Censorship has become a dirty word

1
Holiday Powers
Re-conceptualizing Freedom and Social Cohesion in Contemporary Art
With the support of Cornell University’s Graduate School and History of Art and Visual
Culture Department, and with thanks to Salah Hassan, Iftikhar Dadi, Saba Mahmood, and
Abdellah Karroum
When considering biennials, we must address the way that they straddle the
global and the local. Discussions of biennials emphasize both the creation of access to
the global arts system for that location 1, as well as the concurrent focus on projects by
global artists that are usually meant to be understood locally, by involving the city, its
people, and its cultural institutions. 2 I am, therefore, particularly aware of my subject
position as outsider in approaching this exhibition and conference, which address in a
local context issues of a global discourse. It has made me open up the question of what
responsible curatorial practice is from an outsider’s perspective, as well as what
responsible practice is when imaging outsiders.
As an outsider, there is a necessity of paying respect to local values, particularly
when looking at the examples within social movements of how change must come from
within. Feminist theorists have carefully examined this line between solidarity and
difference. 3 Even so, attempts to give rights from outside have proved disastrous even
recently. The complicity of the Feminist Majority in the United States in its mobilization
against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to liberate the burka-clad women lent moral
1
Harney, Elizabeth. In Senghor’s Shadow: Art, Politics, and the Avant Garde in Senegal,
1960-1995. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2004. 222
2
Hassan, Salah M. and Cheryl Finley. “Introduction: Diaspora/Memory/Place: Three
Artists/Three Projects.” Diaspora Memory Place. New York: Prestel, 2008. 26
3
For example, see Mohanty, Chandra. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory,
Practicing Solidarity. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2003.
2
force to the Bush administration’s war there, giving legitimacy to the so-called
“Operation Enduring Freedom.” In all accounts, though, lives of Afghan women have
become at least no better, if not increasingly unsafe due to political instability. 4
Attempting to force change based on an outside agenda, as this example shows, can have
deeply detrimental effects, including subverting local movements.
This awareness of the easy complicity between scholarship and xenophobic
political practice makes me question how we can understand notions of artistic freedom
within a discussion of how outsiders are imaged and how exhibitions are mounted from
outside. For this discussion, arising out of a biennial, this necessarily brings up questions
of the tension between respecting local culture and exhibiting the realities of global art
practices, as well as the question of self-censorship. The elision between limitations on
artistic freedoms and censorship is problematic because the fears of being accused of
supporting censorship prevent honest discourse about the limitations that exist in all parts
of our lives. By censorship, I mean the willful exclusion of truthful information towards
the end of crafting a public narrative. In contrast, when I discuss limitation, I will use it in
multiple contexts to discuss the point at which freedom is not absolute, where truth is not
willfully excluded but used in a balance with the interests of the larger society. I hope, by
considering examples from Morocco and the United States, to explore why limitation is
not equivalent to censorship, and consider how discussions of contemporary art can be
framed by examples of the limitations of images in visual culture of an Other.
The focus of this paper will be on socially-based limitations of artistic expression
rather than legislated censorship, and the argument here should not be read as condoning
4
Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005. 197
3
the latter. My interest in this topic, however, emerged out of the governmental critique
within a 2009 New York Times article, “Islamic Radicalism Slows Moroccan Reforms,”
by Steven Erlanger and Souad Mekhennet. They write of the recent reforms by King
Mohammed VI: “While insisting that the king is committed to deeper reforms, senior
officials speak instead of keeping a proper balance between freedom and social
cohesion.” 5 They argue that instead of seeking balance, reform is being stalled in the
hopes of not antagonizing conservative and traditional views of Islam, thereby quelling
the space that would otherwise be opened to extremism. I do not propose to offer an
opinion on governmental reform in Morocco. My interest, instead, is in the framework of
this idea of the balance of freedom and social cohesion. In looking at the specific
framework of this article, why are the concepts of freedom and social cohesion put at
odds with one another, and why is balance between the two placed at odds with reform? I
would like to consider instead that balancing freedom and social cohesion is a part of
every aspect of our lives, and is actually constitutive of the very notion of freedom itself.
When thinking of artistic freedom, I am moved to consider the creation of the free
political subject. It seems that the very institution of government follows this logic of
balancing freedom and social cohesion. We rely on governments to provide frameworks
to create a level of social cohesion that will allow us to function both internally within the
nation-state as well as in external relations between individual nations. The citizen
subject is guaranteed certain freedoms in an ideal system. Within Morocco, according to
5
Erlanger, Steven and Souad Mekhennet. “Islamic Radicalism Slows Moroccan
Reforms.” The New York Times. 26 August 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/world/africa/27morocco.html?_r=1&ref=globalhome
4
the 1996 Constitution, the fifth and final constitution framed under King Hassan II, 6 these
include in Article 9 freedom of movement, freedom of opinion, and freedom of
association. In looking at this particular example, we must also recognize that part of
Article 9 states that a limitation can be put upon the exercise of these freedoms by law. 7
Even in a non-realized, ideal system, though, certain freedoms—to move, to speak, to
seek employment, to choose our religion or political parties—are guaranteed at the cost
of other freedoms. While we are free from impediments to these, being a citizen means
following laws, which are put in place to curb absolute freedom. For example, later
articles in the same section of the Constitution include Article 16: All citizens shall
contribute to the defence of the Country, and Article 18: All shall, in solidarity, bear the
costs resulting from disasters suffered by the Nation. 8 Freedoms that are guaranteed are
mitigated by responsibilities. This limitation is inherent within the institution of
government, because societies need to find social cohesion to function, in both an
insulated and international context.
Not all legislation, of course, is meant to balance freedom and social cohesion.
Continuing in a discussion of Morocco, one example according to Susan Slyomovics is
Article 218 of the Moroccan penal code, which defines terrorism as any premeditated act,
individual or collective, with the goal of “attacks against public order through terror or
violence.” She compares the phrasing of this article with French colonial-era statutes that
6
Naylor, Phillip C. North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2009. 229
7
Article 9. Constitution of Morocco. 1996. http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm
8
Articles 16 and 18, Ibid.
5
enabled the unpredictable incarceration of many Moroccans.9 She also points to the laws
“enacted by French colonial authorities to preserve French hegemony over Morocco,” as
in the decree of July 26, 1939 of the French Protectorate that “mandated prison terms for
making, distributing or selling tracts to disturb order, tranquility or security” and, at the
time of her 2003 article, was still invoked by the Moroccan government as justification
for repression. 10 There are clear examples of the point at which governments in practice
legislate social cohesion at the cost of freedom, which is ultimately a separate issue.
Despite this, we must recognize that we as societies are not looking for absolute
freedom—even in the most liberal social institutions, there is an inherent necessity of the
balance of freedom and social cohesion.
The construction of the subject outside the legal system shows the way in which
this balance informs our subject-hood and ways of thinking and creating knowledge, even
outside the boundaries and economic imperatives of academic institutions. Saba
Mahmood argues that it is not just that gender is constructed and desires are discursively
created; she writes that “the terms people use to organize their lives are not simply a gloss
for universally shared assumptions about the world and one’s place in it but are actually
constitutive of different forms of personhood, knowledge, and experience.” 11 Mahmood
uses this premise to unpack the normative liberatory political subject, arguing that the
9
Slyomovics, Susan. “Morocco’s Justice and Reconciliation Commission.” April 4,
2005. Middle East Report Online. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero040405.html
10
Slyomovics, Susan. “No Buying Off the Past: Moroccan Indemnities and the
Opposition.” Winter 2003. Middle East Report Online.
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer229/229_slyomovics.html
11
Mahmood, Saba. “Feminist Theory, Agency, and the Liberatory Subject.” On Shifting
Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era. Ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone. New York:
The Feminist Press at CUNY, 2005. 120.
6
desire for freedom is not innate, but is mediated by cultural and historical situations. 12
Within this paper, this theoretical premise is important in showing that if our personhood
and knowledge are historico-cultural constructions, the foundations of our ways of
thinking are therefore mediated by these same factors. Therefore the norms and
frameworks of the society we live in function as an internal limit on absolute freedom,
much as the idea of government functions as an external limit. In Orientalism, Edward
Said expands upon this notion as one of his “principal operating assumptions,” pointing
particularly to his ideas that:
…fields of learning, as much as the works of even the most eccentric
artist, are constrained and acted upon by society, by cultural traditions, by
worldly circumstance, and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries,
and governments; moreover, that both learned and imaginative writing are
never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions, and
intentions… 13
It is not that scholars and artists, according to Said, fail to achieve intellectual freedom
outside the constraints of society and tradition, but are instead created within these
boundaries. There is a necessary function of this when seen within the logic of freedom
and social cohesion, if we can see the mind as a site of cultural mediation that allows us
to function within, interpret, and communicate with the society and world around us.
Though we as individuals of course have agency in our thought processes, in the very act
of framing ideas and knowledge there is some degree of mediation so that we can play a
role in a society cohesive enough to allow for communication.
If we can see this logic of the balance between freedom and social cohesion
permeating our institutions and subject-hood, and therefore hold as background that no
12
13
Ibid 118
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 201
7
freedom is absolute, what is the role of the framework of freedom and social cohesion
within art and visual culture? I will proceed in treating art, as well as the image within
visual culture, as a site for the production of public knowledge, rather than seeing art as
reflective of the society within which it is created. While visual statements are often less
didactic than a linguistically-based statement, the knowledge that is produced by art must
be recognized as public knowledge, unlike some academy-based knowledge produced for
that subculture alone. Granted, as Michael Warner points out, there are multiple publics
organized around discourses, much as the assumptions of the bourgeois public sphere
“allow us to think of a discourse public as a people and, therefore, as an actually existing
set of potentially enumerable humans. A public, in practice, appears as the public.” 14 The
complicated reality notwithstanding, though, the idea of art is still framed as public.
There are necessary limitations within art, though, by virtue of exhibitions.
Exhibition choices, in giving voice only to certain artists, decide dialogues that will be
held as well as directions of art in the future by constructing a narrative of what good art
is, should look like, or must respond to. Art that is not seen within art institutions,
whatever form they make take, cannot be conceptualized as a site of public knowledge
because it is effectively silenced. Whether this is purposely or not, whether curators are
consciously crafting narratives or not, the role of the image that is seen in creating
knowledge is fundamentally different than the role of the image that is created for—or
incidentally not seen outside of—private viewing. Therefore there are in place inherent
limitations on art by virtue of the role of exhibition, as well as the limitations Said points
out that are created by the societal context of the artist. Applying a Foucauldian reading,
14
Warner, Michael. “Publics and Counterpublics.” Public Culture. Issue 14, Vol. 1. Duke
University Press, 2002. 51
8
we must remember that power is always simultaneously repressive and productive, so
this is not meant to fault exhibition spaces or present limitation in this sense as
intrinsically negative. Instead, we must recognize that these limitations exist within art
practice to be able to proceed in considering the notion of artistic freedom.
Although I have equated art and the image within visual culture above, there are
of course important differences. One of these differences is the seemingly impregnable
aura of personal expression and creativity with which the artist is imbued, an important
difference when comparing the limitation in shaping and production of both types of
images. This construction of the artist arises out of Modernist ideals of individualism and
aesthetic autonomy. Following Charles Harrison’s notions of Modernism in art, I use the
term to describe the critical stance about art and its development in which art is
autonomous from social and utilitarian concerns and popular culture. Harrison quotes
English Modernist Clive Bell, who wrote in 1914 that:
…when you treat a picture as a work of art, you have…assigned it to a
class of objects so powerful and direct as means to spiritual exaltation that
all minor merits are inconsiderable. Paradoxical as it may seem, the only
relevant qualities in a work of art, judged as art, are artistic qualities. 15
The importance of this definition of Modernism in art is the way in which it constructs a
particular notion of the artist, which affects how the artist is constructed today. By
celebrating art for its power, autonomy, and individualism, absolute artistic freedom is a
non-negotiable. The art object gains an aura that affects how viewers understand its role,
in comparison with the visual culture image that is submitted to notions of free speech.
Here, we can consider two examples of limitations of images. Although there are
examples in all countries of these sorts of limitations that are both legally and ethically
15
Harrison, Charles. “Modernism.” Critical Terms for Art History: Second Edition. Ed.
Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 196
9
motivated, I will use two from an American context. Within this conversation of artistic
freedom across lines of cultures, both have to do with the exhibition and limitation of
images of an Other. I am cautious in this description because the subjects of these images
are not intrinsically different, but are instead consciously framed as non-normative
American subjects. The first example is the exhibition of colonial photography. Above
and beyond the politics of the gaze and the violence of submitting these oppressed
subjects to the same voyeuristic paradigm of viewing are the pressing implications for
contemporary subjects and the result upon them of reifying an old system of power. The
logic of social cohesion—in the sense now of allowing all viewers subject-hood—is
placed at odds with the viewing of all images. Mieke Bal in “The Politics of Citation”
critiques the showing of colonial photographs. She writes that while ignoring the images
and therefore leaving unanalyzed the visual ideology taught by false representation is
problematic, 16 the “reproduction, even in enhanced form, of the objectionable images is a
gesture of complicity, no matter how critical the text that accompanies them.” 17 Bal
argues that critique will always be infected by the image, becoming entangled even when
trying to deconstruct them.
The ramifications of this citation upon viewers can be seen, as an example, within
the wide outcry against the 2006 exhibition of photographs by Hector Acebes at
Binghamton University in upstate New York, images taken throughout Africa during
colonialism. Nkiru Nzegwu, professor of Africana Studies at the university, argues that
the importance of these colonialist images is in the way that they “reinforce and
perpetuate negative stereotypes of members” of the university community. These images
16
17
Bal, Mieke. “The Politics of Citation.” Diacritics (Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 1991). 27
Ibid 39
10
then become in a way images of contemporary women on campus: “The administration’s
principled stand undercuts any slick argument that these images are not about the African
women on campus since you are yet to curate or host an exhibition that positively
addresses Africa, its art, culture, or its women…No segment of the university should be
forced to bring out placards and bullhorns in order to be treated with respect.” 18
Nzegwu’s comments can be seen as contesting the framework that these are distant
images of Others. The “complicity,” as Bal calls it, of exhibiting colonial photographs
can then be critiqued, therefore, for the benefit of the contemporary community. Much as
there are contemporary ramifications, though, as Bal points out, our relationship to
exhibited colonial photographs still emphasizes the historical distance—often at the cost
of recognizing continuities. 19 Even so, the space for limitation of the exhibition of these
images is created by this distance, because we see these images as historical
manifestations of racism rather than a contemporary expressive voice being silenced.
A recent example of the controversy surrounding limiting images is the case of
the Danish cartoons. Yale University Press decided this past summer not to print within a
new book the caricatures, including one in which Muhammad wears a turban shaped like
a bomb, that sparked international controversy and were then reprinted by many other
European publications in solidarity with “free speech.” The book deals directly with the
cartoons. The Press decided also to pull all other illustrations of the prophet, including a
19th century sketch of an episode from Dante’s “Inferno” by Gustave Doré. This choice
18
Nzegwu, Nkiru. “Open Letter to Dr. Lynn Gamwell: October 3, 2006.”
AfricarResource: Responses to Hector Acebes Exhibition at Binghamton University.
http://www.africaresource.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=206:re
sponses-to-hector-acebes-exhibition-at-binghamtonuniversity&catid=136:race&Itemid=351
19
Bal 34
11
has been framed by fears of extremism by the consulting authorities on Islam and
counterterrorism. 20 Saba Mahmood, in her recent article about the cartoons, argues that it
is reductive to see the discourse around these cartoons as simply a clash between notions
of blasphemy and free speech. She explores the personal injury caused by these cartoons,
giving the reactions more breadth than the violent extremism they are summed up by. She
writes:
It is striking that in casting the matter as a choice between Islamic
terrorism and open debate, [many writers portray] the cartoons as
statements of facts that are necessary to the security and well-being of
liberal democracies. The performative aspect of the Danish cartoons is
ceded in favor of their informational content, painting them as little more
than referential discourse…[naturalizing] a language ideology in which
the primary task of signs is the communication of referential meaning. 21
Mahmood ends the article by suggesting that the answer is not in legislating anti-hate
speech, as there is a necessary and constitutive normative disposition of the law to
majority culture, but in a turn to the traditions of ethical norms as a means of
transforming cultural and ethical sensibilities.22 While there is not time within this paper
to explore the complexities of this theorization and the ramifications upon the Yale
University Press controversy, it is important to see the limitation of these images within
this argument.
The Yale response panders to characterizations of extremism, rather than
exploring the performative role that the continual re-printing of these images plays, a
reaction which does nothing to transform sensibilities, much as it limits images that
20
Cohen, Patricia. “Yale Press Bans Images of Muhammad in New Book.” The New
York Times. August 13, 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/books/13book.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=patricia%20c
ohen%20muhammad&st=cse
21
Mahmood, Saba. “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable
Divide?” Critical Inquiry (35, Summer 2009). 854
22
Ibid 860
12
rightfully could be limited for the benefit of social cohesion and multiple subject-hoods.
This can be further situated within the 2008 debate over the printing of Sherry Jones’s
novel The Jewel of the Medina, a fictionalized account of the life of A’isha,
Muhammed’s youngest wife. Publishing house Random House backed out of their
publishing contract after consulting with “security experts and Islam scholars,” deciding
to postpone publication, according to deputy publisher Thomas Perry, “for the safety of
the author, employees of Random House, booksellers and anyone else who would be
involved in distribution and sale of the novel.” 23 There is a clear resonance in the
similarity of proceedings with the Yale Press. In the case of Jewel of the Medina,
Beaufort Books decided to pick up the book and it was published in 2008, soon after it
was dropped by Random House. 24 This debate was also framed entirely as fear of
extremism versus free speech. Lorraine Adams in the New York Times offers a middle
position, writing that while the book does not reach the extremes protected by the
American Constitution, including her examples of pornography and neo-Nazi T-shirts,
“neither does [the book] qualify as art.” 25 Particularly for this paper, it is interesting to
note that while Adams does not recommend rallying around offensive material as free
speech, her reasoning is that the novel is not of a high enough quality to qualify as art.
The Random House choice is based more in performing the fear of Islamic extremism
23
Nomani, Asra. “You Still Can’t Write About Muhammad.” The Wall Street Journal.
August 6, 2008. http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB121797979078815073.html
24
Hogan, Ron. “Judge for Yourself: Jewel of the Medina in U.S. Bookstores.”
Mediabistro.com. October 6, 2008.
http://www.mediabistro.com/galleycat/authors/judge_for_yourself_jewel_of_medina_in_
us_bookstores_96577.asp
25
Adams, Lorraine. “Thinly Veiled.” The New York Times. December 12, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/books/review/Adamst.html?scp=1&sq=jewel%20of%20the%20medina&st=cse
13
rather than out of respect for religious belief, similar to the Yale University Press
decision. Thus limitation is enacted and contested within the bounds of free speech, not
artistic freedom, for historical art, popular imagery, and what is considered low quality
writing. Moreover, much as critics call for free speech, the space for limitation is created
by the international political world and the distance between “us” and the non-normative
subject, representing the apparently monolithic category of the Islamic terrorist.
In the situations described above, distance of some sort creates the space for the
limitation—or at least, the discussion of the limitation—of the image. Is there anything
that can be taken from these examples of popular images when considering contemporary
art? How do we move forward if we believe that the logic of the balance of freedom and
social cohesion invades all aspects of our lives, that there are in place necessary
limitations on art by virtue of there being exhibition practices, and moreover that art is a
site for the production of knowledge? As I grapple with my own role as outsider,
considering the balance between global art practices and local values, the place of selfcensorship, and how to understand the role played by imaging outsiders and imaging
from outside, how can limitation be framed? There can be no hard and fast rules, or even
the “minimal conditions” that Mieke Bal suggests in the exhibition and printing of
historical images within postcolonial critique. 26 Rather, the importance is in creating
space for the discussion of these limitations. Instead of being caught by our fears of
verging into censorship, recognizing that there are necessary limitations allows us to
make these limits productive.
26
Bal 41
14
“Freedom?” co-curator Charles Esche in a recent talk discussed the role of the
contemporary museum, one that I think can be extended into a larger thought about the
role of the contemporary art exhibition. Esche argued that the goal is in trying to forge a
space that can create agency in its viewers. We must radicalize the notion of the
autonomous role of art to broaden the context, perhaps stripping it of its Modernist aura,
though Esche does not argue that point. Art for Esche must be shown in such a way as to
allow its “imagining of the world as otherwise” to incite and instigate active response.27
Perhaps we can end by re-conceptualizing social cohesion not as homogeneity, but as an
entangled community of people who are all able to find agency and be active. If we try to
use the inherent limiting within art towards this end, rather than shy away from the
conversation of these limits entirely, freedom can be understood as productive. Instead of
seeing limitations therefore as necessarily hiding truth and preventing expression, within
a larger social context, we can see this balance creating possibilities.
27
Esche, Charles. “Entangled: Public Culture and Its Institutions.” Visual Culture
Colloquium, History of Art Department. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. October
5, 2009.
15
Sources Cited
Adams, Lorraine. “Thinly Veiled.” The New York Times. December 12, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/books/review/Adamst.html?scp=1&sq=jewel%20of%20the%20medina&st=cse
Bal, Mieke. “The Politics of Citation.” Diacritics (Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 1991).
Cohen, Patricia. “Yale Press Bans Images of Muhammad in New Book.” The New York
Times. August 13, 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/books/13book.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=patric
ia%20cohen%20muhammad&st=cse
Constitution of Morocco. 1996. http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm
Erlanger, Steven and Souad Mekhennet. “Islamic Radicalism Slows Moroccan Reforms.”
The New York Times. 26 August 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/world/africa/27morocco.html?_r=1&ref=glo
bal-home
Esche, Charles. “Entangled: Public Culture and Its Institutions.” Visual Culture
Colloquium, History of Art Department. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
October 5, 2009.
Harney, Elizabeth. In Senghor’s Shadow: Art, Politics, and the Avant Garde in Senegal,
1960-1995. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2004. 222
Hassan, Salah M. and Cheryl Finley. “Introduction: Diaspora/Memory/Place: Three
Artists/Three Projects.” Diaspora Memory Place. New York: Prestel, 2008. 26
Hogan, Ron. “Judge for Yourself: Jewel of the Medina in U.S. Bookstores.”
Mediabistro.com. October 6, 2008.
http://www.mediabistro.com/galleycat/authors/judge_for_yourself_jewel_of_med
ina_in_us_bookstores_96577.asp
Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005.
--- “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?” Critical
Inquiry (35, Summer 2009).
Mohanty, Chandra. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing
Solidarity. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2003.
16
Naylor, Phillip C. North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2009.
Nomani, Asra. “You Still Can’t Write About Muhammad.” The Wall Street Journal.
August 6, 2008.
http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB121797979078815073.html
Nzegwu, Nkiru. “Open Letter to Dr. Lynn Gamwell: October 3, 2006.” AfricarResource:
Responses to Hector Acebes Exhibition at Binghamton University.
http://www.africaresource.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=206:responses-to-hector-acebes-exhibition-at-binghamtonuniversity&catid=136:race&Itemid=351
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
Warner, Michael. “Publics and Counterpublics.” Public Culture. Issue 14, Vol. 1. Duke
University Press, 2002.