date: 0utgoing code cable subject: ceasefire proposal info: kittani i
Transcription
date: 0utgoing code cable subject: ceasefire proposal info: kittani i
0UTGOING CODE CABLE FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE INFO: KITTANI PROPOSAL e I. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION FROMANOTHERLANGUAGE OF A MOST IMPORTANT LETTERRECEIVED FROMTHE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES. " APRES LA MORT DU PRESIDENT QUI A OCCASIONNE LA MORT DE PLUSIEURS PERSONNES ET A MIS LE PAYS DANS bî~E ~~"~"~’~~’ T~OeZQt~ PARCE QUE BEAUCOUP, ENTRE AUTRES DES SOLDATS BET..a3E DE LA MIN~KRET MEME DES ETRANGERS, POUR NOUS LE HAUTCOMMANDEMENTFAR IL EST TEMPS D°ARRETER TOUT CELA. POUR CELA LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FAR, C’EST A DIRE LE CHEF D’ETAT MAJOR ET SES COLLABORATEURS ET LE CHEF D’ETAT-MAJOR DU FPR DOIVENT SE RENCONTRER POUR VOIR COMMENT FAIRE SORTIR LE PA~S DE CETTE SITUATION ET VOIR RAPIDEMENT COMMENT APPLIQUER LES ACCORDS D’ARUSHA. LE HAUTCOMMANDMENTFARAPPRRECIE LE TRAVAIL DE LA MINUAR E T TOUS LES EFFORTS QU’~L_S DEPLOIENT~OUR L’APPLICATION DES ACCORDS D ARUSHA. ILS SONT COSCI~~rS DES DIFFICULTES QU’ELLE RENCONTRE. ILS COMPTRENT SUR LA MINUAR ET LUI DE MANDENT DE POURSUIVRE SON ROLE. I L EST TEMPS COMMANDEMENT ACCEPTE 131200 AVRIL 94. D’ ARRETER LA GUERRE, POUR CELA LE HAUT UN CESSER LE FEU INCONDXTIONNEL A PARTR DE FAIT A KIGALI LE 12 AVRIL 94 SIGNE FAR LE CHEF D’ETATMAJOR, COLONEL 6 COLONELS ET 3 LIEUTENANT- I MI NUAR 2 FPR" 2. IN CANDID CONVERSATIONS WOETH THE ELDER CHIEF OF STAFF, HE,MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT AT THE MOMENT OF THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT, THE IDEA OF A MILITARY COUP WAS IN EVIDENCE. HOHEVER HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION AND THAT OF THE SRSG AT HIS RESIDENCE DURING THAT NIGHT CKANGED . ’AT WAS TO BE A PALACE COr D’ETAT TO A D~MOCARTIC PROCE$S WITH ~,,2, SUPPORT OF TME MILITARY. I HAVE HAD A LOT OF RESPECT FOR THIS MAN AS ME ACCOMPLI$HED SO MUCH THROUGH DISCIPLINE AND HIS GENUINE CONCERN FOR HIS TROOPS, « ~ « .~~ ,;~ 3. THIS DOCUMENT IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGr4 IN THE PEACEPROCESS AND MUST BE MAXIMISED TO THE FULLEST. IT MAY BRING A QUICK END TO A BLOODY AND TERRIBLE WAR IF IT IS CAPITALIZED ON AND IF WE MOVE WITH SPEED. IT MAY ALSO ACCELERATE THE STALLED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. APPROACHES TO THIS PROBLEM ARE 8E~’NG EXAMINED. YOUR DIRECTION IN THIS MATTER IS SOLICITED. 4. REGARDS.