50 Years of Operations in Africa - CDEF

Transcription

Cahiers du RETEX contribute to analysis of the major issues of interest to the
French Army today and feed doctrine works.
They are cascaded in four complementary series:
« Operations » collection
It gathers thematic summaries related to a theater of operations or a warfighting
function, as well as collections of tactical lessons in pocket format. collection
« exercices »
« Research » collection
It publishes historical and exploratory work aimed at illuminating a particular area
of force employment. These documents most often follow an academic research
methodology. Entrusted to reserve officers or students, they are not official
documents.
« Reports » collection
It publishes studies including those conducted from accounts of commanders in
operations using the technique of authorities’ interviews.
Illustrations de couverture :
Photo de gauche : Tchad, octobre 1983 - Deux militaires du 2e RIMa (Régiment
d'Infanterie de Marine) prennent contact avec la population sur le marché d'Ati
lors de l'opération MANTA (Crédits : Benoît DUFEUTRELLE) © ECPAD/EMA
Photo de droite : Mali, mars 2013 - Les Actions civilo-militaires déployées dans
le cadre de l'opération SERVAL (Crédits : J. LEMPLIN) © ECPAD/EMA
50 years of overseas operations in Africa
(1964 - 2014)
Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016
3
50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014)
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
Under the direction of the French Army Staff, the Forces Employment Doctrine
Center (CDEF) is in charge of coordinating Army lessons learned (LL, RETEX).
The Lessons Learned developed in this casebook were drawn straight from
the LL analysis performed by the CDEF based on the after-action reports and debriefs (CRFM).
The purpose of this casebook is to make LL elements available to leaders that may be of direct
use to the forces, together with the doctrine for unit tactical employment currently in force.
It is crucial to forward all after-action reports to the CDEF, for analysis and
for the practical measures that follow, their broad dissemination in particular.
This casebook is available online on the CDEF website under the DREX tab – “cahier du
RETEX collection operations”
This research paper was drafted by Valentin Germain, a student at Paris I – Sorbonne
University and an intern at the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) 2013-2014
in conjunction with Captain Nicolas Rey (Lessons Learned division), under the supervision
of Ms Julie d’ANDURAIN, Head of Research division, and Colonel Ghislain HUYGUESDESPOINTES, Head of Lessons Learned division.
CDEF/DREX/B. RECH – 1 place Joffre – 75 007 PARIS
Pnia : 821 753 81 53 – Tél. : 01 44 42 81 53 –
Fax : 01 44 42 42 66 -www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Courriel : [email protected]
4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
T
he past fifty years (1964 to 2014) have seen France committed in Africa in several ways. These
interventions were due to either defense agreements signed when former French colonies
became independent, or in support of African heads of state facing internal destabilization,
NEOs for French nationals, or more recently within a UN mandate.
Despite occasional criticism that they were simply defending France’s “backyard” in Africa,
the reality of these overseas operations (OPEX) was more complex. While they certainly add to
France’s influence worldwide, they perfectly exemplify how France and Africa are linked, and today
go well beyond the history of colonization. The increase in overseas operations conducted at the
request of African states or under UN or EU mandates demonstrates France’s specific competence
in overseas operations.
These operations demonstrate the worldwide developments and political reconfigurations that tie
the former colonizing power, mainland France, to countries in Africa. These have become so diverse
in recent years that an overall assessment and classification seems necessary to better understand
the political and military context of French commitments in Africa while putting these operations in
chronological order. Then, if necessary, the doctrinal framework of French military missions overseas
can be reconsidered.
5
CONTENTS
50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964-2014) ..................................................
1
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................... 5
Summary ..............................................................................................................................................................................
7
List of acronyms ..............................................................................................................................................................
9
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa ............................. 19
1.1 Defending France's "backyard": 1960 -1990 ............................................................................................... 19
1.2 Africa and the way to democracy: 1990 -1994
..................................................................................... 20
21
1.4 France's return to Africa: 2001 - 2014 ........................................................................................................ 22
1.3 A new relationship with Africa: 1995 - 2001 ..............................................................................................
Chapter II: Intervention operations ............................................................................................. 25
2.1 Time-restricted missions ...................................................................................................................................... 25
Tacaud, Chad (February 1978 - May 1980) ...............................................................................................
Bonite, Zaïre (19 May - 15 June 1978) .......................................................................................................
Barracuda, Central African Empire (September 1979 - June 1981) ...........................................
Oside, Comoros (7 December -16 December 1989) ............................................................................
Azalée, Comoros (29 September - 11 October 1995) ..........................................................................
25
29
30
32
32
2.2 Assessment ................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Chapter III: Counterinsurgency missions ................................................................................. 37
3.1 Towards a resumption of counterinsurgency? ........................................................................................... 37
Limousin (March 1969 - September 1972) ............................................................................................ 37
Lamantin, Mauritania (December 1977 - July 1978) ........................................................................... 39
Serval, Mali (11January 2013 - 31 July 2014) ....................................................................................... 40
3.2 Assessment ................................................................................................................................................................... 44
Chapter IV: Combat support operations.................................................................................... 47
4.1 Enduring or influence operations .......................................................................................................................
Verveine, Zaïre (6 -16 April 1977) ..................................................................................................................
Manta, Chad (9 August 1983 - 11 November 1984) ...........................................................................
Epervier, Chad (16 February 1986 - 31 July 2014) ..............................................................................
Noroît, Rwanda (4 October 1990 - 13 December 1993) ...................................................................
Balata-Aramis, Cameroon (February 1994 - 31 May 2008) ...........................................................
Boali, Central African Republic (October 2002 - December 2013) ................................................
47
47
48
51
54
55
55
4.2 Assessment .................................................................................................................................................................. 57
7
Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) ........................................................
5.1 From combat to stability operations ..............................................................................................................
59
59
Close combat phases and self-defense ......................................................................................................
59
60
60
62
5.3 Licorne, a special case ......................................................................................................................................
63
5.4 Assessment ................................................................................................................................................................
64
Chapter VI: Security operations ................................................................................................
65
65
5.2 Various operation mandates and contexts .................................................................................................
Protection and evacuation of non-combatant nationals ......................................................................
Defensive interposition operations ..................................................................................................................
6.1 Missions under multinational mandates ......................................................................................................
Logistical and combat support to multinational operations ..............................................................
66
66
69
6.3 Artémis-Mamba, a French and multinational success ....................................................................
71
Chapter VII: Non-combatant evacuation operations .........................................................
73
73
74
74
6.2 Peacekeeping procedure .....................................................................................................................................
Employment of forces as a component of multinational operations ..............................................
7.1 NEOs: emergency operations .............................................................................................................................
7.2 Defensive operations in urban environment ...............................................................................................
7.3 Operations conducted within a multinational context ..............................................................................
Chapter VII: Humanitarian relief operations .......................................................................... 77
Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................
79
Annexes .............................................................................................................................................
81
Annex 1: Main cooperation or military technical assistance agreements ............................................ 81
Annex 2: List of region-oriented national schools .............................................................................................. 85
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................
Military publications ........................................................................................................................................................
Books (in alphabetical order) .....................................................................................................................................
Research papers and reports (in alphabetical order) ....................................................................................
Articles (in alphabetical order) ..................................................................................................................................
8
87
87
88
89
90
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACM : Actions civilo-militaires / Civil-military operations (CMO )
ALAT : Aviation légère de l’armée de terre / Army aviation
AMIS : Mission de l’Union africaine au Soudan / African Union Mission in Sudan
AML : Automitrailleuses légères / Light armored reconnaissance vehicles
AMO : Assistance militaire opérationnelle / Security force assistance (SFA)
AMT : Assistance militaire technique / Military technical assistance
APEO : Actions sur les perceptions et l’environnement opérationnel / Actions on perceptions and the
operational environment (influence/engagement operations)
AQMI : Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique / Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
BET : Borkou, Ennedi et Tibesti / Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti
BIMa : Bataillon d’infanterie de marine / Marine infantry battalion
Bioforce : Unité militaire française du service de santé des armées / French military unit of the joint
medical department
BSS : Bande sahélo-saharienne / Sahel/ Sahara belt
CEDEAO : Communauté économique des États d’Afrique de l’ouest / Economic community of the
West African states (ECOWAS)
CEEAC : Communauté économique des États d’Afrique centrale / Economic community of Central
African states (ECCAS)
CEMAC : Communauté économique et monétaire des États d’Afrique centrale / Central African
economic and monetary community (CEMAC)
CFT : Commandement des forces terrestres / Land forces command
COTAM : Commandement du transport aérien militaire / Military air transportation command
DAMI : Détachement d’assistance militaire d’instruction / Military assistance training detachment
DETALAT : Détachement de l’aviation légère de l’armée de terre / Army aviation detachment
DIO : Détachement d’instruction opérationnelle / Operational training detachment
DRM : Direction du renseignement militaire / Military intelligence directorate
ECOMOG : Brigade de surveillance du cessez-le-feu de la CEDEAO/ Economic Community of West
African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group
EEI : Engins explosifs improvisés / Improvised explosive device (IED)
EEML : École d’état-major de Libreville / Libreville staff college
EFAO : Éléments français d’assistance opérationnelle / French operational assistance detachment
EMT : État-major tactique / Tactical HQ
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ENU : Échelon national d’urgence / Emergency national echelon
ENVR : Écoles nationales à vocation régionale / Region-oriented national schools
EUFOR RDC : Opération militaire de l’Union européenne au Congo / EU military operation in the Congo
EUFOR Tchad/RCA : Opération militaire de l’Union européenne au Tchad et République
centrafricaine/ EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic
EURORECAMP : Concept français RECAMP, adopté en 2007 par l’UE / French RECAMP concept,
taken up by the EU in 2007
FACA : Forces armées centrafricaines / Central African armed forces
FANT : Forces armées nationales tchadiennes / Chadian national armed forces
FAR : Force d’action rapide / Rapid reaction force
FATIM : Force armée tchadienne en intervention au Mali / Chadian armed force in operations in Mali
FAZSOI : Forces armées de la zone sud de l’Océan indien / Southern Indian Ocean armed forces
FFCI : Forces françaises en Côte d’Ivoire / French forces in Côte d’Ivoire
FFDj : Forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti / Multinational force in Central Africa
FOMUC : Force multinationale en Centrafrique / Rwandan Patriotic Front
FPR : Front patriotique rwandais / Rwandan Patriotic Front
Frolinat : Front de libération nationale du Tchad / National Liberation Front of Chad
Front Polisario : Front pour la libération de la saguia El-Hamra et du Rio de Oro / Saguia El- Hamra
and Rio de Oro liberation front
FRUD : Front pour la restauration de l’unité et la démocratie (Djibouti) ) / AFAR front for the
restoration of unity and democracy in Djibouti
G5 Sahel : Mauritanie, Mali, Niger, Tchad et Burkina-Faso / G5 Sahel : Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chand
and Burkina-Faso
GAD : Groupes armés djihadistes / Jihadist armed groups
GAM : Groupe aéromobile / Helicopter strike group (UK)/ Army aviation battalion TF (US)
GAT : Groupes armés terroristes / Terrorist armed groups
GIGN : Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale / Gendarmerie special forces team
GTIA : Groupement tactique interarmes / Combined arms battalion task force
Guépard NG : Guépard nouvelle génération / New-generation GUEPARD alert system
GUNT : Gouvernement d’union nationale de transition (Tchad) ) / Transitional government of national
unity (Chad)
MICECI : Mission de la CEDEAO en Côte d’Ivoire / ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MINUAR : Mission des Nations unies pour l’assistance au Rwanda / United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda
10
MINUÉE : Mission des Nations unies en Éthiopie et en Érythrée / United Nations Mission in Ethiopia
and Eritrea
MINURCA : Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine / United Nations Mission in the
Central African Republic
MINURCAT : Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad / United Nations
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSMA : Mission multidimensionnelle des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali / United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISAB : Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui / Inter-African mission for
monitoring the Bangui agreements
MISMA : Mission internationale de soutien au Mali sous conduite africaine / African-led International
Support Mission to Mali
MJP : Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (Côte d’Ivoire) ) / Movement for peace and justice (Côte
d’Ivoire)
MNLA : Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad / AZAWAD National liberation movement
MONUC : Mission des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo / United Nations Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPCI : Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire / Côte d’Ivoire Patriots’ movement
MPIGO : Mouvement populaire ivoirien du grand-ouest / Ivorian people’s movement of the Great West
MUJAO : Mouvement pour l’unicité et la justice en Afrique de l’ouest / Movement for oneness (also
mentioned as unity) and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA or MUJWA)
NEO : Non-combatant evacuation operation / REVESAC : Opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants
ONG : Organisation non gouvernementale / Non-governmental organization (NGO)
ONUCI : Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire / United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
(UNOCI)
ONUSOM : Opération des Nations unies en Somalie / United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)
OPEX : Opérations extérieures / Overseas (abroad) operations
OUA : Organisation de l’unité africaine / Organization of African Unity (OAU)
RA : Régiment d’artillerie / Artillery battalion
RAMa : Régiment d’artillerie de marine / Marine artillery battalion
RCA : République centrafricaine / Central African Republic (CAR)
RDA : République démocratique allemande / German Democratic Republic
RDP : Régiment de dragons parachutistes / Parachute cavalry squadron (battalion-size)
REC : Régiment étranger de cavalerie / Foreign (Legion) armor battalion
REG : Régiment étranger de génie / Foreign (Legion) engineer battalion
11
REI : Régiment étranger d’infanterie / Foreign (Legion) infantry battalion REP : Régiment étranger
de parachutistes / Foreign (Legion) parachute (infantry) battalion
RG : Régiment du génie / Engineer battalion
RHC : Régiment d’hélicoptères de combat / Army aviation battalion
RHP : Régiment de hussards parachutistes / Parachute cavalry squadron (battalion-size)
RI : Régiment d’infanterie / Infantry battalion
RIAOM : Régiment interarmes d’outre-mer / Overseas combined arms battalion
RICM : Régiment d’infanterie chars de marine / Marine armor battalion
RIMa : Régiment d’infanterie de marine / Marine infantry battalion
RECAMP : Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix / Reinforcement of
African peacekeeping capabilities
ROE : Rules of engagement / règles d’engagement
RPC : Régiment parachutiste de choc / Shock Parachute battalion
RPCS : Régiment parachutiste de commandement et de soutien / HQ and support parachute
battalion
RPIMa : Régiment parachutiste d’infanterie de marine / Marine infantry parachute battalion
RT : Régiment des transmissions / Signal battalion
Séléka : Coalition de forces rebelles opposées au président centrafricain François Bozizé / SELEKA
Coalition of rebel forces opposed to Central African President François Bozizé
SIRPA : Service d’information et de relation publique des armées / Joint information and public
communications service
TF : Task Force / Force opérationnelle
UA : Unité africaine / African unity
UFDR : Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (Centrafrique) ) / Union of
democratic forces for rally (Central Africa)
UNITAF : United Task Force / Force d’intervention unifiée (Somalie)
VAB : Véhicule de l’avant blindé / Armored (wheeled) fighting vehicle
VBCI : Véhicule blindé de combat d’infanterie / Armored (wheeled) infantry fighting vehicle
VBL : Véhicules blindé léger / Light armored vehicle
ZHS : Zone humanitaire sûre / Humanitarian safety zone
12
INTRODUCTION
A
ll African countries became independent in the second half of the 20th century. Although
some countries became independent in the 1950s (such as Morocco, Tunisia or Guinea),
most of Africa was decolonized during the 1960s. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central
Africa, Chad, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo
left the Union française in 1960; Comoros and Djibouti became independent in 1975 and 1977
respectively.
The split from France, the colonial custodian of these countries since the end of the 19th century,
resulted in deep change, particularly in political and military relationships. Along with political
sovereignty, the idea of military independence emerged. The new countries therefore built up
their armed forces, and often - but not always - used the same model as their former European
colonizers.
These new states were all the more ready to follow the French model against the backdrop of the Cold
War. Their independence coincided with the passing of defense or military cooperation agreements
that enabled special relationships to be maintained. The basic purpose of these agreements was
to protect these young states until they could build up a national defense tool, covering education
and training of military officers and NCOs and guaranteeing the provision of logistical support
should conflict occur.
However, after independence, some of these states found themselves powerless against armed
conflicts requiring trained, combat seasoned forces and quality equipment. Some turned to France,
requesting French intervention to support local forces in internal or inter-state conflicts to ensure
regional stability. Sometimes, French troops were deployed to protect and evacuate French
nationals.
This was the context in which France started to conduct overseas operations. From the early
1960s until the present day, the French Army has deployed troops in over fifty operations in West
Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. As of 1977, it became the norm to give them specific
names (Verveine, Lamanti, etc.), while the term “OPEX” (“opération extérieure”) was introduced
in the early 2000s to refer to overseas (abroad) operations, as specified in a French DoD order.
In fact, there are a high number of overseas missions similar to “OPEXes” that are not strictly
overseas opérations.
From its first operation in Gabon in 1964 to more recent operations, France has always deployed
troops to Africa. Over time, however, these missions have become more complex. Taking stock of
these OPEXes now seems necessary for determining their exact nature and for categorizing them.
Besides distinguishing between operations against an avowed and identified enemy and those that
are essentially peacekeeping operations to protect human lives, we can sort OPEX by mission type:
interposition, security operations, non combatant operations (NEOs), humanitarian, intervention,
combat support, and counterinsurgency.
13
The diverse range of operations is testament to France’s evolving presence in Africa, as well as
the French Army’s capacity for adjusting to various needs. It therefore calls for an analysis by
operation type (referred to as a typological analysis)1. The classification here provides an outline of
all French military commitments in Africa. Furthermore, it clearly sets out the profound changes
in French overseas operations that have progressively shifted from bilateral French-African
frameworks to multinational operations under UN or EU mandates.
This paper will only address French Army missions, and not anti-piracy dispositions such as Atalante
in the Red Sea or the Corymbe standing force mission in the Gulf of Guinea, as these come under
Navy responsibility.2
1 French Department of Defense, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological Inventory of Operations), vol. 2, Africa;
Paris, French Forces Employment Doctrine Center, Lessons Learned department, (hereafter CDEF/DREX, Répertoire
typologique des opérations), 2006. Initially a document for internal use, this “Inventory” is not strictly typological. It is rather
a list of operations in chronological order.
2 Some French operations in Africa are not addressed in this paper for lack of Lessons Learned documents.
14
List (by type) of overseas
operations in chronological order
(1964-2014)
OPERATION
COUNTRY
DATES
TYPE
Gabon
19 February 1964
Chad
March 1969 – September 1972
Verveine
Zaïre
6 – 16 april 1977
Lamantin
Mauritania
December 1977 – July 1978
Counterinsurgency
Tacaud
Chad
February 1978 – May 1980
Intervention
Bonite
Zaïre
19 May – 15 June 1978
Intervention
Barracuda
Central
African
Republic
September 1979 – June 1981
Intervention
Manta
Chad
9 August 1983 – 11 November 1984
Combat support
Epervier
Chad
16 February 1986 – ongoing
Combat support
Togo
September 1986
Intervention
Comoros
7 December – 16 December 1989
Intervention
Oside
Intervention
Counterinsurgency
Combat support
Requin
Gabon
May – July 1990
Non-combatant
evacuation
operation (NEO)
Noroît
Rwanda
4 October 1990 – 13 December 1993
Combat support
Bérénice
Somalia
January 1991
Godoria
Djibouti
26 May – 29 June 1991
Baumier
Zaïre
September – October 1991
Verdier
Togo – Bénin
28 November 1991 – 14 February 1992
Interposition
Iskoutir
Djibouti
February 1992 – June 1999
Interposition
Addax
Angola
Central
Africa
1 – 5 November 1992
Somalie
December 1992 – December 1993
Bioforce
Oryx –
ONUSOM I/II
er
14 March – 2 April 1992
NEO
Humanitarian
operation
NEO
NEO
Humanitarian
Security operations
15
OPEX
PAYS
DATES
TYPE
Bajoyer
Zaïre
28 January – 14 February 1993
NEO
Volcan
Rwanda
9 – 11 February 1993
NEO
Balata –
Aramis
Cameroon
February 1994 – 31 May 2008
Amaryllis
Rwanda
9 – 14 April 1994
Turquoise
Rwanda
22 June – 22 August 1994
Combat support
NEO
Interposition
Croix du Sud I/II Chad – Niger
October 1994 – December 1995
Security operations
Caducée
Guinéa-Bissau
22 November – 9 December 1994
Humanitarian
Azalée
Comoros
29 September – 11 October 1995
Intervention
Malebo
Congo
November 1996 – February 1997
NEO
Almandin I/II
Central Africa
18 April 1996 – 19 June1997
Bubale
Central Africa
January 1997 – April 1998
Pélican I/II/III
Congo
March – June 1997
Almandin III
Central Africa
20 June 1997 – 15 April 1998
Antilope
Congo
October – November 1997
MINURCA
Central Africa
15 April 1998 – 28 February 1999
Iroko
Guinéa-Bissau
June 1998 – June 1999
Khor Angar
Djibouti
January 1999 – July 2000
Malachite
DR Congo
August – October 1998
Khaya
Côte d’Ivoire
25 – 31 December 1999
MINUÉE
Ethiopia –
Eritrea
12 May – 12 December 2001
Licorne
Côte d’Ivoire
19 September 2002 –
21 January 2015
Boali
Central Africa
October 2002 – December 2013
16
Interposition
Security operations
NEO
Security operations
NEO
Security operations
NEO
Interposition
NEO
Interposition
Security operations
Interposition
Combat support
OPEX
PAYS
DATES
TYPE
Artemis –
Mamba
DR Congo
16 May – 6 September 2003
Providence
Libéria
7 – 11 June 2003
Dorca
Chad
31 July – 11 September 2004
Security operations
ONUCI
Côte d’Ivoire
a/o October 2004
Security operations
EUFOR RDC
DR Congo
June – December 2006
Security operations
EUFOR Chad- Chad –
Central Africa
Central Africa
28 January 2008 – 15 March 2009
Security operations
Chari-Baguirmi
1 – 8 February 2008
Chad
Security operations
NEO
Harmattan
Libya
March 2011 - October 2011
Serval
Mali
11 January 2013 – August 2014
NEO
Intervention,
population
protection,
Counterinsurgency
17
CHAPTER I
ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH
MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN AFRICA
F
rance’s military presence in Africa has considerably changed since the 1960s. Although France
has maintained a permanent presence, the number of troops has fallen continuously and
regularly. The drop in numbers is part of a political choice reflecting the growing capacity and will
of African nations to commit their own forces.
French troops
in Africa
1960
1970
1980
1990
1997
2010
2013
2014
30,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
8,405
8,5153
9,3504
6,596
Evolution of the French military presence in Africa, 1960-2014.
1.1. Defending France’s “backyard”: 1960-1990
During the Cold War, Africa applied a bipolar logic of siding with either East or West, thereby forcing
newly-independent countries to adapt to the stakes of a conflict between the East and West, despite
no effective armed forces being available. Hence why, immediately after the decolonization process,
French authorities signed some twenty defense and cooperation agreements with its former African
colonies. France considered its presence in Africa crucial for countering Soviet influence5. It also
wanted to assume responsibility for the defense of its former colonies6.
As the Western bloc saw France as its strong arm in Africa, the US supported France’s actions.
France’s “backyard” in Africa was multidimensional: the “franc CFA” monetary zone (financial
dimension), interests dating from the colonial period (economic dimension), and various agreements
passed with African countries7 (military dimension). These agreements fell into two categories:
cooperation or technical military assistance (AMT) agreements covering the education and training
3 With an additional 1,460 armed forces in the south of the Indian Ocean (FAZOI) in Réunion Island and Mayotte. Cf.
Josselin de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French African policies), Rapport d’information n°324, 28 February
2011, p. 24.
4 Organized as follows: among prepositioned forces, 900 troops (including 450 permanently stationed) in Libreville;
1,900 troops in Djibouti (1,400 permanently stationed); 700 troops in United Arab Emirates and 1,900 in Mayotte and
Réunion Island; 350 troops in Dakar (about 260 permanently stationed). In overseas operations: 4,200 in Mali, 1,000 in
Chad, 1,000 between the Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, and anti-piracy dispositions. Jean-Pierre Chevènement et
Gérard Larcher, Sahel: pour une approche globale (Sahel: for a comprehensive approach), Rapport d’information n°720,
3 July 2013, pp. 166-167.
5 Jeanny Lorgeoux and Jean-Marie Bockel, La présence de la France dans une Afrique convoitée (the French presence in
coveted Africa) Rapport d’information n°104 , 29 October 2013, p. 257.
6 Pierre Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (Which developments for French
security policy in Africa), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004, pp. 15-16.
7 General (retired) Jean-Claude Thomas, Généralités sur notre politique militaire en Afrique, enseignements des actions
passées et orientations pour l’avenir (General considerations on our military policy in Africa, lessons learned from
experience and guidelines for the future), l’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Actes de la journée d’études du
5 février 2007 (Sub-Saharan Africa from one crisis to another : proceedings of the research meeting held on 5 February
2007), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007, p. 6.
19
Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa
of national forces of African countries, and defense agreements constituting a legal basis for
French interventions. Between 1960 and 1991, France signed military assistance agreements with
23 countries8. 8 nations were bound to France through defense agreements until the late 1970s9;
these agreements became “defense partnership agreements” in May 200910.
Initially, France led military actions in its former colonies to restore their domestic situations, to
oppose rebel movements or to defend them from aggressive nations11. During the Cold War, French
prepositioned troops were stationed in Dakar and Brazzaville before their transfer to Libreville.
From the 1970s, France’s next step was to exert its influence outside the area of its former colonies12.
Contact was made with French-speaking nations such as Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) from 1977,
and Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s. French operations were decidedly offensive, as seen in the long,
drawn-out conflict against northern rebels in Chad and in Libya from 1978 onwards, or the airborne
operation over Kolwezi in May that year. Whether through intervention, counterinsurgency or combat
support missions, from the 1960s until the 1990s, France acted alone and with a combat rationale
against avowed enemies.
1.2. Africa and the way to democracy (1990-1994)
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War heralded a new era for French interventions in
Africa. The end of the two-bloc system in Africa meant it lost its strategic importance and became a
minor challenge of influence for Western countries13. This shift in diplomatic momentum generated
new developments in French doctrine, as underscored by President Mitterrand in the discours de
La Baule (La Baule speech) on 20 June 1990. As a left-wing president, Mitterand’s election had
an impact, as he sought to set himself apart from his predecessors. During the 16th France-Africa
Summit, François Mitterrand explained the prominent role democracy was to play from then on. Africa
could not avoid the consequences of the overthrow of the former Soviet system in Eastern Europe by
its former peoples. From this point, France’s role was to help develop democracy in Africa14.
Change was to follow in France’s intervention patterns, with a shift to more NEOs, interposition or
stability operations. This change can also be explained by a shift in the African landscape, whereby
more criticism could be levelled at French intervention. France instigated political and military changes
to meet certain African countries’ longstanding wish for a new role for Paris within a different
relationship between Africa and France. In the early 1990s, African states asserted their will to
provide the means for their own security, with independent military forces15. Through sub-regional
organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)16, African states
gradually took charge of security issues. When civil war broke out in Liberia, they went so far as to set
up a non- standing military force built up with troops from national forces, ECOMOG17.
8 See Annex 1: Main bilateral cooperation or military assistance agreements until the early 1990s.
9 Cameroon (1960 then 1974), Central Africa (1960), Comoros (1973 then 1978), Côte d’Ivoire (1961), Djibouti (1977),
Gabon (1960), Senegal (1960 then 1974), Togo (1963).
10 See Annex 1.
11 A. Dulait, R. Hue, Y. Pozzo Di Borgo & D. Boulaud, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne (Crisis management
in sub-Saharan Africa), p. 8.
12 François Gaulme, La politique française d’intervention dans les conflits limités en Afrique (the French intervention
policy in Africa’s limited conflicts), Penser les ailes françaises n°13, April 2007, pp. 7-8.
13 Jean-Pierre Bat, Le syndrome Foccart (The Foccart Syndrome), Gallimard, 2012, p. 507.
14 J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (France’s African policy), rep. cit., p. 8.
15 P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French
security policy in Africa?), art. cit., pp. 28-29.
16 It was founded in 1975.
17 ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group).
20
1994 marked a turning-point for Africa: the CFA franc currency was devalued, the Apartheid regime
in South Africa ended and genocide was perpetrated in Rwanda18. The Rwandan genocide had
a considerable impact on France; people were more aware that Central Africa was embroiled in
conflict and of the difficulty of military intervention on a “go it alone” basis. France’s complex domestic
political situation at the time, with a “co-existence” government, helps to explain why France started
to withdraw from Africa19. France started to reconsider its security policy in Africa as of 1995,
coinciding with change in doctrine that led to the establishment of professionalized Armed Forces.
As opposed to the years from 1960-1990, to a certain degree the following period would see
France’s withdrawal from Africa.
1.3. A new relationship with Africa (1995-2001)
The second half of the 1990s brought changes to the French Armed Forces, and consequently to
their interventions in Africa. In 1996, President Chirac decided to professionalize the Armed Forces
and suspend compulsory national service. Troop numbers fell significantly, leading to the disbanding
of several units and the reorganization of the reserve forces. Cooperation, in particular military
cooperation, in Africa was rethought. In 1998, new guidelines appeared based on five tenets: refusal
of unilateralism, bilateral military interventions for the security of French nationals, a permanent but
reduced presence, multilateral operations with African Forces, partnership between Europe and
the UN to provide combat support for African Security Forces with a program to reinforce African
peacekeeping capabilities (RECAMP) and the development of regionalization based on regionoriented national schools.20
As unilateral engagements gave way to solely African security building, the Ministry of Cooperation
became a junior ministry (Secrétariat d’Etat) attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Accordingly, within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the general directorate of political and security
affairs also managed military cooperation missions. French cooperation paved the way for the
development of local forces’ education and training. Fewer students were sent to France after 1997;
17 region-oriented national schools opened that could provide training in 10 countries in Central and
Western Africa. As costs were lower than in France, the schools also taught students from foreign
countries: 811 out of the 1,198 posts offered in 200521.
Whereas France had previously opted to “go it alone” during security operations in Africa,
the 1997 launch of the RECAMP program significantly boosted African peacekeeping capabilities.
Founded on the will of states and African organizations, RECAMP’s purpose was to enable Africans
to manage crises on the continent. By helping reinforce defense capabilities, the program committed
nations to playing the key role in the preparation and conduct of exercises and operations22.
18 François Gaulme, La politique française d’intervention dans les conflits limités en Afrique (the French intervention policy
in limited conflicts in Africa) art. cit., p. 8.
security policy in Africa?), art. cit., p. 29.
20 J. Lorgeoux and J-M. Bockel: La présence de la France dans une Afrique convoitée (The presence of France in coveted
Africa), rep. cit., p.260. These developments were derived from the “neither interference nor indifference” tenet initiated
by Lionel Jospin.
21 A. Dulait, R. Hue, Y. Pozzo and D. Boulaud: La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne (Crisis management in subSahara Africa), rep. cit., p. 12. See Annex 2: “Le réseau des écoles nationales à vocation régionale” (The network of
region-oriented national schools).
22 Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix, Doctrine interarmées (Reinforcing African capacities for
peacekeeping, Joint doctrine ), DIA-3.4.7 (B)_RECAMP (2011), n° 179 DEF/CICDE /NP, 22 September 2011, p.21.
21
It included several functions: military leader development, support for the training and organization of
HQs and units, and operational support to committed forces. Validated by France in 1997, RECAMP
was submitted to the European Union and was approved as “EURORECAMP” in 2007. After signing
a strategic partnership agreement with the African Union23 in 1998, it became “AMANI AFRICA”24
and served as a common framework for the organization of crisis management exercises for African
Standby Forces (FAA/ASF).
This change in political direction in Africa led to new developments in doctrine; the downsizing of
military strength, and, in certain specific cases, types of disengagement25. Disengagement did not
equate to “withdrawal”, although some bases were evacuated and closed for specific reasons, for
example Bouar and Camp Béal in Central Africa26.
1.4. France’s return to Africa (2001 – 2014)
The 9/11 attacks and the emergence of a new global terrorist threat led to a change in approach.
Numerous, strong links had been forged between the Sahel area and greater Middle-East where
some terrorists were trained. France was to reengage in Africa, with 2013’s Operation Serval marking
the peak involvement. Southern Sahara emerged as a safe haven for Islamist terrorist combatants
who capitalized on African states’ loose grip on Saharan territories by setting up bases and training
facilities in the area. France’s period of relative inaction in Africa during the late 1990s ended as
the country intervened again, although this time it would act solely in a multinational framework,
backed by UN resolutions and its defense agreements.
New outside actors appeared in Africa; China deployed for essentially economic reasons, while
the European Union showed interest due to the considerable challenges of immigration, terrorism
and organized trafficking in Africa. Africa’s sub-regional organizations played an important part as
internal actors. The Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC/ECCAS), initially intended
to promote regional economic cooperation, became an increasingly major player in managing local
security crises. This was also the case for the Economic Community of Western African States
(CEDEAO/ECOWAS)27.
In line with its policy from the 1990s, France committed in Africa with due regard to any legitimately
and democratically elected governments and authorities. France condemned taking power by force,
and defended the integrity of territories and borders. French military engagement on the African
territory only occurred following a request from an African country and under UN mandate28.
The unilateral interventions that had prevailed from the 1960s to the 1990s thereby gave way
to multilateral deployments conducted in agreement with African countries, most often within
the framework of European actions.
23 The African Union superseded the African Union Organization in July 2002.
24 J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French African policy), rep. cit., p. 36.
25 See Table 1: Developments in the French military presence in Africa.
26 Breaking of diplomatic relations between France and the Central African Republic after Operations Almandin.
P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French
security policy in Africa?), art. cit., p. 31.
27 General J-C Thomann, Généralités sur notre politique militaire en Afrique (General aspects of French military policy in
Africa), art. cit, p. 8.
security policy in Africa?), art. cit., p.34.
22
During the 2000s, the European Union became a full-scale actor for peace and security in Africa,
developing the African component of the European security and defense policy from 200529. From
2003, France deployed troops as part of European forces in Operation Artemis in DR Congo, and
would take the same line with operations in Chad, Central African Republic and Mali.
Today, France’s overall military structure in Africa relies on several elements with different features30.
It combines permanently prepositioned forces, French forces in Gabon31, French forces in Djibouti32,
and French forces in Côte d’Ivoire, activated on 21 January 2015. French troops have also been
deployed to Senegal (Dakar), where French elements constitute a region-oriented operational
cooperation center33. As well as France committing troops as part of its overseas operations, its
“sovereignty” forces are present on La Réunion and Mayotte islands, with the Armed Forces in
the south of the Indian Ocean (1,900 troops). All in all, France has 6,500 French troops deployed on
the African territory.
France’s overall troop organization includes a significant presence on Africa’s Atlantic coastline
(Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon). It also plays a significant logistical role in West and Central Africa
(Mali, Chad, Central African Republic) and enables France’s presence on the Eastern coast of Africa
(Djibouti, La Réunion/Mayotte).
29 J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French African policy), rep. cit., p.34.
30 Jean-Pierre Chevènement et Gérard Larcher, Sahel : Pour une approche globale (Sahel: for a comprehensive approach),
rep. cit., pp. 166-167.
31 900 troops in Libreville, including 450 on a permanent basis.
32 1,900 troops, including 1,400 on a permanent basis.
33 350 troops, including about 260 on a permanent basis.
23
CHAPTER II
INTERVENTION OPERATIONS
2.1. Time-restricted missions
An intervention operation is a time-restricted combat operation; its main objective is the annihilation
or suppression of an enemy force through direct intervention. Such intervention missions belong to a
specific period of French political history: between the end of the colonial empire and the mid-1990s34.
The first example of such an operation in post-colonial Africa occurred in Gabon. In February 1964,
France launched an intervention to restore the Gabonese President, Léon M’Ba (1902 -1967), to
power as he was under threat from opponents. Marine troops were deployed, particularly a company
of 7th marine infantry battalion based in Dakar (“7° RIMa”), a HQ and two companies from Fort-Lamy
(Chad), as well as the separate marine infantry parachute company based in Brazzaville35. Due to
the close positioning of troops, it was possible to launch the operation very quickly, between 18 and
19 February. Although the operation led to 2 deaths in the French Forces36, it did make restoring
President Léon M’Ba’s authority possible.
Nonetheless, it was only in the late 1970s that France launched its most significant interventions:
Operations Tacaud in Chad in 1978, Bonite (also called Leopard) in Zaire in the same year, and
Barracuda in the Central African Republic in 1979.
Tacaud, Chad (February 1978 – May 1980)
France had already intervened in Chad in 1969 (Limousin), in the aftermath of the upheaval caused
by the civil war. In 1978, the country was once again split by internal divisions that had grown in
number since 1975. In April of the same year, a coup brought General Malloum to power, who
initially tried to start negotiations with rebels. Until 1977, the National Liberation Front of Chad
(FROLINAT37), grouping the northern rebels, had not launched large-scale operations, except in
Tibesti. Instead, it capitalized on the period to enhance its combat power thanks to Libyan aid38.
34 The end of the Cold War and the French repositioning process resulted in the end of this kind of mission; the last mission
of that type was Operation Azalée in 1995.
35 Jean-Louis Dufour, Les troupes de marine dans les interventions africaines des années 1960 à nos jours (Marine troops
in interventions in Africa from the 1960s until today), in Maurice Vaïsse (dir), Les troupes de marine dans l’armée de
Terre (Marine troops in the army), Lavauzelle, 2001, p. 263.
36 André Foures, Caractères des interventions militaires françaises outre-mer de 1960 à nos jours (Main features of
French military overseas interventions from 1960 until today), Revue Historique des Armées, n° 169, pp. 92-101,
chart p. 101.
37 A Chadian armed movement founded in 1966 by Ibrahim Abatcha to fight against the southern regime.
38 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad) vol.2,
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, October 1989 vol. 2, p. 35.
25
Chapter II: intervention operations
However, in early 1978, rebels from the north seized the towns of Faya-Largeau, Ounianga, Fada and
Koro-Toro. The Chadian Army lost 2,000 troops in the fighting, as well as a considerable amount of
equipment39. The threat of the rebels quickly seizing the capital city of N’Djamena was so great that
General Malloum requested France’s help under agreements signed in 197640. Plan Citronnelle was
implemented on 3 February 1978, with the aim of providing immediate military technical assistance
to the Chadian Forces, while a longer-term engagement was also prepared. Finally, Operation Tacaud
was launched on 26 March197841 after the first round of French legislative elections.
Operation Tacaud’s defining feature was that it operated on a case-by-case basis, according to
the situation on the ground, explaining the gradual deployment of elements. It can be split into
three main phases: a combat operation from February 1978 to March 1979 that enabled
the military situation to be stabilized, a period of neutrality from March to July 1979, and assistance
in reconstructing the Chadian state from July 1979 to May 1980.
An average of 2,000 French troops was deployed, with a peak deployment of 2,200. A group of
twenty-two advisors deployed, belonging to 11th Airborne division, and 9th Marine infantry division.
Three GTIAs (combined arms battalion task forces) were also sent from Foreign Legion units
(1st REC and 2nd REI) and Marine infantry (3rd RIMa) stationed at Abeche, Ati, Mongo and Moussoro.
Each task force comprised one motorized infantry company, one cavalry troop (company-size) and
one mortar platoon. Some light aviation elements were also deployed with four light helicopters
(Alouette III) as well as eight Puma utility helicopters (seven cargo and one gunship).
The opponents were no longer a gang of lightly armed rebels like in 1969, but organized military
forces equipped with modern weaponry: surface-to-air missiles, 120-mm mortars, recoilless 75- and
106-mm guns, and RPG-7 grenade launchers42.
In order to block the rebel offensives, French troops conducted several combat operations from April
to the summer of 1978. Thus Tacaud also included fighting in Salal (15 - 25 April 1978), where a
company team (built around a cavalry troop) opposed a 400-500 strong enemy battalion. Intense
fighting broke out and French troops withdrew towards Moussoro; Salal remained in rebel hands.
On 27 April, these events were followed by the deployment of ten JAGUARs to provide air support,
stabilizing the frontline along Abeche-Ati-Moussoro.
On 19 - 20 May, French Forces fought two National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) companies
(200-300 combatants) in Ati and seized the city. These companies were equipped with mortars,
automatic weapons and machine guns. France committed the MONGO tactical HQ, one company
from 3rd RIMa and a platoon from the Chadian army. The rebels put up strong resistance; it took
French troops two days, and the support of light aviation and JAGUARs to recapture the city and its
outskirts. Recapturing Ati caused around 100 rebel losses, 3 prisoners were taken and 80 weapons
seized. French troops counted three dead and around ten wounded.
39 CDEF/DREX (French Forces Employment Doctrine Center): Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological
inventory of operations), op. cit., p. 34.
security policy in Africa), art. cit., p. 19.
41 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad) vol.2,
op. cit., p. 123.
42 Jérôme de Lespinois, Emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad 1969-1987 (Employment of air force assets in Chad 1969
– 1987) , Penser les ailes françaises, June 2005, n° 6, pp. 67-74.
26
(Operation Tacaud, map taken from Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad (The wars in Chad), 2014.)
27
The French offensive then moved to Djedaa, where the JAGUAR detachment was initially
deployed, followed by action from ABECHE GTIA 31 May - 1 June. Nearly 600 rebels from
the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT), equipped with mortars, guns and machineguns, had withdrawn into the town. 1st company (3rd RIMa) as well as two platoons from the
3rd company (3rd RIMa) took position to the south and west of the village, together with one
company (1st REC), one battery (11th RAMa), and Chadian gendarmes and soldiers. French
troops delivered heavy surface and air fires and recaptured the town, killing approximately
100 rebels and taking 3 wounded prisoners. The French emerged the victors of these skirmishes,
thereby stopping the rebels’ thrust towards N’Djamena43. The rebels were increasingly prone to
infighting.
The situation stabilized in the latter half of 1978, after negotiations between General Malloum
and the rebels concluded with the formation of a national union government. Nonetheless, serious
dissensions broke out again, culminating in the battle of N’Djamena, 12 - 15 February 1979. French
attempts to reconcile the factions proved futile; all French troops deployed on the Chadian territory
withdrew towards N’Djamena from August 1979. Despite General Malloum stepping down, and
the establishment of an interposition force, fighting resumed between the various Chadian warring
factions, leading to deadly fighting in March 1980. French authorities announced the withdrawal
of troops in April 1980. By the time the operation ended in May, 18 French soldiers had been
killed and 27 wounded.
Chad, June 1978, Operation Tacaud © ECPAD, Roland Pellegrino.
43 Pierre de Tonquédec, Face à Khadafi, Opération Tacaud (Confronting Gaddafi, Operation Tacaud), Saint- Cloud, SOTECA,
2012, p. 46
28
Bonite, Zaire (19 May – 15 June 1978)
Out of all France’s operations in Africa, Bonite is still fresh in people’s minds due to its airborne
operation over Kolwezi in May 197844. Under the dictatorship of President Joseph- Désiré Mobutu
(1965 – 1997), Zaire had suffered attacks from the “Katanga Tigers” since the late 1970s. After
being driven back by 1977’s Operation Verveine, these “Tigers” had taken refuge in Angola, with
support and training from the Soviets and Cubans. On 11 May 1978, nearly 3,000 Katanga fighters
moved into Kolwezi, a city covering some 40 square kilometers and comprising several distinct,
separated districts with a population of over 100,000, including 3,000, mainly Belgian and French,
Europeans employed in the mining industry. As the hub of the country’s mineral wealth (copper and
cobalt), Kolwezi was an important objective in the Shaba province.
Inside Kolwezi, some Zairian Forces broke off to join the Tigers, while the others were pushed back.
When the population, the Europeans in particular, started to suffer abuse, the crisis took on an
international dimension. France decided to send an airborne infantry battalion (2nd REP in full),
reinforced by military
assistance from Zaire, as well
as three parachute teams
from 13 th RDP , making a
Force that was 710 strong45.
Although several hundred
“Katanga” fighters withdrew on
15 May, nearly 500 fighters in
small units stayed to oppose
the French Forces46.
The concept of operations
was to take control of the
residential districts by
airdropping paratroopers on
the city center, in order to
then access the airport 6 kms
away. Airdropping achieved a
surprise effect and prevented
any reprisals against the
civilian populace. Although
Belgian Forces had also been
deployed to Kolwezi, no prior
coordination was possible,
as Paris and Brussels failed
to agree on a common
operation47.
Operation Bonite, 1978, CDEF/DREX, Inventory of operations by types, p. 21.
44 Colonel Michel Goya, la légion saute sur Kolwezi (Foreign Legion airdrop on Kolwezi), Guerre et histoire, December
2013, n° 16.
45 CDEF/DREX (Forces employment doctrine center) Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory
of operations), op. cit., p.24.
46 General Rémy Gausserès (Company commander at the time of the operation), Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai
1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978); supplement to “les cahiers du RETEX” n° 12, 2003, pp. 27-30.
47 Adjudant-Chef (First Sergeant) Jean-Claude Saulnier, Une vie de légionnaire (The life of a légionnaire), Nimrod, 2013,
p. 105.
29
In the early afternoon of May 19, three companies and the battalion HQ (about 400 troops) were
airdropped from less than 250m on Kolwezi. The legionnaires came immediately under fire, suffering
1 dead and 6 wounded. The French troops started street fighting to liberate the European nationals
who had been taken hostage or who had been hiding in their homes. In the evening, the paras/
legionnaires managed to seize the city center and old town. At this point, the “Katanga” fighters were
in control of Manika, a town on the outskirts. The following morning, a second wave was airdropped.
200 legionnaires from the 4th company and the weapons company discovered several mass graves
to the east of the new city. At the end of the day, the legionnaires took control of the Metal-Shaba
mining area held by 200 rebels, as well as of Manika.
From 21 - 27 May, the battalion still held the city, and deployed towards Likasi and Lubumbashi,
leaving the control of Kolwezi to the Belgian Forces that had been airlifted to the airport on 20 May.
On 28 and 29 May, apart from a rifle company and the mortar platoon that had stayed in Kolwezi,
the whole battalion gathered in Lubumbashi. The legionnaires from the 2nd REP all returned to
France by 15 June. The first large-scale airborne operation since Suez in 1956, Bonite proved a
military success. Although approximately 120 Europeans and 500 Zairians were killed prior to the
paras/legionnaires’ arrival48, nearly 2,000 European non-combatants were able to be evacuated.
French troops suffered 5 dead and 15 wounded, while the rebels suffered 250 dead49.
Barracuda, Central African Empire (September 1979 – June 1981)
Operation Barracuda saw French troops deploy to the Central African Empire of Bokassa I.
The USSR’s and Libya’s display of interest in Central Africa, combined with the ambiguous political
attitude of Jean-Bedel Bokassa (1921 - 1996), were initial sources of concern for France. However,
a series of factors - the deteriorating social climate, emerging domestic and external opposition,
and above all the Emperor’s personal responsibility for the student massacre committed in Bangui
in spring 1979 - propelled France to take action to oust the Head of State and offer support
to the opposition50. There were in fact several aspects demanding rapid military intervention: the
worsening domestic crisis in Central Africa, a critical media campaign in France highlighting the
State authorities’ goodwill towards Bokassa and the request for assistance from leaders of certain
neighboring countries (Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny) in order to ensure political stability and
security in the area. Most important was stemming the threats to French nationals and the fact
that negotiations had failed to resolve the crisis.
The first phase of Operation Barracuda, from September - November 1979, had several objectives:
ensuring that French nationals and the new government were protected and providing support
to Central African Armed Forces (FACA) during their law and order mission, thereby avoiding any
direct commitment. The Army detached a tactical HQ, three paratrooper companies, one cavalry
platoon, one aviation detachment and a paratrooper team from 13th RDP . Together with a medical
element and some personnel from the 1st RPIMa, the total strength came to 500 troops.
48 Michel Goya, La légion saute sur Kolwezi (Foreign Legion airdrop on Kolwezi), art. cit., p. 26.
49 R. Gausserès, Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978), art. cit., p. 30.
50 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad), op. cit.,
p. 338.
30
Central African Republic, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2004.
On 20 September, marine infantry troops seized Bangui M’Poko airport51, starting immediately
with the airlift of troops, equipment, and the aviation detachment from N’Djamena to Bangui. French
troops also seized critical points in the city: airport, embassy, seat of government, and radio center.
On the evening of 23 September, all immediate threats had been averted in the capital, with no use
of weapons. Troops ensured Bangui was secure by preventing looting, neutralizing the two battalions
of the imperial guard in Berengo (where the Emperor lived) and capturing a platoon of 37 armed
Libyans52. Protection of 3,200 French nationals was ensured without suffering any losses.
Operation Barracuda developed step by step. From May 1980, troops were split into two company
teams in Bangui and Bouar, and were tasked with re-building and training the Central African Army,
making it strong enough to ensure the country’s security. For the sake of stability, the French Forces’
area of action ranged across the country. Barracuda came to an end in June 1981. French Security
Force Assistance elements took over, who were to stay in Central Africa until 1998.
51 Florent de St Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires en Centrafrique (45 years of military operations in Central Africa),
Lettre du RETEX – Opérations, n°8 9 December 2013, pp. 1-8.
52 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military operations in Chad), op. cit.,
p. 365.
31
Oside, Comoros (7 December – 16 December 1989)
The Togo operation in 1986, as well as Operations Oside and Azalée in the Comoros in 1989
and 1995, also typified intervention missions by their very short duration, and pitching French
troops against those perpetrating coups. During Oside, at the request of the Comorian government,
France sent 200 paratroopers under the defense agreement passed on 17 August 196053.
Operation Oside was sparked by the assassination of President Ahmed Abdallah (1919 - 1989)
on the night of 26 - 27 November, and the threat to the stability of the Comoro Islands. Comorian
local authorities and Armed Forces (500 troops) held 600 mercenaries responsible. Led by
Bob Denard54, the mercenaries’ role on the island had been unclear for several years. President
Abdallah’s assassination drew condemnation from the international community and sparked fears
of a major conflict between the local authorities and the presidential guard. At the request
of Comorian authorities, decision was made to launch an operation. The aim was to restore
the Comorian authorities’ control over the country and compel the mercenaries to leave.
Operational command was taken by the higher command of armed forces of the southern zone of
the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI). Attached to these units were a paratrooper company from 2° REP in
standby in Djibouti, an assistance training detachment from 1st RPIMa, the aviation detachment
from Djibouti, paratroopers from 11th RPC and a mobile army surgical hospital55. Army Forces
comprised 710 troops, supported by 490 navy personnel and several ships (1 escort ship, 1 light
transport ship, 1 replenishment ship and 2 patrol boats)56. Besides reducing the threat from
the presidential guard, the French Forces had to ensure the security of the 1,200 French nationals.
Last, Security Force Assistance was performed to lead the Comorian Forces and, in the long term,
ensure the external protection of the Comoros.
The troops sailed on 12 December 1989 and, three days later, seized Hahaya airport, as well as
the Kandani barracks and Hombo camp. Negotiations immediately got underway with
the mercenaries and the military facilities were demilitarized. Eventually an agreement was reached
whereby Bob Denard and 22 mercenaries would depart for South Africa, while nearly all presidential
guards gathered in Kandani with no bloodshed. Oside officially ended on 16 December, 1989.
The Military Training Assistance detachment stayed in the area to mentor the presidential guard,
which became the Comorian Security Force57. No losses were suffered; the mercenaries withdrew
when confronted with the paratroopers sent by French authorities.
Azalée, Comoros (29 September – 11 October 1995)
Another military coup occurred in the Comoro Islands in 1995 when the elected President, Said
Mohamed Djohar, of the Comorian Republic was ousted by Bob Denard. Denard’s 40- or-so-strong
team was accompanied by nearly 700 coup-perpetrating troops, some of whom had already
participated in a previous coup. The Prime Minister took refuge in the French Embassy and requested
French intervention under the 1978 French-Comorian defense agreements58. France agreed to
intervene, particularly in order to protect French nationals (278 in Grande Comore).
53 Pierre Pascallon, Politique sécuritaire de la France en Afrique (French security policy in Africa), p. 19.
54 Walter Bruyère-Ostell, Histoire des mercenaires (A history of mercenaries), Tallandier, 2013.
55 From 7th RPCS (HQ and support parachute battalion).
56 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.80.
57 Until 8 January 1990.
58 André Dumoulin, La France militaire et l’Afrique (Military France and Africa), Brussels, Ed. Complexe, 1997, p. 115.
32
France deployed a tactical HQ, four infantry companies, one reconnaissance platoon, one long range
observation team, a forward signal party with military intelligence (DRM) teams, paratroopers from
13th RDP, personnel from 41st RT and from the armed forces information and public relations office.
They were accompanied by a TF from special operations command (infantrymen from 1st RPIMa
and a gendarmerie intervention team from GIGN) deployed on board two PUMA utility helicopters.
Last, an aviation element was also deployed for the mission59. The Navy deployed several ships (one
frigate, two patrol boats and one transport ship) and one Breguet Atlantic aircraft, as well as troops
from the Navy’s Jaubert commando. The Air force contributed eight C-160 Transall aircraft, one
C-130 Hercules, and one A-310 heavy lift aircraft. The mandate for Operation Azalée was to protect
French nationals and successfully counter the coup.
Operation Azalée, 1995, CDEF/DREX (French forces employment doctrine center):
a typological inventory of operations, p. 222.
On the night of 3 - 4 October, Navy commandos were deployed while 1st RPIMa was lifted by
helicopters in order to seize the Iconi and Hahaya airports. By nightfall, the town of Moroni, where
the French embassy was located, was under their control. On the evening of 4 October, Bob Denard
released the President, who was then transferred to La Réunion Island. Denard and his mercenaries
surrendered the next day; they were evacuated to mainland France and imprisoned. Meanwhile,
the Comorian rebels were handed over to the Comorian authorities. On 11 October, with the situation
partly stabilized, troops started to disengage, although the Azalée detachment stayed in order to
ensure the security of French nationals and to help local authorities in rebuilding their security
forces. At the end of the operation, there were only two wounded journalists, whereas the rebels
counted 5 dead and approximately 10 wounded60.
This type of operation did not occur again for various reasons. New international developments
- the end of the Cold War in particular - brought drastic changes to the geopolitical roles of several
countries. New political theories emerged, such as the “soft ideologies” explained in Joseph Nye’s
Soft Power61, leading all countries to rethink international relationships. The conflicts that had
made Africa central to European concerns had faded, making it possible for France to change
the paradigm of intervention in Africa, particularly as François Mitterrand wished to be rid of
59 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), p.220.
60 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p. 224.
61 S. Joseph Nye, Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power, New York, Basic Books, 1990.
33
recurring accusations of “Françafrique”62 in a break from De Gaulle’s legacy. On 20 June 1990,
Mitterand’s speech at the 16th France-Africa summit at La Baule marked this new direction. Penned
by Erik Orsenna, the speech stressed how development should go hand-in-hand with democracy, with
the aim of launching new operations and forging new relationships with African countries, whose
sovereignty was now sacrosanct. Intervention operations belong to the period 1960-1990, with
the principle of intervention making a comeback in 2013 with Operation Serval, launched at
the request for assistance from the Malian state authorities in the wake of terrorist attacks63.
2.2. Assessment
Setting aside any political assessment of these intervention operations, and what put an end
to them, overall they can be judged as military successes. On a strategic level, they generally achieved
the goals set. Hence why, in Gabon, President M’Ba’s power was restored. In Chad (1978) Operation
Tacaud was primarily a military success: the rebels coming from the North, supported by Libya,
were stopped in their advance towards southern Chad. The operations sparked negotiations between
the various sides of the rebellion and the local authorities. When fighting broke out in the capital
city, more than one thousand European civilians were evacuated to Libreville and Yaounde, while
assistance to the local populace continued. In the long term however, and particularly from a political
perspective, the mission proved a failure. Hence why, when tensions broke out again in N’Djamena,
France disengaged. Tacaud, therefore, albeit a military success, was not a political success.
Other missions fared better: in Zaire, Barracuda enabled non-combatant evacuation and repelled
the “Katangais” offensive, while maintaining a permanent deployment in the Central African
Republic near the border with Chad. Military intervention in Togo in 1986 prevented the downfall of
the Togolese Head of State, General Eyadema, who had been threatened by a coup. Oside prevented
Bob Denard’s coup perpetrators from taking power. Last, Azalée neutralized rebels and captured
the mercenaries, who were transferred to mainland France for trial.
These intervention missions had a significant surprise effect. They could be conducted at speed;
French institutions authorize the French president to launch an intervention without first seeking
approval from Parliament. From a military perspective, the implementation of the GUEPARD alert
system also upped the speed of operations. Deployed for the first time in1967 in response to unrest
in Djibouti64, GUEPARD applied to professional troops - in particular those that became the Rapid
Reaction Force (FAR: force de réaction rapide) in 1983 - and included a 72-hour standby status
for units that lasted one month. With the total professionalization of the Armed Forces and disbanding
62 In 1990, Pierre Péan’s book on Jacques Foccart was published. Pierre Péan, L’homme de l’ombre : éléments d’enquête
autour de Jacques Foccart, l’homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Vème République (The man in the shadow:
investigation on Jacques Foccart, the most mysterious and powerful man of the 5th Republic), Paris, Fayard, 1990. Since
then, several university research papers have been written, including Jean-Pierre Bat’s Le syndrome Foccart; la politique
française en Afrique de 1959 à nos jours (the Foccart syndrome: French African policies from 1959 till today), Folio
histoire, 2012, and Maurice Vaïsse/ Philippe Oulmont (dir.), De Gaulle et la décolonisation de l’Afrique subsaharienne
(De Gaulle and the decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa), Karthala, 2014. There is also the unpublished book by Benoît
Beucher, La Françafrique, entre mythe et réalités (Françafrique: between myth and reality), Brussels, Université libre,
2010, which provides an excellent summary of the issue.
63 Two successive phases can be distinguished in Operation Serval: one that can be categorized as intervention, and
another as counterinsurgency. This will be addressed later on.
64 M. Goya, Les opérations extérieures en perspective historique 1962-2008 (Overseas operations within a historical
perspective 1962-2008), art. cit., p.65.
34
of the FAR in 1999, the alert system was extended to all land forces65. Today, the NG GUEPARD
alert system66 enables designated units to be deployed for overseas operations under immediate
(12 hours) or short (48 hours to 9 days) notice. This disposition maintains a brigade in a standby
posture for six months, and involves up to 5,000 troops67.
The speed of intervention is also due to the logistic capabilities of the French Army, particularly
transport. In order to act quickly on a theater of operations several thousand kilometers from mainland
France, the choice of air transport is crucial. In the late 1970s, the Military Air Transportation
Command (COTAM) counted nearly 350 available aircraft, of 11 different types, with a total number
of aircraft of 1,500, of thirty types. Military air transportation comprised three squadrons of twelve
TRANSALL C-160s, four squadrons of fifteen NORATLAS N 2501s and four DOUGLAS DC-8s68.
Although the TRANSALL aircraft could lift 16 tons of equipment or 89 troops69, and the NORATLAS
only 8 tons or 45 troops70, decision was made to field C-130s from December 1987. The latter
aircraft had a better lift capacity: up to 20 tons of equipment or 120 troops71.
After the war in Algeria, Tacaud was a typical example of a detachment to Africa far from permanent
bases72. The onward movement of troops and equipment was ensured by two DC-8s and two
C-160s, with eight and sixteen round trips respectively73. As for Bonite, an initial airborne operation
had been planned but then given up. Finally, the operation was confirmed and its date was brought
forward in order to guarantee surprise effects; 2nd REP was airlifted to Kinshasa on US Air force
aircraft74 then airdropped in two waves on Kolwezi, from Zairian C-130s and French C-160s75.
The operation was conducted in adverse weather conditions, proving the adaptability of French
forces. An initial intervention to evacuate French nationals from Bangui76 was considered, but this
was soon given up. The airlift was performed from N’Djamena, where the Tacaud Forces took part
in the operation. Chad’s proximity obviously added to the surprise effect, and was a crucial factor in
achieving speedy execution. Airlift was performed first by two turn-rounds of eight C-160s, then four
PUMA helicopters77. For Oside and Azalée, troops were fielded by sea and helicopter, made easier
by the proximity of the Comorian island of Mayotte (40 minute-flight) and by the presence of troops in
the Indian Ocean and Djibouti78.
65 Nicole Fouilleul, Entre professionnalité traditionnelle et professionalisation en cours, la cohésion dans les troupes de
Marine (Between traditional professionality and ongoing professionalization, cohesion within Marine troops), Centre
d’études en sciences sociales de la Défense, October 2001, p.39.
66 New Generation GUEPARD system. Upgraded in 2012, in 2014 it was integrated into the emergency national echelon
defined in the 2013 French White Paper.
67 Directive for implementation of the GUEPARD alert system, Joint Publications PIA-7.0.1.1_GUEPARD (2013), n° D13010873/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/DR of 12 Sept. 2013 (Amended 9 October 2013).
68 Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Decaillot, De l’intérêt de la France de disposer d’un nombre minimum d’avions de transport
militaires à grosse capacité et long rayon d’action (Why France needs a minimum number of military transport aircraft
with significant carrying capacities and extensive range), Staff College technical certificate, 1979, p.7.
69 Air Force, transportation file: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/technologies/aeronefs/transport/transport, consulted
04/08/2014.
70 Nord N 2501 NORATLAS file: http://www.avionslegendaires.net, consulted 04/08/2014.
71 French air force, transportation file, art. cit.
72 The same year there was an operation in Lebanon.
73 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad),
op. cit., p. 118.
74 Lieutenant-colonelP. Decaillot, De l’interêt de la France… (Why France needs …), op. cit., p.12.
75 CDEF/ DREX, Répertoire typologique des operations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.25.
76 Operation Black pass.
77 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad),
op. cit., p. 362.
78 CDEF/ DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., pp.80 and 221.
35
Prepositioning is therefore a crucial factor; it makes rapid intervention possible. Although not
formalized during the decolonization process despite a significant French presence in Africa79,
prepositioning proved crucial during operations intervening in the center of Africa, Chad especially.
Having troops present made it possible to plan and deploy for Barracuda; airlift was also performed
from N’Djamena, while for Bonite it took an eight-hour flight from Solenzara, Corsica to Kinshasa80.
Implementing Manta (1983) and Epervier (1986) was later made easier by this positioning, with
equipment and logistical support from Central Africa. In the same vein, after Bonite, France expanded
its area of influence to Zaire, a French-speaking, former Belgian colony, thereby creating a unique
axis of presence in the heart of Africa, covering Chad, Central Africa and Zaire. This prepositioning
process coincided with the process of professionalizing the Services. Until 1969, the Foreign Legion
had been the only professional force81. With the number of operations growing, the disposition
needed reinforcement, resulting in several Marine troops units becoming professional troops82
during the course of an initial operation in Chad.
On the tactical level, these typically short-duration missions quickly brought to the fore French troops’
superiority in combat. They lasted from a few days (ten days for Oside, thirteen days for Azalée,
two weeks in Gabon) to a few months (two months for Bonite, three months for the first part of
Barracuda, seven months for the first phase of Tacaud. The aim was always to avoid becoming
bogged down, minimizing losses and effectively seizing and destroying weapons. Thus, during
Barracuda, more than 1,000 weapons were seized, including two light armored reconnaissance
vehicles, four recoilless guns, fifteen mortars, twenty-one rocket-launchers, ten machine-guns and
thirty-eight light machine-guns83. For France, these intervention missions were the opportunity to
test out its Armed Forces and their doctrine on the African theater of operations.
France’s superiority was particularly owed to good coordination across various branches, and
to the individual and collective quality of French soldiers, as displayed during OperationTacaud
when 110 troops from the Air force and the Navy were deployed in addition to Army troops. Ten
JAGUAR aircraft and a KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft provided close air support, reinforcing the
ground troops’ action. Meanwhile, the Navy projected commandos and naval aviation personnel
(40 men in total) with a Breguet Atlantic aircraft. During Bonite, transportation air assets took part in
the airborne operation; Zairian Mirage squadrons with French pilots were also deployed, but did not
prove efficient84. For Barracuda, 40 Air Force and 20 Navy personnel were deployed. Last, Oside
and Azalée included a substantial Navy component, due to the maritime environment of the theater
of operations; the Air force was also involved, in particular for transport.
79 In 1964, there were more than 8,000 troops distributed across six countries, essentially Marine infantry soldiers:
1,400 in Niger, 1,200 in Central Africa, 1,600 in Congo and 3,000 in Chad. J.L. Dufour, Les troupes de marine dans
les interventions africaines des années 1960 à nos jours (Marine troops in interventions in Africa from the 1960s until
today), art. cit., p.263.
80 General Rémy Gausserès, Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978), art.
cit. p. 27.
81 Professionalization of marine troops started in 1969 (with 3rd RIMa based in Vannes and the 8th RPIMa based in
Castres), so as to meet overseas operation requirements.
82 Nicole Fouilleul, Entre professionnalité traditionnelle et professionalisation en cours (Between traditional professionality
and ongoing professionalization), op. cit., p.35.
83 R. Gausserès, Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978), art. cit., p.30.
84 J.C. Saulnier, op. cit., p.120.
36
CHAPTER III
COUNTERINSURGENCY
MISSIONS
3.1. Towards a resurgence of counterinsurgency?
A counterinsurgency mission is as a combat operation against an avowed enemy which, depending
on the situation, territory or time period can be called an “insurgent”, “rebel”, “guerrilla” or “terrorist”.
Well-entrenched on a specific territory, this enemy conducts sporadic operations and takes hostages
from among the populace to assert himself against the legitimate authorities. The purpose of
counterinsurgency is to regain control of the territory by establishing secure zones, while restoring
the legitimate authorities by dissociating the populace from the identified insurgent organization.
Although at first glance, counterinsurgency has a lot in common with intervention operations,
the duration and assets deployed are different. Having conducted few counterinsurgency operations
after 1962, France’s 1969 intervention in Chad marked a resumption of French counterinsurgency
operations, with Operation Limousin, continuing in 1977 in Mauritania with Operation Lamantin.
Then, in more recent times, there came Operation Serval in Mali.
Limousin (March 1969 – September 1972)
Chad became independent in 1960, but was rocked by internal crises fuelled by dissatisfaction
among the rural masses. With economic difficulties and governmental authority mainly in the hands
of ethnic groups from the south, opposition and rebellious movements emerged. The creation of a
national liberation front (FROLINAT) in June 1966 and the build-up of a 1,500- strong army resulted
in a situation that verged on insurgency in the center and east of the country and northern Tibesti.
The 1,850-strong Chadian Armed Forces failed to control the situation despite an initial French
deployment of troops from August to November 1968, under the defense agreement passed in
May 1961 (3rd RPIMa deployed to support Chadian forces in their recapture of AOUZOU85). Chadian
troops became quickly overwhelmed and the capital city came under threat. At the request of
President François Tombalbaye, on 18 March 1969, General de Gaulle decided that French forces
would intervene to prevent the political situation from deteriorating86.
85 In fact, this initial deployment can be regarded as the starting point of the operation. Colonel Michel Goya, L’intervention
militaire française au Tchad (French military intervention in Chad 1969-1972), Lettre du RETEX – recherche n°6,
26 November 2013.
86 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit ., p.12.
37
Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions
(Chad, 1970, Operation Limousin, © ECPAD)
Nearly 1,600 French troops were deployed in three main phases. An initial emergency intervention
from April to September 1969 was aimed at stabilizing the military situation across the entire
Chadian territory, particularly within Chad’s northern “préfectures” (administrative districts):
Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti (BET). From September 1969 to June 1971, French troops engaged on
the Chadian territory reorganized the Chadian Army, which doubled in strength. French Forces
gradually disengaged from June 1971 to August 1972, handing operational responsibilities over to
Chadian authorities.
French forces were initially organized into five battalion task forces or tactical HQs in Mongo, Am
Timam, Largeau, Abéché and N’Djamena. The first offensive was launched from Mongo, in the center
and east of Chad. Upon arrival, the troops stationed in Mongo had to confront 250 rebels. With
a combination of CAS and ground close combat, the French Forces regained ground; providing
assistance to the populace and creating village militias, thereby ensuring National Liberation Front
of Chad (FROLINAT) lost public support.
From 1970, operations mostly took place in the north of the country. The new Libyan regime under
Colonel Gaddafi had so much support for FROLINAT that in July it launched a series of offensives in
the areas of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti (BET). France had to send reinforcement troops from
Fort-Lamy and Fort-Archambault in order to free outposts that had become surrounded by rebels87.
87 Those missions were also given code names: Operation Ephémère in March 1970; Operation Moquette in July 1970.
38
EMT:
tactical
headquarters
Operation Limousin, April 1969, CDEF/DREX,
Typological Inventory, op.cit., p.16.
An offensive phase followed
the defensive phase from
January to June 1971:
Operation Bison. 900 French
troops and 350 Chadians
tracked down the rebels in
Tibesti, using 150 vehicles,
18 helicopters and 8 airplanes.
Although the national liberation
front ( FROLINAT ) suffered
very heavy losses, it was not
enough to tip the balance of
power in the conflict. Due to
heavy French losses (50 dead
in three years88), decision
was made not to deploy
additional troops. As part of
Chad (dubbed “useful Chad”)
had been pacified and the
Chadian army reorganized, the
French started to disengage.
However, France maintained
a military technical assistance
element, 6th RIAOM together
with some Air force elements.
The operation ended in
summer 1972 with President
Pompidou’s visit to Chad; a
political event intended to
highlight the success of the
French engagement.
Lamantin, Mauritania (December 1977 – July 1978)
Although Lamantin was mainly an air operation, it is included in this paper as it implemented
deployment capabilities that affected all other French operations in Africa. Central to this operation
was Spanish Sahara; Algeria, Mauritania, Spain and Morocco were all making claims on it. In
May 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hara and Río de Oro (Polisario Front)
emerged, which soon garnered the support of Algeria, and opposition from Mauritania and Morocco,
leading to a French intervention. From 1975, the Polisario Front started attacking the mining industry,
thereby launching raids against Mauritanian and French interests. The safety of French nationals
became jeopardized in 1977, following several attacks during which French people were killed or
kidnapped. With Mauritania also under threat, France decided to intervene at Mauritania’s request,
with the aim of putting a stop to the Polisario Front’s raids89.
88 A. Foures, Caractères des interventions militaires françaises outre-mer de 1960 à nos jours (Features of French
overseas military interventions from 1960 until today), art. cit.
89 General Michel Forget, Mauritanie 1977 : Lamantin, une intervention extérieure à dominante air (Mauritania 1977: an
air-heavy overseas operation), Revue historique des armées, March 1992, n°186, p.4.
39
The mission was mainly assigned to the Air force, with the purpose of taking the Polisario Front
by surprise just as it launched a raid and suppressing it. Particular to Lamantin was the fact that
every French intervention had to be validated by the Mauritanian authorities prior to the French.
As they could be called on at any time, French Forces had to be in a state of constant operational
readiness. Operations were launched from Dakar, 1,000/1,500 kilometers away from the theater
of operations, or a 5-hour flight-time. As for Army Forces, they operated within small teams of
paratroopers, responsible for guiding Jaguar aircraft. Deployed in the field, the teams played a
warning role and took part in launching offensive actions.
The French intervention, combined with more efficient Mauritanian offensives, made it possible to
gradually repel the Polisario Front’s attacks. However, a military coup in July 1978 ousted President
Moktar Ould Daddah, thereby putting a stop to Mauritania’s claims on Western Sahara, and the
raids stopped. Although this marked the end of Operation Lamantin, a small number of Lamantin
forces would remain in place until May 1980.
Serval, Mali (11 January 2013 – 31 July 2014)
Serval is a typical example of an operation whose nature shifts as it develops. Initially an intervention
mission, as operations developed it turned into counterinsurgency. Since becoming independent,
Mali has experienced several waves of rebellions, some originating from the Tuareg, who claim to have
been marginalized by central authorities. In October 2011, the Tuareg issue gave way to the creation
of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). One of its branches turned radical
and created an Islamist movement, Ansar Dine90. On 14 January 2012, both movements launched
an offensive from the Adrar des Ifoghas towards the south of Mali, claiming self-determination
and independence for Azawad (Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao provinces). The offensive ended in April,
with the Tuareg proclaiming independence for northern Mali. During the summer, several terrorist
groups (Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
(MOJWA) and Ansar Dine opposed the MNLA and, in autumn, took control of northern Mali. They
started to prepare an offensive towards the capital city.
Meanwhile, after 2012’s political and military defeat, President Amadou Toumani was ousted by
a military coup in March. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) enforced
economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions against the military junta in Bamako, which were lifted
after negotiations concluded in an agreement conferring power to the Parliament Speaker. In early
January 2013, several terrorist units moved towards Southern Mali and seized the town of Konna.
Malian state authorities then requested French assistance; French Armed Forces were committed
on 11 January, deploying up to 4,500 land force troops.
90 Aware of the deteriorating situation in Sahel, CDEF/DREX (French Forces Employment Doctrine Center/ Lessons learned
department) published a casebook on the issue in January 2013. Major (Reserve) Mériadec Raffray, Les rébellions
touarègues au Sahel (The Tuareg rebellions in the Sahel), Cahiers du Retex, Recherche, CDEF/DREX, January 2013.
40
Tuareg claims, 2012.
41
Operation SERVAL can be divided into four clear phases91.
- From 11 January to 22 February, French troops primarily endeavored to stop the terrorists’
advance. Several helicopter teams from the 4th RHFS stationed in Burkina- Faso engaged
the column of pick-up vehicles of the Jihadist armed groups (GAD) or terrorist armed groups (GAT)
in the center of the country. Over the next three days, fresh French Forces from the Marine troops
and Foreign Legion were deployed in Mali92, with support from a company of combat engineers
(6th RG) from the GUEPARD alert system in France. These troops formed the first Battalion
Task Force (GTIA 1), tasked with security operations in the capital city’s airport, before launching
the first large-scale ground offensive towards Sévaré and Diabali. Then, they made the Jihadist
armed groups retreat towards the north, and, from 14 to 21 January, they took control of
the Diabali-Kona line. Due to the enemy resistance encountered, on 21 January, decision was
made to increase the number of soldiers. Serval increased from 750 to 2,500 personnel, forming
three additional GTIAs, as well as a helicopter GAM93;
(GTIA SÉVARÉ, January 2013, © ECPAD.)
91The data included in this chapter was taken from CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai
2013 (Lessons learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, January-May 2013), Cahier du RETEX, November 2013,
p.38 (DR classification), and from General Barrera’s book Opération Serval, notes de guerre. Mali 2013 (Operation
Serval, wartime notes. Mali 2013), Paris, Seuil, 2015.
92 21st RIMa of the Epervier deployment (Chad) plus a troop from 1st REC and a PROTERRE battery from 3rd RAMa. A light
tactical HQ and a platoon from 3rd RPIMa, a cavalry troop from 1st RHP from Operation Licorne (Côte d’Ivoire); two rifle
companies from 2nd and 3rd RIMa.
93 GTIA2 with 92nd RI, GTIA3 from 1st RIMa, GTIA4 from 2nd REP. There was also a helicopter GAM. CDEF/DREX, Lessons
learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, op. cit., p.40.
42
- From 23 January to 12 February, the disposition’s build-up continued with the aim of recapturing
the Malian territory and liberating it entirely. On 25 January, an offense reconnaissance was
launched towards Timbuktu and Gao (GTIA1 and GAM). The assigned task was to prevent
the enemy from laying traps in the area by arriving there before him. This GTIA was split into
two elements supported by aviation, due to the 600 kilometers that had to be covered and the
164 vehicles that had to be moved94. Timbuktu and its airport were captured on 27 January. Meanwhile,
the elements from the (Special Forces) Sabre disposition moved towards Gao. They captured
the city’s bridge and airport by neutralizing some fifteen terrorists. On 28 January, French Forces
along with Malian troops secured Bamako, Sévaré, Gao and Timbuktu. At that point, Serval counted
2,000 troops. To consolidate the troops’ advance towards the north and east of the country, order
was given to seize Kidal and Tessalit airports and the town of Ménaka.
- From 12 February to 15 April, French forces continued their advance in depth while split into two
geographical areas: the north and the center. In the north, some of the troops tried to destroy
AQIM forces. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) tried to get closer
to French Forces which, from 16 February until 1 April, were engaged in the Adrar des Ifoghas
mountain range. GTIA3 and GTIA4 and the Chadian Armed Force deployed in Mali (FATIM) moved
into and searched the area (the Amettetai valley and Tigharghar cirque). The terrorist groups
were well organized and held defensive positions, but at the end of the operations 250 terrorists
had been neutralized, and forty tons of equipment and ammunition seized95. French troops
then had to prevent a terrorist safe haven from becoming re-established in the area. In the center,
the mission was tracking down the MOJWA around Gao. GTIA2 fought the MOJWA groups from
21 January to 15 April. After the fall of Gao, the groups quickly became disorganized, while the local
populace increasingly cooperated with the Force. Broadly speaking, this matched the objectives of
locating the withdrawal bases and camps of the MOJWA, causing attrition in its ranks and depriving
it of resources (financial and grassroots support through trafficking).
- From 16 April to May 2013, the final phase, a gradual disengagement, was organized so that
the control of operations could be transferred over to the African-led International Support
Mission to Mali (AFISMA)96, which soon became the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)97. French Forces were downsized from 5,300 to 3,200 on
1 July, then to 2,500 in October 2013. However, the troops continued their action against terrorist
groups in the eastern area around Gao and towards Tessalit and Kidal. The groups’ members tried
to merge into the populace and avoid contact with the Serval Force.
When Operation Serval came to an end in July 2014, to a large extent its objectives had been
met: the terrorist groups that had threatened the capital city had been stopped; Serval put
an end to long-term and deep-rooted terrorism in the northern Mali desert. Success was the fruit of
resolute commitment of French troops, nonetheless, 9 were killed in action and some 60 wounded.
The operations that were performed alongside Malian armed forces, however, or in coordination
with the MISMA, then MINUSMA African forces, neutralized several hundred terrorists.
94 CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons learned summary of Operation
Serval in Mali, January-May 2013), Cahier du RETEX, November 2013, p.42.
95 CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons learned summary of Operation
Serval in Mali, January-May 2013) art. cit., p.54.
96 Authorized by the UN Security Council resolution 2085, 20 December 2012.
97 Created by UN Security Council resolution 2100, 25 April 2013.
43
They also located weapons and ammunition. France demonstrated its troops’ undisputable skills,
moreover, with its allies’ support98, it was able to overcome the logistical challenge of the operation
(Bamako is located 2,000 kilometers away from Tessalit). Flight hours totaled 13,000 hours,
the fixed wing aircraft deployed performed 7,500 sorties (fighters, flying tankers, tactical and
strategic airlift), delivering nearly 300 bombs99.
(Mali, Operation Serval, ECPAD ©)
3.2. Assessment
Thirty-five years separate Lamantin and Serval; France did not conduct any COIN operations in Africa
during that period. The re-emergence of this type of operation can be explained by the presence of a
clearly identified enemy, by the threats to regional stability, and the urgency of the situation. All these
factors accounted for a return to a rapid intervention approach. While it was crucial to capitalize on a
strategic surprise effect, for the most part, returning to COIN was nonetheless justified by a political
and military desire for short wars100. Keeping the cost of the intervention down, in personnel and
equipment, and avoiding soaring costs in overseas operations are also important factors.
98 Serval could rely on support from eight countries for airlift or in-flight refueling missions: Germany, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, United Kingdom, Spain, United States and the Netherlands. French Armed Forces Staff, Sahel reference file
http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index.php/sahel/dossier-de-reference.html, consulted 17/03/2015.
99 GBU 12, GBU 49, AASM, MK82. The various logistics battalions that operated covered 400,000 kilometers per
month, or 10 trips around the earth each month.
100 Colonel Michel Goya : La guerre de trois mois: l’intervention militaire en perspectives (A three-month war: prospects
for military interventions), Politique étrangère, Summer 2013, vol. 78, n°2, pp.157-168.
44
Strategically speaking, Serval was a success: within the space of a few months, the situation in
Mali had been stabilized, rebels’ offensives had been stopped, and the terrorist groups had been
expelled from the north of the country. The same goes for other COIN missions. Limousin stopped
the rebellion in its advance towards the south; the populace was provided with medical support free
of charge and local forces were reorganized. France detached as many as 650 officers and NCOs to
the Moussoro training center and Fort-Lamy military academy. However, for Chadian army leaders,
the training proved insufficient; although “useful Chad” was pacified, the rebellion persisted in
the north of the country. As the conflict situation had not been totally stabilized, and fresh rebel
offensives broke out again, the launch of Operation Tacaud was required. Operation Lamantin in
Mauritania can be analyzed in more or less in the same way; while the short-term objectives were met,
the local situation did not change dramatically101, despite French assistance in enabling Mauritanian
authorities to respond more efficiently to the Polisario Front’s attacks and better defend themselves
against attacks on the territory. In the longer term, it seems that the success of these operations did
not always lead to total suppression of the enemy. Thus in Mali, the regional terrorist threat has not
completely disappeared; instead it capitalizes on its cross-border nature and the Sahel desert area to
reorganize. In terms of Lessons Learned, the situation requires a longer-term strategy, with a focus on
civil-military cooperation integrated into actions on perceptions and the operational environment. This
will make it possible to restore local authorities and the socio-economic fabric, as well as organizing
partnership between the regional states (G5 Sahel)102, to enable a rethink of how operations are
conducted across the entire Sahel-Sahara belt103.
101 The conflict shifted to Morocco afterwards. M. Forget, Mauritanie 1977: Lamantin, une intervention extérieure à
dominante air (Mauritania 1977: Lamantin an air-oriented overseas intervention), art. cit., p.5.
102 Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina-Faso.
103 This is no less than a comprehensive approach whose intellectual origin can be found in the approach developed by
Gallieni and Lyautey. France encountered the value of civil-military cooperation again during the war in Afghanistan. See
Sarah Aubertin, Le Développement, un défi aux relations entre forces armées et organisations civiles en Afghanistan
(Development, a challenge to the relationships between armed forces and civilian organizations in Afghanistan), Cahier
de la recherche doctrinale, CDEF/DREX, 2010.
45
Doctrinally speaking, these successes attest to the quality of the intervention force, in particular
during those operations conducted in the 1970s by newly professionalized troops. For example,
when deployed as part of the 1969 operation, 6th RIAOM based in Fort-Lamy was a professional
unit104, as was 3rd RIMa when called to relieve 2nd REP. Today, the issue of professionalization is
no longer relevant, particularly for Serval. However, what remains a success factor is a capacity
for contingency intervention based on two systems: prepositioned forces and the GUEPARD alert
system. Prepositioning proved a decisive factor in 2013, making it possible to convey troops at
short notice and to stop the terrorist offensives rushing towards Bamako. But prepositioning was
not just a question of transportation logistic issues; French troops in Africa provided skills in various
areas, such as the provision a combined arms HQ (Senegal), the presence of Special Forces (Burkina
Faso) capable of committing aviation assets and one commando, or enough forces to form a GTIA
(Epervier in Chad), or for conveying or transiting troops (Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire)105. Serval was also
an opportunity to test the efficiency of the NG (new generation) GUEPARD alert system. Land Forces
Command (CFT) was able to deploy troops on standby in mainland France: nearly 200 troops were
deployed within 48 hours of the operation’s launch. For example, a company from 2nd RIMa was sent
on 12 January after only 8 hours’ preparation106. In Mali, 60% of French troops came from the NG
GUEPARD alert system.
Tactically speaking, both in the past and today, French soldiers have proven superiority in combat.
In the 1970s, Chadian rebels, armed merely with submachine guns and rifles, were unable to achieve
efficiency in combat107. Moreover, they were overwhelmed by the French capacity for incorporating
airlift, reconnaissance and fire support assets, in particular helicopter air assault forces. However,
despite its tactical superiority, France suffered heavy losses (50 dead) so the offensive in Chad
stopped after 1972. Forty years later, with Serval, tactical superiority in combat was once again
a key element for success. The surprise caused by the scale of the deployment was such that the
enemy chose to flee rather than confront the columns of armored vehicles and air support assets.
The first objective of recapturing territory was achieved without any fighting108. Then, while keeping
a rapid tempo, French forces conducted a maneuver covering a wide range of capabilities: close
combat, counter-IED, field artillery fire support, air-to-surface fire support (guided bombs, rockets,
cannons, missiles), aérocombat (Army Aviation) thanks to the constant presence of helicopters,
logistics (significantly distances over Malian territory, desert climate) and Security Force Assistance
(SFA). These operations fall within the category of standard quick response interventions, whose
efficiency has been proven109.
104 Colonel Michel Goya, L’intervention militaire française au Tchad (French military intervention in Chad 1969-1972),
Lettre du RETEX – recherche n°66, 26 November 2013, p.3.
105 Christophe Guilloteau and Philippe Nauche, L’opération Serval au Mali (Operation Serval in Mali), Information
report 1288, 18 July 2013, p.37.
106 Christophe Guilloteau and Philippe Nauche, L’opération Serval au Mali (Operation Serval in Mali), op. cit., p.38.
107 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and Jérôme de Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70
aux années 90: l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian
example) in Pierre Pascallon, La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique (French security policy in Africa), Paris,
L’Harmattan, 2004, p.54.
108 Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons Learned summary of Operation Serval in
Mali, January-May 2013), p.48.
109 Colonel Michel Goya, Mali : l’intervention militaire en perspectives (Mali: perspectives on military interventions),
CESAT Casebooks n°33, September 2013, p.15.
46
CHAPTER IV
COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS
4.1. Enduring or influence operations
A combat support operation is a long-duration combat mission whose final objective is to rebuild
national forces behind a defense line. France’s support missions in Africa are derived from intervention
and counterinsurgency missions that were launched in the late 1970s. Although at times these can
be very short duration missions, they form part of a longer-term “influence” policy distinct from
the former French “backyard”. Operation Verveine in Zaire was an example110. Roughly speaking,
these support operations continue in the same vein as previous operations such as Limousin, Tacaud
and Barracuda. France deployed troops in the long term for Operations Epervier (Chad, 1986-2014),
or Boali (Central African Republic, 2002-2013).
Verveine, Zaire (6-16 April 1977)
After Patrice Lumumba, one of Belgian Congo’s leading independence figures, was ousted by Joseph
Kasa-Vubu, the first President of Congo-Kinshasa, in 1961, Joseph Désiré Mobutu eventually
came to power with American support, as the US tried to stem the tide of communism in Africa.
Mobutu was first appointed President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (1965-1971), before
changing the country’s name to Zaire in 1971, as his grip on power became increasingly autocratic.
However, since becoming independent, Zaire had become locked into a series of Blocks that were
damaging the country’s economic interests; a situation accentuated by recurring internal crises:
rebellions in 1964-1965, student demonstrations in 1969 and 1971, etc. In March 1977, another
conflict –the Shaba war – further destabilized the country. Thousands of militiamen from the Front
for the National Liberation of the Congo crossed the border between Angola and Zaire to invade
the Shaba province (formerly Katanga). The “Katangese Tigers” seized the towns of Kisengi, Kapanga
and Dilolo. As a target of the Polisario Front’s attacks, Morocco offered to help Zaire, with a view to
more easily countering the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was thought to be siding with
Algeria and the Polisario Front. The considerable distance between Morocco and Zaire, however, did
lead to logistical problems. Together, Joseph Désiré Mobutu and King Hassan II requested France’s
help. France agreed to intervene under the 1975 military cooperation agreement between Paris
and Kinshasa. This primarily airborne operation enabled France to take a position beyond its former
colonization zone and extend its influence.
Operation Verveine was launched on 6 April 1977. The next day, 11 TRANSALL C-160s took off towards
Rabat. An air-bridge between Morocco and Zaire started on 9 April, involving the 11 TRANSALLs and
2 DC-8Fs, i.e. an overall strength of 140 crew and support personnel. Verveine ended on 16 April
with the disengagement of the French detachment. In the space of one week, a total of 125 vehicles,
9 trailers and 36 tons of freight had been airlifted111. The conflict came to an end on 26 May when
110 Major Laurent Levitte, L’opération Verveine en 1977: maîtrise de la projection de force et diplomatie aérienne
(Operation Verveine in 1977: full command of force projection and air diplomacy), Penser les ailes françaises, n°24,
Winter 2010-2011, pp.61-70.
111 Major Laurent Levitte, L’opération Verveine en 1977 : maîtrise de la projection de force et diplomatie aérienne
(Operation Verveine in 1977: full command of force projection and air diplomacy), art. cit., p.68.
47
Chapter IV: combat support operations
Zairian forces recaptured Kapanga. Operation Verveine proved a success, despite the Katangese
Tigers returning the next year in the attack against Kolwezi, which necessitated another intervention,
Operation Bonite.
Manta, Chad (9 August 1983 – 11 November 1984)
After Operation Limousin in 1969, France returned to Chad through Operation Tacaud (March
1978 – May 1980), then again in August 1983 with Operation Manta. France resumed operations
in the middle of Africa after negotiations in 1980 led to the setting up of a Transitional Government
of National Unity (GUNT) headed by President Goukouni Oueddei, a former rebel leader and rival of
Hissène Habré. Despite the peace efforts, conflict broke out again with former Prime Minister Habré’s
loyalists. The conflict was still raging as French troops evacuated Chad in 1980. Goukouni Oueddei
Operation Manta, a map by Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad
(The wars in Chad), Lemme publisher, 2014 ©
48
was overthrown by Hissène Habré in June 1982. With the support of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, GUNT
rebel forces tried to bring down the government, launching a powerful offensive in 1983 that seized
Abéché and put N’Djamena under threat. In July 1983, France started developing an NEO operation
(Operation Bernacle) from Cameroon, in order to intervene in case the situation deteriorated.
Despite a few Chadian successes - Hissène Habré recaptured Faya-Largeau on 30 July the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) and the Libyans especially overwhelmed
the regular armed forces thanks to their modern and sophisticated equipment, including aircraft to
support ground forces (Faya-Largeau was bombed by Libyan SU-22 SUKHOIs112). With the US backing
Hissène Habré against Colonel Gaddafi, President François Mitterrand was persuaded to launch a
direct intervention on 9 August 1983. France sent equipment and instructors prior to committing
troops. At the peak of the operation, 3,500 service members - including 3,200 from the army had been deployed113, making Manta the biggest overseas operation launched by France since
the Algerian war.
While the first phase of the deployment was being organized from 9 to 23 August, instructors were
sent to the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT). The French forces were organized into two
elements: one stationed in N’Djamena and the other in Abéché (Task Force Echo). Another Task
Force was set up around Moussoro and Salal (Task Force Oscar) from 15 August. Reinforcements
were also deployed from France and Central Africa; the latter troops came from French SFA
elements, bringing the number of troops deployed to 1,000. From 2 September until 21 December
1983, as the deployment was consolidated it was confronted with several offensive attempts by
the rebels and Libyans. In response, Army Aviation, artillery and armored assets were reinforced as
the airstrip at N’Djamena could not accommodate BOEING 747 airplanes114. Another Task Force
was positioned in Ati (Task Force Charlie) along with a company-sized unit from Gabon.
To confront the Libyan air threat, Twelve PUMA SA 330 helicopters, nineteen GAZELLE helicopters,
three L-19 observation airplanes, two NORD 2501 transport airplanes, four JAGUARs, four
MIRAGEs, two BREGUET ATLANTICs and two KC-135 STRATOTANKERS were deployed as part of
Army Aviation and the Air force. Crucially, in order to thwart the Libyan air raids, France deployed
a number of SNERI light airport surveillance radars on the Chadian theater, in Moussoro, Ati and
N’Djamena, as well as CROTALE air defense missile batteries in N’Djamena and a SPARTIATE radar
(Army multipurpose instrument flight control and landing system for helicopters) in Biltine 115.
The deployment was designed to play a deterrence role and to deny access to southern Chad.
112 P. de Tonquédec, Opération Tacaud (Operation Tacaud), op. cit., p.113.
113 They came from 9th DIMa, 31st Brigade, 11th DP, Aviation brigade, 13th RDP, 44th RT, 5th RHC and to the EM/FAR
(Rapid reaction force HQ). CDEF/DREX Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations),
op. cit., p.54.
aux années 90 : l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian
example), art. cit., p.62.
115 Arnaud Delalande, De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad (From Manta to Epervier: air
operations over Chad), http://airpower.over-blog.com, 13 December 2013, consulted 03/21/2014.
49
Operation Manta, 1983 © ECPAD
While the French deployment had so far been defenseoriented, January 1984 saw the French launch an air
offensive. Libya supported and encouraged Goukouni
Oueddei in seizing Zigey, near Salal. In response, an
air operation was launched in Toro Doum, north of
Zigey, during which France lost a JAGUAR and its
pilot116. The number of French troops increased from
2,850 to 3,500117. From then on, no large-scale rebel
breakthrough occurred; the Libyans were stopped in
the north and, with cracks starting to appear between
the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT)
forces and the Libyan troops, the coalition began to fall
apart118. Negotiations were organized between France,
Chad and Libya, and an agreement on the “simultaneous
and concomitant withdrawal” of French and Libyan
troops was signed in September 1984. Manta ended
on 11 November 1984 with troop disengagement119.
The losses were 13 dead and 8 wounded120.
117 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.55.
operations over Chad), art. cit.
119 With Operation Silure (25 September – 11 November 1984).
120 CDEF/DREX Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.57.
50
Epervier, Chad (16 February 1986 – 31 July 2014)
Having signed the September 1984 agreements, Colonel Gaddafi was expected to withdraw his
troops from Chadian territory. However, not only did Libya maintain troops in the Borkou, Ennedi and
Tibesti areas, it increased their number and its deployment, as shown by the 3,800-meter airstrip
for heavy lift aircraft built in Ouadi-Doum121. Gathering his troops in the north of Chad, with support
from rebels in the south, Colonel Gaddafi hoped to topple Hissène Habré’s government in order to
put the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) forces that were friendly to Tripoli in its
place. Soon, he resumed his attacks towards N’Djamena and on 10 February 1986, GUNT troops
attacked several communities beyond the “red line” set along the 16th parallel by Paris. France
immediately responded with the launch of Operation Epervier122.
The operation’s defining feature was the primacy of air operations. The troops were made up of
600 Army123 and 800 Air force personnel124. The Army elements’ task was to execute static
protection operations on the N’Djamena and Moussoro sites thanks to anti-aircraft batteries, to
prevent any large-scale action south of the 16th parallel, and, most importantly, to train the Chadian
national armed forces, and accompany them in recapturing the north of the country125. While
Operation Epervier could have relied almost solely on the Air force, this was because it was helped
by successful military and technical assistance in the meantime, enabling a significant build-up of the
FANTs. Against them were 5,500 Libyan troops and 1,500 Chadian coalition rebels, equipped with
heavy armored vehicles and powerful artillery assets. Significant air support was available, as Libya
had 489 French and Soviet combat aircraft, including sixteen TUPOLEV Tu-22 bombers, MIRAGE
and MiG fighters and around twenty ANTONOV transport aircraft126. Help for Libya also came in
the form of advisors from East Germany and Cuba.
Over the course of several phases, Epervier became an enduring operation. The deployment was built
up from February to March 1986, with reinforcement after November, as even with the deployment
of around 40 aircraft, the French forces were still fewer in number than the Libyan air force. In a
purely defensive posture, initially France only had support for the Chadian national armed forces
and recapturing the north. From 1 June to 10 September 1987, the Chadian forces unsuccessfully
tried to recapture the Aouzou strip in the far north of the Chadian territory. They also performed
a raid deep into the Libyan territory that resulted in the successful destruction of the Maaten Al
Sarra base. On 11 September 1987, a cease-fire was concluded between Chad and Libya, making
it possible to reduce the number of French troops to 1,200. On 31 August 1989, the Algiers
agreement was signed between Chad and Libya, putting an end to the conflict127.
121 Pierre de Tonquédec, Face à Khadafi, Opération Tacaud (Confronting Gaddafi, Operation Tacaud), op. cit., p. 113.
123 The Army troops came from the FAR, 13th RDP, 402nd and 403rd RAs.
124 Equipped with 16 JAGUARs, 4 KC-135 STRATOTANKERs, 4 MIRAGEs, 7 C-160s and 5 SA 330 PUMA helicopters.
125 Jérôme de Lespinois, Emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad 1969-1987 (Employment of air force assets in Chad
1969 – 1987) art. cit., p.74.
127 A. Delalande, De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad (From Manta to Epervier : air operations
over Chad), art. cit.
51
Operation Epervier, map by Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad
(The wars in Chad), Lemme publisher, 2014 ©
52
The conflict caused no human losses. It demonstrated the extent to which France was capable
of supporting a country in difficulty. French assistance was preceded by an observation mission
(Mission Musaraigne) that was tasked solely with informing the French authorities of the airstrip’s
construction128. French assistance took the form of bombing the Ouadi-Doum airstrip (Mission
Trionyx) to prevent Libyan air forces from bombing the Chadian territory: on 16 February 1986,
eleven Jaguars protected by Mirage aircraft destroyed the facility. In response, a Libyan Tupolev
Tu-22 dropped four bombs on N’Djamena airport the next day, damaging the airstrip. Restoring air
superiority on the Chadian territory made an air-bridge possible over the Chadian capital, nonetheless,
the Libyan bombing showed that aircraft based on Libyan territory could inflict damage129.
On 5 September 1987, the Chadian attack on Maaten Al Sarra also instigated a Libyan air response:
two Tu-22s attempted bombing French facilities in N’Djamena on 7 September. With the French
MIRAGE unable to intercept them in time, 403rd RA stopped the enemy aircraft with Hawk missiles130.
The second missile launch was a success, destroying the Tu-22 while its four missile hatches were
open. The Tu-22’s four bombs were ejected, although they did not explode on impact as they had
not been activated131. The second Tu-22 bombed Abéché without results, and managed to escape
without being hit by AD artillery132.
A combat support mission initially designed as an overseas operation in 1986, Operation Epervier
gradually shifted into a permanent stationing deployment, becoming one of the links of French
prepositioned bases in Africa. It formed part of a policy of influence and strongholds in Africa disclosed
at the end of the conflict between Chad and Libya. Shifting into a permanent deployment organization
was justified by it being necessary to protect French interests, in particular non-combatants living
in Chad, and to provide logistical support for Chadian armed forces. French troops also provided
medical support to the populace, and offered support in education and health. Last, the Force could
be called upon to make its capabilities and infrastructure available to national and international
contingents, as for the EUFOR/Chad/Central African republic and MINURCAT (United Nations
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad).
Just prior to August 2014, around 950 French troops were deployed for Epervier through a joint
HQ, a battalion TF (320 soldiers and 80 vehicles) executing reconnaissance tasks, compounds guard
duty and providing combat support to Chadian forces, an air task force (150 troops and around
12 aircraft) accomplishing fighter and reconnaissance missions, and a joint support base for
operation support of units. These troops were deployed on N’Djamena air base, the detachment in
Abéché camp and the detachment in Faya-Largeau133.
128 General (retired) Bernard Molard, L’air et l’espace : une continuité stratégique (Air and Space: a strategic continuity),
in Penser les ailes françaises, n°20, Summer 2009, pp.116-125.
129 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and de Jérôme Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70
aux années 90: l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian
130 Colonel Jean-Pierre Petit, Le succès du Hawk au Tchad, (The successes of Hawk missile employment in Chad), in Les
cahiers du RETEX n°6, 2002.
operations over Chad), art. cit.
132 Jérôme de Lespinois, Emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad 1969-1987 (Employment of air assets in Chad 1969 –
1987), art. cit. p.74.
133 Joint armed forces staff, Chad reference file: http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index.php/tchad/dossierde-reference.html, consulted 03/24/2014.
53
Noroît, Rwanda (4 October 1990 – 13 December 1993)
Until the start of the colonial period, the Tutsi ethnic community had wielded power in Rwanda,
despite their being in the minority. After Rwanda’s independence in 1962 heralded the start of
the democracy process, the Hutu majority took power, forcing part of the Tutsis into exile. From
there, the Tutsis created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) in order to regain power, garnering
the support of Uganda, in line with the expansionist views of its president. On 1 October 1990,
the rebel forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front crossed the border; leading to ethnic-based domestic
unrest. This violence triggered a French intervention under the 1975 agreements between France
and Rwanda134. With French and foreign expatriates’ security was at risk, Operation Noroît was
launched on 4 October 1990.
The operation can be broken down into three phases. From 5 to 16 October 1990, French
Forces organized the evacuation of nationals from Kigali and Ruhengeri (770 and 170 nationals
respectively) and assisted in restoring order together with Belgian forces. From 17October to
5 December, the deployment was reduced; troops only provided security at the airport, before
the mission became one of presence and assistance to the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) until
December 1993. On site, force strength evolved according to the assigned tasks. Thus, in a first
phase, a tactical HQ with two motorized and airborne companies with teams from 13th RDP were
committed. From December 1990, a tactical HQ was sent in relief for troop rotation, just as
the military training assistance detachment was deployed from April 1991, comprising paratroopers
from 11th Airborne Division and positioned in Ruhengeri. Army troops numbered around 350,
then 200 from December 1990135. The only operations conducted during Noroît were an intervention
due to unrest in the south of the country in February 1992 and NEO Volcan in Ruhengeri in February
1993. The October coup in Burundi and the raid performed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR)
in November 1993 did not change the deployment organization; troops were nevertheless called
upon by the government and NGOs for humanitarian logistical support. The implementation of
the Arusha agreements between the Rwandan government and the FPR signed on 4 August 1993,
and the expected deployment of a UN force - the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda - led
to the end of Operation Noroît in December 1993.
Balata – Aramis, Cameroon (February 1994 – 31 May 2008)
In the mid-1990s, France deployed troops to Cameroon to assist with the dispute with Nigeria over
the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, as part of Operations Balata and Aramis. In a first phase, in compliance
with the defense and cooperation agreements signed in 1974, France deployed two PUMA helicopters
and parachute commandos136, then, in order to survey the borders, sent fifty troops to assist with
command, logistics, intelligence, operational training and evacuation. Fourteen years after its launch,
the operation ended on 31 May 2008, after political agreements declared the Bakassi peninsula to
be part of Cameroon.
134 Pierre Pascallon, La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique (The French security policy in Africa), art. cit., p. 19.
135 According to the organization of relief, they originated from 2nd REP, 3rd RPIMa, 8th RPIMa, 2nd RIMa, 1st RPIMa,
21st RIMa and 1st RI. CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations),
op. cit., p.90.
136 Operation Aramis: www.alat.fr / page 211.html, consulted 03/25/2014.
54
Boali, Central African Republic (October 2002 – December 2013)
When Operation Bonite in Zaire ended in 1981, France deployed EFAO Security Force Assistance
(SFA) elements. Their mission was multidimensional: assisting with the build-up of Central African
armed forces, while their bases in Bangui and Bouar were used for force prepositioning in Africa
and for troops’ acculturation and training137. They then participated in several operations in Africa:
Manta in Chad, then Noroît, Volcan, Amaryllis and Turquoise in Rwanda, Requin in Gabon, Verdier
in Togo and Bajoyer in Zaire. In October 1997, the EFAO elements left Central Africa in a six-month
disengagement process (Operation Cigogne, October 1997 - April 1998). Following a decision
from the French President, French Forces were to refocus on Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Chad and Djibouti. However, their presence was maintained through the cooperation program of
African peacekeeping capability reinforcement (RECAMP) that was made official at the same time.
Despite the RECAMP program, stability was far from being attained in Central Africa. In October 2002,
President Chirac and President Bozizé, who had just taken power after a coup, signed an agreement
that resulted in the launch of Operation Boali in March 2003. Against a backdrop of marked
political instability, Central African Armed Forces and the Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC) needed support. 300 troops were scheduled in October 2002, though in reality
Mission Boali comprised 200-250 troops within a HQ, an infantry company and a sustainment
detachment. Together with cooperating volunteers, they performed training and advisory tasks in
support of units, NCOs and officers of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), as well as with some
units of the Multinational Force in Africa (FOMUC)138 in order to develop technical and tactical skills.
In November 2006, French troops provided intelligence and logistic combat support for the FOMUC
in Birao, as well as air fire support. Reinforcements were sent to the Central African Republic from
Gabon and mainland France thanks to the GUEPARD alert system. In March 2007, the airfield on
the outskirts of Birao was recaptured from the rebels of the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
(UFDR). Some units that were prepositioned in Chad, Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire, along with forces from
mainland France, were deployed to help an SFA detachment that had become isolated in the city and
under rebel threat139. In December 2012, a marine infantry company (from 8th RPIMa) was tasked
with ensuring the security of French nationals and facilities in Bangui, the capital city. Reinforcements
came in the form of a tactical HQ and a foreign legion company (2nd REP) from Gabon, together with
a company of 2nd REI and two PUMA helicopters from Chad. More than 600 French troops were
deployed. In March 2013, conflict resumed around Bangui, requiring a 300-strong reinforcement
of French troops from Gabon, sent in addition to the 250 troops already present in Central Africa.
137 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique Centrale: Epervier et Boali (Operations in Central Africa: Epervier and Boali),
Cahiers du RETEX, March 2008. Florent de Saint Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires françaises en République
Centrafricaine (45 years of French military operations in the Central African Republic), Lettre de RETEX/Opérations
n°8, 9 December 2013, pp.1-8. The rest of the paragraph is based on these two sources.
138 The Multinational Force in Africa (FOMUC) was created in 2002. It was replaced by the FOMAC (Multinational
Force in Central Africa) on 12 July 2008.
139 CDEF/DREX, Retours d’expérience (Lessons Learned) 1 / 2007, Cahiers du RETEX, October 2007, p.75.
55
Boali: training and advisory missions in support of units,
NCOs and officers of the Central African armed forces. - © ECPAD/EMA
The relationship between France and Central Africa changed in April 2010, with the amendments
made after the renegotiation of various defense agreements in Africa (following the 2008 “White
Paper on National Defense and Security”). The defense partnership no longer provided for French
intervention, even in the case of interference from abroad. This is why ever since the SELEKA (a
coalition of political parties and rebel forces opposed to Central African president François Bozizé)
took power in March 2013, the Boali detachment has focused on protecting French nationals
and strategic key points (diplomatic facilities, non- combatant collection points) and on logistical,
administrative and technical support for the African stabilization Force in Central Africa140 and
the security of M’poko airport. The reinforcements were partly disengaged in June 2013, downsizing
French troops to 400 prior to the deployment of Operation Sangaris on 5 December 2013, replacing
Operation Boali.
140 The former FOMUC became the Mission for the consolidation of peace (MICOPAX) in July 2008, then, in December
2013, the International support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA).
56
4.2. Assessment
From a strategic perspective, Operations Manta and Epervier were successful. Manta put a stop
to the rebels’ southward offensives and negotiations followed. Epervier was a complete success as
it put an end both to the war between Chad and Libya and to the Northern rebels’ offensives which
had occurred repeatedly since 1969. Its durability allowed for the build-up of the Chadian Army; this
was consolidated as a professional army capable of decisive operations such as Maaten Al Sarra on
5 September 1987. A permanent deployment system made it possible to stabilize the area. Noroît in
Rwanda and the “twins” Balata/Aramis in Cameroon all came to an end as the two warring parties
came to an agreement. For example, in Rwanda, the signing of agreements between the rebels
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the government brought a return to a peaceful situation and
the deployment of a UN force. The detachment’s various goals had nonetheless been achieved
(NEO, protection of designated facilities and personnel, training and reorganization of local
forces). Last, the French presence deterred the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) from launching
offensives around Kigali. In Cameroon, the presence of French troops spurred on negotiations and
the signing of agreements. As for Boali, it successfully ensured the protection of French nationals
and interests in Bangui, particularly after the SELEKA took power in March 2013. Although
the operation partly helped train some troops of the Central African Armed Forces, progress
remains to be made, as it was the inefficiency of these forces in the war against the UFDR rebels,
then against the SELEKA members, that led to the launch of Operation Sangaris.
From an operational perspective, the success of these operations is explained by the French Army’s
capability for intervening rapidly in Africa. This capability stems from the prepositioning of troops,
the quality of transport infrastructure (air in particular) and the effectiveness of the GUEPARD
alert system. French troops in Cameroon initially supported Manta in launching Operation Bernacle
and in Central Africa, in Gabon and in Chad for deploying fighter aircraft for Operation Orque141.
Prepositioning also proved useful when it came to deploying reinforcements, whether from France
or from Central Africa, with the commitment of French SFA elements. While Epervier relied on
prepositioned support, it provided logistic capabilities for the following French operations: Noroît and
Turquoise in Rwanda, Requin in Gabon, Verdier in Togo, Croix du Sud I and II in Niger, Pelican II and III
in Congo, Khaya in Côte d’Ivoire and Artemis Mamba in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The quality of prepositioning also depends on France providing transportation assets to convey
troops and equipment on the theater of operations. During Operation Verveine, the complexity and
scale of the transportation means deployed illustrated the French Army’s operational efficiency. Even
if it was a small-scale operation compared to the 1948 Berlin or 1992 Sarajevo air-lifts, Verveine
was nevertheless an excellent testing ground for the response and overseas intervention capabilities
of military air transport142. Sometimes, as with Manta, the initial logistical difficulty was mitigated
by forces prepositioning.
141 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.55.
142 Victor Bréhat, L’opération Verveine, chronique (A chronicle of Operation Verveine), Revue de la defense nationale,
July 1977, pp.162-165.
57
Last, from a tactical perspective, the French Army demonstrated that it had learned from past
experience across the various theaters of operations. Manta integrated the lessons learned from
Tacaud, in particular as regards Army Aviation employment. The French Forces’ tactical efficiency
stems from the employment of professional units from the Rapid Reaction Force. Their experience
and expertise when it comes to intervening in Africa meant that theirs was a real intervention during
combat support missions. Epervier also capitalized on its duration and on the lessons learned from
previous operations: Limousin, Tacaud or Manta. However, as Epervier was an air-oriented mission,
the courses of action were different. The deployment system was based on air and air-defense
deterrence, while the land component was tasked with holding the ground with air support and with
protecting AD assets, in particular the missile batteries.
On the whole, however, combat support missions are often similar to assistance missions. Noroît and
the Rwandan Armed Forces are an example; besides NEOs from Kigali and Ruhengeri, (legionnaires
from 2nd REP rescued and evacuated non-combatant nationals in the south of the country in February
1992) there were few operational activities.
(Civil-military cooperation in a Malian village, 2013 – J. Lempin © ECPAD / Joint Staff)
58
CHAPTER V
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
(INTERPOSITION)
5.1. From combat to stability operations
An interposition mission is a stability operation, without any avowed enemy. The goal is to interpose
between two warring parties. These missions stem from a significant shift in the international
context in the early 1990s, as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (1991)
and the end of the Cold War put an end to the peripheral conflicts between the East and West
in Africa. With it seemingly no longer necessary to support former allied regimes, there was a
political shift in France’s challenges in Africa after the France- Africa Summit in La Baule on 20 June,
1990. In the late 1980s, the minister and former doctor and founder of the NGO “Médecins sans
Frontières”, Bernard Kouchner, set the ball rolling by advocating the “humanitarian right to interfere”.
This stemmed the idea that non- governmental organizations should be included among regular
contributors to conflict resolution, and that “military-humanitarian” interventions were possible.
Militarily, this led to a growing number of stability operations in which France was responsible for
protecting French nationals and the local populace during conflict, while troops could not use their
weapons except for self-defense.
Paradoxically, as these operations took place in countries with longstanding and strong ties to France,
such as Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Central Africa (where there was a permanent deployment of
troops), or Rwanda (not a former colony, but a French-speaking country where France wanted to
extend its influence), these interposition missions corroborated the notion that France intervened
only within its former “backyard”. On the other hand, France was also involved in Ethiopia, Angola and
Somalia; countries with weak historical links to France. These operations were conducted within a
UN or EU framework in the second half of the 1990s, based on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P)
principle issued by the UN General Assembly. Thus, to some extent, French interposition operations
reflect France’s past in Africa and its permanent legacy, as well as international political decisions.
5.2. Various operation mandates and contexts
Interposition operations meet various mandates to fulfil peacekeeping requirements. In order to end a
conflict, French Forces need to make it possible to establish a peaceful, or at least safe environment,
while specifically avoiding naming either warring party an “enemy”. Military skills are therefore put
to use during these operations, while warfighting is avoided. Whether for area control, organizing
transport logistics or interposing between warring parties, orders cover military procedures such
as installing combat posts, or performing observation or patrol tasks, but the usual warfighting
dimension that previously defined them is lacking143. From Verdier in Togo and Benin in 1991 to
143 Jacques Thouvenin, Quelles ressources pour quelles missions ? Le cas français (What resources for what missions?
The French case) Métamorphose des missions ? Le soldat et les armées dans les nouveaux contextes d’intervention
(A complete shift in missions? Soldiers and Armed Forces in the new intervention contexts), Conference speeches 14,
15 and 16 June 1994, Centre d’études en Sciences sociales de la Défense, April 2000, p.124.
59
Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition)
Licorne in 2002, the mandates may have developed and changed but defining them was the typical
common interposition concept split into three courses of action: protection and evacuation of French
and foreign nationals, stabilization of the territory through defensive interposition between nationals,
occasional phases of hostile contact based on application of self-defense rules by French troops.
Protection and evacuation of non-combatant nationals
France’s main reason for intervening in Africa is the presence of French nationals in the countries
that become theaters of conflict. Interposition between warring parties is launched so that
the French people living in these countries do not suffer the effects of a civil war. During Operation
Verdier, for example, France deployed troops to deter the warring parties from fighting and to
ensure the security of the French nationals (3,200 people, including 2,800 in Lomé). The operation
was launched on 28 November 1991 after the rebellion of some Togolese service members who
opposed the government of Prime Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh.
Operations Almandin I and II occurred while Central Africa was torn apart by several internal crises,
after mutinies broke out in a number of Central African armed forces units from April 1996 to
June 1997. The two operations held similar objectives: ensuring the security of French nationals
and interests (EFAO facilities, ambassador’s residence, nationals’ living quarters), protecting
President Ange Patassé and his residence, ensuring security along main supply roads (Bangui
and its surroundings) and in sensitive areas (TV network HQ, fuel storage sites, power stations).
Almandin I consisted of patrolling the European quarters, which deterred the mutineers from attacking
the expatriates. An NEO was nonetheless conducted on19 April 1996 using armored vehicles.
Almandin II was in response to a more marked threat against foreigners; air assets were enhanced
to six transportation aircraft with a 4,000- passenger airlift capacity to Libreville or N’Djamena within
three days. The EFAO elements’ facilities spontaneously became a refuge for many French nationals
or foreign expatriates (as occurred on 24 May 1996). After more riots broke out in November,
EFAO elements deployed into the city again, to protect the embassy and expatriates, including 1,586
French. By its presence, France could also conduct defensive intervention operations.
Defensive interposition operations
During Operation Verdier (Togo, 1991-1992), France deployed nearly 680 troops144. Two companies
and four C-160s were stationed in Cotonou (Benin), while a ten-soldier strong team was detached
to the French embassy in Lomé, the capital of Togo. French Forces in Cotonou influenced events in
favor of the government and successfully delayed the rebels’ offensive against the seat of government
on 3 December, when armor raided the building and forced the Prime Minister to surrender.
Operation Iskoutir (Djibouti, February 1992 - June 1999) followed in the same vein. Conducted
by Marine infantry (5th RIAOM) to provide assistance to the civilian populace in the north, it encouraged
the resumption of negotiations and enforced the ceasefire between the Djibouti Forces and the Front
for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)145. Operation Khor Angar followed Verdier
in January 1999. Its aim was to interpose and protect Djibouti from the disruption caused by
the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. A defensive and temporary operation, Khor Angar ended in
July 2000 after the two countries signed a ceasefire.
144 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.128.
145 Jean-Michel Boucheron, Les forces françaises de DJIBOUTI (French forces in DJIBOUTI), Rapport d’information
n°2591, 21 September 2000, p.37.
60
Operation Turquoise was in response to similar issues, interposing between the Hutu government,
its armed forces and the Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), and protecting
the civilian populace of both ethnic groups, as both were the targets for massacre from both sides.
Hutu extremists (militiamen, military units and the populace) began directing violence against
the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus after the attack against the Burundian and Rwandan
presidents in April 1994. Meanwhile, the FPR reacted to the massacres by perpetrating violent
acts against the civilian populace. From 22 June to 22 August 1994, the French army deployed
more than 2,500 troops tasked with keeping a strictly neutral posture towards the warring parties.
Most of these troops came from the rapid reaction force (FAR), particularly from prepositioned
elements in Africa: EFAO elements from Central Africa, or French forces in Djibouti. From 24 June,
French Forces were responsible for protecting the Cyangugu refugee camp, in the far south-west of
the country, close to the border with Zaire. With an increase in population movement and increased
armed gang activity, along with the FPR gaining ground in the north and east of the country, French
troops decided to set up a humanitarian safe zone linking Lake Goma and Rwanda’s southern border,
covering the south-west146. To make humanitarian activities possible, the attackers were repelled
and kept at a distance. From 6 July, the humanitarian safe zone was kept under control by repelling
the infiltration efforts of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, accommodating every person seeking refuge
in the area and disarming the Rwandan armed forces and Hutu militiamen. From mid- July, some
refugees fleeing the FPR’s offensives settled in the Goma area. French troops deployed there,
occasionally engaging the enemy in Goma. In particular, the high-priority activities covered health
support and food supply, with riot control when necessary. Inside the camps of the humanitarian
safe zone, besides their monitoring, assistance and area denial tasks, troops also had to combat
looters. From 1 to 21 August, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (MINUAR) gradually relieved
French Forces in the area, with French troops totally disengaged by 22 August. Despite the criticism
levelled against it, the rapid and in depth interposition between the armed forces and the FPR
made it possible for French troops to extract a number of refugees, orphans and clerics who were
under threat, before conveying them to safe areas. As Rwanda’s armed forces and militiamen were
disarmed by French troops, the safe humanitarian area fulfilled its purpose: two million people were
conveyed to safe areas. What is more, the Joint Medical Department performed more than 5,000
procedures and stamped out a cholera epidemic in Goma147.
Due to the unrest in Central Africa in spring 1996, France deployed 1,150 soldiers from 18 to
29 April 1996, contributing to Operation Almandin I148. First deployed as a show of force with
armored vehicles (AMLs and VABs), the troops were supported by helicopter overflight (SA 330
PUMAs), in order to deter the mutineers and give a boost to the loyal Central African forces.
The French Force patrolled the European quarters, by its presence and activity it was possible for
the presidential security personnel to regain control and contain the mutineers. Almandin II was
launched on 18 May 1996 after another mutiny. This time, the operation lasted longer and was
split into several phases and mandates. During the first half of May, the objectives were similar
to those of Almandin I. The period of peace that followed was an opportunity for restructuring
the Central African Armed Forces. From November, a second mutiny among the Central African Armed
Forces (FACA) meant French Forces intervened again in the same conditions. Last, from January
1997, the French troops handed over their intervention mission to the MISAB (Inter-African Mission to
Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements), while providing occasional support. The Force
strength shifted from 2,100 in May to 1,750 during the period of calm following the first mutiny, and
up to 2,300 when clashes occurred again.
146 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.192.
147 ibid, p.194.
148 ibid, p.233.
61
Before 2002’s Operation Licorne, an initial French deployment took place in Côte d’Ivoire in
December 1999: Operation Khaya. Some soldiers who were members of the UN mission in
the Central African Republic (MINURCA) had rebelled after not being paid. The revolt caused the
sudden departure of President Henri Konan Bédié, who had to take refuge in the French Embassy.
France decided to interpose and take action to evacuate the president, deploying 526 army troops and
three COUGAR helicopters as well as twelve SAGAIE ERC- 90 light armored vehicles. The evacuation
was performed by two rotations: on 26 December, the president and his family were exfiltrated to
Lomé, Togo, followed by the evacuation of thirteen other members of the government the next day149.
Close combat phases and self-defense
Defensive interposition between warring parties can sometimes lead to phases of hostile
confrontation, requiring an appropriate military response that will depend on the degree of selfdefense. As interposition missions, these operations are based on peace-making activities.
The issue of engaging in combat is important, with the rules of engagement defining the degree of
self-defense, the possibility to respond to fire and to kill. Verdier was based on a broad notion of selfdefense. Opening fire was authorized in order to liberate non-combatants from violent attacks150.
During Turquoise, Resolution 929 of the UN Security Council authorized France to operate in Rwanda;
thus the operation complied with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: weapons
may be employed to accomplish missions, in this case “temporary activities of a strictly humanitarian
nature”151.
On the theater of operations, this could include NEOs, such as that in the Butaré area on 3 July
1994, where the TF from special operations command took action while under pressure from
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR). Opposition to Force infiltration and the disarming of armed forces
or militias (e.g. the humanitarian safe area in Rwanda) were part of that process. During Almandin I
and II, more close combat episodes occurred. The principle of self-defense remains, although units
were encouraged to behave firmly but not aggressively. Security breaches have to be deliberate
attacks if they are to be countered. The engagement was carried out with VABs, AML 90s and
VLRAs with 20-mm guns, as well as PUMA helicopters. Almandin II was conducted in a more violent
environment; French Forces came taken under intermittent fire from 19 May, 1996. Close combat
missions were sometimes justified by the need to recapture a critical point (such as the radio
broadcast HQ, occupied by mutineers on 22 May 1996), or to physically protect troops152. Close
combat was also justified by reprisal operations, such as on the night of 4-5 May; an action that led
to the rebels’ departure from the south-west of the capital, enabling the return of loyalist forces153.
Overall, there were few human losses during these operations: one wounded by an anti-vehicle mine
during Verdier, one dead due to disease and three wounded in combat during Turquoise. There were
no losses during Almandin I, two dead and about fifteen wounded during Almandin II and no losses
during Khaya.
149 Idem, p. 313
150 Idem, p. 128
151 Idem, p. 187
150 ibid, p.128.
151 ibid, p.187.
152 On 4 January 1997, an officer and a NCO from 6th RPIMa were assassinated by mutineers while they were trying to
mediate between rebels in Bangui. Florent de St Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires en Centrafrique (45 years of
military operations in Central Africa), art. cit., p.3.
62
5.3. Licorne, a special case
Out of all the interposition missions, Operation Licorne remains a special case for two reasons.
It marked the transition from exclusively French interventions to operations under multinational
mandates (UN or UE). It is also atypical due to its duration, the adjustments to the various situations
and its transition into a permanent deployment organization, making it similar to operations such as
Boali or Epervier. As an exclusively French interposition within a framework of defense agreements,
Licorne was France’s last traditional interposition operation in Africa. It marked a shift toward
multinational engagements, reflecting the reform of French policies in Africa during 1997-1998
that advocated new courses of action: avoiding bilateralism by working with regional organizations
and operating under UN legitimacy154.
19 September 2002 saw an attempted coup in Côte d’Ivoire. The Patriotic Movement of Côte
d’Ivoire (MPCI) took control of the north of the country, splitting it in two. The rebels seized
the cities of Bouaké and Korhogo. On 22 September, France launched Operation Licorne to ensure
the protection of French nationals and expatriates. Marine troops were deployed with 43rd BIMa
stationed in Abidjan, reinforced by elements from 11th airborne brigade. French Forces performed
NEOs in Bouaké on 25 and 26 September and in Korhogo on 29 and 30 September. On 1 October,
Licorne was 1,260 troops strong155.
On 17 October, President Laurent Gbagbo signed an agreement for the cessation of hostilities
with the MPCI. Once it was signed, French reinforcements were deployed to monitor the ceasefire.
In late November, two new rebel movements, the People’s Movement of the Great West (MPIGO)
and the Movement forJustice and Peace (MJP), started operating in the west of Côte d’Ivoire.
Fresh reinforcements were deployed, increasing the strength to 2,500. From January to 10 February
2003, the MJP and MPIGO launched attacks against the French Forces. With the help of Liberia’s
armed forces, they opened a front in the south-west. The mandate of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MICECI) also began in January. With
the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis agreements on 24 January, President Gbagbo remained in
power and a “government for national reconciliation” was set up. In May, Resolution 1479 created
the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI). In February 2004, this became the UN operation in
Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI), which allowed for the deployment of 6,240 blue helmets for a 12-month initial
period from 4 April. The Licorne force was tasked with ONUCI support.
Initially, Licorne was based on security and NEO operations, before interposition and encouraging
negotiations between the warring parties156. Nonetheless, combat episodes did arise during
the operation, against resolute and well-armed opponents. French Forces had to combine direct fire
from armored vehicles, armed helicopters and mortar fires157. These combats caused significant
losses among French troops. For example, on 25 August 2003, a French river patrol came under
154 General Emmanuel Beth, L’opération Licorne, une opération nationale en soutien d’une mission de l’ONU, (Operation
Licorne, a national operation in support of a UN operation) (L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre (Subsaharan
Africa from one crisis to the next) – Proceedings of the Research Session 5 February 2007, Fondation pour la
recherche stratégique, 2007, p.11.
155 CDEF/DREX, Enseignements de l’opération Licorne (Lessons Learned from Operation Licorne), Cahier du RETEX,
July 2004, p.6.
156 General Emmanuel Beth, L’opération Licorne, une opération nationale en soutien d’une mission de l’ONU, (Operation
Licorne, a national operation in support of a UN operation), art. cit., p.12.
157 CDEF/DREX, Enseignements de l’opération Licorne (Lessons Learned from Operation Licorne), Cahier du RETEX, July
2004, p.13.
63
attack on the Sakassou peninsula; one died and two were wounded. The next year, on 6 November
2004, an Ivorian Su-25 SUKHOI bombed a French camp in Bouaké, killing 9 French soldiers and
wounding 31. The French deployment faced a fresh challenge in December 2010 as a crisis broke
out following the elections; President Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down. The deployment was
reinforced to more than 1,600 French troops, responsible for, among others, performing several
NEOs on 31 March and 16 April 2011. More than 5,000 French and Ivorian nationals took refuge
in Port-Bouët camp and 3,000 people were then evacuated. Meanwhile, support to ONUCI continued
throughout that period; troops neutralized armored vehicles and heavy weapons (4 and 10 April).
In summer 2011, however, Licorne was reduced to 700 troops. With the security situation in
the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire normalized and the goals justifying the deployment achieved, France
ended the operation on 21 January 2015. In compliance with a defense partnership agreement
signed in January 2012158, France maintained 450 troops in the country; the French Forces in
Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI).
5.4. Assessment
Through the major lessons learned, prepositioned forces in Africa came to the fore once again during
Licorne and the other interposition missions, as valuable assets for all emergency interventions and
reinforcements. Another crucial component of Licorne was the importance of command support
capabilities and tactical mobility across large distances. More specifically, Licorne demonstrated
the importance of the Armed Forces keeping up their skills in reversibility and force control,
particularly in urban and crowd control operations.
158 The agreement emphasized the geographic location of Côte d’Ivoire, the quality of its harbor and airport facilities, and
the possibility for Abidjan to become a major strategic, operational and logistic hub.
64
CHAPTER VI
SECURITY OPERATIONS
6.1. Missions under multinational mandates
A security operation is as a stability operation performed by an international force under UN
mandate, without any avowed enemy. It aims to restore a peaceful situation by securing the territory
in which conflict has occurred. For France’s operations in Africa and its Army, the second half of
the 1990s was a period of significant change. After the criticism levelled at 1994’s Operation
Turquoise in Rwanda, France sought to change its intervention methods in Africa. This change
in doctrine coincided with a political development that aimed to respect the legitimacy of elected
regimes and to intervene only through a framework validated by the UN. Following this shift was a
restructuring of the Army, which became entirely professionalized as of 1996.
From that point, France’s operations in Africa were developed under the mandate of an international
organization and within a multinational framework. In 1992, Operation Oryx in Somalia was the first
attempt of this type, in support of the UN peace force present. It was nonetheless with Operation
Croix du Sud II that France meaningfully engaged in multinational operations in Africa. French troops
would later participate in numerous UN operations, such as MINURCA in Central Africa (19971999), MINUÉE in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2001) and ONUCI in Côte d’Ivoire (since 2004). They also
contributed to European Union-organized operations, such as Artémis-Mamba in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (2006), or EUFOR (Chad/Central African Republic, 2008-2009).
The main difficulty in these operations is their multinational nature. Engaging several countries
in different cultures, languages and sometimes operating modes leads to significant challenges in
the preparation and deployment of security operations. A common outlook on the interventions is
required for interoperability to stand a chance of success159. Depending on the countries involved,
requirements can vary; each has its own national aims and military objectives specific to operations.
These first often hinder an intervention’s efficiency, e.g. sending a small number of troops or laying
down caveats160, to avoid ruffling the feathers of public opinion that is reluctant to deploy troops.
The number of countries participating can make the decision-making process longer, considerably
impeding the rapidity of intervention. Real military success therefore lies in one country clearly
maintaining leadership. Such was the case during Operation Artémis; France supplied significant
military and financial means, whereas the allies provided support and legitimacy by their very number.
One country holding designated leadership is important as it makes corroborating multinational
military efficiency possible, as well as avoiding the vagaries of collective decision-making.
perspective 1962-2008), art. cit., p.66.
160 Restrictions to employment of forces within a multinational contingent based on national reasons.
65
Chapter VI: security operations
6.2. Peacekeeping procedures
The features of multinational security operations are quite similar to those of strictly French
interposition operations. Here, the aim is also to interpose between two warring parties and to
control areas, thereby enabling the protection, safety or evacuation of the populace161. In this
type of operation, military units are also tasked with peacekeeping missions while avoiding combat.
These law-and-order activities follow a show of force, to avoid having to use it: the troops must avoid
confrontation and open fire only in self-defense. Putting an end to a war without using force is no
easy task, and experience in Somalia and Bosnia has shown that this type of operation can lead to
heavy losses among the French military162.
These security operations are established according to a wide range of contexts and rules of
engagement. We can nonetheless define two broad categories. France has participated in these
operations either as a component of a multinational peacekeeping operation by the employment
of its troops (Oryx, Croix du Sud I/II, Dorca, ONUCI, EUFOR RDC, EUFOR Chad/Central Africa), or as a
supporting force to these operations by providing logistical and combat support (Bubale, Almandin III,
Minurca, Minuée). Operation Artémis was a special case, due to extent of French involvement.
Employment of forces as a component of multinational operations
In Somalia, the fall of General Siyad Barre in 1991 led to clans openly fighting to take power. With
the population suffering from a famine that caused several hundred thousand deaths and the exodus
of two million people, the international community decided to send in troops. On 24 April 1992,
the United Nations approved Resolution 751 authorizing humanitarian operations and organizing
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).
Humanitarian factors were key to deciding to launch the international intervention. In spring 1992,
“Médecins sans Frontières” reported on the awful living conditions and famine in Somalia163.
The humanitarian situation was nonetheless not the only factor taken onboard: an intense
communication campaign manned by the American media, combined with domestic policy concerns
led the US to organize an airlift, before intervening and supporting the UN mission. On 3 December,
with Resolution 794, the United Nations authorized the deployment of the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF); its mission was to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations.
With Bernard Kouchner as Minister for Health and Humanitarian Action, France initially worked
alongside the US in the airlift. France launched Operation Oryx and joined the UNITAF international
force under UN mandate and US command (Operation Restore Hope). The French Army deployed
2,400 troops from the rapid reaction force (FAR) and French forces stationed in Djibouti to a strategic
area; its proximity to the Ethiopian border enabled the transit of rebels and government troops.
The French soldiers patrolled the main avenues, before taking command of the Baydoa area and
fighting against armed groups. Afterwards they remained a permanent presence in cities, patrolling
their outskirts.
161 Jacques Thouvenin, Quelles ressources pour quelles missions ? Le cas français (What resources for what missions?
The French case), art. cit., p.124.
perspective 1962-2008), art.cit., p.66.
163 Antonin Tisseron, Oryx : un succès méconnu (1992-1994) (Oryx: an unnoticed success), Cahier du RETEX, November
2013, p.21.
66
Thanks to an interlinking of humanitarian and military operations, French troops managed to
increase security within their zone of action, a decentralized C2 organization, and scattering of units.
The operation ended in December 1993.
From October 1994 to December 1995, France deployed troops in Operations Croix du Sud I
and II between Niger and Chad. French soldiers were tasked with setting up a liaison team between
the Tuarag rebels of the AZAWAD rebels’ committee and Niger’s government; parties who had
been in conflict since 1991 but had recently come to an agreement. The team, manned by a FrenchBurkina-Faso contingent, first had to establish a secure environment by patrolling the Agadez
area, before securing the meetings organized by the committee to monitor the implementation of
the Ouagadougou agreements.
France then participated in a multinational operation alongside Algeria, Senegal and Burkina- Faso
to monitor compliance with the cease-fire, and for the recovery, stowing and storage of weapons.
The Army deployed thirty-six troops and twelve light all-terrain vehicles as well as five light support
and reconnaissance vehicles. These vehicles belonged to the marine and foreign legion troops164.
Croix du Sud I ended after the signing of agreements between the Tuarag and the Niger government in
April 1995, while Croix du Sud II ended in December.
France conducted Operation Dorca in Chad from 31 July and 11 September 2004, providing
humanitarian support to Sudanese refugees alongside the international organizations supporting
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). A small-sized deployment of troops operated under several
mandates: one service member was deployed in Sudan under UN mandate, two in Sudan under
NATO mandate, five in Chad, Sudan and Ethiopia under EU mandate, and four in Chad under national
mandate. French elements in Chad tasked with administrative and logistical support bolstered
the deployment165. Dorca missions included conveying food and medical supplies to the refugee
camps in the east of Chad, and securing the refugee camps in the south-east.
France contributed to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI): a deployment of around twenty
service members took part in missions or worked as liaison officers among the 8,000- strong UNOCI.
The operation was deployed in Côte d’Ivoire in October 2004; its troops were tasked with observing
and monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and assisting the government in reintegrating
the rebels. The mission also comprised supporting the peace process and organizing elections.
Despite its large scale, the military component is only one of the tools the UN can use to support
political action and peace-building166. This concept, that aims to put an end to conflict and maintain
peace, is part of diplomatic action and from the broad category of “peacekeeping” for conflict
prevention. Peace-building is aimed at reducing the risk of future confrontation by reinforcing national
capabilities and laying the foundations for lasting peace.
164 1st RPIMa, DRM and 13th RDP, then 43rd BIMa. CDEF/DREX Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological
inventory of operations), op. cit. pp. 210-211.
165 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique centrale : Epervier et Boali (Operations in Central Africa: Epervier and Boali), Cahier
du Retex, March 2008, p.36.
166 Colonel Patrick Chanliau, RCI : le point de vue d’un chef des opérations (Côte d’Ivoire: the point of view of the operation
commander), Doctrine tactique n°28, September 2013, p.73.
67
In Côte d’Ivoire, the UNOCI troops thus played a major role, together with the national contingent of
the Licorne force, particularly during the crisis triggered by the 2010 presidential elections. At that
point, they helped with protecting both the Ivorian populace that was subject to numerous attacks and
thousands of foreign non-combatants. Doing so prevented the security situation from worsening167.
(Licorne: troops tasked with providing protection for Ivorian populace © ECPAD)
France intervened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from June to December 2006 as part
of an operation launched under European mandate, EUFOR RDC. The mandate covered the period of
legislative and presidential elections and its purpose was to support the UN mission on the territory
(United Nations mission in Congo, MONUC), via Resolution 1671 of the UN Security Council168.
The land-oriented operation was under operational command of a German general officer, while the
2,500-strong Force was under the authority of a French general officer169. The Force had to provide
a significant supportive presence and be prepared to support the MONUC whenever its capacities
proved insufficient170.
167 Major General Jean-Pierre Palasset RCI : de la complémentarité d’une force de l’ONU et d’une opération nationale
en soutien de son action (Côte d’Ivoire: the complementarity of a UN force and a national operation in support of its
activities), Doctrine tactique n° 28, September 2013, p.77.
168 Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Pau, L’union européenne en Afrique : complémentarité et limites dans la stabilisation
(The EU in Africa: complementarity and limitations of stability operations), Doctrine n°12, May 2007, p.79.
169 Major Privat Ternynck, L’opération Benga, ou l’aérocombat au service de l’action européenne (Operation Benga:
aviation combat in support of European operations), Doctrine n°14, January 2008, p.75.
170 General Christian Damay, L’Union Européenne et la gestion d’une crise africaine : la République démocratique
du Congo (The EU and the management of an African crisis: the Democratic Republic of the Congo), L’Afrique
subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Proceedings of the Research session, 5 February 2007, Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique, 2007, p.18.
68
Despite France providing the largest contingent out of the eighteen contributing nations to
the operation’s deployment, France did not hold operational leadership. France had sent 1,000 troops,
while Germany deployed 780, Spain 130 and Poland 130171. France also contributed a strategic
reserve that was ready to intervene from mainland France. During the course of operation, the Force
took significant action on 21 and 22 August 2006 in Kinshasa, where violent clashes had broken out
following the results of the first round of the presidential elections172.
The crisis in Darfur, on the border between Chad, Central Africa and Sudan also saw France deploy
as part of a European operation: EUFOR Chad/CAR. Resolution 1778 of September 2007 authorized
the deployment of a multidimensional force in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Force
comprised three elements: a UN police mission, a Chadian police task force tasked with maintaining
law and order in the refugee camps, and an EU military presence in support of the UN173. On
28 January, the Foreign Affairs ministers of the 27 European Union member states decided to launch
a military operation, with France as the framework-nation174. The operation incorporated troops from
twenty countries, with a total force of 3,200, half of which were French175.
The Force was tasked with protecting civilians, refugees and displaced persons in particular.
It facilitated conveying humanitarian aid by improving security within the area of operation. Last,
it provided security support to UN personnel and facilities. The operation deployed in the eastern
areas of Chad and was task-organized into three GTIAs: a Polish battalion in the north, an Irish
battalion in the south and a French battalion in the center. A French detachment was also deployed in
the north-east of Central Africa, in the border town of Birao. Besides these troops, France also
provided the logistical and C2 assets, as well as the nucleus of the operation HQ in Paris and in
Africa. On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Chad/CAR was relieved by the UN Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT II).
Logistical and combat support to multinational operations
In June 1997, several French elements deployed to Central Africa after another mutiny from Central
African forces. While previous mutinies had required French troops to deploy as part of interposition
activities, this situation combined two strictly national operations in support of an inter-African
force, as well as a UN mission that also involved French soldiers. Operation Bubale aimed to support
the inter-African force of the inter-African mission in monitoring the implementation of the Bangui
agreements (MISAB) through a 91-strong C2 and logistic unit176.
171 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique Centrale : Epervier et Boali (Operations in Central Africa: Epervier and Boali),
Cahier du RETEX, March 2008, p.61.
172 General Christian Damay, L’Union Européenne et la gestion d’une crise africaine : la République démocratique
du Congo (The EU and the management of an African crisis: the Democratic Republic of the Congo), art. cit., p.19.
173 Opération EUFOR Chad-RCA (janvier 2008-mars 2009) (Operation EUFOR Chad-CAR), Cahier du RETEX,
July 2009, p.9.
174 A nation that has volunteered and has been given the mandate to take charge of C2. It contributes the C2 structure
and the largest contingent of forces.
175 CDEF/DREX, Opération EUFOR Chad-RCA (janvier 2008-mars 2009), Cahiers du RETEX, July 2009, p.9.
69
Operation Almandin III’s purpose was to provide fire support for the MISAB detachments and ensure
force protection through combat support by recapturing certain districts in the capital city (Bangui).
The operation lasted from 20 May 1997 to 15 April 1998, involving 1,650 troops organized into
two tactical HQs, seven companies, a cavalry troop, a Special Ops C2 detachment and an Army
Aviation detachment.
French troops took part in combat alongside the MISAB. From 20 June, uncontrolled elements
of the Central African armed forces (FACA) directed mortar fire on Bangui with the intention of
hitting MISAB, French operational assistance elements and the French embassy. The Inter-African
Force returned fire and it became a general confrontation. French Forces intervened so MISAB did
not become overwhelmed. Violent fighting continued until 27 June, when a MISAB attack supported
by French troops resulted in a cease-fire. The fighting caused 7 wounded French troops.
The UN peacekeeping Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) followed Operation
Almandin III, deploying 1,450 soldiers from 15 April 1998. French troops within the Force were
tasked with providing support, ensuring the smooth operation of the Bangui airtransit, and helping
destruct the mutineers’ weapons and ammunition. The French Army deployed 160 personnel until
28 February 1999, when the French contingent was relieved by Egyptian troops.
Following the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, the UN decided to launch a peacekeeping
operation - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) - to monitor the cessation of hostilities.
A French detachment was responsible for ensuring the security of the HQ and maintaining good
working conditions, in particular for the operation of communications and transportation assets.
France thereby deployed two officers to the HQ and a 178-strong administrative and protection
unit. French Forces in Djibouti also sent another 21-strong platoon. The French Army deployed 166
soldiers, mainly from 1st REG. The French contingent remained from 12 May to 12 December 2001,
when it was relieved by Irish troops.
France’s contribution to multinational operations thus serves several purposes. First, it enables better
task assignment and expenditure organization. Politically speaking, shifting from strictly national
to multinational operations lends legitimacy to French deployments without conjuring the specter of
colonialism. This shift also bolsters the will to incorporate France into the European defense process
and to make the EU a global player, with French State authorities assuming leadership177.
Nonetheless, there are several limitations to France’s contribution, particularly when it comes to
language. In French-speaking Africa, French-speaking contingents such as the Belgians or French
hold the advantage, even if English remains the language of multinational HQs. As coordination is
paramount to interoperability and avoiding friendly fire, the various national units were not mixed in
the field due to non-compatibility of radio equipment, different types of procedures or varied
interpretations of the ROEs178. Last, French unilateral engagements still take place within very active
bases in Africa, using permanent positioning that served their purpose during the latest operations.
177 Tobias Koepf, Interventions françaises en Afrique : la fin de l’européanisation ? (French interventions in Africa: the end
of Europeanization?), Politique Etrangère, 2012/2, pp.418-419.
178 Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Pau, L’union Européenne en Afrique : complémentarité et limites dans la stabilisation
(The EU in Africa: complementarity and limitations of stability operations), art. cit., p.81.
70
6.3. Artémis-Mamba, a French and multinational success
Artémis was the first European mission in Africa. Based on a previous French operation, Mamba,
Artémis was distinct from other multinational security operations due to the strong French leadership
of Mamba. Artémis-Mamba’s success and flexibility set this operation apart from the rest.
In spring 2003, fighting between rival ethnic groups devastated the city of Bunia in north-east Congo.
The Uruguayan battalion of the MONUC that had deployed could not stop the mounting violence179.
After decision from the Security Council, an international force was mandated to provide support.
France deployed troops on 4 May through Operation Mamba that became European Operation
Artémis on 16 May.
Until 16 May, French soldiers deployed in Bunia. Artémis then incorporated Mamba and France
became the framework nation. Commanding the operation was Major General Neveux. 1,679 troops
were deployed to Bunia, including 825 from the French Army. Since Bunia’s airport capacities did
not allow for the full Force deployment, 294 troops deployed to to Entebbe in Uganda; the designated
(EUFOR Democratic Republic of the Congo © ECPAD)
179 Témoignage du général de division Bruno Neveux (an account by Major General Neveux), Doctrine Special issue,
December 2006, p.56.
71
logistical support airbase. Multinational forces were 381 strong, mainly from the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Belgium and Canada180. The European Force controlled the five access points to Bunia
and patrolled the city districts, with air support provided. The ROE were clear and appropriate: if
necessary, it was possible to gain the advantage by using weapons and a degree of initiative was
permitted. Artémis disengaged and left the theater of operations on 6 September 2003181.
France has asserted its leadership capabilities by investing enough military and financial resources
to succeed alone in operations182. This can, to a large extent, explain the success of Artémis-Mamba.
Due to the unilateral nature of its command and to self-sufficiency and decision-making capacities,
Artémis-Mamba proved an innovative operation183, with France’s clear leadership meaning
the usual drawbacks of multinational operations were avoided and success achieved. Moreover,
Mamba, followed by Artémis illustrated France’s capacity for short notice, first-entry deployment
on a theater, making possible the flexible incorporation of the international reinforcements that
followed184.
180 General Jean-Paul Thonier, L’opération Artémis, les moyens de l’autonomie stratégique français (Operation Artémis:
the assets of French strategic self-sufficiency), Research session organized by the Fondation pour la Recherche
stratégique, 14 January 2004, p.27.
181 L’opération de l’Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo (ARTEMIS) (The EU operation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Artémis), Doctrine Special issue, December 2006, p.54.
perspective 1962-2008), art. cit., pp.66-67.
183 General Jean-Paul Thonier, L’opération Artémis (Operation Artémis), op. cit., p.29.
184 Centre d’évaluation et de retour d’expérience CEREX (Center of assessment and lessons learned (CEREX),
Enseignements de l’opération Artémis (Lessons learned from Operation Artémis), French Doctrine and Higher Military
Education, January 2004, p.3.
72
CHAPTER VII
NON-COMBATANT
EVACUATION OPERATIONS
A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is a mission that aims to protect nationals living abroad
by evacuating them from an area under threat when the state authorities of the country where
they live are no longer able to ensure their safety. As evacuating French nationals from Africa is an
important component of French operations on the continent, it can take place during the course
of various operation types: intervention, interposition, security, etc. However, some operations are
strictly NEO-focused and thus can be defined only by that purpose. The short duration of NEOs sets
them apart from medium- and long-term operations.
7.1. NEOs: emergency operations
A non-combatant evacuation operation is defined by its urgency; political authorities often wait as
long as possible before deciding to evacuate due to the diplomatic and human challenges involved, as
well as for financial reasons. Most of the time, local situations that lead to political or military crises
are volatile, unstable and likely to deteriorate rapidly. As any prior deployment of French troops on
foreign ground is normally subject to the approval of that foreign country’s authorities, it is not really
a practical option due to the legal framework of evacuation. Thoroughly preparing for NEOs therefore
relies on intelligence and anticipation capabilities; these are always emergency operations185.
The time frame is also characterized by the operations’ short duration: action must be taken quickly
to remove French nationals from danger. For example, Operation Requin, conducted in Gabon from
May to July 1990, enabled the evacuation of nationals in the 3 days from 23 to 26 May. With
Operation Volcan in Rwanda in 1993, the timeframe was even shorter (9-11 February), as was
Operation Providence in Liberia in 2003 (7-11 June). Responsiveness and rapidity of intervention is
one of the foremost qualities of the French Army, made possible by prepositioned forces that can
intervene to meet the urgent requirements of this mission type. For example, French operational
assistance elements (EFAO) in Central Africa and the air assets from the Epervier deployment in
Chad intervened during Operation Bajoyer in Zaire in 1993. For Operation Iroko in Guinea-Bissau
in June 1998, the French Forces in Cape Verde were deployed, and for Operation Malachite in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998, French troops in Gabon were deployed.
185 Les opération d’évacuation de ressortissants (RESEVAC) (Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), Doctrine
Interarmées DIA-3.4.2, n°136/DEF/CICDE/NP, 2 July 2009, p.10.
73
Chapter VII: Non-combatant evacuation operations
7.2. Defensive operations in an urban environment
NEOs can be categorized as defensive operations; the employment of force depends on implementing
self-defense. Due to the diversity of the theaters of operations, however, evacuation can include
offensive action and phases of close combat against the enemy. For example, Operations Pelican II
and III conducted in Congo from 5 to 20 June 1997 caused one dead and nine wounded (five with
serious wounds) among French troops. While the French soldiers were on patrol, they ran into rebelbuilt roadblocks leading to violent clashes.
As non-combatant communities usually live in main cities or industrial areas, NEOs usually take place
in urban environments. Plus, urban areas are usually where the airports or sea-ports of departure
for evacuation are located. Conducting NEOs within these densely populated areas makes the task
more difficult; French Forces must be able to achieve crowd control without jeopardizing the initial
mandate. Locating the evacuee assembly point in a city does nonetheless facilitate logistic support
and make it easier to carry out the operation. These particular evacuations can be achieved based
on a back-and-forth organization, reducing the operation’s logistical constraints186. For example,
during Operation Providence, the evacuation phase was organized into 45 helicopter rotations in
the space of 13 hours187.
7.3. Operations conducted within a multinational context
Today, the French Army’s expertise in NEOs is well-known, based on awareness of the environment
as well a longstanding record of this type of operation ever since Operation Bonite in 1978.
Increasingly, however, these French successes have become part of multinational operations. There
are several reasons for this. In some African countries, domestic conflicts can involve nationals
from various countries. Rarely do these countries decide to launch an NEO together; usually an
operation is launched as soon as another country has decided to take action. Sometimes, there is
a concurrence of national interventions despite an increasing tendency among European countries
to streamline, coordinate and pool their assets188.
French NEOs make it possible for French and other nationals to be brought to a safe place. During
Operation Bajoyer, for example, French Forces evacuated 438 non-combatants who came from
32 countries (including 120 French). Operation Amaryllis in Rwanda on 9 and 14 April 1994 enabled
the evacuation of 1,250 people, including 445 French and non-combatants from 38 other countries.
During Pélican II, French troops evacuated 5,666 non-combatants (including 1,524 French).
Last, during Providence, 535 non-combatants of 37 nationalities (176 Lebanese, 90 Americans,
67 Ivorians, 45 Liberians, 42 Indians, 18 French, 14 Chinese) were evacuated.
186 Major General Thierry Ollivier, Les opérations d’évacuation des ressortissants au cœur des principaux engagements
des forces terrestres (NEOs at the heart of ground forces’ main engagements), Doctrine n°16, June 2009, p.5.
187 Lieutenant General Bruno Dary, L’évacuation des ressortissants étrangers du Libéria. Opération Providence (NEOs
in Liberia, Operation Providence), HÉRACLÈS n°30, November-December 2008, p.18.
188 Les opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants (Non-combatant evacuation operations), op. cit., p.89.
74
Chapter VII: Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs)
France’s NEO expertise in Africa can sometimes lead to other governments failing to take action
as instead, they rely on the French Army’s capacities for exfiltrating their own nationals. Thus
the “lead nation” concept appeared during Operation Chari-Baguirmi in Chad from 1 to 8 February
2008, formalizing the principle of solidarity between EU member nations and extending the notion
of the “fully entitled beneficiary” to all European nationals189. The lead nation must thereby coordinate
protection measures for all European nationals in time of crisis. In Chad, for example, French troops
evacuated 1,753 non-combatants. While a third was French, the others came from 79 countries,
Germany in particular. Later the German government would praise the skills and expertise of the
French Army.
189 Captain (Navy) Xavier Gérard, La conduite des opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants (the Conduct of NEOs ),
Doctrine n°16, June 2009, p.15.
75
CHAPITRE VIII
HUMANITARIAN
RELIEF OPERATIONS
A humanitarian relief operation is a mission to provide emergency aid during exceptional crises,
such as support to the local populace, emergency assistance for people during natural disasters, or
the prevention and treatment of against epidemics. The French Army’s operations in Africa often have
a humanitarian aspect. The Joint Medical Department can provide humanitarian assistance during
peacemaking or peacekeeping operations. Some operations, however, are of a strictly humanitarian
nature, setting them apart from other operations in which the humanitarian aspect is only one of
the strategic goals of the committed Force.
These operations can cover a range of action: from supporting the civilian populace, natural
disaster relief to epidemic prevention190. Operation Godoria, for example, conducted in Djibouti from
26 May to 29 June 1991, was aimed at supporting the Djiboutian army in assembling, accommodating
and providing food and medical care for Ethiopian refugees who had fled the civil war. A military
component was also deployed for disarming soldiers and conveying weapons to a safe place191.
The Army took a humanitarian support approach, setting up consultations, medical care and surgery,
as well as providing medicine. With 1,800 personnel deployed, it was possible to support the Djiboutian
Forces in controlling the flow of refugees on land, sea or by air transport. French Forces thereby
took charge of nearly 35,000 refugees and collected 13,000 individual weapons and more than
600 heavy weapons.
The Joint Medical Department can also be deployed in support of a civilian populace during disasters
or epidemics, with assistance from the Rapid Reaction Military Humanitarian Assistance Force. This
Force covers several functions in three specific formations. It can deploy the Rapid Reaction Military
Medical Element; a versatile field medical formation that is self-sufficient and can be transported
by air. It can also deploy the Disaster Military Casualties Identification Team. Last, it can deploy
the “Bioforce”, a structure created in 1983 to assist nations facing epidemic crisis situations.
Its purpose is to identify the nature of the problem and then perform mass inoculation of the population
under threat192.
190 Jean Faure, Le service de santé des armées: Les défis de la professionnalisation (the Joint Medical Department:
the challenges of professionalization), information report n°458, 1998, consulted 23/04/2014.
192 Christian Ménard, Le service de santé des armées (The French Joint Medical Department), Information report n°335,
29 October 2002, p.16.
77
Chapter VIII: Humanitarian relief operations
Bioforce was deployed in the Central African Republic from 14 March to 2 April 1992. The country
was facing a cerebro-spinal meningitis epidemic: 183 cases were recorded and 42 people died
in early 1992. To stop the epidemic from progressing, Central Africa deployed a team of doctors
assisted by the Bioforce unit and doctors from the World Health Organization. Logistical support and
security were provided by French operational assistance elements (EFAO) and personnel from the
Central African Armed Forces. Bioforce’s goal was to combat the epidemic. Then, France deployed
a doctor specializing in epidemiology, another doctor specializing in medical biology, a clinician doctor,
three technicians and one laboratory assistant. These experts performed mass inoculation and
assessed the efficiency of the other national teams and accompanying personnel. By the end of
the operation, Bioforce had provided nearly 200,000 doses of meningococcal vaccine and performed
more than 113,000 inoculations.
Operation Caducée in Guinea-Bissau followed suit; from 22 November to 9 December 1994,
France deployed troops to prepare the commitment of the Bioforce and provide logistical support
for the local authorities in combatting a cholera epidemic. At the request of the Guinea-Bissau state
authorities, France deployed 42 personnel including 32 from the Army. They were responsible for
reinforcing the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces in combatting the pandemic and providing logistical
and medical assistance.
The detachment therefore organized several convoys to supply the country’s remote medical
centers with medicine, fuel and equipment. By the operation’s end, 75 medical centers had been
supplied and several water points sanitized. Awareness campaigns had also been mounted across
the country. French Forces were able to cover 25,000 kilometers without a single accident or
incident; the ROEs had underscored that personnel display a friendly and completely cooperative
attitude.
78
CONCLUSION
O
verseas operations certainly do have ties to France’s colonial past; the phrase “overseas
operations theater” (“théâtre d’opérations extérieures”) first appeared in 1921, at the same
time as the special croix de guerre (war cross) for overseas operations was first awarded.
By setting apart overseas and domestic operations, however, colonial troops did tap into the
spirit of the time: mainland France is not the same as other areas of operations or other “overseas
theaters”193. It would therefore be inopportune and unadvisable to view overseas operations as
a mere continuation of France’s presence in a postcolonial Africa that has remained unchanged,
as is sometimes the case in texts intended for the general public. To do so would be to ignore
France’s efforts, particularly during François Mitterrand’s presidency, to move away from the image
of “Françafrique” typical of De Gaulle. It would also be unjust to African countries, thereby assuming
that they have been incapable of managing African crises alone. As is often the case, the reality of a
situation is more complex than the often overly quick and simplistic criticism levelled at it.
Today, overseas operations are an important component of France’s action worldwide. Clearly,
whether they are land or maritime operations, these operations fuel France’s international influence
and capacity for intervening on a continent with which France has longstanding and close ties. In
reality, the acronym “OPEX” encompasses a wide range of engagement types, scopes and duration.
At a time when “leadership”, particularly that of the US, is being rethought the world over and leading
European powers such as Germany or the UK are showing military restraint in deployment, France
has shown that it is capable of deploying expeditionary capabilities of the highest quality, thanks to its
Army and operational readiness, for these difficult missions. After spending a long time committed
by itself within bilateral frameworks with a host nation, France now favors multinational operations. In
these, French troops have displayed their expertise in training local, and particularly African, Armed
Forces, before passing on these skills to European allies. Although stabilizing countries in crisis does
not always prove easy on the ground, France plays its part in creating peace in the world. With its
overseas operations, France has demonstrated its capability for getting the better of the opponent,
or, in other words, “winning the war”. What proves more difficult, in truth, is “winning the peace”. This
fight, however, is not one for the Armed Forces; it is the task of political authorities and international
organizations.
Some operations did draw negative attention from the media and the public, to the extent that doubts
were raised over whether force employment is an effective response to foreign crises194. Today,
however, overseas operations are clearly a legitimacy factor for France, particularly as terrorism has
threatened to destabilize the entire Sahel-Sahara belt. Thanks to its overseas operations, the French
Army counts as one of the best in the world. On several occasions, it has shown the world and French
public opinion its capability for exercising its power on land, sea and in the air. This legitimacy and
expertise are particularly necessary at a time when the international context calls for maintaining an
operational force that can operate, overseas as well as ensure national security.
193 General Bernard Thorette, Rapport du groupe de travail : monument aux morts en opérations extérieures, (Work
group’s report: War memorials for overseas operations ), French DoD, 2011.
194 Guy-Michel Chauveau and Hervé Gaymard (députés / members of Parliament), Engagement et Diplomatie : Quelle
doctrine pour les interventions françaises ? (Engagements and diplomacy: what doctrine for French military
operations?), Project for an information report introduced by the Foreign affairs Committee, 21 May 2015, p.23.
79
ANNEX 1
Main cooperation or military technical assistance
agreements
Country
Benin
Burkina
Faso
Date
31 March 1966
Military technical cooperation agreement
24 April 1961
14 July 1965
Convention on logistical support to armed forces
Burundi
31 May 1974
18 July 1966
Central
Africa
Congo
Accord particulier relatif au concours en personnel militaire
pour l’organisation, l’instruction et l’emploi de l’escadrille
burundaise
Extension of the above-mentioned agreement to all
Burundian armed forces
Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights
Defense agreement
Military cooperation agreement
21 February 1974
Convention to determine the rules and particulars
of logistical support to armed forces
15 August 1960
Defense agreement
Convention to determine the rules and conditions for
10 September 1965 contributing logistical support to army, air and gendarmerie
forces
21 May 1966
8 October 1966
Comoros
27 February 1975
7 October 1969
Cameroon
Type
11 November 1978
4 August 1979
1 January 1974
24 April 1961
8 August 1965
Côte d’Ivoire
3 September 1965
Agreement on military technical assistance
Defense cooperation agreement
Convention on military technical contribution
Technical cooperation agreement on training key personnel
and equipping the national people’s armed forces
Defense agreements
Military technical assistance agreement
France contributing support to army, air and gendarmerie
forces
26 January 1978
Specific agreement on armament cooperation
19 March 1980
Specific agreement on pilots’ training
81
Annex 2
Country
Date
27June 1977
Djibouti
28 April 1978
3 September 1979
12 February 1980
11 February 1991
Gabon
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Mauritania
Defense and military technical assistance agreement
Exchange of letters to determine the fiscal conditions
relevant to military technical assistance
Convention on the activation and operation of a temporary
military post office
Convention on provost’s authority concerning offenses
or abuses committed by military technical assistance
personnel
Agreement on airspace control
17 August 1960
Defense and military technical assistance agreement
25 August 1965
Convention to determine rules for logistical support to
army, air and gendarmerie forces
17 November 1965 Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights
1 February 1980
Equatorial
Guinea
Guinea
Conakry
Type
Specific agreement on the training of Air force personnel
on Mirage aircraft
9 March 1985
7 April 1985
4 May 1966
Convention on logistical support
4 June 1973
Convention on military affairs and technical assistance
29 December 1978 Convention on the Antananarivo military hospital
6 May 1985
28 July 1986
relevant to technical military assistance
Exchange of letters on Mauritius’ monthly contribution
14 September 1979
to personnel expenditure for military assistance
25 September 1979 Specific military cooperation agreement
16 September 1979 Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights
27 April 1986
19 February 1987
Niger
19 February1977
Rwanda
18 July 1975
relevant to technical military assistance
Senegal
82
29 March 1974
logistical support to land, air and navy forces, to gendarmerie,
military units, civilian services and paramilitary formations
(Republican guards, firemen)
Country
Date
Seychelles
5 January 1979
Annex 1
Type
Specific agreement on maritime issues
6 March 1979
logistical support to armed forces
16 June 1976
Annex to deal with the management of N’Djamena hospital
April 1990
Protocol on the stationing of French troops in the Kossey
camp
Chad
Togo
30 July 1991
Protocol on the Chadian national army assistance
30 June 1992
Protocol on the reorganization of Chadian national forces
strength
10 July 1963
Defense agreement
29 April 1965
Convention to determine the rules and conditions
for logistical support to land, air and gendarmerie forces
28 October 1965
23 March 1976
Accord de coopération militaire technique
22 May 1974
Zaïre
9 July 1976
Military cooperation general agreement:
- Specific cooperation agreement on aeronautics
- Military technical cooperation arrangements
in aeronautics
- Arrangements for the training of Zairian personnel
in French Air Academy and schools
Arrangements for the military technical cooperation
in the area of land forces
Sources : André Dumoulin, La France militaire et l'Afrique (France’s Military and Africe), GRIP, 1997, pp. 115-117 ;
P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ?, (The possible evolution of
French security policy in Africa), art. cit. pp. 17-20195.
195 Since May 2009, eight African countries have signed partnership agreements with France: Cameroon (21 May 2009),
Gabon (24 February 2010), Central African Republic (8 April 2010), Togo (13 March 2009), Comoros (27 September
2010), Djibouti (21 December 2011), Côte d’Ivoire (26 January 2012), Senegal (18 April 2012).
83
ANNEX 2
List of region-oriented national schools
Name
École d’état-major
(EEML)
Staff College
École Supérieure
internationale de
Guerre (ESIG)196
International War
College
École d’application
de l’Infanterie (EAI)
Infantry branch
school
École du Service de
santé des Armées
(ESSAL)
Joint Medical
Corps school
École
des personnels
paramédicaux des
Armées (EPPAN)
Joint school for
paramedical military
personnel
École d’application
du service de santé
militaire (EAS)
Military medical
corps school
École militaire
d’administration
(EMA)
Military
administration
school
École militaire
technique (EMTO)
Military technical
school
École de génie
travaux (EGT)
Engineers
(infrastructure)
school
Location
French
contribution
Type
5 cooperation
trainers
General military
training
5 cooperation
trainers
General military
training
3 cooperation
trainers
General military
training
1 cooperation
trainer
Military medical
training
Sixty students each
year, including 1/2
for Niger
2 cooperation
trainers
Military medical
training
Twenty students
each year, including
1/4 for Gabon
3 cooperation
trainers, including 2
doctors
Military medical
training
2 cooperation
trainers
Military medical
training
2 cooperation
trainers
Military technical
training
3 cooperation
trainers
Military technical
training
Trainees
Sixty students each
Libreville – Gabon year, including 1/8
for Gabon
Yaoundé –
Cameroon
Thiès – Senegal
Lomé – Togo
Niamey – Niger
Melen – Gabon
Koulikoro – Mali
Ouagadougou–
Burkina Faso
Brazzaville –
Congo
Forty students each
year, including 1/5
for Cameroon
Sixty students each
year, including 1/3
for Senegal
One hundred
students each year,
including
1/4 for Togo
Nearly
100 students each
year, including
1/4 for Mali
Over 150 students
1/4 for BurkinaFaso
100 students each
year, including 1/3
for the Congo
196 New name given in 2013.
85
Annex 2
Name
Ecole navale (Centre
d’instruction
maritime)
Naval Academy
(maritime training
center)
Centre de
perfectionnement
aux techniques de
maintien de l’ordre
(CPTMO) Center
for law and order
technique expertise
French
contribution
Type
Nearly fifty students
Bata – Equatorial each year, including
Guinea
1/3 for
Equatorial Guinea
3 cooperation
trainers
Military technical
training
100 students each
year, including 1/3
for Cameroon
2 cooperation
trainers
Location
Awaé –
Cameroon
Centre de
perfectionnement
aux actions postconflictuelles de
déminage et de
dépollution (CPADD)
Training center for
expertise in postconflict EOD and
mine-clearing
Ouidah – Bénin
Ecole de maintien
de la paix (EMP)
Peacekeeping School
Bamako – Mali
Cours d’application
des officiers de
Gendarmerie
Gendarmerie officers
branch school
Ouakam –
Senegal
Centre de
perfectionnement
de la police judiciare
(CPPJ)
Criminal investigation
police training center
Institut Supérieur
d’Etudes de
Protection Civile
(ISEPC)
Civil defense higher
training center
Porto Novo –
Benin
Ouagadougou
– Burkina Faso
Trainees
60 students each
year, including
1/5 for Benin
Peacekeeping
– security forces
3 cooperation
trainers
Peacekeeping
– security forces
1,000 students
1/4 for Mali
1 cooperation
trainer
Peacekeeping
– security forces
50 students each
year, including 1/3
for Senegal
2 cooperation
trainers
Peacekeeping
– security forces
80 students each
year, including
1/3 for Benin
20 students each
year, including
1/3 for BurkinaFaso
2 cooperation
trainers
iPeacekeeping
– security forces
iPeacekeeping
– security forces
Sources : André Dulait, Robert Hue, Yves Pozzo di Borgo et Didier Boulaud, La gestion des crises en Afrique
subsaharienne (The management of crises in sub-Sahara Africa), information report n° 450, 3 July 2006,
p. 13 ;
J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French policies in Africa), rap. cit., p. 32 ;
« Les Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale », http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr, consulted 12/05/2014.
86
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92
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50 Years of Operations in Africa - CDEF

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