Jean-Philippe TROPEANO - Paris School of Economics
Transcription
Jean-Philippe TROPEANO - Paris School of Economics
Jean-Philippe TROPEANO Professor of Economics, Paris School of Economics, Université de Paris 1 Personal details Address Tel. Maison des Sciences Economiques 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75 647 PARIS Cedex 13, France. (33) 1 44 07 82 62 E-mail [email protected] Current Position Sept. 2009-... Professor of Economics, Université de Paris 1- Paris School of Economics Coordinator of the Applied Microeconomics program at the Université de Paris 1- Paris School of Economics Past positions 2006-09 Professor of Economics, Université de Grenoble 2 Research centre: Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), INRA-Université de Grenoble 2001-06 Associate Professor (Maître de Conférences), Université de Paris 1 2000-01 Post-Doctorate at CORE (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium) 2000-01 Teaching assistant (ATER), Université de Paris 1 Research centre: Eurequa 1996-99 Teaching assistant (Allocataire-Moniteur de recherche), Université de Paris 1 Research centre: Eurequa 1997-99 National Service Lecturer in Economics at Cairo University, Egypt (French program of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science). Education 2006 French national exam for full professorship (Agrégation de l’enseignement supérieur en sciences économiques). Rank: 15th. 1999-2000 1996-1997 Ph. D. Thesis in Economics (june 2000), Université de Paris 1 Title : « Geography, Competition and Information: the rôle of Transport Costs». Supervisor: Pr. Anne Perrot. Jury : D. Laussel (referee), J. Gabszewicz (referee), Y. Zénou, C. Crampes and D. Encaoua. 1995 Magistère in Economics, Université de Paris 1. Master degree in Economics and Econometrics Research Topics Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Intellectual Property Rights, Spatial Competition Publication Record Publications in refereed journals [1] «Contrôle des concentrations et lutte anticartels : Substituts ou compléments?» (with A. Cosnita), Revue Economique, May, 2010. [2] « Effets de voisinage et localisation: la ségrégation urbaine est-elle inéluctable ? », (with F. Moizeau and J.-C. Vergnaud), Revue Economique,.July, 2010 [3] « Merger Control with Asymmetric Information: What Structural Remedies Can and Cannot Achieve » (with A. Cosnita), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009. [4] « On the impact of human capital and labour market matching on regional disparities » (with J. Tharakan), Journal of Regional Science, 2009. [5] « Why are technological spillovers spatially bounded? A Market Orientated approach » (with E. Baranes), Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2003. [6] « Politique d’infrastructure et choix de localisation dans un modèle de signal », Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 2003. [7] « Information Asymmetry as a Source of Spatial Agglomeration », Economics Letters, 2001. [8] « Choix de localisation, Coûts de transport et asymétries régionales » (with M. Lafourcade), Revue Economique, 2000. Working Papers submitted or in revision [9] «Do Remedies Affect the Efficiency Defence? An Optimal Merger Control Analysis » (with A. Cosnita), in revision for International Journal of Industrial Organization. [10] «Credence Goods, Experts and Risk Aversion» (with O. Bonroy and S. Lemarié), submitted [11] « Innovation, Coût de Transport et Localisation d’Entreprises », Cahier Eco & Maths 97-63 (with M. Lafourcade). Other publication in book [12] « Politique européenne de la concurrence » in Dix leçons d'économie contemporaine, Dir.: Y Sanson, Dalloz, 2009 Work in progress [13] « Do broad patents deter knowledge sharing? », with Michel Trommetter. Abstract We develop a theoretical model where two competing firms need access to basic knowledge that only one firm owns. We determine the impact of an imperfect property right on the incentive to transfer that knowledge to the competitor. We compare three transfer strategies. (i) patenting may lead to litigation costs that depend on the competition toughness. (ii) keeping the knowledge secret involves no licence revenue but ensures a monopoly profit. (iii) The firm can also cooperate with the competitor and thereby avoids litigation. We show that whenever competition between both firms is low, making patentable basic knowledge promotes knowledge transfer through research cooperation. [14] « Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Powers and Resources within Competition Policy », with Andréea Cosnita. Abstract This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of the competition law in terms of merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of the competition policy given the cost of resources available to the competition agency and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms' behavior in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. We are thus able to infer the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts between controlling mergers and fighting cartels, and thereby conclude on their optimal competition policy mix. We show for instance that to the extent that firms may switch from cartel to merger depending on the current focus of the competition law enforcement, applying a stricter merger control only pays if the cartel fighting policy is not too expensive. Research Contracts ANR contract on “Pesticides use and the market of expertise” supervised by Stéphane Lemarié (GAEL-INRA, ongoing) ACI on « Politique et Territoire », supervised by Hubert Kempf, Université de Paris 1 (20052009). Ministère de l’Environnement (D4E) ; « Espaces verts de proximité : entre attraction et nuisances » (2002-2006). ACI Jeunes chercheurs on « Stratification urbaine, inégalités et politiques de la ville », supervised by Fabien Moizeau, Université de Toulouse 1 (2001-2005). Main conferences 2010 EARIE, Istanbul 2010 Workshop in "Optimal Enforcement and Decision Procedures for Competition Policy", Chania 2010 Conference in Competition and regulation (CRESSE), Chania 2008 Conference in Competition and regulation (CRESSE), Athens 2007 EEA conference, Budapest 2006 EARIE conference, Amsterdam 2005 EEA conference, Amsterdam 2001 EEA conference, Lausanne 1998 EEA and ESEM conferences, Berlin Organization of seminars 2006-09 In charge of the GAEL-INRA external Industrial Organization seminar 2001-06 Co-organizer with Marie-Laure Alain and Jérôme Pouyet of the Industrial economics seminar at the Paris-Sorbonne Doctoral program. Reports Referee: Annales d’Economie et de Statistiques, Journal of Economics, Revue d’Economie Politique, Revue Economique, Revue Française d’Economie, International Journal of Industrial Organization, European Economic Review, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Review of Industrial Organization, International Review of Law and Economics Expertise Research unit assessment: Agence d’évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur (AERES). Research project assessment: Agence National de la Recherche (ANR). Teaching *: course taught in English Université de Paris I - Industrial Organization* (Master degree, 2004 and 2009-…) Microeconomics (Magistère d’Economie and Advanced Undergraduates, 2002-2006 and 2009-…) Economic Geography (Master degree, 2001-2006) Competition Policy* (Master degree, 2005-…) Game Theory (2009-…) Université de Grenoble - Industrial Organization (Advanced Undergraduates, 2006-2009) Economics of Innovation* (Undergraduates, 2006-2009) Microeconomics (Undergraduates, 2006-2009) Competition Policy (Master degree, 2005-…) Ph.D. Program in Africa (NPTCI) - Industrial Organization (Dakar, 2008-…) Cairo University - Microeconomics (Undergraduates students, 2010-...) General Directorate for Competition Policy (French Ministry of Economy) - Training program in Competition Policy for Inspectors in Antitrust Language skills Language French (Native) English Spanish Reading 5 4 4 Last updated: September, 2010. Speaking Writing 5 5 4 4 3 3