Multiplayer cost games with simple Nash equilibria

MULTIPLAYER COST GAMES WITH SIMPLE NASH
EQUILIBRIA
le 2 avril 2013
de 15h30 à 17h00
ENS Rennes Salle du conseil
Plan d'accès
Intervention de Thomas Brihaye (Université du Mons, Belgique). Séminaire du département Informatique
et télécommunications.
After an introduction to the model-checking problem, we will see that multiplayer games with selfish agents
naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded-systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually
neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We show that a large
class of these games, including games where the individual objectives are mean- or discounted-payoff, or
quantitative reachability, does not only have a solution, but a simple solution. More precisely, we establish the
existence of simple Nash equilibria. Realistically, agents have to decide on their moves with very limited
resources, and complicated strategies that require exponential or even non-elementary implementations cannot
realistically be implemented. The existence of simple strategies therefore holds a promise of implementability.
THÉMATIQUE(S)
Formation, Recherche - Valorisation
CONTACT
François Schwarzentruber
Mise à jour le 25 mars 2013
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