Marie Claire VILLEVAL

Marie Claire VILLEVAL
Coordonnées
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique, UMR 5824 (CNRS, Université de Lyon) - 93, Chemin des
Mouilles - 69130 Ecully
Tél.: 04 72 86 60 79 – Fax : 04 72 86 60 90 –
Mel: [email protected]
Page personnelle: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/perso/villeval/
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author=363396
Education
Maîtrise d’économie, Université Nancy II
Doctorat d’économie, Université Paris X
HDR, Université Lyon 2
Situation actuelle
Directrice de recherche CNRS
IZA Research Fellow, Bonn
Responsabilités
Directrice du GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique), UMR 5824 (2007-présent)
Membre du Comité Directeur de l’Association Française de Sciences Economiques (2002-présent)
Vice-Présidente du comité scientifique des Journées de l'Economic, Lyon, Novembre 2008.
Membre de l’Executive Committee of the European Association of Labour Economists (1993-2001);
Trésorière de l’EALE (1998-2001); Chairperson of the EALE Nomination Committee (2001-présent).
Membre du Scientific Advisory Board du Max Planck Institute of Economics (2008-2014)
Membre du Scientific Committee of the European Workshop on Behavioral and Experimental Economics
(EWEBE) (2006-présent)
Membre du comité scientifique des Journées d’Economie Experimentale (2000-présent)
Coordinatrice du programme EMIR (Experiments on Motivation, Incentives, and Rationality) (ANR)
(2007-2010), en association avec les universités de Californie à Santa Barbara, Pompeu Fabra, Cambridge
et East Anglia.
Thèmes de recherche
Economie des ressources humaines, économie expérimentale, économie comportementale
Incitations, motivation, évasion fiscale, contrôle, sanctions, coopération, compétition, interactions sociales
Articles (2003-2008)
Masclet, D., Villeval, M.C. (2008). Punishment, Welfare and Inequality: A Public Good Experiment.
Social Choice and Welfare. A paraître.
Eriksson, T., Villeval, M.C. (2008). Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay. An Experiment
on Incentives and Sorting. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. A paraître.
Eriksson, T., Teyssier, S., Villeval, M .C. (2008). Does Self-Selection Improve the Efficiency of
Tournaments? Economic Inquiry. A paraître.
Dickinson, D., Villeval, M.C. (2008). Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort?
The
Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories. Games and Economic
Behavior, 63, 56-76.
Montmarquette, C., Lévy-Garboua, L., Villeval, M.C. (2008). Responsabilité Individuelle et Politique
Fiscale. Economie et Prévision, 182 2008-1, 19-31.
Fortin, B., Lacroix G., Villeval M.C. (2007). Tax Evasion and Social Interactions. Journal of Public
Economics, 91, 2089–2112.
Villeval, M.C. (2007). Experimental Economics: Contributions, Recent Developments, and New
Challenges. French Politics, Palgrave.
G. Charness, M.C. Villeval (2007). Are Older Workers Really More Risk-Averse and less Adaptable? IZA
Compact, March, 5-6.
Villeval M.C. (2006). Note on Human Capital over the Life Cycle, Economic Record, 82(2).
Clark, A., Masclet, D., Villeval, M.C. (2006). Effort, revenu et rang. Approche expérimentale. Revue
Economique, 57(3), 635-644.
Villeval, M.C. (2005). Nouvelles conditions de travail: Satisfaction ou Résignation ?, Revue Economique,
2, 237-244.
Montmarquette, C., Rullière, J.L., Villeval, M.C., Zeiliger, R. (2004). Redesigning Teams and Incentives
in a Merger : An Experiment with Managers and Students, Management Science, 50(10), 1379-89.
Keser, C., Rullière, J.L., Villeval M.C. (2004). Le Paradoxe de l’Adhésion Syndicale, Economie et
Prévision, 164-165 (3-4), 81-92.
Tournadre, F., Villeval, M.C. (2004). Learning from Strikes, Labour Economics, 11, 243-264.
Malgrange, P., Rullière, J.L., Villeval M.C. (2004). Personnel Economics: Strengths and Weaknesses of
Incentives, Economie et Prévision, 164-165 (3-4), 1-15.
Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., Villeval, M.C. (2003). Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in
the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, American Economic Review, 93 (1), 366-380.
Meidinger, C., Rullière, J.L., Villeval M.C. (2003). Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to
Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?, Experimental Economics 6, 253-272.
Rullière, J.L., Villeval, M.C. (2003). Personnel Economics: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical
Evidence, International Journal of Manpower 24 (7).
Working Papers non publiés
Eriksson, T., Poulsen, A., Villeval, M.C. (2008). Feedback and Incentives. IZA Discussion Paper 3440,
Bonn.
Dickinson, D., Villeval, M.C. (2007). The Peter Principle: An Experimental Test. IZA Discussion Paper
3205, Bonn, et GATE WP 07-28.
Coricelli, G., Joffily, M., Montmarquette, C., Villeval, M.C. (2007). The Physionomics of Tax Evasion:
Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? IZA Discussion Paper 3103, Bonn, et GATE WP 0724.
Lévy-Garboua, L., Montmarquette, C., Villeval, M.C. (2007). Individual Responsibility and the Funding
of Collective Goods. GATE WP-07-18 et IZA Discussion Paper 3041, Bonn.
Charness, G., Villeval, M.C. (2007). Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational
Field and Laboratory Experiment, IZA Discussion Paper 2574, Bonn.
Arbak, E., Villeval, M.C. (2007). Endogenous Leadership - Selection and Influence. GATE WP 2007-07
et IZA Discussion Paper 2732, Bonn.
Cabrales, A., Charness, G., Villeval, M.C. (2006). Competition, Adverse Selection and Efficiency. GATE
WP 06-05 et IZA Discussion Paper 2296, Bonn.
Clark, A., Masclet, D., Villeval, M.C. (2006). Effort and Comparison Income. Experimental and Survey
Evidence. GATE WP 06-01 et IZA Discussion Paper 2179, Bonn.
Datta Gupta, N., Poulsen, A., Villeval, M.C. (2005). Do (Wo)Men Prefer (Non)Competitive Jobs? GATE
WP 05-12 et IZA Discussion Paper 1833.
Koenigstein, M., Villeval, M.C. (2005). The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and
Behavioral Considerations. GATE WP 8-2005 et IZA Discussion Paper 1762.
Meidinger, C., Villeval M.C. (2003).Leadership, Signaling or Reciprocity? GATE-WP.
Invitations (2003-2008)
2008: University of California at Santa Barbara; University of Aarhus; Université de Liège; University of
Maastricht, Max Planck Institute Jena, CIRANO Montréal, Université de Nice; NBER Summer meeting,
Cambridge.
2007: University of Nottingham; IZA, University of Bonn; Aarhus School of Business; University of
Copenhagen, University of Tilburg, University of Rotterdam, CIRANO Montréal, Université de Rennes,
Université de Montpellier.
2006: University of California at Santa Barbara; University of East Anglia; Royal Holloway; CIRANO
Montréal, Université Laval à Québec; Université de Paris I, Université de Rennes; CAFE, Nürnberg;
Appalachian State University ; EWEBE, University of Valencia.
2005: NBER Summer meeting, Cambridge; University of Amsterdam (Tinbergen Institute); University of
Freiburg; George Mason University, Atlanta; CIRANO Montréal, Ringberg Workshop, Max Planck
Institute.
2004: CIRANO Montréal, Aarhus School of Business, University of Erfurt, Université de Montpellier.
Organisation de conférences (2002-2008)
European Conference of the Economic Science Association, Lyon, 11-14 Septembre 2008
2nd European Workshop on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, EWEBE2, Lyon, 7-8 décembre
2007.
Journées de l'AFSE et Journées d’Economie Expérimentale, Lyon, mai 2007.
Workshop “Utility and Inequality: Empirical and Experimental Approaches”, PSE, Paris, 2005
European workshop Human Resources- Field Data and EXPEriments, Lyon, 2003.
Workshop “Leadership and Social Interactions”, Lyon, 2003.
Journées de l'AFSE sur les ressources humaines, Lyon, 2002.
Arbitrage
American Economic Review, Contemporary Economic Policy, Econometrica, Economic Inquiry,
Economic Journal, Economic Theory, Economie et Prévision, European Economic Review, Experimental
Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Industrial and Corporate Change, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, Journal of Economic
Psychology, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Labour
Economics, Louvain Economic Review, Management Science, Organization Science, Review of
Economic Studies, Revue Economique, Theory and Decision