Aid on Demand - The Institute of Public Administration of Canada

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Aid on Demand
Delivering Cost-Effective Technical
Assistance in Developing Countries
A series of case studies on
democratic development
Gordon Evans
Gordon Evans
Aid on Demand
Delivering Cost-Effective Technical
Assistance in Developing Countries
A series of case studies on
democratic development
Copyright© 2013 Institute of Public Administration Canada
IPAC
1075 Bay Street, Suite 401
Toronto, ON M5S 2B1
Telephone: 416-924-8787
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Evans, Gordon, 1952-, author
Aid on demand : delivering cost-effective technical assistance in
developing countries / Gordon Evans.
Includes bibliographical references.
Includes some text in French.
ISBN 978-1-55061-142-7 (pbk.)
1. Technical assistance—Cost effectiveness. 2. Technical assistance—
Cost effectiveness—Case studies. I. Institute of Public Administration of Canada, issuing body II. Title.
HC60.E83 2013
338.91
C2013-903773-X
With the support of
Views and opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors
and in no way should be attributed to the Canadian International Development Agency or the Institute of Public Administration of Canada.
Contents
Foreword / Avant-propos
v
Acknowledgements / Remerciements
ix
Introduction
xvii
1
Aid on Demand–Doing Better with Less / L’aide sur demande–Faire mieux avec moins
2
Beginning the Healing Process: Canada’s Participation in the Honduran Truth
and Reconciliation Commission
35
3
Strengthening Media Governance in Guyana: Mission Impossible?
47
4
The People’s Defender: Strengthening the Office of the Ombudsman in Peru
61
5
Improving Policy Skills in Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs
77
6
Supporting Civil Service Reform in Mongolia: A Case of Consensus Building
89
7
Big Dreams, Modest Means: Implementing Jordan’s Technical and
Vocational Education and Training Strategy
99
8
Budget Analysis in Ukraine’s Office of the President
111
9
Une démarche participative d’élaboration du Plan de modernisation
de la gestion des finances publiques du Mali
121
1
10 Contre vents et marées : des élections libres et équitables en Guinée-Bissau
135
11 Supporting Development Finance Institutions in Southern Africa
147
12 Using Bioscience to Combat Food Insecurity in Africa
159
13 Using Social Marketing to Promote Ethics in Tanzania’s Public Service
175
iv
Aid on Demand—Doing Better with Less
Foreword
IPAC has a long history of developing and publishing research. Drawing on
the expertise of our members, both scholars and practitioners, IPAC has consistently and innovatively contributed to the Canadian body of literature on public
administration and management for over sixty-five years. As our membership
became increasingly engaged in international networks and capacity building, it
was a natural fit to expand our horizons to global knowledge sharing. For over
two decades, IPAC has actively contributed to global learning through its highly
respected Canadian Public Administration journal, our Public Sector Management
magazine, the recent Democratic Development e-Dialogues on our Public Service Without Borders platform, and our first book of international case studies, Innovations in Public Expenditure Management: Country Cases from the Commonwealth. We are now very pleased to add a second book of international case
studies to the IPAC collection, Aid on Demand: Delivering Cost-Effective Technical
Assistance in Developing Countries.
In 2007, IPAC was selected by the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) to manage the Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program, now extended to 2015. In 2009, I asked long-time IPAC colleague and
DDD Governance Advisor Gordon Evans, to develop a series of DDD case studies. Over the last three years, Gord has worked closely with the IPAC team to
identify interesting and innovative DDD projects. The case studies owe their
richness to an exceptional group of DDD advisers who conveyed the challenges,
accomplishments and lessons learned from a diverse and fascinating range of
projects. Excited by the depth, insight and knowledge transfer potential of the
cases, we asked Gord to develop a concept for this book with a view to enhancing the ongoing international dialogue on improving the delivery and results of
technical assistance.
Gord authored all of the case studies in this book with the exception of Mali,
which was written by Lucie Rouillard, Pierre Martineau and Jean-Philippe
Lapointe. In selecting the cases, emphasis was placed on the quality of the project and the transferability of the lessons learned. In addition, an attempt was
made to assemble a geographically and topically diverse collection. The cases
are presented in the language, English or French, in which the project was documented.
To date, DDD has initiated eighty-five projects in thirty-five countries. The high
levels of results and client satisfaction achieved suggest that this model warrants
Foreword
Aid
on Demand—Doing Better with Less
v
wider consideration as an aid vehicle by developing countries and development
organizations. We hope that this publication proves useful for practitioners in
developing countries, donors, NGOs, volunteers, consultants, academics and
students as they contemplate how technical assistance can best serve its intended beneficiary.
Ann Masson, Director, Domestic and International Programs, IPAC.
vi
Aid on Demand—Doing Better Foreword
with Less
Avant-propos
L’IAPC est connu depuis longtemps pour développer des activités de recherche
et en publier les résultats. Misant sur la compétence de ses membres, tant des
universitaires que des praticiens, l’IAPC contribue de manière soutenue et innovante à la documentation canadienne sur l’administration publique et la gestion depuis plus de soixante-cinq ans. Comme nos membres devenaient de plus
en plus engagés dans les réseaux internationaux et le renforcement des capacités,
ce fut un choix naturel d’élargir nos horizons en partageant les connaissances à
l’échelle mondiale. Depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années, l’IAPC contribue activement à l’apprentissage mondial par le biais de sa revue très respectée Administration publique du Canada, son magazine Management Secteur Public, les récents
cyber-dialogues en développement démocratique sur notre plate-forme Service
Public Sans Frontières, et notre premier recueil d’études de cas internationales,
Innovations in Public Expenditure Management: Country Cases from the Commonwealth [Innovations dans la gestion des dépenses publiques : cas des pays du
Commonwealth]. À présent, nous avons le plaisir d’ajouter un second recueil
d’études de cas internationales à la collection de l’IAPC, Aid on Demand: Delivering Cost Effective Technical Assistance in Developing Countries [L’aide sur demande :
offrir une assistance technique valable dans les pays en développement].
En 2007, l’IAPC a été sélectionné par l’Agence canadienne de développement
international (ACDI) pour administrer le programme de Déploiements pour le
Développement Démocratique (DDD), désormais étendu à 2015. En 2009, j’ai
demandé à un collègue de longue date de l’IAPC et conseiller sur la gouvernance de DDD, Gordon Evans, de développer une série d’études de cas se rapportant à DDD. Au cours des trois dernières années, Gord a travaillé en étroite
collaboration avec l’équipe de l’IAPC pour identifier des projets de DDD intéressants et innovants, et avec un groupe exceptionnel de conseillers de DDD
pour communiquer les problèmes, les réalisations et les enseignements découlant d’une variété de projets passionnants. Enthousiasmés par la profondeur,
la perspicacité et le potentiel du transfert des connaissances des études de cas,
nous avons demandé à Gord de mettre au point un concept pour ce recueil afin
de favoriser le dialogue international en cours sur l’amélioration de la prestation
et des résultats de l’assistance technique.
Gord est l’auteur de toutes les études de cas présentées dans cet ouvrage
à l’exception du cas du Mali dont les auteurs sont Lucie Rouillard, Pierre
Martineau et Jean-Philippe Lapointe. Pour choisir les études de cas, nous avons
placé l’accent sur la qualité du projet et la transférabilité des enseignements reAvant-propos
Aid
vii
tenus. En outre, nous avons tenté de rassembler une collection variée tant du
point de vue géographique que du point de vue du sujet. Les études de cas sont
présentées dans la langue, en français ou en anglais, dans laquelle le projet a été
documenté.
À ce jour, quatre-vingt-cinq projets ont été lancés dans trente-cinq pays dans le
cadre de DDD. Compte tenu des résultats élevés et de la satisfaction des clients
qui ont été obtenus, ce modèle mérite d’être davantage considéré comme un
véhicule de l’aide par les pays en développement et les organismes de développement. Nous espérons que cette publication se révèlera utile pour les praticiens dans les pays en développement, les donateurs, les ONG, les bénévoles, les
experts, les universitaires et les étudiants qui recherchent comment les services
d’assistance technique peuvent le mieux servir leurs bénéficiaires.
Ann Masson, directrice, Programmes national et international, IAPC.
viii
Avant-propos
Aid on Demand—Doing Better
with Less
Acknowledgements
This book would not have been possible without the extensive time and effort
provided by a wide range of contributors.
The book’s author, Gordon Evans, has worked since 1998 as an international
consultant in over twenty-five countries focusing on government decision making, strategic planning and policy formulation. Gord co-authored (with Nick
Manning) Helping Governments Keep Their Promises: Making Ministers and Governments More Reliable Through Improved Policy Management for the World Bank.
From 1990 to 1998, Gord worked in the Government of Ontario’s Cabinet Office
as Deputy Clerk of the Executive Council. During that time, he observed firsthand the planning and decision-making processes on which he consults and
writes today. In fact, Gord began his international career with IPAC working on
projects in China and Lithuania.
CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program would not
have achieved its success without the thoughtful collaboration of CIDA’s field
officers and our local partners around the world in identifying strategic opportunities for DDD initiatives. We also acknowledge the dedication and excellence
of the more than 160 Canadian advisers who worked tirelessly with their local
partners to make a difference with limited resources and time. This combined
effort has now delivered eighty-five (and counting) DDD projects.
IPAC is particularly grateful to the DDD advisers who worked intensively with
Gord to develop and get the case studies right. The contributing advisers are
listed alphabetically below:
• Naomi Alboim (Indonesia case study): Currently fellow, adjunct professor, and
chair of the Policy Forum, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University.
Former deputy minister in the Province of Ontario.
• Ian Alexander (Guyana case study): Former senior executive with the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, now an independent consultant, facilitator and
trainer in the areas of strategic planning, organizational development,
communications and public policy.
• Maria Barrados (Mongolia case study): Partner in the consulting firm Barrados
Inc. Served as president of the Public Service Commission of Canada from
2003–2011 and before that as assistant auditor general in the Office of the
Auditor General of Canada.
Acknowledgements
ix
• Brenda Cooke (Jordan case study): A long-time educational leader including ten
years as president of two Canadian colleges and twelve years in international
education and project management. Currently a senior technical adviser
for the CIDA-funded CARICOM—Education for Employment Program
delivered by the Association of Canadian Community Colleges.
• Fiona Crean (Peru case study): City of Toronto’s first ombudsman and
former assistant deputy minister with the Government of Ontario. Trained
as a teacher and mediator, has worked extensively on development and
governance initiatives in South America, Eastern Europe, Southern Africa
and among First Nations and Inuit communities.
• Paul Darby (Ukraine case study): Deputy chief economist of the Conference
Board of Canada since 2004. Manages the Conference Board’s international
consulting practice. Well known for applying econometrics to determine the
impact of policy decisions on the economy.
• David C. Elder (Indonesia case study): Currently fellow and adjunct professor,
School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. Served for more than thirty years
with Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and in
the Privy Council Office as assistant secretary to the Cabinet responsible for
Machinery of Government.
• Alain Gauthier (Guinea-Bissau case study): Specialist in management of national
and international electoral operations for twenty-three years.
• Mary Gusella (Tanzania case study): Former federal deputy minister, Crown
Corporation chair/CEO and International Joint Commission chair. Currently
chair, Commission for Complaints for Telecommunications Services and
director, Human Rights Legal Support Services.
• Michael Kergin (Honduras case study): Served in Canada’s foreign service for
forty years, finishing his career as Canada’s ambassador to the USA 2000–
2005. Since retiring in 2005, started the consultant firm, Intermestic Consulting
Inc., and joined Ottawa University as a senior fellow at the Graduate School
of Public and International Affairs. Also a senior adviser at the law firm of
Bennett Jones LLP.
• Jean-Philippe Lapointe (co-author of Mali case study): A senior executive in the
federal public service. Coordinated and participated directly in a wide range
of initiatives to modernize Mali’s public administration. Has now returned
to the federal public service and is currently posted at the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
x
Acknowledgements
Aid on Demand—Doing
Better with Less
• Pierre Martineau (co-author of Mali case study): Retired from the federal public
service. Now a senior fellow at the Centre for Governance at the University
of Ottawa, teaches project management, managing for results and program
evaluation. Works on capacity building and the modernization of public
administrations throughout Africa, the Middle East and Haiti.
• Louis-Pierre Michaud (Peru case study): Worked in international development
for over six years in Central and South America, the Caribbean and Africa,
specializing in results-based management and monitoring and evaluation.
• Claude Parent (Guinea-Bissau case study): Specialist in management of national
and international electoral operations for sixteen years.
• Olga Romanyuk (Ukraine case study): Economic projects director for the Center
for Public Expertise in Ukraine. Over fifteen years’ experience as project
manager/financial consultant for a wide range of public and private sector,
civil society and donor organizations.
• Lucie Rouillard (co-author of Mali case study): Retired as professor of public
finance at the École nationale d’administration publique. Now works on
capacity building and the modernization of public administrations in
Francophone Africa and Haiti.
• Frank Schwartz (SADC and African Biosciences Initiative case studies): Belleclaire
Consulting. Has worked domestically and internationally for over thirty
years. Served as executive director of the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Public
Affairs.
• Anne-Marie Stewart (Peru case study): Consulted domestically and
internationally since 1996, specializing in organizational change management,
human resources management and strategic planning. Previously served as
assistant deputy minister with responsibility for the Anti Racism Secretariat
in the Government of Ontario.
Andy Graham of Queen’s University’s School of Policy Studies deserves our
thanks for capably serving as editor for the DDD case studies, providing timely
feedback as each case was drafted. Andy also coordinates IPAC’s Canadian case
study program.
IPAC’s DDD team must be thanked for their dedication in ensuring that the
DDD program has run smoothly since 2007. The current team comprises DDD
program managers Marie Fortier-Balogh, Kasia Zakowska and Vicki Campbell;
democratization and human rights expert Diana Ivancic-Skinner, knowledgesharing coordinator Sahar Asaad, and contracting and administrative coordinators Pia Bruni and Daniel Malone. Elisabeth Laviolette, IPAC’s chief translatorAcknowledgements
xi
reviser coordinated translation. We also are grateful to our colleagues at Rights
and Democracy, who co-delivered DDD with us in its early years.
Finally, this book would not have been possible without the support and funding of CIDA. DDD actively engages CIDA officials from Canada and around the
world in finding the right technical assistance for interested local partners. We
would also like to thank Alan Leber, CIDA’s DDD team lead, as well as previous
team leads, for their insights and always helpful collaboration in coordinating
this complex but rewarding technical assistance program.
Ann Masson, director domestic and international programs, IPAC.
xii
Acknowledgements
Aid on Demand—Doing
Better with Less
Remerciements
Ce recueil n’aurait pas été possible sans le temps et les efforts importants qu’y
ont consacré un nombre varié de collaborateurs.
L’auteur de l’ouvrage, Gordon Evans, travaille depuis 1998 en tant qu’expert international dans plus de vingt-cinq pays, se concentrant sur le processus décisionnel de l’État, la planification stratégique et l’élaboration des politiques. Gord a
été le co-auteur (avec Nick Manning) de Helping Governments Keep Their Promises: Making Ministers and Governments More Reliable Through Improved Policy Management [Aider les gouvernements à tenir leurs promesses : rendre les ministres
et les gouvernements plus fiables grâce à une meilleure gestion des politiques]
pour la Banque mondiale. De 1990 à 1998, Gord a travaillé au Bureau du Conseil
des ministres du gouvernement de l’Ontario à titre de greffier adjoint du Conseil
exécutif. Au cours de cette période, il a observé personnellement les processus
de planification et prise de décision sur lesquels il conseille et écrit aujourd’hui.
En fait, Gord a débuté sa carrière internationale avec l’IAPC lorsqu’il a travaillé
sur des projets en Chine et en Lituanie.
Le programme de Déploiements pour le Développement Démocratique (DDD)
de l’ACDI n’aurait pas atteint son succès sans la collaboration réfléchie des agents
sur le terrain de l’ACDI et de nos partenaires locaux partout dans le monde pour
identifier les occasions stratégiques d’initiatives dans le cadre de DDD. Nous reconnaissons également le dévouement et l’excellence des quelque cent-soixante
conseillers canadiens qui ont travaillé sans relâche avec leurs partenaires locaux
à faire une différence avec des ressources et un temps limités. Grâce à cet effort conjugué, plus de quatre-vingt-cinq projets de DDD ont été livrés jusqu’à
présent.
L’IAPC est particulièrement reconnaissant aux conseillers de DDD qui ont travaillé intensivement avec Gord pour mettre au point ces études de cas. Voici la
liste, par ordre alphabétique, des conseillers qui ont apporté leur collaboration :
• Naomi Alboim (étude de cas de l’Indonésie) – actuellement attachée d’études et
de recherches, professeure adjointe et présidente du Forum des politiques,
School of Policy Studies de l’Université Queen’s. Ancienne sous-ministre de
la province de l’Ontario.
• Ian Alexander (étude de cas de la Guyane) – ancien cadre supérieur de la Société
Radio-Canada, aujourd’hui expert indépendant, animateur et formateur
dans les domaines de la planification stratégique, du développement
organisationnel, des communications et des politiques publiques.
Remerciements
xiii
• Maria Barrados (étude de cas de la Mongolie) – associée au cabinet-conseils
Barrados Inc. A agi à titre de présidente de la Commission de la fonction
publique du Canada de 2003 à 2011 et auparavant en tant que vérificatrice
générale adjointe au Bureau du Vérificateur général du Canada.
• Brenda Cooke (étude de cas de la Jordanie) – un leader pédagogique de longue
date dont dix ans en tant que présidente de deux collèges canadiens et douze
ans dans l’éducation internationale et la gestion de projet. Actuellement,
conseillère technique principale pour CARICOM, financé par l’ACDI –
Programme d’éducation pour l’emploi administré par l’Association des
collèges communautaires du Canada.
• Fiona Crean (étude de cas du Pérou) – première ombudsman de la ville de
Toronto et ancienne sous-ministre adjointe au gouvernement de l’Ontario.
Enseignante et médiatrice de formation, a travaillé considérablement à
des initiatives de développement et de gouvernance en Amérique du Sud,
Europe de l’Est, Afrique australe et parmi les collectivités des Inuits et des
Premières nations.
• Paul Darby (étude de cas de l’Ukraine) – économiste en chef adjoint du Conference
Board du Canada depuis 2004. Gère le cabinet-conseils international du
Conference Board. Bien connu pour l’application de l’économétrie pour
déterminer l’impact des décisions politiques sur l’économie.
• David C. Elder (étude de cas de l’Indonésie) – actuellement attaché d’études et
de recherches, professeur adjoint, School of Policy Studies de l’Université
Queen’s. Pendant plus de trente ans, au service du ministère des Affaires
étrangères et du Commerce international du Canada, et du Bureau du
Conseil privé à titre de secrétaire adjoint du Cabinet responsable des services
de gestion de l’État.
• Alain Gauthier (étude de cas de la Guinée-Bissau) – spécialiste de la gestion des
opérations électorales nationales et internationales pendant 23 ans.
• Mary Gusella (étude de cas de la Tanzanie) – ancienne sous-ministre fédérale,
présidente et chef de la direction des sociétés d’État, et présidente de la
Commission mixte internationale. Actuellement présidente, Commission des
plaintes relatives aux services de télécommunications, et directrice, Services
de soutien juridique des droits de la personne.
• Michael Kergin (étude de cas du Honduras) – au service des affaires
diplomatiques du Canada pendant quarante ans, terminant sa carrière en tant
qu’ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis (2000-2005). Depuis sa retraite
en 2005, a lancé le cabinet-conseils Intermestic Consulting Inc., et a joint les
rangs de l’Université d’Ottawa en tant qu’associé principal de recherches
xiv
Remerciements
with Less
à l’École supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales. Également
conseiller principal au cabinet d’avocats Bennett Jones LLP.
• Jean-Philippe Lapointe (co-auteur de l’étude de cas du Mali) – cadre supérieur
de la fonction publique fédérale. A coordonné et participé directement à
diverses initiatives visant à moderniser l’administration publique du Mali.
Est maintenant de retour dans la fonction publique fédérale et occupe
actuellement un poste au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce
international.
• Pierre Martineau (co-auteur de l’étude de cas du Mali) – retraité de la fonction
publique fédérale. Est maintenant associé principal de recherches au Centre
pour la gouvernance de l’Université d’Ottawa, enseigne la gestion de projet,
la gestion axée sur les résultats et l’évaluation des programmes. Travaille
au renforcement des capacités et à la modernisation des administrations
publiques partout en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et à Haïti.
• Louis-Pierre Michaud (étude de cas du Pérou) – a travaillé au développement
international pendant plus de six ans en Amérique du Sud, aux Caraïbes et
en Afrique centrale et orientale, se spécialisant dans la gestion, le suivi et
l’évaluation axés sur les résultats.
• Claude Parent (étude de cas de la Guinée-Bissau) – spécialiste de la gestion des
opérations électorales nationales et internationales depuis 16 ans.
• Olga Romanyuk (étude de cas de l’Ukraine) – directrice des projets économiques
au centre d’expertise publique en Ukraine. Plus de 15 années d’expérience en
tant que chef de projet/expert en finance pour un nombre varié d’organismes
des secteurs public et privé, de la société civile et de bailleurs de fonds.
• Lucie Rouillard (co-auteure de l’étude de cas du Mali) – a pris sa retraite en tant
que professeure des finances publiques à l’École nationale d’administration
publique. Travaille actuellement sur le renforcement des capacités et la
modernisation des administrations publiques en Afrique francophone et en
Haïti.
• Frank Schwartz (études de cas de la Communauté de développement de l’Afrique
australe (SADC) et de l’Initiative Africaine des Biosciences) – Belleclaire
Consulting. A travaillé dans les sphères nationale et internationale pendant
plus de trente ans. A assumé les fonctions de directeur général du Centre
canadien pour l’éthique dans les affaires publiques.
• Anne-Marie Stewart (étude de cas du Pérou) – offre des services de consultation
sur les plans national et international depuis 1996, et est spécialisée dans la
gestion du changement organisationnel, la gestion des ressources humaines
Remerciements
xv
et la planification stratégique. Était auparavant sous-ministre adjointe
responsable du Secrétariat à l’antiracisme au gouvernement de l’Ontario.
Andy Graham, School of Policy Studies de l’Université Queen’s, mérite nos remerciements pour agir habilement en tant que rédacteur des études de cas de
DDD, offrir sa rétroaction au moment opportun lorsqu’une étude de cas est rédigée. Andy coordonne également le Programme d’études de cas canadiennes
de l’IAPC.
L’équipe de DDD de l’IAPC doit être remerciée pour son professionnalisme en
veillant à ce que le programme de DDD se déroule bien depuis 2007. L’équipe
actuelle comprend les gestionnaires de programme de DDD, Marie Fortier-Balogh, Kasia Zakowska et Vicki Campbell, l’expert en démocratisation et droits de
la personne, Diana Ivancic-Skinner, la coordonnatrice du partage des connaissances, Sahar Asaad, et les coordinateurs des services administratifs et des contrats, Pia Bruni et Daniel Malone. Elisabeth Laviolette, traductrice-réviseure en
chef de l’IAPC, a coordonné les traductions. Nous sommes également reconnaissants à nos collègues de Droits et Démocratie, qui ont administré le Mécanisme
DDD avec nous dans ses débuts.
Enfin, ce recueil n’aurait pas été possible sans le soutien et le financement de
l’ACDI. Le programme de DDD engage activement les dirigeants de l’ACDI au
Canada et dans le monde à trouver l’assistance technique appropriée pour les
partenaires locaux intéressés. Nous tenons également à remercier Alan Leber,
directeur de l’équipe de DDD à l’ACDI, ainsi que les précédents directeurs
d’équipe, pour leurs idées et leur collaboration toujours utile dans la coordination de ce programme d’assistance technique complexe mais enrichissant.
Ann Masson, directrice, Programmes national et international, IAPC.
xvi
Remerciements
with Less
Introduction
Aid on Demand began modestly. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) decided to prepare a series of case studies presenting positive examples of delivering technical assistance in developing countries. The cases would
focus on projects delivered through IPAC’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program, funded by the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA). However, as the case studies accumulated, it became apparent
that a separate line of enquiry should be pursued to explore DDD’s unique, costeffective model, characterized in this book as “aid on demand.”
The opening chapter, Aid on Demand—Doing Better with Less, explores this model, comparing it favourably to the conventional project approach. In lieu of resident international consultants, in-country project teams, lengthy assignments,
generous budgets and complex deliverables, aid-on-demand projects typically
fund a Canadian adviser to undertake a series of short missions to help the local
partner with a particular task. The average cost: $170,000; the average duration:
15 months. DDD’s high success rate suggests that, in many circumstances, the
aid-on-demand model does provide a cost-effective alternative. To elaborate this
assertion, the twelve case studies which follow describe a diverse range of successful interventions from strengthening Peru’s Office of the Ombudsman and
participating in the Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission to monitoring elections in Guinea-Bissau and drafting civil service legislation in Mongolia.
Case studies in public administration come in all shapes, sizes and points of
view. Typically, case studies relay a real-life experience for the purpose of documenting, instructing, comparing, generalizing and/or transferring knowledge.
In this publication, the twelve case studies focus on the delivery of technical assistance across a variety of sectors throughout the developing world. The intent
is to present transferable lessons learned that could be used to design, shape and
deliver effective technical assistance initiatives. The primary interviews were
conducted with the Canadian adviser(s) who led each project.1 Wherever possible, local partners were interviewed a year or more following project completion to obtain their perspective and determine whether the project achieved any
lasting impact. The table below lists and briefly indicates the purpose of each
case study.
Introduction
xvii
Country/Region
Purpose
Honduras
recounting Michael Kergin’s participation as a member of the
Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Guyana
establishing a media industry association in Guyana despite strong
government opposition
Peru
helping Peru’s Office of the Ombudsman undergo an organizational
transformation using change management and results-based
management techniques
Mongolia
working with two parallel initiatives under the respective auspices
of the prime minister and president to develop new civil service
legislation
Indonesia
providing on-the-job policy analysis and research training in
Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs
Jordan
developing a realistic implementation plan for an affordable strategy
in Jordan’s technical and vocational education and training sector
Ukraine
preparing an instruction manual on macro forecasting, budget and
gender impact analysis for the Office of the President
Guinea-Bissau
monitoring the 2008 parliamentary and 2009 presidential elections
in Guinea-Bissau against a backdrop of political violence
Mali
using a highly participatory approach to re-energize and reposition a
major public finance reform
Southern Africa Region
securing buy-in for a five-year strategic plan for the Development
Finance Resource Centre of the Southern African Development
Community, a regional network of twenty-seven development
finance institutions
Africa-Wide
assisting the African Bioscience Initiative, a prominent research
network, surmount obstacles resulting from its formal inclusion
within the complex governance structures of NEPAD and the African
Union
Tanzania
designing and implementing an innovative, social marketing
approach to increase ethics awareness among civil servants
xviii
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The case studies use a common structure, summarized in the table below.
Section
Description
Introduction
Provides context and explains how DDD was selected as the
appropriate aid vehicle for the project.
Governance Profile
Presents an array of widely-used governance measures and indicators
which compare individual country performance.2
Defining the Project
Describes how the project’s scope and activities were negotiated; often,
unrealistic client expectations had to be scaled down to a feasible set of
deliverables.
Delivering the Project
Outlines the key methods used, activities undertaken and results
achieved through the project.
Lessons Learned
Summarizes the key reflections on what did and did not work in
delivering the project; an attempt is made to identify lessons that could
be transferred to other technical assistance projects.
Knowledge Transfer
Potential
Discusses the degree to which the lessons learned could be used to
inform future work in the case study’s field.
Postscript
Outlines the events which occurred following project completion and
the degree to which the project’s results have been sustained; where
feasible, draws on local partner observations.
The twelve cases can be read with interest individually. But read together, the
cases demonstrate a set of repeated behaviours and techniques applied effectively in highly diverse circumstances and settings. At risk of sloganeering, these
widely-applicable lessons learned include: get the scope right; find the real problem; make it job relevant; do it, own it; build networks, seek allies; cost it; be politically astute; and deal creatively with adversity. Simple enough in theory, but,
as the case studies demonstrate, implemented effectively only through a highly
skilled and nuanced collaboration between adviser and client.
—––
Since this is a book about delivering foreign aid, it cannot be oblivious to the
controversy which swirls around this highly contentious topic.
At the macro level, debate rages concerning foreign aid’s curative or destructive powers. Buoyant optimists, from Jeffrey Sachs (The End of Poverty) to Bill
Gates to Bono, contend that increased foreign aid, if appropriately targeted and
utilized, could eradicate extreme poverty. Entrenched pessimists, from William
Introduction
xix
Easterly (The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done
So Much Ill and So Little Good) to Dambisa Moyo (Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa) vehemently argue that foreign aid is
not only ineffective, but often injurious to developing nations. A qualified edict
comes from Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Why Nations Fail), who observe that foreign aid is, in most cases wasted, but could be useful if directed towards bringing excluded segments of society into the decision-making process
with a view to developing more inclusive political and economic institutions.
Another macro debate involves foreign aid and democracy. Democracy promotion emerged in the 1980s, aiming to strengthen democratic institutions in developing countries by supporting human rights, rule of law, free and fair elections,
judicial independence, parliamentary oversight, citizen engagement, civil society participation and media freedom. Donors believed that increased democratization would create a sustainable institutional base to pursue poverty alleviation. However, democracy promotion was discredited when it was co-opted by
the Bush administration as a rationale for the Iraq invasion and a tool in the war
on terror. Under the Obama administration, the rhetoric has been dialed down,
but suspicions linger. Carothers suggests that democracy promotion needs to
be de-linked from foreign policy and reemphasize “strong elements of modesty,
subtlety, and the awareness of limitations without losing the vitality, decisiveness, and creativity necessary for success.” 3 DDD certainly fits this approach,
avoiding muscular advocacy in favour of responsive, constructive engagement.
Further debate concerns the way in which aid is delivered. From the donors’
perspective, aid effectiveness depends on better aligning their efforts with developing countries’ national strategies and implementing a wide range of technical tweaks to streamline and harmonize their collective efforts. Over fifty aid
organizations and one hundred and sixty countries and territories have signed
documents espousing these principles, including the Paris Declaration (2005),
Accra Accord (2008) and Busan Partnership (2011).
An alternative perspective argues that the development community foists its
preconceived notions of best practice onto developing countries, ensnaring them
in a capability trap where impressively designed laws and processes mostly fail
in execution.4 Rather than effective aid, developing countries receive overly ambitious, over-designed, cookie-cutter programs, such as public administration
reform strategies or whole-of-government functional reviews, which needlessly
absorb scarce resources. A more effective response would be to encourage and
support homegrown reforms that build on what already exists and take into account the constraints of execution.
Interestingly, a recent internal assessment by the World Bank, citing less-thanxx
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with Less
stellar results achieved in supporting public sector reform over the last decade,
reinforces this perspective, recommending that the Bank’s focus shifts from best
practice to best fit and from a preoccupation with program design to longer-term
support for implementation.5
So, where does Aid on Demand fit within these debates? First, it must be emphasized that the DDD program was not designed to advance or debunk any particular theory on delivering foreign aid. Rather, it reprised a successful, tested
CIDA model for delivering technical assistance and offered it, on demand subject
to CIDA approval, to organizations in developing countries or regions pursuing
specific democratization reforms. Its relevance to the aid effectiveness debates
derives primarily from the modest scope, responsive nature and, in most cases,
successful outcome of individual projects.
Clearly, it would be presumptuous to ascribe any macro relevance to a fifteenmonth, limited-budget, technical assistance project, no matter how successful
in accomplishing its objectives. Similarly, nothing can be inferred concerning
the effectiveness of grandly-designed, comprehensive reforms grounded in best
practices from developed countries. At most, DDD can contribute to a specific deliverable within that strategy. Although best practices, usually Canadian,
are certainly provided for consideration in DDD projects, these are invariably
adapted by the beneficiary to the local context.
In execution, the aid-on-demand model aligns closely with emerging work
which recommends less ambitious, more pragmatic aid interventions where best
fit replaces best practice, where local context is integral, where implementation
is not forgotten, and where big is not necessarily best when it comes to delivering technical assistance. The demand side of the aid equation has been touted for
years, but too often the beneficiaries were not articulating those demands. Here,
client demand is the starting point of the technical assistance dialogue.
One final caveat: the aid-on-demand model is not in any way being championed
as the next big idea in aid modalities. Given past performance, the development
community should eschew bandwagons and panaceas. Neither does the model
provide a sure route to spectacular results. Not every DDD project succeeded;
not every request was met. Nonetheless, the DDD program can reasonably claim
that, for the large majority of projects, it delivered cost-effective technical assistance and produced tangible results which, for the most part, have remained in
place following project completion. In sum, the aid-on-demand model offers a
complementary tool to be considered, hopefully more often, alongside conventional approaches. This collection’s modest goal is to stimulate debate among
practitioners in developing countries and the development community on how
best to formulate and respond to requests for technical assistance.
Introduction
xxi
Endnotes
1
For a different perspective, Princeton’s Innovations for Successful Societies case study
program offers a wide-range of cases developed from the local reformers’ viewpoints.
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/ Also see IPAC’s domestic case
studies, many of which are prepared from personal experience, at http://www.ipac.
ca/CaseStudyProgram-About.
2
The indicators most often cited include the Freedom House rankings on degree of
freedom, the World Bank’s governance indicators, UNDP’s Human Development
and Gender Inequality Indexes, Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index,
and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Caution must be
exercised in extrapolating from these broad and often blunt measures. Considerable
debate revolves around their methodologies and the conclusions that can be drawn
from them. For these cases, the indicators and measures are presented to provide
a general picture of the governance context and challenges in which each project
worked.
3
T. Carothers, US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).
4
M. Andrews, L. Pritchett and M. Woolcock, Capability Traps in Development: How
Initiatives to Improve Administrative Systems Succeed at Failing. (Washington, DC: NDU
Press, 2012); Prism 3, No. 3, June, 2012.
5
See J. Blum, N. Manning and V. Srivastava, Public Sector Management: Toward a ProblemSolving Approach, (Washington, DC: World Bank PREM, 2011). Also see World Bank,
The World Bank’s Approach to Public Sector Management 2011–20: Better Results from
Public Sector Institutions, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).
xxii
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with Less
Introduction
L’aide sur demande a débuté de façon modeste. L’Institut d’administration
publique du Canada (IAPC) a pris la décision de préparer une collection
d’études de cas offrant des exemples positifs de prestation de services d’assistance technique dans les pays en développement. Les études de cas porteraient
sur des projets exécutés par le biais du programme de Déploiements pour le
Développement Démocratique (DDD) de l’IAPC, financé par l’Agence
canadienne de développement international (ACDI). Cependant, alors que les
études de cas s’accumulaient, il s’est avéré qu’il fallait s’attarder sur un secteur
d’intérêt distinct pour examiner le modèle économique, unique en son genre, de
DDD, que l’on appelle dans le présent ouvrage « L’aide sur demande ».
Le chapitre d’ouverture, Aid on Demand: Doing Better with Less (L’aide sur
demande : faire mieux avec moins), examine ce modèle, le comparant favorablement à l’approche de projets conventionnels. Au lieu d’avoir des experts
internationaux résidents, des équipes de projet dans le pays, de longues missions, des budgets généreux et des résultats prévus complexes, les projets d’aide
sur demande financent généralement un conseiller canadien qui entreprendra
une série de courtes missions pour aider le partenaire local aux prises avec une
tâche particulière. Le coût moyen : 170 000 $ ; la durée moyenne : 15 mois. Le
taux de succès élevé des projets de DDD laisse entendre que, dans de nombreux
cas, le modèle d’aide sur demande s’avère une autre option économiquement
avantageuse. Pour élaborer cette assertion, les douze études de cas qui suivent
décrivent un large éventail d’interventions fructueuses allant du renforcement
de l’Office de l’Ombudsman au Pérou et de la participation à la Commission
de vérité et réconciliation au Honduras, à la surveillance des élections en
Guinée-Bissau et à la rédaction de lois sur la fonction publique en Mongolie.
Les études de cas en administration publique comportent toutes sortes de formes, de tailles et de points de vue. Généralement, elles relatent une expérience
réelle dans le but de documenter, d’informer, de comparer, de généraliser ou de
transmettre des connaissances. Dans la présente publication, les douze études
de cas portent sur l’assistance technique apportée dans une variété de secteurs
dans tous les pays en développement. Elles visent à présenter des leçons transposables qui pourraient être utilisées pour concevoir, définir et offrir des initiatives d’assistance techniques efficaces. Les principales entrevues ont été menées
auprès des conseillers canadiens à la tête de chaque projet1. Dans la mesure du
possible, les partenaires locaux ont été interviewés un an au minimum après
la réalisation d’un projet afin d’obtenir leur point de vue et de déterminer si le
Introduction
Aid
xxiii
projet avait eu des effets durables. Le tableau ci-dessous énumère et présente
brièvement le but de chaque étude de cas.
Pays/Région
But
Honduras
Retracer la participation de Michael Kergin en tant que membre de la
Commission de vérité et de réconciliation au Honduras
Guyane
Établir en Guyane une association de l’industrie des médias malgré une
forte opposition gouvernementale
Pérou
Aider l’Office de l’Ombudsman du Pérou à se soumettre à une
transformation organisationnelle en utilisant des techniques de gestion
du changement et de gestion axée sur les résultats
Mongolie
Travailler sur deux initiatives parallèles sous les auspices respectifs du
premier ministre et du président afin d’élaborer une nouvelle loi sur la
fonction publique
Indonésie
Offrir une formation en cours d’emploi en recherche et analyse des
politiques au ministère des Affaires étrangères de l’Indonésie
Jordanie
Élaborer un plan réaliste de mise en œuvre d’une stratégie abordable
dans le secteur de l’éducation et de la formation technique et
professionnelle
Ukraine
Préparer pour le Bureau du président un manuel d’instructions sur les
prévisions macro-économiques, le budget et l’analyse des répercussions
sur le genre
Guinée-Bissau
Surveiller les élections parlementaires de 2008 et les élections
présidentielles de 2009 en Guinée-Bissau dans le contexte des violences
politiques
Mali
Recourir à une approche fortement participative pour relancer et
repositionner une importante réforme de la finance publique
Afrique australe
Obtenir l’appui à un plan stratégique quinquennal pour le Centre de
ressources pour le développement du financement de la Communauté
de développement de l’Afrique australe (SADC), réseau régional de vingtsept institutions financières de développement
À l’échelle de l’Afrique
Aider l’Initiative Africaine des Biosciences (IAB), réseau de recherche
important sur les sciences biologiques en Afrique, à surmonter les
obstacles provenant de son ancienne inclusion dans les structures de
gouvernance complexes de NEPAD et de l’Union africaine
Tanzanie
Concevoir et mettre en œuvre une approche novatrice en marketing
social afin d’accroître la sensibilisation des fonctionnaires à l’éthique.
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Les études de cas utilisent une structure commune, résumée dans le tableau cidessous.
Section
Description
Introduction
Fournit un contexte et explique comment le programme de DDD a été
sélectionné comme véhicule d’aide approprié pour le projet.
Profil de gouvernance
Présente un ensemble de mesures et d’indicateurs de gouvernance
largement utilisés qui comparent la performance des pays individuels2.
Définition du projet
Décrit la manière dont la portée et les activités du projet ont été
négociées ; souvent les attentes irréalistes des clients ont dû être
rabaissées à un ensemble de résultats plus réalisables.
Exécution du projet
Présente les méthodes clés utilisées, les activités entreprises et les
résultats que le projet a permis d’atteindre.
Leçons tirées
Résume les réflexions clés sur ce qui a fonctionné et n’a pas fonctionné
au cours de l’exécution du projet ; on s’efforce d’identifier les leçons qui
pourraient servir à d’autres projets d’assistance technique.
Potentiel de transfert
de connaissances
Discute dans quelle mesure les leçons tirées pourraient être utilisées
pour éclairer les travaux futurs dans le domaine de l’étude de cas.
Post-scriptum
Présente les événements qui se sont produits après la réalisation du
projet et indique dans quelle mesure les résultats du projet ont été
durables ; lorsque cela est possible, tire parti des observations des
partenaires locaux.
Les douze études de cas peuvent être lues avec intérêt individuellement. Mais
lorsqu’on les lit ensemble, les études de cas mettent en évidence un ensemble de
comportements et de techniques répétés qui s’appliquent efficacement à des circonstances et des milieux d’une grande diversité. Au risque de devenir des slogans, ces leçons tirées, applicables à grande échelle, comprennent les points suivants : bien cerner l’étendue du projet; élucider le véritable problème; le rendre
pertinent; le réaliser, se l’approprier; établir des réseaux, chercher des alliés; en
établir le coût; être bien avisé sur le plan politique; et faire preuve de créativité
face à l’adversité. Cela est assez simple en théorie, mais comme le montrent les
études de cas, il faut une collaboration hautement compétente entre le conseiller
et le client pour que ces leçons soient mises en pratique de manière efficace.
———
Comme ceci est un recueil sur l’exécution de projets d’aide étrangère, il n’est
pas possible de faire abstraction des débats qui entourent ce sujet hautement
litigieux.
Introduction
xxv
À l’échelon macroéconomique, le débat fait rage au sujet des pouvoirs bénéfiques ou destructeurs de l’aide étrangère. Les optimistes pleins d’entrain, qu’il
s’agisse de Jeffrey Sachs (The End of Poverty), de Bill Gates ou de Bono, prétendent
que l’aide étrangère accrue, lorsqu’elle est ciblée et utilisée de manière appropriée, pourrait éradiquer la pauvreté extrême. Les pessimistes intransigeants, de
William Easterly (The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good) à Dambisa Moyo (Dead Aid: Why Aid is
Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa) font valoir avec véhémence
que l’aide étrangère est non seulement inefficace, mais souvent préjudiciable
pour les pays en développement. Dans un ouvrage nuancé (Why Nations Fail),
Daron Acemoglu et James Robinson font remarquer que l’aide étrangère est
dans la plupart des cas gaspillée mais pourrait être utile si elle visait à amener
les segments de la société qui en sont exclus à participer au processus décisionnel en cherchant à mettre au point des institutions politiques et économiques
plus inclusives.
Un autre débat macroéconomique porte sur l’aide étrangère et la démocratie. La
promotion de la démocratie a vu le jour dans les années 1980, visant à renforcer
les institutions démocratiques en soutenant les droits de la personne, la primauté du droit, les élections libres et justes, l’indépendance judiciaire, la surveillance
parlementaire, la mobilisation des citoyens, la participation de la société civile et
la liberté des médias. Selon les donateurs, une plus grande démocratisation créerait une base institutionnelle durable qui permettrait de réduire la pauvreté. Cependant, la promotion de la démocratie a été discréditée quand elle a été cooptée
par l’administration Bush comme justification de l’invasion de l’Irak et comme
outil de lutte contre le terrorisme. Sous le gouvernement Obama, la rhétorique
a perdu de sa vigueur, mais les suspicions subsistent. Carothers laisse entendre
que la promotion de la démocratie ne doit plus être liée à la politique étrangère
mais doit remettre l’accent sur « de forts éléments de modestie, de subtilité, et
sur la prise de conscience des restrictions sans perdre la vitalité, l’esprit de décision et la créativité nécessaires au succès3 ». Le programme de DDD correspond
définitivement à cette approche en évitant la défense de causes à outrance en
faveur d’un engagement réceptif et constructif.
D’autres débats concernent la manière dont l’aide est apportée. Dans la perspective des donateurs, l’aide est plus efficace lorsque nous alignons mieux nos
efforts sur les stratégies nationales des pays en développement et si nous mettons en œuvre une vaste gamme de solutions techniques pour rationaliser et
harmoniser nos efforts collectifs. Plus de cinquante organismes d’aide et centsoixante pays et territoires ont signé des documents endossant ces principes, y
compris la Déclaration de Paris (2005), l’Accord d’Accra (2008) et le Partenariat
de Busan (2011).
xxvi
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with Less
Selon une autre perspective, le milieu du développement impose ses notions
préconçues de meilleures pratiques aux pays en développement, les prenant au
piège alors que ceux-ci manquent de capacités et ne parviennent pas à mettre à
exécution la plupart des lois et processus conçus de manière impressionnante4.
Au lieu de recevoir une aide efficace, les pays en développement reçoivent
alors des programmes sortis du même moule, trop ambitieux, de conception
trop poussée, comme les stratégies de réforme de l’administration publique
ou les examens des activités de l’ensemble du gouvernement, qui absorbent
inutilement des ressources restreintes. Une initiative plus efficace consisterait à
encourager et appuyer des réformes maison qui s’inscriraient dans la continuité
de ce qui existe déjà et tiendraient compte des contraintes de la mise à exécution.
Il est intéressant de noter qu’une récente évaluation interne entreprise pas la
Banque mondiale, citant des résultats loin d’être éblouissants obtenus en appuyant des réformes du secteur public au cours de la dernière décennie, renforce
cette perspective, recommandant que la Banque modifie son orientation et qu’au
lieu de viser les meilleures pratiques elle cherche plutôt un meilleur ajustement,
et qu’au lieu de se préoccuper de la conception de programmes elle recherche
plutôt à soutenir la mise en œuvre à plus long terme5.
Où se situe donc L’aide sur demande dans ces débats ? Tout d’abord, il faut
souligner que le programme de DDD n’a pas été conçu pour faire avancer ou
démystifier aucune théorie particulière sur la prestation de l’aide étrangère. Par
contre, il a repris un modèle concluant, expérimenté par l’ACDI pour apporter
des services d’assistance technique qu’il a offerts sur demande, sous réserve de
l’approbation de l’ACDI, aux organismes des pays ou régions en développement
qui mettaient en œuvre des réformes particulières de démocratisation. Sa pertinence aux débats sur l’efficacité de l’aide vient principalement de la modeste
portée, de la nature adaptée aux besoins et, dans la plupart des cas, des résultats
positifs des projets individuels.
Il est évident qu’il serait présomptueux d’attribuer une pertinence
macroéconomique à un projet d’assistance technique de quinze mois à budget limité, même s’il réussit à atteindre ses objectifs. De même, on ne peut rien
conclure au sujet de l’efficacité de réformes exhaustives merveilleusement
conçues fondées sur les meilleures pratiques des pays développés. Tout au
plus, le programme de DDD peut contribuer à un résultat spécifique attendu
au sein de cette stratégie. Alors que les meilleures pratiques, habituellement
canadiennes, sont définitivement présentées à titre d’information pour les projets de DDD, les bénéficiaires les adaptent toujours au contexte local.
En termes d’exécution, le modèle de l’aide sur demande s’aligne étroitement sur
les travaux émergents qui recommandent des interventions en matière d’aide
Introduction
xxvii
qui soient moins ambitieuses, plus pragmatiques où les meilleures pratiques
sont remplacées par un meilleur ajustement, où le contexte local est intégral, où
l’on n’oublie pas la mise à exécution, et où tout ce qui est grand n’est pas forcément meilleur quand il s’agit d’apporter de l’assistance technique. L’aspect de la
« demande » de l’équation de l’aide a été vanté pendant des années, mais trop
souvent les bénéficiaires n’étaient pas capables de bien exprimer ces demandes.
Ici la demande des clients est le point de départ du dialogue sur l’assistance
technique.
Une dernière mise en garde : on ne défend en aucune manière le modèle de
l’aide sur demande comme étant la prochaine grande solution parmi les modalités de l’aide. Étant donné la performance passée, la communauté de développement devrait éviter les effets boule de neige et les remèdes universels. Le modèle
ne garantit pas à coup sûr des succès spectaculaires. Les projets de DDD n’ont
pas tous réussi ; les demandes n’ont pas toutes été satisfaites. Cependant, le programme de DDD peut raisonnablement prétendre que, pour la grande majorité
des projets, il a apporté une assistance technique valable et produit des résultats concrets qui dans l’ensemble ont persisté après la réalisation des projets.
En définitive, le modèle de l’aide sur demande offre un outil complémentaire
qu’il faut étudier, de préférence plus souvent, en même temps que les approches
classiques. Le modeste objectif de cette collection est de stimuler le débat parmi
les praticiens dans les pays en développement et la communauté de développement sur la manière de présenter les demandes d’assistance technique et sur la
manière d’y répondre.
Notes
1
Pour avoir une perspective différente, voir le programme d’études de cas « Princeton’s
Innovations for Successful Societies » qui présente une vaste gamme d’études de
cas basées sur les points de vue de réformateurs locaux. http://www.princeton.
edu/successfulsocieties/ Voir également les études de cas nationales de l’IAPC,
dont un grand nombre sont tirées d’expériences personnelles http://www.ipac.ca/
CaseStudyProgram-About
2
Les indicateurs les plus souvent cités comprennent les classements selon le degré de
liberté de la Freedom House, les indicateurs de gouvernance de la Banque mondiale,
les indices de développement humain et d’inégalité des sexes du PNUD, l’indice
de liberté de la presse de Reporters sans frontières, et l’indice de perception de la
corruption de Transparency International. Il faut faire preuve de prudence lorsque
l’on extrapole ces mesures vastes et souvent brutes. D’importants débats tournent
autour de leurs méthodologies et des conclusions que l’on peut en tirer. Pour ces
xxviii
Introduction
with Less
études de cas, les indicateurs et les mesures sont présentés de manière à fournir une
image générale du contexte de gouvernance et des défis auxquels fait face chaque
projet.
3
T. Carothers, US Democracy Promotion During and After Bus. (Washington DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2007).
4
M. Andrews, L. Pritchett et M. Woolcock, Capability Traps in Development: How
Initiatives to Improve Administrative Systems Succeed at Failing. (Washington DC: NDU
Press, 2012) ; Prism 3, no 3, juin 2012.
5
Voir J. Blum, N. Manning, et V. Srivastava, Public Sector Management: Toward a ProblemSolving Approach. (Washington DC: World Bank PREM, 2011). Voir également Banque
mondiale, The World Bank’s Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-20: Better Results
from Public Sector Institutions. (Washington DC : Banque mondiale, 2012).
Introduction
xxix
Chapter 1
Aid on Demand–Doing Better with Less
The aid-on-demand mantra, doing better with less, reprises that ever-ready
phrase of governments hoping to convince a skeptical public that they will be
truly thankful for the program cuts which they are about to receive. In this case,
we are being less cynical; this chapter will present a distinctly Canadian way of
delivering foreign aid that does actually deliver more for less. CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program was launched in May 2007.
Drawing on several successful predecessors, DDD was designed to deliver a
quick-response capacity to meet client demands for product-specific, low-budget, short-duration projects.1 In this book, the approach used by DDD is characterized as “aid on demand.” In several fundamental respects, to be explored below, the aid-on-demand model challenges conventional wisdom about the right
way to deliver aid.
DDD Facts
% program launched in 2007; extended to 2015
% delivered by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC)
% responsive program; CIDA and beneficiary agree on project; IPAC then
recruits Canadian adviser and manages project
% four themes: rule of law; human rights; freedom and democracy;
accountable public institutions
% $18.3 million budgeted
% to date, 85 projects initiated
% over 160 Canadian advisers engaged
% project duration averages 15 months
% average direct project cost of $170,000
A Different Approach
The conventional foreign aid project involves the placement of a project team,
led by an experienced international consultant, in a developing country for an
extended engagement of two to four years. Project costs typically run into single-digit millions. The usual aim: to oversee the design and implementation of a
complex, multi-faceted reform based on a best-practice model from a developed
country. Justification for the conventional approach rests on the premise that it
1
takes time, money and professional experience to set up the project office; hire
and train project staff; establish project oversight bodies; familiarize the client
with new methodologies; develop and obtain approval for the reform strategy
and, over time, its multiple policies, draft laws and regulations; and provide
government-wide training on assorted operational procedures.
Since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, attempts have been made to improve the conventional model by promoting demand-driven reforms, aligning
projects with national systems and avoiding cumbersome, costly project infrastructure such as project implementation units. Notwithstanding these efforts,
the fundamental delivery model remains largely intact as progress towards implementing new models has faltered.2
The aid-on-demand model flies in the face of conventional reform logic. By design, its projects have neither the time nor money to follow the conventional
model’s parameters. How then does it manage to produce consistently good
results? Reasons may include:
• Tangible products: Aid-on-demand projects focus on specific policy or program
initiatives, not broad reforms or generic capacity building. Typical project
outputs include cabinet policy proposals, draft legislation, strategic plans,
implementation manuals, communications campaigns and briefing papers.
The specificity of the outputs increases the chances that the recommendations
will be implementable.
• Built-in demand: A longstanding debate within the development community
concerns supply-side (what donors believe developing countries should do),
versus demand-side (what developing countries wish to do) reforms. The
Paris Declaration sought to shift the emphasis to the demand-side, although
progress has lagged expectations. The aid-on-demand model falls clearly
on the demand-side since most projects originate when a client requests
assistance with a task that is already on their plate. Since the need and the
task are pre-established, the requested technical assistance is directed more
at “how” than “what.”
• Sustained client engagement: Too often, development projects spend inordinate
amounts of time and resources working from the project office to craft
sophisticated, polished policy documents (e.g., national development
or sector strategies, medium-term expenditure framework documents,
performance measurement manuals) that certainly read well, but do not
mesh with the existing local system. As such, implementation prospects
remain poor since the proposals are neither widely understood nor contextsensitive. By contrast, aid-on-demand projects are ill-suited to working in
2
isolation and depend on sustained client engagement for the production of
core project documents.
• The local partner provides the local knowledge: Development projects need to
ensure that local context is accurately reflected. Certainly, over time, a
resident international consultant can be sensitized to many of the political
and cultural nuances facing the client organization. However, is this detailed
knowledge essential to ensure a successful collaboration? For the aid-ondemand model, although advisers with prior experience in the client country
are often selected, there is insufficient time to develop a deep understanding
of the local context for the topic at hand. Inevitably, the adviser must rely
on the local partner to determine how best to reflect local context. This
initiates an intensive two-way dialogue where the client must take the
time to understand the policy substance of what the adviser is proposing,
appropriately convey the relevant local context, and work with the adviser
to adapt contextually unsuitable proposals.
• Sufficient capacity is a given: Lack of capacity continues to be routinely used
to explain implementation failures of donor-initiated reforms. This habitual
stance infers that capacity gaps within beneficiary organizations represent
an omnipresent obstacle to development. By contrast, the aid-on-demand
approach presumes that sufficient basic capacity exists or can be quickly
developed within the client organization to implement the resulting policy
products. Where significant capacity gaps do exist, the inclination would be
to tailor the proposals accordingly rather than rely on long-term technical
assistance while the client catches up. The frequent success of aid-on-demand
projects suggests that perceptions concerning chronic capacity gaps in the
public administrations of developing countries may be overstated.
• Client reliance: Aid-on-demand projects typically fund one to three advisers
for two to four missions over a twelve to eighteen-month period. The advisers
will arrive at, and usually work from, the client’s workplace. Advisers rely
on the client to ensure sufficient face time, arrange external meetings and
organize events, such as workshops or training sessions. The aid-on-demand
model precludes project offices, dedicated project staff and elaborate project
management structures. It is by nature highly collaborative.
Another aid-on-demand characteristic is the selection criteria for identifying its
advisers. DDD prefers to use current or former senior executives from counterpart civil service organizations. Underlying assumptions include:
• current and former senior public service executives are more likely to be
available for short-term rather than long-term, in-country assignments;
3
• the client is more likely to relate to an adviser who is or has been employed
at a senior level in a counterpart organization;
• it will be easier for the senior executive to enlist the assistance of, or obtain
information and documents from, his or her current or former department;
and
• senior executives offer lengthy experience with navigating government
approval processes and understanding political incentives.
Overall, client satisfaction with recruited advisers has been very high. Only two of
DDD’s eighty-five initiated projects have required the replacement of the project
adviser.
These arguments favouring aid-on-demand programs are not intended to malign
traditional foreign aid projects. There will certainly be many situations where an
aid-on-demand approach is inappropriate. However, given the preponderance
of the conventional project mechanism, it is suggested that a much wider
range of aid scenarios would benefit from this different approach to delivering
technical assistance.
Cost Effectiveness
It is beyond the scope of this enquiry to furnish a cost-benefit analysis comparing conventional and aid-on-demand models. Nonetheless, a descriptive comparison of the respective pros and cons can be instructive. This comparison is being undertaken in an environment where dissatisfaction with the performance
of conventional approaches in delivering public administration and civil service
reforms is increasing and alternative approaches are being eagerly sought.3
For a cost comparison, let us take a typical, conventional foreign aid project, in
this case based on an actual CIDA project which lasted four years. The project
sought to reform the policy-making process in a developing country, utilizing
an in-country project team led by a resident international consultant and working with a well-placed client in a central agency. Other international consultants
visited for short-term assignments, several study tours to Canada were undertaken, and extensive training provided to policy officials in central agencies and
line ministries in partnership with a local university. The project did not meet
the deadlines set out in its ambitious timetable, owing to delays in obtaining
policy approvals for certain products, but ultimately produced several solid accomplishments. The overall cost was $6.4 million.
4
By comparison, the average cost of a DDD project is $170,000. Assuming overhead costs of 20 percent, a $6.4 million budget could finance approximately thirty individual DDD projects. Admittedly, it is difficult to compare the respective
impacts of a conventional project’s range of outputs for one client versus the
outputs from thirty aid-on-demand projects, but a number of competitive cost
advantages for this model can be cited:
• Minimal start-up: The responsive nature of the program, where the local
partner and CIDA shape the project in advance, significantly lowers project
definition and inception costs.
• No down time: The Canadian advisers arrive in the country, work for a
couple of weeks and leave. If the project experiences a hiatus, for example
because of an election or cabinet shuffle, the adviser simply delays the next
trip, maintaining contact with the client by e-mail in the interim. A resident
adviser must find something else to do and usually remains on salary during
such periods.
• No in-country project teams or offices: The significant expense of maintaining a
resident adviser, local project team and project office for three to four years is
replaced by a few air fares and several weeks’ expenses for hotels and meals
over one to two years.
• No study tours: DDD only supports costs related to the Canadian advisers and
some modest in-country expenditures. Study tours must be funded by the
beneficiary.
A comparison of the respective effectiveness of the two models is impractical.
Not surprisingly, comparative data does not exist for aid-on-demand projects
since the approach is relatively rare and evaluations undertaken by development organizations do not differentiate by delivery model. What can be cited is
a range of evaluations inferring sub-optimal results for conventional reforms.
A recent World Bank assessment noted that administrative, civil service and public financial management reforms scored well below the overall 71.6 percent of
public sector management projects rated as having at least moderately satisfactory outcomes.4 A comparison of public finance reforms in Africa indicates that
progress in the quality of budget-process design, law and preparation significantly surpassed progress in budget execution, suggesting that implementation
of best practice models remains underwhelming.5 Moreover, the performance
of aid-supported reforms appears to be falling. From 1999–2006, two-thirds of
countries receiving public sector reform lending from the World Bank improved
their Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores. From 2007–
5
2009, only 39 percent of countries improved their CPIA scores while 25 percent
of countries registered declines.6
Although a thorough evaluation is lacking, a few observations can be made concerning aid-on-demand programs. Of the fifty-seven concluded DDD projects,
forty-three were completed with all core tasks/outputs fully delivered while
fourteen were partially completed. Of the fourteen partially completed projects,
six were suspended for political reasons, such as military coups. The successful
completion rate for uninterrupted projects therefore stands at an impressive 84
percent or 75 percent if the suspended projects are included.
With respect to client satisfaction, a survey of seven local partners from the case
study projects was conducted at least one year following project completion to
obtain perceptions regarding the project’s quality and sustainability. This admittedly small sample size does reinforce the positive impressions conveyed
through the case studies.
Measure
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
4
experience, skills, knowledge of Canadian
adviser
1
6
effective collaboration between adviser
and local partner
2
5
3
2
overall success of project
relevance of Canadian models to local
context
2
Ratings were 5=very high; 4=high; 3=medium; 2=low; 1= very low
Beyond the high levels of satisfaction expressed, it is interesting to note that the
highest average scores related to the quality of, and working relationship with,
the Canadian advisers (4.9 and 4.7 average scores) while the lowest related to
the relevance of Canadian models (4.0 average score). This suggests that any
use of best practices from Canada simply provided a starting point and that the
project’s value derived more from the ability of the adviser to collaborate with
the local partner in adapting these or other models to the local context.
Limitations
The aid-on-demand approach should not be construed as the next big idea in aid
modalities and most certainly should not be touted as a wholesale replacement
for the conventional model. Aid-on-demand programs do not work in every
circumstance and are unlikely to be appropriate when:
6
• no local counterpart exists; e.g., in cases where foreign consultants are asked
to substitute for national civil servants;
• the iniative involves leading the design and delivery of a major, multi-year
reform program;
• significant capital investments, such as integrated IT systems, will accompany
the technical assistance;
• local capacity truly is lacking and alternatives such as local consultants with
the necessary skill set are not available;
• the client insists on an in-country presence with a resident adviser; and/or
• significant client resistance is likely to be encountered to the proposed
reforms; for example, when a project is expected to implement an unpopular
conditionality attached to an IMF program or World Bank loan.
A caveat should be added concerning democratization projects. Although governments may oppose projects working with external clients, such as independent media, civil society organizations or election monitors, this should not preclude an aid-on-demand project from proceeding as long as the external partner
is willing and the working environment is reasonably safe.
In sum, when circumstances permit, the aid-on-demand model should be
considered more widely as an alternative or supplement to conventional
approaches.
Lessons Learned
The case studies themselves offer a wide range of lessons learned related to
their individual policy or program areas. Arguably, the most compelling lessons
learned derive from the way in which advisers and their local partners formed
effective working relationships and responded to unrealistic expectations or
unanticipated events. These lessons learned demonstrate that placing the right
adviser with a motivated client can produce superior results notwithstanding
limited time and funding. The following eight lessons learned, common to several cases, stand out.
Get the scope right: For any project, but particularly one of short duration, it
is essential that the expected activities and outputs realistically match available
time and project resources. Beneficiaries, accustomed to more expansive projects, may not be expecting such a focused, no-frills project. At the work planning
stage, it is essential that a clear, mutual understanding is achieved concerning
what the project will and will not fund and what outputs are feasible.
7
In Ukraine, the budget analysis unit in the President’s Secretariat initially hoped
that the project would facilitate the establishment of a well-functioning macroeconomic policy unit with similar econometric modeling skills/tools as those
in the Ministry of Finance. During work plan negotiations, a more modest and
realistic set of deliverables emerged with the project’s key output becoming the
preparation and testing of a budget analysis manual. The resulting methodology
was applied successfully to the actual government budget during the project.
A modest training and capacity-building project on the application of a social
marketing approach to ethics advancement in Tanzania’s public service came
under pressure when donors supporting Tanzania’s Public Sector Reform Programme demanded more action-oriented, results-focused initiatives. In response, the Ethics Promotion Division in the Office of the President hoped to
transform the DDD project into a full-fledged implementation program incorporating a series of pilot projects. Through negotiations, an ambitious but feasible
project was designed which added a single pilot project to the original project activities. Ultimately, the project proved highly successful and is now being
rolled out to additional ministries.
Find the real problem: One of the most common mistakes in policy making is
to assume that the problem or, worse, the solution is obvious. Several DDD projects discovered, most often through stakeholder interviews, that the perceived
problem was not the real obstacle. Given the short duration of the projects, this
determination must be completed early on. In order to do so, advisers must
strike the right balance between gaining the client’s trust and performing a legitimate challenge function.
The Development Finance Institution network, established under the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), comprises twenty-seven development finance institutions from fifteen member states. A donor evaluation had
identified internal governance problems. On closer investigation, it was discovered that the primary problem was a breakdown in communication and a misunderstanding concerning respective roles/responsibilities. By fixing the relationship, the reputedly acute governance problems faded from view.
Indonesia’s Policy Planning and Development Agency believed that its traditional isolation and lack of operational relevance within the Department of Foreign Affairs could best be addressed by organizational restructuring. Through
the project, less radical but more effective solutions were identified, such as
expanded networking, inter-departmental working committees and enhanced
information sharing.
8
Peru’s Office of the Ombudsman had twice before attempted to adopt a resultsbased management (RBM) approach with little success. Perhaps a third effort
would be the charm. However, the Canadian advisers, supported by the ombudsman, determined during the project design phase that the problem was
not so much methodological as organizational. This time, RBM would be implemented as part of a comprehensive change management strategy that worked
across organizational silos and drilled down to the operational level. This time,
the RBM approach stuck.
Do it, own it: Too often, international consultants produce sophisticated documents replicating best practices from developed countries. Often, recipient governments approve these documents, although rarely with a full understanding
of their content. Not surprisingly, problems arise during implementation when
coordinating agencies struggle to explain to implementing ministries how these
sophisticated concepts should be applied to ill-fitting local processes. Over time,
the gap between formal and actual practices continues to grow as dual systems
operate in relative isolation. In most aid-on-demand projects, the adviser’s role
focuses on providing policy advice and examples that can be adapted to the
local context by the local partner, rather than writing complex, lengthy documents. The majority of plans, policies and manuals produced through DDD
projects are written by the local partner.7 As a result, greater understanding,
pride and buy-in for the final product are generated. Having written it, the local
partner becomes better equipped to explain and, over time, refine the product as
circumstances change and experience is gained.
In Mali, a major public finance reform had not met 40 percent of its phase-one
goals. To develop an action plan for phase two, it was agreed that a different approach would be tried. Instead of the usual consultant-driven, top-down process
that substitutes external experts for local resources, the advisers proposed to
pursue a broadly participative approach involving nearly one hundred stakeholders representing forty organizations from the public service, civil society,
donors, parliament and other interested institutions. Working groups organized
around the reform’s four strategic objectives laboured intensively to develop
and draft the content of the action plan. The final product, approved by government, became a source of pride by its many authors and contributors. The high
degree of ownership in turn generated commitment to downstream implementation.
In Tanzania, a project aiming to apply social marketing techniques to the promotion of ethics in Tanzania’s public service encountered problems in obtaining
sufficient funding for local consultants to conduct audience research. This left
the project with one option: do it yourself. Consequently, the local partner and
team supporting the project were trained by the Canadian advisers to conduct
9
the audience research themselves. This hands-on involvement in the research
translated into greater command of, and commitment to, the content. In fact, the
client organization presented the strategy to senior management for approval.
A year later, the same project team conducted an evaluation of progress to date.
Although born of operational necessity, the do-it-yourself approach ultimately
proved conducive to generating pride of ownership and implementation momentum.
Make it job relevant: Virtually every external assistance project aspires for its
beneficiary to assume ownership of the project, which in turn reinforces sustainability. Most often, ownership is best achieved when the project’s subject matter
relates directly to the client organization’s day-to-day work. In such cases, the
project clearly contributes to a task at hand rather than espousing abstract principles or creating add-on obligations. As a responsive program, aid-on-demand
projects most often relate to the client’s current or pending job responsibilities.
Rather than utilize generic, hypothetical examples as part of a training program,
the project with Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs decided to develop
and present position papers on actual policy issues. For example, a policy paper was prepared on the positions and tactics to adopt at the upcoming G-20
meeting. Instruction on utilizing electronic searches for policy research directly
supported the preparation of the position papers. The accompanying train-thetrainers program was structured around supporting the new policy and research
process. That the position papers were well received by the minister further increased the client’s incentives to own and improve the new policy development
process. This clearly would not have occurred if the project had not produced
real position papers.
In Ukraine, the budget analysis manual was prepared for use by analysts in the
President’s Secretariat. What really confirmed the manual’s acceptance and potential sustainability was testing it live on the actual government budget. It was
at this point that the Canadian adviser felt “they got it.”
Build networks, seek allies: For any policy, those charged with its development must secure the endorsement of those with direct influence over its approval. However, there are strong arguments to expand the network of supporters beyond this discrete set of influential players. First, decision makers expect it.
When deliberating on a policy proposal, they will wish to know the anticipated
reactions of various groups, information best obtained through prior consultation. Second, meaningful stakeholder consultations with those responsible for,
interested in, or affected by, a proposed policy can enhance its quality and increase its acceptance. Third, it generally pays to cast a wide net as apparent less
consequential players may wield unanticipated influence, often during imple10
mentation. Finally, people and positions change. Today’s middle manager may
become tomorrow’s senior executive. In sum, one’s network can never be too big
or one’s allies too numerous.
The Mali example on public finance reform, referenced earlier, demonstrates
how expanded networks, if meaningfully involved during the strategy or policy development phase, can create a wide base of support and momentum for
downstream implementation. Although the reform process has been derailed
by the 2012 military coup and ensuing events, it is anticipated that, with the
resumption of foreign aid, the reform’s broad network of supporters will enable
it to pick up quickly where it left off.
In Jordan, an extensive stakeholder network had developed a technical and vocational education and training sector strategy. Unfortunately, the strategy was
unaffordable by a factor of ten. Called in to resolve this gap, the project faced
the formidable challenge of producing a reworked, affordable strategy without
alienating the stakeholder group. Ultimately, this was accomplished by re-engaging the network in the revision process and deeming the priority-setting exercise to be the next logical step in their work, rather than a repudiation of prior
efforts. Networks not only need to be built; they need to be sustained.
The Tanzanian social marketing project made an important decision when establishing the team to design data collection instruments, conduct audience research and develop a social marketing strategy based on an analysis of the results. Representatives from the pilot ministry were included from the outset. By
actively involving implementers, the project not only benefited from a contextsensitive design, but established credibility, momentum and buy-in in advance
of the pilot launch. Too often, implementing organizations are left out of the
reform process until implementation is about to begin.
In the Peruvian Ombudsman project, significant efforts were made to win over
skeptical managers who had lived through previous failures in implementing
a results-based management (RBM) approach. One of those managers, Deputy
Ombudsman Eduardo Vega, began to see the potential benefits of the project’s
recommendation to reintroduce RBM as part of a comprehensive change management strategy. His endorsement of the approach proved crucial in winning
over other managers. The dividend for enlisting Mr. Vega increased further
when he was appointed acting ombudsman a year into the project.
The project supporting preparation of a strategic plan for the African Biosciences
Initiative (ABI) benefited from both its established network and an unexpected
ally. Prospects for the project’s success had dimmed markedly following removal of the project’s local partner and continuing inaction on ABI’s draft strategic
plan by its oversight organization. However, pressure from ABI’s regional and
11
bio-safety networks, which had been consulted extensively during the preparation process, kept the plan alive. Later, the project’s original proponent, who
had been kept in the loop on the project by the Canadian adviser, assumed an
influential position in the oversight organization. He not only requested that
work resume on ABI’s strategic plan, but that its planning model be considered
as a template for pan-African policies in science, technology and innovation.
This nearly moribund project had suddenly assumed an influence beyond its
original scope.
Cost it: A recurring problem with development projects arises when the resulting policy or program proposals omit related implementation costs. High-level documents, such as sector strategies or policy frameworks, are particularly
prone to such gaps. When these documents are developed through stakeholder
consultations, it is critical to ensure that realistic fiscal parameters shape the dialogue and inform proposals. Although time consuming and often challenging,
an accurate costing of proposals will significantly increase prospects for successful implementation.
When costing is omitted from strategy development, wish lists flourish. The estimated cost of Jordan’s technical and vocational education and training strategy, $163 million, far outstripped the $16 million of available funding. Had the
costing been completed at the outset rather than following completion of the
strategy, much time and effort would have been saved. Fortunately, the project
team skilfully navigated stakeholders through the wish list to come up with a
realistic, affordable set of priorities.
Both the Southern African Development Community and African Biosciences
Initiative projects involved the preparation of multi-year strategic plans using
a similar model. In discussions with local partners, the most valued attribute of
the strategic planning model was the clear linkages established between policy
goals and objectives, outputs, activities, results measures and costs. The identification of realistic fiscal requirements simplified preparation of subsequent
operational plans, monitoring frameworks, and annual budgets. In both cases,
the planning model will be replicated in future years.
Be politically astute: Given that political buy-in is routinely cited as a critical
success factor for technical assistance projects, it is surprising how many projects take great pains to avoid the political level. Whether this arises from client
or consultant apprehension or some other reason, buy-in will certainly not be
secured by simply plunking a proposal down on the minister’s desk at the project’s conclusion. Why would a minister champion a reform when the political
incentives to do so have never been explained? At the other extreme, projects
should avoid working exclusively at the political level. Without administrative
12
buy-in, the prospects for successful implementation, continuity and sustainability diminish significantly.
The project supporting the revision of Mongolia’s civil service legislation was
established to support a working group formed by the prime minister. Well into
the project, the president, from an opposing political party, established a second
working group mandated to develop and submit a separate legislative package
on civil service reform. Rather than ignoring the presidential working group,
the Canadian adviser engaged with both groups to increase the chances that
compatible policy positions would emerge from the drafting process. Given that
the prime minister’s party lost a subsequent parliamentary election, this decision proved vital to ensuring continuity of support. A second-phase project is
now underway to continue advising on civil service legislation, including a new
proposal from the presidential working group.
At its inception, the Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
faced concerted criticisms concerning the omission of human rights from its
mandate, the lack of human rights expertise among its members, the lack of
prior consultations with civil society organizations and the refusal to acknowledge the overthrow of then President Zelaya as a military coup. In response, the
TRC initiated an extensive outreach effort to engage civil society and contracted
human rights experts to investigate allegations of abuse. Ultimately, the Commission did concur that the removal of President Zelaya constituted a military
coup and addressed human rights issues at length. The final report, released in
the presence of nine hundred Honduran citizens from all walks of life, was wellreceived and praised for presenting a balanced perspective. Often, the best approach to confronting political controversy is to address the criticisms head-on.
Deal creatively with adversity: All technical assistance projects struggle when
the project environment destabilizes, unanticipated events occur, or intractable
obstacles arise. For short-duration, limited-budget projects, a quick, agile response is required to maintain momentum, deliver worthwhile technical assistance or even just survive.
In Guinea-Bissau, the atmosphere surrounding elections can be foreboding amid
threats of violence and intimidation. From an election-monitoring perspective,
however, the greatest obstacles are usually more mundane, from plodding administrative processes to translation difficulties to equipment shortages. Elections, with unalterable critical paths, cannot wait for red tape. This case study
chronicles some innovative responses by the monitoring teams to get the job
done.
13
The Guyana case study describes the difficulties encountered by a project aiming to support a national dialogue on media reform in Guyana. Early on, the
government declared its intention to boycott the project. After the initial shock,
the project reinvented itself, shifting from a consensus building to an advocacy
role. Ultimately, a private-sector media industry association was successfully established through the project. Fortunately, the aid-on-demand approach proved
sufficiently flexible to permit this creative, mid-course correction in response to
unanticipated changes in the project environment.
The Tanzanian social marketing project faced a do or die moment when sufficient funding for local consultants to complete the essential audience research
component failed to materialize. The creative do-it-yourself solution, described
earlier, saved the project from likely cancellation. The project’s ultimate success
certainly owes to its quick, outside-the-box response to adverse circumstances.
Sustainability
This chapter presents the aid-on-demand model as a cost-effective, client-sensitive approach to providing technical assistance. The initial evidence seems
compelling. For an average project cost of $170,000, 84 percent of DDD projects
delivered concrete policy or program outputs directly tied to client requests. The
litmus test of technical assistance, however, is that tangible benefits have been
sustainably transferred to the client country.
In each of the case studies that follow, a postscript is added to update the project’s implementation status. In two cases, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, military
coups have derailed progress on governance reforms, including those achieved
under the DDD projects. For the majority of cases, however, project outputs continue to be implemented, adapted and in some cases replicated beyond the client
organization. In response to a question on the degree to which project results
were still in use, three local partners rated sustainability as very high, three as
high and one as medium.
Conventional, longer-term projects can design, test, implement and build sufficient client capacity to deliver complex reforms over several years. Arguably,
such extensive involvement should be more likely to achieve sustainable results.
The counter-argument, suggested here, is that in many circumstances, the aidon-demand model’s more focused mandate and built-in client demand create
sufficient incentives and strong local ownership for sustained implementation
at much lower cost.
14
This concludes the preamble to Aid on Demand. It is hoped that a convincing case
has been made that the aid-on-demand model warrants wider consideration by
the development community. Now, it is time to let the case studies walk all this
talk.
Endnotes
1
CIDA implemented this type of multi-project program aimed at delivering concrete
policy products over a short time frame at low cost in 1997 with the Public Policy
Options Program (PPOP) for China. CIDA and IPAC have adapted the longer-running
Partnership Program model, which similarly involved multiple projects, but focused
more on capacity building over the medium term, to deliver more concrete policy
and program outputs. Based on these early successes, CIDA has since established a
number of multi-project aid programs.
2
The 2005–10 evaluation of progress towards the Paris Declaration measures indicated
that only one of thirteen targets established for 2012 had been met. Aid Effectiveness
2005–10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration (OECD Publishing: Paris, 2011).
3
One of the first evaluations to identify performance problems with current approaches
to public sector management was the 2008 World Bank evaluation, Public Sector
Reform: What Works and Why: An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Support (World Bank:
Washington, DC, 2008). The 2011 IEG evaluation identified similar and, in some cases,
worsening performance problems.
4
Based on assessments completed by the Independent Evaluation Group,
administrative and civil service reforms rated 6.9 percent below the 71.6 percent
average while public financial reforms rated 9.9 percent below. Cited in J. Blum, N.
Manning, and V. Srivastava (2011) op. cit.
5
This assessment, which compares the average PEFA scores (a donor-developed
methodology that permits cross-country comparisons across a range of public finance
system attributes) for upstream, de jure dimensions versus downstream, de facto
dimensions, is contained in M. Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Development
(Cambridge University Press: New York, 2013), 121-125.
6
IEG Annual Report 2011: Results and Performance of the World Bank Group (World Bank:
Washington, DC, 2011).
7
In cases where the DDD adviser has written a core document, for example when a
new methodology is being introduced, it has subsequently been worked through lineby-line with the local partner to ensure full understanding. Given the DDD adviser’s
relatively short time in the country, the responsibility for explaining and defending
the document invariably falls to the local partner.
15
L’aide sur demande–Faire mieux avec
moins
Le mantra de l’aide sur demande, faire mieux avec moins, reprend cette phrase
toujours prête des gouvernements dans l’espoir de convaincre un public sceptique qu’il apprécia vraiment les coupures à venir dans les programmes. Dans
ce cas-ci, nous sommes moins cyniques ; ce chapitre présentera une façon
typiquement canadienne d’offrir une aide à l’étranger qui apporte plus avec
moins. Le programme de Déploiements pour le Développement Démocratique
(DDD) de l’ACDI a été lancé en mai 2007. Misant sur plusieurs réussites précédentes, DDD a été conçu pour livrer une capacité d’intervention rapide afin de
répondre aux demandes de clients pour leur apporter de l’aide sur des projets de
courte durée, disposant de petits budgets et portant sur des produits particuliers . Dans ce recueil, l’approche utilisée par DDD est caractérisée comme « une
aide sur demande ». Dans plusieurs points fondamentaux, qui seront explorés
ci-après, le modèle de l’aide sur demande défie la sagesse conventionnelle quant
à la bonne façon d’apporter de l’aide.
Faits concernant DDD
• mécanisme lancé en 2007 ; étendu à 2015
• administré par l’Institut d’administration publique du Canada (IAPC)
• programme réactif ; l’ACDI et le bénéficiaire s’entendent sur la nature du projet ; l’IAPC recrute
ensuite le conseiller canadien et dirige le projet
• quatre thèmes : primauté du droit ; droits de la personne ; liberté et démocratie ; institutions
publiques responsables
• 16,3 millions de dollars budgétés
• à ce jour, 85 projets mis en route
• plus de 160 conseillers canadiens engagés
• projets d’une durée moyenne de 15 mois
• coût direct moyen d’un projet de 170 000 $
Une approche différente
L’approche conventionnelle de l’aide étrangère implique la mise sur pied d’une
équipe en charge du projet, dirigée par un expert international expérimenté
L’aide sur demande–Faire mieux avec moins
17
dans un pays en développement et un engagement d’une durée de deux à quatre ans. Les coûts du projet sont généralement en millions d’un chiffre. L’objectif
habituel : superviser le concept et la mise en œuvre d’une réforme complexe
et multiforme basée sur un modèle de pratiques exemplaires d’un pays développé. La justification de l’approche classique repose sur la prémisse qu’il faut
du temps, de l’argent et de l’expérience professionnelle pour mettre sur pied le
bureau chargé du projet ; engager et former le personnel responsable ; établir les
organes de contrôle du projet ; familiariser le client avec la méthodologie ; préparer les rapports de lancement ; élaborer la stratégie de réforme et en obtenir
l’approbation et, au fil du temps, ses multiples politiques, projets de loi et règlements ; et fournir de la formation à l’ensemble du gouvernement sur diverses
procédures opérationnelles.
Depuis la Déclaration de Paris sur l’efficacité de l’aide, des tentatives ont été faites
pour améliorer le modèle classique en cherchant à promouvoir des réformes axées
sur la demande, aligner les projets avec les systèmes nationaux et éviter une infrastructure lente et coûteuse des projets, notamment les unités de mise en œuvre de
projets. Malgré ces efforts, le modèle de prestation fondamental reste en grande
partie intact car les progrès dans la mise en œuvre de nouveaux modèles ont cessé.
Le modèle de l’aide sur demande va à l’encontre de la logique de la réforme
conventionnelle. De par sa conception, ses projets n’ont ni le temps ni l’argent
pour suivre les hypothèses du modèle classique. Comment alors parvient-il à
produire de façon soutenue de bons résultats ? En voici plusieurs raisons :
• Produits concrets : les projets de l’aide sur demande portent sur des initiatives
traitant de politiques ou de programmes spécifiques, non pas de vastes
réformes ou du renforcement de capacités génériques. Les résultats de projets
typiques incluent des propositions de politiques au cabinet, des projets de
loi, des plans stratégiques, des manuels de mise en œuvre, des campagnes de
communication et des documents d’information. La spécificité des résultats
augmente les chances que les recommandations seront applicables.
• Demande intégrée : un débat de longue date au sein de la communauté de
développement concerne les réformes du côté de l’offre (ce que les donateurs
pensent que les pays en développement devraient faire) par rapport
aux réformes du côté de la demande (ce que les pays en développement
souhaitent faire). La Déclaration de Paris a cherché à mettre l’accent sur la
demande, même si les progrès ont retardé les attentes. Le modèle de l’aide sur
demande se situe clairement du côté de la demande puisque la plupart des
projets proviennent de la demande d’assistance du client qui doit accomplir
une tâche. Étant donné que le besoin et la tâche sont préétablis, l’assistance
18
technique demandée porte davantage sur le « comment faire » que le « quoi
faire ».
• Engagement soutenu du client : trop souvent, les projets de développement
consacrent beaucoup de temps et de ressources à rédiger des documents
de politique élaborés et peaufinés (par ex. : des stratégies nationales de
développement ou de secteur, des documents de cadre des dépenses à
moyen terme, des manuels de mesures axées sur les résultats) qui se lisent
certainement bien, mais ne se rapportent pas aux systèmes existants. Comme
tel, les perspectives de mise en œuvre restent faibles puisque les propositions
ne sont ni bien comprises par tous ni contextuelles. En revanche, les projets
d’aide sur demande ne conviennent pas au travail effectué en situation isolée
et comptent sur l’engagement soutenu du client pour la production des
documents de base du projet.
• Le partenaire local fournit les connaissances locales : les projets de développement
doivent assurer que le contexte local est bien reflété. Certainement, au fil du
temps, un expert international résident peut être sensibilisé aux nombreuses
nuances politiques et culturelles auxquelles fait face l’organisation cliente.
Toutefois, ces connaissances approfondies sont-elles indispensables pour
assurer une collaboration fructueuse ? Pour le modèle de l’aide sur demande,
même si les conseillers possédant une expérience préalable dans le pays
du client sont souvent choisis, il n’y a pas suffisamment de temps pour
développer une compréhension approfondie du contexte local pour le sujet
en question. Inévitablement, le conseiller doit compter sur le partenaire local
pour déterminer comment refléter au mieux le contexte local. Il en résulte un
dialogue bilatéral intensif où le client doit prendre le temps de comprendre
la teneur politique de ce que le conseiller propose, de communiquer de façon
appropriée le contexte local pertinent et de travailler avec le conseiller pour
adapter les propositions qui sont considérées inappropriées au contexte.
• Une capacité suffisante va de soi : le manque de capacité continue d’être
fréquemment utilisé pour expliquer les échecs de mise en œuvre des réformes
initiées par les donateurs. Cette position habituelle laisse entendre que les
lacunes au sein des organisations bénéficiaires représentent un obstacle
omniprésent au développement. En revanche, l’approche de l’aide sur
demande suppose qu’une capacité de base suffisante existe ou qu’elle peut
être rapidement développée au sein de l’organisation du client pour mettre
en œuvre les produits stratégiques obtenus. Lorsque d’importants écarts
de compétences existent, l’inclinaison serait d’adapter les propositions en
conséquence plutôt que de compter sur l’assistance technique à long terme
pendant que le client se met au courant. La réussite fréquente des projets
d’aide sur demande sous-entend que les perceptions au sujet des écarts
19
chroniques de compétences dans les administrations publiques des pays en
développement sont peut-être exagérées.
• Dépendance du client : les projets d’aide sur demande permettent en général de
financer de un à trois conseillers pour deux à quatre missions sur une période
de douze à dix-huit mois. Les conseillers iront sur le lieu de travail du client
et passeront une bonne part de leur temps à travailler directement avec lui.
Le modèle de l’aide sur demande exclut les unités de mise en œuvre de
projets, les bureaux d’étude, le personnel assigné aux projets et les structures
de gestion de projets complexes. C’est, de par sa nature, un modèle de haute
collaboration.
Une autre caractéristique de l’aide sur demande est le critère de sélection pour
identifier ses conseillers. DDD préfère utiliser des cadres supérieurs actuels ou
anciens provenant d’organismes comparables de la fonction publique. Même
si les professionnels du développement à long terme ne sont nullement exclus,
une telle expérience n’est pas habituellement recherchée. Les hypothèses sousjacentes sont les suivantes :
• les hauts fonctionnaires actuels et anciens sont plus susceptibles d’être
disponibles pour effectuer des missions à court terme plutôt qu’à long terme
dans le pays ;
• le client est plus susceptible de se rapporter à un conseiller qui est ou a été
employé à un niveau supérieur dans un organisme homologue ;
• il sera plus facile pour le cadre supérieur de solliciter l’aide ou d’obtenir des
renseignements et des documents du ministère où il travaille ou a travaillé
auparavant ; et
• les cadres supérieurs possèdent une longue expérience de la navigation
des processus d’approbation du gouvernement et de la compréhension des
incitatifs politiques.
En général, le client a été très satisfait des conseillers recrutés. Seulement deux
des quatre-vingt-cinq projets lancés dans le cadre de DDD ont nécessité le
remplacement du conseiller en charge du projet.
Ces arguments en faveur des programmes d’aide sur demande ne visent pas à
sous-estimer les projets traditionnels de l’aide étrangère. Il y aura certainement
de nombreuses situations où une approche de l’aide sur demande est inappropriée. Toutefois, étant donné la prépondérance du mécanisme classique du projet, il est suggéré qu’un plus large éventail de scénarios d’aide bénéficierait de
cette approche différente pour fournir de l’assistance technique.
20
Rentabilité
Une analyse coûts-avantages comparant les modèles classiques et l’aide sur
demande n’entre pas dans le cadre de cette étude. Néanmoins, une comparaison descriptive des avantages et des inconvénients respectifs peut être révélatrice. Cette comparaison est effectuée dans un milieu où l’insatisfaction de
la performance des approches classiques dans la livraison des réformes de
l’administration publique et de la fonction publique augmente et des approches
subsidiaires sont très recherchées.
Pour une comparaison des coûts, prenons un projet classique typique d’aide
étrangère, dans ce cas basé sur un projet réel de l’ACDI, qui a duré quatre ans. Le
projet visait à réformer le processus d’élaboration des politiques dans un pays
en développement, en utilisant une équipe de projet dans le pays dirigée par
un expert international résident et travaillant avec un client bien placé dans un
organisme central. D’autres experts internationaux sont venus au pays pour de
courtes missions ; plusieurs séjours d’études ont été organisés au Canada ; et
une solide formation a été donnée aux responsables des politiques dans les organismes centraux et les ministères de première ligne en partenariat avec une
université locale. Le projet n’a pas respecté les délais fixés dans son calendrier
ambitieux en raison des retards à obtenir les approbations des politiques pour
certains produits, mais, a finalement produit plusieurs solides réalisations. Le
coût d’ensemble était de 6,4 millions de dollars.
Par comparaison, le coût moyen d’un projet de DDD est de 170 000 $. En supposant des frais généraux de 20 pour cent, un budget de 6,4 millions de dollars pourrait financer environ trente projets individuels de DDD. Certes, il est
difficile de comparer les enjeux respectifs d’une série de résultats d’un projet
classique pour un client par rapport aux résultats de trente projets d’aide sur
demande, mais plusieurs avantages concurrentiels en termes de coûts pour ce
modèle peuvent être cités :
• Mise en route minimale : la nature réactive du programme, lorsque le
partenaire local et l’ACDI mettent en forme la proposition à l’avance, réduit
considérablement la définition et les coûts de lancement du projet.
• Aucun temps d’arrêt : les conseillers canadiens arrivent dans le pays,
travaillent pendant deux semaines et partent. Si le projet est interrompu
par suite d’élections ou d’un remaniement ministériel, le conseiller retarde
simplement la mission suivante, reste en relation avec le client par courriel
dans l’intervalle. Un conseiller résident doit trouver autre chose à faire et,
bien sûr, continue à recevoir son salaire durant de telles périodes.
21
• Pas d’équipes de projet ou de bureaux pour le projet dans le pays : les frais importants
pour soutenir un conseiller résident, l’équipe locale du projet et un bureau
sur plusieurs années sont remplacés par le prix de quelques billets d’avion et
les frais d’hôtels et de repas pour plusieurs semaines échelonnées sur une ou
deux années.
• Pas de séjours d’étude : DDD ne prend en charge que les coûts liés aux conseillers
canadiens et quelques modestes dépenses dans le pays. Les voyages d’étude
sont financés par le bénéficiaire.
Une comparaison de l’efficacité respective des deux modèles n’est pas pratique.
Comme il faut s’y attendre, des données comparatives n’existent pas pour les
projets d’aide sur demande puisque l’approche est relativement rare et les évaluations effectuées par les organismes de développement ne se différencient pas
par modèle de prestation. Ce qui peut être cité est une série d’évaluations concluant des résultats sous-optimaux de réformes conventionnelles.
Une récente évaluation de la Banque mondiale indiquait que les réformes
administratives, les réformes de la fonction publique et de la gestion des
finances publiques avaient une note bien en dessous du chiffre global de 71,6
pour cent des projets de gestion du secteur public qui enregistraient des résultats4 au moins modérément satisfaisants. Une comparaison des réformes des
finances publiques en Afrique indique que les progrès réalisés concernant la
qualité de la conception, la législation et la préparation du processus budgétaire dépassaient nettement les progrès accomplis dans l’exécution du budget,
ce qui suggère que la mise en œuvre des modèles de meilleures pratiques reste
décevante5. En outre, la performance des réformes financées par l’aide semble
être en baisse. De 1999 à 2006, les deux tiers des pays recevant de l’aide de la
Banque mondiale pour une réforme du secteur public ont amélioré leurs résultats dans le cadre de l’évaluation politique et institutionnelle du pays (CPIA). De
2007 à 2009, seulement 39 pour cent des pays ont amélioré leurs résultats dans le
cadre de l’évaluation de CPIA, tandis que 25 pour cent des pays ont enregistré
des baisses6.
Même si une évaluation exhaustive n’existe pas, quelques observations peuvent
être faites concernant les programmes d’aide sur demande. Sur les cinquantesept projets de DDD achevés, quarante-trois ont été terminés avec toutes les
tâches/résultats de base livrés au complet tandis que quatorze ont été partiellement terminés. Des quatorze projets partiellement achevés, six ont été suspendus pour des raisons politiques, tels que des coups d’état militaires. Le taux de
réussite pour les projets ininterrompus s’établit donc à un impressionnant 84
pour cent, ou 75 pour cent si les projets suspendus sont inclus.
22
En ce qui concerne la satisfaction des clients, un sondage de sept partenaires
locaux de projets d’études de cas a été réalisé, à tout le moins l’année qui a suivi
l’achèvement du projet, pour obtenir leurs perceptions concernant la qualité
et les effets durables du projet. Cet échantillon, certes de petite taille, renforce
toutefois les impressions positives véhiculées par les études de cas.
Mesure
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
4
expérience, compétences, connaissances du conseiller
canadien/de la conseillère canadienne
1
6
collaboration efficace entre le conseiller/la conseillère et le
partenaire local
2
5
3
2
succès de l’ensemble du projet
pertinence des modèles canadiens dans le contexte local
2
Les classements étaient : 5=très élevé ; 4=élevé ; 3=moyen ; 2=faible ; 1=très faible
En dehors des niveaux élevés de satisfaction exprimée, il est intéressant de constater que la moyenne des notes les plus élevées se rapportait à la qualité de la
relation de travail avec les conseillers canadiens (notes moyennes de 4,9 et 4,7)
alors que la note la plus faible se rapportait à la pertinence des modèles canadiens (note moyenne de 4). Ceci laisse entendre que l’utilisation des meilleures
pratiques canadiennes a simplement fourni un point de départ et que la valeur
du projet provient davantage de la capacité du conseiller de collaborer avec le
partenaire local pour adapter ces modèles ou d’autres au contexte local.
Restrictions
L’approche de l’aide sur demande ne doit pas être interprétée comme étant la
prochaine grande solution parmi les modalités de l’aide et ne devrait surtout pas
être promue comme étant un remplacement de gros au modèle conventionnel.
Les programmes d’aide sur demande ne marchent pas dans toutes les circonstances et ne sont probablement pas appropriés lorsque :
• la contrepartie locale n’existe pas ; par ex., dans les cas où des experts
étrangers sont appelés à remplacer des fonctionnaires nationaux ;
• l’initiative consiste à diriger la conception et la réalisation d’un important
programme de réforme pluriannuel ;
23
• d’importants investissements en capital, tels que des systèmes informatiques
intégrés, accompagnent l’assistance technique ;
• la capacité locale fait vraiment défaut et que, comme alternative, les experts
locaux possédant l’ensemble des compétences nécessaires ne sont pas
disponibles ;
• le client insiste sur une présence au pays d’un conseiller résident ; et / ou
• l’importante résistance du client va vraisemblablement se heurter aux
réformes proposées, par ex., lorsqu’un projet est supposé mettre en œuvre
une conditionnalité impopulaire jointe à un programme de l’IGF ou de la
Banque mondiale.
Il faut ajouter une mise en garde concernant les projets de démocratisation.
Même si les gouvernements peuvent s’opposer à des projets qui nécessitent de
travailler avec des clients externes, notamment des médias indépendants, des
organisations de la société civile ou des observateurs électoraux, ceci ne devrait
pas empêcher un projet d’aide sur demande de se poursuivre pour autant que
le partenaire externe est consentant et que le milieu de travail est suffisamment
sécuritaire.
En définitive, lorsque les circonstances le permettent, le modèle de l’aide sur demande devrait être davantage considéré comme une option ou un complément
aux approches classiques.
Leçons retenues
Les études de cas elles-mêmes offrent un large éventail d’enseignements liés à
leurs domaines individuels de politique ou de programme. On peut dire que les
leçons les plus convaincantes découlent de la façon dont les conseillers et leurs
partenaires locaux ont établi des relations de travail efficaces et répondu à des
attentes irréalistes ou des événements imprévus. Ces enseignements montrent
que le placement d’un conseiller approprié avec un client motivé peut produire
des résultats supérieurs même si le temps et le financement alloués au projet
sont limités. Les huit leçons suivantes, communes à plusieurs cas, se distinguent.
Bien cerner l’étendue du projet : Pour tout projet, mais surtout pour un projet
de courte durée, il est essentiel que les activités et les résultats attendus correspondent de façon réaliste au temps et aux ressources alloués pour effectuer le
travail. Les bénéficiaires, habitués à des projets plus vastes, ne s’attendent peutêtre pas à un tel projet ciblé, sans superflu. Au stade de la planification du tra-
24
vail, il est essentiel qu’une compréhension réciproque claire soit atteinte concernant ce que le projet va et ne va pas financer et les résultats possibles à réaliser.
En Ukraine, l’unité d’analyse du budget au Secrétariat du président espérait à
l’origine que le projet facilite la mise en place d’un groupe de politiques macroéconomiques qui fonctionne bien, avec des compétences et des outils en modélisation économétrique similaires à ceux du ministère des Finances. Au cours
des négociations du plan de travail, un ensemble plus modeste et plus réaliste
des réalisations attendues s’est dégagé, avec le principal résultat du projet devenant la préparation et la mise à l’essai d’un manuel d’analyse du budget. La
méthodologie résultante a été appliquée avec succès au budget du gouvernement en vigueur au cours du projet.
Un projet modeste de formation et de renforcement des capacités sur l’application
d’une approche de marketing social à l’avancement de l’éthique dans la fonction publique de la Tanzanie a connu des pressions lorsque les donateurs soutenant le Programme de réforme du secteur public de la Tanzanie ont voulu que
les initiatives soient davantage orientées vers l’action et axées sur les résultats.
En réponse, la Division de la promotion de l’éthique au Bureau du président
espérait transformer le projet de DDD en un programme de mise en œuvre à
part entière intégrant une série de projets pilotes. Par le biais de négociations,
un projet ambitieux mais réalisable a été conçu, ajoutant un seul projet pilote
aux activités initiales du projet. Finalement, le projet s’est avéré très réussi et est
maintenant mis en œuvre dans d’autres ministères.
Élucider le véritable problème : L’une des erreurs les plus communes dans
l’élaboration des politiques est de supposer que le problème ou, pire, la solution
est évidente. Plusieurs projets de DDD ont découvert, le plus souvent par le biais
d’entretiens avec les intéressés, que le problème perçu n’est pas le véritable obstacle. Étant donné la courte durée des projets, cette détermination doit être effectuée dès le début. Pour ce faire, les conseillers doivent trouver le juste équilibre entre le besoin de gagner la confiance du client et la nécessité de procéder à
une fonction de remise en question légitime.
Le réseau de la communauté de développement de l’Afrique australe (SADC), a
rapproché vingt-sept institutions financières de développement issues de quinze
états membres. L’évaluation d’un donateur avait identifié des problèmes de gouvernance entre les diverses organisations. Une étude plus approfondie a permis
de découvrir que le problème principal était un manque de communication et
un malentendu concernant les responsabilités/rôles respectifs. En redressant la
situation, les prétendus problèmes importants de gouvernance ont disparu.
L’Agence de la planification des politiques et du développement de l’Indonésie
pensait qu’une restructuration organisationnelle serait la réponse à son isolement
25
traditionnel et son manque de pertinence opérationnelle au sein du ministère
des Affaires étrangères. Par le biais du projet, des solutions moins radicales mais
plus efficaces ont été identifiées, notamment l’expansion des réseaux d’échange,
des comités de travail interservices et l’amélioration du partage de l’information.
L’Office de l’Ombudsman du Pérou avait deux fois auparavant tenté d’adopter
une approche de gestion axée sur les résultats (GAR) avec peu de succès. Peut-être
un troisième effort serait le porte-bonheur. Cependant, les conseillers canadiens,
soutenus par l’ombudsman, avaient déterminé lors de la phase de conception
du projet que le problème n’était pas tant méthodologique qu’organisationnel.
La GAR serait donc mise en œuvre dans le cadre d’une stratégie globale de gestion du changement qui serait appliquée à l’ensemble des silos organisationnels
et intégrée jusqu’au niveau opérationnel. Cette fois, l’approche de la GAR avait
fonctionné.
Le réaliser, se l’approprier : Trop souvent, les consultants internationaux
produisent des documents élaborés, répétant les meilleures pratiques des pays
développés. La plupart du temps, les gouvernements bénéficiaires approuvent
ces documents, même s’il est rare qu’ils en comprennent pleinement le contenu.
Sans aucun doute, les problèmes surgissent durant la phase de mise en œuvre lorsque les agences de coordination font leur possible pour expliquer aux
ministères intéressés comment ces concepts élaborés devraient être appliqués
aux processus locaux mal adaptés. Au fil du temps, l’écart entre les pratiques
formelles et réelles continue de croître étant donné que les systèmes doubles
fonctionnent dans un isolement relatif. Dans la plupart des projets d’aide sur
demande, le rôle du conseiller est essentiellement de fournir des conseils stratégiques et des exemples qui peuvent être adaptés au contexte local par le partenaire local, au lieu d’écrire des documents longs et complexes. La majorité des
plans, des politiques et des manuels produits par le biais des projets de DDD
sont rédigés par le partenaire local7. Ce qui résulte en une meilleure compréhension, une plus grande fierté et adhésion pour ce qui est du produit final. Pour
l’avoir écrit lui-même, le partenaire local est donc plus apte à expliquer le produit et, au fil du temps, à l’affiner à mesure que les circonstances changent et
qu’il acquiert de l’expérience.
Au Mali, une importante réforme des finances publiques n’avait pas réalisé 40
pour cent des objectifs de la première phase. Il était donc convenu d’essayer
une approche différente dans l’élaboration d’un plan d’action pour la deuxième
phase. À la place du processus de consultation descendant habituel suivant
lequel les ressources locales sont substituées aux experts externes, les conseillers
canadiens ont proposé de poursuivre une approche participative générale engageant près d’une centaine d’intervenants qui représentaient quarante organismes de la fonction publique, la société civile, des donateurs, le parlement et
26
d’autres institutions intéressées. Les groupes de travail organisés autour de quatre objectifs stratégiques de la réforme ont travaillé intensément à l’élaboration
et la formulation du contenu du plan d’action. Le produit final, approuvé par
le gouvernement, est devenu une source de fierté pour ses nombreux auteurs et
collaborateurs. Le degré élevé d’adhésion à son tour a généré un engagement à
une mise en œuvre en aval.
En Tanzanie, un projet visant à appliquer des techniques de marketing social
pour la promotion de l’éthique dans la fonction publique tanzanienne rencontrait des difficultés à obtenir un financement suffisant pour que les experts locaux puissent conduire une étude d’audience. Il ne restait qu’une solution : le
réaliser soi-même. Les conseillers canadiens ont donc formé le partenaire local et
l’équipe d’appui au projet pour conduire l’étude eux-mêmes. Cette participation
pratique à la recherche s’est traduite par un engagement plus soutenu et une
plus grande maîtrise du contenu. En fait, l’organisation cliente a présenté la stratégie à la haute direction pour son approbation. Un an plus tard, la même équipe
a effectué une évaluation des progrès réalisés à ce jour. Même si elle provenait
d’une nécessité opérationnelle, l’approche de réaliser soi-même cette étude s’est
finalement révélée propice à générer une fierté d’appropriation et un élan de
mise en œuvre.
Le rendre pertinent au travail : Pratiquement tous les projets d’aide extérieure
aspirent à ce que les bénéficiaires assument la responsabilité du projet, qui à
son tour en renforce la viabilité. Le plus souvent, la prise en charge est le mieux
réalisée lorsque l’objet du projet se rapporte directement au travail journalier
de l’organisation cliente. Dans ce cas, le projet contribue clairement à une tâche
à accomplir au lieu d’adopter des principes abstraits ou de créer des obligations supplémentaires. En tant que programme réactif, les projets de l’aide sur
demande se rapportent le plus souvent aux responsabilités en vigueur ou en
attente dans le travail du client.
Au lieu d’utiliser des exemples génériques, hypothétiques dans le cadre d’un
programme de formation, il avait été décidé d’élaborer et de présenter des exposés de position sur des questions concrètes en matière de politique pour le projet
à réaliser avec le ministère des Affaires étrangères de l’Indonésie. Par exemple,
un document d’orientation avait été préparé sur les positions et les tactiques à
adopter lors de la prochaine réunion du G-20. Des instructions sur l’utilisation
des recherches électroniques pour la recherche sur les politiques appuyaient directement la préparation des rapports. Le programme d’accompagnement à la
formation des formateurs était structuré de sorte à appuyer le nouveau processus des politiques et de recherche. Le fait que les rapports soient bien accueillis
par le ministre a stimulé le client de sorte à prendre en charge et améliorer le
27
nouveau processus d’élaboration des politiques. Ceci n’aurait certainement pas
eu lieu si de véritables exposés de position n’avaient pas été produits.
En Ukraine, le manuel d’analyse du budget avait été préparé à l’intention des
analystes du Secrétariat du président. Ce qui a vraiment confirmé l’acceptation
et la pérennité possible du manuel a été d’en faire l’expérimentation sur le budget du gouvernement actuel. C’est alors que le conseiller canadien a senti « qu’ils
avaient compris ».
Établir des réseaux, chercher des alliés : Quelle que soit la politique, celui
qui est en charge de son élaboration doit obtenir l’appui de celui qui a une influence directe sur l’approbation. Il y a, toutefois, de solides arguments pour
étendre le réseau des adeptes au-delà de cet ensemble discret de joueurs influents. Premièrement, les décideurs s’y attendent. Lorsqu’ils délibèrent sur une
proposition de politique, ils voudront connaître les réactions prévisibles des différents groupes, l’information qui est la mieux obtenue par le biais de consultations préalables. Deuxièmement, des consultations sérieuses auprès des parties
prenantes responsables d’une politique proposée, intéressées à elle, ou affectées
par elle peuvent aider à en améliorer la qualité et en accroître l’acceptation.
Troisièmement, il est généralement payant de lancer un large filet étant donné
que les joueurs en apparence moins importants peuvent exercer une influence
inattendue, souvent au cours de la mise en oeuvre. Enfin, les personnes et les
postes changent. Le gestionnaire intermédiaire d’aujourd’hui peut devenir le
dirigeant de demain. En fait, un réseau ne peut jamais être trop grand ou les alliés trop nombreux.
L’exemple du Mali sur la réforme des finances publiques, dont il est fait référence
plus haut, montre comment les réseaux élargis, s’ils participent valablement au
cours de la phase d’élaboration de la stratégie ou de la politique, peuvent créer
une large base de soutien et d’élan pour une mise en œuvre en aval. Même si le
processus de réforme a déraillé par le coup d’état militaire de 2012 et les événements qui ont suivi, il est prévu que, avec la reprise de l’aide étrangère, le vaste
réseau des adeptes de la réforme lui permettra de reprendre rapidement là où il
s’est arrêté.
En Jordanie, un vaste réseau d’intervenants avait mis au point une stratégie
dans le secteur de l’éducation et de la formation technique et professionnelle.
Malheureusement, la stratégie était inabordable par un facteur de dix. Appelé
pour résoudre cette lacune, le projet se trouvait face à l’énorme défi de produire
une stratégie retravaillée abordable sans aliéner le groupe d’intervenants. En
fin de compte, ceci fut accompli en réengageant le réseau dans le processus de
révision et en considérant l’exercice d’établissement des priorités comme étant
28
la prochaine étape logique dans leur travail, au lieu de repousser les efforts antérieurs. Il faut non seulement établir les réseaux, il faut aussi les soutenir.
Une importante décision a été prise dans le cadre du projet de marketing social
en Tanzanie en établissant l’équipe chargée de concevoir des instruments de collecte de données, de conduire des études d’audience et d’élaborer une stratégie
de marketing social reposant sur une analyse des résultats. Des représentants du
ministère pilote étaient inclus dès le départ. En engageant activement les exécutants, le projet a non seulement bénéficié d’une conception contextuelle, mais
établi la crédibilité, l’élan et l’adhésion avant le lancement pilote. Trop souvent,
les organismes d’exécution sont laissés de côté lors du processus de réforme
jusqu’à ce que la mise en œuvre soit sur le point de commencer.
Dans le projet de l’Ombudsman du Pérou, des efforts importants ont été déployés pour convaincre les gestionnaires sceptiques qui avaient vécu des échecs
précédents lors de la mise en œuvre d’une approche de gestion axée sur les résultats (GAR). L’un de ces gestionnaires, le vice-ombudsman Eduardo Vega,
commençait à voir les avantages potentiels de la recommandation du projet de
réintroduire la GAR dans le cadre d’une stratégie globale de gestion du changement. Son approbation de l’approche s’avérait cruciale pour convaincre les
autres gestionnaires. L’avantage d’engager M. Vega alla plus loin lorsqu’il fut
nommé ombudsman par intérim l’année qui a suivi le démarrage du projet.
Le projet d’appui à la préparation d’un plan stratégique pour l’Initiative
Africaine des Biosciences (IAB) a bénéficié à la fois de son réseau bien établi et
d’un allié inattendu. Les perspectives de réussite du projet avaient considérablement faibli à la suite du retrait du partenaire local du projet et de l’inaction continue de l’organisme de supervision de l’ébauche du plan stratégique de l’IAB.
La pression des réseaux régionaux et bio-sécuritaires de l’IAB, que l’on avait
beaucoup consultés pendant le processus de préparation, avait toutefois permis
de maintenir le plan en vie. Le partisan initial du projet, qui avait été tenu au
courant du projet par le conseiller canadien, a assumé plus tard une position
influente dans l’organisme de supervision. Il a non seulement demandé que
les travaux reprennent sur le plan stratégique de l’IAB, mais que son cadre de
planification soit considéré comme modèle pour l’élaboration de politiques
panafricaines en science, technologie et innovation. Ce projet presque mort a
assumé soudainement une influence au-delà de sa portée initiale.
Établir le coût : Un problème périodique avec les projets de développement
survient quand les coûts de mise en œuvre des politiques et des programmes ne
sont pas inclus dans les propositions obtenues. Les documents de haut niveau,
tels que les stratégies sectorielles ou cadres politiques, sont particulièrement sujets à ces lacunes. Lorsque ces documents sont élaborés dans le cadre de con-
29
sultations auprès des intéressés, il est essentiel de s’assurer que des paramètres
financiers réalistes forment le dialogue et renseignent les propositions. Même si
cela prend du temps et n’est souvent pas facile, une estimation précise des coûts
des propositions permettra d’accroître considérablement les perspectives d’une
mise en œuvre réussie.
Lorsque l’estimation des coûts est omise dans l’élaboration d’une stratégie, les
listes de souhaits s’épanouissent. Le coût estimatif de la stratégie dans le secteur
de l’éducation et de la formation technique et professionnelle de la Jordanie,
de 163 millions de dollars, a largement dépassé les 16 millions de dollars de
financement disponible. Si l’estimation avait été produite au début et non pas
après l’achèvement de la stratégie, bien du temps et des efforts auraient été
épargnés. Heureusement, l’équipe du projet avait habilement amené les intervenants à explorer la liste de souhaits pour parvenir à un ensemble de priorités
réalistes et abordables.
Les projets tant de la communauté de développement de l’Afrique australe
(SADC) et de l’Initiative Africaine des Biosciences (IAB) comprenaient la préparation de plans stratégiques pluriannuels où un modèle similaire était utilisé.
Dans les discussions avec les partenaires locaux, l’attribut le plus valable du
modèle de planification stratégique était les liens précis établis entre les buts
et objectifs politiques, les résultats, les activités, les mesures des résultats et les
coûts. L’identification de besoins budgétaires réalistes simplifiait la préparation
des plans opérationnels, des cadres de surveillance et des budgets annuels ultérieurs. Dans les deux cas, le modèle de planification sera reproduit dans les
années à venir.
Être bien avisé sur le plan politique : Étant donné que l’adhésion politique est
régulièrement citée comme un facteur critique de succès des projets d’assistance
technique, il est surprenant de constater combien de projets font tout pour éviter
le niveau politique. Que ceci provienne de l’appréhension du client ou de l’expert
ou de quelque autre raison, l’adhésion ne sera certainement pas garantie en laissant simplement tomber une proposition sur le bureau du ministre à la fin du
projet. Pourquoi un ministre soutiendrait-il une réforme lorsque les motivations
politiques à la faire n’ont jamais été expliquées ? À l’autre extrême, les projets
devraient éviter de travailler exclusivement au niveau politique. Sans adhésion
administrative, les perspectives de réussite de la mise en œuvre, la continuité et
la durabilité du projet diminuent considérablement.
Le projet à l’appui de la révision de la législation de la fonction publique de
la Mongolie avait été établi en vue de soutenir un groupe de travail constitué
par le premier ministre. Dans le courant du projet, le président, d’un parti politique adverse, avait établi un deuxième groupe de travail chargé d’élaborer et de
30
présenter un autre ensemble de mesures législatives sur la réforme de la fonction
publique. Au lieu d’ignorer le groupe de travail présidentiel, le conseiller canadien s’est entretenu auprès des deux groupes afin d’augmenter les chances que
des positions politiques compatibles ressortent du processus de rédaction. Étant
donné que le parti du premier ministre avait perdu des élections parlementaires ultérieures, cette décision s’est avérée vitale pour assurer la continuité du
soutien. Une deuxième phase du projet est actuellement en cours pour continuer
à conseiller sur la législation de la fonction publique, y compris une nouvelle
proposition du groupe de travail présidentiel.
Lors de sa création, la Commission de vérité et de réconciliation au Honduras
(TRC) faisait face à des critiques concertées concernant l’omission des droits de
la personne dans son mandat, le manque d’expertise sur les droits de la personne
parmi ses membres, l’absence de consultations préalables avec les organisations
de la société civile et le refus de reconnaître le renversement du président de
l’époque, le président Zelaya, comme étant un coup d’état militaire. En réponse,
la commission s’est engagée dans un vaste effort de sensibilisation pour attirer
l’attention de la société civile et a embauché à contrat des experts en droit de la
personne pour enquêter sur les allégations d’abus. Finalement, la commission
a été de l’avis que la destitution du président Zelaya constituait un coup d’état
militaire et elle s’est donc sérieusement penchée sur les questions de droits humains. Le rapport final, publié en présence de neuf cents citoyens honduriens
de tous les milieux, a été bien accueilli et félicité pour présenter une perspective
équilibrée. Souvent, la meilleure façon de faire face à une controverse politique
est d’attaquer les critiques de front.
Faire preuve de créativité face à l’adversité : C’est une épreuve pour tous les
projets d’assistance technique lorsque l’environnement du projet se déstabilise,
des événements imprévus se produisent ou des obstacles insurmontables surviennent. Pour les projets de budget limité et de courte durée, une intervention
rapide et habile est nécessaire pour maintenir l’élan, offrir une assistance technique utile ou même simplement survivre.
En Guinée-Bissau, le climat entourant des élections peut être un présage à la
suite de menaces de violence et d’intimidation. Du point de vue de l’observation
des élections, cependant, les plus grands obstacles sont généralement plus banals, allant de processus administratifs laborieux à des difficultés de traduction
à la pénurie de matériel. Les élections, avec des chemins critiques inaltérables,
ne peuvent pas attendre les formalités administratives. Cette étude de cas retrace plusieurs solutions novatrices des équipes de surveillance pour effectuer
le travail.
31
L’étude de cas de la Guyane décrit les difficultés rencontrées par un projet visant
à soutenir un dialogue national sur la réforme des médias en Guyane. Dès le
début, le gouvernement avait déclaré son intention de boycotter le projet. Après
le choc initial, le projet s’est réinventé, passant d’une concertation à un rôle de
plaidoyer. En fin de compte, une association privée de l’industrie des médias a
été créé avec succès par le biais du projet. Heureusement, l’approche de l’aide
sur demande s’est avérée suffisamment souple pour permettre cette correction
créative à mi-parcours en réponse à des changements imprévus.
C’était une question de vie ou de mort pour le projet de marketing social en
Tanzanie lorsqu’une suffisance de fonds ne se matérialisait pas pour permettre
aux experts locaux de terminer l’étude d’audience qui était l’élément essentiel du
projet. La solution novatrice de « le réaliser soi-même », décrite précédemment,
a sauvé le projet de sa probable annulation. En fin de compte, c’est grâce à une
réponse rapide et différente devant des circonstances défavorables que le projet
doit tout son succès.
Viabilité
Ce chapitre présente le modèle de l’aide sur demande comme étant une approche valable, axée sur les besoins du client pour offrir une assistance technique. La preuve initiale semble convaincante. Pour le coût moyen d’un projet de
170 000 $, 84 pour cent des projets de DDD ont livré des résultats concrets en
matière de politique ou de programme directement liés aux demandes des clients. Toutefois, l’épreuve décisive de l’assistance technique est que des avantages concrets aux effets durables soient transmis au le pays du client.
Dans chacune des études de cas qui suivent, un post-scriptum est ajouté pour
faire le point sur l’état de mise en œuvre du projet en question. Dans deux cas, le
Mali et la Guinée-Bissau, des coups d’état militaires ont fait dérailler les progrès
sur les réformes en matière de gouvernance, y compris ceux réalisés dans le
cadre des projets de DDD. Pour la majorité des études de cas, les résultats des
projets continuent cependant d’être appliqués, adaptés et, dans certains cas, reproduits en dehors de l’organisation cliente. En réponse à une question, à savoir
si les résultats des projets ont des effets durables, trois partenaires locaux ont
classé la durabilité comme étant très élevée, trois comme élevée et un comme
moyennement élevée.
Les projets classiques, à plus long terme peuvent concevoir, mettre à l’essai,
mettre en œuvre et renforcer suffisamment les capacités du client pour réaliser
des réformes complexes sur plusieurs années. On peut soutenir qu’un engagement aussi long devrait permettre d’obtenir des résultats durables. Le contre32
argument, proposé ici, est que dans bien des circonstances, le mandat plus ciblé
et la demande intégrée du client dans le cadre du modèle de l’aide sur demande
créent des incitatifs suffisants et un solide engagement local pour une mise en
œuvre soutenue à moindre coût.
Ceci conclut le préambule de l’Aide sur demande. Il est à espérer que les arguments sont convaincants et que le modèle de l’aide sur demande mérite un
examen approfondi par la communauté de développement. Maintenant, il est
temps de laisser les études de cas donner le ton.
Notes
1
L’ACDI a mis en œuvre ce type de programme multi-projets visant à offrir des
produits concrets en matière de politiques, de courte durée et à peu de frais, en 1997,
avec le Programme canadien Options politiques publiques (POPP) pour la Chine ; a
adapté le modèle du Programme de partenariat en marche depuis plus longtemps,
qui comportait lui aussi des projets multiples, mais qui était davantage axé sur le
renforcement des capacités à moyen terme pour livrer des résultats plus concrets
concernant les politiques et programmes. Tirant parti de ces premiers succès du
POPP, l’ACDI a depuis mis en place un certain nombre de programmes d’aide multiprojets.
2
L’évaluation de 2005-2010 des progrès vers les mesures de la Déclaration de Paris a
montré que seulement un des treize objectifs fixés pour 2012 avaient été respectées.
Efficacité de l’aide 2005-2010 : Progrès dans la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration de
Paris (Éditions OCDE : Paris, 2010).
3
L’une des premières évaluations pour identifier les problèmes de performance des
approches actuelles de gestion du secteur public était l’évaluation, en 2008, de la
Banque mondiale sur : Public Sector Reform: What Works and Why: An IEG Evaluation of
World Bank Support (Banque mondiale : Washington DC, 2008). L’évaluation de 2011,
réalisée par l’Independent Evaluation Group [groupe d’évaluation indépendant]
(IEG), a identifié des problèmes de performance similaires et, dans certains cas, plus
graves.
4
Basées sur les évaluations réalisées par l’IEG, les réformes administratives et de la
fonction publique étaient de l’ordre de 6,9 pour cent au-dessous de la moyenne de
71,6 pour cent tandis que les réformes des finances publiques étaient de 9,9 pour cent
au-dessous. Cité dans K. Blum, J.N. Manning, et V. Srivastava (2011), cit. op.
5
Cette évaluation, qui compare les notes moyennes du PEFA (une méthodologie
mise au point par des donateurs, laquelle permet d’effectuer des comparaisons dans
l’ensemble du pays par le biais d’une série de caractéristiques du système de finances
33
publiques) en amont, dimensions de jure par rapport à l’aval, dimensions de facto,
est comprise dans M. Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Development (Cambridge
University Press : New York, 2013) 121-125.
6
IEG Annual Report 2011: Results and Performance of the World Bank Group [Rapport
annuel de 2011 de l’IEG – Résultats et performance du groupe de la Banque mondiale]
(World Bank: Washington DC, 2011).
7
Dans les cas où le conseiller de DDD écrit un document de base, notamment
l’introduction d’une nouvelle méthodologie, celui-ci est ensuite travaillé ligne par
ligne avec le partenaire local pour en assurer la pleine compréhension. Étant donné
que le conseiller de DDD ne reste qu’une période de temps relativement courte
dans le pays, la responsabilité d’expliquer et de défendre le document retombe
invariablement sur le partenaire local.
34
Chapter 2
Beginning the Healing Process: Canada’s
Participation in the Honduran Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Michael Kergin.
Abstract: The international community swiftly condemned the military coup that deposed the Honduran President in June 2009. Although the de facto government formed
after the coup only lasted until the next scheduled election in November, Honduras did
not return to diplomatic normalcy for another two years. Meanwhile, the deep political,
social and economic divisions that underpinned the crisis remained largely in place. To
determine what actually happened in June 2009 and identify a way forward for the country, the newly-elected President established the five-member Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in April 2010. The Commission comprised two Honduran
and three international members, including Michael Kergin, former Canadian ambassador to the United States and Cuba. In just over a year, the TRC travelled to all eighteen
Honduran provinces, held over three hundred meetings, and received testimony from
one-hundred and fifty-five political, judicial, military, and legislative figures linked to the
events. Its final report, titled “So That These Events Will Never Reoccur,” was released in
July 2011. This case study examines how the Commission, facing significant skepticism
concerning its mandate, reached out to its critics, dealt directly with the highly-charged
issue of human rights violations and crafted a balanced, well-received set of recommendations. The Honduran experience described below is rich in lessons learned and provides some critical insights on the effective use of truth and reconciliation commissions
as a catalyst to begin the healing process in conflict-affected nations.
Sommaire : La communauté internationale a rapidement condamné le coup d’état qui a
renversé le président du Honduras en juin 2009. Même si le gouvernement de facto qui a
été formé après le coup d’état n’a gardé le pouvoir que jusqu’aux élections prévues en novembre, le Honduras n’a retrouvé la « normalité » diplomatique que deux ans plus tard.
Pendant ce temps, les divisions politiques, sociales et économiques qui ont contribué à
la crise ont largement perduré. Afin de comprendre ce qui s’est réellement passé en juin
2009 et de changer de cap pour aller de l’avant, le président élu en avril 2010 a établi une
Commission de vérité et de réconciliation (TRC), composée de cinq membres. En un peu
plus d’un an, la TRC s’est rendue dans les dix-huit provinces du pays, a tenu plus de
trois cents réunions et a reçu les témoignages de cinq-cinquante-cinq acteurs politiques,
Canada’s Participation in the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission
35
judiciaires, militaires et législatifs liés aux événements. Son rapport final, intitulé « Pour
que ces événements ne se reproduisent jamais », a été publié en juillet 2011. Notre étude
de cas se penche sur la manière dont la commission, confrontée à un profond scepticisme
vis-à-vis de son mandat, s’est attaquée de front à la question très délicate des violations
des droits de la personne et a proposé un ensemble de recommandations équilibrées et
bien accueillies. L’expérience du Honduras est riche en enseignements et éclaire de façon
pertinente sur l’utilisation efficace des commissions de réconciliation et de vérité pour
amorcer le processus de réhabilitation dans les pays touchés par des conflits.
Introduction
On 28 June 2009, the world took notice of Honduras. That morning, its president, Manuel Zelaya, was forcibly removed from his private residence by the
military and transported by plane to Costa Rica from where he announced that
a coup had occurred. Back in Honduras, a new government, led by a member
of the president’s own Liberal party, was hastily installed by the National Congress. International condemnation swiftly followed.
The coup culminated a series of escalating clashes between the judicial, legislative and executive branches of government. The flashpoint was President
Manuel Zelaya’s decree calling for a referendum to authorize the inclusion of a
separate ballot during the upcoming presidential election to permit the establishment of a national Constituent Assembly to revise the Honduran Constitution,
including the controversial removal of the one-term limit on the presidency.1 In
quick succession, the attorney general declared that only Congress could convene a Constituent Assembly, the Supreme Court declared the separate ballot
to be unconstitutional, the National Congress passed a law banning referenda
within 180 days of an election, the president ordered the military to distribute
the printed-in-Venezuela referendum ballots, 2 the military refused to do this on
the basis of the Supreme Court’s instruction, the president led a group of supporters to seize the ballots at the army base, the Supreme Court issued an arrest
warrant to bring the president before a presiding judge, and the army, ignoring
the warrant, illegally extradited the president to Costa Rica, which brings us
back to the coup d’état.3
Typically, military coups do not lead to Canadian foreign aid projects, but
CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program often finds
itself in unusual situations. In this instance, DDD was selected as the mechanism
through which Canada would support the participation of Michael Kergin, former Canadian ambassador to the United States and Cuba, as a member of the
Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).4
36
The impetus for a Honduran TRC derived from the twelve-point San Jose Accord, mediated by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and agreed to by de facto
President Roberto Micheletti and deposed President Zelaya in late October 2009.
The Accord would have required the formation of a national unity government
and permitted President Zelaya to complete his presidency. Point seven of the
Accord stipulated the establishment of a Truth Commission. However, the Accord was never implemented owing to the Micheletti regime’s refusal to allow
Zelaya back into the country and the president’s unwillingness to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the de facto presidency.5
The November 2009 presidential election, won by opposition candidate Porfirio
Lobo of the National Party, effectively ended the discredited Micheletti regime
and restored the constitutional time line for presidential elections. Nonetheless,
the election was perceived as illegitimate by some given that it took place during
a state of emergency and was boycotted by the pro-Zelaya movement. How then
to begin the healing process? Against a backdrop of continuing political tension
and international isolation, President Lobo decided in February 2010 to convene
a truth and reconciliation commission.
The capsule summary above hardly does justice to the complexity and nuances
of the Honduran political environment during this period and skips over important contextual issues such as the legacy of covert and overt US involvement in
the country’s politics and economy, the Zelaya government’s increasingly proVenezuela foreign policy in advance of the coup, and the pervasive influence of
the Mexican and Colombian drug cartels.6 What this case study will focus on is
the work of the TRC and Canada’s participation in it.
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Establishment of the Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
Client: Commission established by president, but operated independently with a Secretariat
Lead Consultant: Michael Kergin
Duration: April 2010–July 2011
Budget: $227,000
Key Planned Outputs/Outcomes:
1. TRC’s Work Plan
2. TRC’s Final Report
37
Governance Profile
Although Honduras was one of the Americas’ first democracies, its last half century has been dominated by military rule, oligarchy and unstable democratic
institutions. Freedom House has ranked Honduras as partly free for over a decade and downgraded its scores for political rights and civil liberties following
the 2009 coup.7
The continuing erosion of press freedom in Honduras has been particularly
alarming. Reporters Without Borders now ranks Honduras 127th of 179 countries on its Press Freedom Index, worst in Central America and a sharp decline
from 2004 when it ranked 53rd. Freedom House has condemned the increasing,
systematic, and largely unpunished harassment and murder of journalists since
2009 and recently assigned a not free rating to Honduras’s press freedom.
The World Bank’s governance indicators present a mixed picture. Three of the
six indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and government effectiveness) have declined since 2000, while three (regulatory quality, rule of
law, and control of corruption) have shown slight improvement. Nonetheless,
Honduras ranks in the lower third of world countries in five of the six indicators. Corruption remains deeply entrenched, with Honduras ranking 133rd of
176 countries on Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Discrimination against women and girls continues to be problematic, with
Honduras ranked 100th of 148 countries on the 2012 United Nations Gender
Inequality Index.
Honduras remains one of the poorest countries in the Americas, ranking 120th
of 187 countries on the 2012 United Nations Human Development Index. Only
Nicaragua (129th), Guatemala (133rd) and Haiti (161st) score lower. Further reducing the quality of life are extraordinary levels of violence, which in part derive from the increasing use of Honduras by the drug cartels as a transshipment
point. The 2011 United Nations report on crime and drugs ranked Honduras as
having the highest per capita homicide rate in the world at 82.1 homicides for
every 100,000 inhabitants. These indicators paint a picture of a country caught in a vicious circle of severe
poverty and weak governance, exacerbated by the drug trade and entrenched
inequality. On the other hand, Honduras has avoided the devastating civil wars
that have afflicted El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala.
38
Most foreign aid projects undergo significant scoping by the donor during the
design period when the objectives, level of effort and desired outputs are determined. In this case, the project arrived at CIDA pre-defined. The president of
Honduras had decided to establish a truth and reconciliation commission and
wished to nominate a Canadian member. Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
had already been directly involved. Aside from securing the participation of,
and funding for, Mr. Kergin, there was little else to do from a project design
perspective.
The TRC’s mandate, set out by Presidential Decree on 13 April 2010, was clear: to
examine the events leading up to and following the 28 June crisis and to provide
recommendations to ensure that such events do not reoccur. The Commission
comprised five members: coordinator Eduardo Stein from Guatemala, Maria
Zavala from Peru, Julieta Castellanos and Jorge Casco from Honduras, and Michael Kergin.8 The TRC convened its first formal session in early June, beginning
a series of deliberations that would culminate with the public release of the final
report in July 2011.
From its inception, the TRC faced significant skepticism. First, the pro-Zelaya
faction questioned its legitimacy as the Commission had been established by
what they viewed as an illegal government and it was not prepared to prejudge
the question of whether the president’s ouster constituted a coup. Second, the
president had not consulted civil society groups in the formative discussions
on its mandate and composition. Finally, the lack of a human rights focus in its
mandate and lack of human rights expertise among its members suggested that
this subject and, more specifically, the reputed human rights violations of the
Micheletti regime would remain off-limits. Early on, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights offered this critique: “Unfortunately, in Honduras the
decision to establish the commission seems to have more to do with a hasty desire to turn the page, rather than clarifying last year’s disruption of democracy
and the serious crimes that took place.” Fearing a whitewash, the pro-Zelaya
groups established an alternative truth commission.9
The TRC was acutely aware that its credibility and effectiveness would depend to a large degree on its willingness to address these criticisms head-on.
Accordingly, an extensive outreach effort was undertaken to convince civil
society groups, opinion leaders and diplomats from skeptical countries of the
Commission’s impartiality, openness and independence. UNDP human rights
39
experts were contracted to research human rights abuses, particularly those that
occurred during the de facto Micheletti presidency. The Commission even offered to co-operate and share information with the alternative truth commission,
although the overtures were rebuffed. These efforts went a long way towards
blunting, and in many cases constructively engaging, the TRC’s critics.
From June 2010 to June 2011, the TRC held over three hundred meetings throughout the country to hear from politicians, civil servants, military officials, civil
society groups, editorial boards, victims of human rights abuses and ordinary
citizens. The only important political official who refused to appear was President Zelaya, although a number of his cabinet ministers were interviewed.
TRC Facts
• over 300 meetings held, including 125 outside capital
• two dozen town halls in all 18 Honduran departments (provinces)
• testimony from 155 political, judicial, military, and legislative figures linked to the events
• 2,200 pages of transcripts
• 50,000 pages of documentation
• 250 direct (900 including video) testimonies on human rights abuses
As the report was being finalized, two key events occurred. In May 2011, President Lobo and former President Zelaya signed the Cartagena Accord which
paved the way for Manuel Zelaya’s return to Honduras. In June, the OAS agreed
to lift its suspension of Honduras.
The fifteen hundred-page final report, titled “So That These Events Will Never
Reoccur,” was released on 9 July 2011 at the Children’s Museum in Tegucigalpa
in the presence of nine hundred Honduran citizens from all walks of life. The
report was handed over to twenty students and then to a dozen mayors, symbolizing the future of the country and the breadth of contributions from all corners
of Honduras.
Key observations of the TRC report included:
• the forcible removal and extradition of President Zelaya did constitute a
coup d´état;
• the executive, judicial and legislative branches all transgressed the
Constitution at various points leading up to, during, and immediately
following the coup;
40
• given that the date for the November 2009 elections had been established
prior to the coup, the Constitution prohibited President Zelaya from seeking
another term, and the elections were widely considered to have been fair and
open, the election and the Lobo presidency should be considered legitimate;
• both the Zelaya and Micheletti governments engaged in corrupt practices;
• a wide range of human rights abuses, including police violence and murder,
did occur and went unpunished during the Micheletti regime; and
• the actions of the international community, and of the Organization of
American States (OAS) in particular, intensified the political divide and
likely prolonged the conflict.
Key recommendations of the report included:
• Constitutional reform should proceed and include removal of the entrenched
articles, elimination of the military’s political duties and inclusion of a
presidential impeachment procedure;
• a Judicial Tribunal should be established to arbitrate disputes between the
executive, judicial and legislative branches;
• appointments to high-level judicial and legislative bodies should be depoliticized;
• the political party system and the related rules and practices for party
financing, delegate selection and choosing a leader should be more
transparent and accessible to rural and disadvantaged Hondurans;
• the attorney general should resume the corruption investigations into both
the Zelaya and Micheletti governments (the report noted that only the Zelaya
government’s practices were currently being pursued);
• the government should vigorously pursue, prosecute and punish human
rights abuses perpetrated during the Micheletti regime;
• the actions of the human rights commissioner during this period should be
subject to an independent review initiated by Congress;
• the United Nations should oversee the establishment of an international
body to investigate links between organized crime (i.e., the drug cartels) and
government corruption;
• reparations should be provided to verifiable victims;
• a range of measures should be adopted to protect the freedom of movement
and safety of journalists; and
41
• the OAS’s Democratic Charter should be amended to strengthen the
organization’s capacity for preventative diplomacy.
Following the report’s release, the TRC conducted one final tour around the
country. The meetings were well attended and the recommendations generally
well received. Worrying, though, was the widespread lack of confidence that the
report would ever be implemented if left to the existing political institutions.
Understandably, Hondurans mistrusted the motivations of a political and economic elite that benefits from the status quo, however undemocratic.
Lessons Learned
It is difficult to narrow the list of lessons learned from such a rich experience as
membership in the TRC. The following provides a sample from the philosophical to the pragmatic.
Reconciliation yes, truth maybe: The project reports filed by Mr. Kergin after
each mission highlighted from the beginning the Commission’s realization that
it would be more successful at addressing reconciliation than uncovering the
truth. One of the first reports observed: “Faced with the highly conflicting accounts of the events themselves, it is likely that the value of the Commission’s
recommendations will lie more in the reconciliation part of its mandate than in
the truth component.”
Beyond the usual problems of deliberate omission and lying, the Commission
found that highly subjective interpretations of events, based in part on differing values or allegiances, made the establishment of an objective or true set of
facts impossible. For example, while the pro-Zelaya supporters unequivocally
viewed his ouster as a military coup, the pro-Micheletti faction strongly believed
that President Zelaya had abrogated his right to the presidency and therefore
his removal simply represented a lawful, constitutionally sound succession. Although the truth must of course be sought and deceit exposed wherever feasible,
TRCs are much more likely to succeed at initiating a dialogue between hostile
parties than conducting a definitive forensic exercise.
Respond positively and proactively to criticism: The criticisms levelled at
the TRC pertained to the circumstances and mandate under which it was established, rather than any actions or statements of its members. Nonetheless, if
the TRC had simply gone about its job without addressing these criticisms, it is
doubtful that the final report would ever have been viewed as presenting a balanced perspective. By the end of the TRC’s hearings, civil society had played a
substantive role, human rights violations had been examined in detail, and, in
the report itself, the removal of President Zelaya was characterized as a coup.
42
The generally positive reception accorded the report suggests that this strategy
of winning over and engaging as many critics as possible was sound.
Get out of the capital city: Perhaps reflecting on life in Ottawa and his time
in Washington, DC, Michael Kergin insisted that the Commission travel outside
Tegucigalpa, Honduras’s capital, and hold hearings throughout the country.
Ultimately, the Commission visited all eighteen Honduran departments (provinces), including trips to remote provincial capitals reachable only by plane or
boat on the Moskito Coast. These out-of-town hearings provided a deeper sense
of the problems, aspirations and, in many cases, sense of abandonment by their
government of ordinary Hondurans and strongly influenced the direction of the
final report and its recommendations.10
Communicate to the international community: The final report was naturally written and released in Spanish. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons and
much to Mr. Kergin’s frustration, a readable English copy took eight months to
produce. Although the primary audience was of course the Honduran people,
American, Canadian and European audiences represented influential stakeholders who could have applied pressure on the Honduran government to implement the report’s recommendations. Moreover, the G-16 group of donors could
have circulated the report to their home governments as a prelude to mobilizing the necessary technical assistance to deliver the proposed reforms.11 By the
time the report was finally translated and distributed, significant momentum
had been lost. In retrospect, the delay in releasing a quality translation in English
represented an important opportunity lost.
Knowledge Transfer Potential
Truth and reconciliation commissions directly focus on uncovering what happened during divisive periods of internal conflict, often involving gross violations of human rights. In addition to redressing past wrongs, TRCs attempt
to point the way forward. Proposals may range from those having immediate
impact, such as paying reparations, to those which can only be implemented
over the medium to longer term, such as strengthening the nation’s democratic
institutions.
From Argentina’s 1983 National Commission for Forced Disappearances to
South Africa’s iconic 1995 Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Canada’s
2008 Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission, well over
twenty countries have opted for this mechanism as a means to begin the healing process from past, often horrific abuses of power and internal strife. Clearly,
there is much to gain from a closer, comparative examination of the different
43
TRC experiences given the significance of the issues addressed, the potential
impact of successful implementation, the relative newness of this approach and
the limited number of cases.
This case study suggests that the lessons learned from the Honduran TRC experience can contribute to the growing body of knowledge on how to increase the
effectiveness of such commissions. Having flown under the international radar,
it is important that the lessons learned from the Honduran TRC be added to
those from its better publicized counterparts.
Postscript
The political schism continues to heal. In May 2011, President Lobo and former
President Zelaya signed the Cartagena Accord, which paved the way for Manuel Zelaya’s return to Honduras. Upon returning, the former president gave a
conciliatory speech in which he pressed for further democratic reforms. In June
2011, Honduras’s international isolation ended with its readmission to the OAS.
Since the Accord, key players in Latin America, such as Brazil and Argentina,
have recognized the current government.
The Accord also led to the entry of Resistencia, the pro-Zelaya faction which split
from the Liberal Party following the coup, into mainstream politics. In March
2012, Resistencia was reconstituted as the Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre). Interestingly, President Zelaya’s wife, Xiomara Castro, will be the party’s
presidential candidate in the November 2013 election.
The TRC report continues to influence discussion and shape events in Honduras. In September 2011, President Lobo addressed the United Nations General
Assembly, committing to implement the TRC’s proposals. Parliament did initiate legislation to enable the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to address
constitutional reform. The president has, as recommended by the TRC, requested the UN to establish a prosecutorial body similar to Guatemala’s CICIG.12 In
May 2012, in response to a TRC recommendation, the Court of Audits reported
on the illegal appropriation of state funds by both the Zelaya and Micheletti
governments. In June, the government established a five-member anti-corruption commission, modelled somewhat on the TRC, to investigate the country’s
pervasive security problems, including the influence of the drug cartels and corruption in the judicial system and police forces. In fact, Michael Kergin was approached about participating in this commission.
It would be naïve, however, to assume that the gradual easing of political
tension will by itself resolve Honduras’s problems. The ongoing persecution and murder of journalists continues. Tragically, the son of TRC member
44
Julieta Castellanos was murdered, reputedly by police, while driving home from
a party. Although the police are often implicated in these crimes, they are rarely
apprehended or convicted.13 It is, of course, far beyond the scope of this short
case study to speculate on the cures to the drug trafficking, police corruption
and rampant violence afflicting Honduras. Nonetheless, it seems sensible to accept the argument made by the TRC that a more open, pluralistic political system with broader participation from all regions of the country and better support from the international community will be part of the solution. The national
dialogue that must occur to heal the wounds of the 28 June 2009 coup must go
beyond that particular event to address these more fundamental governance
issues.
Endnotes
1
The Honduran Constitution, approved in 1982, includes the entrenched (“petreo”)
Article 374 which stipulates that it and a number of other articles relating to specific
subjects cannot ever be modified, including the one-term limit on presidencies.
Although President Zelaya’s opponents feared that a successful referendum would
pave the way for the president to seek a second term, the TRC did not uncover any
evidence that this was his intention.
2
The Honduran Constitution confers a number of specific powers and responsibilities
on the military that would, in most democratic countries, be under civilian control.
Article 272 stipulates that: “In order to ensure the free exercise of the vote, the
custody, transport and surveillance of electoral materials and other aspects of the
security of the process, the President of the Republic, put the Armed Forces available
to the National Elections Tribunal, from a month before the elections, until the final
declaration of the same.”
3
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission confirmed that the actions of the military in
removing President Zelaya to Costa Rica constituted a coup. These actions abrogated
article 102 of the Honduran Constitution which stipulates that: “No Honduran may
be expatriated or delivered by the authorities to a foreign State.”
4
Honduras is one of CIDA’s twenty countries of focus. In 2009, CIDA committed
to direct 80 percent of its future bilateral aid to these 20 countries. Countries were
selected on the basis of needs, capacity to benefit from aid, and alignment with
Canada’s foreign policy priorities. Honduras was the only Central American country
selected. Peru, Columbia, Bolivia, Haiti, and the Caribbean Regional program were
also selected.
45
5
During this period, President Zelaya was in Honduras, having secretly re-entered the
country and taken refuge in the Brazilian embassy.
6
A more in-depth description of the context for the Commission’s work is set out
in Michael Kergin’s article, “Truth or Reconciliation?” published in Optimum,
an on-line public affairs journal. See http://www.optimumonline.ca/article.
phtml?e=mesokurj&id=402.
7
Freedom House annually rates 184 countries as being free (1.0–2.5); partly free (3.0–
5.0); or not free (5.5–7.0) using a methodology that gauges the degree of civil liberties
and political rights. Honduras had retained scores of 3 in both categories since 2001,
but these were downgraded following the coup to a 4 where they have remained
since.
8
Eduardo Stein was a former vice president of Guatemala and had, as foreign minister,
interacted with the Guatemalan Truth Commission. He also worked on the peace and
reconciliation processes in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Maria Zavala was a former
justice minister and president of Lima’s Supreme Court in Peru. Julieta Castellanos
and Jorge Casco were the current and former rectors of the Autonomous National
University of Honduras. Michael Kergin worked for Canada’s diplomatic service
over several decades, including ambassadorial posts to the United States and Cuba.
9
The “True Commission” (Comisión de Verdad) was formed in June 2010. The focus of
this Commission was on human rights violations, a perceived gap in the mandate of
the TRC. The Commission was chaired by the Honduran human rights advocate, Else
Monge, and included Nobel Peace Prize Laurete Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Salvadoran
Supreme Court Justice Mirna Antonieta Perla, Canadian academic and jurist Craig
Scott and other members with expertise in human rights issues.
10 For example, the recommendation to provide access to the judicial system in the
language of indigenous peoples of Honduras, in compliance with the ILO International
Convention on the rights of indigenous peoples, derived from the meetings of the
TRC with the indigenous communities of the Moskito Coast.
11 The G-16 was the major donor forum at this time for coordinating foreign aid to
Honduras. It comprised Canada, Germany, Spain, Sweden, United States, France,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the World
Bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Inter-American Development
Bank, IMF and European Union.
12 The United Nations established the International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala in 2006 to investigate crimes committed by clandestine security forces.
13 See the Economist article: “Violence in Honduras: The Eye of the Storm,” 16 June 2012.
46
Chapter 3
Strengthening Media Governance in
Guyana: Mission Impossible?
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Ian Alexander.
Abstract: This case study describes efforts to strengthen media governance in Guyana
though CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) Program. According to
the original work plan, the government, media industry and civil society were to engage
in a tri-partite national dialogue to increase media independence and responsibility. At
the outset, the expected results included modern broadcast legislation, establishment of
a permanent regulator, a new media code of conduct and public complaints process, and
creation of a media industry association. Then problems began that would change the
project dramatically. First, the project’s client was unable to continue. Then, the government and the state-controlled media unexpectedly withdrew their participation. What
followed was an on-the-fly reinvention of the project from a consensus-building to an
advocacy role with a new client outside government. In place of facilitating dialogue, obviously impossible given the government boycott, the project focused on establishing the
Guyana Media Proprietor’s Association (GMPA). The lessons learned from the project
are both cautionary; i.e., what to do when the work plan is undermined by an uncooperative partner, and proactive; i.e., what could have been done in advance to mitigate risk.
Notwithstanding the perpetually turbulent project environment, the establishment of a
media industry association stands as a solid accomplishment. If and when the government pursues meaningful reform of Guyana’s media governance, GMPA will be wellpositioned to contribute. Democratization is clearly not a linear process.
Sommaire : Cette étude de cas décrit les efforts de renforcement de la gouvernance des
médias en Guyane par l’entremise du programme de Déploiements pour le Développement Démocratique (DDD) de l’ACDI. Selon le plan de travail initial, le gouvernement,
l’industrie des médias et la société civile étaient censés converser dans le cadre d’un dialogue national tripartite afin de renforcer l’indépendance et la responsabilité des médias.
Les résultats attendus comprenaient initialement une législation moderne de la diffusion, l’établissement d’un régulateur permanent, d’un nouveau code de conduite des
médias et d’un processus de plainte du public, ainsi que la création d’une association de
l’industrie médiatique. Avant la mise en oeuvre du projet, de nombreux problèmes sont
survenus, bouleversant le projet. D’abord, le client du projet a indiqué qu’il n’était pas en
mesure de participer. Ensuite, le gouvernement et les médias d’état ont retiré leur participation. Il s’ensuivit une suite de changements dans la mise en œuvre du projet qui passa
Strengthening Media Governance in Guyana
47
d’un rôle d’établissement de consensus à un rôle de défenseur d’intérêts particuliers. Au
lieu de faciliter le dialogue, ce qui semblait manifestement impossible compte tenu du
boycott du gouvernement, l’accent fut donc placer sur l’établissement de l’Association
des propriétaires de médias guyanais (APMG). Les leçons que nous avons tirées de ce
projet sont à la fois un avertissement (que faire quand le plan de travail est sapé par un
partenaire refusant toute coopération) et une leçon de pro-activité (qu’aurions-nous pu
prévoir pour atténuer ce risque). En dépit des perturbations constantes qui ont agité le
cadre de ce projet, l’établissement d’une association de l’industrie médiatique reste un
accomplissement solide. Quand le gouvernement poursuivra de nouveau des réformes
de la gouvernance médiatique en Guyane, l’APMG sera bien placée pour y contribuer. De
toute évidence, la démocratisation n’est pas un processus linéaire.
Introduction
What happens when the government suddenly decides to boycott a foreign aid
project that depends on political buy-in? In most circumstances, the answer
is obvious: shut it down. In the world of democracy promotion, however, the
appropriate response is often to resituate the project with the external groups
pressuring for change; i.e., shifting from a role of mediation to one of advocacy.
This is loosely the story of the media governance project in Guyana, but with an
additional and daunting twist: the nation’s political class, media industry and
civil society institutions mostly reflect the ethnic cleavages that have afflicted
Guyana from colonial times. The project not only had to deal with the usual
problems of vested interests protecting the status quo, but with deeply rooted,
historical and cultural tensions. This case study will explore whether this was
indeed mission impossible.
Guyana, formerly British Guiana, gained its independence on 24 May 1966 under Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the People’s National Congress
(PNC) Party. Although socialist in orientation, the PNC was initially overtly and
covertly supported by the UK and US governments, which feared that the opposition People’s Progressive Party (PPP), led by Cheddi Jagan, would transform
Guyana into a Marxist state.
Until his death in 1985, Burnham’s increasingly autocratic rule was marked
by election fraud, political assassinations and severe repression of civil liberties. Guyana’s democratic journey began with the 1992 election, the first to be
deemed free and fair by international observers. The PPP, still led by Cheddi
Jagan, emerged victorious and has remained in power since under a series of
presidents.
48
Guyana’s political party system reflects the country’s ethnic divisions with the
PNC supported by Afro-Guyanese (30 percent of the population) and the PPP by
Indo-Guyanese (43 percent of the population).1 The Alliance for Change party,
formed in 2006 to bridge the political-ethnic divide, holds a small number of
parliamentary seats.
Guyana has retained close ties with the Caribbean countries. In fact, Guyana
was a founding member and hosts the secretariat of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) in Georgetown.2
Fifteen years after the 1992 election, little progress could be reported on establishing an independent, responsible media in Guyana. State-run monopolies on
radio and nation-wide television continued to serve as government mouthpieces. The independent press remained highly partisan and sensationalist. Draft
broadcasting legislation, first prepared in the 1990s and most recently revised in
2002, resided in limbo. Without a legal foundation or permanent regulator, both
the government-run and private media continued to operate in an unregulated,
wild-west environment.
Nonetheless, at the project’s inception, grounds for cautious optimism on this
long-stalled file seemed warranted. In May 2008, the head of the Presidential
Secretariat committed to end the government monopoly over radio within a
year. The project’s client, the Advisory Committee on Broadcasting, appeared
well-placed to bring the various stakeholders together and was confident of
government support.3 During the scoping mission, the project’s lead consultant,
Ian Alexander, presented a realistic appraisal that suggested a way forward.
“Implicitly or explicitly, virtually everyone expressed their own earnest and sincere
desire for improvement, and laid the blame for the present unfortunate state of
affairs at the feet of other parties. Further probing, however, revealed a considerable
convergence, if not consensus, around several significant themes.”
So far, so good.
49
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Promotion of Media Independence and Accountability
Client: Advisory Committee on Broadcasting; then Guyana Press Association
Lead Consultant: Ian Alexander
Duration: August 2008 to February 2012
Budget: $120,200
1. framework for media governance
2. permanent media industry association
3. new media code of conduct
4. approved broadcasting legislation
Governance Profile
A free, responsible media is integral to good governance. The World Bank identifies “civil society and media” as one of six fundamental dimensions of good governance.4 The UK government included “encouraging a free media” as a central
element of accountability, one of the three themes of good governance, alongside
capability and responsiveness.5
Guyana’s transition from autocracy to democracy culminated in the free and
fair 1992 elections. In 1994, Guyana endorsed media freedom by signing the
Chapultepec Declaration at the Hemisphere Conference on Free Speech in
Mexico City:
“Without an independent media, assured of the guarantees to operate freely, to make
decisions and to act on them fully, freedom of expression cannot be exercised. A free
press is synonymous with free expression… The temptation to control and regulate
has led to decisions that limit the independent action of the media, of journalists,
and of citizens who wish to seek and disseminate information and opinions… While
defending a free press and rejecting outside interference, we also champion a press
that is responsible and involved, a press aware of the obligations that the practice of
freedom entails.”6
Unfortunately, the pace of Guyana’s democratization has slowed while the quality of governance continues to erode. Although ranked free by Freedom House
over the last decade, Guyana’s freedom score has declined since 2005 owing to a
downgrade in civil liberties.7
50
Amid promises of media reforms, Guyana’s ranking on Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index rose sharply in 2009 to the 78th percentile among all
countries (39th of 175 countries), but has since dropped to the 61st percentile as
the promises remain unfulfilled. Guyana now places well below its neighbor
Surinam and fellow CARICOM member Jamaica, but still ahead of Brazil,
Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador, the lowest-ranking South American
country.
Source: Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index (percentile of all countries)
The World Bank’s voice and accountability indicator, one of six used to gauge the
quality of a country’s governance, reflects “perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” Guyana’s
ranking has slowly declined over the last decade from the 67th percentile in 2002
to the 50th percentile of world countries in 2011.
For other World Bank governance indicators, Guyana continues to suffer from
low political stability (33rd percentile) and receives poor scores in regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption (all below the 40th percentile).
More positively, its score in government effectiveness has shown some modest
improvement (50th percentile in 2011) in recent years.
Corruption remains an acute problem, with Guyana ranked 133rd of 176 countries on Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, the
worst of any CARICOM country. Only Venezuela (165th) and Paraguay (150th)
rank lower among South American countries.
Guyana’s ranking on the UN Human Development Index has declined since
51
2008, from 97th to 118th of 187 countries. This places it as the second lowestranked CARICOM (Haiti ranks lowest) or South American country, behind Surinam (105th); Paraguay (111th), and Bolivia (108th).
Often, DDD projects refine their scope and outputs during the work planning
stage when budgetary and time constraints become apparent. Typically, a more
focused, less ambitious set of deliverables emerges. For this project, redefinition
began before the work plan had even been developed.
Prior to the first mission, in April 2009, the project’s client changed from the
government-appointed Advisory Committee on Broadcasting (ACB) to the independent Guyana Press Association when the ACB indicated it could no longer fulfill this role. Interestingly, the project’s planned outputs—developing a
framework for media governance, supporting the implementation of the new
broadcast legislation, developing a broader media code of conduct to replace the
2006 elections code, and forming a sustainable media industry association—did
not change as government support for the reforms was assumed to be intact.
The proposed co-regulatory model (see figure on the next page) was used as
the basis for strengthening media governance. This model requires a tri-partite
approach to advance two fundamental requisites of good media governance:
media freedom and media responsibility. In the Guyanese context, it implicitly
required meaningful interaction between the two major ethnic groups through
the different institutions that each dominated.
52
At this early stage, confidence persisted in the project’s methodology and design, but amid concerns about which person or group could effectively play the
all-important facilitator role.
Most DDD projects unfold in a predictable manner, closely following the approved work plan and implementing the planned deliverables within the prescribed period of time. Surprises do arise, but most often are manageable. This
project, however, endured a perpetually turbulent operating environment.
First, there was the issue of revolving clients. The project’s first client, the Advisory Committee on Broadcasting, encountered staffing problems and was forced
to withdraw. The project’s second client, the Guyana Press Association, proved
unsuitable, as it did not, as promised, mitigate its traditional hostility to the government in order to play a facilitator role. By late 2009, the Association was no
longer actively serving as the client. Instead, the Guyana Media Proprietors Association (GMPA), a body established through the project, emerged as the de
facto client for the remainder of the project.
Second, the government of Guyana decided to boycott the project. In response
to criticisms levelled by the Guyana Press Association in mid 2009, the presiden-
53
tial advisor on governance informed the Canadian high commissioner that “The
Government of Guyana is unsupportive of, and will not be participating in, any
activity based on the CIDA proposals on the Media in Guyana.”8 Following this
lead, the state-controlled media withdrew from project-related events or activities. This counterproductive stance persisted throughout the project.
Third, on-the-ground events involving the government belied its public commitments to media reform:
• Early 2008: The president, also minister of information, suspended a private
TV station’s license for four months against the advice of the Advisory
Committee on Broadcasting.
• Mid 2008: The government banned the head of the Guyana Press Association,
Gordon Mosely, from entering State House or the Office of the President
ostensibly because of critical coverage.
• Mid 2010: The government dissolved the respected Media Monitoring Unit
(MMU) of the Guyana Elections Commission. A diminished MMU was
reactivated for the November 2011 election and then shut down.
• Fall 2011: The government pushed through deeply-flawed broadcasting and
access to information laws, ignoring input from external stakeholders. The
legislation has yet to be proclaimed.
• Fall 2011: A separate, pro-government media association was formed to
represent state-controlled media organizations and provide a counterweight
to the perceived anti-government industry association.
• Early 2012: The president awarded twelve radio licenses, thereby ending
the state monopoly, but doing so without due process. The status of these
licenses remains uncertain as they have yet to be approved by the National
Frequency Management Unit.
Fourth, the volatile project environment necessitated constant changes of plans
and activities. Whereas the large majority of DDD projects are completed within
18–24 months, this project lasted three and a half years. Following the third
mission in May 2010 and at the request of the Canadian High Commission, the
project maintained what was termed a watching brief throughout the period
leading up to and immediately following the November 2011 election. This
required the lead consultant to provide modest support by phone and e-mail to
GMPA and essentially remain on call in case circumstances changed in the postelection period.
54
Missions to Guyana
Nov. 2008
scoping mission
April 2009
first mission
Sept. 2009
second mission
May 2010
third mission
Feb. 2012
fourth mission
Unquestionably, the project’s core achievement was the establishment of a viable media industry association, albeit without participation from the statecontrolled media. Over the project’s lifespan, GMPA evolved from a disparate
group of workshop attendees to a formally constituted body able to prepare
policy briefs and undertake public awareness campaigns. Key milestones in its
development included:
• September 2009: During the project’s second mission, three two-day events for
media stakeholders were attended by over 40 individuals representing more
than 20 organizations. At the media proprietors’ meeting, the groundwork
was laid for the establishment of a media proprietors group.
• January 2010: GMPA held elections and created a permanent executive.
• May 2010: In conjunction with the project’s third mission, GMPA held a twoday workshop for two dozen proprietors and senior managers of print and
broadcast media. On the second day, the association’s draft Constitution was
reviewed.
• Remainder of 2011: GMPA set up an office, hired staff and increased its duespaying memberships. Now established, GMPA expanded its advocacy
activities, including press releases and public awareness campaigns.
• February 2012: GMPA was publicly launched, coinciding with the final project
mission.
Recently secured funding from the European Commission augurs well for
GMPA’s sustainability. Given the association’s multi-racial leadership and membership, it is well-positioned to pursue media reform while rejecting the divisive
approaches of the past.
Progress was also made on a strengthened code of media conduct and public
complaints system, which unfortunately remain unfinished. Leadership on this
initiative was provided by Dr. Paloma Mohamed, director of the Centre for
55
Communication Studies at the University of Guyana, who coordinated a small
drafting team throughout the project.
The one output that did not advance at all, because of government intransigence,
was modern broadcasting legislation. Unfortunately, the deeply-flawed law that
was rushed through parliament prior to the 2011 election did not incorporate
key proposals from the project or other Guyanese stakeholders to strengthen
media independence and responsibility. Interestingly, the law has yet to be proclaimed.
In sum, although the project’s original objectives were not fully realized, and
never could have been without government participation, progress was made
on establishing a vehicle through which private media organizations could
press for greater media freedom and collectively increase responsibility. This
corresponds with the experience of many democratization projects where pressure for change occurs from the outside in.
Lessons Learned
This project contains both cautionary; i.e., what to do when the work plan is undermined by an unco-operative partner, and proactive lessons; i.e., what could
have been done in advance to mitigate risk.
Anticipate conflict in high-risk projects: The phrase “high-risk, high-reward”
is over-used in the development world, but certainly applies to democratization initiatives where vested interests reinforce racial or ethnic divides. This
case illustrates how a seemingly conducive environment for positive democratic
change can be quickly negated by a resurgence of anti-democratic behaviour.
The question arises: could anything have been done to anticipate or address this
possibility?
This project, like most projects, produced a work plan and logical framework to
deliver a number of technical outputs in an orderly manner over a prescribed
period of time. Risk was identified, as it always is, but did not influence the pace
or content of the work plan. In retrospect, the project could have better reflected
the high potential for conflict in its design. Three measures might have helped.
First, a contingency plan could have been developed that presumed government
opposition to the proposed reforms. This might have eased the project’s transition from a consensus-building to advocacy role. Second, greater emphasis on
conflict and change management skills could have been built into the consultant’s skill requirements (fortunately, in this case, the consultant did have this
experience). Third, a longer inception period would have enabled the project to
56
determine the real motivations of key players, undertake more extensive consensus building, and carefully groom and equip a local champion to play an
effective facilitation role. As it was, greater emphasis was placed on producing policy products, such as the Framework for Strengthening Media Governance
in Guyana, rather than on mitigating the antagonisms that arose in the project’s
early stages. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that these tensions were longstanding and may have arisen under any circumstance.
Improvise to survive: As described earlier, the project faced an existential moment when the government withdrew its participation in advance of the second
mission. A further challenge involved the lack of a suitable client. Unquestionably, the easiest response would have been to cancel the project. Instead, the
High Commission, CIDA and IPAC opted to allow the project to assume a tactical approach: seizing opportunities when they arose, seeking out individuals or
groups with shared goals, ratcheting activity levels up or down to fit circumstances, and, most creatively, establishing a de facto client through the project.
As a result, the actual project only loosely conformed to the planned project.
Progress on media governance was not achieved, as envisioned, through a
tripartite dialogue, but rather through the establishment of a media industry
association. Given government opposition, this proved to be the best available
tactical response. When the future government is truly ready to discuss reform,
an industry body able to contribute meaningfully to a tripartite dialogue now
exists.
Flexibility produces results: One of the advantages of aid-on-demand programs like DDD is their rapid, flexible response capacity. At the project’s front
end, this meant moving quickly to take advantage of the apparent, albeit disingenuous embrace of media reform by the government. At the back end, this
permitted the maintenance of modest but ongoing contact with the client over
an extended period of time. The lengthy watching brief period from 2010–12 enabled the project to continue the provision of technical support to GMPA during
its formative period while successor donor funding from the European Commission was secured. Without this bridging support, GMPA’s sustainability would
certainly have been more at risk.
This level of flexibility could not easily have been accomplished by traditional
foreign aid projects encumbered by service contracts, project staff and rented
office space. It should be added that DDD itself is not designed to accommodate
watching briefs. The Guyana High Commission, CIDA and IPAC deserve credit
for supporting this effective improvisation. Future aid-on-demand programs
should consider incorporating or even expanding this type of flexibility into the
program design, for example, by being able to compensate local consultants under certain circumstances.
57
Worth a try: On the surface, this case study suggests that consensus-building
models may not be applicable in countries such as Guyana with long-standing
ethnic and cultural cleavages. Fundamental changes in governance may be a
prerequisite of meaningful progress. On the other hand, big bang governance
reforms are rare and extremely difficult to achieve. Moreover, although Guyana
clearly experiences tensions, it is not a conflict country or fragile state. Arguably,
the best tactic would be to expand the range of governance projects and learn to
adapt traditional consensus-building models to the Guyanese context. As this
project demonstrates, incremental progress can be made. With more such projects, unanticipated synergies could arise.
At first glance, the knowledge transfer potential of this project appears limited.
The project’s envisaged tripartite, co-regulatory model, requiring the government, media industry and civil society to reach consensus on core issues through
dialogue and negotiation, fell apart when the government unexpectedly withdrew its support. Accordingly, the project did not implement the type of policy content that would typically be cited for knowledge transfer, although the
co-regulatory model and media governance framework paper can certainly be
referenced by other projects that aim to strengthen media independence and
responsibility.
However, as a case study in democratic development, the lessons learned do
have knowledge transfer potential. Democratization is not a linear process and
numerous projects may encounter an unco-operative or even hostile government partner. The tactical approach used by the project in face of government
opposition cannot be precisely replicated, but it can serve as an example of how
to finesse a contribution to improved media governance.
Postscript
The climate for media freedom in Guyana remains problematic. Freedom House
lowered Guyana’s rating from free to partly free owing to verbal intimidation of
journalists by members of the governing party prior to the 2011 elections. However, this atmosphere may be changing, albeit slowly and subtly.
The November 2011 election significantly changed Guyana’s political landscape.
Although the PPP retained the presidency, Guyana now enjoys its first minority
government. Importantly, the new Partnership for National Unity (PNU), com-
58
prising the PNC and several smaller parties, is more ethnically diverse and has
identified improved media governance as a policy priority.
2006 Election
2011 Election
Party
# Seats
Party
# Seats
PPP
36
PPP
32
PNC
22
PNU
26
AFC
5
AFC
7
Other
2
During an interview in December 2012, a local partner to the DDD project identified some positive signs. For example, prior to the last election, a workshop
attended by both state and private media produced an agreement underscoring the importance of non-interference in media coverage during the upcoming
election. The following day, presumably in response, the government lifted a
ban on an opposition TV station. Moreover, the local partner noted that a media
code of conduct and improved broadcasting regulations, two of the original deliverables from the project work plan, could be back on the table in 2013.
The Guyana Media Proprietors Association, although experiencing some growing pains, continues to meet and contribute to the national dialogue on media
governance. Although major obstacles remain, the local partner did feel that
a culture change with respect to media freedom may finally be emerging and
credited the DDD project with sparking the realization among the various media
organizations and stakeholders that improved media governance depended on
mutual collaboration and shared purpose. Conceivably, the potential contribution of the Guyana Media Proprietors Association to charting a path forward on
media governance may be realized sooner than anticipated.
Endnotes
1
For the 2011 election, the PNC joined with the Guyana Action Party, National Front
Alliance, and Working People’s Alliance to form the Partnership for National Unity.
2
CARICOM comprises 15 members and 5 associate members. The organization was
formed in 1973 and focuses on regional economic integration. Guyana was a founding
member along with Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.
59
3
The Advisory Committee on Broadcasting was created in 2001 as a temporary body
pending the passage of broadcasting legislation and establishment of a formal
regulator. In the prolonged absence of approved legislation, it has continued for over
a decade. It is a tripartite board and is strongly influenced by the government.
4
Actionable Governance Indicators (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2008). The good
governance model positions political accountability, checks and balances, private
sector interface, decentralization and local participation, and civil society and media
as essential contributors to effective public sector management.
5
Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor (UK Government:
London, 2006).
6
The Chapultepec Declaration was signed by 32 countries and territories from the
Western Hemisphere, including the United States, but not by Canada, Cuba, Haiti
and Venezuela.
7
Freedom House annually rates 184 countries as being free (1–2.5); partly free (3.0–
5.0); or not free (5.5–7.0) using a methodology that gauges civil liberties and political
rights. Guyana was ranked as free with a score of 2.0 from 2003–05, partly free with a
score of 3.0 in 2006, and free with a score of 2.5 from 2007 to date.
8
Quotation is from a letter, dated 20 August 2009, written by Presidential Advisor on
Governance, Gail Teixeira, to the Canadian high commissioner.
60
Chapter 4
The People’s Defender:
Strengthening the Office of the
Ombudsman in Peru
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Anne-Marie Stewart, Fiona
Crean and Jean-Pierre Michaud.
Abstract: In developing countries, the national ombudsman often assumes a broader
mandate that deals not only with individual complaints of maladministration by public
institutions, but with systemic human rights and democratization issues. This is certainly the case in Peru where the Defensoria del Pueblo (DDP) has long-played such a
role and is viewed as the most credible public institution by the Peruvian people. This
case study describes a successful, CIDA-funded project to introduce results-based management (RBM) in DDP. What is unique about the project is the decision by the Canadian
team and Peru’s ombudsman to do this as part of a comprehensive change management
process. Within a year, remarkable progress had been achieved, notwithstanding a leadership transition early in the project and initial resistance to the approach by DDP management and staff. The project demonstrates that RBM should not be viewed simply as a
methodological tool, but rather as a vehicle for strengthening organizational effectiveness
and accountability. Moreover, if RBM is to be meaningful, it must be embraced by senior
management and embedded in all key processes at both strategic and operational levels. The payoff can be significant: for an ombudsman’s office, a well-managed, effective
organization will be better equipped to pursue its critical role in defending individuals,
preserving human rights and strengthening democratic institutions.
Sommaire : Dans les pays en développement, l’ombudsman national exerce souvent un
mandat plus large en s’occupant non seulement des plaintes déposées par les particuliers
en cas de mauvaise gestion de la part des institutions publiques, mais également des problèmes systémiques liés aux droits de de la personne et à la démocratisation. C’est assurément le cas au Pérou où la Defensoria del Pueblo (DDP) joue depuis longtemps ce rôle et
est considérée par la population comme l’institution publique la plus crédible du pays.
Cette étude de cas décrit un projet financé par l’ACDI, fort d’un grand succès, qui visait
à établir un système de gestion axée sur les résultats (GAR) à la DDP. Le caractère unique
de ce projet réside dans la décision de l’équipe canadienne et de l’ombudsman du Pérou
de mener cette initiative dans le cadre d’un processus global de gestion du changement.
Des progrès remarquables ont été accomplis en l’espace d’un an malgré le changement
Strengthening the Office of the Ombudsman in Peru
61
de direction survenu au début du projet et la résistance initiale de l’équipe de direction
et du personnel de DDP vis-à-vis de l’approche. Le projet prouve que la gestion axée sur
les résultats ne devrait pas être considérée comme un simple outil méthodologique, mais
plutôt comme un moyen de renforcer l’efficacité organisationnelle et la responsabilité.
En outre, si la gestion axée sur les résultats est amenée à occuper une place importante,
elle doit être approuvée par la haute direction et intégrée à tous les processus clés, et ce,
tant sur le plan stratégique que sur le plan opérationnel. Les bénéfices peuvent être considérables : un organisme bien dirigé et efficace permettra à l’Office de l’ombudsman de
remplir à fond son rôle principal de défendre les personnes, de préserver les droits de la
personne et de renforcer les institutions démocratiques.
Introduction
The world’s first national ombudsman was established by the Swedish Riksdag
(parliament) in 1809. One hundred and fifty years later, the rest of the world
began to see the wisdom of empowering an independent official to investigate
complaints from individuals concerning inappropriate actions by public institutions. New Zealand and the United Kingdom were among the first western
countries to create such positions in the early 1960s. Today, a legislated ombudsman function exists in the majority of developed and many developing countries.
Surprisingly, Canada has never established a national ombudsman, preferring instead to appoint specialized ombudsman positions such as the Correctional Investigator and the Canadian Taxpayers’ Ombudsman. However, nine
Canadian provinces and the Government of Yukon have appointed an ombudsman beginning with Alberta, New Brunswick and Quebec in the late 1960s.1
At the municipal level, three cities, Montreal, Sherbrooke and Toronto, have appointed a legislated ombudsman.
In developing countries, the ombudsman’s office often receives a broader
mandate covering human rights and, in some cases, anti-corruption. In practice, the ombudsman can become a leading spokesperson on systemic issues
at the heart of the nation’s democratic development. This has certainly been
the case in Peru where the Office of the Ombudsman’s name, Defensoria Del
Pueblo (DDP), translates as “defender of the people.” Peru’s first ombudsman,
Jorge Santistevan de Noriega, rationalized an expanded mandate for the office,
explaining that:
“Normally, an ombudsman deals with individual cases. But that only functions if
the institutional framework functions, if the district attorney’s office functions, if
the courts function. All of that has been undermined. The framework for protecting
62
individual human rights does not exist. So, in Peru, the ombudsman’s office has led
the investigations into allegations of vote fraud because no one else would.” 2
Santistevan’s efforts resulted in the Ombudsman’s Office receiving the highest
approval rating of any public institution by Peru’s understandably cynical citizens. This situation persists today, where DDP continues to be regarded as the
nation’s most credible public institution.3
Source: August 2010 poll by Compañia Peruana de Mercados y Opinion Publica
The scope of work conducted by DDP and its twenty-eight regional offices is
extremely diverse. DDP can be called upon to deal with issues regarding human
rights violations, corruption, indigenous people’s rights, police violence, gender
equality and social conflicts such as the ongoing anti-mining protests.
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has supported DDP
from its inception in 1996. Under Canadian and Swiss leadership, a basket fund
was established in 2006 to coordinate external assistance to DDP from Canada,
Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and, later, Belgium.4 Peru is one of CIDA’s twenty
countries of focus.5
In 2010, DDP requested technical assistance to incorporate a results-based management (RBM) approach into their 2011–15 strategic plan and to integrate the
plan with financial and human resource planning systems. To meet this need,
CIDA turned to its Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program.
DDD, administered by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC),
provides short-term technical assistance to address specific policy or program
issues.
63
City of Toronto Ombudsman Fiona Crean, who had advised DDP since 1996,
was asked to act as an ombudsman expert and resource on the project. AnneMarie Stewart was brought in to serve as project manager.6 The project’s work
planning mission was completed in April 2010, the project work plan approved
in September and the project launched in January 2011.
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Supporting the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoria Del Pueblo)
Client: Peru’s Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoria Del Pueblo - DDP)
Lead Consultants: Anne-Marie Stewart, Fiona Crean, Louis-Pierre Michaud
Duration: April 2010 to January 2012
Budget: $208,200
1. Improve DDP’s personnel capacity in the design, use and application of results-based
management (RBM) techniques and tools.
2. Establish an RBM system by integrating RBM tools and techniques into the DDP’s work.
3. Transfer skills and knowledge to the DDP staff in the design, use and application of the RBM
techniques and tools.
Governance Profile
Peru’s democratic journey took a major leap forward with the flight of President
Fujimori in 2000.7 Following the peaceful 2002 presidential elections, Freedom
House elevated Peru’s status to free. Since then, further progress towards increased democratization has largely stalled, with the country’s Freedom House
scores for political rights and civil liberties remaining unchanged for more than
a decade.8
Similarly, Peru’s scores on the World Bank’s governance indicators have changed
little over the last decade. The scores for political stability, regulatory quality and
rule of law remain the same, with modest improvement for voice and accountability and control of corruption, and a slight decline for government effectiveness. Transparency International ranks Peru 83rd of 176 countries on its 2012
corruption perception index with a score of 38 out of 100, virtually unchanged
from 40 in 2002. A particular area of concern is journalistic freedom, with sharp
declines registered on Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index since
2009.9 Freedom House has condemned recent police attacks on journalists during anti-mining protests.10
64
Peru’s ranking on the United Nations Human Development Index remains virtually unchanged over the last decade (77th in 2012 versus 82nd in 2002). Given
Peru’s continuing robust economic growth, the potential certainly exists for economic gains to translate into enhanced human development, although persistent environmental problems and high levels of social conflict and corruption
present countervailing forces.
The office of the ombudsman is one of several parliamentary offices that enable
the legislative branch to hold the executive branch to account.11 In emerging
democracies, the position can assume added importance not only as the people’s
advocate, but as a systemic defender of human rights and democratic institutions.
Ombudsman Offices in Latin America
Country
FH 2002
FH 2012
Status of Ombudsman
Argentina
3.0
2.0
since 1994
Bolivia
2.0
3.0
since 1997
Brazil
3.0
2.0
no
Chile
2.0
1.0
no
Columbia
4.0
3.5
since 1991
Costa Rica
1.0
1.0
since 1993
Ecuador
3.0
3.0
since 1997
El Salvador
2.5
2.5
since 1991
Guyana
2.0
2.5
office is vacant
Honduras
3.0
4.0
since 1992
Nicaragua
3.0
4.5
since 1995
Paraguay
3.5
3.0
since 2001
Peru
2.5
2.5
since 1996
Uruguay
1.0
1.0
since 2010
Venezuela
3.5
5.0
since 1999
FH scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free)
Throughout Latin America, the majority of countries established ombudsman
offices during the 1990s in tandem with the transition to democracy. The table
65
above sets out the Freedom House (FH) scores for 2002 and 2012 and the status
of the ombudsman office for a range of Latin American countries.
Although the region’s democratization process continues to progress, it remains
uneven and incomplete. Clearly, the relevance of the national ombudsman’s role
in strengthening governance and safeguarding human rights across the region
remains high. This has certainly been the case in Peru where DDP’s actions and
credibility have long served as a counterweight against interests that seek to
undermine the country’s democratic institutions.
DDP was no stranger to RBM methodologies. Twice before, in 2004 and 2007, efforts to introduce RBM were made but did not stick. The obvious challenge was
to ensure that this time would be different. Aware of past failures, the Canadian
team looked closely at why previous attempts had failed. Several reasons stood
out:
• RBM was treated primarily as a technical rather than management or
accountability tool.
• One-off training programs were viewed as sufficient for implementation.
• The organizational development dimension of RBM had not been explored.
• The DDP officials who received the RBM training did not actively participate
in the development of the organization’s strategic plan.
• The necessary linkages between RBM, strategic planning and, in turn,
financial and human resources planning were never articulated.
In designing the project, Ms. Stewart and Ms. Crean made a number of recommendations to ensure that past mistakes would not be repeated.
• Senior management must buy into and actively participate in the reforms.
• The introduction of RBM must not be viewed as a technical task. Rather, it
needs to be positioned within a change management framework.
• Instead of two separate projects on RBM and strategic planning (the original
DDP proposal), a single project should proceed that integrates and embeds
both processes into all key planning and delivery systems.
• The project itself must be structured in a way that forces interaction between
DDP’s traditional work silos.12
66
• The training component needs to be expanded and intensified to provide
a more comprehensive perspective on the linkages between RBM, strategic
planning and financial and human resource planning.
• Technical expert resources in RBM must be secured not just to provide
training, but to support the change management process through to the end
of the project. Louis-Pierre Michaud, from Le Groupe-conseil Baastel, was
engaged to provide this expertise. Local consultants were also recruited to
facilitate knowledge transfer.
Although a radical departure from what DDP had originally requested, the proposal resonated with Peru’s Ombudsman and former Prime Minister Beatriz
Merino. Her strong support for the approach ensured that the project would be
given a fair hearing by her somewhat skeptical management team.
The project commenced in January 2010 and continued for just over a year.
Mission Date
Mission Purpose
April 2010
work planning mission
January 2011
inception mission
March 2011
training mission
May 2011
operational mission
June 2011
operational mission
September 2011
operational mission
November 2011
project completion mission
January 2012
final wrap-up mission
Fortuitously, the project’s timing coincided with the finalization of DDP’s fiveyear strategic plan for 2011–15. This permitted the RBM methodology to be applied immediately to a real document and address relevant issues facing DDP.
DDP’s strategic plan underscores the essential linkage between effectively pursuing its mandate and modernizing its organization.13 For an ombudsman’s office, increased organizational effectiveness can translate into more timely, higher
quality, less costly, better communicated case work on issues of fundamental importance to preserving human rights and strengthening democratic institutions.
67
DDP: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (2011–2015)
1. Defend people in front of the public administration and public utilities to achieve a full
enjoyment of human rights.
2. Promote and disseminate capabilities about human rights amongst poor communities and
excluded people, with a gender and intercultural approach,stimulating social inclusion,
particularly of vulnerable groups.
3. Strengthen and modernize the ombudsman’s office in order to assist people efficiently and
achieve positive outcomes.
When DDP contemplated how to reflect its strategic plan in operational plans
and budgets, it was obvious that RBM tools would need to be used. Thus, the
most common pitfall of RBM projects, lack of operational relevance, was avoided. Rather than being perceived as an unwelcome, add-on process, RBM was
viewed as part of the solution.
What is unique is that the project is designed as a change management intervention.
Standalone training on results-based management in the past has failed because it did not have
management commitment and was not integrated into the institution. What we are saying is
that sustained structural changes can’t be made without leadership, employee learning and new
systems for inclusion and participation.14 (F. Crean)
However, the Canadian team went to great lengths to emphasize that the inclusion of impressive-looking results chains in planning documents was not the
end of the story. The critical success factor for RBM implementation is its institutionalization which can only be achieved through a wholesale change management process. Here, resistance was encountered and only set aside when Ms.
Merino “read the riot act” concerning the importance of this project.
Ombudsman’s offices in developing countries tend to recruit analysts with human rights and legal expertise, some of whom will later be promoted into management positions. Often lacking is broad management experience and familiarity with organizational development. Naturally, management tends to focus on
the policy issues and cases at hand, underestimating the importance of a wellmanaged organization and the potential contributions of its internal administrative units. This was certainly the case in DDP so it was not surprising that a
culture clash occurred when the Canadian team began to insist that these issues
could no longer be avoided. To drive this home, this question was repeatedly
posed: “What does RBM mean for you and your job?”
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Despite initial reluctance, these efforts began to resonate within DDP. In particular, Deputy Ombudsman Eduardo Vega, who had been assigned to the project by Ms. Merino to demonstrate senior commitment and assure the quality of
DDP participation, recognized the potential value of such reforms and began to
persuade skeptics within DDP. Moreover, the project’s structure, which forced
isolated organizational departments to work together, began to break down the
long-standing silos.
A potential crisis arose on 31 March 2011 when Ombudsman Beatriz Merino
resigned. The loss of the project’s client and champion could certainly have
had severe if not fatal consequences. Fortunately, the leadership transition was
seamless as Mr. Vega was appointed acting ombudsman and strongly reiterated
his continuing support. Clearly, the litmus test for project credibility had been
passed.
At the project’s mid-point in July, Ms. Stewart recommended a mid-term progress review and was rejoined by Ms. Crean. Although the majority of the project’s elements were proceeding well, the review zeroed in on the need to augment and strengthen DDP’s operational capacity in order to efficiently address
the organization’s human resources needs. The mid-term review also identified
the need to address shortcomings in DDP’s Sistema de Información Defensorial
(SID), the organization’s IT system which combined a management information
system and a case management system for complaints.
Working within the limits of the project’s original budget, funding allocations
were shifted so that local consultants could be hired to advise and support DDP
staff in filling the human resources operational gaps and to begin to re-design
the policy framework and related structures underpinning SID. Through these
interventions, DDP began to build sufficient internal capacity to support effectively the system-wide linkages and impacts of the RBM system.
DDP’s efforts to link RBM with budget formulation were acknowledged when
it was selected by the Ministry of Economy and Finance to serve as a pilot organization to integrate RBM into the public finance management system on a
government-wide basis.
The project concluded in January 2012 with a wide range of concrete accomplishments to its credit.
69
PROJECT RESULTS
• over one hundred DDP managers and staff trained in RBM methodology
• RBM principles, indicators and targets incorporated into DDP’s 2011–15 strategic plan
• RBM methodology used as basis for developing a monitoring and evaluation framework
• DDP Monitoring Committee comprising senior management established to oversee monitoring
and implementation of the strategic plan
• operational plans based on the strategic plan and linked to budgets developed within an RBM
framework
• DDP’s strategic plan disseminated to all DDP staff
• basket-fund donors agreed to utilize DDP’s performance measurement framework as the basis
for their reporting requirements
• the Ministry of Economy and Finance selected DDP as a pilot institution to test and develop a
government-wide RBM system integrated with the budget
• RBM now embedded in DDP’s core operational systems and programs
The project’s final report concluded that this successful intervention had met all
of its objectives, but reiterated that systemic change takes time and further support would be required.
The technical and financial support provided to Peru’s Office of the Ombudsman by CIDA and other donors has enabled DDP to consolidate and expand
its critical role in promoting democratic governance. Admittedly, the obscure
world of RBM, integrated planning and change management means little to the
general public. Nonetheless, these tools can address acute internal problems that
diminish the quality of an organization’s day-to-day work.
Lessons Learned
The project’s purported success was recently validated by an independent evaluation of CIDA’s Peru Program. Here, the assessors described the support provided to DDP as “…one of the Peru Program’s most successful initiatives” and
scored it very high in critical categories such as relevance and sustainability.15
Not surprisingly, a number of lessons learned can be drawn from this project.
Learn from lessons learned: Admittedly, this seems a rather obvious lesson to
cite. Nonetheless, it is astounding how often project designers ignore the experience of predecessor projects. In DDP’s case, two earlier RBM projects had clearly
been ineffective. At the project design stage, the Canadian team spent consider70
able effort examining why the previous RBM training had failed to produce any
tangible results. Their conclusions that RBM could not be implemented in isolation shaped the project work plan and the ultimate composition of the project
team. Ms. Crean, Ms. Stewart and Mr. Michaud respectively brought experience
in managing an ombudsman’s office, leading change management initiatives
and implementing RBM. Clearly, a different approach was going to be taken.
Develop future champions: One of the most common lessons learned in international development is the importance of securing a champion at top management levels to serve as the project’s advocate. With Ombudsman Beatriz Merino
firmly onside, this project certainly enjoyed that advantage. However, it went
one step further.
The Canadian team worked hard to gain the trust and engagement of Eduardo
Vega, then deputy ombudsman, who had been assigned by Ms. Merino to assure
the quality of DDP participation. Not only did Mr. Vega play an instrumental
role in bringing other DDP officials onside, but, when he was later appointed
as acting ombudsman following Ms. Merino’s resignation, he ensured that the
project remained an organizational priority. Projects should not only secure a
champion at the top, but attempt to cultivate a critical mass of opinion leaders at
senior and middle management levels. You never know where they may end up.
Methodology is not enough: RBM is typically accompanied by an impressive
set of charts and tables including a logic diagram or results chain, which illustrates how inputs enable activities, which produce outputs, which in turn translate into intermediate and longer-term outcomes. At each stage, performance
indicators and targets can be set and linked to available funding. In particularly
ambitious systems, such as New Zealand’s, an actual cost will be established
for each output and used as the basis for budget allocation. The diagram below
presents a typical RBM results chain.16
RBM Results Chain
Implementation
Inputs
Results
Activities
Outputs
Outcomes
Impacts
However impressive the logic, reality often presents a more convoluted picture
and the achievement of expected results invariably confronts an organization’s
financial and human resource constraints. This project’s success largely derived
from the recognition that the key challenges would be more organizational and
cultural than methodological. To address these problems, a path was chosen
where RBM was introduced through a comprehensive change management approach that drilled down to the operational level.
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Don’t overlook internal synergy: Quite rightly, development projects focus on
developing trust and rapport with the client. A secondary and often overlooked
consideration is synergy within the project team itself. This DDD project not
only required experience and technical knowledge on managing an ombudsman’s office, but two distinct skill sets for implementing RBM and change management. The former requires an in-depth understanding of RBM methodology
and how it can be effectively incorporated within strategic planning, budget
formulation and performance management processes. Change management, on
the other hand, typically requires a broad range of senior management experience and organizational development skills.
For this project, Anne-Marie Stewart led the change management component
while Louis-Pierre Michaud worked on the technical RBM elements. However,
as the project progressed, the Canadian experts themselves began to understand
even more deeply the enormous benefits of introducing RBM within a change
management context and were able to enrich each other’s work. When they visited together or separately, they spoke with a single voice. In turn, DDP officials became similarly enthused and began to make the same connections. If the
project team had failed to internalize this synergy, it is doubtful that their DDP
counterparts would have been convinced.
Stocktaking pays dividends: Although the project was going well, Ms. Stewart felt
that it would be beneficial to complete a mid-term assessment which she conducted with Ms. Crean in June. This exposed some subtle flaws and resulted in a
few critical tweaks to the work plan aimed at reinforcing DDP’s human resources capacity. Although the project could likely have been completed successfully
without the stocktaking, a critical gap affecting the quality of implementation
might have been overlooked. Even twelve-month projects can benefit from an
objective mid-term review.
The knowledge transfer potential for this DDD project is very high. The prevalence of the ombudsman position throughout Latin America and the ongoing
evolution of these offices as advocates for human rights and democratization
suggest that the benefits of sharing experiences and best practices among countries would be significant.
As part of this project, a survey of RBM approaches used by ombudsman offices
in other Latin American countries was conducted. It concluded that DDP’s RBM
approach, if implemented successfully, would be leading edge, including its use
of performance information at the sector level.17 Moreover, DDP’s innovative
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efforts to improve organizational effectiveness by implementing RBM through
a change management approach should certainly be considered as a model for
other countries in the region.
Postscript
Eduardo Vega remains in his post as Peru’s ombudsman as his office continues
to address a wide range of controversial, difficult issues. These include convening consultations with Peru’s indigenous peoples on oil exploration in the Amazon basin, protesting a Supreme Court ruling that reduced penalties for paramilitary death squad members convicted for the Barrios Altos massacre in the early
1990s, reviewing anti-terrorism legislation that may unduly restrict freedom of
expression, and producing the monthly monitoring report on social conflicts.
A year after this DDD project concluded, DDP’s director of strategic planning,
international co-operation and investments, who also served as project coordinator, was interviewed regarding the project’s sustainability. The RBM framework,
incorporated into DDP’s 2011–15 strategic plan, remains highly relevant. In fact,
DDP refined several higher-level indicators where the organization had little if
any ability to influence the desired results through its own actions. They want
to ensure that accountability within their organization can be meaningfully applied. The change management process continues, albeit slowly. Organizational
challenges, such as staff turnover and budget constraints, have certainly affected
the pace of change, but senior management understands the long-term commitment required. Overall, despite bumps in the road, DDP feels it is headed in the
right direction and credits the project for illuminating a pragmatic and positive
way forward.
Endnotes
1
Prince Edward Island remains the only province that has not appointed an
ombudsman.
2
J. Darling, “Ombudsman Rewriting Peru’s History,” (Los Angeles Times, 7 November
2000).
3
The Catholic Church remains the most popular institution in Peru. The poll reported
here was conducted by Compañia Peruana de Mercados y Opinion Publica S.A.C.
(CPI) Peru in August 2010.
4
The basket fund, titled Promotion of Equity and Inclusion for the Exercise of Human
Rights Program, was the first to be established in Peru.
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5
In 2009, CIDA committed to direct 80 percent of its future bilateral aid to 20 countries
of focus. Peru, along with Columbia and Bolivia, was among three South American
countries identified as priority recipients.
6
Anne-Marie Stewart had worked extensively as a consultant with Ontario’s Office
of the Ombudsman under Roberta Jamieson during the late 1990s. During this time,
Fiona Crean was employed as the Office’s executive director. She became the City of
Toronto’s Ombudsman in 2008.
7
President Fujimori served as Peru’s president from 1990 to 2000. In 2000, facing
charges of corruption and human rights violations, the president attempted to resign
and, when the offer was refused by the Congress, fled to Japan. In 2007, the former
president was extradited back to Peru where he was tried and convicted on a number
of charges.
8
Freedom House uses a 1-7 scoring system, with 1 being the most free, for two
categories: political rights and civil liberties. Peru has scored 2 on political rights and
3 on civil liberties for the last ten years.
9
Peru slipped from 85th in 2009 to 109th in 2010, 115th in 2011 and 105th in 2013 (of 179
countries).
10 Freedom House press release on 15 June 2012.
11 Other positions that typically report to the legislature and have statutory autonomy
from the Executive include the auditor general, chief electoral officer, freedom of
information/privacy commissioner, human rights commissioner and, in some
systems, the civil service commissioner.
12 The project reported to the ombudsman through a senior delegate and the coordinator
of DDP’s strategic plan. The project was then structured into three components: Service
& Program Delivery, Financial and Human Resource Management and Internal
Communications and External Linkages (later changed to Change Management).
13 Contained in H. Leon-Manco, “Human Rights in Practice: The Work of the Peruvian
Ombudsman,” Anlep Working Paper #3 (University of Oslo: Oslo, 2011).
14 F. Crean, “Accountability and Good Governance: The Ombudsman in Peru,” Public
Sector Management (IPAC; Volume 22, Issue 3, 2011).
15 Evaluation of CIDA’s Peru Program 2005–2010: Synthesis Report, (Queen’s Printer:
Ottawa, 2012). The DDP project scored highest in five of eight assessment categories,
including sustainability, relevance, efficiency, management principles and
performance management.
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16 Adapted from model in United Nations Development Group Results-Based
Management Handbook, (United Nations: New York City, 2010).
17 Reporting on high-level, sector (e.g., health, education) performance indicators is not
intended to infer a direct causal link between DDP’s interventions and a particular
sector result, but rather to assess whether actions taken by public institutions in areas
(e.g., access to service) where the ombudsman has made recommendations have
registered any improvements.
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Chapter 5
Improving Policy Skills in Indonesia’s
Department of Foreign Affairs
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Naomi Alboim and
David C. Elder.
Abstract: This case study describes a highly-successful project delivered through the
CIDA-funded Deployment for Democratic Development program in 2010 to strengthen
Indonesia’s foreign policy analysis and research capacity. What distinguished the project
was the job relevance of the policy training, strong political buy-in from the Minister,
the training techniques used and the high degree of ownership by its client, the Policy
Planning and Development Agency in Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The
policy training focused on the development of policy proposals and presentations that
addressed actual departmental and Ministerial strategic priorities (e.g., policy positions
for an upcoming G-20 meeting). The end products were presented in a live situation to
the department head. A train-the-trainers program was developed in parallel to ensure
that the new policy analysis process could be sustained and continuously improved going forward. A component on conducting policy research using electronic sources was
fully integrated within the training program and used to support the development of the
policy presentations. Remarkably, the project itself was completed in less than a year.
Given the relative scarcity of technical assistance projects which work directly on foreign
policy or which provide job-relevant policy training, the knowledge transfer potential
and lessons learned from this project are significant.
Sommaire : Cette étude de cas décrit un projet très fructueux de renforcement des capacités de recherche et d’analyse des politiques étrangères de l’Indonésie dispensé en
2010 dans le cadre du programme de Déploiements pour le Développement Démocratique (DDD), financé par l’ACDI. Ce projet s’est distingué par la pertinence de la formation offerte, les techniques de formation mises en oeuvre, un ralliement fort de la part
du ministre, et le haut degré d’appropriation de son client, l’Agence de planification et
d’élaboration des politiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères de l’Indonésie. Cette
formation en politiques a mis l’accent sur l’élaboration de propositions et de présentations politiques abordant les priorités stratégiques départementales et ministérielles,
notamment les positions politiques en vue d’une prochaine réunion du G-20. Les
produits définitifs ont été présentés au chef du ministère ; un programme de formation
des formateurs a été élaboré en parallèle afin de veiller à ce que le nouveau processus d’analyse politique soit viable et apporte une amélioration soutenue dans l’avenir.
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Une composante portant sur l’utilisation de ressources électroniques dans la conduite
d’activités de recherche fut pleinement intégrée au sein du programme de formation et
utilisée pour étayer l’élaboration des présentations. Compte tenu de l’envergure du projet, il est remarquable de constater qu’il a été réalisé en moins d’un an. Étant donné le
manque de projets d’aide technique portant directement sur des questions de politiques
étrangères ou dispensant une formation liée à l’emploi dans le domaine politique, le potentiel de transfert des connaissances et les leçons tirées de ce projet sont considérables.
Introduction
Indonesia is a vast, populous country comprising 240 million people, 300 ethnic
groups, and 742 languages and dialects spread across 6,000 or more islands. Indonesia is also home to the world’s largest Muslim population. Its fast-growing
economy, currently ranked 18th in the world, is on track to becoming the seventh
largest by 2050.1 Although the complexity of Indonesia’s internal governance
remains daunting, the nation has begun to assume a more prominent global role
as a member of the G-20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group,
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Canada’s relationship with Indonesia has been expanding in tandem with its
overall strengthening of economic and political ties with Asia. Between 2009
and 2010, Canadian exports to Indonesia grew by 9.4 percent, imports by 25.2
percent and foreign direct investment by 17.6 percent.2 In addition to the G-20,
Canada interacts with Indonesia as a member of APEC and a dialogue partner of
ASEAN. In 2009, CIDA identified Indonesia as a priority aid recipient, naming
it as one of twenty countries of focus.3 For 2010/11, Indonesia ranked as CIDA’s
18th largest recipient of non-humanitarian foreign aid, receiving $17.5 million.4
This case study describes a small, but highly successful project delivered through
CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program in 2010. This
project was planned as the successor to a 2008 DDD project that worked with the
Policy Planning and Development Agency (BPPK) of Indonesia’s Department of
Foreign Affairs to increase their understanding of, and ability to work within, a
modern policy process.5 The initial project’s final report concluded that: “There
is no doubt that the [training] course, as a course, was a great success…Training
courses are only the beginning of learning. The real benefit comes in the application, the feedback and then the subsequent re-application.”
The successor project, approved in 2009, sought to build a sustained capacity for
policy planning and analysis within the BPPK. What ultimately distinguished
this project was its success in moving beyond generic policy training and incorporating actual departmental and governmental foreign policy priorities into
78
the policy training and support provided by the Canadian consultants. The project supported Indonesia’s priority to develop policies that were the extension
and expression internationally of its role as a major bilateral and multilateral
power in its region and a member of the G-20, with democratic institutions, a
dynamic, open economy and a diverse, multicultural society.
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Supporting Good Governance Practices in Foreign Policy Planning and Development
Client: Policy Planning and Development Agency; Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs
Lead Consultants: Naomi Alboim, David C. Elder, Barbara Porrett, Gary Soroka
Duration: October 2009 to August 2010
Budget: $224,000
Key Outputs:
1. Training and train-the-trainers on applied policy research and analysis
2. Workshops on increasing organizational effectiveness
3. Workshops on accessing electronic resources
Governance Profile
For three decades, Indonesia was ruled by the autocratic Suharto regime. His
New Order administration did oversee sustained economic growth, but also
committed pervasive human rights violations, most notably in East Timor. With
the severity of the Asian financial crisis and rising resistance towards his regime,
Suharto resigned in 1998.
Indonesia’s democratic journey began with the 1999 parliamentary elections
and continued with the first direct presidential election in 2004. Freedom House
formally upgraded Indonesia from partly free to free in 2006, where it has remained since.6 Indonesia’s press freedom, however, declined after 2010, falling
from 117th to 146th of 179 countries in 2011 with a slight improvement to 139th
on the Reporters Without Borders’ 2013 Press Freedom Index.
Indonesia now ranks 121st of 187 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and 106th of 148 countries on the UN Gender Inequality Index (GII).7 In comparison to other countries, Indonesia’s HDI ranking has
dropped slightly since 2002 from the 37th to 35th percentile and more substantially in GII from the 38th to 28th percentile.
Notwithstanding recent socio-economic challenges, all of Indonesia’s World
Bank governance indicators have improved over the last decade.8 The stronImproving Policy Skills in Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs
79
gest gains have been registered in voice and accountability and political stability
with solid improvement in government effectiveness and control of corruption.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index echoes this finding.
In 2002, Indonesia was perceived as one of the world’s most corrupt countries,
ranking 96th of 102 countries (94th percentile). By 2012, its ranking had improved to 118th of 176 countries (67th percentile).
Institution building is fundamental to any good governance model and policy making represents a core function of any government ministry. This DDD
project contributed to both while working in what will be a priority sector for
Indonesia’s future development. As Indonesia’s democratization deepens, its
economy grows and its international role consequently expands, demands on
its Department of Foreign Affairs will intensify.
The project’s design, finalized during the October 2009 scoping mission, emphasized the practical and job-applicable from the outset. This precept was built into
the project’s three core areas of technical support: strengthening policy research
and analysis, improving organizational effectiveness and expanding access to
electronic resources.
The proposal is to build on the earlier training, but to provide opportunities for the application
of the theory to the development of real-life policy proposals, principally through the use of
group work through the various stages of policy development culminating in the preparation of
persuasive written policy recommendations.
… from the Project Work Plan
Policy training, in the abstract, invariably confronts the challenge of meaningful
application in the workplace. Fortuitously for the project, the newly-appointed
minister of Foreign Affairs had worked previously as a civil servant in BPPK
and was committed to increasing the agency’s relevance. Moreover, the head of
BPPK, Ambassador Artauli Tobing, fully shared the views of Canadian advisers
Naomi Alboim and David C. Elder that the policy training must be linked to real
policy issues. Similarly, the train-the-trainers component was refocused away
from policy theory towards the techniques used to produce the actual policy
research and analysis documents.
Historically, BPPK was perceived across the department as an isolated research
unit of marginal operational relevance. BPPK’s head was strongly committed to
reversing this unacceptable status quo. Initially, it was assumed that the proj-
80
ect would propose a new agency structure that, in turn, would resolve these
long-standing problems of relevance and role. However, the Canadian advisers urged that less far-reaching solutions, such as more effective networking,
inter-departmental working committees, and information-sharing mechanisms
also be considered. Ultimately, it was agreed that these intra-departmental innovations as well as increased quality and relevance of the policy analysis and
recommendations produced by BPPK would prove more effective than a new
organization chart.
The project’s third component aimed at expanding the access to, and use of, electronic sources for policy research. Instead of providing a general course on electronic search methods separately from the policy training, the search techniques
were applied directly to the preparation of the actual policy notes. Training and
hands-on assistance were not only provided to the BPPK analysts, but to officials
in charge of the departmental library.
The approved 2009 project work plan fully reflected this insistence on job relevance. All three project components were now designed to address immediate
policy and organizational challenges facing BPPK.
The project was delivered over two missions during April and July 2010. Between the initial scoping mission and the first training mission, BPPK took ownership of the project’s directions for developing its human resources and devoted considerable effort to selecting the trainees. A balance was struck whereby
senior management and analysts from every unit in BPPK were well represented
alongside high-potential, junior officials. To ensure that the training was relevant to the department, BPPK took care in choosing the right policy issues for
the focus of the training. The four content areas chosen for intensive policy analysis and development were those identified by the government of Indonesia
as departmental and ministerial strategic priorities: climate change, the role of
Indonesia in the G-20, expanding regional markets, and the place of Indonesia
in regional multilateral fora.
Missions to Indonesia
October 2009
Scoping mission
April 2010
First mission
July 2010
Second mission
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For the April mission, two groups of twenty policy analysts were trained over
two three-day periods. The trainees were divided into smaller groups of five and
assigned one of the four identified policy issues. Here, the various steps in the
foreign policy development process—from defining the problem, establishing
national objectives and priorities, and preparing a situation analysis that included an analysis of the nation’s foreign policy interests, assets and instruments, to
researching and consulting with policy networks and stakeholders, identifying
options and writing up the proposal—were applied to real-life issues facing the
department. The electronic research component was integrated with the training. Twenty-one analysts attended three ninety-minute workshops held in tandem with the policy training sessions and individual tutorials were provided to
assist in searching databases for information on the specific priority areas.
All participants in the training program were given homework that they were
expected to complete and present during the second mission. This included a
briefing note to the minister on their policy recommendations, an analytical annex and a PowerPoint presentation.
At the end of each day, the Canadian advisers met with those designated for the
train-the-trainers program to review how to incorporate the content and lessons
learned into an ongoing policy training program. On completion of the policy
training course, a full-day course was provided for the departmental trainers. As
follow-up homework, all designated trainers were expected to prepare a section
of the training program for delivery during the second mission.
In addition, a workshop was held for twenty senior managers and staff, chaired
by the head of BPPK, to discuss organizational effectiveness with an emphasis
on improving intra-departmental communications. This exercise was repeated
during the second mission, but this time representatives from other units within
the department participated as well, which explored further how to strengthen
organizational effectiveness through improved networks and information-sharing rather than restructuring.
Between May and July, the Canadian advisers continued to work by e-mail with
the trainees on their group policy papers. As part of their research, the trainees conducted over 4,000 related electronic searches using a range of tools from
Google Scholar to open text sources to subscription services. Helpfully, the project consultant, Ms. Barbara Porrett, discovered that the Department of Education and the National Library held existing subscriptions to a variety of relevant
sources so ongoing access for BPPK was easily arranged.
The July mission included a two-day course at which eight policy groups presented their policy briefs using PowerPoint to the head of BPPK. The staging
largely replicated an on-the-job situation with the added realism of addressing
82
actual policy issues. The session allowed the groups to present the policies and
actions that they as groups had developed to advance Indonesia’s interests and
to justify their approaches to their peers and to BPPK’s senior management. The
Head of BPPK commented from the perspective of how she would bring forward their policy proposals to the department’s senior management and the
minister.
Again, the core training on policy development was followed by a workshop
for the eighteen officials designated for train-the-trainers. To test their training
modules, the BPPK trainers simulated a training exercise with the main group
playing the role of new recruits. Moreover, the trainers assumed full responsibility for preparing the training manual, wanting to ensure that their work and the
Indonesian examples were appropriately reflected.
Given the project’s limited resources and time, the Canadian advisers were impressed with the progress made. The final project report concluded that sustainability was promising since the right people had been selected for the training,
the identified policy issues were relevant to their jobs, and BPPK had demonstrated strong leadership throughout. Above all, the BPPK policy analysts and
future trainers had truly made it their own.
This positive assessment was echoed in the course evaluations. Of sixteen respondents, thirteen deemed the course to have fully met objectives and three
somewhat met objectives. All sixteen felt the course to be relevant to their daily
work. Further testimony came from the minister, who not only was interested
in receiving all training materials and documents produced, but also requested
that the BPPK trainers become trainers for the Department of Foreign Affairs as
a whole.
Lessons Learned
Although short in duration, this DDD project made a significant impact on the
approach to policy research and analysis in Indonesia’s Department of Foreign
Affairs. Several lessons learned stand out:
The virtuous circle of relevance, respect and ownership: Virtually every external assistance project aspires for its beneficiary to assume ownership of the
project. The underlying premise is straightforward: sustainability can only be
achieved if the client organization truly believes in and incorporates the project’s
content into its day-to-day work.
This DDD project certainly benefited from a committed and motivated client.
Ambassador Tobing viewed the transformation of BPPK from a marginal agency
83
into a respected player at the centre of departmental planning and strategy as a
centrepiece of her foreign affairs career. The minister’s support was invaluable.
It is not every day that a foreign aid project’s outputs end up on the minister’s
desk. That they were well received by the minister raised BPPK’s stature within
the department and, in turn, increased its incentives to further own and improve
the new policy development process. This clearly would not have occurred if the
project had utilized generic, hypothetical policy examples.
Foreign policy does not have to be off-limits if trust is earned: Up until
the late 1990s, few if any external assistance projects were located at the centre of government; i.e., in the Cabinet Office or Prime Minister’s Office. It was
simply assumed that such areas were too sensitive and the material too confidential to allow foreign consultants in the door. However, when several of the
new democracies in Eastern Europe did, in fact, invite the consultants in, it was
demonstrated that one can advise on the quality of a policy process without
becoming embroiled in the substance of those policies. Foreign policy falls into a
similar category. Yes, the material is sensitive and foreign advisers must exercise
discretion, but, as this project demonstrated, it is feasible to train policy analysts
on policy research and analysis without intruding on a nation’s foreign policy.
BPPK and Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs should be commended for
recognizing that the right balance could be struck.
The other critical success factor is trust between client and consultant. Policy
training simply does not work if the client forgoes rigorous analysis and debate for fear of transgressing confidentiality. Fortunately, the Canadian advisers
gained the agency’s trust from the outset.9 Asked if there were any moments
where the Indonesian partners hesitated about dealing with a particular issue,
their answer was “not for a nanosecond.”
Homework not handholding: The project’s work plan and budget permitted
two missions, three months apart. Unlike conventional foreign aid projects, with
project teams, multi-year timelines and much higher budgets, this DDD project
chose to delegate the majority of the work to the participants. Between missions,
it was up to BPPK to conduct the analysis, produce the policy notes, prepare
the presentations and, importantly, develop their own training modules adapting the Canadian material to their challenges and circumstances. The Canadian
advisers certainly helped with e-mailed comments and advice on electronic
searches, but there was no question about who was responsible for the actual
products. In the second mission, it was evident that the homework approach
had successfully engendered pride of ownership. The quality of the policy presentations and the enthusiasm with which they were delivered showed the extent to which the analysts, particularly the junior ones, had absorbed the lessons
from the Canadian training. The material for training analysts that the trainers
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developed and its presentation in a simulated training situation enabled BPPK
to move forward on its staff development in a way that was aligned with its
policy priorities.
Create a critical mass: Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs uses a rotation career model where BPPK is one possible destination during domestic
assignments. An alternative model uses full-time policy specialists who are not
part of the diplomatic rotation. The disadvantage of the rotation model is that
policy analysts do not remain in BPPK long enough to maximize their policy
skills. On the other hand, these policy skills move with the incumbents out to
diplomatic posts where they can be usefully applied. To offset the inevitable loss
of policy expertise within BPPK, the project involved other operational units
and worked closely with the Secretariat, a corporate unit which was not part
of the rotation system, but had ongoing responsibility for administration and
for training and is directly responsible for the departmental library. It is hoped
that, on balance, the department will retain sufficient policy expertise despite
the high turnover in BPPK. Moreover, BPPK’s improved profile and relevance
within the department should increase its desirability as a career option for incountry assignments.
Two dimensions of this project offer knowledge transfer opportunities: first, its
emphasis on practical policy research and analysis skills; second, its focus on
foreign affairs policy, which is off-the-grid of most external assistance programs.
Unlike public finance or civil service management, there are very few places
where public servants in developing countries can receive job-relevant training
on policy research and analysis. One reason is that many developing countries
do not yet have a well-defined policy process. Another is that the majority of
available policy training tends to be generic and theoretical, most often delivered by academic institutions in developed countries. This DDD project, however, worked directly with BPPK’s policy analysts to develop products related to
the task at hand. The training was not only on-the-job, but also part of their job.
Although numerous external assistance projects involve policy development,
foreign affairs is one sector that is rarely supported. World Bank technical assistance programs, for instance, work mostly with central institutions and economic or social sector ministries. The majority of bilateral aid programs similarly aim
at institutions with economic growth or poverty reduction mandates. Democratization programs do focus on institution building, but usually concentrate on
85
external institutions such as parliament, electoral commissions, media associations, human rights bodies, or civil society organizations.
To illustrate, Canada’s 2009-10 Parliamentary Report on Official Development Assistance does not contain a single reference to a project or program in foreign affairs policy, notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) enjoys the third largest ODA budget after CIDA
and the Department of Finance.10 This omission is not surprising. Foreign policy
is crafted by a relatively small community of politicians and civil servants and
its policy concerns are often highly sensitive. Nonetheless, this DDD project
did work directly on foreign policy with Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The relative scarcity of such projects raises the importance of this project’s
knowledge transfer potential.
Postscript
With most short-term projects, sustainability remains an issue since the tools
developed during the project will not yet have been institutionalized. However,
this DDD project was able to move beyond theoretical training and, with the
active support of BPPK, provide practical, job-relevant training aimed at producing concrete policy products. In this case, since the actual products were
job-ready, the question was not whether the project would ultimately be implemented, but how well. For BPPK, the quality of implementation would depend
not only on continuously improving policy skills and expanding intra-ministry
and stakeholder networks, but on meeting that particular challenge of foreign
affairs ministries, constant job rotation to overseas posts.
Not surprisingly, many of the project’s beneficiaries have since been assigned
abroad. Mr. Yusra Khan, former BPPK secretary, is now the ambassador and
deputy permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations in New
York. Mr. Teiseran Foun Cornelis, former head of BPPK’s America and European Region, is now ambassador to the Bahamas. Ms. Marina Estella Anwar Bey,
former head of BPPK’s Asia-Pacific and African Region, is now consul general
in Hamburg, Germany. Mr. Agus Sardjana, former BPPK head for international
organizations, is now ambassador to Croatia.
The continual movement of diplomats in and out of the nation’s capital represents the natural rhythm of foreign affairs. Knowing this, the project tailored an
approach that could withstand the disruption. First, the training was delivered
to a large group of forty policy analysts, many of whom were not facing an
imminent transfer abroad. Second, the train-the-trainers curriculum was documented in a training manual, which could serve to orient new arrivals. Finally,
86
skills such as policy analysis and electronic research are highly portable and
desirable attributes at home or abroad. It is worth noting that the minister of
Foreign Affairs, a strong proponent of the project, remains in place and will continue to demand high-quality policy briefings. At this juncture, the prospects for
sustainability are promising.
Endnotes
1
“BRICs and Beyond.” (Goldman Sachs, 2007).
2
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
3
The establishment of “countries of focus” was part of CIDA’s aid effectiveness agenda
to concentrate greater resources in fewer countries. These countries were slated to
receive 80 of Canada’s bilateral aid. Indonesia was one of five Asian countries selected
with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam.
4
From Report to Parliament on Canada’s Official Development Assistance: 2010-11. Based on
DAC-OECD data, Canada remains a relatively minor donor to Indonesia; the highest
bi-lateral donors include Japan (US$1.5 billion), Australia (US$349 million), France
(US$326 million), and USA (US$296 million).
5
In early 2010, the Department of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia became the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. (For the sake of consistency the report uses the name of department
throughout.)
6
rights.
7
The UN Human Development and Gender Inequality Indexes are produced annually
and are based on data from two years before; i.e., the 2011 report uses data from 2009.
8
The six categories used in the index include: voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
9
That all of the Canadian advisers engaged in the project had directly related
professional experience was a major factor in the positive attitude that the BPPK
management and the analysts had toward the training. Of the two advisers who
undertook the scoping mission and the two training missions, one had extensive
policy experience as a former deputy minister in a number of government ministries
(Alboim) and the other was a former officer in Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT) and in the Privy Council Office (Elder); they were joined in the April mission
87
by a librarian from the International Development Research Center with expertise
in electronic sources on international development (Porrett); much of the course
material on the role of the policy unit was developed by a former DFAIT officer with
experience in its Policy Planning Unit (Soroka).
10 In 2009–10, CIDA disbursed $3.5 billion, the Department of Finance $541 million, and
DFAIT $283 million.
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Chapter 6
Supporting Civil Service Reform in
Mongolia: A Case of Consensus Building
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Maria Barrados.
Abstract: This case study describes a 2011 CIDA-funded project to support civil service
reform in Mongolia. The project enabled Canada’s Public Service Commission (PSC) to
work with Mongolia’s Civil Service Council (CSC) and a working group formed by the
prime minister to revise the national civil service legislation. Initially, the project grappled with the policy challenges of adapting Canada’s federal model to a unitary country
and simplifying Mongolia’s highly complex, New Zealand-style public administration
model. The greatest challenge, however, arose when a second working group on civil
service reform was formed by Mongolia’s president. At this point, Ms. Maria Barrados,
the project lead and former PSC president, had a critical decision to make on whether
and how to respond. Although the project’s remaining resources and time were limited,
Ms. Barrados determined that the best course of action would be to work directly and
intensely with both working groups in an effort to achieve consensus on fundamental
policy positions. Through this engagement, it was hoped that common policy grounds
would be evident between the two sets of legislative proposals.
Sommaire : Cette étude de cas décrit un projet, financé par l’ACDI en 2011, dont le but
était de soutenir la réforme de la fonction publique en Mongolie. Ce projet a permis à la
Commission de la fonction publique (CFP) du Canada de collaborer avec le Conseil de la
fonction publique de la Mongolie, ainsi qu’un groupe de travail constitué par le premier
ministre en vue de réviser la législation de la fonction publique du pays. Le projet a dû
faire face aux enjeux politiques que posait l’adaptation d’un modèle fédéral canadien à
un pays centralisé, et la simplification nécessaire du modèle d’administration publique
extrêmement complexe de la Mongolie (modèle inspiré de celui de la Nouvelle-Zélande).
Un problème plus ardu encore s’est présenté lorsque le président de la Mongolie a constitué un deuxième groupe de travail sur la réforme de la fonction publique. Pour Maria
Barrados, directrice du projet et ancienne présidente de la CFP, il s’agissait alors de prendre une décision cruciale. Les ressources et les délais pour réaliser le projet étant limités,
elle a décidé de travailler directement avec les deux groupes de travail et de mobiliser
les efforts pour établir un consensus sur les positions politiques fondamentales. Il faut
souhaiter que cet engagement aboutisse à une entente commune concernant ces deux
projets de loi.
Supporting Civil Service Reform in Mongolia
89
Introduction
Few Canadians know that Canada ranks as Mongolia’s second largest foreign
investor after China.1 Moreover, the relationship is set to expand as Turquoise
(formerly Ivanhoe) Mines’ multi-billion dollar joint venture to develop the
mammoth Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine proceeds to completion by 2017. But
this case study is not about mining. Rather, it describes another area of Canadian
involvement in Mongolia: supporting civil service reform.
The Civil Service Reform Project, funded through CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program, ran from February to December 2011. Its
objective was “to support Mongolia’s efforts to promote good, citizen-oriented
economic governance through the development of a professional, competent,
accountable and non-partisan civil service.”2 Its key outputs supported the preparation of new civil service legislation by Mongolia’s Civil Service Council.
The project’s origins trace back several years to a request from the Mongolian
Civil Service Council to Ms. Maria Barrados, then president of the Public Service
Commission (PSC) of Canada, to visit Mongolia. The eventual courtesy visit, undertaken in conjunction with a trip to China, established a rapport with the head
of Mongolia’s Civil Service Council (CSC), Mr. Dorjdamba Zumberellkham, and
a recognition that Canada’s civil service model could serve as a valuable reference point for the Mongolian reform.3 To expand the dialogue, the PSC completed a comparative analysis of the two systems in August 2010.
The relationship was further cemented during a September 2010 visit to Ottawa
by Mongolia’s prime minister where a formal Memorandum of Understanding
was signed between the PSC and CSC. Typically, such MOUs are confined to
information exchanges and support for occasional study tours. However, Ms.
Barrados and Mr. Zumberellkham decided to aim higher. In consequence, Ms.
Barrados approached CIDA to see if there was an appropriate aid vehicle to support a more extensive involvement. Enter DDD.
DDD enables CIDA to respond to short-term, focused needs for technical assistance. In this case, with some initial work already underway, DDD was able to
provide the necessary bridge funding to support visits to Ulaanbaator in January and March 2011. These scoping efforts culminated with a formal request for
Canadian technical assistance from Prime Minister Batbold to Prime Minister
Harper in March. By May, a DDD work plan and budget had been agreed.
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PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Civil Service Reform
Client: Civil Service Council (Mongolia)
Lead Consultant: Maria Barrados (president, Public Service Commission of Canada)
Duration: February to December 2012
Budget: $250,000
Key Outputs:
1. Comparative analysis of Mongolian and Canadian civil service legislation (pre-project)
2. Discussion paper on recommended legislative changes
3. Draft legislative amendments reflecting recommendations
4. Improved legal skills/knowledge by CSC regarding merit principle, delegation and enforcement
Governance Profile
Mongolia’s emergence as a democracy coincided with the perestroika era and
breakup of the Soviet Union. Over a five-month period in 1990, the politburo of
the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) resigned, a constitutional
amendment eliminated one-party rule, and the first multi-party elections were
held. In 1996, the 72-year rule of the MPRP ended when the Democratic Union
coalition assumed power. Although violence and a state-of-emergency accompanied the 2008 parliamentary election, won by the MPRP, the 2009 presidential
election was generally perceived to be free and fair. Similarly, the 2012 parliamentary election, won by the opposition Democratic Party, was deemed to be
free and fair by foreign and civil society observers.
Freedom House currently rates Mongolia as free with a 2.0 rating.4 Mongolia’s
press freedom, however, has slipped from 76th to 98th of 179 countries between
2010 and 2013 on the Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. However, parliament’s approval in June 2011 of the new Law on Information, Transparency, Right and Freedom to Access Information is viewed as a positive step.
Mongolia remains a poor country, ranking 108th of 187 countries on the 2012
United Nations Human Development Index. However, its abundant mineral
wealth offers the potential, if managed effectively and sustainably, to make rapid
strides in economic growth and poverty reduction. Mongolia ranks reasonably
high on the 2012 UN Gender Inequality Index, placing 56th of 148 countries. The
new electoral law, stipulating that at least 20 percent of candidates be women,
resulted in an increase in female parliamentary representation from three to nine
seats.
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Over the last decade, Mongolia’s scores on the World Bank’s governance indicators have fallen in all six categories.5 For example, Mongolia’s comparative rank
in government effectiveness has fallen from the 44th percentile of all countries
in 2000 to the 31st percentile in 2010. Corruption remains a challenge. Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perception Index, which gauges perceived
levels of corruption, rated Mongolia as 94th of 176 countries. However, this represents a promising improvement from 2011 when the country placed 120th of
182 countries.
More positively, the governance problem is widely acknowledged within Mongolia. The 2011 World Bank Country Survey cited improved governance and government effectiveness as, by far, the key development priority for the country.6
In Mongolia’s case, the governance discussion invariably turns to the impact of
the vast wealth that will flow from mineral extraction in the decades to come.
The World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy 2012–14 for Mongolia underscores
the importance of avoiding the resource curse and ensuring that a diversified
economy evolves where poverty alleviation accompanies economic growth.7
For this to happen, Mongolia’s persistent governance problems must be addressed. The creation of a diversified economy will not occur without the establishment of competent, accountable public institutions able to develop and
administer sound socio-economic policies. Thus, support for civil service reform
becomes tied to the recognition that good governance cannot be achieved without a professional, non-partisan, merit-based civil service. Canada’s involvement here is timely and, in several respects, dovetails with its role as the largest
foreign investor in Mongolia’s mining sector.
In many DDD projects, a reconciliation of client expectations, project capacity
and a realistic set of deliverables only occur at the work planning and budgeting
stage. For this project, because of the pre-existing working relationship between
the CSC and PSC and the continued involvement of Ms. Barrados, a clear, mutual understanding of the project’s scope and a realistic set of deliverables were
achieved from the outset. The work plan simply built on previous work and set
out the logical steps needed to assist the CSC to produce a set of draft amendments to Mongolia’s civil service legislation. To guide the process, the prime
minister formed a working group that included the CSC. Given this strong support from the prime minister, the project was launched with reasonable expectations of smooth sailing.
92
Initially, the key challenges were more of a policy than a political nature. Years
before, Mongolia had adopted New Zealand’s complex public administration
model.8 In many instances, the institutional fit was poor, the traditions different,
and the underlying processes insufficiently developed to accommodate such sophisticated features as contracting with state secretaries for specified levels of
outputs. The Canadian advisers therefore faced the dual policy challenges of
adapting Canada’s federal system to a unitary country and undoing many of the
New Zealand reforms.
Key issues that emerged during the initial work included scope of the law, i.e.,
which types of public employees should be included/excluded, practical application and enforcement of the merit principle by CSC, appropriate delegation
from the CSC to ministries, the role of ethics, transferring non-core functions
from the CSC, and appropriate definitions of political activity.
Month
2011 Visits with/by Mongolian Officials
Jan.
Scoping mission (Jan. 24–28)
March
Experts mission (end March)
May
1st Mongolian delegation (May 16–20)
June
1st mission (June 20–24)
Aug.
2nd mission (Aug. 22–26)
Oct.
3rd mission (Oct. 10–14)
Nov.
2nd Mongolian delegation (Nov. 12–15)
Nov.
4th mission (Nov. 28–Dec. 1)
The intensity of work and interaction between the Canadian advisers and their
Mongolian counterparts is evidenced by the high number of back and forth
working visits. By June, the package of recommendations was well advanced
and the reform well profiled, with the prime minister opening the National Forum for Public Service Reform with over 600 participants from across Mongolia.
By August, discussions were underway with the head of the parliamentary Intergovernmental Working Group on Amendments to Civil Service Law on submitting the legislative proposals to parliament for review and passage during
the Fall Session.
Then the project environment unexpectedly changed. In fall 2011, Mongolia’s
president formed a second working group on civil service reform, identifying
93
the establishment of a competent, professional public service as a matter of national security.9 Not surprisingly, the president’s working group had its own
views on the scope and priorities of the reform process. The Canadian team
found itself caught in the middle.
This created a major dilemma for the Canadian advisers. The easiest response
would have been simply to complete their work with the CSC and allow the
dual processes to unfold along their own unpredictable paths. Instead, Ms. Barrados and her team decided to place themselves at the disposal of both working
groups. Although little time or project funding remained, arrangements were
made to bring representatives from the president’s working group to Canada
and then follow up with a mission to work directly with them on their legislative
proposals. This consensus-building approach aimed at establishing sufficient
common ground between the two proposals so that the eventual reconciliation
process would not be faced with choosing one model over another. It was hoped
that, through this engagement, two separate, but not widely conflicting legislative proposals would be submitted to parliament in spring or fall of 2012.
Lessons Learned
The project’s final report cited the need for more flexibility in response to unanticipated events as the primary lesson learned, an observation that applies to
many, if not most, development projects. In addition, two more subtle lessons
learned should be cited.
Play the Go-Between (if you can): Occasionally, technical assistance projects
find themselves caught in the middle of a political debate. This project’s experience suggests that the most constructive approach will be, when feasible, to
avoid choosing sides and to focus on moving both parties towards common
policy positions. Admittedly, this is much easier said than done.
Such situations must be handled with extraordinary sensitivity and discretion.
In this case, since it would have been unrealistic to attempt to bring the two
groups together, the project worked independently with both, using what might
be termed shuttle consultancy to develop compatible policy positions. The deft
political navigation undertaken by Ms. Barrados found the right balance, as the
Canadian team was able to work effectively with both teams.
Return to Principles: The challenge faced by the Canadian team in providing sound, consistent policy guidance should not be underestimated. The time
frames were short, the project resources minimal, and the context unfamiliar. In
such an environment, advisers must respond to numerous changes, refinements
94
and new ideas brought forward by the client or other stakeholders. Moreover, in
Mongolia’s case, the unexpected establishment of a second working group with
its own views on civil service reform significantly increased the potential for offering conflicting or discrepant policy advice.
To avoid such traps, the team continually referred to the underlying principles
of proposed policy directions with both working groups. For example, would
proposition x actually support merit-based recruitment and selection? And if
so, how? Successful civil service reform requires a coherent, principle-driven
model, not a patchwork of disconnected compromises.
The knowledge transfer potential for this project is clear. Numerous developing
countries are pursuing or contemplating the revision of civil service legislation.
Obviously, the technical advice provided to the Mongolian government might
prove relevant in other settings.
A more difficult but compelling area of knowledge transfer relates to the project’s consensus-building approach with the two working groups. Had the project not engaged with the president’s working group, the two legislative proposals would be more likely to reflect irreconcilable policy differences reinforced
along party lines. Prospects for sustainable civil service reform diminish when
competing models are presented as partisan choices. These lessons may be pertinent for any project that finds itself in a situation where two political actors are
working on the same issue.
Postscript
The initial project formally concluded in December 2011, although frequent email exchanges between the working groups and Ms. Barrados continued. A
second-phase project, to run from May 2012 to March 2013, was designed to
provide technical assistance as the draft legislation worked its way through the
parliamentary process.
These plans had to be revisited when the opposition Democratic Party won the
June 2012 parliamentary election, placing both the government and presidency
under the same party. In the wake of these changes, the draft civil service legislation was not submitted to parliament as planned and, in January 2013, an
entirely new CSC was appointed.
95
The initial version of this case study, written prior to the election, contended
that, regardless of the electoral outcome, efforts by this modest, but skillfully implemented DDD project to mediate common policy positions between the two
working groups would increase prospects for coherent civil service legislation.
This assertion is now being put to the test.
When Ms. Barrados travelled to Mongolia in March 2013, as part of the second-phase DDD project, now extended to December 2013, she received a very
positive reception from the new CSC. Clearly, interest remains high in renewed
technical assistance from Canada. In the coming months, Ms. Barrados will
continue to advise on civil service legislation, including a new proposal from
the presidential working group, and mentor the CSC as they assume their new
responsibilities. Arguably, if the initial DDD project had taken the easy route
and not approached the presidential working group, the seamless transition and
quick establishment of rapport with the new CSC would not have occurred. Accordingly, the earlier assertion regarding enhanced prospects for coherent civil
service legislation remains in play.
Endnotes
1
In 2010, Canada had $400 million, or 8.2 percent of total FDI, in assets in Mongolia.
2011 Mongolia Investment Climate Statement (US Embassy: Mongolia, 2011), p.79.
2
From DDD project work plan
3
The PSC was felt to be a good fit for Mongolia as there were a number of similarities.
First, it was felt that the two countries had similar resource-based economies; second,
like the PSC, the CSC is independent and reports to parliament. Third, like Canada,
Mongolia uses a “position-based” rather than career system for recruitment and
selection.
4
rights.
5
The six categories used in the index include: voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
6
World Bank Country surveys canvas the opinions of public sector, private sector, and
civil society with respect to the development priorities of the country and the World
Bank’s role. In the current Mongolian survey, government effectiveness/governance
is cited by 31 percent as the most important development priority, well ahead of
economic growth, identified by 12 percent.
96
7
The term “resource curse” refers to economies that become captive to, and distorted
by, enormous resource revenues. Governance institutions in turn become focused on
perpetuating an elite that benefits from the resource revenues rather than supporting
a diversified economy that distributes the benefits more widely across society.
Examples of countries that have experienced the resource curse include Nigeria (oil),
Angola (oil), Venezuela (oil), and Democratic Republic of Congo (rubber, minerals).
See KWWSZZZZRUOGEDQNRUJHQFRXQWU\PRQJROLDRYHUYLHZ.
8
New Zealand was at the forefront of implementing what came to be known as the new
public management (NPM) model in the late 1980s. Although countries such as the
UK adopted many of NPM’s features, the applicability of such a model to developing
countries has been seriously questioned. See Allen Schick, “Why Most Developing
Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms.” World Bank Research Observer.
Volume 13, No. 1, February 1998.
9
Mongolia’s Constitution confers upon the president powers in the areas of foreign
relations, national defence, and national security (the president is the head of the
National Security Council). Typically, civil service reform would not be considered
a matter of national security, but it is not uncommon in developing countries for a
president to become involved in areas of national interest even if it stretches his or her
Constitutional remit.
97
Chapter 7
Big Dreams, Modest Means:
Implementing Jordan’s Technical and
Vocational Education and Training
Strategy
This case study, based on an earlier case study by Leslie Shimotakahara, was
prepared with the assistance of Brenda Cooke.
Abstract: Jordan faces daunting employment problems, from high youth unemployment
levels to low labour-market participation rates, particularly among women and youth
to an underdeveloped private sector. To address these deficiencies, Jordan’s Ministry of
Labour coordinated the preparation of a strategy for the technical and vocational education and training sector and established a Donor Coordination Unit to oversee its implementation. Unfortunately, the strategy had been developed through lengthy, highlyparticipative stakeholder consultations undertaken without any fiscal parameters. Not
surprisingly, the estimated implementation cost of the resulting strategy ($163 million)
far outstripped available funding ($16 million). This case study retraces the efforts of a
six-month consultancy funded by the Canadian International Development Agency to set
up the new coordination unit and guide them through the sensitive process of scalingdown stakeholder expectations to a realistic level without losing their buy-in. The success of these efforts provides some important lessons learned for any country faced with
implementing an under or un-costed strategy.
Sommaire : La Jordanie fait face à des problèmes d’emploi redoutables, des niveaux élevés
de chômage des jeunes à de faibles taux de participation au marché du travail, en particulier parmi les femmes et les jeunes, à un secteur privé peu développé. Pour remédier à ces
insuffisances, le ministère du Travail de la Jordanie a coordonné l’élaboration d’une stratégie pour le secteur de l’enseignement et de la formation technique et professionnelle et
a établi une unité de coordination des donateurs pour en superviser la mise en œuvre.
Malheureusement, cette stratégie avait été élaborée par le biais de longues consultations
très participatives auprès des intervenants sans paramètres budgétaires. Il n’est donc pas
surprenant que le coût estimatif de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie résultante (163 millions de dollars) ait largement dépassé les fonds disponibles (16 millions $). Cette étude
de cas retrace les efforts de six mois de consultations financées par l’Agence canadienne
de développement international, pour mettre en place la nouvelle unité de coordination
Implementing Jordan’s Technical and Vocational
Education and Training Strategy
99
et la guider à travers le processus sensible de réduire à un niveau réaliste les attentes des
parties prenantes sans perdre leur adhésion. Le succès de ces efforts offre quelques leçons
importantes aux pays qui doivent mettre en œuvre une stratégie dont le coût est sousestimé ou n’est pas estimé.
Introduction
An all-too-familiar recipe for policy failure was brewing in Jordan in the mid2000s. A two-year, bottom-up, multi-stakeholder consultation process to develop a complex, cross-cutting strategy to be delivered by numerous public, private
and non-governmental sector institutions and funded by multiple donors was
proceeding with no particular fiscal parameters imposed.
The strategy in question, known by its acronym E-TVET, was intended to produce a coordinated response in the technical and vocational education and training sector to the country’s very real employment challenges, such as high and
growing youth unemployment, low labour-market participation rates, especially by women and youth, and an underdeveloped private sector. The strategy committed to “enhance both the socio-human aspects of the labour force
that caters for the individual needs and abilities, and the economic aspects that
promote the competitiveness of the Jordanian economy at the regional and international levels.” The E-TVET strategy was developed under the umbrella of
Jordan’s National Agenda, a far-reaching, ten-year blueprint sponsored by King
Abdullah II to spur Jordan’s social, economic and political transformation. The
E-TVET strategy components included: employment; planning; financing; information systems; occupational classification and standards; status of E-TVET;
non-formal TVET; role of private and non-governmental sectors; and regional
and international dimension.
The strategy aimed to move the sector from a supply- to a demand-driven
model, with significantly strengthened private-sector participation. The lengthy,
highly participatory process undertaken to develop the strategy culminated
with a highly-ambitious, comprehensive document and heightened stakeholder
expectations. The strategy’s nine components were further elaborated by environmental scans, thirty-five objectives and eighty-four policies and strategies.
Notably absent was an assessment of potential implementation costs. Given that
an eventual fiscal impact assessment produced a cost estimate of $163 million,
this represented a significant omission.
Assigned responsibility for coordinating strategy implementation, the Ministry
of Labour decided to establish a Development Coordination Unit (DCU) report-
100
ing to the ministry’s general secretary. The daunting complexity of this task,
given the multiple stakeholders, is indicated below.
Key E-TVET Stakeholders: Jordan
Key E-TVET Stakeholders: Donors
• Ministry of Education
• CIDA
• Ministry of Higher Education &
ScientificResearch
• European Commission
• Ministry of Labour
• Al-Balqa’ Applied University
• armed forces
• Board of Education
• GTZ
• Japan International Cooperation Agency
• Korean International Cooperation Agency
• US AID
• World Bank
• Higher Education Council
• Vocational Training Corporation
• NGOs
• private education sector
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had supported Jordan’s TVET sector since the mid 1990s.1 In 2006, CIDA contributed to the development of the current E-TVET strategy and planned to provide further technical
assistance to help with implementation.2 However, initial donor commitments
totalled $16 million for the first four to five years, or just 10 percent of the ETVET strategy’s estimated total cost.3 Although a sector-wide approach (SWAp)
was envisaged, where donors could add to the pot, the overall cost greatly exceeded any realistic funding scenario.4
Given the funding gap, the strategy clearly needed to be reworked. To accomplish this with such a diverse group of stakeholders would require experienced
mediation skills. It would have been unfair to expect the newly-formed DCU
to assume such a sensitive and complex task as their first order of business. Although CIDA had anticipated the need to assist DCU and initiated a tender for a
two-year consultancy, this process could not be completed for at least six to eight
months and DCU needed help immediately.
To bridge the delay, CIDA turned to its Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) program, launched in 2007 and designed to supply quick-turnaround, short duration technical assistance. In early 2008, Ms. Brenda Cooke, an
experienced education consultant with prior experience working in Jordan, was
contracted to help establish and build capacity in DCU and somehow develop
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a financially realistic implementation strategy—a tall order for six months of
work.
Governance Profile
The aspirations of the Arab Spring notwithstanding, democracy continues to
elude the Middle East and North Africa.5 Jordan experienced neither the intensity of protest nor the degree of political upheaval of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.
Consequently, the country’s response was more muted, comprising several constitutional changes and the replacement of the government.
Throughout the 2000s, Freedom House ranked Jordan as partly free. However,
in 2010, the country’s ranking was cut to not free following the November 2009
dissolution of parliament and subsequent revisions to the election law, which
prompted a boycott of the 2010 elections by the Islamist opposition parties. Media freedom in Jordan remains severely curtailed. In 2013, Reporters Without
Borders ranked Jordan 134th of 179 countries on its Press Freedom Index, virtually unchanged since 2003, although there have been short periods of greater
press freedom during this period.6
The World Bank’s governance indicators present a mixed picture. Although
scores for voice and accountability (25th percentile) and political stability (34th
percentile) have declined significantly since 2000, Jordan’s rankings in government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption have
all remained at relatively positive levels, ranging from the 57th to 62nd percentiles of all countries.7 Transparency International currently ranks Jordan in the
top third of countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index (58th of 174 countries), behind only Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Israel and Bahrain in the region.
On the United Nations’ Human Development Index, Jordan has experienced a
modest gain over the last decade and now places in the 51st percentile, or 100th
of 187 countries. For gender equality, Jordan scores poorly, ranking 99th of 148
countries behind nine other countries in the region on the UN Gender Inequality
Index and 121st of 135 countries on the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap
Index.
Overall, this profile depicts a country that has created reasonably sound governance institutions, but has not committed to democratization. Of course, this
observation cannot escape the complex regional context where the Middle East
and North Africa region remains the world’s most volatile and least democratic.
102
When Ms. Cooke arrived at the Ministry of Labour in March 2008 to develop a
work plan, DCU consisted solely of a few ministry secondees.8 Obviously, finding and furnishing office space, recruiting an executive director, finalizing job
descriptions, hiring and training staff, securing a budget, setting up computer
systems and developing operational procedures would constitute a major part
of the assignment. In an ideal world, the planned six-month assignment would
have been wholly devoted to these tasks. Unfortunately, internal and external
pressures to achieve progress on E-TVET implementation precluded an extended learning curve. DCU officials, under Ms. Cooke’s guidance, were going to
have to learn on-the-fly. Accordingly, the work plan not only included pragmatic
organizational deliverables (set up the DCU; build capacity), but ambitious policy and program outputs (create reform implementation model; operationalize
the reform program).
Even a cursory reading of the E-TVET strategy reveals the scope of project redefinition required. An unrealistic, uncosted wish list of proposed reforms had
to be transformed into a feasible, affordable implementation plan. At the same
time, client and stakeholder expectations needed to be scaled-down without
sacrificing buy-in. Given the risks involved, tight timelines and inexperience of
DCU, the formidable task of scaling-down expectations was not attempted during the work planning stage, but as one of the main tasks of the consultancy. In
fact, time would be required to convince DCU themselves of the need to follow
a more pragmatic path. The work plan was duly completed on 3 April and Ms.
Cooke reported for work on 1 May to begin the consultancy which lasted to 14
August 2008.
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PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Supporting the Establishment and Operationalization of a Development
Coordination Unit (DCU) at Jordan’s Ministry of Labour
Client: Majed Habashneh, secretary general, Ministry of Labour
Lead Consultant: Brenda Cooke
Duration: March to August 2008
Budget: $74,370
1. develop implementation model for reform program
2. set up the DCU (mandate, job descriptions, hiring)
3. operationalize the reform program
4. build capacity and team approach for DCU management and staff
An unexpected complication arose at the outset when DCU’s intended executive
director declined the position. Consequently, the unit’s entire formative period,
during which the office was established, hiring completed and procedures put
in place, occurred in the absence of its senior executive. The unexpected leadership vacuum precluded the planned mentoring of the executive director by the
adviser, but did afford more time to work directly with new staff. Throughout
the assignment, Ms. Cooke routinely sat with DCU officials and provided daily,
hands-on guidance as they assumed their job responsibilities. On 20 August, an
executive director was finally appointed, just as the project concluded.
Looming large on the horizon was the fast-approaching stakeholder workshop
from which a realistic, affordable approach to E-TVET implementation was supposed to emerge. If sufficient consensus was not achieved, the prospects for a
coherent response going forward would be severely constrained. Given that
the same stakeholders who had developed the strategy were now being asked
to agree on a dramatically less ambitious set of objectives, a tactful game plan
would be paramount.
On 11 May 2008, sixty-five stakeholders gathered in Aqaba, Jordan to undertake
the difficult task of de-constructing and prioritizing the E-TVET strategy. After
two days of often intense deliberations, the basis for an affordable implementation plan began to crystallize. Two tactics played an important role in achieving
this result:
104
• The strategy was depicted as the product of an initial visioning stage while
the work plan was presented as the product of a subsequent implementation
stage; i.e., they were not repudiating the strategy so much as following a
logical sequence. This paved the way for the work plan to become the goto document. In time, the strategy and its log frame became categorized,
somewhat pejoratively, as historical information.
• Stakeholders were organized into three breakout groups and tasked with
conducting extensive SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats)
analyses on E-TVET funding, public-private and public-public partnerships,
quality assurance and E-TVET Council governance. This exercise identified a
realistic set of constraints on which to base the ensuing recommendations.
The Stakeholders’ Workshop in Aqaba marked a turning point in the E-TVET
strategy. The workshop proceedings were published and a new, five-year implementation plan prepared by DCU.9 The new plan used the term building blocks
to highlight that the proposed measures represented just the first steps towards
delivering this complex reform. To demonstrate this reductive approach, the
figure below compares the commitments from the original E-TVET strategy to
those in the new implementation plan for the occupational classification and
standards component of the strategy. Two building block actions replace six programs and strategies while phrases such as “comprehensive system” give way
to more modest terminology like “begin to establish.”
105
E-TVET Strategy: Policies and
Strategies
Implementation Plan: Building
Blocks
1. To adopt the Unified Arab Occupational
Classification, Job Description and
Standards System as a general
framework.
1. To establish a Centre of Accreditation and Quality
Assurance to monitor and assess the quality of
the E-TVET institutions, programs and staff, and
to accredit institutions.
2. To develop and adopt the necessary
legislative and organizational frameworks
for licensing to practice a job.
2. To begin to establish a National Qualifications
Framework for key industry sectors.
3. To develop a comprehensive system
for occupational tests and granting of
licenses to individuals and work places to
practice jobs.
4. To establish an autonomous entity under
the E-TVET Council responsible for the
functions of performance and skill testing
as well as accreditation and licensing of
individuals and work places to practice
jobs.
5. To ensure adoption by government and
non-government sectors of the national
system of occupational classification and
standards.
6. To adopt the proposed general
framework for the relationship between
occupational levels and educational
cycles.
In the remaining months of the project, DCU became fully operational and capable of coordinating delivery of the new E-TVET implementation plan. Challenges certainly arose along the way, including excruciatingly slow ministry administrative processes, ministerial and deputy ministerial changes, overlapping
donor interventions, and reallocation of anticipated ministry funding for DCU.
Notwithstanding, the large majority of the project’s planned outputs were delivered. Acknowledging the progress made by the DDD project, the World Bank
moved the effective date of its loan to implement the E-TVET strategy forward
to 23 July from 6 October 2008. Further endorsement arrived when Ms. Cooke
was named the successful candidate for a CIDA-funded assignment to work for
the next two-years with the Ministry of Labour and DCU to build capacity and
coordinate E-TVET implementation. Arguably, the timely bridging assistance
106
provided through DDD averted an otherwise protracted period of fragmented
implementation with insufficient means.
Lessons Learned
The key lessons learned from this case study highlight two themes: first, the
importance of developing high-level policy within a realistic fiscal framework;
second, when this does not occur, the need to utilize effective tactics to scaledown stakeholder expectations without sacrificing their buy-in.
Set fiscal parameters: The introduction of medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the late
1990s signaled a concerted attempt to ensure that government policy was developed within a sound fiscal framework. Notwithstanding these efforts, many
governments, often encouraged by donors, continue to develop strategies beyond any realistic fiscal constraints. Such cases typically involve bottom-up consultations with multiple stakeholders, from which the resulting strategy emerges as an encyclopedic, uncosted wish list of everything everyone desires for
the foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, ensuring that high-level strategies and
policies are costed is now viewed as a fundamental characteristic of a soundlymanaged public finance system.10 This case study begins at the conclusion of a
bottom-up, fiscally-unconstrained process that had just produced a predictably
unaffordable strategy.
Keep your stakeholders onside: It would have been tempting for the Ministry of Labour to cut ties with the stakeholders that had produced the wish-list
strategy. In such situations, the salvage job is often conducted internally by the
responsible ministry, working with the Ministry of Finance. Such an approach,
while expedient, can be short-sighted. Prospective partners in implementation
can suddenly become a formidable source of opposition, resentful at having a
unilaterally-developed strategy foisted on them. By opting to engage existing
stakeholders in the revision process, the ministry ensured that those responsible
retained a stake in successful implementation.
Re-label and conquer: Rather than focus on the deficiencies of the existing
strategy, Ms. Cooke and DCU presented implementation as the logical next step
in developing the strategy. This transition was described as moving from visioning to implementation. Instead of becoming defensive, the same stakeholders
who had developed the wish list participated willingly in the exercise to set
priorities within a realistic budget. Semantics aside, the shift in terminology effectively defused and rechanneled potential opposition towards the production
of a better product.
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Expedite implementation: Unlike the E-TVET strategy, developed through a
painstaking, two-year consultation process, the new, five-year implementation
plan was quickly finalized following the Aqaba workshop. If the ministry had
allowed this process to linger, the risks of lost momentum and renewed lobbying for pet projects would only have increased.
The knowledge transfer potential of this case study relates more to its success
in shaping unrealistic expectations into a feasible plan rather than in any sectorspecific issue. As mentioned, uncosted, unaffordable strategies are produced all
too often. Although the preferable approach would be to build in fiscal parameters from the outset, when this does not occur, the lessons learned in this case
will certainly be applicable.
Postscript
Since 2008, Jordan has experienced severe economic and political shocks arising
from the 2009 global recession and 2011 Arab Spring protests, accompanied by
frequent changes of government—six prime ministers during the last five years.
High-levels of political instability and fiscal constraint are hardly conducive for
implementing a complex, long-term reform such as the E-TVET strategy. Moreover, the dependence on donors for funding and technical assistance to support
the reform adds another layer of uncertainty.
Nonetheless, implementation of the E-TVET strategy continues. The path has
been far from smooth, but some positive results are beginning to emerge. In
2012, the Center for Accreditation and Quality Assurance was endorsed by Royal Decree. After some delays and consultant quality problems, the Vocational
Training Centre released its reform blueprint, The New VTC: Skills and Training
for the 21st Century, in 2012.
DCU remains in charge of coordinating the E-TVET reform process. Although
the original vision for the unit foresaw a permanent organization managing all
matters related to international assistance in the Ministry of Labour, for a variety
of reasons, this role never fully materialized. Initially, DCU operated somewhat
like a World Bank project implementation unit (PIU).11 Over time, however,
DCU seized opportunities to expand its reach, at first with CIDA’s Building and
Extending Skills Training Systems project and later with other projects, such as
USAID’s support to the tourism sector. In 2009, a Megaprojects Unit was established within DCU to work across government to ensure that labour-market
108
information, skills development and vocational training were taken into account
when designing and delivering mega-projects.
Another lasting contribution of the project was the mentoring provided to DCU
officials. Members from the original DCU team were canvassed on the DDD
project’s impacts. From a personal perspective, all reported highly positive benefits to their subsequent careers inside and outside government. One former
member even suggested that he could be considered a project accomplishment,
having since made a career with the work skills acquired at DCU. In fact, the
current executive director of DCU, Mr. Maher Rababa, was one of the then new
unit members mentored by Ms. Cooke in 2008.
Whether or not the E-TVET reform is ultimately deemed a success, the shortterm technical assistance provided through DDD certainly deserves credit for
quickly turning around an out-of-control initiative, setting it back on a realistic
path and giving it an important second chance to form part of the solution to
Jordan’s profound labour-market and employment challenges.
Endnotes
1
The Association of Canadian Community Colleges worked in Jordan in this sector
from 1995 to 2004 through two CIDA-funded projects.
2
CIDA ultimately funded a two-year consultancy to support and build capacity in
DCU and the four-year, $6 million Building and Extending Skills Training Systems
(BEST) project, delivered by the Saskatchewan Institute of Applied Science and
Technology.
3
The $16 million would be provided by the two major donors, CIDA and the World
Bank, although the European Commission was exploring the possibility of providing
€35 million through a budget support mechanism to the ministry in 2009.
4
A SWAp is an aid mechanism or modality designed to deliver complex, sector-wide
reforms by establishing a common fund supported by multiple donors. In principle,
this approach enhances local leadership, aids harmonization and policy coherence.
5
Freedom House annually ranks countries as free, partly free or not free on a scale of
1–7, with 1 being completely free. The highest regional scores were received by Israel
(1.5); Lebanon and Kuwait (4.5); and Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Oman and Qatar (5.5).
6
Jordan currently ranks in the 25th percentile of countries for press freedom. It has
ranked in the 30th percentile or better during four years: 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010.
109
7
Among Middle Eastern countries, Jordan was surpassed in these measures only by
Bahrain, Israel, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
8
Ultimately, DCU was to be led by an executive director and supported by seven
positions including: executive assistant, finance officer, procurement officer, M&E
officer, IT officer, PPP/donor coordinator, and VTC coordinator.
9
The proceedings are available at KWWSZZZPROJRYMR3RUWDOV3URFHHGLQJV
¿QDOSGI.
10 Multi-year costing of sector strategies is a core dimension in assessing policy-based
budgeting as part of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability tool now
being applied around the world by a group of donors, including the IMF, World Bank,
European Commission and four bilateral donors.
11 At the time, the World Bank’s Employer-Driven Skills Development project was the
largest project supporting E-TVET reform, becoming operational in July 2008. PIUs
are generally deemed to be a less desirable model for aid coordination since they
operate largely outside of the recipient country’s systems. The 2005 Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness proposed reducing the use of PIUs by two-thirds as one of its
core indicators.
110
Chapter 8
Budget Analysis in Ukraine’s Office of the
President
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Paul Darby and Olga Romanyuk.
Abstract: The CIDA-funded project, National State Budget Analysis by Secretariat of the
President, continued Canada’s long-standing commitment to democratic development in
Ukraine. Led by the Conference Board of Canada and its local partner, the Ukrainian
International Centre for Policy Studies, the project was initially conceived as a straightforward capacity-building exercise where methodological expertise would be transferred
through workshops. However, a more ambitious project emerged at the client’s request
during the inception mission. First, the consultants were tasked with drafting a budget
analysis manual; second, the manual was to include a gender budgeting chapter. The
manual was duly produced and tested over a three-month period. Client ownership of
the manual was certainly cemented during the October workshop where the President’s
Office analysts applied the model live to the actual 2009 budget. The 2010 election resulted in a complete changeover in the President’s Office. Perhaps surprisingly, the project’s Ukrainian adviser recently reported that the analysts in the new president’s office
were using the budget analysis manual. Evidently, the decision to develop the manual
was prescient.
Sommaire : Le projet, Analyse du budget de l’État national par le Secrétariat du président, financé par l’ACDI, poursuit l’engagement soutenu du Canada au développement
démocratique en Ukraine. Sous la direction du Conference Board du Canada et de son
partenaire local, l’Ukrainian International Centre for Policy Studies [centre international
ukrainien pour l’étude des politiques], le projet a été conçu à l’origine pour être un simple
exercice de renforcement des capacités où l’expertise méthodologique serait transférée
par le biais d’ateliers. Toutefois, au cours de la mission de mise en route, un projet plus
ambitieux vit le jour à la demande du client. D’abord, les consultants avaient pour tâche
de préparer l’ébauche d’un manuel d’analyse du budget ; puis, le manuel devait inclure
un chapitre sur la budgétisation fondée sur le genre. Le manuel a été produit comme il se
doit et mis à l’essai pendant trois mois. Le droit d’appropriation du manuel par le client a
certainement été consolidé lors de l’atelier tenu en octobre où les analystes et consultants
du Bureau du président ont appliqué le modèle en direct au vrai budget de 2009. Les élections de 2010 ont donné lieu à un changement complet au Bureau du président. Certains
seront peut-être étonnés d’apprendre que le conseiller ukrainien du projet a récemment
rapporté que les analystes du nouveau Bureau du président utilisent le manuel d’analyse
du budget. Manifestement, la décision de développer le manuel était une prévision.
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Introduction
Canada, with a Ukrainian Diaspora of 1.2 million, has long retained a special
relationship with this Eastern European nation. Canada was the first Western
nation to recognize Ukraine’s independence and mobilized its largest ever
number of election observers to monitor the 2004 presidential revote. Ukraine
was the only Eastern European or former Soviet Union country named as a
country of focus by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).1
The 2008 request submitted from Ukraine’s Office of the President to CIDA
for assistance in strengthening its budget analysis capacity continued the
long-standing relationship between the two countries in advancing Ukraine’s
democratic development.
This case study describes the design, delivery and eventual impact of this project, delivered in 2008–09 through Deployment for Democratic Development
(DDD), a CIDA-funded democracy promotion program. The project was tasked
with strengthening the quality of budget analysis in the Office of the President
through hands-on training using a budget analysis manual developed by the
project consultants. During the inception phase, it was decided to incorporate a
gender budgetary analysis tool within the manual.
Ukraine’s semi-presidential governance model mandates the president to participate actively in the system of checks and balances.2 In a semi-presidential
system, both parliament and the president play a role in constraining the government’s executive powers. Under Article 106:30 of the Constitution, the president has “the right to veto laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada [parliament]
of Ukraine with their subsequent return for reconsideration by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine.” In fact, President Yushchenko vetoed the 2007 budget of the
government coalition led by Prime Minister Yanukovych.
However, for a veto power to be deployed effectively, it is essential that the veto
holder be able to pinpoint reasons. To do so meaningfully with respect to the
state budget, the president’s office requires the capacity to analyze the budget
and propose specific revisions. Ergo, the request for assistance to CIDA.
In April 2008, the project was formally launched with the objective: “to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat of the President to analyze the national state
budget and institutionalize a transparent and equitable budgetary process, thus
better fulfilling the President’s constitutional responsibilities in terms of providing checks and balances to the Cabinet of Ministers.”
112
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: National State Budget Analysis by Secretariat of the President
Client: Secretariat of the President
Consultant(s): Conference Board of Canada and International Centre for Policy Studies
Duration: approved April 2008; three missions: May, July, October 2008; final report March 2009.
Budget: $118,546 supplemented by $16,500 from Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
Key Outputs:
1. Secretariat of the President staff trained in how to assess the reasonableness of the underlying
assumptions of the state budget’s economic forecast, including the key economic drivers;
2. Secretariat of the President staff trained in how to assess the economic impact of new measures
contained in the state budget;
3. Secretariat of the President staff trained in how to assess the alignment of the proposed state
budget measures with stated national policy goals;
4. Secretariat of the President staff trained in how to undertake a gender disaggregated analysis of
the state budget; and
5. a manual that describes the methodology to achieve the above four outputs and gives examples
from the most recent state budget.
The project operated during a period of economic and political turmoil where
the usually arcane world of macroeconomics was thrust to the forefront of public debate. In November 2008, following a debt downgrade and severe currency
depreciation, Ukraine negotiated a US$16.4 billion loan with the IMF. In January 2009, the dispute with Russia over natural gas pricing led to a suspension
of Russian gas shipments through Ukraine to Europe at the height of winter.
Clearly, compelling incentives existed for the Office of the President to assume
a more proactive role in assessing the macro and microeconomic impacts of the
state budget.
Governance Profile
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution made headlines around the world when it forced
a revote of the discredited 2004 presidential elections. In 2006, Freedom House
raised Ukraine’s status to free from partly free after the presidential revote. This
ranking was maintained until 2011 when Ukraine was downgraded to partly
free, coinciding with the jailing of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s once-promising democratic journey appears to have
taken a detour.
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CIDA Programming Framework: 2007–11
For Ukraine to prosper, it needs to have a strong, effective and efficiently run government.
Despite the positive results achieved by a wide range of governance investments by CIDA and
other donors, Ukraine continues to face serious challenges in regards to governance capacity,
Soviet-style institutional inertia, confused and overlapping jurisdictions, a blurred line between
the administrative and political components of government and the penetration of the state by
oligarchic interests. Such weak governance, especially in relation to public financial management,
results in corruption.
CIDA’s Framework for Country Programming 2007–11 underscored the challenges
for post-independence Ukraine and the need to strengthen governance. Positively, Ukraine’s scores on the World Bank’s governance indicators rose sharply
in all categories between 2000 and 2008. Since then, declines have been experienced in all indicators, particularly government effectiveness (from 27th to 22nd
percentile of all countries) and control of corruption (from 23rd to 17th percentile).
Widespread corruption persists. Ukraine ranked 144th of 176 countries covered
by Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Among European countries, Ukraine is now ranked lowest, falling behind Russia (133rd)
and Belarus (123rd). Ukraine’s score is virtually unchanged since 2002 and has
actually declined from 1998.3
The Reporters Without Borders’ 2013 Press Freedom Index ranks Ukraine 126th
of 179 countries. Within Europe, only Russia and Belarus score lower. Ukraine’s
ranking has declined precipitously since 2009, when it placed 89th, following
steady improvement from 2004.
There has been little change in Ukraine’s ranking on the United Nations Human
Development Index (HDI) over the last decade. The 2012 HDI ranked Ukraine
78th of 187 countries versus 80th of 173 countries in 2002—third lowest among
European countries, surpassing only Bosnia and Herzegovina (81st) and Moldova (113th).
Ukraine’s ratings on UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index have improved steadily
over the past decade, rising from the 55th percentile in 2002 to the 62nd percentile in 2012. This stands in the middle of former Soviet Union countries behind
the Baltic countries, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Georgia. The table on
the next page compares the index’s component measures for Canada, Germany
and Ukraine.
114
Measure
Basis
Canada
Germany
Ukraine
Gender Inequality Index
148 countries
11th
5th
57th
Maternal Mortality
deaths per 100K
12
7
32
Adolescent Fertility
births per 1,000
11
7
26
Seats in Parliament
percentage
28%
32%
8%
Secondary Education
percentage
100%
96%
92%
Labour Force Participation
percentage
62%
53%
53%
The project’s origin allayed any questions concerning political buy-in. Reputedly, President Yushchenko himself expressed frustration at the level of budget analysis provided through his office. A senior public official present at the
meeting approached the Conference Board of Canada, which had been active in
Ukraine for a decade, concerning a potential project with the Office of the President to fix the problem.
Canada Fund
The Canada Fund for Local Initiatives is a unique CIDA programming mechanism that provides
small grants to Ukrainian organizations… The main priority for the Canada Fund in Ukraine
is democratic governance… the Canada Fund is expected to integrate gender equality
considerations into all projects.
Embassy to Ukraine website
CIDA was soon involved and a team quickly assembled from the Conference
Board and the Ukrainian International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).4 Innovatively, funding for Ms. Romanyuk of ICPS was secured through the local Canada
Fund as it could not be provided directly through DDD.
Defining the project’s scope proved a particular challenge and experienced some
dramatic oscillations of perception and substance during the April to May inception period:
• Too narrow: The project was originally conceived as a capacity-building
project where sufficient skills to analyze the state budget would be developed
through a series of workshops.
115
• Too broad: The client, unaware of how long it takes to build a well-functioning
macroeconomic policy unit, hoped that, through the project, the office would
acquire similar econometric modelling skills/tools as those of the Ministry of
Finance.
• Narrower, but expanding: The client agreed that full macro skills would not
be realistic, but requested that the project write and test a budget analysis
manual with staff to address worries about staff turnover and sustainability.
• Expanding again: Late in the process, CIDA HQ requested the addition of
a gender impact component. Fortuitously, Ms. Romanyuk had extensive
experience in gender analysis so this proved feasible.
Although circuitous, the time taken to get it right proved worthwhile. In fact,
lead consultant Paul Darby of the Conference Board felt in retrospect that even
greater attention to the project’s scope and definition could have been built in at
the inception stage. In short-duration projects, this phase is essential for fostering the client’s buy-in to the final product.
DDD’s structure, with limited duration and budgets, forces projects to focus
their activities and resources. Accordingly, this project’s core activities were
compressed into a few months and three missions.
Project Timelines
May
First mission: scope project
July
Second mission: agree on manual contents
September
Draft manual
October
Third mission: test manual; final training
Considerable time was devoted to debating the structure and content of the
manual, which ultimately comprised four chapters. The manual also included
a budget classification model which made it possible to transform program expenditures into a functional classification using the budget program codes. This
provided the Office of the President with the capacity to analyze the budget
structure and assess the expenditure priorities in the budget; for example, the
share of investment expenditures versus the share of consumption expenditures.
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Budget Analysis Manual Structure
Chapter 1
Guide to the Budget Risk Analysis Regarding the Macroeconomic Assumptions
Underlying the Budget
Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Impact of State Budget Measures
Chapter 3
Alignment of Budget Measures with National Priorities
Chapter 4
Analyzing the Gender Impact of Budget Measures
From Paul Darby’s perspective, the litmus test for sustainability occurred when
the Office of the President’s analysts and consultants gathered around a computer and applied the model live to the actual 2009 budget. By untangling budget codes, the possibilities of linking proposed expenditures to understandable
policy areas, such as social protection, began to emerge. From the gender side,
the ability to assess whether sector expenditures were directed disproportionately to men held significant appeal.
The Ukraine gender budgeting methodology was prepared by Dr. Romanyuk
using the 2008 state budget as the base case. The manual suggests a variety of
ways to analyze budget expenditures from a gender perspective, including the
percentage of female beneficiaries for various programs, the proportion of female civil servants employed within each ministry/ministry program, and the
proportion of female employees in occupations receiving state support. Each
government program was categorized as gender neutral, supportive of men, or
supportive of women, with social programs assessed separately. A ten-step gender audit process was also included.
The budget manual chapter, Analyzing the Gender Impact of Budget Measures, freely acknowledged that existing legal and institutional gaps constrain the preparation of a gender-responsive budget in Ukraine. The manual proposed several
remedial measures, including legal changes to the budget code, establishment of
an administrative body promoting gender equality, expanded collection of gender-differentiated statistics by the state statistics bureau, public awareness campaigns, and the provision of training in gender analysis. Ultimately, the chapter
was included in the 2009 ICPS Potential and Performance Report which was widely
disseminated to, and accessed by, civil society organizations.
117
Lessons Learned
The demands on DDD projects are substantial. Within a short time frame and
limited budget, one or two Canadian experts are expected to assist their clients
to produce tangible outputs and, in the medium term, sustainable policy outcomes. Little time exists for cultural acclimatization, relationship building, piloting, or extensive consultations. Notwithstanding these constraints, this DDD
project did produce a concrete product that proved to be of both immediate and
ongoing benefit. It is instructive to review the key lessons learned.
Leave Something Behind: As originally conceived, the project would have delivered a series of workshops aimed at capacity building with a view to equipping analysts in the Office of the President with the ability to prepare an informed critique of the state budget. During early meetings between the project
partners, it was agreed that a budget analysis manual should be developed and
tested as the centrepiece of the project, in part to address the problem of high
staff turnover. All project principals agreed that this was the right call. Too often,
technical assistance projects charged with capacity building confine their output to a workshop or two on best practices. Absent any adaptation to national
systems, the workshop content remains devoid of job relevance and is quickly
forgotten.
Use Local Networks: The Conference Board’s previous work in Ukraine on
macroeconomic modelling with the ministries of Finance and Economy and
the Central Bank made it a known and obvious partner for the project. Having
worked before with Ukraine’s International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS),
the Conference Board did not have to look far for a local partner. Moreover, it
was ICPS’ former director, and former president of the National Academy of
Public Administration under the Office of the President, who first brought the
president’s desire for improved budget analytical capability to the Conference
Board’s attention.
Look for Leverage: DDD only funds Canadian technical assistance and related
costs. In this case, the need for a local partner required an alternative approach.
Working closely with CIDA’s Ukraine Office, headed then by Mr. Nathan Taylor,
the Canada Fund was tapped to fund the local partner.
Nothing like the Real Thing: Although the project produced the budget and
analytic models based on the prior year’s budget, the time frames for testing
the models coincided with the release of the draft 2009 state budget. As a result,
project participants were able to test their new skills on the real thing. The Rubicon of job relevance was crossed the moment this occurred.
118
Two dimensions of this project warrant knowledge transfer consideration. Although numerous projects work with finance ministries to bolster budget analysis capacity, few work in this area with offices of the president. The importance
of this role in ensuring that constitutional checks and balances are operating
effectively should not be underestimated. Moreover, this type of tool could be
used by external groups, such as the office providing support to parliament’s
budgetary committee or by civil society organizations which critique the budget.
Second, the gender budget analysis tool could have wider international application as an evidence-based mechanism to unpack the budget labyrinth and determine whether women’s real policy needs are being equitably addressed. Internationally, alternative budget analysis has been used by civil society groups in
countries such as India and South Africa to provoke public debate on the policy
implications of budget choices and actual expenditures.5
In fact, the gender budget analysis chapter and methodology were shared with
another CIDA project (Socio-Economic Performance and Potential Analysis Capacity) managed by the Conference Board. Excerpts from the gender budget
analysis section were also incorporated into a regular ICPS publication, which
is widely distributed to government, the private sector, NGOs and academia.
Postscript
Ukraine’s resolute path towards EU accession veered dramatically off-course
following the February 2010 presidential election, which saw Viktor Yanukovych
emerge victorious over then Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Ongoing public
acrimony between the two continued unabated, culminating in the arrest, trial
and incarceration of the former prime minister in October 2011.
The European Union labelled this and related actions selective justice and relegated Ukraine’s EU accession aspirations to a conditional process termed sequenced negotiations. Although President Yanukovych did initial an EU Association Agreement including conditions establishing a Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area in March 2012, it remains unsigned by European authorities.
Following the EU-Ukraine summit in February 2013, the EU reiterated the need
to resolve a number of issues, including selective justice, before further progress
could be made.
But what about the project? In the months following the project’s completion,
signs of its sustainability appeared promising. Ms. Romanyuk reported that the
analysts in the Office of the President remained in touch with her regarding apBudget Analysis in Ukraine’s Office of the President
119
plication of the methodology, confirming Paul Darby’s observation following
the manual’s live testing that “they got it.” Moreover, civil society organizations
were continuing to use the gender impact assessment tool.
However, presidential and semi-presidential systems are by their nature more
highly politicized than most parliamentary systems. When the presidency
changes, so do hundreds or, in some countries, thousands of appointed civil
service positions. The Yanukovych victory in 2010 accordingly resulted in a complete changeover in the Office of the President, including the budget analysts
trained under the 2008–09 DDD project.
Given the circumstances, one might anticipate that the budget analysis manual would find itself consigned to a basement file cabinet. Surprisingly, a recent
follow-up with Ms. Romanyuk revealed that the manual was being used by the
new officials in the Office of the President and the gender impact analysis tool
continued to be referenced by civil society organizations. Evidently, the original
decision to base the budget analysis training program on a prepared manual
was prescient.
Endnotes
1
CIDA identified 20 countries of focus in 2009 as part of its aid effectiveness agenda.
The intention was to direct 80 percent of CIDA’s bilateral aid to these countries.
2
Ukraine’s governance system is broadly classified as semi-presidential, where the
president and prime minister both have meaningful influence over national policy.
Other examples of semi-presidential systems include Russia, France, and Pakistan.
3
The TI Corruptions Perception Index ranks countries on a 0–100 scale (formerly 0–10)
where 100 represents an absence of corruption. In 2012, Denmark was rated the least
corrupt country with a 90 score and Somalia the most corrupt with an 8 score.
4
Team members included: Mr. Paul Darby and Mr. Pedro Antunes from the Conference
Board, and Ms. Olga Romanyuk and Maxim Boroda from ICPS.
5
In Gujarat, the NGO DISHA’s Pathey Program produces an alternative budget
analysis; see http://www.disha-india.org/achieve_ment.html. In South Africa, the
Women’s Budget Initiative involves civil society and government in jointly conducting
a gender budget analysis.
120
Chapter 9
Une démarche participative d’élaboration
du Plan de modernisation de la gestion des
finances publiques du Mali
Cette étude de cas a été préparée par Lucie Rouillard, Pierre Martineau et JeanPhilippe Lapointe.
Sommaire : Cette étude de cas décrit une initiative du programme de Déploiement pour
le Développement Démocratique (DDD) financé par l’ACDI. Une approche participative
de développement organisationnel est utilisée pour appuyer l’élaboration de la Phase II
du Plan d’Action Gouvernemental pour l’Amélioration et la Modernisation de la Gestion
des Finances Publiques (PAGAM/GFP) dans le cadre cette initiative, réalisée au Mali
entre avril 2009 et juin 2010 par trois consultants canadiens, qui a compté l’engagement
et l’intégration d’une centaine de représentants de la fonction publique, de la société civile, de l’Assemblée nationale et de diverses autres institutions du Mali ainsi que des
partenaires techniques et financiers. Bien que la nouvelle approche ait pris plus de temps
et couté plus cher que prévu à l’origine pour réaliser le projet, elle a permis d’atteindre
l’objectif de renforcer de façon durable les capacités des responsables de sa mise en œuvre et des autres parties concernées, et de garantir une solide appropriation du plan. Le
gouvernement du Mali a adopté le Plan d’action en juillet 2010. Aux dires des responsables maliens, le processus d’adoption par le gouvernement malien est dû en grande
partie à l’approche participative utilisée. Même si le processus de réforme a déraillé par
suite du coup d’état militaire de 2012 et des événements qui en ont découlé, il est prévu
que, avec la reprise de l’aide étrangère, il sera en mesure de reprendre rapidement là où
il s’est arrêté.
Abstract: This case study describes an initiative funded through CIDA’s Deployment for
Democratic Development program. Using an organizational development participatory
approach to support the development of Phase II of the Government Action Plan for the
Improvement and Modernization of Public Finance Management, this initiative, which
was accomplished in Mali between April 2009 and June 2010 by three Canadian consultants, involved and integrated the work of nearly a hundred representatives from the
public service, civil society, the National Assembly, and various other institutions in Mali
as well as technical and financial partners. While the new approach required more time
and costs than originally estimated to carry out the initiative, it aimed at building sustainable capacity and a strong ownership of the plan by those responsible for its implementation and other key stakeholders. The Action Plan was adopted by the Mali government
Une démarche participative d’élaboration du Plan de modernisation de la
gestion des finances publiques du Mali
121
in July 2010. The participatory approach used, as reported by Malian officials, greatly
helped the adoption process by the government. Although the reform process has been
derailed by the 2012 military coup and ensuing events, it is anticipated that, with the
resumption of foreign aid, this reform will be well positioned to pick up quickly where
it left off.
Contexte
Le Gouvernement du Mali (GM) s’est engagé dans un vaste plan de modernisation de la gestion de ses finances publiques et une première phase du PAGAM/
GFP a été conçue et mise en œuvre au cours de la période 2005-2010. Le Plan
s’inscrivait dans le Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSLP) – le
document fixant les orientations stratégiques du Mali, et dans le Programme
de Développement Institutionnel (PDI) – le programme de modernisation de
l’administration publique.
La première phase du Plan d’action a connu des retards dans sa mise en œuvre. À
son échéance, en décembre 2010, près de 40% des activités prévues n’avaient pas
été réalisées. De plus, le dispositif de pilotage et de suivi avait montré quelques
faiblesses. Les résultats du Plan furent néanmoins jugés encourageants et démontrèrent la nécessité d’entreprendre une seconde phase.
De nouveaux paramètres devaient être pris en compte pour la Phase 2 : la volonté politique de déconcentrer et de décentraliser des finances publiques ; le
besoin d’harmoniser le cadre juridique et institutionnel avec les directives de
l’UEMOA ; et le renforcement de la participation citoyenne, y compris celle des
femmes, dans la gestion des finances publiques au Mali. De plus, les acteurs du
Plan et les partenaires techniques et financiers (PTF) ont souhaité une approche
fondée sur la Gestion Axée sur les Résultats (GAR) pour l’élaboration de la seconde phase du PAGAM/GFP, dont la mise en œuvre devait débuter en 2011.1
Au printemps 2009, le programme de DDD a mobilisé deux consultants afin
d’appuyer la Cellule d’Appui à la Réformes des Finances Publiques (CARFIP)2
– une structure du Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (MÉF) du Mali, pour
l’élaboration du Plan de cette seconde phase, incluant une stratégie et des mécanismes de suivi-évaluation tenant compte des possibilités de synergie avec
le Programme de Développement Institutionnel (PDI). Le niveau d’effort des
consultants était estimé à environ 45 jours chacun durant la période d’avril à
juin 2009, auxquels pourrait s’ajouter une mission en septembre pour finaliser
les travaux devant conduire à l’approbation du Plan d’action par le GdM.3 Un
consultant local, à la charge du GM, compléterait l’équipe.
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La GAR appliquée au processus d’élaboration de la seconde phase du
PAGAM/GFP
La forme traditionnelle d’intervention décrite plus haut est bien connue. Une
équipe d’experts est formée. Son travail préparatoire se fait normalement à distance et il est suivi d’une présence terrain minimale, généralement appuyée par
un consultant local, le tout culminant par le dépôt du rapport d’experts auprès
des autorités compétentes. Cette autorité doit alors s’approprier le document et
gérer sa mise en œuvre.
Parmi les reproches faits à ce type d’intervention, on compte :
• l’absence de transfert d’expertise et donc sa faible contribution au renforcement
durable des capacités locales ;
• un faible niveau d’appropriation qui nuit à l’efficacité et à l’efficience de la
mise œuvre ; et
• une déresponsabilisation des acteurs locaux.
Capitalisant sur la flexibilité du programme de DDD, les experts choisis ont
donc voulu sortir du cadre habituel de consultation4 et adopter une approche
novatrice, véritablement fondée sur la GAR, privilégiant la participation et
l’encadrement des responsables maliens dans l’élaboration de leur plan. Si cette
approche restait à développer, les principes qu’elle devait intégrer étaient connus :
• permettre de relier les initiatives de modernisation des finances publiques du
GM à ses orientations stratégiques ;
• assurer une continuité des activités entreprises dans la première phase du
Plan et la consolidation des résultats, favorisant la qualité et la robustesse du
système des finances publiques ;
• privilégier la participation directe des responsables dans l’élaboration et
l’exécution de leur Plan d’action, favorisant ainsi le développement durable
de leurs capacités;
• favoriser, par son caractère participatif, une mobilisation accrue des acteurs
et des citoyens face aux changements que suscitent les innovations contenues
dans les activités du plan d’action et, conséquemment, son appropriation,
contribuant ainsi au développement démocratique.
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Description de la démarche d’élaboration de la seconde phase du PAGAM/
GFP
Dès leur première intervention sur le terrain, en juillet 2009, les consultants se
sont heurtés à des difficultés importantes. D’une part, les cadres visés par la
réforme avaient reçu les habituelles formations de base sur la GAR, nettement
inappropriées pour mener à bien les tâches qui les attendaient. D’autre part,
certains membres des PTF, bien qu’ils approuvaient l’approche de la GAR, résistaient à l’idée d’une authentique démarche participative, soucieux des délais
que cette démarche allait impliquer et, surtout, de la volonté des instances impliquées à aborder les véritables enjeux touchant les finances publiques du Mali.5
L’approche conçue par les consultants allait devoir intégrer un encadrement accru du processus et une présence active sur le terrain pour fournir un appui
technique essentiel au travail des participants. En contrepartie des coûts et délais supplémentaires, cette approche allait susciter un apprentissage important
pour tous les participants (fonctionnaires, société civile, parlementaires et PTF).
Cette approche de GAR, qui a nécessité l’élaboration d’un processus de collaboration et le développement d’outils méthodologiques, peut se résumer dans les
quatre étapes suivantes :
1. Construire une architecture logique et la valider (juillet à décembre
2009)
Le développement d’une architecture logique pour encadrer les efforts relatifs
au PAGAM/GFP II assure la cohérence de ces efforts, facilite leur validation,
permet le développement d’une compréhension partagée par tous les intéressés, et facilite aussi le développement du cadre de suivi et d’évaluation. Comme
le modèle logique, ou la chaîne de résultats, est un outil relativement connu
des gens formés en GAR, démarrer l’intervention avec cet outil semblait être la
bonne stratégie.
Les deux niveaux supérieurs de l’architecture ont été ébauchés par les consultants à la lumière de l’ensemble des diagnostics et études touchant les finances
publiques du Mali afin de pallier la crainte des PTF quant à l’exhaustivité de la
réflexion des groupes de travail. L’ébauche a ensuite été peaufinée avec les membres de la CARFIP. L’élaboration de l’architecture logique a été un processus
itératif, une source d’apprentissages et de compromis pour tous les participants,
consultants inclus.
La validation de l’architecture logique s’est réalisée en deux étapes : la validation politique et la validation organisationnelle. La première touchait la for124
mulation du résultat ultime et des quatre effets stratégiques qui composent le
Plan. Elle relève des acteurs politiques qui doivent en faire l’adoption formelle.
Cette validation a été faite lors de la cérémonie inaugurale de l’élaboration du
PAGAM/GFP II (décembre 2009). La rencontre regroupait une centaine de personnes associées à l’élaboration du Plan, dont la secrétaire générale du ministère
de l’Économie et des Finances, les directeurs généraux du ministère, de même
que des représentants provenant de toutes les entités associées au plan d’action,
la Commission des finances de l’Assemblée nationale, la société civile et les PTF.
Les intérêts multiples représentés lors de cette cérémonie et l’aspect novateur
de l’architecture logique ont donné lieu à des échanges intéressants et quelques
fois provocateurs. Le graphique qui suit présente les deux niveaux supérieurs de
l’architecture logique du PAGAM/GFP.
La validation organisationnelle touche la déclinaison des quatre effets stratégiques mentionnés plus haut en leurs effets intermédiaires et en leurs extrants
et activités. Ce travail, responsabilité partagée par la vingtaine d’organisations
impliquées, a été réalisé à la troisième étape et y est décrit en détail.
Une leçon importante apprise ici est de réaliser le caractère non linéaire de ce
genre d’intervention et d’en saisir la complexité afin de ne pas brusquer la prise
de décision. Les compromis nécessaires à la formulation du modèle logique se
sont avérés nombreux, frustrants parfois, mais ils ont constitué un enrichissement à la réflexion, ont permis d’accroître la robustesse du modèle retenu, ainsi
que sa compréhension et, aspect crucial, son appropriation par les intéressés.
125
Concevoir le processus et les outils méthodologiques pour étoffer le
modèle logique (juillet à décembre 2010)
Chacun des effets stratégiques devait ensuite être décliné en effets intermédiaires, effets immédiats, extrants, activités et intrants. La séquence des activités
à réaliser devait être programmée dans un calendrier triennal glissant, les priorités déterminées et les coûts estimés. À travers tout ça, il fallait évidemment
identifier les risques et les façons de les gérer. Une méthodologie simple mais
solide était essentielle au succès de ces efforts.
Dans un premier temps, afin de réduire l’ampleur du travail des participants, les
consultants ont choisi de ne pas recourir à un niveau ‘effets immédiats’ pour lier
les extrants aux effets intermédiaires. Cette simplification ne semble pas avoir
diminué la robustesse de l’architecture logique.
Dans un second temps, pour assurer la cohérence des extrants et des activités, un
guide a été élaboré. On y retrouvait un glossaire et un inventaire de treize études
pertinentes devant être prises en compte dans l’élaboration du Plan. Le Guide
prescrivait la description des extrants et des actions proposés, et de leur lien
avec l’effet intermédiaire correspondant. Il encadrait également l’identification
des risques et hypothèses rattachés aux extrants, le choix des indicateurs de performance, et présentait une procédure préliminaire en vue du calcul des coûts
des activités. Suite à sa validation par la CARFIP, le Guide d’élaboration des
extrants et des activités a été expédié à chaque participant, accompagné des gabarits électroniques nécessaires.
Dans un troisième temps, étant donné la centralisation de l’information financière d’un ministère sous une même Direction de l’Administration et des Finances (DAF), les gestionnaires responsables des différentes composantes n’étaient
pas en mesure de quantifier eux-mêmes les coûts des activités à réaliser. Un
consultant local a donc été embauché pour faire l’évaluation des coûts et la soumettre aux autorités concernées.
Finalement, un processus était prévu pour remonter vers les consultants les soumissions préparées par chacun de la trentaine de démembrements impliqués
dans le PAGAM/GFP 2 afin de permettre leur consolidation au sein d’un même
Plan. Les participants disposaient de moins de six semaines pour élaborer leurs
soumissions et les soumettre aux consultants.6 Les consultants auraient alors un
maximum de deux mois pour peaufiner la trentaine de soumissions et produire
le Plan consolidé.
Il est rapidement devenu évident que la formation et l’expérience des participants, y compris les membres de la CARFIP, ne les avaient pas préparés à un
travail aussi complexe. Pour réussir, l’approche participative proposée néces126
siterait donc un encadrement serré. La flexibilité du programme de DDD a permis d’ajouter un troisième consultant canadien à l’équipe dès décembre. Déjà
localisé à Bamako, il allait pouvoir assurer cet accompagnement des participants
durant l’élaboration du Plan.
3. Créer et animer quatre groupes thématiques (décembre 2009 à mai
2010)
Équipé d’une méthodologie bien documentée, chaque démembrement allait devoir décliner les effets stratégiques applicables en effets intermédiaires, extrants
et activités. Pour faciliter le démarrage de ce travail, les consultants avaient déjà
suggéré un certain nombre d’effets intermédiaires à partir des treize rapports
énumérés dans le guide méthodologique.
Pour mieux encadrer les démembrements, assurer une participation efficace des
acteurs impliqués dans la préparation du PAGAM/GFP II et en faire les maîtres
d’œuvre de la conception du Plan, la CARFIP a proposé de créer quatre groupes
thématiques alignés sur chacun des quatre effets stratégiques. Chaque groupe
était formé des organisations associées à l’effet stratégique correspondant,
d’un représentant des PTF et d’un membre de la CARFIP (voir le tableau qui
suit). Il était également constitué d’un président, le plus souvent un directeur
général, qui était responsable de l’organisation et de l’animation des réunions,
assisté d’un rapporteur. La présidence de chaque groupe thématique était aussi
responsable de la liaison avec les trois autres groupes sur toutes les questions
d’intérêts communs. Le consultant canadien terrain était présent aux rencontres
des groupes thématiques.
Le processus qui devait faire remonter les soumissions des démembrements
vers les consultants a du même coup été bonifié, les groupes se voyant attribuer
la responsabilité de s’assurer de la qualité des soumissions de leurs membres.
Cette revue par les pairs devait permettre un partage plus efficace de l’expertise
technique déjà présente dans certains secteurs de l’Administration malienne.
Elle devait aussi réduire la charge de travail des consultants au niveau de
l’assurance-qualité de la trentaine de soumissions, ces dernières ayant passé par
le ‘filtre’ du groupe.
Pour mieux réaliser l’ampleur de cette participation, le tableau suivant énumère
les structures composant chaque groupe, notant bien que chaque structure, à
l’exception des PTF, était elle-même composée d’une équipe de représentants,
totalisant près d’une centaine de participants.
127
Les recettes de l’État
sont optimisées de
façon durable
La qualité de
préparation et
d’exécution du
budget correspond
aux normes
internationales
et permet la
généralisation des
appuis budgétaires
Le système de
gouvernance financière
responsabilise les
acteurs et accroît la
transparence et la
prévisibilité de la gestion
des finances publiques
La déconcentration et la
décentralisation sont renforcées
par un système de gestion des
finances publiques adéquat
Direction Générale des
Impôts
Direction Générale de
l’Administration des
Biens de l’État
Commission des Finances
de l’Assemblée Nationale
Direction Nationale des Collectivités
Territoriales
Contrôle Général des
Services Publics
Direction Nationale de l’Intérieur
Direction Nationale
des Domaines et du
Cadastre
Douanes
Cellule d’Appui à
l’Informatisation des
Services Fiscaux et
Financiers
Direction Nationale
du Trésor et de la
Comptabilité Publique
Conseil National de la
Société Civile
Direction Générale de
la Dette Publique
Banque Africaine de
Développement
Coopération
canadienne
AFRITAC (FMI)
Cellule d’Appui à la
Réforme des Finances
Publiques
Banque Mondiale
Publiques
Marchés Publics et des
Délégations de Services
Publics
Agence Nationale d’Investissement
des Collectivités Territoriales
Direction Générale du Budget
Direction Générale des Impôts
Direction Générale du
Contentieux de l’État
Direction Nationale du Trésor et de la
Inspection des Finances
Direction Nationale de la Planification
du Développement
Commissariat au
Développement
Institutionnel
Bureau du Vérificateur
Général
Direction Nationale
du Trésor et de la
Institut National de la Statistique
Direction Administrative et Financière
du Ministère de l’Éducation de Base
du Ministère de la Santé
du Ministère de l’Énergie et de l’Eau
Section des Comptes de la
Cour Suprême
Cellule d’Appui à la Décentralisation/
Déconcentration du MEBALN
Direction Nationale du
Contrôle Financier
Déconcentration du Ministère de la
Santé
Conseil National de la
Société Civile
Union Européenne
Ambassade des Pays-Bas
Publiques
Publiques
Déconcentration du Ministère de
l’Énergie
Gouvernorat du District de Bamako
Association des Municipalités du Mali
Conseil National de la Société Civile
AFRITAC (FMI)
Divers PTF
Cellule d’Appui à la Réforme des
Finances Publiques
Durant cette étape, l’enjeu fut d’assurer une coordination efficace et un apport
productif. Il s’avéra rapidement que la qualité du travail des groupes était inégale, que les participants ne faisaient pas preuve d’une grande discipline en
ce qui concerne leur présence aux rencontres et leur contribution à la réflexion collective. De l’avis des consultants, cette situation aurait été attribuable au
manque d’expertise technique des participants, au manque d’expérience des
128
groupes concernant le processus participatif et aux contraintes de disponibilité
des cadres supérieurs devant piloter les travaux.
Force a été de constater qu’un encadrement serré par l’expert canadien présent
sur le terrain était une condition critique au succès du processus. Suivant ce constat, quatre ateliers de travail animés par l’expert présent sur le terrain réunirent
chaque groupe thématique pour deux jours. Les ateliers visaient à améliorer la
qualité des travaux et accélérer la cadence des groupes en vue de rencontrer les
délais. Les groupes ont par la suite produit des soumissions préliminaires qui
ont été discutées avec les consultants, en grande partie par courriel.
Finalement, malgré une responsabilité explicitement assignée, les groupes thématiques travaillaient en silo et n’établissaient pas les relations transversales
attendues pour refléter l’aspect systémique du Plan.7 Les présidents et rapporteurs des groupes thématiques ont donc dû être conviés à deux rencontres intergroupes pour échanger sur les enjeux transversaux impliquant certains extrants
et activités. Pour les aider, les consultants ont développé une ‘matrice transversale’ à partir des propositions reçues de chaque groupe en identifiant les extrants qui touchaient des intérêts communs comme la gestion des ressources humaines, les systèmes de contrôle interne et externe, les systèmes d’information,
la gouvernance financière, etc.
4. Consolider les travaux des groupes (mai-juin 2010)
Pendant que le consultant local faisait l’évaluation des coûts des extrants et activités, les consultants canadiens consolidaient les documents produits par les
quatre groupes.8
L’ébauche finale a été soumise à un atelier de validation les 9 et 10 juin 2010
regroupant, là encore, tous les acteurs impliqués dans le PAGAM/GFP II : Fonction publique, Assemblée nationale, Société civile, PTF, etc. Le PAGAM/GFP II a
été adopté par le GM dans les semaines qui ont suivi l’atelier de validation, une
année après le début de l’intervention.
Conclusion, leçons apprises et recommandations
L’approche participative élaborée par les consultants a nécessité le double du
budget initialement prévu. Elle s’est échelonnée sur douze mois au lieu de trois.
Elle a nécessité plusieurs centaines de jours-personnes de travail de la part des
acteurs maliens impliqués, au lieu des quelques dizaines de jours-personnes habituellement nécessaires pour les rencontres entre les cadres et les consultants
effectuant le travail.
129
Le fait d’opter pour une approche participative, surtout à l’échelle de celle utilisée pour accompagner l’élaboration du PAGAM/GFP II, implique des compromis sur le plan technique, un style d’intervention adapté et des ressources conséquentes.
Sur le plan technique, il faut accepter que le produit final puisse ne pas être
aussi techniquement à point que les productions habituelles issues des délégations d’experts internationaux. Et alors ? Les classeurs des pays ‘bénéficiaires’
regorgent déjà des ces savantes productions et ces pays ne s’en portent pourtant
pas mieux.
Sur le plan du style d’intervention, il faut accepter que le processus soit en partie
hors du contrôle des consultants.9 Lorsqu’on responsabilise des acteurs locaux,
il faut en effet s’attendre à ce que ceux-ci jouent leurs rôles et prennent des décisions avec lesquelles les consultants pourraient ne pas être d’accord – mais c’est
leur document, leur plan, pas celui des consultants. Ultimement, il faut être à
l’aise avec l’idée de travailler en accompagnement et en renforcement plutôt
qu’en substitution des capacités locales.
Sur le plan des ressources, il faut évidemment disposer du temps et des moyens
humains et financiers nécessaires. Les approches ‘traditionnelles’ privilégient la
rapidité de la réponse technique obtenue de l’expert. L’approche participative
élaborée mise sur les processus qui favorisent le transfert d’expertise aux acteurs
locaux, le renforcement durable de leurs capacités, leur appropriation du résultat et la capacité de bien réaliser. Elle exige aussi une présence terrain continue.
À en juger par le sentiment de satisfaction et de fierté des acteurs qui ont participé à la démarche (sentiment palpable lors de l’atelier de validation), ainsi que
par la vitesse du processus d’approbation qui s’en est suivi au GM, nul doute
que cette approche participative s’est avéré un facteur-clé de réussite. Nous
maintiendrions donc l’approche participative que nous avons élaborée, malgré
les dépassements de coûts considérables et les échéances supplémentaires.10
Pour assurer l’ancrage institutionnel du Plan d’action, la poursuite du renforcement des acteurs et la pérennité des efforts investis, il serait essentiel de relancer
l’exercice.11 Sans répétition, il n’y aura pas de véritable apprentissage durable.
Au lieu d’être des investissements, les efforts déployés n’auront alors été que de
simples dépenses courantes.
Il faut cependant être conscient que de réaliser une seconde itération de cette
approche participative nécessiterait une volonté réelle peu commune tant du
pays bénéficiaire que des PTF. Une telle intervention ‘horizontale’ affecte de facto
l’ensemble des ministères et agences gouvernementales et chevauche l’ensemble
130
des portefeuilles de projets12 des différents PTF. L’orchestration d’autant
d’intérêts pas toujours convergents ne saurait être une sinécure.
Pour de prochaines interventions participatives, nous proposons les pistes
d’améliorations suivantes :
• Démarrer la démarche par une formation ‘technique’ des participants, une
mise à niveau, question d’établir une base commune de compréhension,
de préciser les attentes et engagements, de comprendre la démarche et ses
échéanciers, etc. ;
• S’assurer que le niveau d’encadrement technique disponible sur le terrain est
suffisant pour accompagner adéquatement les groupes dans les tâches qu’ils
ont à accomplir ;
• S’assurer que le programme de travail est approprié à la capacité relative
des groupes, tient compte de la complexité des tâches et de leur volume
en structurant le travail en tranches ‘absorbables’ par les participants,
en prévoyant des validations plus fréquentes parce qu’une bonne
programmation peut multiplier les opportunités de transfert d’expertise vers
les participants ;
• S’assurer au préalable de la disponibilité et de l’engagement des cadres à qui
l’on confie le leadership des groupes de travail pour minimiser les dérives en
temps et en qualité ;
• Pour assurer la pérennité des acquis et l’approfondissement des apprentissages
initiés pendant la démarche, faire en sorte que la démarche ne soit pas qu’un
événement ponctuel, unique.
Épilogue
En novembre 2011, la première année du PAGAM/GFP II à peine entamée, deux
des consultants originaux ont été appelés, dans le cadre d’un autre projet canadien, à seconder la Cellule d’Appui à la Réforme des Finances Publiques dans la
mise à jour du PAGAM/GFP II afin d’y intégrer ex-post les conclusions de cinq
nouvelles études réalisées en 2010 et 2011.13 S’ils ont pu reproduire sur à peine
deux semaines l’approche participative qu’ils avaient élaborée en 2009-2010,14 ils
se sont encore heurtés au manque de temps et ont dû, de nouveau, prendre euxmêmes en charge la gestion des risques, en formulant à nouveau le vœu qu’une
prochaine itération permette de transférer la responsabilité de cette partie à la
partie malienne.
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Un événement beaucoup plus important restait malheureusement à venir.
Le Mali est, de longue date, un important bénéficiaire de l’aide au développement. Selon des données de l’OCDE, il aurait reçu environ 1,27 milliard de dollars en 2011, dont plus de 100 millions de l’ACDI. Force est de constater que cette
aide n’a malheureusement pas apporté les améliorations socio-économiques requises : le pays est enlisé dans la pauvreté, avec un rang de développement
humain en régression et une toujours aussi grande iniquité entre les genres, et
la plupart des indicateurs de bonne gouvernance de la Banque mondiale en régression.
En mettant fin à 20 ans de démocratie et à des institutions qui se sont avérées
plus fragiles qu’on ne le croyait, le coup d’état du 21 mars 2012 a du même coup
mis fin à la mise en œuvre du PAGAM/GFP II. En effet, le coup a provoqué le
gel de l’aide internationale. Ce gel agit de deux façons sur le PAGAM/GFP II.
Dans un premier temps, une très importante partie des activités prévues au Plan
dépendaient directement de financements extérieurs. Dans un second temps,
avec un budget d’état dont presque la moitié provient de l’aide étrangère, le gel
de cette aide réduit le budget au niveau des opérations de survie. Il est douteux
d’y voir beaucoup d’activités préconisées par le PAGAM/GFP II.
Ceci étant dit, si les élections ont lieu telles que prévues en 2013 et que la démocratie est restaurée, il est fort probable que l’aide étrangère le sera rapidement
elle-aussi. Nous croyons que, grâce à la vaste implication directe et soutenue de
2009 à 2011 des parties intéressées, la démarche participative développée pour
élaborer la forme et le fond de la Phase II du Plan d’Action Gouvernemental
pour l’Amélioration et la Modernisation de la Gestion des Finances Publiques
facilitera grandement la remise en marche rapide du PAGAM/GFP.
Lucie Rouillard, PhD, a pris sa retraite à titre de professeure en finances publiques à
l’ÉNAP et fait maintenant des interventions de renforcement des capacités en Afrique
francophone et à Haïti.
Pierre Martineau, professionnel en résidence au Centre d’Études en Gouvernance de
l’Université d’Ottawa, a enseigné la gestion axée sur les résultats, la gestion de projets et
l’évaluation. Il fait des interventions de renforcement des capacités et de modernisation
des administrations publiques en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et à Haïti.
Jean-Philippe Lapointe est un cadre supérieur de la fonction publique fédérale. Basé au
Mali pendant quelques années, il a coordonné et est lui-même intervenu dans diverses
initiatives de modernisation de l’administration publique malienne.
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Notes
1
La GAR ayant été considérée après le fait pour la Phase 1 du PAGAM/GFP, elle s’était
résumée à formater les activités, extrants et indicateurs déjà prévus dans le Plan dans
un Cadre d’analyse logique et son Cadre de mesure du rendement.
2
Il est important de souligner l’apport considérable du coordonnateur de la CARFIP,
M. Bounafou Touré. Contributeur stratégique essentiel, le succès de l’intervention
doit autant à son travail incessant de mobilisation et de motivation des acteurs qu’aux
efforts des consultants qui lui expriment à nouveau leur reconnaissance.
3
L’évaluation de la Phase 1 devait être réalisée avant le lancement de l’intervention
de DDD. Elle ne l’a été qu’en août 2009, produisant son rapport à la fin octobre.
L’échéancier initial de l’intervention ne pouvait donc, au départ, être respecté.
4
Ce mode de consultation avait déjà produit une douzaine de rapports et d’études sur
les finances publiques du Mali, rapports dont les conclusions/recommandations ont
été intégrées comme intrants dans la nouvelle démarche.
5
Ces enjeux et les actions propices à leur résolution avaient été énoncés dans la
douzaine de rapports et analyses inventoriés par les consultants et spécifiquement
communiqués par eux, à plusieurs reprises, aux divers participants afin que les
conclusions/recommandations soient effectivement prises en compte dans le plan de
la Phase 2.
6
Ces délais étaient nécessaires pour assurer la rédaction finale du Plan, sa validation et
son adoption par l’Assemblée nationale à l’été 2010 afin d’être en application dès le 1er
janvier 2011.
7
Certains PTF avaient à plusieurs reprises exprimés leurs craintes d’un traitement
insuffisant des ‘enjeux transversaux’.
8
À cause des délais à rencontrer et du manque d’expertise technique des participants,
ce sont les consultants canadiens qui ont dû se charger de l’élaboration des priorités
et de la gestion des risques.
9
Un adage cher aux gens en développement organisationnel demande de ‘faire
confiance au processus’.
10 Il faut souligner que c’est la flexibilité et l’orientation des résultats du programme de
DDD, de son équipe de gestion et de l’équipe de gestion du programme au Mali qui
ont rendu possible la conception et la mise en œuvre de notre approche.
11 D’ailleurs incomplet, les consultants canadiens ayant dû se charger eux-mêmes de
l’élaboration des priorités afin de guider les éventuels arbitrages budgétaires, et de la
gestion des risques afin de rencontrer les échéanciers du GdM.
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12 Chacun attribué contractuellement à une agence d’exécution/accompagnement
différente.
13 Il était en fait question de sept études. Deux n’ayant pas encore été validées par le
gouvernement du Mali, elles ont été exclues de ce travail de mise à jour du Plan du
PAGAM/GFP II.
14 Grâce en partie au fait que le projet canadien avait déjà bonifié une partie du travail
original et au fait que l’envergure des éléments à mettre à jour était bien délimitée.
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Chapter 10
Contre vents et marées : des élections
libres et équitables en Guinée-Bissau
Cette étude de cas a été préparée avec l’aide d’Alain Gauthier et de Claude Parent.
Sommaire : La petite nation ouest-africaine de Guinée-Bissau a enduré la violence, la souffrance, la répression politique et de nombreux coups militaires depuis son indépendance
du Portugal en 1974. En dépit des déboires qui ont perturbé ses aspirations démocratiques, cette nation est parvenue à mener plusieurs élections pacifiques, libres et équitables. La présente étude de cas décrit les efforts fructueux du Canada pour apporter un
appui aux Nations Unies dans la coordination et le soutien logistique des élections de
2008 et de 2009. Entrepris dans un contexte de tension politique, dans des délais pratiquement impossibles à réaliser, ces deux projets ont eu un impact considérable sur la coordination efficace des équipes d’observateurs internationaux. L’expérience vécue dans le
cadre de ces deux projets a démontré que les efforts de surveillance de futures élections
peuvent être renforcés par une planification préalable suffisante et l’exécution rapide et
opportune des tâches administratives. Essentiellement, la principale leçon retenue est
qu’il faut s’occuper des petites choses avant de pouvoir se consacrer aux vrais problèmes.
D’un point de vue de la démocratisation, le haut degré de compétence et d’impartialité
dont a fait preuve la Commission électorale nationale de la Guinée-Bissau et le haut
niveau de satisfaction exprimé par les citoyens à propos du processus de vote donnent
un peu d’espoir. Malheureusement, après un autre coup militaire en avril 2012, une importante réalisation de la Guinée-Bissau sur le plan de la démocratie, acquise contre vents
et marées, est peut-être maintenant en péril.
Abstract: Guinea-Bissau, a small West African nation, has endured violence, suffering,
political repression and military coups since its independence from Portugal in 1974. Despite constant setbacks to its democratic aspirations, the nation has managed to conduct
several peaceful, free and fair elections. This case study describes Canada’s successful efforts to support the United Nations with coordination and logistical support for the 2008
and 2009 elections. Undertaken amid political tension, against virtually impossible timelines, the two projects made significant contributions to the effective coordination of the
international observer teams. Reflecting on the experience, both projects concluded that
future election monitoring efforts could be strengthened by sufficient advance planning,
and efficient, timely execution of administrative tasks. In essence, the key lesson learned
has been to take care of the little things, so that one can focus on the real problems. From
a democratization perspective, the high degree of competence and impartiality demon-
Des élections libres et équitables en Guinée-Bissau
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strated by Guinea-Bissau’s National Electoral Commission, and the high level of satisfaction expressed by citizens in the voting process, provided some grounds for modest optimism. Sadly, after experiencing yet another military coup in April 2012, Guinea-Bissau’s
one significant democratic accomplishment, achieved against formidable odds, may be
at serious risk.
Introduction
À la veille de leur départ de l’aéroport de Lisbonne pour la Guinée-Bissau, les
experts-conseils canadiens Claude Parent et Christian Gohel ont été informés
qu’un candidat à la présidentielle venait d’être assassiné – un début guère prometteur pour une mission destinée à aider l’ONU à appuyer les élections présidentielles de juillet 2009. La possibilité de rester à Lisbonne lui étant offerte, M.
Parent, un observateur électoral expérimenté, a répondu : « Nous verrons ce qui
arrivera » et s’est envolé avec Monsieur Gohel pour la Guinée-Bissau.
Le climat politique était moins instable pour la mission de surveillance précédente des élections législatives de novembre 2008 de la Guinée-Bissau. Pour les
experts canadiens Alain Gauthier et Jean-Marc Baudot, le principal défi fut de
soutenir un appui technique et logistique efficace à l’observation des élections
dans un délai d’exécution extrêmement court de dix jours.
Étant donné les obstacles politiques et logistiques considérables, il est remarquable que la Guinée-Bissau ait tenu trois élections relativement pacifiques, libres et équitables en 2008 et 2009.1 Cette étude de cas examinera les efforts du
Canada, dans le cadre du programme de Déploiements pour le développement
démocratique (DDD) de l’ACDI, administré par l’Institut d’administration
publique du Canada, pour aider l’Organisation des Nations Unies à la coordination d’observateurs internationaux aux élections de 2008 et 2009.
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PROFIL DU PROJET
Titre : Appui pour la coordination et la mise en oeuvre de l’observation internationale des
élections
Client : Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en Guinée-Bissau
Experts-conseils principaux : A. Gauthier; J.M. Baudot (2008); C. Parent; C. Gohel (2009)
Durée : Novembre 2008 à Janvier 2009 ; Juin à Août 2009
Budgets respectifs : 81,140$ (2008) ; 114,960$ (2009)
Principaux extrants/résultats prévus :
1. Fournir un soutien technique et logistique aux observateurs internationaux
2. Organiser des réunions d’information pour les observateurs internationaux et le soutien
technique
3. Aider à l’accréditation des observateurs internationaux
4. Mettre au point des outils communs à l’usage des observateurs
5. Organiser des réunions-bilan ; rassembler et consolider les rapports des observateurs ; préparer
des rapports de synthèse
Profil de la gouvernance
PRÉSIDENTS DE LA GUINÉE-BISSAU
Luis Cabral (1974-1980)
• renversé par Jiao Vieira
Jiao Vieira (1980-1998)
• a remporté la 1ère élection de la nation en 1994
• le renvoi du chef de l’armée a déclenché la guerre
civile
en 1998
Kombi Yale (2000-2003)
• chassé du pouvoir par un coup d’état
Jiao Vieira (2005-2009)
• assassiné par des militaires après avoir tué le chef de
l’armée
Milam Sana (2009-2012)
• mort de causes naturelles
Carlos Gomes Jr.
• a remporté le 1er tour des élections
• un coup d’état militaire a empêché un 2e tour
Manuel Serif Nhamadjo
• président de la transition après le coup d’état
• nouvelles élections promises pour 2013
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À première vue, la Guinée-Bissau ne semble pas être un candidat prometteur
pour des élections libres et équitables. Depuis son indépendance du Portugal
en 1974, cette nation de 1,6 millions d’habitants en bordure du Sénégal et de la
Guinée a subi des coups d’état militaires, des régimes répressifs, des assassinats
politiques, l’implication militaire dans le trafic de drogues, et une guerre civile.
Aucun président élu n’a pu réaliser avec succès un mandat complet.
Freedom House classe la Guinée-Bissau comme partiellement libre depuis plus
d’une décennie. Ceci place la Guinée-Bissau à un niveau similaire à celui du
Nigeria, du Kenya et du Pakistan.2 Qu’elle se place si haut est essentiellement dû
au fait qu’elle a tenu périodiquement des élections raisonnablement pacifiques,
libres et équitables. Qu’elle ne détienne pas une place plus élevée est attribuable
à l’intervention fréquente de l’armée pour renverser les dirigeants librement
élus du pays. Étant donné le coup d’état militaire d’avril 2012, les perspectives
d’une plus grande démocratisation semblent peu probables, malgré les efforts
de la Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Occidentale (CEDEAO)
pour assurer un retour pacifique vers un régime civil.3
Auparavant, la liberté de l’information se comparait bien à celle d’autres pays
d’Afrique, obtenant un Indice de Reporters sans frontières pour la liberté de
l’information en 2012, qui se situait dans le premier tiers des pays subsahariens.
Toutefois, la note de la Guinée-Bissau, en 2013, a diminué brusquement, reflétant les restrictions imposées aux médias à la suite du coup d’état de 2012.4
Il n’y a rien d’étonnant à ce que les indicateurs de gouvernance de la Banque
mondiale pour la Guinée-Bissau restent très faibles, la classant au plus bas pour
le respect de la règle de droit (6ème percentile) et pour l’efficacité gouvernementale (15ème percentile). La corruption reste endémique. La Guinée-Bissau s’est
classée 150e de 176 pays pour l’Indice de perception de la corruption de Transparency International en 2012.
La Guinée-Bissau souffre d’extrême pauvreté, se classant 176e de 187 pays sur
l’Indice de développement humain des Nations Unies de 2012. Pratiquement
aucun progrès n’a été réalisé dans plus d’une décennie et la confusion résultant
du récent coup d’état produit une détérioration économique rapide.
On déplore également que la Guinée-Bissau continue de servir de principale
plaque tournante de transbordement de la cocaïne de la Colombie destinée à
l’Europe. Compte tenu de l’implication bien connue de l’armée dans le commerce de stupéfiants, le danger que la Guinée-Bissau ne devienne un état narco
reste bien réel.5 Il est peu probable que des améliorations durables en matière de
gouvernance soient réalisées tant que cette situation durera.
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Définition du projet
La demande d’assistance initiale à l’ACDI provenait du Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en Guinée-Bissau (BINUGBIS), à laquelle la Commission nationale électorale (CNE) avait demandé de l’aide. Deux
postes avaient été proposés : un coordonnateur international des observateurs et
un agent responsable de la logistique.
Le tableau ci-après résume les activités clés des trois étapes.
Principales activités d’assistance technique aux élections
Réélections
• rencontrer les organisations pertinentes de l’ONU
• rencontrer la Commission électorale nationale
• rencontrer les missions internationales
• mettre au point une base de données des observateurs nationaux
• aider à l’accréditation des observateurs nationaux
• développer des trousses, listes communes, rapports, protocoles de sécurité
• appuyer l’acquisition et la distribution de l’équipement de communication
• appuyer et gérer la réservation et l’attribution des véhicules
• informer les observateurs nationaux
• mettre en place la salle de situation
• élaborer des plans de déploiement à l’échelle du pays
Élections
• maintenir le contact avec toutes les équipes d’observateurs
• rester en contact avec la commission électorale
• répondre aux situations d’urgence au besoin
Post-élections
• faire le point avec les organisations de l’ONU et la commission électorale
selon les besoins
• compiler des rapports statistiques
• terminer le projet
• finaliser les rapports et les recommandations se rapportant au projet
La conception d’un projet simple ne garantit toutefois pas une réalisation sans
problème. En pratique, la coordination de l’observation électorale décrite ci-dessous est souvent très chaotique.
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Liaison du projet
Pour les élections de Novembre 2008, la présence internationale comprenait quarante équipes d’observation de deux à trois personnes chacune provenant des
organismes et des pays figurant dans le tableau ci-contre ainsi que des missions
indépendantes comprenant une centaine d’observateurs de l’Union européenne
et de la Communauté des pays de langue portugaise (CPLP).
Équipes d’observateurs coordonnées par l’ONU
• CEDEAO
• Union Africaine
• Union économique et monétaire de l’Ouest africain (UEMOA)
• Francophone
• Canada
• Indonésie
• Japon
• Royaume-Uni
• États-Unis
Arrivés seulement dix jours avant les élections, messieurs Gauthier et Baudot devaient gérer un délai très court. Faute de temps pour élaborer un plan de travail
détaillé, ils étaient forcés de travailler plus dans un mode de crise que de gestion
de projet. Face à des délais serrés, des procédures administratives du PNUD, des
difficultés de traduction, des pénuries d’équipement et tous les problèmes habituels que l’on rencontre lorsqu’on travaille dans un pays en développement, il a
été remarquable d’avoir pu effectivement réaliser à temps les tâches principales.
Commentant le travail de l’agent responsable de la logistique, M. Gauthier a
observé que « Il a beaucoup souffert. »
En prévision des élections, les points de vue différents des missions participantes sur le rôle de coordination du BINUGBIS, en particulier ceux des équipes
d’observation africaines, compliquaient les efforts pour assurer une approche
unifiée de la collecte et du partage de l’information. En fin de compte, les observateurs ont pu recueillir suffisamment d’information pour produire un rapport
d’activités complet.
Le jour du scrutin, malgré les problèmes des réseaux cellulaires surchargés, la
salle de situation est restée en contact avec « la plupart des équipes la plupart
140
du temps ». Aucun problème de sécurité majeur ne s’est présenté et très peu
d’irrégularités ont été observées. Le rapport post-électoral a relevé quelques problèmes, mais dans l’ensemble, les élections ont été considérées libres et justes. Le
représentant du Secrétaire général de l’ONU, qui avait assumé la responsabilité
de superviser la mission d’observation électorale, a exprimé sa satisfaction de la
contribution apportée au projet, compte tenu surtout des courts délais.
Les résultats compilés par les observateurs internationaux étaient les suivants :
• soixante-douze pour cent des électeurs ont voté,
• cinquante pour cent des électeurs étaient des femmes,
• neuf pour cent des bureaux de vote ont connu des tentatives d’obstruction,
• quatre-vingt-six pour cent des bureaux de vote se sont préparés et ont ouvert
correctement,
• quatre-vingt-dix pour cent des bureaux de vote ont demandé aux électeurs
de présenter une pièce d’identité,
• dix pour cent des observateurs ont signalé des activités frauduleuses ou
douteuses,
• des agents de la sécurité étaient postés dans onze pour cent des bureaux de
vote,
• aucun incident d’interférence inappropriée de la police ou de l’armée n’a été
rapporté,
• seulement soixante-seize pour cent des urnes ont été scellées correctement,
• dans cinquante pour cent des cas, les urnes en transit pour le dépouillement
étaient accompagnées par un agent de la paix ou un membre du personnel
électoral,
• le dépouillement des votes était transparent dans quatre-vingt-douze pour
cent des cas,
• aucune personne non autorisée était présente pour le dépouillement des
votes dans soixante-seize pour cent des bureaux de vote, et
• onze pour cent des bureaux de vote ont signalé des tentatives de dérangement
du dépouillement.
Les élections présidentielles de Juillet 2009 ont été entraînées par l’assassinat du
Président Vieira en Mars.6 L’agitation s’est poursuivie avec l’assassinat du candidat Baciro Dabo le 4 juin, trois semaines avant les élections. Malgré la violence
141
environnante, le processus électoral lui-même a été, une fois de plus, considéré
comme pacifique, libre et équitable. Les efforts de l’ONU pour réduire les tensions y ont certainement contribué, en plus d’une entente négociée et signée par
les deux finalistes et de la déclaration post-électorale conjointe des deux candidats affirmant que : « Je reconnais les résultats. Je suis un démocrate. D’ailleurs
le Représentant du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU, Monsieur Joseph Mutaboba, a
manifesté sa très grande satisfaction à l’égard de Monsieur Parent pour sa contribution à la réalisation de cette négociation entre les candidats.
Même si quelques améliorations sont appliquées depuis 2008, le second projet a
rencontré un bon nombre des mêmes obstacles que l’équipe précédente. Il n’est
pas surprenant que les recommandations de l’équipe canadienne pour améliorer le processus d’observation des élections fassent écho à celles présentées en
2008. Pour ce qui est des élections elles-mêmes, les résultats rapportés par les
observateurs internationaux ont confirmé que la capacité de la Guinée-Bissau de
gérer le processus électoral continue de s’améliorer, avec les indicateurs importants suivants :
• les documents et matériels étaient disponibles dans tous les bureaux de vote,
• les zones de vote étaient sécurisées dans tous les bureaux de vote,
• quatre-vingt-quatorze pour cent des bureaux de vote étaient préparés et
ouverts correctement,
• tous les bureaux de vote avaient demandé une pièce d’identité aux électeurs
et l’ont vérifiée par rapport aux listes,
• des agents de la sécurité étaient postés dans quatre-vingt-neuf pour cent des
bureaux de vote le jour du scrutin,
• trente-neuf pour cent des agents du personnel électoral étaient des femmes,
• un seul incident de grave irrégularité était signalé,
• quatre-vingt pour cent des urnes étaient scellées correctement, et
• quatre-dix-neuf pour cent des électeurs sondés étaient satisfaits du processus.
Du point de vue de la démocratisation, les signes les plus encourageants étaient
le haut degré de compétence et d’impartialité démontré par la Commission électorale nationale et le haut niveau de satisfaction du processus électoral exprimé
par les électeurs. On peut seulement espérer que le récent coup d’état ne représente pas un recul permanent et que le successeur du président du Conseil
Électoral Permanent sera aussi performant que celui qui a géré les élections de
2008 et 2009.
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Leçons retenues
Trois leçons tirées de ce cas méritent d’être mentionnées.
Appliquer les principes de gestion de projet : Les observateurs internationaux
des élections peuvent faire face à des menaces d’intimidation, des fraudes électorales flagrantes ou à une intervention militaire. Ils peuvent aussi rencontrer des
obstacles moins dramatiques, mais tout de même irritants comme le manque de
coordination, le manque de matériel traduit ou de l’équipement défectueux. Si
l’on peut éviter les problèmes administratifs de tous les jours, on a la capacité de
mieux se concentrer sur les problèmes importants.
Du point de vue de la planification, la surveillance des élections devrait être
assez simple et bénéficier de l’application des principes de bonne gestion de
projet. Les activités sont bien établies et la date des élections est fixée longtemps
à l’avance. Avec suffisamment de temps, les étapes critiques peuvent être déterminées, des responsabilités claires attribuées et un plan de travail détaillé
élaboré. Malheureusement, les arrangements de dernière minute sont trop souvent la norme. Les rapports des deux équipes du projet recommandent un large
éventail de propositions d’ordre pratique, notamment l’arrivée plus tôt des
coordonnateurs, l’utilisation d’observateurs à long terme et de la société civile,
la préparation préalable des documents ainsi qu’une coordination plus efficace
des missions internationales participantes. Ces recommandations, l’on espère,
seront intégrées dans les futurs efforts de surveillance des élections en GuinéeBissau.
Les élections ne sont pas des affaires courantes : Avant des élections, les
coordinateurs se voient confrontés à bien des tâches et à des problèmes qui nécessiteront une action immédiate. Le jour du scrutin, les observateurs internationaux doivent être en place à l’échelle du pays avec un équipement de communication qui fonctionne, des protocoles de sécurité fiables et avec les documents
appropriés. Des urgences, souvent dans des régions éloignées, peuvent survenir
à tout moment. Pour ceux qui ont des responsabilités de coordination, la capacité d’intervenir rapidement est essentielle.
Dans le cas de la Guinée-Bissau, les longues procédures administratives du
PNUD se sont révélées inadaptées à ce genre de milieu de travail. La surveillance
électorale ne peut pas être traitée comme les autres projets d’aide technique, où
les retards administratifs compromettent les dates d’échéance du projet. Étant
donné que les dates des élections ne changent pas, les retards administratifs
importants sous-entendent qu’une partie indispensable de l’équipement ne sera
pas obtenue ou qu’une tâche critique ne sera pas terminée. En Guinée-Bissau,
les coordonnateurs étaient le plus souvent en mesure de trouver des alterna-
143
tives, par exemple, en achetant des articles avec leur argent personnel. En règle
générale, la surveillance des élections serait renforcée si le PNUD et les autres
organismes qui apportent un soutien administratif instituaient une forme de
procédures administratives accélérées.
C’est payant de parler : L’une des tâches principales dans la coordination des
observateurs internationaux est d’assurer une approche suivie et cohérente,
et d’éviter le chevauchement entre les missions participantes. Étant donné les
calendriers de courte durée et les possibilités limitées d’interaction, ceci peut
être très difficile à réaliser. En Guinée-Bissau, par exemple, au moins onze organismes ayant des attentes très différentes, ou un désir plus ou moins grand
d’être conseillés, ont participé. À plus d’une occasion, les experts canadiens ont
trouvé que le fait de rencontrer un chargé de mission principal après le travail
pour une bière ou de faire appel à un ancien contact – par exemple, Claude
Parent connaissait le chef de la mission de l’UE dans le cadre de leur travail sur
les élections à Haïti – permet de réduire la paperasserie, d’économiser du temps
précieux et de générer de la bonne volonté.
Potentiel de transfert des connaissances
La surveillance électorale est une forme courante d’aide au développement.
Aujourd’hui, l’ONU appuie entre quarante et cinquante projets électoraux par
an7. Les donateurs individuels et les ONG, souvent sous l’égide d’un organisme
international comme l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe
(OSCE), travaillent généralement avec la commission électorale du pays hôte
pour apporter leur aide à la surveillance. En 2010-2011, le Canada a déployé
quatre cent vingt-trois observateurs dans cinquante-deux pays8.
Les nombreuses initiatives de surveillance électorale entreprises chaque année
ne cessent d’ajouter au vaste ensemble de connaissances sur la meilleure façon
d’appuyer ce processus. Les efforts visant à intégrer les leçons tirées du passé
ont produit un certain nombre d’outils génériques tels que le Manuel de l’Union
européenne pour les observateurs des élections européennes et le Guide de
l’OSCE pour les observateurs à long terme des élections.
Même si ces deux projets de DDD peuvent contribuer à cet effort plus général,
leur principale valeur dans le cadre du transfert des connaissances réside dans
le fait d’assurer que les enseignements tirés des élections de 2008 et 2009 en
Guinée-Bissau contribuent aux efforts d’observation des futures élections du
pays. Les recommandations proposées dans les rapports des projets de DDD et
brièvement résumées dans la présente étude de cas fournissent un bon point de
départ. Malheureusement, compte tenu des événements récents et de la dégra-
144
dation de la qualité de la gouvernance de la Guinée-Bissau, il faudra peut-être
attendre quelque temps pour passer aux prochaines étapes vers l’avant.
Post-scriptum
Le mélange détonant du régime militaire, le trafic de drogues et la corruption
du gouvernement continuent d’affliger la Guinée-Bissau. Après la mort du Président Sanhá en janvier 2012, Raimundo Pereira a prêté serment en tant que président par intérim dans l’attente de nouvelles élections. Le 13 avril 2012, l’armée
a arrêté le président par intérim Pereira et le premier ministre Gomes, qui, avec
quarante-neuf pour cent des voix au premier tour du scrutin présidentiel, était
largement favorisé pour remporter le second tour prévu le 29 avril. En mai 2012,
la CEDEAO a obtenu un accord de tous les partis, à l’exception préoccupante du
parti du président présomptif, finissant de troisième place, Manuel Nhamadjo,
qui agirait en tant que président par intérim pendant un an.
Depuis lors, la sécurité et les conditions économiques en Guinée-Bissau ont continué à se détériorer. Une tentative de coup d’état en octobre 2012 a provoqué
des représailles du gouvernement, y compris des violations massives des droits
de la personne et des exécutions extrajudiciaires. Les dirigeants de l’ONU, de
plus en plus préoccupés par la relation étroite entre le gouvernement et le cartel
de la drogue, ont déclaré que : « le coup d’état avait été perpétré par des personnes totalement impliquées dans les affaires de drogue ».9
Les perspectives de tenir les élections promises en mai 2013 paraissent sombres,
le président par intérim les jugeant « impossibles pour des raisons techniques ».10
Malheureusement, en octobre 2012, le Président de la Commission électorale,
M. Desejado Lima Da Costa, est mort à Lisbonne. Le sort de la commission électorale actuelle reste incertain. Le temps le dira, mais le progrès significatif de la
Guinée-Bissau sur le chemin de la démocratie, acquis contre vents et marées, est
définitivement en danger.
Notes
1
Les élections présidentielles de 2009 ont requis deux tours car le Président doit obtenir
50% des votes.
2
Freedom House classe annuellement 184 pays comment libres (1-2,5) ; partiellement
libres (3-5) ; ou pas libres (5,5-7) en utilisant une méthodologie qui mesure le degré
de libertés civiles et de droits politiques. La Guinée-Bissau a été classée comme
partiellement libre avec un score de 4 depuis 2007.
145
3
La CEDEAO a négocié un changement de pouvoir à un gouvernement provisoire,
en attendant de nouvelles élections dans un an et fournira une force de maintien
de la paix. Toutefois, le parti du présumé vainqueur du second tour des élections
controversées de 2012 a boycotté le gouvernement intérimaire, qui compte plusieurs
membres impliqués dans le coup.
4
En 2013, la Guinée-Bissau s’est classée 92e de 179 pays contre 75e en 2011-2012 et 67e
en 2010. À la suite du coup d’état, Reporters sans frontières ont rapporté que « un
black-out des actualités, au cours duquel toutes les stations de radio et télévision
ont été fermées, a été suivi par le contrôle militaire du contenu médiatique. On peut
espérer que le retour à la normalité politique et institutionnelle promise par la junte
au pouvoir se traduira par une restauration complète de l’activité des médias ». Le
nouveau gouvernement intérimaire a menacé « d’utiliser ses pouvoirs juridiques
pour annuler les licences pour de bon » si les médias « n’alignent pas leurs politiques
éditoriales avec les principaux intérêts de la Guinée-Bissau ».
5
Le journal The Guardian a publié un article décrivant les origines du commerce de
la drogue en Guinée-Bissau en 2008. Voir http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/
mar/09/drugstrade. Der Spiegel a cité un représentant officiel de l’Office des Nations
Unies contre la drogue et le crime qui a décrit la Guinée-Bissau comme l’un des vrais
états narco dans le monde. Il a souligné que dans d’autres « états narco », comme la
Colombie ou l’Afghanistan, les problèmes sont confinés à des régions particulières.
Extrait de l’article de Der Spiegel, Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a Drug
Traffickers’ Dream ; 4 mars 2013.
6
La Constitution de la Guinée-Bissau exige que des élections se tiennent dans les 90
jours suivant la mort d’un président en exercice.
7
Le PNUD fournit la majorité de cet appui. Voir http://www.un.org/wcm/content/
site/undpa/main/issues/elections/actors
8
Voir http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb%5Ccpo.nsf/projFr/A034062001
9
Voir l’article du NY Times Global Edition, « Leader Ousted, Nation is Now a Drug
Haven », 1er novembre 2012.
10 Cité dans le Rapport du Conseil de la sécurité en février 2013. Voir http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/index.php
146
Chapter 11
Supporting Development Finance
Institutions in Southern Africa
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Frank Schwartz.
Abstract: Increasingly, regional solutions are being advanced to spur economic growth
among developing nations. The Southern African Development Community (SADC),
comprising fifteen member states, supports a regional network of 27 development finance institutions. The project described in this case study outlines the technical assistance provided to SADC’s permanent secretariat, the Development Finance Resource
Centre (DFRC), through the CIDA-funded Deployment for Democratic Development initiative. The project’s core outputs included 5-year strategic and 2-year business plans and
a results-based management framework for SADC/DFRC. What is noteworthy about
this project is the intensity of effort applied during the inception stage to consult with
members (involving some heroic travel logistics) and redefine the original problem statement, which miscast relationship issues between DFRC and its board as flawed governance arrangements. This refocusing of the project paved the way for the successful effort
by Stuart Kufeni, DFRC’s CEO, and Frank Schwartz, the Canadian consultant, to develop
and obtain buy-in for the strategic plan.
Sommaire : On a recours de plus en plus souvent à des solutions sur le plan régional pour
stimuler la croissance économique au sein des pays en développement. La Communauté de développement de l’Afrique australe (SADC), qui compte quinze états membres,
soutient un réseau régional de 27 institutions financières de développement. Le projet
présenté dans cette étude de cas décrit l’assistance technique fournie au Centre de ressources pour le financement du développement (CRFD), par l’entremise de l’initiative de
Déploiements pour le Développement Démocratique (DDD) qui est financée par l’ACDI.
Les principaux extrants de ce projet comprenaient un plan stratégique quinquennal et
un plan d’activités biennal, ainsi qu’un cadre de gestion axé sur les résultats pour la
SADC et le CRFD. Ce qu’il faut retenir de ce projet, c’est l’intensité des efforts fournis
au début du projet pour consulter les membres – mentionnons la fantastique logistique
des déplacements – et redéfinir l’énoncé du problème initial qui avait (mal) interprété les
problèmes relationnels entre le CRFD et les cadres supérieurs de la SADC comme des
accords de gouvernance mal conçus. Cette opération de recentrage du projet a permis
à Stuart Kufeni, chef de la direction du CRFD, et à Frank Schwartz, expert canadien, de
réussir à mettre au point un plan stratégique pour lequel ils ont obtenu l’adhésion de
l’ensemble des parties.
Supporting Development Finance Institutions in Southern Africa
147
Introduction
Development finance institutions (DFIs) perform a vital role in advancing economic and social development across southern Africa. Established by governments to address chronic gaps in commercial financing, DFIs provide urgently
needed capital for projects in strategic areas such as infrastructure and small
and medium enterprise. The Development Finance Resource Centre (DFRC), an
agency of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is the permanent secretariat for a network of 27 DFIs which operate in SADC’s 15 member
states. DFRC is governed by a Board of Trustees elected by member DFIs and is
headquartered in Botswana. DFRC’s core administration is funded from dues
paid by its member DFIs and programming is generally covered by donors, although training program fees do materially defer the cost of some courses.
SADC MEMBER STATES
Angola
Malawi
South Africa
Botswana
Mauritius
Swaziland
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Mozambique
Tanzania
Lesotho
Namibia
Zambia
Madagascar
Seychelles
Zimbabwe
SADC traces its origins to the Frontline States group, established in 1970 to combat apartheid and promote national liberation across southern Africa. In the
1980s, Frontline States was succeeded by the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) with an expanded mandate pursuing liberation from South Africa’s economic dominance. SADCC was transformed into
SADC by treaty in 1992. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, SADC has increasingly focused on the economic integration and socio-economic development of
Southern Africa.
In 2007, an evaluation prepared by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) recommended that SADC develop a more strategic management
approach and resolve governance and organizational problems. CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD) initiative, which specializes in quickresponse, short-term projects, was selected to provide the necessary technical
assistance. The project’s inception mission was undertaken in mid 2008.
148
Governance Profile
Southern Africa’s economic potential is enormous, anchored by South Africa’s
large, growing economy. However, the region also includes nations devastated
by civil strife, authoritarian rule and extreme poverty. The well-established link
between sound democratic governance and quality of life is underscored in the
table below, which links each country’s rank on the United Nations 2012 Human
Development Index (HDI) to three other governance indicators. Not surprisingly, four of the top five ranked SADC countries in terms of HDI are categorized as
free by Freedom House (FH). Those same five top SADC countries are also highest ranked for the World Bank’s rule of law indicator and among the six least corrupt SADC countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index. At the other extreme, two of the bottom three countries in terms of HDI
scores, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are categorized as
not free by Freedom House and rank among the worst in the world on the World
Bank and Transparency International measures.
SADC
HDI Rank
(out of
187)
Freedom
House
Score/Rating
World Bank Rule
of Law
(avg. percentile)
Transparency Int.
CPI Rank
(out of 176)
Member States
Seychelles
46
3.0 (partly free)
55th
51
Mauritius
80
1.5 (free)
75th
43
Botswana
119
2.5 (free)
70th
30
South Africa
121
2.0 (free)
59th
69
Namibia
128
2.0 (free)
61st
58
Swaziland
141
6.0 (not free)
42nd
88
Angola
148
5.5 (not free)
10th
157
Madagascar
151
5.0 (partly free)
24th
118
Tanzania
152
3.0 (partly free)
34th
102
Lesotho
158
3.0 (partly free)
47th
64
Zambia
163
3.5 (partly free)
39th
88 (tie)
Malawi
170
3.5 (partly free)
50th
88 (tie)
Zimbabwe
172
6.0 (not free)
1st
163
Mozambique
185
3.5 (partly free)
34th
123
Dem. Rep. of Congo
186
6.0 (not free)
2nd
160
149
So what does this have to do with SADC? If the EU can serve as a guide, SADC’s
efforts to promote economic integration across the region will, over time, exert pressure on member countries to strengthen the rule of law, improve the
quality and transparency of regulation, reduce corruption, and open up internal markets. Obviously, improving democratic governance falls outside SADC’s
mandate or influence, and an EU-like arrangement will not be considered for
the foreseeable future, but there are strong arguments that the types of policies being pursued by SADC will provide a sustained, positive influence in this
direction.
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Supporting the SADC Development Finance Resource Centre
Client: Stuart Kufeni, CEO, SADC: DFRC
Consultant: Frank Schwartz, Belleclaire Consulting
Duration: July 2008 to April 2009
Budget: $125,000
Key Outputs:
1. five-year strategic plan and related two-year business plan
2. results management framework and plan
3. policy and plan for improving corporate governance
The initiating project document identified three main activities: preparing a
new five-year strategic plan; providing training on results-based management
(RBM); and developing a new corporate governance arrangement. However,
during the initial work planning mission, it was discovered that what were perceived as governance problems stemmed from confusion surrounding the respective roles and responsibilities of the secretariat (DFRC) and SADC. In part,
confusion surrounding the precise meaning and operational implications of the
principle of subsidiarity contributed to the relationship problem.1 Fortunately,
Mr. Stuart Kufeni, appointed as DFRC’s CEO in November 2007, had already begun to address this contentious issue by the time the project began in mid 2008.2
This allowed the project to refocus on building institutional capacity to deliver
DFRC’s agreed roles and responsibilities rather than reforming the underlying
governance arrangements.
150
DFRC Roles/Responsibilities as per SADC’s Finance Investment Protocol
1. effect capacity building and training of managers and staff of DFIs
2. support the strengthening of all DFIs in the sectors of their responsibilities
3. offer a policy and research capacity for the region
4. facilitate the mobilization and sharing of information through a central hub for ICT
5. engage in confidence-building measures within the region for purposes of supporting
investments
6. offer advisory services to the governments of the state parties and the DFIs in respect of
development resources and financial services
7. identify and promote opportunities for co-operation and coordination in development finance
in the region
To obtain first-hand observations on DFRC’s role and effectiveness, the project’s Canadian adviser, Frank Schwartz of Belleclaire Consulting, undertook a
whirlwind consultation blitz, meeting with representatives from 21 DFIs and
other key stakeholders in nine countries during the initial two visits. These visits
confirmed initial perceptions concerning the lack of fundamental governance
problems, reinforced that emphasis should be placed on improving working relationships, and provided a wide range of ideas on strengthening DFRC.
The subsequent situation analysis report identified five major challenges that
DFRC needed to address:
1. adequately and sustainably funding the DFRC core;
2. mobilizing sufficient and increasing resources for programming;
3. enabling DFIs to play important catalytic roles in the development process of
their countries and the region as a whole;
4. demonstrating value for money to members and results to all; and
5. improving relationships with key stakeholders.
This document served as the basis for development of SADC’s 2009–14 strategic
plan.
151
The project comprised four missions built around the preparation of a series of
products. The first two missions, described below, produced the project work
plan and an environmental scan. The final two missions completed the five-year
strategic plan, the related two-year business plan, and a results-based management framework.
Mission
Date
Mission Activities
July 2008
inception mission; develop project work plan
Sept. 2008
conduct intensive consultations; complete environmental scan
Nov. 2008
draft five-year strategic plan; two-year business plan; DFRC work structure
Mar. 2009
prepare results-based management framework; finalize plans
The strategic plan itself was far less detailed than its predecessor (2004–09),
which had been criticized as being both unrealistic and non-strategic. To kick
off the planning process, a two-day workshop was held, facilitated by the consultant with active participation from five DFRC board members and five DFRC
staff. Given earlier observations on a schism between DFRC and the board, this
joint approach represented a major step forward.
The workshop evaluation ratings, set out in the figure below, confirmed that the
exercise had been perceived by participants from both sides as useful and collaborative.
152
Source: Workshop evaluations completed by participants.
The Canadian adviser, CEO and DFRC staff then worked intensively over the
next two weeks to finalize the strategic plan and a related two-year business
plan. The conceptual framework for the strategic plan is set out below.
Vision
To be a centre of excellence that efficiently and proactively facilitates development finance
solutions for the SADC region.
Strategic Directions and Objectives
Pursue excellence in our
services
Build strong stakeholder
relationships
• high quality outputs
• meeting the needs of
stakeholders and benefiting
from them
• member satisfaction
• acceptance of DFRC as an
important player in the
region’s development finance
community
Strive for sustainability
• maintain/increase
membership
• consistently generate
sufficient funding to function
effectively
The plan was then circulated to members for comments, with final revisions
being completed during the fourth mission. In parallel, the final product, a Managing for Results and Accountability Framework to be utilized within DFRC
as a means to identify, monitor, report on and assess achieved versus expected
results, was prepared.
153
The time frames for developing and consulting on the strategic and business
plans were relatively short for such an exercise, but were made feasible by the
extensive stakeholder visits during the inception phase, the agreement obtained
on the situation analysis, and the emphasis placed on improving working relationships by DFRC’s new CEO since assuming the position in 2007.
Although a plan for improving corporate governance was identified in the original work plan as a separate output, it was covered off in the strategic plan itself;
section 2.3 of the plan outlines how DFRC will support SADC’s four priorities:
trade development, infrastructure, food security, and HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the
plan emphasizes the importance of improving working relationships with key
stakeholders, in particular the SADC Secretariat. As mentioned above, the governance issue was miscast from the beginning, so the related resources were
reassigned to assisting preparation of the strategic and business plans.
Lessons Learned
The lessons learned present a mix of project-related and general observations on
donor-client relationships.
Go the distance, literally: Given the time limitations and budget constraints of
DDD projects, it would have been tempting to forego the in-person, logistically
complex, multi-country consultations which took place within a very short time
period. Although consultation-by-telephone would certainly have been simpler
and cheaper, it would equally have been a major mistake. By meeting the CEOs
from SADC’s DFI network in person, the consultant was able to deal with the
sensitive issue of DFRC’s relationship with its members in more depth than
would have been possible over the phone. Moreover, these meetings provided
valuable input for the DFRC’s new policy directions and generated advance
buy-in for those policies.
Provide a challenge function: DDD projects only succeed if they get it right
from the beginning. There is neither sufficient time nor resources to rethink or
recast the project midway through. Fundamental to this project’s success was
shifting its focus away from governance problems to the more pertinent issue of
relationship management. If the consultant had not challenged this assumption
early in the process, scarce resources would have been squandered on resolving
a problem that was no longer pertinent.
Projects require succession planning: DDD’s capacity to mobilize quickresponse, low-cost, demand-driven interventions presents an advantage
that conventional external assistance programs cannot match. Although the
program’s focus on concrete policy products ensures that something tangible
154
will be left behind, DDD’s short project durations do increase the risk that
problems may arise during implementation. To a degree, this risk can be
mitigated by committed senior management, and this project certainly enjoyed
that advantage. For many projects, however, sustainability would be further
assured if a successor project was identified from the outset and ready to take
over immediately following completion of the DDD project.
Be practical in defining results: Although this project did deliver its planned
outputs and achieved concrete results, there is risk associated with specifying
and then monitoring a full RBM framework. The scale of the ensuing data collection efforts can impose an enormous, labour-intensive effort on the organization.
Moreover, these costs multiply if each donor insists on its own RBM variant. The
best advice for a small organization is to measure outputs and near-term outcomes in such a manner that there is a clear indication of tangible effects. This is
what is needed for management and operational purposes, leaving the detailed
and costly measurement of longer-term outcomes and impacts to evaluators and
academics.
Although there are equivalent organizations to SADC elsewhere in Africa and
around the world, the knowledge transfer potential is not comparable to that for
projects which work directly with national governments. Arguably, however,
the lessons learned from working with regional organizations such as SADC
may be more important given the relative lack of analytic attention paid to such
bodies and the continuing trend towards trade liberalization and regional solutions to development challenges.
Postscript
Clearly, the project produced tangible, relevant products that were accepted by
a motivated client. Unlike so many projects, where the precise contribution is
difficult to gauge, this project’s primary output, SADC’s 2009–14 Strategic Plan,
can be found on the SADC-DFRC website.3 Step one on the road towards sustainability has certainly been accomplished.
However, approval of a strategic plan in no way guarantees implementation.
Over the years, the development landscape has become littered with attractively packaged, but wholly unimplemented strategic plans. Given that DDD’s
support did not extend to the implementation period and no other project has
stepped in to continue this technical assistance, at least one critical success factor for sustainability is missing; i.e., that support does not end with the product.
155
Nonetheless, there were a number of positive signs. First, the need for the plan
was not foisted on the client; SADC had an existing strategic plan (2004–09) and
the time had come to produce a new one. Second, DFRC’s recently appointed
CEO was personally committed to strengthening and refocusing his organization; the strategic plan offered an ideal vehicle. Third, the plan, although selfdescribed as ambitious, was based on an indicative five-year budget; too often
the linkage between intentions and resources only surfaces as an afterthought.
Fourth, an accompanying two-year business plan was produced to ensure that
the specific actions needed to operationalize the plan were identified and monitorable. And last, but likely not least, Stuart Kufeni (SADC DFRC CEO) still
keeps in touch and exchanges ideas with Frank Schwartz.
In fact, in January 2013, CEO Stuart Kufeni was interviewed to obtain his views
on the project’s medium-term impact. The strategic planning process developed
through the project remains very much alive. The strategic plan is continually
referenced within the organization, particularly during the annual budget process, and communicated externally. The supporting two-year business plan has
been updated annually since 2010. The monitoring and evaluation framework,
designed but not implemented during the project, is now used regularly to
gauge progress towards achieving the plan’s objectives and identify and resolve
problems as they arise.
Reflecting on the project, Mr. Kufeni cited several areas in which the 2009–14
plan represented a significant improvement over its predecessor: a much more
focused document; greater emphasis on stakeholder involvement at all stages; a
clear, replicable methodology; and strong linkages to financial and operational
planning. DFRC itself continues to meet the objectives established in the plan.
For instance, the number of capacity-building programs delivered by DFRC increased from eight in 2009–10 to eighteen in 2011–12.4 Moreover, the number of
participants has more than doubled during this same period.
Early next year, DFRC will begin preparations for a new, multi-year strategic
plan. Mr. Kufeni feels confident that the approach used to develop the 2009–14
plan will be reprised. Evidently, the guarded optimism expressed following
project completion concerning its potential sustainability was not misplaced.
156
Endnotes
1
The DFRC was established by treaty on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. This
term is more commonly used to define governance arrangements between different
levels of government, inferring that functions should only be delivered at a higher
level where they cannot be delivered more effectively at the local level. For example,
the European Charter of Local Self-Government cites the principle of subsidiarity as
a core governance principle.
2
At this time, a new SADC Finance Investment Protocol, which clearly set out DFRC’s
roles/responsibilities, was undergoing ratification. To be ratified, the protocol had to
be signed off by at least two-thirds of member states. SADC declared the protocol to
be ratified in April 2010.
3
See http://www.sadc-dfrc.org/assets/files/publications/strategic_plan2009-2014.pdf.
4
SADC DFRC Annual Report 2012.
157
Chapter 12
Using Bioscience to Combat Food
Insecurity in Africa
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Frank Schwartz.
Abstract: If Africa is to overcome food insecurity, a major contribution must be made by
Africa’s science and research community. Unfortunately, Africa hosts few world-class
scientific research institutions. One instrument for addressing this situation is the African
Bioscience Initiative (ABI), which operates four regional networks and the African BioSafety Network of Expertise. This case study describes a CIDA-funded project to assist
ABI with the development of a new strategic plan. The project unfolded in three stages
during 2011-12: the first stage, culminating with the completion of ABI’s draft strategic
plan, was characterized by a robust, motivated collaboration between client, consultant
and stakeholders. The second stage saw progress frustratingly grind to a halt when the
project’s local partner was relieved of his ABI coordination duties. The third stage began
unexpectedly when ABI’s strategic plan was suddenly seized upon as a potential model
for developing a broader, Africa-wide policy on science, technology and innovation. Fortuitously, the project’s new champion was well aware of ABI’s strategic plan, having originated the 2010 request to CIDA for technical assistance to ABI. With renewed purpose,
this nearly moribund project suddenly assumed an influence well beyond its original
scope. Sometimes a little luck helps. The project’s dramatic ups and downs provide lessons learned that underscore the importance of engaging stakeholders, actively managing risk and persisting when setbacks occur. Beyond the roller-coaster ride of changing
clients and shifting momentum, this case study highlights the importance of boosting the
quality of African bioscience research. Scientific breakthroughs by organizations supported through ABI will better equip Africa to meet its formidable food insecurity and
economic development challenges.
Sommaire : Pour que l’Afrique parvienne à surmonter son insécurité alimentaire, il est
nécessaire que la communauté africaine de la science et la recherche apporte une contribution majeure. Malheureusement, l’Afrique accueille peu d’établissements de recherche scientifique de classe mondiale. Un instrument pour remédier à cette situation est
l’Initiative Africaine des Biosciences (IAB), laquelle exploite quatre réseaux régionaux et
le Réseau africain d’Expertise en Biosécurité (ABNE). Cette étude de cas décrit un projet
financé par l’ACDI visant à aider l’IAB à élaborer un nouveau plan stratégique. Le projet
s’est déroulé en trois phases au cours de 2011-2012 : la première phase, aboutissant à
l’achèvement du projet de plan stratégique de l’IAB, s’est caractérisée par une collabora-
Using Bioscience to Combat Food Insecurity in Africa
159
tion solide et motivée entre le client, le consultant et les intervenants. La deuxième phase
a connu un arrêt frustrant de son avancement lorsque le partenaire local du projet a été
relevé de ses fonctions de coordination de l’IAB. La troisième phase a commencé de façon
inattendue lorsque le plan stratégique de l’IAB a subitement été pris comme modèle potentiel pour développer une politique plus générale à l’échelle de l’Afrique sur la science,
la technologie et l’innovation. Par hasard, le nouveau champion du projet était bien au
courant du plan stratégique de l’IAB pour avoir soumis lui-même à l’ACDI en 2010 la
demande originale d’aide technique pour l’IAB. Avec un but renouvelé, ce projet presque
mort a eu une influence qui s’est étendue bien au-delà de sa portée initiale. Un peu de
chance aide parfois. Les hauts et les bas malheureux du projet fournissent des enseignements qui soulignent l’importance d’impliquer les intervenants, de gérer activement les
risques et de persévérer lorsque des contretemps surviennent. À part les changements en
dents de scie de clients et de l’impulsion, cette étude de cas met en évidence l’importance
de renforcer la qualité de la recherche en sciences biologiques en Afrique. Les percées
scientifiques d’organismes soutenus par l’IAB prépareront mieux l’Afrique à relever les
défis formidables auxquels elle doit faire face pour combattre l’insécurité alimentaire et
accroître le développement économique du pays.
Introduction
Two persistent development gaps facing Africa intersect in this case study: underinvestment in science and research, and food insecurity.
Science, research and innovation are widely acknowledged as tools that can
spur development and improve quality of life. Not surprisingly, the continent
facing the greatest development challenges is the least equipped to produce and
utilize scientific research. The UNESCO Science Report 2010 indicates that Africa
significantly lags the rest of the world in areas such as scientific researchers, patents, publications and investment, although advances are beginning to be made,
particularly by South Africa.
Food insecurity represents another gap which will only increase as the effects of
global warming and related water supply problems intensify. Seventeen of the
world’s twenty-four countries suffering malnourishment rates of more than 30
percent are African.1 If Africa is to overcome food insecurity, a critical contribution must be made by African scientists and researchers with support from the
international development community.2
A certain player in these efforts will be the African Biosciences Initiative (ABI),
established in 2005 to become one of Africa’s pre-eminent scientific research
institutions.3 This case study describes a twenty-month project funded by the
160
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to assist ABI identify research priorities, position itself for the next five years and deal with challenging
new governance arrangements. Before beginning, however, it is necessary to unpack the organizational labyrinth within which ABI operates.
At the top, the 54-member African Union (AU), like its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), provides a forum for coordinating a broad range
of continental political, military, economic, social and cultural initiatives.4 The
AU is governed by the AU Assembly, which includes the heads of state from all
member countries and is supported by its secretariat, the AU Commission. The
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), established in 2001 as an
innovative attempt to jumpstart Africa’s development, reports to the AU Assembly through the 20-member Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC).5 In addition, NEPAD is overseen and advised by the NEPAD
Steering Committee comprising personal representatives of each HSGOC member. Operationally, NEPAD is supported by the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), which is supervised by the AU Commission Chair. ABI
operates under the NPCA, bringing together three of twelve NEPAD flagship
science and technology programs, including biodiversity, biotechnology, and indigenous knowledge systems. ABI is delivered through four regional networks
and the African Bio-Safety Network of Expertise. Confused? The diagram below
attempts to depict this extremely complex set of governance arrangements.
Supranational organizations, like the AU, European Community and United Nations, often possess an unwieldy set of governance and decision-making structures. Basic organizational functions, such as priority-setting, policy-making,
budget formulation and performance management, can become enormously
complicated owing to the number of actors, need for consensus and uncertain
accountability. In such cases, the importance of having a clear, well-conceived,
affordable, operationally-relevant strategic plan becomes paramount.
ABI has enjoyed a strong Canadian connection from its inception in 2005. CIDA
supported the construction and operationalization of a state-of-the art research
lab in Eastern and Central Africa (BecA Net) focusing on animal biotechnology, as well as the establishment of other regional networks in North Africa
(NAB Net) for bio-pharmaceuticals, Southern Africa (SAN Bio) for health biotechnology, and West Africa (WAB Net) for crop biotechnology.
161
Given their longstanding relationship, it was natural that ABI turned to CIDA in
2010 to develop a new strategic framework and assess the implications of recent
changes in ABI’s governance.6 Not surprisingly, CIDA agreed, since ABI’s work
directly supports one of CIDA’s three priority themes, combating food insecurity.7
To provide the necessary support, CIDA utilized Deployment for Democratic
Development (DDD), a responsive program designed to mobilize high-calibre
technical assistance for limited periods of time to deliver concrete policy or program objectives. Frank Schwartz, who had earlier worked on a similar DDD
project for the Southern African Development Community, was retained. The
project was launched in February 2011.
162
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Supporting the Development of a Strategic Framework and Operational Plan for the
NEPAD African Biosciences Initiative (ABI)
Client: Office of Science and Technology (ABI)
Consultant: Frank Schwartz
Duration: February 2011 to September 2012
Budget: $198,000
Key Outputs:
1. approved business plan
2. approved results management framework and implementation plan
3. approved business and annual work plan template
Governance Profile
Since NEPAD, as a program of the AU, serves fifty-four member states, it is
impractical to present a national or even regional democratic governance profile. However, it is feasible to summarize the progress towards democratization
across Africa and explore the relationship between the level of democratization
and prevalence of food insecurity.
For Africa, democratization has largely stalled over the last decade. The table below presents the distribution of African countries classified as free, partly free or
not free by Freedom House (FH) for 2002, 2007 and 2012.8 Alarmingly, the trend
towards greater democratization may, in fact, be reversing. During the last five
years, the number of countries classified as free by Freedom House has declined
while the number of not free countries has risen.
Year
Free Countries
Partly Free Countries
Not Free Countries
#
%
#
%
#
%
2002
9
17
25
47
19
36
2007
11
20
23
43
20
37
2012
9
16
23
42
23
42
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With respect to food insecurity, the table below displays the top and bottom
seven countries on the 2012 FH index beside the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) measure indicating the percentage of population
suffering from undernourishment.9 Not surprisingly, with the exception of Namibia, countries with higher levels of democratization experience lower levels
of malnourishment.
Most Free Countries
FH
Score
FAO
%
Least Free Countries
FH
Score
FAO
%
Cape Verde
1.0
9
Democratic Rep. of Congo
6.0
37
Ghana
1.5
<5
Ethiopia
6.0
40
Mauritius
1.5
6
Togo
6.0
17
Benin
2.0
8
Zimbabwe
6.0
33
Namibia
2.0
33
Chad
6.5
33
Sao Tome & Principe
2.0
8
Eritrea
7.0
65
South Africa
2.0
<5
Sudan
7.0
39
Other measures confirm the connection between levels of democratization and
food insecurity. Of the twelve countries with undernourishment rates of less
than 10 percent, seven are ranked as free. Only two of nine countries ranked as
free have undernourishment rates exceeding 20 percent compared to twentyfour of forty countries ranked as partly free or not free.
Although democratization is not an essential condition for successfully addressing food insecurity problems, democratic countries appear to achieve better results over the longer term. Ghana, for instance, with one of the longest-standing
democratic traditions in Africa, has lowered its undernourishment rate from 41
percent in 1990–92 to less than 5 percent today.
164
On the other hand, one of the most successful initiatives in reducing food insecurity occurred under the otherwise repressive regime of Malawi’s President
Mutharika. In 2005, against the advice of international development institutions,
he instituted repayable subsidies to small family farms for fertilizer and seeds. In
consequence, crop yields doubled in a single year. Malawi’s approach has since
been copied by other countries and the hitherto reticent donor community.10
Ultimately, it is the policies and the carry-through to implementation that count.
However, although non-democratic countries are certainly capable of pursuing sound policies to address food insecurity, such approaches are more prevalent in the African democracies. This suggests that the food insecurity problem
would be positively affected if the trend towards democratization across Africa
resumed.
Similarly, democracy is not a prior condition of hosting an effective research
institution as evidenced in the table below.11 Of the eight African countries with
the highest quality scientific institutions, two are classified by Freedom House as
free, four as partly free and two as not free. However, it can be argued that scientific research is more likely to flourish in open, transparent governance systems.
In fact, the networking research model depends on openness and information
sharing, attributes typically associated with democratic societies.
165
Quality of Scientific Institutions
Country
FH
South Africa
Free
Kenya
Partly Free
Senegal
Partly Free
Burkina Faso
Partly Free
The Gambia
Not Free
Mali
Free
Rwanda
Not Free
Tanzania
Partly Free
ABI’s request to CIDA for technical assistance was timely: ABI’s current strategic plan (2005–10) was about to expire and its new governance arrangements,
i.e., reporting through NPCA, were just beginning to evolve. For the strategic
plan, the path was reasonably straightforward. In early 2011, the work planning
mission successfully identified a sequence of activities and outputs that would
produce a strategic plan and the necessary tools for monitoring and implementation.
However, the implications of the new governance arrangements were less clear.
Rather than undertake an intensive organizational or functional review, it was
decided to use the strategic planning process as the vehicle for developing and
recommending an appropriate organizational structure for ABI delivery within
NPCA.
Given the uncertainty, the transition to the new NPCA-ABI arrangements was
highlighted in the project work plan as a significant source of risk. In fact, four of
the five main identified risks related to the transition and its potential impact on
ABI’s effectiveness. Adding to the apprehension was the preference for greater
centralization and control over ABI expressed during the initial interviews with
NPCA senior management.
Risk
Level
continued support for ABI from NPCA senior management
medium
network and stakeholder buy-in to the new arrangements
medium
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NPCA will allocate sufficient core funding to ABI positions
medium
NPCA decision-making processes will work well and support ABI
development
medium to high
Typically, network organizations (ABI is structured with hubs and nodes) place
a premium on innovation and flexibility and do not thrive under rigid command
and control structures. Also potentially at risk, if the transition to NPCA authority went badly, were the donor funds upon which ABI heavily depended. At the
project’s outset, a rather prominent red flag had been raised.
The work plan anticipated a quick, focused project to produce a new 2012–17
strategic plan and the necessary tools to monitor implementation. The table below compares the planned versus actual timing of the project’s missions and activities. For seven months, work remained largely on schedule with high levels
of client engagement. Then things began to slip, badly. So what happened?
#
Planned
Mission Dates
Actual
Mission Dates
Mission Activities
1
March 2011
March 2011
develop work plan
2
May 2011
May 2011
environmental scan and institutional review
3
June 2011
Aug. 2011
develop five-year strategy
4
Sept. 2011
Sept. 2011
strategic plan, including HR, financing and governance
5
Oct. 2011
Aug. 2012
revised plan, results-based management framework
6
not included
Sept 2012
(in Boston) integrate ABI plan with NEPAD STI policy
The ABI project demonstrates how the impact of technical assistance projects
is highly client dependent. The 2010 request to CIDA for technical assistance
was submitted by Dr. Aggrey Ambali, then director of NEPAD’s Office of Science and Technology and ABI Coordination. By the time the project began in
early 2011, Dr. Ambali had been assigned a new role. Now, the key counterpart
was Dr. Luke Mumba from the successful SanBio network. Over the next seven
months, a robust, motivated working relationship between Dr. Mumba, his team
and Frank Schwartz evolved. As a result, a good quality strategic plan for ABI
167
was prepared on deadline and submitted to NPCA for approval in November
2011. Then, progress stopped.
In December 2011, disappointingly, Dr. Mumba was relieved of his ABI coordination duties. Over the next six months, interaction between the project and
NPCA was largely confined to picayune administrative issues. Although ABI’s
strategic plan was finally approved in May 2012, prospects for effective implementation appeared less than promising. Then, quite unexpectedly, a new, albeit
familiar, client emerged.
In summer 2012, a ministerial-level AU Committee had criticized the slow pace
of progress on science, technology and innovation (STI) issues. In June, NPCA
responded by appointing Dr. Ambali, the originator of the 2010 CIDA request, as
head of NPCA’s STI hub and tasked him with modernizing the 2005 Consolidated Plan of Action for African STI. To drive and lend credibility to the reform process, a prestigious, high-level, eight-member panel was established, co-chaired
by Dr. Calestous Juma of Harvard University and Professor Ismail Serageldin
of the Library of Alexandria. In the meantime, Dr. Ambali sought out the ABI
strategic plan and requested that work resume on finalizing the implementation
mechanisms. This led to Mr. Schwartz being invited to the September meeting
of the High-Level Panel’s Working Group at which the ABI’s strategic plan was
used as a model for the other STI policy fields. With Dr. Ambali now serving as
the de facto client, this nearly moribund project had suddenly assumed an influence well beyond its original scope.
ABI’s draft strategic plan charts a course to 2017 that elaborates its vision with
five strategic directions, each of which is further refined by objectives, targets
and major initiatives. In addition, an indicative budget is provided to ensure
that the plan can be feasibly delivered. The plan aims not only to strengthen the
quality, scope and impact of bioscience research, but to ensure that the organization itself is well supported, positioned and managed. Considerable attention is
paid to ensuring that the transition to NPCA supervision goes smoothly and that
the effectiveness of the networking model is retained. In fact, an organizational
model and staffing proposal for NPCA is included in the plan that shifts the organization from a program-based to a functional structure.
168
ABI’S 2012–17 Strategic Directions
1. focus on practical, development-oriented research
2. strengthen the networks and networking
3. boost African bioscience research capacity
4. demonstrate results and impacts
5. pursue sustainable program support
But back to food insecurity. Efforts to reduce food insecurity require a multisector approach involving agriculture, transportation, environment, education,
health and trade to name just a few. Nonetheless, the potential for interventions
with major impacts is particularly high in the bioscience research sector. A vaccine against a particular livestock disease may save a nation’s herds and stave
off economic disaster. ABI’s strategic plan outlines a number of practical measures that will strengthen African bioscience over the next five years, such as
conducting research to improve the varieties of staple crops and value-added
products, supporting one hundred and fifty MSc/PhD candidates to study bioscience, increasing female participation in bioscience, and promoting publicprivate partnerships. A core assumption of ABI is that boosting the quality of
African bioscience research provides the continent with greater means to meet
its formidable food insecurity and economic development challenges.
Sample ABI Research Initiatives
• development of stress-tolerant wheat varieties for northern Africa
• integrated biotechnical approaches for conservation and improvement of date palm in northern
Africa
• development of small-scale mushroom growing in Malawi
• small-scale aquaculture productivity increases through innovative pond management systems
• scientific assessment of traditional remedies (one being tested has the potential to combat the
HIV-1 sub-type C virus)
Lessons Learned
The key lessons learned relate to coping with the ebbs and flows of client enthusiasm during the project, which unfolded in three distinct stages. The first
stage, which culminated in the completion and submission for approval of ABI’s
strategic plan, involved an energized, highly collaborative partnership between
169
the client and the Canadian expert. The second stage comprised an excruciating period of bureaucratic foot-dragging and the shunting aside of the project’s
counterpart, Dr. Mumba. The third stage began, unexpectedly, when the project’s original champion, Dr. Ambali, found himself appointed to a position empowered to bypass the inertia and revive ABI’s strategic plan as a model for the
AU’s broader African policy framework for STI. To summate, all’s well that ends
well. From a lessons learned perspective, it is worthwhile to examine a few of
the circumstances and actions which contributed to this outcome.
Sometimes you get lucky: For technical assistance projects, few events are more
nerve-racking than losing one’s champion. Rapport, momentum and attention
may all suffer as the new counterpart reassesses priorities and ponders what
new paths to follow. A technical assistance initiative can suddenly find itself
consigned to project purgatory where deliverables are politely received, without comment, and immediately filed in the desk drawer of no return. But every
now and then, serendipity intervenes. In fact, the ABI project experienced this
fortuitous dynamic when the impasse that followed Dr. Mumba’s departure was
broken by the surprise reappearance of Dr. Ambali in a position of influence.
Good work often finds a way of resurfacing.
Make some friends: Sometimes luck can be encouraged. For technical assistance projects, solid rapport with one’s client is a perennial critical success factor.
External experts are also well advised to develop a broad range of acquaintances
outside of the assignment. Such friendships have their own value, but also provide avenues to obtain insight and publicize the project to a broader audience.
In rare cases, and this project is one of them, that acquaintance may later become
instrumental to the project’s ultimate success.
During each ABI project mission, Frank Schwartz found time to visit with Dr.
Ambali, keeping him apprised of the project’s progress and enjoying his perspective on Africa’s efforts to strengthen its bioscience capacity. Moreover, Dr.
Ambali had obtained his PhD in population genetics at Dalhousie University
in Halifax, Mr. Schwartz’s home town. Later, when Dr. Ambali was appointed
to spearhead efforts to revitalize the AU’s STI policy, he knew exactly whom to
call and where to look to identify a strategic plan that could serve as a model for
other STI policy fields.
Enlist your stakeholders: A concerted effort was made early in the project to
meet and engage key stakeholders from all networks in the preparation of the
environmental scan. To accomplish this, a frenetic month of consultations was
undertaken, criss-crossing the continent and visiting all five network hubs in
Nairobi, Ouagadougou, Dakar, Pretoria and Cairo as well as a workshop in Ma-
170
lawi. Aside from improving the quality of the environmental scan, the extensive
stakeholder consultations generated a high degree of buy-in which proved invaluable during the hiatus following Dr. Mumba’s departure. At this point, it
would have been easy to terminate the project or simply ignore the plan. However, senior managers and researchers from the five networks continued to press
for adoption of ABI’s strategic plan, serving as a de facto internal lobby to keep
the process alive. By the time Dr. Ambali re-entered the scene, the networks that
would be counted upon for implementation were ready and eager to go.
Patience can be a virtue: However proverbial, this phrase certainly applied
to the ABI project. Six months passed from the point where ABI’s strategic plan
was submitted to NPCA to the point where it was approved. Although tempting, it would have been counterproductive to force the issue by applying external pressure to NPCA decision-makers. Even if an earlier lip-service approval
could have been obtained, prospects for effective implementation would have
been slim without buy-in from senior NPCA management. Fortunately, DDD
projects have sufficient flexibility to wait out decision-making vacuums.
Spotlight on risk: During the work planning and inception missions, a number of warning signs were received concerning risks related to the transition
of the NEPAD Secretariat into an organization directly under the AU. Suggestions from NPCA leadership that a more centralized, command and control approach was desired for ABI raised serious concerns for the future effectiveness
of an organization that had thrived on a flexible, networking (hub and node)
model. Throughout the project, considerable attention was paid to monitoring
the identified risks, enabling both ABI and CIDA to anticipate problems and
consider mitigation measures. Too often, risk assessments are treated as throwins to work plans and rarely referenced thereafter, at least until things begin to
go badly. Given the inherent risk in most technical assistance projects, to manage
projects otherwise can be extremely short-sighted.
The ABI project stands as one of those rare examples where the knowledge
transfer potential was realized within the life of the project. If the project had
simply been completed as planned, this case study would have recommended
that the ABI strategic plan be considered for application on an Africa-wide basis
to other STI policy fields. In fact, this is what occurred at the September 2012
Boston conference where ABI’s strategic plan was utilized, at the urging of Dr.
Ambali, by the High-Level Panel as the basis for a new Consolidated Plan of
Action for African STI.
171
Another area of potential knowledge transfer warrants mention. Organizationally, ABI uses a networking model where one Africa-wide and four regional centres of excellence, or hubs, work with smaller institutions, or nodes, engaged in
related research. While the hubs offer a critical mass of research expertise, the
nodes can provide unique skills and facilities in a mutually-enriching exchange
of knowledge. Given the broad range of challenges facing Africa that require
regional or continental solutions, an expanded research capacity at these levels
will be essential. ABI’s networking model may be looked to as an effective approach for expediting the growth and maximizing the contribution of Africa’s
scientific research community.
Postscript
In a recent conversation with Dr. Ambali, he confirmed that implementation of
the Consolidated Plan of Action for African STI is proceeding well. In early April
2013, the high-level panel will reconvene to deliberate on the Science, Technology
and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024. This high-profile, ten-year strategic plan
is modelled very closely on the methodology used to develop the ABI 2012–17
strategic plan. Ms. Chimwemwe Chamdimba, a colleague of Dr. Ambali’s at NEPAD, reported that the ABI strategic planning methodology provided them with
something they had never had before and proved directly transferable to other
programs.
Implementation of the ABI strategic plan also continues well. The plan is currently being used as the basis for preparing regional plans. Dr. Ambali emphasized
that this will create much stronger policy coherence across regions. Evidently,
the risks that ABI would become paralyzed by bureaucratic inertia or lose its
distinct network character did not materialize. Given the continuing importance
placed on this initiative at the ministerial level within the AU, prospects for ABI
expanding its role within the African research community are encouraging. For
the fight against pervasive, daunting problems such as food insecurity, this support positions one small actor to make an oversized contribution.
172
Endnotes
1
The State of Food Security in the World 2012, (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations: Rome, 2012).
2
CIDA identifies research and development as one of three development paths to
support its food security strategy. Increasing Food Security, (CIDA: Ottawa, 2009).
However, in The State of Food Security in the World 2012, the FAO observes that, globally,
the relatively low level of official development assistance directed to the agriculture
sector remains problematic.
3
ABI’s mandate is not limited to food insecurity as its work touches on agriculture
more broadly as well as health and the environment. However, it is classified under
the Agriculture and Food Security thematic area of NEPAD and the majority of its
work involves agricultural research.
4
The Organization for African Unity (OAU) emerged in 1963 from the Union of African
States, an initiative spearheaded by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah to foster in the postcolonial era in Africa. The African Union was formally proposed in 1999 through
the Sirte Declaration and held its inaugural session in 2002 under its first President,
South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki. Currently, Morocco is the only African nation that is not
a member, having withdrawn in 1984 after the AU supported the membership of the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). The AU is headquartered in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
5
NEPAD amalgamated two former OAU programs, the Millennium Partnership for
African Recovery and the OMEGA plan. Its secretariat is located in South Africa. The
HSGOC comprises the heads of state of the five originating countries (Algeria, Egypt,
Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and fifteen heads of state elected every two years
on a regional basis from among AU Assembly members.
6
In 2010, NEPAD was more formally integrated as a legal, technical body within the
AU’s governance structure. To achieve this, the NEPAD Secretariat was transformed
into the NPCA and linked directly to the AU through the AU Commission and
HSGOC.
7
Although ABI’s research supports three core NEPAD policies (the Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Programme, the AU/NEPAD Environmental
Initiative and the NEPAD Health Strategy), its primary focus is in agricultural research.
In fact, NEPAD classifies ABI under its agriculture and food security thematic area
(one of six). The other two CIDA priority themes include future of children and youth,
and stimulating sustainable economic growth.
173
8
rights.
9
The FAO measures are published in the report, “The State of Food Insecurity in the
World 2012”, (UN FAO: Rome, 2012).
10 See J. Sachs, “How Malawi Fed Its Own People,” (International Herald Tribune, 19
April, 2012).
11 “2012–13 Global Competitiveness Report,” (World Economic Forum: Geneva, 2012).
Note that Tunisia, which is generally ranked high in African research capacity, was
not included in this survey.
174
Chapter 13
Using Social Marketing to Promote Ethics
in Tanzania’s Public Service
This case study was prepared with the assistance of Mary Gusella.
Abstract: In 2009, Ms. Adieu Nyondo, director of the Ethics Promotion Division in Tanzania’s Office of the President, had a novel idea. She believed that the application of
social marketing techniques to the advancement of ethics in Tanzania’s public service
might succeed in changing attitudes where other efforts had fallen short. Securing CIDA
support, she worked closely with Canadian advisors Mary Gusella and the Centre of Excellence for Public Sector Marketing to develop an effective social marketing campaign.
However, a year and a half later, the project’s prospects appeared bleak owing to an
inability to secure sufficient funding for local consultants to complete the audience research in the pilot ministry. Sometimes, eureka moments are born of necessity. With
few if any alternatives, the Canadian advisors and Ms. Nyondo devised a creative approach that fit within project budgets and timelines: do it yourself. In February 2012,
the social marketing team received intensive training before successfully conducting 315
employee interviews, 301 client surveys and four focus groups. In April, the baseline
results and proposed strategy were presented to and enthusiastically endorsed by senior
management of Public Sector Management, Office of the President. The social marketing
team then geared into overdrive to implement the strategy, including desk drops of the
ethics code, employee briefings on the code and signed compliance declarations, onepage notices tallying complaints received and resolved posted on ministry’s public notice
boards, notices welcoming citizen feedback on complaints, and an e-mail dashboard and
supporting IT system for senior managers indicating the status of complaints resolution.
In January 2013, the Canadian team returned to assist with an evaluation of progress-todate. Notwithstanding the short time frames, marked improvements were observed in
employee awareness of the code and client experience with ministry officials. Given the
pilot’s success, phase-two implementation is slated to begin later this year.
Sommaire : En 2009, Mme Adieu Nyondo, directrice de la Division de la promotion de
l’éthique au Bureau du président de la Tanzanie, a eu une nouvelle idée. Elle pensait que
l’application des techniques de marketing social pour la promotion de l’éthique dans
la fonction publique de la Tanzanie pourrait réussir à changer les attitudes où d’autres
efforts avaient échoué. S’étant assurée du soutien de l’ACDI, elle a travaillé en étroite
collaboration avec les conseillers canadiens Mary Gusella et le Centre d’excellence en
marketing gouvernemental pour mettre sur pied une campagne efficace de marketing so-
Using Social Marketing to Promote Ethics in Tanzania’s Public Service
175
cial. Cependant, un an et demi plus tard, les perspectives d’avenir du projet ne laissaient
guère d’espoir du fait de l’incapacité à obtenir des fonds suffisants pour permettre aux
experts locaux de terminer l’étude d’audience entreprise auprès du ministère pilote. Parfois, c’est de la nécessité que naissent les découvertes. Avec pour ainsi dire aucune autre
solution, les conseillers canadiens et Mme Nyondo ont mis au point une approche novatrice convenant aux budgets et aux calendriers du projet : le réaliser soi-même. En février
2012, l’équipe de marketing social a reçu une formation intensive avant de conduire avec
succès trois cent-quinze entretiens auprès d’employés, trois cent-un sondages auprès de
clients et quatre groupes de discussion. En avril, les résultats de base et la stratégie proposée ont été soumis et approuvés avec enthousiasme par la haute direction de la gestion
du secteur public auprès du Bureau du président. L’équipe de marketing social a alors
doublé de vitesse pour appliquer la stratégie, y compris le dépôt du code de déontologie
sur les bureaux, des séances d’information sur le Code au personnel et des déclarations
de conformité signées, des avis d’une page enregistrant les plaintes qui ont été reçues
et traitées affichées sur les panneaux d’avis publics du ministère, des avis invitant les
commentaires et suggestions des citoyens au sujet des plaintes, et un tableau de bord
par voie électronique, accompagné d’un système de TI à l’appui pour que les directeurs
indiquent l’état de résolution des plaintes. En janvier 2013, l’équipe canadienne est revenue pour apporter son aide à l’évaluation des progrès réalisés jusqu’à ce jour. Même si
les délais étaient très courts, des améliorations marquées ont été observées concernant la
sensibilisation des employés au Code et l’expérience de la clientèle avec les dirigeants du
ministère. Compte tenu du succès de la phase pilote, la mise en œuvre de la deuxième
phase devrait commencer plus tard cette année.
Introduction
Social marketing originated in the early 1970s with the realization that commercial marketing techniques could be used to deliver public policy objectives by influencing social behaviours.2 Canada was among the pioneers of the approach,
using social marketing to promote a broad range of socio-economic goals including health promotion (anti-smoking), environmental protection (energy
conservation), economic development (boost job skills), public education (stay
in school) and crime prevention (drinking and driving). But what does this have
to do with a case study concerning the promotion of ethics in Tanzania’s public
service?
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Definition of Social Marketing
A process that uses marketing principles and techniques to influence target audience
behaviours that will benefit society, as well as the individual. This strategically oriented
discipline relies on creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have
positive value for individuals, clients, partners, and society at large.
Source: Lee, Rothschild and Smith (2011)1
The use of ethical frameworks or codes to influence personal and professional
behaviour traces back to antiquity. In many respects, the “Hippocratic Oath”
and the “Ten Commandments” represent ethical codes. More cynically, Machiavelli’s musings on the merits of deceit and manipulation serve as an anti-ethical
code for the political realm. Public services began to embrace ethical principles
as they transitioned from political patronage and spoils systems to the merit
principle as far back as the late 1800s and early 1900s.3 One of the first codes of
ethics was introduced by the International Cities Managers Association (ICMA)
in 1924.4 More recently, formal instruments have been adopted to promote ethical behaviour in the public service, such as Canada’s Public Servants Conflict of
Interest Guidelines (1973), Standard of Conduct for Public Service Employees
(1973) and Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service (2003, 2012).5
In Tanzania, the Public Leadership Code of Ethics was approved by parliament
in 1995 and the Code of Ethics and Conduct for the Public Service in 2005. Ethics
concerns have been consistently advanced in national policy documents, such as
the five-year national plans, Mkukuta I and II, and the Public Sector Reform Programme.6 Notwithstanding sustained efforts to advance ethics, from employee
handbooks to sensitization initiatives to ethics training, as of 2009, the desired
results remained elusive. Clearly, something completely different was required.
Around this time, Ms. Adieu Nyondo, director of the Ethics Promotion Division in Tanzania’s Office of the President, had a novel idea. She had read how
social marketing had been used in other countries to alter deeply-embedded
societal behaviours. Her immediate challenge, promoting ethics in Tanzania’s
public service, similarly required a major attitudinal shift. She conjectured that
techniques, which had proven so effective in changing attitudes and behaviours
in many social and health areas, could be successfully applied to the advancement of ethics in the public service. What Ms. Nyondo did not know, was that
no one had ever tried this before.
In 2009, she approached the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) which then identified its Deployment for Democratic Development
177
(DDD) program as an appropriate aid vehicle. Mary Gusella, a former federal
deputy minister who had worked previously in Tanzania with the Ethics Secretariat, was a logical choice as principal adviser. Interestingly, Ms. Gusella had
worked on one of Canada’s first social marketing initiatives in the mid-1970s,
a successful campaign to focus attention on women’s equality for International Women’s Year. Jim Mintz, a leading expert in social marketing and his colleagues Joanna Chan and Mike Kujawski at the Centre of Excellence for Public
Sector Marketing, a Canadian consulting firm specializing in social marketing,
were also brought on board. Now the challenging task of creating the first-ever
social marketing campaign aimed at promoting ethics in a public service could
begin in earnest.
PROJECT PROFILE
Title: Supporting the Development of an Ethics Strategy to Advance Ethics Change in
the Public Service
Client: Ms. Adieu Nyondo, director of the Ethics Promotion Division, Public Service
Management, Office of the President
Consultants: Mary Gusella; Centre of Excellence for Public Sector Marketing (J. Mintz;
J. Chan; M. Kujawski)
Duration: March 2010 to April 2013
Budget: $276,927
Key Outputs:
1. Train local partners in social marketing methodology.
2. Design a social marketing campaign and related tools.
3. Conduct research and test methodology in pilot ministry.
4. Evaluate pilot results and design implementation plan.
Governance Profile
Following Tanzania’s independence in 1961, Julius Nyerere ruled until his retirement in 1985. Nyerere promulgated ujumaa, a form of one-party rule espousing socialism and self-reliance. Following introduction of a multi-party system,
his Chama cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) easily won the country’s first
election in 1995 and all three subsequent elections.
Tanzania has long attracted significant amounts of foreign aid. Receiving
US$2.45 billion in 2011, Tanzania ranked fourth among aid recipients in SubSaharan Africa after the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Kenya.7
178
One of CIDA’s twenty countries of focus, Tanzania receives the fourth highest
amount of Canadian foreign aid in Africa.
Notwithstanding foreign aid levels, Tanzania remains an extremely poor country. In 2012, Tanzania ranked 152nd of 187 countries (19th percentile) on the UN
Human Development Index. Gender development remains similarly problematic, with Tanzania ranking 119th of 148 countries (20th percentile) on the 2012 UN
Gender Inequality Index. Tanzania performs somewhat better on the 2012 World
Economic Forum Gender Gap Index, ranking 46th of 135 countries (34th percentile), but still well behind other African countries such as South Africa (16th),
Mozambique (23rd), Burundi (24th) and Uganda (28th). One area of strength is
parliamentary representation, where over 30 percent of members, including the
Speaker, are women. In Canada, by contrast, women constitute 25 percent of
parliamentarians.
Freedom House ranks Tanzania as partly free, a rating it has held for nearly two
decades, and cites one-party dominance, impunity for its security forces and
government interference in the media as barriers to further progress.8 Media
freedom had steadily improved over the last decade, but experienced a sharp
decline in 2012, falling to 70th among 179 countries from 34th in 2011 on the
Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index.
The World Bank’s governance indicators present a mixed picture. Over the last
decade, marked improvements have been made in voice and accountability
(now at the 46th percentile among all countries), political stability (47th percentile) and control of corruption (36th percentile) with modest progress being
achieved in regulatory quality (36th percentile). However, slight declines have
been experienced in government effectiveness (37th percentile) and rule of law
(34th percentile).
In 2012, Tanzania ranked 102nd of 176 countries on Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index. Its 35 score (out of 100) was the highest ever, rising from 32 in 2007 and 27 in 2002.9 Sustaining this trend will be critical for
achieving the longer-term goals of this DDD project regarding the promotion of
ethics in the public service.
The advancement of ethics in Tanzania’s public service had clear policy backing,
having been identified as part of a package of initiatives to strengthen accountability and responsiveness to the public, a key result area of the current Public
179
Sector Reform Program (PSRP II).10 Initially, the project was conceived as a modest intervention, in line with DDD’s mandate to provide quick-response, lowbudget, short-duration technical assistance. However, on day one of the project’s
work planning mission, the PSRP II donors informed the government that the
reform must become more action-oriented and results-focused and make greater
efforts to involve ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). Consequently,
project negotiations were suddenly thrust into the debate concerning how best
to reflect the new PSRP II direction.
Given the uncertainty, two work plans were developed: the first supported capacity building and the design of a social marketing campaign; the second added a series of pilots in several MDAs. While the first plan fit more easily within
DDD’s budget constraints, the second supported the donors’ new action, results
and ministry inclusion criteria. Ultimately, the partners agreed on a middle position where capacity building and campaign design would be supplemented
by a single MDA pilot and the engagement of civil society organizations in the
process. The pilot project’s research, analysis and communications components
were to be undertaken by local consulting firms. Although the project’s scope
now exceeded what would normally be delivered through a single DDD project,
it did meet the client’s desire to incorporate action and results-oriented activities. In sum, the project team felt that the work plan, although ambitious, was
doable. At least, that was the plan in September 2010.
Public service executives in developing countries routinely face challenges unknown to their counterparts in the developed world. Multiple, sometimes conflicting demands from donors must be juggled while constantly seeking external funding for activities that cannot be financed directly from the state budget.
Deadlines requiring quick turnarounds from notoriously byzantine administrative processes must be met as unexpected requests from one’s own minister pile
up. Not surprisingly, such problems can pose significant barriers to delivering
results-focused projects with tight timelines and budgets from programs such
as DDD.
180
Nonetheless, this DDD project began on a positive note. During the February
2011 mission, the consultants provided intensive training on social marketing
to an expanded group, including two divisions from the Office of the President
(Ethics Promotion; Information, Education and Communications), the Tanzanian Public Service College and the Ethics Secretariat. This inclusive approach
responded to donor criticism that organizations with ethics-related mandates
were not coordinating effectively. In addition, terms of reference for the local
consulting firm were finalized, criteria for selecting a pilot ministry prepared
and a pilot ministry identified. The next mission, tentatively slated for October
2011, would take place once the tendering process for the local consulting firm
and the subsequent audience research in the pilot ministry were completed.
Mission Date
Mission Purpose
June 2010
prepare work plan
Feb. 2011
train project team
Feb. 2012
conduct audience research; establish baseline
April 2012
present results and strategy to management
Jan. 2013
evaluate progress
Unfortunately, events did not unfold as planned as a series of obstacles dissipated the project’s initial momentum.
• The client’s budget could not, as anticipated, fund the local consultants,
forcing lengthy negotiations with the World Bank to secure alternative
financing.
• The postponed procurement process for local consultants experienced further
delays to accommodate various donor approvals.
• When finally received, the bids from local consulting firms to conduct the
audience research far outstripped available funding. The winning firm’s bid
came in at 55,000 Tanzanian shillings versus the 27,000 budgeted. Additional
money could not be obtained from DDD.
• The client’s budget precluded engaging civil society organizations in the
process.
At this juncture, the project appeared unlikely to proceed at all, given the inability to secure funding for its core activities.
181
Sometimes, eureka moments are born of necessity. With few if any alternatives, the Canadian advisers and Ms. Nyondo devised a creative approach that
fit within project budgets and timelines: do it yourself. Instead of hiring local
consultants to conduct the audience research, the social marketing team, now
including representatives from the pilot ministry, would be trained by the Canadian advisers to conduct the actual research. Interestingly, one of the project’s
original goals had been to incorporate a learning-by-doing approach into the
project. At the time, it was not suspected how literally this principle would ultimately be applied.
For two intense weeks in February 2012, the project revived and thrived. During week one, tools to conduct the audience research in the Ministry of Lands,
Housing and Human Settlements Development (MLHHSD) were finalized and
translated into Swahili by the team itself. Role-playing was used to familiarize
participants with live interview and focus group techniques. During week two,
the Tanzanian team completed 315 employee questionnaires, 301 client surveys
and held four focus groups. Ministry clients, in particular, were enthralled to be
consulted and eagerly participated. Hard copies of all questionnaires and surveys accompanied the Canadian team back to Ottawa for entry into data compilation software. A follow-up mission to complete the data analysis and present
the results to senior management was scheduled for April.
So, what did the baseline data reveal? A sample of employee results included:
• 99 percent of employees agreed that it was their responsibility to adhere to
the Public Service Code of Ethics and Conduct;
• 63 percent of employees stated that they did not own a copy of the code;
• employees rated their knowledge level of the code at 3.3 out of 5;
• 48 percent of employees claimed to have seen unethical conduct by other
ministry officials; and
• 84 percent of employees who had seen unethical conduct had not reported it.
A sample of ministry client results included:
• 45 percent of clients reported that they had been a victim of unethical conduct
at the ministry;
• 60 percent of clients who felt they had been a victim of unethical conduct did
not file a complaint;
• 40 percent of clients were unaware that reporting or complaints mechanisms
were available to them;
182
• 90 percent of clients felt that unethical conduct adversely affected the
ministry’s quality of service;
• 41 percent of clients were dissatisfied with the ministry’s quality of service;
and
• 37 percent of clients felt that channels for reporting unethical behaviour were
ineffective.
Using the data, the team developed a social marketing strategy to improve results. The first step involved differentiating three target audiences: 1. ministry
commissioners, directors and assistant directors; 2. ministry officers, assistant
officers and technicians; and 3. ministry clients. For each target audience, positioning objectives, desired behaviours, key messages, communications channels
and supporting activities were proposed. Goals were set to influence knowledge, beliefs and behaviours, supported by numerical objectives, for example,
to increase the percentage of employees who possessed a copy of the ethics code
from 37 to 50 percent by November 2012, or to decrease the percentage of clients
who were unaware of available reporting or complaints mechanisms from 40 to
25 percent.
The strategy was presented by the Ethics Promotion Division to thirty-eight senior managers at a meeting chaired by the permanent secretary of Public Sector
Management, President’s Office. To conclude the meeting, the permanent secretary strongly endorsed the quality of the work and the proposed implementation roll-out. A similar briefing was later provided to senior management of the
pilot ministry. As the concluding activity of the DDD project, the Canadian team
was requested to return in less than a year to assess the pilot project’s progress.
The social marketing team then geared into overdrive to implement the strategy.
Implementation Measures
• copies of the ethics code desk-dropped across the ministry;
• employees briefed on the code and asked to sign a compliance declaration;
• ethics training provided to administrative and technical staff;
• coloured one-page notices tallying complaints received and resolved posted on ministry’s
public notice boards;
• notices welcoming client feedback and complaints posted;
• e-mail dashboard and supporting IT system developed for senior managers indicating status of
complaints resolution;
• ethics information package distributed to senior management; and
• ministry senior management debriefed on ethics principles and issues.
183
Throughout this period, the social marketing team remained in close touch with
the Canadian advisers through e-mail, teleconferences and Facebook. In January 2013, the Canadian advisers returned to support the pilot project evaluation.
To obtain comparative data, the social marketing team replicated the February
2012 baseline data collection exercise. Once again, completed employee questionnaires and client surveys returned with the advisers to Ottawa for data entry
and analysis. Given the abridged time frames—social marketing campaigns can
take five to ten years to register an impact—expectations were not high that
any substantive progress would be indicated. However, some surprisingly positive findings did appear in select areas. A sample of the comparative data is
presented below.
Measure
2012
Baseline
2013
Result
employees have seen a copy of the code
65%
88%
employees own a copy of the code
37%
73%
knowledge-level of the code (self-rated 1–5)
3.26
3.47
employees have seen unethical conduct in the ministry
48%
51%
clients have experienced unethical conduct in the ministry
45%
24%
client awareness of complaints mechanisms
40%
40%
client awareness of complaints handling office
30%
35%
clients believe unethical conduct adversely affects service quality
90%
90%
clients unsatisfied with ministry service quality
41%
32%
clients believe channels for reporting unethical conduct ineffective
37%
28%
With quick wins in improved employee awareness and client experience and
continued endorsement from senior management, momentum accelerated for
moving ahead with the phase two roll-out to a new set of MDAs. By the project’s
conclusion, it was difficult to fathom that, a year before, project cancellation appeared imminent. Fortunately, a novel and energizing solution had been found
to deliver Ms. Nyondo’s original, but untested idea that social marketing could
be effectively applied to ethics advancement.
184
Lessons Learned
This DDD project yielded a diverse set of lessons learned. The most pertinent
one, that social marketing should be considered as a tool to promote ethics in
the public service, represents an emerging lesson that should be tracked as
project implementation progresses for possible application in other countries.
This will be discussed in the following section on knowledge transfer. Other
lessons include:
Embrace originality: Few projects can claim to be truly innovative, especially given the prevalence for basing reforms on best practices from developing
countries. But original ideas do arise, often from a prospective local partner who
desires to try something different after enduring years of underperforming reforms. Increasingly, the development community is acknowledging the importance of best fit and context-sensitivity rather than best practice as preferred
drivers of reform design.11 This case underscores how an original, locally-conceived idea can, with the right support, make headway where conventional approaches have failed. Donors and governments in developing countries should
consider how best to support originality and integrate local context in the design
and delivery of development strategies.
Setbacks foster opportunity: With the project on life support, few options
remained. Accordingly, the social marketing team decided to assume direct
responsibility for conducting the audience research in the pilot ministry. Ultimately, this forced decision proved beneficial beyond anyone’s expectations,
resulting in heightened ownership, accelerated momentum, team building, improved job skills, enhanced quality control, increased planning certainty, lower
cost, quicker delivery and avoidance of lengthy procurement processes. It is
not uncommon for technical assistance projects to encounter seemingly insurmountable obstacles. This project demonstrates that creative, potentially preferable alternatives may be available.
Do-it-yourself: As discussed above, the social marketing team’s first choice
was to contract out the audience research work in the pilot ministry to local consultants. On the surface, this seemed eminently sensible. However, the compelling benefits from contracting in, i.e., doing the consulting work internally, suggest that the do-it-yourself option should be considered more often. Although
contracting in will be less appropriate when the task falls outside normal job
requirements, constitutes a one-time activity, requires highly technical skills or
cannot be feasibly delivered within existing resources, this case suggests that the
do-it-yourself approach may be advantageous under the right circumstances.
185
Create networks, include implementers: The downsides of working in functional silos are both well-documented and persistent. For cross-cutting issues,
which require active co-operation across different organizations, these silos can
be impenetrable. Given the diversity of organizations involved, it was hardly
surprising that Tanzania’s ethics-mandated institutions had drawn criticism
from donors for poor coordination. Aware of this legacy, the DDD project created a social marketing team representing three ethics-mandated organizations,
a communications division within the President’s Office and the pilot ministry.
This latter addition proved invaluable as the pilot ministry representatives identified contextual issues and opportunities that could not have been intuited by
non-insiders. By actively involving implementers, the project not only benefited
from a context-sensitive design, but established credibility, momentum and buyin in advance of the pilot launch. Although difficult to substantiate, it is likely
that the project’s quick wins were, in part, attributable to the fact that the pilot
ministry felt more like a contributor than a test subject.
Leverage related priorities: Typically, strategic goals are achieved through the
delivery of multiple, inter-related policy objectives. Synergy occurs when each
policy objective successfully contributes to and is enhanced by the others. This
dynamic is particularly vital when the desired policy outcome requires a complex result such as behavioural change. Social marketing, which aims to change
behaviours, must therefore be integrative in order to succeed. In the Tanzanian
case, ethics promotion constituted just one of several measures supporting the
goal of stronger accountability and responsiveness under PSRP II. Another measure was implementation of a complaints-handling mechanism for ministry clients. In designing the pilot, the social marketing team decided to address both
measures, thereby creating a project environment where synergies could materialize. This may, in fact, have occurred. It is likely that the dual improvements
between 2012 and 2013 in heightened awareness by ministry employees of their
ethical responsibilities and reduced incidence of clients experiencing unethical
behaviour by ministry employees may have been mutually reinforcing. Moreover, success in achieving these policy objectives will positively impact service
quality, identified as a strategic imperative for successful delivery of PSRP II.
Project designers should always consider whether and how their activities can
seek synergies with, and leverage gains in, related priorities.
Flexibility enhances aid effectiveness: On two occasions, the project had to be
significantly restructured in response to changing circumstances. At the workplanning stage, it added the ministry pilot to address new donor requirements
for more action-oriented, results-focused PSRP II initiatives. Halfway through,
the social marketing team decided to assume direct responsibility for conduct-
186
ing the data collection exercise at the pilot ministry instead of using local consultants. Both changes affected project design, time lines and cost. If CIDA had
been less flexible in responding to shifting circumstances, this highly productive
project would never have realized its potential.
The promotion of ethics in public services in developing countries, while nothing new, has been overshadowed by the structural, legal and results-based dimensions of public administration reform. In 2006, the World Bank and International Institute for Ethics co-hosted the first World Ethics Conference to draw
attention to ethics and leadership, described as underemphasized elements of
governance reform.12 With greater priority being placed on advancing ethics and
ethics-related initiatives such as institutionalizing integrity, demand for knowledge transfer in this field should continue to expand.13
From a project perspective, this DDD initiative’s knowledge transfer potential is
high. As the first-ever attempt to apply social marketing techniques to promoting ethics in the public service, the reform should be tracked for possible application to ethics initiatives in other countries. At this stage, it has demonstrated
some promising results in raising employee and client awareness, but its future
impact on beliefs and behaviours will only be achieved in the medium term as
the approach is rolled out to other MDAs. Tanzania’s efforts in this regard bear
watching.
More broadly, the potential for using social marketing to deliver a wide range of
public policy objectives in developing countries should be considered. Typically,
major reform programs develop communications strategies, but rarely consider
a social marketing approach, perhaps because the desired behavioural changes
will not be realized within the life span of the supporting technical assistance
project. However, as increasing attention is placed on reform sustainability and
follow-through to implementation, demand for techniques which can influence
social or individual behaviours over the medium to longer term will likely increase.
Postscript
Only recently completed, it is premature to speculate on the medium- to longer-term progress of this promising initiative. Positively, Ms. Nyondo reports
that the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development will
be completing construction of the new complaints office, relocated to the front
187
of the ministry’s main building, and finalizing their citizen charter in the coming months. The next implementation phase of the social marketing strategy is
slated to begin in July 2013.
Endnotes
1
N. Lee, M. Rothschild, and W. Smith, “A Declaration of Social Marketing’s Unique
Principles and Directions,” (unpublished manuscript, 2011).
2
The term and concepts were popularized by P. Kotler and M. Zaltman, “Social
Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change,” Journal of Marketing 35 (1971):3.
3
In the United States, the Pendleton Act (1883) established the basics of a merit-based
system. In Canada, the Civil Service Act (1908) created the Civil Service Commission
to advance a career, merit-based public service.
4
The ICMA was founded in 1914 to advance professional local government worldwide.
The ICMA code is discussed in S. Cohen and W. Eimicke, Trends in 20th Century US
Government Ethics, (Columbia University: New York City, 1998).
5
K. Kernaghan, A Special Calling: Values, Ethics and Professional Public Service. (Canada
Public Service Agency, Queen’s Printer: Ottawa, 2007).
6
Mkukuta is the Swahili acronym for the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction
of Poverty.
7
Data taken from OECD Stat Extracts from the Development Geo Book.
8
Freedom in the World 2012. (Freedom House: Washington, DC).
9
Prior to 2012, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index scored
countries between 0 and 10. In 2012, it began scoring between 0 and 100. Accordingly,
previous-year scores have been adjusted to reflect the new scoring system.
10 Other components of the package included developing a compliance framework
to monitor adherence to the Code of Ethics by MDAs, rationalization and capacity
development for the five ethics oversight institutions, implementation of a
complaints-handling mechanism, more effective engagement with NGOs, facilitation
of a compliance inspection routine for professional groups, and introduction of client
service charters.
188
11 See J. Blum, N. Manning, and V. Srivastava, Public Sector Management: Toward a
Problem-Solving Approach, (World Bank PREM: Washington, DC, 2011).
12 World Ethics Forum: Conference Proceedings, edited by C. Sampford and C. Connors,
(Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law: Brisbane, Australia, 2006).
13 The institutional dimensions of integrity systems are increasingly being looked
to as contributors to anti-corruption efforts. This topic figured prominently in
presentations and discussions at the 15th biennial anti-corruption symposium held in
Brasilia in November 2012. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada hosted
an e-Dialogue on the subject in December 2012, led by Ms. Fraser-Moloketi of UNDP,
the results of which can be viewed on its website www.pswb.net.
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L’IAPC International se concentre sur le développement durable en renforçant la capacité des institutions d’État par le biais de l’assistance technique
d’homologues et du partage des connaissances parmi les gouvernements et les
fonctionnaires ainsi que les universitaires au Canada et à l’étranger. Ces partenariats de collaboration facilitent l’innovation et l’apprentissage pratique, et permettent d’accroître la qualité et la viabilité des résultats des programmes.
Nos programmes offrent des occasions en or aux fonctionnaires pour :
• partager les pratiques exemplaires et les enseignements retenus de par les
frontières ;
• rechercher et apporter de nouvelles solutions aux enjeux de la gouvernance ;
• établir des réseaux et des relations à l’échelle planétaire ;
• favoriser le perfectionnement professionnel ;
• valoriser les idées et l’apprentissage par le biais de publications et la
participation à des événements publics ;
• promouvoir et profiler les services canadiens et publics à travers le monde ;
et
• contribuer aux objectifs du Canada et du monde en matière de saine
gouvernance.
Pour en savoir plus au sujet de l’IAPC international, visitez www.iapc.ca.
191
The aid-on-demand mantra, doing better with less, reprises that
ever-ready phrase of governments hoping to convince a skeptical
public that they will be truly thankful for the program cuts which
they are about to receive. In this case, we are being less cynical;
this book will present a distinctly Canadian way of delivering
foreign aid that does actually deliver more for less. Launched in
2007, CIDA’s Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD)
program was designed to deliver a quick-response capacity to
meet client demands for product-specific, low-budget, shortduration projects. In this book, the DDD approach is characterized
as aid on demand. In several fundamental respects, the aid-ondemand model challenges conventional wisdom about the right
way to deliver aid.
ISBN 978-1-55061-142-7

Aid on Demand - The Institute of Public Administration of Canada

Transcription

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