France TNP

FRANCE
66eme session de I'Assemblee Generale des Nations Unies
Premiere Commission
Intervention de
S.E. I'Ambassadeur Eric Danon,
Representant permanent de la France
aupres de la Conference du Desarmement a Geneve
New York, 24 octobre 2011
66th session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee
"Disarmament machinery"
Statement by
H.E. Ambassador Eric Danon,
Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
New York, 24 October 2011
hlISSlON
PERhlANENTE
DE
LA
FRANCE
AUI'RES
245 EAST 47TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
DES
NATIONS
UNIES
TEL. (2121 702-4900
Monsieur le President,
Chers CollBgues,
La K machinerie du desarmement s , qui organise et met en ceuvre un multilat6ralisme auquel
nous sommes tr6s attaches, connait une situation contrastbe.
I. C'est particuli6rement vrai en ce qui concerne les armes nucleaires.
1. La vitalit6 du TNP n'est plus a demontrer et la Conference d'examen de 2010 a donne A I'ensemble
des Etats parties une feuille de route pour agir sur les trois piliers du Traite dans les prochaines annees.
Le respect de cette feuille de route constitue pour nous une priorit6. La Conference de Paris des 30 juin
et l e r juillet derniers a permis de renforcer la cohesion des Cinq et d'examiner les voies et moyens A
mettre en ceuvre pour remplir leurs engagements pour 2015.
La nomination d'un facilitateur et le choix d'un pays hgte pour la conference sur la mise en
czuvre de la Resolution de 1995, constituent aussi des jalons importants de la feuille de route du
TNP. Et les pays participant a la conference de 2012 auront a imaginer, s'ils en ont la volonte
politique, un forum sp6cifique pour poursuivre dans la voie longue et difficile conduisant A un
Moyen-Orient exempt d'armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs.
2. Si la question nucl6aire progresse ainsi dans le cadre du TNP, il n'en est pas de m6me dans
celui de la Conference du Desarmement. Pour autant, la France est convaincue qu'il s'agit de la
seule enceinte possible pour negocier un trait6 cut off avec des chances d'aboutir.
Les debats du HLM ont confirme, s'il en etait besoin, que le blocage de la CD n'etait pas dG au
forum lui-m6me mais a un contexte international particulier ; nous sommes confrontes a des
antagonismes de nature politique et non a des contraintes proc6durales.
Les regles de proc6dure et notamment la regle du consensus sont les garantes des int6r6ts de
defense et de securite de tous les pays. Certes, aujourd'hui, le paradoxe vient de ce que la regle
du consensus constitue un element de blocage du lancement de la negociation tout en restant
indispensable a la future negociation elle-m6me.
Mais vouloir exporter le debat dans une autre enceinte - notamment, comme certains I'evoquent,
A I'Assemblee GBnerale sous forme de groupes de travail - ne contribuera pas a resoudre les
problemes politiques sous jacents au blocage de la CD. Cela amenera au contraire A les faire
perdurer, en diluant la pression exercke pour les surmonter. A nous de rappeler plutgt a ceux qui
sont A l'origine de ce blocage qu'ils n'ont rien a gagner, sauf peut-6tre un peu de temps - mais A
quel prix ! -, A aller B contresens de I'Histoire.
Monsieur le President, Chers Collegues,
II. Avant d'aborder la pertinence des enceintes traitant des armes classiques, permettez-moi en
guise de transition, un mot sur notre forum annuel qu'est la Commission du Desarmement.
Force est de constater que I'UNDC n'a pas tenu ses promesses. Plus de trente ans apres sa
creation et un nombre de (( cycles )> que nous ne comptons plus, le resultat de ces annees de
deliberations est bien mince. Sans parler du coat que representent, pour les Nations Unies
comme pour les delegations nationales, ces r6unions repetitives sans resultat final.
Monsieur le President, Chers Collegues,
IV. Un multilateralisme efficace doit d'abord &re jug6 sur sa capacite B rkgler les problemes de
son temps, c'est-a-dire creer un monde plus sQr et a meme de reduire les menaces que
representent les armes de destruction massive et les armes classiques.
A cet egard, la France partage la frustration exprimee par la quasi-totalite des pays durant nos
travaux. Certains souhaitent aujourd'hui, au travers des resolutions qu'ils presentent, tenter de
debloquer notamment la situation la CD et lancer la negociation du FMCT.
La France arretera son vote sur ces resolutions
a I'aune de plusieurs criteres
11 La coherence, tout d'abord - coherence des resolutions entre elles mais aussi avec les
discussions menees B la CD. Ainsi, remettre en cause I'ordre des priorites entre les quatre
themes principaux de I'ordre du jour de la CD ou les mandats agrees par tous dans le
programme de travail CDl1864 est a ecarter. Nous considerons que, loin de faire avancer le
desarmement, il s'agit d'un recul.
21 La clart6 et la pertinence des mandats ensuite. De ce point de vue, certaines propositions
concretes nous paraissent interessantes et d'autres beaucoup moins. Transposer les
discussions de la CD B I'AGNU, dans des groupes de travail dont la composition, les regles de
procedure ou encore le financement ne sont pas clairs, serait hasardeux et contre-productif.
31 Enfin, la question de I'adhesion des Etats membres. Les resolutions qui promeuvent des
initiatives nouvelles se doivent de recueillir le consensus ou, en cas de vote, 6tre adoptees a la
tres grande majorit6 des pays. C'est ainsi que la negociation du Trait6 sur le Commerce des
Armes avait ete lancee et pourrait prochainement aboutir. II est A craindre qu'une adhesion
moyenne des Etats lors des votes, prive les initiatives nouvelles du support et donc du souffle
necessaires pour &re menees a bien.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President
Mr Chairman,
Dear colleagues,
The disarmament machinery which organizes and implements a multilateralism that we are all attached
to, is in a mixed situation.
I. This is particularly true as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.
1. There is no longer any need to prove the vitality of the NPT, and the 2010 Review Conference gave all
states-parties a roadmap to take action on the treaty's three pillars in the coming years. For us,
respecting this roadmap is a priority. The Paris Conference of June 30-July 1 reinforced the cohesion of
the Five and facilitated the examination of the ways and means to be implemented in order for them to
meet their commitments by 2015.
The appoinbnent of a facilitator and selection of a country to host the conference on the implementation
of the 1995 resolution are also important milestones on the NPT roadmap. And the countries participating
in the 2012 conference will have to devise--if they have the political will-a specific forum with respect to
the long, hard road leading to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems.
2. While progress is being made on the nuclear issue under the NPT, the same cannot be said
with regard to the Disarmament Conference. Nevertheless, France is convinced that this is the
only possible forum for discussing a cut off treaty that has any chance of success.
The HLM debates confirmed, as if it were necessary, that the deadlock of the CD is not due to
the forum itself but to a particular international context; we are facing conflicts of a political
nature rather than procedural constraints.
The procedural rules and in particular the consensus rule are guarantees to safeguard all
countries' defence and securitv interests. Certainlv. it is todav a ~ a r a d o xthat the consensus rule
is an element in the stalematebhilst remaining indispensable to ihe negotiation itself.
But exporting the debate into another forum-notably, as some hope, into the General
Assembly, in the form of working groups-will not help resolve the political problems that
underlie the deadlock of the CD. On the contrary, it will enable them to persist, while diluting the
pressure to overcome them. It is our job to rather remind those who are at the root of this
deadlock that they have nothing to gain-except perhaps a bit of time, but at what cost!-by
going against History.
Mr Chairman, dear colleagues,
II. Before I talk about the relevance of forums dealing with conventional weapons, allow me, as a
sort of transition, to say a word about our annual forum, the Disarmament Commission.
It must be acknowledged that the UNDC has not lived up to its promises. More than 30 years
after it was founded, and a countless number of "cycles," the result of those years of deliberation
is modest. Not to mention the cost-for the UN and national delegations-of these repetitive
meetings that yield no final results.
Between the years in which this body hasn't managed to agree upon an agenda, as in 2004 and
2005, and those in which work cycles came to an end without any concrete results, as we just
saw this past spring, we cannot help but feel deep regret.
Nonetheless, the UNDC was able in the past to come up with useful elements such as the 1999
guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapons free zones, which unfortunately are not
always respected by those claming the creation of such zones.
This situation is no doubt due largely to strongly opposing interests and a lack of flexibility.
However, even to establish, for example, confidence-building measures with respect to
conventional weapons, we manage to find agreements in other forums, but not in this one. There
may be here some lessons to be learned with regard to the Commission's viability.
Mr Chairman,
111. 1 would like to conclude by discussing forums relating to conventional weapons,
Three series of negotiations have been completed in 15 years, which France applauds,
particularly given the active role our country played in them: the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine
Treaty, the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, and the Oslo Convention on Cluster
Munitions. They have one thing in common: they relate to the conventional weapons that inflict
the most significant humanitarian damage. They reflect the beneficial influence and the ability to
mobilize of the civil society, whose role in the multilateral system should be further reinforced.
At the same time, the conclusion of the Ottawa and Oslo conventions raises the question of the
effectiveness of the CCW forum. We can expect that next November will be a critical moment for
the credibility-and thus the future-of this framework. We are here at the crucible of a wellknown problem regarding the efficiency of the machinery, that of whether a forum is suited to the
negotiation it is to host.
For France, the situation is clear. The conclusion of the Ottawa and Oslo conventions is not
sufficient, because they will not be adopted within a reasonable time frame by the entire
international community. Their universalization, which remains and will always remain a priority
for us, is running up against the reticence of numerous key countries. We deplore the fact that
the countries with the largest stockpiles of anti-personnel mines or cluster munitions believe they
cannot ratify these two conventions in the near future.
Without resigning ourselves as we wait for them to sign on to these conventions, we continue to
seek ways to achieve concrete results on the ground. For that purpose, in November we will
continue negotiating a sixth CCW protocol on cluster munitions.
For our part, this thought through and assumed choice of a sixth protocol is only worth it if three
key criteria are present : it must be a legally binding instrument, be compatible with the Oslo
Treaty, as well as it must have a decisive, immediate humanitarian impact. And we have faith
that the CCW forum will allow us to achieve that result.
Mr Chairman, dear colleagues,
IV. Effective multilateralism must first be judged according to its ability to solve the problems of
the day, i.e., to create a safer world capable of reducing the threats represented by weapons of
mass destruction and conventional weapons.
In this regard, France shares the frustration expressed by nearly all countries during our work.
Some today hope, through the resolutions they are presenting, to unblock the situation in the CD
and launch negotiations of the FMCT.
France will determine its vote on these resolutions on the basis of several criteria:
11 First, consistency-the consistency of the resolutions amongst themselves, but also with
discussions carried out within the CD. Thus, questioning the order of priorities for the four core
issues on the CD's agenda or the specific mandates agreed to, by all, in the CD11864 work
program should be ruled out. We believe that far from advancing disarmament, it would be a
step backwards.
21 Second, clarity and relevance of the mandates. From this standpoint, certain concrete
proposals seem interesting, and others less so. Transposing discussions from the CD to the
UNGA into working groups the composition, procedural rules or financing of which are unclear
would be risky and counterproductive.
31 Finallv, the auestion of adherence of the Member States. Resolutions that ~ r o m o t enew
initiatives must'achieve consensus, or, in the event of a vote, be adopted by ihe vast majority of
countries. This is how negotiations were launched for the Arms Trade Treatv and could soon
conclude. But it is to be feared that a less than large-scale adhesion when voting takes place
would deprive these new initiatives of the support and thus of the energy they need to be carried
out.
Thank you, Mr Chairman.