Antitrust Writing Awards 2016 - Institute of Competition Law
Transcription
Antitrust Writing Awards 2016 - Institute of Competition Law
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 Washington DC, 9 April 2013 www.awards.concurrences.com JURY The 2013 Jury comprised the Board, the Academic and Business Steering Committees, the Editorial Committee and the Readers. Each of these contributed to the selection process. The Editorial Committee of the Institute of Competition Law selected a pool of around 100 articles based on Steering Committees members’ suggestions. Then, both the Steering Committees members and the Readers made a short-list of the most interesting articles. The Board members finally selected the award-winning articles among the short-lists provided by the Steering Committees and the readers. Board s s s s s s s Julie BRILL, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission Alexander ITALIANER, Director General, DG COMP, European Commission Frédéric JENNY, Chairman, OECD Competition Committee William E. KOVACIC, Law School Professor and Director, George Washington University Competition Law Center Bruno LASSERRE, President, French Competition Authority and Chairman European Competition Network Academic Steering Committee Christian BOVET, Geneva University Daniel CRANE, University of Michigan Law School s Harry FIRST, New York University s Eleanor FOX, New York University s Michal S. GAL, University of Haifa s Andrew GAVIL, Howard University School of Law, Washington DC s David GERBER, Kent College of Law, Chicago University s Laurence IDOT, University of Panthéon-Assas, Paris II s Clifford A. JONES, University of Florida s John B. KIRKWOOD, Seattle University Law School s Ioannis LIANOS, University College London s John E. LOPATKA, Penn State Law University s Janusz ORDOVER, New York University s Nicolas PETIT, Institute for European Legal Studies, Liege s Howard SHELANSKI, Georgetown University s Daniel SOKOL, University of Florida s Andreas STEPHAN, University of East Anglia s Florian WAGNER-VON PAPP, University College London s Wouter P.J. WILS, King’s College London s Joshua WRIGHT, George Mason University s s Business Steering Committee Editorial Committee s Paul ANDRES, Antitrust Counsel, Nestlé s Jean-Yves ART, Deputy General Counsel, Microsoft Nicolas CHARBIT, Chief Editor, Concurrences and e-Competitions s Vanessa CAPRANO-CHAUVIN, Legal Director, Teva s Olaf CHRISTIANSEN, Senior Vice-President, Bertelsmann Elisa RAMUNDO, Managing Editor, the Institute of Competition Law s Laurent GEELHAND, General Counsel, Michelin s Wolfgang HECKENBERGER, Chief Counsel Competition, Siemens s Fanny MEJANE, Deputy Chief Editor, Concurrences s Anna CHEHTOVA, Senior Editor - Attorney, US FTC s Mathew HEIM, General Counsel, Qualcomm s Cory HAYLEY-JOHNSON, US Associate Editor s Julia HOLTZ, Competition Director, Google s Maly OP-COURTAIGNE, US Associate Editor s Susan JONES, Head Corporate Legal Antitrust, Novartis s Abigail SLATER, US Associate Editor Attorney US FTC s Gabriel MCGANN, Chief Antitrust Counsel, Coca-Cola s James MURRAY, Associate General Counsel & Chief Antitrust Counsel, Intel s Libby RUTHERFORD, Vice President and General Counsel for Global Compliance and Go-To-Market, Procter & Gamble s Vanessa TURNER, General Counsel, Visa Europe s Suzanne E. WACHSSTOCK, VP & Chief Antitrust Counsel, American Express s Mark WITHENER, Senior Competition Counsel, General Electric s Gary ZANFAGNA, Chief Antitrust Counsel, Honeywell CONTENTS Awards 2 Ranking 12 Reception & Dinner 14 Press report 16 Testimonials 17 Rules 19 Organizers 20 FOREWORD Bill Kovacic Nicolas Charbit George Washington University Competition Law Center Institute of Competition Law Concurrences / e-Competitions T he Antitrust Writing Awards’ goal is to promote antitrust scholarship and competition advocacy by recognizing and awarding the best articles published in the antitrust law and law & economics fields in the last 12 months. The Awards feature two different categories of articles: Academic and Business. The Academic Articles category comprises articles published in academic journals, whereas the Business Articles category features articles published in professional magazines or newsletters. The articles have been selected by a jury and by readers. The 2013 jury consisted of a Board - Alexander Italianer, Julie Brill, Fred Jenny, Bill Kovacic, and Bruno Lasserre - an Academic and a Business Steering Committees composed of leading academics and counsels. Readers contributed to the selection process by voting for articles. We are most thankful to the jury members who spent valuable time to read and review the 100 selected articles and to our sponsors who made these Awards possible. This 2013 edition of the Awards also features a Ranking of 30 newsletters and other professional antitrust publications. Whereas the Articles Awards reward individual articles, the Newsletters Ranking rewards antitrust newsletters considered overall. The aim of this Ranking is to provide practitioners with a useful description and ranking. In the wake of Chairman Lasserre’s own words, we will continue working to promote quality articles in the antitrust field and to favor the cooperation at play between antitrust publications to ensure the greatest circulation of academic and professional expertise. Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 1 PART I AWARDS WINNING ARTICLES ACADEMIC ARTICLES 1. BEST GENERAL ANTITRUST ARTICLE RECIDIVISM IN EU ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WOUTER P.J. WILS > World Competition, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2012 R ecidivism has in the last few years attracted much attention and controversy in the context of EU antitrust enforcement. In the conclusions of their study, published in 2005, of appeals against decisions of the European Commission in cartel cases, Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs identified an “awesome level of recidivism on the part of major companies who appear as usual suspects in the world of business cartels. In short this suggests a confirmed culture of business delinquency.” In 2006, the European Commission revised its Guidelines for setting fines in antitrust cases. One of three main changes was that repeat offenders would be fined more than in the past: the European Commission now takes into account not only its own previous decisions, but also those by the competition authorities of the EU Member States applying EU antitrust law; the increase of the fine on account of recidivism may be up to 100 %; and each prior infringement will justify an increase of the fine.[...] Noteworthy is also that some national competition authorities in EU Member States that have adopted fining guidelines more recently have chosen not to follow the example of the European Commission’s 2006 Fining Guidelines, opting instead for a lower maximum increase of fines on account of recidivism and stricter conditions as to what instances of recidivism are taken into account. On the other hand, it has been observed that the European Commission has not made full use of the possibilities offered by its 2006 Fining Guidelines, increasing in practice fines by 50 % in case of one prior infringement, 60 % in case of two prior infringements, 90 % in case of three prior infringements, and 100 % in case of four prior infringements, far below the 100 %, 200 %, 300 % and 400 % limits set out in the 2006 Fining Guidelines. John Connor has claimed to have identified, on the basis of his own statistics on the incidence of recidivism, compared with the decisions taken by the European Commission in application of the 2006 Fining Guidelines, a “large number of defendants convicted under the new guidelines that received 2 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 no recidivism penalty when they clearly qualified for such. […] More generally, John Connor has claimed, on the basis of his (world-wide) statistics for international cartels during the last two decades, that “recidivism appears to be increasing rapidly, both in number and relative to all corporate cartelists. […] This observation seems to justify a continuation of policies that impose brutally higher fines and other effective sanctions on cartel recidivists.” This paper first clarifies the concept of recidivism (Chapter II), and then analyses the treatment of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the setting of fines (Chapter III), the interplay between recidivism and leniency (Chapter Julie Brill, FTC IV), and the difficulty of drawing concluJoshua Wright, George Mason University -FTC sions as to the overall effectiveness of EU antitrust enforcement from the observed Ewoud Sakkers, DG COMP (for W. P. J. Wils) incidence of recidivism (Chapter V). ACADEMIC ARTICLES 2. BEST ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES ARTICLE MOVING BEYOND CARICATURE AND CHARACTERIZATION: THE MODERN RULE OF REASON IN PRACTICE ANDREW I. GAVIL > Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, 2012 T he “rule of reason” endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1911 decision dissolving the Standard Oil trust has been variously denigrated by critics as “unstructured,” “full blown,” “uncertain,” and costly to administer in all its forms. This article challenges that conventional wisdom as dated. It argues that the rule of reason has evolved considerably since Standard Oil, largely due to the Court’s progression away from per se rules and undemanding burdens of proof, in favor of a structured analytical framework that focuses on evidence of anticompetitive effect and efficiency. While lower courts differ somewhat in their approaches, many cases are decided largely at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages and the modern rule of reason works generally well to sort the strong from the weak claims. Nevertheless, despite this considerable progress, criticism of the rule of reason persists. Ironically, today’s critic yearns for the certainty of the per se era, but at the other end of the spectrum: they advocate for per se legal standards and easy to apply filters that would more readily terminate weak or allegedly “frivolous” cases, even though defendants prevail at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage of antitrust litigation the overwhelming percentage of the time. The discourse is dominated by easily exaggerated claims of “false positives.” Little concern is expressed for the potentiality of an increased incidence of “false negatives” or for the costs of obtaining an imagined degree of economic certainty. substitute for better and more cost-effective approaches to resolving antitrust cases. One solution can be found in thoughtful use of abbreviated analysis, sometimes referred to as the “quick look.” The article retraces the intellectual history of the quick look and concludes that the prevalent view today that the quick look can only be invoked based on evidence of “actual anticompetitive effect” is misguided. Abbreviated analysis was the brain child of relatively more conservative commentators and enforcers concerned with the costs of antitrust decision-making. It was designed to permit courts to more readily reach reliable conclusions about the likely effects of conduct based on an assessment of basic market facts, informed by economic reasoning. This approach, which traces its origins to Professor Philip Areeda’s suggestion that sometimes the rule of reason can be applied in the “twinkling of an eye,” warrants our renewed attention. A more symmetrical evaluation of the plausibility of harms and efficiencies might aid the resolution of many cases that do not warrant in-depth assessments of measurable effects and benefits. The Julie Brill, FTC often theoretical benefit of added certainty may Eleanor Fox, NYU Andrew Gavil, FTC simply not be worth the additional cost. When these arguments are unpacked, however, they turn out to be directed in significant part at the U.S. antitrust system. The combination of antitrust specific incentives to suit, such as treble damages and attorneys’ fees, and system characteristics such as broad discovery, class actions, and jury trials, are derided as a “toxic cocktail” that brings defendants to their knees and promotes coerced settlements, which in term further encourage weak cases. Although these arguments are exaggerated, they are not without some merit. They also may suggest, however, that adjustments to antitrust doctrine are a poor Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 3 ACADEMIC ARTICLES 3. BEST UNILATERAL CONDUCT ARTICLE TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ACCESS DENIALS SUSAN A. CREIGHTON AND JONATHAN M. JACOBSON > World Competition: Law & Economics Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2012 S usan Creighton’s and Douglas Ginsburg, NYU Jonathan Jacobson’s “25 Jonathan Jacobson, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Years of Access Denials” was written for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Antitrust magazine. It tracks developments in denial of access cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act from Aspen in 1985 forward. The primary focus is on what several courts since Aspen have held to be a requirement – that the denial of access to the defendant’s facilities represent a reversal of a previously-profitable course of dealing. The article explains that any such requirement would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Otter Tail, the holding of which has never been questioned, and with sound antitrust policy. Firms will be reluctant to commence dealing with potential rivals – and so will forego economically efficient relationships – if, as a legal consequence, they are barred by antitrust laws from terminating those relationships. The threat of deterring efficient arrangements is especially acute when one considers how easy it is for a plaintiff to assert a narrow market definition in which the defendant could be argued to have a dominant position. Because of the high value that antitrust places correctly on a firm’s ability to choose with whom it will deal, the better focus is not on prior dealings but on whether the refusal to deal would make economic sense without the elimination or marginalization of a competitive constraint. Termination of a previously-profitable business arrangement may be relevant to that calculation, but should not be determinative. 4 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 ACADEMIC ARTICLES 4. BEST MERGERS ARTICLE MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACROSS POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES HOWARD SHELANSKI, JESSE SOLOMON, AND RONAN P. HARTY > Concurrences N° 2-2012, n°45073, May 2012 B ill Kovacic has written persuasively that the political rhetoric of antitrust has often been at odds with what the antitrust agencies have actually done and with any meaningful assessment of their performance. This article follows Kovacic by analyzing data from the FTC’s and the DOJ’s review of mergers over thirty years, from 1981 through 2010, for correlations to shifts in political administration. We analyze historical trends from one administration to the next with regard to five metrics: (1) agency budgeting, (2) the number of transactions reported under the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, (3) requests for and grants of early termination of the waiting period, (4) the issuance of second requests by the agencies, and (5) transaction challenges brought by the agencies. These data demonstrate some interesting, and at times counterintuitive, relationships between specific administrations and merger review and enforcement activity. On a more granular level, these data also demonstrate some trends regarding how merger review and enforcement statistics have been sensitive to change over from one agency chief to the next within administrations. By some measures, enforcement activity appears to decline during Republican administrations and increase during Democratic governments. At the same time, there are other measures that contradict that pattern. Our analysis therefore supports Kovacic’s skepticism about any simple relationship between antitrust enforcement and political administration and reinforces his call for moving beyond activity measures in judging the success of an administration’s antitrust policies. James Keyte, Skadden Arps Jesse Solomon, Davis Polk Howard Shelanski, FTC Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 5 ACADEMIC ARTICLES 5. BEST ECONOMICS ARTICLE LOYALTY REBATES AND THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS HANS ZENGER > Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 717-768, 2012 T Julie Brill, FTC Hans Zenger, CRA Bill Kovacic, GWULS 6 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 he degree of divergence between U.S. and European case law on the proper legal treatment of loyalty rebates is larger than in almost any other field of international antitrust law. Whereas U.S. jurisprudence has traditionally considered loyalty rebates to be a pro-competitive business practice, the Court of Justice of the European Union has repeatedly held that loyalty rebates are an illegal means of distorting competition. This article challenges the Community Courts’ conviction that loyalty rebates do not constitute competition on the merits and claims the opposite. The adoption of loyalty rebates is a direct consequence and a vital expression of the competitive process. The need for different forms of loyalty rebates naturally emerges from the diverse market conditions that prevail in different industries, which explains the widespread use of diverse loyalty rebates in business practice. It is the heterogeneity of commercial pressures that dominant firms are facing which determines the competitive structure and size of their rebates. By suppressing competition in rebates, orthodox legal doctrine in Europe has distorted the competitive process in a variety of global markets and thereby caused significant harm to competition and consumers. Since loyalty rebates are an efficient and healthy form of competition, plaintiffs and competition authorities that allege anti-competitive foreclosure as a result of loyalty rebates should generally carry the burden of proving the existence of a restriction of competition. The Court’s prevailing interpretation of Article 102 TFEU, by contrast, is bound to punish successful innovators and to protect less effective rivals from the inconveniences of the competitive process. BUSINESS ARTICLES 1. BEST GENERAL ANTITRUST ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF POLICY STATEMENT OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS ROBERT E. BLOCH AND SCOTT P. PERLMAN > Mayer Brown, Antitrust and Competition, 2012 U nder the Affordable Care Act, health care providers are encouraged to form accountable care organizations (ACOs) to manage and coordinate care for purposes of the Medicare Shared Savings Program. The ACOs formed for Medicare also are likely to be used by providers to contract with commercial payers, and represent an important opportunity for providers to work together to improve the quality of care while also reducing health care costs. However, increased provider consolidation also raises the risk that ACOs will be able to exercise market power in the form of higher rates to commercial payers and patients. In an effort to balance these considerations, in October 2011, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice issued a Statement on Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Policy Statement) to “ensure that health care providers have the antitrust clarity and guidance to form procompetitive ACOs that participate in both the Medicare and commercial markets.” This article describes the Policy Statement, including its reliance on clinical integration criteria set by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, the Policy Statement’s safe harbor provisions, and guidance to parties forming ACOs that fall outside the safe harbors. The article also discusses the manner in which the Policy Statement departs from the agencies’ 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care to encourage the formation of ACOs, and whether those changes increase the risk that ACOs will have anticompetitive effects. Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC James Muray, Intel Scott Perlman, Mayer Brown Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 7 BUSINESS ARTICLES 2. BEST ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES ARTICLE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS HELD BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES TOM K. CASSELS, KEITH R. JONES, RICHARD PIKE, AND FRANCESCA RICHMOND > Baker & McKenzie Client Alert, April 2012 T om Cassels, Keith Jones, Richard Pike and Francesca Richmond from Baker & McKenzie’s Antitrust Litigation team in London are the authors of Antitrust Litigation: Access to Documents Held by Regulatory Authorities, winner of the Business category Anticompetitive Practices section. The article is one of a series produced by this team on the topic. It describes an April 2012 judgment handed down by the English High Court that addressed whether documents submitted by decision addressees as part of the European Commission’s leniency process should be disclosed in a private action for damages. The article also comments on the European Commission’s position on whether such documents should be disclosed and the submissions made by the European Commission to the English High Court as well as to the courts of other Member States and in the U.S. on this issue. Claimant access to documents has been subject to litigation in a number of EU Member States. The possibility that leniency documents might be disclosed has created real tension between regulators’ desire not to 8 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 inhibit future leniency applications and the need for claimants to be able to obtain information in order to establish that an infringement has occurred that has caused them damage. The European Commission has indicated that it intends to address this tension by announcing its own proposals on the interplay between private antirust actions and leniency programs. These proposals are likely to protect documents created specifically to support applications for leniency, but that protection is not likely to extend to other documents submitted with the application. Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC Julia Holtz, Google Francesca Richmond, Baker & McKenzie Tom Cassels, Baker & McKenzie The potential for claimants to obtain information from regulatory authorities and varying approaches in different jurisdictions to disclosure as between parties calls for a joined up litigation strategy when bringing or defending a multi-jurisdictional antitrust damages claim. BUSINESS ARTICLES 3. BEST UNILATERAL CONDUCT ARTICLE THE CURIOUS CASE OF COMPULSORY LICENSING IN INDIA NAVAL SATARAWALA CHOPRA AND DINOO MUTHAPPA > Competition Law International, Vol. 8 No. 2, August 2012 I n March 2012, the Indian Patents Authority granted the first compulsory license under Indian patent law in Natco v. Bayer, to Bayer’s patented anti-cancer drug ‘sorafenib tosylate.’ A compulsory license for the manufacture and sale of sorafenib tosylate was granted to Natco for the balance term of Bayer’s patent, subject to the payment of a royalty of six per cent of the net sales of the drug to Bayer ‘The Curious Case of Compulsory Licensing in India’ discusses the Natco v. Bayer decision and considers the possibility of India’s competition authority, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), issuing a compulsory license on similar grounds, in the event a dominant holder of intellectual property (IP) rights refuses to voluntarily license its IP. The article discusses the European Union (EU) and American approaches to non-merger compulsory licensing under competition law, and the approach and enforcement priorities of the CCI under abuse of dominance cases in India is also outlined. In the EU and the U.S., it is only after a careful comparative analysis between the need to encourage innovation and the goal of promoting and fostering competition that a compulsory licensing remedy is issued in exceptional cases. Under the provisions of India’s competition legislation, the Competition Act, 2002, a compulsory license to remedy an abusive refusal-to-license appears to be within the CCI’s ambit. Though competition law is a tool used for the attainment of economic freedom and prosperity in the developed economies of the EU and the U.S., in the Indian context and in light of the previous decisions of the CCI, the authors find that competition law in India may be motivated by other considerations, including access to healthcare. especially circumspect in the exercise of such authority and also caution against the CCI becoming a price regulator. If competition intervention is used to remedy social inequity rather than to ensure a competitive market place, pharmaceutical companies may find great risk in operating in India and this may adversely impact foreign investment in this sector. The article therefore recommends that compulsory licensing as a remedy to anticompetitive conduct should only be used where there are over-arching contraventions of competition law and alternative remedies are insufficient, and where the interests in favor of a licensee are so strong, they trump any harm that could be caused to the innovation incentives of IP holders. Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC Paul Andres, Nestlé Naval Satarawala Chopra, Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff Given that the test for establishing a refusal-to-license abuse and the corresponding grant of a compulsory license remedy is subject to strict scrutiny in jurisdictions overseas, the authors recommend that the CCI be Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 9 BUSINESS ARTICLES 4. BEST MERGERS ARTICLE ANTITRUST ANALYSES OF PATENT ACQUISITIONS—QUID NOVI? DAVID M. MAIORANA, GEOFFREY D. OLIVER, AND AUSRA O. DELUARD > Jones Day Publications, May 2012 T he article uses the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and European Commission (Commission) review of the Google/Motorola Mobility patent acquisition, along with the DOJ review of the Apple-Microsoft-RIM/ Nortel Networks and Apple/Novell patent acquisitions (collectively, the ‘2012 Patent Acquisitions’), to explore the application of traditional theories of horizontal and vertical merger review to the acquisition of patent portfolios. The article argues that the analysis of the acquisition of patent portfolios is similar to that of the acquisition of any other assets, with a few minor differences to account for the specific nature of intellectual property rights. Specifically, antitrust agencies will apply a traditional horizontal analysis to consider the degree of direct competition between IP rights held by an acquiring firm and the IP rights being acquired to determine whether the acquisition would substantially lessen competition between alternative technologies. One of the clearest examples was the Federal Trade Commission’s analysis and remedy in connection with the formation of the Montedison/Shell joint venture in the 1990’s. Most polypropylene plants licensed technology either from Montedison or from Shell as inputs to their production. To prevent the joint venture from controlling both of the two leading technologies, the FTC required Shell to divest both tangible and intangible assets. Horizontal analysis is potentially relevant to every acquisition of patents, even though it was not discussed by the DOJ or the Commission in connection with the 2012 Patent Acquisitions. The antitrust agencies will also apply a vertical analysis to patent acquisitions. This considers whether the combination of upstream inputs—intellectual property rights over technology—with downstream operations would change the ability or incentives of the IP owner to exclude competitors in the downstream business from access to the technology and, if so, whether the effect would be to hinder the ability of competitors to compete in the downstream business. The risk of such foreclosure may be particularly high if the intellectual property in question consists of 10 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 standard-essential patents. This was the focus of the analysis of both the DOJ and the Commission in the 2012 Patent Acquisitions. The article examines the agencies’ conclusion that the 2012 Patent Acquisitions were unlikely to harm competition. The article notes that the DOJ’s reliance in part on Apple’s licensing commitments was consistent with U.S. agencies’ willingness to rely on licensing remedies in IP acquisitions. Although Google’s licensing commitments were more ambiguous, both the DOJ and the Commission concluded that the acquisition was unlikely to change Motorola Mobility’s licensing practices or competitors’ access to standards-essential patents. The article concludes that the agencies are likely to apply this analytical framework to consideration of future IP acquisitions. Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC Ron Stern, General Electric David Maiorana, Jones Day BUSINESS ARTICLES 5. BEST ECONOMICS ARTICLE SPONSORED ENTRY ALAN OVERD > CRA Competition Memo, January 2012 S ome mergers materially reduce the choice of suppliers available to customers. When this happens, how much weight should competition authorities give to the potential for customers to sponsor new entry? The possibility of customers sponsoring new entry as a means of countering adverse merger effects is often cited, but the conditions under which such a defense is likely to be convincing are limited. Two recent cases investigated by the UK Competition Commission (CC) give an insight into the circumstances in which sponsored entry arguments are likely to be successful. In one case (BATS/ Chi-X), it was concluded that the threat of customers sponsoring a new entrant was so potent that the merged firm would have no incentive to raise prices. In the other (Kerry/Headland), customers were found to have shifted significant volumes to alternative suppliers following a completed transaction which raised substantial competition concerns. The CC cleared both deals without conditions. The two cases analyzed in the article show that competition authorities are willing to consider sponsored entry arguments provided the economic analysis demonstrates that the impact is likely, timely and sufficient to counter a potential substantial lessening of competition resulting from a merger. In one case, the potential entry remained hypothetical, but modelling work, the views of customers and market precedents were relied upon to show that if the merged entity’s offering did deteriorate, sponsored entry would be likely to produce a viable rival. In the other case, the fact that the transaction was completed allowed an assessment to be carried out of customers’ ability to shift volume to previously smaller market participants at prices consistent with pre-merger levels. Sponsored entry differs from standard buyer power arguments in an important respect. It can be argued that countervailing buyer power arguments have a weakness in that large customers may be able to protect themselves from the potentially anti-competitive effects of a merger but the impact on smaller customers could still be significant. Sponsored entry, in contrast, leads to the emergence of a new market participant whose output is likely to be available to customers regardless of size. That said, sponsored entry—like buyer power arguments in general— is only likely to be convincing in a minority of cases. It requires a number of stringent conditions to be met in order for it to be deemed to be sufficient to prevent a substantial lessening of competition. However, these recent cases show that competition authorities are willing to consider sponsored entry as a credible defense when these conditions are met. Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC Hans Zenger (for Alan Overd), CRA Jean-Yves Art, Microsoft Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 11 PART II RANKING 30 newsletters and other professional antitrust publications have been reviewed by the Institute’s Editorial Board in order to provide practitioners with a useful description and ranking. WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA USED TO RANK? Professional antitrust publications include newsletters, blogs, client briefs, memoranda, and even webinars accompanied by written presentations freely made available on the internet. Whereas the Articles Awards reward individual articles, the Newsletters Ranking rewards antitrust newsletters considered overall. Antitrust professional publications are ranked according to 7 criteria: s Country coverage s Case coverage s Website’s accessibility WHY A RANKING? s Innovation The quality and usefulness of antitrust newsletters and other professional publications vary greatly. Even though all this is going in the right direction due to increased competition between firms and also between university competition law centers, users’ ability to read or browse such publications is limited. There are just too many of these publications and too many similarities between them for users to effectively assess what is worth reading or watching. s Readership s Counsels’ Choice s Articles shortlisted or nominated for the Antitrust Writing Awards The assessment of the above categories is based on a combination of objective and subjective criteria, together with individual interviews. Ranking such publications is intended to guide users on which publications they should read or view first, depending what they are looking for. GLOBAL RANKING The Global Ranking of the Antitrust professional publications is based on the 7 rankings below. 1 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 6 JONES DAY 2 SKADDEN ARPS 7 BAKER & MCKENZIE 3 ALLEN & OVERY 8 CLIFFORD CHANCE 4 NORTON ROSE 9 FRESHFIELDS 5 WHITE & CASE 10 MAYER BROWN RANKING BY COUNTRY COVERAGE RANKING BY CASE COVERAGE This ranking is based on the number of jurisdictions addressed in the 2012 publications of each firm. This ranking is based on the number of cases covered in the 2012 publications of each firm. 1 ALLEN & OVERY 16 O’MELVENY 1 ALLEN & OVERY 16 PROSKAUER 2 CLIFFORD CHANCE 17 GIBSON DUNN 2 NORTON ROSE 17 SHEARMAN STERLING 3 JONES DAY 18 WINSTON & STRAWN 3 HERBERT SMITH 18 COVINGTON 4 HOGAN LOVELLS 19 DAVIS POLK 4 WEIL GOTSHAL 19 BAKER BOTTS 5 LATHAM WATKINS 20 MCDERMOTT 5 CLIFFORD CHANCE 20 MCDERMOTT 6 NORTON ROSE 21 WEIL GOTSHAL 6 JONES DAY 21 FRESHFIELDS 7 BAKER & MCKENZIE 22 ARNOLD & PORTER 7 ARNOLD & PORTER 22 GIBSON DUNN 8 HERBERT SMITH 23 COVINGTON 8 SKADDEN ARPS 23 KIRKLAND & ELLIS 9 SHEARMAN STERLING 24 KIRKLAND & ELLIS 9 HOGAN LOVELLS 24 WINSTON & STRAWN 10 FRESHFIELDS 25 PROSKAUER 10 LATHAM WATKINS 25 SIDLEY AUSTIN 11 WHITE & CASE 26 SIDLEY AUSTIN 11 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 26 MAYER BROWN 12 LINKLATERS 27 PAUL WEISS 12 LINKLATERS 27 SULLIVAN CROMWELL 13 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 28 SULLIVAN CROMWELL 13 PAUL WEISS 28 BAKER & MCKENZIE 14 SKADDEN ARPS 29 WILMERHALE 14 WHITE & CASE 29 WILMERHALE 15 MAYER BROWN 30 BAKER BOTTS 15 O’MELVENY 30 DAVIS POLK 12 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 RANKING BY ACCESSIBILITY RANKING BY COUNSELS’ CHOICE This ranking is based on objective criteria (pdf/html/print publications, access to archives…) and subjective criteria (design, search engine features…). This ranking is based on counsels’ choice of their favorite professional publication (based on a questionnaire sent to at least 3,500 counsels). 1 WHITE & CASE 16 WILMERHALE 1 SKADDEN ARPS 16 SIDLEY AUSTIN 2 BAKER & MCKENZIE 17 LATHAM WATKINS 2 WHITE & CASE 17 MCDERMOTT 3 SIDLEY AUSTIN 18 O’MELVENY 3 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 18 LATHAM WATKINS 4 PROSKAUER 19 ARNOLD & PORTER 4 FRESHFIELDS 19 SHEARMAN STERLING 5 SULLIVAN CROMWELL 20 GIBSON DUNN 5 LINKLATERS 20 PROSKAUER 6 JONES DAY 21 FRESHFIELDS 6 NORTON ROSE 21 DAVIS POLK 7 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 22 SKADDEN ARPS 7 JONES DAY 22 WILMERHALE 8 CLIFFORD CHANCE 23 DAVIS POLK 8 HOGAN LOVELLS 23 SULLIVAN CROMWELL 9 KIRKLAND & ELLIS 24 WINSTON & STRAWN 9 ALLEN & OVERY 24 O’MELVENY 10 NORTON ROSE 25 PAUL WEISS 10 BAKER & MCKENZIE 25 ARNOLD & PORTER 11 MAYER BROWN 26 HERBERT SMITH 11 MAYER BROWN 26 KIRKLAND & ELLIS 12 MCDERMOTT 27 HOGAN LOVELLS 12 COVINGTON 27 HERBERT SMITH 13 SHEARMAN STERLING 28 LINKLATERS 13 GIBSON DUNN 28 WINSTON & STRAWN 14 ALLEN & OVERY 29 WEIL GOTSHAL 14 CLIFFORD CHANCE 29 BAKER BOTTS 15 COVINGTON 30 BAKER BOTTS 15 WEIL GOTSHAL 30 PAUL WEISS RANKING BY INNOVATION RANKING BY READERSHIP This ranking is based on the presence of innovative antitrust professional materials found on the firms websites (e-books, blogs, webinars etc.). This ranking is based on the number of counsels having acknowledged that they receive the surveyed publications (based on a questionnaire sent to at least 3,500 counsels). 1 ARNOLD & PORTER 16 GIBSON DUNN 1 SKADDEN ARPS 16 COVINGTON 2 BAKER & MCKENZIE 17 HOGAN LOVELLS 2 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 17 MCDERMOTT 3 NORTON ROSE 18 KIRKLAND & ELLIS 3 WHITE & CASE 18 WEIL GOTSHAL 4 WINSTON & STRAWN 19 LATHAM WATKINS 4 NORTON ROSE 19 BAKER & MCKENZIE 5 FRESHFIELDS 20 LINKLATERS 5 FRESHFIELDS 20 WILMERHALE 6 CLEARY GOTTLIEB 21 MAYER BROWN 6 HOGAN LOVELLS 21 SHEARMAN STERLING 7 CLIFFORD CHANCE 22 MCDERMOTT 7 CLIFFORD CHANCE 22 PROSKAUER 8 WHITE & CASE 23 O’MELVENY 8 ALLEN & OVERY 23 DAVIS POLK 9 JONES DAY 24 PAUL WEISS 9 MAYER BROWN 24 PAUL WEISS 10 SKADDEN ARPS 25 PROSKAUER 10 SIDLEY AUSTIN 25 BAKER BOTTS 11 ALLEN & OVERY 26 SHEARMAN STERLING 11 JONES DAY 26 O’MELVENY 12 COVINGTON 27 SIDLEY AUSTIN 12 LATHAM WATKINS 27 SULLIVAN CROMWELL 13 DAVIS POLK 28 SULLIVAN CROMWELL 13 GIBSON DUNN 28 HERBERT SMITH 14 HERBERT SMITH 29 WEIL GOTSHAL 14 LINKLATERS 29 WINSTON & STRAWN 15 WILMERHALE 30 BAKER BOTTS 15 ARNOLD & PORTER 30 KIRKLAND & ELLIS RANKING BY BEST BUSINESS ARTICLES This Ranking is based on the Antitrust Writing Awards Business articles. Articles considered in this ranking are: shortlisted, nominated and winning-awards articles. SHORTLISTED NOMINATED WINNERS CLIFFORD CHANCE ALLEN & OVERY BAKER & MCKENZIE FRESHFIELDS CLEARY GOTTLIEB DAVIS POLK HERBERT SMITH MCDERMOTT JONES DAY HOGAN LOVELLS O’MELVENY MAYER BROWN KIRKLAND & ELLIS SKADDEN ARPS NORTON ROSE PROSKAUER SHEARMAN STERLING WHITE & CASE WILMERHALE Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 13 RECEPTION & DINNER America’s Health Insurance Plans Japan Fair Trade Commission Bertelsmann Mexican Federal Competition Commission Bureau de la Concurrence - Canada CADE Colombian Competition Authority Corning DC District Court Ericsson Estée Lauder European Commission General Electric George Mason University George Washington University Law School Google Microsoft Nestle New York University 1 Novartis NY State Office Attorney General Qualcomm RIM Sandisk Square UK Office of Fair Trading US Federal Trade Commission Yale University Intel 2 3 14 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 4 5 8 1 Ron Stern, General Electric 2 Joshua Wright, George Mason University - FTC, George Cary, CGSH, Andrew Gavil, FTC 3 Maurits Dolmans, CGSH, Peter Carney, White & Case, Mark Gidley, White & Case, Alden Abbott, RIM 4 Peter Carney, White & Case, Steve Harris, Baker & McKenzie, Shweta Shroff Chopra, Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff & Co 6 7 5 Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC, Eleanor Fox, NYU 6 Howard Shelanski, FTC 7 Richard Steuer, Mayer Brown, Marcos Paulo Verissimo, CADE 8 Douglas Ginsburg, NYU 9 Bill Kovacic, GWU 10 Robert Hubbard, NY State Attorney General, Abigail Slater, FTC, Julie Brill, FTC 9 10 Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 15 PRESS REPORT FTC COMMISSIONER SEES INCREASED FOCUS ON ‘PAY-FOR-DELAY’ IF HIGH COURT SIDES WITH AGENCY LEAH NYLEN > MLex, 9 Apr. 2013 [21.55 EST] W ashington -- If the US Supreme Court sides with the Federal Trade Commission and rules that payments from branded to generic drug makers to delay entry of cheaper drugs are automatically suspect under antitrust laws, the agency will likely step up its enforcement in the area, a commissioner said. The nation’s highest court heard arguments last month on the legality of socalled «pay-for-delay» agreements, where a branded drug maker pays to keep a generic from entry the market. Oral arguments in that case - which pitted the FTC against Solvay along with generic Par, Paddock and Actavis, formerly known as Watson - shed «scant light» on whether the court will hold the payment presumptively unlawful or go with a more lenient standard proffered by some courts to base the legality on the so-called ‘scope of the patent’ test, FTC Commissioner Julie Brill said. The most lenient test generally would allow the payments if the litigation wasn’t a sham, the patent wasn’t obtained by fraud and and the agreement doesn’t keep the generic out beyond the length of the patent. «I expect, depending on the outcome of the case, we will see increased activity on the reverse payment issue,» Brill said, speaking at an event* in Washington Tuesday night. «Time will tell.» The FTC has long opposed the payments as anticompetitive, saying they deny consumers access to cheaper drugs. * «Antitrust Writing Awards 2013.» Concurrences and George Washigton University Law School. Washington, DC. April 9, 2013. IN BRIEF If the US Supreme Court sides with the Federal Trade Commission and rules that payments from branded to generic drug makers to delay entry of cheaper drugs are automatically suspect under antitrust laws, the agency will likely step up its enforcement in the area, a commissioner said. FTC Commissioner Julie Brill 16 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 TESTIMONIALS BOARD ACADEMIC STEERING The Antitrust Writing Awards are a unique opportunity to read some of the best academic and business articles of the year. I thoroughly enjoyed the different perspectives on antitrust that each article provided, as well as the well-crafted arguments put forward by their talented writers" The awards ceremony was a rewarding event in more ways than one. It was a pleasure to see these outstanding authors from all over the world and to hear a synthesis of their work which has contributed so much to the law and it’s practice.” COMMITTEE Eleanor Fox, Professor, New York University Alexander Italianer, Director General, European Commission, DG COMP By recognizing superior writing in academia and practice, the Antitrust Writing Awards enhance the indispensable intellectual infrastructure of our field.” The Antitrust Writing Awards represent a very valuable project that will encourage and support excellence in antitrust writing.” David Gerber, Chicago University, Kent College of Law, Professor Bill Kovacic, Professor and Director, George Washington University Competition Law Center I truly enjoyed taking part in the 2013 Antitrust Writing Awards, which serves an important function in helping promote quality articles in the antitrust field. It is also an illustration of the cooperation at play between antitrust publications to ensure the greatest circulation of academic and professional expertise.” Bruno Lasserre, President, French Competition Authority and Chairman, European Competition Network The Writing Awards have been very valuable in highlighting antitrust scholarship and emphasizing the transnational characteristics of today’s antitrust scholarship. I applaud the efforts of the Concurrences team!” Janusz Ordover, Professor, New York University The writing process provided exposure to a number of very interesting articles and client alerts. I applaud Concurrences for bringing these works to the attention of a broad group of practitioners.” Daniel Sokol, Professor, Florida University BUSINESS STEERING COMMITTEE The Antitrust Writing Awards provide a vital forum for the validation and recognition of thought-leading scholarship. They accompany and consecrate the rising prominence and impact of competition law on the global economy.” The Antitrust Writing Awards bring together the Academic and the Business world from many countries, contribute to a better understanding of other legal cultures and thereby promote the global development of Competition law.” Paul Andres, Nestlé Olaf Christiansen, Bertelsmann The quality and conciseness of the Business Articles, as well as the experience and knowledge which their authors are sharing, are of great use to corporate lawyers.” Jean-Yves Art, Microsoft Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 17 TESTIMONIALS WINNERS & GUESTS The Concurrences writing awards highlight outstanding work by practitioners in the area of competition law and policy and shed valuable light on ’cutting edge’ topics.” Alden Abbott, RIM The Antitrust Writing Awards represent a perfect mix of academic and business writing and set the scene for a valuable exchange among all players in the antitrust arena.” Anna Rosa Cosi, SanDisk I was impressed with the diligence with which the jury reviewed and selected the publications. This is a valuable exercise that not only rewards the authors, but also is very helpful for practitioners. We were honoured to receive an award for our firm’s alert memoranda and are grateful to Concurrences for this excellent initiative.” Maurits Dolmans, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton As sponsors as well as participants, we are delighted to play an active role in raising the bar of antitrust scholarship and the quality of client publications across the legal community.” Olivier Fréget, Allen & Overy We are pleased with the significant contribution that the Antitrust Writing Awards program makes to the development and promotion of antitrust scholarship and practical business literature.” I greatly value seeing the list of articles nominated for a Concurrences award each year because it invariably brings to my attention some excellent pieces I would otherwise have missed.” Douglas H. Ginsburg, New York University It was an honor to have our paper reviewed and considered by such a distinguished panel of luminaries, with such leading thinkers in both Europe and the United States. The concept of encouraging excellence in both academic and more practical writings on competition is an excellent one, and Concurrences has done a remarkable job in creating a process for doing so.” Jonathan M. Jacobson, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati The Antitrust Writing Awards represent a unique initiative to reward pure and applied research in antitrust. Academics and practitioners making valuable contributions to the literature see their names recognised and their work publicized. On a personal front, I have enjoyed reading some of the papers that were selected this year, most of which I would have overlooked absent this initiative.” Atilano Jorge Padilla, Compass Lexecon I greatly appreciate our receiving this award, and the dinner was a great opportunity to meet and talk with other practitioners and government enforcement officials.” Scott P. Perlman, Mayer Brown J. Mark Gidley, White & Case This is a great event promoting antitrust scholarship around the world.” Hans Zenger, CRA 18 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 RULES A. Awards B. Ranking The aim of the Antitrust Writing Awards is to promote competition scholarship, and more generally, to contribute to competition advocacy. Whereas the Awards reward individual articles, the Ranking rewards free access antitrust professional publications considered overall. The Ranking’s’ goal is to promote competition advocacy by selecting the best of these publications in order for readers to know what they should read first, depending what they are looking for. 1. ELIGIBILITY - - Articles eligible must have been published in print or electronic format in 2012 in English. Articles can be co-authored. Authors eligible are individuals. Articles must be made freely available on the Internet (SSRN, academic websites...) or on the Awards website for the purpose of these Awards in order to allow the Jury to vote. Articles are classified in Academic and Business categories. The Academic category comprises articles published or accepted for publication in academic peer-reviewed journals, whereas the Business category comprises articles published in professional publications, such as newsletters, client briefs, memoranda, blogs. Each of these categories is sub-divided as follow: General (including cross-over topics, procedural issues) Anticompetitive practices (including criminal cartel enforcement, civil federal, state, and private enforcement, treatment of joint ventures, vertical restrictions) Unilateral conducts (including monopolization, attempted monopolization and invitations to collude) Mergers (substantive merger analysis, merger enforcement and guidelines) Economics (including economic theories, models, and statistical tools used in the antitrust field) 2. SELECTION & VOTING PROCEDURE The Editorial Committee of the Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking selects two pools of eligible academic and business articles based on Academic and Business Steering Committees members’ suggestions. The Steering Committees members and the readers then each make a short list of nominated articles. The Board members finally select the award-winning articles among the nominated articles provided by the Steering Committees and the readers. The Editorial Committee, the Steering Committees and the Board members are collectively referred as the Jury. Papers are judged according to writing, scholarship, originality, practical relevance and the contribution they make to competition advocacy. There is a winning-award article for each of the sub-categories mentioned at 1. above, for each of the Academic and Business categories. However, the Board reserves the right to award fewer Awards than planned if the articles under consideration do not meet the high standards of the Awards. 1. ELIGIBILITY - - - Antitrust professional publications include newsletters, client briefs, memoranda, blogs, e-books, and even webinars accompanied by written presentations made freely available on websites of law firms, economic consulting firms, universities, etc. Publications eligible must have been released in print or electronic format in 2012 in English. Authors eligible are corporate entities. Publications are ranked according to 7 categories: Country coverage: Ranking based on number of jurisdictions addressed in the 2012 publications of each firm Case coverage: Ranking based on number of cases covered in the 2012 publications of each firm Accessibility: Ranking based on objective criteria (pdf/html/print publications, access to archives…) and subjective criteria (design, search engine features…) Innovation: Ranking based on individual interviews Readership: Ranking based on number of counsels having acknowledged that they receive the surveyed publications (based on a questionnaire sent to 3,500 counsels) Counsels’ Choice: Ranking based on counsels’ choice of their favorite professional publication (based on a questionnaire sent to 3,500 counsels) Winning Business Awards articles 2. SELECTION & VOTING PROCEDURE The Editorial Committee selects a pool of eligible antitrust professional publications. The assessment of the above categories is based on a combination of objective and subjective criteria, together with individual interviews. For the Readership and Counsels’ Choice rankings, the Editorial Committee sends a questionnaire to the 3,500 counsels subscribing to Concurrences Journal and e-Competitions Bulletin. Any in-house counsel or general counsel dealing with antitrust law is eligible to vote. Firms considered in the ranking can direct their clients to the online questionnaire in order to include in the survey their own contacts’ votes. A business e-mail is requested in order to make sure only counsels vote. C. Management The Antitrust Writing Awards & Rankings are managed by the Institute of Competition Law. The Institute, acting as the event manager, works to ensure that a sufficient number of quality articles and publications are submitted and surveyed, checks eligibility and organizes the Awards ceremony. The 2013 Awards ceremony will take place on Tuesday April 9, the day before the ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting in Washington DC. Attendance is on invitation only. Any unexpected issues will be dealt with by the Editorial Committee of the Institute of Competition Law. Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 19 THE ORGANIZERS Founded in May 2008, based on a generous cy pres award, the mission of the Competition Law Center is to sponsor research and promote education in the field of competition law – also known as antitrust law – particularly relating to issues of international enforcement and the harmonization of national laws and policies. Bill Kovacic George Washington University Competition Law Center The center aims, among other things, to: > sponsor and conduct legal and empirical research into competition law, including its private enforcement; > organize seminars, symposia, conferences, innovative courses, and public lectures for judges, executive officials, academics, practicing lawyers, and law students on topics relating to competition law and its private enforcement; > serve as a resource for those seeking to promote private enforcement in competition laws in the U.S. and abroad; and enhance the skills of current and future private practitioners of competition law. www.gwu.edu Concurrences is a print and online quarterly peer-reviewed journal dedicated to EU and national competitions laws. Launched in 2004 as the flagship of the Institute of Competition Law the journal provides a forum for both practitioners and academics to shape national and EU competitions policy. Print and online versions. As a publication by an independent publisher, Concurrences enjoys unmatched editorial freedom. The Scientific Committee sets up the Editorial Policy and ensures rigorous peer-review in order to achieve the highest academic standards. The International Committee actively promotes Concurrences abroad and in the US by organizing conferences, workshops and in-house seminars. Each year, the Concurrences Antitrust Writing Awards co-organized with GW Competition Center honor outstanding academic and professional publications. Concurrences is also the publisher of «William E. Kovacic: An Antitrust Tribute, Vol. 1» available on concurrences.com and Amazon. www.concurrences.com 20 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 Nicolas Charbit Institute of Competition Law Concurrences / e-Competitions William E. Kovacic An Antitrust Tribute Liber Amicorum - Volume I Description This Antitrust Tribute is a selection of 31 essays providing an insightful and original look at volume, mainly covering issues of U.S. and European antitrust law, gathers articles by prominent authors among Professor Kovacic’s friends and colleagues. It is organized into two parts. Part I, entitled “An Antitrust Career”, consists of 9 papers that pay tribute to picture of his scholarship and public enforcement efforts. Part II, entitled “New Frontiers of Antitrust”, includes 22 articles covering different aspects of competition law, ranging from cartels in the U.S. and Europe to mergers analysis, private rights of action, antitrust settlements, etc. The overall result is a collective work that offers the opportunity to look whose growth Prof. Kovacic has contributed greatly. Volume II will focus on the international career of William E. Kovacic and on international and bilateral antitrust issues. The Editors Nicolas Charbit, PhD, is the President of the Institute of Competition Law, an independant publisher and Transatlantic think tank. Elisa Ramundo, LLM, is the Managing Director of the Institute. Anna Chehtova and Abigail Slater work at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and have co-edited this Antitrust Tribute in their private capacity. The Publisher DETAILS Publication date: November 2012 Hardcover Price: $215.00 Shipping & Handling Charges Domestic orders: $9.50 Export orders: $12.50 Trim Size: 6 X 9 inches ISBN: 978-1-939007-40-7 Available on amazon.com e-book Price: $185.00 ISBN: 978-1-939007-41-4 Available on concurrences.com ORDER Subscriber details Name-First name: ........................................................................................ e-mail: ......................................................................................................... Institution: ................................................................................................... Street: .......................................................................................................... City: ............................................................................................................. Zip Code: .................................................................................................... Country: ..................................................................................................... . Send your order to Institute of Competition Law 885 Avenue of the Americas # 32 G 10001 New York NY www.concurrences.com [email protected] Création : Yves Buliard : +33 6 67 29 85 43 - www.ybgraphic.fr The Institute of Competition Law is the publisher of Concurrences Journal and the e-Competitions Bulletin. The Institute is based in Paris, Brussels and New York. www.concurrences.com Nicolas Charbit Elisa Ramundo Anna Chehtova Abigail Slater William E. Kovacic An Antitrust Tribute Liber Amicorum - Volume I Alden F. Abbott, Theodore L. Banks, Thomas Barnett, Jean-François Bellis, William Blumenthal, Rachel Brandenburger, John M. Connor, Adrian Emch, Joseph Farrell, John Fedele, Andre Fiebig, Harry First, Albert A. Foer, Andrew I. Gavil, David J. Gerber, Douglas H. Ginsburg, John D. Harkrider, Stephen Harris, Ronan P. Harty, Roxann E. Henry, Hugh M. Hollman, Clifford A. Jones, James A. Keyte, Joseph Krauss, Abbott B. Lipsky, Joseph S. Nord, George L. Priest, James F. Rill, J. Thomas Rosch, Christian M. Rowan, Seth Sacher, Fiona A. Schaeffer, Kristin Shaffer, Howard A. Shelanski, Joe Sims, D. Daniel Sokol, Jesse Solomon, John M. Taladay, Theodore Voorhees, Xiaoye Wang, Spencer Weber Waller, Christine Wilson, Joshua D. Wright