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publicopinion
POLISH PUBLICOPINION 2/2016 Solid and Professional ISSN 2083-1714 CONTENTS Poland in the European Union Socio-political activity of Poles Trust in the public sphere Opinions about the “Family 500+” programme IN ADDITION TO THE REPORTS REFERRED TO ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED RECENTLY (IN POLISH): · Involvement in Volunteering · Party Preferences in February · Opinions about Parliament and President · Holiday Trips in 2015 and Plans for 2016 · Willingness to Cooperate · No Change in Government Ratings · Attitudes towards Refugees · Poles about Participation in Lawmaking and Lobbying · Social Moods in February Poland in the European Union The new Polish authorities put more stress than their predecessors on policy independence from the European Union and prioritise cooperation with other countries in this region, in particular with the Visegrad Group states. The question of national sovereignty was invoked in recent months in the context of the mandatory so-called Was the decision by the European Commission refugee quotas, as well as to initiate a procedure to monitor the rule more recently, due to the of law in Poland… Don't know initiation by the European justified Commission of procedures 37% 27% 36% for monitoring the threats to unjustified the rule of law in Poland. Polish public opinion is Was the decision by the European Commission … Motivated by concern about divided about the validity of the rule of law in Poland and Don't know threats to it the EC decision to initiate the procedure for monitoring the 35% 23% 42% rule of law in Poland. The Motivated by rejection of Law and Justice (PiS) and resulted from number of people considering insufficient knowledge about the situation in Poland the decision as justified and opposing it are almost the same. The EC motives are also perceived differently: the conviction that the decision was motivated by the rejection of Law and Justice (PiS) and resulted from insufficient knowledge about Poland was more common than the view that it was a result of concern about threats to the rule of law in Poland. In spite of controversies around the actions of the European Commission, there is no increase in concern about the sovereignty of II 2014 17% 36% 47% Poland within the EU. The majority of Poles believe that EU XI 2015 17% 45% 38% membership does not excessively II 2016 13% 35% 52% reduce Poland's sovereignty. This view is now expressed more often than in November 2015. Slightly more than a third of respondents share the opinion that EU membership imposes excessive restrictions on Poland's independence. Which opinion is closer to your own view? Membership in the EU does not excessively restrict Poland's sovereignty and independence Membership in the EU excessively restricts Poland's sovereignty and independence Don't know More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Poland in European Union", February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2016, N=1000. The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland. · The Future of Poland's Energy Supply · Trust in Politicians in February Socio-political activity of Poles · Activities and Experiences in 2015 · Energetics and Ecology – Declarations and Attitudes Electoral victory of Law and Justice (PiS) in the October parliamentary elections, which meant that full executive power was located in the hands of one political grouping, and activity of its leader Jarosław Kaczyński, seen as controversial by many citizens, caused political emotions in the post-election time to rise, rather than cool. In December supporters and opponents of the current government organized demonstrations in Warsaw. Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD), which grouped many circles opposed to the policies of current authorities, continued the protest action in January and announced institutionalisation of activities. The post-election conflict indicates the strength of sociopolitical and cultural divisions and their potential to mobilise and activate the society. Do you support actions of Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD)? Subjective influence on public affairs is now at the highest level since the beginning of 1990s (June 1992). Over twofifths of respondents (41%) feel that they have influence on the national affairs. Do people like you have influence on the affairs in Poland? 100% (%) 91 87 86 90% 83 No 76 80% 79 73 72 65 70% 73 70 68 65 60 56 60% 50% 40% 24 Yes 19 20% 11 7 10 2 4 10% 5 2 2 X 1997 V 1999 V 2004 30 30 25 28 Strongly support 11% 30% Moderately support 31% 15% Moderately oppose 24% 17% Strongly oppose 22% Don't know 24 Attitude to activities of Law and Justice (PiS) and Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD) Supporters of neither Don't know 3 5 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 12% 24% 30% 34% I I I IX 2007 2008 2009 2010 IX VII III X IV I 2012 2013 2014 2014 2015 2016 Factors increasing subjective influence on the national affairs are: good evaluation of household material living conditions, higher education and age below 55 years. Political views are also important. Respondents identifying with the right wing are more often convinced that they have influence on Poland's affairs than people with leftist and centrist orientation or the politically indifferent. The election results, beyond doubt, increased civic subjectivity of people identifying with the right wing. From November 2015 to January 2016 the level of political alienation markedly fell. The proportion of citizens who believe that it does not matter for them whether the government is democratic or not decreased by 11 percentage points and, at 29%, it is now at one of the lowest levels in CBOS surveys of democracy. At the same time, the proportion of people who are not indifferent in this regard increased by 9 points to 62%. It is the highest value ever recorded. Do you agree that, for people like you, it does not really matter whether government is democratic or not? 70% Disagree 60% Supporters of KOD only Supporters of current authorities only Among KOD supporters men and women are about equally represented. People aged 55 and above are relatively numerous. KOD supporters tend to live in cities, especially the biggest (500 thousand and more). Their education and material conditions are above average. They are less religious than society as a whole; they include a relatively high proportion of people with leftist and centrist political views. KOD sympathisers support the parties: Nowoczesna (50%) and Civic Platform (PO, 22%). Among supporters of PiS policy, men are overrepresented. As with KOD supporters, people aged 55 and above are relatively numerous. As far as place of residence is concerned, they do not differ from the society as a whole. Their education and material situation do not differ markedly from the general population; however, the wealthiest (those with monthly income of 2000 PLN per capita and above) are slightly underrepresented. PiS supporters are characterized by relatively high religiosity and right-wing political orientation. A vast majority (72%) would vote PiS, while others support Kukiz'15 (11%) and the party KORWiN (4%). Gender: 50% 49% Men Agree 40% Women 30% 46% 54% 51% Age: 20% 18-24 years Don't know 10% 25-34 35-44 0% X VI '92 '93 V '95 III '99 X '00 III '02 V '04 IX/X '05 XI IV XI '06'07 VII I '08 '09 III '10 VIIIXI '11 VII III VI '13 '14 XI I '15 '16 Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD) is supported by 46% of respondents, while Law and Justice by 42%. 2 13% According to analyses, some people approve both of KOD and authorities. A third of respondents unequivocally approve of KOD (without supporting the government). The group of unequivocal supporters of PiS (i.e. those who do not support the Committee) is slightly smaller. Onefourth of respondents support neither side. 0% VI VII 1992 1993 21% Supporters of both KOD and authorities 33 19 15 16% 41 36 30% Do you support actions of current authorities? 45-54 55-64 65 and above 9% 10% 18% 16% 18% 17% 14% 16% 19% 20% 22% 21% Supporters of KOD only Supporters of current authorities only Place of residence: 30% Rural Urban up to 19 999 9% 20% 23% 17% 15% 19% 11% 20 000 - 99 999 100 000 - 499 000 500 000 and above Trust in institutions Supporters of KOD only Supporters of current authorities only Education: Basic vocational Tertiary 650 - 999 PLN 1000 - 1399 PLN 28% 17 Commissioner for Human Rights 13 50 9 3 Institute of National Remembrance 15 47 11 4 NATO 14 48 13 UN 13 Public administration 40% Good 50% 59% Courts Television Religious practice: Several times a week 1% 9% 36% Once a week 15% 15% Once or twice a month Several times a year Never 16% Constitutional Court 23% 7% Centre Right Don't know 8 17% 19% Newspapers 2 28 4 25 Trade unions 2 33% 21% 19% 30 26 Churches (other than Catholic) 27% 5% 7 Political parties 2 17 12 12 31 8 23 13 27 16 21 15 13 30 14 28 13 26 13 20 24 41 24 17 14 33 18 7 8 16 30 34 21 26 4 36 30 3 4 Sejm and Senate 25% Political views: Left Big business 53% 23 4 26 34 8 13 25 25 38 4 7 6 8 6 20 47 7 Government 13 46 3 21 19 44 10 EU Average 17 53 8% 10% 33% 46 11 Material living conditions: Bad 51 56 38% 19% 53 9 Local government 15% 17% 2000 PLN and above 24 Police Income per capita: 7% 16% 17% 20% 23% 1400 - 1999 PLN 20 Roman Catholic Church 8 2 11 56 23 Army 7 3 11 57 22 Scouting 8 3 6 52 31 Caritas Red Cross 26% 29% 31% 35% 23% Secondary (%) 6 4 5 42 43 Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity 16% 20% 20% Primary Up to 649 PLN high negative ratings are given to: newspapers, Sejm, Senate, government and television. 42% 14% 35 22 43 15 59% More information about this topic can be found in CBOS reports in Polish: "Socio-political Activity in Poland" and “Opinions about Democracy”, February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample: January 2016, N=1063. The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland. Trust in the public sphere Charities such as the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity, Caritas and the Red Cross enjoy the highest trust. Other trusted institutions are: the Army, scouts and the Roman Catholic Church. Over three-fifths of respondents have confidence in the police, local government, the Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) and the Institute of National Remembrance. A comparable proportion of respondents express their trust in international institutions in which Poland is a member, such as NATO, UN and EU. Half of respondents trust the public administration, and a slightly smaller percentage have confidence in courts of law. The other institutions are trusted less. Almost two-fifths of respondents have trust in government, television and the Constitutional Court. Even smaller proportion trust newspapers, Sejm, Senate, Churches (other than Catholic) and trade unions. Political parties receive the lowest scores: only a fifth of respondents put some trust in them. Apart from political parties, distrusted by two-thirds of respondents, relatively Strong trust Moderate trust Moderate distrust Strong distrust Don't know Compared with 2012, the institutions which gained in public trust are: Institute of National Remembrance (7point increase), local government (6-point rise), the Army, NATO, and public administration (5 points each). There was also a slight increase in trust in Caritas, scouting, Commissioner for Human Rights (3 points each) and big enterprises (2 points). On the other hand, there was a decrease in trust in mass media: since 2012 trust in TV dropped by 6 percentage points while newspapers lost 4 points. The most trusted institution, the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity, lost 4 points. Do you trust … 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% Television: 10% 0% I 2002 I 2004 Yes No I 2006 Newspapers: I 2008 I 2010 Yes No I 2012 I 2016 80% 60% EU: 40% UN: Yes No Yes No 20% 0% I 2002 I 2004 I 2006 I 2008 I 2010 I 2012 I 2016 “Don't know” omitted 3 Moreover, the decline of trust in media (both TV and newspapers) is visible in an eight-year perspective. The level currently recorded is the lowest ever. In the same period there was also a decrease in ratings of international organizations, such as EU or UN, trusted by over half of respondents. Trust in EU is now the lowest since Poland's accession. More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Social Trust", February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample: January 2016, N=1063. The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland. Opinions about the “Family 500+” programme The president signed the law on state support for children, which fulfils one of the major pre-electoral promises of PiS. This law has a goal of financially supporting families bringing up children and increasing the birth rate in view of negative demographic trends. It envisages a benefit of 500 PLN for every second and subsequent child and for every first child in families in which per capita income is not higher than 800 PLN (or 1200 PLN in case of families with a disabled child). In general, Poles appreciate the need to conduct state policy towards increasing fertility. Over three-quarters think that the state should have a policy to encourage people to have more children. The view is becoming more widespread. Do you agree that the state should have a policy to encourage people to have more children? (%) VII 2013 33 38 35 II 2016 17 42 Strongly agree Moderately agree Moderately disagree 6 14 Strongly disagree 6 3 6 The introduction of the 500 PLN childcare benefit for every second and subsequent child up to the age 18 and for every child in low-income families is supported by a vast majority of respondents. According to government estimates, 278 000 more children will be born in the next ten years due to the introduction of the “Family 500+” programme than would otherwise be the case. This would reduce the pace of decline in the number of births, although it would not reverse the negative trend. Social expectation related to the consequences of the introduction of this programme are moderately optimistic. Almost two-thirds of respondents hope that the introduction of the “Family 500+” programme will increase the number of births in Poland. Most of them predict a modest increase. Will the introduction of the “Family 500+” programme contribute to the increase in the number of births in Poland? Yes, significantly Don't know Yes, but only to a small extent 16% 6% 49% 29% No The effectiveness of the programme “Family 500+” will probably depend not so much on its duration, but rather on whether it will become anchored in social consciousness as a constant and predictable element of the support system for families and fertility in Poland. Future implementation of this programme is doubtful. Over half of respondents are afraid that this government or the following will not have money to continue it. Almost a third of Poles think that this programme will be prioritised and will continue for years. Will there be funding for the programme “Family 500+” in the following years? Yes, it will be prioritised and will continue for years Don't know Don't know 32% Strongly support Moderately support 47% 33% No, this government or the following will discontinue it Don't know 9% 6% 5% Moderately Strongly oppose oppose For more information on CBOS services and publications please contact: CBOS 5/7, Świętojerska, 00-236 Warsaw, Poland Phones: (48) 22 629 35 69, 22 628 37 04 Fax: (48) 22 629 40 89 e-mail: [email protected] 4 17% 51% Do you support the introduction of a 500 PLN childcare benefit for every second and subsequent child up to the age 18 and for every child in low-income families? www.cbos.pl More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Family 500 Plus Programme as a Component of State Support for Families and Boosting Demography", February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2016, N=1000. The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland. 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