publicopinion

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publicopinion
POLISH
PUBLICOPINION
2/2016
Solid and Professional
ISSN 2083-1714
CONTENTS
Poland in the European
Union
Socio-political activity
of Poles
Trust in the public sphere
Opinions
about the “Family 500+”
programme
IN ADDITION
TO THE REPORTS REFERRED TO ABOVE,
THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED
RECENTLY (IN POLISH):
· Involvement in Volunteering
· Party Preferences in February
· Opinions about Parliament and
President
· Holiday Trips in 2015 and Plans for 2016
· Willingness to Cooperate
· No Change in Government Ratings
· Attitudes towards Refugees
· Poles about Participation in Lawmaking
and Lobbying
· Social Moods in February
Poland in the European Union
The new Polish authorities put more stress than their predecessors on policy
independence from the European Union and prioritise cooperation with other
countries in this region, in particular with the Visegrad Group states. The
question of national sovereignty was invoked in recent months in the context of
the mandatory so-called Was the decision by the European Commission
refugee quotas, as well as to initiate a procedure to monitor the rule
more recently, due to the of law in Poland…
Don't know
initiation by the European
justified
Commission of procedures
37%
27%
36%
for monitoring the threats to
unjustified
the rule of law in Poland.
Polish public opinion is Was the decision by the European Commission …
Motivated by concern about
divided about the validity of the
rule of law in Poland and
Don't know
threats to it
the EC decision to initiate the
procedure for monitoring the
35%
23%
42%
rule of law in Poland. The
Motivated by rejection of Law
and Justice (PiS) and resulted from
number of people considering
insufficient knowledge about
the situation in Poland
the decision as justified and
opposing it are almost the same. The EC motives are also perceived differently:
the conviction that the decision was motivated by the rejection of Law and
Justice (PiS) and resulted from insufficient knowledge about Poland was more
common than the view that it was a result of concern about threats to the rule of
law in Poland.
In spite of controversies around the
actions of the European
Commission, there is no increase in
concern about the sovereignty of
II 2014
17%
36%
47%
Poland within the EU. The majority
of Poles believe that EU
XI 2015
17%
45%
38%
membership does not excessively
II 2016
13%
35%
52%
reduce Poland's sovereignty. This
view is now expressed more often than in November 2015. Slightly more than a
third of respondents share the opinion that EU membership imposes excessive
restrictions on Poland's independence.
Which opinion is closer to your own view?
Membership in the EU
does not excessively
restrict Poland's
sovereignty and
independence
Membership in the EU
excessively restricts
Poland's sovereignty
and independence
Don't know
More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Poland in European
Union", February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2016, N=1000. The random
address sample is representative for adult population of Poland.
· The Future of Poland's Energy Supply
· Trust in Politicians in February
Socio-political activity of Poles
· Activities and Experiences in 2015
· Energetics and Ecology – Declarations
and Attitudes
Electoral victory of Law and Justice (PiS) in the October parliamentary elections,
which meant that full executive power was located in the hands of one political
grouping, and activity of its leader Jarosław Kaczyński, seen as controversial by
many citizens, caused political emotions in the post-election time to rise, rather
than cool. In December supporters and opponents of the
current government organized demonstrations in
Warsaw. Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD),
which grouped many circles opposed to the policies of
current authorities, continued the protest action in
January and announced institutionalisation of activities.
The post-election conflict indicates the strength of sociopolitical and cultural divisions and their potential to
mobilise and activate the society.
Do you support actions
of Committee for Defence
of Democracy (KOD)?
Subjective influence on public affairs is now at the highest
level since the beginning of 1990s (June 1992). Over twofifths of respondents (41%) feel that they have influence
on the national affairs.
Do people like you have influence on the affairs in Poland?
100%
(%)
91
87
86
90%
83
No
76
80%
79
73
72
65
70%
73
70
68
65
60
56
60%
50%
40%
24
Yes
19
20%
11
7 10
2 4
10%
5
2
2
X
1997
V
1999
V
2004
30
30 25
28
Strongly support
11%
30%
Moderately support
31%
15%
Moderately oppose
24%
17%
Strongly oppose
22%
Don't know
24
Attitude to activities of Law and Justice (PiS)
and Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD)
Supporters
of neither
Don't know
3
5
3
4
2
2
2
2
3
3
12%
24%
30%
34%
I
I
I
IX
2007 2008 2009 2010
IX VII
III
X
IV
I
2012 2013 2014 2014 2015 2016
Factors increasing subjective influence on the national
affairs are: good evaluation of household material living
conditions, higher education and age below 55 years.
Political views are also important. Respondents
identifying with the right wing are more often convinced
that they have influence on Poland's affairs than people
with leftist and centrist orientation or the politically
indifferent. The election results, beyond doubt, increased
civic subjectivity of people identifying with the right wing.
From November 2015 to January 2016 the level of political
alienation markedly fell. The proportion of citizens who
believe that it does not matter for them whether the
government is democratic or not decreased by 11
percentage points and, at 29%, it is now at one of the
lowest levels in CBOS surveys of democracy. At the same
time, the proportion of people who are not indifferent in
this regard increased by 9 points to 62%. It is the highest
value ever recorded.
Do you agree that, for people like you, it does not really
matter whether government is democratic or not?
70%
Disagree
60%
Supporters
of KOD only
Supporters
of current
authorities only
Among KOD supporters men and women are about
equally represented. People aged 55 and above are
relatively numerous. KOD supporters tend to live in cities,
especially the biggest (500 thousand and more). Their
education and material conditions are above average.
They are less religious than society as a whole; they
include a relatively high proportion of people with leftist
and centrist political views. KOD sympathisers support the
parties: Nowoczesna (50%) and Civic Platform (PO, 22%).
Among supporters of PiS policy, men are overrepresented.
As with KOD supporters, people aged 55 and above are
relatively numerous. As far as place of residence is
concerned, they do not differ from the society as a whole.
Their education and material situation do not differ
markedly from the general population; however, the
wealthiest (those with monthly income of 2000 PLN per
capita and above) are slightly underrepresented. PiS
supporters are characterized by relatively high religiosity
and right-wing political orientation. A vast majority (72%)
would vote PiS, while others support Kukiz'15 (11%) and
the party KORWiN (4%).
Gender:
50%
49%
Men
Agree
40%
Women
30%
46%
54%
51%
Age:
20%
18-24 years
Don't know
10%
25-34
35-44
0%
X VI
'92 '93
V
'95
III
'99
X
'00
III
'02
V
'04
IX/X
'05
XI IV XI
'06'07
VII I
'08 '09
III
'10
VIIIXI
'11
VII III VI
'13 '14
XI I
'15 '16
Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD) is supported
by 46% of respondents, while Law and Justice by 42%.
2
13%
According to analyses, some people approve both of KOD
and authorities. A third of respondents unequivocally
approve of KOD (without supporting the government).
The group of unequivocal supporters of PiS (i.e. those who
do not support the Committee) is slightly smaller. Onefourth of respondents support neither side.
0%
VI
VII
1992 1993
21%
Supporters
of both KOD
and authorities
33
19
15
16%
41
36
30%
Do you support actions
of current authorities?
45-54
55-64
65 and above
9%
10%
18%
16%
18%
17%
14%
16%
19%
20%
22%
21%
Supporters of KOD only
Supporters of current authorities only
Place of residence:
30%
Rural
Urban up to 19 999
9%
20%
23%
17%
15%
19%
11%
20 000 - 99 999
100 000 - 499 000
500 000 and above
Trust in institutions
Supporters of KOD only
Supporters of current authorities only
Education:
Basic vocational
Tertiary
650 - 999 PLN
1000 - 1399 PLN
28%
17
Commissioner for Human Rights
13
50
9 3
Institute of National Remembrance
15
47
11 4
NATO
14
48
13
UN
13
Public administration
40%
Good
50%
59%
Courts
Television
Religious practice:
Several times a week
1%
9%
36%
Once a week
15%
15%
Once or twice a month
Several times a year
Never
16%
Constitutional Court
23%
7%
Centre
Right
Don't know
8
17%
19%
Newspapers 2
28
4
25
Trade unions 2
33%
21%
19%
30
26
Churches (other than Catholic)
27%
5%
7
Political parties 2
17
12
12
31
8
23
13
27
16
21
15
13
30
14
28
13
26
13
20
24
41
24
17
14
33
18
7
8
16
30
34
21
26
4
36
30
3
4
Sejm and Senate
25%
Political views:
Left
Big business
53%
23
4
26
34
8
13
25
25
38
4
7 6
8
6
20
47
7
Government
13
46
3
21
19
44
10
EU
Average
17
53
8%
10%
33%
46
11
Material living conditions:
Bad
51
56
38%
19%
53
9
Local government
15%
17%
2000 PLN and above
24
Police
Income per capita:
7%
16%
17%
20%
23%
1400 - 1999 PLN
20
Roman Catholic Church
8 2 11
56
23
Army
7 3 11
57
22
Scouting
8 3 6
52
31
Caritas
Red Cross
26%
29%
31%
35%
23%
Secondary
(%)
6 4 5
42
43
Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity
16%
20%
20%
Primary
Up to 649 PLN
high negative ratings are given to: newspapers, Sejm,
Senate, government and television.
42%
14%
35
22
43
15
59%
More information about this topic can be found in CBOS reports in
Polish: "Socio-political Activity in Poland" and “Opinions about
Democracy”, February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample: January
2016, N=1063. The random address sample is representative for adult
population of Poland.
Trust in the public sphere
Charities such as the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity,
Caritas and the Red Cross enjoy the highest trust. Other
trusted institutions are: the Army, scouts and the Roman
Catholic Church. Over three-fifths of respondents have
confidence in the police, local government, the
Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) and the
Institute of National Remembrance. A comparable
proportion of respondents express their trust in
international institutions in which Poland is a member,
such as NATO, UN and EU. Half of respondents trust the
public administration, and a slightly smaller percentage
have confidence in courts of law. The other institutions are
trusted less. Almost two-fifths of respondents have trust
in government, television and the Constitutional Court.
Even smaller proportion trust newspapers, Sejm, Senate,
Churches (other than Catholic) and trade unions. Political
parties receive the lowest scores: only a fifth of
respondents put some trust in them. Apart from political
parties, distrusted by two-thirds of respondents, relatively
Strong
trust
Moderate
trust
Moderate
distrust
Strong
distrust
Don't
know
Compared with 2012, the institutions which gained in
public trust are: Institute of National Remembrance (7point increase), local government (6-point rise), the Army,
NATO, and public administration (5 points each). There
was also a slight increase in trust in Caritas, scouting,
Commissioner for Human Rights (3 points each) and big
enterprises (2 points). On the other hand, there was a
decrease in trust in mass media: since 2012 trust in TV
dropped by 6 percentage points while newspapers lost 4
points. The most trusted institution, the Great Orchestra
of Christmas Charity, lost 4 points.
Do you trust …
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Television:
10%
0%
I 2002
I 2004
Yes
No
I 2006
Newspapers:
I 2008
I 2010
Yes
No
I 2012
I 2016
80%
60%
EU:
40%
UN:
Yes
No
Yes
No
20%
0%
I 2002
I 2004
I 2006
I 2008
I 2010
I 2012
I 2016
“Don't know” omitted
3
Moreover, the decline of trust in media (both TV and
newspapers) is visible in an eight-year perspective. The
level currently recorded is the lowest ever. In the same
period there was also a decrease in ratings of international
organizations, such as EU or UN, trusted by over half of
respondents. Trust in EU is now the lowest since Poland's
accession.
More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in
Polish: "Social Trust", February 2016. Fieldwork for national sample:
January 2016, N=1063. The random address sample is representative
for adult population of Poland.
Opinions about the “Family
500+” programme
The president signed the law on state support for children,
which fulfils one of the major pre-electoral promises of
PiS. This law has a goal of financially supporting families
bringing up children and increasing the birth rate in view
of negative demographic trends. It envisages a benefit of
500 PLN for every second and subsequent child and for
every first child in families in which per capita income is
not higher than 800 PLN (or 1200 PLN in case of families
with a disabled child).
In general, Poles appreciate the need to conduct state
policy towards increasing fertility. Over three-quarters
think that the state should have a policy to encourage
people to have more children. The view is becoming more
widespread.
Do you agree that the state should have a policy
to encourage people to have more children?
(%)
VII 2013
33
38
35
II 2016
17
42
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Moderately
disagree
6
14
Strongly
disagree
6
3 6
The introduction of the 500 PLN childcare benefit for every
second and subsequent child up to the age 18 and for
every child in low-income families is supported by a vast
majority of respondents.
According to government estimates, 278 000 more
children will be born in the next ten years due to the
introduction of the “Family 500+” programme than would
otherwise be the case. This would reduce the pace of
decline in the number of births, although it would not
reverse the negative trend. Social expectation related to
the consequences of the introduction of this programme
are moderately optimistic. Almost two-thirds of
respondents hope that the introduction of the “Family
500+” programme will increase the number of births in
Poland. Most of them predict a modest increase.
Will the introduction of the “Family 500+” programme
contribute to the increase in the number of births in Poland?
Yes,
significantly
Don't
know
Yes, but only
to a small extent
16%
6%
49%
29%
No
The effectiveness of the programme “Family 500+” will
probably depend not so much on its duration, but rather
on whether it will become anchored in social
consciousness as a constant and predictable element of
the support system for families and fertility in Poland.
Future implementation of this programme is doubtful.
Over half of respondents are afraid that this government
or the following will not have money to continue it. Almost
a third of Poles think that this programme will be
prioritised and will continue for years.
Will there be funding for the programme “Family 500+”
in the following years?
Yes, it will be prioritised
and will continue for years
Don't
know
Don't know
32%
Strongly
support
Moderately
support
47%
33%
No, this government
or the following will
discontinue it
Don't
know
9%
6%
5%
Moderately Strongly
oppose
oppose
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4
17%
51%
Do you support the introduction of a 500 PLN childcare
benefit for every second and subsequent child up
to the age 18 and for every child in low-income families?
www.cbos.pl
More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in
Polish: "Family 500 Plus Programme as a Component of State Support
for Families and Boosting Demography", February 2016. Fieldwork for
national sample: February 2016, N=1000. The random address sample
is representative for adult population of Poland.
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