The Cultural Frontiers of Europe - the Institute for Euroregional Studies

Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea
University of Debrecen
Volume 9
The Cultural Frontiers of Europe
Edited by
Alina STOICA, Didier FRANCFORT & Judit CSOBA SIMONNE
References by
Sharif Gemie & Renaud de la Brosse
Spring 2010
Eurolimes
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
Editors-in-chief: Ioan HORGA (Oradea) and István SÜLI-ZAKAR (Debrecen)
Spring 2010
Volume 9
The Cultural Frontiers of Europe
edited by Alina STOICA, Didier FRANCFORT & Judit CSOBA SIMONNE
Honorary Members
Paul Allies (Montpellier), Peter Antes (Hanover), Enrique Banús (Barcelona), Robert Bideleux (Swansea), Erhard Busek
(Wien), Jean Pierre Colin (Reims), George Contogeorgis (Athene), Gerard Delanty (Sussex), György Enyedi (Budapest), Richard
Griffiths, Chris G. Quispel (Leiden), Moshe Idel (Jerulalem), Jaroslaw Kundera (Wroclaw), Ariane Landuyt (Siena), Kalypso
Nicolaidis (Oxford), Gheorghe Măhăra (Oradea), Adrian Miroiu, (Bucureşti), Frank Pfetsch (Heidelberg), Andrei Marga, Ioan
Aurel Pop, Vasile Puşcaş, Vasile Vesa (Cluj-Napoca), Mercedes Samaniego Boneau (Salamanca), Rudolf Rezsohazy (Leuven),
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Dusan Sidjanski (Geneve), Maurice Vaïsse (Paris)
Advisory Committee
Iordan Bărbulescu, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (Bucureşti), Teresa Pinheiro (Chemnitz) Czimre Klára, Kozma Gábor, Teperics
Károly, Varnay Ernı (Debrecen), Rozália Biró, Antonio Faur, Alexandru Ilieş, Rodica Petrea, Sorin Şipoş, Barbu Ştefănescu, Ion
Zainea (Oradea), Maria Crăciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan, Nicoale Păun, Radu Preda (Cluj-Napoca), Margarita Chabanna
(Kiev), Serge Dufoulon (Grenoble), Juan Manuel de Faramiňán Gilbert (Jaen), Thomas Lunden (Stockholm), Didier Francfort
(Nancy), Tamara Gella (Orel), Ion Gumenâi, Alla Roşca, Octavian Tîcu (Chişinău), Karoly Kocsis (Miskolc), Iolanda Aixela
Cabre, Cătălina Iliescu (Alicante), Savvas Katsikides (Nicosia), Anatoly Kruglashov (Chernivtsi), Renaud de La Brosse, Gilles
Rouet (Reims), Giuliana Laschi (Bologna), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb), Maria Marczewska-Rytko (Lublin), Fabienne Maron
(Brussels), Ivan Nacev, Margareta Shivergueva (Sofia), Carlos Eduardo Pacheco do Amaral (Asores), Alexandru-Florin Platon
(Iaşi), Mykola Palinchak, Svitlana Mytryayeva (Uzhgorod), Stanislaw Sagan (Rzeszow), Angelo Santagostino (Brescia), Grigore
Silaşi (Timişoara), Lavinia Stan (Halifax), George Tsurvakas (Tessalonik), Peter Terem (Banska Bystrica), Esther Gimeno
Ugalde (Wien), Jan Wendt (Gdansk), Gianfranco Giraudo (Venice)
Editorial Committee
Ioana Albu, Ambrus Attila, Mircea Brie, Mariana Buda, Carmen Buran, Florentina Chirodea, Lia Derecichei, Cristina Dogot, Dorin
Dolghi, Diana Gal, (Oradea), Natalia Cuglesan, Dacian Duna (Cluj-Napoca) Fulias Soroulla Michaela Maria (Nicosia), Andreas
Blomquist (Stockholm), Nicolae Dandis (Cahul), Molnar Ernı, Penzes Janos, Radics Zsolt, Tımıri Mihály (Debrecen), Bohdana
Dimitrovova (Belfast), Mariana Cojoc (ConstanŃa), Sinem Kokamaz (Izmir), George Lazaroiu, Florin Lupescu, Simona
Miculescu, Adrian Niculescu (Bucureşti), Anca Oltean, Dana Pantea, Istvan Polgar, Irina Pop, Adrian Popoviciu, Alina Stoica,
LuminiŃa Şoproni, Marcu Staşac, Constantin łoca (Oradea), Şerban Turcuş (Roma), Viktoryia Serzhanova (Rzeszow)
The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.
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ISSN: 1841-9259
Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom
Alina STOICA, Mircea BRIE (Oradea) ◄► The Cultural Frontiers of Europe. tttt
Introductory Study ......................................................................................................................
….. 5
1. The Birth and Evolution of the Intercultural Frontiers Concept ………………………….…
….. 9
Georges CONTOGEORGIS (Athens) ◄► Cultural Europe and Geopolitics ……..………
….. 11
Maria Manuela TAVARES RIBEIRO (Coimbra) ◄► Europe of Cultural Unity andtttt
Diversity ………………………….………………………………………………………...
….. 21
Sharif GEMIE (Glamorgan) ◄►Re-defining Refugees: Nations, Borders and Globalization…..... 28
Marine VEKUA (Tbilisi) ◄► Georgia and Europe in the Context of Culturaltttt
Communications ……………………………………………………………………………
…... 37
2. The Europe of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue ………………...……………
…. 51
Alina STOICA, Sorin ŞIPOŞ (Oradea) ◄► A Few Aspects on Intercultural Dialogue:tttt
Interwar Romania as Seen by the Portuguese Diplomat, Martinho de Brederode ….…….
….. 53
Barbu ŞTEFĂNESCU (Oradea) ◄► Rural Cultural Border ................................................
….. 66
Chloé MAUREL (Paris) ◄► From the East-West Major Project (1957) to the Convention onttt
Cultural Diversity (2007): UNESCO and Cultural Borders …………………………………
….. 76
Nicolae PĂUN, Georgiana CICEO (Cluj-Napoca) ◄►The Limits of Europeanness. Cantttt
Europeanness Stand Alone as the Only Guiding Criterion for Deciding Turkey’s EUtttt
Membership? ………………………………………………….….…………………………
….. 92
3. Artistic Intercultural Expressions ……………………..……………………………………...
….. 107
Didier FRANCFORT (Nancy) ◄► De l’histoire des frontières cultures à l’histoiretttt
culturelle des frontières et à l’histoire des cultures frontalières. Pour une rupture detttt
perspective et de nouvelles approaches ……………………………………………………
….. 109
Denis SAILLARD (Nancy) ◄►Nourritures et territoires en Europe. La gastronomietttt
comme frontière culturelle ……………………………..…………………………………...
….. 130
Jean-Sébastien NOËL (Nancy) ◄► Klezmer “revivalisms” to the test of real ortttt
supposed cultural borders: the stakes of memory and objects of misunderstanding ……....
….. 143
4. Focus ..................................................................................................................................................
….. 153
Ioan HORGA, Mircea BRIE (Oradea) ◄► Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geottt
cultural Archipelago ………………………….………………………...…………………..
….. 155
5. Book Reviews ...............................................................................................................................
….. 171
6. Our European Projects ..............................................................................................................
….. 189
Alina STOICA (Oradea) ◄► International conference « Nouvelles approches des frontièrestttt
culturelles » 4-6 March 2010, Oradea, Romania …………………….…………..…………
….. 190
Diana GAL (Oradea) ◄► International Conference “Regional Development and Territorialtttt
Cooperation in entral and Eastern Europe in the context of the CoR White Paper ontttt
Multilevel Governance” (Oradea, Romanian, 20-21 May 2010) ....................................
….. 191
Sorin ŞIPOŞ (Oradea) ◄► International Symposium Imperial Policies in Eastern andtttt
Western Romania Oradea - Chişinău, 3rd edition, 10-13 June 2010 .....................................
….. 193
7. About the Authors ......................................................................................................................
.. 195
The cultural Frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study
Alina STOICA, Mircea BRIE
The scientific debates about the European culture are either grouped around the
concept of cultural homogenization, phenomenon found in a strong causal relationship
with what the globalization and mondialisation really are, or designate a reality that exists
beyond denial or demolition – cultural diversity. The universalization and uniformization
of values, of images and of ideas submitted by media or cultural industry are not the only
ways of expression. One has to consider that the cultural diversity records a plurality of
ideas, images, values and expressions, within the coexistence of parallel cultures (national,
ethnic, regional, local, etc.). Moreover, in this context, some authors speak of the
“identitary rematch” and the “feeling of turning back to the historical, national and
cultural identity” especially in a space like Central and Eastern Europe and during such
historical time that the national specificity and identity would have to redefine themselves
by being open to the new configurations – geo-political, historical and cultural (David,
Florea, 2007:645-646). The national and regional cultures do not disappear under the
immediate acceleration of globalization, and this is also due to an increase of interest in
the local culture. Mondialisation, seen as a broader process that includes globalization, is
“characterised by multiplying, acceleration and intensification of economic, political,
social and cultural interactions between actors from different parts of the world” (Tardif,
Farchy, 2006:107-108). Beyond the epistemological relative antagonism, it can be seen
that the cultural cooperation space tends to become “multipolar”, the debate incorporating
the new concept of “cultural networks”. Such networks have started to confuse the old
structures, providing a step forward in terms of identity, communication, relationship and
information (Pehn, 1999:8).
Beyond the physical border, whatever the view of the conceptual approach, within
or bordering the European Union, one can identify other types of “frontiers”. Among such
frontiers the cultural borders have a special spot. What is the place of the cultural border
within such conceptual perspective? The particular cultural border makes a clear
distinction between Europe and non-Europe. This perspective that brings into question the
idea of a European unity and gives the image of a European cultural whole (true, divided
into cultural “subcomponents”), is taken apart by the supporters of national cultures of
European peoples. The statement “culture of cultures” (used also in the pages of the
current volume), although admitting the unity on the whole, stresses the specificity of
cultures. The cultural borders are basically contact areas that provide communication and
cooperation, without being boundaries between European peoples or cultures. The ethnocultural borders may overlap those of a state: inside the majority of the European states we
can identify “symbolic” borders. Such cultural areas can become real models of
interculturality, but also can be discontinuities that more or less separate human
communities based on ethnic or cultural criteria. The European space is in its nature a
pluralist society, rich in cultural and social traditions which will further diversify”
(Tandonnet, 2007:50).
Europe, seen from such angle, may seem as a conglomerate of cultural areas that
are separated by “cultural borders”, more or less overlapping with the nation-states
borders. These cultural areas can be easily labelled as subcomponents of a unitary
6
European culture as expression against the extra-European spaces. Europe can be
conceived as a unified cultural whole, despite some discontinuities that occur between
elements that make up its complex structure. Thus, the European culture is built on a
complex system of shared values that characterize the European cultural space. We mainly
refer to the common cultural values, thanks to which we can confirm today the existence
of a cultural reality, specific to the European space (see Rezsöhazy, 2008).
The volume The Cultural Frontiers of Europe, brings together some papers
presented during the Nouvelles Approches des Frontieres Culturelles Conference, held in
Oradea, at the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, in March 2010.
The event was coordinated by Prof. Ioan Horga PhD., in collaboration with the Nancy II
University, within an international project (NAFTES) initiated by the latter; the event
targeted to debate on the permanence of borders in a moment when Europe is facilitating
the free movement of persons and property. Such orientation is far from being an
exclusive one, but stresses the cultural issues, the multidisciplinarity of the cultural border
idea.
“The idea of cultural border has often been used to justify, change and challenge
the establishment of political borderlines between states or regions”, stated Prof. Didier
Francfort during the conference.
With this volume we attempt to answer a few questions:
So what is the Europe of culture?
What are the contents, the meaning, the project?)
The current Eurolimes volume is divided into three sections. The first section, The
Birth and Evolution of the Intercultural Frontiers Concept, presents an explanatory
approach to the idea of cultural border, chosen by the authors to follow its evolution in
time. The cultural phenomenon in Europe has long preceded any form of definite political
organization. If before the emergence of the nation-state in XIX century the culture had
been an element of European unity, after the intervention of the political organization this
“European conscience” was compromised. Nevertheless, a certain cultural
cosmopolitanism has been kept across the centuries through elites, notwithstanding the
existing borderlines and the necessity of being in control of people and states (see Maria
Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, apud Jacques Rigaud, op.cit.). “L’Europe de la Culture n’est
pas, ne peut pas être, une “euroculture”, mais est, ou doit être, une communauté de
cultures, ou pour mieux dire, une pratique de l’interculturalité” (see Maria Manuela
Tavares Ribeiro).
But, according to specialists, the question on the meeting of the cultural with the
geopolitical approach to Europe is raised for the first time after World War II, as a result
of the internal ethnocentric crystallization of Europe and, at the same time, of the danger
that the European Powers may turn into an appendage of the new hegemonic complex (see
Georges Contogeorgis).
In this context, the role of the refugees in Europe can be observed within the
cultural frontiers as well (see Sharif Gemie). Nevertheless, great importance has been
given to the dimension of Georgia's cultural border with Europe and the European Union
(see Marine Vekua), making the transition to the second section, The Europe of Cultural
Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue, that is based on several study cases that covers the
dimension of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. It is therefore reviewed the case
of interwar Romania and Portugal, two Latin countries located at Europe’s western and
eastern frontiers, which found the way of dialogue during the centuries and developed it at
large after World War I when the very first Portuguese Legation led by Martinho de
Brederode, Count of Cunha, was set up in Bucharest (see Alina Stoica, Sorin Şipoş). On
7
the other hand, the cultural border dimension is discussed from the perspective of the
traditional rural world culturally contaminated during past years with elements of the
European dominant urban. There are a few areas left where the traditional culture has
survived, keeping elements of archeocivilization. The existence of such elements does
require knowledge, alongside with their preservation and exploitation not only as cultural
heritage of the entire Europe, but also as local, national, regional and European identity
elements (see Barbu Ştefănescu).
A different approach to the concept of cultural border belongs to UNESCO. For
more than 50 years, UNESCO has been questioning the delimitations and the reality of
cultural borders. Contrary to the opinion of some specialists who consider that cultural
borders are factors of conflict, UNESCO has been attempting a synthesis between
universalism and multiculturalism. The universalist idea is supported by the East-West
Major Project (1957-1966), project that encourages the cultural unity. It reveals a
progressive turn around in UNESCO’s cultural politics, which led UNESCO to develop a
more synthetic conception, allying promotion of cultural unity and cultural diversity.
Therefore, since the 1960s, UNESCO has tried hard to safeguard the world cultural
heritage, notably in Africa, where it appeared to be endangered, and undergoing extinction
(see Chloé Maurel).
Apart from this, another perspective of the cultural border is given by the
enlargement of the European Union and implicitly, of the accessions and integration of the
European states. This context has generated vivid discussions on what defines the
“Europeanness” and what its main features are. Who is entitled to embark in this process?
What defines in a European context a certain type of political action? The current volume
has attempted to move beyond the sheer political and economic considerations and to go
to the core of the whole effort of building a European Union based on the intertwined
processes of integration and enlargement. The study case reviews Turkey and the process
of Turkey’s accession to the EU, stressing the cultural border issues (see Nicolae Păun,
Georgiana Ciceo).
The last section, Artistic Intercultural Expressions, states that the cultural
difference appears as a legitimation of territorial-political structures. The cultural practices
are “instrumentalised” as markers, as an authentication. The cultural specificity gives the
two sides of the border an irreducible uniqueness. In such context, the differences in
representative food practices (see Denis Saillard), music, dance and choreographies (see
Jean-Sebastien Noel) bear a great significance for the construction of crossborder cultures.
Therefore, the cultural border is the fruit of a solid construction, but not as defined as the
political border (see Didier Fracfort).
The paper Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago, signed by
Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie, is a conceptual - epistemological analysis of the European
cultural borders. The main idea is that of focusing the scientific debates onto two types of
European cultural-identity constructions: a “culture of cultures”, i.e. a strong-identity
cultural space within particular, local, regional and national levels, or a “cultural
archipelago”, i.e. a common cultural space interrupted by discontinuities. With reference
to the identification of cultural borders, the authors note that the “areas of cultural contact
belong to at least two categories: internal areas between local, regional or national
elements; external areas that impose the delimitation around what European culture is.
Both approaches used by the authors do not exclude each other, in spite of the conceptual
antagonism. The existence of national cultural areas does not exclude the existence of a
common European cultural area. In fact, “it is precisely this reality that confers the
8
European area a special cultural identity”, and its own cultural specificity, respectively.
(La culture au cœur, 1998:117-133).
Bibliography
David, Doina; Florea, Călin (2007), Archetipul cultural şi conceptul de tradiŃie, in The
Proceedings of the European Integration-Between Tradition and Modernity
Congress 2nd Edition, Editura UniversităŃii „Petru Maior”, Târgu Mureş
La culture au cœur (1998), la culture au cœur. Contribution au débat sur la culture et le
développement en Europe, Groupe de travail européen sur la culture et le
développement, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg
Pehn, Gudrun (1999), La mise en réseau des cultures. Le role des réseaux culturels
européens, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg
Tandonnet, Maxime (2007), Géopolitique des migrations. La crise des frontières, Edition
Ellipses, Paris
Tardif, Jean; Farchy, Joöelle (2006), Les enjeux de la mondialisation culturelle, Éditions
Hors Commerce, Paris
Rigaud, Jacques (1999), “L’Europe culturelle”, in Culture nationale et conscience
européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan
Warnier, Jean-Pierre (1999), La mondialisation de la culture, Paris, Editions La
Découverte
Sticht, Pamela (2000), Culture européenne ou Europe des cultures? Les enjeux actuels de
la politique culturelle en Europe, Paris, L’Harmattan
1. The Birth and Evolution of the Intercultural Frontiers Concept
Georges CONTOGEORGIS (Athens) ◄► Cultural Europe and
Geopolitics
Maria Manuela TAVARES RIBEIRO (Coimbra) ◄► Europe of
Cultural Unity and Diversity
Sharif GEMIE (Glamorgan) ◄► Re-defining Refugees: Nations,
Borders and Globalization
Marine VEKUA (Tbilisi) ◄► Georgia and Europe in the Context of
Cultural Communications
Cultural Europe and Geopolitics1
Georges CONTOGEORGIS
Abstract: The question on the meeting of the cultural with the geopolitical approach to
Europe is raised for the first time after World War II, as a result of the internal ethnocentric
crystallization of Europe and, at the same time, of the danger that the European Powers may turn
into an appendage of the new hegemonic complex. The collapse of bipolarise, the geostrategic
weakening of Russia, the peculiar antagonistic tug-of-war between the European Union and the
USA in the environment of globalization, however, set the relationship between the cultural
identification of Europe and its state structure on a new basis.
The dilemmas that are brought about by the matter of the meeting of a multicultural
Europe with its political perspective cannot help but lead to the disengagement of political Europe
from its geography and, in any case, from its non-anthropocentric (its feudalistic references, such
as religion or the early liberties) cultural base. In their place a new politeyan patriotism, as far as
its content is concerned, will be cultivated, and will simultaneously construct the cultural and the
political identity of the European Union on bases that are clearly anthropocentric (that is, seated
in the perspective of freedom in the individual, social, and political sphere).
Keywords: cultural, geopolitical, bipolarise, geostrategic, globalisation
I. The establishment of a ‘political society’ (or a state) require the union of either
an act of power or of general will of the social body concerned besides the international
context making the will or act of power legitimate.
The European Union is a new political phenomenon to the modern cosmosystem;
yet it is well-known in certain particular historical circumstances of the Greek
cosmosystem2. Interesting in the modern context is the fact that the process of European
integration reveals in fact that it is not federalism – or rather a meeting point between
societies within a common political framework – in crisis, but a socio-political system of
genuine socialism that has entailed the crush of federalism in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia.
The European Union is an unforced political experience issued by the political
will of its Members. I mean the ‘countries’ and not the ‘peoples’, as the idea of political
Europe has been envisaged from the top. It is also an idea going even further as compared
to the will expressed by its founding fathers.
This remark means that a political Europe has already brought together the
material conditions, that is, cultural and material maturity, on the one hand, and has
overcome negative reserves and influences, on the other hand. Indeed, the success of this
idea on a continent with divisions and bloody wars shows that the basis is very solid and
that this project marks the existence of a steady element that the circumstances prevent
from expressing itself.
1
2
In Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (ed.), Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras, Quarteto, Coimbra,
2004:71-87
I make reference to the phenomenon of sympolitéia occurring at the ecumenical epoch shortly
before the Roman conquest. The most important representatives are the Aetolian and Achaean
sympolitéia. We have to notice that the foundations of the European Union resemble the
sympolitéia rather than the modern federal structure.
12
On the other hand, just like any idea of a society, the idea of the political Europe
does not only have joint bases; at the same time, it has limits that, in this case, influence
the deepness of the stakes as well as its own borders. Thus, the project of Europe is meant
to define its content and space.
Which is the steady element of Europe and which were the circumstances
preventing it from being expressed in a political project?
The steady element making up Europe is mainly culture and the cultural
infrastructure of the continent. Nevertheless, the general cultural reference may fuel the
dynamics of moulding a common political will under certain circumstances. In order to
put into practice such a joint political project, meeting these conditions is the core of
cultural or general identity reference with particular cultural or identity references.
II.The general cultural reference represents an idea of Europe essentially settled within
the Greek cosmos. This idea is based on the synthesis of two different identities: an idea of
cosmosystem and a polity identity. I distinguish between polity identity and political identity
as political patriotism may turn into attachment to a political community (the state) or may be
expressed on the level of global cosmosystem identity, that is, outside basic polity form3.
The growth of the European idea and its elements, as well as its stages has been
confronted with two great elements favouring division: one is the passage of Western, or
rather Latin, Europe to Middle Ages; the other is the features and conditions of the
continent’s transition to modern times. The despotic transition of Latin Europe has
destroyed its more or less anthropocentric nature and decreased the connection with
Hellenism to mere Christianity4. As the revival of anthropocentric movement and its
ethnocentric outcome are different as compared to Eastern Europe, they are the origin of
power conflicts and a deeply antithetic vision on passage to modernity.
However it may be, the research on common cultural basis of Europe starts from a
central presupposition regarding geographical identity. From the topographic point of
view, Europe is a core cultural factor, a sine qua non condition when analysing other
cultural elements. Europe is opposed to Africa, Asia, and the Americas essentially through
its geography.
Topographical appurtenance is the initial hypothesis to start the discussion.
Conversely, the non-appurtenance to Europe is the formal reason for exclusion. There are
communities on the continent that do not culturally belong to the so-called European
culture, while others share the European values with a topography lying elsewhere.
Besides, geography is a spare argument for countries touching Europe’s borders. It is the
argument raised mainly against Russia and Turkey’s joining them: should the borders of
Europe be pushed beyond its geography all the way to Alaska or Iran and Iraq? And, in
3
For the concepts of polity, political, cosmosystemic or ecumenical identity and their relation with
national identity, see Georges Contogeorgis, Histoire de la Grèce, Paris, Hatier, 1992; «Identité
cosmosystémique ou identité nationale? Le paradigme hellénique», Pôle Sud, 10/1999:106-125;
and «Identité nationale, identité politéienne et citoyenneté à l'époque de la mondialisation», in
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (dir.), Europa en Mutaçao: Cidadania, Identidades,
Diversidade Cultural, Coimbra, 2003:150-174.
4
Before the anthropocentric implantation of Byzantium into the West, Christianity used to be one
of the most important elements for the Hellenic belief, mentality, institution, etc. to the
European peoples. Thus, despite the pledging of Latin Europe after the fall of the Roman West,
its preferential connection with the Greek world is still preserved through the action of the
Church.
13
this case, why not envisaging Israel or Morocco and other neighbours of Russia and
Turkey join it?
In fact, geography is more than a topographic element: it is a mental reality that is
not devoid of cultural load. Already in the Greek mythology the concept of Europe is
symbolised by its opposition against Asia. Once the continents delimitation, the Greeks
want or manage to endow them with particular symbolisms. The abduction of Europe (by
Zeus) in Asia means at the same time its duty or rather historical dependence and act of
birth, its accession to autonomy.
Indeed, this automatic act has a deep significance as it reminds the antithesis
between the Greek civilisation as opposed to the Asian civilisation. One is
anthropocentric, i.e. based on freedom, while the other is despotic. Europe is an
emancipated woman entering the history scene via its accession to anthropocentrism.
It is important to notice that at the beginning it is not ‘Greece’, but Europe being
against Asia. As the Greeks are the only to create and embody the anthropocentric
cosmos, the Europeans are barbarians to them. Thus, the Europeans are in a particular
position; they are barbarians, yet they are close, familiar to the Greeks. Even after their
accession to anthropocentrism, the Greeks would not cease considering themselves
Europeans. In its Politics, Aristotle notices that Asia has a penchant for willing servitude
embodying the despotic system. The Asian despotism is opposed not only to the Greek
anthropocentrism, but also to European peoples that are brave and led by a free spirit
according to him. It is clear that behind this opposition there is the antithesis between
Asian state despotism and the pre-despotic status of Europe5.
Nevertheless, Europe will be part of the Greek core cosmosystem from now on
without acquiring an identity characteristic of the continent. The concept of Europe will be
topographic for a long time; it exists with the Greeks but not with the European peoples.
The cosmosystemic break after the fall of the Western Roman Empire makes the
advantage of continuous contact of the European world with Greek cities disappear and
particularly its insertion to the Roman Empire and its conversion to Christianity beyond
the anthropocentric city system6. On the European continent, there is a return to the
cosmosystemic dualism: the Latin West falls into a deep despotism, while the Greek East
has a small scale city based anthropocentric cosmosystem.
The 9th century marks a turning point within the Greek cosmos that is expressed
through a dramatic reconsideration of the geostrategic orientation of Byzantium. These
changes are based on organic reintegration of the European West to city small scale
anthropocentric cosmosystem7 beyond the Slavic East in the Christian cultural area
(Heller, 1997; Vodoff, 1988). For the first time, the geography of Europe coincides with a
fundamental cultural element, Christianity, and participates to the anthropocentric future
of Hellenism in terms of peripheral core area.
5
6
7
Aristotle attributes this difference between the European and the Asian man depending on
climate. Europe is cold, Asia is hot, while Greece is midway, having a temperate climate.
Focusing his interest on the city, it is obvious that Aristotle makes general remarks that they do
not depend on a global theory on the evolution of the world.
Indeed, the city system disappears in the 6th century, when the feudal system appears. See
François Jacques, Les cités de l’Occident romain. Du 1er siècle avant J.-C. au VIe siècle après
J.-C. (Documents traduits et commentés par…), Paris, 1992
For details on this issue, see « Les conditions pragmatologiques de la diffusion de la littérature
hellénique en Europe occidentale », in D. Koutras (dir.), Athènes et l’Occident, Athènes
2001:109-124
14
Nevertheless, this cultural union of Europe leads to a cosmosystemic
heterogeneity of the continent. The westerners are privileged by the resettlement of
anthropocentric parameters leading to the city system: in Italy, the city is an alternative
society project facing the feudal system and favouring monetary change. Beyond the Alps,
the city is in fact an integrating part of the feudal field, thus being reduced to a commune.
Although this evolution has been the efficient cause of passing from the small to the large
cosmosystemic scale on a long term, the engaged process of transition from despotism to
anthropocentrism is the basis of a new division of Europe that is not to be pursued by the
Slavic East.
Considering these facts, although the concept of the European East and West has
been created in Constantinople to describe the division of the Roman Empire and
distinguish between the Latin (pledged or despotic) and the Greek (anthropocentric)
worlds, it acquires a different meaning as it goes further from Byzantium. It will define
the division of the continent between the new West from an anthropocentric point of view
and the Slavic backward East. Yet the doctrine division projected on the symbolic level
will only be a cover for a reality relating to the conditions of passage to anthropocentric
cosmosystem on both sides of Europe. In fact, differences between Catholicism and
Protestantism are by far the most important as compared to the ones between Catholicism
and Orthodoxy. Moreover, the Slavic Orthodoxy is pledged except for the ritual. From
several points of view, it is closer to Catholicism than Greek Orthodoxy, particularly at
pre-ethnocentric times.
The opposition occurred as a consequence of the differences in the transition to
anthropocentrism varies throughout Europe. A Spanish bishop reproaches to the youth of
the country that they are not concerned with holy books and learn the language of the nonbelievers to read non-Christian books. The books belonging to the Arab non-believers
were written by Aristotle and Plato, they are not excerpts from the Koran. Speaking to the
Russians, a Polish Jesuit notices that the Greeks – the Byzantines – provide only liturgical
books and keep scholar books to themselves.
At the end of the Middle Ages, from Spain to Poland, Europe distinguishes itself
from the Slavic Europe and is opposed to the Muslim Arabs. The words of the Spanish
bishop reveal not only the difference of religion, but also the anthropocentric inferiority of
the Christian Spain. On the contrary, the Polish Catholic underlines to the Russians that
they are closer to the Greeks from the Christian point of view, while the Poles are close
from the point of view of the Greek literature.
In their turn, the Byzantines, after settling their internal affairs to make Hellenism
and the new religion live together or be understood – the approach to life, literature, etc. –
are fully aware of their anthropocentric nature. During his mission to the Arabs,
Constantin, one of the two Greek intellectuals christianising the Slavs, reminds them:
“Sciences come from us”. That remark underlies that it is (not only) religion that makes
the difference. Stress is laid on the Greek origin of sciences to underline the continuity of
anthropocentric Hellenism at the time of Byzantium, that is, the constant of its own
identity and not the history of a phenomenon no longer attended.
As compared to Europe, the Byzantines are the sole owners of the Roman
imperium and the genuine representatives of the Hellenic anthropocentrism. However, this
range covers both the Greeks and the Romans. Religion is a capital element of the union
despite the rivalry between Churches on primacy concerning the influence on the
metropolitan power of Byzantium and the social power claimed by the Roman Church.
Nevertheless, we are aware of the deep difference separating the Greek world from
the rest of Europe: “I consider that the borders of Europe are in Thrace” – on the coast of the
15
Bosporus – notices King Constantin Porphyrogenete, while King Julian underlines that
‘Greece’ is clearly wider and different in concept as compared to Europe: one is
geographical, the other is cosmosystemic. Indeed, the Hellenic anthropocentrism is opposed
to Christianity in this sense.
Crusades are revealing for two elements drawing the attention of Western
Europeans: the Islam and the Byzantine anthropocentrism. The Islam is the religious Other
that has moulded the European unity at the beginning. Westerners would support the
Byzantines when facing difficulties to control the holy places. The anthropocentric
Byzantium cause admiration and jealousy of the Western feudal class at the same time. It is
a role model; at the same time, the feudal class is aware of their fate when facing its
anthropocentric superiority: the serf versus the free man, the notable concerning the
cosmopolite bourgeois and the civil servants (Contogeorgis, Histoire de la Grèce. For
controversies on crusades, see Cohen, 1983; Alphandéry, Dupront, 1995; Maalouf, 1983).
The mass meeting caused by crusades of the Westerners and the Hellenic
anthropocentric would bear cosmo-historical consequences. It would accelerate the crush
of the feudal domain and its anthropocentric transition starts by the rebirth of the
Byzantines’ interest in Europe. The occupation and plundering of Greek lands including
Constantinople by the crusaders are the paramount meeting in point of consequences. Yet
at the same time, it leads to a deep division of Europe that, although cosmosystemic at the
beginning, turns into a doctrine symbolism.
First of all, it breaks the understanding settled between Hellenism and Christianity
within Byzantium. The Church prefers the alliance with the Ottoman Islam against the
clear will of the leading class (bourgeois, politicians, intellectuals) of the Greeks declaring
themselves in favour of a strategic alliance with their Latin homologues. After the fall of
Byzantium and the political marginalisation of the Greeks, the European geopolitics
adapts itself to the dynamics of the post-feudal order construction. This would bring about
a division in other directions caused by bloody religious wars or the developing
ethnocentric project. Considering the environment, the opposition between the European
East and West changes actors and content. Russia replaces Hellenism in embodying the
European East but this time the West substitutes Hellenism towards an anthropocentric
movement as opposed to the Slavs, who confine themselves to a state feudalism until the
beginning of the 20th century.
Thus, religion is at the same time a fundamental identity element and a division
element in Europe. Nevertheless, internal identification of Europe including Christianity is
settled based on the Greek cosmosystem politically managed by the Roman cosmopolis. It
is the same basis that legitimates the solidarity against the Other, which is the Arab and
Ottoman Islam. We should not forget that the Arabians identify Europe with “Roumis”,
that is, Byzantines.
This holds true for modern times: religion has largely helped hiding or supporting
cosmosystemic antagonisms opposing the European peoples. Anticlericalism or
Protestantism express each by itself the clashes entailed by the pledging of the Catholic
Church or by the developed dynamics of the new anthropocentric social classes in the
West.
We have to mention that Church division is due to the cosmosystemic and thus
political division of Europe. Conflicts occurring on the continent oppose particularly
counterparts from the point of view of the doctrine. This holds true for Catholics or
Protestants, as well as for Orthodox. Russia’s case is interesting: until the Crimean War,
Russia plays on Orthodoxy embodying Hellenism; consequently, it invents pan-Slavism
and the nationalities’ project. Thucydides is clear about it: the internal and external affairs
16
of the countries need justification to be legitimate, yet they are always conditioned by
interest.
1. Thus, we presume that from a certain moment on Europe has reached cultural
borders connecting them to its geographical position just like differing endogen interests
preventing it from identifying itself around its own identity. Chasms favoured by
anthropocentric emergence of Europe focus on identity conflicts originating in national
issues, the will of different ethnics to be politically invested and the fight to control the
European space. On the other hand, the belated anthropocentric transition of the Slavic
Europe brings another source of conflict, that of the path to follow to break from
despotism and the content of the new world. The Bolshevik revolution and the division of
Europe into two socio-political sides express this reality.
The crystallisation of nationalities and the end of transition systems (from
socialism to state liberalism) after the 1980s seem to be the end of a long period of
internal chasms during which the micro-identity argument prevails at the expense of the
global European identity. The revival of the European idea brings together the identity
offer originated in geography, the anthropocentric aims (liberties, rights, etc.), the
manifold symbolisms issued by religion, traditions, memories, etc.
It is this new geopolitical reality that is at the origin of the endeavours of some
American circles to elaborate a philosophy of the history based on religion or rather on the
religious element of civilisation (Huntington, 1996. For a critical approach of his
hypothesis, see our survey Huntington et ‘le choc des civilisations’. ‘Civilisation
religieuse’ ou cosmosystème ? », Revista de Historia das Ideias, vol. 24/2003). To
interpret historical evolution through religion, to see evolving anthropocentric proximity
of a society depending on religion is undoubtedly absurd and eventually meant to support
geostrategic aims.
At a first glance, the projection of religion as argument for identity offer does not
appear in the policies of the European Union in point of enlargement. However, it
influences certain intellectual circles on the continent and has largely supported
disfavoured social classes to find a refuge and feel at home when confronted with deep
mutations of contemporary world. It is also anthropocentric homogeneity of the world and
research of difference in external symbolism that allows the emergence of a trend to
define the European civilisation and identity and more strictly the Western one in terms of
religion. Indeed, we can see that it is more and more about Judeo-Christian identity
breaking away from the Greek-Roman anthropocentric references.
Nevertheless, even if we admit the European identity as a religious base for
pondering, we need to question the content of this religion. Yet, the difference between
Christian religion and the Judeo-Christian project is deep on a conceptual level.
Christianity defines the synthesis of the new religion according to a Greek-Roman vision
of the world or the anthropocentric version of a religion of a typically despotic conception.
Thus, the first element, ‘Judeo-’, hides that Christianity is based on opposition to Judaism
and particularly to its origins in Asian despotism (Contogeorgis, 2002). Moreover, stress
laid on the ‘Judeo-Christian’ concept may be an attempt for the Islam to remind its
‘Judaic’ bases and define itself as a ‘Judeo-Muslim’!
The option favouring the Christian version of the European religion does not
contribute to its Judaic origins; it rather reminds the determining reconciliation of the new
religion with the Hellenic anthropocentric (small scale) or ethnocentric (large scale)
cosmosystem. This reconciliation has been often tested until recently and Europe has paid
for it. Thus, it has no interest in returning to it particularly as it does not facilitate the
17
elaboration of a viable argumentation concerning Russia, as the latter may legitimately
claim its Judeo-Christian identity basis.
Indeed, the abovementioned considerations show that if religion is one of the
pillars of the European civilisation common basis, it is not due to its despotic ‘JudeoAsian’ origins, yet it is due to its cultural basis coming from its osmosis with the
anthropocentric Greek-Roman civilization (Contogeorgis, 2002). From this point of view,
the despotic cosmos belongs to a certain history of Europe – not as a whole – but not to its
global historical identity or its modern anthropocentric status. Moreover, when looking
into the European churches, one realises that Christian religion has adapted to despotism,
has served it, but has not been the cause of its transition to despotic cosmosystem.
From this point of view, Christianity is an element of union or division of the
European world according to the cosmosystemic adventures of the latter. Thus, if religion
is mentioned relating to European identity, it is not certain that it can support unity under
the current circumstances. The insistence on religion could have facilitated an
understanding amongst the adepts of different Christian doctrines. Besides, as history has
shown that the Christian schism was deeply political, the reunification of Europe will
support unity if not understanding amongst Churches. Yet it is as certain that Christianity
risks being a factor of exclusion as Europe will no longer be Christian or even not solely
Christian.
This means that European Union will be carried out on an anthropocentric basis
before turning political. In other words, it will be the result of the anthropocentric meeting
of the European peoples and not that of ecclesiastic reconciliation.
As early as the 1960s, R. Aron noticed that the socialist side – Eastern Europe –
was merely a version of the West (Aron, 1962). He meant that the bases of genuine
socialism were anthropocentric and, we may add, belonged to the same path of transition
issued from a small scale anthropocentric cosmosystem, that is, the Greek-Roman world.
The fall of socialism – and state liberalism – has updated the anthropocentric
aspect of the European identity, particularly the fact that hence there are no longer two,
but one Europe sharing the same socio-economic and political system from the
cosmosystemic point of view. In this new context, the issue of European geography and
culture returns to the agenda in a dramatic manner. At the same time, we can see that the
European anthropocentric acquis is no longer its privilege as it has become universal.
To overcome chasms caused by the transition from despotism to anthropocentrism
and the new European Union following question is raised: is it necessary to bring up the
cultural argument including geography to build a political Europe or meeting the
newcomers in the polity based Central and Eastern Europe market system? It is precisely
this major question that settled the issue on the enlargement criteria fuelling the Union
integration wave of ten Central European and Mediterranean countries. Indeed, the
cultural argument facilitates the integration of the former socialist countries to the
European Union, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox. The polity argument is based
on the cultural element or even on the same geography giving way to anthropocentric
harmonisation: in economic and political issues and particularly in point of assimilation of
fundamental rights and liberties.
The first option acknowledges the existence of a certain unbalance from the point
of view of anthropocentrism between the EU countries and the others; yet this unbalance
does not disturb the way the Union works. The second option requires that harmonisation
is an accession presupposition and concludes that it cannot follow integration. This means
that the European Union settles the accession conditions to the new countries.
18
Essentially, this dilemma refers to the European Union internal chasms focused on
the issue: what kind of Europe do we want? A rather economic Europe interested in
founding an area of free market, or a Europe made up of a well structured political system
with its own values and identity with a federal and even a sympolity structure, if possible?
Without solving this issue, the recent enlargement has been more or less directed
by the first priority and undoubtedly conditioned by geopolitical considerations. Indeed,
the economic borders can go beyond the political borders of the European Union.
The difficulties encountered to have a Constitution for Europe and the strategic
priorities relating to a state show the core of the issue, that is, the issue of the European
Union borders is essentially connected with the European geography and culture.
However, the final decision will be conditioned by geopolitics. Eventually, geopolitics
makes reference to strategic interests of the countries making up the European Union and
to the international power relations. The current compromise, enlargement and attempt to
build a polity Europe at the same time, show that the Member States have not yet
elaborated a clear idea on the future of the European system. Nevertheless, it seems that
the partners of the European mission will soon face real issues as the European Union will
be compelled to envisage its place worldwide – and thus its relations with the United
States – as well as its relations with Russia and Turkey.
2. Geopolitics is the fourth pillar in the process of European construction, the
three others being geography, culture, and anthropocentric and polity deepening.
We have already noticed that the political project of Europe is the result of a
geopolitical cause: the dramatic change of the international order at the end of WWII
leading to a feeling of powerlessness and insecurity throughout Europe, the former
mistress of the world. It witnesses the fall of the colonial system and feels the risk of being
crushed in the middle of the new bipolar system, a system reserving a secondary place at
the same time menacing the liberal system, considering the antagonism with the socialist
rival.
Divided by its opposing political and socio-economic systems, Europe cannot
afford to play between the two considerable protagonists. The UN power shared by five is
there just to witness a definitely past finished. The political Europe sheltered by the
United States is compelled to envisage the issue of its borders from the point of view of its
ideological-political system.
The fall of the ideological-political bipolarity makes Europe rediscover its own
geographical borders and question its own cultural affinities. At the same time, it faces the
new international order that is almost unipolar. The research of a new role on the
cosmosystemic scene necessarily raises the issue of settling a certain partnership with its
former and hence the only ally, the United States.
Right after the fall of the socialist system, the political Europe sees its
understanding with the United States as a great opportunity to reject the Soviet Empire
and expand its vital space to the Russian borders. The integration of Eastern countries
largely responds to this geopolitical priority. Thus, the geo-cultural argument supports
perfectly the European Union to lay foot on the core strategic pillars, such as Finland,
Poland, South-Eastern European countries, as well as Cyprus and Malta. An internal
economic space is created to act as an economic engine of the hard nucleus of the Union.
This enlargement of the European political space raises two questions: one is
internal, while the other is external.
The former is related at the same time to its own identity and political balance.
The encounter of the political Europe with a former socialist Europe raises the question of
its character and finality.
19
The dilemma of a rather economic or polity Europe reveals an issue on the
European Union’s priorities. Should we go to the bottom of anthropocentric acquis and, in
this case, take actions of harmonisation of the new partners or should we limit ourselves to
creating an internal vital space, an endo-polity periphery?
On the other hand, the new cosmosystemic environment characterised by a
growing anthropocentric standardisation can cause an identity crisis in Europe. Indeed, if
the anthropocentric acquis is universal, how can political Europe reaffirm its originality
all the more as it cannot express itself with its own national identity?
One can even say that this remark is also valid in point of the will to support its
worldwide geostrategic cause. In a bipolar world, the concept of West has served the
project for a common identity around the liberal system. In the new unipolar system, the
idea of West risks helping to prolonging the dependence of political Europe on the United
States, as well as the conflict on a religious basis.
At the moment, research on European identity acquires a capital importance,
considering that the reinforcement of European societies’ attachment to the European Union
dynamics will eventually result in a reorientation of their vision concerning the institutions
of political Europe, the interest to support the will for power worldwide. The European
world gets together due to a cosmosystem focused on: a) the continent’s geography; b) the
Greek-Roman heritage of the European societies, a unity with the vanguard small scale
anthropocentric cosmosystem on the level of construction of the large scale anthropocentric
world; c) geopolitical considerations in general. Europe as a country will not be national; it
will be geo-cultural and thus polity-oriented. It is thus meant to deny the doctrine of
modernity that sees the nation as the sole cultural unit able to provide a meaning and content
to a polity entity and the state as a sole political home of the national act. It is a concept of
the country of Europe that can assert itself as compared to the “Other” present from a
geopolitical point of view, in this case the United States and even Russia.
The exclusion of Russia from the European Union will not take place as it is not
European; it is simply very large and therefore it risks to break internal balances. Thus, the
geopolitics of the European Union settles the boundaries of Europe’s frontiers. Yet,
geographical and cultural borders of the Old Continent are the external limit of any
ambition of political Europe. However, it is not up to them to make a decision on the
political borders. It is precisely in this discrepancy that internal and external geopolitics
comes up. It is an intervention that is not meant to prevent the European Union from
claiming its European identity particularly as polity Europe includes core elements of the
geo-cultural pillars defining the concept of Europe.
Nevertheless, geopolitics says that the political borders of Europe cannot under
the given circumstances coincide with geographical and cultural borders. This reserve
(‘the given circumstances’) is not advisable due to a scientific caution, but due to the fact
that the issue is not closed at least on a rhetorical level. We should mention Charles de
Gaulle speaking of a Europe including Russia for geopolitical reasons, that is, to
counterbalance the United States of America.
I cannot imagine how this project can be carried out at least on a mid-term basis.
Yet, on a long term, it is not out of the question particularly if China enters the
international scene forcefully and if Europe is endowed with a polity system and a strong
identity reference. On the other hand, the fear of a shift of internal power breaking the
existing balance within the Union, as well as the issue of strengthening identity, socioeconomic element and politics of the polity-oriented Europe can prevent the accession of
Turkey or cause regulating enlargements, such as the accession of Ukraine. But in this
case, we would no longer be able to envisage a polity-oriented Europe.
20
In conclusion, cultural Europe is the long-term by-product of the Old Continent
based on four pillars: a) geography, b) culture strictly speaking, c) anthropocentric acquis,
d) internal and external geopolitics of the European Union.
The issue of the borders of Europe introduces as a prior hypothesis the geography
and its cultural historical particularity issued from anthropocentric cosmosystem in
general. Yet the final decision on the political frontiers of the European Union will be
made each time from the perspective of geopolitical considerations. As more often than
not geopolitics is a primary yet too rough argument, geography and culture will be invited
to justify political choices.
Thus, the return to primary sources of European identity will be topical for as long
as internal chasms compel political Europe to balance between strengthening polity and
the conception of a cowardly market partnership.
Considering these elements, we have to remember the remark according to which
elements belonging to culture and identity have not been a priority for the union of Europe
unless threatened from the outside.
Consequently, we can assume that the borders of the political Europe will be the
result of a synthesis of geo-cultural Europe and geopolitics, that is, a political compromise
of the Europeans considering more or less the internal force relations relating to the polity
project and the global cosmosystem.
Bibliography
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Aron, R., Dix-huit leçons sur la société industrielle, Paris, 1962
Cohen, C., Orient et Occident au temps des croisades, Paris, 1983
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Coimbra, 2002
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Sud, 10/1999
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Cidadania, Identidades, Diversidade Cultural, Coimbra, 2003
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Europe occidentale », in D. Koutras (dir.), Athènes et l’Occident, Athènes 2001
François, Jacques, Les cités de l’Occident romain. Du 1er siècle avant J.-C. au VIe siècle
après J.-C. (Documents traduits et commentés par…), Paris, 1992
Heller, Michel, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris, 1997
Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order, 1996
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24/2003
Maalouf, A., Les croisades vues par les Arabes, Paris, 1983
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Europe of Cultural Unity and Diversity
Maria Manuela TAVARES RIBEIRO
Abstract: The Europe of culture prevails over all political structure: as of the 18th
century the Europe of Christianity, convents, universities, and Enlightenment used to be more
united than the Europe of nation-states that fragmented and sometimes compromised this
“European awareness”. If there still is a certain cultural cosmopolitanism preserved amongst
elites throughout epochs despite the existing borders and the need to control people, nation-states
enrich national cultural awareness and make the Judeo-Greek-Latin heritage deeply influencing all
cultures on a continent a common denominator despite other movements and subsequent
repercussions.
Then we can ask ourselves if it isn’t a utopia to attempt the creation of a European state
based on a common European culture. The answer comes quickly: such unified culture remains a
myth amongst a Europe marked by cultural diversity.
Keywords: Europe, Culture, National Culture, Globalisation, Identities.
Europe of Culture
The Europe of culture prevails over all political structure: as of the 18th century
the Europe of Christianity, convents, universities, and Enlightenment used to be more
united than the Europe of nation-states that fragmented and sometimes compromised this
“European awareness”. If there still is a certain cultural cosmopolitanism preserved
amongst elites throughout epochs despite the existing borders and the need to control
people, nation-states enrich national cultural awareness and make the Judeo-Greek-Latin
heritage deeply influencing all cultures on a continent a common denominator despite
other movements and subsequent repercussions (Rigaud, 1999:171).
For instance, in his article entitled “L’Europe culturelle” (1994), Jacques Rigaud
speaks not of a “European cultural conscience”, but rather of a “metamorphosis”. This
reminds us of André Malraux’s words: “The world of culture is not that of immortality; it
is that of the Metamorphosis” (Sticht, 2000:115). So, what is the Europe of culture? What
are its content, meaning, and project? The Europe of culture is not and cannot be a “Euroculture”; yet it is, or should be, a community of culture or rather a practice of
interculturality.
In a novel entitled Désir d’Europe (1995), Pierre-Jean Rémy quotes the thinking
of Moravia when comparing Europe of culture to a double-faced valuable cloth: one is
made of a multicoloured tissue as a patchwork, while the other has only one rich and deep
colour (Rigaud, 2002:172).
In his work Notes towards the definition of culture (1947), the poet Thomas
Stearns Eliot suggest that “culture cannot be simply described as something making life
worth living”. According to Paul Valéry, a writer in the interwar period, “the idea of
culture, intelligence, remarkable works is to us an ancient relationship – so ancient that we
seldom go back to it – with the idea of Europe.” It is a remarkable example of
“Eurocentrism”. This writer stresses that “other parts of the world have had admirable
civilisations, top poets, builders and even scholars. Yet nowhere one can find the single
physical feature: the most intense exhaling power united with the most intense absorbing
power” (Valéry, 2001:228-229).
22
Europe and culture – two words so often associated and wrongly defined: what
Europe? what culture? The term “culture” is as opaque as that of “Europe”.
According to the same Paul Valéry, Europe can be defined through culture, while
culture can be defined through Europe – transaction, translation, tradition. Yet can Europe
preserve its pre-eminence or will it turn into a “small cape of the Asian continent”? Julien
Benda does not agree to this conception and states that Europe has never been “the brains
of a big body” as “this body, as a body as such... has never been seen” (Benda, 1947:230).
When analysing Valéry’s discourse, Jacques Derrida considers it as a “traditional
discourse of modernity”, a “discourse of the modern West” and adds that it is a dated
discourse considering that throughout a century Europe has shown the world some of the
most terrible moments of its history (Derrida, 1991:230).
We cannot speak of a cultural unity of Europe, according to Julien Benda. He
repeats that we have to consider national particularities coming to the foreground and
strengthened throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.
National culture, cultural identity
The notions of national culture and cultural identity always involve a risk of
narcissism. According to Krzysztof Pomian, the phrase “cultural identity” suggests
something “static, immobile, dead”( Krzystof, 1999:59).
The identity of each nation cannot be considered as contradictory, multiple and
subject to steady updates. Thus, the evolution of lifestyle, economy, science, as well as the
staggering development of means of communication, the protest against institutions and
structures (Church, army, and university) involve deep changes and deteriorations.
As a matter of fact, the maintenance of “heritages” cannot be an end in itself.
Although memory is the foundation of culture, we cannot speak of a productivity of
oblivion: according to Yves Hersant, new generations “cannot play their music from a
sheet of the past” (Hersant, 1999:193).
The importance of organising cultural life explains that in certain countries, the
State has assumed a growing responsibility in the matter. After the Scandinavian
countries, France, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain have established Ministries of
Culture. The cases of Switzerland, Italy and the United Kingdom show how much
governmental entities are involved in culture. Central and Eastern European countries see
state institutions taking over in point of culture (Rigaut, 2002:175).
Cultural life is manifold in all European countries. Artistic professions are
vulnerable and anxious about the future; financial requirements of culture are huge and
they are seldom a priority for public communities. Cultural function of the means of
communication often remains an expectation.
Much too often we regret the want for renewal of public cultural policies. Thus,
we can speak of the need to recreate these policies. In fact, culture should be the object of
political will in its most noble meaning due to its unquestionable importance and the place
it holds amongst European peoples.
Yet the difficulties, doubts and questions raised by cultural life contribute to
bringing the European countries together insofar as none can consider its relationship with
culture as a closed nucleus (Rigaut, 2002:175).
Considering the current context, are changes elements of connection or distance
between our countries? Whether limited to the European Union or not, does Europe have
an integrative cultural function or does it not?
23
There is a pressing need to have an open definition of culture: it cannot only be
reduced to patrimony or “erudite culture”, yet it has to embrace the culture of the Others,
otherwise it may degenerate (Hersant, 1999:197).
Language and culture
Language and culture are the core of identity phenomena. After the 1980s, the
notion of identity becomes successful in the field of social sciences. It has acquired
several definitions and interpretations. We can define it as a set of directories of action,
language and culture allowing an individual to see their appurtenance to a certain social
and power group and thus identify themselves. Yet identity does not solely depend on the
birth of choices acted out by subjects. In the field of the power relations policy, groups can
grant an identity to individuals. For instance, the French tend to confine all immigrants
from Western Africa to one African identity, while they refuse this mixture. Some are
Christian, some are Muslims. Some speak a language, while others speak another
language. Within the framework of globalisation of culture, an individual can assume
different identifications mobilising different elements of language, culture, or religion,
according to the context.
Individual and collective identification through culture has as a corollary the
production of Otherness as compared to other groups belonging to a different culture.
Indeed, intercommunity contact can involve highly different reactions: idealisation of the
Other, attraction to the exotic, of the “good savage”, or contempt, lack of understanding,
rejection thus leading to xenophobia (Warnier, 1999:9-10).
We know that language is the irreplaceable support of cultures. That is why it is
appropriate to remind the following quotation from Claude Lévi-Strauss: “The worst
loneliness would be to have a universal language.” This means that in a plural Europe, it is
important to state the conviction that Europe is polyglot: we have to provide the means in
order to turn it into reality.
Globalisation and Culture
As a general and irreversible phenomenon, globalisation concerns all aspects of
human life and particularly culture. Thus, we can ask the following question: does
globalisation of economy necessarily lead to rendering European, or world, cultures
American?
Undoubtedly, we witness a certain Americanisation of mass culture – through
television, cinema, music, jeans, Coca-Cola, hamburgers, and Disneyland. It is obvious
that this American domination is more sensitive in the field of image, whether animated or
still, rather than music, theatre or books.
Globalisation raises another question to the Europe of culture: what do other
countries and continents, such as Latin America, Japan, Africa, the East, with which there
are cultural connections and where they still speak European languages, such as the
Portuguese, Spanish, or French, expect from Europe? This is obviously a challenge for
Europe.
Throughout this progressing process of metamorphosis, political and economic
changes cause antagonist cultural conceptions within Europe. We cannot therefore speak
of a European culture influencing national cultures. Nevertheless, we can say that the
single project will always be defined through the multiplicity of the European area: the
Europe of cultures.
24
The myth of a “European culture”
Nevertheless, globalisation is not the only challenge for European cultures.
Fractures of social connections in our societies, the loss of reference in point of memory
and values, the claims for local, regional, or ethnic identity, although legitimate, may
question national cultures (Rigaud, 1999:178-179).
All countries in Europe face these issues, although each interprets and attempts to
solve them depending on their own sensitivity, history, and political culture.
There is no doubt that the European Union has had after the Maastricht Treaty
certain competence in the cultural field but it has only been subsidiary in order to resume
the terms of the Treaty. In other words, the European Union has not reached a genuine
legitimacy.
Nevertheless, such questions seem limited to the countries of the European Union,
as the Union itself does not stand for a cultural reality. On a cultural level, we can wonder
what Europe would be without Switzerland or other Central and Eastern European
countries of which Milan Kundera was right to say that they are culturally connected with
the West, including the countries of Slavic origin (Rigaud, 1999:178-179).
For example, we can notice that in the field of museums, theatres, and festivals
there are several connections between countries. We also witness a strengthening cultural
cooperation between cities, regions, universities, or associations. It is well-known that
there are cultural powers pre-existing and transcending the Europe of treaties. From this
perspective, there is one more question: is it possible to create or develop a joint cultural
project from these cultural networks?
The notion of “European culture” is interrogative and thus it is still uncertain. Can
this culture be merely the privilege of the elite? Can peoples see themselves as belonging
to it?
It means that the European initiatives and projects are determined by the national
conceptions and interests of the Member States (Sticht, 2000:117). Yet, it is important to
stress that within the European Union, such a reality is expressed through the principle of
subsidiarity according to which competences in point of culture are stressed by national
policies. Consequently, there is no genuine supranational cultural policy.
Despite possible initiatives, certain economic and social elements interfere with
national cultural policy and rather contribute to stating national values to the disadvantage
of an intercultural platform. An example in point is the establishment of a European
Cultural Institute. However, it largely depends on harmonisation of national policies. In
other words, such a project can only be strengthened by settling a common basis.
We can therefore say that all harmonisation process faces several difficulties.
Current challenges of the European cultural project have their origins in antagonisms that
will only be overcome in favour of human meetings and exchanges that are indispensable
to a joint project. According to Pamela Sticht, “it is certain that all confrontation with
foreign norms leads to questioning one’s own values – without being necessary to break
the differences characteristic of human cultural richness” (Sticht, 2000:118).
To sum up, Europe is characterised by a cultural diversity strengthened by its
local, regional and national identities and entities. It is true that national and even regional
cultural identities currently coexist with the European “cultural identity”. It is the principle
of subsidiarity and cooperation mentioned in art. 128 of the Treaty of Maastricht and art.
51 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Considering this framework in coexistence with national
interests and the establishment of multilateral projects, the emergence of a socio-cultural
concept of culture has made it possible to have several and diverse reflections on the
European dimension of culture (Sticht, 2000:45).
25
The idea of a joint cultural project
The Treaty of Rome (1957) has but a shy article favouring cooperation (no. 430)
which is inaccurate leaving the freedom of action to the Communities and the Council of
Europe (Brossat, 1999:318). Particularly it is in the 1970s that the European cultural
dimension starts to develop.
We should remind that in 1973, the first declaration of the nine members of the
EEC on European identity is adopted shortly after the emergence of the “European Union”
phrase during the EEC Summit held in Paris in 1972.
In fact, the issue on the European “cultural identity” is largely debated in the
1970s and the 1980s. Referring to the Declaration of Copenhagen, this is what could be
read:
“The Nine European States might have been pushed towards disunity by their
history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests. But they have overcome their past
enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival
of the civilization which they have in common.
The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and
moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures [...]
and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European
Identity.
The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization,
the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes
to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take
part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality
and its own dynamism. [...] other European nations who share the same ideals and
objectives.” (European Parliament, Bulletin nº 43/73, 1973-1974:8-9. Cf. Pamela Sticht,
op. cit., p. 46).
The document evokes values, joint principles, concepts on life, and elements that
can establish a European identity familiar with human rights.
The project for a European Foundation introduced to the European Council by the
Belgian Minister Léo Tindemans on December 29, 1975, insisted on the need to bring peoples
together by favouring human relationships between youth on an academic level through
debates, scientific meetings, and so on. He even evoked an extension beyond the borders of the
united Europe (Tindemans, 1975). This postulation was not welcome by the Member States.
However, we should notice that there already was a European Culture Foundation established
in Geneva in 1954 by the Swiss Denis de Rougement and inspired by the same ideals.
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the action of the EEC although it lacks
accuracy on a cultural level. In other words, the Treaty of Rome seeks to implement some
means leading to concrete action even if it has not developed a cultural policy. Examples
in point may be in the field of copyright and fiscality on cultural foundations (See articles
30-34 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome, 1957).
The issue of “cultural identity” is the basis of the project on the European Cultural
Charter elaborated by the Council of Europe in Athens in 1978. We should underline the
fact that at the same time, in the United States, the reflection on cultural identity tends
towards multiculturalism as foundation for coexistence of different communities on the
national territory. Due to multicultural immigration flows, the debate in Europe focuses on
majority identity.
In the 1980s, cultural cooperation between Member States is obvious in the
Declaration of Stuttgart in 1983 and the Single Act in 1985. If cultural actions are still
26
limited to modest endeavours in 1982 – 1986, the Council of Europe adopts an
interuniversity cooperation programme in 1986 – COMETT (“action programme of the
community in education and training for technology”). Thus, some make a call for setting
up a genuine cultural policy.
We have to add that there is a collaboration with the European Council and the
UNESCO (international organisation established on November 16, 1945) in the process of
European construction. The cultural project within the EEC is limited to its initial phase to
define the objectives and methods for a European union on the political, economic and
cultural levels. It is obvious that national interests prevail. Due to the difficulties in
interpreting the concept of culture, the cultural project is not materialised. However,
cooperation between supranational instances has had an important impact on the process
of harmonising national interests in a European context. As a matter of fact, it is not
surprising that it has become urgent to become aware of the value of culture in the
European political context. This is what has happened in the case of the Treaty of
Maastricht.
A supranational culture?
During the 1993 GATT reunion, Jacques Delors stated: “Culture is not
merchandise like others” (Compagnon,2001:233).
Which is then the innovative element brought by the Treaty of Maastricht from
the point of the European dimension of culture? I repeat, it is the enforcement of the
principle of subsidiarity expanded to the cultural field. This means that the dispositions of
art. 128 consider the use of the European patrimony and at the same time the importance
of diversity of regional and national cultures. Which are the common elements and which
are the differences?
The article of the Treaty expresses in a very objective manner: increasing
knowledge and the dissemination of the European culture and history; preservation and
safeguard of the European cultural patrimony; cultural exchange; artistic, literary and
audiovisual creations. It means bringing to the foreground the cooperation with third
countries and international organisations competent in the field of culture, particularly the
Council of Europe. The intrinsic connection between culture and other fields of
intervention is settled, too.
The coordinating body as settled by art. 189 of the Treaty is made up of the
ministers of Culture of the Member States who are in charge with supporting dynamic
actions and proposing recommendations to be voted by the Parliament and the Committee
of the Regions.
There have been contestations, such as the one of the Italian Roberto Barzanti,
who criticises the principle of subsidiarity that he considers a hindrance to a joint cultural
policy (Barzanti, 1992, Apud Sticht, 1999:53). On the contrary, other opinions, such as
that of Colette Flesch, Director General of the Audiovisual, are in favour of this principle
in the sense that, according to her, it makes the best use of cooperation between Member
States and provides incentives to awareness on the European dimension of culture.
Such an idea emerges from the Treaty of Amsterdam (art. 151) aiming at
“respecting and promoting diversity of cultures”.
According to the Treaty of Maastricht (art. 128), Community programmes should
be promoted following two fundamental axes: a horizontal axis – tight cooperation
between specialists and professionals on the regional and national levels – and a vertical
one – strengthening specific and priority actions. Community programmes should be the
fruit of these analyses, surveys and projects. “Kaleidoscope”, “Ariane”, “Raphael” and
27
“Media II”, lately brought together under a framework programme: “Culture 2000”. It
aims at projects lasting several years and envisages a diversity of the means to be used in
order to carry out a viable cultural policy. As a whole, it indicates the strategies and
research to fill in for the lacks of previous programmes without however interfering with
national competences.
But if community policy has to be complementary to national policies, we should
also mention private initiatives establishing inter-European networks (centres,
associations, forums, etc.).
Within the framework of the abovementioned changes, two antagonist thinking
movements prevail: the former allows the coexistence of local, regional and national
identities, that is, multiculturalism; the latter is based on the will to bring together national
interests with a view to reach a single policy aiming at establishing a European national
state against national states or at defending interculturality – as needed and advisable.
Thus, we can wonder if it is not a utopia to attempt to establish a European state
based on a joint European culture. The question is immediate: such united culture is still a
myth in a Europe of cultural diversity (Sticht, 1999:228-240; Vinsonneau, 2002).
Bibliography
Compagnon, Antoine (2001), “La culture, langue commune de l’Europe?”, in “Qu’est-ce
que la Culture? Vol. 6, Paris, Editions Odile Jacob
Brossat, Caroline (1999), La culture européenne: définitions et enjeux, Bruxelles,
Bruylant
Vinsonneau, Geneviève (2002), L’identité culturelle, Paris, Armand Colin
Derrida, J. (1999), L’Autre Cap, Paris, Minuit
Rigaud, Jacques (1999), “L’Europe culturelle”, in Culture nationale et conscience
européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan
Warnier, Jean-Pierre (1999), La mondialisation de la culture, Paris, Editions La
Découverte
Benda, Julien (2001), L’Esprit européen. Rencontres internationales de Genève, 1946,
Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1947, in Qu’est-ce que la Culture? Vol. 6, Paris,
Editions Odile Jacob
Krzystof Pomian (1999), “Constantes et variables de l’identité culturelle française”, in
Culture nationale et conscience européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan
Tindemans, L.(1975), Rapport au Conseil Européen: L’Union Européenne
Sticht, Pamela (2000), Culture européenne ou Europe des cultures? Les enjeux actuels de
la politique culturelle en Europe, Paris, L’Harmattan
Parlement Européen, Bulletin 1973-1974, nº 43/73
Valéry, Paul (1924), “La crise de l’esprit” (1919), in Variété, Paris, Gallimard
Hersant, Yves (1999), “Synthèse des travaux”, in Culture nationale et conscience
européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan.
Re-defining refugees: nations, borders and globalization
Sharif GEMIE1
Abstract: The simplest definition of a refugee might be ‘someone who has left their
home’. This article questions the centrality of ‘home’ to refugees, re-considering the debate
between Liisa Malkki and Gaim Kibreab on this theme, and reviewing some historical
commentaries on images and definitions of refugees. It suggests an interplay between state policy
and the manner in which refugees frame and present their own experiences and identities.
Keywords: migration, refugees, homelands, asylum-seekers, screening
At first sight, the issue seems so simple: a person, a bundle, a journey... and a
form. Who could even think to question: ‘What is a refugee?’ Why would they need to ask
the question? Yet the issue has been discussed and – arguably – is being debated with
greater intensity during a period of renewed concern about the nature of national borders
in a globalizing world.
Registering the Refugee
There was an interesting exchange between Liisa Malkki and Gaim Kibreab
during the 1990s, concerning the manner in which refugees’ experiences formed their
identities (Malkki, 1992:24-44; Kibreab, 1999:384-410). Malkki’s essay in Cultural
Anthropology reflected some of the ideas that were developing concerning the emerging
shape of a post-modern, globalized world. While fully recognizing the distress suffered by
refugees, she questioned the usual diagnosis that was applied to their condition. Above all,
she criticized what she termed ‘sedentarism’, a belief which held that identity, particularly
national identity, was necessarily tied to a territory, and that therefore ‘deterritorialisation’ was the first loss that a refugee suffered. Malkki suggested that such
beliefs reflected the form in which nationalism had developed in modern Europe. Given
these perspectives, refugee agencies tended to misunderstand the nature of displacement.
They saw it not ‘as a fact about socio-political context, but rather as an inner, pathological
condition of the displaced.’ No specific social or political solution was proposed in
Malkki’s essay, but one was left with the impression that she was suggesting that - perhaps refugees were less unusual, less atypical one might think, and that the urge to propose
repatriation or assimilation as the obvious solutions to their dilemmas was misplaced.
Kibreab’s response in the Journal of Refugee Studies was forceful and angry. He
questioned whether globalisation was having as dramatic effects as Malkki assumed.
Rather than producing an evaporation of borders, he argued, globalization was stimulating
nation-states to draw firmer, tighter borders around their territories. He pointed to the
proposals of a ‘Fortress Europe’ as an example. ‘The assumption that identities are
deterritorialized and state territories are readily there for the taking, regardless of place or
national origin, has no objective existence outside the minds of its proponents.’ Malkki’s
arguments, which seemed to propose that there was no ‘home’ to return because ‘there
never was a “home” in the first place’, risked endangering the refugees’ positions and
1
I would like to acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme trust for the research conducted in the
writing of this article, and also the advice of the other members of the Outcast Europe project:
Fiona Reid, Laure Humbert and Louise Rees.
29
political projects. Under these circumstances, ‘there may be no substitute for one’s
homeland’, which – argued Kibreab – should remain central to refugees’ demands.
In a sense, the two authors were proposing ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ definitions
of the processes that constitute the identities of refugees; their viewpoints illuminate
different aspects of the refugee’s experience, but also point to an integral dilemma. Malkki
concentrated on the actual experience of the people carrying the bundles: these are the
ones who have left their homelands. For her, their experience constitutes in and of itself a
new identity, as valid as any of the identity produced by settled, ‘sedentarist’ peoples.
Kibreab’s reply stresses the importance of the process of objective, exterior verification
within the life-world of a refugee: often, the refugee only appears on the historical stage,
only appears ‘visible’, when they achieve some form of formal recognition by a state (or
state-like body). On other hand, Kibreab fails to note that this registration process itself
may well not only simply refuse recognition to some but, more confusingly still, the same
process may also distort and mis-represent the refugee’s experience.
Michel-Acatl Monnier makes some pertinent observations about the nature of
registration processes. He observed some eighty interviews with asylum-seekers in the
early 1990s in Switzerland, of whom four were finally accepted as ‘genuine’ asylumseekers. He noted the disparity between how the interviewers understood their role, and
the ignorance, the lack of preparation or comprehension on the part of the asylum-seekers.
‘The majority of asylum-seekers do not seem to understand that their future depends on
what is written down in the record’ (Monnier, 1995:305-25). On the other hand, the
interviewers are more than familiar with a certain procedure, and seem to take it for
granted. Welfare agencies and interviewers share a common culture, almost a complicity:
all fail to consider how their procedures might appear to the asylum-seeker. The
possibility that taboos or simple ignorance of cultural norms may prevent the asylumseeker expressing themselves ‘correctly’ is never considered. Monnier concluded by
asking a pointed question: who is the successful asylum-seeker? The one who tells the
truth, or the one who learns to lie in an acceptable and convincing manner?
The key point to draw from Monnier’s valuable research is that the registration
processes themselves have a history, and deserve interrogation: considering this point
further may help to clarify the differences between Malkki and Kibreab.
Nations and Registration
One of the first modern uses of the word ‘refugee’ occurred during the late
seventeenth century: it was applied to French Huguenots seeking ‘refuge’ in other
neighbouring countries. The Huguenots were generally welcomed in Britain, partly
because state policy in that age tended to assume that populations were intrinsically a
source of wealth, and therefore, the more people, the stronger the state, but also because
there was still only a rudimentary concept of ‘refugee’ as a status carrying with it rights
and obligations (Marrus, 1990:47-57; Ponty, 1996:9-13). The difficult, irregular evolution
of the concept took the form of a type of dialogue between exiles, peoples, states and
international bodies over the succeeding centuries. The first responses were ad hoc:
particular solutions by specific states to particular crises. As a generalisation, refugees
fleeing political oppression were accepted by other states. For example, republican and
radical exiles after 1848 were largely welcomed by neighbouring states, with little
consideration for the political causes they represented; those who fled France after the
repression of the Paris Commune of 1871 met with some greater scepticism (Caestecker,
2008:9-26). It was, however, the shift to more biologically-based arguments about the
nature of national identity that marked the decisive turning-point from the earlier tradition
30
of liberal toleration. This led to the Aliens Act in Britain in 1905, and the Immigration
Quota Act in the USA in 1924, when the Statue of Liberty finally rescinded her previous
invitation to ‘your poor, your huddled masses yearning to be free’.2 Refugees were then
often viewed with suspicion, as carriers of disease, as rogues seeking to exploit the
unthinking benevolence of host communities, as subversive revolutionaries bringing
noxious politics into respectable nations. Perhaps the darkest hour was in June 1938, at the
Evian Conference in Switzerland. This was called to discuss the fate of Jews in Nazi
Germany, but not a single major power was prepared to make any special provision to
allow for the entry of German Jewish refugees. ‘Legally, as far as the United States was
concerned, there were no refugees’ (Zucker, 2001:46). The unique exception was the
Dominican Republic which, through a bizarre historical paradox, was pursuing a racist
policy of encouraging white immigration, and therefore welcomed European Jewish
emigrants (Wells, 2009).
Out of these discussions, a type of ‘structure for debate’ emerged, with
humanitarian agencies arguing that refugees were innocent victims of processes beyond
their control, while hostile ‘restrictionists’ denounced their political record of the exiles.3
At times, the argument between the two camps produced a clearly gendered polarization,
as in France in January and February 1939, when women and children among Spanish
refugees were accepted, and distributed among towns and villages across France, while
men – and particularly young men of the age to serve in the Spanish Republic’s militias
and army – were viewed with greater suspicion, and placed in improvised concentration
camps. Dolores Torres, a refugee crossing into France in January 1939, was immediately
asked the age of her son as she arrived at the frontier. She realized that if she told the
truth, and admitted that he was sixteen, he would be judged to be of an age where he could
have served with the Republican forces, and therefore the French authorities would take
him away from her, and intern him with the other adult males. She lied to the border
guards, and said her son was only fifteen (Torres, 1997:166 ; On the Spanish refugees’
experience, see Gemie, 2006:1-40). Similar screening processes were implemented after
1945, as Allied agencies attempted to distinguish between Displaced Persons who merited
humanitarian assistance, and mere homeless Germans, who were judged to be as guilty as
the Nazi regime. Belgian authorities immediately ran into one of the greatest moraladministrative dilemmas of the period, turning on one’s choice of adjective and noun.
Were the exiles who had fled to Belgium during the Third Reich to be classified as
‘German Jews’ or ‘Jewish Germans’? If the former, then they were to be accepted as
enemies of the Nazi regime, and allowed to stay; if the latter, then they were not eligible for
any special treatment, and were to be returned to their ‘homeland’ (Caestecker, 2005:72-107).
These examples demonstrate how state policy has not only influenced and shaped
comprehension of what constitutes a refugee, but has also provoked certain types of
behaviour from the refugees themselves as they attempt to negotiate their status.
Malkki is therefore clearly correct to draw attention to the historically contingent
manner in which ‘refugee’ has been defined. One could think of the evolving definitions
as a type of reciprocal process in which nation and refugee reflect back on each other, and
the refugee is then formed as a type of ‘shadow’ figure to the regularly-constituted nation2
3
Provisional and partial legislation restricting immigration had been passed earlier in 1917 and 1920.
Michael R. Marrus devises the term ‘restrictionist’ in his useful analysis, ‘The Uprooted’. On
reactions to refugees, see also Sharif Gemie, Laure Humbert and Fiona Reid, ‘Why Study
Refugee History? – Six Answers’, http://history.research.glam.ac.uk/news/en/2008/sep/15/whystudy-refugee-history/
31
state, in which citizenship, borders, and state are aligned to produce passport, national
anthem and therefore identity. Certainly, it is only in a world constructed on the principles
of ‘a state for everyone and everyone in a state’ that the refugee becomes an anomaly,
whose situation needs to be debated, analysed and then classified (Aleinikoff, 1995:25778). At times, one sees a desperate competition, as the powerful and the powerless fight
with the same weapons – the only ones available – for the ‘refugee and host are equal
believers in national identities’ (Daniel and Knudsen, 1995:1-12). This can lead to a type
of hyper-nationalism among refugees. One can be struck by the number of Spanish
refugees who quickly turned to use the word Reconquista to define their political hopes:
the term was first applied, retrospectively, to the final defeat of the Muslim Moors in
Spain in 1492, and formed a key concept in an emerging right-wing, nationalistic
paradigm, tracing a history of an assertive nationalism from 1492, through 1808 (the
revolt against French occupation) to 1936 (the uprising against the republic). Spanish
republican refugees seized the term ‘Reconquista’ to indicate their sense that they
constituted the ‘real’ Spain opposed to the false structures of Franco, who relied on help
from foreigners such as Italian fascists, German Nazis and – irony of ironies – Moroccan
Arab mercenaries.
Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg have observed this tendency to grasp onto
national identities among exile communities. They warn against the common ‘postmodernist celebration of fragmentation’, which imagines national borders just dissolving
into ‘a multicoloured, free-floating mosaic’. Like Kibreab, they note that exile communities
often are desperate for a fixed sense of identity and homeland. ‘Minority and national
liberation movements often appropriate ethnographic essentialism as a strategy to
authenticate their own experience, as a form of reactive resistance to the Eurocentre... Often
essentialism is a political necessity’ (Lavie and Swedenburg, 1996:1-26). Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
who fled from Sudan first to speak against Islam in the Netherlands, then became a member
of the far-right wing People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, before joining the
conservative American Enterprise Institute, is another telling example of a similarly
desperate attempt to re-create a fixed identity in shifting and uncertain situation.
When the reconstruction of the nation by the refugee community is not a viable
option, then assimilation is proposed. Sometimes refugees can achieve astounding
successes within the context set by the national paradigm as the following biographical
examples demonstrate.
• Joseph Conrad (1857-1924), who was born in Poland, and became a British
subject in 1886. His novels are now regarded as masterpieces of English literature.
• Sir Nikolaus Pevsner (1902-83) came from a German-Jewish family, and
managed to find a post in the University of Birmingham in 1933. He became one of the
greatest of Britain’s architectural historians.4
• Madeleine Albright (1937 - ), from a Czech Jewish family who converted to
Catholicism.
In these cases, these individual ‘success stories’ really have a claim to represent
their new countries and could even be cited as triumphant cases of assimilation,
demonstrating the enduring capacity of nation states to absorb, educate and integrate.
Amongst refugees who cannot ‘return’, however, one notes another career
structure, arguably equally successful, but not so obviously demonstrating integration.
Such people do re-create successful lives, but often achieve this through a masterful
manipulation of their marginal status. These could include:
4
One small, personal anecdote: he also taught my mother architectural history at Birbeck University.
32
• Victor Serge (1890-1947), who was born in Brussels to Russian exiles, lived in
France where he was imprisoned from 1914-17, then migrated to Spain (1917), the Soviet
Union (1918), worked for the Third International in Germany (1921-23), lived in Austria
(1923-25), before returning to the Soviet Union. He was expelled from the Communist
Party in 1928, arrested in 1928 and 1933, and then expelled in 1936. He subsequently
lived in Belgium and France, leaving in 1941 for Mexico. During his various exiles he
wrote some remarkable novels (See Weissman, 2001).
• Manuel Tuñón de Lara (1915-97), a Spanish Communist student, who was
interned in 1940, and fled to Paris in 1946. While in exile, he wrote studies of Spanish
history which have been widely recognised as masterpieces (Malerbe; Tuñón de Lara (191597) 1999:243-48).
• Mano Chao (1961 - ), son of a Basque mother and a Galician father, exiled in
Paris. Chao is currently a successful and innovative musician, pioneering forms of world
music and cultural fusion.
These examples suggest that there is another viable option available to refugees
that is neither assimilation nor repatriation.
Globalisation: Challenges to the Nation-State
Kibreab may well be right to argue that refugees need ‘homelands’, and that they
are therefore forced to work within the structures and logics created by the nation-state.
But this insight should not blind us to the fact that developing global structures are
challenging these established forms. The widespread attempts to create stricter border
controls may well be responses to a perceived weakness rather than indications of a
continuing strength, as declining state structures obstinately refuse to surrender the last
prerogative of national sovereignty: the right to refuse admission to foreigners (Eeckhout,
9 octobre 2009. On current European border policies, see: JAnderson and Dowd,
1999:593-604; Levy, 2005:26-59). The solidity of the nineteenth-century nation-state is
itself, in part, merely a representation by the state of itself. In reality, each state has
encountered dilemmas of definition and control. The study of border zones, in particular,
demonstrates that ‘borders rarely match the simplicity of their representation on maps,
which are themselves tools of control and order’ (Donnan and Wilson, 1999:53).
The noted cultural theorist Zygmunt Bauman has analysed a new era of ‘liquid
modernity’. The old, nineteenth-century nation-state was constructed almost explicitly
against the nomadic, and can be represented by the nightmare bureaucratic structures
referred to by Foucault as the Panoptican, and evoked by the dystopias of Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley’s Brave New World. The new forms of power are,
instead, ‘increasingly mobile, slippery, shifty, evasive and fugitive’, manipulated by a
global elite of absentee landlords (Bauman, 2000:14). The older political movements,
whether anarchist, communist, socialist or republican, looked to the construction of forms
of public community as a means to implement their programmes: today, community is
eroded as real political power slips away from the public space. It continues to be a highly
seductive theme, for it offers ‘the promise of a safe haven, the dream destination for
sailors lost in a turbulent sea of constant, unpredictable and confusing change’ (Bauman,
2000:171). Bauman often strikes a pessimistic note: above all, he warns, we should not
throw ourselves into ‘a desperate, though vain, search for substitute local solutions to
globally generated troubles’(Bauman, 2004:59).
Certainly, there are some profound and important changes emerging in the nature
of culture within the globalizing world. Arjun Appadurai’s rich, eloquent arguments
suggest that importance of global diasporas, which he considers are in the process of
33
replacing nation-states as sources of identity and affective sentiment. Like the examples
previously cited, he notes the continuing tendency for exile communities and protest
movements to speak the language of nationalism, but cautions against seeing this as proof
of the permanency of the nation-state. ‘For counternationalist movements, territorial
sovereignty is a plausible idiom for their aspirations, but it should not be mistaken for
their founding logic or their ultimate concern.’ Instead, in the same passage, Appadurai
notes that ‘the materials for a post-national imagery must be around us already’
(Appadurai, 1996:21).
More prosaically, one could consider the evidence uncovered by Fabrizio Gatti, an
Italian journalist who travelled with would-be emigrants from west Africa along the new
caravan route, up through central Africa, across the Sahara, into Libya and – if they are
lucky – onto one of the Mediterranean islands within the EU. These people often started
their journeys with funds, maps and the typical bundles of possessions which seem to have
been carried by all exile people since the dawn of time. Their journeys quickly developed
into an arduous test of strength: at each stage drivers, café-owners, bandits and smugglers
would exploit them. They quickly lost all their possessions, soon resembling Marx’s
classic definition of the proletarian: someone who has nothing left to sell but their physical
power to labour. Above all, they were absolutely alone. ‘These young people knew that,
whatever happened, no one would come to their rescue. No father, no brother, no state, no
humanitarian organisation and above all, no government, whose corrupt choices had
already led them to their plight, would ever mourn their death. Once they left, they were
nobody’s children’ (Gatti, 2008:151). At first sight, this does appear to be a situation of
absolute dispossession and absolute despair. But then, on further acquaintance, Gatti
realizes that even these hopelessly exploited travellers retain one last resource.
These young people have no home. They do not know where they will be, what
they will be doing or where they will live next month. But they all have an e-mail address.
The web and the internet remain for them the only stable dimension. It is the only space in
which they have an address, in which they can leave a mark, in which they can exist.
These young people who have fled the dead end of their native land have become the true
residents of the global village (Gatti, 2008:165).
One cannot argue that this slender connection is any meaningful manner an
adequate substitute for the resources offered by a modern nation-state. On the other hand,
it is an indication of an important shift in communicative cultures: the sense of separation,
of isolation, of diaspora often felt by the exile, while still real, no longer has the same
force that it possessed only twenty years ago. Secondly, this resource does point to a new
form of community, which in turn can function as a means of mobilisation and activism
(Saunders, 2008:303-321).
The recent work on diasporas suggests the importance of these new exile
communities. Stéphane Dufoix points to the essential ambiguity of the term: it
‘simultaneously represents the shared awareness of the nation’s physical absence and its
symbolic presence’ (Dufoix, 2008:54). In a sense, his observation leads us back to the
contrasting arguments of Kibreab and Malkki: the first defining the refugee experience by
what the refugee does not possess, the second by their potential to create something more.
The End of the Refugee Camp
Travellers arriving in a foreign country are often surprised by the way they are
met and understood. This experience becomes all the more disturbing when the traveller in
question is not a leisured tourist, free to catch the next plane back home, but someone
experiencing some form of enforced exile, and thus compelled to make a new life in
34
challenging circumstances. Sometimes the misunderstandings can be about the most basic
elements of identity. Gelareh Asayeh, an Iranian now living in the USA, records that ‘I
grew up thinking I was white’. She was surprised and disconcerted to be classified as
‘coloured’ when she arrived in the USA (Asayeh, 2006:12-19). Such misunderstandings
and simplifications have, however, far more serious consequences when they are enacted
and enforced through bureaucratic and institutional measures. One could cite, once again,
the manner in which the French state ‘welcomed’ the Spanish refugees in 1939. Anarchosyndicalists, communists, Spanish republican patriots, Basque Catholics and Catalan
regionalists were amazed, even horrified, to find that all of them were indiscriminately
considered to be ‘Spanish reds’. Vietnamese boatpeople had a similar experience: they
were startled that the – in their eyes – obvious differences in their class and status were
ignored by their new hosts, and they were all categorized by therapeutic professionals and
government agencies as simply ‘refugees’ (Knudsen, 1995:13-35).
This issue lies at the centre of the debate on definition. There can only be one
definition if there is one category to be identified, registered and treated: nation-states seek
homogeneous units as the subjects for their policies (Skran and Daughtry, 2007:15-35).
The refugee only emerged as a distinct character not just because they stood as opposites,
as ‘shadows’ to the dominant structure of the nation-state system, but also because their
physical presence was often constituted in a specific structure: the refugee camp. Such
practices have an ambiguous role. On the hand, they do imply recognition, and the failure
to gain recognition perhaps constitutes a still greater tragedy than life in a refugee camp.
Today there are approximately two million Iraqis who have fled their homes and their
nation: about a million of them live in Syria, about half a million in Jordan. (Only seven
thousand managed to gain access to the USA in 2003-07)5. An enormous wall prevents
their entry into Saudi Arabia (Information from Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio, El País, 29 de
agosto de 2009:29-30). One would think it was self-evident that such people must be
accorded refugee status. In fact, this has not happened. One simple, bureaucratic reason
for this absence is that neither Syria nor Jordan have signed the relevant UN conventions
on refugees (the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol). But there is another, more
profound and more disturbing reason for the invisibility of the Iraqi exiles. In line with
Bauman’s arguments concerning ‘lite’ forms of power which seek, wherever possible, to
avoid responsibilities, there is a widespread shift away from according refugee status to
exiled groups. Julie Peteet’s comments suggest the reasons for this shift: ‘In its very
usage, “refugee” once called for international action.’ Refugee status implies refugee
rights: it implies the provision of relief and protection. In its place, a series of largely
inadequate substitutes have been proposed: safe havens, safe corridors, preventive zones
and preventive assistance.
Above all, the newly ‘lite’ powers seek to avoid the construction and maintenance
of refugee camps. ‘While camps can confine refugees literally and figuratively, they also
provide spaces for formulating new identities as well as places from which to organize
politically, as transpired in camps from Afghanistan to Palestine to Mexico.’6 In place of
recognizable communities, within which common interests can be identified by the
refugees themselves, and common strategies devised, there will be merely large quantities
– perhaps exceptionally large quantities – of atomized exiles, sometimes categorized
5
Julie Peteet, ‘Unsettling the Categories of Displacement’, Merip 244 (2007),
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer244; accessed 7 March 2008. I have found this article
exceptionally useful, and it has shaped many of the points made in the subsequent paragraphs.
6
Peteet, ‘Unsettling the Categories’
35
under the new euphemism of ‘Internally Displaced Persons’. In place of ‘a state for
everyone and everyone in a state’, these new exiles are left to be the recipients of
whatever haphazard forms of aid they can obtain. This inevitably draws them into
sectarian enclaves. In place of the dialogue between exiled peoples, established nationstates and international bodies which established the basic category of ‘refugee’,
governments are now acting to define refugees out of existence. Considering this point,
Seteney Shami speculates about the new forms of exilic identity which might emerge from
this context, and whether, in particular, Islamic movements might function as appropriate
forms of global, transnational identities, replacing the various protest-nationalisms that
previously dominated refugee communities (Shami, 1996:3-26).
Conclusion
The debate between Malkki and Kibreab turns on the issue of whether one sees
refugee status as a humiliation or as a recognition. Malkki’s arguments seem to imply that
it is almost an inherent, undeniable quality to forms of exile: this assumption leaves her
freer to consider alternatives to current conceptualizations of the refugee experiences.
Kibreab correctly observes how it can be difficult to obtain such a status, and notes the
concrete, if limited, benefits which can derive from it. His arguments, however, remain
predicated on the continuing existence of nation-states in their established forms. This
assumption leads him to under-estimate the potential development of non-state, postnational identities among refugees in a globalised world.
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Georgia and Europe in the Context of Cultural Communications
Marine VEKUA
Abstract: The article is about the concept of identity classification of the leading
European cultural groups and Georgia’s place among them. The article overviews Georgia’s
profile and historical relationships with Europe; highlights Georgia’s contemporary contributions
in European culture in parallel with one of the country’s main priorities in terms of foreign policy
– euro integration. The author proves that Georgia has come a long way and nowadays it’s
obvious that Europe has always been the main orientation for it, thus it is only natural that
Georgia has been exerting every effort to become a full valuable member of the European family.
Keywords: Georgia and Europe, background of relationships, cultural communications
and perspectives
I. Reflections on the Theory of Cross-Cultural Communications
The classic academic explanation for cross-cultural communications is an
adequate mutual understanding together with a relationship between two participants in
the act of communication who belong to different national cultures; at the same time it
expresses a tolerant attitude towards different ethnic groups. The main goal of crosscultural communications is to reach international consensus in all areas of social life.
Cross-cultural communications is as complicated as the culture of each country in itself.
For centuries the humanity has been trying to solve the dilemma of the
relationship between two civilizations – the East and the West. The complexity of these
communications are expressed in the global process of evolution, as well as individually
in different aspects of social life of each society, in specific areas of national cultures,
even in personal or everyday habits. From this point of view, Georgia’s geopolitical
location is unique – right at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. This circumstance has
permanently had the country facing historical choices.
The culture of living, creating, thinking, analyzing, building, communicating,
managing, getting dressed, joking and so on is, in so many words, cultural diversity; the
cultural diversity is represented in the nation’s treasures, values, traditions, ideals, rules
and moral principles which are the very core of each national culture for its historical
evolution. The 21st century demands new trends from the peoples all over the world: to not
lose the national identity when interacting with different nationalities and cultures. The
cultural diversities could be expressed in many aspects of the human life. Among them
there are some main branches which are of the outmost importance, both difficult and
interesting at the same time: science, arts, business, politics, social life. There are some
common directions which could make closer and acceptable cross-cultural
communications: dance, music, arts, architecture, etc. These fields of human activities
have no frontiers in language understanding. They can just apply to the conscious or
subconscious and this kind of emotional communications is easily understood by both
sides. But this is only a small part of communications; the whole spectrum needs to be
considered carefully in the depth of substance, for a correct understanding.
The well-known British scientist, author of several books on cross-cultural
communications, Richard D. Lewis, offers a very important theory of cultural
38
communications which helps in defining the national characteristics on the different levels
and from different points of view.
Indeed, my goal is neither the analysis of main postulates of the cross-cultural
theory, nor the review of Richard D. Lewis fundamental researches. I have only relied on
some of his general provisions.
According to Richard D. Lewis’s theory the national characteristics are mostly
spread (for example: the temperamental Italian, the charismatic Japanese, the silent
Norwegian, the punctual German and if I may add, the hospitable and friendly Georgian).
“In some countries regional characteristics could be expressed in a very specific way and
move national characteristics to the second position” (Lewis, 2006:19). In case of Georgia
it could be defined and matched to different regions such as Kakheti, Imereti, Svaneti,
Kartli, Guria, etc.: heavy Kakhetians, open-minded Imeretians, slow Svans, smart
Kartlelians, humoristic Gurians, etc. To break down cultural groups which could affect the
social life, there should be mentioned the smaller part of the group – the family, and the
smallest – the individual.
Such simple manner of identification is caused by several reasons. First of all,
immersion in the problem of cultural identification would cause a shift of emphasis to
ethno psychology that in its turn would withdraw the main sphere of our research. The
specified size of the paper has set some limits, as well. Hence, the certain style of
narration is conditioned by the above-mentioned reasons.
Obvious cultural groups are able to not only cross geographical borders. There are
a lot of indicators to bring together different groups of people – such as religion, age,
profession, gender, etc. A closer study of the issues will take one far from the main subject
of the article. Going back to the theory of cross-cultural communications one could
endlessly discuss different ideas on how the national mind is culturally attuned at every
age, or how a set of values and core believes are created at a later stage, or what is normal
and abnormal; one could even discuss different national tastes, styles, manners, etc.; but
the core element of my interest is to focus on the identity of the Georgian national culture
and try to match it with the European diversity of cultures. In order to reach this main goal
and to apply the theory of cross-cultural communications basic principles it is necessary to
roughly recognize and classify leading European cultural groups and to identify Georgians
among them; overview Georgia’s profile and historical relationship with Europe; review
Georgia’s contemporary contribution to European culture in parallel with the country’s
priority in foreign policy – euro integration. In analyzing Georgia’s long way of evolution
it becomes obvious that Europe has always been the main orientation for the Georgia and
until today Georgia has provided every effort to become a full scale member of the
European family.
All the following qualitative methods were used to support the main goal of the
paper: to create a picture of cross-cultural communications between Georgia and Europe
including historical background, main points, tendencies, reasons, policy, generating
forces, figures and perspectives.
The method of historical analysis gave the opportunity to overview and to classify
the history of Georgian national cultural evolution and its main and important points in
parallel with different stages of cultural communications with Europe.
The method of ethnographical analysis made possible to define ethno-national
portrait and to highlight the most typical characteristics of the Georgian as an archetype.
The method of secondary analysis made possible to categorize ethno-national,
psychological and social elements of Georgians national character in context of European
analogies.
39
The method of critical discourse analysis was necessary for building a conceptual
frame of characteristics of the main European national cultural groups and for defining
new points of theory of cross-cultural communications; it characterizes the mission of the
Georgian noble intellectual individuals in Europe, it defines their contribution to the
European culture and it explains how they related their experience to the culture in
Georgia.
The method of comparative analysis was used to define and to compare the main
values and beliefs of the both European and Georgian cultures.
The method of documentary analysis was needed to define main directions and
state priorities of Georgia in view of its foreign policy attempting to integrate all kinds of
European structures as well as perspectives of communications in different fields of
cultural relationships.
As per the theory of Richard D. Lewis the world’s cultures are classified in three
categories. First group is liner-actives, those who plan, schedule, organize, pursue action
chains, do one thing at a time. For example, Germans and Swiss belong to this group.
Another group is multi-actives, those who are lively, loquacious people, who do many
things at once, planning their priorities not according to the irrelativeness or importance
that each appointment brings with it. For example, Italians, Greeks, Spanish, Latin
Americans and Arabs are members of this group. In the last, third group – reactive, are
those cultures that prioritize courtesy and respect, listening quietly and calmly to their
interlocutors and reacting carefully to other side’s proposals. For example, Chinese,
Japanese, Finns are in this group. To be successful in communications means to
understand culture and society, what is traditionally correct or incorrect, acceptable or not
acceptable for both sides of the process. Stereotyping the cultural groups by definition of
characteristics is not correct, but it is to generalize equal groups in accordance to their
main values and believes, traditions and habits.
There is no doubt that the Georgians, in view of the above-mentioned, do belong
to the second group. It’s easy to understand that there are individuals, groups of people or
even countries and areas which more or less look like Georgians – the same rules and
symbols to communicate, the same ways to raise children, to celebrate different events, to
respect and award for equal benefits, to understand and realize the main goals and role of
a human being in civil, democratic society and many other principles of social life. To
bring closer the Georgian’s identity to any other it is necessary to define its nature of
ethnic and national values and beliefs.
Based on the main concept of the theory of cultural communications offered by
Richard D. Lewis and combined with concepts of scholars of Georgian social studies it is
possible to create the universal mental Georgian identity portrait.
A national character is formed during centuries and it is highly influenced by the
historical development. The core characteristics of cultural identity are based on cultural
values. The national character is formed in the course of centuries and this process is very
much influenced by the nation’s historical development. Basic characteristics of cultural
identity are formed on national values involving universal, inalterable in time perceptions
being maintained by the nationality in its historical memory, considered as its own and
strived for their inalterability. The national character is expressed in the ethnos’ attitude to
the basic values: tradition, history, religion, culture.
Relying on the works of Georgian historians, philosophers, men of letters,
ethnographers and psychologists, the social-psychological characters of Georgia can be
briefly formulated in the following way:
40
“1 – complex, amid wars, the historical path has developed chivalrous, patriotic
and rebellious character;
2 – Georgians, in general, praise the woman who was deemed to be the main
carrier and transmitter of national values and education. The cult of woman is expressed in
Georgian myths, literary, historical, esthetical and other sources;
3 – the strong collectivism characteristic for Georgians is expressed in relative and
peer links and is oriented on personalistic society;
4 – communications of Georgians are based on competition and characterized by
risky behavior;
5 – high level of reliability in personal relations;
6 – close contacts between generations and special respect for the past;
7 – Georgians are emotional, friendly, hospitable and their relations are mostly
relying on customs and agreement than on formal rules” (Kipiani, 2002:69).
Different historical or political events are chronologically formulating ethnopsychological characteristics, changing stresses correspondingly, ruining old habits and
sometimes even traditions. Basic values remain unchangeable and permanent. These
values were briefly expressed just in three words 100 years ago by an outstanding
Georgian writer and public figure Ilia Chavchavadze. These words are vital even today
and represent the main guideline for each Georgian: Language, Motherland, and Belief.
There is no doubt that the same core values are similar for almost all of European national
cultures and it makes possible to develop natural, successful and peaceful Georgian and
European cultural communications.
II. Georgia and Europe: historical background of cultural relationships
The well-known Georgian psychologist Shota Nadirashvili considers that “a
nation should have four basic attributes to fill healthy: territory, language, religion and
culture. Nations as well as their cultures are born, become old, could get ill or even die”
(Nadirashvili, 2009:2). There are a lot of such examples in the world history. What kind of
national cultural portrait represents Georgia?
The frames of this paper enable us to make only a brief of the history of Georgia. The
thorough analysis of the relations between Georgia and different countries of Europe is not
possible, though many researches were devoted to the relations between Georgia and other
European countries (they were collected in the eight-volume History of Georgian Diplomacy).
These relations were always characterized with a certain tenseness, dynamics, causes and
outcomes.
Officially, Georgia is a transcontinental country in the Caucasus region, partially
in the Eastern Europe and partially in the South West Asia. Georgia is an extremely
beautiful country of about 5 million people, ringed by the Caucasus Mountains and the
Black Sea; it borders with Turkey, Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. As it was mentioned
before, the unique geographic location of the country put Georgia in the spot of taking
sides between the West and the East, and of defending its own identity during all of its
long and difficult history. The famous Georgian writer of 20th century, K. Gamsakhurdia
used to write that “our territory was a bridge between people of West and East and the
historical mission of Georgians was on one hand to get used to people of two great
civilizations and on the other hand to bring together European and Asian souls”
(Gamsakxurdia, 1967:47).
The history of Georgia can be traced back to the ancient kingdoms of Colchis and
Iberia. The visiting ancient Greeks knew Georgia as the land of the Golden Fleece. In
other words, many neighbor countries, especially Greece, borrowed the Georgian method
41
of gold mining by sheep fleece. After some time, the legend about Princess Medea from
Colchida and Golden Fleece was born and subsequently became famous. Georgia was one
of the first countries to convert to Christianity in the 4th century (326 A.D.). Linguistics
knows 14 alphabets all over the world and among them a full value alphabet is the
Georgian one exclusive by its identity. Discussions on the real birthday date of the
Georgian alphabet are still ongoing, but the majority of scholars considers that it should be
the 3rd or the 4th century. By the 6th and the 7th centuries, the Georgians were known as
founders of monasteries abroad, mostly in Greece, which were ecclesiastical, educational
and cultural centers uniting Georgians outside the country where young people could
acquire knowledge in theology, philosophy, history, literature, foreign languages,
medicine. Georgia reached its political, economical and cultural peak during the reign of
King David Builder and Queen Tamar in 11th and 12th centuries. It was then when our
famous poet Shota Rustaveli wrote his masterpiece of literature, “The Knight in the
Panther’s Skin”, which scholars have compared to Dante and Shakespeare. The well
known scientist Mouris Bowra considered that in this poem one can find out the European
and Oriental values, parallel to specific national characteristics. As scholars consider, the
poem looks like a huge mirror of Georgian culture by that time – between EllenisticByzantic and Persian-Oriental cultures. Starting from the 5th century, the Georgians were
getting their education in Constantinople and Byzantium. But King David Builder founded
the first educational center in West Georgia (11th century) – Gelati Academy as Another
Jerusalem and The New Ellada. Later on, in Eastern Georgia another educational center
was founded – Iqualto Academy of the same importance. The earliest European
University of Bologna was founded in 1088. Close to that time Georgia had two
educational centers: Gelati and Iqualto. The 11th-12th centuries are regarded as the
Renaissance of the Georgian culture.
During the Middle Ages, all scientific discoveries, technical innovations,
Renaissance, Reformation put Europe in front of a new era. At the same time, because of
the difficult external situation, Georgia had to defend its territory from various permanent
invasions. This was the main reason why Georgia was somehow isolated from the core
processes that took place in the Central Europe. After all long and demanding wars,
Georgia needed some time to recover. This is the period when two bright historical
figures, Nikiphore Irbakh (17th century) and Sulkhan Saba Orbeliani (18th century) took
diplomatic responsibility, travelled through the whole Europe with different cultural and
political missions; they were accepted by almost all European Royal Families as
ambassadors of Georgia. Other European missioners, Italian Archangello Lamberty (17th
century) and French Jeanne Shardin (18th century) significantly contributed to the
dissemination of education and culture throughout Georgia. It is not a coincidence that by
that time the first Georgian book “Alphabetum Ibricum” was published in Roma in 1629.
That period could be defined as a real beginning of cross-cultural communications
between Europe and Georgia.
Meanwhile, the peace in Georgia was very weak and in 1801 the country was
annexed by the Russian Empire. For two centuries the Georgian national culture was
suppressed and controlled by Russia. Russia filtered all European contacts with Georgia.
In spite of such filters, the second half of 19th century shows scholars, enlighteners,
writers, artists, actors widely presented in the European historical area; they brought their
a solid contribution to different fields of both science and culture.
In 1860’s many young Georgians left their motherland and relocated to Paris,
Berlin, Zurich, Geneva, for better education in fields of humanitarian and economic
sciences, in physiology, biology, etc.. Many of them became well-known scientists. The
42
famous Georgian enlightener Niko Nikoladze was one of them. His Zurich University
Ph.D. thesis (“Education and its economic results”) attracted many European colleagues
with bright and progressive ideas. Another recognized individual, writer, translator and
journalist, Grigol Robakidze, was well-known and became popular to almost all
newspapers’ editors of Paris for his article “Decadence of French Press” which was
published in 1875 in Paris. Such intellectuals brought from Europe new ideas, original
research methods, communications with colleagues and what is most important – a strong
will to found an educational center in Tbilisi.
Later, in 1918, the University of Tbilisi was founded. In the same year, 1918,
Georgia declared independence which lasted only three years. In 1921 Georgia was
annexed by the Soviet Russia for the second time. It was early the 20th century when one
of the best parts of Georgian society - poets, artists, scientists and politicians had to
immigrate to various European capitals; they brought along the culture of their
Motherland. It is obvious that links were established and unavoidable mutual process of
cultural communications started.
In that time, the process of the Georgian and European cultural communications
was not so easy and clear. The difficulty and dramatics of the historical moment made
indispensable to divide cultural communications between Georgia and Europe into two
main streams. The first one had to function out of the Motherland which by that time used
to be a part of Soviet Empire. One of the bright examples of such kind of activities was
establishing in Paris, in 1948, the Georgian journal “Bedi Kartlisa. Revue de
Kartvelolojie”. It was published by a couple of notable Georgian people, Kalistrate and
Nino Salia, at first only in Georgian, and later on in German, French and English. It
became a serious bridge between the Georgian and the European intellectual
communications during almost the second half of 20th century. The second stream could
continue its activities from the inside of the Soviet Union which meant that almost the
whole 20th century the Soviet Georgia and Europe could only communicate through
censorship of the soviet ideology. It was in 1991 when the independence of Georgia was
restored, a new era in the democratic development of the country started, the two main
cultural streams joined and new perspectives arose in front of diversity of communications
between Georgia and Europe.
III. Georgia and Europe: dialogue without frontiers
1. Intellectual communications
The 20th century, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, allowed
cultural communications between Georgia and Europe to be stronger and deeper. The first
university in the South Caucasus was established in 1918 – Tbilisi State University; the
Georgian Academy of Science was founded in 1941. The well-known Georgian scientific
schools and scholars in psychology (D.Uznadze), mathematics (I.Vekua,
N.Muskhelishvili), physiology (I.Beritashvili) and many others were adopted and awarded
by different European scientific centers and leading universities. Centers of Kartvelian
studies were set up in France (Marie Felicite Brosset), Germany (Arthur Leist), Great
Britan (Sir John Oliver Wardrop and his sister Marjory Wardropp, David Marshall Lang),
Norway (Hans Voght), Belgium (Gerard Garitte). All of them contributed an enormous
energy, effort, knowledge to discover and popularize the Georgian culture in Europe.
With the funding of CERN – European Organization for Nuclear Research in the
CAD-CAM engineering center, five parallel projects of ATLAS were implemented and
ten Georgian engineers took part in it. The name of scientist Gia Dvali is well known to
43
European physicians. He pioneered and advanced (with other fifteen Georgian colleagues)
the research direction in the quantum gravity, string theory and black holes at LHC (Large
Hardron Collider at International Center for Theoretical Physics).
Only widely-educated and knowledge-based society is ready to bring benefits to
all fields of activities of its country. European integration is a main concept for the
development of the Georgian higher educational system. Bologna Process gives an
opportunity to share values in education policies of different national countries which are
necessary for international cooperation, free and increased mobility and mutual
recognition. The Bologna Process demands huge changes in Georgian national
educational system and tries to support involving it in the European Higher Education
Area (EHEA). Georgia joined the Bologna Process on 19.05.2005.
A number of radical, legislative, institutional and administrative changes were
implemented: new law on higher education, accreditation system, student-centered and
grant-based financing, Unified National Admission Exams, research grants, student loans,
a law on professional education, membership of BFUG Board and London Communiqué
Drafting Group. One of the priorities for nowadays Georgia is to increase the
attractiveness of the Georgian higher education system through strengthening the
European dimension in quality, content and outcomes; to be ready for new trends such as
collaboration and competitiveness, university autonomy and accountability; to accept the
higher education as public goods, as well as private commodity and “massification” of
education through maintaining the quality improvement culture.
Education is a process which means that it couldn’t be finished by reaching
definite goals. More and more should be done in future not only from the perspectives of
Georgia; the Bologna Process offers a wide opportunity for educational systems of 46
countries to meet together and discuss on overcoming challenges and problems to find
reasonable, wise and acceptable solutions all together. State policy demands education as
one of the main priorities for development of the country. The Development and Reforms
Fund was established in 2004 on the initiative of President Saakashvili. Since that time
more than three hundred young people got Master Degrees in the best universities all over
the world, mostly in Europe. They came back not only with the high quality knowledge in
their narrow specializations but they brought valuable pieces of diversity of national
cultures and implemented them in different fields of social life in Georgia. The main aim
of the DRF is to support the reforms that need to be carried out in Georgia in order to
improve the building of state and democratic institutions.
There are some interesting figures and facts which can demonstrate the general
strategy of the Development and Reforms Fund during the period of its activity which
actually illustrate the main state policy of the country.
The first point to be made is the number of students which got Grants for studying
at the best universities all over the world and get Master’s Diplomas. We can compare the
first year – only 33 students and the last, 2009 – 150 students.
The second point demonstrates the budget of Master’s Program in 2005-2009:
starting from 1 million Georgian Lari five years ago going to 7, 5 last year.
The third point shows the Master’s Program Grants according to study fields: the
majority is represented in Business Administration field, and then Law, Engineering,
Social and Human Sciences.
And the last one illustrates Master Program Grants according to the Host
countries. The whole number of students during Fund years of activity is 331; among
them, there are 93 in UK, 53 in Netherlands, and only 46 in USA and then Germany,
44
France, Italy and other European countries In other words the majority becomes student of
top universities of Europe.
It’s necessary to mention that there are several educational funds and
organizations which represent different countries in Georgia, such as DAAD, Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung (Germany); British Council, Golden Bridge ( UK ); AIESEC; Rico
International and many other educational or special programmes offered by Italian,
French, Greece, Netherlands and other embassies in Georgia. All of them have the same
mission: to support the developing of the modern Georgian educational system according
to the main principles of Bologna Proce
2. Esthetics and physical culture
Culture covers wide frame of segments of communications between different
countries and societies. The field of science and technique innovations is somehow narrow
and is not well-known to wide masses. The artist-wise aspect could be understood
absolutely differently: it does not require specific knowledge of science, for example, or
language, etc. It is enough to have interests in different directions of arts and be loyal to
other cultural values and beliefs.
Intensive esthetic communications between Georgia and Europe started from the
very beginning of the 20th century and have been successfully continuing till nowadays.
Well-known Georgian people of art, especially painters - Elene Akhvlediani, David
Kakabadze, Lado Gudiashvili, sculptor Iakob Nikoladze (who has been working side by
side with August Rodin for a long time) - belonged to the modern generation of the
symbolical café “La Rotonde” - famous, talented, young and progressive people in Paris;
those Georgians were close to Pablo Picasso, Amedeo Modigliani, Mouri Utilio, Ignasio
Zuloaga and others. The same values, understanding of the main meaning of the art,
spiritual freedom of expression and searching for new ways to make two different
cultures along with thier best representatives closer and interesting to each other.
Traditions of communications of that period were continuing through the entire
20th century. The range of diversity of cultural relationships became wider. Different
capitals of Europe attracted Georgian musicians, translators, actors, film makers.
Orientation of those people was always radically European. They were talented, openminded, and bright. The best stages of European theatres and famous concert halls not
only hosted, but turned out to become second homes for many Georgians, among those
opera singer Paata Burchuladze, Lado Ataneli, Tamar Iveri, Nino Machaidze, Anita
Rachvelishvili (who had the honor to open the last season in La Scala), pianists Eliso
Bolkvadze, Marina Nadiradze, etc.. Well-known director Robert Sturua is the author of
several drama performances in Great Britain and other European countries. The composer
of modern classical music Gia Kancheli lives and works in Holland; the dainty manner of
directing brought on Otar Ioseliani the epithet of “incredible film maker” in France and
other European cities; popular violinist and woman conductor Liana Isakadze has founded
The Oistrakh Violin Academy in Germany; a lot of theatres hosted the famous ballet
dancers Nino Ananiashvili, Irma Nioradze, Ketevan Papava. Naturally, these individuals
are just the top of the iceberg and it is impossible to list all the names. Although even this
incomplete list should be sufficient for proving how widely the Georgian culture is
represented within the European society and how desirable the Georgian values and social
treasures are for the majority of the European cultures. These famous people have brought
to Europe different parts of the Georgian esthetics, shared it with the public and tried to
identify for the Georgian manners, tastes and style of arts a place to express themselves
onto the stage of the global European culture.
45
For the majority of population worldwide sports, as well as arts, are very popular
and easy to understand. That is why it is important to underline a few facts: for almost 20
years, the Queen of Chess has been a Georgian Lady (Nona Gaprindasgvili is the six times
world champion, and before her, for another six times it was Maya Chiburdanidze). That
translates into the fact that the traditions of Georgian women’s chess school were
awarded, acknowledged as being the best, respected and implemented in the huge intercultural field as one of its smallest part. The Georgian sportsmen are represented in
different sports in Europe. Kakhi Kaladze became a symbol of a Milan football team;
Georgian rugby players represent their talent and national manner in teams of France and
Andorra for many years. This is one of the many possibilities to contribute and to share
elements of one’s own national style, manner, character and spirit for integration purposes
into the European physical culture.
3. State policy
The enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004 has brought a historical
shift for the Union in political, cultural, geographical, social and economical terms, further
reinforcing the political and economic independence between the EU and Georgia. It
offers the opportunity for the EU and Georgia to develop an increasingly close
relationship, going beyond co-operation, into involving a significant measure of
economical integration and a deepening of political co-operation. Both European Union
and Georgia are determined to make use of this occasion to enhance their relations and
promote stability, security and welfare. The approach is founded on partnership, joint
ownership and differentiations. The main recent development in EC-Georgia bilateral
relations has been the establishment of an ENP Action Plan (ENP AP), which was
endorsed by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council on 14 November 2006. The ENP AP
aims at bringing about an increasingly close bilateral relationship going beyond past
cooperation under the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). By agreeing
an ENP Action Plan, Georgia and the EU have committed themselves to developing
deeper economical integration and to strengthening bilateral political cooperation,
including foreign and security policy.
The European Neighborhood Policy of the European Union sets ambitious
objectives based on commitments to shared values and effective implementation of
political, economic and institutional reforms.
The European Neighbourhood Policy gives the opportunity to have a real and
successful exchange of different points of views.
The ENP is a very concrete project. Forty-five countries, which are involved in it,
presented a lot of new ideas according to the general directions of the Neighbourhood
Policy: closer cooperation in fields such as politics, energy, environment, transport; also
mobility to enhance human contacts, further economical, trade and education integration.
In other words: there is a strong wish for concrete aims to make the ENP more
effective and attractive to reach the main goal - to create an area of wide communications,
partnership and friendship in all directions of social life.
There is the only way for realization rich diversity of valuable and interesting
projects - clear and definite understanding of political importance, as well as considerable
financial resources. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) is such an exclusive
and innovative partnership. It gathers the European Commission, the EU Member States,
the ENP partner countries and the European Public Finance Institutions around the general
policy of NIF. In her speech at the first meeting of the Governing Board on May 6, 2008
46
the European Commissioner for External Relations and ENP Ferrero Waldner highlighted
three main goals which could make successful the whole policy of NIF.
“First, the European Commission has committed to fund the NIF considerably, up
to € 700 million between now and 2013” (Ferrero, 2008:2).
“Secondly, it could not have been done without Member States. To really make a
difference the NIF needs their financial contributions too. This is the first leverage effect
of the NIF: Community grants funding matched by Member States’ own grants. But
involving Member States is not just about funding. It is also about mounting joint
European operations. This will ensure that all resources are channeled more effectively in
support of the reform agenda agreed in ENP Action Plans. This is the second leverage
effect: to put money together and to manage it together.
Thirdly, to be effective the NIF relies critically on European Public Financing
Institutions, which will play a key role in identifying and preparing projects that will promote
sustainable development and further integration, which the NIF is set out to support” (Ferrero,
2008:3).
The general aspects of Georgia’s partnership with different European structures
are presented in details in the “Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013” which defines the
specific European neighbourhood and partnership instrument in case of Georgia. To
summarize the document’s basic meaning, it becomes obvious that EC assistance over the
period covered by this CSP will mostly focus on supporting Georgia in contacts with
Council of Europe and Venice Commission in parallel with a view of signing and ratifying
a number of international documents and instruments which could bring Georgia into the
same line of standards with European democracy in all its manifestations.
In its resolution of January 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of
Europe acknowledged the Georgian authorities’ resolve to build a stable and modern
European democracy and to better integrate the country into European and Euro-Atlantic
structures. From the historical point of view the most reforms are only just beginning and
major challenges are still waiting ahead. But the ambitious work which has been
undertaken to bring legislation into line with European standards has yet to produce
concrete results in most areas.
In the period 1992-2005 the EU gave Georgia EUR 505 million in grants.
Assistance was provided with a wide range of instruments. The most important among
them used to be TACIS, the Food Security Programme (FSP), EC Humanitarian Office
(ECHO), European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Rehabilitation
and Macro-financial Assistance (MFA).
EC assistance priorities for the 2007-2010 programming cycle have been
identified as the following: considerations and requirements, which also apply to the
subsequent National Indicative Programmes established under this CSP.
Priorities for future EC assistance to Georgia shouldsupport PCA implementation
and directed to achievement of the ENP AP’s objectives. At the same time other donors'
assistance programmes in Georgia cover several aspects of development. The process of
Georgian economic and social integration under the ENP is a distinctive EU external
policy. The effective support for its implementation should therefore constitute the main
focus of EC assistance in several main directions:
- “be coherent with the Government's own reform strategy;
- contribute to the achievement of the MDGs for Georgia;
- be compatible with available EC resources (i.e. for instance exclude capitalintensive investments);
47
- allow concentration of limited EC resources on a reduced number of key
priorities;
- facilitate as much as possible the transition from technical assistance to
budgetary support;
- where appropriate, be complementary with other donors' and IFIs'
interventions” (Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013: 20).
As the EU-Georgia ENP AP constitutes a blueprint for future strengthened EUGeorgia relations, for the future EC priorities of assistance to Georgia, for the purposes of
this Strategy Paper which are presented in all details in the Action Plan of the country.
The EC assistance priorities apply to all EC assistance instruments and programmes which
will or might be available for Georgia. EC assistance priorities are very important and
could be briefly outlined as following: political dialogue and reform; cooperation for the
settlement of Georgia's internal conflicts; cooperation on justice, freedom and security;
economic and social reforms, poverty reduction and sustainable development; traderelated issues, market and regulatory reforms; cooperation in such specific segments as
transport, energy, environment; information, society and media; people-to-people
contacts.
Georgia is invited to enter into intensified political, security, economical and
cultural relations with the EU, enhanced regional and cross border co-operation and
shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
The European Union takes note of Georgia’s expressed European aspirations and
welcomes Georgia’s readiness to enhance co-operation in all domains covered by the
Action Plan. The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the degree of
Georgia’s commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly
agreed priorities, in compliance with international and European norms and principles.
The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully Georgia’s efforts and
concrete achievements in meeting those commitments.
The Action Plan is a first step in this process. The EU-Georgia Action Plan is a
political document laying out the strategic objectives of the cooperation between Georgia
and the EU. It covers a timeframe of five years. Its implementation will also help fulfill
the provisions of the PCA, build ties in new areas of co-operation and encourage and
support Georgia’s objective of further integration into European economic, political,
social and cultural structures.
Conclusions
Cultural dialogue of different nations without imitated exclusive borders and
frontiers is one of the powerful engines of evolution of the contemporary humanity. The
struggle of two civilizations, the West and the East has been logically reflected on the
history of Georgia which is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It’s absolutely
natural that this duplicity has influenced the history, traditions, mentality, culture and
values of the Georgians. However, the Christian basis, similarity to Georgian ethnopsychological archetype with other European cultural groups, ardors to European mental
type and major priorities of development defines and directs the main orienteer for
Georgia – to integrate in Europe with all its diversity. This basic goal used to have
different solutions according to concrete historical period and conditions.
Cultural relations of Georgia and Europe in every historical period have got their
certain result. The 17th-18th centuries introduced the European culture in Georgia and the
first Georgians book was printed in Rome. The 19th-20th centuries made the breakthrough
in education and science: the first European university was established in Tbilisi, the
48
European architecture added the western image to the capital-city and beautiful houses of
European type were built. The 20th-21st centuries became the period of change in the
Georgian culture, education and science: many Georgian artists successfully “embedded”
with the European aesthetical space and in parallel promoted the wide exposure of
European art in Georgia; many unique joint researches were performed at the Georgians
research centers; student mobility programs and Bologna principles brought the Georgian
educational system closer to the international European standards.
As to the critical appraisal of the national foreign policy from the aspect of
integration into Europe, it may take place after a certain period of time based on the
achievements attained. For the time being we may say that in spite of domestic policy
problems which have been accompanied by the formation of democratic institutions in our
country, the vector of foreign policy is aimed correctly and accomplished in a good way.
Therefore, those certain positive drives which have accompanied the Georgian foreign
policy from the aspect of euro integration are not occasional.
Cultural relationships between Georgia and Europe have started since ancient time
and continued till today. During this period, especially the last 100 years Georgian
scientists, writers, artists, actors and others have been widely presented within the
European historical area and made a solid contribution to different fields of science and
culture; Europe, as well, was attracted by Georgia’s history and identity and interacted
with it. These cross-cultural communications are still very important for both partners of
the core process and have a long and successful perspective.
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2. The Europe of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue
Alina STOICA, Sorin ŞIPOŞ (Oradea) ◄► A Few Aspects on
Intercultural Dialogue: Interwar Romania as Seen by the
Portuguese Diplomat, Martinho de Brederode
Barbu ŞTEFĂNESCU (Oradea) ◄► Rural Cultural Border
Chloé MAUREL (Paris) ◄► From the East-West Major Project
(1957) to the Convention on Cultural Diversity (2007): UNESCO
and Cultural Borders
Nicolae PĂUN, Georgiana CICEO (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► The Limits of
Europeanness. Can Europeanness Stand Alone as the Only
Guiding Criterion for Deciding Turkey’s EU Membership?
A Few Aspects on Intercultural Dialogue: Interwar Romania as Seen
by the Portuguese Diplomat, Martinho de Brederode
Alina STOICA, Sorin ŞIPOŞ
Abstract: Within a Europe with frequent change of boundaries, we believe that it is of the
outmost value to examine the intercultural dialogue between Romania and, in this particular study
case, Portugal. We will attempt to prove the fact that, although located at the continent extremities,
the dialogue between the two countries did exist, overall after setting up the very first Legation of
Portugal to Bucharest, in 1919.
The authors’ entire scientific intervention is based on the thorough analysis of all
diplomatic relations of the very first Portuguese diplomat in Bucharest, Martinho de Brederode.
The postwar Romania shows a face of crisis, shortage in housing and traffic routes, fluctuations of
the national currency, epidemics; the imagine continues with the cultural relations of Martinho de
Brederode, diplomat and man of letters, relations established during his stay in Bucharest.
Keywords: intercultural dialogue, diplomacy, crisis, Romania, Portugal
The Romanian space was again brought to the western attention during the
Austrian Reconquista that started in 1683, after a period when the Ottoman Empire
seemed to steadily dominate vast territories of the Central and South-Eastern Europe. On
one hand, the rise of the oriental issue within the relations between the great powers of
Europe, in connection with the Ottoman Empire legacy, maintained a watchful attention of
the political factors on the realities of the lower Danube. On the other hand, at the dawn of
the 18th century, the suzerain power had replaced the local princes with Greek princes
from Fanar and thus greatly increased the Ottoman influence, creating the false idea that
the border of the Ottoman Empire had crossed the Danube, and the Turks had really
incorporated the Romanian principalities to all intents and purposes. Nevertheless, certain
western circles had already been aware of the eastern continent space, and the interest had
progressed in time. “Little” Europe was about to turn into “Great” Europe, and the
Century of Light, with its appetite for exotic realities, with the idea of “citizen of
universe”, with the cosmopolitan discourse, should provide the appropriate environment.
The Russo-Austro-Turkish military conflicts gradually brought back the
Romanian world to the attention of all great powers. The Moldavian boyars showed
during the peace negotiations that the Romanian countries had, during the Middle Ages,
privileged relations with the Ottomans, thus having their autonomy and institutions
recognized. In such context, the West is informed, from stories of people who had
travelled and written about the Romanian space throughout previous centuries that to the
north of the Danube there is a people of Romance descent, people who had full autonomy
from the Ottoman Empire. The Napoleonic Wars increased the interest that France had in
South-Eastern Europe, on the background of hostilities that broke out with Russia.
Even though the great powers took interest in Romania, countries like Portugal,
located at the far south-west of Europe showed low interest for Romanians. Nevertheless,
after the World War One, when the European borders were being rearranged based on the
right to self-determination, we witness an interesting process of the newly-constituted or
reunified states, the case of Romania, of expanding their diplomatic collaborations. This is
the case of Romania and Portugal. Apart from the fact that both peoples were of Romance
54
descent, there was a somehow common element, i.e. their position at the eastern and
western borders of Europe, fact that determined a rather similar evolution. Once the
diplomatic connection set, it is interesting to examine the perception of Martinho de
Brederode’s, ambassador of Portugal to Romania, of a state located at the other end of
Europe. How the Portuguese ambassador referred to Romanian realities, how he really
understood them, what his personal and official opinions on the interwar Romanian
society were, these are the questions we are trying to address in this study case.
I.Biographical Data
Martinho de Brederode was born on April 15th, 1866, inside the residence of the
Brederodes in Lisbon (Oliveira, Brederode, 2004:169)1. Fatherless before he turned 2, with a
very sick mother and thus incapable of raising her two sons, Martinho and his brother,
Fernando, were raised by the grandmother on their mother’s side, in the Mateus Palace,
from Vila Real. The one who truly dedicated herself to educating the two children was their
mother’s sister, D. Isabel, future Countess of Paraty (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de
Portugal em Pequim, Cx 198, no.15, 4 July 1908; Ibidem, 13 December 1907)2.
The information regarding his studies and childhood are incomplete. The lack of a
diary or of personal notes leaves for the unknown important fragments of the diplomat’s life.
He and his brother received the elementary instruction in the family home, with
private tutors, just like all boys from within his social environment. He continued his studies at
the Villa Real Elementary School, and then he went to the Coimbra High-School, together
with their mother whose health was slightly better. His first university classes were taken at the
University of Coimbra. His application and transcripts can be found in the University archives.
Probably forced by family circumstances, in 1885, after two years studied at Coimbra, Faculty
of Philosophy, he relocated to Lisbon, where he signed up at the Letters Superior Course, class
of Portuguese and French. He graduated from university with honors, “distinct
acknowledgment”, the Chairman of the Examining Committee being the man of letters called
Teofilo Braga, who was elected in 1910 as the first President of the Republic of Portugal.
If we consider his talent in literature (he wrote: A morte do amor, Charneca, O po
da estrada and Sul), this option was his and moreover it was about him. He was a man of
letters! The military uniform was becoming him on the outside, but not on the inside. The
discipline, as an organizational concept was unknown to him, although he terribly loved to
apply it to those around him, as harshly as possible. He made terror a way of life,
exasperating and alienating those close to him.
Controversial personality, envious, self-conceited, proud and impulsive, traits so
specific to the class he belonged to and to the manner that he was raised in, Martinho de
Brederode was the object of various dislikes within the intellectual and political circles, in
both Portugal, and in Romania.
1
The exact address is Direita das Janelas Verdes Street, no. 43, Lisbon. He was baptized on the 23rd
of the same month, in Santos– o – Velho Church.
2
Countess of Paraty, aunt to Martinho de Brederode, belonged to Honorary Dames at the Queen D.
Amelia’s Court and thus, the interest held by the Portuguese diplomat for the queen’s health. Her
husband, the Count of Paraty, was during 1907-1908 Minister IInd class to Vienna. See: ADMAE,
Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Pequim / Legation of Portugal to Peking, personal file
Martinho de Brederode, Cx 198, no.15, Peking, Report, 4 July 1908; Ibidem, Report, 13
December 1907
55
II. Martinho de Brederode Arrives in Romania
The very first problem encountered by the Portuguese diplomat to Bucharest was
the shortage of housing. “Renting a house is exorbitant. It is not easy under these
circumstance to find a place for the Legation headquarters, a simple, or a second or a third
floor for any less than 100 000 up to 200 000 lei per annum. But, in short, the main reason
for this situation is that Bucharest, which before the war had 250 000 inhabitants, has
nowadays, after only a few years, over a million inhabitants. Many of them enriched by
the war do not mind the prices. On the other hand, big companies recently established
here hold as tenants, at the highest rates, entire houses and palaces, in order to set up their
warehouses, offices or accommodation for the many employees and clerks working for
them. To be noted that the lack of manpower (not long ago the army was still called up)
and of transports, materials and general shortage prevented new constructions to be
carried out in Bucharest” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucarereste,
CX 135, no. 4, f.1).
So, finding a house was most difficult. “The offer is zero or almost zero. This
explains the enormous price asked for letting a house. All the same, I see a very rich
country which is about to receive from Germany war damage compensations way more
important than the ones we were awarded. The Leu will rise fast (there are voices
predicting that the Leu will even exceed the French Franc). Thus, the local specialists state
that the prices will go down.” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em
Bucarereste, CX 135, no. 4, f.1). Nevertheless, considering the Portuguese recession
experience in 1892, when further to the rise of the Portuguese currency almost to the value
of the British Pound, the prediction was for a fall in prices, which never happened,
Martinho de Brederode estimated that the prices for housing and products on the
Romanian market will not go down. “The absolute truth of the supply and demand law
checks again” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucarereste, CX 135, no. 4, f.2).
He barely found a place for the Legation headquarters which agreed somehow with
his exigent expectations. The house on 54th Calea Victoriei was used as an official, but also
personal residency and it demanded his consistent effort to provide for the rent and related
expenses, in a city which he already though it was too expensive. “The house where I reside is
small and even so I pay [rent – n.n.] 2500 lei a month (500 escudo), a lot more than I can
afford. And this price does not cover the electricity, the telephone, the butler and the
policeman at the door, for which I must pay an additional 600 lei a month” (ADMAE, Lisbon,
fond: …Bucharest, CX 137, no.42, f. 2). He tried to find another place with a smaller rent; the
disappointment did not fail to appear: “There is a shortage here on the house lease market.....
When I manage to find an unoccupied one, they ask between 100.000 and 200.000 lei rent for
one year” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond: …Bucharest, CX 137, no.42, f. 4).
In his opinion, the housing problem on the Romanian market could only be solved
in a few years, when the balance of finances and economy would have allowed the civil
building constructions to be resumed. “The prices will not go down any sooner than 3-4
years. And if the Leu rises, as it is now, my salary will be sufficient only for paying the
rent for the modest and small house which currently serves as the headquarters of
Portuguese Legation in Bucharest and for which I am now paying 3000 a month (600
escudo)” (ADMAE, Lisbona, fond:…Buchareste, no.17, f.1), noted Martinho de
Brederode in February 1920. In just a few months, the rent for the Portuguese Legation in
Bucharest went from 2500 lei/month to 3000 lei/month.
Worried, the Portuguese Minister turns to the Lisbon official circles, to get help in
solving the “embarrassing situation I found myself in, situation which is definitely
incompatible with the national décor [Portuguese – n.n.]. (...) During the year that I lived
56
here I spent money from my own pocket for diplomatic purposes: dinners, services, etc.
and also for hand-out material, all of them indispensable, cca 7000 escudo (35 000 lei).
But I am not reach, so I find it impossible to bear such sacrifices” (ADMAE, Lisbon,
fond: Bucharest, Series B, no.25, f.1), concluded the diplomat within a Report from the
summer of 1921. He had raised the same problem one year before, in a letter addressed to
the Portuguese Secretary of State, from the General Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Lisbon after numerous successive transfers, Paris-Roma, Roma-Paris, RomaBucharest, added by the war shortage. He was now, in Bucharest, in the position to
borrow money from friends (Ibidem, Series A, no.23).
III. Reunited Romania - Circumstances as Seen in Martinho de Brederode
Reports
Newspapers at the time, Universul, Le progres, L`Indépendance de la Roumanie,
commented harshly how the price increase affected the salaries of state clerks in Romania.
According to Martinho de Brederode’s notes (Ibidem, no.40, f.1), the many promised
measures took shape in 1922. The postwar recession affected Romania greatly and
degenerated in dissatisfactions amongst diplomats in mission to Bucharest. The diplomats
were asking for salary raises, absolutely necessary, because of the increase in prices, at
national, European and even world levels. In one of his reports, Brederode was referring
to a project drafted in view of the aforementioned, signed by all ambassadors less the ones
from Bucharest. “Addressing specifically the subject of the Legation where I was
appointed, I must let your Excellency know that its current equipment is categorically
inferior to my expenses incurred by our diplomatic purposes. Life in Bucharest is
expensive, twice more expensive than in Lisbon” (Ibidem, no.40, f.1).
Also worried of his salary, extremely low, which was frequently late, the
Portuguese Minister wrote: “if the Leu catches up with the Franc, as I am paid 172 Pounds
a month, I will be left with the equivalent of approx. 4200 lei, so after the rent payment I
will only be left with 1200 lei. Based on my information, the life here will only get more
expensive. You cannot take lunch for less than 100 de lei. The cheapest suit costs 3500 lei
(700 de escudo)” (Ibidem, Series A, no.6).
The problems that Martinho de Brederode encountered made him dislike his new
diplomatic mission. To the initial discomfort it added the burden of the low temperature,
specific to the Romanian heavy winters, temperatures to which he was not accustomed.
His first leave that took him back to Portugal was in November 1920. Various
personal problems, his financial challenges, the European roads and general chaos did not
allow his return to Portugal earlier than February 1921. Scheduled for two months, his
vacation to Lisbon extended. He spent all spring with his family, aiming to go back to
Bucharest in May 1921. His departure for Bucharest via Paris, initially set for 22 May
1921, was once again postponed for medical reasons3. He returned at the end of June 1921
(Ibidem, no. 49, f. 1).
After the Romanian national state was reunited in 1918, the sector of transports
and communications, absolutely necessary in order to restore normality, proved to be one
of the most difficult problems which Romania was dealing with, frequently addressed by
Martinho de Brederode in his Reports submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Lisbon. It read: “the everyday life was facing acute difficulties and the local authorities,
counting on their on-time interventions at the central authorities and at the State
3
A sprained ankle, left foot, proved with medical certificate his impossibility of travelling to
Bucharest. See: Ibidem, 21 Mai 1921
57
Subsecretariat, were hoping for more serious measures, to allow the municipalities to
supply [the population – n.n.] with flour, vegetables, fire coal and petrol. But, the
institution dealing with the commuting freight trains made it harder on the authorities with
reference to fuel and food, which would lead to serious consequences upon the country.
Entire activities within workshops and industry were stopped, because of the lack of fuel
and bread (ADMAE, Lisbon, Idem, fond Political Relations Romania-Portugal, P.3, M
138-139 (1918-1922), Series A, no.82, f.2).
All these gave a lot of headaches to Averescu’s government. “The responsibility
of the new government is huge, as they just won elections and it must serve the interests of
profiteers and speculators” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste,
CX 134, Series B, no.75, f.3), and “the immediate interests of a population which winter
finds with no bread, no fuel and no petrol” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal
em Bucareste, CX 134, Series B, no.75, f.2) have to come in second. “And if we add to
this dark picture the fact that the cost of living goes up when the first cold comes, we can
easily foresee the crisis facing the Romanians in 1920 and during a regime that was very
popular and was animated by the highest concern for all social classes. Throughout great
reforms and social equality, we will have one single body of sacrifice and suffering”
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, CX 134, Series B, no.75, f.2),
noted the Portuguese diplomat.
His reports told us that the wheat flour was completely lacking at the end of
December 1919 and it was foreseen that the situation had no chances to change (ADMAE,
Lisbon, fond: … Bucharest, Series A, no.8, f.3) any sooner than the end of February at the
earliest,. “The cost of living is high and everything is lacking, including firewood which is
essential for wintertime heating”. All these were also happening because of the lack of
transports, “even though Romania had a vast forest territory”. In Bucharest of that time,
the firewood was sold for 400-600 Francs / ton, prices greater than the ones recorded in
London (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond: … Bucharest, Series A, no.8, f.3-4).
The population was dissatisfied with the country progress. “There are numerous
strikes, amongst which there is the printers’ strike, noted Brederode. There are 10-12 days
since the only newspapers which have been printed and sold are the socialist ones. There
are even records of street riots. Many people were injured, but the police intervention
ended the events” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond: … Bucharest, Series A, no.8, f.8).
December 27th, 1919, the Portuguese Minister to Bucharest resumed the main
cause for stopping the progress of the Romanian-Portuguese commercial relations. About
them, the Portuguese diplomat stated that “nothing has worked in 15 days. It is a general
strike. Three days ago, the Company tried to return them to use, but armed conflicts arose,
resulting in some injured people and the trams stopped running the streets of Bucharest”
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond: … Bucharest, Series A, no.14, f.2; Central Historical National
Archives, Bucharest, dos. Portugalia, Roll 15, frame 133, f.15). The Capital’s street
agitation made it look like a new war was about to break out. “50% of the electricity and
gas clerks went on strike. (...) Life in Bucharest has already been hard. Now it is even
harder. Because the petrol price went up, the wax candles sold quickly and only those of
poor quality, smaller and more expensive remained available, (too expensive if we
consider the price – quality ratio) from 2 lei and 50 bani to 3 lei” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond
Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, no.14, f.4). Another report read: “The living
conditions here are more expensive in all aspects than they are in London or in any other
European capital. The bureaucracy is sabotaging everything and it is almost completely
controlled by the Liberal Party who has an interest for the government to fail in setting
58
things straight” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Relaçõis politicas Romenia – Portugal, P.3, M
138-139 (1918-1922), Series A, no.9, f.4).
With a particular interest within the communication problem in Romania, Martinho
de Brederode mentions in his diplomatic correspondence “the partial strike in the railways
workshops, where only 20% workers are currently employed” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond
Relaçõis politicas Romenia – Portugal, P.3, M 138-139 (1918-1922), Series A, no.9, f.2). The
railways held the key position and role within the transport and communications system. The
Romanian Direction of Railways owned and run almost all railroads in the country. The state
also owned the telegraphy, the telephony, the post office and the radio, together with the
company of civil aviation, inland and maritime navigation companies, exactly in the same
situation with the railroads. Referring to the aforementioned, Martinho de Brederode wrote: “It
has been 14 days since I last received news or papers from Portugal, or France. It is likely to
have their own strikes which might prevent the information from reaching me, sometimes
more than 15 days up to a month. Then I get so many, but still don’t receive books or journals;
probably they get lost in the process. Here I feel further away from Portugal than when I was
in Peking, where the Lisbon letters and papers reached me in 16 to 20 days, although the
distance is incomparably bigger” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Relaçõis politicas Romenia –
Portugal, P.3, M 138-139 (1918-1922), Series A, no.9, f.4).
On May 15th, 1920, the Portuguese diplomat wrote in his official correspondence
with Lisbon the existing problems within the European postal system. “Isolated strikes are
still current all over Europe” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Relaçõis politicas Romenia –
Portugal, P.3, M 138-139 (1918-1922), Series A, no.9, f.4). (...) “A couple of days ago,
the Smiflon4 was attacked by the strikers and this is probably why I have not received my
mail” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, CX 137, no. 25). (...)
“It is July 16th and I still have not received my salary for May. I suppose the money has
left already. I got though some papers dated June 4th, 1920” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond
Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, CX 137, no. 25), he told Lisbon. From the London
papers obtained from English diplomats in Bucharest together with some French papers
obtained from the Legation of Portugal to Paris, he found out that “Italy prevents
correspondence from getting from France to Romania” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação
de Portugal em Bucareste, Series A, no.61, f.2). (...) I was told yesterday by the England’s
Charge d’Affaires that he was indignant at the attitude of the new Italian colleague in
Bucharest, who evinces a changed policy, in favor to Germany, and who would like to
draw Romania on the same side” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em
Bucareste, Series A, no.61, 5 July 1920, f.3). To balance the situation, the French Minister
to Bucharest made an official declaration “which assured Romania of France’s sympathy”
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, no.62, Bucharest, f.1).
The problem with the traffic routes is still as stringent as ever. A new strike broke
out at the PTTR5, where, according to Brederode, it was “a true anarchy”. (...) Pitulescu
has resigned” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, no.81, f.1). On
July 19th, 1920 he wrote: “It has been 15 days since I have received neither news nor
newspapers on the strike you have there [in Portugal – n.n.], which probably is still
pending. I am completely isolated from my country, without knowing what I must do”
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, no.88, f.1). On July 20th,
1920, he concluded that a telegram he had sent long before to Lisbon and to which he had
not received any replies failed to reach its addressee. Once again he blames the “horrific
4
5
We understand that it is a European Post Office service.
PTTR, Post Office Telephony Telegraphy Radio [n. t.]
59
international postal and telegraphic system” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal
em Bucareste, no.90, f.1) and gives the example of his brother’s letter that was stopped in
Budapest, then with great difficulty resent by the Hungarians and then recorded another 9
days until it reached Bucharest. The political problems between Romania and Hungary
took its toll on documents delivery.
The newspapers issued in different moments and places were not only the pot
where all the great ideas fermented, but also the most suitable way to reflect the many
existing visions on everyday realities. During his first years of his mission to Bucharest,
Martinho de Brederode was just adapting to the Romanian language. Excellent speaker of
French, he would read the Bucharest papers published in French. In January 1920, he
attached to his Report an article from Le Progres which was describing the economic
chaos recorded in Romania, the strike problem and the everlasting going up of prices.
“Sous le rapport de la vie chère nous détenons le record parmi tous les pays d´Europe: un
record qui est une méritant calamite” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em
Bucareste, CX 134, no.28, f.3)
To the complications of the Romanian society it added the Asian pest (plague n.n.), a common disease of the Middle Ages, disease that brought panic among people,
according to the Portuguese diplomat’s statements. The Ministry of the Interior decided to
forbid travelers coming from the Turkish-Asian space, through the port of Constanta, from
entering the country, effective December 4th, 1919 (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de
Portugal em Bucareste,, Series B, no.1, f.2). Like all diplomatic missions to Romania, the
Portuguese Legation received a warning note on the pest and was informed about the fact
that all travelers were forbidden from entering the country through the sea ports. They had to
remain quarantined in Constanta for at least 10 days, to keep the local population safe
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste,, Series B, no.1, f.3). On
January 7th, 1920, Brederode informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon that the
Monitorul Oficial6 published “the formalities required for allowing or leaving of aliens”
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, Series A, no.19, f.1; Monitorul
Oficial (Bucharest), 1920, p.2). January 12th, 1920, Martinho de Brederode continues to send
information on the bubonic plague in Romania, stressing the full interdiction of entering
Romania from Bukovina or Bessarabia borders (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de
Portugal em Bucareste, Series B, no.4, f.1). “The disease was discovered east of Hotin, the
return from Bukovina or Bessarabia is forbidden. Leaving for Poland is allowed, but with no
permission to return. All prisoner repatriations are on hold until further notice” (ADMAE,
Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, Series A, no.34, f.1).
From January 30th, 1920, “the entrance to Romania of travelers and merchants
from Constantinople is only allowed through the ports of ConstanŃa and Sulina, because of
the plague. They are to remain there for 10 days, under medical supervision. The entrance
of any emigrant group is strictly forbidden” (ADMAE, Lisbon, Series B, no.9, f.1), noted
Martinho de Brederode.
Paying attention to the littlest details from within all angles of the Romanian dayto-day life, details that might have influenced the country’s economic evolution and,
implicitly, the Portuguese interests in Bucharest, Martinho de Brederode submitted during
his diplomatic mission in 1919-1933, hundreds of reports containing information on
economic and social life in Romania, more precisely reforms, living standards, commerce,
financial progress, statistics, agriculture, etc.
6
Official state publication where the Romanian legislation is published [n.t.]
60
His Report dated December 23rd, 1919 is the very first substantial diplomatic
document sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affaires in Lisbon. Extended on an impressive
number of pages, the respective Report introduces us the political life during interwar
Romania. He kept updated on the role and the political and economical implications of the
Vaida Voevod government at whose inauguration he attended during his first days in
Bucharest. A politician with strong implications in the progress of the Romanian
economy, noticed by the diplomat, was the Minister of Finances Aurel Vlad7, “of
Transylvanian origin”, and who, like the most majority of Transylvanians left a good
impression on the Portuguese diplomat. He caught in Le Progres newspaper one of his
interviews, and Brederode was highly impressed by Vlad’s honest but also diplomatic
manner of describing the financial progress of Romania: “in spite of the optimistic tone of
Mr. Vlad’s statements, the information laid out is the closest to reality [by comparison
with other political discourses of the time – n.n.] and contains less laudatory terms”
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, Series A, no.11, f.1).
Numerous problems arisen at the borders of postwar Romania delayed the
boosting of important economical branches, such as the industry. In the diplomat’s
opinion, not everything was lost. The existing administration was to be blamed. “The
industry, already degrading, could have been remedied, with work, namely with
willingness. This was also prevented by the arrival of Bolshevik troops at the Romanian
border with Bessarabia and probably because of the terror brought by the Hungary’s
claims backed by Admiral Horthy’s army, but also because of the a growing position of
the socialist movement” in Romania (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em
Bucareste ,Series A, no.20, f.1). „O pais debate-se num grande mal estar”8.
“The prices of basic things went up and life in general is more expensive by the day.
The Leu, the Romanian currency, drops drastically. Today the Paris stock exchange set 23
cents and a half Francs to one Leu. It seems though that it will still drop” (ADMAE, Lisbon,
fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste ,Series A, no.20, f.1). Hence, “Romania is a rich
country, it has everything: minerals of various sorts, gold in considerable quantities which is a
precious metal already known and exploited by Romanians, coal, (...), thick and abundant
forests, lots of oil, cereals etc. It is disappointing that the lack of transports led this country to a
deplorable situation. The exports are impossible to accomplish” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond
Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, Series A, no.20, f.1).
7
Aurel Vlad – born on 25 January 1875, at Turdaş, near Orăştie, was a lawyer and doctor of law.
Participating in parliamentary elections, Aurel Vlad, entered as a deputy in the Parliament in
Budapest, in 1903 after a victory over the government's official candidate, la Dobra. He played
an important role in the revolution of autumn of 1918, when he was elected president of the
Romanian National Council in Orăştie. Following the Grand National Assembly from Alba
Iulia in December 1, 1918, Aurel Vlad was elected to the Governing Council, being given the
Finaces department. He attended the National Party meeting on 12 December 1918 in Oradea,
together with Vasile Goldiş, Ştefan Cicio Pop, Alexandru Vaida Voievod. In 1920 the National
Party went into opposition, which determined Aurel Vlad to resign from parliament
Transylvania Club and leave all positions held in the party, now acting as an independent
politician. He was Minister of Religious Affairs and Arts in Iuliu Maniu’s government from
1928. He died on 2 July 1953.
See: Page Orăştie Municipality (design Secui Adrian),
http://www.orastieinfo.ro/personalitati/aurel_vlad/aurel_vlad.html; See also Valentin Orga,
Aurel Vlad, History and Destiny, Cluj Napoca, Argonaus Publishing House, 2001
8
„The country is struggling in a deplorable state” – our translation. See: Ibidem, f.2
61
Agriculture had stayed the basic trait of society, but until the reform in 1921
various problems affected Romania, just like the majority of the Central Eastern Europe
countries. All agricultural products have “astonishing prices”, said Brederode, because the
“peasants bear a terrible hatred to the people living in towns. And, as a result, they refuse
to send products to the town markets, and the few products they agree to supply are
exaggeratedly expensive” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste,
Series A, no.24, f.8). The lack of food in town markets and the necessity of acquiring
products from the rural environment opened to the peasants the possibility of a full
blackmail. “They [town people - n.n.] pay for a kilogram of fresh meat 10-15 times more
than the real price” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, Series A,
no.24, f.8). Once again, Bredorede was fervently criticizing the Liberal Party that “carries
the great fault here, as well as in the case of strikes. Nobody has respect for anybody. It is
highly required the presence of an action man, full of energy and intelligence, a true
statesman, as Marghiloman” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em
Bucareste,Series A, no.24, f.8).
“My English colleague shares the same opinions as myself, namely the life here is
very difficult” ( ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, no. 19, f.13).
Among other things, Romania was dealing with the problem of minorities. Beyond the
revisionist attitude of Hungarian ethnics, the Romanian state was facing difficulties with the
third largest ethnic minority (Scurtu, Buzatu, 2000:40), the Jewish population, issue
perceived and reviewed by the Portuguese diplomat. “Starting April last year, (...) the Jewish
population was granted all political rights. Please note that throughout the last 60 years, (...)
their only occupation has been the commerce. (...) With his finesse and with the help of his
intelligence in business that singles out his race, the Jew ended up by easily enjoying
everything, both politically and economically. What else can I say? Almost the entire
commerce, all banks are Jewish. At least the richest and most flourishing ones” (ADMAE,
Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, CX 134, Series A, no.19, f.14).
What gained access for Jews to the economical power of Romania? Brederode
himself notes: “here the Jews have never been persecuted like they were in Russia. Au
contraire, many of them, millions that live in Romania now fled and took refuge here
following the persecutions from Poland and Russia. Here they were able to work and sell
goods. But never before they’ve had political rights and hence, public positions. They
used to be guests, not esteemed, but tolerated. No Jew has entered the Bucharest society so
far, except for Aristide Blank, one of the potentates from Marmorosch Blank, the biggest
and the greatest of the Romanian banks” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em
Bucareste, CX 134, Series A, no.19, f.15). The Jews’ political orientation was not unitary,
but many of them were “activists for the Socialist Party and antimonarchic by definition”,
fact greatly disliked by the Portuguese monarchist diplomat. Such combination between
the “socialist danger” and the “feudalism of Jewish money” was badly taken in by
Martinho de Brederode (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, CX
134, Series A, no.19, f.15).
IV. Martinho de Brederode and Cross-Romanian Cultural Relations
His pro-monarchy orientation, or a keen compatibility or perhaps his personal
interests had drawn him closer to Matei Caragiale. Neither official nor private mailing of
the Portuguese archives that we have studied had any mention from the Portuguese
diplomat regarding the son of the great Romanian dramatist. Nevertheless, without stating
any names, in one of his Reports dated October 21st, 1925, Martinho de Brederode was
referring to the article on Vasco da Gama, whose translation and subsequent publication in
62
Romanian had cost 7800 lei, an amount probably slightly exaggerated, if we consider the
amount that Mateiu mentioned about the same article, i.e. 5000 lei. What is really
important, though, is the fact that the Portuguese diplomat mentions the support he got
from a friend for this particular purpose. It is highly probable that this is Mateiu Caragiale
(ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, Cx 37, Series D, no.22, f.2).
Nevertheless, the few notes extracted by Perpessicius from Mateiu Caragiale’s
diary (1923-1935) (Perdigão, Zamfir, 1998:4), that turned into ashes when the Rosetti
Library in Bucharest burned during the bombing in 1944, prove that such collaboration
did exist. First of all, Mateiu Caragiale repeatedly helped Martinho de Brederode to
publish in Universul a series of articles about himself or about Portugal.
Unfortunately, a few misunderstandings, or perhaps financial issues mixed with
personal vanities created an abyss between the two. In January 1924, Portugal
commemorated the fourth centenary since Vasco da Gama’s death (Perdigão, Zamfir,
1998:4). On this occasion, the Academy member Henrique Lopes de Mendoca, author of
Portugal’s current national anthem, was tasked by the Portugal government to edit a
brochure on Vasco da Gama, which was submitted to all Portuguese legations from within
allied countries, with the requirement to be translated into the respective national
languages and be published in the press, with the purpose of spreading the name of Vasco
da Gama – symbol of the Portuguese maritime stemma, the immortal hero of Camões’s
epic, Lusiada. With respect to this brochure, the aforementioned ad notes in French found
in Mateiu Caragiale’ Diary, transcribed by Perpessicius and subsequently translated into
Romanian, read: „January 7th. Universul. Article on Vasco da Gama and picture. 5000 lei,
January 17th, Brederode. Universul, January 19th. Brederode incident, very unpleasant. At
least I wasn’t wrong about him. January 20th (scissors). Universul. Get receipt from
Brederode” (Perdigão, Zamfir, 1998:4). It seems that Brederode translated the article into
French and Mateiu Caragiale into Romanian; Mateiu laid his mark on the translation with
his masterful vocabulary, he turned the text without altering the original at all. In Mateiu
Caragiale’s Diary there are four entries on Brederode and the situation created around this
article (Perdigão, Zamfir, 1998:6).
The cultural relations between the two countries, Portugal and Romania, continue
over the next years. Great political and cultural Romanian personalities were in close
connection to Portuguese scholars. “I have just received from the Ministry of Education in
relation with Transylvania, invitations for the rectors of the Universities of Coimbra,
Lisbon and Porto, to assist on February 1st a.c.9, to the solemn inauguration of the Dacia
Superior University, in Cluj. Would you be as kind as to pass the invitation on, as soon as
possible? The special train leaves Bucharest for Cluj, on January 29th a.c. I was also
invited” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legaão de Portugal em Bucareste, no.11, 10 January
1920, f.1), stated the Portuguese diplomat.
In 1925, another invitation was addressed to the Portuguese Legation in Bucharest
and to its Minister, Martinho de Brederode. The invitation covered the attendance to an
International Conference in Chemistry, which was to take place between June 21st and
June 27th in Bucharest. “The countries’ official delegations shall accede to the
International Union of Chemistry” (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Legaão de Portugal em
Bucareste, Series D, no.4, f.1). The same invitation had been addressed to the Portugal
Society of Chemistry whose response was still pending. The further analysis of relevant
subsequent documents shows the absence of Portugal from the conference.
9
Abbreviation for “anni currentis” or “anno currente”, of the current year (n. t.)
63
In 1926 the university professor Mihai Manoilescu visited Portugal for a series of
conferences on corporatism, held at the Universities of Lisbon and Coimbra (AMAE,
Bucharest, fond. Portugalia, vol. XII, 1920-1934:137-138). During the following years
Manoilescu repeatedly returned to Portugal where he succeeded to meet Salazar, in 1936.
A few years later, Lucian Blaga, the Romanian Ambassador to Lisbon, stated: “I was
given the honor to meet this statesman twice. The same honor was granted to Manoilescu,
as well, during his visit as guest of the Portuguese Government. His ambassadors were the
two works The Theory of Protectionism and The Corporatist Century” (AMAE,
Bucharest, fond. Portugalia, vol I, p. 220). Upon his return to Bucharest, he held a
conference on Portugal and Salazar’s political regime, conference subsequently published
as a brochure, in Romanian, in 1940 (Manoilescu, 1936).
In 1928 the historian Nicolae Iorga visited Portugal at the invitation of the Society
of Geography. Shortly after, he published his work O país latino mais afastado na
Europa: Portugal (Portugal - The Latin Country Furthest Away from Europe), where
among other suggestions, he proposed the establishment in Coimbra of a “integral Latinity
school”, as “symbol, declaration and providence for the future” (Iorga, 1928:12-15).
The year of 1929, when the Romanian Ambassador to Lisbon was Alexandru
Gurănescu, was rich in cultural relations between the two states. According to the Report
dated July 31st 1929, the University of Coimbra accommodated the very first Romanian
library in Portugal, with the related reading room (AMAE, Bucharest, fond. Portugalia,
vol. XII, 1920-1934, f.59-61). The year of 1929 is also the year when Nicolae Titulescu,
one of the most prodigious Romanian political figures and diplomats, internationally
renowned, visited Lisbon accompanied by Vespasian Pella. Stepping on Portuguese land,
Titulescu stated: “Portugal is to us, Romanians, a most beloved and appreciated country,
as we work together within the League of Nations and never have we had any
divergences” (GhiŃescu). It is the moment of decision on the “Hungarian optants” dispute
trial, finalized by the Hague Conference and signed in Paris, on April 1930.
The academic and scientific cooperation held a great significance, the higher
eduction institutions maintaining a close collaboration, as we mentioned above. The
educational department of the two countries developed students exchange programs, with
international scholarships, therefore more and more young Romanian students benefitted,
on yearly basis, from scholarships at universities and prestigious institutions from
Portugal, such as Lisbon, Coimbra, Porto, but also vice-versa, at universities in Bucharest
or in Cluj (ADMAE, Lisbon, fond Relaçõis com a Roménia 1925-1931, P2, A.16).
Brederode’s efforts in the cultural rapprochement of the two countries remarkably
paid after he retired, mainly after Alexandru Duiliu Zamfirescu was appointed as the
Romanian Ambassador to Lisbon, in 1935. A Report dated June 10th, 1936 reads: “when I
arrived here I first had to set up the Chancery, to organize the archives and all ongoing
works. It is now time for cultural and propaganda matters. ... A series of requests for
information literature on Romania, from Portuguese state institutions, coming from
personalities from both university and private environments have piled up during the last
months. In addition to the abovementioned and on the occasion of the admirable
conference given by Elena Văcărescu at the University of Coimbra, Eugenio de Castro,
Dean of Faculty of Letters, world renowned poet, asked me for the material necessary to
the establishment of a Romanian Institute, beside the French, German, Spanish, Italian and
English ones already in force and functioning in the most outstanding rooms of the new
wing [of the University, n.n.]” (AMAE, Bucharest, fond Portugalia, f. 234).
Elena Văcărescu’s connection with Portugal was deeper and more profound and it
came from both Romanian and Portuguese presence within the League of Nations. This is
64
where the Romanian writer and poet Elena Văcărescu met the Portuguese Júlio Dantas.
The latter had already shown great interest in Romania, judging by the immense number
of Romanian books in his possession. He met and admired Elena Văcărescu and he even
published various articles on her, out of which we can single out Tres mulheres celebras
(Three Famous Women), work that placed Elena Văcărescu next to Marie Curie
(Ghitescu).
In one of his Reports dated July 21st 1937, Mihail Comărşescu stated: “In Portugal,
no work has so far been published in Portuguese on Romania. To cover this deficiency I
have found useful to take on the publishing of a brochure which would present a picture of
Romania to the Portuguese and American Latin readers and Brazil in particular,
emphasizing all her cultural, artistic and touristic potentials” (AMAE, Bucharest, fond
Portugalia,…. f. 236).
The general conditions for the development of Romania carried, in all aspects, the
mark of all states where important military actions took place. The unification of all
Romanian provinces with The Romanian Old Kingdom made the recovery of Romania
more complicated. On such a background, Martinho de Brederode pointed out three
factors outstandingly dangerous to Romania: the decadent administration, the chaos with
the railways and in general with all means of transportation and the peasants’ activities.
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personal file Martinho de Brederode, Cx 198, no.15, Peking, Report, 4 July 1908;
Ibidem, Report, 13 December 1907
Idem, Lisbon, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucarereste / Legation of Portugal to
Bucharest, Pasta Pessoal / personal file Martinho de Brederode, CX 135, Series A,
no. 4, Bucharest, Confidential and reserved report, 23 December 1919, f.1
Ibidem, CX 137, Series A, no.42, Bucharest, Confidential report, 3 June 1920, f. 2
Ibidem, Series A, no.17, Bucharest, note sent by Martinho de Brederode to Minister of
Foreigner Affaires in Lisbon, confidential, 2 February 1920, f.1
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vacation, autumn of 1920 to 11 June 1921, Confidential and reserved, 3 April 1921, f.1
Ibidem, Series A, no.23, Bucharest, Letter addressed to the Portuguese Secretary of State,
from the General Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon, by the
Portuguese diplomat, 2 February 1920
Ibidem, no.40, Bucharest, Report Martinho de Brederode, 25 August 1922, f.1
Ibidem, Series A, no.6, Bucharest, Diplomatic Note, 12 January 1920
Ibidem, 21 Mai 1921
Ibidem, no. 49, Bucharest, Note issued by Martinho de Brederode to the Ministry of
Foreign Affaires in Lisbon, 2 June 1921, f. 1
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P.3, M 138-139 (1918-1922), Series A, no.82, Bucharest, Report, 12 July 1920, f.2
Idem, fond Legação de Portugal em Bucareste, CX 134, Series B, no.75, Bucharest,
Confidential report, 6 noiembrie 1920, f.3
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Archives, Bucharest, dos. Portugalia, Roll 15, frame 133, f.15
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Ibidem, CX 137, no. 25, Bucharest, Report Martinho de Brederode, 15 mai 1920
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1920, containing one article from Le Progres newspaper, 29 December 1920, p.3
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f.1
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P2, A.16
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no.9, Report, 23 January 1920, f.4.
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Books
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the road and conferences, Bucharest, Editura Casei Şcolare
Manoilescu, Mihail (1936), Portugal of Salazar, Bucharest, Biblioteca Lumea Nouă
Monitorul Oficial (Bucharest), 1920, 2 January, p.2, art. Control of aliens
Oliveira, Eduardo Fernandes de, Santos, Fernando Brederode, Brederode da Holanda em
Portugal. Oito seculos de historia de uma familia europeia, Lisabona, 2002
Orga, Valentin, Vlad, Aurel (2001), History and Destiny, Cluj Napoca, Argonaus
Publishing House
Page Orăştie Municipality (design Secui Adrian),
http://www.orastieinfo.ro/personalitati/aurel_vlad/aurel_vlad.html
Perdigão, Daniel, Zamfir, Mihai (1994), “A Matein portrait: Vasco da Gama”,
Amfiteatru magazine, no.2, Bucharest
Zainea, Ion, Stoica, Alina (2008), „The revolution in Portugal and Salazar’s Regime in the
Romanian press and publications”, în Revista da História das Ideias, vol.29,
Coimbra, Portugalia, p.583-615
Rural Cultural Border
Barbu ŞTEFĂNESCU
Abstract: The traditional rural world, culturally very well defined, has been during the
last centuries rather in steep collapse in Europe. Even to the extent that it is surviving, it has been
culturally contaminated with elements of the dominant urban. In certain areas of Eastern Europe,
including Romania, the specific historical circumstances have made the translation towards the
urban slower and therefore, cultural elements of archeocivilization imprinted with past ages traits
have continued to subsist, as facts of life. The existence of such elements does require knowledge,
alongside with their preservation and exploitation not only as cultural heritage of the entire
Europe, but also as local, national, regional and European identity elements.
Keywords: rurality, cultural border, identity, traditions, exploitation
Nowadays, when “contemporary society slowly and irreversibly tends to
progressive homogeneity/unification triggered by agents of the Power and accelerated by
industrial and technological revolution”, when “... ‘post-historical’ humanity has become
increasingly undifferentiated in conducts, opinions, interests and judgements in consensus
with an ubiquitous reality of the real, where the specific, particular, and difference turn
into pure aberrations subject to exclusion” (Platon, no. 1-4, 1994:24), the rural is greatly
restraining on the planet if it is not meant for disappearance when facing the generalized
attack of the urban. Moreover, over half of the world’s population belongs to the urban1.
Yet there are areas where the relationship between the urban and the rural is clearly
unbalanced to favour the former, amongst which the European Union (73.3% in 2005)
(25-ème Congrès international.., 18 au 23 juillet 2005:2). Romania in itself is an
exception, as almost half of the population is living in the countryside. If in some
European areas the old reference frame for the existence of the predominant rural aspect
of preindustrial society – so that it seemed one of the “historical permanence” mentioned
by Nicolae Iorga (Constantiniu, 2009: 20) - has become discreet, as Romania joined the
EU with a rural aspect seeming oversized as compared to the average: over 45% of the
population in Romania belonged to the rural in 2004, a year when migration rate from
rural to urban areas per 1,000 population was 6.6 (in absolute figures – 117,495
(Ştefănescu, 2006: 239), 90% of nowadays Romania can be framed as rural, as 40% of the
inhabitants are involved in agriculture), which is incompatible with the general European
realities from many points of view (the EU average is 4.7% inhabitants involved in
agriculture) (Buruiană, 2003:197).
With a even older population, considering that youth tends to be more cityoriented or going abroad, while many retired people leave the city for the countryside, the
Romanian villages preserve core elements belonging to archaic life: charged with
subsistence economy weigh, there still are villages with no electricity, draining systems,
gas, or running water – according to the results of a survey carried out in 2006. In the
Romanian rural environment, 91% had no access to gas; 84% had no draining systems;
1
In 2005, the rural still had a symbolic majority: 51%, as compared to the 49% representing the
urban (25-eme Congres Internationel de la population, Tours, 18-23 juillet, 2005, p. 3). The
report favoured the urban in 2009.
67
they had agricultural and artisanal techniques, means of transportation belonging to other
epochs, manufacturers that could not respect the basic EU hygienic-sanitary norms
(compulsory milking equipment, slaughterhouses, etc.), a lowering level of education,
inappropriate medical assistance) (Ştefănescu, 2006:239).
Those who analysed from different perspectives the predominantly rural social
segment, that is the peasants, have noticed amongst its characterising features
conservatism, resistance to change, adherence to subsistence economy, solidarity with the
past considered from a mythological perspective not as a pass time, yet as a golden age.
Hence, despite the nostalgia connected to the predominantly rural history of different
civilisations, including the European one, there is the need to go beyond peasant society
throughout the process of modernisation or to change the peasant and rural character of
the society in favour of other more dynamic social segments less tightly related to the web
of old community relations more adherent to urban environment. Modernisation and
urbanisation have been so far hand in hand with Western Europe particularly during the
industrial revolutions that countries in this part of the world have lived thus resizing
human habitat with the brutality of a developing capitalism.
The process can be followed with all its lags and different rhythms in Central and
Eastern Europe. Here, the slow capitalist evolution was stopped by the brutal interference
in property status, production organisation, labour finality, communist state. Disowned of
their land and technical means, peasants turned into factory workers and urban residents to
a great extent. Inhabitants remaining to work in agriculture were not co-interested; they
became routined and joined an ethics justifying theft, considering that they only had an
insignificant production quota. Consequences of technical modernity accompanying the
process – as shown by mechanisation, chemical processes, land improvements, specialists,
as well as the process of bringing property together, modern agriculture conditions – were
mostly cancelled by the badly paid non-interested peasant. In its turn, the village was
subject to a “modernisation” urge according to the idea to bring the village closer to the
town. Forceful systematisation, started and fortunately never finished by Ceausescu’s
regime, was materialised in connecting houses to new street networks, building new
blocks of flats – more often than not inaesthetic and unfunctional – in commune centres,
most of them devoid of minimal equipment needed for modern comfort. Many rural places
were declared towns without meeting the minimal international standards in point, as the
communist regime was concerned with decreasing the incredible high percentage of rural
population that did not formally support the ambitions to place Romania amongst the
world developed countries. The result of this policy was that Romanian towns became
rather rural, standardising their architecture, turning great worker neighbourhoods into
slums. Brutally taken from his conservative environment endowed with a coherent value
system, the peasant living in the town could not turn over night into the city man with
proper “documents”. Despite the proportion of the process, residence in rural environment
has remained substantial in Romania, just like the phenomenon of “plying” with its social
and economic consequences were all characteristic of the communist period (Ştefănescu,
2006:238).
When the centuries old quasigeneral rural element made room to the
overwhelming urban, the cultural border between the two environments altered not only
quantitatively. Elements of urbanity became elements of existence in the rural that was too
stubborn to fade away. At the same time, the rural was more wanted as it became more
narrow and discreet, not only because it represented the starting point and people look into
their origins historically or mythically, but also because it could be a refuge from the
dynamic urban live. The village became a synonym of tradition, peace, and a life full of
68
environmentally friendly elements. Often overrated from a cultural point of view, the
village raised nostalgia, rediscovery or enthusiasm.
Overcoming the rural coming from the depths of history is a major issue for
today’s Romania. As long as it set the tone and gave a certain meaning to life, it set up a
stability based on a value system that had been tested throughout thousands of years.
“Yes, as long as it stayed in one place, tough, active, and peaceful, this peasant universe
that people my age have still known and loved, with its colours, customs, intimate
knowledge of the land, its bare needs, deep moderation, the history of France, the French
life had another stability, another resonance. A different contact with nature” nostalgically
pondered Fernand Braudel on the difficult moment when his country overcame peasant
condition plunging into the dazzling rhythm of modernisation (Braudel, vol. I, 1989:628).
The Romanian rural is at such difficult moment when the expanding Europe
encompasses its own peripheries including the Romanian one – they were even talking
about the Romanians’ status as “outsiders” (Medeleanu, 2007:47). Not only a physical
massive universe fades away, but also a mental one, as the village is assimilated to the
Romanian national ideology at the time it came into being as the people’s cultural matrix,
as a major identity element. In 17th century Transylvania, the mass incriminated as “rustici
infidelis” got to be assimilated to Romanians, just like the noblemen were assimilated to
Hungarians irrespective of their ethnic origin. This ethnic level transfer of images to their
social origin was legally amended by the constitutional acts issued that century:
Transylvanian rural life became “synonymous to the Romanian character; it stands for the
core of the Romanian specific” (Mitu, 2006:240). We have to underline that from the
point of view of identity elements, in 2002, the village was still the first amongst core
topics of Romanians’ core image of themselves, which involved a strong traditionalism of
collective mentalities and our society in general. In other words, the village was still
strong in the conscience and subconscious not only of those living in the countryside, but
also of those living in the city yet having a physical connection with the village – family,
house, land – or only a mental one (Frumos, Iacob, 2002:140-141).
Nowadays, although it does not fully disappear, the world seemed to Cioran –
who had just left for the Paris of modern culture – embarrassing, stiff, a-historical.
Responding to the question: “How is it possible to be a Romanian?”, the philosopher used
to say: “By hating my people, my country with its atemporal lingering peasants almost
bursting out sleepiness, I was embarrassed by this ascendance, I was denying them, I
refused their second-hand eternity, I rejected their petrified larva certitudes, their
geological revelry... Not knowing how to spur them, how to animate them, I grew to
dream of an extermination. Nevertheless, stones cannot be massacred. The show they
offered justified and staggered, fed and repressed my rage. And I never ceased to curse the
accident that made me be born among them" (Kluback, 1999:90). Or as Lucian Blaga
stated that he lived the experience of a “boycott of history” and that “this delay in front of
childhood and myth has deeply and definitively influenced us” (Medeleanu, 2007:9). The
same Blaga said: “eternity was born in the countryside”. “A petrified eternity. There, in
the countryside, in the emboweled yet always ‘silvery’ dust of the roads, I sought for the
landmarks of our soul...” (Medeleanu, 2007:47).
Indeed, the fact that the romantics recovered the village as an identity element, as a
place to preserve genuine and ancestral features, had highly important consequences in the
Romanian culture. Particularly the meeting between the “sleepy” world of the village in
solidarity with the beginning of the people, with the idea of the illustrious Roman origin,
which was one of the forceful ideas of the Romanian identity system. The noble Romanian
origin would be ideologically situated above social nobility, particularly if it was made up
69
not only of an elite, but of a whole ethnic group, the most numerous in Transylvania: “A
people in rags suddenly saw themselves dressed in imperial purple. The humble and the
wretched were in fact nephews of emperors that were not at all inferior to those who brought
them to that humble situation” (Medeleanu, 2007:48). Just like other national ideologies in
Central Europe, the Romanian national ideology aimed at cultural homogeneity meant to
integrate the massive rural within the national whole. They did that by overbidding
according to the spirit of the time and popular culture, considered the source of age and joint
permanent values of the nation, in other words national specific, “through which”, as
Simona Nicoara put it, they gave satisfaction to a “majority (modern Romania has remained
predominantly peasant for two centuries!) of rural mentality and culture” (Nicoară,
2002:168). From now on, the peasant will no longer be absent from the Romanian political
ideologies that will approach him whether to urge him to contribute with his traditions to
making the difference and thus to support the national imaginary, or to lay the basis of a
state structure. The Romanian peasant – a victim of history to these days – puts his potential
into practice and becomes in national ideology the honest and devout patriot.
The communist rhetoric on the village was bivalent: on the one hand, the sleepy
village world was opposed to the dynamics and change promoted by the communist regime,
to forced modernisation to catch up from an economic point of view and to impose the
social superiority of the new system. Therefore, they were its great victims; collectivisation
had its point in clearly changing social relations to favour workers who had to be provided
with strong and less pretentious contingents. The workers’ income and urban comfort had to
be the attractions of industry considering that collective household could not provide for
those working there. On the other hand, the same discourse proposed the slogan of working
peasantry allied to the workers for the revolutionary change of society, easily getting over
the fear of change, as rural conservatism considered it an antirevolutionary element, such as
wealthy peasants as opposed to whom poor peasants had nothing to lose due to change. At
the same time, they tried to change traditions: the peasant was not the history anonymous
stuck in customs during the previous epochs: according to communist ideologists, he proved
revolutionary appetite, as riots turned into revolutions, or he was the pillar of the fight for
independence and state union. It was the peasants and less the workers supporting a failing
internationalisation for Ceausescu’s regime nationalism who supported through their
number and spirit of sacrifice of a people aware of their political ideals and national
aspirations avant la lettre in Middle Ages (Ştefănescu, 2009:89-90). A patriot peasant and
his healthy traditions were the safe shield to put aside pervert attempts through the actions of
the foreigner. “Living with their windows closed, we compared us to ourselves and we are
amazed, then mad because the foreigners did not see us as we thought we were. To this
beautiful portrait we drew ourselves” and from which “protochronism was born as an
expression of our assumed superiority as compared to the West” belonged the peasant, too
(Medeleanu, 2007:214). The blacklisted village of those who had to physically disappear
was once again summoned to give vigour to this idea: the music, dance and beauty of our
folk art, the “invaluable quality” of folk culture – rural, Romanian technical priorities
discovered over night, belong to a protochronist discourse meant to cover the gross failure of
the regime on a socio-economic level. The attention paid to ethnology, “a genuine science of
cultural alterity” (Mitu, 2006:80), to ethnographic museology disfavouring other sciences
such as sociology are arguments in point. They were supposed to support the “national
specific” that was the same with genuine folk culture as compared to the “class” bourgeois
character of elite culture (Stefanescu, 2009:90).
Thus, during the communist regime, “...the peasant was considered the source of
the most special qualities of the people and, at the same time, he was considered a
70
backward creature stuck in a millenary tradition, unable to break from his basic tools. The
communist propaganda turned him into a slogan. It provided the image of a labour animal
submitted to merciless exploitation. The one freeing the peasant from serfdom that took
him out of the dark was, according to their opinion, the party of the working class. The
actual peasant was always replaced with a myth...” (Medeleanu, 2007:249).
All European peoples massively lived their peasant experience, including a
peasant economy, which they broke from at different moments. Fernand Braudel placed
France amongst the countries where rural remnants lasted longer and he quoted Louis
Chevalier, who, in 1947, stated that “peasantry [was] in a way the regular consciousness
of the country, with its possibilities and limits. It was only through peasants that France
could have an accurate meaning of what could dare or refuse at all times" (Braudel,
1989:607). With the corresponding delay, Romania has been undergoing such a moment
of definite detachment from the rural for several centuries: in order to become more
modern, it has to overcome the cultural border of the rural that is still expressed in the
elements of a subsistence economy in the community sense of the social close to certain
traditions, etc. As historians and anthropologists, we see that, despite the amputations it
has suffered, Romania is the last redoubt of the European traditional rural features and,
once it is conquered, most of a world to which Europe has adhered for thousands of years
will disappear. Paraphrasing Fernand Braudel, we may say that “we witness a fast
unexpected catastrophic disorganisation” of the peasant world “coming from our deepest
past” (Braudel, 1989:609).
If the process is inevitable for the cultural wealth of the united Europe and for the
preservation of local specifics, it would be better for the European state and transnational
structures not only to set but also to achieve preservation as facts of life and not only as
confessions in museum show cases, of parts of anarchism elements that the Romanian
villages still preserve.
Thus, the Romanian rural is currently under two trends difficult to reconcile:
integration to a socio-economic structure tending to homogeneity on a level where the
state is peripheral and the activation of self-preservation instinct that the traditional rural
world had to the highest degree throughout the time as it was supported by the postmodernist riot against poverty of human existence by uniformity, by the plea to
acknowledge and preserve differences (Platon, 1994:22-23).
Without being the archaic rural as it used to be in the former half of the 20th century
– it had to undergo two severe “adjustments”, the brutal intervention of the communist
regime enforcing industrialisation, agriculture collectivisation and thus reduction of the rural
and the freedom of movement on a European level with major consequences on a stiff
unperforming rural on the social and economic levels – the Romanian village still preserves
archaic elements culturally resembling other times that survived although they had to
withdraw when placed on the blacklist of those that had to disappear even through
administrative measures, or was purposely neglected and left to die alone. Left alone, the
rural world tries to survive through a mix-up of contradicting theories: to modernise, which
is expensive and they cannot afford it, or to turn to archaism.
Nowadays, the Romanian village seems to be not willingly in opposition, with
less and less means, to a “dynamics of homogeneity” typical of contemporary society on a
cultural or economic level. On the economic level, it opposes elements of subsistence
economy to a continuous production growth. The same Fernand Braudel stated that
“peasant economy lasted in France or elsewhere as long as winter was for people a
hardship we cannot imagine today…” or as long as people toiled with their own hands or
used animals to do that (Braudel, 1989:628). These are realities that are more and more
71
seldom yet being present in the Romanian rural landscape, just like the peasant
stubbornness to live if not exclusively, mainly from “what is theirs”, or practising
polyculture (Braudel, 1989:640), raising cattle based on the same diversity of species.
On a cultural level, by joining a ritual norm that has not yet been abolished, there
is a balance between the trend for erosion of regional particularities through a growing
mobility of population, uniform education, levelling actions of mass communication,
bureaucratisation “associated with the ever tighter dependence of social texture on
government regulations”, a progressive freezing of the village “in a sturdy uniformity”
(Platon, 1994:24).
The current Romanian village bears more than the one before the imprint of
history. Its traditional basis, the image of the Romanian peasant “whose primitivism is
expressed by its eccentric and superstitious celebrations” (Mitu, 2006:17), have been
partially altered by different urges of modernisation, particularly the one supported by the
communist regime. After a three-decade experience of collectivisation, in 1990, due to the
rural law adopted by the post-December regime, the Romanian village was granted again
the “right to anarchism”. The dissolution of CAP (agricultural cooperatives) and granting
lands on the same lands entailed an excessive division of property. Then, there was a
process that is far from being on the verge of ending, that of juridical remaking of
property, with hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of lawsuits. The ambiguous regime
of property in today’s Romania has several important consequences: it does not allow – or
allows it only with great difficulty – the circulation of lands making it possible to remake
the great properties. It poses a lot of problems to investments; it embezzles the energy of
the peasants from the natural scope of cultivating the land to turn to courts of law, let
alone the expenses it supposes; it makes it difficult to access European funds, etc. Beyond
the signs of physical intervention on the rural, the communist ideas and conceptions are
peripheral in villages, such as an overestimate of the national and intolerance for the other:
“We keep repeating that we are Romanians to set an impermeable barrier between ‘we’
and ‘the others’...” (Medeleanu, 2007:203). “The poison of the communist propaganda
and class ideology has poured hatred, intolerance, vehemence and vulgarity in our souls,
wrote Horia Medeleanu (Medeleanu, 2007:214). Although the communist propaganda
spoke of the peasant as the historical ally of the working class granting adherence to the
revolutionary idea, “communism has attacked the foundations of his being, destroying his
sacred connection to the land. This estrangement of our peasant from the land is the
greatest crime that communism has committed against the Romanian people...” (Medeanu,
2007:250). The same essayist pointed out: “I thought they disappeared with the
communism. They are back after the miracle of the revolution and they provide a terrible
image. I saw then old people with their wrinkled faces and a tragic expression clinching to
their piece of land. They frantically looked for the ‘old places’. One could ‘read’ in this
hold on to the land the beginning of a Romanian peasantry rebirth process, but nobody
considered these revived from the dead” (Medeleanu, 2007:251).
Particularly for Romanian officials, this unlikely present and expanded rural is an
anachronic “dead wood” that is both an embarrass and a burden. When other countries
have less than 5% rural population, we have ten times more; when others use the most
sophisticated technologies, we still use the plough. For these considerations and lack of
skill, the Romanian political class has generally been ignoring the village, leaving it alone
to agonize and die, thus getting rid of several problems. We often have thought that the
village has been treated as a diseased person in a prolonged agony. The most economical
and efficient solution would be euthanasia. If it cannot turn into something else, the
village must disappear. Unfortunately, villages are to a great extent pre-cemeteries with a
72
compulsory amendment: in the post-December period, the Romanian village has become
very visible in the political discourse only during elections campaigns. Often considered
by media as easy to manipulate, the peasant voted with those who promised his right to
anarchism – see agrarian law of 1990 – or with those who generously turned to justice
demagogy, fake patriotism sentimentalism, or with those with a significant religious
element (Stefanescu, 2006:239-240).
After 1989, through the tormented reconstruction of individual property, the
village has had an oxygen balloon of right to anarchism on a short term. Delusive right, as
the enthusiasm of the peasant recently become owner has proved to be too much as
compared to his physical, economic, and financial possibilities, as the state mainly left
him on his own trapped in an intricate and incoherent legislation arbitrarily enforced.
After two decades, the standard portrait of the post-December Romanian peasant shows a
(same) old individual exhausted by a labour rather ritualized than efficient, poor,
completely disoriented, and prisoner of the past. The high costs of transition here are
mainly supported by him. Politicians cannot understand the drama of the peasant who uses
maize (cobs) as fuel for heating, as the peasant considers bread and its substitutes as holy!
What is the change for the better in their fate as compared to the communist regime when
they had to choke children with nylon bags stating that they had been still born in order to
ease the burden of raising them without having anything to feed them? (Stefanescu,
2006:241-242).
The world of peasants in today’s Romania is mainly anchored in an anti-capitalist
mentality. Capitalism means initiative and risk beyond the capital that the Romanian
peasant does not have.
We cannot ignore the fact that hundreds of thousands of village inhabitants work
abroad and thus bring some of the experience acquired there and submit the village to an
inevitable process of acculturation. At the same time, the fact that part of the village
inhabitants work abroad entail not only the adoption of some foreign cultural elements, but
also a stronger attachment to identity elements. People who used to grant minor attention to
them when they had been in the country, start to need them when abroad. The participation
of the “Spanish” or “Italians” to the great religious celebrations at home is impressive:
churches are full, donations are in a potlatch type competition and they come from
thousands of kilometres to celebrate little Easter. This contributes to a greater solidarity to
the home cultural environment and the ingrate often humbling status they experience in the
countries where they work. Another interesting phenomenon is that the emigrating
Romanian peasant has integrated to the rural life elsewhere: if the Poles accredited the
image of the “plumber”, the Slovaks that of the “house maid”, the Romanian emigrant has
symbolically become the “strawberry picker”.
In this context, we are interested in the traditional element that brings to present
day archaic cultural elements belonging to other historical times yet still surviving in a
certain historical and cultural context making up a cultural border. They are elements of
archaeocivilisation with a conservative character thus opposed to modernisation.
Consequently, most promoters of modernisation tend to consider them obstacles and
intend to eliminate them. Nowadays, the consequences of enforced modernisation in the
past centuries has increased the feeling of nostalgia for a simpler unperverted world
devoid of the vices brought by industrialisation, a world that has disappeared. The Europe
growing up in front of our eyes has a hard time forgetting that its origin is predominantly
rural; most Europeans’ ancestors a few generations back were peasants. This explains the
natural need for solidarity with one’s ancestors, with their lifestyle, thinking and manner
of acting from time to time.
73
The possibility to go back in time can be supported by stressing the elements of
the past lifestyle, where they are not only remembered by the inhabitants, but still belong
to their daily life. The need for the archaic and the rustic in post-industrial society can be
achieved in places where what we call tradition is still alive, that is, where an archaic
lifestyle has been preserved, which is the case of several regions in Romania.
There is a risk to all societies fallen behind from the point of view of modern
civilisation, which is also the case of Romania, to skip certain stages, to rush things, to
ignore collateral effects, such as losing the rural cultural inventory. If there are voices
claiming the need to preserve it, to seek for integrating solutions to modernity, we cannot
speak of an awareness generating an opinion trend in point. This is possible neither in the
case of those who have an archaic lifestyle, who can hardly be convinced that preserving
tradition does not mean being stuck to the past, that tradition can be a wellbeing element;
or the local, national, or European decision-makers, who should pay more attention to
preserving archaic culture elements in their regional development projects, thus belonging
to the general European cultural patrimony.
Throughout the 20 years of transition, there have been phenomena to temporarily
revive certain aspects that seemed outrun two decades ago, such as agricultural and artistic
techniques. There are several examples in point: the plough and wagon, hand sowing,
reconsidering traditional storage means. This has entailed a revival in practising (for
instance at Budureasa, Bihor County) of crating, etc. Another example would be the
preservation of several beliefs and customs that used to be censored by the communist
regime. This has become possible by increasing spiritual needs of a confused population
facing the lack of an existential perspective, or in the context of local communities’
endeavours to impose a cultural identity: folk and ceremonial moments, elements of specific
cuisine, costumes, etc., are more and more often used in a process of legitimating the village
in the internal and international contexts. When broadcast by television networks, they are
rooted in public awareness.
Rural habitat still preserves a rich architectural patrimony with local features. In
the mountains, the scattered habitat involved settlement groups (hamlets) or isolated
households, or doubling households with “huts” lying in grasslands where economic
activities connected to grazing and cereals, vegetables and fruit growing develop all
through the year or only temporarily. Here, houses, barns and other household annexes are
preserved, some of them very old. They are made of wood with hay roofs, with archaic
heating systems, having a great ethnographic value.
The property laws, the dissolution of communist agricultural cooperatives, the
reestablishment of peasant properties in growingly unpopulated villages with old people
and devoid of capital and thus with no means for minimal investments, the lack of
regulations concerning land circulation, with no market for diverse low quality products,
etc., have entailed a return of the peasant to the traditional technology: in Romania, the
wagon and oxen, the plough made of wood, mowing with manual mower, or the use of
wooden rake to dry and gather hay are present day realities.
Particularly in the mountains, there still is a traditional economy developing on
small areas that is combined with cattle breeding, fruit growing and traditional crafts, where
bread is still made in traditional oven, daily food is very different from ritual food, where
feasts of the liturgical calendar are doubled by “traditional” feasts. In this area, agriculture is
mainly environmentally friendly with a low level of polluting substance (chemical
fertilisers, pesticides, etc.), in most cases to fight potato beetle. Usually, fertilisers are of
animal origin, thus preserving the ancestral practice of stable fertilisers for both cereals and
grasslands. There is also the practice of crop rotation. Fruit trees are traditional and need no
74
chemical treatment. Grasslands preserve the same floral structure and there is a small
number of machineries used to process them. Thus, both vegetal and cattle production are
strictly ecological. Forests are not treated with chemicals either. The same natural quality
can be found in berries, mushrooms or herbs. It is not by accident that many companies
focus on picking and processing berries or cattle bred in rural households to export them as
ecological products.
We think that it is one of the key elements that might have a positive influence and
economic growth of villages in the mountains, as well as the preservation or revival of
traditions. Low price organic products, the archaic landscape added to the natural one, the
peace, the unpolluted air and water are about to draw many tourists. Many will prove to be
sensitive to cultural aspects relating to food, habitat, and spirituality provided an appropriate
infrastructure.
Resembling examples of different origins can be found in the field of spiritual
culture: the activity of potteries is currently preserved mainly due to some old spiritual
practices particularly those relating to the dead: six weeks, six months, a year, three years,
and five years memorials, then the little Easter and other occasions, the traditions relating to
the dead suppose moments of competition with the dead of the family, purification of tombs
with holy water, giving to the poor. In the villages around Beius, seven pots filled with water
and a candle are laid in each tomb. After they are blessed by the priest, then they are given
to children and the poor. Survival of potteries also has other reasons. Nevertheless, there is
none more powerful as this one: adapting vases to the requirements of modern life, or the
stress laid on decorative vases for tourists, etc. Developing the cultural element of tourism
could preserve and revive pottery centres that are important to the culture in the area, as well
as in Europe.
Preserving the ever thinner heritage made up of folk culture is primarily related to
economic efficiency. Yet, this does not exist outside tourism. I repeat: tourism with a strong
cultural element, with archaic taints in the Romanian society should be considered as
belonging to the European cultural heritage. The Europeans who are over the peasant and
rural condition status for centuries or decades should be eager to come and find them here.
Could these survivals live in competition with the modern? Yes, if we have the
knowledge of not opposing but associating them to the modern, not as exotic elements, but
as a joint cultural heritage. If we know how to do that, we are able to save and revive
them. If we do not, we will lose them and part of our identity. Paradoxically, we will
become poorer with more euro in our pocket in a Europe on the verge of becoming
commonplace for lack of cultural diversity. We hope nobody wants this to happen.
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From the East-West Major Project (1957) to the Convention on Cultural
Diversity (2007): UNESCO and Cultural Borders
Chloé MAUREL
Abstract: For more than 50 years, UNESCO has been questioning the delimitations and
the reality of cultural borders. The East-West Major Project (1957-1966) illustrates UNESCO’s
initial universalist conception and its will to encourage cultural unity. It reveals a progressive turn
around in UNESCO’s cultural politics, which led UNESCO to develop a more synthetic
conception, allying promotion of both cultural unity and cultural diversity. Since the 1960s,
UNESCO has tried hard to safeguard the world cultural heritage, notably in Africa, where it
appeared to be endangered. The creation of the World Heritage List in 1972 and the attempt to set
up a “New World Information and Communication Order” in 1980 were important steps. Several
Conventions were adopted. The Convention on Cultural Diversity (2005) is particularly important,
because it together emphasizes the diversity of the different cultures and affirms the Universalist
idea of all cultures belonging to a common cultural ground. It therefore refutes Samuel
Huntington’s conception of an inevitable clash of civilizations: the UNESCO’s convention goes
against the idea that cultural borders would be factors of conflict. It constitutes an attempt of
synthesis between universalism and multiculturalism. Yet the UNESCO’s actions remain too
scattered, and the efficiency of the UNESCO’s conventions is very poor. Besides, the UNESCO’s
instruments have also pernicious effects: they are often used as instruments for political or
economical targets. Now, UNESCO should not only promote the idea of “cultural diversity” and
celebrate “cultural borders” and “intercultural dialog”, but above all clearly distance itself from
the idea of liberalizing culture and from WTO politics. Indeed, liberalizing culture increases social
inequality and therefore deepens the “cultural gap” between people. UNESCO should take more
concrete steps to allow every people to partake in cultural life.
Keywords: Universalism, Multiculturalism, Globalization, Liberalization, World Cultural
Heritage
The issue of cultural borders is, from more than a half century, in the centre of
UNESCO’s concerns. This intergovernmental organization was created in 1945 with the
official aim to contribute to peace by means of education, science and culture. In the
1950s, UNESCO aimed to bring cultures closer together, to unify ways of thinking and of
living, in pacifist and universalist conceptions. Then, from the 1960s on, the UNESCO’s
conceptions have changed: the will to preserve cultural identities has increased. UNESCO
gave up trying to abolish cultural borders, but on the contrary, began to preserve them in
order to promote originality and uniqueness of specific cultures. How can this turn around
be explained? By which means has UNESCO since the 1960s promoted cultural heritage
and cultural diversity? Which actors and which conceptions have influenced UNESCO? It
is interesting to first analyze the UNESCO East-West Major Project (1957-1966), which
illustrates this progressive turn around in UNESCO conceptions; then the UNESCO’s
focus on world heritage, and in particular in the field of African cultural heritage; and at
last UNESCO’s normative action, notably the elaboration of UNESCO Conventions and
particularly the Convention on Cultural Diversity, adopted in 2005 and entered into force
in 2007.
*
77
I. The East-West Major Project (1957-1966)
UNESCO was created just after the World War II, at a time when the general
opinion spread that cultural uniformization could contribute to peace and progress. At that
time, UNESCO actors were interested in possibilities of bringing civilizations together,
and particularly the East and the West (Huxley, 1946:70; Yutang, n° 8, septembre 1948: 3;
Kirpal, 1983:67-68). Thus, UNESCO took up an idea that had been dealt with by its
predecessor during the interwar period: the Organisation for Intellectual Cooperation.
Many projects that UNESCO undertook in its first years were in line with such idea: for
example, the project of writing a “Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind” (launched
in 1947, but only published in the 1960’s), or efforts to coordinate history schoolbooks of
different countries. Along this line, in 1949 UNESCO started a series of studies on
“interrelations of cultures and their contribution to international understanding” (such as
“The Cultural Essence of Chinese Literature”, “The Place of Spanish Culture”, “The Basic
Unity underlying the Diversity of Culture”).
Most of all, from 1957 to 1966 UNESCO led a ten-year programme, titled the
“Major Project on mutual appreciation of Eastern and cultural appreciation of Eastern and
Western cultural values” (Cf. Wong, vol. 19, n°3, September 2008). This project perfectly
illustrates the problem of delimitating cultural border between the East and the West. At
the time of its elaboration, the notions of East and West were conceived in a purely
intuitive way. When they said East, UNESCO actors referred to India, Japan, Thailand,
Indonesia, Taiwan. When they said West, they referred to Western Europe and North
America. The rest of the world was neglected in this mental picturing.
The activities of the project included studies and research (symposia, creation of
institutions, exchange of teachers and researchers); education for youth (encouragement to
students exchanges), and information for the general public (films, radio and TV
programs, articles, posters, leaflets, sheets, pocketbooks, and the publication of a
UNESCO’s translated literature series, “Representative Works” of world literature)
(Évaluation du projet majeur pour l’appréciation mutuelle des valeurs culturelles de
l’Orient et de l’Occident, 1968:9).
When this project was conceived, the dominating idea was that a marked cultural
border separated the Eastern peoples from the Western ones. Western intellectuals and
UNESCO civil servants considered that such cultural border kept the Eastern people
isolated, prisoners of their traditional cultures, of their retrograde traditions. They decided
therefore to attempt abolishing that cultural border, in order to allow Eastern people to
open themselves to Western modernity and to blend in with a supposed future “world
civilization”.
So the official aim of the East-West project was, at its beginning, to “favour
connection and understanding between Eastern and Western people” (Le Courrier de
l’Unesco, December 1958:3), to invite them to “discover or deepen their similitude”
(Évaluation du projet majeur pour l’appréciation mutuelle des valeurs culturelles de
l’Orient et de l’Occident, 1968:4), to abolish the “thousand barriers […] which separate
the East from the West” (Unesco archives, file X 07. 83, 13 January 1960:1-2)1. It was
aimed to highlight reciprocal influences between Eastern and Western cultures, in order
that everybody could become aware of the existence of a common cultural ground, of a
“common heritage of all humanity” (MAPA/I AC/3, Annex I; CUA/96, 17 juin 1959:4).
Jacques Havet, a French UNESCO civil servant in charge of the coordination of the
1
In this article, every archives document mentioned comes from Unesco archives, unless other
source was named.
78
project, claimed explicitly that the project was in opposition to the idea claimed in 1889
by Rudyard Kipling that “East is East, and West is West, and never the two shall meet”2.
Eastern Member States as India were then very favourable to the conception underlying
the East-West project (Diplomatic archives of Germany: B 91, Band 16: report of K.
Pfauter, 24 February 1956; Radhakrishnan, n° 12, December 1958:4-7).
Publications, conferences3, exhibitions, radio programs and films came to life in
this course of ideas, for example a book titled East and West: towards mutual
understanding (Fradier, 1959)?, an exhibition titled “Orient-Occident” organized in Paris
in 1958 (which tried to emphasize reciprocal influences and artistic proximity of Eastern
and Western civilizations) (« Orient-Occident », 1958), and films trying to outline the
universality of mime, or emphasizing common points of Eastern and Western music (Le
geste, ce langage: mimes d’Orient et d’Occident (Unesco, 1962); Et les sons se répondent
(Unesco, 1966).
However, it soon appeared impossible to clearly define the cultural border
between the East and the West (CUA/108:3; MAPA/ED/2, mai 1962:2-3). The UNESCO
civil servants, together with the UNESCO experts, and representatives of Member States
at the UNESCO General Conference and at the UNESCO Executive Council all failed to
determine the common criteria (geographic, cultural, historical, religious, ethnic, and
linguistic) (MAPA/1 AC/3, 15 March 1957:2; MAPA/1-AC/2, section 17). UNESCO
assigned two intellectuals, a Lebanese (East) and a German (West) to demarcate this EastWest border. But they proved unable to do it, and concluded: “It is difficult to find a
precise definition of both terms East and West [...] Have the notions of East and West a
geographical of historical meaning, a cultural or material meaning on which data should
we rely? Where begins East, and where ends West? [...] This scramble for definition isn’t
it vain? [...] East and West exist, it is a fact” (MAPA/3 AC/4, February 1958:8).
At the UNESCO General Conference in 1958, Member States representatives,
although reasserting their intuitive conviction that “a real difference separates two
traditions in the edification of human civilizations”, failed in defining a clear geographical
cultural border between East and West4. Eventually, as a compromise, they defined
Western culture as “the one prevailing in European countries and in all the other countries
whose culture stem from the European culture”, and Eastern culture as “the non European
cultures, particularly those whose roots are in Asia”. However, from its formulation, this
definition appeared to them as non satisfactory because of its eurocentrism (MAPA/I
AC/3; MAPA/3 AC/3, May1959).
About the beginning of the 1960s, a turn around happened in UNESCO
conceptions: more and more people were becoming aware that cultural borders between
the East and the West were vanishing or even disappearing. It gave rise to reactions in
different circles: in the US, multiculturalism conceptions extensively developed among
social scientists (Cf. Pretcelle, 1999:26-27 ; Kymlicka, 1995); in Western Europe, more
and more intellectuals staged mass consumption and accused it to provoke cultural
uniformization (Cf. Braudrillard, 1970); in the Third World countries, intellectuals called
for their cultures being better recognized and taken into consideration (X 07.83 Maheu,
part II b, 20 December 1963). Under the influence of these trends, the UNESCO official
conception evolved: from then on, the organization no more undertook to favour cultural
2
Speech by Jacques Havet, doc. mentioned. Cf. R. Kipling, “The Ballad of East and West”.
Ex.: « L’homme moderne en Orient et en Occident », 1958, Bruxelles ; « L’art contemporain en
Orient et en Occident », 1960, Vienne.
4
Unesco General Conference 1958, speech of Z. Husain.
3
79
uniformization, but on the contrary to fight it (ever since the cultural uniformization
started to be regarded as cultural impoverishment) and to protect cultural identities (X 07
A 120/197 UNSA: 31 May 1965).
These turn around completely reshaped the spirit of the East-West project.
Henceforth, it was aimed to preserve cultural borders, seen as part of the cultural world
heritage, at risk of disintegration if pressured by cultural globalization. Intellectuals,
UNESCO civil servants, and Member States representatives stated the importance of
preventing the fading of cultural borders. From an initial negative connotation, cultural
borders acquired then a positive connotation: in a more and more uniform world, they
became the symbol of cultural wealth (CUA/108, 29 août 1961: 3). Thus, Jacques Havet
noted in 1960 that, in front of the “irresistible evolution of the world”, which becomes
“more and more tightened”, UNESCO must fight against cultural uniformization5.
UNESCO launched new activities, as collecting traditional Asiatic tales and describing old
community rituals (CUA/96, 17 juin 1951: 7; Évaluation du projet…, 1968:60-61).
In addition, the African States that entered UNESCO between 1960 and 1962
claimed for recognition of their own cultures, and asked to partake in the East-West
project (12 C/PRG/SR.32 (prov.), December 1962: 3-10). USSR supported their claims (X
07.83 Maheu II a, 11 April 1961:9; Actes de la conférence générale de 1962: 166-167).
The UNESCO civil servants tried therefore to include Africa in the project, integrating it
to the category “East” (X07. 21(44) NC IV: report by Y. Brunsvick, 22 May 1962;
CUA/108: 3). Yet the place of Africa in the project remained very minor.
Eventually, identifying the East and the West in the project proved to be very far
from a geographical reality, since Africa and Latin America were included within the
“East” and Australia and New Zealand were considered as part of the “West”.
Paradoxically, the areas where this geographical border is really situated, such as USSR or
Turkey, did not play an important role in the project.
The results of the project were mitigated. Many criticisms arose when it was
underway. The representative of Thailand deplored in 1961 “that the [cultural] circulation
was carried out in only one sense” and that “every efforts made by Eastern countries to
expose their cultures by sending documentation in Western countries failed”
(MAPA/60.657, January 1961: 4, 7-9). The representative of Laos, supported by the
representative of Indonesia, criticized in 1962 the “imbalance” between East and West in
the project6. Indeed, Western countries had a greater share of partaking in the project than
the Eastern countries (X07.83 Maheu, part II b, 26 February 1963). Furthermore, there
were stereotypes and prejudice in the presentation of Eastern cultures (MAPA/ED/2, May
1962; MAPA/9256.17; CUA/108, p. 3; Évaluation du projet…,1968: 84-85). So the
project failed to arouse a better mutual understanding between the East and the West
(CUA/125, 9-13 September 1963:5 ; X07.21(44)NC III : june 1961:11-15; X07.21(44)NC
IV: report by Y. Brunsvick, 22 mai 1962). An internal audit carried out by UNESCO
experts in 1968 revealed the lack of reciprocity in the project: publications, films, radio
and TV programs, translations of literary works, were mainly done by Western people. “In
the cultural exchanges aroused by the project, the movement was mainly in the way of a
presentation of oriental values to Occident. It was not always possible to fully assure the
mutual character which had been initially assigned to the enterprise” (CUA/108, p. 3-4,
and annex I and IV; Évaluation du projet…,1968: 12, 75, 84). The project often presented
Eastern cultures in a caricatured way, marked by exotic and oriental features, in spite of
5
6
Speech by J. Havet, doc. mentioned, p. 1.
Actes de la conférence générale de 1962, 32e séance de la Commission du programme.
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the warnings given by the UNESCO civil servants (Fradier, Avril 1963:4-7). Articles of
the UNESCO Courier revealed the predominance of the Western vantage point: they
presented Orient as a distant and mysterious region; photographs appeal to exotism and
picturesque (Collison, juin 1957: 11-12; Fradier; Menhuin, Novembre 1957:22). The
Eastern cultures were presented mainly in their traditional (and not contemporary) aspects,
they were referred to as still and rooted civilizations (Diplomatic Archives of France:
NUOI box 835, 25 juin 1963; Unesco archives: CUA/108, p. 3; MAPA/6 AC/2;
Evaluation du projet…,1968:84-85). The Western culture was always presented implicitly
as the frame of reference, as shown by the issue of UNESCO Courier devoted to
“literatures of Orient and Occident”: among the 13 articles of the issue, only 2 were
written by Eastern intellectuals. The issue consisted mainly in a presentation of the
Eastern literatures done by Western intellectuals; when doing so, the intellectuals
constantly alluded to Western references (Le Courrier de l’Unesco, juin 1957).
The project illustrated the conceptual turn around in UNESCO, and how the
concepts regarding cultural borders evolved from the 1950s to the 1960s. The cultural
border between the East and the West was initially perceived as a divide that should be
overcome, in order to allow for the coming of a world civilization; then it progressively
appeared as cultural wealth, that had to be protected and promoted. From then on, it
seemed as being a part of the world cultural heritage. The putting into effect of the project
also reveals difficulty in defining a clear cultural border between the East and the West,
and difficulty in generating balanced cultural flows between the two areas. From the
1960s on, UNESCO has more and more devoted itself to protect and promote both
cultural heritage, and cultural diversity.
II. UNESCO and Cultural Heritage
II.1. Increased Focusing on Cultural Heritage
The protection and promotion of the world cultural heritage were expanding rapidly
among the UNESCO’s activities. In the 1960s, UNESCO gained major fame in this field, by
organizing the rescuing of the antique temples of Abu Simbel in South Egypt. This largescale operation was given a wide media coverage. The temples were dismantled and then
moved and reconstructed in a safer area. It was successfully achieved in 1968 and it gave
UNESCO legitimacy within the field of protection of world cultural heritage (Cf. Maurel,
2006:817-829).
A few years later, in November 1972, the Organization adopted the “Convention
concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage”. This is when
UNESCO began to establish the “World Heritage List”. This list takes inventory of
cultural and natural sites which the World Heritage Committee considers as having
outstanding universal value. Several steps were taken in the following years. In the 1980s,
UNESCO held projects to promote Eastern cultures, such as the “Silk Road Project”. In
1988, UNESCO’s DG, Federico Mayor, launched the “World Decade for Cultural
Development” (1988-1997) (Anouma, 1996:161-180). Yet the results were disappointing.
As Yves Courrier, a former UNESCO civil servant, observed, this ambitious and costly
operation had minor impact and negligible results (Courrier, 2005:55-56; same idea in
Jean-Michel Dijan, Octobre 2005). It is the same with the “Culture of Peace Programme”,
launched in the 1990s.
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II.2. The “New World Information and Communication Order” (NWICO) or
How to Overcome the North/South Economic and Cultural Divide (1980)
In the 1970s, the Third World countries, and notably many African countries,
claimed for a better repartition of production and circulation of information at the world
level. They denounced domination of information by a few powerful press agencies
belonging to Western countries. Indeed, at that time over 80% of global news flow were
controlled by 4 major Western news agencies. The Third World countries claimed for a
more equitable system, which would allow their populations to better partake in producing
the information and, more generally, in consumption and production of culture.
Further to these demands, the new DG of UNESCO, the Senegalese Amadou
Mahtar M’Bow decided to convene in 1977 an international panel chaired by the Nobel
Peace Prize laureate Sean MacBride. This panel was commissioned to identify and make
recommendations on how to make the global media representation more balanced and
more democratic. The MacBride Commission produced in 1980 a report titled Many
Voices, One World. This text outlined the imbalance in information flows, in favour of the
Western countries. Its conclusions were not entirely new: in the 1960s, the American
media scholar Wilbur Schramm had already noted the unbalance in the world flow of
news, unbalance which led to the conclusion that in elaboration of world news much
attention was given to developed countries and little to less-developed ones (Schramm,
1964:65).
The MacBride report also observed that the developing world was culturally
marginalized by the emergence of satellite and computer technologies. It established that a
small number of developed countries controlled almost 90% of the radio spectrum, and
that Western satellites broadcast Western television programs into Third World countries
without prior permission (The UN had already voted in the early 1970s against such
broadcasts). The MacBride Commission proposed to establish a “New World Information
and Communication Order” (NWICO), more equitable. Representatives of the Third
World played a leading role in this Commission, as Tunisia’s Information Minister,
Mustapha Masmoudi.
But these proposals ran up against opposition from the Western powers, and
mainly the US. The US, defending the interests of American media corporations, was
hostile to NWICO and violently attacked it, painting it as a dangerous barrier to freedom
of the press and to individual freedom. The US alleged that NWICO was trying to
establish a totalitarian control on press by ultimately putting an intergovernmental
organization at the head of controlling global media, potentially allowing for censorship
on a large scale. The US and UK championed on the idea of “free flow of information” (in
the spirit of “free trade” and economic liberalism), and went against the idea of
(inter)governmental intervention aiming to favour a more balanced circulation of
information. Faced with the threat of the US to suspend the payment of its contribution
and to withdraw from UNESCO, UNESCO abandoned the project, causing great
disappointment of numerous developing countries. The US eventually withdrew its
UNESCO membership at the end of 1984.
So, the pressures of the Western countries prevented UNESCO from working to
favour a more balanced flow of information and communication between the North and
the South. This gap increased more and more: it led to the current of “global digital
divide” (Lu, 2001:1-4; Guillen & Suárez, 2005:681-708). This is a sort of cultural border,
in the negative meaning of the term.
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II.3. A Stress on African Cultural Heritage
Because it became aware of the growing North-South gap, from the 1960s on
UNESCO has actively worked to promote African cultures. Since the 1960s, Africa, which
had been previously neglected by UNESCO, became the “new frontier” of the UNESCO
cultural programs. This action was particularly boosted by the African people. At UNESCO
General Conference in 1960, representatives of African countries insisted on the importance to
develop African studies in Africa. The Malian intellectual, Amadou Hampâté Bâ, who
represented Mali at UNESCO General Conference in 1960, urged UNESCO to “save from
destruction a huge oral heritage, which is now stored only in memory of mortal human
beings”. He noted that “safeguarding oral traditions of African countries [is] an urgent need”
(11 C/PRG/SR.6 (prov.), p. 4). From 1962 to 1970, A. H. Bâ, representative of Mali in
UNESCO’s Executive Council, played a leading role towards preservation of African cultures.
So, in the 1960s, UNESCO started to collect oral African traditions and to transcribe
oral African languages. A. H. Bâ actively contributed to the elaboration of a unified system
to transcribe oral African languages. Grammars and dictionaries were set up; historical and
cultural tales were transcribed, such as the initiatory Peul tale Kaïdara, published in 1968
(Bâ, 1968). In 1972, UNESCO launched a “Decennial Plan for studying oral tradition and
promoting African languages”. Besides, the “Ahmed Baba Institute” (Cedrab), founded in
1970 in Timbuktu by the government of Mali with collaboration of UNESCO started to
collect old manuscripts and to restore them. There are hundreds thousands manuscripts in
the region, some of them dating back to the 13th century. They are of the outmost importance
in shaping a new look on African history. These manuscripts refute the myth of absence of
historical African written sources (Djian, août 2004).
Such devotion of UNESCO to Africa was influenced by Pan-Africanism. The “World
Festival of Black Arts”, organized in Dakar in 1966 at the initiative of Leopold Sedar Senghor,
with the help of UNESCO, fully illustrated it. This festival aimed to introduce Africa “as a
producer of civilization” by “people at large in the whole world” (7 (96) A 066 (663) « 66 »,
II). In the 1970s, the UNESCO Courier intensively promoted African cultural heritage (Ngugi,
January 1971 :25; Courrier de l’Unesco, May 1977; Juillet 1977, « Freiner l’avance des
déserts »; Novembre 1977: « L’Afrique australe et le racisme »; Décembre 1977: « L’essor de
la cité arabe il y a 1000 ans »; août-septembre 1977: « L’empreinte de l’Afrique »). In 1979 for
the first time this magazine dedicated a whole issue to this continent (août-septembre 1977:
« L’empreinte de l’Afrique »). In 1970, representatives of African countries at UNESCO
complained that during the colonial period many African works of art, together with African
historical and archaeological pieces were relocated to European countries and remained there.
They asked for these objects to be returned to Africa. They demanded “restitution of the
artistic and cultural treasures which were removed from their countries before independence”
(Unesco, Conférence intergouvernementale…, 1970: 31). This claim was supported by the
UNESCO’s DG from 1974, Amadou Mahtar M’Bow. In 1978, the latter launched an official
demand: “The men and women of these countries have the right to recover these cultural
assets which are part of their being. […] These men and women who have been deprived of
their cultural heritage therefore ask for the return of at least the art treasures which best
represent their culture, which they feel are the most vital and whose absence causes them the
greatest anguish. This is a legitimate claim; and UNESCO, whose Constitution makes it
responsible for the preservation and protection of the universal heritage of works of art and
monuments of historic or scientific interest, is actively encouraging all that needs to be done to
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7
meet it” . It led to the creation in 1978 of the “Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the
Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit
Appropriation”. But this demand came up against the firm opposition of Western countries.
The US strongly criticized the stand taken by M’Bow on this issue. The North-South divide
appeared to be clearer and clearer within UNESCO.
In spite of these political tensions, from 1965 to 1986 UNESCO supervised a
long-drawn-out enterprise: the writing of a General History of Africa. This project was
launched at the initiation of many African countries and particularly of the Organisation of
African Unity (created in 1963). Among the writers of this book, African historians
constituted the majority: they represented 2/3 of the members of the international
scientific committee in charge of the writing. Joseph Ki Zerbo, a Burkinabe historian,
played a leading role in this project. The important participation of African intellectuals in
the writing of this book contrasted with the unbalance which characterized the previous
historiography project led by UNESCO, the History of Mankind (published in 1968),
mainly written by Western intellectuals.
The General History of Africa, published in 1981, proved to be an innovative
work: it presented itself as the first attempt to elaborate a unified African point of view on
Africa as a whole (Collectif, Histoire de l’Afrique, 1981; M’Bow, vol. 1, p. 12, 14, 9-10,
15). The Pan-African inspiration of the project is notable8. The text is influenced by the
“New African History” trend: it aimed to reassert the value of pre-colonial times, viewed
as a sort of golden era. Cheikh Anta Diop, one of the leaders of this historiography trend,
used African sources (mainly archaeological sources) in order to outline both wealth and
influence of the pre-colonial African empires, contrary to the conclusions of the traditional
colonial history. In the foreword, M’Bow wrote that the book intended to present a
“faithful reflection of the way in which African authors see their own culture” and
emphasized that the project was motivated by “the wish to see African history from within
the inside” (M’Bow vol. 1: 9-10, 15). This Pan-Africanism conception blended with a
universalist perspective, since in this book, the history of Africa is also conceived as “a
cultural heritage which belongs to humanity as a whole” (Ogot, vol. 2: 18).
From the 1970s on, UNESCO has tried to promote not only traditional African
cultures, but also contemporary ones. The “International Fund for the Promotion of
Culture” subsidized many cultural projects by African artists and intellectuals. But many
of these projects met encountered problems during their progress (CLT/CIC/FIPC/12: OP
44, 1984).
In 1975 UNESCO organized in Accra (Ghana) an “Intergovernmental Conference
on Cultural Policies in Africa” (“Africacult”). In 1991 UNESCO launched the program
AFRICOM, which encouraged the development of museums in Africa. From the 1990s
on, UNESCO has particularly promoted history and memory of slavery, e.g. the “Slave
Route Project”. The scientific committee of this project gathered scholars and teachers
from all over the world. They organized symposia, conferences, training sessions, and
published books. However, this project, scattered in numerous limited actions, registered
7
8
Unesco, “Cultural Property: its Illicit Trafficking and Restitution. For the Return of an Irreplaceable
Cultural Heritage to those who Created It. A plea from M. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, UNESCO
Director-General, 7 June 1978”
(http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/38701/12320174515speech_mbow_return_en.pdf/speech_m
bow_return_en.pdf)
In the volume about XX Century, section VII is titled : « L’Afrique indépendante dans les affaires
mondiales ».
84
unequal and often inconsistent results, which recently led UNESCO to undertake an internal
audit of it. Jean Michel Deveau, vice-president of this committee, was disappointed by the
limited impact of this project, and expressed his regrets that “UNESCO’s decision to declare
2004 international year to commemorate the struggle against slavery and its abolition
obtained very few echos” (Deveau, N° 188, 2006/2:259-262).
In 2006, UNESCO launched a project titled the “African Liberation Heritage”. It
aimed to document and preserve the memory of the liberation movements, through
archival documentation, oral historical research and the identification and protection of
heritage sites related to the struggles for independence. It focused on Angola,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, countries in
which the liberation struggles were particularly extensive and harsh.
So, from the 1960 on, UNESCO’s efforts to protect and promote cultural heritage
and cultural diversity have been intense (especially concerning African cultures); though
political opposition from the US prevented UNESCO to carry out NWICO project so that
the North and the South would be better balanced in terms of access to (and creation of)
culture, such efforts proved useful.
III. UNESCO’s Normative Action
III.1. From Tangible to Intangible Heritage
In its efforts to promote cultures and to protect cultural borders, UNESCO also put
the emphasis on normative action.
Cultural borders are often areas of cultural wealth but also of conflicts, sometimes
of armed conflicts. That’s why UNESCO set up as early as 1954 the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It proved however
helpless to prevent destruction of cultural heritage in the numerous armed conflicts that
occurred from this time on, like destruction of Vietnamese and Cambodian cultural
heritage by the US during the Vietnam War.
In 1970, UNESCO adopted the “Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property”
(1970). Two years later, in 1972, the “Convention concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972” introduced the idea of cultural and natural heritage.
In 1982, at the UNESCO “World Conference on Cultural Policies” (“Mondiacult”) held in
Mexico, the notion of “intangible heritage” was introduced. It was then officially
recognized in 1992 with the creation of the notion of “cultural landscape” by the World
Heritage Committee. It resulted from taking into consideration the folklores and living
cultures, and the efforts of Japanese representatives to UNESCO (supported by other
countries, notably African countries) to legitimate a more open conception of cultural
heritage, including not only the “monumental” heritage but also the “living” heritage
(Bortolotto, 2007). The notion of “cultural landscape” intended to separate from the only
known approach, i.e. the “monumental” approach. A “cultural landscape” was conceived
as combined works of nature and humankind, expressing a long and intimate relationship
between peoples and their natural environment. The World Heritage Committee aimed to
balance the geographical repartition of World Heritage sites. The World Heritage list
indeed included at that time mainly sites situated in Europe, and Africa was tremendously
under-represented. The creation of such notion of “Cultural Landscape” appeared to be
best suited to the African background, since, in Africa, both nature and culture are
intimately related (Cf. Africa Revisited, 1998; Cousin & Martineau, 2009/1-2:342-343).
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In 1995, UNESCO elaborated, with the help of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (Unidroit) the “UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects”. It intended to fight International trafficking of cultural
property. In 2001, the “Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage”
was adopted, followed in 2003 by the “Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage”. The latter was particularly created in reference to Africa. “Intangible
Cultural Heritage” was defined as “the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge,
skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated
therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of
their cultural heritage”. This intangible cultural heritage was meant to be “transmitted
from generation to generation” and at the same time “constantly recreated by communities
and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their
history”. It was considered as “provid[ing] them with a sense of identity and continuity,
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity”9. The Convention on
Intangible Cultural Heritage, which came into force in 2006, led to the creation of a
“Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage” and a “List of Intangible
Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding”. An “Intergovernmental Committee for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage” and a “Fund for the Safeguarding of the
Intangible Cultural Heritage” were also established. As Susan Keitumetse observed, “this
is a commendable step by UNESCO, given that the 1972 UNESCO Convention has for
more than 30 years focused specifically on the tangible aspects of cultural heritage” (Cf.
Keitumetse, vol. 61, No. 184, 2006: 166-171). Recognition of intangible heritage favoured
a better consideration of African cultural heritage.
Nowadays 52 States have ratified this convention. But the results are still
minimum and even more, possibly negative. As Susan Keitumetse reviewed, focused on
using the intangible heritage in a Tlokweng village, an African community in Botswana,
“safeguarding elements of intangible heritage by creating inventories and representative
lists can reduce the value of the cultural capital together with the social capital upon which
the heritage exists by making some elements of intangible heritage ubiquitous, in the
process lessening their existence and use values and thus disrupting the socio-cultural
contexts within which these elements exist”10.
Because of the mercantile issues that it can raise the normative action of UNESCO
within cultural heritage has also other negative consequences. Since the 1960s, UNESCO
promoted “cultural tourism”, as a way of safeguarding cultural heritage and of bringing money
to less developed countries (SESSA, 1967; Cousin & Martineau, 2007:337-364 ; Cousin,
2008: 41-56). This conception has evolved since then, but it remains centred on the idea that
tourism is an apolitical phenomenon, which brings cultural exchange and economic profit.
Yet, the benefits for the populations are discussed in particular by economists. Moreover,
many ethnographical investigations conducted in Europe, Africa or Asia have proven that
cultural tourism raises both political issues and power struggles (Caire & LE MASNE, 2007 in
BATAILLOU & SHEOU (dir.), p. 31-57; Cousin, Martineau, article mentioned).
The notion of “world cultural heritage” was diverted from its initial address. It
now appears more like a “touristic tool”, serving political and economical interests. This
can wield bad effects on cultures. For example, S. Cousin and J.-L. Martineau analyzed
the “instrumentalization” of customs, traditions, culture and heritage. They disapprove of
the “transformation of world heritage into tourism”. In their study case about Osun
9
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, article 2.
S Keitumetse, article mentioned.
10
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Osogbo “sacred grove” (sacred forest along the banks of the Oshun River just outside the
city of Osogbo, Osun State, Nigeria, inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in
2005), they underline the importance of lobbying actions, led along political and
economical issues. The political target was to “give to the new capital of Osun State a
historical anchorage, which it lacked of, against the city of Ife-Ife, well anchored in
history”. The main political objective was “to allow Osobgo to move from the place of
secondary town to the rank of capital of state”. Inclusion of Osun Osogbo sacred grove in
UNESCO’s World Heritage List is “the result of almost 15 years of steps taken by Osun
State to construct for itself a historical and cultural legitimacy”. Through nomination on
World Heritage, UNESCO appears as a legitimization body. The problem is that through
this system, the culture can be manipulated and used as a political or economical
instrument (Cousin & Martineau, 2007: 351-358).
Many other shortcomings prevent UNESCO’s normative action from being
successful: only a very small number of state ratified certain UNESCO’s conventions. For
example, only 11 States have so far ratified Unidroit Convention. And in spite of the
creation in 1997 of the Red List of African Archaeological Cultural Objects at Risk,
aiming to stop the looting of African archaeological objects, trafficking in cultural
property continues and brings loss (often irreparable) of cultural heritage of African
countries.
More generally, as Philippe Baqué, Jean-Michel Dijan and Yves Courrier observe,
most of UNESCO’s conventions and instruments are of a “very poor efficiency”. Most of
UNESCO’s normative instruments remain just dead letters, because they are not binding
agreements (Baqué, Octobre 2006; Courrier, p. 54; Dijan, article mentioned).
With reference to the Sub-Saharan Africa, it is still clearly under-represented on
the World Heritage List (less than 10%), in spite of the creation in 2006 of the “African
World Heritage Fund”, which aims to help African States to increase the number of their
sites nominated on the “World Heritage List”.
Besides, UNESCO’s efforts to promote African cultural heritage were often
carried out by Western people, which often narrowed to protecting ancient, traditional
forms of culture. And generally, the norms generated by Word Heritage List are set out by
Western people, who therefore imprint their conceptions and reading grids to African
cultures. This fact can contribute to maintaining the African culture in a subordinate
position by comparison to the Western culture, and to materializing the African cultures
with stiff, rigid, artificial cultural borders, rather than to encourage their vitality.
III.2. The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions (2005)
The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions (2005) was signed at UNESCO in October 2005, and entered into force in
March 2007; it aroused big hopes. This convention was the result of many steps. The
boost came mainly from France and Canada (Musitelli, n°62, Summer 2006). The
UNESCO’s conference on cultural policies for development, held in March 1998 in
Stockholm, concluded that the economical globalization damaged local cultures and
traditions. Then in November 2001, the UNESCO’s General Conference unanimously
adopted the “Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity” (at that time, the US had not
yet rejoined UNESCO). The declaration intended to take a stand against the risk of
cultural uniformization caused by globalization.
Both France and Canada employed different diplomatic means to convince many
countries of the need to protect cultural diversity; their action was supported by advocacy
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groups such as the “National Coalitions for Cultural Diversity”, and by international
cultural organizations, such as the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF),
and the International Network for Cultural Diversity (RIDC). The OIF played a pioneer
role by adopting, in June 2001 in Cotonou, a “Declaration of Ministers of Culture on
Cultural Diversity”, which influenced UNESCO and directly inspired UNESCO’s
declaration. Most of all, France dedicated itself to convincing the European Union. In
August 2003, the European Commission was admitted to negotiate within UNESCO, in its
own name, matters of its competency. The European Commission had a decisive influence
on UNESCO, because its (then) 25 Members voted the same way, in October 2005, when
the General Conference finally adopted the “Convention on the Protection and Promotion
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions”. This adoption was almost unanimous. Only two
Member States voted against it: the US and Israel.
This text considers cultural diversity as “the common heritage of humanity”, “as
necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature”. It recognizes the diversity of
cultural expressions and cultural traditions as essential to the exchange of ideas and values
among these cultures. It underlines the importance of creativity and interaction among
different cultures. It sees cultural diversity as a “living, renewable and constantly changing
treasure of humanity” (UNESCO, série Diversité culturelle, 2003:3). It intends to oppose
the cultural homogenization that globalization incites. For that purpose, the convention
tries to set out rules and principles concerning the world cultural diversity. It was the first
time that a consensus was met by international community within this field. This text
recognizes both the role and the legitimacy of public policies in promoting cultural
diversity. It outlines the importance of international cooperation in order to protect
minorities or vulnerable cultures. It tries to fill in a loophole and to articulate the
numerous normative tools already existing on the subject, and generally not enforced
(Cassen, Septembre 2003).
An important point is that this convention transforms the French notion of
“cultural exception” into the universal notion of “cultural diversity”. According to Jean
Musitelli (who contributed to the adoption process of this text), this evolution constitutes a
“Copernican revolution” (Musitelli, n°62, Summer 2006). Besides, this convention is
more ambitious than the former ones of UNESCO: it tries to give a juridical status to
culture and to oppose the domination of the WTO, which aims to liberalize cultural goods
and services. Its negotiation and subsequent adoption at UNESCO (and not at the WTO,
as the US wanted) show an effort to give competencies back to UNESCO, competencies
which the WTO was progressively taking (Cf. Germann, 2004:325-354).
Yet many factors are jeopardizing the efficiency of this convention. Its main
weakness is that is does not call the WTO guidelines into question. As the WTO, the
UNESCO convention states that cultural goods and services are of economic nature:
UNESCO does not reject the WTO’s mercantile conception of culture. On the contrary,
article 20 subordinates the UNESCO’ convention to the WTO rules. It is the result of
pressures coming from the US. Moreover, in case of infraction against the convention,
there is no sanction provided (Mattelart, octobre 2005). The power of the convention is
therefore very limited, mainly symbolic. This convention does not appear to be as robust
as the WTO agreements that support global trade in mass media and information.
With regards to the ways and means of promoting cultural diversity, UNESCO is
now at a crossroads. Two opposite conceptions about globalization and liberalization
coexist within it. On the one hand, many UNESCO representatives or UNESCO partners
advocate that the institution should orient its cultural politics along the lines of economic
liberalism. For example, Prof. Patrice Meyer Bisch, representative of UNESCO Chair on
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Human Rights and Democracy, recommends “refocusing UNESCO on transnational
sovereignty”, i.e. to give more room to NGOs, private actors, transnational firms,
foundations, associations. According to him, it is necessary “to reform [UNESCO] toward
more liberalism”. “After having reached the economic field, […] liberalism can apply to
cultural field”. He thinks that neither the States nor UNESCO “have the necessary abilities
to represent cultures”. He disagrees with the idea of UNESCO strongly ruling in cultural
matters: in his opinion this would restrict cultural freedom. According to him, UNESCO
shouldn’t impose rules, but only “favour synergy between civil, private, public cultural
actors” (Meyer-Bisch, N° 170, 2001/4: 673-676). On the other hand, UNESCO denounced
some negative consequences of liberalization. Along this line, UNESCO representatives
participated in the “World Social Forum” (WSF) in 2001 in Porto Alegre and in the
following sessions of WSF. They were associated to round tables and, on these occasions,
dwelled on the necessity that globalization should respect human rights and cultural
diversity (Solinís, n° 182, 2004/4: 707-708; Cf. Milani, Arturi, Solinís (ed), 2003). So, at
present, UNESCO must clarify its position towards liberal globalization.
*
For more than 50 years, UNESCO has been questioning the delimitations and the
reality of cultural borders. The East-West Major Project (1957-1966) illustrates the
UNESCO’s initial universalist conception and its determination to encourage cultural
unity. It reveals a progressive turn around in UNESCO’s cultural politics, which led
UNESCO to develop a more synthetic conception, allying promotion of cultural unity and
cultural diversity at a time. Analyzing the trouble that the East-West project encountered
during its achievement also illustrates the extreme difficulty to determine borders between
cultures: neither large delimitations, as established by Fernand Braudel in Grammaire des
civilisations (Braudel, 1987), nor finer delimitations, based for example on languages
(Warnier, 1999: 8-9), are able to reflect the extraordinary complex and shifting character
of the mosaic of cultures.
Since the 1960s, UNESCO has tried hard to safeguard the world cultural heritage,
notably in Africa, where it appeared to be endangered, and undergoing extinction. The
creation of the World Heritage List in 1972 and the attempt to set up a “New World
Information and Communication Order” in 1980 were important steps. Several
Conventions were adopted. The Convention on Cultural Diversity (2005) is particularly
important, because it together emphasizes the diversity of the different cultures and
affirms the universalist idea of all cultures belonging to a common cultural ground. It
therefore refutes Samuel Huntington’s conception of an inevitable clash of civilizations:
the UNESCO’s convention goes against the idea that cultural borders would be factors of
destabilization and conflict (Huntington, 1996). It outlines the importance of cultural
variety and intercultural dialog. It constitutes an attempt of synthesis between
universalism and multiculturalism.
Yet UNESCO’s actions remain too scattered, and the efficiency of the UNESCO’s
conventions is too limited, because these conventions are not binding agreements.
Besides, the UNESCO’s instruments have also pernicious effects: they are often used as
instruments for political or economic targets. They are in many cases diverted for the
profit of private actors, like corporations, which benefit from the transformation of culture
in commercial (for example touristic) products.
Now, it seems that the important challenge to be taken up by UNESCO is to give
every people the social-economical conditions to be able to discover cultures and to be
part in creating them. Liberalizing culture, i.e. handling culture as trade (as WTO does) is
89
opposed to this scope, because liberalization increases social inequality and therefore
deepens the gap between people in the access to culture. This “cultural gap” is now
deepening, both between the North and the South and within each country. So UNESCO
should not only promote the idea of “cultural diversity” and celebrate “cultural borders”
and “intercultural dialog”, but above all clearly distance itself from the idea of liberalizing
culture and from WTO politics. UNESCO should take more concrete steps to allow every
people to partake in cultural life.
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The Limits of Europeanness. Can Europeanness Stand Alone as the Only
Guiding Criterion for Deciding Turkey’s EU Membership?
Nicolae PĂUN, Georgiana CICEO
Abstract: The gradual advance of the European integration process has generated vivid
discussions on what defines the Europeanness and what its main features are. They were meant to
bring useful insights to the wider ongoing debates with regard to who is entitled to embark in this
process or what defines in a European context a certain type of political action. They attempted to
move beyond the sheer political and economic considerations and to go to the core of the whole
effort of building a European Union based on the intertwined processes of integration and
enlargement. As such, they were closely entangled with those concerning the core values that
define a European identity. Due to the limits imposed on this article we intend to circumscribe the
analysis to discussing Europeanness against the background of the last and possible future round
of enlargement in the direction of Turkey.
Keywords: European Union, Europeanness, European identity, Turkey
After years of permissive consensus that helped bringing the European unification
project farther and farther in economic and political terms, the question of what the
cultural dimension of the whole European political project really is has come to attract a
lot of interest. Although economic prosperity and political stability were put on the
forefront by the founding fathers of the EU, over the years it became clear that a lack of
agreement on common cultural values results in a reduced support for further European
integration and reinforces a certain reluctance vis-à-vis the transfer of allegiances to
central European institutions (Zetterholm, 1994:79-80) deepening an already sensitive
issue on the agenda of European integration namely that of the democratic legitimacy of
the whole project. It is now more than ever considered that the common currency needs to
be accompanied by a ‘corresponding “cultural currency” that could help the European
nations and their citizens to identify culturally’ in the already existent economic and
political area, so that they can have an ‘orientation’ in the ‘growing Europeanization of
their world’ (Rüsen, 2000:76). In fact, the main motivation behind any concerted effort to
bring cultural unification in line with the already advanced economic and political
unification has always been connected with the necessity of instilling a European
consciousness or a European identity into European people’s minds. As identities are
cultural constructions, this was regarded as an absolutely necessary precondition for
bringing about the goal of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe as enshrined
in the Treaty of Maastricht and reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, the
existence of a European identity was supposed to increase the legitimacy of the European
Union as a polity and help binding together its citizens.
But from its onset, the vertical deepening of the European integration went hand
in hand with the horizontal process of enlargement which brought additional problems to
the already difficult task of building a common European identity. The present article
attempts to explore to what extent the last rounds of European enlargement have put to a
test the very idea of European identity and if in view of forthcoming rounds of
enlargement, particularly that of Turkey, the concept can support further stretching or it
has already reached its limits. Proceeding from the European motto of unity in diversity
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we intend to ask how much diversity the European Union can still bear without diluting its
own rationale. In doing so, we start by discussing the main features of the European
identity as they came to be defined over the years. Thereafter we come to discuss how the
enlargement to the East was approached from the perspective of the post-modern
discussions on the European identity. We then take the discussion a step further in order to
evaluate how far the Europeanness can serve as a single guiding principle for making a
decision on the extremely divisive issue of Turkey’s application for membership into the
European Union. While identity matters in terms of strengthening the whole European
construction, the European Union cannot lose sight of its far-reaching goals especially in
the realm of foreign and security policy.
What shapes Europeanness?
Over the years wide areas of convergence have been developed between a
European and a European Union identity. Despite the fact that the EU identity cannot
surpass the European identity it is obvious that the former contributed greatly to the
reinforcement of the latter by establishing clear criteria for what it means to be regarded as
European. A number of norms with deep roots in the common cultural heritage of ancient
Greece, Christianity and Europe of Enlightment, connected in a way or another with the
ideal of liberal democracy and embedded in the domestic structures of the member states
came to define European identity. They represent the main features of European
secularism and were embodied as such in the Copenhagen criteria and Article 2 of the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union: the respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of the persons belonging to minorities. This set of values came to be utilized as a
compatibility test for all those aiming to acquire membership status as from the very
beginning the European Community/Union was not conceived as a construction with a
fixed geometry. According to Article 49, Title VI of the Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the European Union, ‘any European State which respects the values referred to
in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the
Union’. The underlying understanding would be that only states belonging to the
European continent and sharing the same set of norms and values may be taken into
consideration. European Union’s faithfulness to these values reinforced its image as a
normative power according to a formula put forward by Jan Manners.
The belonging to a common set of values does not mean in any way however that
the European Union is trying to deprive its members from their cultural diversity. On the
contrary, the Union takes pride in being founded on the multicultural idea of ‘unity in
diversity’. Despite the inherent tensions contained in this idea such as those existing
between the European and national identity it is by now widely agreed upon that these
extremes do not mutually rule out each other as individuals are at the same time members
of different social groups and hold multiple identities. According to Thomas Risse, the
relation between European and national identities resemble the image of a ‘marble cake’
as various components of an individual’s identity cannot be neatly separated on different
levels (Risse, 2005:296). This relationship is further complicated by the fact that the
European identity has always been a work in progress. As a consequence, European
identity came to signify different things to different people at different points in time. One
possible explanation resides in the very ‘cultural and social topography’ of Europe, which
is ‘fragmented, lacking clear unifying principles and shared experiences around which
people could identify’ (Peter Van Ham, 2001:59). Under these circumstances the
European identity can be defined in a wide variety of keys between an exclusivist and an
94
inclusivist one (Hooghe and Marks, 2004:415-420). In an exclusivist perspective
European identity could only appear slowly through the formation of shared memories and
traditions, myths and symbols similar to those that helped the formation of nation states
(Smith, 1995:139-140). This would require a high degree of compatibility between
popular traditions, values, symbols and experiences of those belonging to this project the
more difficult to be reached with every new increase in the number of members. At the
other end of this continuum we find those who interpret the European identity in an
inclusivist manner. For them, the only way to develop a European identity ‘might well be
to turn our backs to European history and develop a community that is oriented toward the
future’ (Van Ham, 2001:70). This post-national construction of a European identity will
also require a ‘new sense of belonging’, based not on shared memories, but on
‘sedimented experiences, cultural forms which are associated however loosely with a
place called Europe’ (Van Ham, 2001:72). This interpretation posits also that only by
means of a ‘continuous redefinition of itself’ not against the other (See for instance
Neumann, 1996:139-174; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 8), but through relationships
with others (Van Ham, 2001:72; Weiler, 2009:256-257) Europe can preserve ‘its
celebrated diversity, its openness and inclusiveness’ (Van Ham, 2001:72).
The present essay will try to evaluate based on the above-mentioned
considerations how the latest round of enlargement influenced the ongoing discussions on
European identity and to what extent this extensive focus on identity is going to affect any
decisions on Turkey’s candidature for membership in the European Union. In doing so we
proceed from the assumption that the European identity in-the-making is not going to
supersede national identities and that although the others matter in terms of forging an
identity they can bring useful inputs as long they share the members’ fundamental values.
The Europeanness and the accession of the Central and Eastern European states
After the Cold War years when a number of statements of policy-makers from
the member states governments or European institutions while deploring the division of
the continent and the absence of Central and Eastern European states from the European
project, asserted that, without them, the project remain incomplete, a sense of moral
responsibility seemed to prevail in the highly emotional atmosphere of the beginning of
the ’90s, only to be reinforced in the years to come. This was best expressed by Joshka
Fischer when saying that enlargement is not just a supreme national interest of
Germany, but a moral obligation due to the fact that ‘following the collapse of Soviet
Union the EU had to open to the East otherwise the very idea of European integration
would have undermined itself and eventually self-destructed’ (Fischer, 2000). In the
face of the events of 1989, the European Community decided to assume a leading role in
relation to the CEE states. This idea was best expressed in the Declaration of the
European Council held in Strasbourg in December 1989: ‘the Community remains the
foundation of a new European architecture’. The idea was enthusiastically greeted by
the CEE states who insisted on the idea of their ‘return to Europe’ which from a
rationalist perspective may sound as a hollow construction for advancing the cause of
EU membership, but from a socio-constructivist perspective involved a natural right to
accession based on moral arguments in favor of the enlargement. However, the solutions
concerning how to handle the relations with the CEE countries evolved only gradually
from the beginning of ’90s to the end of the century – from avoiding the issue of
enlargement to increasingly accepting it on the price of its own embarking on a difficult
process of internal reform. By then the most outstanding problems of the early ‘90s had
95
been settled: the reunification of Germany, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and
the fate of the financial deal proposed by Jacques Delors.
The decision on Eastern enlargement was favored by the gradual development of
idea of shared values understood not only as collective identity constructions about
Europe, but at the same time as common cultural traditions and historical experiences,
common development of distinct Western constitutional and political principles, a definite
sense about what constitutes Europe’s ‘others’ that started to forge their way and to shape
the discussion on Eastern enlargement. This shared values paved the way to the criteria
laid down at Copenhagen seen as a precondition for embarking on the process of
accession, whereas the acquis came to provide the normative basis for this latest round of
enlargement. The criteria bear the imprint of the shared foundation of the European
culture and Western Christianity. They proceed from the assumption that liberal human
rights are the fundamental values of this community. In the domestic sphere they are
translated in a social and political order based on social pluralism, the rule of law,
democratic political participation and representation as well as private property and a
market based economy (Ciceo, 2005:97-8).
European Union proved to be a powerful magnet shaping the aspirations of
candidate countries (Wallace, 2000:151). As far as the CEE states were concerned the
enlargement set in motion a very complex and profound set of adjustment processes with
the aim of socializing applicant countries into the dominant mores and values of the EU
thus enabling them to achieve ’democracy by convergence’. In order to accurately
evaluate these processes EU has developed a policy of democratic conditionality
(Pridham, 2002:953-973). This conditionality tool set hurdles in the accession process of
the CEE countries. The underlying idea would be to induce them to comply with specific
standards. These hurdles originate in the Copenhagen criteria that were further elaborated
on in the European Commission’s avis of 1997 and from 1998 in the annual regular
reports on candidate countries. They were also tied with EU programs of financial
assistance, the accession partnerships, twinning for the secondment of pre-accession
advisers from the Member States’ civil services to the applicant countries1 in return for the
compliance with the imposed standards. As gaining international approval is an important
way of legitimizing political choices in the post-communist context, the conditionality tool
proved to be a very powerful one in determining the CEE states to embrace the European
values. Aware of this reality, EU has used this policy of democratic conditionality in
different ways: timing the accession process (starting of negotiations, determining the date
of full accession), ranking the applicant’s overall progress, benchmarking in specific
policy areas, providing examples of best practice, assessing the applicant’s administrative
capacity and institutional ability to implement and enforce the acquis communautaire
(Grabbe, 2002:1028-9).
Accession to the EU by new members has generally been also part of a broader
process of Europeanization2 that went hand in hand with the process of domestic
1
2
Their task was to help the CEE countries in importing know-how on the implementation of the
acquis to national and local administrations and the whole pre-accession strategy.
By Europeanization it was usually understood a two-way interaction between the ‘national’ and
the ‘European’ level, with Member States assuming the role of both contributors and products
of European integration (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004:621). The Europeanization alters
the process of domestic politics within individual countries leading to a convergence of politics
of member states. This Europeanization – it is conventionally assumed - is especially
pronounced in countries that are already member states of the European Union. However, a
96
transformation of their communist regimes and rigid command economies in democratic
pluralistic regimes with market economies. As the idea of enlargement gained momentum
the two processes - the regime transformation and advancing towards full-EU membership
– became increasingly not just simply parallel, but deeply interconnected. They came to
be so intricately linked that they depended on each other and even more they fed each
other (Matli and Plümper, 2004:307-8). The reform process of the Central and Eastern
European countries has taken thus a particular form due to the foreign policy decision they
made in favor of accession to the EU and the necessity to meet the Copenhagen criteria.
They had anything else to do but to align themselves to the standards imposed on them by
the European Union. What it remained very debatable from this perspective was the extent
to which the EU was able to impact on the reform of the CEE states. It is already
commonly agreed that its effectiveness depended on the domestic political costs of
compliance and on governmental cost-benefit calculations (Schimmelfennig, Engert and
Knobel, 2003:495-6). This raised fears that the imperfect shape of the institutions created
in the CEE states would add to the already significant democratic deficit of the EU.
However, it was not only the preparedness of the candidate countries that
mattered for the enlargement. Also the absorption or extension capacity of the EU turned
to be an essential precondition for this process, as EU became increasingly aware that it
lacks the institutional infrastructure for accommodating the CEE countries (Voruba,
2003:45). It was obvious from the very beginning that the reforms would have to include
the whole European construction – from institutions to finance, agricultural policy and
structural funds. CEE states played thus even before their full accession a central role in
any political calculations on the future shape of the Union. They were in the background
of all the difficult negotiations that took place on the occasion of the Intergovernmental
Conferences from Amsterdam (1997) and Nizza (2000), of any bargain on Agenda 2000
and of the discussions on the future Constitution of the European Union.
In sum, the latest rounds of enlargement were primarily centered on the
constitutive values of the European political order, reflecting a common identity and
manifested as such in the Copenhagen criteria. In comparison with the previous rounds of
enlargement when the political and economic factors played key roles in the decision
making process, this time the driving forces were generated by the moral responsibility of
bringing the other Europe within a comprehensive European order and the necessity of
adapting the countries of the region to the core values of the European Union3 given their
long exposure to a set of values fundamentally different from the one accepted in Western
Europe. What is also important to be mentioned in this context is the fact that in the case
of the latest rounds of enlargement we speak about the accession of countries whose
belonging to Europe could not be denied but raised fears concerning a possible altering of
the core European values. Their admission triggered an inward looking search for defining
what is defining for those belonging to the European family, what differentiates them from
others. These searches were further intensified by the post-modern climate in which they
3
process of Europeanization takes place already when the candidate countries start to incorporate
the acquis into their own legislation (Pridham, 2002:953-5).
Frank Schimmelfennig (1999:1-11) wrote under these circumstances about a ‘double puzzle’ of
the Eastern Enlargement given the fact that neither a rationalist power-based analysis nor a
neoliberal interest-based study cannot explain how the countries of the European Union came to
embark themselves in a process whose costs exceeded by far its benefits and left socioconstructivism as the better equipped theoretical framework to explain this round of
enlargement.
97
took place. So, the admission into the European club of the CEE countries bore some
particular features that altered the previous pondering on enlargement and left durable
imprints for future discussions on this issue as it led to an enlargement fatigue and
resilient question marks concerning the absorption capacity of the European Union.
How much diversity without diluting unity? Can Turkey aspire to EU
membership?
Even after the latest rounds of enlargement, the European Union came to be
perceived as the ‘success story of an advanced idea with high fascinating potential, powers
of persuasion and export value’ (Gehler, 2005:344). Nowadays, however the most arduous
question is to what extent these attributes can be maintained in case of a possible Turkish
accession. As a matter of fact the outlook of Turkey’s membership to the European Union
has deeply divided Europeans and intensified the debates about Europe’s conception of its
own core values and identity. Many political scientists, historians and politicians alike
were prompted to claim ab initio that a country whose land mass is overwhelmingly in
Asia, which has a population of Muslim faith, and maintains a political culture marked by
a strong influence of the military on the political establishment is definitely not a
‘European’ country. For other Turkey is simply ‘too big, too poor, too Muslim’
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 March 2010).
At a closer look the arguments in favor and against Turkey’s accession can be
grouped in six main categories: geographic, demographic, political, economic, securityrelated and identity-related. Geography is played either in favor of or in opposition to
Turkey’s membership depending on the line of arguments that it is followed. The
geographic borders of Europe, especially to the East are subject to intense philosophical
and intellectual considerations. The issue is all the more sensitive because according to
this criteria it will be decided who belongs to Europe and deserves European Union
membership and who is not. Demographically, Turkey’s population stood at 72 million in
2009 with a growth rate of 1.3 percent per annum – down from 1.5 percent in 2005
(Babalı, 2009:35). Not even the staunchest supporters of Turkey’s accession did manage
to come up as yet with demographically-based arguments in favor of its membership due
to the fact that in the EU the population size determines political representation and voting
weight in the Council and Parliament. As demographers project an increase in the Turkish
population to 80-85 million over the next 20 years, whereas the population of Germany,
the actual most populous member state is expected to decrease to 80 million from 83
million today, it is to be expected that Turkey will come to be placed on an equal footing
with Germany. Politically, the main discussions are in connection with the state of
Turkish democracy and human rights which are perceived to lag behind the European
standards especially with regard to the protection of minority rights, the freedom of
expression, including the freedom of religion, the independence of the judiciary, the civilmilitary relations, the acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide and the occupation of
Northern Cyprus4. While the opponents of the enlargement point to the inadequate nature
of the reforms, the supporters emphasize the deepness of the transformation of the Turkish
society as a result of the reforms already undertaken after Turkey was recognized as a
4
EU foreign ministers suspended in December 2006 membership negotiations on eight out of the
35 negotiating chapters following the recommendation of the Commission to penalize Turkey
for a trade embargo on the Republic of Cyprus. Other chapters were blocked by either France or
Cyprus. Accordingly, only twelve of the 35 negotiation chapters have been opened until now
and only one was closed (on science and technology).
98
candidate state5 and warn against a dramatic slow-down of the reform process following the
spreading out of the perception that the application of Turkey will be indefinitely postponed
and the decreasing level of support for the reforms and for the European Union6. From an
economic perspective, Turkey has managed to fare outstandingly well. It is Europe’s sixth
and world’s 17th economy, it has tripled its GDP per capita in the last six years, reaching
10,368 in 2008, it has increased significantly its commercial exchanges with the European
Union, it managed to stay afloat the adverse effects of the global financial crisis and it
improved its strategic position as the key transit country and hub for Europe’s further energy
diversification (Babalı, 2009:34-5). Turkey is perceived by its supporters as a reliable
candidate in economic terms due to its ability to adopt the acquis communautaire as
demonstrated since it started the customs union with the European Union. At the same time,
due to the great economic disparities among different regions, Turkey raises fears for
necessitating substantial financial compensation for meeting the Western European levels of
regional development. They are compounded by the concern that Turkey cannot
successfully adapt to the Common Agricultural Policy and the social market economic
model. The security-related arguments have been during the Cold War the most conclusive
arguments in favor of Turkish belonging to Europe. They contributed to awarding Turkey
the long sought-after European legitimacy. The need for Turkey as a buffer against Soviet
expansion helped Turkey gain associate membership to the European Community in 1963
(Müftüler-Bac, 2000:29). The demise of the Iron Curtain eroded Turkey’s security position
in Europe and so the security-related arguments came to be increasingly replaced by
identity-related ones, although Turkey is the ‘leading non-member contributor to the ESDP
missions and operations from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Congo’ (Davutoğlu, 2009:13) and
started a ‘policy of constructive engagement in its neighborhood and beyond’ (Ibidem) that
opened new vistas and provided it with enhanced room of maneuver in international affairs.
However, in the context of the revival of the pondering on Europeanness there are the
identity-related arguments that appear to matter most nowadays.
In the post-Cold War period, European identity has become a focal point for
analyzing European politics. It fueled endeavors to determine what binds together the
Europeans and make them different from the others. With the fall of the Iron Curtain,
Europe’s others were not any longer the countries of Central and Eastern Europe exposed
for long time to authoritarian and undemocratic regimes. This search pointed to the
Islamic neighbors of Europe and the foreigners living in Europe perceived as outsiders in
terms of religion, ethnicity and culture. Turkey came to be directly affected by this postmodern transformation of European politics, especially if we take into consideration the
fact that the Turkish element represented a ‘dominant other’ in the history of European
states system’ (Neumann, 1999:39-41) due to the proximity of the Ottoman Empire and
the strength of its religious tradition that posed a constant threat to the European
civilization. Cultural differences and divergent social norms and attitudes make it easy to
label Turkey as non-European especially if the European identity is based on cultural
features. They involve among other things a common history and the sentiment of
5
6
As a result of this sweeping reforms one third of the Turkish constitution was re-written. The
reforms enacted human-rights legislation, abolished death penalty, improved women’s rights,
brought new safeguards against torture, reformed the prison system, curbed previous substantial
restrictions of freedom of expression, association and the media and reduced the power of
National Security Council as well as the influence of the military on the public life.
Nowadays only 42 percent of Turks still support EU membership down from 73 percent in 2004
(Leo Cendrowicz, 2009).
99
belonging to a community that shares the same values. As already mentioned, for Europe
these values have deep roots in Judaism and Christianism. Enriched by the Greek
philosophy, Roman law, Renaissance and Enlightment, they have put up the foundations for
concepts like human rights, rule of law, solidarity, pluralism or solidarity. Out of them grew
up the idea of secularization understood as separation of church and state and featured as a
unique European achievement. According to Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (Shakman Hurd,
2010:191-7) the whole identity-related discussions concerning the accession of Turkey are
in a way or another connected with the way the concept of secularism comes to be
interpreted. In an exclusivist reading Turkey as a ‘non-Christian-majority secular
democratic’ state cannot sit at the same table because it fails to anchor its secularism in the
same Judeo-Christian foundations and because its secularism is just a byproduct of a
political decision taken less than a century ago, having as such no deep roots into the mind
of the people. In an inclusivist reading Turkey is perceived according to a formula put
forward by Ole Wæver as being not necessarily ‘anti-European’ but more ‘less Europe’ and
could catch up by being exposed to a process of intense Europeanization. What necessarily
needs to be added to this observation is the fact that viewed from this angle the whole
dilemma about Turkey’s entry is compounded by the already mentioned lack of consensus
concerning the European identity. As a matter of fact we can speak in this case about a selffueling vicious circle because the lack of decision concerning the essentials of Europeanness
complicates the ability of the Europeans to come to terms with the application of Turkey and
the very application for membership of Turkey compounds the ability of the Europeans to
agree on the precise content of their Europeanness.
Parallel to Europe’s inward search for its own identity, Turkey underwent ‘its own
identity crisis, one that began in the 19-th century and still lingers’ (Müftüler-Bac, 2000:31).
Viewed through these lenses, Turkey appears as a ‘torn-country’ (Huntington, 1993:42),
meaning that Turkey is neither completely Western nor Eastern as it ‘does not share the
Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, but neither does it belong to the predominantly Arab
Islamic culture’ (Bozdaglioglu, 2003:68). However when it comes to shaping the new
country’s identity, apart from the traditionalists of the Far Right who would favor a
traditional, Islamist and Oriental course for their country, two sort of dominant discourses
tend to capture the discussions. It is not fair to define them in outright opposition as both
agree on an EU membership and on building a modern, secular and Western-oriented state
and both make ample references to the process of Europeanization. It is just that the
Eurosceptics, represented by the Turkish armed forces, high-level bureaucrats and some
representatives of the centre-right political parties, consider that pursuing modernization
along EU lines is discriminatory on cultural, economic and political grounds. They point in
the direction of the CEE countries that followed the very same path. Secondly, they fear that
if at the end of the Europeanization process does not lay a clear membership perspective, the
country might disintegrate. The pro-Europeans gathered around the centrist parties from
both left and right consider that Turkey should go on with the process of democratization,
not necessarily on EU lines and that it will be to the benefit of both Turkey and the EU if
Turkey is accepted in the European Union. The efforts for Europeanization of the Turkish
society began already in 1923 with the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey (Oguzlu,
2004:103-6). The interwar Western-oriented elites gathered around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
initiated a substantial reform process that led to the abolition of the Sultanate and the
Caliphate, replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin one and introduction of
European standards in education, health and public life. Nevertheless, the reform process did
not come to touch the essence of a century-old society. During the Cold War period
Turkey’s Europeanization process was conducted mostly on economic and security levels as
100
any questions concerning Turkish Europeanness were suppressed due to strategic
calculations and there was no pressure neither inside nor outside to cover more areas.
However, Turkey failed to recognize the post-modernist turn that carved its way in Europe
in the 1980s and grew deeper and deeper after the end of the Cold War.
Opponents to Turkish accession have come up with the privileged partnership
model as a substitute for full membership. In Germany, one can reckon with a widespread
support for this solution. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has repeatedly stated that it
favors the alternative of a privileged partnership (Merkel, 2010). By doing so she tries to
alleviate the fears of the German electorate and come across the demands of the German
Bundestag which exerts continuous pressure on the government for reevaluating the
accession from the perspective of the European identity even in the event that Turkey
would fulfill the Copenhagen criteria (Bundestag, 2004:2). After the presidency of
Jacques Chirac, who had been a vocal albeit lukewarm supporter of Ankara's ambitions,
France appears to have become increasingly skeptical on the issue of Turkish EU
membership. The incumbent French president Nicolas Sarkozy regards Turkey as being
among those countries that ‘have the vocation of building a special relationship with
Europe, have the vocation of being associated as closely as possible with Europe, but do
not have the vocation of becoming a full membership of the European Union’ (Sarkozy,
2009). The logic behind the privileged partnership formula tends to reinforce the thesis
according to which Turkey cannot be considered as part of the ‘broader European family
or civilization nexus, but as an important non-member with which relations primarily of
an economic nature need to be developed’ (Önis, 1999:135).
Needless to say that this proposal is strongly opposed by the Turkish leadership
(Tayyip Erdoğan, 2010) who claim that the rules cannot be changed as the game unfolds
and regard this proposal as a sheer proof of Western European populism (Today’s Zaman,
27 June 2009). For them the formula of a privileged partnership is nothing but a
euphemism for denying Turkey full membership. Overturning the agreed course and
fundamental nature of the negotiations further indicates the intention of giving Turkey a
second-class status that will obviously be unacceptable. Although deeply dissatisfied with
the prolonged accession process that lasted more than 50 years since the application for
associate membership to the European Economic Community and almost 5 years since the
beginning of the membership negotiations, Turkey insists that the European Union should
stick to the agreed rules: ‘Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the
basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States’ (Helsinki European
Council: Presidency Conclusions, 11 December 1999).
Turkey’s frustration is already widely acknowledged. The Report of the European
Security and Defense Assembly of the Western European Union (3 December 2009:8)
states that ‘Turks feel that the European Union has deliberately put the countries of the
former Soviet bloc before a long-standing western ally and NATO member’. However, the
consequences of continuously delaying a decision on Turkish accession are not
completely weighed upon by the European political establishment. This is rather adamant
about the open-ended character of the negotiation process that does not guarantee
beforehand any outcome of the negotiations and continue to come up with alternative
proposals as it was the case with the privileged partnership. Moreover, as the group of
distinguished European policymakers that have formed the Independent Commission on
Turkey already pointed out, they build upon the growing public resistance to further EU
enlargement and let the whole discussion revolve around the nowadays very sensitive
questions on European identity fueling as such a vicious circle in which they set the tone
to be followed by the public opinion in the political debates on Turkey’s potential
101
membership and then ground their decisions on the dominant beliefs of their electorate
(Independent Commission on Turkey, 2009:11). Under these circumstances it is extremely
problematical to move forward with Turkish integration when a clear majority of
Europeans obviously disapproves it. But it is also true that acting like this the politicians
tend to ignore important matters that normally will have to be addressed in connection to
the enlargement of the European Union towards Turkey. In other words ‘there is no point
in asking whether Turkey is really European to resolve the issue of Turkish membership’
(Kumm, 2005:323). There are some other questions that need to be raised.
One it will be concerning the benefits and the losses of a possible membership for
the European ambitions of becoming a global actor. As part of the strategy for achieving
this strategic goal, European Union will have to boost its influence in the Middle East.
Turkey can add value to Europe’s endeavors due to its strategic position and its mounting
relations with the countries of the Middle East as a result of a forward looking ‘policy of
constructive engagement in its neighborhood and beyond’ (Davutoğlu, 2009:13). Turkey
and the European Union can support each others’ efforts in the region: the EU by its
‘financial capacity and ability to transform partners through conditionality that Turkey
lacks’ and Turkey by its ‘geographic and cultural proximity’ (Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı,
2009:81). ‘A Turkey that can use its soft power resources effectively could help to remedy
the weakness of the EU’s influence’ in the Middle East and bring a conspicuous
contribution to constructing Europe as a global actor (Düzgit and Tocci, 2009:1). In a
world that turns out to be increasingly multipolar, it is to be expected that ‘with Turkey as
a member, the EU will be a far more effective global actor and will have more influence in
the entire area ranging from Europe to China’ (Bildt, 2009:26). A prolonged pondering on
Europeanness can make EU waste a golden opportunity to improve its global actorness
because it risks remaining without any ability to influence Turkey at a time when this is on
the way of becoming a regional power.
Then one has to address the question of the contribution Turkey, as a country with
a prevailing Muslim population, embarked on a profound process of transformation of its
own domestic policy system along European lines, could bring by the power of its own
example to persuade the Muslim communities both inside and outside Europe to embrace
the ideas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is obvious that Turkey’s
accession to the EU ‘adds a cultural angle to the debate’. Moreover, it will oblige the
European Union to draw a distinction line ‘between a Christian, geographically narrow
Europe and a broader, multicultural Europe of values’ (Anastasakis, 2005:79). As the
Independent Commission on Turkey already pointed out the perspective of beginning the
accession negotiations made Turkey to implement a number of comprehensive reforms up
until 2003, but the path of these reforms was considerably slowed down thereafter not last
because of the mixed messages with regard to the outcome of the negotiations. Turkey’s
interest in further pursuing its reform program might continue to diminish and
consequently its capacity of convincing other to follow its example.
Last but not least it is important to ask what message a possible turndown of
Turkey would convey to the Muslim population inside and outside the European Union. It
is to be expected that a rebuttal of Turkey will place persistent question marks on the
Europe’s ability and desire to generate a culture of dialogue, of integration, of support for
unity in diversity. This can further lead to alienating its Muslim population, increase their
Euroscepticism and weaken the cohesion in Europe.
One cannot reckon however with a total rebuttal of Turkey’s European Union
membership. Among the supporters of the Turkish membership we can count Sweden,
Spain and most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who had developed over
102
the time strong economic and political links with Turkey (Balcer and Zalewski, 2010:3944). With the victory of the European People’s Party in the 2009 elections for the
European Parliament, the perspective of Turkish membership appeared to have distanced
away. Nevertheless, even within this large European political family one may find voices
in favor of a Turkish membership in the European Union as for instance the president of
the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag (Tagesspiegel, 2010). The accession
of Turkey into the European Union will have to be decided by each of the existing
members. With a deeply embedded opposition to the admission of Turkey into the club it
is nowadays totally unrealistic to conceive a positive result. This will make necessary the
engaging in a political dialogue of all those concerned by such a decision as the European
construction was from the very beginning a political project driven forward by its own
elites. As far as both the European identity and the Turkish identity remain contested,
unfinished concepts, we consider that it will be misplaced to limit the entire discussion on
Turkey’s EU membership to matters related to its Europeanness. In the end, this very
factor of Europeanness especially if designed in a narrow manner can prove to be an
inadequate one when making strategic calculations such as those concerning the foreign
policy agenda of the European Union.
Conclusions
In the post-modern nowadays’ atmosphere, Europeanness tends to play an everincreasing role in the way in which the peoples of Europe evaluate the future shape of the
continent or come to offer their support for the European Union. However, the concept did
not manage to become sufficiently elaborated as to afford its transformation into an
analytical tool able to provide satisfactory answers to questions as to who deserves to be
brought in and who needs to be left out. Member countries need also to agree to the fact
that identity-related factors despite their high degree of sensitivity in the eyes of the public
opinion represent no official accession criterion and are open to biased assessments on
further enlargements. The narrower the understanding of identity, the lower are the
chances of accepting any new members into the club. Especially in the context of the
latest rounds of enlargement because of an extensive focus on identity with its still
indefinite contours, the discussion on Europeanness has become increasingly politicized
(Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009:11). In comparison to the Cold War period, when
economic and political considerations prevailed in any discussion concerning the
enlargement, nowadays the discussion is very much centered on identity-related issues.
In the case of the Central and Eastern European countries who find themselves
within the natural boundaries of Europe and whose history is tightly intertwined with that of
Western Europe it would have been impossible to deny them a European identity. This
would have meant also a departure from all those ideals it is supposed that the Europeans
put up with throughout the entire period of the Cold War. Despite deep concerns with regard
to their economic backwardness and deficiency of their democratic institutions the
underlying consensus was that these countries just like Greece, Spain and Portugal before
them need help for overcoming their past and establishing themselves as full-fledged
members of the European Union. As a consequence the Copenhagen criteria were
interpreted in a relaxed manner and the economic and political factors were played down in
all the deliberations on their enlargement. Their European vocation and the Western feelings
of responsibility for these countries appeared to have mattered most. The CEE countries
were however induced to comply with the European standards as they had to adopt the
entire acquis communautaire without having any power to influence it. Irrespective of their
diligence in adopting the European standards the accession of the CEE countries intensified
103
the debates on Europeanness and set in a feeling of enlargement fatigue with long-term
effects on any future enlargements.
The most affected by these developments appear to be Turkey who has up to now
the longest accession road to go along. ‘Whereas Turkey needs the EU for its own
domestic and foreign policy project to succeed, the EU needs Turkey in order to meet the
numerous regional foreign policy challenges in economic, political and energyenvironmental realms’ (Düzgit and Tocci, 2009: 2). Given the fact that ‘the underlying
beliefs and attitudes that generate opposition to Turkey’s membership in the European
Union are deeply ingrained and persistent’ (John Redmond, 2007:306), that the situation
of Turkey is compounded as already discussed by a number of other considerations apart
from the identity-related ones, a rational debate on Turkey and a renewed effort to
convince the European public will be absolutely necessary in order to reach a
reconsideration of Turkey’s accession. The European project was always an elite-driven
one and a decision concerning Turkey’s accession will make necessary a good deal of
political determination at the highest levels of decision-making, but given the wide gap
between the European institutions and European citizens (Păun, 2008:100-1) and the low
level of support for Turkey’s bid for membership it is to be reckoned that a hard work of
persuasion will have to be employed in order to overturn the existing preferences.
Focusing the discussion exclusively on a tight understanding of Europeanness threatens to
obscure other important issues such as European Union’s quest to carve out for itself a
more proactive role in the world, and it is precisely in this realm where Turkey can bring
an outstanding contribution given its geopolitical position, its dynamic foreign policy and
its key location along the energy corridors.
Particularly after the Cold War with its geopolitical tensions and the postmodern
order that followed it, Europeanness came to play a powerful role at the level of public
opinion but the ongoing discussion on Turkey’s membership already highlighted its limits.
Wisdom dictates that rationality is also bound to play a significant role in any discussion on
European Union enlargement. A successful Turkish accession will be an important indicator
of how much impact the conceptualized European identity has on the integration process
and enlargement. It will enhance European political practice by expanding the understanding
of pluralism in a European context. It will also send a powerful signal in the direction of the
Muslim communities in Europe with regard to its willingness to adopt a broader concept of
identity that will enable them to find their place within. Last but not least it will also help
Europeans to transcend the impasse they have reached as the not yet completed process of
defining their own identity impede them on sorting out the Turkish demand for membership
and any discussion on Turkish membership is doing anything else but to further the
divisions with regard to their own identity. Europeanness is bound then not to be defined in
an exclusivist manner, but in a way that will stimulate Turkey to further its process of
Europeanization and adopt both the values and the acquis communautaire of the European
Union so that its diversity will not harm the European unity.
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3. Artistic Intercultural Expressions
Didier FRANCFORT (Nancy) ◄► De l’histoire des frontières
cultures à l’histoire culturelle des frontières et à l’histoire des
cultures frontalières. Pour une rupture de perspective et de
nouvelles approches
Denis SAILLARD (Nancy) ◄► Nourritures et territoires en Europe.
La gastronomie comme frontière culturelle
Jean-Sébastien NOËL (Nancy) ◄► Klezmer “revivalisms” to the
test of real or supposed cultural borders: the stakes of memory
and objects of misunderstanding
De l’histoire des frontières cultures à l’histoire culturelle des frontières et
à l’histoire des cultures frontalières. Pour une rupture de perspective et
de nouvelles approches
Didier FRANCFORT
Abstract: The concept of cultural border cannot anymore be used at large since the
generalization of the anti-essentialist points of view in human and social sciences, inspired by the
sometimes contradictory works of Eric Hobwsbawm, Benedict Anderson or Ernest Gellner. The
cultural border is not an immemorial given, e.g. expression of a difference in identities, as the
nations do invariably exist. It is the result of a process that is no more natural than the political
border. This study proposes to examine the notion of cultural border attempting three directions of
study: a first direction describes an ongoing international research (NAFTES) carried out at the
borderline with the human body related fields (dancing, cooking), a second direction going deeper
(music frontier in Lorraine during the annexation of Moselle by Germany) and a third direction,
more proactive, proposing new cinema sources to conduct a reflection on the transgressive
dimension.
Keywords: music, dancing, cooking, cultural borders, identification processes
Le paysage scientifique de la fin du XXe et du début du XXIe siècle est marqué
par l’émergence d’un discours anti-essentialiste qui, dans le domaine des Sciences
Humaines et Sociales, a surtout consisté à interroger de façon critique les évidences liées à
l’existence longtemps perçue comme quasi-immémoriale d’une identité nationale et de
traditions spécifiques (Francfort, 2010). Les travaux d’Eric Hobsbawm, de Benedict
Anderson, de Miroslav Hroch ou d’Ernst Gellner constituent un ensemble de références,
un cadre théorique dans lequel s’inscrivent des travaux de dé-construction, de façon
parfois contradictoire, des certitudes sur l’existence d’une permanence immuable.
L’historien est ainsi invité à jouer dans la société une fonction de Cassandre ou de troublefête consistant à dire que ce que l’on croyait constitutif de nos racines les plus anciennes
est le fruit d’un travail d’ « invention ». Dire qu’il y a ce phénomène d’invention ne
conduit pas à nier la réalité de l’existence objective et subjective des nations ou d’autres
groupes sociaux fondamentaux (communautés religieuses, communautés de « pays », de
« petites patries), de territoires ou de régions ou même de quartier). La notion de frontière
culturelle telle qu’elle a été pensée comme une évidence et utilisée comme élément de
légitimation de déplacement des frontières politiques entre États ou entre collectivités
territoriales (ou de contestation de ces frontières « politiques ») est ainsi soumise à une
critique théorique de grande ampleur. Cette réflexion se propose d’interroger à nouveau
l’idée de frontières culturelle pour voir ce qu’elle peut devenir au moment où les idées
anti-essentialistes semblent s’être imposées à la majorité des recherches sur les faits
culturels frontaliers relevant de démarches historiques.
Le renouvellement critique de la démarche implique à la fois que l’on s’interroge
sur de nouveaux clivages territoriaux culturels et politiques et que l’on s’interroge sur de
nouveaux critères de différenciations frontaliers autres que les critères « classiques » de
démarcation tels que la langue, la religion ou le niveau de revenu. Les données exposées
ici reflètent ainsi de façon provisoire l’état de la recherche établie dans le cadre du
programme de recherche NAFTES mis en place, pour une durée de 30 mois, dans l’Axe 1
de la MSH Lorraine à partir du premier juillet 2009. Nous tenterons, dans un premier
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temps, d’exposer les lignes directrices de ce programme de recherche en cours, pour tenter
dans une deuxième partie d’étudier, de façon monographique, l’émergence d’une frontière
culturelle mise en place pour répondre aux contraintes nouvelles, en les entérinant et les
contestant à la fois, en prenant, comme exemple, l’histoire de la Lorraine séparée par la
frontière du Traité de Francfort de 1871 à la Première Guerre mondiale, exemple qui a été
au cœur de la réflexion des équipes associées dans l’Axe 1 de la MSH Lorraine où des
chercheurs de sciences politiques, d’histoire, de sociologie se sont intéressés à
l’inscription du fait frontalier dans le paysage et, surtout, dans les comportements et les
mémoires (Francfort, 2007). Un troisième temps de réflexion proposera des orientations
de recherche sur ce que peut constituer une approche spécifique à l’histoire culturelle des
faits frontaliers. Il ne s’agit pas simplement de dépasser le caractère de « coupure » qui
sépare deux entités évidemment distinctes pour insister sur la « couture » qui les
rapproche, il s’agit d’interroger la différence préalable à la démarcation et de s’interroger
de façon critique sur ses éventuels fondements. En d’autres termes, l’histoire culturelle
invite à penser la frontière comme un processus ininterrompu de construction d’altérité
culturelle. Cette approche critique des différenciations culturelles présente à nos yeux
l’immense avantage d’éviter toute possibilité d’«instrumentalisation» politique. Les
différences de langue, de religion, de façon de se conduire ou de voir le monde ne
sauraient justifier l’établissement de frontières politiques étanches plutôt ici que là. Le
sentiment d’appartenance se construit et peut trouver des critères de différenciation
décisifs variables: ici la langue, ici la religion, ici un passé commun… La réflexion sur ce
qui fait la véritable différence gagne ainsi à intégrer une approche de critères
affectivement très présents comme ceux qui sont liés au corps, à l’alimentation qui sont
rarement associés à une démarche critique non narcissique.
Aux frontières du corps et de la culture
Alors que l’heure est à la globalisation culturelle et que l’effacement des frontières
politiques liées à la Guerre froide, en Europe, s’accompagne d’un accroissement des échanges
transfrontaliers, les sciences humaines et sociales sont placées devant un défi complexe et
paradoxal : penser à la fois l’effacement et la persistance des frontières. L’histoire culturelle
s’intéresse particulièrement aux frontières invisibles, à ce qui reste dans la représentation pas
toujours consciente de l’altérité la plus voisine.
Entre les pays de l’espace de Schengen, les anciens postes de douane sont désertés,
devenant comme les enceintes de cités antiques, un objet archéologique. Restent les réalités
humaines et la force du sentiment d’appartenance opposant, de part et d’autre d’une frontière
aisément franchissable un « nous » et un « eux » irréductiblement différenciés. Tout ce qui
différencie peut devenir objet d’étude, non parce qu’il s’agit d’une opposition « naturelle »
indépassable mais parce que cela renseigne sur la construction permanente et toujours
redéfinie de sentiments d’appartenance: les niveaux de vie, les modes, les goûts alimentaires,
les comportements politiques, les attitudes religieuses, les langues… Il n’y a pas d’indice de
différenciation subjective plus importants que d’autres. L’imaginaire est bien en cause: le
rapport physique à l’Autre qui peut osciller entre désir et répulsion est un objet d’étude qui doit
avoir sa place dans l’étude des phénomènes de différenciation territoriale. L’idée d’un
embodiment des constructions identitaires dans les lignes de démarcation apparaît comme un
objet d’étude particulièrement stimulant. Avec la frontière, la construction identitaire prend
corps. Le rapport physique à l’altérité voisine ne peut pas être étudié uniquement dans les
discours. C’est bien ainsi que l’histoire culturelle comme histoire des représentations se
différencie de l’histoire des idées. Les contacts scientifiques établis au sein de l’International
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1
Society for Cultural History ont permis de dégager et d’associer deux objets d’étude de ce
qui relève de la construction de lignes de différenciation culturelle : la danse et l’alimentation.
Des travaux existent dans chaque domaine pour décrire la constitution de frontières dans les
domaines chorégraphiques ou « gastronomiques » (in Pitte et Montanari (dir.), 2009. Mais à
note connaissance le rapprochement qui nous semble fécond n’a pas encore été tenté et des
espaces significatifs de contacts culturels entre l’Europe centrale et Orientale et l’Orient le plus
proche ont été souvent délaissés par la recherche. C’est pourquoi un ambitieux programme
international de recherche a été lancé dans le cadre de la MSH Lorraine, regroupant en
s’élargissant peu à peu chercheurs et laboratoires de nombreux pays (Allemagne, Azerbaïdjan,
Luxembourg, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, Turquie…), a été consacré de façon conjointe aux
approches culturelles de l’embodiment de la construction de l’identité centrées sur la nourriture
et sur la danse. Ce programme, intitulé de Nouvelles Approches des Frontières Culturelles
(NAFTES)2 rassemble des spécialistes d’histoire culturelle de la gastronomie et d’autres
« marqueurs », des universitaires s’intéressant à l’Europe centrale et orientale, au monde turcoottoman, aux populations migrantes en Europe, la réflexion sur « le goût des autres » a une
place centrale. Il faudrait, pour être exact, parler plutôt de goût et de dégoût. La construction
d’une démarcation symbolique et imaginaire avec une société voisine passe souvent par la
mise en place d’une image répulsive qui engage le corps au moins autant que l’esprit. Le
concept freudien de « narcissisme des petites différences » peut ainsi être utilisé avec profit.
En 1929, en pleine crise, dans un passage célèbre de Das Unbehagen in der
Kultur, texte longtemps traduit, en français, comme Malaise dans la civilisation, Freud
retrouve ce concept qu’il avait déjà élaboré Dans une traduction récente (Cotet, Lainé et
Stute-Cadiot), un passage met bien en évidence le lien établi entre «le narcissisme des
petites différences» et les mécanismes de l’agressivité que Freud retrouve à la fois dans le
pangermanisme et dans les réalités soviétiques (Francfort, Ceci n’est pas un homme» in
Analuein, 2008:28-38): «Je me suis une fois occupé du phénomène selon lequel,
précisément, des communautés voisines, et proches aussi les unes des autres par ailleurs,
se combattent et se raillent réciproquement, tels les espagnols et les Portugais, les
allemands du Nord et ceux du Sud, les Anglais et les Ecossais, etc. J’ai donné à ce
phénomène le nom de «narcissisme des petites différences», qui ne contribue pas
beaucoup à l’expliquer» (Freud, 2007:56). La construction d’une différenciation culturelle
ou ethnique ne renvoie pas seulement à des tracés frontaliers géographiques.
L’antisémitisme illustre le même phénomène de façon non territoriale. «Ce ne fut pas non
plus un hasard incompréhensible si le rêve de domination germanique sur le monde appela
comme son complément l’antisémitisme, et il est concevable, on le reconnaît, que la
tentative d’édifier en Russie une nouvelle culture communiste trouve son support
psychologique dans la persécution des bourgeois» (Freud, 2007: 56).
Le projet NAFTES se propose donc de rassembler, loin de tout souci de
légitimation, des chercheurs issus de plusieurs disciplines et de plusieurs champs
géographiques de référence s’interrogeant sur la construction de signes de différenciation
culturelle. Un appel d’offre de la MSH Lorraine en avril 2009 a pu ainsi être une occasion
de fédérer des équipes et des chercheurs travaillant sur l’idée de frontière culturelle. Un
projet a ainsi été validé et lancé dès juillet 2009. Lors d’une première réunion générale le
25 septembre 2009, il a été clair que de nouvelles institutions pourraient étendre les
domaines d’étude. Un vaste domaine géographique a été considéré comme l’espace non
exclusif de référence de Berlin à Bakou et d’Helsinki à Héraklion. Dans cet espace, il
1
2
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/isch/
http://www.msh-lorraine.fr/index.php?id=391
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s’agit de voir ce qui relève des frontières culturelles non dans les domaines qui ont
souvent servi de justification des démarcations politiques (langue et religion) mais dans
les domaines dont le poids affectif important conditionne largement la vision de
l’ « étranger » le plus voisin sans servir de prétexte ou de justification à la ségrégation
politique. Les deux aspects qui ont été rapprochés (la danse et l’alimentation) relèvent
essentiellement du corps. Il suffit d’évoquer une péripétie liée à la Première Guerre
mondiale pour comprendre les principaux enjeux : alors que la Confédération Helvétique
reste neutre et à l’écart du conflit, le fossé entre les Suisses francophones considérés
comme globalement favorables à l’Entente et germanophones a priori gagnés au camp
adverse de la triple-Alliance a été désigné comme le Röstigraben, faisant allusion à une
façon de préparer les pommes de terre. Des souvenirs sur l’époque de l’Annexion de la
Moselle, avant la Première Guerre mondiale, évoquent également, à Metz, une
différenciation entre les familles francophones et germanophones reconnaissables à
l’odeur émanant des cuisines où l’on préparait les pommes de terre de façon différente,
selon les cas plutôt rôties ou plutôt bouillies. La question n’est pas ici de s’ériger en
critique gastronomique et d’avouer une prédilection particulière pour un mode de
préparation plutôt que pour un autre ni de considérer que tous les Allemands ne mangent
que des pommes de terre bouillies alors que les Français mangent des pommes rôties ou
des frites. Elle est plutôt de comprendre les mécanismes de construction d’un discours
bien établi et repris comme un mythe autour de ces questions de différence bipolarisées.
En même temps, l’intérêt pour des questions liées au corps permet souvent de sortir d’une
trop stricte tendance réductrice à la bipolarisation.
Le programme de NAFTES a été présenté ainsi successivement dans une première
réunion à Lunéville puis, immédiatement après, lors d’un colloque international coorganisé avec le CEFRES de Prague. Quelques premiers résultats peuvent dès à présent
être retranscrits de façon schématique autour de quelques idées directrices.
a) Des pratiques « corporelles » (danse et alimentation) accompagnent la réalité la
plus matérielle des frontières physiques (politiques et administratives). Elles participent au
marquage symbolique de l’espace. Des lieux se constituent comme des « vitrines
gastronomiques » d’une nation de part et d’autre d’une frontière. Certes, l’espace de
Schengen fait parfois oublier ces boutiques où l’on trouvait les produits spécifiques. La
différence de prix ou de fiscalité rendaient intéressants des produits non pour leur rareté
mais pour leur prix avantageux : les alcools tiennent alors une place primordiale (ainsi que
les cigarettes). La frontière peut-être une frontière entre États comme celle que traversent
les passagers du ferry qui relie Helsinki à Tallin. Mais des phénomènes plus complexes de
différenciation de l’espace multiplient les frontières « internes » enter régions, entre
quartiers. Les magasins spéciaux des pays du bloc soviétique réservaient des produits
inaccessibles à la population locale aux étrangers détenteurs de « devises fortes » (les
cigarettes Kent, certains alcools…). Les frontières passent aujourd’hui aux caisses des
duty free d’aéroport, voire dans des géographies plus complexes lorsque les achats de
produits « typiques » se font par Internet. La danse a pu contribuer également au
marquage symbolique des frontières géographiques les plus matérielles. Elle est une forme
d’appropriation du territoire, de marquage du sol. Lorsqu’en 1951 la RDA et la Pologne
ont signé un accord fixant leur frontière commune sur l’Oder, on a dansé du côté polonais
des danses folkloriques. Dans la Roumanie victorieuse au lendemain de la Grande Guerre,
les délégués des provinces rattachées au Royaume ont dansé une hora à la quelle a
participé la délégation française du général Berthelot.
b) Dans la danse comme dans l’alimentation, chacun se pense comme détenteur
d’un sens de l’équilibre et pense l’altérité en terme d’excès ou d’insuffisance. Les danses
113
nationales sont virtuoses et impliquent que l’on garde une forme innée et supérieur
d’équilibre. La nourriture « de chez soi » fuit la fadeur ou le caractère exagérément épicé
du « goût des autres»3.
c) Danse et alimentation sont des pratiques culturelles renvoyant de façon
comparable à une certaine dimension de sociabilité et à une articulation valorisant le
collectif sur l’individuel. Les danses nationales qui marquent le mieux l’appropriation
collective d’un territoire sont souvent, comme la hora, des danses collectives, dansées en
cercle. Certes, un rapprochement peut être fait avec l’ancien nom grec de la frontière4 mais
les différentes variantes (hora, horon, horo…) ont pour tous les danseurs une forte valeur
d’identification exclusive. C’est aussi la hora qu’ont dansé les pionniers lors de la création
de l’État d’Israël. La place symbolique des grands banquets révèle un investissement
collectif équivalent. La sociabilité, plaisir d’être rassemblés, semble s’épanouir
particulièrement dans les régions frontalières (Francfort, 2001, « Peut-on parler d’une
sociabilité des frontières ? »). Elle constitue une donnée fondamentale commune aux
pratiques culturelles étudiées dans NAFTES. Danse et modes alimentaires sont deux
marqueurs d’identité au cœur d’un réseau de références identificatrices comprenant
l’élaboration et la définition progressive de costumes traditionnels, de canons de références
constitués par un corpus d’œuvres relevant de la culture savante. La frontière culturelle se
construit à mesure que des deux côtés d’une ligne pas toujours clairement définie un
processus de « patrimonialisation » s’opère de façon différentielle.
d) L’élément de base de la démarcation frontalière finit par revenir à une forme plus
ou moins actualisée de limes séparant civilisation et barbarie. La construction de l’image du
voisin ennemi passe par l’élaboration d’une image déshumanisée d’être grossier et brutal. La
construction d’une image de soi plébéienne ou d’un primitivisme assumé conduit à repérer
en l’autre les signes d’une insupportable prétention aristocratique, apparaissant par exemple
dans le rôle des précepteurs français des opéras de Tchaïkovski. C’est dire que la frontière
culturelle sépare deux modèles de construction identitaire, un « eux » et un « nous » en des
termes dans lesquels les identités assumées par les acteurs historiques ne correspondent pas
aux identités assignées par les sociétés voisines.
e) On assiste à l’époque contemporaine à des formes diverses et contradictoires de
dé-territorialisation des effets de démarcation culturelle. La distinction sociale ne coïncide
pas toujours exactement avec des limites précises de quartiers urbains. On ne peut en
aucun cas postuler que la frontière sépare des entités sociales culturellement homogènes si
ce n’est en acceptant la logique des « purifications » ethniques. L’homogénéité ne peut en
aucun cas, sauf dans des logiques totalitaires, correspondre à tous les aspects de ce qui fait
une culture (de la cuisine à la religion, de la langue au vêtement, des goûts musicaux aux
références littéraires). La culture « nationale » se construit largement en exil, dans
l’émigration. L’étude des constructions différentielles d’identités implique une étude
systématique des pratiques culturelles des migrants, des retours d’exil. Dans son roman
intitulé L’ignorance (Kundera, 2003:38-39), Milan Kundera illustre bien le phénomène de
« choc des cultures » lié aux expériences migrantes. « Sur une longue table appuyée au
mur, à côté des assiettes de petits-fours, douze bouteilles attendent, rangées. En Bohême,
on ne boit pas de bon vin et on n’a pas l’habitude de garder d’anciens millésimes. Elle a
3
Cette question du « goût des autres » sera la thématique d’un colloque international organisé à
Bakou (Azerbaïdjan) en octobre 2010.
4
Une contribution de Guy VOTTÉRO, professeur à l’Université Nancy 2, sur « Le vocabulaire de
la "frontière" en grec et en latin » doit paraître en 2010 dans un ouvrage collectif sur les
frontières publié par l’Axe 1 de la MSH Lorraine.
114
acheté ce vieux vin de bordeaux avec d’autant plus de plaisir : pour surprendre ses
invitées, pour leur faire fête, pour regagner leur amitié. Elle a failli tout gâcher. […] Entretemps le garçon apparaît dans la porte avec dix chopes d’un demi-litre de bière, cinq dans
chaque main, grande performance athlétique provoquant des applaudissements et des rires.
Elles lèvent les chopes et trinquent: «À la santé d’Irena ! À la santé de la fille retrouvée!».
Ces premières données sur l’étude croisée de la construction de lignes de démarcation
à partir de la nourriture, de la boisson et des pratiques corporelles codifiées conduisent à
relativiser de nombreuses idées accompagnant des conflits sur des questions d’«identités».
Cette démarche anti-essentialiste ne revient pas à une forme de relativisme niant la réalité des
différences de système de référence sur le modèle du «vérité en deçà des Pyrénées, erreur au
delà » de Blaise Pascal. Le fait qu’une frontière culturelle ne soit pas le reflet de différences
évidentes immémoriales mais le fruit de constructions qui accompagnent les fluctuations des
frontières politiques ne conduit pas à dire que les différences sont artificielles. Elles peuvent
acquérir un poids affectif et imaginaire aussi fort que si elles s’inscrivaient vraiment dans
l’immémorial. La naissance des mythes et les stéréotypes ont une grande incidence sur les
comportements historiques eux-mêmes. Le titre du colloque organisé par Jean-Noël Jeanneney
résume bien la problématique: « Une idée fausse et un fait vrai » (Jeanneney, 1999). Les
comportements peuvent changer et s’adapter aux représentations, fussent-elles éloignées de la
réalité des pratiques. C’est ce que Pierre Bourdieu décrit comme « l’effet Montesquieu»
rappelant la typologie du comportement politique adapté aux climats qu’avait établie l’auteur
de L’Esprit des Lois (Bourdieu, 1980). Il est intéressant de voir que la construction de
marqueurs différentiels culturels peuvent concerner toutes les formes de production culturelle,
même un art réputé universel comme la musique.
La construction d’une frontière culturelle dans un domaine réputé universel:
la musique
Le cas extrême de l’utilité de la construction de stéréotypes pour démarquer des
pays plus ou moins voisins et créer un effet de frontière culturelle consiste à opposer des
nations naturellement musiciennes à des nations qui ne le sont pas. Si les Français ne se
vantent guère d’être un peuple par essence musicien, il peut y avoir, en la matière une
distance considérable entre la perception de soi et l’identité assignée de façon externe. On
attribue à Brahms des propos terribles selon lesquels la musique française, « cela n’existe
pas ». Dès avant la Première Guerre mondiale, une frange des élites allemandes présentait le
Royaume-Uni comme « le pays sans musique ». Pendant la guerre, l’idée fut reprise par la
propagande officielle et l’ouvrage d’Oskar Adolf Hermann Schmitz, paru en 1904, fut
largement réédité en 1915(Schmitz, 1914:288). À l’intérieur même du champ musical, des
oppositions irréductibles sont établies entre des pays où la tradition symphonique l’emporte
(comme l’Allemagne) et des pays où triompherait naturellement le chant (comme l’Italie)
(Francfort, 2009:429-440). Il est vrai que dans la construction des cultures nationales, les
différents pays trouvent des systèmes de références différents. En France, ni Rameau, ni
Debussy ne sauraient rivaliser avec Victor Hugo. La place de la musique dans l’auto
représentation des nations diffère de façon significative. Les lignes de démarcation sont
certes provisoires, construites, historiques et non ataviques mais elles sont bien là.
Les modifications brutales de frontières constituent un laboratoire pour étudier les
modalités de constructions de systèmes concurrents d’identification culturelle touchant
même les domaines qui semblent les plus « neutres ». Plutôt que de multiplier, dans cette
réflexion programmatique les cas de frontières musicales, nous pensons devoir illustrer cette
idée en analysant la mise en place en un temps relativement court d’une frontière culturelle
inattendue: la frontière musicale coupant en deux la Lorraine après l’annexion du
115
département de la Moselle par l’Allemagne récemment unifiée. La Lorraine est alors
apparue entre 1871 et 1914 comme une région meurtrie où l’évocation musicale de la défaite
et de l’ « amputation » d’une partie du territoire ne pouvait que choquer. La région demeurée
française était trop blessée pour pouvoir le dire en musique. Le proverbe français selon
lequel « les grandes douleurs sont muettes » s’appliquait lorsqu’un compositeur voulait à sa
façon commémorer la défaite et ses conséquences. Guy Ropartz, Directeur du Conservatoire
de Nancy, constata cela en créant le 24 juillet 1897 la version pour orchestre et chœur
d’hommes du Rhin allemand que son ami Albéric Magnard avait tirée des vers de Musset.
Le public lorrain, n’obtenait pas le succès escompté. L’accueil fut « glacial » car les
Lorrains se présentaient comme les « Habitants des marches de la France où le pouls de la
patrie bat ardent et fiévreux »ayant « des susceptibilités inconnues ailleurs » (Simon-Pierre
Perret, Harry Halbreich, 2001:138-142). Le fait que la Lorraine soit peu évoquée en musique
rejoint souvent l’idée qu’une typologie régionale immuable condamne les habitants de la
frontière à ne pas être naturellement sociables mais à être des gardiens attentifs de l’intégrité
du territoire (Francfort, 2001).
Ce devoir de réserve et de recueillement devait être appliqué à l’ensemble de la
nation, dans toutes les régions. Il ne dura qu’un moment. La formule attribuée à Léon
Gambetta (« Pensons-y, n'en parlons jamais... ») fut même mise en chanson par Gustave
Fautras en 1880. Les couplets patriotiques de Paul Déroulède ont été mis en musique par des
compositeurs tels que Robert Planquette. Des chansons comme Le Tambour de Gravelotte,
Vous n’aurez pas l’Alsace et la Lorraine, Le Passeur de la Moselle ont connu une vogue
réelle. La popularité du général Boulanger (Perret, Halbreich, 2001:138-142) fit des
provinces perdues un thème susceptible d’être évoqué en musique. On évoqua d’ailleurs
plus volontiers l’Alsace, par exemple dans les Scènes alsaciennes de Massenet (1881).
La marche frontalière de la jeune république française se voit assigner un
caractère ombrageux peu propice au chant. Il y aurait un naturel lorrain peu bavard et,
peut-être, peu musical. Bien des régions frontalières développent le thème d’une absence
atavique de sociabilité. La Lorraine ajoute à ce discours le thème d’une faible présence de
formes spontanées de musique. La musique risque toujours d’être un divertissement.
Toute une tradition régionale s’invente opposant le sérieux des « vrais » Lorrains des
campagnes à la « frivolité » des habitants de Nancy. Évoquant, dans les années 1920, ses
souvenirs de jeunesse, l’académicien Louis Bertrand présente le caractère lorrain comme
« un caractère qui n’est point sans austérité et qui peut même passer pour dur » (Bertrand,
1926:27-29, 36-39). Même le patriotisme a des accents de discrétion, il est, selon
l’expression de Jules Ferry, le « vrai patriotisme point bruyant, point tapageur» (Ferry,
apud Barral, 1989:102.). « L’effet Montesquieu» fonctionne bien. Le stéréotype est perçu
comme un trait essentiel de la nature. Les œuvres funèbres peuvent ainsi fonctionner
comme des marqueurs identitaires. Le Mercure Lorrain, animé par l’écrivain et critique
René d’Avril5, évoque le grand succès que Guy Ropartz a obtenu, en 1908, en dirigeant
Souvenirs de Vincent d’Indy. Certes, le compositeur méridional n’est guère plus lorrain
5
René d’Avril, ancien élève de Franck et professeur d’histoire de la musique au Conservatoire de
Nancy, est un ardent régionaliste et La Lorraine-Artiste est une tribune à ses idées. Elle n’est
pas seule. En 1902, le théâtre de Lunéville présente lors de la même soirée des oeuvres de
Saint-Saëns, de d’Indy, une conférence sur la « décentralisation musicale ». Lors de la même
soirée, le théâtre accueille le groupe littéraire régional de René d’Avril, Léon Tonnelier intitulé
la Grange lorraine, mêlant poèmes et musique : Victor Hugo, Bach, Schumann, d’Indy et
Thirion sont au programme. Guy Ropartz fut ainsi considéré a posteriori, en 1925, par Émile
Vuillermoz comme « le d’Indy de la décentralisation». VUILLERMOZ E., La symphonie in
ROHOZINSKI L. (dir.), Cinquante ans de musique française de 1874 à 1925,t. 1, p.338.
116
que le Breton Guy Ropartz mais l’évocation nostalgique du temps passé conduit le public
à une intense tristesse : « En Lorraine où l’on honore les morts avec tant de cœur, ce
thème pathétique devait, cependant, être mieux compris que partout ailleurs » (D’Avril,
n°1, 1 avril 1908:4). Albéric Magnard retrouve l’estime du public et de la critique de
Nancy avec son Chant funèbre 6: « Un temps de commémoration des morts et un concert
adéquat aux sentiments que cette fête, grave, solennelle et douce, éveille dans l’âme des
Lorrains: le Chant funèbre, d’Albéric Magnard, résonne longuement, clair et douloureux
comme un soleil de novembre » (D’Avril, n°10-12, octobre-décembre 1908:80).
Le caractère culturel frontalier en musique se traduit aussi autrement. Il s’agit de
positionner une latinité construite contre la germanité qui aurait tort de triompher trop vite.
Dans la Lorraine francique (germanophone), les traditions allemandes auraient modifiées
par le « caractère particulier du pays lorrain et de ses habitants»: «Les Lorrains ont opéré
des choix parmi la masse des éléments qui venaient de l’Est, ils y ont apporté des
inventions de leur cru et ils y ont ajouté une dimension didactique et moralisante qui était
propre à leur génie » et à « l’esprit d’un peuple qui a connu beaucoup de vicissitudes au
cours de son histoire, qui a perdu le goût de la protestation et de la révolte et attend plus
de l’au-delà que d’une amélioration de sa condition terrestre » (Moes, 2000:8).
La Lorraine se caractérise par le caractère peu enjoué de ses habitants mais
cependant la vie musicale, particulièrement après l’annexion de la Moselle, doit faire de la
région une vitrine de la culture française. En 1884, lors de débats du Conseil municipal sur
le Conservatoire de Musique, des plaintes s’expriment. Des lettres anonymes parviennent
au maire: « l’art est véritablement en décadence ». Qui sait, peut-être sera-t-on bientôt
forcé l’aller recruter des musiciens hors de la région7.
La Troisième République a contribué à mettre en place en France un réseau
associatif dense assurant à la fois l’éducation musicale et la formation de la nation
(Gerbod, 1980:27-44, Gumplowicz, 2001, Gerbol, 1980:27-44). À la veille de la Première
Guerre mondiale, on dénombre en France 2000 sociétés chorales et quatre fois plus de
fanfares, harmonies et sociétés instrumentales. La Meurthe-et-Moselle et les autres
départements lorrains demeurés français voient en quelques années se multiplier les
associations et institutions musicales. En 1883, dans le département de la Meuse, 32
communes comptent au moins une société musicale (Simon, 1883:373-375). Epinal
compte alors trois sociétés concurrentes: l’Orphéon spinalien, l’Harmonie d’Epinal et
l’Union musicale. Du 13 au 15 juin 1885, un grand concours international de musique eut
lieu à Nancy, rassemblant 80 harmonies fanfares et chorales (Daval, 1er volume, 1994:6).
Dans l’arrondissement de Briey qui correspond à la partie de l’ancien département de la
Moselle demeurée française et rattachée à l’ancien département de la Meurthe, l’effort
d’encadrement combine les initiatives d’État et les initiatives privées. René d’Avril s’en
félicite: « Nous possédons cependant dans notre région et plus particulièrement dans
l’arrondissement de Briey un certain nombre de sociétés importantes. Nous ne faisons pas
allusion aux « sociétés professionnelles » composées d’ouvriers indemnisés par les
directeurs d’usines lorsqu’ils assistent aux répétitions, mais de sociétés libres de tous liens.
Il y en a une dizaine dans cet arrondissement et, si l’on calcule, qu’hormis Longwy, il n’y
a pas de villes de plus de 3.500 habitants, on conviendra que c’est joli ? » (D’Avril, n°1012, octobre-décembre, 1908:88).
L’Annuaire administratif, statistique, historique de Meurthe-et-Moselle ne
dénombre à Nancy que deux ou trois sociétés musicales (la Société Philharmonique de
6
7
Chant funèbre pour orchestre (op.9), créé à Paris en mai 1899.
Archives municipales de Nancy, Archives du Conservatoire de Musique R1(b)-1
117
Nancy, une ou deux chorales dédiées à Sainte Cécile). En 1900, on compte onze sociétés
musicales. La musique est aussi le fait d’orchestres de cafés. Leur nombre, qui s’est
considérablement accru dans les années 1900 est perçu comme une occasion de financer,
grâce au droit des pauvres perçus dans les cafés, des initiatives caritatives. On ne manque
pas de vanter l’excellence des musiciens de brasserie. Il se peut qu’une certaine inflation
associative et institutionnelle caractérise la Lorraine comme d’autres régions frontalières.
L’État chercherait à être plus présent à la périphérie du territoire qu’il contrôle : une partie
importante de la vie musicale est représentée par les musiques des 29ème, 37ème et 69ème
régiments de ligne auxquels des compositeurs « savants » n’ont pas peur de dédier
certaines de leurs œuvres.
Nancy a aussi son Orchestre Symphonique et Lyrique depuis 1884, orchestre qui fut
créé par Édouard Brunel, directeur du Conservatoire de Musique8, à la suite de concerts dans
les salons de l'Hôtel de Ville. Dans les années 1890, les mélomanes lorrains se plaignent de
devoir chercher hors de la région des musiciens acceptant de rester pour assurer
« l’éducation musicale des foules par ces concerts populaires du dimanche, qui sont le
charme et la joie de nos pluvieuses après-midi d’hiver en Lorraine » (Pierson, 1892:71-73).
Le Breton Guy Ropartz, élève de Massenet et de Franck, resta à la tête des institutions
musicales nancéiennes de 1894 à 1919 avant de poursuivre vers l’Est et vers Strasbourg
redevenue française. Grâce à Ropartz, le public lorrain découvre les œuvres des élèves de
Franck en particulier d’Indy et Chausson dont le Poème pour violon et orchestre (op.25) a
été créé à Nancy, avec Eugène Ysaÿe, le 27 décembre 1897. Ropartz dirige aussi la création
de ses œuvres, même les plus marquées par des références à la Bretagne et à la mer comme
Le Pays, créé à Nancy en 1912. Il défend la musique de son ami Magnard, il donne de la
musique russe (du Glazounov), redécouvre La légende de Sainte Élisabeth de Liszt en 1903,
ne craint pas de diriger du Wagner. Debussy a insisté sur la mission régionale de Ropartz:
« La musique doit beaucoup à Guy Ropartz. On sait son apostolat à Nancy, dont il dirige le
Conservatoire. Il dépense là, sans compter, un enthousiasme infatigable pour la diffusion des
belles œuvres » (Debussy, 23 février 1903, 1987:105).
La région n’apparaît plus comme une terre silencieuse dès lors que l’on rappelle
qu’Ambroise Thomas est né à Metz en 1811 ou que Gustave Charpentier est né à Dieuze en
1860. Mais cela suffit-il pour évoquer un génie du lieu ? Le fait d’insister sur le critère du lieu
de naissance risque toujours de conduire à une forme d’essentialisme que le travail d’historien
tend systématiquement à remettre en cause. Ambroise Thomas a plus été formé à Paris et en
Italie qu’en Lorraine. Mais la situation née de la Guerre de 1870 implique une forme de
mobilisation de tout ce qui associé la région et ses enfants à ce que la culture française compte
de plus reconnu. Les musiciens nés en Lorraine sont ainsi appelés à faire œuvre de patriotisme
en s’associant dans la célébration de la culture française et de ses accents régionaux.
Mais le périodique artistique régional, dans une de ses livraisons de la même
année 1892 reprend un article du Ménestrel d’Arthur Pougin sur les succès de Gustave
Charpentier en lui donnant un titre significatif : « Un musicien lorrain » (Debussy,
1987:105). L’auteur ne précise pas que le compositeur est né à Dieuze (en Moselle
annexée) mais écrit simplement « né en Lorraine ». Il n’est plus alors question de Lorraine
mais de Tourcoing, des conservatoires de Lille et de Paris, de prix de Rome et l’on serait
bien en peine de donner à la cantate Didon un quelconque sens régional.
Cette volonté de distinguer, dans la production musicale française des débuts de la
Troisième République un esprit lorrain culmine avec le « Concert des Lorrains » organisé
8
Le conservatoire est né la même année de la transformation de l’école municipale de musique en
une succursale du Conservatoire de Paris . Archives Municipales de Nancy R1(b)-1.
118
en janvier 1902 par Guy Ropartz au Concert du Conservatoire de Nancy. Le périodique
régional La Lorraine-Artiste annonce largement la manifestation, présente à ses lecteurs
les « artistes lorrains dont les œuvres seront exécutées » puis rend compte du concert avec
un article de René d’Avril: « La pensée lorraine fut bellement glorifiée au concert du 26
janvier. Chacun avait tenu à porter le meilleur de son talent pour un monument, d’ordre
composite, certes, mais élégant néanmoins de majesté et d’harmonie » (La LorraineArtiste, 1902:25-30, 44-45).
Gustave Charpentier qui est certainement le plus connu est présenté comme un
musicien à la fois provincial et parisien, ce qui aux yeux de René d’Avril est presque un
exploit. On peut se demander ce qui dans « la dualité de la nature du lorrain-montmartrois »
représente la face lorraine de sa personnalité. La réponse de René d’Avril est nette : « la
sentimentalité ». L’ « exubérance juvénile », la « vie intense », tout ce qui est « populaire »
est parisien, tout ce qui est sensible, retenu, discret est lorrain (La Lorraine-Artiste, 1902:2530, 44-45). Au moment où se figent les caractéristiques d’une musique «nationale »
française et où le nationalisme et le contexte de l’Affaire Dreyfus (Fulcher, 1999)
interviennent dans les choix esthétiques des fondateurs de la Schola Cantorum 9, le style
« national » français est défini avec des variantes régionales. Si la langue, la nature du sol, le
climat opposent les brumes allemandes et le soleil d’Italie, la musique française doit
combiner unité et diversité, d’autant plus que bien des « scholistes » comme Déodat de
Séverac se disent d’ardents régionalistes (Séverac, 1993:70 –71).
La difficulté spécifique qui se pose aux musiciens lorrains qui veulent insister sur
leur caractère régional vient du fait que ce qui les différencie des autres régions risque de les
rapprocher de l’Allemagne qui divise et meurtrit leur région. René d’Avril10, membre actif
de l’Union régionaliste lorraine, parvient, en partie grâce à la musique, à démontrer qu’il n’y
a aucune contradiction entre le régionalisme et le patriotisme. La musique intervient
considérablement dans le travail de construction d’une double identité régionale et nationale.
La spécificité de la Lorraine est que les dirigeants des institutions « nationales » (musiques
militaires, associations musicales…) sont confrontés à la nécessité d’établir un rapport immédiat
à la culture allemande voisine. L’Allemagne est, en effet, omniprésente dans la définition d’une
musique française lorraine. Qu’il s’agisse de s’en inspirer ou de rejeter toute influence.
Dans le « concert des Lorrains » de 1902, Louis Thirion dans son deuxième
Chant sans parole pour violoncelle et orchestre retrouve une « sentimentalité [qui se]
baigne dans le calme », qualité un peu abandonnée, selon René d’Avril dans le premier
chant, trop versé dans le « modernisme » (D’Avril, 1902:45). René d’Avril va jusqu’à
comparer l’œuvre de Thirion à « simplicité des moyens réalisés par Bach dans ses cantates
et ses concertos ». Le « Messin Pierné » présenta lors de ce « concert des Lorrains » son
vaste poème symphonique avec orgue, chœur, baryton, cloches l’An Mil. La description
qu’en donne René d’Avril n’est pas très éloignée de celles que l’on a pu donner, lors de
leur création, en particulier en France ou en Alsace-Lorraine de certaines œuvres de
Gustav Mahler11 : Pierné enfle la voix et produit « un bruit effroyable » dans la première
9
La Schola Cantorum a eu à Nancy une succursale, déclarée en octobre 1905 avec, comme but, de
« favoriser l’exécution des chefs d’œuvres de musique chorale ». Elle disparaît en 1906
(Archives départementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, 4 M 99).
10
L’évolution ultérieure de Léon Malgras, alias René d’Avril (1875-1966), son rôle dans la presse
régionale, en particulier après 1940, ne nous semble pas devoir être prise en compte ici pour
comprendre son régionalisme culturel.
11
Voir par exemple la description des concerts de Mahler lors du premier Musikfest d’Alsace –
Lorraine de Strasbourg en mai 1905 qu’a laissée Romain Rolland dans la Revue de Paris, 1er
119
partie de son poème symphonique. « Trop de tintamarre et d’assourdissement ». En
revanche, dans l’Ave et le Kyrie, Pierné retrouve sa « verve » et son oeuvre est pleine de
« couleur » et de « vie bondissante et spirituelle ». René d’Avril s’oppose à une accusation
implicite de wagnérisme que l’on pourrait adresser à Pierné : « César Franck, Bach, un
peu le Wagner des « Maîtres Chanteurs » inspirèrent sans servilité l’âme médiévale du
compositeur. L’on a parfois l’impression que la Moselle française qui le vit naître sait
cependant d’avance qu’elle arrosera, mêlée aux eaux du Rhin, maintes villes où les
cathédrales gothiques, suivant l’expression de Musset, « se reflètent modestement »
(D’Avril, 1902:45).
Avec le «festival des artistes lorrains» de 1902, Guy Ropartz a donc largement
contribué à fonder une musique lorraine française et à faire connaître des compositeurs
dont le style a contribué à construire une identité nationale musicale, en grande partie
contre les caractéristiques supposées ou réelles de la musique allemande. Ce n’est rien ôter
au mérite artistique du cercle des amis et des élèves de Ropartz que de dire que l’esprit
d’une musique française lorraine est une construction et non l’expression d’une sensibilité
constante. En illustrant le conflit culturel franco-allemand perçu comme l’affrontement
d’une essence germanique et d’une essence française, la musique a contribué à la fixation
d’une frontière en deçà de laquelle s’élabore l’identité française.
On assiste à une construction identitaire en miroir inversé. D’un côté, une
musique allemande, dominée par l’esthétique wagnérienne, assimilée à une musique tout
en force agressive, en effets tapageurs. De l’autre, une musique sensible et retenue,
d’essence française, prête à adapter quelques points isolés de la tradition allemande. Tout
ce qui est allemand ne peut être que suspect de véhiculer le militarisme qui a meurtri le
patriotisme, à commencer, bien sûr par Wagner. Lorsque l’on regarde les critiques
musicales de L’impartial, on voit bien que l’identité musicale française se construit contre
un certain stéréotype de la musique allemande, incarné, d’abord dans l’œuvre de Wagner
dont la musique n’est que «tapage», « accords heurtés » et n’a été composée que «pour
des oreilles et surtout des poumons allemands» (L’Impartial, 27 février1885). C’est une
musique dont «l’absence de mélodie», la «lourdeur», les allusions guerrières contribuent à
donner à l’auditeur français et surtout lorrain un malaise: « on se croirait presque en
danger » (L’Impartia1, 13 janvier 1885). Toute la musique allemande est affectée, même
chez les critiques qui l’apprécient, d’une caractérisation spécifique significative d’une
vision du vainqueur de 1870. La musique de Richard Strauss est « fougueuse, nerveuse,
bien ample ». Même Brahms, dont les admirateurs sont souvent d’ardents opposants au
wagnérisme, est suspect. René d’Avril le trouve «germain, pesant et affecté» (Le Mercure
Lorrain, n°10-12, octobre-décembre 1908:82). La sensibilité musicale se situe sur un axe
unique entre une culture allemande caractérisée par la recherche des effets de masse et une
sensibilité française privilégiant l’individu.
L’esprit lorrain serait détenteur privilégié des qualités communes à la nation française.
En musique, comme en littérature, comme en politique, le génie français, menacé et donc plus
affirmé encore en Lorraine, résiderait dans une certaine modération. Lorsque Raymond
Poincaré, éminent homme d’Etat lorrain, veut rendre hommage à Charles Gounod, il évoque
sa modération comme une qualité éminemment française (Poincaré, 1906:109, Actes du
colloque organisé par l’Université Nancy 2 Nancy, PUN 1999:7-18).
Dès lors que les musiques française et allemande sont, à ce point, par essence
différente, la contamination n’est pas trop à craindre et l’on peut donner sans risque du
juillet 1905. Ce texte a été repris dans ROLLAND Romain, Musiciens d’aujourd’hui, 11ème
édition, Paris, Hachette 1908, p. 175-196.
120
Wagner à Nancy. Les premières auditions d’extraits de drames lyriques à Nancy ont
provoqué moins de réactions hostiles et moins d’incidents qu’à Paris. Lorsque le prélude
de Lohengrin est interprété en décembre 1884, la réaction est mitigée: l’œuvre est « très
chaleureusement applaudie et bissée » mais, en même temps, le chroniqueur de NancyArtiste note que « pas mal de personnes sont restées froides » et attribue cela au fait que
« probablement ces personnes ont pensé que la France possède encore assez de musiciens
de génie pour ne pas aller rechercher des ouvrages d’un étranger qui a été si dur et si
injuste pour notre pauvre France» (Nancy-Artiste , 27 décembre 1884). Pourtant, le
wagnérisme est bien représenté à Nancy et dans l’ensemble de la Lorraine demeurée
française. La ville accueille en 1903 avec ferveur Alfred Cortot qui diffuse, comme le note
La Lorraine-Artiste, non seulement la musique mais « l’idéologie wagnérienne », « de
façon presque apostolique» (La Lorraine-Artiste, 1903:378). Les critiques musicaux
lorrains peuvent exprimer l’émotion que provoquent certains passages de Wagner. Dans
une des nombreuses rééditions de son guide au Voyage à Bayreuth, Albert Lavignac a
joint un chapitre complémentaire établissant une « liste approximative » des Français
venus à Bayreuth et précisant leur ville d’origine (Lavignac, 1919:548-578). Les Lorrains,
encore absents lors de l’inauguration du Festspielhaus en 1876, commencent à venir en
1882 pour Parsifal, avec les familles Hess, Goudchaux et Auguste Kling. Lavignac
mettait en garde son lecteur en disant que ses renseignements pouvaient être inexacts. Il
faut ajouter au nom des wagnériens inscrits comme résidants à Nancy (Gaston Vallin en
1894) ou à Lunéville (Guérin en 1896), les noms de personnalités résidant à Paris mais qui
ont des liens certains avec l’histoire lorraine: Max d’Ollone, Maurice Barrès, la famille de
Wendel, Émile Gallé. Le répertoire symphonique et lyrique allemand (et autrichien), la
musique de chambre continuent donc à être très présents dans les programmes lorrains
entre 1871 et 1914, même si le répertoire français de Saint-Saëns à Massenet l’emporte.
Au théâtre, on donne régulièrement avec succès le Freischütz rebaptisé Robin des Bois,
Boccacio de Suppé, Martha de Flotow (Daval, 1887:117).
Bien qu’elles soient jouées, parfois acclamées, les œuvres allemandes sont, nous
l’avons vu, stigmatisées comme radicalement étrangères. Aucune réelle fusion des
traditions musicales ne semble possible, il faut choisir un camp, la musique est
« nationalisée » et ce phénomène est bien nouveau. Avant la Guerre de 1870, la frontière
était plus éloignée et on pouvait envisager des formes de rapprochement des traditions
musicales. En 1864 le Préfet de ce qui était encore le département de la Meurthe accordait
sans hésiter l’autorisation à un petit groupe de résidants allemands à Nancy de fonder une
société destinée à promouvoir « l’étude et l’exécution du chant allemand »: cette société
constituée lors d’une assemblée le 7 novembre 1864 avait pour nom La Germania
(Archives départementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, 4 M 99). L’annexion de la Moselle et
de l’Alsace explique la disparition de cette société après 1870.
La période de l’annexion a prouvé que l’usage « frontalier » de la musique consistant
à chercher à légitimer sa démarche musicale en lui affectant un sens national, de fondation ou
de défense de la nation, et pour cela affirmer s’en tenir aux traditions « purement » nationales,
à un style musical vernaculaire permettait bien, en réalité, composer ou interpréter une
musique influencée par la musique des autres nations, marquée par une sensibilité proche ou
trouver des éléments musicaux qui de façon plus ou moins fortuite coïncident avec ceux que
trouvent les autres musiciens parce que cela est dans l’air du temps. Il peut être utile ainsi de
s’intéresser aux œuvres dont l’argument évoque la Lorraine et la blessure de l’annexion. Si l’on
s’en tient à la production symphonique et lyrique, force est de constater qu’elles sont très rares.
Dans ce répertoire « lorrain », une œuvre est demeurée célèbre de Louis Ganne
connut un succès durable. Tous les nationalismes européens ont recouru aux marches. Le
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e
contexte dans lequel est créée l’œuvre de Ganne est significatif. La XVIII fête fédérale de
gymnastique de France est organisée à Nancy les 5 et 6 juin 1892. La marche nouvelle
servit à accueillir et à saluer la délégation des Sokols tchèques (La Lorraine-Artiste a. X,
n°24, 12 juin 1892:397). Elle fut reprise par les musiques civiles et militaires. La musique
de Ganne peut évoquer les compositions de František Kmoch (1848-1912) qui
accompagnaient les exercices gymniques de ces sociétés patriotiques tchèques, ce qui
impliquerait une esthétique commune aux nationalismes. Elle fait d’En passant par la
Lorraine et des sabots un symbole du maintien d’une tradition régionale populaire. Dans
sa Marche lorraine, Louis Ganne popularise l’air « en passant par la Lorraine, avec mes
sabots », également revendiqué comme un air breton sur des paroles, également « avec des
sabots », « En m'en revenant de Rennes », parfois considérée comme une variante de la
chanson dédiée à Anne de Bretagne, « duchesse en sabots ». Captation d’héritage,
« invention de tradition » (Hobsbawm, 1983), la marche composée par Louis Ganne fait
bien de la Lorraine le bastion de la nation. Un poème d’Émile Hinzelin donne un sens
peut-être précis à cette marche (à laquelle des paroles lorraines ont été ajoutées par la
suite) en publiant dans La Lorraine-Artiste un poème saluant la musique de Louis Ganne
et la délégation tchèque:
« Au nom de la France bénie
Je te salue peuple loyal et doux
Qui gardes sans faiblir avec un soin jaloux
L’intégrité de ton génie.
Ils sont finis les temps de deuil !
Peuple fidèle au front superbe et téméraire,
Peuple à l’esprit superbe et généreux mon frère,
La Lorraine te fait accueil »
(La Lorraine-Artiste a. X, n°24, 12 juin 1892:397).
Le poète assimile la souffrance des Lorrains placés sous le joug allemand et celle
des Tchèques soumis aux Habsbourg, il leur prête des traits communs de nations ne
cherchant pas la guerre mais prêtes à se défendre. Il assimile surtout la résistance
culturelle française et tchèque à l’hégémonie d’une culture germanique. Les qualités
musicales de la marche, si elles sont réelles, ne suffisent donc à expliquer l’immense
succès d’une œuvre qui s’inscrit dans un contexte optimiste, celui de l’alliance francorusse, qui pourrait être élargie en une mythique alliance des « Latins » et des « Slaves »
contre les « Germains ».
La vie musicale impulsée par Ropartz et le succès d’une musique populaire qui
mêle un militarisme paisible et un caractère populaire ont permis à Lorraine demeurée
française de se construire une image musicale de frontière, à la fois militarisée et capable
d’opposer un front culturel à l’hégémonie allemande. Qu’en est-il de l’autre côté de la
frontière? Peut-on observer une situation symétrique?
Une première remarque s’impose: la musique française reste bien présente en
Moselle. Des musiciens de Nancy traversent la frontière. En avril 1908, l’Association
musicale de Metz, dirigée par Walter Unger réunit ainsi des musiciens français et
allemands qui jouent ensemble la Passion selon Saint Mathieu de Bach (Le Mercure
Lorrain, n°8, 15 avril 1908:61). En 1906, Gabriel Pierné revient à Metz pour créer sa
Croisade des enfant, chantée en allemand. Les critiques et les musiciens favorables à la
France accusent à la fois, paradoxalement, le système musical allemand d’ignorer et de
piller le répertoire français. Dans le premier numéro de sa nouvelle revue, Le Mercure
lorrain, paru en avril 1908, René d’Avril écrit « en prélude » pour expliquer le titre de sa
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publication, qui d’ailleurs fut bien éphémère: « Ce dieu, déjà lorrain pour tout dire, frappé
à l’effigie d’un César qui ressemblerait un peu à M. Barrès, c’est lui que nous invoquerons
pour la défense et l’illustration de l’art en Lorraine, contre tout Barbare qui chercherait à
ravir nos trésors ou simplement à en contester la valeur » (Le Mercure Lorrain, n°1,
1avril 1908:1).
Le programme du Théâtre de Metz met en évidence le maintien du répertoire
français avec des reprises comme celle des Dragons de Villars de Maillart.
Les échanges culturels entre Lorraine française et Lorraine annexée ne sont pas
sans enjeux économiques. En août 1902, La Lorraine–Artiste de Nancy se félicite de
l’inauguration, à Metz, d’un nouvel orgue de la maison Cavaillé-Coll dans l’église SaintEucaire (La Lorraine-Artiste, 1902:288). Le musicien qui inaugure l’instrument est Paul
Pierné (le cousin de Gabriel, dont il joue d’ailleurs un Prélude). « Il est intéressant de voir
la facture française s’imposer en pays messin », se réjouit la revue culturelle nancéienne
(La Lorraine-Artiste, 1902:288). Mais avec l’instrument, le répertoire français (Pierné,
Widor, Saint-Saëns…) s’impose aux côtés de Bach.
Mais il est un domaine où les mélomanes de Lorraine française semblent parfois
envier ceux de Lorraine annexée : c’est celui de la vie associative musicale, de la densité
du réseau d’association et de leur mode de fonctionnement. La Lorraine-Artiste félicite, en
1902, l’Association musicale Messine pour son nouveau système d’abonnement par
souscription ((La Lorraine-Artiste, 1902:334-335). La vie associative musicale dans les
départements de la Meurthe-et-Moselle, des Vosges ou de la Meuse, loin d’être
négligeable, n’atteint pas cependant les proportions de celle de la Moselle annexée. Le
Messin présente de façon très favorable la première fête chorale lorraine donnée à
Sarrebourg le 18 juin 1893. Il n’y eut « pas la moindre note discordante» (Le Messin, 22
juin 1893). Le baron Schott de Schottenberg, président de la société des chanteurs
d’Alsace-Lorraine et l’ensemble des autorités étaient présents. Le docteur Brand, maire
de Sarrebourg, dressa, dans son discours, une « histoire du chant allemand ». On
inaugura la bannière du Liederkranz de Sarrebourg, fondé en 1878. L’institution du
Männergesangverein s’était suffisamment généralisée pour que la manifestation ait un
aspect de manifestation de masse avec 32 sociétés représentées par 900 membres. Le
Gesangverein de Strasbourg emporta le prix en interprétant Germanenzug de
Rheinberger mais les auditeurs conservèrent surtout le souvenir d’avoir entendu chanter
ensemble 850 choristes.
Ce mouvement associationniste musical mosellan accompagne la présence
d’institutions étatiques allemandes. En juillet 1893, l’inspecteur des musiques militaires
arrive à Metz pour diriger les répétitions des manifestations qui doivent marquer la visite
de l’Empereur Guillaume à partir du 4 septembre (Le Messin, 22 juillet 1893). Plus de
6000 personnes accueillent l’Empereur (des fonctionnaires, des élus, des représentants des
Églises, etc.). Le 6 septembre un concert est donné par les musiques du 67ème d’infanterie
et le 9ème de Dragons (Le Messin, 6 septembre 1893).
Le réseau associatif musical mosellan a pu favoriser l’émergence d’un répertoire
original mais il ne s’agit pas de morceaux équivalents à la Marche lorraine qui triomphe
de l’autre côté de la frontière. Ces œuvres témoignent des contacts fréquents entre la
Lorraine annexée et ses musiciens en partie formés par des institutions françaises avant
l’annexion et l’Allemagne nouvelle. La figure de Théodore Gouvy est, à cet égard,
exemplaire: né en Sarre « prussienne » en 1819, il ne put s’inscrire au Conservatoire de
Paris, tenta cependant de faire carrière en France mais finit par travailler essentiellement à
Leipzig. Une partie de sa production est destinée aux associations chorales, en particulier
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à partir de 1873, celle de Hombourg-Haut, favorisée par la société des forges que possède
sa famille et dirigée par un militaire allemand (Roth, Halbreich, Teutsch, 1999).
Forte présence de l’État et des institutions dans la vie musicale, densité du réseau
associatif, militarisation de la vie associative musicale et choix d‘instrumentations
« cuivrées ». Bien des traits rapprochent les deux côtés de la frontière. Certes, on joue
peut-être plus souvent Bocaccio de Franz von Suppé à Metz qu’à Nancy et, inversement,
on découvre très vite à Nancy, grâce à Guy Ropartz, ce que la musique française, en
particulier dans le répertoire symphonique, produit de plus original (en particulier Albéric
Magnard, dont les œuvres sont souvent créées à Nancy).
Si l’on s’en tient aux proclamations, le nationalisme a creusé un fossé culturel
infranchissable entre la France et l’Allemagne. La musique doit choisir son camp et être
française ou allemande. Les choses en réalité sont beaucoup plus nuancées et les contacts
musicaux ne sont jamais coupés par la frontière. L’émergence des musiques qui se veulent
l’expression exclusive d’une nation se produit simultanément dans l’ensemble de
l’Europe. Nombreux sont les compositeurs «nationaux» originaires de pays parfois
éloignés qui ont eu la même formation, les mêmes maîtres (par exemple Reinecke à
Leipzig), les mêmes modèles et à qui les institutions étatiques et partisanes demandent de
produire des musiques ayant les mêmes fonctions sociales, cérémonielles ou des musiques
évoquant de façon comparable les origines ou la géographie d’une nation. Compositeurs et
critiques proclament qu’est née une musique de la nation. Mais ces musiques sont-elles si
différentes les unes des autres?
L’exemple de la musique en Lorraine entre 1871 et 1914 montre à quel point les
ressentiments ou les antagonismes n’empêchent pas l’émergence d’une culture européenne
commune. Même si la frontière n’est pas imperméable, si une culture commune persiste, si
toute la production ne peut être assimilée à une production nationale, quelques œuvres sont
choisies de façon significative pour unifier symboliquement la nation et la représenter. Le
succès durable de la Marche lorraine comme symbole identitaire à la fois régional et national
est, à cet égard significatif, d’une Lorraine que l’histoire aurait condamnée à être la plus
française des régions et à offrir un concentré des signes d’appartenance à la nation.
Les cultures frontalières: perspectives de nouvelles approches de l’art de la
différence.
L’exemple des frontières musicales a déjà fait l’objet d’études et de publications,
le rapprochement entre les représentations des frontières impliquant le corps étudiées dans
le cadre du programme NAFTES aboutit à des résultats en cours de publication dont le
présent article n’épuise pas, loin de là, la richesse. Le renouvellement des approches des
frontières culturelles, grâce à l’application d’une forme de dé-construction d’identités
distinctes doit aussi être étudié de façon systématique à partir d’autres corpus qu e la
musique, la danse et la gastronomie. Quelques films emblématiques suffiront à évoquer
l’importance des sources cinématographiques pour comprendre comment les
représentations accompagnent, critiquent, justifient ou contestent les frontières politiques.
Les relations franco-allemandes dont la pacification a été présentée comme le
modèle d’une étape de la construction européenne ont donné pas mal de passages de
frontières significatifs. D’une certaine façon, La Grande Illusion de Jean Renoir (1937),
montrant la fraternisation de soldats et d’officiers des armées ennemis attachés à leur rang
social au moins autant qu’à leur nation, se poursuit avec Le Passage du Rhin d’André
Cayatte: un prisonnier de guerre ayant travaillé en Allemagne (le personnage de Roger
interprété par Charles Aznavour) peut décider de revenir s’y installer librement après la
guerre. La constitution d’un corpus de films montrant non pas les frontières telles qu’elles
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sont dans la réalité mais montrant ce que sont les frontières dans la mémoire et l’imaginaire
conduit à ne pas négliger des films qui ne sont pas nécessairement représentatifs de la
production de masse, qui n’ont pas triomphé au box-office mais qui expriment de façon
parfois complexe l’inscription des démarcations territoriales dans les rêves autant que dans
les réalités. À cet égard, l’attitude « quantitativiste » qui prévaut parfois et qui consisterait,
sous prétexte de ne pas confondre valeur esthétique et valeur heuristique d’une source
cinématographique, à privilégier dont le succès commercial accompagne une certaine
pauvreté de facture et de « contenu » ne convient pas ici. Certes, Godard est plus difficile à
interpréter comme « reflet » de son époque et de sa société que de Funès mais faut-il y
renoncer ? Deux cinéastes majeurs, sans doute éloignés des grands circuits de distribution,
apparaissent à bien des égards comme des cinéastes de la frontière. Il faut certainement que
l’histoire culturelle évite l’écueil de l’ « œuvrisme » qui consisterait à accumuler une
érudition repliée sur la seule production d’un artiste ou d’un écrivain. L’idée d’une approche
d’histoire culturelle de la frontière à partir de sa représentation cinématographique ne peut
conduire à l’établissement d’une simple série de films évoquant plus ou moins précisément
les frontières. La cohérence des visions et la perception de tous les éléments d’un imaginaire
de la frontière nécessite cependant le repérage de constantes dans l’œuvre
cinématographique qui revient de façon lancinante sur la question de cette ligne de partage,
comme s’il s’agissait d’une blessure originelle constitutive. Les deux cinéastes majeurs qui
peuvent, nous semble-t-il, susciter une première réflexion sur une histoire culturelle des
frontières à partir de films sont Theo Angelopoulos et Andreï Tarkovski.
Dès ses premiers films, le cinéaste grec Angelopoulos s’intéresse à des parcours
transfrontaliers. Le voyage des comédiens (Ο Θίασος, 975) replace une tournée théâtrale
au cœur de la Guerre mondiale puis de la Guerre civile. Dans Le Voyage à Cythère (Ταξίδι
στα Κύθηρα, 1983), un ancien résistant communiste profite de l’amnistie qui suit la chute
du régime des colonels, pour retrouver sa Macédoine. Dans Paysage dans le brouillard
(Τοπίο στην Οµίχλη, 1988), un frère et une sœur grecs cherchent en Allemagne leur père
qu’ils n’ont jamais vu. Mais c’est avec Le Pas suspendu de la cigogne (Το Μετέωρο Βήµα
του Πελαργού, 1991) que le cinéaste grec fait de la question de la frontière le sujet central
du film. Angelopoulos semble dans ses films suivants fasciné par la frontière continentale
du nord de la Grèce et les confins de l’ex-Guerre froide qui séparait de façon différente la
Grèce « occidentale » et les pays se réclamant du socialisme, qu’il s’agisse de l’Albanie
d’Enver Hoxha, de la République ex-Yougoslave de Macédoine ou de la Bulgarie. Dans
Le Regard d’Ulysse (Το Βλέµµα του Οδυσσέα, 1995), un cinéaste grec exilé cherche dans
tous les Balkans de vieilles bobines de pellicule. Le périple du cinéaste multiplie les
passages de frontière. Dans un triste paysage enneigé, le cinéaste, interprété par Harvey
Keitel12, passe en taxi la frontière gréco-albanaise, avec une passagère impérévue, une
vieille dame cherchant à retrouver sa famille à Korça. Puis, traversant les Balkans, le
voyage conduit en train à Bucarest. Chaque passage de frontière est un épreuve et le
voyage est bien un voyage initiatique. Dans L’Eternité et un jour (Μια αιωνιότητα και µια
µέρα, 1998), Angelopoulos met en scène un vieil écrivain (interprété par Bruno Ganz) qui
doit quitter la maison de sa jeunesse et se retrouve sur la route avec un gamin perdu. La
frontière n’est pas une simple discontinuité spatiale, elle implique toute une dimension de
parcours dans le temps. Les héros d’Angelopoulos agissent tous en historien face à cet
objet singulier qu’est la frontière. Il faut passer de l’autre côté du miroir pour retrouver et
surtout comprendre le passé et l’ensemble des traumatismes qui nous marquent. La
frontière n’est pas seulement un rapport plus ou moins constructif à l’altérité, elle est une
12
Le rôle devait être à l’origine interprété par Gian Maria Volntè, décédé en cours de tournage.
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donnée indispensable à la construction d’une identité. L’histoire culturelle permet ainsi
d’accéder à des connotations plus intimes de ce qui fait la frontière : la transgression,
illustrée facilement lorsque la différence de législation permet dans tel pays européen
d’accéder à des produits interdits ailleurs, la plongée dans le passé lorsque le pays voisin
est pensé comme étant moins développé.
L’itinéraire « frontalier » de Tarkovski introduit dans les parcours initiatiques
marqués par les frontières une dimension morale. L’enfance d’Ivan (Иваново детство,
1962) se situe essentiellement le long de la ligne de front, pendant la Grande Guerre
Patriotique de 1941-1945. La guerre conter le nazisme est bien une guerre contre le Mal
avec une présentation du côté du bien qui ne simplifie jamais l’héroïsme mais montre sa
complexité. Le jeune héros se montre autoritaire, peu attentif au monde qui l’entoure,
accaparé par le combat contre le Mal. Stalker (Сталкер, 1979) conduit à une question de
transgression de frontière. Quelque part, dans un lieu indéfinissable il existe une zone,
coupée du monde par une frontière surveillée en permanence, infranchissable. Le lieu est
réputé être dangereux mais en son cœur un lieu encore plus secret la « chambre » est un
lieu où tous les désirs peuvent être réalisés. Les téméraires qui cherchent à entrer dans la
zone et à accéder à la « chambre » doivent se faire aider par des passeurs appelés
« Stalkers » qui seuls peuvent guider, y compris en traversant la ligne dangereuse de
démarcation constamment surveillée. Le film de Tarkovski évoque le voyage d’un savant
et d’un écrivain qui cherchent à atteindre la « chambre » avec leur « stalker ». Le
franchissement de la zone frontalière avec ses barbelés, ses policiers évoque certes tout ce
qui faisait le «rideau de fer» mais on aurait tort de limiter le film à une charge dénonçant
les réalités soviétiques et tout ce qui empêchait la libre circulation des personnes dans les
pays du « bloc socialiste ». Contraint à l’exil en Italie, Tarkovski réalise en 1983 un film
sur le destin d’un poète russe cherchant à retrouver des traces d’un compositeur russe
ayant vécu en Italie au XVIIIe siècle. Il s’agit de Nostalghia. La frontière entre le pays
perdu et l’exil est moins visible que la frontière de la zone de Stalker. Il y a bien pourtant
des zones de passages d’un univers à l’autre. Lorsqu’à la fin le poète cherche à faire
passer d’un côté à l’autre de la piscine thermale vide la faible flamme vacillante d’une
chandelle, le geste de cette transmission, de ce témoignage met bien en évidence le fait
qu’en histoire culturelle ce qui relève du passage est aussi important que ce qui relève, de
façon corollaire de la démarcation.
En 2009, le festival théâtral de Nancy qui symbolise le dépassement culturel du
Mur de Berlin en est à sa onzième édition. Il s’appelle de façon significative Passages. Le
travail sur les frontières et sur leur dépassement gagne ainsi à associer étroitement
recherche et contacts avec les professionnels de la culture. La journée de lancement du
programme NAFTES dont il est question dans la première partie de cette a été faite au
Château de Lunéville le 25 septembre 2009. Cette réflexion sur les frontières culturelles,
vingt ans après la chute du Mur ne pouvait pas négliger la place de l’engagement de gens
comme Rostropovitch contre ce que les réalités soviétiques ou inspirées par le modèle
soviétique ont eu de plus insupportable pour les sociétés. Le violoncelliste Jean de
Spengler a joué un extrait d’une Suite de Bach, en hommage à ce qu’a joué Rostropovitch
au pied du Mur de Berlin. L’approche des frontières en histoire culturelle peut ainsi avoir
quelque chose de l’ordre d’une démarche expérimentale ouverte et vivante qui consiste à
confronter chaque jour la recherche à son environnement social dans le cadre d’une action
culturelle. Les Sciences Humaines et Sociales n’ont pas de brevets à déposer, ni d’aide
technique au progrès de l’humanité à proposer. La valorisation des Sciences Humaines et
Sociales passe par une présence dans la société : elle ne se fait pas seulement en aval pour
diffuser des publications, elle se fait aussi en amont. La réception des idées exposées dans
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des conférences publiques ouvertes aide à mieux formuler les questionnements et apporte
souvent des éléments de réponse. Un telle exigence est particulièrement vive lorsqu’il
s’agit de faits frontaliers. Les Sciences Humaines et Sociales, l’histoire culturelle qui
cherche à dialoguer avec les professionnels de la culture, sont également placés devant un
choix : soit l’on illustre les « petites différences » en légitimant ce qui sépare, soit on
cherche ce qui rassemble en créant de multiples parcours de passage d’une société à
l’autre. On l’aura compris, nous souhaitons nous engager dans cette seconde voie. C’est
pourquoi nous souhaitons que les institutions s’intéressant aux frontières culturelles
s’inscrivent dans une recherche systématiquement comparatiste sur les cultures
européennes. D’ailleurs, même lorsque des formes artistiques sont censées exprimées une
originalité atavique irréductible, elles touchent malgré tout à une certaine universalité13.
Le même folklore régional peut être intégré à la célébration d’une nation ou
présenté comme un trait inassimilable à cette nation, comme une preuve qu’il faut que la
région s’émancipe, qu’elle est une nation soumise qui doit devenir indépendante. Le cas
est net entre 1870 et 1914 pour la musique traditionnelle irlandaise qui peut être intégrée
aux œuvres de compositeurs loyaux envers la Couronne du Royaume–Uni ou à des
manifestations hostiles à la domination britannique. Le marquage folklorique de la
musique anglaise et des musiques des régions celtiques périphériques (des côtes de
Cornouailles à l’Écosse, du Pays de Galles à l’Irlande…) est d’ailleurs musicalement tout
à fait comparable (Blake, 1997:46).
La même musique celtique a des vertus loyalistes ou irrédentistes. Ce qui est vrai
à l’échelle d’un État l’est peut-être aussi pour l’Europe. Les folklores sont-ils si différents
les uns des autres? L’idée de fonder la musique «nationale» sur le folklore ne contribue-telle pas à fonder une culture européenne commune ? Quelques notes de cornemuse nous
conduisent les auditeurs français dans une imaginaire Bretagne alors que l’instrument
marque aussi bien l’Écosse, la Galice. Il est une marque «celtique» mais n’est-ce pas
encore trop restrictif ? La parenté des folklores ne peut-elle être étendue?
Il y a eu un moment où toute l’Europe s’est sentie espagnole, en partie pour rejeter
l’influence de Wagner. Bizet, Glinka, Tchaïkovski, Arnold Bax, Debussy, Ravel,
Chabrier, Sibelius ont écrit de la musique espagnole plus ou moins authentique. Depuis
Glinka, les compositeurs russes se sont particulièrement sentis une âme espagnole. Le
Capriccio espagnol de Rimski l’atteste bien en 1887. Ainsi César Cui écrit à Enrique
Granados: « Merci, très cordialement merci pour vos Danses espagnoles. Elles sont
ravissantes, charmante par leur mélodie et l’harmonisation. Il est curieux que toutes les
expressions populaires, riches et authentiques, de certains pays aient un air de famille et
une similitude qui provient des modes anciens dans lesquelles elles furent composées. Vos
chansons ont un tel caractère d’originalité individuelle que je ne m’attendais pas à
trouver cette ressemblance »14.
La familiarité des folklores tient peut-être à ce que, dans toute l’Europe, les
folkloristes ont recherché la même chose. Ce ne sont pas les folklores qui se ressemblent mais
les folkloristes. Ayant eu une formation musicale comparable - Ilmari Krohn, par exemple est
passé à Leipzig, ils apprécient les mêmes choses dans le patrimoine folklorique, ils recherchent
13
14
Nous avons noté ce phénomène dans un passage consacré à la parenté des folklores dans Le
Chant des Nations, , Poaris, Hachette 2004.
FERNANDEZ Antonio, présentation du CD GRANADOS Enrique, Doce Danzas españolas
para piano Alicia de Larrocha, piano. EMI CDM7 64529. Antonio Fernandez insiste sur le fait
que le folklore de Granados est imaginaire, qu’il ne s’agit pas de transcriptions d’authentiques
airs populaires mais d’une invention qu’il considère comme plus authentique encore.
127
les mêmes choses, et donc rejettent des musiques comparables comme inauthentiques et
indignes de figurer dans les recueils de musique populaire. Le folklore européen a subi une
forme de normalisation. Le projet politique utopique n’est pas seul en cause: des modèles
implicites d’authenticité des musiques populaires guident les choix. Les formes « marquées »
comme folkloriques sont reconnaissables un peu partout comme des récits épiques (comme le
Kalevala), des berceuses, des danses aux premiers temps bien marqués, des hymnes
religieux…Même lorsque l’on n’a pas forgé de toute pièce les folklores, leur redécouverte
s’est faite dans des conditions comparables, avec des objectifs comparables et cherchant à
établir un corpus comparable et utilisé de façon souvent très proche. L’Europe a bien à la
veille de la Première Guerre mondiale une musique commune, jusque dans ses emprunts aux
folklores. C’est peut-être une forme de préhistoire de la «World Music» dont il s’agit.
La « World Music » de ce début de XXIe siècle, mêlant et adaptant à une certaine
idée de la modernité des chants populaires du monde entier, a pu être présentée comme
une forme d’appropriation abusive de la musique des autres, d’intégration peu
respectueuse des cultures périphériques par la culture —et le commerce— des centres de
pouvoir et de richesse. Prenant l’exemple de l’Afrique du Sud, Veit Erlmann a mis en
évidence que la « globalisation » musicale n’est pas seulement une forme de pillage postcolonial mais aussi un dialogue. Il situe le début de ce processus de « globalisation » dans
la période des années 1890 et cite les tournées effectuées en Angleterre et aux États-Unis
par des chœurs d’Afrique du Sud. Le travail entrepris en France dans le cadre d’un
programme de l’Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) sur la globalisation musicale,
programme auquel nous sommes associés15, contribue donc à sa façon à une approche des
cultures frontalières.
Au terme de cette réflexion sur une approche des faits frontaliers en histoire
culturelle, nous pouvons d’abord remarquer la profonde unité de la démarche d’histoire
culturelle qui à partir de représentations très différentes et de modes d’expression très
différent, de la musique au cinéma, de la gastronomie au théâtre parle de choses aussi
sérieux que les questions d’identification, de captation de légitimité ou de violence. C’est
pourquoi cet article peut adopter une forme presque programmatique pour tenter de
démontrer que le renouvellement des objets de recherche (la danse, la gastronomie) ou leur
association inédite (dans le cadre du programme NAFTES, par exemple) peut enrichir les
monographies portant sur des aspects plus « classiques » tels que la musique ou la
littérature. Lors du 3ème Congrès de l’International Society for Cultural History à Turku, en
mai 2010, Jacques Revel a rappelé l’importance de réfléchir aux faits sociaux à partir de
leurs représentations en maniant des échelles différentes. Les cadres frontaliers rendent
particulièrement nécessaire le passage incessant du local au régional, de l’étatique au
multinational. Avec de tels aller-retour, dépassant même la notion de transferts culturels,
dépassant ce qui ne serait que bilatéral, l’histoire culturelle ne peut être instrumentalisée au
profit d’une cause institutionnelle qu’elle soit nationale ou européenne: elle peut aider les
sociétés à s’interroger sur les visions d’elles-mêmes et des sociétés voisines, même sur leur
côté sombres les moins justifiables. C’est peut-être dans cette liberté qu’elle peut dialoguer
avec des professionnels de la culture, artistes, écrivains, même avec les plus transgressifs.
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Nourritures et territoires en Europe.
La gastronomie comme frontière culturelle.
Denis SAILLARD
« On ne peut guère imaginer matière plus intimement liée à notre existence et à nos
activités quotidiennes que le boire et le manger. Il est indéniable que la cuisine et
les us et coutumes qui s’y rapportent, reflètent et modèlent de diverse manière les
lieux, la nature, l’histoire, la façon de voir les choses, le savoir technique, le
modèle social et la situation économique de chaque société. »
Document Europa de la Poste islandaise, 2005.
Abstract: The gastronomical discourse often links food and territory. It draws a lot of
material and mental « borders ». This is the case for national discourses, yesterday and today. For
instance « national » gets the upper hand of « transnational » on Europa stamps issued in 2005
whose topic was Gastronomy. However history tell us that inter and extra-European food trade
and culinary exchange were quite developed. Their speeding-up since several decades and fusion
cuisine’s fast spread lead to current questioning about the future of European gastronomical
cultures. Some cultural borders are revived or modified.
Keywords: identities, nation, nationalism, cultural transfers, transnational.
Le discours gastronomique ne cesse de repérer des liens géographiques,
territoriaux, entre la nourriture et une région donnée: zones de production d’un aliment,
régions où l’on élabore un « plat typique », où l’on fait un usage alimentaire spécifique ou
réputé tel, etc. Il peut s’agir d’un discours scientifique, par exemple quand, en 1937,
Lucien Febvre établit des cartes des fonds de cuisine français (beurre, graisses animales,
huiles, ...) pour le tout nouveau musée national des arts et traditions populaires (Ferrières,
2009:201-219). Cependant ce discours peut aussi servir à marquer une différenciation
anthropologique souvent dévalorisante pour l’Autre. Il n’est guère nécessaire d’insister sur
la kyrielle de sobriquets de nature alimentaire utilisés pour désigner les autres, ceux du
village, de la région ou de la nation situés au-delà d’une « frontière », administrative ou
non: les Français sont taxés de froggies, mangeurs de grenouilles, de l’autre côté de la
Manche (Moulin, 1989:10). Eux-mêmes ont longtemps désigné les immigrés italiens par
le terme de macaroni (Leveratto, 2010 et Noiriel, 2010). Un biographe d’Emile Zola a
stigmatisé la consommation d’huile d’olive de l’auteur de Germinal afin de rappeler ses
origines transalpines et décrédibiliser son œuvre et ses idées (Courtine, 1978:5-19 ; sur ce
littérateur gastronomique, cf. Francfort, 2007:257-274). En Toscane, les habitants de
Farnocchia sont qualifiés de fagiolani c’est-à-dire de haricots donc d’idiots, par ceux des
villages voisins (Tak, 1988).
S’établit par conséquent une représentation des autres et des « identiques », deux
groupes séparés par une frontière culturelle. Ici je m’interrogerai principalement sur la
construction d’un discours gastronomique territorial à l’échelle de la nation qui aboutit à
tracer des frontières culturelles entre les différents Etats d’Europe. Ces délimitations, dans
le contexte actuel de l’intégration européenne et de la mondialisation, trahissent-elles la
volonté d’une fermeture à autrui ou expriment-elles simplement la volonté
d’individualiser une culture au sein d’un grand espace géopolitique et économique ouvert
? J’analyserai principalement les choix faits par soixante et une administrations postales
européennes quand il s’est agi, pour la série Europa en 2005, de produire des timbres sur
la « gastronomie ». Les émissions philatéliques font partie de la panoplie de vecteurs
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utilisés pour conférer une identité à une nation (Anderson, 1983; Thiesse, 2006) et il
importe de comprendre la symbolique utilisée par les Etats « anciens », recréés ou
nouveaux, voire les entités non officiellement reconnues ou provisoires, en ce début de
XXIe siècle, près de cinquante ans après le traité de Rome et quinze ans après la chute du
Mur de Berlin. D’autre part, au début de l’année 2006, le Conseil de l’Europe publiait un
beau livre dont le titre, Cultures culinaires d’Europe. Identité, diversité et dialogue,
indique assez bien la dialectique contenue dans notre objet d’étude. En effet, étudier la
construction de marqueurs identitaires gastronomiques invite également à aborder la
question des migrations et des transferts alimentaires et culinaires, donc des échanges à
travers l’histoire avec l’Autre, de la transgression de la frontière culturelle.
Les timbres Europa 2005: « la gastronomie »
Depuis 1993 PostEurop est l’organisme international héritier, pour la partie
postale, de la Conférence européenne des postes et télécommunications (CEPT), qui avait
été fondée en 1956 par les six Etats de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de
l’acier (CECA). Chaque année PostEurop fixe un thème commun à ses membres pour une
émission, très prisée par les philatélistes du monde entier, qui porte le label Europa.
Chaque membre est totalement libre pour le choix de son visuel et le nombre de timbres.
En 2005 ce dernier fut compris entre un et six. Cette année-là PostEurop reconnaissait le
label de l’émission Europa à 53 « entités », Etats à part entière, « dépendances » d’Etats
européens: ses 43 membres et 10 autres entités, dont certaines, depuis, ont rejoint
l’organisme. Comme toutes les institutions européennes PostEurop est confronté à la
question de la définition de l’Europe. Elle reprend celle de la CEPT, qui incluait – pardelà donc le rideau de fer à l’époque de sa définition – « tous les pays situés à l’ouest
d’une ligne partant du milieu du Bosphore, traversant la mer Noire et la mer Caspienne
jusqu’à l’embouchure de l’Oural, longeant le fleuve et suivant la crête des monts de
l’Oural. » Cette définition de nature géographique permet à la Turquie et aussi au
Kazakhstan d’émettre officiellement des timbres Europa, mais en revanche elle est
quelque peu ambiguë sur l’appartenance ou non à l’Europe des Etats caucasiens. Dans les
faits PostEurop reconnaît les émissions Europa de l’Arménie, de l’Azerbaïdjan et de la
Géorgie. En revanche, pour des raisons philatéliques et politiques, l’organisme postal
européen considère comme abusives les utilisations de la mention Europa émanant
d’autres pays situés au-delà de cette limite géographique.
Cependant, les documents officiels de PostEurop sont parfois contradictoires ou
confus: ainsi dans la Revue annuelle de PostEurop pour l’année 2005, Andorre, qui est
sous double administration postale espagnole et française, est porté sur la carte officielle
(Annual Review, 2005:2-3) mais ne figure pas dans la liste des 53 (Annual Review,
2005:47-50); tandis que l’île de Man, Jersey et Guernesey sont regroupés dans une seule
« entité ». D’autre part la présente étude n’a pas les mêmes objectifs que la classification
officielle de PostEurop, par ailleurs très évolutive depuis 1993. Aussi nous considérons ici
61 « entités » émettrices. Les Pays-Bas n’ont pas émis de timbre en 2005; nous ajoutons
aux 52 postes Andorre, Madère, les Açores, l’île de Man et Guernesey, ainsi que les deux
administrations postales bosniaques (croate et serbe), celle du Monténégro (indépendant
quelques mois plus tard) et enfin celle de Chypre du Nord (« République turque de Chypre
du Nord ») fonctionnant pour une entité non reconnue par l’ONU. Ces quatre dernières
administrations postales sont, logiquement, ignorées par PostEurop (sauf erreur le Kosovo
n’a commencé à émettre des timbres Europa qu’en 2006) qui compte parmi ses membres
les Etats souverains de Chypre et de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Mais la façon dont ce type de
territoire se représente nous intéresse quand il s’agit d’analyser les frontières culturelles.
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Une transnationalité culturelle minoritaire, traversée par des identités
culturelles nationales
Une nette majorité d’administrations postales, 46 sur 61 soit 75% (groupe 1), a
choisi une ou plusieurs recettes ou produits typiques de son pays; 7 (groupe 2) ont émis
des visuels plus génériques mais porteurs eux aussi d’une identité territoriale et culturelle:
Andorre, Biélorussie, Chypre, Danemark, Estonie, Saint Marin, Vatican; 8 autres enfin
(groupe 3) des représentations sans référence géographique, si ce n’est européenne dans
son ensemble, mais pas forcément dépourvues de marqueurs identitaires: Allemagne,
Croatie, France, Grande-Bretagne, île de Man, Italie, Liechtenstein, Suisse.
A l’évidence le groupe 3 possède une certaine unité avec trois des six pays
fondateurs de la Communauté européenne auxquels s’ajoute la Grande-Bretagne. Et, dans
une classification de type culturel, il n’est pas étonnant de retrouver le Liechtenstein et la
Suisse dans un groupe où figurent l’Allemagne et la France. Ainsi la seule compréhension
du terme « gastronomie » délimite une frontière culturelle entre deux groupes de pays
européens. Ce terme possède en effet deux sens. Il est très souvent utilisé comme
synonyme de « cuisine » et c’est donc dans cette acception que la plupart des
administrations postales l’ont entendu. Cependant la gastronomie, au sens premier, est la
«connaissance de tout ce qui se rapporte à la cuisine, à l’ordonnancement des repas, à l’art
de déguster et d’apprécier les mets» selon le dictionnaire Larousse, qui s’inspire de l’énoncé
de Brillat-Savarin (Physiologie du Goût, 1826): « La gastronomie est la connaissance
raisonnée de tout ce qui a rapport à l’homme en tant qu’il se nourrit. Son but est de veiller à
la conservation des hommes au moyen de la meilleure nourriture possible».
L’administration postale allemande, dans la présentation de son timbre, précise
soigneusement la définition de « gastronomie ». Son texte souligne les origines « grécofrançaises » du mot. L’Allemagne, en représentant par un simple trait blanc sur fond noir
une table portant un verre, une bouteille, une bougie et une tasse sur une soucoupe, stylise
la gastronomie davantage encore que la Croatie et l’Italie qui ont choisi deux produits
symboliques de l’alimentation, le pain et le vin pour la première, le blé et le raisin pour la
seconde. Les deux timbres italiens sont les seuls de toute la série Europa 2005 à utiliser le
drapeau européen comme fond. La France, le Liechtenstein, l’île de Man et la Suisse
représentent la haute cuisine. Man consacre son timbre à la formation des jeunes chefs
(Youth Programme Masterchef). Le timbre suisse, comme l’allemand, se veut par sa
stylisation particulièrement transnational : la mention « art culinaire » figure en quatre
langues et une carte de l’Europe apparaît sur la cloche au centre de la table. De surcroît
cette cloche masque son contenu. La Grande-Bretagne enfin a émis une série de six
timbres, rebaptisée « Changer de goûts (Changing Tastes) », illustrant le multiculturalisme
alimentaire moderne; l’Afrique et l’Asie font, grâce à elle, leur entrée dans la gastronomie
vue d’Europe.
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Par conséquent il est possible de percevoir une différenciation culturelle y compris
dans le groupe des émissions transnationales. L’histoire de la gastronomie française
conduit ainsi logiquement au timbre Europa de 2005. Cela fait maintenant plus de trois
siècles, depuis la révolution culinaire des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles et les tables royales de
Versailles, que la France joue un rôle primordial dans la gastronomie mondiale. C’est dès
la fin du XVIIIe siècle que se crée à Paris, métropole particulièrement bien approvisionnée
par une production nationale et internationale extrêmement variée, le restaurant moderne.
Quelques années encore et, grâce à Grimod de la Reynière, Antonin Carême, BrillatSavarin puis leurs nombreux émules, la France réinvente le discours gastronomique grec
antique, fait de la gourmandise une qualité et exporte ses chefs dans le monde entier (Ory,
1998; Ferguson, 2004; Hache-Bissette et Saillard, 2007).
Elle souligne continuellement la grande diversité et la richesse de ses terroirs et
rappelle qu’elle est la patrie des banquets gaulois, du cuisinier médiéval Taillevent et de
Rabelais. Elle dresse un Panthéon virtuel à ses chefs du passé, Vatel, Auguste Escoffier,
Prosper Montagné, etc. comme à ceux d’aujourd’hui, de Ducasse à Gagnaire en passant
par Bocuse et Robuchon. Le dessin du timbre Europa – le chef en plus – est similaire à
celui émis nationalement en 1980 qui portait déjà la mention « gastronomie française ».
La Grande-Bretagne, elle, se veut officiellement la promotrice du multiculturalisme depuis
de longues décennies. Dans le domaine gastronomique cela n’empêche pas qu’il existe
toujours Outre-Manche, ne serait-ce que pour des raisons économiques, une défense de la
production alimentaire et des traditions culinaires nationales. Des campagnes en faveur de
la « nourriture britannique » sont régulièrement lancées dans le pays, comme on peut le
voir sur le site internet Love British Food. Chaque automne est organisée une « Quinzaine
de la nourriture britannique ». Ce type de manifestation peut aller jusqu’à prendre des
colorations essentialistes ou nationalistes, lesquelles caractérisent également le discours de
certains hérauts de la cuisine française (Hache-Bissette et Saillard, 2007: 177-290). Tel est
le cas d’un article très hostile à Elizabeth David, célèbre cuisinière anglaise qui avait
popularisé la cuisine méditerranéenne en Grande-Bretagne à partir de la fin des années
cinquante (Hayward, october 2009: 68). Le numéro où il figure, « fait l’éloge de la tourte
(pie), ce mets qui unit la Grande-Bretagne ». Le magazine gastronomique de la chaîne
alimentaire Waitrose possède par ailleurs une rubrique « Tradition » qui met en exergue le
lien entre nourriture, territoire et culture (« Into the Woods. […] Liz Edwards gets a taste
of old England », Hayward, 2009:79-85). Ce type de représentation s’inscrit en réalité
dans une histoire longue de la défense de la culture culinaire et alimentaire britannique
(Mennell, 1985 et Lehmann, Gilly, The British Housewife: Cookery Books, Cooking and
Society in 18th-Century Britain, Totnes, Prospect Books, 2003). Il n’en reste pas moins
que c’est le thème multiculturel qui a été choisi par le Royal Mail, ainsi que celui de la
haute cuisine grâce à l’île de Man. En effet la Grande-Bretagne prend soin d’être, à
l’image du modèle français, à la pointe en ce domaine. Il en va de même pour
134
l’Allemagne, dont la qualité de la cuisine est parfois brocardée. L’histoire culinaire
allemande est pourtant fort riche et la pensée gastronomique très développée depuis le
XIXe siècle, ce que révèlent les travaux en cours de l’historienne Eva Nether.
La présence de la Croatie dans le groupe 3 est la moins attendue. Même si la
slovène a choisi une thématique originale, toutes les administrations postales des entités
issues de l’éclatement de la Yougoslavie ont émis des visuels nationaux. Ce choix paraît
logique en raison de la jeunesse de ces Etats nés au cours d’une période de conflits
meurtiers et de déplacements ethniques forcés. Deux graphistes de Zagreb, Orsat
Franković et Ivana Vučić, ont représenté du pain et un verre de vin rouge sur un fond
uniformément blanc. La notice philatélique croate, Petit essai sur le pain et le vin (A
sketch on bread and wine), l’une des plus longues de celles produites pour Europa 2005,
insiste sur l’universalité des symboles gastronomiques choisis : « Le pain et le vin sont les
deux choses les plus importantes dans la vie de l’être humain. » Cependant il est difficile
de ne pas remarquer le dessin d’une croix sur la pain; le fond blanc peut aussi faire penser
à un autel. D’ailleurs la notice souligne elle-même les différences de perception du vin.
Multipliant les références aux religions chrétienne, juive et grecque antique, mais pas à
l’islam, elle montre que le vin peut être soit célébré, soit considéré avec méfiance, voire
condamné et proscrit. Pour conclure elle ne cite pas la vieille bénédiction hongroise « Vin,
pain et paix » mais la pensée du métaphysicien magyar Béla Hamvas. Au sortir de la
Seconde Guerre mondiale, dans Philosophie du vin (A bor fiozófiája, publiée bien après sa
mort survenue en 1968; l’édition croate date de 1993), Hamvas, s’en prend aux
hygiénistes, aux athées et aux fanatiques religieux. Il fait l’apologie de la joie de vivre et
celle du vin, où comme dans toute nourriture et dans l’amour, réside, selon lui, la présence
divine. Ainsi l’administration postale croate a incontestablement eu l’intention de dépasser
un nationalisme étroit. Cependant, déterritorialisée dans le graphisme et le motif des
timbres, la gastronomie est ici spiritualisée, tandis que la notice philatélique énonce sans
ambages que le vin peut constituer une source de division culturelle.
Les « spécialités nationales » tracent des frontières culturelles
Les sept pays du groupe 2 n’ont pas opté pour une représentation identitaire
strictement nationale. La Biélorussie n’a pas désiré représenter un plat local mais deux
symboles gastronomiques génériques, du pain et des légumes. Toutefois les graphistes ont
aussi fait figurer sur les deux timbres des nappes brodées traditionnelles. La République de
Saint-Marin, qui avait déjà émis une série de huit timbres « Les saveurs de notre terre »
deux ans plus tôt, a également représenté le pain et le vin. Mais le visuel, la carafe italienne
en particulier, et la notice des deux timbres les rattachent au domaine méditerranéen. Il en va
de même pour ceux d’Andorre, deux natures mortes de tables sans équivoque méridionales,
de Chypre, deux tables en plein air, et du Vatican, deux assiettes en céramique où Picasso a
peint des poissons, œuvres appartenant au musée de la cité pontificale. Ces deux timbres du
Vatican se réfèrent implicitement et habilement au symbole chrétien antique du Sauveur,
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l’ictus, voire à la pêche miraculeuse du Christ au lac de Tibériade. L’Estonie et le Danemark
ont chacun émis deux timbres, l’un avec un visuel alimentaire peu distinctif, le second avec
des produits typiques du pays, notamment des poissons.
Le Vatican n’a pas caché son embarras face au thème de la gastronomie:
« Chaque pays exprime avec la cuisine […] sa culture, son histoire, sa tradition, son art.
[…] L’Etat de la Cité du Vatican possède, par sa nature, un rayonnement international et
se justifie, comme entité étatique, parce qu’il offre un siège identifiable et souverain au
Successeur de Pierre. » Sans réalité nationale, pas de cuisine à soi. Les trois-quarts des
Etats et entités d’Europe ont, eux, bel et bien présenté leur cuisine nationale, laquelle
constitue l’un des éléments de ce que l’on a nommé « la check list identitaire », commune
à toutes les nations européennes (Löfgren, 1989 et Thiesse, 2006). Chaque nation se
construit une identité en développant un discours, des représentations, qui individualisent
son histoire, ses symboles, les coutumes de sa population, etc. Une frontière culturelle est
par conséquent tracée entre ces différentes identités nationales «imaginées» (Anderson,
1983), «inventées» (Hobsbawm et Ranger, 1983), «fabriquées» (Agulhon, 1989). Ainsi,
en 2005, le rédacteur de la notice des timbres du Luxembourg peut considérer la frontière
culturelle gastronomique comme une évidence : « Est-il possible de manger une paella
sans penser immédiatement à l’Espagne, de goûter des pâtes al dente sans s’évader pour
l’Italie, de partager un bon mezze sans se retrouver un peu en Grèce ? Et pour cause, la
spécificité culturelle d’un pays passe aussi par ses traditions gastronomiques. Car comme
l’affirme l’adage populaire: “Dis-moi ce que tu manges et je te dirai qui tu es”. Dit
autrement, il est légitime d’affirmer que la culture gastronomique d’un pays est fortement
liée à son histoire, à ses conditions géographiques et climatiques, à la richesse de sa
structure sociale, à la mentalité et au mode de vie des individus qui le composent».
Les vignettes des 46 entités du groupe 1 montrent donc des plats, des boissons,
des produits et des éléments de service fort divers, puisque réputés propres à un espace et
une culture donnés, mais elles possèdent, à quelques exceptions près, la même fonction et
relèvent de cette « grammaire identitaire » des nations européennes (Löfgren, 1989):
lavash (pain) et harissa pour l’Arménie; plov et dolma pour l’Azerbaïdjan; jambon pour
l’Espagne; poulet au paprika pour la Hongrie; mămăligă (polenta) et învârtite cu brânză
(gâteau au fromage) pour la Moldavie ; cozido et bacalhau (morue) pour le Portugal;
blinis, caviar et samovar pour la Russie; etc. Quelques exemples suffiront ici, comme les
deux timbres du Luxembourg, où des photographies détaillent deux de ses plats
traditionnels: «Au Luxembourg, la bonne chère fait également partie intégrante de la
culture. Car s’il est vrai que, de par la position frontalière du pays, la cuisine
luxembourgeoise combine harmonieusement la cordialité allemande avec la finesse de la
cuisine franco-belge, elle a également une personnalité qui lui est propre. C’est ainsi que de
nombreuses recettes liées au mode de vie agricole ont influencé de larges couches de la
société luxembourgeoise, et ce jusqu’à nos jours. […] Plat national par excellence, le Judd
matt Gaardebounen ou Collet de porc fumé aux fèves des marais à la sauce brune, est un
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plat de caractère particulièrement apprécié des gourmets. Accompagné de pommes de terre
poêlées au lard et d’une bonne bouteille de vin blanc de la Moselle luxembourgeoise, [il]
constitue un véritable régal à partager entre amis ou en famille».
Cependant dans ce groupe, certaines images retiennent particulièrement
l’attention: celles qui lient étroitement cuisine (ou alimentation) et territoire ou paysages
nationaux (Thiesse, 2006 et Fumey, 2010:106-111), et celles qui insistent sur la
différenciation culturelle. Ainsi l’Islande, dont les deux timbres circulaires comme des
assiettes ont remporté le prix artistique PostEurop, Jersey et Guernesey évoquent
l’environnement maritime. Les timbres islandais représentent également la flore et les
paysages terrestres du pays. La Lituanie et le Kazakhstan figurent leurs pâturages et leurs
produits laitiers typiques (plus le pain noir pour la Lituanie), la Turquie une campagne où
abondent légumes et céréales. Si la notice du timbre slovaque égrène la liste de plusieurs
plats et boissons typiques, le visuel figure simplement du pain et du sel. En offrir à un
visiteur étranger est une tradition slave particulièrement vivace en Slovaquie où elle porte
le nom de «chlieb a sol’». Cette tradition d’hospitalité est cependant conjuguée avec
l’affirmation territoriale nationale puisque la tranche de pain dessine l’Etat slovaque,
indépendant depuis 1993. Le lien entre cuisine et territoire est davantage marqué encore
sur les deux timbres roumains, dont la riche symbolique comprend des cartes.
..
…
Ces dernières leur confèrent également une dimension historique, plus que dans
tout autre représentation de la série Europa de 2005, y compris celles émanant d’Etats très
récents et celles des territoires en quête d’une reconnaissance internationale. L’une des
deux cartes représentant l’Europe au IXe siècle porte la mention « DACIA » et figure un
limes au nord du pays; « les Daces qui habitaient ce territoire sont les ancêtres des
Roumains », précise la notice philatélique. La dimension historique est reprise par
plusieurs autres détails. La chasse est ainsi représentée comme une activité séculaire (le
cavalier à l’arc), qui perdure jusqu’à aujourd’hui et constitue l’une des sources principales
des recettes nationales. L’administration postale de Bucarest insiste d’ailleurs
régulièrement sur la filiation, contestée, entre Roumains et Daces (Thiesse, 2001:95-100).
En 2005, presque simultanément avec l’émission Europa, elle émet un bloc de quatre
timbres sur la viticulture présentant chacun un cépage typique sur fond du décor sculpté de
l’église iconoclaste Stavropoleos construite à Bucarest en 1724. La notice rappelle les
origines millénaires de la viticulture et mentionne l’histoire de Burebista, roi du «premier
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Etat dace indépendant et centralisé» (un peu plus grand que la Roumanie actuelle) qui, au
premier siècle avant JC, avant donc l’occupation romaine, aurait été contraint de prendre
des mesures pour en restreindre l’étendue. Elle cite aussi comme «preuve de continuité»
historique, l’origine dace de trois termes viticoles roumains actuels.
Quant à la différenciation culturelle par la cuisine et l’alimentation elle est
particulièrement intéressante à analyser sur les vignettes de l’Autriche et des Etats issus de la
Yougoslavie. Le timbre de l’administration postale viennoise est un dessin humoristique
mais il ne peut échapper que son sujet, le mélange, c’est-à-dire le café mélangé à du lait dans
des proportions égales, définit une identité culturelle par rapport à une autre, en l’occurrence
celle des Ottomans. La notice philatélique détaille les circonstances historiques de
l’invention, à la fin du XVIIe siècle à Vienne, du mélange, «une institution, une partie de
l’Autriche», puis résume la place centrale des cafés dans la société viennoise: Congrès de
1815, valses, littérature, etc. Les timbres des trois entités bosniaques sont eux aussi
fortement identitaires. Le règlement du conflit des années 1990, défini par les accords de
Dayton, n’est pas encore arrivé à son terme. Les deux vignettes de l’Etat central,
officiellement reconnu, de la Bosnie-Herzégovine (image à gauche) figurent la sogan dolma
et la baklava, nourritures d’origine orientale. Les baklavas sont produites et consommées
sous des formes variées dans l’ensemble du sud-est de l’Europe, vaste région communément
désignée sous le terme de «Balkans» (Todorova, 1997), mais l’administration postale de
Sarajevo est la seule à les avoir choisies pour Europa 2005. La notice des timbres émis par
la poste croate de Mostar (au centre sur l’image), décrit la « cuisine familiale
d’Herzégovine » et insiste surtout sur la fabrication du jambon fumé, qui figure sur l’une des
deux vignettes (en haut à droite) avec une bouteille de vin, du pain, de l’ail et des oignons.
Le jambon constitue également le sujet de l’un des quatre timbres du Monténégro aux
visuels assez génériques, les trois autres étant le miel, le vin rouge, les poissons et crustacés.
Les images de la «République serbe» de Bosnie (Banja Luka) illustrent la cuisine
rurale et ses «plats traditionnels», où apparaît une nouvelle fois le jambon, servis sur une
grande table en bois, autour d’un foyer. Ces représentations de 2005 se situent dans la
continuité du conflit de la décennie précédente. La cuisine et les habitudes alimentaires
servent de marqueurs identitaires aux discours nationalistes, comme on le voit de manière
éloquente dans Nationalism on the menu, documentaire réalisé en 2007 par Djordje
Naskovic et David Muntaner.
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La porosité des frontières alimentaires et culinaires
Le choix d’une spécialité culinaire ou alimentaire nationale peut par conséquent
dériver vers un discours nationaliste qui souligne les oppositions avec l’Autre
(consommation ou non de la viande de porc, etc.) tandis que la diversité gastronomique
intérieure, les frontières culinaires internes, sont complètement gommées. Il est remarquable
que, pour la série Europa 2005, l’un des deux seuls pays à ne pas avoir complètement
dissous les régions dans la nation soit la Slovénie. Issu pourtant récemment lui aussi de
l’éclatement de la Yougoslavie, cet Etat a acquis l’indépendance dans des circonstances un
peu moins dramatiques. Sa poste a représenté la potica, un gâteau roulé présenté comme
«l’une des spécialités culinaires les plus appréciées» du pays et un dessert couramment
servi dans «presque chaque foyer slovène». Sa technique de confection remonte à environ
deux siècles et dérive de celle de la povitica. Mais ce gâteau se présente dans des
déclinaisons très variées, notamment pour le fourrage utilisé même si la noix est aujourd’hui
la plus souvent choisie. Aussi le timbre montre-t-il trois poticas, fourrées respectivement de
noix, de graines de pavot et d’estragon, dans l’intention d’évoquer les principales zones
géographiques slovènes, les régions « alpine, méditerranéenne et pannonienne », mais
également pour suggérer l’idée que la cuisine slovène résulte d’une conjonction
d’influences. La notice du timbre mentionne de surcroît les emprunts faits par les recettes
slovènes à celles de l’ensemble des Balkans et à la haute cuisine internationale.
D’ailleurs l’un des deux timbres de la République de Macédoine (pour reprendre la
dénomination figurant sur les timbres), à l’extrémité opposée de l’ex-Yougoslavie,
représente lui aussi, à côté d’un pain rond et d’épis de blé, un gâteau roulé au pavot.
Gibraltar, entité portuaire aux confins de l’Europe et de l’Afrique, de la Méditerranée et de
l’Atlantique, a explicité sur ses quatre timbres les migrations culinaires et la grande diversité
de sa propre cuisine. Leur texte, «L’influence de la cuisine…», précise en effet, en anglais et
en espagnol, les différentes origines de quatre recettes : influence culinaire portugaise pour
le bar grillé (Robalo a la parrilla / grilled Sea-Bass), gênoise pour la tourte aux épinards
(Torta de acelga / spinach pie), britannique pour le diplomate à la crème pâtissière (Trifle
with custard), maltaise enfin pour les paupiettes de veau (rollitos de ternera / veal ‛birds’).
On remarquera au passage l’absence d’exemple culinaire espagnol, mais surtout que les
choix opérés par Gibraltar et la Grande-Bretagne démontrent assez que des vignettes
philatéliques peuvent très bien évoquer, malgré leur petite taille, autre chose qu’un symbole
identitaire simplificateur.
Ces derniers timbres rejoignent par là le but assigné par le Conseil de l’Europe,
désireux sans nul doute de ne pas verser dans une vision essentialiste de chacune des
nombreuses cuisines nationales, aux auteurs du livre Cultures culinaires d’Europe:
insister sur les mutations. Cet ouvrage collectif se présente sous la forme de 40
contributions (6 des 46 membres, en 2006, du Conseil sont absents de cette publication:
Albanie, Andorre, Liechtenstein, République tchèque, Saint-Marin et Suisse), encadrées
d’une introduction et d’une conclusion toutes deux assez développées. Une grande latitude
a néanmoins été laissée aux auteurs et l’ouvrage frappe l’imagination non seulement par
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l’effet « kaléidoscopique » de toutes ces recettes si différentes, mais également par ses
innombrables mentions des mutations et échanges culinaires à travers les siècles (cf. aussi
Fumey, 2004 et 2010; Oddy et Petranova, 2005). Ainsi « localité » et contraintes
naturelles ont été maintes fois dépassées par les sociétés humaines. Quant aux habitudes
alimentaires qui passent parfois pour immuables, elles se sont nettement modifiées et leur
métamorphose s’accélère au cours des dernières décennies. Même si des habitudes, des
préventions ou des dégoûts peuvent retarder longtemps cette évolution, ingrédients et
recettes franchissent les frontières : le gâteau roulé au pavot mis en valeur sur les timbres
slovène et macédonien a également une solide réputation en Pologne, en Slovaquie, dans
le sud-est de l’Europe, etc. De surcroît il est connu et fort apprécié, sous le nom de
makotch, dans le nord de la France en raison de l’immigration de travailleurs polonais à
l’époque de l’exploitation minière. Même transnationalisme pour le gâteau à la broche
(Bonnain, 1995) et pour combien d’autres plats et produits alimentaires !
Il n’en reste pas moins que les discours identitaires, nationaux ou autres, sont
parfaitement capables d’intégrer des nourritures venant d’ailleurs. Les processus utilisés
vont du très simple au plus sophistiqué: ces discours oublient de préciser l’« exotisme »
(Régnier, 2004) des plats et produits, ou bien ils louent la capacité d’appropriation de leur
propre culture et ses résultats, ou encore ils revendiquent plus ou moins catégoriquement,
mais de manière peu convaincante pour les historiens de la gastronomie, la paternité de
telle ou telle recette. Ainsi la frontière culturelle est-elle bien vite à nouveau tissée. C’est
par exemple le cas dans le sud-est de l’Europe où l’influence culturelle ottomane est
largement sous-estimée, voire entièrement passée sous silence. Ce que déplorent les
militants des mouvements antinationalistes, comme Atanas Vangeli en République de
Macédoine: « […] La période ottomane a aussi laissé énormément de traces dans les
coutumes et les gestes quotidiens qui sont des caractéristiques inévitables de notre code
culturel. […] La cuisine est un autre domaine de la vie quotidienne qui ne manque pas
d’influences turques: la sarma (feuilles de vigne ou de chou farcies), la moussaka, la
tourlitava (ratatouille) et le börek (feuilleté). Nous buvons du café turc et nous sommes
tous friands de baklavas, de touloumba et de boza, ces douceurs orientales. Sans oublier
la kafeana (du turc kahvehan), qui est l’institution où se crée l’opinion publique, que ce
soit en ville ou à la campagne, et qui, bien que semblable aux bars et aux restaurants,
restera toujours une kafeana car elle n’a pas d’homologue dans le monde occidental».
(« Quelque chose en nous de profondément ottoman », Globus cité par Courrier
international, 18 février 2010).
Des frontières culturelles solubles dans la mondialisation ?
Aussi la connaissance de l’histoire et de la gastronomie et sa diffusion peuvent
être précieuses pour modifier l’appréhension que nous avons chacun des frontières
culturelles. Un livre comme Cultures culinaires d’Europe, qui détaille leur construction et
leur complexité, possède incontestablement une fonction pédagogique. Cependant, à
l’instar du discours d’Atanas Vangeli reconnaissant explicitement l’existence d’identités
culturelles, et de la série philatélique PostEurop mettant en valeur la diversité
gastronomique, le Conseil de l’Europe se montre soucieux de la reconnaissance et de la
défense de la multitude d’identités culturelles qui existent de l’Atlantique jusqu’à l’Oural
et la Caspienne. Son ouvrage gastronomique porte d’ailleurs le sous-titre Identité,
diversité et dialogue.
« Les miieux culturels européens reconnaissent enfin le rôle de l’alimentation
dans la constitution des identités locales, régionales et nationales, et dans les liens
qu’entretiennent ces identités en notre époque de mondialisation des échanges », écrit
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l’historien Fabio Parasecoli dans l’introduction de ce livre. Rejoignant les préoccupations
d’intellectuels et d’associations, telle Slow Food, peu enclins au nationalisme ou au
conservatisme politique et social et celles de producteurs agricoles spécialisés, le discours
gastronomique du livre publié par le Conseil de l’Europe développe l’idée que la diversité
culinaire et alimentaire, source de richesse culturelle, est peut-être menacée par
l’évolution économique internationale actuelle. Les frontières culturelles seraient-elles
donc solubles dans le grand marché mondial qui tend à se mettre en place?
Dans la série philatélique Europa 2005, un pays se fait l’écho de cette interrogation.
La Pologne a bien choisi, elle aussi, une spécialité alimentaire comme symbole, mais il ne
s’agit pas d’un plat national. L’image représente l’oscypek podhalański, un fromage fumé, à
base traditionnellement de lait de brebis pressé dans des formes en bois, fabriqué au sud du
pays dans le Podhale, dont la ville principale est Zakopane. Seule région véritablement
montagneuse de Pologne, elle possède une personnalité culturelle propre, « inventée » et
incarnée dans le dialecte, le folkore, etc. Le choix de l’oscypek podhalański, également
produit dans les montagnes au-delà de la frontière avec la Slovaquie (cas fréquent de non
superposition des frontières étatiques et culturelles; depuis 1994 existe l’eurorégion des
Tatras), a-t-il été réalisé dans le but d’affirmer et d’ancrer l’appartenance de cette région
limitrophe à la Pologne ? Non, il fut motivé parce que ce fromage fut le premier produit
régional polonais classé par la législation de l’Union européenne, qui s’inspire pour une part
du modèle français des AOC (appellations d’origine contrôlée) dont la création remonte aux
années 30. La notice philatélique luxembourgeoise Europa 2005 évoque d’ailleurs le
principe de ce classement: « Véritable berceau de la gastronomie dans le monde, l’Europe
possède une incroyable variété de produits agroalimentaires de qualité. Consciente de la
valeur d’un tel patrimoine, la Commission européenne a même mis en place, dès 1994, un
système en vue de protéger et de préserver les traditions culinaires européennes issues de
savoir-faire ancestraux».
La mosaïque européenne: fusions et frontières-phénix
Loin d’être un élément mineur de la « check-list identitaire » nationale,
alimentation et cuisine apparaissent au contraire comme une matière particulièrement
propice au discours nationaliste. Consubstantiels aux besoins et aux expériences corporels,
à la mémoire personnelle et familiale ainsi qu’à des territoires réels, recomposés ou
mythiques, les habitudes et les goûts alimentaires, éprouvés quotidiennement, jouent un
rôle important dans la vie sociale et l’imaginaire de chacun. Le discours gastronomique,
pour peu qu’il passe par des formes et des vecteurs non élitistes, ce qui est généralement le
cas, parle donc directement à la totalité de la population qui le reçoit. L’existence d’une
frontière alimentaire et culinaire peut alors paraître naturelle et indépassable aux yeux de
deux «communautés», deux villages, deux régions, deux nations, d’autant que les facteurs
géographiques déterminent les productions agricoles pour une part plus ou moins
importante selon les lieux et les époques. Le besoin de se rassurer par rapport à l’étrangeté
d’autrui et d’exprimer une supériorité par rapport à l’Autre peuvent aller de pair avec cette
apparente évidence.
Les nations européennes, au cours des siécles précédents et jusqu’à nos jours,
comme nous le voyons sous de multiples facettes dans les documents philatéliques de
2005 sur la gastronomie, doivent aborder de face la question des frontières de type
culturel: en atténuant la signification et la portée de celles qui existent à l’intérieur de leur
propre espace et en développant un arsenal de représentations identitaires pour l’ensemble
de cet espace. Dans le contexte de la construction de l’Union européenne et de la
mondialisation, cette double tâche (Dieckhoff et Jaffrelot, 2004) s’opère aussi bien dans
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les Etats récemment créés ou reformés que dans ceux à l’histoire plus ancienne, dans les
pays les plus étendus comme dans ceux qui possèdent une superficie plus modeste. Ainsi,
dans ces représentations officielles, ou au moins officieuses, que sont les timbres
nationaux, on s’aperçoit que les images porteuses d’une transnationalité culturelle, déjà
assez peu nombreuses, sont elles-mêmes traversées par des éléments identitaires
nationaux: c’est particulièrement le cas des timbres croates, français et britanniques.
Cependant cette série de timbres Europa 2005 montre également que les frontières
culturelles ne sont pas seulement perçues sous un prisme national, voire peut-être que dans
certains cas c’est le prisme national lui-même qui est en train de se métamorphoser. Même si
les conceptions sur la construction européenne varient d’un pays et d’un parti politique à
l’autre, les nations peuvent difficilement faire abstraction de leur appartenance ou de leur
volonté d’appartenance à un ensemble géopolitique aux multiples traditions culturelles. Les
institutions européennes ont choisi de mettre simultanément en valeur la «diversité
culturelle» et le «dialogue interculturel». Si visuellement la série philatélique Europa 2005,
elle, penche nettement vers le premier thème, de nombreuses notices sont rédigées dans un
« esprit européen », interculturel, tout discours identitaire n’étant pas nationaliste.
L’analyse de la gastronomie nous montre que les différenciations culturelles
existent toujours, ne serait-ce que dans l’imaginaire d’une grande majorité d’Européens.
Alors que les mouvements migratoires, l’intégration européenne et la mondialisation de
l’économie et de l’information (internet, culture internationale de masse, etc.) semblent
accélérer la rencontre et le mélange des cultures culinaires, tant dans la restauration bon
marché (fast foods en tout genre) que dans la haute cuisine («cuisine-fusion»), des
frontières se réinventent partout. Elles sont loin d’être obligatoirement investies de valeurs
nationalistes ou régionalistes, même si les tenants de ces idéologies croient y voir leur
triomphe. Sur un plan concret, géographique, avec le développement international des
«terroirs», des zones de production délimitées, mais aussi mentalement avec la prise de
conscience grandissante que la fusion des cuisines pourrait ranger les multiples cultures
gastronomiques dans un musée, apparaît le besoin de se repérer par rapport à des
frontières culturelles.
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Segalen, Martine (ed.), L’autre et le semblable. Regards sur l’ethnologie des
sociétés contemporaines, Paris, Presses du CNRS
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Nationalism, London, Verso; (1996) L’imaginaire national, Paris, La Découverte
Bonnain, Rolande (1995), «Un emblème disputé», in Bessis, Sophie (ed.), Mille et une
bouches.Cuisines et identités culturelles, Paris, Autrement, coll. “Mutations/Mangeurs”, n°154
Craith, Máiréad Nic (2008), « From National to Transnational. A discipline en route to
Europe », in Craith, M. N. and Kockel, Ullrich (eds.), Everyday Culture in Europe
Dieckhoff, Alain et Jaffrelot, Christophe (2004), « La résilience du nationalisme face aux
régionalismes et à la mondialisation », Critique internationale, n° 23
Fabre, Daniel (ed.) (1996), L’Europe entre cultures et nations, Paris, Maison des Sciences
de l’Homme, coll. “Ethnologie de la France”
Ferguson, Priscilla P. (2004), Accounting for Taste. The Triumph of French Cuisine,
Chicago et Londres, The University of Chicago Press
Fumey, Gilles (2004), „Brassages et métissages de l’Europe culinaire”, in Géographie et
Cultures, n°50, “Géographie des saveurs”
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Fumey, Gilles (2010), Manger local, manger global. L’alimentation géographique, Paris,
CNRS-Editions.
Hache-Bissette, Françoise et Saillard, Denis (eds.) (2007), Gastronomie et identité
culturelle française. Discours et représentations (XIXe-XXe siècles), Paris, Nouveau
Monde éditions
Goldstein, Darra et Merkle, Kathrin (eds.) (2006), Cultures culinaires d’Europe. Identité,
diversité et dialogue
(Culinary cultures of Europe: identity, diversity and
dialogue), Strasbourg, Conseil de l’Europe
Hobsbawm, Eric et Ranger, Terence (eds.) (1983), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press
Kockel, Ullrich (2007), « Heritage versus tradition. Culture resources for new Europe ? »,
in Demossier, Marion (ed.), The European puzzle: the political structuring of
cultural identities at a time of transition, Oxford, Berghahn
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La Dispute
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XIX-1 (National Culture as Process)
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from the Middle Ages to the present, Oxford et New York, Basil Blackwell; (1987)
Français et Anglais à table du Moyen-Age à nos jours, Paris, Flammarion
Montanari, Massimo (2004), Il cibo come cultura, Rome / Bari, Laterza
Montanari, Massimo et Pitte, Jean-Robert (eds.) (2009), Les frontières alimentaires, Paris,
CNRS Editions
Moulin, Léo (1989), Les Liturgies de la table. Une histoire culturelle du manger et du
boire, Anvers, Fonds Mercator et Paris, Albin Michel
Noiriel, Gérard (2010), Le massacre des Italiens: Aigues-Mortes, 17 août 1893, Paris, Fayard
Oddy, Derek J. et Petranova, Lydia (eds.) (2005), The Diffusion of Food Culture in Europe
from the Late Eighteenth Century to the Present Day, Prague, Academia Press
Ory, Pascal (1998), Le discours gastronomique français, Paris, Gallimard, coll. “Archives”
Ory, Pascal (2004), L’histoire culturelle, Paris, PUF, coll. “Que sais-je ?”
Régnier, Faustine (2004), L’exotisme culinaire. Essai sur les saveurs de l’Autre, Paris,
PUF, coll. “Le lien social”
Smith, Anthony D. (1991), National Identity, Londres, Penguin Books
Tak, Herman (1988), “Changing Campanalismo. Localism and the Use of Nicknames in a
Tuscan Village Mountain”, Ethnologia Europaea, XVIII
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Europäische Perspektiven, Berlin, Akademie Verlag
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Dieckhoff, Alain et Jaffrelot, Christophe (eds.), Repenser le nationalisme: théories
et pratiques, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po
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Todorova, Maria (1997), Imagining the Balkans, Oxford, Oxford University Press
La plupart des timbres Europa 2005 figurent sur les pages du site internet de PostEurop:
http://www.posteurop.org
Les notices présentant les timbres sont parfois consultables sur les sites des
administrations postales et sur différentes pages philatéliques, comme par exemple
pour la Slovénie et la Croatie: http://www.istrianet.org/istria/philately/stamps/2005.htm
Klezmer “revivalisms” to the test of real or supposed cultural
borders: the stakes of memory and objects of misunderstanding
Jean-Sébastien NOËL
Abstract: As a musical style, klezmer is historically associated with both the body
dancing at weddings and the European Jewish cultural area. Furthermore, the great political and
economic emigration waves from the 1880s to the 1920s and the destruction of European Jewry
during the Second World War have created a vacuum between the original tradition of ancient
klezmorim and the actual ways of playing klezmer music. Since the 1970s, a wave of revival has
grown from North and South America reaching Europe in the following two decades. Incidentally,
while reading some musicians’ writings, the klezmer and neo-klezmer phenomena are narrowly
linked with the questions of memory and revival. Their productions, the way they conceive their
relationship with the historical lands of ancient klezmorim and their discourses based on such
notions as “roots” and “authenticity” ask in a specific way the question of cultural borders, as a
question of representation.
Keywords: Klezmer revival, traditions, cultural border, festival, dance
Introduction
The notion of the cultural border still remains useful when regarding musical
revivals and especially the new lease of interest for the Jewish folk music from the 1970s
in America and, in the next decades, in Europe. Indeed, the commercial success and the
critical acclaim of the “Klezmer revival”, embodied amongst others by the Argentine
Giora Feidman, by the American David Krakauer – whose productions benefit from a
worldwide diffusion – or by more occasional interpreters such as classical virtuosi like
Itzhak Perlman, the double nature of the phenomenon becomes obvious: inscribed both in
the context of a globalized culture (of the borders of mass production and cultural
specificity with the label of “traditional music” ) and in a real but blurred space, this music
is narrowly linked with the notion of symbolic territories. From the Balkans to Warsaw,
the Klezmer space doesn’t line up either with the ancient Yiddishland, nor with the former
“Pale”, both of these territories used to be covered by klezmorim and kapelyen until the
first decades of the twentieth century.
Nowadays musicians play with borders in quite a complex way: if the
phenomenon is still limited in a country such as Romania, where the tradition of walking
musicians used to be strongly present, Klezmer has become one of the top world music
sellers, tapping great audiences in the specialized festivals (Krakow, Warsaw, Berlin,
Vienna, Paris, Saint Petersburg and San Francisco).
Incidentally, what is the music actually played in these Klezmer festivals – and
what is the public targeted? Does the so-called Jewish “authenticity”, highlighted by a
music mostly recreated in the United States in the 1970s, correspond to a living heritage or
to a transferred representation?
This paper aims to throw light on multiple phenomena, sometimes wider than the
generic term of “Klezmer”, by a systematic study of the effects of territoriality and
borders, in the productions and discourses of the groups claiming this appellation as theirs.
The tracklists of the albums, their slides, their titles and moreover the websites of the
artists and the places they play in, build a first corpus up, which is to grow and to be
completed. The first conclusions of a running survey, this work-in-progress does not give
144
a definitive look on the question, but rather an intermediate perspective on a musical
phenomenon in total change.
I. Questions of definition: « klezmer » and klezmorim after 1970
The term « Klezmer1 », understood as a well identified musical and commercial
genre relatively recently, dates back to the 1980s. It is chronologically shifted from other
revivalisms and from the commercial taking off of the folk scene in the 1950-1960s.
During these decades, in words of Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “this music was notably
absent from the folk song and music revival” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1998, p.49). Indeed,
personalities such as Mickey Katz (1909-1985), Spike Jones’s traveling companion in the
1940s, well known for his Yiddish or “yinglish” song parodies, used to be less famous as a
clarinet player, almost a marginal pioneer of the 1970s revival.
Originally, the klezmorim, Ashkenazi Jewish travelling musicians, used to play an
instrumental music for the simkhes (feast or holidays), particularly for the Jewish
weddings from Central and Eastern Europe. Their repertoire was composite: the three
main sources were Jewish liturgy and the hazzanût (cantorial art), the nigunim or Hassidic
songs and the surrounding popular repertoires, especially for dancing. The wanderer used
to imply a double paradoxical status: both a much sought-after musician for entertaining
the feasts (the badkhonim) and a pariah, whom people distrusted (the Klezmer musician,
who didn’t receive academic training, was socially downgraded). Musicologist Walter Zev
Feldman, a specialist of both Ottoman and Jewish music, did profound work on the
permeability of the repertoires. He proposed a four step typology for Klezmer music: the
music played before 1850, consisting in the instrumental adaptation of the liturgical
repertoire or in the dances for the simkhes (usually played with a flute and a fiddle with a
cimbalom) ; the music influenced by the Turkish classical tradition2 ; the music influenced
by the non-Jewish socio-cultural surrounding groups, such as Romanians, Ukrainians,
Russians and Hungarians ; and finally, the music produced in the United States by
European-born musicians (Feldman, 1994). The revivalist phenomenon could correspond
to the four categories established by Walter Zev Feldman. A mobile repertoire from the
oral tradition, put down in writing very late, Klezmer balances between two kind of
demand : on one hand, the effective overtaking of the linear borders by the merging and
the creolization processes from which Klezmer is derived ; on the other hand, a precise
cornerstone in the musical specificities of the territories. For instance, the American
fiddler Bob Cohen (settled in Hungary) and his own band, Di naye kepelye3, drew their
inspiration from the playing of several Romanian Klezmorim families.
As for the term “revival” (Boyes, 1994), it asks a semantic and historical question:
discourses on the authenticity, even if they are asked by the musicians themselves, refer to
the essence of a partly vanished music. Revivalism, etymologically speaking, deals with
1
The term comes from the Hebrew “kle” (plural, kli), the instrument, and “zemer”, the singing:
from the 16th century, klezmer no longer refers to “the instrument of singing”, but to the
musician. In central and oriental Europe in the 20th century, the term is mostly used in a
depreciative meaning, so as to qualify the musician without formal training, who transcribed
popular tunes when hearing them and played for the weddings low quality music.
2
This category, that Feldman calls “the oriental repertoire” results from the role played by
wandering Jewish Ashkenazi musicians, like by Gypsies, in the diffusion of the classical
Turkish music in the Ottoman Empire, especially in Romania.
3
Thanks to musicologist and folklorist Itzik Shvartz, Bob Cohen get information on the history, the
techniques, the repertoires and the playing of the grand klezmorim families from Iaşi : the
Bughici, the Segal, the Weiss and the Lemesh.
145
coming back to life: in other words, it would hold the project of the re-actualization of a
repertoire, of a playing style and of a social function of the band, partly or totally
destroyed in the 19th and 20th by the sinking of the Jewish traditional society and by the
extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War. Thus, this revivalism had
the function of giving a new signification to an old and obsolete term: the klezmorim, from
public and wandering entertainers, became, from the 1970s, memoire holders. In the
traditional world, the depicting word used to qualify a popular musician without formal
training from the academies. Nowadays, and thus from the 1970s, the neo-Klezmer
movement re-qualifies the memory of their “forebears”, raised to the status of holders of
soul of the lost European Yiddishkayt. As in Chagall’s paintings or through Sholom
Aleikhem’s short-stories, the old Klezmer musician assumed the symbolic virtues of the
iconic figure of the Yiddish treasure.
Fig. 1 Distribution by country of the 617 professional Klezmer ensembles (non-exhaustive
corpus). They are classified by their foundation location.
Nevertheless, regarding the geographical origins of most of actual Klezmer bands
(both the pioneer groups of the 1970s and more recent ones), the American domination is
obvious. Over a non-exhaustive corpus in progress (617 active groups in the 1990s and in
the 2000s), the United States houses about 58 % of the Klezmer groups all over the world.
Coming second and third, Germany and Canada only amount to 6 % each.
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Moreover, this graph highlights the striking deficit in the historical lands of the
klezmorim in the 19th and in the first half of the 20th centuries: Romania, Russia, Poland,
Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, the North of the Balkans. The actual host countries for the
post 1970s Klezmer genre correspond to the immigration lands (United States, Canada
and to a certain extend Israel and Australia). Adding the countries where Klezmer has
successfully taken root for the 1980s: Germany and West European countries
(Netherlands, France, United-Kingdom, Italy, Swiss), North Europe (Denmark, Suede)
and then (for a second time) Central and Oriental Europe (Austria, Hungary, Czech
Republic and Poland).
II. Between authenticity and radicalism: spatial and border strategies
A lot of actual groups accept one way or another the label of world music, closer
to the original understanding of ethnomusicologist Robert E. Brown than in the mere
commercial-logic meaning, generalized as from the 1980s. Indeed, numerous bands have
produced, as some of a paratext to their music, writings so as to justify their approach.
Thus, groups like Klesmos or Klezmania ! identify themselves with world music, with
expressions such as “world Klez music” or “world-Jewish” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, p.50).
Nevertheless, this cornerstone in the world involves a series of differential relations with
the territories, furthering the enclosure of a specific music. Incidentally, some groups and
some scholars have organized a systematic collection of the ancient musical traces,
sometimes with an academic precision and method (Budowitz, for example, has done for
years). This kind of work tends to validate the notion of the cultural border as a mark of
this specificity. Furthermore, the field of world music is thus conceived as a wide
network, making the exchanges of these specificities possible.
As already mentioned the history of Klezmer and of its formal evolutions is
closely linked with successive migrations and with European politico-economic contexts.
The economical causes of the emigration in the 19th century and the political reasons of
the waves of departure as from the 1880s to the 1920s (the American Emigration Acts)
have been precisely described. Victor Karady highlighted the mutations in the Central and
Eastern European Jewish communities during the 19th century, especially linked with the
growing of a “stratified urbanization” (Karady, 2004). At the turn of the 20th century, a
number of wandering Jewish musicians have made their style and their playing advance
since they entered the urban society (growing influence of the songs from the Yiddish
Theater and of the Gentile music). Their function also changed: musicians, traditionally
trained in the familial circle, playing for the weddings (Jewish or not) from shtetl to shtetl,
took advantage of the taking off of recording techniques to pursue a career in the music
hall and entertainment. This had concerned such personalities as Harry Kandel (18851943), Abe Schwartz (1881-1963), Dave Tarras (1897-1989), Naftule Brandwein (18841963) or Shloimke Beckerman (1883-1974). Incidentally, the art of the klezmorim had not
only remained or developed (according to two different modalities) in Europe : the great
waves of immigration to the United States allowed the settlement of a repertoire, of a
technique, of an instrumentarium, while making this style change in the contact of other
musical genres. Thus, the historical recordings of orchestras in the 1920s testify to a mix
between folkloric look of the former kapelyen (especially through costumes in the slide or
on the pictures attached) and the new shape of jazz music. The orchestra of cellist Joseph
Cherniawsky, for Victor, recorded in the mid 1920s some transitional pieces, keeping
folklorized references to the European Klezmer, while adapting it to the American taste
and mode, with the dancing rhythms of jazz and swing.
147
Though the settlement, in the United States, of the Klezmer traditions and initial
function of entertainment and dance music, the previously mentioned figures - Harry
Kandel, Abe Schwartz and Dave Tarras – allowed, on one hand, a technical transfer and, on
the other, gave us the testimonies (with their American recordings) of a new American
music. Musicologist Mark Slobin highlighted this phenomenon of adaptation from the
kapelyen of central and oriental Europe to the new American cultural and economical
context (Slobin, 2000). Moreover, listenable recordings – European or American ones (e.g.,
a Hora from Bessarabia by the Belf's Romanian Orchestra – Bucharest, 1909-1910 or
another Yiddish Hora entitled “A heymish freylekhs” by Max Leibowitz – New York,
19194) – dates from the early 20th century, that is to say from a traditional Yiddish European
world in a state of profound change, already upset by the new connection between religious
faith and social organization.
Thus, Andy Statman5 (born in 1950) described himself as “a spontaneous,
American-roots form of very personal, prayerful Hasidic music, by way of avant-garde
jazz6”. Child of Brooklyn, this well-known and acclaimed clarinet and mandolin player, is a
key figure of an essentialist conception of Klezmer, at that point that he qualified his music
as purely Hassidic (that is to say touching directly the soul of the listener to arouse a
religious fervour) rather than “Klezmer”. As one can see, Statman didn’t pursue any ethno
musicological purpose to come across the lost reality of the European klezmorim sound
again. He has, rather, inscribed his practice in an absolutely American reality, so as to give
an authentic religious dimension to it. He placed, thus, the border, that is to say what
demarked him as a musician, between a profane and only aesthetic practice (which he
rejected) and a spiritual approach (which he sought).
On the contrary, other musicians would aim at recovering the reality (or what he
thinks the reality might be) of tones, sounds and playing modes of the kapelyen: this is the
case, for instance, of Budowitz, a band founded in 1995, whose members live in Hungary,
Germany and the United States. The main page of their web site clearly indicates this will
to collect the most pieces of knowledge (musical techniques, old recordings, survivors’
testimonies) in order to understand the former Klezmer style. “The music of Budowitz
features kaleidoscopic renditions of folk music molded into the unique personal group
style from the regions of Bessarabia, Galitsia and Bukovina, performed on tsimbl (Jewish
dulcimer), 2 violins, 3-string viola, 19th Century C and Eb-clarinets, early bayan (button
accordion from 1889), bassetl (shoulder strapped cello) and baraban (drum). The rare
repertoire of Budowitz includes pieces gathered through intensive fieldwork in more than
15 countries and includes not only ritual and dance music by Jewish folk composers of the
19th Century but also original works by all the members of Budowitz”7. Moreover, one
member of the band, accordionist Joshua Horowitz, published in the Hungarian Studies an
article entitled “If the Music is Jewish, Why is the Style Hungarian?” (Horowitz, 2008:6376) inviting more particularly the new Klezmer musicians to ask themselves what makes
their music (and with quite essentialist words) “ethnically specific”. This work of
4
Yiddish, Hebrew and klezmer – Anthology of Jewish Music, Recording Arts, 2007 [2X613].
A former pupil of Dave Tarras, himself a great Klezmer musician, first in Ukraine and then in
New York (where he settled in 1921).
6
Quoted by EISEN, Sara, in “Sound of His Soul. His virtuosity is legendary, his versatility
stunning. And as always, Andy Statman's roots are showing”, http://andystatman.org/Read.htm
(accessed April 5, 2010).
7
See on the ensemble Budowitz’s website: http://www.budowitz.com/Budowitz/Home.html
(accessed April 5, 2010)
5
148
precision, both attached to the acoustic and regional specificities of the historical
instruments and mostly based on oral testimonies of the musicians who remained in
Bucovina or in Transylvania, forcefully asks the question of the existence and of the
reconnaissance of the cultural borders through the approaches of actual Klezmer
musicians. These borders are though as a guarantee of authenticity – which doesn’t
necessarily mean imprisonment – for Klezmer bands often settled on the both sides of the
Atlantic Ocean, producing themselves in the American or European festivals and selling
records through the commercial process of the world music.
II.1. Musicians and their ethno musicological approach of borders and
territories
Amongst the pioneers of the American Klezmer revivalism, a Californian band from
Berkeley adopted a name, sounding as a manifesto for returning to roots: The Klezmorim,
co-founded in 1975 by clarinetist Lev Liberman, freshly graduated in ethnomusicology at
Berkeley University. Their first album, Eastside Wedding (1977), had been edited on the
independent American label Arhoolie Records, which specialized in folk music, a very
fashionable genre since the 1960s. With his ethno musicological training, Liberman found
78-rpm discs in the YIVO’s archives, which he studied systematically.
Musician Bob Cohen, born in New York, inscribed his artistic approach in a quest of
authenticity. Considering himself as a yiddishophone Jew (he uses, in his writings, the term
Yid and non-Jew) from Bessarabia, not as an American8. In 1988, when settling in Hungary,
he aimed at recovering the traces of the music played by ancient klezmorim. The band he
founded then in Budapest, Di Naye Kapelye, was composed both of American musicians
(Cohen himself and clarinetist – in addition a cantor linked to the orthodox stream - Yankle
Falk) and Central European (Ferenc Pribojszki, cymbalum and flutes, Gyula Kozma, doublebass, Antal Fekete, viola). Cohen defines the work of his band in the following words: “In Di
Naye Kapelye, we prefer to tell folks we play Jewish music. Old Jewish music. Music that
would appeal to my grandfather’s aesthetic sense. We see no need to invent tradition. We live
in East Europe, where the basic tools of the klezmer’s art – active traditional music and dance
– are all around us, as well as elderly Jewish survivors9.”
As for the musicians of the Maxwel Street Klezmer Band of Chicago, they
highlight the notion of heritage, almost in a familial meaning, when they present the
nature of their project: “With the destruction of the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe
and disappearance of the shtetl (Jewish ghetto), the soulful sound of the Klezmer was all
but lost and forgotten. Then, in the late 1970's, young Jewish musicians in America were
drawn to re-discover the music of their Eastern European heritage, preserved on antique
recordings rescued from "grandma's attic." In addition to instrumental music, the revival
of klezmer has also come to include folk melodies and the colorful comic songs of the
Yiddish theater.” Their ensemble’s name directly evokes the main Jewish quarter of
Chicago, since the great migrations waves of the 1880s. This peculiar quarter, from the
8
Cohen, Bob, “Jewish Music in Romania. Oy Rumenye, Rumenye, Geveyn amol a land a ziser a
fayner
!”,
on
the
ensemble
Di
Naye
Kapelye’s
website:
http://www.dinayekapelye.com/jmromania.htm (accessed April 5, 2010)
“I am a bessarabisher yid – my grandparents were born in Bessarabia, today’s Republic of
Moldova, in the towns of Orhei (Uriv in Yiddish) and Krivelyany (Kivelyan), and lived in
Chisinau (Keshenev) until the time of the 1905 pogrom. I was born in New York, and now
reside in Budapest”.
9
Ibidem
149
1920s, has been the center of another immigration phenomenon, with the settlement of
Afro-American people who participated in the taking off of Blues music.
II.2. New Yorker, scene of the post beat-generation period: a new type of
space for Klezmer
The Musée d’Art et d’Histoire du Judaïsme (MAHJ) organized in Paris, from
April 9th to July 10th of 201010, an exhibition on the New York underground musical
scene, called Radical New Jewish Culture, whose key figure is the saxophonist John Zorn
(born in 1953). The outstanding documentation mobilized for this event allowed the
audience to hear oral testimonies of some leading personalities from this avant-garde
scene, redefining mainly their relationship with Klezmer, as a musical technique musicale
and as a culture. Incidentally, the expression of the guitarist Marc Ribot (born in 1954) is
significant: “I did not grow up with Klezmer and there is no continuity. What has been
portrayed as a continuity is in fact a radical disruption”. What sounds like an oxymoron is
in reality a new paradigm: radicalism – etymologically a return to the roots – creating a
relationship to the Klezmer and to the Jewish culture in a wider meaning, not specifically
religious, implying a critical dimension. The links of the key figures of this movement
with the underground culture of the Lower East Side and with the Beat Generation allow
us to measure the impact of their discourses and of their behavior towards the klezmer
scene. Then, these musicians don’t think their relationship with European roots and with
the past in terms of revival or revivalism anymore, but with an assumed critical point of
view. Early 20th century recordings are not considered anymore as the matrices of a
project of recovering a former reality, but the phrasings, the rhythms, the musical scales or
modes function henceforth as a basic material of an absolute new music. This music is
radical as it takes its roots in the former musical shapes, without reproducing them, while
bypassing chronology and discourses about a kind of “genealogical” continuity. Thus,
during the festival organized in Munich in 1992 – the Festival for New Jewish Radical
Music – John Zorn created his masterpiece Kristallnacht, opening with a section called
“Shtetl”. Zorn superimposed idiomatic formulas of klezmer (successive lamenti by the
violin and the clarinet, characteristic playing technique) with excerpts of speeches by
Adolf Hitler. To John Zorn, as to others in this festival, the choice of the town of Munich
was highly meaningful. In accordance with the approach of the radical Jewish scene, it
asked a critical question to the contemporary Jewish culture: after the rise of NSDAP had
been made possible in Munich and later Auschwitz, what could be the limits and the
meaning of a Jewish authenticity? For who tries to think on the mobility of cultural
borders through such a phenomenon as klezmer music, the benefit of this New Yorker
radical Jewish culture, in a pioneer festival in Germany, proposes a very complex and
dialectical answer: it requires one to think of the notion of patrimony in an active and
actual dimension - without nostalgia.
III. Musical practices between territoriality and overtaking the borders
III.1. Inscribing the music in territories
The internationalization of the neo-Klezmer results at the same time in a body of
structural, economical and cultural factors. The settlement of this genre in northern
countries, as for instance in Sweden, can be surprising. Developing itself with the Swedish
progressive rock at the beginning of the 1980s, the interest for some hits of the Klezmer
10
http://radicaljewishculture.mahj.org (Accessed April 5, 2010)
150
repertoire was inscribed in the wider field of folk music. The performance of the
American band The Klezmorim at the outdoor festival Falu Folk Music in 1986 paved the
way for the popularization of a genre, following in the next decade by Swedish groups
specialized in Klezmer music, such as Freilach Express or Aaron Jazz Band11.
The publishing houses and the sale spaces (specialized shops for cultural products
and for music or supermarkets) played a decisive role. For the 1980s, recording houses of
world music have published Klezmer revival groups, sometimes on specific labels: for
example, The Klezmorim and the Klezmatics were issued by Flying Fish, The Modern
Klezmer Quartet by Global Village Music (with label “Dveykes”) whereas the
Transcontinental Music, a section of the l’URJ (Union of Reform Judaism) published
anthologies of Klezmer. John Zorn himself founded his own label in 1995 in New York,
Tzadik12, so as to produce artists linked with the New Jewish Radical Culture scene,
giving a large space for Klezmer (for instance the clarinetist David Krakauer). The first
opus issued by Tzadik, was his own composition Kristallnacht, with all its political and
symbolical charge.
Moreover, the categorization of the recordings in the commercial process gives us
information on the territorial assignment of this music. Then, in the first issues of Klezmer
products, this categorization was still blurred and did not mention any delimited space.
Recording house Flying Fish Records indicated, for example, for Metropolis, the 1981
opus of the already well known and acclaimed The Klezmorim : “ File under : Folk or
Jazz13”. This indetermination of the genre, before the commonplace acceptance of the
term “Klezmer” as a commercial label during the 1980s, makes a contrast with the music
contained in the album, whose track list draws the map of a well defined space:
“ Constantinople” (title 1), “Bucharest” (title 2), “Heyser Bulgar” (title 7), “A Wild Night
in Odessa” (title 11). Moreover, the text written by the band leader Lev Liberman is
absolutely explicit: “They lived like Gypsies and played like demons. You could find
them stirring dancers to frenzy at a weeklong village wedding, marching in brass-buttoned
splendor with the Tsar's military band, entertaining aristocrats at a Viennese spa, or
jamming at a waterfront tavern in the Moldovanke, the thieves' quarter of Odessa. They
were called klezmorim and they had a style all their own, full of unorthodox tonalities and
crazily-interlocking rhythms — the rollicking, vodka-soaked sound of a steam calliope
gone mad. The migrations of the restless twentieth century brought these accomplished
musicians to the great cities of America. On the street corners of the metropolis, in mighty
theatre orchestras, and finally in the studios of the fledgling recording industry, klezmorim
blended their age-old instrumental tradition with the innovations of the Jazz Age to create
a sound unrivaled in its rowdiness, passion, and tenderness. We are The Klezmorim. We
play klezmer music. It's been underground for fifty years. Now it's back!” In other words,
while recording houses added this revivalism of a disqualified genre to their catalogs
under a blurred category, groups claimed on one hand the specificity of their approach by
collecting so-called authentic traces and oral testimonies and firmly rooted their practice
in well delimited territories. They drew the borders by themselves, not impenetrable but
11
THYREN, David, “Klezmer in Sweden”, on the Swedish Klezmer Association’s website:
http://www.klezmer.nu/eng-index.htm (Accessed April 5, 2010)
12
http://www.tzadik.com (Accessed April 5, 2010)
13
Slide of the original LP, Metropolis. [Flying Fish 70258] – 1981. Written by Lev Liberman, the
text also explains: “To aid in our research of the authentic settings and styles of klezmer music
c. 1870-1930, we invite anyone having personal knowledge of klezmorim, or having access to
klezmer manuscripts, photographs, memorabilia, or 78-rpm discs, to write to us.”
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assumed as the basis of their musical project, which cut them off from other jazz and folk
artists, sometimes published by the same labels.
III.2.The festivals or the touristic temptation
The Munich festival, organized in 1992 by John Zorn and the German producer
Franz Abraham marked a turning point not only for the radical wing of the musical avantgarde, but also for both the American and European Klezmer musicians. If the free jazz
aesthetic and credo of Zorn were far from being universal, the artists of the American
Klezmer scene have gained the opportunity to take over the European festival with an
increasing popularity. By the way, their activities went passed concerts with a huge crowd
in Krakow, Berlin or Paris. Their annual agendas, sometimes published on their website,
give information to the variety of their work. Thus, the members of the Chicago band
Maxwell Street, in addition to their concerts, were involved in many workshops or master
classes for specialists or for an amateur public.
The Klezmer groups, which have pulled themselves up to a high level of
worldwide recognition, take over the specialized scenes of the “Klezmer” labeled or the
more generalist festivals. Amongst these events, some try to set off their international
reputation by inviting prestigious international stars, as David Krakauer and his bands
Klezmatics and Klezmer Madness !, running top of the bill at Krakow Festival. More
recently created, as the klezmer festival of Bucharest “Jazz meets Klezmer” has
distinguished itself by making more geographically restricted choices: the Romanian
Klezmer Band, the Hungarian musicians of Di Naye Kapelye, the Austrians of The
Klezmer Connection and of the Vienna Klezmer Band and the Czech group Klec.
Nevertheless, these festivals, if their numbers increase and if they attract a
growing audience, ask some questions. With her expression “Jewish space”, historian
Diana Pinto (Pinto, 1996) doesn’t define the space occupied by Jewish people, but the
ways European societies integrate the Jewish history and collective memory - and
especially of the Holocaust – into their own national narratives. In, the Klezmer
phenomenon implies Polish, German, Dutch and French audiences, far beyond the
membership of a Jewish community.
Amongst the rich literary, musicological or more generally popular production
dealing with Klezmer, some movies, and especially those of the American musician and
director Yale Strom, highlight the paradoxical persistence – sometimes cruel – of the
cultural borders toward a music which was presented as a multicultural, open and crossborder phenomenon. So, behind the window of the European festivals, the questions of
memory, and some of them strongly attached to the past of the Holocaust, are still relevant
today. The pilgrimages of American aficionados to Poland (this is the subject of Strom’s
movie Klezmer on Fish Street, 2003), looking for their cultural and memorial “roots” are
portrayed in their most complex dimension, far from the simplicity of the idealistic pictures
of globalized disc industry: the building of a Jewish folklore in the Kazimierz quarter in
Krakow, from the “kasher like” food to the “Schindler’s List”, closely resembles to the
“Jewish virtual world” (Gruber, 2002:317) described by Ruth Ellen Gruber.
Besides, artistic works such as those by Yale Strom14 attest to a will of a
recovering of the traditional klezmorim’s traces. As a director, Strom devoted several
movies to the phenomenon of the klezmer “revival”. However, his documentary Klezmer
14
Amongst a large and rich bibliography, see : Yale STROM, Elisabeth SCHWARTZ, A
Wandering Feast: a Journey Through The Jewish Culture of Eastern Europe, Jossey Bass ed.,
2005, 241 p.
152
on Fish Street highlights, by following musicians from Boston travelling to Poland for the
Krakow Summer Festival, the great ambiguity and all the complexity of a so-called
“return to the roots”. The attitude of the American musicians, more “Polish Jewish” than
those of the local Polish Jews – and the irritation aroused in their interlocutors – shows the
part of fantasy and misunderstanding underlain by such a cross-border experience, as
much as the part of invention, according to the classical analysis by Eric Hobsbawm15,
existing in each so-called authentic tradition.
Bibliography
Astmann, Dana, Gruber, Ruth Ellen, (2009), “Beyond Virtually Jewish: New
Authenticities and Real Imaginary Spaces in Europe”, in The Jewish Quarterly
Review, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Fall 2009)
Boyes, Georgina, (1994), The Imagined Village: Culture, Ideology and the English Folk
Revival (Music & Society), Manchester University Press
Feldman, Walter Zev, (1994), “Bulgărească/Bulgarish/Bulgar: The transformation of a
klezmer dance genre”, in Ethnomusicology, vol. 38, No 1
Gruber, Ellen Ruth, (2002), Virtually Jewish. Reinventing Jewish Culture in Europe,
Berkeley, University of California Press
Hobsbawm, Eric, Ranger, Terence, (2006), dir., L’invention de la tradition, Paris, éditions
Amsterdam, [1983 for the first edition in English]
Karady, Victor, (2004), The Jews of Europe in the Modern Era. A Socio-Historical
Outline, CEU Press
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara, (1998), “Sounds of sensibility”, in Judaism. A Quarterly
Journal of Jewish Life and Thought », issue n°185, vol. 47/1, winter 1998
Pinto, Diana, (1996), A New Jewish Identity for post-1989 Europe. JPR Policy Paper No.
1. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research
Rubin, Joel E. (2006), “Heyser Bulgar (The Spirited Bulgar): Compositional process in
Jewish-American dance music of the 1910s and 1920s », in Birtel, Wolfgang,
Dorfman, Joseph, Mahling, Christoph-Hellmut, ed., Jüdische Musik und ihre Musiker
im 20 Jahrhundert Schriften zur Musikwissenschaft, Mainz, ARE Musikverlag
Saxonberg, Steven, Waligorska, Magdalena, (2006), “Klezmer in Kraków: Kitsch, or
catharsis for poles ?”, in Ethnomusicology, vol. 50, n°3
Shiloa, Amnon, (1996), Les traditions musicales juives, Maisonneuve & Larose
Slobin, Mark, (2002), ed., American Klezmer: its Roots and Offshots, Berkeley, University
of California Press
Slobin, Mark, (2000), Fiddler on the Move, Exploring the klezmer world, New York,
Oxford University Press
Strom, Yale, (2002), The Book of Klezmer, the History, the Music, the Folklore, from the
14th century to the 21st, Chicago, A Capella Books.
15
Eric HOBSBAWM, Eric RANGER, dir., L’invention de la tradition, Paris, éditions Amsterdam,
[1983 for the first English edition], 2006, 370 p. See particularly the introduction by Eric
Hobsbawm, pp. 11-25, and the reference to the collections by the revivalist English composers
of “folkloric” Christmas songs, in reality late adaptations of canticles.
4. FOCUS
Ioan HORGA, Mircea BRIE (Oradea) ◄► Europe: A Cultural Border, or a
Geo-cultural Archipelago
Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago
Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie
Abstract: The image of the European culture is given by the association of the concepts
people – culture – history – territory, which provides certain local features. From this relation, we
identify a cultural area with local, regional and national features beyond a certain European
culture. Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a
culture of cultures, that is a cultural area with a particular, local, regional and national strong
identity, or a cultural archipelago, that is a common yet disrupted cultural area. Whatever the
perspective, the existence of a European cultural area cannot be denied, although one may speak of
diversity or of “disrupted continuity”.
The paper is a survey on the European cultural space in two aspects: 1. Europe with
internal cultural border areas; 2. Europe as external cultural-identity border area. From a
methodological point of view, we have to point out that despite the two-levelled approach the two
conceptual constructions do not exclude each other: the concept of “culture of cultures” designs
both a particular and a general identity area. The specific of the European culture is provided
precisely by diversity and multiculturalism as means of expression on local, regional, or national
levels. Consequently, the European cultural area is an area with a strong identity on both
particular and general levels.
Keywords: culture, border, diversity, Europe, identity, globalisation, interculturality
Introduction
The trends expressed in the scientific environment of the European culture are
either gathered around the concept of cultural homogeneity, a phenomenon in a strong
causal connection with globalisation, or it designates an existing reality that cannot be
denied or eliminated, that is cultural diversity. In the first case, we deal with
universalization and uniformity of values, images and ideas broadcast by media or cultural
industry. Within such construction, regional and national character suffers, as one may
notice the insertion of a means of cultural “predominance” mainly issued by the United
States of America, also known as “Americanisation” of world culture (La culture au cœur,
1998:255-258). In the second case, cultural diversity involves plurality of ideas, images,
values and expressions. They are all possible through a variety of expression and the
presence of a great number of parallel local, regional, ethnic, national, etc. cultures.
Moreover, given the context, certain authors speak of “identity revenge” and the “feeling
of returning to historical, national and cultural identity”, particularly in an area such as
Central and Eastern Europe and at a historical time when national features and identity are
compelled to be redefined by being more open to the new geopolitical, historical, or
cultural configurations (David, Florea, 2007:645-646). Beyond the relative
epistemological antagonism of the approach, our debate can have slight variations. The
field of cultural cooperation tends to become „multipolar”, as the concept of “cultural
networks” is introduced. These networks have begun to shatter old structures and support
identity, communication, relationship and information (Pehn, 1999:8). International
stakeholders acquire an ever more important role; their projects, ideas, methods or
structures, in other words their identity, are not only more visible (thus acquiring a
multiplying effect on others); they are also more specific and particular in expression.
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Is the European culture global or specific? Can we speak of cultural globalisation?
Or, is the European culture going cosmopolite? Which is the place of the traditional, the
ethnic, the national, the specific and the particular? The debate makes room to the
equation global v local, general v particular. National and regional cultures do not
disappear under the immediate acceleration of globalisation due to the increasing interest
in local culture. Considered as a general process, globalisation is “characterised by
multiplication, acceleration and strengthening of economic, political, social and cultural
interaction between actors all over the world” (Tardif, Farchy, 2006:107-108). If
generalised, this cultural globalisation does not have the same influence throughout
Europe.
In the French version of the report published in March 1998 on the issue, the
European Steering Committee on Culture and Development of the Council of Europe
starts with the question: “European culture: the corner shop, the independent trader, or the
world supermarket?” The conclusions of the report are rather generalisations that can be
classified as follows (La culture au cœur, 1998:255-259):
- There is a very strong requirement for accessible broadcast media products and
other worldwide cultural services; at the same time, local cultural offer including local
media arouses the interest for the particular, for ideas, images and values celebrating the
community and local feelings due to interaction and local practices. Diversity is also
preserved due to the support of nation-states.
- Facing the strong trend for consolidation of „cultural continents” world (e.g. the
European or the North-American one), there are autonomous “cultural islands” that are
defined and preserved on local, regional and national levels by enforcing all expressions
and cultural production to the local and traditional criteria of excellence/acceptance. These
“cultural islands” turn into cultural museums closed against any external influence.
- There is a strong “seduction of globalisation”. From this point of view, the
European culture is an economic success as it is worldwide oriented from a commercial
point of view. The economic “conquest” of world markets supports cultural “export”. In
this equation, an important role is played by great companies in the field of information
and telecommunication, cultural production, entertainment and tourism.
- The European area is a place for cultural mixture, for interculturality. This makes
it possible that “hybrid cultures” may appear to assimilate ideas, images and values to
their own cultural format.
- If we accept the idea that all countries should act worldwide and that no culture
can work in isolation, the policies adopted by governments should save local cultural
production and diversity.
The European cultural perspective is also provided by the European Union’s
policy. “Is there a European cultural policy?” This is the title of a conference held in
Bucharest in January 2009 by Vincent Dubois, a professor at the Institute of Political
Sciences in Strasbourg and a member of the Institut Universitaire de France. The question
seems to be natural and legitimate from the point of view of identifying the specific
culture in the European area. The discourse begins with an apocryphal quotation by Jean
Monnet (he would have never uttered this phrase!): “If I were to redo something –
certainly, the European construction – I would start with culture” (Dubois, 2009). The
abovementioned message considers that what we call the “Jean Monnet method”, the
project he built to sketch the European integration, has another direction: starting with the
economic structure, there is a mechanism. Considering the production system, we grow to
be interested in social issues. These interests entail Europe’s cultural integration. This
157
project, this orientation of interests has definitely had influence on the manner of
designing the process of cultural integration. What cultural actions initiated by the
European Union lacks, either partly or totally, is the support and claim of a cultural policy
through the involved political organisations. Nevertheless, there are three important
objectives of the European cultural agenda: 1. promoting cultural diversity and
intercultural dialogue. Yet, as far as this objective is concerned, we deal with a broad
meaning of culture overriding culture in a strict sense. It concerns interethnic exchanges
beyond mere promotion of cultural products; 2. promoting cultures as creative
accelerators. Terms such as “art” or “culture” are not used in the documents issued by the
European Union. The term “culture” is used in the wider anthropological meaning. The
term they prefer is “creativity”; it designates any activity defined through innovation; 3.
promoting culture as an all-important element in the European Union’s external relations.
We can see that the cultural objectives as such are subsumed to the ones concerning
European integration in a broad sense (Dubois, 2009).
An important element is provided by the reference level: sub- or multinational,
autochthonous or diasporas; last but not least, it is the European and international context
(Bennett, 2001:29-32).
Beyond any approach, the image of the European culture is provided by the
association of the concepts people – culture – history – territory. They confer a certain
local specificity due to their characteristics. From this point of view, we can identify
besides a European culture, a cultural area of local, regional and national specifics. Thus,
we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of
cultures, that is a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional, or
national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is a joint yet disrupted cultural area.
Irrespective of the perspective, we cannot deny the existence of a European cultural area,
whether a diversity cultural area, or one of “disrupted continuity”.
What is the place of cultural borders from such conceptual perspective? We are
going to attempt a double approach: 1. Europe with internal border areas; 2. Europe as an
area with external cultural-identity borders. From a methodological point of view, we have
to point out that despite the two-levelled approach the two conceptual constructions do not
exclude each other: the concept of “culture of cultures” designates both a particular and a
general identity area.
I. Europe – an area of cultural borders
The concept of border has long developed as an “intolerance axis” of nationalism
and racism, of neighbours’ rejection (Wackermann, 2003:28). Besides the physical
frontier, irrespective of the conceptual approach, we identify other types of “borders”
whether within or at the border of the European Union. We consider these frontiers
symbolic or ideological since more often than not they are not palpable. From
Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious to cultural identities and social gaps, the
wide range of approaches of these frontiers may continue in the context of implementing
efficient European neighbourhood policies. The physical border at the external boundary
of the European Union may “open” in time. Yet other types of borders may appear
between people and communities. For instance, immigrants live within the European
Union preserving their own identity and thus creating a world that “refuses integration”
due to the specifics this identity develops. We can see that there is a gap between this kind
of communities and the majority that may become a symbolic cultural border and turn into
“external” border.
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In the current context of economic-financial crisis, many European societies
develop a strong “self-protection” feeling not only of economic origin. There is also a
kind of preservation of their own identity, including the cultural one. Crisis or exaltation
moments can easily lead to nationalist feelings diluting the “Europeanist” perception of
the border. This dilution occurs at the same time with strengthening identity-community
and the feeling of ethno-cultural appurtenance to a nation. There is a time when many
European peoples come to the foreground and “re-find their identity” by turning to the
national trend despite the “unity” and solidarity stated by the Member States officials at
European institutions.
National borders established at different times and in different historical and
political contexts have contributed to national and cultural economic integration of
peripheries. In the current context, the integration of Central and Eastern European
countries to the European Union has brought about a reversed phenomenon: disintegration
of national market and administrative decentralisation have led to influencing the
integration of peripheries to national and cultural systems. Currently, there are strong
trends to focus on cross-border cooperation, thus eroding the idea of compact and
relatively isolated national group (Muller, Schultz, 2002: 205). From the cultural point of
view, we can notice the flows of exchanges without a loss of local, regional, or national
features. Cultural characteristics introduce the debate on cultural border. It divides cultural
areas with their own identity, thus building what we call the European cultural area of
cultures.
I.1. Europe: culture of cultures
The numerous political borders tend to have a decreasing importance in the
European Union area to the point of fading away. In time, the former borders turn into
mere “symbols of singularity and independence” (Banus, 2007:139). At the same time,
cultural borders acquire a new ever more visible role. It is not only an internal approach,
when cultural “sub-elements” specific to the European area can be identified; it is also an
approach characteristic of governance external to the European Union. This cultural
border makes a clear-cut distinction between Europe and non-Europe. This perspective
raising the issue of the unity of the European civilisation and providing the image of a
European cultural set (divided into cultural “sub-elements”) is crushed by the supporters
of national cultures of European peoples. The “culture of cultures” idea lays stress on
cultures’ specifics, yet acknowledging its unity. Basically, cultural borders are contact
areas providing communication and cooperation to avoid barriers between the European
peoples or cultures.
Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are elements specific to the
European area. The European integration process is complex; it does not impose and is not
conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or the existence of a common culture including
all Europeans. Specificity and diversity are precisely the means of intercultural dialogue
between European peoples. Each European society has to find their own integrating
solutions depending on traditions and institutions. The integrating model used in Germany
might not work in France. There are salient differences between the model of the French
assimilation policy and the tolerance expressed in the United Kingdom. If we expand this
approach to Central and Eastern European area, differences are even more striking.
European societies and cultures do not reject each other in the European
construction equation. It is a time when each can learn from the experience and expertise
of others. The ex-communist Eastern and Central European countries have undergone a
process of transition to a democratic model after 1990. Yet, this democratic model
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involves accepting diversity including the acknowledgement of national minorities’
claims. In some situations, cultural expression and political responses to claims did not
rise to the occasion. Unfortunately, the result was military solutions.
In Western Europe, minorities have gradually earned a long-term recognition of
autonomy and equity in point of national resources (from this point of view, there are
contrasts with the sudden changes in Central and Eastern Europe turning into intense
manifestations due to minorities’ claims and resistance of the majority). There is not the
same situation in the rights of minorities originating from old European colonies. Upon
their proposal, there is the issue of social status, financial means and relationship between
European cultures and cultures in the regions of origin (La culture au cœur, 1998:69).
Europeans’ attitude concerning immigrants has not been steady throughout time.
If in the 1970s the European countries favoured immigration and some of them, such as
Federal Germany and Switzerland, even encouraged it for reasons of labour force, things
have subsequently changed. At the end of the 1980s, due to the overwhelming number of
immigrants and their “non-European” character, the old continent became less welcoming.
However, Europe tried to favour a climate of openness and generosity. “It is fundamental
to create a welcoming society and acknowledge the fact that immigration is a double
meaning process supposing adaptation of both immigrants and the society assimilating
them. By its nature, Europe is a pluralist society rich in social and cultural traditions that
are to develop even more in the future” (Tandonnet, 2007:50). Could this European
optimism identified by Maxime Tandonnet be just a utopia? The presence of the Islam in
Europe is certitude, yet its Europeanization is still debatable. According to the French
academician Gilles Kepel, “neither the bloodshed of Muslims in Northern Africa wearing
French uniforms during the two world wars, nor the toil of immigrant workers living in
terrible conditions and building France (and Europe) for next to nothing after 1945 did
turn their children into... European citizens as such” (Leiken, 2005:1). If Europeans can
assimilate the Muslim immigrants or if there is to be a conflict of values is open to debate.
Stanley Hoffman has noticed that Westerners are more and more scared that “they are
invaded not by armed forces and tanks, but by immigrants speaking different languages,
worshiping other Gods, belonging to other cultures and taking their jobs and lands, living
far from the welfare system and menacing their lifestyle” (Stanley, 1991:30; Huntington,
1998:292).
Alternating negotiation and conflict, communication and doubt, Muslims build
little by little an individual and collective identity “risking to be at the same time pure and
hybrid, local as well as transnational” (Saint-Blancat, 2008:42). The multiplying identity
vectors contribute to the flow of symbolic borders and to individualising diasporas
communities. There is a sort of gap around each Islamic community as compared to the
rest of the community. This gap often turns into an internal and external border at the
same time. This reality is stressed by the establishment of community models where
identity features are transferred from the ethnic and national area (Turks, Magrebians,
Arabs) to the religious, Muslim, Islamic one (Saint-Blancat, 2008:44). According to the
behaviourist model, we can notice several behavioural reactions of Islamic communities
building up a solidarity overcoming ethnic or national differences. This reality is also
determined by the discriminating attitude of the majority. Several stereotypes lead not
only to a patterned image, but also to a solidarity around the Islamic values even in the
case of non-believers, maybe atheists. The phenomenon can be reversed: from Islamic
solidarity, they may reach ethnic solidarity. It is the case of the Pakistani Islam
communities in the United Kingdom (about 750,000 people) who have ethnically
160
regrouped (individualised on an ethnic border) due to a religious support (Pędziwiatr,
2002:159).
Ethno-cultural borders may overlap or not over state borders: we can identify
symbolic “borders” in most European states separating more or less human communities
on ethnic or cultural criteria.
EU policy has an impact on national minorities’ position in the Member States.
One of the current objectives of the European Union is building a “neutral” area where
different national cultures may find themselves and cooperate (La culture au cœur,
1998:69). A key element of accession agreements for Central and Eastern European
countries mentioned the treatment of national minorities including the management of the
“border” between minorities and majorities. For example, in Estonia there was a
programme funded by the state on the issue of the “Estonian society integration”
(implemented in 2000-2007) together with programmes funded by the EU, UN and other
Northern states whose aim was to promote interethnic dialogue and Estonian language
learning by the Russian speakers (Thompson, 2001:68). In Hungary, the government was
concerned with improving the treatment of the Gipsies, which was required by the
European Union during the pre-accession negotiations. The issue of the Gipsies is a
general issue for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In their reports on the
accession negotiations with the countries in the region, the European Commission showed
their concern on the protection of national minorities’ rights. In the 1999 report on the
progress of the candidate countries, the Commission stated that “the rooted prejudice in
many candidate countries still results from discrimination against Gipsies in social and
economic life” (Thompson, 2001:69). There will still be difficulties despite the attempts of
the European institutions to improve the situation. Some Central and Eastern European
countries seek to redefine their national position after escaping the Soviet era. In such a
context, national minorities have a hard time to identify with the national identity of the
state. For example, according to Estonia’s response to the recommendations of the
Commission on minorities’ protection, the Government speaks of “preserving the
Estonian nation and culture” and the “development of the population loyal to the Estonian
Republic” (Thompson, 2001:69). The case of Ukraine (which is not a European Union
Member State) is more eloquent due to the fact that it has a privileged relationship with
the EU at its external border. Here, one can find what Samuel Huntington called the
“erroneous civilisation line” – a delimitation dividing two cultures with different
perceptions of the world (Thompson, 2001:69).
Thus, the difficulties of integration are obvious. Amongst the groups of different
ethnies or cultures, there are often communication barriers that often lead to gaps and
entail discrimination reactions and conflict situations. On the other hand, these gaps are
but expressions of elitist political trends that are difficult to seize in daily life. From this
point of view, ethnic borders are spaces of mutual understanding and insertion and, from
another point of view, they are spaces of divergence and exclusion (Tătar, 2003:159).
I.2. Cultural border versus political border/cultural identity
From this perspective, Europe seems a structure made up of cultural areas
delimited by cultural “borders” overlapping more or less on national states’ borders. The
border defined by the Dictionnaire de géographie (Baud, Bourgeat, 1995) as a “limit
separating two areas, two states”, a disruption “between two types of space organisation,
communication networks, societies, often different and sometimes opposed”
(Wackermann, 2003:11), represents the “interface of territorial discontinuities”
(Wackermann, 2003:10). Borders show the limits of jurisprudence, sovereignty and
161
political systems. Thus, they can have the role of lines, “barriers” or “landmarks”. On the
other hand, they show the typology of political construction. The relation border –
political system is interestingly seized by Jean-Baptiste Haurguindéguy, who sees the
“border as a limit of the political” and “the political as a limit of the border”
(Haurguindéguy, 2007:154).
As compared to political border, cultural border is not seen exclusively in
connection with the idea of state; this image can also be seen as compared to the
international context, international political system and international bodies. However,
everything can be connected with the relation between the political area and the border
through “democracy”. Just like democracy, culture is not, and should not be, the exclusive
means of political structures. Intergovernmental bodies established after WWII have
repeatedly stated their interest in “cultural democracy”, “cultural rights” and the
promotion of coherent policies in the cultural field (La culture au cœur, 1998:37). Besides
these desiderata, national states have been directly involved in promoting cultural policies
to “develop national identity”. Several European states allow an important part of their
cultural budget to preserve and protect a material cultural patrimony standing for the joint
heritage of Europe in its entirety. The rich Roman or Renaissance cultural heritage
contribute to more than strengthening the European culture, as it is also overlapped on the
Italian political desiderata to develop the identity of the Italian nation and state (La culture
au cœur, 1998:44).
Cultural policy is more than building and renovating cultural buildings; it stands
for a whole set of measures in the cultural field (Bennett, 200:55-62). Promoting cultural
identity and culture, favouring creativity and active participation in the cultural field are
four fundamental objectives of the European cultural policies. The importance deriving
from such policy is the foundation of establishing identities and states in several regions of
the European continent. Tracing political borders, as well as claims of any nature are
supported more often than not by cultural and identity arguments. It is a topical
perspective even in the context of European integration and globalisation nowadays: the
process is associated with current trends to local and regional elements, which brings
about the strengthening of identity significance and cultural heritage (Wackermann,
2003:39; O’Dowd, Wilson, 1996:237).
Cultural identity (represented by encoded behaviour and communication, such as
language, customs, traditions, clothes, traditional structures, institutions, religion, arts,
etc.) is the specific element providing national cohesion and continuity of generations.
Identity is plural, as each individual is defined in an effective or potential manner through
a multiple appurtenance: either immediate surroundings (family and close friends), or the
first levels of ethnic, religious, social or local appurtenance take shape (La culture au
cœur, 1998:52). Several individuals or groups of individuals cannot identify themselves
with such identity structures, which generates the search for new references, that is, new
systems of values. In Western Europe, crises of the provident state, unemployment,
immigration or exclusion have a deep influence on society. On the other hand, in Central
and Eastern Europe, the road to democracy has proved to be painful in many countries.
The return to nationalism has been a mere expression of a reality leading to creating or
strengthening cultural identities. Thus, in many European countries, one of the cultural
policies objectives is “favouring (re)discoveries or (re)assertion of identities” (La culture
au cœur, 1998:53).
Dictionaries of cultural geography define borders as basic spatial structures having
the role of geopolitical disruption and marking or landmark acting on three levels: real,
symbolic and imaginary. The symbolic refers to the appurtenance to a community
162
anchored in their own territory thus making reference to identity. Anthropologists insist on
the founding role of the symbolic in establishing collective or individual identities through
delimitations. Borders always trigger strong marks of identity leaving its imprint on
cultural relationships on an inhabited territory (Spiridon, 2006). The tradition of geohistorical research initiated by the French school of Annales has insisted on the significant
equation border – identity. Lucien Febvre has analysed the semantic evolution of the
notion of border as a sign of the mutation of historical reality in parallel with the
establishment of nation-states. The couple border – identity is present in the ideas
expressed by Fernand Braudel in L’identité de la France. To Braudel, the border is the
place where autonomous yet interdependent plans are articulated – on the one hand, real
geopolitical borders and, on the other hand, their intellectual, ideological and symbolic
projections. The ideas mentioned above hold true in the spatial delimitation of Europe and
the perceptions of European identity, particularly as the idea of “European cultural
identity” refers to offcut and delimitation: geopolitical, ideological or symbolic, and to
unstable borders sometimes traced in a paradoxical manner and generating confusions
(Spiridon, 2006).
I.3. Cultural borders, foundation of current geopolitics
Nowadays, the great attempt for European unification is the third great attempt of
the kind. After the forceful attempts of Napoleon and Hitler, who did not succeed in an
imperialist manner, the process of European construction has acquired an ever greater
consistency through a progressive integrating policy based on the ideals of peace and
welfare (La culture au cœur, 1998:77).
The process of integration through successive stages has enabled the passage from
the European Economic Community to the European Community, then the European
Union. Despite the first failed attempts to settle a “political community”, the integrating
process has continued to become stronger. This equation makes room to geopolitical
factors as expressions of cultural differences beyond economic factors, such as stability,
growth potential, a good market, or the presence of qualified labour force. In the process
of building an “enlarged family” of democratic societies, the partisans of integration hope
for a progressive reduction of nation-states power despite nationalist remainders shattering
some former communist countries in Europe. After the fall of communism, many Central
and Eastern European countries have found their existence connected to their own cultural
awareness: “a culture cannot survive without tradition, and a tradition cannot live without
minimum continuity” (La culture au cœur, 1998:80). Cultural differences associated with
linguistic, ethnic, religious or migration divisions have contributed to exponential increase
of xenophobia and intolerance in several European regions. We can add to the examples in
the Balkans and the Caucasus area the discrimination against immigrants in certain
Western European countries or the exacerbation of tensions between majorities and
minorities from the point of view of building and preserving a strong identity for each
ethno-linguistic group. A recent example raising again an older issue is the intention of the
Fidesz Government in Budapest to grant Hungarian citizenship to Hungarian ethnics
living in neighbouring countries as of January 2011. The measure envisages about 3.5
million Hungarian ethnics living in countries neighbouring Hungary: Romania, Slovakia,
Serbia, Ukraine, Croatia, and Austria. This matter has increased the tensioned relations
with Bratislava and other countries neighbouring Hungary. After calling back the
ambassador in Budapest, the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stated on Monday, 17
May, that he would further a law to withdraw the Slovak citizenship to any individual
requesting Hungarian citizenship (Cochino, 2010). This dispute raises not only a regional
163
issue involving either the disappearance of the Hungarian minority in Southern Slovakia
or the secession of the regions, but also an issue of stability within the EU and NATO.
On the matter of settling the geopolitical identity of Europe, an important element
is the relations between the EU and Russia. The following pattern can be identified: the
countries of the “New Europe” – Eastern European states in post-communist time have
been in a tough Russophobia and joined a Euro-Atlantic orientation. The situation has a
long history: Eastern Europe has ceaselessly been a war area between Europe and Russia.
An example in point is the moment when the United Kingdom deliberately used the region
as a “tieback” to prevent a possible alliance between Russia and Germany that would
facilitate the end of the Anglo-Saxon domination in the world in the 19th century and the
beginning of the 20th century. It is the same situation now. The only difference is that
stress is laid on energetic projects in the “tieback” countries defending the argument
according to which it is a payback for the “Soviet occupation” in the 20th century. “New
arguments, old geopolitics” (Dugin, 2010). Besides this approach, another geopolitical
project has been introduced – the “Eurasia project”. This project involves settling two
geopolitical units in Northern Eurasia that would be “great areas” – European and
Russian. In this context, Europe is conceived as a centre, as a civilisation. The most
important moment in a multipolar architecture is eliminating the “tieback”, this bone of
contention controlled by the Anglo-Saxons that disagrees either with Europe, or with
Russia (Dugin, 2010). “Consequently, these countries and people that objectively tend to
build the New Europe will have to redefine their geopolitical identity. This identity must
be based on a main rule: together with Europe and Russia at the same time. The European
integration and friendly relations with Russia – these are the elements bridging the two
poles of a multipolar world” (Dugin, 2010).
Beyond the opinions of the Russian politologist quoted above, the geopolitical
construction around centres such as the United States of America, the continental Europe,
or Russia have some slight variations. The western world (the Americas, the EU Member
States, Australia, South-Eastern Asia and countries such as Japan, Israel and South Africa)
is a complex economic, political and cultural entity showing that it has the resources to
overcome conflicts between local, regional and national cultures (La culture au cœur,
1998: 82-83). This reality does not involve the disappearance of cultural identities and
borders. Moreover, when facing the process of globalisation, there is an acceleration of
local cultural production/request. This process does not involve exclusivity and
intolerance towards other cultures; it involves the positioning in a general structure built
on a geopolitical support referring to an integrationist phenomenon in certain situations.
II. Europe – a geo-cultural archipelago
Irrespective of the approaches on diversity and multiple identities from a cultural
point of view, Europe can be conceived as an organic cultural structure despite disruptions
that may occur between the elements making up its complex structure. Considering this
approach, the European culture is built on an intricate system of common values
characterising the European cultural area. Just like isles making up an archipelago, despite
some areas delimitating it, the European cultural area is made up of elements that can be
characterised as organic structures with a certain composition in point of shape and
expression. The areas limiting these “insular” cultural areas interpreted as cultural borders
from the perspective of our approach are disruptions within an organic cultural system:
Europe. This cultural area is organic and has specific relations with the neighbouring
cultural areas.
164
II.1. Cultural Europe: between common values and interests
The classical criterion for cultural location connecting a cultural area to a people
speaking the same language, having the same lifestyle and behaviour, etc., can be replaced
by some criteria defining the common and organic cultural area of the Europeans.
We first refer to common cultural values due to which we can confirm today the
existence of a cultural reality specific to the European area. In the survey entitled The
Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our Common Values, Rudolf Rezsöhazy develops the
common values of the European cultural area on new elements conferring specificity and
unity (Rezsöhazy, 2008:1). The Greek-Roman civilisation as a basis to build the European
culture and spirit; 2. The values of Christianity starting with basic notions, such as the
single and personal God, the concept of salvation and damnation of man, love, justice,
solidarity and fraternity of man (all men are considered sons of the same Father); 3.
Middle Ages and mediaeval civilisation; 4. Renaissance and Reform; 5. Enlightenment; 6.
Political and industrial revolution; 7. Capitalism and socialism; 8. Development, progress
and welfare of post-war history; 9. Family as core value of our society.
Another approach conferring unity to the European area refers to common
interests of Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern and Western Europe have
undergone a process of political, economic, military and environmental integration
(Dubnička, 2007:299). The fight against terrorism and the fear of military wars, the fear of
increasing world population associated with poverty and migration to Western Europe
raise the following dilemma: integration or national identity? Which is the role of the EU
in this situation? The answers to these questions have to be sought in the following fields:
culture, history, religion, economy and security (Dubnička, 2007:299-309). Besides
divergences separating the Europeans, the current context brings to the foreground the
strong determinism recorded by the integrationist trend triggered by common interest.
An area with common values and interests is able to build and strengthen its
common identity character. There is also the relation with the non-European area. From
this point of view, the European cultural area takes a distinct form as compared to other
cultural types and systems. Thus, there is a cultural border around cultural Europe. Such
cultural border makes a clear distinction between Europe and non-Europe. Besides this
theory laying stress on scepticism concerning certain projects for future enlargement of
the European Union, we can notice the use of debating on the issue of the real borders of
Europe, an issue approached by analysts for centuries.
Cultural perspective raises debates on the notion of the unity of the European
civilisation as well as on the relation between geography and culture. Can Europe be
separated from Asia on the cultural criterion of delimitation? Professor Delanty
approaches the concept of Christian Europe and Europe as an heir of the Roman and
Greek civilisation (Delanty, 2006:46). Besides the line of geographical, tectonic
separation of the two continents, is the European culture able to impose new borders? It is
a question to which European analysts provide different answers. Visions are strongly
influenced by the current geopolitical subjectivity. During Middle Ages, Europe was
limited to the Catholic West clearly separated from the expanding Islamism. Through
Peter the Great’s endeavours, Russia was included in the European diplomatic system.
Europe as a concept expanded. For the first time in 1716, in Almanach royal published in
France, the figures of the Romanovs were amongst the European monarch families. This
was mainly due to the fact that Russia joined the other powers in the European diplomatic
system (Anderson, 1968:156). Around 1715, the position of the Ottoman Empire
resembled Russia from many points of view. It joined the European diplomatic arena at
the end of the 15th century. The fact that the Turks joined the European relations system
165
was mainly due to the rivalries between France and the Habsburgs (Anderson, 1968:157).
Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire did not express as a European state and did never
belong to the European diplomatic system in the 18th century. To Napoleon, the European
area meant the “French Europe” conceived as a space whose borders had to be settled
according to the tensions against the Ottoman Empire (Delanty, 2006:46). Further
examples are available to these days. Yet, the hypothesis of cultural borders of the
European area imposes certain delimitations that we often assume, whether we like it or
not.
Our aim is not to trace such borders of the European area. However, we have to
point out that our debate rather imposes a characterisation of the European identity as a
spatial notion that is protected like a fortress. Is Europe (we directly refer to the EU, which
is more or less associated to the European area as a whole!) not only politically, but also
culturally an area imposing external borders clearly determined from a territorial point of
view? If we pursue the evolution of the process of European construction in time, we can
conclude by answering the question with the simple fact that in the European Union
external borders are more and more important (more closed!), while the internal borders
are becoming formal (more open!). Thus, Europe seen as a “fortress” is more and more
open, more “hospitable” from the point of view of its Member States, and more closed,
more secure at the borders and less permissive from the point of view of the rest of the
world. In this construction, we can identify more than the advantages of high degree of
democracy and welfare that the Community citizens enjoy; there is also the exclusivity
imposed to others by closing the fortress. When putting aside internal barriers, Europe
(EU!) starts to become a super-state reinventing the “hard” border to protect states and
politically associated people; it excludes those who have not been beneficiaries of such
political decisions. Do external borders of the Community turn into expressions of the
national state border in this context? It is a difficult issue entailing debates not only on the
character and typology of the border, but also on aspects introduced by the fact that the
European Union does not have a border from within which is can see outside. There are
several territories that are geographically “within” the Community, but do not belong to
the European Union. The attempt to trace the Community border to (physically!) separate
the “Europeans” and the “non-Europeans” is impossible from a cultural point of view.
Even recent historical heritage after the Cold War imposes both borders and real barriers
that cannot be surpassed from the point of view of political decisions. Borders are still
closed irrespective of cultural heritage. On the other hand, the process of tracing external
borders does not seem to have finished. Considering this remark, there are people and
states that will belong to the “inside” in the future, although they are currently outside the
borders. The hard border whose construction is more definite excludes both Europeans
and non-Europeans. Consequently, the European border is either open or closed
depending on the exclusivist interests and less on cultural grounds. Thus, politicians’
discourse using the European cultural heritage as a reason against the integration of
countries such as Turkey is mere populist action. The decision is political and the club is
exclusivist. “Europe is and should remain a house with many rooms, rather than a
culturally and racially exclusive club” (Bideleux, 2006:62). Thus, the European
Community is a territory closed on both political and identity grounds.
II.2. Numerical revolution and the society of communication: between
diversity and homogeneity
Due to technical development in the field of reproducing and broadcasting
information through numerical encoding, distances between different parts of the world
166
have greatly diminished nowadays. The new free practices with access to networks and
numerical content of information provide the opportunity to have quick access to a lot of
information. For example, due to different internet programmes, people in any part of the
world can communicate in real time for free. The new technologies change production and
cultural consumption due to the fact that cultural content belonging to a wide cultural
range is at our disposal. Between culture, communication and new technologies there is a
natural relation leading to outlining a communicational society within which cultural
production and consumption is specific, yet shallow (La culture au cœur, 1998:318).
Specific cultural programmes can be broadcast within the new context not only in
a limited space; they are available in diasporas areas (Tardif, Farchy, 2006:166-167).
Distance communication between communities belonging to the same cultural area is
facilitated and settles the premise of developing a borderless cultural area. Thus, emigrant
communities in the diasporas can keep in touch with the cultural area of origin and
succeed to preserve their identity. The internet provides a great chance to small cultures
and threatened linguistic communities. Universalisation should not be understood as a
means of uniformity, but as a chance to cultural identity... integration in the universal
value circuit (Oberländer-Târnoveanu, 2006:2).
This opportunity to promote the particularity and preservation of identity of small
groups under the pressure of assimilation is accompanied by a similar process in a
reversed direction: cultural elements specific to cultural “homogeneity” resulting from
globalisation are more easily offered to cultural environment including small cultural
communities. Another result is “relocating cultural consumption” as the new technologies
of information and communication reduce distances and compress time (La culture au
cœur, 1998:120). This reality puts aside local and provincial constraints although there is
an “invasion” of the universal. The European cultural area as a whole acquires a more
consistent form in this context, as its elements are more connected and related through
interculturality. Cultural diversity acquires a consistency through several models provided.
The choice undoubtedly leads to homogeneity. There is the same process in the European
area. Beyond any infusion from the outside, particularly the American area and the
Islamic area, it preserves its own cultural specific (La culture au cœur, 1998:117-133).
II.3. Network culture – a new type of cultural border
The multiplication of education, research and cooperation opportunities in the
cultural field has been carried out due to international “workshops” and the development
of transnational networks. The role of these networks is to accelerate cultural actions and
promote common values (La culture au cœur, 1998:321). Thematic networks aim at
settling research, development and knowledge actions on common interests identified on
regional, interregional and transnational levels. Technically, the network is made up of a
group of institutions with resembling aims identifying a common need in their field of
action. Joining under an organisation can be formal or informal, as communication
between members and sharing joint objectives of the networks are essential for it to work.
Thus, a network is defined by sharing information and idea, learning from the
experience of others, expertise and large perspective on approaches in the field of cultural
patrimony marketing and management. “Networks make us become familiar with the new
artistic and cultural expressions, new methods of management and provide consistency to
the partnership between public institutions and civil society” (Lujanschi, Neamu, 2005:4).
In the new European cultural configuration, networks make up the expression of a
different form of cooperation as compared to the classic system. They have the role to
favour, simplify and rush the implementation of joint cultural projects. Networks are
167
useful as they allow reaching international level without going through the national
institutional framework (Pehn, 1999:47).
Networks have a core role both for professionals’ mobility and acquiring a
European cohesion. Cultural exchange and cooperation greatly contributes to Europe’s
integration and cohesion. The European Union encourages long-term cooperation leading
to networks interconnecting cultural institutions. Networks provide a wide range of public
information and increasing interest in culture by developing the ability for
communication, collaboration and diversity understanding (Lujanschi, Neamu, 2005:7).
The Manifesto of the European Cultural Networks adopted in Brussels on 21
September 1997 by the Forum of European Cultural Networks considers that “European
cultural networks contribute to European cohesion, facilitate mobility of operators and
cultural products, facilitate trans-cultural communication, fights xenophobia and racism,
and provides practice in inter-cultural understanding, strengthens the cultural dimension of
development that is not produced by purely economic factors” (Lujanschi, Neamu,
2005:3).
More often than not, these networks are considered unofficial organised groups
attempting to focus information and putting pressure on decision-makers. Some analysts
even consider them exclusivist groups established around institutions in Brussels and
Strasbourg (La culture au cœur, 1998:321). More or less formal, these networks are often
used by the European institutions in decision-making. Thus, networks become
interlocutors acquiring regional, national or European recognition. Yet, their recognition is
not related to a certain financial support. It is a certain legitimacy, that is, a new manner of
working on an institutional level.
No matter their role relating to the European institutions, as petitioners or partners,
European cultural networks have become important transnational vectors to stimulate
cooperation in the cultural field. Intercultural dialogue is facilitated by formal or informal
connection of specialists or representatives of organisations in the European area. Thus,
the European cultural area acquires a new approach as regards its structure: cultural “small
isles” interconnected through a transnational relational system. “The process of
‘networking’ is a long-term process of a deep and subjective nature that is difficult to
quantify and judge” (Pehn, 1999:49).
Conclusions
Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European
level: a culture of cultures, that is, a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular,
local, regional and national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is, a joint cultural area
with disruptions. No matter the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is
not denied, whether we speak of diversity or “disrupted continuity”. The European culture
seen as a “house with many rooms” does not exclude the existence of the “house” or the
“rooms”. The natural question arising from this perspective is as follows: are specific
cultures completely integrated in the general European cultural area? The answer seems
natural. Our European identity supposes a basic reality. Besides, the particularity of the
European culture is provided by diversity and multiculturalism as means of expression on
the local, regional or national levels. Consequently, the European cultural area is an area
with strong identity both particularly and generally. The phrase “culture of cultures” is
appropriate from this point of view. As to identifying cultural borders, we can notice the
fact that cultural contact areas belong to at least two categories: internal areas between
local, regional or national elements; external areas that impose the delimitation around
what European culture is. Both approaches used in this paper do not exclude each other
168
despite the conceptual opposition. The existence of national cultural areas does not
exclude the existence of a common European cultural area. In fact, it is precisely this
reality that confers the European area a special cultural identity. Europe can be conceived
as a cosmopolite space, a media-cultural space where cultural security can turn into an
element of preservation of a European common identity, besides the approaches we have
referred to. Facing economic pressure generated by the economic policies, today’s Europe
responds to the whole world as a powerful common cultural area through the EU. Do
peoples’ identities disappear in this equation? The debate has to comprise approaches
starting from the definition of the place of the national in the context of the European
construction process. Can the nationalism specific to the 19th and 20th centuries Europe be
extrapolated to peoples in a different concept, that of Europeanism? Besides the slight
variations of the approach, “nationalism” can be European. In this case, Europe as a whole
is strengthened as a structure in construction including the cultural perspective.
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5. Book reviews
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numerous books written about this process and the subsequent implications of each stage
during this evolution. Nevertheless, despite the great number of writings on the European
integration process, the academic world needs more and more information about certain
internal events which have happened within the European institutions. One of such books
is that of Pascal Fontaine’s, covering the role of the Democrat-Christian group in the
European parliamentary activity throughout the entire period of the European integration
process. Structured in three parts and forty-three chapters, the very condensed book of P.
Fontaine succeeds in offering a very deep approach to the European legislative process,
and could be considered as a reference book for specialists in European studies, for
students and for the euro-deputies, too. After an introduction concerning the necessity of
the approach and the employed methods, the first part of the Fontaine’ book focuses on
the period considered “of the pioneers”, that is 1952-1979, the period when European
deputies were not elected, but appointed by the national officials. Starting by introducing
us in the problem of the origins of the process of European integration and the apparition
of the Democrat-Christian Group, the first part of the book presents the implication of the
popular representatives in some important European events, such as: the Conference of
Messina; the creation of EURATOM; the Common Market and, later on, the monetary
union; the creation of custom-union and the first provision on Common Agricultural
Policy; the enlargement of the European Community. On the other hand, the author does
not omit the main international political events of the time and focuses on the DemocratChristian Group’ standpoint on some international episodes like the Bretton Woods
Accords; the Hungarian and Czech Revolution of 1956&1968; the Berlin wall; the
Portuguese revolution, the Cypriote crisis of 1974 or the death of Franco the following
year. For every presented episode, the author explains the attitude of his DemocratChristian Group and how it succeeded in accomplishing its objectives or influenced the
consequences of events. The first part ends in the focus on the role of the foundation of
European People’s Party and on its role in the first free election of the European
Parliament.
The second part of the Fontaine’ book deals with the first three legislatures of the
EPP (1979-1994). The main issues addressed in this part we consider to be the references
concerning the adoption of the Single European Act, over which the PPE members gave
their full agreement, and in the genesis of the Maastricht Treaty, considered to being
significantly influenced by the EPP; the references to the rejection by the European
Parliament of the budget of the European Commission; the references to the CAP or to the
internal market generally. On the other hand, other information is really significant for
those interested in how the European institutions really work: the implication of the
European Union in the Yugoslavian war by humanitarian and political initiatives, and the
vote of EPP members for the enlargement of the Union in 1994.
The third part of the volume concerns the period 1994-2009 and focuses on
different topics. Firstly, the author underlines the internal transformations of EPP, given
the influence of two of the most important presidents of the group, Wilfried Martens and
Hans-Gert Pottering. Subsequent to this introduction, the author focuses on the EPP
contribution for the issue of Schengen space and on the process of accession of the new
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twelve members (in 2004 and respectively 2007); on the process of adoption of the new
treaties (of Amsterdam and Nice); on elaboration of the Constitution of Europe and of the
Treaty of Lisbon; on the activity of Santer, Prodi and Barosso Commissions; on the new
directions registered by the internal market and adoption of EURO; on the support of EPP
for the democratic forces from Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia; on the relations with
Russia and the question of Turkey accessing the European Union. The economic crisis
appeared in 2008, the different political events happened in the Central European
countries (like the new Czech presidency) or the new presidents of EPP are considered by
the author too, and the end of the book concentrates on a perspective image of EPP as an
essential European Parliament political group.
The book is really edifying for the most important events happened during the
European history and it would be unfair to not admit it. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the
character of the writing is very positive and so is the regular one-sided perspective of
approach; such position represents a limitation of the book. Despite this, and corroborated
with other similar writings, this volume could constitute a veritable source of information
both for the specialist in European studies and for everyone with an interest for details
about the role of political groups operating inside the European Parliament.
Cristina Dogot ([email protected])
Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol.9, No.3, September 2009,
European Institute of Romania, 91 p.; Romanian Journal of European
Affairs, vol. 9, No.4, December 2009, European Institute of Romania, 99 p.,
ISSN 1582-8271
Volume 9, No. 3, 2009 of Romanian Journal of European Affairs, the journal of
the European Institute of Romania, includes articles regarding topics such as: the
economy crisis, the situation from Afghanistan, the problem of the accession of Turkey to
the European Union, the European Union and the Black Sea regions, the issue of
Hungarian-Slovak relations and the protection of Hungarians from outside of Hungary, the
public opinion and the attitudes of ethnic groups on European Integration in Moldova
(2000-2008). Authors such as Eugen Dijmărescu, Liviu Bogdan Vlad, Adina Negrea,
Edward Moxon-Browne, Cigdem Ustun, Cristian NiŃoiu, Galina Nelaeva, Sergiu
Buşcăneanu address the above mentioned issues given interesting interpretations. We
especially point out the article of Edward Moxone-Browne and Cigdem Ustun regarding
the process of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. The authors acknowledge the
difference between the European and the Turkish cultures and their different historical
path : “Indeed, it is most often argued that a lack of common cultural identity between
Turkey and the EU is precisely the reason why this step in the Enlargement process is a
<<step too far>>”. In the same time, the authors notice the opposition of some EU
countries to Turkish accession and the rejection of accession to EU in Turkish public
opinion. In 2002, 76% of the Turks supported the integration, while in 2006 the number of
supporters of integration into EU decreased to 57%. These aspects were not in favour of
integration. Another interesting article is that of Galina Nelaeva regarding the “cold war”
in Hungary-Slovakia relations regarding the protection of Hungarian ethnics from
Slovakia. The author mentions that the problem of protecting the Hungarian ethnics in the
neighbouring countries became a top priority for Hungary starting with the 1980’s. During
1998 - 2002, Galina Nelaeva underlines, the Hungarian Minister Orban suggested a
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number of laws which gave benefits to Hungarian ethnics from abroad. Such a law was
“Status law” dated 2001 which allowed the Hungarian ethnics living abroad to receive a
Hungarian identity card. Slovakia criticized this law as being discriminatory. Another
interesting article is the one of Sergiu Buşcăneanu’s, concerning attitudes of Moldavian
ethnic groups towards the European Integration of Moldova. The conclusion of the author
based on statistical evidence was that the majority of Moldovan citizens are in favour of
the integration. He underlines that people with a higher social and economic status are
mostly in favor of integration process.
Volume 9, No. 4, 2009 of the Romanian Journal of European Affaires includes
articles regarding regional and cohesion policy of the European Union, competition and
regulation on the EU energy market, European Union energy security, the Eastern
Partnership of the European Union with EU Eastern neighbors, Czech presidency of EU
countries, the the profile of Romanian candidates for the 2009 European elections.
Authors such as Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Călinescu, Cristina Havriş, Ovidiu-Horia
Maican, Oana Mocanu, Petr Kaniok, Hubert Smekal, Sergiu Gherghina, Mihail Chiru
offer interesting interpretations of these issues. We especially point out the article of Alina
Bârgăoanu and Loredana Călinescu considering regional and cohesion policy of the
European Union, showing the EU politics attempting to find a balance between cohesion
and competitivity, trying not favour one on the expence of the other. Cohesion policy
harmonizes the disparities existent in European Union, but it also lays the basis for
economic growth. Another interesting article is that of Oana Mocanu which mentions the
Eastern Partnership which emerged in 2008 as a consequence of a Swedish-Polish
proposal. This partnership implies the development of the relations with Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia, Azerbainjan, Armenia and Belarus under the umbrella of European
Neighbourhood Policy. The author describes the objectives of this partnership and the
benefits that it will bring: “The free trade areas entailed, the visa-free travel perspective,
the enhanced bilateral cooperation and the development of multilateral and, most of all,
regional components of the initiative are only a few of the main goals that the EaP intends
to address”. And, of course, the articles regarding the energy policy of the European
Union which suggest to reduce the dependency on Russia, but also to try to diversify the
energy resources from other markets.
The articles presented in Romanian Journal of European Affairs approache
contemporary important topics and debate the subjects with modern and elaborated
approaches. The magazine is an important source of information for contemporary
policies issues.
Anca Oltean ([email protected])
Western Balkans Security Observer (Journal of Belgrade School of Security
Studies), Year 4, No. 13, April-June 2009, Belgrade, 75 p., ISSN: 1452-6115
The Western Balkans Security Observer represents one of the most challenging
periodicals that consider security in comparative perspectives from inner and outer EU
space. Inevitable, the European security cannot be approached without taking into
consideration the dynamics of the Balkan region. As it can be noticed, the policy of the
journal gathers interdisciplinary approaches of security issues focused mainly on nonmilitary aspects within a region that directly or indirectly affects the European security.
The overall approach is open and suggests that the Balkans, especially the former
Yugoslav space, can deal with and contribute with security in the present regional context.
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The April-June 2009 edition has a very challenging theme: “Carl Schmitt and the
Copenhagen School of Security Studies”. The articles gathered in this volume are
questioning the opinion of the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt who considered
that the essence of politics is the distinction between friends and enemies. This statement
is analyzed from the perspective of critical theory, adapted to the international security
environment at the beginning of the 21st Century. Concepts as political, politics, policy are
related to security and securitization perspectives from the Copenhagen School of
Security Studies.
The first article signed by Pedrag Petrovic reevaluates the enemy as the essence of
the political and the text offers a review of Schmitt’s daring understanding of politics in
terms of friend-enemy categories. This controversial approach underlines highly intriguing
and bold ideas on sovereignty, order, free will, state of emergency, terrorism and politics
as well as sharp criticism of liberalism.
Another interesting article is dedicated to one of the most recent concepts used in
academic debates – societal security and identity. Among different definitions and
interpretations of security, the constant relationship between security, identity, preferences
and expectations of all societal actors will affect the regional and international dynamics
of security. Therefore we can talk about security cultures derived from the identity and
societal experiences. If we address the newly dimensions of security in the present
international context, we can observe that the state is no longer the only and exclusive
reference object of security and the social groups tend to become more legitimate in the
security agenda.
Adel Abusara makes an analysis on the conditionality of EU in the perspective of
continuously approaching of Western Balkans toward membership. The conditionality is
questioned both theoretically and historical. In another text, the relation friend-enemy is
questioned within a case study regarding the German intelligence activities in Kosovo.
The article examines the media coverage of the scandal involving German secret service
personnel in the attack on EULEX headquarters in Kosovo in November 2008 and the
subsequent tensions between the Republic of Kosovo and Germany.
Dorin I. Dolghi, ([email protected])
Western Balkans Security Observer (Journal of Belgrade School of Security
Studies), Year 4, No. 13, July-September 2009, Belgrade, 149 p.,
ISSN: 1452-6115
This issue of the Western Balkans Security Observer is addressed to strategic
culture and security sector reform. As it can be noticed since the first article, a major
contribution to scientific debate represents the discussion of strategic culture as an
analytical tool, applied on the EU example. This perspective, disputes the notion that the
EU is unfit to develop a strategic culture for cultural or structural reasons or it must
change in order to facilitate the development of such a culture. The EU strategic culture is
traced in the Union’s history, in its power resources, its geopolitical setting and in the
attitudes of its leaders. In order to make it operational, the analytical framework gathers
variables that affect directly or indirectly the perceptions, attitudes and behavior toward a
European security culture.
Other connections related to the security culture analyses the intrinsic tension
between democratic and military. The article signed by Steven Ekovic, presents this
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relation by providing an overview between military establishment and key features of
democratic political system – rule of law, power sharing, role of civil society and good
governance.
An excellent case study is approached in an analysis on Macedonian strategic
culture from a preference formation and decision-making perspectives. Stojan Slaveski
underlines that political culture affects political behavior and consequently the security
policy and security culture. The author defines the Strategic Culture of a nation as a set of
values, as foundational elements, as well as their prioritization and finally their translation
into the security policy standpoints, including the strategy and goals of the national
security policy. The geopolitical position of Macedonia and the security culture induce
several options toward a security policy: to build its own armed forces and depend on the
UN collective security system; to proclaim a policy of “neutrality”; to sign defense
agreements with other countries; to enter into Euro-Atlantic integration process; or a
combination of several of the mentioned alternatives.
Another case study is addressed to the changes in the Turkish security culture and
the civil-military relations, signed by Nilufer Narli. This sensitive relation in the Turkish
system of governance is influenced in the past decade by several external influences such
as the EU harmonization process or the US security influence confronted to the Turkish
security culture. These variables continue to determine changes both in political culture
and in security culture with effects on the decrease influence of military structures.
The cultural aspects within the Croatian security sector reform are analyzed by
Zvonimir Mahecic who underlines the importance of the impact of a variety of cultural
influences and social values. Other contributions are addressed to culture of career
development and ranking and selection of military officers, America, the EU and strategic
culture from the perspective of renegotiation of transatlantic relations.
As a whole, this issue of Western Balkans Security Observer underlines the
importance of cultural influences over security dynamics. Within the academic debates,
culture, identities and values become variables that can contribute to a better
understanding of preference formation and the perception of security. Therefore, we
recommend the articles both for lecture and for critical approach within further
investigations.
Dorin I. Dolghi, ([email protected])
Slavia Centralis, number 1-2/2008, 1-2/2009, Department of Slavic Languages
and Literatures, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor, ISSN 1855 – 6302
Present for only two years within the European publishing environment, the
magazine is edited by the team of teachers and researchers from the Department of Slavic
Languages and Literatures at the University of Maribor, Slovenia. The biannual publication
aims to introduce the Slavic Literary and linguistic scholarship in the original scientific
research in circulation. The articles published in Slovene and other Slavic languages
(Hungarian, German or English) are a valuable tool in formal language as a main fundament
of the cultural values cherished by those nations that care about their identity.
The magazine’s first year of issue is dedicated to the Slovenian writer Primož
Trubar, the works' topics covering almost all aspects of life and work of one of the
greatest Protestant authors of the XVI century. The two issues appeared in 2008 and
presented the conducted researches in analysing aspects of the Slovenian cultural, political
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and social life in the sixteenth century, the writer's recruitment among his European
contemporaries, philosophical and religious concepts used by the author in his writings,
the language and the form in which some of his works were written, but also a sneak peek
into his private life. Thus, the Slovenian researchers bring to the reader’s attention aspects
of the first part of the historical process that spans during the last decade of the fifteenth
century until the second half of the eighteenth century, a period characterized by the
intertwining of pre-modern and Medieval Elements. In this context, the XVI century is
characterized by Marko Štuhec from the point of view that various social groups stressed
different elements in the same complex of religious ideas to the specific interiorization of
their living conditions, allowing them to characterize the Reformations as large-scale
social and socio-psychological interactions. From the analysis made by Alenka Jensterle
Dolezal of the two basic works of the great Slovenian writer Katehizem (1550) and
Predguvor, we enter the dual world of Trubar, a world divided into a society with the right
faith, and the condemned one, the society of others who live a lie, who don’t have the
right faith. Also, the research in terms of discourse theory of Trubar's selected
correspondence prologues are an opportunity for Blanka Bošnjak of finding a particular
pattern of their preparation. The parallel made by Alexander Bjelčevič between Primož
Trubar and his contemporary Bartolomé de Las Casas, gave us some common points in
the life and works of the two writers, but also that there is a great difference, given the
membership of the two major XVI century religious movements: post Tridentine reform
of the Roman Catholic Church and the appearance of the Reformed Protestant Church.
Based on the biographical data of Primož Trubar, Milena Mileva Blaze finds that his work
was influenced “by his life in his primary family and by his three marriages”. Through his
work, but mostly by letters, which refer to his wives and children, the author drafted a
concrete image of the Woman as a loving Pious Wife, the more valuable, since it is a
spontaneous expression, says the author of the study. The fact that Primož Trubar is the
first writer who translated the New Testament into Slovenian is an opportunity for Marko
Jesenšek to declare Trubar’s linguistic culture to be of a very high level – his translations,
adaptations and autonomous texts are linguistic – stylistically well considered and in a
reformist spirit. In Trubar’s Catechism with Two Interpretations, Irena Orel states that the
positive or negative evaluation of socially, religiously and temperamentally defined
groups of people – together with their moral and spiritual qualities – is typified by
antithesis as the basic stylistic element of rhetorical prose, or by merism, a characteristic
stylistic element of the Bible, which juxtaposes the conceptual world and comprehends it
in its complementary uniformity. P. Trubar's work, examined by Russian Scholars for 180
years, is studied by Marianna Leonidovna Beršadskaja from Saint Petersburg State
University. Even a short review of Russian Slavonic scholars’ work on Trubar lets the
author state that researchers analyzed the specific of the Slovene Reformation and showed
the immense public and cultural relevance of everything Trubar and his followers
achieved in the development of Slovene language and Slovene national self
consciousness. The complex issue of forming literary neologism is brought to the reader’s
attention by the work of Andreja Legan Ravnikar, who analyzes the most productive
model of forming adjectival derivates in the process of translating the Bible into the
Slovenian, by Primož Trubar and Jurij Dalmatin. The number ends with a study upon the
word-formation issue signed by Irena Stramljič Breznik. Based upon the most typical
meaningful word categories in the first Slovene Grammar Book written by Adam Bohorič,
the author examines his tendency to describe and classify a word – formation elements
typical and present in spoken and/or written Slovene language of the 16th century, despite
his Latin training.
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The intercultural dialogue in its many facets is the central theme of the two issues
of the publication in 2009. Thus, the common roots of large Central European linguistic
renewal movements among Czechs, Hungarians and Croats are analyzed in the article
signed by István Nyomárkay. Then, the issues of language and culture in the EU exhibit a
complex pattern and their proper management, that cannot be conceived without taking
into consideration the results of inter-linguistic and intercultural research that make the
object of the study elaborated by Janusz Bańczerowski. The next article, signed by Nada
Šabec, discusses the impact of internet on language use and, more specifically, analyzes
the frequent mixing/switching of Slovene and English blogs (so-called Sloglish). The
objective of the paper of Mateusz Warchałis is to present the processes of language
borrowings, which take place on phonological, morphological and semantic levels. The
study was done on the basis of selected English borrowings that are present in Slovenian,
Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian. In the article to Libor Pavera, the author deals with a
writer who lived and wrote on a geographical borderline, as well as on linguistic and
cultural borderlines, which is reflected in her work. Expressionism, the issue of the paper
of István Lukács, was the most influential artistic movement among the Central –
European Avant-garde. It developed at almost the same time as it did in Hungarian,
Croatian and Slovenian literature and was based on a “hybrid – poetical construction”
with German inspiration. This fact in itself might have formed a reason for analysis by the
author of the region literatures. The position of the Slovene language in the E.U. is the
subject chosen by Marko Jesenšek for marking the European Year of Languages and the
European Year of intercultural Dialogue and for opening the number 2/2009 of the
magazine. In the same context, the study of Alenka Valh Lopert examines the foreign
words used by professional announcers in their prepared and non-prepared (spontaneous)
speech aired on the two radio stations in Maribor. Living on the language borderlines, the
Slavic people have put effort into organizing themselves by trying to sustain their identity
through incorporating new values into native traditions. The Slavic tradition as a source of
inspiration to new challenges in the contemporary world is the subject chosen by Emil
Tokarz; the main figure of the study presented by Regina Wojtoń is the presentation of
national minorities in Andrej Skubic’s novel Bitter Honey. The central theme of the article
of Mladen Pavičić is the post – Yugoslavic multi-linguist of the block settlement Nove
Fužine in Ljubljana, as it is presented in the novels Fužinski bluz by Andrej Skibic and
Čerfurji raus! by Goran Vojnović. At the end of the issue, a group of researchers from the
Akademia Techniczno-Humaniestyczna of Bielsko-Biała chose to address Macedonia, the
Macedonian language, the inter-state relations and intercultural dialogue, building on the
statement that aspiration of conquering Macedonia and its subsequent annihilation are still
current amongst the neighbouring countries: Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albany.
In conclusion, the themes of studies and analysis conducted by researchers and
published in the magazine circumscribe the idea expressed by the Dean of the Faculty of
Arts where the team from the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures operate.
The fight over the integrity of the Slovene language is seen as a struggle over the unique
nature of the Slovenian identity and a struggle for independence, “the idea of Slovenian
nationhood was indirectly connected with and dependent on the question of Slovene as a
language, its function, and varietal usage”. The parallel between the linguistic and the
national questions could be the solution to an impasse, in the vision of the faculty “that is
why humanists today are well aware of the importance of the Slovenian language in
science and education”.
Florentina Chirodea, ([email protected])
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Ouvertures sur les frontières in Espaces et sociétés, issue no. 138, 3/2009, Érès,
Toulouse Editions, 228 p., ISBN 978-2-7492-1110-7
Espaces et société is an interdisciplinary magazine of human and social sciences
which proposes to address current aspects with each issue. The subject of this issue, no.
138, is Ouvertures sur les frontières, including articles on the subject and not only.
The magazine is very well structured. Even from the start we get familiar with the
contents of the issue, which is recurrently shaped in the same manner for each magazine issue.
That is to say, each number has a folder that also gives the theme of the journal. This time the
theme is Ouverture sur les frontier (Opening of Borders). The second part is titled Hors
dossier (Off topic) and contains articles on another subject. This issue’s subject is Paysages et
environnement: quelle(s) mutation(s) des projets d’aménagement?( Landscape and
environment: mutation(s) of development project?) At the end, we find a third part, Notes de
lecture (Reading Notes), which contains thematic reports and reviews of the articles.
In the first part of the magazine, Ouvertures sur les frontières, we find six articles:
Frontières en Amérique Latine: réflexions méthodologiques (Borders in Latin America:
Methodological Reflections), Les frontières de l’isthme centraméricain, de marges
symboliques à des espaces en construction (Boundaries of the Central American Isthmus,
from Symbolic Ends to Spaces under Construction), Métropolisation et intégration
transfrontalière: le paradoxe luxembourgeois (Metropolisation and Cross-Border
Integration: the paradox of Luxembourg), La frontière, un outil de projection au monde.
Les mutations de Tanger (Maroc) (The Border, A Projection Tool in the World), Naples:
repenser la ville à partir de la qualité des frontières internes (Naples: Rethinking the City
Starting from the Quality of Internal Borders), De la permanence du concept de frontier.
Les liens entre travail et vie privée à La Défense (The Permanence of the Border Concept.
Links between Work and Private Life in La Defense). All articles are focused on the
dynamics of mondialisation and the borders evolution. Each article presents a different
phenomenon, an aspect to consider when discussing borders.
In the second part of the magazine, we find three articles on the environment and
development: L’aménagement des chemins de randonnée: un instrument d’identification
et de « gouvernance » territoriales (The Construction of Footpaths: An Instrument for
Territory Identification and "Governance"), Transformations urbaines à Palermo Viejo,
Buenos Aires: jeu d’acteurs sur fond de gentrification (Urban Transformations in
Palermo Viejo, Buenos Aires: game of players amid gentrification ) and Formes de ville
optimales, formes de ville durables. Réflexions à partir de l’étude de la ville fractale
(Optimal City Forms, Sustainable City Forms. Reflections on the Study of the Fractal
City). These articles consider the environmental and social issues, but also the incentives
of national and European public policy. One must encourage the innovation and bring new
ideas within the field of development.
The third part of the magazine is dedicated to notes and reviews. The first four
notes add to the articles written about the borders, as they are about reviews that invite
you to travel and they are about books that deal with border issues. Besides, at the end, we
find reviews of other books, as well, about several other domains.
All articles that this magazine published have at the end a summary in French,
English and Spanish. At the same time we can find the list containing all magazine issue
published since its beginnings in 1970, together with all the themes addressed. I find this
commendable as you can see the evolution of the publication and its path to the future.
Mariana Buda, ([email protected])
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*** The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and
Association, Edited by T. Diez, M. Albert and S. Stetter, Cambridge
University Press, 2008, 265 p., ISBN 978-0-521-70949-1
This book is the result of an international research project supported by the
European Union’s Fifth Research Framework Program and the British Academy and
represents the first systematic study of the impact of the European integration on the
transformation of border conflicts. It also provides a theoretical framework centred on
four “pathways” of impact and applies them to five study cases of border conflicts:
Cyprus, Ireland, Greece/Turkey, Israel/Palestine and various conflicts on the Russia’s
border with the European Union. All the contributors suggest that also the integration
together with the association provide the European Union with potential means to
influence border conflicts, but that the European Union must constantly re-evaluate its
policies depending on the dynamics of each conflict. Their findings reveal the conditions
upon which the impact of integration rests and challenge the widespread notion that
integration is good for peace. This book appeals to scholars and students of international
relations, European politics and security studies for the European integration and conflict
analysis studies.
In this volume, the authors address some questions on the basis of a comparative
study of five cases of border conflicts within the European Union, at its borders and between
associated members. “Does association as a weaker form of our membership, when
compared to integration, also make a difference? What role do specific actors - local,
regional, national, European – play in this process? Or is the context of integration alone
sufficient to do the trick?”
As the volume’s cases demonstrated, there are circumstances in which the impact
of integration is to hinder cross-border cooperation, and to introduce new conflict to a
border region. Even if integration has helped to transform a border conflict towards a
more peaceful situation, its success is often dependent on events outside the European
Union’s control and on local actors making use of the integration process in ways that are
conflict-diminishing and not conflict-enhancing.
In order to understand the impact of European integration and association on border
conflicts, we find five study cases in this volume (chapters 2-6): Northern Ireland, Cyprus,
Greece/Turkey, Russia/Europe’s North and Israel/Palestine. Each of these study cases stands
in a different relationship to the present European Union and the integration process.
The Irish study case is unique in that the European Union membership of both
concerned states has enabled the European Union to both directly intervene in the peace
process and indirectly affect the context for peace-building. This chapter shows us the
European Union’s influence in transforming the Irish border from a line of conflict into a
line of cooperation (Katy Hayward & Antje Wiener).
Cyprus is a case where a border that fails to be internationally recognized runs
through a new member state (Cyprus joined the European Union on 1 May 2004). Beside
the particular challenge of a conflict about a non-recognized border, this case allows us to
trace down the impact of accession negotiations, as does, at least in part, the case of
Russia and Europe (Olga Demetriou).
The Greek-Turkish conflicts have constituted a conflict resolution challenge for
the European Union dating back to the beginnings of the European integration. Chapter 4
shows that while the European Union has possessed important instruments to influence
Greek-Turkish relations, it has not been able to exercise that influence independently of
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what the Greek and Turkish domestic actors have chosen to make out of the European
Union (Bahar Rumelili).
Chapter 5 covers Northern Europe in a specific-region perspective, exploring the
European Union’s role as a “perpetuator” of conflicts in a border of a regional context.
Russia could, in this sense, play a more prominent role in the making of Northern Europe
and Europe more generally instead of just concentrating on building its “own” Europe on
the ruins of the ex-USSR (Pertti Joenniemi).
The last case discussed in this volume departs from the other study cases within this
book as neither of the two conflict parties, Israel and Palestine, is geographically or, at least
in the near future, politically part of the European Union (Haim Yacobi & David Newman).
Chapter 7 of the book takes a look at how the European Union actors themselves
conceptualize their role in border conflict transformation. This allows us to come to a
more reflective assessment of the formation of the European Union’s policy.
The most of the authors of this volume are consecrated in the political science
field, the theoretical framework gives us a more sociological approach to conflict as much
as the empirical analysis of changing identity scripts to an in-depth analysis of conflict
settings normally more encountered in ethnographic studies than in political science
writing. However, this book is first of all about the possible European Union impact on
border conflicts through integration and association.
Diana Gal ([email protected])
Annals of the University of Oradea. Series: International Relations and
European Studies (Analele UniversităŃii din Oradea. Seria: RelaŃii
InternaŃionale şi Studii Europene), Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, Tom 1,
2009, 202 p., ISSN 2067-1253
The scientific research expertise of the collective chair from the European Studies
and International Relations department of the Faculty of History, Geography and
International Relations, University of Oradea and of its partners has taken shape by
publishing the first issue of the Annals. The volume is structured in five chapters, each
one of them approaching a specific subject from within International Relations. The
chapter dedicated to the International Relations History holds forth new investigation
methods and also new documents analyzing the relations between different countries or
cultures at different historic moments.
The section dedicated to communication within International Relations, subject
that has been of great interest for authors ever since 2001 (proof of this is the four
volumes published after the international conferences that took place in Oradea: The Role
of Mass Media and the New Information and Communication Technologies in the
democratization Process of Central and Eastern Europe Societies (2002); The Contribution
of Mass Media to the Extension of European Union (2003); International and European
Security versus the Explosion of the Global Media (2004); Media and the Good
Governance facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement (2005)), tapping into subjects
connected to the reglementation of the European mass media, the European Union’s
communication strategy or communication concerning the quality of higher learning in
Central and Eastern Europe. One of the permanent key-directions of the authors’
preoccupations and studies within the field of communication is the role of the mass
media as a vector of communication within International Relations.
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The Cross-border cooperation problem is approached from different angles:
administrative, economic, law, political, social or demographic, in order to highlight through
this instrument all the regional development characteristics. In this issue, the technical and
political sides are privileged in their articles by both Romanian and foreign authors.
The subject of the European Security in an international context is an ambitious
one, at its very start, but with fast and objective developing perspectives with the
contribution of the country’s and outside specialists and researchers, who are preoccupied
by the strategic partnership and by the political analysis in the regions from instable areas.
In the first issue of the Annals the role of the OSCE in the European Security’s
architecture and the position of the Romania’s President concerning the foreign and
external policies are analyzed.
The last section of the magazine is reserved to the conceptual and methodological
dimensions of the international relations sphere and it brings together different subjects,
like the International Business Ethics, the European Union’s theories and architects, as
well as Europe’s political future.
The five sections and fields of interest proposed to the readers will not exclude
other modern subjects that will enhance the interest of researchers within the field of
International Relations and European Studies. Therefore, the magazine has great odds of
improvement in this multi dimensional area and of becoming a landmark for all those who
are interested. Its scientific contents and relevant practical approaches recommend this
journal as a reference study in the field.
Luminita Soproni ([email protected])
RIBEIRO, Maria Manuela Tavares (coord.) – Imagining Europe. Coimbra:
Almedina Editions, 2010, 153 p., ISBN 978-972-40-4046-2
On February 2010 Almedina Editions published a book called Imagining Europe,
which was coordinated by Maria Manuel Tavares Ribeiro. This work was done with the
collaboration of six national and foreign scholars from various areas of historical
investigation and collects in one hundred fifty-three pages, a contribution to a more
profound reflection on Europe.
Several matters are analyzed by experts "who shared their knowledge and
experience with participants of the Cycle of Conferences about the Imagining Europe
which took place on March 5th, 2008" (p. 12).
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro refers in the introduction that “Imagining Europe
is thinking and reflecting about public, religious, economic, social and cultural projects. It
is also reflecting about its destiny, its strategic position, its role in the world, its future in
perspective” (p. 12).
In the first article that is included in the collection L’Europe politique: quel avenir?
George Contogeorgis, professor at the University of Panteion in Athens, emphasizes the fact
that all of the reflections about Europe’s political future needed to take three factors into
consideration: its present status and its internal dynamics, the discourse projecting over its
ideal future, and the international situation. In debating each one of these factors, the author
observed that political Europe depends mostly on its primal relationship with the United
States of America. The preference on a relationship based on complementary dependency
or partnership depends to a large extent on the growth of the European systems, more
specifically, its transformation into État sympolitéien.
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Peter Antes, a professor at the Hannover University analyses, in his A Vision of
Europe: many religions in one political community, the religion factor in Europe, saying
that in the last years there has been practically no cultural debate in the Old Continent that
has not approached problem of religion. The author remembers the endless discussions
about the veil in France, the Danish cartoons of the Muhammad Prophet, the rhetoric of
George W. Bush’s crusade, the presence of Christian symbols in Bavarian and French
schools, the marriage between homosexuals and the Vatican’s opposition, the propaganda
of Tom Cruise regarding Scientology. For Peter Antes, it’s impossible to imagine Europe
without references to this important area of social affairs.
Therefore, in his article, the author first reviews the entire historical process since
the Christian supremacy to the religious pluralism, and then emphasizes the distinction
between religion and groups, and later analyzes the dream of full acceptance of the
religious pluralism and its limits. In conclusion, Pater Antes summarizes the results of his
study and seeks to find the answer to the following question: is religious pluralism a new
phenomenon, without relation to European history, or has it been a part of the European
identity throughout the history of the Old Continent?
In The American way: the American construction of Europe, Maria Fernanda
Rollo, professor at the New University of Lisbon, after recalling the origins and
assumptions of the Marshall Plan, focuses on the use of the AT&P program in Portugal, as
well as the entire Marshall Plan.
The author recalls that the circumstances of Portugal's inclusion in ERP have
shaken some certainties in Salazar's economic policy. The cyclical ebb of “industrialism”
is evident, not only when the Marshall Plan worked as a “main plan” of the Portuguese
economy, between 1949 and 1952, but also in the years to come, i.e. the 50s. The analysis
proposed by the author conducts the reader to a debate of another issue, in fact, a central
issue in the problems already examined by Maria Fernanda Rollo. This is a question that
combines historical curiosity with a more consistent historiographical problem, already
approached in relation to various countries that participated in the Marshall aid and even
compared to Western Europe as a whole: to what extent have the Portuguese authorities
been able to take advantage of the Marshall Plan, improving its possibilities?
Luis Andrade, professor at the University of the Azores, in An Atlantic perspective
of relations between Europe and the United States of America examines the evolution of
the external relations between Europe and the United States, not forgetting the Portuguese
foreign policy, more specifically, the role of the utmost importance that the Azorean
archipelago has had over the years, regardless of the better or worse relationship between
the two continents. The author, as do many experts, reminds us of the fact that the Azores
constitute the essential link in the transatlantic relationship between Portugal and the
United States of America.
Cristina Robalo Cordeiro, professor at the University of Coimbra in Europe in
search of its soul: the need of metaphysics, using the words of the poet of Belle Époque,
Guillaume Apollinaire, and remembering the paragraphs of Généalogie de la morale of
Friedrich Nietzsche, lead the reader into a reflection about the little importance that
institutional Europe gives to the imagination and that, says the author, is because Europe
“does not question its soul or perhaps even doubt the existence of its soul” (p.118).
Cristina Robalo Cordeiro concludes by the need of metaphysics still be felt, that is, the
need for the existence of a "universalist and idealist philosophy that Europe needs to
believe that to act outside the pressure of interest, i.e., hypothetical imperatives" (p. 118).
In an article on The imagination of the Portuguese on the eve of European
imagination: the New State and the European regionalism, Rui Cunha Martins, a
185
professor at the University of Coimbra, starting from the "realization that a comprehensive
project such as Europe convenes “region” in order to organize its own expansive
dynamic” (p.123), proceeds with the analysis that the Portuguese New State Regime and
how it was confronted with the same problem of expansiveness organization
For these reasons, Imagining Europe is an indispensable book for the study,
knowledge and discussion of the complex but always exciting European issues. This book
will certainly challenge the readers to reflect on our time and on Contemporary Europe.
Clara Isabel Serrano ([email protected])
Ambrus L. Attila, Calitatea factorilor de mediu din Euroregiunea Bihor –
Hajdu – Bihar şi influenŃa acestora asupra stării de sănătate a populaŃiei,
Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, 2010, 152 p., ISBN 978-606-10-0089-0
Ambrus L. Attila has structured his work “Calitatea fatorilor de mediu din
Euroregiunea Bihor – Hajdu – Bihar şi influenŃa acestora asupra stării de sănătate a
populaŃiei” (Environmental Factors’ Quality in the Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion and
Their Influence on Population’s Health) into three main sections where he tries to
diachronically seize research and geographical framework of the Euroregion, the quality
of environment, the influence of meteorological elements, socio-economic factors and
lifestyle on health, as well as some aspects on population’s health to finally provide a
series of general conclusions and suggestions on the opportunities of development in the
Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion.
The first chapter is a foray in research on the Euroregional level describing spatial
elements, geographical position and the limits of the Euroregion, as well as the climate
potential, waters and bio-pedo-geographical elements. A special survey is carried out on
human resources and general demographic data providing a steady comparison of the two
counties: Bihor in Romania and Hajdu-Bihar in Hungary, both belonging to the
Euroregion. Here, we can find a numerically balanced human element; in point of
ethnicity, the Hungarian population is a majority, while the Orthodox confession is
dominant and is followed by the Reformed and Roman-Catholic confessions.
The second part is an analysis of environmental quality in the Euroregion in
several directions: surface and underground waters, drinkable waters, soil and waste
management.
The chapter identifies a series of economic agents with polluting effect, as they
pollute with chemical elements harming environment quality in the two counties. Due to
the statistical data, we can notice the most polluting sectors: oil exploitation and mining,
oar and oil processing, thermoenergetics, chemical industry, wood and cellulose
processing, metallurgy, electrotechnics industry, machine constructions, cement industry,
transportation, community management and agriculture.
The quality of air and water is within normal limits with considerable
improvements. An important role is the limiting of economic agents’ activities and the
enforcement of different laws and norms. Soil is generally fertile except for mountainous
areas. From the point of view of agriculture, because of unfavourable intervention and
unadapted agricultural practices there are dysfunctionalities on the level of soil quality.
Chapter three focuses on the influence a wide range of meteorological, socioeconomic elements and lifestyle have on health, as well as aspects of the population’s
health in the Euroregion. Particularly, the author pursued the research of the influence of
186
air temperature, atmospheric fallouts and dew on human body; atmospheric pressure, wind
and their effects on population’s health; seasons and their influence on health; special
meteorological phenomena and their effects on human body by using a series of charts
showing features and alterations of the abovementioned elements; typology of diseases
and the meteorological factor influencing them.
A relevant case study was carried out in researching climate influence on health
by identifying statistical data for Oradea and Debrecen by comparing the data for the
minimal and maximal points of temperature and dew covering the period 2006-2007.
As far as lifestyle and standard of living of the population as impact elements on
health are concerned, a series of elements is shown such as: alcohol, cigarettes, physical
activity, and alimentation. Excessive consumption may lead to precarious health in the
Euroregion.
The analysis of population’s health reveals a series of demographical indicators
(death rate) in time with data covering the period 1990 – 2005.
The final part of the work comprises a SWOT analysis of the Euroregion
providing a series of general conclusions and suggestions on opportunities for
development in the Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion. A core element would be a joint
development policy, accessing funds for sustainable development, organising scientific
events, round tables, and developing institutional connections in the two counties. All
these should focus on improving factors harming population’s health.
Constantin łoca ([email protected])
Michael EMERSON, Richard Youngs, Democracy’s Plight in the European
Neighbourhood - Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties, Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2009, 173 p., ISBN 978-92-9079-926-9
The present book, coordinated by Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs, is a sequel
to Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, published by Centre for European
Policy Studies in 2005.
Starting with the assumption that the process of achieving democracy is a long and
hazardous one, the authors asked a group of experts to write short essays covering fifteen
case studies from across the neighbourhood. There were a common range of questions,
such as: the setbacks of democratization; the emerging ideological competitors to liberal
politics; the impact of certain structural factors, such as radical Islam; corrupt state
capture; energy resources, rent-seeking behaviour, and the movement towards
multipolarity; the evolution of external democracy promotion efforts, and the
‘Europeanization’ process.
The book was structured in studying three political regions: states in or close to the
European Union (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey); states of the former Soviet
Union (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus),
and states of the Arab world (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt). Every case study reveals
something about the fundamentals of democratisation’s uneven course in the European
neighbourhood.
Looking at these case studies analytically, two primary categories may be
distinguished: struggling transitions and autocratic dynasties. For the first category, the
term ‘transition’ embraces countries that have exited communism and are aiming at the
European model of democratic politics, but whose democracies are vitiated by deep
187
defects. The transition processes take on various guises of distorted, perverted, or
dysfunctional democracy.
For the second category, the authors adopt an elastic concept of ‘dynasty’, including
regular monarchical dynasties, authoritarian presidents and their family succession, the
presidents-for-life, and a system of alternation between the posts of President and Prime
Minister by a single individual. The concentration of power has become increasingly
consolidated, as witnessed in the various forms of dynastic succession.
Michael Emerson makes several interesting remarks in his introductive essay:
• “But the EU also needs to develop systematic methods to address serious
democracy deficits in any member state, new or old, and here the European
Parliament might best take the lead.”
• “For many of the authoritarian countries of the neighbourhood, the transition
paradigm has reached a dead end. A different scenario is needed, focusing on
long-term socio-economic development and the emergence of new middle class
and educated elite interests as the future drivers of democracy.”
• “Finally, the European Union needs to develop a more open and constructive
posture towards moderate and democratically inclined Islamist opposition parties
in several Arab states.”
The conclusion is that the European Union finds itself surrounded by states that
broadly fall into either one of two categories. Its attraction is diminishing in some places,
but offers under-utilised potential in others; and the broader factors, such as the financial
crisis, may still have positive or negative effects on democracy.
This book represents a valuable, interesting and accessible work, which updates our
information about the European Union’s neighbourhood. Therefore, we encourage you to read it.
Irina Ionela Pop ([email protected])
Nationalisme régionaux. Un défi pour l’Europe. (Regional Nationalisms. A
challenge for Europe.) Frank Tétart. Edition De Boeck, Bruxelles, 2009, 112
p, ISBN 978-2-8041-1781-8
The book titled Nationalisme régionaux. Un défi pour l’Europe. (Regional
Nationalisms. A Challenge for Europe) is a captivating book, both easy to understand and
exciting to read. In paperback format, the work addresses the general public, not as a too
specialized book, but especially comprehensive, educational and illustrative. Designed more
like a manual, Nationalisme régionaux. Un défi pour l’Europe. includes two major parts, or
two large chapters: the first one titled Le nationalisme, un concept idéologique et
géopolitique?(Nationalism, Ideological Concept and Geopolitics?) and the second one titled
Le nationalisme, un phénomène toujours d’actualité (Nationalism, Always A Current
Phenomenon). The text is built around these two issues, telling its story, logically and
coherently.
The first part, Le nationalisme, un concept idéologique et géopolitique ? is
focused on the theory. We can find here the most comprising definitions of both
nationalism and the nation. These two notions are intertwined, mutually complementing
each other. To understand the phenomenon of nationalism, the author proposes a
geopolitical approach, mainly for methodological reasons. The two "mobilizing factors" of
nationalism, language and territory, are particularly addressed in this first chapter. The
language is the most obvious and efficient marker of national identity. This is the reason
188
why language plays such a fundamental part. Together with the territory, the language
stresses the nationalism’s geopolitical character.
The second part of the book, Le nationalisme, un phénomène toujours d’actualité,
could also have been designated as the practical part of the book. Here, with the help of
case studies, studies of nationalism or current processes, commonly called regional
nationalisms, the author highlights and exemplifies the theory presented in the first
chapter. The considered regional nationalisms are those of Flanders, Scotland, Catalonia,
Basque Country, Northern Italy and even those of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
mondialisation, as a phenomenon created by the European Union for a certain unification,
is carried out differently within regions of Europe, depending on objectives and means of
each region.
The theme proposed by the author is interesting and current, the ease and the
captivity of reading is also given by the exemplification of statements. Each sub-chapter
or reference is accompanied by articles, maps, explanations or passages that support the
expressed idea. In my opinion, this is the approach which should be found in the books of
this kind. For those who want to know more on the subject of regional nationalisms, the
author proposes at the end a bibliography containing reference works within this field,
works that can be consulted.
Mariana Buda ([email protected])
6. Our European Projects
Alina STOICA (Oradea) ◄► International conference “Nouvelles approches
des frontières culturelles”4-6 March 2010, Oradea, Romania
Diana GAL (Oradea) ◄► International Conference “Regional Development and
Territorial Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the
CoR White Paper on Multilevel Governance”(Oradea, Romanian, 20-21
May 2010)
Sorin ŞIPOŞ (Oradea) ◄► International Symposium Imperial Policies In Eastern
And Western Romania, Oradea - Chişinău, 3rd edition, 10-13 June 2010
International conference
« Nouvelles approches des frontières culturelles »
4-6 March 2010, Oradea, Romania
Currently, two research teams at the Universities of Metz and Nancy in the field
of Humanities and Social Sciences coordinate an interdisciplinary research project
(NAFTES) that has expanded internationally since 2008 by joining more and more
European and international universities. The coordinator of the project is Prof. Dr. Didier
Francfort from the University of Nancy2.
The University of Oradea has been a partner in the project since 2009 through the
Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations.
Given the context, according to the NAFTES schedule, in March 2009, an
international conference on Nouvelles approaches des frontiers culturelles (New
Approaches on Cultural Borders) was hosted by the University of Oradea through the
Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations represented by Prof. Dr. Ioan
Horga, as well as the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea - Debrecen and the
University Nancy 2. The event
brought together researchers from
different universities throughout
Europe and Central Asia (Oradea Romania, Nancy - France, Strasbourg
- France, Warsaw - Poland, Metz France, Istanbul - Turkey, Turku Finland, Saint-Quentin en Yvelines France, Oslo - Norway, Baku Azerbaijan, Pantheon University of
Athens - Greece).
According to the terms of the project, the scientific event in Oradea approached a
currently highly debated issue, the issue of cultural borders in a general context, when
physical borders tend to fade away. During the debates, several theoretical aspects on the
European cultural borders were approached, as well as practical issues, case studies
envisaging UNESCO’s involvement in the matter, the situation of Turkey, Georgia,
Portugal and Romania, and the issue of interculturality on the artistic level (dance, music,
and gastronomy). Some of the papers presented during the session have been chosen to be
published in issue no. 9 of the Eurolimes Journal focused on the topic of The Cultural
Borders of Europe.
The event has had continuity particularly on the level of academic collaboration
between Oradea and Nancy also providing the opportunity to enlarge the relations of the
University of Oradea with universities in Europe and Central Asia. There were also
discussions on starting new projects, such as the partnership between the Tara Crisurilor
Museum in Oradea and the Luneville Castle lying 25 km away from Nancy, France.
The meeting ended with the visit to the most important tourist attractions in
Oradea: the Vulturul Negru Palace, the Moon Church, the Tara Crisurilor Museum, St.
Nicolas Church, the synagogue, the fortress
(Alina STOICA: [email protected])
University of Oradea
191
International Conference
“Regional Development and Territorial Cooperation in Central and
Eastern Europe in the context of the CoR White Paper on Multilevel
Governance”
(Oradea, Romanian, 20-21 May 2010)
Regional development is the main challenge for the states from the area of Central
and Eastern Europe after their accession to the European Union, and territorial
cooperation is an efficient means for the harmonious and balanced integration of the EU’s
territories, with a view to modernize the regions lacking economic and social
development. With the major goal of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion,
the EU’s economic development policy supports the efforts by each Member State of
mitigating the interregional disparities through transfers of financial resources to the
backward regions.
Multilevel governance engages, at the highest level, the participation of the regional
and local authorities to the elaboration and implementation of the development programs
and plans; hence, the initiative of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) to open up a large
debate forum on the subject of the involvement of the sub-national authorities was well
received by the entire spectrum of stakeholders, from the regional and local levels to the
business community, civil society and academic field. The conference is part of the public
debate initiated by the CoR starting June 2009 and ending in September 2010.
The Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) of the University of Oradea
(coordinated by Professor Ioan Horga, PhD.) could take the credit for being one of the
most active European institutions engaged in the debate. After being the only Romanian
institution and among the very few within Central Europe which expressed a clear point of
view on the White Paper of the Multilevel Governance of the Committee of Regions (in
December 2009, see vezi www. cor.europa.eu/pages/event Template.aspx ) through this
conference, IERS, having previously earned its status as an European centre of excellence
192
in the field of regional studies and regional cooperation, partook in the second stage of
debating on the White Paper of the CoR. It is the stage designed to develop the debate on
this document which not only follows the Treaty of Lisbon, but also aims to help
transcending the decentralizing process from vision into reality. The current debate was
organized by four research structures of the most important Romanian universities, with
expertise within the European problems: The Institute for Euroregional Studies of the
University of Oradea, The “Altiero Spinelli” Centre for the Study of European
Governance of Babes Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, The Academic Club for
European Studies (CASE) of the National School for Political and Administrative Studies
Bucharest, The “Alicide de Gasperi” Centre for European Studies of the Western
University of Timisoara.
The conference was attended, by the partner Universities of Debrecen/Hungary
and Uzshorod/Ukraine, plus another 27 representative authors from the academic
environment of Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Italy, Moldova, Portugal, Spain, France,
together with the Vice-President of the Group of Research and Action for European
Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels; this not only proves the conference high standards, but
also the organizers’ capacity of mobilizing, for debate purposes, different points of view
from various countries, both member states and non-members of the EU (Ukraine).
The conference brought together 82 papers presented in plenary meetings and two
workshops: Regional Development: Performances and Perspectives; Territorial
Cooperation and CoR White Paper on Multilevel Governance.
(Diana GAL: [email protected])
University of Oradea
193
International Symposium
Imperial Policies
In Eastern and Western Romania
Oradea - Chişinău, 3rd edition, 10-13 June 2010
Although it is too early to give the final ruling, we can state that progress has been
made by the Romanian historiography further to the scientific partnership between the
University of Oradea, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, and the
State University of Moldova, the Romanian Academy, through the Centre for
Transylvanian Studies and the “łării Crişurilor” Museum in Oradea. The
accomplishments are equally scientific and human-related. We have always said that the
good relations between institutions are almost always preceded by human relations of
friendship and respect between all members of the academic team. The Conference and
the subsequent volumes Romanian borders within European context, Oradea, 2008;
Historiography and politics in Eastern and Western Romania, Chişinău-Oradea, 2009 and
today Imperial policies in Eastern and Western Romania are but a few of the scientific
accomplishments.
Why a scientific symposium titled: Imperial policies in Romania? To some it may
seem outdated; to some it may sound elitistical. The idea came from our colleagues in
Chişinău, more exposed to imperial and post-imperial policies. We are attempting to
investigate the imperial policies consequences to the Romanian territory, in general, and in
particular, to its eastern and western extremities. Please note that the study follows not
only the negative consequences, as shown by a certain part of the communist
historiography, but also the modernization policy conducted by the Viennese Court, the
religious policy that gained a spot for the Romanians within the Transylvanian groups.
From the methodological angle, the comparative method in which we approached our
research allowed for the emphasis of both particularities and similarities between the
economic, administrative, religious, military and cultural policies promoted by the
empires acting on our territory: Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Empire, Austro-Hungarian
Empire, as well as the Czarist Empire and later on the USSR.
194
Another level of analysis pursued the medium and long run effects that the imperial
policies had on the Romanian society, in general, and on the western and eastern
Romanian population, in particular. The abundance of historical sources, many of them
having so far been closed to the public, allows the quest for new approaches using the
newest research methods.
The symposium had the following sections: EMPIRES, IMPERIAL PATTERNS
AND
POLICIES:
SOURCES
AND
HISTORIOGRAPHY;
POLITICS,
ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY WITHIN THE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY
MODERN EMPIRES; POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY WITHIN
MODERN EMPIRES; IMPERIAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND STRATEGIES WITHIN
ROMANIA IN XX CENTURY; CONTEMPORARY CONSEQUENCES AND ECHOES
OF THE IMPERIAL POLICIES. There was also a section where the scientific
publications from Chişinău, Oradea and Cluj-Napoca were presented.
Among the attendees to the symposium we mention Acad. Ioan-Aurel POP, Director
of the Centre for Transylvanian Studies; Prof. Barbu ŞTEFĂNESCU, PhD., University of
Oradea; Prof. Ioan HORGA PhD., University of Oradea; Prof. Sorin ŞIPOŞ, PhD.,
University of Oradea (Chair of Symposium); Prof. Ion EREMIA, PhD., State University
of Chişinău; Lecturer Igor ŞAROV PhD., State University of Chişinău; Lecturer Ion
GUMENÂI, PhD., State University of Chişinău; Lecturer Ovidiu MUREŞAN PhD.,
“Babeş-Bolyai” University from din Cluj-Napoca, Lecturer Şerban Turcus, PhD., “BabeşBolyai” University from Cluj-Napoca.
(Sorin ŞIPOŞ: [email protected])
University of Oradea
7. About the authors
Mircea BRIE, Lecturer PhD at the Department for International Relations and European
Studies, University of Oradea, member of the Institute for Euroregional Studies and Editor in
Chief of the Analele UniversităŃii din Oradea, Serie RelaŃii InternaŃionale şi Studii Europene.
Organizer and participant to several national and international congresses and conferences.
Graduate in the fields of History-Geography and Sociology, PhD in History. Fields of interest:
Social History, Historical Demographics, History of International Relations, Sociology of
Religions, Cultural Anthropology, Euroregional and border fields. Author of 5 works and over
40 articles and surveys in the field. Works: International Relations from Equilibrium to the
End of the European Concert (17th century-beginning of the 20th century), Oradea, 2009 (in
collaboration with professor Ioan Horga); Marriage in the North-Western Transylvania,
Oradea, 2009; The frontiers of the Romanian Space in the European Context,
Oradea/Chisinau, 2008 (in collaboration with Sorin Sipos, Florin Sfrengeu, Ion Gemenai). (Email: [email protected])
Georges CONTOGEORGIS, is professor of political science and former rector. He served as
Director of Research at the French CNRS, holder of the Francqui chair, member of the High
Council of the European University Institute of Florence etc. He has taught at many
universities around the world. He is corresponding member of the International Academy of
culture of Portugal. His main works: Theory of revolutions in Aristotle, Paris, 1975; Social
dynamics and political autonomy. Greek cities during the Turkish domination, Athens, 1982;
History of Greece, Paris, 1992; The authoritarian phenomenon, Athens, 2003; Citizen and
city. Meaning and typology of citizenship, Athens, 2003; Nation and modernity, Athens, 2006;
Democracy as freedom. Democracy and representation, Athens, 2007; The Hellenic Democracy
of Riga Velestinli, Athens, 2008; Youth, freedom and the state, Athens, 2009. (E-mail:
[email protected])
Didier FRANFORT is a professor of Contemporary History at the University of Nancy 2 and
Co-Director of CERCLE (Centre for Research on European Literary Culture). After taking
interest in the history of Italian migration and the sociability within Northern Italy, he became
a specialist in comparative cultural history of Europe, in particular in the place of music among
identitary constructions (Le Chant des Nations, Hachette Littérature, 2004). He is a member
of the Committee of the International Society for Cultural History (ISCH) and of the Board of
Directors of the Association for the Development of Cultural History (ADHC). He animates
the Axis of MSH Lorraine on frontiers and the program which is devoted to the New
Approaches to Cultural Borders (Programme NAFTES, July 2009-December 2011). (E-mail:
[email protected])
Sharif GEMIE is Professor in Modern and Contemporary History at the University of
Glamorgan (Wales, UK). He is the author of five books, including Women and Schooling
(Keele University Press, 1995) Brittany 1750-1950: the Invisible Nation (UWP, 2007) and
French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (UWP, 2010). He is currently coauthoring a work on refugee experiences and the Second World War. (E-mail:
[email protected])
Ioan HORGA holds the „Jean Monnet” Chair in Euroregional Studies and is Head of Institute
for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen, Jean Monet European Center of Excellence. He is
member of the Scientific Committee of the European Master „Building of Europe” at the
University of Siena (Italy) and of the Master in „Specialistes en integration et politique
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europeenne des voisinage” at the University of Reims (France). He is currently concerned with
issues regarding borders, cross-borders cooperation, regional development, media and religion
contribution to the shaping of European awareness. He is the Chief editor of Eurolimes. He is
also member of the Advisory Committee of the Neighbourhood Collection, edited by Bruylant
Publishing House. Works: Cultural Frontiers of Europe (Ioan Horga,, Istvan Suli-Zakar),
Oradea University Press, 2010, 220 p.; The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and
European Neighborhood Policy (Ioan Horga, Grigore Silasi, Istvan Suli-Zakar, Stanislav
Sagan), Oradea University Press, 2009, 276 p.; Cross-border Partnership with Special Regard
to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian Tripartite Border (Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar),
Debrecen 2009, 278 p. (E-mail: [email protected])
Chloé MAUREL, graduate of the École Normale Supérieure de la rue d’Ulm, with a degree
in history, has a PhD in Contemporary History. History Teacher in high school, she is also a
Lecturer at the University of Paris1 and at the University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin-enYvelines. Associate Researcher at the IRICE (Sorbonne), the IHMC (École Normale
Supérieure/CNRS) and the CHCSC, she works on the history of international organizations
and world history. Her paper, written under the direction of Pascal Ory at the University of
Paris 1, focused on the history of UNESCO. She is the author of La Chine et le monde
(Studyrama, 2008), Géopolitique des impérialismes (Studyrama, 2009), Che Guevara
(Ellipses, à paraître en 2010) et Dossiers d’histoire des relations internationales depuis 1945
(Ellipses, à paraître en 2010). (E-mail: [email protected])
Jean-Sébastien NOËL, teacher in high school, he completed his PhD at the University of
Nancy 2 on the musical expressions of death and mourning and on the memory of the
composers of Jewish cultures in Central and Eastern Europe and the United States (18801980ca), under the direction of Professor Didier Francfort. With a doctoral scholarship from
the Foundation for the Memory of the Holocaust, his research has led him to carry out his
studies in the New York archives. (E-mail: [email protected])
Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares RIBEIRO, Ph.D in history, full professor at the Faculty
of Letters, University of Coimbra, Scientific Coordinator of CEIS20 Coimbra, Portugal,
associate member of the Academy of Science, Lisbon, chief editor of Estudos do Seculo XX
journal, chairman of the Scientific Commission of Grupo de Historia. Her main intrests of
scientific research are: history of ideas, cultural history, history of European idea. Some of her
latest publications are: Mare Oceanus: Atlantico-espaço de diálogos, 2007; História da
Imprensa e a Imprensa na História. O contributo dos Açores, 2009; Imaginar a Europa, 2010;
De Roma a Lisboa: a Europa em Debate, 2010. (E-mail: [email protected])
Alina STOICA, is assistant professor, Ph.D in history at International Relations and
European Studies Department at the Faculty of History, Geography and International
Relations, University of Oradea. She is a member of the Institute of Euroregional Studies,
Oradea-Debrecen and member of CEIS XX, Coimbra, Portugal. She is also a member of
the Editorial Committee of Eurolimes journal and executive editor of the Analele
Universitatii din Oradea, International Relations and European Studies issue. Works: The
revolution in Portugal and Salazar’s Regime in the Romanian press and publications, in
Revista da História das Ideias, vol.29, 2008, Portuguese – Moroccan diplomatic relations
at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, in Analele UniversităŃii
din Oradea Fascicola Istorie-Arheologie, Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, 2008;
Diplomatic Portuguese-Yugoslavian Relations after the great world conflagration, in
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„Analele UniversităŃii din Oradea”, Fascilola RelaŃii InternaŃionale şi Studii Europene,
TOM I, 2009; The Roumanian – Ukrainian border at the beginning of the 21 st centuri, in
„Portugal, Europa e o Mundo” (coord. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, 2010. (Email: stoicaalina79@)yahoo.com)
Denis SAILLARD, Research associate at the Centre of the Cultural History of Contemporary
Societies (CHCSC), University of Versailles, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines. He published works
about the Belle Epoque's representations (France, Italy and Great Britain). Now his studies
focuses on the representations of food and gastronomic discourse (France and Europe). Codirector with Françoise Hache-Bissette of the book Gastronomie et identité culturelle
française. Discours et représentations (XIXe – XXe siècles), Paris, 2007. Co-organizer of the
conference, “The Taste of Others. From the experience of Otherness to gastronomic
appropriation in Europe (18th - 21st Century)", Baku, Azerbaijan, 2010. (E-mail:
[email protected])
Sorin ŞIPOŞ, born in June 14, 1969, in the Village of Cuzap, Commune of Popeşti, Bihor
County. In 1993 he got his degree in History at the Faculty of History and Philosophy of Cluj Napoca, with a major in Medieval History. Currently he is a Doctor of History and a Professor
at the Faculty of History and Geography of the University of Oradea, teaching Medieval
History of Romania, History of Transylvania, History of Political Ideas, etc. He has published
as sole author or in co-authorship: Silviu Dragomir – Historian, 2002 and 2009 (new edition)
and Antoine François Le Clerc, Topographical and Statistical Memory of Bessarabia,
Wallachia and Moldavia, province of Turkey in Europe, 2004 (in co-authorship with IoanAurel Pop), From Small to Large Europe: French Testimonials From Early 19th Century on
the Eastern Border of Europe. Studies and Documents (in co-authorship with Ioan Horga) ;
Silviu Dragomir et le Dossier de la Diplôme de Chevaliers Hospitalier (in co-authorship with
Ioan-Aurel Pop), in addition to more than 100 studies and articles published in various national
and international journals. He is the Editor-in-chief of the MunŃii Apuseni Journal and member
of the Eurolimes editorial board. (E-mail: [email protected])
Nicolae PĂUN is a vice-dean of the Faculty of European Studies at the Babeş-Bolyai
University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He is also a member of the Reflection group of the
historians in European integration of the European Commission. Starting with 2010, he
was nominated to lead the Jean Monnet Chair ad personam. He is a PhD coordinator in
the field of International Relations and European Studies. Professor Păun has also
published a large number of books and articles in prestigious reviews and publishing
houses in Romania and abroad. (E-mail: [email protected])
Georgiana CICEO is a lecturer Ph.D at the Faculty of European Studies at the BabeşBolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania. She is teaching the History of International
Relations. Between 1991 and 2000 she followed a diplomatic career at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Romania. In the same period she has attended courses at the Diplomatic
Academy in Vienna as well as other specialisations in Germany and India. She has
published multiple articles related to European integration and international relations. (Email: [email protected])
Barbu ŞTEFĂNESCU, Ph.D in history, full professor and vice rector in international
relations and communication field at the University of Oradea. He was manager of the national
financed grant; Agriculture, Craftsmanship and Trade at the Inhabitants of Beius Area in the
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17th-19th Century; The Evolution of the Romanian Communities from Hungary in the 19th20th Century; Rural World and Modernization (Bihor County, 18th Century-First Decades of
the 19th Century). As a member of a grant he took part in The Integration of the Romanian
Economy in the European Economy. Historical and Contemporary Dimension, coordinated by
the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest. He is the author of ninw books and over 100
articles among which Rural Sociability, Violence and Ritual, University of Oradea Publishing
House, 2004, p. 624; The Rural World from the Western Romania between Mediaeval and
Modern, University of Oradea Publishing House, 2006, p. 290; Le Monde rural de l’Ouest de
la Transylvanie du Moyen Age a la Modernite, Academie Roumaine, Centre d’Etudes
Transylvanie, Cluj-Napoca, 2007, p. 467. (E-mail: [email protected])
Marina VEKUA is Ph.D, professor of Journalism with professional background of years of
working in different newspapers and television. In 1979 Marina Vekua graduated from Tbilisi
State University with a Diploma of Journalist. In 1988 Marina Vekua got an academic status
of “Kandidat Nauk” and later, in 2004 she got Ph.D. in Journalism from Tbilisi State
University. From 1988 to 2009 Marina Vekua used to teach at TSU and from 2001 to 2009
was the full professor and at the same time the dean of the Faculty of Journalism, later the
head of the same department under the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences. From 2008 to
2009 she stayed at the position of the member of the Board of Trustees at the Georgian Public
Television. At present Marina Vekua is full professor at the Guram Tavartkiladze University.
Marina Vekua is the author of different scientific articles, two books, academic programmes,
several teaching courses in journalism. Marina Vekua is the founder and the member of
different professional non-government organizations. Publications: Arts of Polemics Tbilisi
State University, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2003; Informational Security of Society and State Georgian
Association of American Studies, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2005, p. 134-138; Different Models of
Higher Education in Journalism New Trends in Higher Education, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2006,
p.352-356; How the Journalism Changed After September 11 War and Peace Journalism,
Tbilisi, Georgia, 2009, p.94-100. Complete academic title: Ph.D., full professor of Journalism
at the Department of Journalism at the Guram Tavartkiladze University, Tbilisi, Georgia. (Email: [email protected])
Eurolimes
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
Has published
Vol. 1/2006 Europe and its Borders: Historical Perspective
Vol. 2/2006 From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identitary Testimonies
Vol. 3/2007 Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe
Vol. 4/2007 Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers
Vol. 5/2008 Religious frontiers of Europe
Vol. 6/2008 The Intercultural Dialogue and the European Frontiers
Vol. 7/2009 Europe and the Neighbourhood
Vol. 8/2009 Europe and its Economic Frontiers
Will publish
Vol. 10/2010 The Geopolitics of European Frontiers
Vol. 11/2011 Leaders of the Borders, the Borders of the Leaders
Vol. 12/2011 Communication and European Frontiers
Vol. 13/2012 Europe: Social Frontiers