IRMM Mass Spectrometry Building STRESS TEST – Methodology

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE
Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements
Safety, Health, Environment and Security sector
SHES/05/11 rev.1
15.12.2011
IRMM Mass Spectrometry Building
STRESS TEST – Methodology document
Author: Pierre Kockerols
1 Introduction
In decision of the Council after the nuclear accident in Japan, the European NPP's are
submitted to "stress tests" in order to check their robustness against extreme events.
In Belgium, the stress tests are coordinated by the FANC. The studies for the NPP's is
under way (Doel and Tihange). There are agreements between Belgium and France and
Belgium and the Netherlands for a mutual collaboration. Later on they will be subject of a
EU peer review.
In June 2011, the Belgian Parliament has requested that a similar assessment by stress
tests would be done for all major non-power nuclear installations. By letter dd. 4.7.2011
the FANC has introduced this request to all class 1 installations. A paper describes the
expected approach to be followed. A meeting was organised by FANC on 12.8.2012 to
provide additional information to the involved parties (see related mission report).
FANC has requested that the present methodology report would be established for
November 2011.
2 General framework
2.1 Scope of the study
The scope of the study will be limited to the mass spectrometry (040 MS) building, as it is
the only effective class 1 installation on the IRMM site. The study will include the controlled
areas MS1 and MS2, the supporting infrastructure (ventilation, fire protection systems,
electricity supply, …) and the applicable procedures for normal and abnormal conditions.
2.2 Initiating events
Following initiating events are conceivable on the IRMM site and will be considered in the
study:
a) Earthquake
b) Flooding
Retieseweg 111, B-2440 Geel - Belgium. Telephone: (32-14) 571 211. http://irmm.jrc.ec.europa.eu
Telephone: direct line (32-14) 571 282.
E-mail: [email protected]
c) Forest fire
d) Lightning strike
e) Severe natural events: excessive snow, tornado
f) Gas leak on the site or in vicinity of the site
g) Black-out – total loss of electrical supply
h) Criticality accident
i) Terrorist attack with aircraft
j) Cyber attack
It has been decided with the four operational class 1 nuclear installations of the region that
for the coherence of the studies, the hypotheses of the initiating events will be streamlined.
2.3 Assessments
The assessments will be done in an deterministic way. For each initiating event following
points will be addressed:
•
possible origin or causes and impact on the installation
•
event sequence for safety systems and organisational means
•
final consequences for the confinement and possible source term
•
discussion on possible mitigating measures
Part of the assessments will be outsourced to external experts. Possibly some
assessments will be shared with similar installations of the region.
2.4 Potential for modifications
Based on the assessments made, a potential for modifications will be set-up split in:
•
short/mid term modifications which can be implemented immediately or in the
coming (~3)years according to the normal investment plan;
•
long term modifications which will be included in the "IRMM site management
plan 2012-2020" and which will be applicable to a new or completely refurbished
controlled area.
2.5 Reporting
A single stress tests report will be issued 30.6.2012. The report will present the
consolidated study; specific more extensive assessments studies will be attached in
appendix. The report will be written in the English language.
A summary report will be written in the Dutch language.
As requested by FANC, the restricted information will be separated from the main report
and integrated in a limited controlled document.
The general safety related stress tests assessments will be included in the on-going tenyearly assessment of the nuclear safety at IRMM, for which a final report has to be
provided for 1.12.2012.
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3 Format and content of the report
Based on the above, the final report will have following format and (in italics) content.
(1) Introduction
•
Framework of the study
(2) Description of the installations
•
Location site, buildings, controlled areas
•
History
•
Type of activities in the MS building
•
Inventory nuclear and radioactive materials in the MS building
•
Description of the safety and security barriers
•
Description of the safety systems
• Ventilation (extraction MS1, MS2, glove boxes MS1, MS2)
• Fire protection system (fire detection, fire extinguishing)
• Radiological surveillance systems (air monitoring)
• Liquid effluents collection system
• Emergency electrical power supply
•
Organisational means in case of incident, accident or emergency
(3) Assessments
a) Earthquake
•
Estimation maximum possible earthquake
(this assumption will be made coherent between all sites, in line also with the study
performed by NIRAS for the waste disposal site).
•
Estimation consequences of this earthquake on the installation and possible
subsequent effects:
•
Failure of the safety systems
•
Failure of the confinement
•
Failure of organisational means
(this estimation will be probably based on an "expert opinion")
•
Calculation of the related maximum possible source term.
•
Discussion on possible reinforcement of sensitive areas or equipment
b) Flooding
•
Estimation possible origin and impact of flooding: flooding of the basement, flooding of
the site
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•
Estimation consequences of flooding on the operability of the safety systems, the
organisational means and possible subsequent effects
•
Discussion on possible protection measures
c) Forest fire
•
Estimation possible impact of forest fire
•
Estimation consequences of such a fire on the installation and possible subsequent
effects:
•
Failure of the safety systems
•
Failure of the confinement
•
Failure of organisational means
•
Calculation of the related maximum possible source term.
•
Discussion on possible protection measures
d) Lightning strike
•
Estimation possible impact of different types of lightning
(will be done by external expert)
•
Estimation consequences of such a lightning strike on the installation and possible
subsequent effects:
•
Failure of the safety systems
•
Failure of the confinement
•
Failure of organisational means
•
Maximum possible source term: same as for forest fire
•
Discussion on possible protection measures
e) Severe natural events: excessive snow, tornado
•
Estimation possible damage of severe natural events
•
Estimation consequences of such events on the installation and possible subsequent
effects:
•
Failure of the safety systems
•
Failure of the confinement
•
Failure of organisational means
•
Maximum possible source term: same as for earthquake
•
Discussion on protection measures if needed
f) Gas leak on the site or in vicinity of the site
•
Estimation possible origin of gas leak: on the site, road traffic and other installations
•
Estimation consequences on the operability of the safety systems, the organisational
means and possible subsequent effects
4
•
Discussion on protection measures if needed
g) Black-out – total loss of electrical supply
•
Estimation possible origin and impact of black-out
•
Estimation consequences of black-out on the operability of the safety systems, the
organisational means and possible subsequent effects
•
Discussion on possible protection measures
h) Criticality accident
•
Estimation possible causes of criticality
•
Estimation consequences of criticality on the organisational means
•
Discussion on possible protection measures
i) Terrorist attack with aircraft
•
Estimation possible impact of different types of terrorist attack with aircraft (small
plane/large plane/large fuelled plane)
•
Estimation consequences of the different types of attack on the installation
(this estimation will be probably based on an "expert opinion")
•
Calculation of the related maximum possible source term.
j) Cyber attack
•
Estimation possible types of cyber attack
•
Estimation consequences on the organisational means
•
Discussion on possible protection measures
(4) Severe accident management
a) Organisation of the licensee to manage the accident and the possible
disturbances
•
Organisation planned
•
Possible disruption with regard to the measures envisaged to manage accidents and
associated management
b) Measures implemented
•
Accident management measures for managing the consequences of a severe accident
•
Accident management measures and installation design features for protecting
confinement integrity
•
Accident management measures currently in place to mitigate the consequences of
loss of containment integrity and to reduce releases to the environment.
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(5) Summary improvement measures
a) Short/mid term improvement measures
Measures, estimated budget and (~3 year) planning
b) Long term improvement measures
List of points of attention for a new building or refurbished controlled area
4 Organisational means
The stress test study will be conducted by the IRMM Health Physics service (SHES
sector).
The studies will be performed by Pierre Kockerols with assistance of the radiation
protection staff (Andreas Fessler, Gustaaf Melis, Frederik Van der Straat, Marleen Van
Bocxstaele, Klaus Okkinga) and fire brigade (Willem Vermeulen).
When needed, technical information will be requested to the IRMM Infrastructure and Site
Management unit.
The IRMM Director Mr. Krzysztof Maruszewski will be informed about the progress.
Following studies or assessments will be outsourced:
•
Assessment of lightning protection (procurement on-going, company not yet selected)
•
Calculation of the source term in different circumstances (procurement on-going,
company not yet selected)
•
Expert opinion on seismic resistance building and infrastructure (procurement ongoing, company not yet selected)
•
Expert opinion on aircraft crash consequences
•
Expert opinion on forest fire protection
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE
Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements
Safety, Health, Environment and Security sector
SHES/08/11
15.12.2011
IRMM Mass Spectrometry Building
STRESS TEST – Progress report 15.12.2011
Author: Pierre Kockerols
1 Introduction
This document describes shortly the progress related to the stress test assessment as
requested by FANC.
In parallel the methodology document has been updated in order to integrate the
comments as formulated by FANC (e-mail dd. 2.12.2011).
2 General measure taken by the Joint Research Centre
As a consequence of the Fukushima accident, the EC Joint Research Centre has taken
the decision to create a central Nuclear Safety and Security Coordination unit. The
purpose of this unit is to improve the efficiency of the different institutes in the
management of and in the research on nuclear safety and security.
3 Actions taken by IRMM
Joined metings with SCK•CEN, Belgoprocess, FBFC International:
•
A meeting was organised on 9.9.2011 in order to assess the approaches intended to
be followed by the different sites.
•
A meeting was organised on 17.10.2011 to assess the conceivable initiating events
which will be considered by the different sites. A presentation was also given in this
meeting by Electrabel on the approach for the NPP’s.
•
A meeting was organised on 8.11.2011 together with NIRAS and experts of KSB-ORB
including a presentation on the seismic assessment performed for the cAt-project. The
purpose was to assess which conceivable earthquake could be considered in the
region.
Preliminary assessments:
Retieseweg 111, B-2440 Geel - Belgium. Telephone: (32-14) 571 211. http://irmm.jrc.ec.europa.eu
Telephone: direct line (32-14) 571 282.
E-mail: [email protected]
•
A fire protection expert of the corporate services of the Belgian Air Force has been
invited on 25.11.2011 in order to have a first evaluation on how two mitigate the
consequences of a aircraft crash with kerosene fire. The applicable standards for the
fire extinguishing capability were discussed. It is anticipated to organise a common
meeting with the involved sites and the fire brigades of Mol and Geel in order to
evaluate to what extent the requirements of these standards are met.
•
A first check has been done in order to assess the consequences of a flooding of the
basement of the MS building: loss of ventilation, loss of air monitoring, loss of
electricity supply.
Procurements launched or anticipated:
•
Procurement of two dedicated studies:
Study 1 - Re-assess the source term in the controlled areas MS1 and MS2 for the
three following initiating events:
a. Damaged confinement as a result of a major earthquake;
b. Damaged confinement as result of a major fire;
c. Fire and loss of confinement as result of a major airplane crash.
Study 2 - Estimate the consequences of a conceivable earthquake on the
installation and possible subsequent effects:
a. Failure of the safety systems;
b. Failure of the confinement.
This procurement in on-going and will be ordered still in 2011.
•
Procurement of a study to assess the lightning risks for the buildings on the IRMM site
and to advise on the possible remedial measures.
This procurement was not successful (no candidates) and has to be re-iterated.
•
Procurement of a new fire brigade truck
Draft specifications have been prepared. These specifications will be further amended
to take into consideration the results of the first assessments of the stress tests.
4 Organisation at IRMM
No specific measures taken with respect to the organisation.
The outcome of the incident evaluation of the fire of the main building on 8.12.2011 will
give a valuable experience feedback on how to increase the performance of the
organisational means in place.
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