Intervener Attorney-General-of-Canada

Transcription

Court File No.: 35364
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE MANITOBA COURT OF APPEAL)
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
APPELLANT
AND:
JOHN MELVILLE STEELE
RESPONDENT
AND:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
INTERVENERS
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
(Rules 37 and 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)
Jeffrey G. Johnston
2127 – 284 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8
William F. Pentney
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
50 O’Connor Street, 5th Floor, Room 556
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8
Tel: (613) 941-3528
Fax: (613) 957-8412
Email: [email protected]
Per: Robert J. Frater
Tel: (613) 670-6289
Fax: (613) 954-1920
Counsel for the Intervener,
Attorney General of Canada
Solicitors for Counsel for the Intervener,
Attorney General of Canada
Amiram Kotler
Neil Steen
Attorney General of Manitoba
510 – 405 Broadway
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 3L6
Henry S. Brown, Q.C.
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
2600 – 160 Elgin Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3
Tel: (204) 945-0833
Fax: (204) 945-1260
Tel: (613) 233-1781
Fax: (613) 788-3433
Counsel for the Appellant
Solicitors for Counsel for the Appellant
J. David L. Soper
Walsh & Company
2nd Floor – 426 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 3H9
Marie-France Major
Supreme Advocacy LLP
100 - 340 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0R3
Tel: (204) 947-2282
Fax: (204) 943-0211
Tel: (613) 695-8855 ext. 102
Fax: (613) 695-8580
Amanda Sansregret
Legal Aid Manitoba
300-294 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 0B9
Solicitors for Counsel for the Respondent
Tel: (204) 985-9813
Fax: (204) 956-4146
Counsel for the Respondent
Leslie Paine
Michelle Campbell
Attorney General of Ontario
720 Bay Street, 10th Floor
Toronto, Ontario M5G 2K1
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
Burke-Robertson
441 MacLaren Street, Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2H3
Tel: (416) 326-3480
Fax: (416) 326-4656
Tel: (613) 236-9665
Fax: (613) 235-4430
Counsel for the Intervener,
Solicitors for Counsel for the Intervener,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
PART I - OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................... 1 A. Overview .......................................................................................................................... 1 B. Facts ................................................................................................................................. 1 PART II – RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN ISSUE ......................................................... 2 PART III - ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 2 A. That Violence is Not Defined Supports a Broad and Purposive Approach ..................... 2 B. This Court’s Interpretation of Violence Supports a Harm-Based Approach ................... 3 C. The Realities of Domestic Violence are Consistent with a Harm-Based Approach........ 5 D. Principles of Statutory Interpretation Mandate a Harm-Based Approach ....................... 7 E. The Objective of the Dangerous and Long-Term Offender Regime Supports a HarmBased Approach .............................................................................................................. 8 F. The Interpretation of Violence in Other Common Law Jurisdictions Supports a
Harm-Based Interpretation of the Use or Attempted Use of Violence ........................... 9 PART IV - COSTS ................................................................................................................... 10 PART V – ORDER SOUGHT .................................................................................................. 10 PART VI – LIST OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... 11 PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ................................................................... 13 1
PART I - OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.
Overview
1.
Violence, including the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i), is not defined in the
Criminal Code. As a result, the meaning of violence, including its use or attempted use, is to be
interpreted in a broad and purposive fashion in accordance with prevailing views as to what
constitutes violence. While violence was once strictly understood as the exercise of physical force
resulting in injury, its meaning has undergone an evolution from this conduct-based approach to a
harm-based approach which focuses on the harmful effects of violence and not the means used to
produce those effects. Under the harm-based approach, violence is not confined to physical acts and
extends to threats of violence which precede these acts, both of which are recognized as harmful.
2.
In choosing not to define violence in s. 752(a)(i) of the Code, Parliament did not make the
use or attempted use of violence subject to a minimum seriousness requirement. This legislative
silence should be respected. The use or attempted use of violence does not depend upon a threshold
degree of physical action, including an imminent apparent danger or some overt acted directed
towards the actual use of violence. It is contrary to Parliament’s legislative intent and inconsistent
with principles of statutory interpretation to insert words into s. 752(a)(i) which serve to narrow the
scope of this provision. Just as a serious personal injury offence in s. 752 is not reserved for very
serious violent crime, neither is the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i) concerned with
only physical acts of violence which meet a threshold of seriousness.
3.
A harm-based approach to the interpretation of the use or attempted use of violence in s.
752(a)(i) is supported by this Court’s interpretation of violence which reflects this evolution in its
meaning. It is also supported by the objective of the dangerous and long-term offender regime in
Part XXIV of the Code which is to protect the public from the risk of harm posed by any future
violent acts by designated offenders. A harm-based interpretation of the use or attempted use of
violence is aptly illustrated by the realities of domestic violence and the experience in other
common law jurisdictions which do not limit the concept of violence to physical acts of violence
while recognizing that the meaning of violence can evolve and is not frozen in time.
B.
Facts
4.
The Attorney General of Canada accepts the facts as stated by the Appellant.
2
PART II – RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN ISSUE
5.
The “use or attempted use of violence” within the meaning of s. 752(a)(i) of the Criminal
Code1 should be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner in keeping with the harm-based
definition of violence. This approach reflects the prevailing view that violence is best understood in
terms of its harmful effects, not based on the conduct involved, and is not subject to a threshold
requirement of seriousness in order to be properly viewed as violence.
PART III - ARGUMENT
6.
At issue in this appeal is the interpretation of “violence” in relation to a “serious personal
injury offence” (“SPIO”) under s. 752 of the Criminal Code. To be designated as a dangerous or
long-term offender under s. 752(a)(i), the SPIO in question must involve “the use or attempted use
of violence against another person.”
7.
Violence can be gauged by conduct or by harm. The Court below adopted a conduct-based
approach to the use or attempted use of violence in concluding that s. 752(a)(i) depends on “some
degree of physical action.”2 Applying this reasoning, the Court held that a threat of violence by
itself is incapable of amounting to the use or attempted use of violence, even where the threat
involves reference to a weapon. This approach fails to adhere to the accepted view of violence
which equates violence with harm, not conduct, and does not limit violence by questions of degree.
A.
That Violence is Not Defined Supports a Broad and Purposive Approach
8.
Violence appears throughout the Criminal Code but is nowhere defined in the Code,
including in s. 752(a)(i). That Parliament chose to leave violence undefined is significant. In the
case at bar, violence should be given its ordinary and popular meaning while being accorded a broad
and liberal interpretation.3 The use or attempted use of violence should be “given such fair, large
and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”4
9.
Violence, including the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i), should be interpreted
in a broad and purposive manner to reflect society’s evolving understanding of what constitutes
violence. The criminal law is not frozen in time.5 Neither is the criminal law’s view of violence in
particular contexts. The notion of violence is not fixed, but, like other concepts, is informed by
1
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Code”).
Reasons for Judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal at para. 85.
3
Canada (Information) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306, 2011 SCC 25 at para. 48;
and R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, 2005 SCC 78 (“C.D.”) at paras. 26-27.
4
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12.
5
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 at pp. 259-261.
2
3
contemporary social norms and values, including society’s changed views regarding the nature of
violence.6
10.
This Court in R. v. Vu7 noted that kidnapping, which is likewise not defined in the Code, has
been interpreted based on its historical origins at common law taking into account its evolution to
reflect modern-day characteristics.8 Similarly, “communication” in the Copyright Act9, as an
undefined term, has been viewed as encompassing evolving but unknown technological
advances.10 Most recently, the Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling11 stated in
relation to “punishment” for the purposes of s. 11(h) of the Charter that “[t]he scope of
‘punishment’…has expanded over the years as new cases have pushed the limits of old
definitions.”12 The meaning of undefined terms, like the criminal law itself, is not immutable.
11.
The same is true of “violence” in the Code. Specifically, society’s understanding of
violence has evolved from a conduct-based perspective to a harm-based perspective.13 That is not
to say that there has been a shift in purpose, only that society’s appreciation of violence has shifted.
The purpose of protecting society from violence has remained constant.14 Any interpretation of
violence, including the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i), must be sensitive to this
evolution.
12.
The approach of the Court below is out of step with society’s evolving understanding of
violence, which has come to recognize that the meaning of violence is measured by harm, not by
conduct, and is not limited by degrees of seriousness. Violence includes acts and words, including
threats of violence, notwithstanding the degree of harm involved, on the basis that all violence is
harmful to society.
B.
This Court’s Interpretation of Violence Supports a Harm-Based Approach
13.
This Court’s jurisprudence illustrates the wide spectrum over which violence can occur and
evinces the evolution of violence from a conduct-based paradigm to a harm-based a paradigm.
6
R v. Tran, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 350, 2010 SCC 58 at para. 19; and R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (“Butler”) at pp.
476-477.
7
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 411, 2012 SCC 40.
8
Ibid. at paras. 45-47.
9
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
10
Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, [2012] 2
S.C.R. 231, 2012 SCC 34 at para. 100.
11
2014 SCC 20.
12
Ibid. at para. 43.
13
C.D. at paras. 53-87.
14
Butler at pp. 494-495.
4
14.
At one end of the continuum, violence can be understood in its traditional sense as a
conduct-based physical assault involving the use of force. Thus, in R. v. Keegstra15, McLachlin J.
as she then was, in discussing threats or acts of violence for the purposes of s. 2(b) of the Charter,
observed that under this Court’s then jurisprudence violence connoted “actual or threatened physical
interference with the activities of others.”16 This conduct-based interpretation reflects the oft-cited
dictionary definition of violence as “[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury or damage
to persons or property.”17
15.
The approach in Keegstra is in contrast to that adopted in C.D. where in interpreting
“violent offence” under s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act18, which is also undefined, this
Court observed that while the primary meaning of violence is concerned with the conduct employed
to produce injury or damage in terms of the force used, violence can also be understood in terms of
its harms. The Court in C.D. adopted a harm-based definition of violent offence over the conductbased approach reflected in Keegstra. The Court explained that a harm-based definition captures
violent offences which cause, attempt to cause or threaten to cause bodily harm and accords with the
prevailing definition of violence which focuses on its effects rather than on the means employed to
produce those effects.19
Significantly, threats of violence amount to violence under both
approaches.
16.
That the understanding of violence has evolved from a conduct-based approach to a harm-
based approach which includes threats of violence is reinforced by this Court’s recent decision in R.
v. Khawaja.20 There, in upholding the constitutionality of the terrorism provisions of the Criminal
Code, the Court rejected the argument that s. 2(b) of the Charter only excludes protection of
expressive activity that involves actual physical violence and does not extend to threats of violence.
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a unanimous Court, recognized that physical acts of violence
and threats of violence are both harmful to Canadian society and for this reason neither is deserving
of protection as free expression under s. 2(b).21
17.
For the same reasons that it makes little sense to exclude acts of violence from the ambit of
s. 2(b) but to confer protection on threats of violence, it is equally illogical to confine the use or
15
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (“Keegstra”).
Ibid. at p. 830.
17
Ibid.
18
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
19
C.D. at paras. 53-87.
20
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 555, 2012 SCC 69.
21
16
5
attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i) to actual physical violence while carving out an exception
for threats of violence. Both acts of violence and threats of violence are harmful. A harm-based
approach to the question of what constitutes the use or attempted use of violence is sufficiently
broad to encompass physical acts of violence and threats of violence or a combination of both. The
conduct-based approach applied by the Court below excludes certain types of violence caught by
the harm-based approach, such as threats of violence, including those involving a weapon.
C.
The Realities of Domestic Violence are Consistent with a Harm-Based Approach
18.
Limiting the use or attempted use of violence through reliance on a conduct-based
approach is problematic in relation to domestic violence. While R. v. Lavallee22 arose in the
context of self-defence, this Court’s discussion of the dynamics of domestic violence illustrates
how under a harm-based approach, violence can occur in the absence of physical action.
19.
This Court in Lavallee recognized that the realities of domestic violence are such that a
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm on the part of an abused spouse can
crystallize in advance of an imminent harm or an actual assault at the hands of an abusive
spouse. The Court noted that insisting on an imminence requirement, in conjuring up the image
of an uplifted knife, a pointed gun or a clenched fist before self-defence will be justified, is
inconsistent with domestic violence where a battered spouse can often predict the onset of
violence, including the nature and extent of the violence, before the first blow is struck.23
20.
The realities of domestic violence illustrated by Lavallee are difficult to reconcile with
the reasoning in the Court below. The logical extension of the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of s. 752(a)(i) is that a threat of violence would have to escalate to the point of the
uplifted knife, the pointed gun or the clenched fist in order to qualify as the use or attempted use
of violence. This interpretation reflects a conduct-based approach to violence rather than the
harm-based model which recognizes that threats of violence which precede the threatened
conduct are themselves harmful and also amount to violence.
21.
This Court in C.D. cited with approval Professor Scassa’s discussion of violence against
women as favouring a harm-based definition which includes threats of violence.24 Scassa, in
commenting on the significance of the Criminal Code offering no definition of violence, stated the
22
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (“Lavallee”).
Ibid. at pp. 875-883.
24
C.D. at paras. 30, 67 & 85 citing Scassa, Teresa, “Violence Against Women in Law Schools” (1992), 30 Alta. L.
Rev. 809 at p. 816 & p. 818.
23
6
following in explaining why violence should not be confined to the dictionary definition of physical
acts of violence and extends to threats of violence: “Threats of violence are violence itself. Those
who are threatened know that the violence they fear has already begun with the threat.”25
22.
Similarly, in the family law context, violence does not require direct physical injury. In
interpreting “violence” under s. 24(3)(f) of the Family Law Act26, courts have adopted a liberal
and remedial approach in recognizing that violence includes injury caused by words and deeds.27
Violence can be made out based on written and spoken communication where this conduct “is
calculated to produce and does in fact produce an anxiety state which puts the wife in fear of her
husband’s behaviour and impinges on her mental and physical health.”28 In this situation,
“violence has been done to her equilibrium as surely as if she had been struck by a physical
blow.”29 Text messages between spouses have been found to constitute violence. Courts have
held that s. 24(3)(f) contemplates protecting spouses from injury or harm which can arise without
physical contact in holding that text messaging is a form of violence.30
23.
This Court has recognized that weapons and specifically firearms may cause death and
injury and are often used in violent crime, including crimes of domestic violence.31 Based on the
realities of domestic violence, violence could occur where an abusive spouse threatens an abused
spouse, particularly where the threat includes a claim that the abusive spouse has a weapon to
make good on the threat. The approach of the Court below would foreclose this possibility in
treating an implied threat of violence, including that with a weapon, as not being sufficiently
serious to constitute the use or attempted use of violence, particularly in the absence of the
weapon actually being wielded.
24.
This result – SPIO not applying to threats of force – would produce undesirable results in
domestic violence cases. The reasoning of the Manitoba Court of Appeal would limit the use or
attempted use of violence to the actual onset of the physical assault, including that with a
weapon. This interpretation invites the argument that not every instance of domestic violence is
caught by s. 752(a)(i) on the basis that the use or attempted use of violence excludes relatively
25
Scassa at p. 818; and C.D. at para. 85.
R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 3.
27
Menchella v. Menchella, 2012 ONSC 6304 at paras. 10-11.
28
Ibid. at para. 11 citing with approval Hill v. Hill (1987) 10 R.F.L. (3rd) 225 (Ont. S.C.J.).
29
Ibid.
30
31
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 2000 SCC 31 at para. 43.
26
7
minor incidents of domestic violence as not being serious enough to qualify as a SPIO.32 This
approach to the use or attempted use of violence fails to adhere to the accepted view that the law
must be harmonized with prevailing social values and, in particular, must evolve to reflect
changing social values regarding the realities of domestic violence.33
D.
Principles of Statutory Interpretation Mandate a Harm-Based Approach
25.
Principles of statutory interpretation provide helpful guidance in interpreting how the use or
attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i) should be interpreted where violence is not defined in the
Criminal Code. These principles establish that: (i) words should not be added to legislation where
the language used is reasonably capable of interpretation34; and (ii) legislative silence in leaving a
term undefined, while not determinative, is relevant to legislative intent.35
26.
Applying these principles to s. 752(a)(i) supports the conclusion that the meaning of the use
or attempted use of violence is not to be altered by the addition of words which serve to narrow its
scope. Moreover, the fact that violence is not defined means that the interpretation of the use or
attempted use of violence is not fixed and can evolve to reflect prevailing views of what constitutes
violence, including the harm-based approach over the conduct-based approach.
27.
The Court below qualified the meaning of s. 752(a)(i) in a way which limits the ambit of the
use or attempted use of violence. The Manitoba Court of Appeal grafted onto the use or attempted
use of violence a qualitative dimension which the legislature did not intend. The Alberta Court of
Appeal has similarly concluded that the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i) depends
upon an objectively serious level of violence to constitute a SPIO.36
28.
Parliament could have restricted the notion of violence, including the use or attempted use
of violence in s. 752(a)(i), by legislating a seriousness threshold. It did not. This decision means
something and must be respected.37 As the Ontario38 and Saskatchewan Courts of Appeal39 have
held in interpreting s. 752(a)(i), the use or attempted use of violence does not require a measurement
32
R. v. Naess, 2004 CanLII 53065 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 54.
R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 at paras. 239-240.
34
Markevich v. Canada, [2003] S.C.R. 94, 2003 SCC 9 at para. 15; and Stoddart v. Watson, [1993] 2 S.C.R 1069 at pp. 10781079.
35
Ibid.; and Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, 2008 SCC 12 at para. 42.
36
R. v. Neve (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Alta. C.A.), 1999 ABCA 206 at para. 86.
37
R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686 at paras. 25-26; Canada (Information ) v. Canada (Minister of National
Defence) at para. 48; and C.D. at paras. 26-27.
38
R. v. Lebar (2010), 252 C.C.C. (3d) 411 (Ont. C.A.), 2010 ONCA 220 at paras. 57 & 63.
39
R. v. Goforth (2005), 193 C.C.C. (3d) 354 (Sask. C.A.), 2005 SKCA 12 at para. 53.
33
8
of the degree of violence involved. Violence in s. 752(a)(i) is not qualified by an adjective
imposing a minimum level of seriousness but applies broadly to the use or attempted use of any
degree of violence. To interpret s. 752(a)(i) as the Court below did would be to insert words into
the statute which serve to narrow the ambit of this provision contrary to Parliament’s intent. This
should not be done.
29.
That the use or attempted use of violence under s. 752(a)(i) is a basis for an offence to
qualify as a SPIO does not mean that the offence itself must be sufficiently serious in terms of the
violence involved. This Court’s reasoning in R v. Currie40 is instructive in this regard. There the
Court held that the reference in R. v. Lyons41 to “very serious violent crime”42 is not to be equated
with the finding that a SPIO needs to be especially serious and violent to qualify as a predicate
offence. Rather, it need only be a violent offence.43 The same reasoning should apply to the
interpretation of the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i). The violence in question need
only involve the use or attempted use of violence. There is no additional requirement that the
violence must also meet a threshold of seriousness for the offence to be a SPIO under s. 752(a)(i).
30.
Parliament, in choosing not to define violence in the Code, including in s. 752(a)(i), has
signalled that, much like the common law approach to the offence of battery, where violence is
concerned “the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally
prohibits the first and lowest stage of it.”44 All violence is harmful regardless of degree.
E.
The Objective of the Dangerous and Long-Term Offender Regime Supports a HarmBased Approach
31.
The main objective underlying the dangerous and long-term offender regime in Part XXIV
of the Code is consistent with a harm-based approach to the interpretation of s. 752(a)(i). This
objective is relevant to the meaning of the use or attempted use of violence as part of the contextual
approach to statutory interpretation.45
32.
The primary purpose of the regime is the protection of the public from the harm posed by a
future risk of violence by a designated offender.46 This Court in Currie explained that restricting
40
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 260 (“Currie”).
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (“Lyons”).
42
Ibid. at p. 328.
43
Currie at paras. 27-28.
44
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1768 at p. 120.
45
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42 at paras. 26-27.
46
Lyons at pp. 328-329; and R. v. Johnson, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 357, 2003 SCC 46 at paras. 19-20.
41
9
the meaning of a SPIO to very serious violent crime would be contrary to this legislative objective
by only protecting society from the worst offenders responsible for the worst types of offences.47
Circumscribing the use or attempted use of violence in the manner done by the Court below would
also subvert this objective by limiting the dangerous and long-term offender designations to
offenders responsible for violent offences which are judged to be sufficiently serious even though
these same offenders may pose a risk to the public of committing further violent offences generally.
33.
Imposing a threshold of seriousness for violence to constitute the use or attempted use of
violence is at odds with this Court’s holding in Currie that Parliament did not intend to wait for the
commission of a particularly violent and grievous offence to justify a dangerous or long-term
offender designation.48 The Ouimet Report recognized that the imperative for such a regime lies in
“the protection of the public from unlawful violence”49, not unlawful violence of a certain
magnitude. The dangerous and long-term offender regime seeks to protect the public from all
violence and related harm and not only violence which meets a minimum degree of seriousness.
F.
The Interpretation of Violence in Other Common Law Jurisdictions Supports a
Harm-Based Interpretation of the Use or Attempted Use of Violence
34.
Where a statutory term like violence is not defined, a comparative analysis of how this term
has been interpreted in other jurisdictions may assist in interpreting its meaning.50
35.
In Yemshaw v. London Borough of Hounslow51, the U.K. Supreme Court considered the
meaning of “violence” in s. 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 which provides that it is not reasonable
for a person to continue to occupy accommodation if it is probable that this will lead to “domestic
violence” against the person. Domestic violence is defined in the Act as violence or threats of
violence. The issue in Yemshaw was whether “violence” required physical violence or should be
interpreted broadly to include abusive behaviour such as psychological, sexual or financial abuse.
36.
The lower courts ruled against the appellant as they were bound by the decision in Danesh v.
Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea52 in which the English Court of Appeals held that violence
was limited to physical contact.53 In allowing the appeal and overruling Danesh, the U.K. Supreme
47
Currie at paras. 22, 24 & 26-28.
Ibid. at para. 24.
49
Lyons at p. 322.
50
Re:Sound v. Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 376, 2012 SCC 38 at paras. 41-46.
51
[2011] UKSC 3 (“Yemshaw”).
52
[2006] EWCA Civ 1404.
53
Ibid. at para. 15.
48
10
Court stated that “where Parliament uses a word such as ‘violence’ the factual circumstances to
which it applies can develop and change over the years.”54 The Court noted that while the natural
meaning of violence is physical violence, violence is “not a term of art” with a fixed meaning but is
“capable of several meanings and applying to many different types of behaviour” which “can
change and develop over time.”55
37.
To similar effect is the decision of the House of Lords in I and Another and Another v.
Director of Public Prosecutions56 interpreting the meaning of the “use or threat of unlawful
violence” in relation to the statutory offence of affray under s. 3(1) of the Public Order Act 1986.
The House endorsed the reasoning of the Divisional Court that the visible carrying of petrol bombs
by members of a gang was capable of constituting a threat of violence, notwithstanding the fact that
the accused were not yet throwing or brandishing their weapons. At the same time, the House
approved of the Divisional Court’s finding that the mere possession of a concealed weapon, without
accompanying threatening circumstances, is not enough to constitute a threat of unlawful violence.57
38.
The approaches to violence in the United Kingdom are consistent with two propositions in
interpreting the use or attempted use of violence in s. 752(a)(i). First, the meaning of violence is
capable of evolution. Second, the existence of violence should be measured against a harm-based
standard and is not dictated by categories of conduct.
PART IV - COSTS
39.
The Attorney General of Canada does not seek costs and submits that the ordinary rule that
costs are not awarded against interveners should apply.
PART V – ORDER SOUGHT
40.
The Attorney General of Canada asks that the appeal be disposed of in accordance with the
foregoing submissions and requests permission to make oral argument at the hearing of the appeal.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Date at the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, this 3rd day of April, 2014.
Jeffrey G. Johnston
of Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada
54
Yemshaw at para. 25.
Ibid. at para. 27.
56
[2001] UKHL 10.
57
Ibid. at para. 16.
55
11
PART VI – LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Para. No(s).
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42
31
Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, 2014 SCC 20
10
Canada (Information) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence),
[2011] 2 S.C.R. 306, 2011 SCC 25
8, 28
Danesh v. Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea
[2006] EWCA Civ 1404
34
Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231, 2012 SCC 34
10
I and Another and Another v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [2001] UKHL 10
37
Markevich v. Canada, [2003] S.C.R. 94, 2003 SCC 9
25
Menchella v. Menchella, 2012 ONSC 6304
22
R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452
9, 11
R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, 2005 SCC 78
8, 11, 15, 21, 28
R. v. Currie, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 260
29, 32, 33
R. v. Goforth (2005), 193 C.C.C. (3d) 354 (Sask. C.A.), 2005 SKCA 12
28
R. v. Johnson, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 357, 2003 SCC 46
32
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 6 S.C.R. 697
14, 15
R. v. Khawaja, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555, 2012 SCC 69
16
R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852
R. v. Lebar (2010), 252 C.C.C. (3d) 411 (Ont. C.A.), 2010 ONCA 220
R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309
18, 19, 20
28
29, 32, 33
R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686
28
R. v. Naess, 2004 CanLII 53065 (Ont. S.C.J.)
24
12
Cases Cited
Para. No(s).
R. v. Neve (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Alta. C.A.), 1999 ABCA 206
27
R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290
24
R v. Tran, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 350, 2010 SCC 58
9
R. v. Vu, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 411, 2012 SCC 40
10
Re:Sound v. Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada,
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 376, 2012 SCC 38
34
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 2000 SCC 31
23
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199
9
Stoddart v. Watson, [1993] 2 S.C.R 1069
25
Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, 2008 SCC 12
25
Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, [2011] UKSC 3
35, 36
Authors and Secondary Sources Cited
Para. No(s).
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. III.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1768
30
Scassa, Teresa, “Violence Against Women in Law Schools”
(1992), 30 Alta. L. Rev. 809
21
13
PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 752
PART XXIV
PARTIE XXIV
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS AND LONGTERM OFFENDERS
DÉLINQUANTS DANGEREUX ET
DÉLINQUANTS À CONTRÔLER
Interpretation
Définitions
Definitions
Définitions
752. In this Part,
752. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à
la présente partie.
“court”
“court” means the court by which an offender
in relation to whom an application under this
Part is made was convicted, or a superior court
of criminal jurisdiction;
“designated offence”
“designated offence” means
« infraction désignée »
« infraction désignée »
a) Infraction primaire;
b) infraction prévue à l’une des dispositions
suivantes :
(a) a primary designated offence,
(i) l’alinéa 81(1)a) (usage d’explosifs),
(b) an offence under any of the following
provisions:
(ii) l’alinéa 81(1)b) (usage d’explosifs),
(i) paragraph 81(1)(a) (using explosives),
(ii) paragraph 81(1)(b) (using
explosives),
(iii) section 85 (using firearm or
imitation firearm in commission of
offence),
(iv) section 87 (pointing firearm),
(iv.1) section 98 (breaking and entering
to steal firearm),
(iv.2) section 98.1 (robbery to steal
firearm),
(v) section 153.1 (sexual exploitation of
person with disability),
(iii) l’article 85 (usage d’une arme à feu
ou d’une fausse arme à feu lors de la
perpétration d’une infraction),
(iv) l’article 87 (braquer une arme à feu),
(iv.1) l’article 98 (introduction par
effraction pour voler une arme à feu),
(iv.2) l’article 98.1 (vol qualifié visant
une arme à feu),
(v) l’article 153.1 (exploitation d’une
personne handicapée à des fins
sexuelles),
(vi) l’article 163.1 (pornographie
juvénile),
(vii) l’article 170 (père, mère ou tuteur
qui sert d’entremetteur),
14
(vi) section 163.1 (child pornography),
(vii) section 170 (parent or guardian
procuring sexual activity),
(viii) l’article 171 (maître de maison qui
permet des actes sexuels interdits),
(ix) l’article 172.1 (leurre),
(viii) section 171 (householder
permitting sexual activity by or in
presence of child),
(ix.1) l’article 172.2 (entente ou
arrangement — infraction d’ordre sexuel
à l’égard d’un enfant),
(ix) section 172.1 (luring child),
(x) le paragraphe 212(1) (proxénétisme),
(ix.1) section 172.2 (agreement or
arrangement — sexual offence against
child),
(x.1) le paragraphe 212(2)
(proxénétisme),
(x.1) subsection 212(2) (living on avails
of prostitution of person under eighteen),
(xi) le paragraphe 212(2.1) (infraction
grave — vivre des produits de la
prostitution d’une personne âgée de
moins de dix-huit ans),
(xi) subsection 212(2.1) (aggravated
offence in relation to living on avails of
prostitution of person under 18),
(xii) le paragraphe 212(4) (infraction —
prostitution d’une personne âgée de
moins de dix-huit ans),
(xii) subsection 212(4) (prostitution of
person under 18),
(xiii) l’article 245 (fait d’administrer une
substance délétère),
(xiii) section 245 (administering noxious
thing),
(xiv) l’article 266 (voies de fait),
(x) subsection 212(1) (procuring),
(xiv) section 266 (assault),
(xv) section 269 (unlawfully causing
bodily harm),
(xv) l’article 269 (infliction illégale de
lésions corporelles),
(xvi) l’article 269.1 (torture),
(xvi) section 269.1 (torture),
(xvii) l’alinéa 270(1)a) (voies de fait
contre un agent de la paix),
(xvii) paragraph 270(1)(a) (assaulting
peace officer),
(xviii) l’article 273.3 (passage d’enfants
à l’étranger),
(xviii) section 273.3 (removal of child
from Canada),
(xix) le paragraphe 279(2)
(séquestration),
(xix) subsection 279(2) (forcible
confinement),
(xx) l’article 279.01 (traite des
personnes),
(xx) section 279.01 (trafficking in
persons),
(xx.1) l’article 279.011 (traite de
personnes âgées de moins de dix-huit
ans),
15
(xx.1) section 279.011 (trafficking of a
person under the age of eighteen years),
(xxi) section 279.1 (hostage taking),
(xxii) section 280 (abduction of person
under age of 16),
(xxiii) section 281 (abduction of person
under age of 14),
(xxi) l’article 279.1 (prise d’otage),
(xxii) l’article 280 (enlèvement d’une
personne âgée de moins de seize ans),
(xxiii) l’article 281 (enlèvement d’une
personne âgée de moins de quatorze
ans),
(xxiv) l’article 344 (vol qualifié),
(xxiv) section 344 (robbery), and
(xxv) section 348 (breaking and entering
with intent, committing offence or
breaking out),
(c) an offence under any of the following
provisions of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34
of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as
they read from time to time before January 1,
1988:
(i) subsection 146(2) (sexual intercourse
with female between ages of 14 and 16),
(ii) section 148 (sexual intercourse with
feeble-minded),
(iii) section 166 (parent or guardian
procuring defilement), and
(iv) section 167 (householder permitting
defilement), or
(d) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offence referred to in paragraph (b) or (c);
“long-term supervision”
“long-term supervision” means long-term
supervision ordered under subsection 753(4),
753.01(5) or (6) or 753.1(3) or subparagraph
759(3)(a)(i);
(xxv) l’article 348 (introduction par
effraction dans un dessein criminel);
c) infraction prévue à l’une des dispositions ciaprès du Code criminel, chapitre C-34 des
Statuts revisés du Canada de 1970, dans toute
version antérieure au 1er janvier 1988 :
(i) le paragraphe 146(2) (rapports
sexuels avec une personne de sexe
féminin âgée d’au moins quatorze ans
mais de moins de seize ans),
(ii) l’article 148 (rapports sexuels avec
une personne faible d’esprit),
(iii) l’article 166 (père, mère ou tuteur
qui cause le déflorement),
(iv) l’article 167 (maître de maison qui
permet le déflorement);
d) infraction constituée par la tentative ou le
complot en vue de perpétrer l’une ou l’autre
des infractions énumérées aux alinéas b) ou c).
« infraction primaire »
« infraction primaire » Infraction :
a) prévue par l’une des dispositions suivantes :
(i) l’article 151 (contacts sexuels),
“primary designated offence”
“primary designated offence” means
(a) an offence under any of the following
provisions:
(ii) l’article 152 (incitation à des contacts
sexuels),
(iii) l’article 153 (exploitation sexuelle),
16
(i) section 151 (sexual interference),
(iv) l’article 155 (inceste),
(ii) section 152 (invitation to sexual
touching),
(v) l’article 239 (tentative de meurtre),
(iii) section 153 (sexual exploitation),
(iv) section 155 (incest),
(v) section 239 (attempt to commit
murder),
(vi) section 244 (discharging firearm
with intent),
(vii) section 267 (assault with weapon or
causing bodily harm),
(viii) section 268 (aggravated assault),
(vi) l’article 244 (décharger une arme à
feu avec une intention particulière),
(vii) l’article 267 (agression armée ou
infliction de lésions corporelles),
(viii) l’article 268 (voies de fait graves),
(ix) l’article 271 (agression sexuelle),
(x) l’article 272 (agression sexuelle armée,
menaces à une tierce personne ou
(xi) l’article 273 (agression sexuelle
grave),
(ix) section 271 (sexual assault),
(xii) le paragraphe 279(1) (enlèvement);
(x) section 272 (sexual assault with
weapon, threats to third party or causing
bodily harm),
(xi) section 273 (aggravated sexual
assault), and
b) prévue à l’une des dispositions ci-après du
Code criminel, chapitre C-34 des Statuts
revisés du Canada de 1970, dans toute version
antérieure au 4 janvier 1983 :
(i) l’article 144 (viol),
(xii) subsection 279(1) (kidnapping),
(ii) l’article 145 (tentative de viol),
(b) an offence under any of the following
1983:
(iii) l’article 149 (attentat à la pudeur
d’une personne de sexe féminin),
(iv) l’article 156 (attentat à la pudeur
d’une personne de sexe masculin),
(i) section 144 (rape),
(ii) section 145 (attempt to commit rape),
(iii) section 149 (indecent assault on
female),
(iv) section 156 (indecent assault on
male),
(v) subsection 245(2) (assault causing
(v) le paragraphe 245(2) (voies de fait
causant des lésions corporelles),
(vi) le paragraphe 246(1) (voies de fait
avec intention de commettre un acte
criminel), si l’intention est de commettre
l’une des infractions visées aux sousalinéas (i) à (v) du présent alinéa;
c) prévue à l’une des dispositions ci-après du
17
bodily harm), and
(vi) subsection 246(1) (assault with
intent) if the intent is to commit an
offence referred to in any of
subparagraphs (i) to (v) of this
paragraph,
(c) an offence under any of the following
enacted by section 19 of An Act to amend the
Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences
and other offences against the person and to
amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or
in consequence thereof, chapter 125 of the
Statutes of Canada, 1980-81-82-83:
(i) section 246.1 (sexual assault),
(ii) section 246.2 (sexual assault with
weapon, threats to third party or causing
bodily harm), and
(iii) section 246.3 (aggravated sexual
assault),
(d) an offence under any of the following
1988:
(i) subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse
with female under age of 14), and
(ii) paragraph 153(1)(a) (sexual
intercourse with step-daughter), or
(e) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offence referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to
(d);
“serious personal injury offence”
“serious personal injury offence” means
(a) an indictable offence, other than high
treason, treason, first degree murder or second
degree murder, involving
revisés du Canada de 1970, dans leur version
édictée par l’article 19 de la Loi modifiant le
Code criminel en matière d’infractions
sexuelles et d’autres infractions contre la
personne et apportant des modifications
corrélatives à d’autres lois, chapitre 125 des
Statuts du Canada de 1980-81-82-83 :
(i) l’article 246.1 (agression sexuelle),
(ii) l’article 246.2 (agression sexuelle
armée, menaces à une tierce personne ou
(iii) l’article 246.3 (agression sexuelle
grave);
d) prévue à l’une des dispositions ci-après du
revisés du Canada de 1970, dans toute version
antérieure au 1er janvier 1988 :
(i) le paragraphe 146(1) (rapports sexuels
avec une personne de sexe féminin âgée
de moins de quatorze ans),
(ii) l’alinéa 153(1)a) (rapports sexuels
avec sa belle-fille);
e) constituée par la tentative ou le complot en
vue de perpétrer l’une ou l’autre des infractions
énumérées aux alinéas a) à d).
« sévices graves à la personne »
« sévices graves à la personne » Selon le cas :
a) les infractions — la haute trahison, la
trahison, le meurtre au premier degré ou au
deuxième degré exceptés — punissables, par
mise en accusation, d’un emprisonnement d’au
moins dix ans et impliquant :
(i) soit l’emploi, ou une tentative
d’emploi, de la violence contre une autre
personne,
(ii) soit une conduite dangereuse, ou
susceptible de l’être, pour la vie ou la
18
(i) the use or attempted use of violence
against another person, or
(ii) conduct endangering or likely to
endanger the life or safety of another
person or inflicting or likely to inflict
severe psychological damage on another
person,
and for which the offender may be
sentenced to imprisonment for ten years
or more, or
(b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence
mentioned in section 271 (sexual assault), 272
(sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third
party or causing bodily harm) or 273
(aggravated sexual assault).
sécurité d’une autre personne ou une
conduite ayant infligé, ou susceptible
d’infliger, des dommages psychologiques
graves à une autre personne;
b) les infractions ou tentatives de perpétration
de l’une des infractions visées aux articles 271
(agression sexuelle), 272 (agression sexuelle
armée, menaces à une tierce personne ou
infliction de lésions corporelles) ou 273
(agression sexuelle grave).
« surveillance de longue durée »
« surveillance de longue durée » La
surveillance de longue durée ordonnée en vertu
des paragraphes 753(4), 753.01(5) ou (6) ou
753.1(3) ou du sous-alinéa 759(3)a)(i).
« tribunal »
« tribunal » Le tribunal qui a condamné le
délinquant qui fait l’objet d’une demande en
vertu de la présente partie ou une cour
supérieure de juridiction criminelle.
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12
Enactments Remedial
Solution de droit
Enactments deemed remedial
Principe et interprétation
12. Every enactment is deemed remedial, and
shall be given such fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation as best ensures
the attainment of its objects.
12. Tout texte est censé apporter une solution
de droit et s’interprète de la manière la plus
équitable et la plus large qui soit compatible
avec la réalisation de son objet.

Intervener Attorney-General-of-Canada

Transcription

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