate, the wrong people are one step ahead. Yes, when is the system going to address what to do about the perpetrators (the cause); we have been trying desperately and without a lot of success to treat the symptom (the abused). Something needs to be done about the cause, or the cycle will never stop. The information on the survey is provided by six workers—five work with women, and one works with teens. Our agency currently works with a company who has currently received funding to work on these types of specific issues. Thanks for doing this, and I hope to receive some education around this topic. It is an area we haven’t researched much; and know if a perpetrator was knowledgeable, could use info to harm. Looking forward to the results. Can't wait for resources for client on this important issue. Staff have varying levels of knowledge about technology issues and can easily be unaware of the safety issues regarding confidentiality and dangerous use of technology, thus putting themselves, the house, residents and staff at risk. I think we need to develop some policies and information sheets for residents and staff around these issues. This needs to be a more "front and centre" topic, especially with recent cases like Amanda Todd's coming to light. 29