I. Judgments - British Institute of International and Comparative Law

Transcription

BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
PROJECT REFERENCE: JLS/2006/FPC/21 – 30-CE-00914760055
THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS
Project Advisory Board:
The Rt Hon Sir Francis Jacobs KCMG QC (chair); Lord Mance; Mr David Anderson QC; Dr
Peter Barnett; Mr Peter Beaton; Professor Adrian Briggs; Professor Burkhard Hess; Mr Adam
Johnson; Mr Alex Layton QC; Professor Paul Oberhammer; Professor Rolf Stürner; Ms Mona
Vaswani; Professor Rhonda Wasserman; Professor Mathijs ten Wolde
Project National Rapporteurs:
Professor Alegría Borrás (Spain); Mr Andrew Dickinson (England and Wales); Ms Esther Rivera
(Spain – Assistant Rapporteur); Mr Christian Heinze (Germany); Professor Lars Heuman
(Sweden); Mr Urs Hoffmann-Nowotny (Switzerland – Assistant Rapporteur); Professor
Emmanuel Jeuland (France); Professor Paul Oberhammer (Switzerland); Mr Jonas Olsson
(Sweden – Assistant Rapporteur); Mr Mikael Pauli (Sweden – Assistant Rapporteur); Dr Norel
Rosner (Romania); Ms Justine Stefanelli (United States); Mr Jacob van de Velden (Netherlands)
Project Director:
Jacob van de Velden
Project Research Fellow:
Justine Stefanelli
Project Consultant:
Andrew Dickinson
Project Research Assistants:
Edward Ho
Aniket Mandevia
Floor Rombach
Daniel Vasbeck
1
REPORT
The Effect in the European Community of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters: Recognition, Res Judicata and Abuse of Process
France
Professor Emmanuel Jeuland
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
2
I.
Judgments............................................................................................................7
A.
The concept, form, structure and terminology of judgments.............................................. 7
B.
The final determination and findings on issues of fact and law ....................................... 15
C.
The binding character of a judgment ................................................................................ 16
D.
Judgments that are capable of having preclusive effects .................................................. 18
II.
Preclusive effects ...........................................................................................21
A.
Claim preclusion ............................................................................................................... 21
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
B.
Existence and nature of claim preclusive effects......................................................................................21
Policies underlying claim preclusive effects ............................................................................................21
Conditions for claim preclusive effects ....................................................................................................22
Invoking claim preclusive effects.............................................................................................................25
Exceptions to claim preclusive effects......................................................................................................26
Claimant and Defendant ...........................................................................................................................26
Other participants .....................................................................................................................................26
Represented persons .................................................................................................................................27
Persons connected to the Claimant, Defendant, and other participants ....................................................28
Strangers ..............................................................................................................................................29
Issue preclusion................................................................................................................. 30
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
C.
The existence and nature of issue preclusive effects ................................................................................30
Policies underlying issue preclusive effects .............................................................................................31
Conditions for issue preclusive effects .....................................................................................................31
Invoking issue preclusive effects..............................................................................................................32
Exceptions to issue preclusive effects ......................................................................................................32
Strangers ..............................................................................................................................................33
Wider preclusive effects ................................................................................................... 33
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
III.
The existence and nature of wider preclusive effects ...............................................................................33
Policies underlying wider preclusive effects ............................................................................................34
Conditions for wider preclusive effects ....................................................................................................34
Invoking wider preclusive effects.............................................................................................................34
Exceptions to wider preclusive effects .....................................................................................................34
Strangers ..............................................................................................................................................35
Preclusive effects of judgments within the Brussels/Lugano Regime ..........36
A.
Recognition ....................................................................................................................... 36
1.
2.
3.
4.
Judgments recognised...............................................................................................................................36
Procedural aspects of recognition.............................................................................................................36
Exceptions to the rule (grounds for non-recognition)...............................................................................37
Effects of recognition ...............................................................................................................................39
3
B.
Claim preclusion within the Brussels/Lugano Regime..................................................... 39
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
C.
Existence and nature of claim preclusive effects......................................................................................39
Policies underlying claim preclusive effects ............................................................................................40
Law applicable to claim preclusive effects...............................................................................................40
Conditions for claim preclusive effects ....................................................................................................40
The identity of claims in the Brussels/Lugano Regime ............................................................................41
The identity of parties in the Brussels/Lugano Regime............................................................................41
Invoking claim preclusive effects under the Brussels/Lugano Regime ....................................................41
Exceptions to claim preclusive effects under the Brussels/Lugano Regime.............................................41
Persons affected by claim preclusive effects ............................................................................................41
Issue preclusion................................................................................................................. 41
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Existence and nature of issue preclusive effects.......................................................................................41
Policies underlying issue preclusive effects .............................................................................................41
Law applicable to issue preclusive effects................................................................................................41
Conditions for issue preclusive effects .....................................................................................................42
Invoking issue preclusive effects..............................................................................................................42
Exceptions to issue preclusive effects ......................................................................................................42
Persons affected by issue preclusive effects .............................................................................................42
D. Wider preclusion (abuse of process/claims and issues that could or should have been
raised)........................................................................................................................................ 42
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
E.
IV.
The existence and nature of wider preclusive effects ...............................................................................42
Policies underlying wider preclusive effects ............................................................................................42
The law applicable to wider preclusive effects.........................................................................................42
Conditions for wider preclusive effects ....................................................................................................43
Invoking wider preclusive effects.............................................................................................................43
Exceptions to wider preclusive effects .....................................................................................................43
Persons affected by wider preclusive effects ............................................................................................43
Authentic instruments/court approved settlements........................................................... 43
Preclusive effects of third state judgments....................................................44
4
Introduction.
A contemporary French author working on the Bodin’s opera explains that France is more an administrative State
than a judicial State (Blandine Barret Kriegel, les chemins de l’Etat, Calmann Levy, 1986). At the end of the XVI°
century, Bodin “saved” the French king in writing that the king had the “imperium” over his subjects, especially
over the lower courts. Bodin said that the king was sovereign and that his power was legislative, administrative and
judicial whereas the lower lords kept only judicial power. Now in the French constitution of 1958, the separation of
powers defined by Montesquieu who was inspired by the English system is present but the judicial is not considered
as a power but as an authority. In the middle Ages, the French kings have to reassure their power over their subjects
and has to be autonomous in relation with the pope and the Roman-German emperor.
Many aspects of French law may be explained by this historical approach. The French system is not directly roman
based. The study of Roman law was even forbidden in Paris during a large part of the Ancient Regime. It may
explain, for example, that the roman expression of res judicata is not used in French Law (the Latin expression “’res
judicata pro veritate accipitur” is only used sometimes to explain the rule).
Thus, in France, the consumer law involves the strong role of the economic minister. The real equivalent in French
law of the class action is the administrative power over the firms. More generally the statute prevails over the
judgment. The statute is general (applies every where in France to every body) and abstract (without personal
specification) whereas the judgment is particular and concrete. The judgement is strictly individual. The civil code
forbids the general judgment (“arrêt de règlement” article 5 of the civil code CC) which before the revolution had
the effect of a statute. It is usually affirmed that the revolutionaries feared the government of judges. It explains why
Montesquieu said that the judge was only “the mouth of the statute”. It is possible to say that the French system is
based on an administrative and centralized power rather than on the decentralized power of parliaments. The French
judge is not as great a figure as in England (he is recruited much younger than in England; he may be less than 23
year old when he becomes a judge). It is not rare that a statute reverses a judgment (validation statute). The
European court of human right condemns such a statute if it is not explained by good reasons of general interest (e.g
CEDH 14 feb. 2006, Le Carpentier c France, JCP 2006, II, 10171 note Thioye).
French administration is being transformed at the moment and takes more and more the form of agencies (regulation
authorities) which have judicial power (competition agency, financial agency, energy agency, discrimination agency
etc.). The European court of human right considers these agencies as tribunal but there are not qualified as tribunal
in internal law. So their decisions are not judgments. But it may be said that the lines between legislative,
administrative and judicial power are still moving in France.
It may explain why the authority of judgments is strictly limited. Res judicata relates only to the parties. This aspect
is one of the main theoretical obstacles of the implementation of class action with the opting out system in France.
It is simply a matter of evidence since Domat (Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel, 1772, p.247, n°IX) and
Pothier (Des obligations, reed. 1835, n°842 s) who inspires article 1351 of the civil code (CC). The evidence matter
is not very important in French law. There is no book on evidence and almost no research (except X Lagarde,
Réflexion critique sur le droit de la preuve, LGDJ 1994). It is divided between civil code (means of evidence) and
the civil procedural code (CPC) for the way of looking for evidence (expertise, inquiry etc.). The reason why it was
divided after the French revolution was to avoid that the evidence was a judicial matter. The main way of evidence
does not need judge. It is the written proof of the contracts. It is important to know this historical background to
appreciate the effects of judgments in France and the circulation of judgments in Europe.
The great scholar Motulsky criticized the French system based on article 1351 CC writing that the concept of cause
was vague and that the solutions were not predictable. He suggested that the sole criteria of res judiciata should be
the litigation at play. Motulsky was born in Russia (in a part which is polish today) and became a lawyer in
Germany between the two world war. His legal culture was German. He inspired the French civil procedural code
especially article 480 which is dedicated to res judicata. As a result res judicata has two legal sources in French law:
the traditional article 1351 CC (since 1804) and the new article 480 of the civil procedural code (CPC since 1976 the
CPC was called new civil procedural code since 2007 because several articles of the 1806 civil procedural code
were still in force until 2007). The criteria are not exactly the same in both articles. Case law refers to both article
but article 1351 CC is a statute whereas article 480 CPC is a decree, so article 1351 prevails over article 480. In the
norms hierarchy, the statue prevails over decree. There is no real contradiction between these articles but a
difference of approach (see below). The recent development of res judicata in France may be seen as an influence of
Motulsky since the criterion of the “cause” is now strictly limited. Article 1351 CC applies to civil, penal and
administrative law (it is important to notice that there are administrative and civil tribunals in France).
Translations of the civil code and of the civil procedural code may be found in the official internet site of French law:
Legifrance. But the translations in themselves are not official and often too literary. So these translations have to be
cautiously used. Sometimes in the report I will modify the translation for clarity.
5
There are several distinctions in the field of res judicata. Res judicata has both negative and positive effect. The
negative aspect is the claim preclusive effect. The positive effect (close to issue preclusion) means that it is possible
to invoke what has been decided in a previous judgment in another trial (Perrot and Fricero, Autorité de la chose
jugée, Jurisclasseur, 1998, n°2). There is another distinction between relative res judicata and absolute res judicata.
Res judicata is relative when it applies only to the parties. It is absolute when it applies to everybody. There is
another distinction between the effect of res judicata in civil jurisdiction and the external effect of res judicata. The
external effect is the effect of a penal, European (see Peerbux-Beaugendre, autorité de la chose jugée et primauté du
droit communautaire, RFDA 2005, 473 ; C Nourrissat, L’autorité de la chose jugée des decisions de la CJCE,
Procédures 2007, etude n°20 : the European judgment has a erga omnes effect over the French judgment acc. Com.,
5 mars 1985, Bull., IV, n°83 ; cass. Com., 7 avril 1998, Bill. IV n°130 and CE 10 jan. 2001, France Nature
environnement, rec. CE 2001) constitutional or administrative judgment over civil proceedings (the penal judgment
prevails) and the effect of a civil judgment over penal, European, constitutional or administrative judgment (see
Jeuland, Droit processuel, 2007, LGDJ n°465 s.). But ECHR judgment has no direct effect on the French judgment
at play (Cass. soc., 30 sept. 2005, JCP 2005, II, n°10180 note Bonfils but PY Gautier, de l’obligation pour le juge
civil de réexaminer le process pares une condemnation par la CEDH, D. 2005, p. 2273). Lastly there is a distinction
between the procedural effect and the substantial effect of a judgment. The procedural effects have res judicata and
the removal of the judge (art. 481 CPC it means that the judge cannot change his judgment except if there is a
mistake). The substantial effect (see H Peroz, la reception des jugements étrangers dans l’ordre juridique français,
LGDJ, 2005) is the rights of the parties determined by the judgment (the judgment may be declarative or constitutive
of the rights).
Res judicata may be challenged by a mean of review. In French law, there are different types of recourse. The
distinction is drawn between ordinary recourse and extraordinary recourse. According to article 527 CPC : “ordinary
means of review shall be by way of lodgement of an appeal and of an application to set aside; extraordinary means
of review shall be by way of a third party application to set aside, a factual reconsideration [“revision”] and a
petition in cassation”. The ordinary recourse stays the execution unlike extraordinary recourse which does not. It
may explain why the time limit period is longer for a petition in cassation (two months) than for an appeal (one
month). In the category of ordinary recourse, there is the main remedy which is the appeal recourse (the case is
judged again in fact and in law) and a rarer recourse open when a party was not present to the hearings and makes
opposition to the judgment (in French “opposition”). In the category of extraordinary recourses there are the petition
of cassation (only in law not in fact), the third party application (“tierce opposition”) and the very rare
reconsideration of the case (less than 5 cases each year) only when the original facts have been proven inaccurate
after the time limit period of other recourses has elapsed.
6
I.
Judgments
A. The concept, form, structure and terminology of judgments
Please describe the typical concept, form, structure and terminology of judgments in your legal system.
Summary:
The concept of ‘judgment’ is not defined in the French procedural code; academically, a judgment is considered a
legal act created by an impartial body which applies a rule of law to give an answer to a claim. Under French law, a
tribunal must meet three criteria: (1) there must be a legal statute which allows its creation; (2) it must be an
impartial body with independent judges; and (3) judgment to a legal claim must be provided. It is possible that a
body which is considered a tribunal under the ECHR may not be considered as such under French law. The French
Code of civil procedural law provides for the formal requirements of a judgment which include basic requirements
such as the name of the court, judges, the clerk, the representation of the public prosecutor, and the date. The
judgment must be signed by the judge and the clerk in order to make the judgment official. Regarding the legal
content of a judgment, first it must state the claims of the parties and their grounds. Furthermore, it must be reasoned
and the reasons must take into account all the claims and grounds, else the judgment will be reversed. Lastly, the
judgment must include the dispositif which is likened to the operative part. One should note that judgments
concerning findings of fact or other judgments from which no immediate appeal is available, do not have to state the
reasons.
Full response:
1. Concepts.
The concept of judgment is not defined in the civil procedural code (CPC). Scholars have tried to define it. It used to
be defined by an organic criterion (a judge’s act) and a procedural criterion. The judgment was seen as the act of a
judge having complied with the procedural rules.
This definition is not satisfactory since all the judge’s acts are not judgments (for example: administrative order or
measure of judicial administration such as the allocation of cases) and many civil administrative decisions (public
sector) comply with procedural rules.
The judgment used to be defined by res judicata as well. But it is quite illogical to define a legal act by its effect and
the settlement has res judicata without being a judgement (article 2052 CC).
From a recent academic point of view, the judgment is a legal act created by an impartial body which applies a rule
of law to give an answer to a claim (Cadiet et Jeuland, Droit judiciaire privé, 5ème éd. Litec, 2006, n°76 s.). The
judgment says (juris dictio in Latin means to say the law) what the law is. It is not only a legal act which ends a
contentious litigation since there are non contentious judgments (for example: adoption proceedings; the change of
name etc.).
The concept of tribunal must meet three criteria.
- Legal requisite.
There must be a legal statute to create a tribunal. However legal statutes do not usually qualify the entity that they
create. For example, the competition agency (Conseil de la concurrence) is not qualified as a tribunal in its statute;
so the constitutional council said that it was not a tribunal (decision 23 jan. 1987, JO 26 jan. 87) but the Paris court
of appeal decided that the competition agency made judgments (16 mars 1988, BOCCRF, 19 mars 88, p.77). The
procedure followed by the competition agency is often copied on the civil procedural code but sometimes on the
penal procedural law (eg. Cons. Conc., 5 dec. 2005, Concurrences n°1, 2006, p.187 obs. CM).
- Organic requisite.
There must be an impartial body with independent judges. Usually the regulatory agencies are independent. This is
why they are almost tribunal (but usually the stature does not precise that they are tribunal, so the legal requisite is
not met.
- Material requisite.
Third and most importantly condition, the material requisite means that an entity provides a judgment to a legal
claim.
As a result an entity may be a tribunal according to ECHR (which does not use the legal criterion) but not a tribunal
in the internal French sense.
7
For example, the public media watchdog agency (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel) is not a tribunal in the internal
sense but a tribunal according to article 6-1 ECHR which means that it has to comply with the principles of fair trial.
It has to be said that the French system distinguishes between private and public law. A part of commercial law (in a
broad sense) concern public law. For example, the recourse against the decisions of the public media watchdog
agency has to be lodged in the public high Court (Conseil d’Etat). In France, there are three “supreme courts” in the
sense that their decision can not be challenged by another court: the court of cassation is specialized in private law,
the constitutional council is specialized in constitutional law and the public high court (Conseil d’Etat) which is
specialized in administrative law.
It has to be said that article 6.1 ECHR is applied to civil procedural law since this article 6-1 ECHR applies to civil
matter. For example the judge who decides a summary provision must not decide the same case on the merits (Bor
Na Mona case, Cass. Ass. Plén. 6 nov. 1998, RTDciv. 1999, 183, obs. Normand). Another requisite of article 6.1 is
that judgments have generally to be motivated by reasons (article 455 CPC). Some exceptions are accepted in
internal French law in certain exceptional cases (e.g. the selection of cases in the court of cassation does not have to
be motivated by reasons).
The word “judgment” is the general term which encompasses the decision given by an arbitration court (award or
“sentence”), the order given by a unique judge usually the president of the tribunal (called a “ordonnance”), the
judgment decided by the court of appeal (which is an arrest “arrêt” because it stops the findings of fact) and the
judgment given by the court of cassation (which is also an arrest “arrêt” because it stops the findings of law).
The word “court” (“cour”) is usually used for a tribunal seized against a previous judgment (court of appeal, court of
cassation).
2. Form and structure
The typical judgment must comply with article 454 and 455 of the civil procedural code (CPC). Article 454 deals
with formal requisites.
-
It provides primarily: “the judgement is given on behalf of the French people”. So each judgment begins
with the formula “on behalf of the French people (“au nom du peuple français”).
-
This article indicates that the judgment states: “the court from which it emanates”. The word court here
encompasses all the civil tribunals (“juridictions civiles”). This requisite is necessary to check that the
tribunal has jurisdiction.
-
Then this article indicates that the judgement must state: “the names of the judges who deliberated on it”.
The rule is that the judge who deliberated must have been present for the hearings.
-
The judgment must also state “its date” which may have consequences such as the beginning of the legal
interest.
-
The judgment has to state “the name of the representative of the public prosecutor when he attended the
hearings”. In insolvency proceedings, in family matters concerning the public order, or in any cases where
the public prosecutor thinks he should be present, he has the legal right to attend the hearings.
-
Then the judgment has to state “the name of the clerk” because he is the official witness of the judgment
and “the names or denomination of the parties as well as their domicile or registered office”,
-
in addition “if necessary, the names of the lawyer (“avocet”) or any person who represented or assisted the
parties”. This last requisite means that if there is a lawyer or a person who represented a party, he has to be
mentioned. For example the parents represent their children and the CEO represents his firm.
-
Lastly the judgment must state “in non-contentious matters, the name of the persons to whom it must be
notified” because the non contentious judgment may be notified to the claimant and to third persons such as
the grand-parents in an adoption proceedings for example.
Article 456 CPC deals with the signature: “The judgement must be signed by the presiding judge and the clerk of the
court. In the event of impediment of the presiding judge, a reference thereof must be entered into the minutes that
must be signed by one of the judges who deliberated on it”.
This provision shows the important role of the clerk. These signatures transform the judgment in an official
document which provides evidences of the judgment content.
The legal content of the judgment is provided by article 455 CPC which gives the structure of the judgment: “the
judgement must set forth succinctly the respective claims of the parties and their grounds. Such presentation may
take the form of a reference to the pleadings of the parties with the indication of their date”.
8
There is no precise form to set forth the respective claims of the parties. But the total absence of mention to the
parties’ claims is condemned. There must be a clear understanding of the objectives of the claims and the reasons in
law (with the statute and the article concerned with the case) and facts. This mention may be substituted by a
reference to the pleadings of the parties with the date of them.
Then article 455 CPC provides that “the judgement must be reasoned”. Before the French revolution, some
important judgments were not reasoned because the judges were substitute for the king and could not guess what the
king would have said. This is the reason why the judgments of the court of cassation are still so short and quite often
difficult to understand (very laconic).
The judgments of the tribunal and court of appeal are longer but the reasons are generally not very developed. There
is no dissident opinion so that the reasons state only the opinion of the tribunal as a whole. But the reasons must take
into account all the claims and grounds even though the reasons may be only a few words.
The judgment will be reversed if it did not touch upon all the claims or all the grounds. It is a cause of “cassation”.
The reasons (“les motifs”) are necessarily in French; the used of foreign languages or minority languages (Britonnic,
Corsica, Alsacian etc.) are forbidden since the royal statute of Villers-Cotterêt (1539).
Lastly article 455 CPC indicates: “It pronounces the decision in the form of operative part” which is called the
“dispositif”. It may be a condemnation, an annulment, a denial of the claim etc.
The form of the Court de cassation judgment follows the judicial syllogism: applicable rule, the findings of facts and
the conclusion. The reason is that the French judge is only the “mouth” of the legislative statute (Montesquieu). He
does not create the law but applies it. This tradition is still present but it is now accepted that the judge has a margin
of creativity especially if a large concept is involved (e.g children interest or good faith).
The previous judgment is typical. But many judgments do not comply with these rules and take the form of a simple
mention in the case docket: for example the decision to listen to the parties or the witness; the decision for the judge
to visit the place concerned by the case etc.
The majority of non definitive judgments concerning the findings of fact (“mesures d’instruction”) have not to
comply with the formal requisite and have no express reason because there is no immediate appeal. A “mesure
d’instruction” is a means of evidence ordered by the court. These kinds of judgments could only be challenged with
the definitive judgment. Article 150 CPC provides “the decision which gives or amends directions about the findings
of fact may not be set aside; it may not be contested independently of the judgment on the merits of the case by way
of an appeal or by way of a petition in cassation, save where they are specified by law. The same shall apply to
decisions rejecting a request for a direction regarding the findings of fact or for the variation of those already given.
So article 150 explains the provision of article 151: “where it may not be appealed against independently of the
judgment on the merits of the case, the decision may take the form of simple notes recorded on the file or on the
transcript of the hearing”.
The only exception is the expertise order which has to comply with the formal requisite and must have express
reason because an immediate appeal is possible. An immediate appeal is possible because an expertise order has
high consequences. It has to be said that, in French law, the expert is not a witness and is appointed by the court
even though the expert is paid by the parties (there is only one expert appointed). In practice, the judge usually
follows the expert advice or there is a settlement after the expert advice thereafter no longer requiring a judgment.
Moreover judgments which take into account a waiver of claim are very short (one line).
Finally, the court of cassation does not select about one third of the claims without giving reason or providing
reasons such as: the claim has no serious ground or the court already decided several times the same question
(“procedure de non admission” article L.431-1 Code of the judicial organization). This selection has been
developed for a few years to rid the court of non important cases in term of law. There are about 20000 cases a year
in France in the court of cassation; 6000 cases are not admitted without reasons (see La selection des pourvois à la
Cour de cassation, dir. S Amrani Mekki et L Cadiet, Economica, 2005).
The judgment has still res judicata if it does not comply with a formal (e.g cass. 1st civ., 15 nov. 1967, RTDciv. 1968,
p.410 obs. Hébraud about a judgment without signature) or substantial requisite (even though the judgement does
not comply with a public order rule e.g Cass. 3° civ., 5 oct. 1982, Bull. III, n°189 ; Cass. 2° civ., 25 oct. 2007, JCP
IV, n°3114). If the judge had no jurisdiction, the judgment has res judicata but an appeal may be lodged (e.g cass.
1re civ., 25 feb. 1964, Bull. civ. I, n°110). But in exceptional cases the judge decision is considered non existent
(Perrot and Fricéro, op. cit., n°23) or is not qualified as a judgment. (if the judge decided without hearing the parties
Cass. 1re, 17 oct. 1995, Bull. I, n°367). Perrot and Fricéro consider that a judgment which does not comply with
article 6.1 ECHR could not have res judicata according to case law (ibidem).
9
Let’s examine an example of a typical judgement (“arrêt”) of the Court of cassation (see below). Here is the outline.
1. The name of the court and the section
(there are 5 civil and commercial sections : section 1 is specialised in family matter, contract law, tort law, private
international law etc. section 2 is specialized in procedural law ; section 3 in real estate law ; commercial section is
specialized in commercial matters and the social section in labour law).
2. The date and the sense of the decision (claim rejected or not)
3. The number of the claim and the indication whether the judgment will be published
4. The name of the section’s president.
5. The word “French republic” on behalf of the French people.
6. The facts and previous proceedings (court of appeal).
7. The claims (almost absent) beginning by the word first ground of cassation (“premier moyen”)
8.- The applicable law (le “visa”)
9.- The court of appeal decision
10.- The reasons of the judgment which begins usually by “but” when the claim is rejected. The reasons are very
short and may take the form of a general rule. The reason may take the form of a general rule called a “hat” (“un
chapeau”).
11.- The operative part beginning by « par ces motifs » (« reasons ») and indicates that the court of appeal judgment
is reversed (“casse”) and that a party is condemned to pay a certain amount of money (2000 euros) for the justice
fees of the other party.
1.- Cour de cassation chambre civile 2
2.- audience publique du 2octobre 2007
3.- N° de pourvoi : 05-18602
4.- Président : M. Bargue
5.- AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS
6.- LA COUR DE CASSATION, PREMIERE CHAMBRE CIVILE, a rendu l'arrêt suivant :
Attendu que les époux X... ont formé, le 27 mars 1992, une demande de redressement judiciaire civil ; que le
tribunal d'instance a estimé qu'il était impossible d'établir un plan de redressement ; qu'infirmant le jugement, la cour
d'appel de Douai, par arrêt du 11 février 1993, a accueilli la demande des époux X... et aménagé le paiement de leurs
dettes par échelonnement et a réduit le taux d'intérêt à l'égard des créances mobilières ; qu'après le rejet du pourvoi
formé contre cet arrêt (Civ. 1, 20 juillet 1994, n° 93-04.088), la banque assigné, le 16 mai 2001, les époux X...
devant le tribunal d'instance aux fins de voir constater leur retour à meilleure fortune, tout en sollicitant la fixation
de sa créance conformément au contrat initial ;
7. Sur la première branche du moyen :
8. Vu les articles 1351 du code civil et L. 332-2 du code de la consommation ;
9.- Attendu que pour fixer la créance de la banque, au titre du prêt complémentaire, à la somme de 5 135,40 euros
suivant décompte arrêté au 11 février 2003, l'arrêt retient que la banque n'est pas fondée à se prévaloir d'une créance
d'un montant différent de celui retenu par l'arrêt du 11 février 1993 ;
10. Qu'en statuant ainsi, alors que la décision par laquelle le juge de l'exécution, saisi d'une contestation des mesures
recommandées, vérifie la validité et le montant des titres de créance n'a pas l'autorité de la chose jugée au principal,
et n'interdit pas au créancier, lors d'une autre instance, de faire constater le montant exact de sa créance, la cour
d'appel a méconnu l'étendue de ses pouvoirs et violé les textes susvisés ;
7.- Et sur la seconde branche du moyen :
8.- Vu les articles 480 du nouveau code de procédure civile et 1351 du code civil ;
10. Attendu que l'autorité de la chose jugée n'a lieu qu'à l'égard de ce qui a fait l'objet d'un jugement et a été tranché
dans son dispositif ;
10
9. Attendu que pour juger que par son arrêt du 11 février 1993, la cour d'appel de Douai avait réduit le taux des
intérêts de la créance immobilière de la banque à 0,01 % par an, l'arrêt retient, qu'au vu des motifs du même arrêt il
se déduisait que la cour d'appel avait nécessairement entendu appliquer un taux inférieur au taux contractuel aux
créances immobilières à compter du 25 février 1993 ;
10. Qu'en statuant ainsi, alors que dans le dispositif de ce premier arrêt, elle s'était bornée à ne réduire le taux des
intérêts à 0,01 % qu'à l'égard des créances mobilières, la cour d'appel a violé les textes susvisés ;
10. PAR CES MOTIFS :
CASSE ET ANNULE, dans toutes ses dispositions, l'arrêt rendu le 24 mars 2005, entre les parties, par la cour
d'appel de Douai ;
remet, en conséquence, la cause et les parties dans l'état où elles se trouvaient avant ledit arrêt et, pour être fait droit,
les renvoie devant la cour d'appel de Douai, autrement composée ;
Condamne les époux X... aux dépens ;
Vu l'article 700 du nouveau code de procédure civile, condamne les époux X... à payer à la Caisse régionale de
crédit agricole mutuel (CRCAM) du Pas de Calais la somme de 2 000 euros ;
rejette la demande des époux X... ;
Dit que sur les diligences du procureur général près la Cour de cassation, le présent arrêt sera transmis pour être
transcrit en marge ou à la suite de l'arrêt cassé ;
Ainsi fait et jugé par la Cour de cassation, première chambre civile, et prononcé par le président en son audience
publique du deux octobre deux mille sept.
Next, I would like to introduce an example of a Court of appeal judgment. The structure is the same as the court of
cassation judgment but it appears clearer with a first part which deals with facts, proceedings and claims (1) and a
second part which focuses on reasons (which are usually longer than for the court of cassation) and on decision (2).
Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence CT0044 audience publique du 25 janvier 2007
N° de pourvoi : 46
1. FAITS, PROCÉDURE ET PRÉTENTIONS DES PARTIES
Par jugement réputé contradictoire en date du 30 juillet 2004, le Tribunal de Commerce de MARSEILLE a
condamné la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement à payer à l'Association dénommée la caisse des Congés
Payés dans le Bâtiment et les Industries Connexes des Départements des Bouches du Rhône et du Vaucluse la
somme de 327.375 ç au titre de cotisations sociales pour la période allant du 1er avril 2003 au 31 décembre
2003 et celle de 300 ç au titre de l'article 700 du nouveau code de procédure civile, et à lui communiquer sous
astreinte provisoire, les bordereaux de déclarations de salaires des mois pour la période considérée, après avoir
dit que l'activité exercée par la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement relevait d'une certaine nomenclature et
imposait l'affiliation de ses salariés auprès de la caisse des Congés Payés dans le Bâtiment et les Industries
Connexes des Départements des Bouches du Rhône et du Vaucluse, le jugement étant assorti de l'exécution
provisoire pour l'ensemble de ses dispositions.
La S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement a régulièrement fait appel de cette décision dans les formes et
délai légaux.
Vu les dispositions des articles 455 et 954 du nouveau code de procédure civile, dans leur rédaction issue du
décret No 98-1231 du 28 décembre 1998 ;
Vu les prétentions et moyens de la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat
Développement dans ses nouvelles conclusions récapitulatives en date du 12 décembre 2006 tendant à faire
juger que l'assignation introductive de l'instance est nulle, le délai de quinze jours entre la date de l'assignation
délivrée en Mairie (6 juillet 2004) et celle de la date d'audience (20 juillet 2004) n'étant pas respecté, que la
règle pas de nullité sans grief ne peut être invoquée par la caisse des Congés Payés dans le Bâtiment et les
Industries Connexes des Départements des Bouches du Rhône et du Vaucluse et qu'au demeurant le nonrespect du délai prescrit par l'article 856 du nouveau code de procédure civile a causé au destinataire un grief
11
en l'empêchant de préparer utilement sa défense dans une période estivale durant laquelle, au surplus, l'activité
de l'entreprise était arrêtée pour cause de cause payés annuels, que la lettre simple que l'huissier instrumentaire
a adressée au destinataire de l'acte, qui était absent au moment de sa signification, ne comportait pas une
mention exigée par la loi, à savoir la date d'audience, au fond que la demande n'est pas fondée, la caisse des
Congés Payés dans le Bâtiment et les Industries Connexes des Départements des Bouches du Rhône et du
Vaucluse faisant un amalgame insupportable et dénature un jugement rendu par le Tribunal de Commerce de
MEAUX , qu'il doit être fait application de l'article 1244-1 du Code Civil ;
Vu les prétentions et moyens de la caisse des Congés Payés dans le Bâtiment et les Industries Connexes des
Départements des Bouches du Rhône et du Vaucluse dans ses conclusions au fond en date du 17 novembre
2006 tendant à faire juger : que l'assignation introductive de l'instance n'est pas nulle, la nullité ne pouvant être
prononcée qu'en cas de grief démontré et que la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement qui n'ignorait pas
l'imminence de l'engagement d'une procédure judiciaire, ne peut se plaindre de l'existence d'un grief, qu'au
surplus, la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement reconnaît qu'elle a été destinataire de la lettre simple que
l'huissier lui avait adressée pour l'aviser du dépôt de l'acte en Mairie de Fontvieille (13), ce qui implique que la
S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement a eu connaissance de la date de l'audience devant le Tribunal de
Commerce de MARSEILLE,ûque la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement reconnaît qu'elle n'a été
destinataire de la lettre simple de l'huissier, que le 23 juillet 2004, ce qui fait qu'en toute hypothèse elle n'aurait
pu assister à l'audience tenue, le 20 juillet 2004, et ce qui la prive de la possibilité d'invoquer l'existence d'un
grief, ûque, en tout état de cause , le moyen ne peut être soulevé devant la formation de jugement au fond de la
Cour d'Appel d'AIX en PROVENCE, mais aurait dû l'être devant le Conseiller chargé de la Mise en État pour
la deuxième chambre,ûau fond, que la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement ne peut disconvenir qu'elle
devait affilier ses salariés à la caisse spéciale des congés payés, en l'état d'un jugement rendu, le 1er février
2005, par le Tribunal de Commerce de MEAUX réglant le problème de l'affiliation pour l'ensemble du
Groupe ;
L'ordonnance de clôture de l'instruction de l'affaire a été rendue le 14 décembre 2006.
2.- MOTIFS ET DÉCISION
Attendu que la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement qui a déposé, le 12 décembre 2006, des conclusions
postérieurement à la caisse des Congés Payés dans le Bâtiment et les Industries Connexes des Départements
des Bouches du Rhône et du Vaucluse, n'a pas répondu au moyen de droit formulé expressément par l'intimée
dans ses dernières conclusions déposées, le 17 novembre 2006, moyen de droit sur lequel celle-ci fondait son
rejet de l'exception de nullité de l'acte de procédure proposée par la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement ;
Attendu que la nullité d'un acte introductif d'instance délivré par un huissier est, selon l'article 649 du nouveau
code de procédure civile, régie par les dispositions qui gouvernent la nullité des actes de procédure ; que, selon
l'article 72 du nouveau code de procédure civile, constitue une exception de procédure, le moyen tendant à
faire déclarer la procédure irrégulière ; que la nullité d'un acte de procédure pour vice de forme peut, selon
l'article 112 dudit code, être invoquée au fur et à mesure de leur accomplissement ; que le moyen de droit
soulevé par la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement tenant à la nullité de l'acte introductif d'instance délivré
le 6 juillet 2004 est une exception de procédure ;
Attendu que selon l'article 771 alinéa 1 dudit code dans sa rédaction issue du décret No 2005-1678 du 28
décembre 2005, rendu applicable devant la Cour d'Appel par l'article 910 alinéa 1 du même code, le Conseiller
chargé de la Mise en État est, jusqu'à son dessaisissement, seul compétent, à l'exclusion de toute autre
formation de la Cour d'Appel pour statuer sur les exceptions de procédure - les parties ne sont plus recevables
à soulever ces exceptions ultérieurement à moins qu'ils ne surviennent ou soient révélés postérieurement au
dessaisissement du Conseiller chargé de la Mise en État ; que, selon l'article 775 du nouveau code de
procédure civile, les ordonnances rendues par le Conseiller chargé de la Mise en État ont au principal l'autorité
de la chose jugée lorsqu'elles statuent sur une exception de procédure ;
Attendu qu'il a été conféré au Conseiller chargé de la Mise en État une compétence exclusive pour statuer sur
les exceptions de procédure par décisions revêtues de l'autorité de la chose jugée et susceptibles de déféré
devant la formation de jugement de la Cour d'Appel ; que l'esprit du décret vise à confier au magistrat chargé
de la Mise en État le soin de purger la procédure de tous les vices pouvant l'affecter avant que l'affaire ne soit
examinée au fond ; qu'il s'ensuit que la compétence conférée à ce magistrat est générale et concerne toutes les
exceptions de la procédure sans distinguer si la nullité affecte un acte de procédure accompli devant les
premiers juges ou durant l'instance d'appel, pour le cas où l'exception n'a pas été soulevée simultanément et
avant toute défense au fond ou fin de non-recevoir par suite de la non-comparution du défendeur devant les
premiers juges ;
12
Attendu qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner l'exception de procédure qui aurait dû être soulevée par la S.A.R.L.
Active Habitat Développement devant le Conseiller chargé de la Mise en État seul compétent pour statuer ;
Attendu au fond qu'il ressort des rapports de contrôle de la caisse des Congés Payés dans le Bâtiment du
Département de la Seine et Marne des 13 et 20 novembre 2003 que la société Active Habitat qui a, depuis
1998, une activité de rénovation de bâtiments, couverture, ravalement, peinture... et dont le siège social est
situé dans le département de la Seine et Marne, est affiliée à la caisse des congés payés de Melun ; que ses
activités administratives d'une part, et commerciales d'autre part, ont été externalisées en 2002 par la création
de deux sociétés en 2002 dont la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement pour les tâches commerciales ; que
l'activité de la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement qui conditionne l'affiliation de ses salariés à une caisse
de congés payés doit s'apprécier par rapport à l'activité réellement exercée par l'entreprise dont elle dépend,
cette entreprise pouvant être constituée par un groupe de sociétés ; que la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat
Développement ne développe pas une activité propre de commercialisation et technique dans le domaine de
l'imprégnation des bois et autres services , comme le mentionne son objet social sur le Kbis ; que son activité
est totalement liée et dépendante de celle exercée par la société Active Habitat qui n'emploie pas de personnel
commercial et avec laquelle elle forme un Groupe de sociétés poursuivant une activité industrielle et
commerciale formant un tout et afférente à une activité de travaux du bâtiment ;
Attendu que le jugement mérite confirmation pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus et ceux non contraires des
premiers juges ;
Attendu qu'il n'y a pas lieu de faire application de l'article 1244-1 du Code Civil et d'accorder des délais de
paiement eu égard à l'ancienneté et à la nature de la dette dont s'agit ;
PAR CES MOTIFS
La Cour, statuant par arrêt contradictoire, prononcé par sa mise à disposition au greffe de la Cour d'Appel
d'AIX en PROVENCE à la date indiquée à l'issue des débats, conformément à l'article 450 alinéa 2 du
nouveau code de procédure civile,
Reçoit l'appel de la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement comme régulier en la forme.
Au fond, confirme le jugement déféré en toutes ses dispositions.
Condamne la S.A.R.L. Active Habitat Développement aux entiers dépens de l'instance, dont distraction au
profit de Maître Jean-Marie JAUFFRES, sur son affirmation de droit, en application de l'article 699 du
nouveau code de procédure civile.
LE GREFFIER
LE PRÉSIDENT
Lastly I would like introduce a summary order. The formal requisites are complied with. The claim is presented and
then the judge gives his reasons beginning by “sur ce” which means “about this” and the operative part of the
decision.
Tribunal de grande instance de Foix CT0061
Audience publique du 23 décembre 2005
N° de pourvoi : Publié par le Service de documentation et d'études de la Cour de cassation
TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE DE FOIX ORDONNANCE DE REFERE
DU 23 DECEMBRE 2005 PRESIDENT: Monsieur TESSIER-FLOHIC X... : Valérie GRANER RGNo: 05/00167
PARTIES: DEMANDEUR Monsieur Y..., Dominique Z... né le 15 Octobre 1967 à PAMIERS (09100), demeurant
Bellecoste - 09700 MONTAUT représenté par Me Pierre VASSEROT, avocat au barreau de L'ARIEGE,
DEFENDERESSE ACCA DE MONTAUT, dont le siège social est sis Mairie - 09700 MONTAUT représentée par
Me Charles LAGIER, avocat au barreau de LYON, FAITS ET PROCÉDURE :
13
Monsieur Y... Z... a fait assigner l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée de Montaut devant le juge des référés
par exploit du 29 novembre 2005, afin d'obtenir sous astreinte sa carte de chasse.
Il expose qu'il est propriétaire de terres sur cette commune et qu'à sa demande de renouvellement de carte de chasse,
l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée lui a opposé un refus d'abord verbal, puis écrit le 27 août 2005.
Elle soutiendrait pour motiver son refus que les parcelles de terres dont son père est actuellement usufruitier auraient
été retirées des parcelles de chasse soumises à l'association.
Il indique qu'il agit sur le fondement de l'article 808 du nouveau code de procédure civile, eu égard à l'urgence à le
laisser chasser avant la trêve hivernale.
Il assure que c'est parfaitement légitimement que son père en sa qualité d'usufruitier et donc bénéficiaire d'un droit
d'usage sur les terres a pu retirer ces parcelles de l'ensemble foncier sur lequel le droit de chasse de l'Association
Communale de Chasse Agréée de Montaut s'exerçait. Il n'avait nullement à en solliciter l'autorisation du nupropriétaire contrairement aux affirmations de l'association.
Il n'y a donc eu aucune collusion entre le père et le fils pour retirer ces parcelles de l'ensemble foncier et c'est sans
fondement que l'association a cru devoir le priver de sa carte de chasse.
Il demande en conséquence que lui soit délivrée la carte d'adhérent pour la saison de chasse 2005-2006 par
l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée de Montaut et ce sous astreinte de 1000 E par jour de retard à compter
de l'ordonnance à intervenir.
Il entend aussi obtenir aussi à titre de dommages-intérêts pour avoir ainsi été privé de ce droit de chasse d'une
provision de 1 500 E.
l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée de Montaut conclut au rejet des demandes de Monsieur Z.... Au
principal , elle indique qu'elle a refusé l'octroi de la carte d'adhésion au demandeur par lettre recommandée avec
accusé de réception du 24 août 2005, ce qui démontre à soi seul le défaut d'urgence dans cette affaire, puisque
Monsieur Z... a attendu le 29 novembre 2005 pour assigner alors même que la chasse était ouverte depuis le 17 août
pour le sanglier et depuis le 11 septembre pour le reste du gibier.
Elle rappelle que ce défaut de diligence le privera en tout état de cause de chasse passé le 8 et le 29 janvier 2006,
date de fermeture de la chasse pour les lapins et les grands animaux, la chasse à la perdrix et au lièvre étant déjà
fermée.
Au fond et en droit, l'association soutient qu'il a été fait retrait d'une surface de 50 ha à la suite de la demande de
Monsieur Jeannot Z..., père du demandeur et usufruitier de ces terres. Dès lors en application de l'article L 422-21IV le propriétaire ou le détenteur du droit de chasse qui fait valoir son droit d'opposition ne peut plus prétendre à la
qualité de membre de l'association.
En l'espèce, compte tenu du démembrement du droit de propriété, l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée
soutient que ce droit n'appartient qu'au nu-propriétaire. A défaut d'opposition au retrait de Monsieur Y... Z... contre
la décision de son père, l'association soutient qu'il l'a tacitement acceptée et dès lors ne saurait plus en être membre.
L'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée se portant demandeur reconventionnel demande qu'il lui soit accordé 1
500 E au titre de ses frais irrépétibles.
SUR CE :
Attendu que dans tous les cas d'urgence le juge des référés peut ordonner toutes les mesures qui ne se heurtent à
aucune contestation sérieuse ou que justifie l'existence d'un différend.
Que la contestation relative à la délivrance d'une carte de membre d'une association de chasse, revêt en soit un
caractère d'urgence compréhensible en zone rurale où la chasse constitue une activité importante.
Que le fait que Monsieur Z... a attendu le 20 novembre pour assigner ne constitue pas, de sa part, une négligence
faisant perdre à la demande son caractère d'urgence, dans la mesure où il a recherché une solution amiable, puis a
saisi sa Compagnie d'assurance défense-recours et enfin à assigné en référé.
Que sur le plan de l'urgence, la demande est recevable.
Attendu sur l'existence d'une difficulté sérieuse, que l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée conteste le droit de
lui délivrer une carte de membre au motif qu'il existerait une difficulté tenant à sa qualité de propriétaire de parcelles
qui ont fait l'objet d'un retrait.
Que cependant, il est apporté au juge des référés tous les éléments de nature à permettre de trancher le litige, sans
entamer la compétence des juges du fond.
14
Qu'en droit il convient de s'interroger sur la possibilité pour une association de chasse de refuser la délivrance d'une
carte au nu-propriétaire des terres qui ont été l'objet d'un retrait du domaine de chasse de l'association, à la diligence
de l'usufruitier. Attendu en droit que "le propriétaire ou le détenteur du droit de chasse ayant exercé un droit à
opposition ne peut prétendre à la qualité de membre de l'association sauf décision souveraine de l'Association
Communale de Chasse Agréée."
Attendu qu'en l'espèce Monsieur Y... Z... a bénéficié d'une donation notarié par son père, suivant acte authentique du
14 janvier 2003, d'une sèrie de parcelles sises commune de Montaut pour une surface d'environ 75 ha; que les parties
se sont accordées pour qu'un démembrement de propriété soit opéré, Y... Z... devenant propriétaire et Jeannot Z...,
son père, usufruitier.
Que Monsieur Jeannot Z... qui n'est pas à la cause, n'est pas détenteur d'un droit de chasse contractuel sur les terres
devenues propriétés de son fils.
Que cependant l'usufruit confère à son détenteur l'exercice du droit de chasse, composante de l'usage des biens qui
lui sont dévolus.
Que sans qu'il y ait lieu ici de s'interroger sur la capacité juridique pour l'un ou l'autre de dénoncer à l'association de
chasse agréée, puis au Préfet de l'Ariège, le refus d'intégrer un certain nombre de parcelles, de celles soumises à
action de chasse des membres de l'association, le juge des référés doit constater que le nu-propriétaire, Monsieur Y...
Z... ne s'est pas opposé à son père, usufruitier qui a sollicité le retrait des parcelles.
Que dès lors, son inaction doit s'analyser comme une adhésion implicite à ce retrait et qu'en conséquence, c'est à bon
droit que l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée de Montaut, faisant application de l'article L 422-21-IV du
code de l'environnement lui a refusé la délivrance de la carte d'adhérent.
Que Monsieur Z... sera donc débouté de sa demande.
Attendu qu'il apparaît équitable de laisser à la charge de chacune des parties, les frais irrépétibles exposés ; qu'elle
seront déboutées de leurs demandes fondées sur l'article 700 du nouveau code de procédure civile. PAR CES
MOTIFS :
Nous, Alain TESSIER-FLOHIC, Président du Tribunal de Grande instance de Foix, statuant en matière de référé,
publiquement, par décision contradictoire et en premier ressort
Vu l'urgence,
- Déboutons Monsieur Y... Z... de l'ensemble de ses demandes.
- Déboutons l'Association Communale de Chasse Agréée de Montaut de sa demande au titre de ses frais irrépétibles.
- Laissons les dépens à la charge du demandeur.
Ainsi ordonné les jour mois et an que dessus.
Le X...
Le Président
B. The final determination and findings on issues of fact and law
How does the court's determination of a matter in your legal system relate to the findings on issues of fact and law
on which this determination is based?
Summary:
Two distinctions are drawn in French procedural law regarding this issue. The first is that between the reasons
(motif) and the holding (dispositif); both are contained within the same judgment. The second distinction is between
the objective or relief of the claim (‘objet’ or ‘prétention’) and the reasons (‘fondement’, ‘moyen’, or ‘causes’) of
the claim, which may be factual or legal. Questions of admissibility, jurisdiction, or applicable law must be
answered before disposition of the substantive claims.
Full response:
According to article 455 CPC, the distinction is drawn between the reasons (motif) which may concern the findings
of fact or the finding of law and the holdings (dispositif).
But both are encompassed in the same judgment. This article provides: “the judgment shall have to set forth
succinctly the respective claims of the parties and their grounds. Such presentation may take the form of a reference
to the pleadings of the parties with the indication of their date. Reasons for the judgment shall have to be given. It
15
shall pronounce the decision in the form of holdings”. Instead of summarizing the pleadings of the parties, the
judgment may refer to the final written pleadings identified by the date. If there is only one written pleading there is
no need for the date (Cass. 2nd civ., 28 mar. 2003, bull. II, n°165).
Another distinction is drawn between the objective or relief of the claim (“objet” or “prétention”) and the reasons
(“fondement”, “moyen” or “causes”) of the claim.
These reasons may be factual or legal meaning based on the facts of the case or on rules of law. A discussion arose
among scholars about the definition of the judgment’s reasons because two articles of the CPC seem contrasting. In
article 6 CPC, reasons are based on the facts of the case: “in support of their claims, the parties shall be held to
allege the relevant facts giving rise to them”. The reasons here seems to be only based on fact.
Nevertheless, article 565 CPC provides: “claims shall not be considered as new where they pursue the same object
as those submitted before the lower judge even where their foundation in law is different”. In this provision which
deals with appeal procedure, the reasons given by the claimant is based in law. Scholars consider now that the
“causes” or reasons of the claim are both in law and in fact.
The judge has to answer to the reasons in the first part of his judgement (“motifs”) and to the relief or objective of
the claim in the holdings (“dispositif”).
There is no other formal distinction between the final determination and the findings of fact and law on which the
determination is based.
But questions of admissibility (article 123 CPC), jurisdiction (article 74 CPC) or applicable law have to be answered
first. Jurisdiction and procedural question have to be presented before the admissibility and substantial question.
Sometimes there may be some previous questions of a substantive matter: for example the labor judge has to qualify
a contract as a labor contract in order to decide if he has jurisdiction. In this situation, article 77 CPC provides
“where he does not rule upon the substance of the dispute, but where the determination of a point of jurisdiction
shall be dependent upon the substance at issue, the judge shall have to, in the holding of the judgment, rule upon the
substantive issue and upon jurisdiction by separate dispositions” (see below).
C. The binding character of a judgment
Please describe the prerequisites for a judgment to have binding character so as to be capable of having preclusive
effects in your legal system.
Summary:
In France, a distinction may be drawn between « autorité de la chose jugée » and « force de chose jugée ». A
judgment has the authority of res judicata in the sense that it is not possible to lodge the same claim in the court of
first instance. It will have such an effect from its pronouncement and will be capable of execution and enforcement,
as long as no appeal has been lodged. If an appeal has been lodged, the judgment cannot be executed until the
appellate process is exhausted. The judgment will receive the “force de chose jugée” and be considered definitive if
the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the party against whom the judgment is enforceable receives
notification of the execution, and (2) the judgment is not subject to any review staying its execution. If there is no
recourse remaining (especially petition in cassation), the judgment is irrevocable.
Full response:
The French classification is not so simple because there are several concepts “autorité de chose jugée” (authority of
res judicata), “force de chose jugée” (force of res judicata), “force executoire” (enforceability), definitive judgment
and irrevocable judgment. Maybe French law on this point is not clear enough. Perrot and Fricéro (op. cit., n°6)
wrote : “ the confusion is born from a distortion of terminology. One of the condition for the enforcement is that the
judgment is in force of res judicata.
1.- Res judicata (“autorité de la chose jugée”).
Judgment is res judicata from its pronouncement. It means that the same case may not be tried twice. An appeal
may be lodged against the judgment.
2.- Force of res judicata (“force de chose jugée”).
The judgment is in force of res judicata (“force de chose jugée”) when notified and when there is no review staying
the execution. The judgment has in effect the authority of res judicata (“force de chose jugée”) and therefore may be
enforced.
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21. The first condition of “force de chose jugée”: notification.
According to Article 503 “judgments may not be executed against the parties standing liable thereto unless they
have been notified, save where the enforcement is voluntary. In the event of an execution on the mere production of
the original [minute which means small judgment without the certificate of enforcement], the said production shall
amount to a notification”.
This last hypothesis deals with the ex parte order (“ordonnance sur requête”). Because the defendant has to have no
knowledge, the mere production of the original is the equivalent of notification. Article 502 CPC provides: “a
judgment or an instrument may be enforced only on the production of a certified copy imprinted with a certificate of
enforcement, save where the law provides otherwise”.
The notification of the judgment has to be made by an enforcement agent (huissier).
22. The second condition of “force de chose jugée”: no review staying the execution.
Article 500 CPC provides “has force of res judicata [“force de chose jugée”] the judgment which is not subject to
any review staying its execution”.
The review which stays its execution is appeal and motion to vacate. A judgement which is not subject to review is
under 4000 euros (first and last resort: “en premier et dernier ressort”).
A judgement is res judicata from its pronouncement but is in force of res judicata (“force de chose jugée”), only
after notification and absence of possible review staying its execution. The same article provides: “the judgment
which is subject to such a review shall have the same authority on the expiration of the time-limit for such a review
where the same has not been made within the time-limit”. The time-limit for an appeal is one month (15 days for
interlocutory judgement).
3. Enforceability.
It is enforceable (“exécutoire”) when it is in force of res judicata. This means: when notified (see above article 500
CPC) and when there is no review staying the execution; appeal only stays the enforcement. A judgment may be
enforced when it is in force of res judicata. The reason why French law is not very clear is that enforceability is
defined by the concept of “force de chose jugée”. So enforceability and force of res judicata may be confused.
According to article 501”The judgment shall be enforced, under the following conditions, as from the moment it as
force of res judicata [“force de chose jugée”], save where the debtor enjoys the benefit of a period of grace or the
creditor enjoys the benefit of a provisional enforcement”.
There are exceptions in case of provisional enforcement or period of grace. Sometimes a judgment is in force of res
judicata and is not enforceable or a judgment is enforceable and is not in force of res judicata. In case of provisional
enforcement, the judgment is enforced before or during the appeal period so that the judgment is not yet in force of
res judicata. In case of a period of grace, the judgment may have force of res judicata (notification and no appeal)
but the judgment is not yet enforceable. As a result enforceability and force of res judicata are not equal.
While an appeal is pending the first judgment has preclusive effect in the sense that it is not possible to lodge the
same claim in the first instance (cass. 2nd civ., 10 mar. 2005, Procedures 2005, n°119, Perrot), but execution is
stayed except if a provisional execution is granted. A freezing injunction based on this first instance judgment may
be ordered.
The general consequences of a reversed judgment that was previously binding is stated by article 561 CPC: “an
appeal shall join issues in relation to a matter already determined before a court of appeal in order that they be
adjudged de novo on a consideration of the facts and of the law”.
In literal translation of the idea of “de novo” (given by the official website Legifrance which is not an official
translation), appeal challenges res judicata and the case is judged again in law and fact. Which means that the
judgment of the court of appeal replaces the first judgment which has no more res judicata ; the court of appeal
judgment has to be executed.
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4.- Definitive judgment.
The judgment is considered as definitive when it is enforceable but there is still a possible review by the Court de
cassation which is in law and which does not stay the execution. The review in the Court of cassation concerns only
points of law and not on facts. There is another recourse which may be made by a third person (“tierce opposition”)
and which does not stay the execution. The judgment becomes final (“definitive”) and so binding when the time
limit of the appeal has expired and when the judgment has been notified.
The definitive judgment has another meaning when it is opposed to provisional decisions (see below question D).
5.- Irrevocable judgment.
The judgment is irrevocable (“irrévocable”) when there is no possible remedy remaining (no petition in cassation, no
appeal except a very rare factual review or a third party application since the judgment is not notified to the third
parties).
D. Judgments that are capable of having preclusive effects
Please identify and describe (1) the types and characteristics of judgments in your legal system that are capable of
having preclusive effect and (2) any types of judgments that are not capable of having preclusive effects.
Summary:
The following judgments are capable of having preclusive effects in France: (1) judgments which decide all or part
of the main issue in the claim; (2) those ruling upon a procedural plea; (3) judgments for peremptory declaration of
inadmissibility or any other incidental application (e.g. judgments dealing with pleas relating to statutes of
limitations or res judicata issues). The following judgments are not capable of having preclusive effects: (1) nondefinitive judgments (jugement avant-dire droit), (2) summary interlocutory orders (although such may be given
provisional preclusive effects if the result is contentious, and not ex parte, proceedings), (3) and pre arranged
judgment (“jugement d’expédient”). Furthermore, neither (1) judgment of acknowledgment (“jugement de donner
acte”); (2) judicial contracts; nor (3) measures of judicial administration (which deal with court work and the
scheduling of proceedings) will have preclusive effect.
Full response:
The distinction is drawn between judgment on the grounds (jugement de fond) and the other judgments. It has to be
said that judgments on the merits may deny the claim and judgments on the grounds may deals with a procedural
plea. As a matter of fact judgments are capable of having preclusive effects when they decide a legal issue whether
substantial or procedural (1). But they are not capable of having preclusive effect if they don’t decide a legal point
(2).
1. Judgments capable of having preclusive effects
The main article on this subject is article 480 CPC which provides: “the judgment which decides in its holdings all
or part of the main issue, or one which rules upon the procedural plea, a plea seeking a peremptory declaration of
inadmissibility or any other incidental application, shall from the time of its pronouncement, become res judicata
with regard to the dispute which it determines. The main issue shall mean the subject-matter of the litigation as
specified under Article 4”.
The distinction is not drawn between procedural and substantive judgments but the list given below begins with the
judgment which decides all or part of the main issue which is the judgment on the merits which may deny the claim.
The judgment may be declaratory or constitutive but the distinction is not legal but only academic. There is no
consequence to this distinction except in a theoretical approach. The judgment may be non contentious (art. 25 CPC).
There has been discussion in the academic legal community (“la doctrine”) about non contentious judgment because
article 480 deals with a dispute. So in the opinion of some scholars non contentious judgment does not have res
judicata (e.g Perrot and Fricéro, op. cit., n°27). But since recourses are open against non contentious judgment, the
majority of scholars consider that non contentious judgments have res judicata (since an appeal challenges res
judicata see art. 561 CPC).
Then the judgment which rules upon the procedural plea which may concern jurisdiction or another procedural plea
such as non validity of the service of notification has res judicata.
The judgment which rules upon a plea seeking a peremptory declaration of inadmissibility (no interest, quality or
“power of attorney”, statute of limitation and res judicata) has res judicata as well.
Other incidental applications have res judicata, for example if there is a fraudulent document or falsification of
signature
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2. Judgments that are not capable of having preclusive effects.
This category dealt with other judgments or judge’s act. The title XIV of the CPC on judgment distinguishes
judgments on the grounds (section one) which have res judicata and other judgments (Section II) which have not res
judicata. As a matter of fact, there are 5 types of judgments that are not capable of having preclusive effect.
21. non definitive judgment.
The sub-section 1 of section 2 on other judgments deals with non definitive judgments (« jugement avant-dire
droit »). There are two kinds of non definitive judgments: order about evidence (which orders an expert for example)
and provisional order. A provisional order may be a provisional amount of money for example.
According to article 482 “the judgment which is limited in its holdings to giving an order regarding means of
evidence [“measures d’instruction”] or a provisional order shall not carry, on the main issue, the authority of res
judicata”.
This article means that it caries the authority of res judicata for the provisional issue but the tribunal is not bound to
determine the definitive judgment. The decision taken before the definitive judgment may not be reversed by the
judge who ordered it except in case of changing circumstances.
French law is a little bit confusing about definitive judgment because it has two meanings: an enforceable judgment
(notification and no appeal) or the opposite of a non definitive judgment “jugement avant dire droit”, in other word a
judgment on the grounds against an appeal may be lodged.
There are mix judgment (“jugement mixte” which are at the same time definitive and provisional). For example, a
judgment may decide that a party is liable and chooses an expert to evaluate the damages. The liability is a definitive
judgment which has res judicata. The order regarding the expert is an interlocutory decision which has no res
judicata. It means that after the expert advice on the damages, there will be a new definitive judgment on the
damages (Perrot and Fricéro, n°77). In a mix judgment only the definitive part has res judicata. The problem is that
sometimes it is difficult to determine if a judgment is a mix judgment. Example one: a judgment which ordered a
expert and stated that the fault was established is a mix judgment (cass. 3rd civ., 29 june 1977 RTDciv. 1978, p.425
Perrot). Example two: a judgment which orders an expert and predetermines a rent is not a mix judgment but a non
definitive judgment. So the tribunal on the grounds is not bound by this judgment (CA Paris 26 nov. 1986, D. 1987,
IR p.1). Last example: a bank company wanted to obtain the authorisation to seize a debtor bank account whereas
there was a pending trial on the grounds. The court stayed this authorization and condemned the bank company to
pay damages because of an abuse of action. The bank company lodged an appeal against the damages considering
that it was a mix judgment and that this part of the judgment was final. But the court of cassation decided that
damages for an abuse of action was not on the grounds. So the immediate appeal was not admissible (Cass. 2° civ.,
26 oct. 2006).
22. Interlocutory order.
The sub-section 2 of section 2 is about summary interlocutory orders; they are not res judicata on the main issue.
Since the judge is not seized on the main issue, the summary order has not res judicata on the main issue but may
not be reversed except if there are new circumstances. According to article 484: “a summary interlocutory procedure
order shall be a provisional order given at the request of one party, the other party being present or called, in cases
where the law confers upon a judge who is not seized of the main issue, the power to give immediately the necessary
orders”. “Necessary orders” mean urgent measure in waiting for the definitive judgment.
There is a discussion among scholars to determine whether summary judgments get provisional res judicata (opinion
of Motulsky). This analysis is now accepted by the majority of scholars for the adversarial order (“référé”) but not
for the ex parte order which may be modified easily by the judge who rendered it (Cadiet et Jeuland, op. cit., n°727).
23. The pre arranged judgment (“jugement d’expédient”).
There is no reference to this judgment in the civil procedural code but it exists in case law and is defined by scholars.
The pre arranged judgment (“jugement d’accord”, “jugement convenu” or “jugement d’expédient ») is a real
jugement given by a judge when the parties pre arranged a decision prior to going to court. For example, when there
was only a divorce based on fault in France (before 1975), a lot of couples agreed to say that there was a fault to
obtain the judgment when there was no fault. This type of judgment is considered as a contentious judgment because
it looks like a formal contentious judgment. So a party cannot lodge a new claim in the same case after the judgment.
24. The judgment of acknowledgment (“jugement de donner acte”).
19
There is no reference to this judgment in the civil procedural code but it exists in case law and is defined by scholars.
A judgment of acknowledgment is given when a judge recognizes a declaration of a party or of a third party. It is not
considered as a real judgment and has no res judicata.
For example a judgment which states that a party wants to keep the possibility to sue in the future another party for a
damage is a simple judgment of acknowledgment without res judicata. In a future suit the tribunal will not be bound
by this judgment and is not obligated to grant damages.
25. Judicial contract.
The existence of a judicial contract (“contrat judiciaire”) may be mentioned (Cadiet et Jeuland, op. cit., n°105).
It is an enforceable act of the judge which takes into account an agreement between parties. But it has the nature of a
contract and may not be reviewed as a judgment (for example: Cass. 2° civ., 20 oct. 1993, JCP 93, IV, 2685).
It may only be challenged as a contract (annulment of the general agreement between the parties and the certificate
of the judge). The problem is that new statutes modified the nature of this judge act and in this particular case the
judicial contract has become a non contentious judgment with possible reviewing (appeal and other recourses).
Article 131-12 CPC is applicable to judicial mediation (a mediation decided by a judge with the agreement of the
parties. This article states: “at the request of the parties the judge shall approve by way of homologation the
agreement that they shall submit before him. Homologation shall appertain to non-contentious matters”. The
reasoning is as follow: since the homologation is a non contentious judgment, since non contentious judgment may
be reviewed by an appeal and since an appeal challenges the authority of res judicata (art 561 CPC ‘appeal
challenges res judicata …”), the homolgation has res judicata.
Article 1441-4 is applicable to settlements concluded outside tribunal (opposite to judicial mediation). This article
states “the president of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, seised by way of petition by a party to the settlement
agreement, shall confer an entitlement to enforcement to the Consent Agreement produced before him”. This article
does not indicate whether it is a non contentious judgment but a case was in favour of this analysis (Versailles 18
juin 2003, D. 2004 p.1332 note Merveille and Thominette ). The court of cassation decided recently that it was an ex
parte order with a possibility of recourse: the ex parte order may be changed by the judges who decided it. But an ex
parte order has no res judicata (Cass. 2nd civ., 24 may 2007, D. 2007, AJ 167).
26. Measure of judicial administration.
To this list, the administrative order or measure of judicial administration may be added. It is not a judgment so
there is no remedy and therefore it is not res judicata. But there are many measures of judicial administration.
There exist two categories (Cadiet et Jeuland, op. cit., n°101).
-
The first category encompasses measures which organize the court work such as the allocation of cases
between sections of the tribunal and the designation of judges. The schedule order in the court is part of this
category.
-
The second category deals with the administration of each case and may encompass the schedule of the
proceedings, the decision to exclude the case from the general list of cases or the decision to postpone a
hearing (“renvoi”).
Article 537 is the only article which deals with this kind of measure. It provides “measures of judicial
administration shall not be subject to any review”. Since there is no review, this decision is not a judgment and has
no res judicata. The criterion of this kind of measures is that it may not damage the parties (Cass. Soc., 24 mai 1995,
RTDciv. 1995, 958 obs. R Perrot).
A last category of judgement may be mentioned : the judgment given when the case is not ready to be tried because
a piece of evidence is lacking (“jugement en l’état”) which has no res judicata (see Bolard, les jugements en “l’état”,
JCP G 1997, I, 4003 and Perrot and Fricero n°103).
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II. Preclusive effects
This part of the questionnaire is concerned with the effects of a judgment (including, for this purpose, any
statement of the reasons given for a judgment) insofar as it restricts the ability of the participants in the
proceedings in which it was given, or related or non-related persons, to bring or conduct later proceedings
(whether or not forming part of the same action) as they would wish. In particular, this section is concerned
with so-called rules of "res judicata" or their equivalent. References to "Claimant" are to the person seeking
a remedy from the court, and references to "Defendant" are to the person against whom a remedy is sought.1
The terminology used in this intended for guidance only and is not intended to exclude or restrict discussion
of the legal concepts and terms which are relevant to your legal system. This section is not concerned with the
evidential status of the record of judgment, nor with the value of judgments as a legal precedent for future
cases (stare decisis), both of which fall outside the scope of this Project. For the purpose of drafting the
questionnaire, a distinction has been drawn between "claim preclusive effects" (see Part II.A) and "issue
preclusive effects" (see Part II.B). These are intended to be descriptive categories, the former (which might
also be described as "same claim preclusion") embracing rules of preclusion affecting the raising of claims
which a legal system considers to have been determined in earlier proceedings and the latter embracing rules
of preclusion affecting attempts to re-open issues of law or fact which a legal system regards as having
already been determined in earlier proceedings. A third category of "wider preclusive effects" has been used
(see Part II.C) to accommodate rules of preclusion which are considered to fall into neither of these
categories. Those co-ordinating the Project recognise, however, that different legal systems will approach the
categorisation differently depending on how they define the concepts of “claim” and “issue”, and that
terminology will vary (e.g. in England, reference is made to "cause of action estoppel", "issue estoppel" and
to various other rules, including "abuse of process"). Rapporteurs are thus encouraged to be flexible and to
fit their description of the law and practice of their legal system into the framework established below as they
think most appropriate.
A. Claim preclusion
1. Existence and nature of claim preclusive effects
Are judgments in your legal system capable of having claim preclusive effects?
Yes, judgments are capable of having claim preclusive effects according to article 1351 Civil Code (see below),
articles 480 and 122 CPC (see below).
A comparison is made between the second writ of action and the judgment.
The judgment has res judicata since the pronouncement even though the judgment has not been served yet.
2. Policies underlying claim preclusive effects
What are the policy considerations for the claim preclusive effect of judgments in your legal system?
Summary:
The policy underlying the concept of preclusive effects is that of truth. It centers on combining two opposing ideas:
the need for stability and human fallibility. It tends to rationalize and moralize the parties behavior.
Full response:
The traditional policy of res judicata is the truth.
Articles 1350 and 1351 CC are placed in the section on evidence in the civil code. Res judicata is specifically a
presumption because the truth is presumed from the judgment. Article 1350 CC states :”a statutory presumption is
one which is attached by a special statute to certain transactions or to certain facts; such as:
3° The authority which law gives to res judicata”.
Jacques Heron and Thierry Le Bars write: “legal system presumes the judges decision as truth”.
1
Thus, for example, a person named as Defendant in legal proceedings who advances a counterclaim should be treated as "Defendant" for the
purposes of the main claim against him (including, for example, any true defence of set-off) and "Claimant" for the purposes of the counterclaim.
21
A latin adage is the origin of this approach: res judicata pro veritate habetur (see Boyer et Roland, adages romains,
Litec) which means res judicata is considered as the truth.
This traditional ground is discussed because an erroneous judgment still has res judicata even though it has been
proven a false judgment. Moreover the existence of recourses involves that the judgment does not say always the
truth (Perrot and Fricéro, op. cit., n°4).
There is a very rare and difficult legal recourse called reconsideration (revision) when new evidence of fact appears
after the judgment. There are less than 5 reconsideration proceedings each year (art. 593, 731 CPC).
In a way, res judicata protects the judgments which are questionable (Heron and Le Bars, n°332). Scholars prefer to
use the expression of “power of legal truth” rather than presumption of truth (Wiederkehr, Verbo autorité de chose
jugée, Dictionnaire de la justice, dir. Cadiet, 2004, p.85). An erroneous judgment may be imposed if there is any
further possible recourse.
This opinion was discussed by Georges Wiederkehr since a judgment is right or wrong but not false or true. So to
this author, the grounds of res judicata are not legal truth. According to his opinion, res judicata is based on the
judge function: he makes a ruling so his decision constitutes law. Since his decision is a part of law, it has res
judicata. This explains why his decision may not be challenged except in the event of an appeal.
Another opinion considers that the judgment still expresses the truth. But this truth is not a scientific truth (for
example: truth emerging from a DNA evidence) which always has a degree – even the slightest - of uncertainty
(according to epistemologists such as Popper, see Jeuland, dictionnaire de la justice, Verbo expertise).
The judicial truth is infallible if there is no more recourse by decision of a man. This truth is a human truth which
may be based on the will to reassure the social peace. Res judicata and recourses combine two opposite ideas: the
necessity of stability and the human fallibility. In order to stabilize human relationships, the judgment may not be
challenged after the one month appeal period has elapsed.
Another idea is that res judicata is a tool to rationalize and moralize the parties’ behavior (Normand RTDciv. 1995,
p.177). The parties have to choose and use all the legal and factual arguments from the beginning (see Cesareo Case
below)
3. Conditions for claim preclusive effects
What are the conditions for the claim preclusive effects of a judgment?
Summary:
The prevailing test for whether a judgment will have claim preclusive effect is the triple identity test. This requires
that the second action involve (1) the same parties; (2) the same relief; and (3) the same legal grounds. However, the
triple identity test has, of late, not been strictly adhered to, and instead, there is a growing trend which focuses on the
general concept of the first set of proceedings as a whole. If new factual circumstances arise between the first and
second action, a new claim between the same parties will be admissible.
Full response:
Two articles deal with res judicata.
Article 1351 of the Civil Code is the traditional one. It encompasses the triple identity test: “the force of res
judicata takes place only with respect to what was the subject matter of a judgment. It is necessary that the thing
claimed be the same; that the claim be based on the same grounds; that the claim be between the same parties and
brought by them and against them in the same capacity”.
The article 480 CPC which entered into force in 1976 is different and inspired by the great scholar Motulsky who
wrote an article criticizing the triple identity test (pour une delimitation plus precise de l’autorité de la chose jugée
en matière civile, D. 1968, chron. P.1).
He suggested that the judge compare more generally the dispute contained in the new claim and the dispute settled
by the judgement. Motuslky opinion was followed by the authors of the procedural code.
This is why article 480 CPC provides: “the judgment which decides in its holdings all or part of the main issue, or
one which rules upon the procedural plea, a plea seeking a peremptory declaration of inadmissibility or any other
incidental application, shall from the time of its pronouncement, become res judicata with regard to the dispute
which it determines”. The important part of this article is “with regard to the dispute”.
However article 1351 is higher in the norms hierarchy since the civil code is a legal statute and the code of civil
procedure a mere governmental regulation (décret).
22
Both articles are quoted by the cases but article 1351 CC still prevails to define what a dispute is. As we will see, the
triple identity test is no longer strictly respected.
The trend is to concentrate the grounds in the same proceedings and thus to take into account article 480 CPC which
deals with the general concept of dispute. In particular, the legal grounds (causa petendi ou causes de la demande)
have to be concentrated in one trial.
If one ground is not presented in the first trial, it may not be presented in a new claim. To explain this recent
development we need to expose the triple identity test in French law.
It has to be mentioned that if a judgment on res judicata does not refer to this test distinguishing parties, relief and
ground, it will be reversed by the court of cassation (eg cass. 2° civ., 16 mar. 1995, bull.n°55). If there is one or two
identities lacking the new claim is admissible. The problem is that neither the “cause” (grounds) nor the “object”
(relief) is clearly defined. Cases law uses this absence of definition to expand or restrict the scope of res judicata on
a case by case basis. There have been academics attempt to clarify these concepts or to substitute clearer concept.
Nevertheless these attempts failed because there would need a legislative change to modify article 1351 CC. So we
need to present in details the triple identity test (Perrot and Fricero, op. cit., n°127 quoting Motulsky and Vizioz).
31.- Same parties.
This requisite is easy to understand. There are two sub-conditions: a person was a party to the first trial and is still a
party in the new trial. Defendant, claimant and interveners are parties in the first trial. Intervention may be voluntary
or forced by another party. But a person who participates for a mere point of evidence was not considered as a party
in the first trial for res judicata test (Cass. 2° civ., 15 july 1975, JCP G 1976 II, 18313 Daigre).
A party not present during the first trial may be represented and therefore considered as a party. So a minor who is
represented by his parents in a first trial may not be a party in a second claim (art. 492 CC).
Case law uses he concept of identity of parties to expand res judicata in order to include situations where there are
persons who have the same interest (Perrot and Fricero, op. cit., n°141). Moreover creditors are considered as
represented by their debtors in one trial except if the debtor commits fraud (Cass. 1st civ., 8 nov. 1976, Bull. I,
n°331). An assignee is considered to be represented by his assignor in the first trial.
Another issue is when a party is involved in the second claim in another legal position (qualité).
For example, the first claim was between one party A and another physical person B ; the second claim is made by
A against the firm C represented by B so that the second claim is also sent to B. B is sued twice but not in the same
legal position. In the second case, he is not a party, but the mere attorney of a party. As a result, the second case is
admissible (Cass. 1st civ., 7 jan. 1976 bull. I, n°7)
If a party had the position of a heir of one party in a first trial and bring an action on his own in a second claim, there
is no identity of parties (Cass. 2nd civ., 6 july 1967, bull. II, n°247).
32. Same relief (objet de la prétention, petitum).
If the second claim deals with the same relief, for example damages, it is not admissible. For example a boundary
action has not the same relief has an ownership action (Cass. 3° civ., 18 oct. 2006, Bull. III, n°202).
If there are new facts after the first judgment, the new claim is admissible even though what is claimed is identical to
the first trial. For example a Landlord wants to end a rental agreement because of the faults committed by the renter.
The first judgment did not allow him to do it. But since there were new faults after the first judgment, a new claim
seeking the same outcome was admissible.
In liability litigation, if a victim obtained damages from an initial judgment, he may obtain further damages in a
subsequent trial if he can present a new damage. If the physical state of the victim gets worst after an initial trial, he
can claim new damages in a subsequent trial (Cass. 2 civ., 30 oct. 1984, Bull. n°198). It may be a distinct damage
(physical damage and then an emotional and psychological damage). Nevertheless if it is not a new physical damage
but a new medical treatment, it is not an admissible claim (cass. 2 civ., 19 dec. 1977 RTDciv. 79, 618 Durry) but
there is a contrasting case by the social chamber of the court of cassation (Soc., 14 april 1976, Bull V, n°220).
The difficulty concerns the implicit judgment. In one case, the first judgment decided that a contractual party has to
comply with the contract. This contractual party lodged a second claim seeking the annulment of the contract. The
court of cassation decided that the validity of the contract was implicit in the first judgment (Cass. 1re, 28 mars 1995,
D. 1996, 121 Benabent).
23
A tribunal may not impose the performance of the contract if it does not consider the contract valid. This decision
was criticized by the commentators because it leads to a difficult determination of what is implicit.
More recently court of cassation judgements decided that the validity of a contract is not implicitly decided when the
tribunal orders a party to perform the contract (Cass. 1re civ., 1er juil.1997, Bull. I, n°219).
33. Same grounds
The traditional position was that it was possible to make a new claim between the same parties for the same relief
with new grounds. For example: if a first judgment denied damages for personal fault (on the ground of article 1382
of the Civil code), it was possible to bring a new claim on the ground of product liability (1384 or 1386 of the Civil
code eg Cass. Req. 21 jan. 1941, Gaz. Pal. 41, 1, p.135).
This traditional case law was reversed by a recent court of cassation judgment (Cass. Ass. Plén., 7 juil. 2006, D.
2006, Jurisprudence p. 2135 « Renouvellement des critères de l'autorité de la chose jugée : l'Assemblée plénière
invite à relire Motulsky », Laura Weiller).
In this Cesareo case, a man died and transferred his inheritance to his two sons. One of them A used to work with
him for years without being paid. Brother A asked brother B to pay him the amount of the wages owed out of
brother’s b part of the inheritance. His grounds was an article of the rural code which provides that in case a person
works without being paid for a member of his family, he will be paid from the inheritance. But the tribunal denied
his claim because this article applies only to rural situation which was not the case. The brother brought a new claim
based on the theory of enrichment without cause since his brother received the same amount from the inheritance
without having worked for their father.
The Court of cassation decided that the new claim was inadmissible because A should have presented this ground in
the first trial. It means that the grounds must be concentred in the first trial. If one of them is forgotten, it cannot be
employed in a second claim. The consequence of the Cesareo case is that the parties and the lawyer must present all
the possible grounds in the first claim.
The traditional principle is that grounds may be changed during the proceedings but the relief has to be determined
at the beginning of the trial. An additional claim is possible but it has to be closely connected to the initial claim.
The Cesareo case creates the principle of concentration of grounds in the first trial. This result rationalizes and
moralises proceedings and makes them shorter. The work of the judge is simplified. The claimant must act with
transparency and good faith from the beginning of the trial. He must not hold back grounds for a subsequent new
trial (it used to be a possible tactic). The principle of reasonable delay is taken into account by this case law. It may
be an indirect influence of the European Union law (see Magendie Report, célérité et qualité de la justice, La
documentation française, 2004, p.51).
The Magendie report was in favour of the principle of concentration of grounds in 2004. The facts, legal grounds
and evidences presented late would be inadmissible. The report wondered if there was a need for the principle of
concentration of claims at the beginning of the trial which was suggested in 1993 by the Storme Group (éd. Kluwer,
p.81). But the Magendie report considered that this suggestion has gone too far. This principle would imply to admit
further additional claims in the same trial (even those which are not closely connected to the initial claim).
French procedural applies the principle of concentration of claim in labour law (“principe de l’unicité de l’instance”).
Every claim concerning a particular labour contract has to be made in the initial trial. If a claim is forgotten, it will
not be admissible through a new claim. But in appeal, in labour matter, new claims about the same labour contract,
are admissible. This principle is criticized in labour law because the employees without legal assistance (chich is
possible) often forget important claims. So this principle of concentration of claim becomes sometimes a trap for
certain employees. It is another reason why French law does not welcome the principle of concentration of claim.
But the principle of concentration of grounds is acceptable.
Everything is done now to give more importance to the first instance:
-
In particular, if the judgment has to be provisionally executed before the appeal judgment (in many cases, it
is a discretionary decision often made by the judge in regards to the situation of the parties), the lodging of
the appeal will be dismissed in case where the first judgment has not been provisionally executed (art. 526
CPC). One can not lodge an appeal only to avoid executing a judgment.
-
New claims are rejected in appeal. There are exceptions to this rule. Counterclaims are admissible in appeal
and claims which are the complement of the initial claim (Article 563
”To support on appeal the claims submitted before a lower judge, parties may raise new grounds, produce
new documents or offer new evidence”. Article 564
”Parties may not submit to the court (of appeal) new claims except in order to set-off, to get the opponent's
claims rejected or to obtain a ruling on issues arising from the intervention of a third party or from the
24
occurrence or manifestation of a fact”. Article 565 “Claims are not new as far as they are directed towards
the same purposes as those submitted before the lower judge even where their legal ground is different”.
Article 566 “The parties may also make explicit their claims which were only virtually included in the
claims and defences submitted before the lower judge and may add thereto such other claims as are
collateral, consequential or complementary thereto”. Article 567
”Counter-claim will likewise be admissible on appeal.). Generally speaking, the appeal proceedings have to
deal with the same case but new grounds are admissible. According to Cesareo case, one can not bring the
same claim under new ground in a second first instance but one can lodge an appeal. These two results are
consistant.
-
Cesareo Case has to be understood in relation with a new important case of the 21st of December 2007 (JCP
2008, II, 10006, Weiller). This Dauvin case specifies the power and obligation of the judges in term of
legal grounds. Mr. Dauvin bought a used car and discovered afterwards that the car was in a need of repair.
So he brought an action against the seller to obtain the cost of the repair; a diminishing the sale price and
damages. He claimed that the seller pretended that the car was in perfect condition and that there was a
latent defect. The first judge and the court of appeal decided that the latent defect was not proven and
rejected the claim. The claimant brought a petition in cassation because, according to the claimant, the
court of appeal should have applied another ground which is that the delivery of the car did not coincide
with the seller declaration of the car conditions. The court of cassation decided that the judge is not
obligated to modify the ground of the parties. This case law is based on article 12 CPC which is not clear
on this point: “the judge settles the dispute in accordance with the rules of law applicable thereto. He must
give or restore their proper legal definitions to the disputed facts and deeds notwithstanding the
denominations given by the parties”. Some scholars thought that a judge was obligated to use every ground
applicable. Cesareo case and Dauvin case are connected in term of rationalisation and moralisation of the
proceedings. A party has to present all the grounds possible from the beginning and may not rely on the
judge to complement his argument. So the court of cassation is consistant with itself. Nevertheless the
burden on the party is heavy especially if he does not have a good lawyer (which may be linked to legal aid)
or if he has no lawyer (which is still possible in first instance court except in the high court). The work of
judge is facilitated by these two cases.
Cesareo case has been confirmed several times in 2007 and 2008 by the court of cassation (eg Cass. Com., 20 feb.
2007, Procédures, 2007 n°128 Perrot ; civ. 3, 13 feb. 2008, JCP G 2008 IV, n°142).
So the triple identity test is now limited to the first two identities (relief and parties) as far as legal grounds are
concerned. So it is closer to the German law than before (see German report).
Nevertheless, the factual grounds may have changed between the first judgment and the second claim. In the case of
changing circumstances, a new claim is admissible (Cass. 3 civ., 25 april 2007, D. 2007 AJ 1344).
4. Invoking claim preclusive effects
Please describe how the claim preclusive effects of a judgment are invoked in your legal system.
Summary:
Party may invoke the claim preclusive effects of a prior judgment at any time during the proceedings, although he or
she may be subject to a penalty if this occurs at the end of the proceedings and the invoking party had been aware of
the judgment for some time. Additionally, the court may decide of its own motion to raise the issue of preclusion,
but it is not obliged to do so. If a prior judgment is successfully invoked for its claim preclusive effects, the
opponent’s claim will be considered inadmissible.
Full response:
The claim preclusive effects of a judgment are a reason of non admissibility (fin de non recevoir).
Article 122 CPC provides : “Shall constitute a plea seeking a peremptory declaration of inadmissibility one which,
without an examination on the merits of the case, shall cause to render the opponent’s claim inadmissible on the
grounds that it does not disclose a right of action, a locus standi or an interest, or it is precluded by virtue of
prescription, a determined time-limit or by the operation of res judicata”.
The causes of inadmissibility may be invoked at any time of the proceedings nevertheless there may be damages if
they are invoked at the end of the proceedings, whereas this cause of inadmissibility has been known for a long time.
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Article 123 CPC states: “A plea seeking a peremptory declaration of inadmissibility may be brought at any stage of
the proceedings save that the judge may order damages and interest against those who, in a dilatory intention, failed
to raise them earlier”.
To obtain the declaration of inadmissibility, the defendant needs not prove a damage caused by the reasons of non
admissibility.
Since the decree of the 28th December 2005, the judge may decide to declare the claim inadmissible without the
parties’ request. The trend is to strengthen the powers of the judge to limit the amount of pending cases in court. It
explains why the judge may now invoke the effects of res judicata. The judge is not obligated to do so but he may do
so.
5. Exceptions to claim preclusive effects
Please verify whether the claim preclusive effect of judgments in your legal system is subject to generally accepted
exceptions.
There is no exception to claim preclusive effects if the requisites of res judicata are fulfilled.
If there are new facts the identity of fact is no more met.
If there was a dismissal of the case due to voluntary withdrawal, there is no judgment so there is no preclusive
effect. The statute of fraud may lead to the cancellation of the judgment and a reform but it is not really an
exception, it is a reason for the recourse.
If the judgment was not on the merits it has res judicata only for what it decided (an expertise for example). If it is
an interlocutory injunction it has provisional res judicata. So it is not possible to obtain a change of this decision
except if there are new facts. Nevertheless the judge who decides on the merits is not bound by the interlocutory
judgment.
In the previous section, the Questionnaire addressed general aspects of claim preclusive effects of judgments.
The following numbered points address particular questions that may arise in relation to the operation of the
claim preclusive effects of judgments in particular circumstances which may be subject to specific rules and
conditions. It is appreciated that some of the issues you have addressed in the more general answers in the
previous section will be involved when you consider these specific situations. Therefore, it is important that
you provide an insight in this section into the particularities, if any, of the application of claim preclusion in
the circumstances as described.
6. Claimant and Defendant
May a Claimant or Defendant in your legal system be prevented by judgment on a particular claim from bringing or
defending fresh proceedings against the Defendant or Claimant based on what is considered in your legal system to
be the same claim?
Anti suit injunction does not exist in French law.
If res judicata is invoked late in the proceedings the judge has to take it into account but may condemn the defendant
to pay damages because he waited too long (art 32-1 CPC “a litigant acting in a dilatory or vexatious manner may be
penalised by way of a civil penalty of E 3 000, without prejudice to damages and interests thereon which may be
claimed”). But if the new claim does not seek the same remedy, there may not be a abuse of action (civ. 3°, 31 mars
2005 : JCP 2005, IV, 2122).
The first judgment has res judicata until the appeal judgment.
So, if the first set of proceedings is under appeal, the first judgment has res judicata and new claim identical to the
judgment will not be admissible (eg civ. 1, 11 juin 1991, bull. Civ. I, n°189 ; civ. 2°, 10 mars 2005, Bull. Civ. II,
n°60).
7. Other participants
To what extent, if at all, do the claim preclusive effects of judgments extend to other participants in the litigation?
Summary:
26
A judgment’s claim preclusive effects applies to all the parties in the action, including those parties who have
intervened, and those third parties who have been brought into the action usually for purposes of indemnification. A
judgment will also be binding against the universal successor of a party.
Full response:
The judgment has res judicata on all the parties even to the interveners.
The intervention may be voluntary or imposed (art 325 to 328 CPC).
In any case, the intervener is a party, so the judgment has res judicata on him.
It is possible to force a third person to become bound by a judgment (intervention force afin de rendre commun le
jugement). According to article 331 “a third party may be joined for the purpose of being cast in judgment by any
party who has the right to bring a claim against the former. He may likewise be sued by a party who has an interest
in making the judgment common to them all. The third party shall have to be called in good time to establish his
defence”.
As a consequence, the judgment has res judicata on this third party who may not bring the same action in court. But
the judgment is not an enforcement title against this third party (civ. 3°, 23 juin 1981, Bull. n°132).
Moreover, the judgment has res judicata on the universal successor of a party (eg in the case of a merging of
companies). If a Union brings an action in the collective interest of a group of persons without being an attorney of
these persons, the judgment has no res judicata to these persons (soc. 20 mai 1985 Bull n°297).
8. Represented persons
Does your legal system provide for group/representative actions (including, for example, US-style class actions)? To
what extent, if at all, do the claim preclusive effects of judgments in such actions extend to the other members of the
group/persons represented in the action?
Summary:
While no US-style class actions exist in France, French law distinguishes between several types of representative
actions. First, there is what is considered the usual representation which may be either legal, judicial, or contractual.
In these cases, the judgment will have preclusive effects on the represented party. Additionally, French law provides
for an action of joined representation, e.g. a consumer association representing several consumers. In such cases,
only the consumers, and not the association itself, are bound by the judgment. Furthermore, there are situations
whereby representation is implicit in a judgment. For instance, a judgment condemning a debtor binds his creditors
who cannot make a third party application. There are also collective means of redress, e.g. via labour unions or
associations usually in the context of consumer or environmental law. In these actions, the judgment will bind the
union or the association, but will not preclude future personal actions by the members. Lastly, there is a category of
actions called substitutive actions that may take place in situations involving corporate law, e.g. where a small group
of shareholders may bring an action against the chairman in the place of the company.
Full response:
This is a difficult point because the concept of representation is larger in procedural law than in civil law. Different
situations may be distinguished.
There is the usual representation which may be legal (the parents for their children, a chairman for his company),
judicial (the judge may decide that a spouse represents her husband who is not capable to do so e.g. he is in a coma)
or contractual.
The judgment has res judicata on the represented person who is the real party but not to the attorney who is not a
party.
There is a specific action of joined representation (art L422-1 consumer code). A consumer association may
represent several consumers. The association needs to obtain a written mandate from each consumer. But the
association can not obtain these mandates by doing a public advertisement. This action was created in 1992 (statute
of the 18th of January 1992) when the consumer association demanded French class action.
To date this judicial action has had no success. It has been used less than ten times since 1992. When this action is
brought into court, the judgment has res judicata over the consumers who gave the mandates. But the judgment has
no res judicata on the association.
27
The concept of representation has also a larger meaning in procedural law. Several persons are considered as
implicitly represented and bound by the judgment. A judgment condemning a debtor binds his creditors who are
considered as represented by their debtor in court (com. 18 nov. 1958, Bull., n°397, Heron et Le Bars, n°340). As a
consequence the creditors can not make a third party application (tierce opposition).
There is no class action in France (Cadiet and Jeuland, n°360). The claimant has to have a personal interest.
Nevertheless an association who represents several parties (ligue de défense) is legal. It is a sort of class action
which includes opting in. The parties have to decide before the trial if they want to be claimants. The judgment has
res judicata on each member of the association.
There is no class action with an opting out system or a opting in after the beginning of the trial. A real class action
could be created in the near future in France.
There are collective actions brought by Union (article L 411-11 Labour code) or associations (specific statutes in
consumer law L421-1 consumer law code or environmental law) in the interest of a large group of people
(consumers, employees etc.). The judgment has res judicata on the Union or on the association but, not on their
members who may bring personal actions.
Lastly there are several substitutive actions when a person is too weak to bring an action himself. It is no longer
considered as representative action because there is no mandate. A special statute is necessary since it is an
exception to the requisite of personal interest.
- There are many examples of substantive actions in labour law (Cadiet and Jeuland, n°384). A union may bring an
action in the place of an employee in particular for equality, harassment or discrimination reasons (art. L.123-6,
L.122-42-1, L.122-56 labour code). There are not many examples in practice of this action but it is a tactic which
may be used by Union to threaten employers in negotiations.
- Such an action exists in corporate law. A small part of shareholders may bring an action in the place of a company
against the chairman who is at fault (action ut singuli L223-22 commercial code; L.225-252 commercial code). The
chairman is not going to bring an action, as the attorney of the company, against himself. This kind of action is not
rare.
- A very traditional action may be considered as a substitutive action: art 1166 civil code (action oblique).
- The ministry of economy may bring an action belonging to a supplier against a distributor for illegal contractual
clauses (L442-6 Commercial code, Angers 29 mai 2007, D. 2007, AJ 1953 et Versailles, 3 mai 2007, D. 2007, AJ
1656).
Generally speaking, the substitutive action is not a representative action (soc. 1er fév. 2000, JCP 2001, II, 10451
Jeuland) because the person or group who brings the action is a party not an attorney. The substituted party (for
example an employee) does not give a mandate to the substitute. The substituted party is only informed of this
action.
As a consequence, the substituted person is not a party in this trial. He may bring a parallel action on his own.
Therefore the judgment obtained by the substitute has res judicata on this substitute but not on the substituted person
(but it is an arguable point and there is not a legal or even a clear judicial answer).
The substituted person may make a third party application. Strangely enough if the substitute obtains damages, these
damages belong to the substituted party since it is his substantial right. It is necessary in such a case to distinguish
the substantive effect of the judgment which may benefit to the substituted party and the procedural effect (res
judicata). Usually the substituted party intervenes in the trial so that he becomes a party and the judgment has res
judicata on him.
9. Persons connected to the Claimant, Defendant, and other participants
To what extent, if at all, do the claim preclusive effects of judgments extend to persons who have not directly
participated in the proceedings giving rise to judgment but who are connected in a legally relevant way to the
Claimant, Defendant or another participant in the proceedings?
Summary:
The general principle in French law is that a judgment may not have an effect on a third party. However, some
judgments have absolute effect in that they apply erga omnes. This occurs typically in relation to judgments in
nationality, intellectual property and filiation litigation. The judgment does not have res judicata in the strictest
sense, but rather it has a substantive effect in that it must be taken into account by the third party.
Full response:
28
See question 8 about successors and creditors.
The principle is that the judgment may not have an effect on a third party. A judgment may not impose an obligation
or give right to a third party. Res judicata is relative to the party (relativité de la chose jugée).
A stranger may make a third party application when a judgment may have an effect on him. For example, a
judgment condemned an owner to destroy a house built without authorization; the renter who lives in the house had
an interest to make a third party application.
Some specific judgment has an absolute effect of res judicata in nationality, intellectual property (art L613-27
intellectual property code) and filiation’s litigation.
If a man becomes French as a result of a judgment, his children and grand children may become French as a
consequence of this judgment in certain situation.
If a man is acknowledged to be the father of another, the children of the later have a grand father as a consequence
of the judgment.
These judgments are called “erga omnes” (art 324 civil code). They have absolute res judicata and not only relative.
Heron and Le Bars consider that this kind of judgments has a substantive effect on the third party but it does not
have res judicata. The judgment has to be taken into account by the third party but it is not a matter of res judicata
(Cadiet and Jeuland, n°341).
The third party may not bring the same action in first instance because he would not be entitled to do so (the great
son may not bring again the filiations litigation between his father and his alleged grand father).
The stranger may not make a third party application.
Nevertheless, article L613-27 of the intellectual property code provides that the annulations of a patent as an
“absolute effect except if there is a third party recourse”. So res judicata is absolute but the third party application is
open. A difficult problem is a case where an annulation is refused in the first instance and damages are calculated to
the benefit of the patentee against the counterfeitor. After a second claim for the same patent but not against the
same counterfeitor, the annulation is pronounced. The second judgment has absolute res judicata.
Does it have res judicata even in regard to the first judgment which has only a relative res judicata since it refuses
the annulation? A case law decided that the second judgment does not eliminate the first one so that the damages
are not cancelled (Paris 29 sept. 1995 D.1996, Sommaires commentés p. 288 “Nullité des brevets d'invention :
l'autorité de chose jugée d'une première décision la soustrait à l'effet absolu d'une possible décision d'annulation
ultérieure » Par Jean Marc Mousseron, Joanna Schmidt and Jean-Christophe Galloux).
10. Strangers
To what extent, if at all, do the claim preclusive effects extend to persons who have not directly participated in the
proceedings giving rise to judgment and who are not connected in a legally relevant way to the Claimant, Defendant
or another participant in the proceedings or the subject matter of the action?
Summary:
The discussion above in question 9 is applicable in this instance as well. Generally, a judgment will not have claim
preclusive effects on strangers capable of making a third party application. Furthermore, a third party may make a
motion to set aside a prior judgment provided that the third party has an interest in the litigation and he was neither a
party nor represented in the first action.
Full response:
See question 9. Generally speaking the judgment does not have res judicata on the strangers who may make a third
party application (art 583 CPC) or a first instance action since the parties of this new trial would not be the same as
the previous trial.
Article 583 CPC provides “shall be admissible to bring a third-party application to set aside any person who shows
an interest, provided that he was neither a party nor represented in the judgment which he impugns. The creditors
and other assigns of a party may, notwithstanding the above, lodge a third-party application to set aside a judgment
delivered on a fraudulous exercise in relation to their rights or where they raise grounds which are proper to them. In
non-contentious matters, a third-party application to set aside shall be available only to third parties who have not
been notified; it may be likewise against judgments delivered as of last resort even where the decision has been
notified to them”.
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B. Issue preclusion
1. The existence and nature of issue preclusive effects
Are judgments in your legal system capable of having issue preclusive effects?
Summary:
Only the explicit holdings of a French judgment have preclusive effect. The reasons must not be taken into account.
This rule contradicts the traditional rule which held that reasons were capable of having issue preclusive effect if
they were necessary to support the holdings.
Full response:
The French equivalent to “issue preclusion” is the positive effect of res judicata; even though the idea of positive
effect is less procedural than the idea of issue preclusion. Scholars discuss the existence of this positive effect since
the reasons rarely are an effect of res judicata in a subsequent trial (in principle only the holdings have res judicata
but there are exceptions). Nevertheless, an example may be given: in a first trial a judge stated that a man and a
woman had a sexual relationship. As a consequence the man had to pay a certain amount of money to the woman to
raise her child, even though it was not proven that the man was the father. Then the woman claimed in a second trial
that the man was her child’s father. The judge denied the claim and stated that the man and the woman had not a
sexual relationship. The court of cassation reversed the second judgment deciding that the second judgment could
not put in question what the first judge had stated (Cass. 1re civ., 4 janv. 1995, Bull. 95 I, n°7 see T Le Bars, autorité
positive et autorité negative de chose jugée, Procédures 2007, etude n°12, p.12).
Article 480 CPC provides “The judgment which decides in its holdings all or part of the main issue… become res
judicata with regard to the dispute which it determines”.
This means that only the holdings have res judicata. The reasons of the judgment must not be taken into account.
The rule was different before the current code of procedural law (1976); the reasons had res judicata if they were the
necessary support of the holdings. Nevertheless, the solution leads to a great difficulty; the issue preclusive effect
was unpredictable and hard to know.
The new rule was not easily accepted especially for the first instance judges and court of appeal judges. In the
eighties, the Court of cassation admitted to giving res judicata to “decisive” reasons and deciding reasons.
The decisive reasons (motifs décisifs) are the necessary support of the holdings. The court of cassation decided in
the eighties that their reasons have res judicata (eg : Cass. 3° civ., 27 avril 1982, RTDciv. 83, 236, Normand). The
deciding reasons (motifs décisoires) constitute a decision which is in the form and included in the reasons (see
recently Montpellier 4 mai 2005 JCP 2006 IV 1783).
Now the Court of cassation strictly construes article 480 so that only the explicit holdings have res judicata. The
decisive reasons may not be taken into account (eg civ. 2°, 12 fév. 2004, bull., n° 55). The same formula is always
used by the court of cassation: “the reasons of the judgment, even though they are the necessary support of the
holdings do not have res judicata”.
The deciding reasons (motif décisoire) do not have res judicata, either. In one particular case (eg cass. 2° civ., 22
janv. 2004, D. 2004 som. 1204 obs Julien or cass. 2° civ., 6 avril 2004 Bull. N°152), the reasons stated that the
applicable law did not respect the European convention of human right but the holdings of the judgment did not
encompass this decision , as a result this decision does not have res judicata2.
2
« Attendu que l'arrêté ministériel du 16 mars 1978, qui fixait à Z 90 la cotation provisoire des actes de
scanographie, a été abrogé par un arrêté du 11 juillet 1991 et qu'une circulaire ministérielle du même jour a fixé à Z
19 la nouvelle cotation provisoire ; que les deux actes administratifs du 11 juillet 1991 ont été annulés par deux
arrêts rendus par le Conseil d'Etat le 4 mars 1996, le premier, en raison de l'incompétence de son auteur et le second,
au motif que la banalisation des actes de scanographie n'autorisait plus à leur égard le recours à la cotation
provisoire ; que l'article 27 de la loi n° 97-1164 du 19 décembre 1997 a validé les actes pris sur le fondement de
l'arrêté et de la circulaire du 11 juillet 1991, ainsi que sur le fondement des arrêtés des 1er février 1993, 14 février
1994, 22 février 1995 et 9 avril 1996 qui avaient renouvelé, chaque année, la cotation provisoire à Z 19, en tant que
la légalité de ces règlements serait contestée pour un motif tiré de l'incompétence de leur auteur ; Attendu que la
société civile de moyens Scanner de l'ouest lyonnais (la SCM) a demandé, pour des actes de scanographie pratiqués
entre le 23 septembre 1991 et le 28 février 1997, l'application de la cotation Z 90 et le paiement de la différence avec
30
2. Policies underlying issue preclusive effects
What are the policy considerations for the issue preclusive effect of judgments in your legal system?
Summary:
The French rule that only the holdings are to have preclusive effects is based on a policy of increasing foreseeability
and legal certainty.
Full response:
The current solution is formalist. The underlying policy is that the preclusive effect is foreseeable.
Before the new civil procedural code (1976), the preclusive effect was not easily predictable since the decisive
reasons or holdings written in the reasons had preclusive effect.
To avoid this uncertainty, the new code provides that only the holdings have preclusive effect. The great scholar
Jacques Normand wrote in 1988 : “to end difficulties created by an overly subtle case law, the new procedural
code’s authors have wanted to impose to the judge a perfect mastery of his pen: his decisions are only written in the
holdings. Only the holdings have res judicata.
Although the combination of articles leads to determine with transparency the power of judges (art. 455, 480 and
488, art. 77 and 95 CPC) this field is not yet stabilized. In fifteen years, the court of cassation has not been able to
impose on itself a uniform interpretation of these provisions”3.
Actually, case law has not been very clear since 1976 and there is still a slight uncertainty on this matter (especially
with art. 95 see below). But since 1990 and with what Jacques Normand wrote reminding the court that these
provisions were compulsory even though it may be in certain case a little bit unfair, the court of cassation has made
its possible to be strict in its interpretation.
It is worth mentioning that the frequent expression stating in the holdings that the court of cassation “rejects every
other claim” (other claim than the main issue) has res judicata if it may be deduced out of the reasons that the claim
has been examined (Cass. Com., 9 may 2007, Procédures 2007, n°178 Perrot).
3. Conditions for issue preclusive effects
What are the conditions for the issue preclusive effects of a judgment?
les sommes qui lui avaient été réglées par la Caisse de mutualité sociale agricole de l'Isère sur le fondement de la
cotation Z 19 ; que la décision de rejet de la commission de recours amiable a été déférée au tribunal des affaires de
sécurité sociale par lettre recommandée du 2 mars 1998 ; que par un jugement du 27 avril 1999, le tribunal a dit que
la question préjudicielle de la légalité des arrêtés ministériels fixant la cotation provisoire des actes de scanographie
postérieurement à 1991 devait être soumise au Conseil d'Etat ; que ces arrêtés ont été déclarés illégaux par un arrêt
du 20 novembre 2000 ; que par un jugement du 18 décembre 2001, le tribunal des affaires de sécurité sociale a
décidé que l'abrogation de la cotation Z 90 ayant été validée par l'article 27 de la loi du 19 décembre 1997, les
demandes de la SCM étaient mal fondées ; Sur le premier moyen : Attendu qu'il est fait grief au jugement du 18
décembre 2001 d'avoir ainsi statué, alors, selon le moyen, qu'il ressortait des motifs du jugement du 27 avril 1999,
qui a déclaré écarter l'application de l'article 27 de la loi de validation du 19 décembre 1997 comme contraire aux
exigences de l'article 6 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme, et retenu que la cotation
Z 90 devait s'appliquer aux actes effectués jusqu'au 1er février 1993, date d'entrée en vigueur du premier arrêté
ministériel non annulé qui ait fixé une cotation inférieure, qu'en renvoyant au Conseil d'Etat, dans son dispositif,
l'appréciation de la légalité des arrêtés ministériels dont la loi du 19 décembre 1997 avait pourtant eu pour objet de
valider les effets, le tribunal avait implicitement mais nécessairement jugé que ce texte législatif devait rester sans
application en l'espèce ; qu'en décidant que la chose jugée par ce jugement portait seulement sur le renvoi d'une
question préjudicielle au Conseil d'Etat, le tribunal a violé l'article 480 du nouveau Code de procédure civile ; Mais
attendu que l'autorité de la chose jugée n'a lieu qu'à l'égard de ce qui a fait l'objet du jugement et a été tranché dans
son dispositif ; que le jugement du 27 avril 1999 ayant seulement, dans son dispositif, posé une question
préjudicielle et réservé les demandes des parties, ses motifs relatifs à la non-conformité de la loi de validation à la
Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme étaient dépourvus de l'autorité de la chose jugée ;
D'où il suit que le moyen est mal fondé ».
3
RTDciv. 1988, p.386.
31
Summary:
Because only the holdings have res judicata effect, the conditions are formal. However, a court’s judgment regarding
its own jurisdiction over a case will have res judicata whether or not it is in the holdings.
Full response:
See question B1 and B2.
The condition is only formal: only the holdings have res judicata.
Article 95 CPC may be seen as an exception: “where the judge, in considering his jurisdiction, resolves the
substantive issue determinative of the same, his ensuing decision shall have the authority of res judicata in relation
of this substantive consideration”.
For example, if the labour judge decides that a contract is a labour contract to appreciate if he has jurisdiction in a
litigation of labour law (hours worked for example), this substantive determination will have res judicata even
though it is not in the holdings.
The court of cassation decided that the substantive reasons which are necessary for the decision on the jurisdiction
matter have res judicata (Civ. 1, 12 jul. 2001, bull. n°216). Jacques Ghestin (in Justice et droits fondamentaux, mél.
Normand, Litec, 2003, p.199) criticized this court of cassation’s arrest since it creates an exception and an
uncertainty in this field.
Moreover he argued that article 75 has the same meaning as article 480: “where he does not rule upon the substance
of the dispute, but where the determination of a point of jurisdiction shall be dependent upon the substance at issue,
the judge shall have to, in the holding of the judgment, rule upon the substantive issue and upon jurisdiction by
separate dispositions”. Actually this article indicates “in the holdings of the judgment” not in the reasons. Therefore
the substantive consideration necessary to solve the jurisdiction issue should have preclusive effects only if it was
stated in the holdings. The court of cassation, applying article 77 CPC decided in 2006 that the positive effect of res
judicata was limited to what was decided in the holdings (Cass. 3° civ., 22 mars 2006, Bull. III, n°80).
4. Invoking issue preclusive effects
Please describe how the issue preclusive effects of a judgment are invoked in your legal system.
The preclusive effect is invoked in subsequent proceedings.
There is nothing specific. The previous judgment is simply invoked and its holdings have preclusive effect. There is
no problem of proof.
5. Exceptions to issue preclusive effects
Please verify whether the issue preclusive effect of judgments in your legal system is subject to generally accepted
exceptions.
See above.
In the previous section, the Questionnaire addressed general aspects of issue preclusive effects of judgments.
issue preclusive effects of judgments in particular circumstances which may be subject to specific rules and
you provide an insight in this section into the particularities, if any, of the application of issue preclusion in
May a Claimant or Defendant in your legal system be prevented by judgment on a particular claim from challenging
in the same or subsequent proceedings against the same party any finding (whether adverse or otherwise) on an issue
of fact or law which the court may have determined in giving judgment on a particular claim?
See above.
32
To what extent, if at all, do the issue preclusive effects of judgments extend to other participants in the litigation?
See above.
If your legal system provides for group/representative actions (including, for example, US-style class actions), to
what extent, if at all, do the issue preclusive effects of judgments in such actions extend to the other members of the
There is nothing to be said on this subject in French law, to my knowledge.
What has been said about claim preclusive effects (see above) is applicable.
To what extent, if at all, do the issue preclusive effects of judgments extend to persons who have not directly
participated in the proceedings giving rise to judgment but who are connected in some way to the Claimant,
Defendant or another participant in the proceedings or to the subject matter of the action?
There is nothing to be said on this subject in French law, to my knowledge.
What has been said about claim preclusive effects (see above) is applicable.
10. Strangers
To what extent, if at all, do the issue preclusive effects of judgments extend to persons who have not directly
participated in the proceedings giving rise to judgment and who are not connected in a legally relevant way to the
Claimant, Defendant or another participant in the proceedings or the subject matter of the action?
There is nothing to be said on this subject in French law, to my knowledge. What has been said about claim
preclusive effects (see above) is applicable.
C. Wider preclusive effects
This section is concerned with the wider preclusive effects of judgments, that is to say any preclusive effect
which does not fall into either section A (claim preclusive effects) or section B (issue preclusive effects) above.
It is thus concerned with rules which preclude the raising of claims or re-litigation of issues which are not
considered by your legal system to have been determined by an earlier judgment, e.g. on the basis of
procedural fairness or abuse of process), but which are in some sense related to determined claims or issues.
1. The existence and nature of wider preclusive effects
Does your system attribute wider preclusive effects to judgments on the basis of, for example, a doctrine of abuse of
process or procedural unfairness?
Summary:
The French doctrine of abuse of process does not prevent a claimant from bringing a second action; however, it may
subject him to pay damages to the defendant and a fine to the State if he has abused his right to sue.
Full response:
The doctrine of abuse of process exists but does not prevent the claimant from bringing a new action.
A claimant may be condemned to pay damages to the defendant and a fine to the French state if he abuses his right
to sue. Article 32-1 provides that a “litigant acting in a dilatory or vexatious manner may be penalised by way of a
civil penalty of less than E 3000, without prejudice to damages and interests thereon which may be claimed”.
He has to make a fault which is not necessary on purpose (civ. 2°, 10 janv. 1985, Gaz. Pal. 85 pan 113 Guinchard ;
civ. 2°, 6 mars 2003, JCP 2003, IV, 1771). The doctrine of abuse of process is not contrary to the fair trial and there
could be an abuse to invoke without necessity the principle of fair trial (Cadiet et Jeuland, op. cit., n°447).
33
It has to be said that a positive res judicata exists in French law.
It means that if the triple identity test is only partially met, a new claim may be brought for what has not been
decided yet (the one that does not have res judicata).
Nonetheless the positive res judicata is an academic concept (Heron and Le Bars n°345), there are no legal grounds
except article 95 CPC which is only an example: “where the judge, in considering his jurisdiction, resolves the
substantive issue determinative of the same, his ensuing decision shall have the authority of res judicata in relation
of this substantive consideration”.
For example, if the labour judge decides that a contract is a labour contract to establish jurisdiction (he only has
jurisdiction for labour contract) in a litigation of labour law (hours worked; for example), this substantive
determination will have res judicata (except if there is a recourse on this particular qualification). If there is a second
claim on another aspect about the same contract (salary for example), the second question is admissible but the
qualification of labour contract may not be challenged.
Another example is the idea that a penal judgment has res judicata in civil proceedings. If someone is condemned as
a thief by a penal tribunal and if a victim sues to obtain damages in a civil tribunal, the second tribunal is bound by
the first to appreciate if there was a theft. The civil claim is admissible but the second judge cannot differently
qualify the penal facts (example given by Heron and Le Bars, op. cit., n°346).
2. Policies underlying wider preclusive effects
What are the policy considerations for the wider preclusive effect of judgments in your legal system?
Summary:
The policy in support of wider preclusion in France is largely to do with the protection of the defendant from
harassing claims. However, wider preclusion is interpreted narrowly in order to preserve the public right to file suit.
Full response:
The policy underlying the doctrine of abuse of process is the idea that there is a right to bring an action which may
not be used to damage the defendant.
But the case law is strict (there must be a fault) because the right to bring an action is a public liberty (Cadiet and
Jeuland, op. cit., n°447).
3. Conditions for wider preclusive effects
What are the conditions for the application of wider preclusive effects of a judgment?
See above.
4. Invoking wider preclusive effects
How are wider preclusive effects invoked in your legal system?
See above.
5. Exceptions to wider preclusive effects
Please verify whether the wider preclusive effects of judgments in your legal system are subject to generally
accepted exceptions.
A defamation action based on proven facts may not constitute a abuse or process (Cass. 2°, 13 nov. 2003, JCP 2003,
IV, 1010).
To bring successively two actions is not a abuse or process if the relief pursued is not the same (cass. 3° civ., 31
mars 2005, JCP 2005, IV, 2122).
In the previous section, the Questionnaire addressed general aspects of wider preclusive effects of judgments.
preclusive effects of judgments in particular circumstances which may be subject to specific rules and
34
you provide an insight in this section into the particularities, if any, of the application of wider preclusion in
May a Claimant or Defendant in your legal system be prevented by judgment on a particular claim from (1)
advancing, in the same proceedings or later proceedings, related claims against the Defendant or Claimant; and/or
(2) from seeking the determination in such proceedings of other potentially related issues of fact and/or law?
To what extent, if at all, do the wider preclusive effects of judgments extend to other participants in the litigation?
If your legal system provide for group/representative actions (including, for example, US-style class actions), to
what extent, if at all, do the wider preclusive effects of judgments in such actions extend to the other members of the
To what extent, if at all, do the wider preclusive effects of judgments extend to persons who have not directly
participated in the proceedings giving rise to judgment but who are connected in some way to the Claimant,
Defendant or another participant in the proceedings or to the subject matter of the action?
10. Strangers
To what extent, if at all, do the wider preclusive effects of judgments extend to persons who have not directly
participated in the proceedings giving rise to judgment and who are not connected in a legally relevant way to the
Claimant, Defendant or another participant in the proceedings or the subject matter of the action?
35
III. Preclusive effects of judgments within the Brussels/Lugano
Regime
This Part is concerned with the practice of your legal system concerning the recognition of "judgments" (as
defined) under the Judgments Regulation, the Brussels Convention (as amended) and the Lugano Convention,
to the extent that the State of which your legal system falls part is a Member State or Contracting State
bound by the Regulation and/or the either of the Conventions. References to "State of Origin" are to the
Member or Contracting State from which the judgment emanates and references to "Recognising State" are
to the Member or Contracting State in which recognition of the judgment, for whatever purpose, is sought.
Detailed analysis of the provisions of the Brussels Regulation and of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, as
well as the decisions of the European Court of Justice referred to below, is not called for, except insofar as
such analysis is necessary or appropriate to explain the practice of your legal system.
A. Recognition
1. Judgments recognised
Which judgments, or types of judgments, are recognised (or not recognised) in your legal system under the
Brussels/Lugano Regime?
Summary:
Article 25 of the Convention and 32 of the Regulation are applied strictly in France and therefore, all judgments
contained therein are recognised. However, the court of cassation decided that a judicial settlement is not a decision
under the Convention.
Full response:
Article 25 Brussels convention and 32 Brussels regulation are strictly applied in French law. All the judgments, even
the non contentious judgments (H Gaudemet Tallon, competence et execution des jugements en Europe, LGDJ 3ème
éd., 2002, n°369), comply with these articles.
H Gaudemet-Tallon draws a distinction between the receptive act of the judge (for example settlement) and the true
non contentious judgment when the judge expresses his will even though there is no litigation.
Thus the court of cassation decided that a judicial settlement was not a decision according to article 25 Brussels
convention (Civ. 1re, 11 fév. 1997, 326 note Mayer). This solution could be reversed because (as we have seen in
internal law see above) there are more and more judicial settlements which are considered as real non contentious
judgments with possible recourse.
Denilauler case (provisional measure without notice) has been applied in Paris Court of appeal decision in 1995
(Paris 8 juin 1995: JDI 1996, 145, Huet).
The English Mareva injunction which is called now a freezing injunction is admissible according to article 25
because the notice has been served to the last known address of the defendant in London (Paris 5 oct. 2000 et 14 juin
2001, RC 2002, 704 note HMW ; Cass. Civ. 1re, 30 juin 2004, RC 2004, 815, HMW).
2. Procedural aspects of recognition
What are the procedural aspects of recognition under the Brussels/Lugano Regime in your legal system?
Summary:
According to French law, a petition for recognition under the Brussels Regime must be presented to the chief clerk
of the high court in duplicate by a lawyer. The petition must include a copy of the foreign judgment and in some
cases, a foreign certificate establishing its enforceability. Notice of the clerk’s decision must be given to the
applicant who may refer the matter to the president of the high court for review in the event of a refusal. Refusals
must be well-reasoned. The clerk’s decision must also be served to the defendant who may challenge it in a court of
appeal. The proceedings under the Lugano Convention are very similar.
1. Brussels Regime
36
According to article 509-2 to 509-7 CPC the petition for purpose of recognition or establishment of the
enforceability must be presented to the chief clerk of the high court (TGI tribunal de grande instance; but not to the
judge) in duplicate by a lawyer (art. 812 CPC normally a lawyer is compulsory but there is a doubt see F Panneau et
C Mourlaque, l’exequatur des decisions étrangères en matière civile et commerciale : mode d’emploi, Procédures,
2005, etude 4, n°25).
Article 509-2 CPC deals with the procedural aspect of recognition under the Brussels regime: “The petitions for the
purpose of recognition or establishment of the enforceability, on the territory of the French Republic, of foreign
enforceable instruments, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) n°44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, must be presented to the chief clerk
of the High Court”.
So the petition has not to be made to the judge her/himself.
According to Article 509-4 CPC “the petition must be presented in duplicate. It must comprise the precise
information of the documents mentioned (in the petition)”.
The petition must encompass a copy of the foreign judgment and a foreign certificate establishing that the foreign
judgment is enforceable but the certificate is not compulsory).
The proceedings are not adversarial and the order to enforce (exequatur) is granted by the clerk if the file is
complete. The clerk only conducts a formal check to verify the file is complete and indicates his/her decision to the
claimant.
According to Article 509-6 CPC, the clerk’s decision of recognition or enforceability “ must be given to the
applicant against annotating or receipt, or must be notified to him by registered letter with request for notice of
receipt. The double of the petition as well as the certificate or the decision must be kept at the clerk's office”.
If the clerk refuses to recognize the foreign judgment, the claimant may refer the matter to the president of the High
court (Tribunal de grande instance).
In that situation, the president of the high court decides as a last resort (there is no appeal).
According to Article 509-7 CPC (Decree nº 2004-836 of 20 August 2004, in force on 1 January 2005) “if it does not
emanate from the judge, the refusal of the delivery of the certificate may be submitted to the president of the High
Court. He will decide in the final instance upon petition. The applicant and the necessary authority will be
summoned and heard”.
Article 509-5 CPC (Decree nº 2004-836, 20 August 2004, in force on 1 January 2005) specifies that “the decision
rejecting the petition for purposes of establishment of enforceability must be well reasoned”. There is a problem to
know what the recourse is for the defendant against the president’s decision in favour of the recognition; it could be
possible to refer the matter again to the president of the high court and to comply with adversarial proceedings
(Panneau and Mourlaque, loc. Cit., footnote 67).
The clerk’s decision of recognition or enforceability (exequatur) is served to the defendant (with the foreign
judgment if it is not yet served) who may challenge this decision in the court of appeal (with a delay of one month
after the service, or 2 months if the defendant is not domiciled in France).
The reasons of non recognition are examined for the first time in appeal.
2. Lugano Regime
The Lugano regime is quite similar to the Brussels regime.
The petition is presented to the clerk’s high court. The proceedings are not adversarial. But the four grounds of
recognition of the foreign judgment are checked by the clerk in the first instance. In appeal the proceedings are
adversarial and the grounds or recognition are discussed.
3. Exceptions to the rule (grounds for non-recognition)
How does your legal system approach the grounds for non-recognition under the Brussels/Lugano Regime so far as
they concern the preclusive effects of the judgment?
Summary:
French courts have had to adjudicate the rule of prohibition of review in Article 36 of the Brussels Regulation. The
public policy exception in Article 34(1) [27(1) of the Convention] is strictly interpreted in line with Hoffman v Krieg
37
and is rarely successful and rarely invoked. There have been several holdings regarding this exception (1) the
foreign judgment must be reasoned; (2) a mechanism for appeal must exist in the rendering country; (3) the rights of
the defendant must be taken into consideration when making the decision whether or not to recognise the foreign
judgment; and (4) a contract between a French citizen and a foreign lawyer regarding fee sharing is not considered
contrary to the public order. Furthermore, the exception in Article 34(2) [27(2)] has been applied in several French
cases.
1. Prohibition of review.
The court of cassation has to reiterate the rule of prohibition of review provided by the Brussel regulation (art. 36)
from time to time (Civ 1re, 8 janv. 2000, Abadia Otin, Gaz Pal, 1-3 oct 2000, p. 32 Niboyet).
For example, a statute of limitation may not be evoked in the recognition proceedings. The French judge complies
with the grounds provided by article 27, 1 and 2 and cannot check the applicable law (Civ 1re, 12 juil. 1994, RC 95,
68, Ancel).
2. Article 27, 1 Brussels convention (34, 1 Brussels regulation).
French judge complies with Hoffman V Krieg case and construe strictly article 27, 1. Article 27, 1 is rarely invoked
and rarely successful (e.g. Civ. 1re, 28 féb. 1984 D. 84 IR 114 Brunois). The public order may not be checked if the
defendant does not invoke it (Civ 1re, 17 nov. 1999 RC 2000, 52, Ancel).
Renault V Maxicar case considers that a legal error is not contrary to the public order except if an essential rule of
law has been infringed upon. The high court of Troyes decided that the foreign judgment could not be recognised
because Rome Treaty (art 85 become 81 TCE) was not applied; but this judgment is quite old and criticized because
it is a review of the foreign judgment (H Gaudemet Talon, op. cit., n°401).
Krombach ECJ case (the French proceedings of “contumace” condemned by the European court of justice does not
exist any more) has a French predecessor in the famous Pordea case (1re Civ., 16 mars 1999, RTDciv. 99, 469,
Perrot).
A French plaintiff wanted to bring an action in England. The cautio judicatum solvi had been fixed at about 25000
euros. The French plaintiff decided to stop his action. The English defendant made a petition in France to obtain the
enforceability of the English judgment pertaining the cautio judicatum solvi. The court of cassation decided that the
French Plaintiff could not bring an action in England because of the high amount demanded so that his right to be
heard by a judge had not been complied with. Article 6.1 ECHR has been infringed. Upon article 6.1, fair trial is part
of the public order which is provided through article 27,1 of the Brussels convention.
Then there are several decisions about the content of the procedural public order.
-
The foreign judgement has to be reasoned (Civ. 1re, 17 mai 1968, JDI 1979, 380, Holleaux ; civ. 1re, 9 oct.
1991, RC 92, 516 Gaudemet Tallon) but any document may be used to serve as equivalent of the reasons
(Civ 1re, 17 janv. 2006; JCP 2006 II, 10052 note Martel). It explains why an English Mareva injunction has
been recognised even though the English decision was not reasoned. There were documents, especially the
petition, which explained why the Mareva injunction has been stated.
-
An appeal must exist in the foreign country against the foreign judgment to comply with the public
procedural order, but the court of cassation is not very demanding. For example (civ 1re, 8 feb. 2000, Bull.
N°42) a possibility of recourse may exist even though it is discretionary).
-
The rights of defence are taken into account to refuse the recognition. Nevertheless the refusal to postpone
a hearing in Spain is not contrary to the rights of defence, even though many documents have been
provided to the other party the day of the hearings (civ. 1re, 8 fev 2000, previously quoted).
-
Lastly a contract between a French citizen and a German lawyer about the sharing of fees is not contrary to
the public order (Civ. 1re, 28 féb. 1984 D. 84 IR 114 Brunois).
3. Article 27, 2.
The defendant has to be absent from the proceedings. The German order of payment supplemented by a clerk
declaration that it has been served has to be enforced in France (cass. Civ., 5 déc. 1995, Rev. crit. DIP 1996, 361,
Ancel).
The service of the claim has to comply with the rule of the state of origin (civ. 1re, 4 mars 1980, bull. I, °74). The
writ may sufficiently determinate the relief of the claim (Cass. 1re civ., 9 oct. 1991, JCP 91, IV, 427).
38
The term of useful time is appreciated in concreto by the judge (Paris 1er juil. 2004, D. 2005 pan. 1265 Courbe).
4. Effects of recognition
What are the effects of "recognition" within the Brussels/Lugano Regime?
Summary:
In France, a foreign judgment will have the same effects as it has in its country of origin as long as those effects are
no more than an equivalent French judgment would have in France. Sometimes it is necessary, in order to
distinguish between a request for enforcement and mere recognition, to issue an exequatur order in French courts.
This serves as a sort of judicial guarantee of the foreign judgment; such guarantee will have the same preclusive
effects in France as a comparable French judgment. If a judgment is not yet enforceable in its country of origin, the
French courts may suspend the decision on recognition.
Full response:
The foreign judgment cannot have more effects than it has in its country of origin (H Gaudemet Tallon, op. cit.,
n°372). The foreign judgment which is recognised in France is part of the French legal system.
The recognition involves res judicata but it is larger. For example, if a German judgment orders a party to comply
with a contract, this decision establishes the existence of this contract. A third party has to take into account this
contract in the countries where Brussels and Lugano regime is applicable (H Gaudemet Tallon, op. cit. n°373).
The foreign judgment which may be enforceable in its country (Civ. 1re 17 nov. 1999, Rev. crit. DIP 2000, 786,
note Cuniberti) may be enforced in France if an exequatur order is granted (see above).
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish the enforcement and the mere recognition. Thus an exequatur order is needed
to obtain a judicial mortgage (hypothèque judiciaire) according to the Paris court of appeal (14 déc. 1988, D. 1989,
280 note Prévault) but this decision is criticized by scholars because it is only a matter of recognition; the foreign
judgment is not enforced but a judicial guarantee is obtained (H Gaudemet Talon, op. cit., n°374).
Under Brussels or Lugano conventions the foreign judgment may not have more effects in France than the French
judgment would have had in the same litigation (H Gaudmet Tallon, ibid).
The Chambéry Court of appeal (Chambéry, 3 mars 1998, JCP 98, IV, 2819) decided that the exequatur order has the
same res judicata between the parties as the French judgment would have had in the same litigation. Therefore a
Swiss payment order delivered by a Geneva public office which is enforceable in France by way of an exequatur
order has res judicata in France. Consequently, a party may not oppose to the seizure order that the payment order is
not a decision according to article 25 Lugano convention. Moreover the payment order has the same effect in France
as it has in Switzerland. It is enforceable 20 days after its service if there is no opposition. So the payment order is
enforceable in France.
If the foreign judgment is not yet enforceable in its own country because there is a pending recourse, the French
judge may suspend his decision (Versailles Court of appeal, 21 juin 1990, Rev. crit. 92, 117).
The foreign judgment may have a fact effect or an evidence effect in France according to the French rule of private
international law (HGT n°372 see question ……)
B. Claim preclusion within the Brussels/Lugano Regime
1. Existence and nature of claim preclusive effects
Do judgments recognised in accordance with the Brussels/Lugano Regime have claim preclusive effects in your
legal system?
Summary:
A foreign judgment has claim preclusive effects in France. Such a judgment may be invoked to prevent a new claim
in French litigation and may not be the basis for a new French judgment. The court may, although it is not obliged
to, raise the issue of preclusion of its own motion.
Full response:
The foreign judgment may be invoked to prevent a new claim in the same litigation in France (exception de chose
jugée HGT ibid). Moreover the foreign judgment may not be the basis of a new French judgment (actio judicati De
Wolf c; Cox, 30 nov. 1976 aff. 42/76). The doctrine written in French does not consider that the judge must decide
39
on his own authority that the foreign judgment has res judicata and that the new claim is not admissible (Gothot et
Holleaux, la convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968, Jupiter, 1985, n°251 ; Droz, competence judiciaire et
effets des jugements dans le marché commun, Dalloz 1972, n°459).
It is a procedural issue depending on the French procedure (art 125 CPC provides that the judge may invoke res
judicata if the parties do not invoke it but the judge is not obliged to do so).
2. Policies underlying claim preclusive effects
What are the policy considerations for the claim preclusive effect of judgments originating in other EU Member/
Lugano Contracting State in your legal system?
The policy considerations are mutual trust in Europe and the usual internal reasons (see above).
3. Law applicable to claim preclusive effects
Does your legal system consider that claim preclusive effects of a judgment recognised under the Brussels/Lugano
Regime follow from (1) the conclusion that the judgment is recognised under the Brussels Regulation or the
Brussels or Lugano Convention (as applicable), without further justification being required, (2) the conclusion that
the judgment is recognised for these purposes applied in conjunction with the rules of the State of Origin concerning
the claim preclusive effects of the judgment, (3) the conclusion that the judgment is recognised for these purposes
applied in conjunction with the rules of your legal system concerning the claim preclusive effects of an equivalent
local judgment, (4) the conclusion that the judgment is recognised for these purposes applied in conjunction with the
rules of your legal system concerning the claim preclusive effects of an equivalent judgment of a nonMember/Contracting State; or (5) other reasoning?
Summary:
There is some conflict regarding this issue in that there has been no uniform practice in the courts. Some courts
apply the law of the state of origin, while others invoke only French law. It has recently been suggested that foreign
law should only be consulted in order to determine whether the judgment may still be challenged.
Full response:
See question 1 above.
French law in conjunction with the rules of the State of origin is applicable to determine the effect of the foreign
judgment.
There are discussions on this subject in private international law. Some cases used the law of the state of origin (e.g.
Cass. 1re, 21 mai 1997, Rev. crit. DIP 98, 306, Muir Watt). It used to be Bartin’s opinion (Principes de droit
international privé, Domat, 5° ed. 1935, t1, §214, p.595). Public order may be taken into account to limit the effects
of the foreign judgment.
Some cases only apply French law (Cass. 1re civ., 14 janv. 1975, Bull. I, n°12). Several scholars are in favour of this
solution (recently see H Péroz, la reception des jugements étrangers dans l’ordre juridique français, LGDJ 2005,
n°243 s.).
A recent colloquium discussed this point. Mathias Audit suggested that the foreign law should apply only to know if
the foreign judgment may still be challenged (La loi applicable à l’autorité de la chose jugée, Procédures 2007, etude
n°16). But French law should determine the conditions of claim preclusive effects. Only French law may give res
judicata to a foreign judgment.
There is a discussion among scholars about the foreign non definitive judgment. It seems that orders may have res
judicata but not necessary the provisional measures (see Delaporte, Les measures provisoires et conservatoires en
droit international privé, TCDIP, 1987-1988 ; contra E Jeuland, Les effets des jugements provisoires hors du
territoire du for, Revue de la Recherche Juridique, 1996, p.173). In the Simitch case, a provisional alimony granted
during the divorce proceedings could be enforced in France (Cass. 1re, 6 feb. 1985, GAJFDIP, n°62).
4. Conditions for claim preclusive effects
What are the conditions for the claim preclusive effects of a judgment?
See internal law above.
40
5. The identity of claims in the Brussels/Lugano Regime
How do courts in your legal system determine the identity of claims under the Brussels/Lugano Regime?
The identity of claims is determined according to the European court of justice’s cases (CJCE 8 déc. 1987 Gubisch
rev. crit. 88, 370, Gaudemet Tallon ; CJCE 14 oct. 2004, Maersk Olie Rev. crit. 2005, 118 Pataut).
The interpretation of claim is larger than of internal procedural law. The court of cassation decided that the
European case law must be complied with; so the supreme court reversed a court of appeal decision which decided
that the procedural conditions of litispendance has to be appreciated according to the French law: “the identity of
claims … is defined by the concepts of the Brussels convention which have an autonomous European interpretation
and it may not be defined by reference to the national law” (civ 1re, 6 dec. 2005, Procédures 2006, n°83 Nourrissat).
6. The identity of parties in the Brussels/Lugano Regime
How do courts in your legal system determine the identity of parties under the Brussels/Lugano Regime?
See internal law.
7. Invoking claim preclusive effects under the Brussels/Lugano Regime
Please describe how the claim preclusive effects of a judgment originating in another EU Member/Lugano
Contracting State are invoked in your legal system.
See internal law.
8. Exceptions to claim preclusive effects under the Brussels/Lugano
Regime
Please verify whether the claim preclusive effect of a judgment originating in another EU Member/Lugano
Contracting State is subject to generally accepted exceptions in your legal system.
There are no exceptions to the knowledge of the Rapporteur.
9. Persons affected by claim preclusive effects
To which persons or categories of persons do the claim preclusive effects of judgments recognised in accordance
with the Brussels/Lugano Regime extend?
See internal law.
C. Issue preclusion
1. Existence and nature of issue preclusive effects
Do judgments recognised in accordance with the Brussels/Lugano Regime have issue preclusive effects in your legal
system?
There is nothing specific under Brussel/Lugano regime.
2. Policies underlying issue preclusive effects
What are the policy considerations for the claim preclusive effect of judgments originating in other EU Member
States in your legal system?
There is nothing specific under Brussel/Lugano regime.
3. Law applicable to issue preclusive effects
Does your legal system consider that issue preclusive effects of a judgment recognised under the Brussels/Lugano
Regime follow from (1) the conclusion that the judgment is recognised under the Brussels Regulation or the
Brussels or Lugano Convention (as applicable), without further justification being required; (2) the conclusion that
the judgment is recognised for these purposes applied in conjunction with the rules of the State of Origin concerning
41
the issue preclusive effects of the judgment; (3) the conclusion that the Recognized judgment is recognised for these
purposes applied in conjunction with the rules of your legal system concerning the issue preclusive effects of an
equivalent local judgment; (4) the conclusion that the judgment is recognised for these purposes applied in
conjunction with the rules of your legal system concerning the issue preclusive effects of an equivalent judgment of
a non-Member/Contracting State; or (5) other reasoning?
There is no case to my knowledge on this particular subject. But I would say that internal procedural law (see above)
is applicable in conjunction with foreign law (as for preclusive effects see above).
Both laws would be applicable successively.
But the foreign judgment may not have more effect in France than a French equivalent judgment so that the effect of
foreign judgment could be limited to the holdings. The principle of equality may be invoked in such a case (D
Foussard, Entre exequatur et execution force, TCFDIP, 1997, Pedone, p.190).
4. Conditions for issue preclusive effects
What are the conditions for the issue preclusive effects of a judgment?
There is nothing specific on this subject. See internal law.
5. Invoking issue preclusive effects
Please describe how the claim preclusive effects of a judgment originating in another EU Member/Lugano
6. Exceptions to issue preclusive effects
Please verify whether the issue preclusive effects of judgments in your legal system are subject to generally accepted
exceptions.
7. Persons affected by issue preclusive effects
To which persons or categories of persons do the issue preclusive effects of judgments recognised in accordance
D. Wider preclusion (abuse of process/claims and issues that could or should have
been raised)
1. The existence and nature of wider preclusive effects
Do judgments recognised in accordance with the Brussels/Lugano Regime have wider preclusive effects in your
legal system?
2. Policies underlying wider preclusive effects
What are the policy considerations for the wider preclusive effect of judgments in your legal system derived from
the Brussels/Lugano Regime?
3. The law applicable to wider preclusive effects
Does your legal system consider that wider claim and issue preclusive effects of a judgment recognised under the
Brussels/Lugano Regime follow from (1) the conclusion that the Recognized Judgment is recognised under the
Brussels Regulation or the Brussels or Lugano Convention (as applicable), without further justification being
42
required; (2) the conclusion that the Recognized Judgment is recognised for these purposes applied in conjunction
with the rules of the State of Origin concerning the effects of the Judgment; (3) the conclusion that the Recognized
Judgment is recognised for these purposes applied in conjunction with the rules of your legal system concerning the
effects of an equivalent local judgment; (4) the conclusion that the Recognized Judgment is recognised for these
purposes applied in conjunction with the rules of your legal system concerning the effect of an equivalent judgment
of a non-Member/Contracting State; or (5) other reasoning.
There is nothing specific on this subject. See above.
4. Conditions for wider preclusive effects
What are the conditions for the wider preclusive effects of a judgment?
5. Invoking wider preclusive effects
Please describe how the wider preclusive effects of a judgment originating in another EU Member/Lugano
6. Exceptions to wider preclusive effects
Please verify whether the wider preclusive effects of judgments recognised under the Brussels/Lugano Regime are
subject to generally accepted exceptions.
7. Persons affected by wider preclusive effects
To which persons or categories of persons do the wider preclusive effects of judgments recognised in accordance
E. Authentic instruments/court approved settlements
Do the preclusive effects described in Part III.B. to Part III.D. above (or similar effects) extend to authentic
instruments and court (approved) settlements within the meaning of Articles 57 to 58 of the Brussels Regulation
(Articles 50 and 51 of the Brussels/Lugano Conventions)?
Summary:
A commercial act authenticated by a business panel that actively checks the content of the act will be considered an
authentic act that is enforceable in France if it is enforceable in its country of origin.
Full response:
A commercial act which has been authenticated by a corridor colegiado de comercio (Bussiness panel) is an
authentic act according to article 50 (Aix en Provence 2 mars 2000, rev. crit. DIP 2001, 163 Légier).
If the public authority is only passive and does not check the content the act is not authentic (Paris 2 avril 1998, Rev.
crit. DIP 99, 102 Pamboukis about an American order which states that a firm has to suspend its payments).
If the act is enforceable in the state of origin it is enforceable in France (except public order See Gaudemet tallon,
op. cit., n°470 s).
43
IV. Preclusive effects of third state judgments
This Part concerns the preclusive effects of "third state judgments", i.e. judgments from a State which is
neither a EU Member State nor a Contracting State to the Lugano Convention. It has been included not only
for the purposes of comparison with the domestic and Brussels/Lugano Regimes (as well as the rules in force
in the United States of America, which is not a party to the Brussels or Lugano Conventions), but also so that
the end product of the Project does not exclude completely this important aspect of the study of the crossborder effects of judgments. It is concerned mainly with the generally applicable rules of your legal system
for the recognition of foreign judgments outside the Brussels/Lugano regimes, and not with special regimes
applicable, by virtue of international treaty or otherwise, to judgments in specific subject areas or from
particular foreign jurisdictions (save insofar as such regimes cast light on the general practice in your
system). If third state judgments have preclusive effects in your legal system, both as a matter of general law
and by virtue of international convention, please focus on the former rules, giving examples from
international conventions only where necessary to highlight significant differences in treaty practice from
that pertaining under the general law.
Do the preclusive effects described in Parts II and III above (or similar effects) extend in your legal system to third
state judgments?
Summary:
A foreign judgment can have both material and normative effects in France. The material effects of a foreign
judgment concern the evidence, the determinations of fact, and the title effect of the judgment. The normative
effects deal with the judicial decision itself, i.e. the judgment will have a substantive effect and a preclusive effect in
France. The party seeking to invoke the foreign judgment must prove that it has res judicata and has been served.
The judgment will then be subject to special considerations, such as whether there was proper jurisdiction in the
rendering court. In some instances, a foreign judgment will need an exequatur; if there is no exequatur, the judgment
will not have claim preclusive effect in France. There are three procedural situations in which a foreign judgment
may be invoked: (1) invocation in French proceedings initiated by the same opposing party as in previous
proceedings; (2) to prove the judgment’s res judicata effect; and (3) to disprove the judgment’s res judicata effect
and prevent exequatur proceedings in France.
Full response:
Among the effects of a foreign judgment, it is possible to distinguish the normative effects and the material effects
(Loussouarn, Bourel, Vareilles-Sommières, Dalloz, 9ème éd. 2007, n°493).
1. The material effects
The material effects concern the evidence, the determination of a fact and the title effect.
-
A foreign judgment proves the facts encompassed by the judgment (a judicial expert report used by the
judgment for example). The French judge is not bound by the foreign judge appreciation of the facts but it
is considered as a clue (Cadiet et Jeuland, n°761; Loussouarn, Bourel, Vareilles-Sommières, n°493-3).
-
The judgment has an effect of fact (effet de fait) which is a vague concept. For example a foreign judgment
which orders that a ship has to be sold may be taken into account by the French court to determine who is
the new owner of the ship and if a creditor may seize this ship (com. 4 oct. 2005, Rev. crit. DIP 2006, 405
H Muir Watt see Bureau and Muir Watt, Droit international privé, PUF, 2007, n°251).
-
Moreover, the foreign judgment may be a title to obtain a provisional order (Loussouarn, Bourel, VareillesSommières, n°493-4 ; for example Cass 1re civ., 9 dec. 2003, rev. crit. DIP 2005; p.660 Jeuland about a
settlement between an insurance company and Japanese victims homologated by a judge in Japan invoked
in France in a suit against the liable person of the incident in New Caledonia).
2. Normative effects
The normative effects are the effects dealing with the judicial decision itself as a norm.
-
The foreign judgment is enforceable if an exequatur is granted.
-
Furthermore the judgment has a substantive effect. For example if a divorce is pronounced abroad, this
divorce exists in France if the conditions of recognition are met.
44
-
Lastly, the foreign judgment has a preclusive effect (Cass. Civ. 28 feb. 1860, Buckley, DP 1860, 1, 57).
The foreign judgment may be invoked in French proceedings by the defendant to prevent the admissibility
of the new claim in the same litigation. If the same litigation has been decided by the foreign judgment, the
French judge considers that the French claim is not admissible.
The date taken into account is the pronouncement of the foreign judgment. The party who invokes res judicata has to
prove that the foreign judgment has res judicata and has been served (force de chose jugée See Cass. 1re civ., 19 oct.
1999, Agnelet, Rev. crit. DIP 2000, 49, Muir Watt). If the regularity of the foreign judgment is invoked, the
conditions of public order, jurisdiction and absence of fraud have to be met (Cadiet and Jeuland, op. cit. n°764).
This solution is not applicable to the patrimonial and declarative judgments (e.g. a judgment condemning a party to
pay a contractual debt) which need an exequatur. If there is no exequatur a new claim may be brought in France
(Cass. Civ. 10 mars 1914, Negrotto, DP 1917, I, 137 see Loussouarn, Bourel, Vareilles-Sommières, n°503).
The solution is different in Lugano convention and Brussel regulation. This typical French solution is old and
criticized by the commentators. It is a formalist solution without meaning.
It may only be explained by historical reasons (Mayer et Heuzé, Droit international privé, 9ème éd. 2007, n°400):
the res judicata of declarative and patrimonial judgments have been very rarely invoked and this kind of judgment
usually leads to an exequatur since the winner wanted essentially to be paid (typically an amount of money).
It is not like a divorce which does not necessarily lead to an exequatur but to the recognition of the legal situation. It
has to be said that a foreign judgment which annuls a contract has an authority in France without exequatur (Civ. 9
déc. 1974, Rev. crit. 1975 504 Mezger but the annulment judgment may be seen as not declarative but constitutive).
Moreover, the foreign proceedings in declarative and patrimonial matters prevent a party from bringing a new action
in France on the grounds of litispendance. It would be logical to admit that the foreign judgment prevent a party
from bringing a new action in France in the same litigation (Mayer et Heuzé, n°410; Loussouarn, Bourel, VareillesSommières, op. cit., n°503-2).
3. Proceedings
There are three procedural situations.
-
First res judicata of the foreign judgment may be invoked during the proceedings in France initiated by the
other party in the same litigation (autorité de chose jugée soulevée par voie d’incident (for example Cass.
1re, 17 juin 1997, Rev. crit. DIP 1998, 314, Ancel).
-
Second, a claimant may bring an action in France to obtain from the judge that the foreign judgment has res
judicata in France and may prevent a future claim (action en opposabilité ou action déclaratoire).
-
Third, a party may bring an action in France to obtain that the foreign judgment does not have res judicata
in France. Therefore it prevents an exequatur proceedings in France (action en inopposabilité ou action
dénégatoire see Cass. 1re 2 avril 1957, Weiller, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence de droit international
privé, n°24-25 ; TGI Paris 10 fév. 1993, Rev. crit. DIP 93, 664 Gaudemet Tallon ; Cadiet and Jeuland,
n°764).
45

I. Judgments - British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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