Intervener Attorney-General-of-Ontario

Transcription

Court File No. 35009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEBEC COURT OF APPEAL)
B E T W E E N:
BANQUE DE MONTRÉAL, CITIBANQUE CANADA,
LA BANQUE TORONTO-DOMINION, BANQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA
Appellants
(Appellants)
- and RÉAL MARCOTTE, BERNARD LAPARÉ, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC,
LE PRESIDENT DE L’OFFICE DE LA PROTECTION DU CONSOMMATEUR
Respondents
(Respondents, Mise-en-Cause)
- and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA
Interveners
(Interveners)
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
Constitutional Law Branch
4th Floor, 720 Bay Street
Toronto, ON M7A 2S9
BURKE-ROBERTSON
Barristers & Solicitors
200-441 MacLaren Street
Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3
Janet E. Minor (LSUC No. 14898A)
Tel: (416) 326-4137
Fax: (416) 326-4015
[email protected]
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
Tel.: (613) 236-9665
Fax: (613) 235-4430
E-mail: [email protected]
Robert A. Donato (LSUC No. 44544F)
Tel: (416) 326-4473
Fax: (416) 326-4015
[email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener
Attorney General of Ontario
Ottawa Agent for the Intervener
Attorney General of Ontario
TO:
THE REGISTRAR
Supreme Court of Canada
301 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0J1
AND TO:
Mahmud Jamal
Sylvain Deslauriers
Sylvana Conte
Alberto Martinez
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP
Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place
Toronto, Ontario
M5X 1B8
Patricia J. Wilson
340 Albert Street, Suite 1900
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7Y6
Tel: (416) 862-6764
Fax: (416) 862-6666
Email : [email protected]
Tel: (613) 787-1009
Fax: (613) 235-2867
Email: [email protected]
Counsel for the Appellants/Respondents,
Bank of Montreal, Citibank, TorontoDominion Bank, National Bank of Canada,
Amex Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of
Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, Bank of Nova Scotia,
Laurentian Bank
Agent for the Appellants/Respondents,
Bank of Montreal, Citibank, TorontoDominion Bank, National Bank of
Canada, Amex Bank of Canada, Royal
Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, Bank of Nova Scotia,
Laurentian Bank
Bruce W. Johnston
Phillippe H. Trudel
André Lespérance
Andrew Cleland
Trudel & Johnston
Bureau 90
750, Côte de la Place dÀrmes
Montreal, Quebec
H2Y 2X8
Moira Dillon
Supreme Law Group
900 – 275 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5H9
Tel: (514) 871-8385
Fax: (514) 871-8800
Tel: (613) 691-1224
Fax: (613) 691-1338
Counsel for the Appellants/Respondents,
Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé
Agent for the Appellants/Respondents,
Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé
Jean-François Jobin
Francis Demers
Samuel Chayer
Bernard, Roy & Associés
8.00 – 1 rue Notre-Dame Est
Montréal, Quebec
H2Y 1B6
Pierre Landry
Noël & Associés
111, rue Champlain
Gatineau, Quebec
J8X 3R1
Tel: (514) 393-2336 Ext: 51452
Tel: (819) 771-7393
Fax: (514) 873-7074
Fax: (819) 771-5397
Email: [email protected] Email : [email protected]
Counsel for the Respondent/Intervener,
Attorney General of Quebec
Agent for the Respondent/Intervener,
Attorney General of Quebec
Marc Migneault
Allard, Renaud et Associés
100, rue Laviolette, Bureau RC 11
Trois-Rivières, Quebec
G9A 5S9
Pierre Landry
Noël & Associés
111, rue Champlain
Gatineau, Quebec
J8X 3R1
Tel: (888) 672-2556 Ext. 3426
Fax: (819) 371-6489
Tel: (819) 771-7393
Fax: (819) 771-5397
Email : [email protected]
Counsel for the Respondent/Intervener,
Président de lÒffice de la Protection du
Consommateur
Agent for the Respondent/Intervener,
Président de lÒffice de la Protection du
Consommateur
Nancy E. Brown
Attorney General of British Columbia
1001 Douglas Street
P.O. Box 9280 Stn Prov Govt
Victoria, British Columbia
V8W 9J7
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
Burke-Robertson
441 MacLaren Street
Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 2H3
Tel: (250) 356-5597
Fax: (250) 356-9154
Tel: (613) 236-9665
Fax: (613) 235-4430
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney
General of British Columbia
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney
General of British Columbia
Robert J. Normey
Attorney General of Alberta
4th Floor, Bowker Building
9833 – 109th Street
Edmonton, Alberta
T5K 2E8
Henry S. Brown, Q.C.
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
2600 – 160 Elgin St
P.O. Box 466, Stn “D”
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 1C3
Tel: (780) 422-9532
Fax: (780) 425-0307
Tel: (613) 233-1781
Fax: (613) 788-3433
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney
General of Alberta
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney
General of Alberta
John B. Laskin
Torys LLP
3000 Maritime Life Tower, TD Centre
79 Wellington Street West
Toronto, Ontario
M5K 1N2
Patricia J. Wilson
340 Albert Street
Suite 1900
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7Y6
Tel: (416) 865-7317
Fax: (416) 865-7380
Tel: (613) 787-1009
Fax: (613) 235-2867
Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian
Bankers Association
Agent for the Intervener, Canadian
Bankers Association
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................... 1
PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...................................................................................... 2
PART III – ARGUMENT...................................................................................................... 2
1. The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine ............................................................ 2
2. The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine is Not Applicable in this Case ........... 6
A. The “Pith and Substance” of the Consumer Protection Act Provisions .......... 6
B. The Provincial Law Does Not Trench on the “Core”
of the Federal Banking Power ......................................................................... 8
C. The Provincial Law Does Not “Impair” the Core ............................................14
3. The Preamble to the Bank Act Alone Cannot Trigger the Paramountcy Doctrine 19
PART IV – COSTS ................................................................................................................20
PART V – ORDER SOUGHT...............................................................................................20
PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................22
PART VII – LEGISLATION.................................................................................................26
i
1
PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Overview
1.
This case concerns the interplay between the provincial power over “Property and Civil
Rights in the Province” (s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867) and the federal power over
“Banking” (s. 91(15)). The Attorney General of Ontario intervenes to address the first
constitutional question in this proceeding: whether specific provisions of the Quebec Consumer
Protection Act regulating credit card transactions and agreements are constitutionally
inapplicable to banks.
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 92(13), 91(15), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, App. III, No. 5 [Constitution Act, 1867].
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1.
2.
The Attorney General of Ontario respectfully submits that the Quebec Consumer
Protection Act provisions are applicable to the appellant banks. It is submitted that neither step of
the two-prong interjurisdictional immunity test is satisfied in this case: (1) the provincial law
does not trench on the “core” of the federal banking power; and (2) the provincial law does not
“impair” the core. The Superior Court of Quebec was correct in holding that neither step of the
test was satisfied, and the Quebec Court of Appeal correctly affirmed that holding.
3.
Ontario makes no submissions on whether the specifics of Quebec’s Consumer
Protection Act conflict with particular provisions of the federal Bank Act, so as to trigger the
paramountcy doctrine. Ontario’s position is that if this Court should hold that specific provisions
of the legislation do conflict, then any such conflict should be resolved by the doctrine of
paramountcy. As this Court has affirmed in its federalism jurisprudence, paramountcy is the
preferable, more flexible constitutional doctrine in cases of overlapping federal and provincial
legislation.
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 [Book of Authorities of the
Attorney General of Ontario [BOA] Tab 11] at para. 77 [Canadian Western Bank].
Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 [BOA Tab 17] at paras.
52, 54 [Mangat].
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Statement of Facts
4.
The Attorney General of Ontario accepts the facts as stated by the respondent mise-en-
cause, the Attorney General of Quebec, and as found by the trial judge.
Factum of Respondent Attorney General of Quebec at paras. 4-17.
Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal, 2009 QCCS 2764 at paras. 215-318 [Superior Court
Judgment].
PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE
5.
The following constitutional questions were stated by the Chief Justice of Canada on
June 24, 2013:
1. Are ss. 12, 66-72, 83, 91, 92, 126, 127, 219, 228, and 271-272 of the Consumer
Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, and ss. 55-61 of the Regulation respecting the
application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q., c. P-40.1, r. 3,
constitutionally inapplicable in respect of bank-issued credit cards by reason of
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity?
2. Are ss. 12, 66-72, 83, 91, 92, 126, 127, 219, 228, and 271-272 of the Consumer
Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, and ss. 55-61 of the Regulation respecting the
application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q., c. P-40.1, r. 3,
constitutionally inoperative in respect of bank-issued credit cards by reason of
the doctrine of federal paramountcy?
6.
The Attorney General of Ontario supports the factual and legal analysis of the respondent
Attorney General of Quebec on the first question. With respect to the second question, Ontario
takes no position on whether a conflict triggering the paramountcy doctrine is demonstrated on
the facts of this case. However, Ontario supports the submissions of the Attorney General of
Quebec regarding the preamble to the Bank Act and will make brief submissions on this point.
PART III – ARGUMENT
1.
The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine
7.
In Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, this Court engaged in a comprehensive review of
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and concluded that “interjurisdictional immunity is a
doctrine of limited application”. This Court explained that the dominant tide of constitutional
3
interpretation “does not favour interjurisdictional immunity” and that, accordingly, “the Court
does not favour an intensive reliance on the doctrine”.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 33, 35, 47; see also paras. 34,
36-38, 67, 77-78.
Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44 [BOA Tab 18] at para.
50 [Ryan Estate].
8.
In this case, the appellant banks are asking this Court to revisit the role of the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in the context of the same heads of provincial and federal
power that were at issue in Canadian Western Bank: the provincial “Property and Civil Rights”
power and the federal “Banking” power. While the banks argue that they are applying the
framework for analysis articulated in Canadian Western Bank, their argument relies on
particularly expansive notions both of the “core” of the federal banking power and of the
“impairment” required to invoke the doctrine. Therefore, while the banks argue that their
position is consistent with Canadian Western Bank, their approach would significantly broaden
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. It is therefore worth briefly reviewing the reasons that
the doctrine should remain restricted in scope and limited in application.
Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 91(15), s. 92(13).
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 38.
Chatterjee v. Ontario Attorney General, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 [BOA Tab 13] at para. 2:
Resort to a federalist concept of proliferating jurisdictional enclaves (or “interjurisdictional
immunities”) was discouraged by this Court’s decisions in Canadian Western Bank v.
Alberta and British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc.[citations
omitted], and should not now be given a new lease on life.
9.
First, constitutional doctrines relating to the division of powers should reflect the
overarching principle of federalism. Interjurisdictional immunity runs counter to the dominant
interpretation of Canadian federalism – a “federalism that puts greater emphasis on the legitimate
interplay between federal and provincial powers”. As this Court explained in Canadian Western
Bank, the dominant tide of constitutional interpretation “finds its principled underpinning in the
concern that a court should favour, where possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by
both levels of government.”
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 36, 37 [emphasis in original];
see also para. 24.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 50.
4
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 [BOA Tab 24] at paras. 55, 57
[Securities Reference].
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134
[BOA Tab 9] at paras. 62-63, 70 [PHS].
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R.
536 [BOA Tab 19] at para. 44 [COPA].
Superior Court Judgment, supra at para. 567.
Banque de Montréal c. Marcotte, 2012 QCCA 1396 at para. 86 [Court of Appeal Judgment].
10.
Second, broad application of the doctrine does not sit well with other constitutional
doctrines in Canada. The essence of the “pith and substance” doctrine, in particular, is to permit
a law to have incidental effects on the other level of government, so long as the dominant feature
of the legislation falls within the jurisdiction of the enacting body. Similarly, the “double aspect”
doctrine holds that some laws have both a federal and a provincial aspect, and are therefore
competent to both Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 29-31, 34, 42.
Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 569-570, 602-603.
11.
Interjurisdictional immunity also runs counter to the flexibility and restraint of the
paramountcy doctrine as the preferred method for resolving the interplay between federal and
provincial jurisdiction. The paramountcy doctrine is based on the specifics of enacted legislation
by each level of government, and restricted to those situations in which federal and provincial
laws conflict. In contrast, interjurisdictional immunity operates irrespective of the nature or
extent of actual federal regulation. The doctrine can therefore result in far-reaching and severe
effects. By rendering provincial law inapplicable even in the absence of conflict with federal law
– and, indeed, even in the face of federal legislative silence – interjurisdictional immunity creates
legal uncertainty and, in some cases, can give rise to a legislative or regulatory vacuum.
COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 62-64.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 44, 77-78, 89.
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 [BOA
Tab 8] at paras. 4, 43, 72-73, 76-77 [Lafarge].
PHS [BOA Tab 9], supra at paras. 64, 69.
See also: Court of Appeal Judgment, supra at para. 86.
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12.
Third, unlike all other doctrines of constitutional law in Canada, interjurisdictional
immunity sits uneasily with the tradition of the incremental development of the common law and
interpretation of the constitution. The doctrine requires the judiciary to engage in what this Court
has described as an “abstract” attempt at defining a “core” of a constitutional head of power. The
exercise is further abstracted because the “core” of the power is necessarily to be distinguished
from the full scope of the power, which is generally what has been elaborated incrementally in
the jurisprudence.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 43; see also para. 31.
13.
Fourth, interjurisdictional immunity has produced “asymmetrical” results in Canadian
federalism. In theory, the doctrine is reciprocal, and should serve to protect provincial heads of
power and provincial undertakings from federal encroachment as well. However, in practice, the
jurisprudential application of the doctrine has primarily favoured federal immunity at the
expense of provincial legislation protecting workers, consumers and the environment.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 45; see also paras. 34-35.
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 [BOA Tab 22] at
para. 183 [Assisted Reproduction Reference] per LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
14.
In short, interjurisdictional immunity undermines the overarching Canadian federal
principle that a fair amount of jurisdictional and legislative overlap “is to be expected and
accommodated”. As such, this Court has been clear that interjurisdictional immunity should be
used sparingly. Rather, courts should favour the application of both provincial and federal
legislation whenever possible.
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 [BOA
Tab 14] at para. 45.
15.
In COPA and Ryan Estate, this Court applied a two-step test for the application of the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The first step is to determine whether the provincial law
trenches on the protected “core” of a head of power. If it does, the second step is to determine
whether the encroachment is sufficiently serious to invoke the doctrine – whether it “impairs” the
core.
COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at para. 27.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at paras. 54-56.
6
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 48, 50.
16.
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is generally restricted to “situations already
covered by precedent”, and there is little, if any, precedent addressing the core of the banking
power. The appellant banks rely on Bank of Montreal v. Hall, but that was a case determined on
the basis of the doctrine of paramountcy. The jurisprudence has traditionally refrained from
finding that the federal banking power has a core that bars the application of provincial
legislation. This is likely due to the intertwined nature of the provincial property and civil rights
power and the federal banking power, and the dependency of banks on the body of provincial
law that regulates the contractual and other private law aspects of loans and lending.
Nonetheless, this Court appeared to acknowledge in Canadian Western Bank that the banking
power has a core. Ontario agrees that one can postulate a core of banking, but (as explained
below) this core would not include credit card regulation.
Factum of the Appellant Banks at paras. 41-45.
Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 [BOA Tab 3] at paras. 59-65 [Hall].
COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 26, 58.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 49
PHS [BOA Tab 9], supra at paras. 61, 65.
2.
The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine is Not Applicable in this Case
A.
The “Pith and Substance” of the Consumer Protection Act Provisions
17.
The first step in the process of constitutional interpretation is to identify the “pith and
substance” of the law. The identification of the “pith and substance” or dominant feature of the
law is critical to the entire constitutional analysis. This Court has held that the process should be
informed by the federalism principle, which “accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and
encourages intergovernmental cooperation.”
Securities Reference [BOA Tab 24], supra at para. 57; see also paras. 55, 93-94.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 21-27
Assisted Reproduction Reference [BOA Tab 22], supra at paras. 184, 189-191 per LeBel
and Deschamps JJ.
7
18.
In this case, Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act regulates credit card transactions and
agreements. The main provisions that form the basis for the constitutional challenge require the
disclosure of credit card fees (s. 12) and provide a statutory “grace period” of 21 days to pay a
credit card balance, during which interest is not payable (s. 126-127).
Consumer Protection Act, supra, s. 12, 126-127.
19.
The loan of money is a matter of contract, and the Consumer Protection Act regulates and
makes certain modifications to the law of contract in order to better protect consumers. The “pith
and substance” or dominant feature of the legislation is the protection of consumers in their
contractual relations with businesses; and the “pith and substance” of these specific provisions is
the protection of consumers in their contractual relations involving credit cards.
Richard v. Time Inc., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 265 [BOA Tab 25] at paras. 39-41, 160-162
[Richard].
Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 576-592.
20.
The regulation of credit card contracts, in the interest of consumers, falls within the heart
of provincial jurisdiction over “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” (s. 92(13) of the
Constitution Act, 1867). The phrase “Property and Civil Rights” originally appeared in article
VIII of the Quebec Act, 1774, which maintained the French civil law as the body of private law
in Quebec. The phrase is “a compendious description of the entire body of private law which
governs the relationships between subject and subject, as opposed to the law which governs the
relationships between the subject and the institutions of government.” The regulation of credit
card contracts therefore lies within the constitutional authority conferred to the provinces to
establish, regulate or modify private law, including the law of contract.
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (loose-leaf) (Toronto:
Carswell, 2007) vol. 1 [BOA Tab 34], c. 21 at 2.
H. Brun, G. Tremblay & E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5e ed. (Cowansville:
Editions Yvon Blais, 2008) [BOA Tab 31] at 475:
Le paragraphe 92(13) inclut globalement, d’abord et avant tout, ce qui est considéré comme
du droit civil au Québec et qui est traditionellement dans le Code civil. Dans les autres
provinces, les matières correspondantes qui participent du système common law sont aussi
de compétence provinciale. […]
La compétence de principe des provinces sur le droit privé s’étend aussi à ce qu’on appelle
aujourd’hui la protection du consommateur [emphasis added].
8
21.
Where banks engage in credit card transactions, and where the federal government elects
to regulate such transactions that involve a bank, the matter possesses a “double aspect” – an
aspect of consumer protection of contractual relations through the provincial Consumer
Protection Act, and also a banking aspect through the Bank Act.
22.
The provincial property and civil rights power and the federal banking power are by their
nature intertwined. Even the most rudimentary forms of banking depend on provincial
legislation, particularly on the provincial law that regulates contracts and secured transactions.
As this Court emphasized in Bank of Montreal v. Hall, “there can be no hermetic division
between banking as a generic activity and the domain covered by property and civil rights”:
overlap or “spillover” between federal and provincial laws is “inevitable”.
Hall [BOA Tab 3], supra at para. 40.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 85, 89.
See also: Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1995] 3
S.C.R. 453 [BOA Tab 16] at para. 30 (in the context of the interplay between federal
bankruptcy law and provincial property and civil rights law)
B.
The Provincial Law Does Not Trench on the “Core” of the Federal Banking Power
23.
The first step of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is to consider whether the
provincial law trenches on the “core” of the federal banking power. The core is the “minimum
content necessary to make the power effective for the purpose for which it was conferred”.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 50 [emphasis added]; see also
paras. 41, 51, 77.
Lafarge [BOA Tab 8], supra at paras. 43, 64.
Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1
S.C.R. 749 [BOA Tab 6] at para. 302.
24.
The activities of banks, traditional or otherwise, do not define the core of the banking
power. It is not the activities involved in banking that have a core, but the banking power. The
9
focus, therefore, should be on federal legislative authority, and on “the purpose for which it was
conferred”, rather than on bank activities.
Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board), [1980]
1 S.C.R. 433 [BOA Tab 10] at 453, 467-468 [Canadian Pioneer].
25.
This Court has commented on the problems inherent in defining the banking power by
way of functions or activities. These criticisms apply whether considering the full scope of the
banking power or the “core”. In Canadian Pioneer, Beetz J. indicated that it might not be
possible “to define banking in purely functional terms”. In Canadian Western Bank, Binnie and
LeBel JJ. again cautioned that “activities”, unlike federal works, undertakings, things or persons,
are particularly prone to “practical problems of application”:
While the text and logic of our federal structure justifies the application of
interjurisdictional immunity to certain federal “activities”; nevertheless, a broad application
of the doctrine to “activities” creates practical problems of application much greater than in
the case of works or undertakings, things or persons, whose limits are more readily defined.
A broad application also appears inconsistent, as stated, with the flexible federalism that the
constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect and federal paramountcy are
designed to promote.
Canadian Pioneer [BOA Tab 10], supra at 461; see also 449-450.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 42; see also paras. 43, 65, 85, 89.
26.
The appellant banks’ argument in this case ignores this Court’s repeated cautions about
the problematic nature of a functional definition of banking. The banks’ basic argument is that
the activity of “lending” is part of the core of banking. The banks then argue that as credit card
transactions involve “lending”, credit card regulation also forms part of the core.
Factum of the Appellant Banks at paras. 41-45, 51.
27.
The banks’ only modification to a functional definition of the core of banking is to
restrict it to specific activities when they are done by banks. The banks therefore make use of the
“institutional test” of banking to limit the benefit of interjurisdictional immunity to the banks
alone. However, the critical task of defining the core remains based on banking functions or
activities. As such, the banks argue that whereas insurance is not an activity that forms part of
the core, “lending” is such an activity. Indeed, the banks go so far as to argue that if the activity
10
of “lending” by banks is not part of the core, “it is time for the Court to state flat out that contrary
to Canadian Western Bank there is no such thing as core banking”.
Factum of the Appellant Banks at para. 51; see also paras. 49-50.
28.
Ontario respectfully submits that a constitutional analysis that focuses on the purpose for
which the power was conferred, rather than on banking activities, reveals that there is a “core” of
banking, and also that this core does not include the regulation of credit card transactions and
agreements. For the purpose of this appeal, it may not be necessary for this Court to embark
upon a delineation of the core of banking (as the Court could hold that whatever the core, credit
card regulation clearly lies outside of it). Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider, by way of
contrast, what might fall within the core.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 42-43, 50, 65, 85, 89.
29.
The core of the banking power would presumably comprise the regulation of the vital
parts of banks as federally incorporated undertakings. Federal laws regulating the chartering of
banks, capital structure, corporate governance, and labour relations would presumably fall within
the core. In addition, it might be reasonable to suppose that the allocation of “Banking” to federal
jurisdiction in the Constitution Act, 1867 evinces a policy preference for nationwide branch
banking, in contrast to the regionalized banking structures that were prevalent in the United
States.
Many observers have attributed the Canadian system’s relative success to its structure, one that
is very different from that of the U.S. system. The Canadian banking sector has always been
composed of very large banks with nationwide branches. This has not only allowed Canadian
banks to diversify their loan portfolios across regions; it has also allowed them to transfer
funds in order to shore up banks in regions affected by adverse economic shocks. Nationwide
branch banking has also allowed Canada’s banks to achieve economies of scale while
competing among themselves for business in local markets.
C.W. Calomiris & S.H. Haber, “Why Banking Systems Succeed – and Fail: The Politics
Behind Financial Institutions”(2013), 92 Foreign Aff 97 [BOA Tab 32] at 108.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 83:
The purpose of allocating “Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money” to
Parliament under s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was to create an orderly and uniform
financial system, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and control in contrast to a
regionalized banking system which in “[t]he years preceding the Canadian Confederation [was]
characterized in the United States by ‘a chaotic era of wild-cat state banking’” (P. N.
McDonald, “The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism” (1972), 10
Alta. L. Rev. 155, at p. 156; B. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law: Cases, Text and Notes on
Distribution of Legislative Power (3rd ed. 1969), at p. 603).
11
See also: Reference re: An Act respecting the Taxation of Banks, [1939] A.C. 117 (P.C.)
[BOA Tab 21] at paras. 24-26; Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1947] A.C. 503 (P.C.) [BOA Tab 1] at para. 17 (where the invalidated legislation would
have substituted a provincial system of social credit for a national banking system)
30.
Furthermore, those critical aspects of federal bank regulation aimed at fostering and
protecting the solvency and reliability of the banks as national deposit-taking and lending
institutions might lie at the core of the banking power. The core might therefore comprise federal
regulation of foreign ownership restrictions, minimum capital and liquidity requirements and
prudential lending and investment regulations, as well as the corresponding subjection of banks
to a federal regime of reporting, inspection and compliance in relation to these regulations.
E.S. Binavince and H.S. Fairley, “Banking and the Constitution: Untested Limits of
Federal Jurisdiction” (1986) 65 Can. Bar. Rev. 328 [BOA Tab 29] at 336-337.
P. McDonald, “The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism”
(1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 155 [BOA Tab 35] at 156, 186.
31.
Finally, as Beetz J. noted in Canadian Pioneer, s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867
refers not simply to “Banking”, but to “Banking, the Incorporation of Banks, and The Issue of
Paper Money”. As such, if the issuance of banknotes had not become the monopoly of the Bank
of Canada, that also would probably be considered part of the core of banking.
Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 91(15).
Canadian Pioneer [BOA Tab 10], supra at 460:
[I]t is significant in this regard that in s. 91.15 of the Constitution, legislative jurisdiction over
the issue of paper money is linked with jurisdiction over banking and the incorporation of banks.
Binavince & Fairley [BOA Tab 29], supra at 336-337.
McDonald [BOA Tab 35], supra at 186.
32.
In contrast, the regulation of credit cards does not form part of the “minimum content
necessary to make the power effective for the purpose for which it was conferred”. The
regulation of credit card transactions and agreements – and specifically, the regulation of fee
disclosure or a statutory “grace period” for payment of interest – simply do not relate (and
certainly do not relate closely or sufficiently) to bank solvency, bank structure, or other aspects
of the regulation of banks that might be considered the “minimum content” necessary to make
the power effective at the federal level. Another way of putting it is that the regulation of credit
cards is not a matter so distinctly of federal interest that it is “that which makes certain works or
undertakings, things […] or persons […] specifically of federal jurisdiction” [emphasis added].
12
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 50; see also paras. 41, 51
Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 630-665, 679, 698-699.
33.
Indeed, as the “pith and substance” analysis shows, the regulation of credit card
transactions and agreements can be regarded as a matter that, in general, is much more closely
tied to the distinctly provincial competence to establish, regulate and modify a body of private
law. As the Superior Court of Quebec explained, making reference to the specific legislative
context of Quebec, consumer protection law is “indissociable” from the history of contract law,
and a direct outgrowth or culmination (“l’aboutissement direct”) of contract law. This view is
echoed in common law Canada as well. In The Law of Contracts, Professor Waddams describes
consumer protection measures – and specifically, legislated disclosure obligations – as measures
intended to address the problem of mistake or the problem of unfairness in contract law:
Consumer protection merits separate consideration. The growth in the use of standard form
printed documents, together with the inequality of bargaining power between the business
supplier of goods and services and the customer have placed stress on contract law. The
problems are two: First, the customer may not know or understand the contents of the
document signed – basically a problem of mistake. Secondly, the contents, whether or not
known and understood, may be unfair. […] One type of consumer protection legislation
aims at eliminating the mistake – examples are disclosure requirements and requirements
relating to the appearance and form of printed documents. The other type of legislation
attacks the problem of unfairness, either by giving the court or other tribunal a discretion to
assess it, or by prohibiting or positively requiring the use of certain specified terms.
Such legislation is entirely consistent with judicial development of contract law. Clear
disclosure of particular terms that are liable to be misunderstood is of concern to a court
even where the disclosure is not required by legislation, and in such cases nondisclosure
may lead to a judicial remedy.
S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2010)
[BOA Tab 36] at 7-8 [emphasis added].
C. Masse, “Fondement historique de l’évolution du droit québécois de la
consommation”, in P-C Lafond, ed., Mélanges Claude Masse : En quête de justice et
d’équité (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2003) 38 [BOA Tab 33] at 52.
34.
The banks’ argument that “lending” forms part of a protected core of banking also ignores
the serious problem of parsing which parts of the body of provincial private law would apply and
which would not. The act of “lending” requires a body of private law to govern the loans made.
Consumer protection legislation, personal property security legislation, mortgage/hypothec
legislation, and in Quebec, the Civil Code, are all deeply entwined and integrated with the body
13
of private law that is at the heart of provincial jurisdiction over “Property and Civil Rights”. The
banks would presumably wish to rely, for example, on provisions in the Civil Code that declare
that fraud vitiates contract formation, or provisions in provincial legislation that provide rights in
respect of secured property.
Richard [BOA Tab 25], supra at paras. 39-41.
Bank of Montreal v. Demakos, [1996] O.J. No. 4667 (Gen. Div.) [BOA Tab 2] at para. 30:
It would seem beyond doubt that the central nerve or core of the credit card is the
customer’s written agreement with the bank card issuer. The sparse legislation which exists
in Canada at the federal and provincial level is largely concerned with creating narrow but
specific legislative controls on this contract.
Civil Code of Québec, arts. 1401, 1385.
35.
The banks’ argument, if accepted, inevitably leads to either: (i) a path haunted by the
spectre of a “legal vacuum”, in which huge portions of provincial property and civil rights law
governing bank activities become inapplicable to banks; or (ii) a quagmire requiring courts to
conceptually distinguish provisions that regulate, for example, disclosure of fees in a contract
from other provincial rules governing “lending” (such as those relating to how a contract is
formed, its express and implied terms, the circumstances in which the contract is vitiated, and so
forth).
PHS, supra at paras. 64, 69.
36.
While “lending”, as a business activity, is unquestionably a significant function of banks,
this is simply not the test to determine the core of banking. The regulation of credit card
transactions does not fall within the minimum content that makes effective the specifically
federal purpose for which the banking power was conferred on the federal government. It is
possible that certain limited aspects of “lending” – such as lending restrictions intended to ensure
the solvency of the institutions themselves (e.g., requirements for collateral or security in
particular circumstances) could form part of an exclusive core. However, the provincial law
governing consumer credit card transactions (and certainly the rules involving disclosure and a
statutory grace period) is made in the interests of protecting consumers and does not relate to the
purpose for which the federal banking power was conferred. Furthermore, it is integrally related
to the province’s historic role in establishing, regulating and modifying private law.
14
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 83-85.
37.
The Superior Court of Quebec and Quebec Court of Appeal decisions place significant
emphasis on the history of credit cards in concluding that “credit cards are far removed from
banking”. Ontario submits that while the banks’ entry into the credit card market relatively late
within the history of credit cards is not in itself determinative of whether credit cards form part
of the “core” of banking, the history is entirely reflective of the fact that the “minimum content”
necessary to effect the purpose for which the banking power was conferred does not include the
regulation of credit card transactions.
Court of Appeal Judgment, supra at paras. 85-87.
III.
The Provincial Law Does Not “Impair” the Core of the Banking Power
38.
It is Ontario’s position that the core of banking is not implicated in this case. However,
even if this Court were to hold that the regulation of credit card contracts does encroach on the
core of the banking power, then the Consumer Protection Act does not “impair” this core. As this
Court stated in COPA, “it is not enough that [the impugned provincial legislation] strike at the
heart of a federal competency”; the interference must also be sufficiently serious for
interjurisdictional immunity to be successfully invoked.
39.
A provincial law must “impair” the core of a federal power for interjurisdictional
immunity to apply. In Canadian Western Bank, LeBel and Binnie JJ. explained that “[i]t is when
the adverse impact of a law adopted by one level of government increases in severity from
‘affecting’ to ‘impairing’ (without necessarily ‘sterilizing’ or ‘paralyzing’) that the ‘core’
competence of the other level of government … is placed in jeopardy, and not before.” As such,
a court must consider whether the provincial law “not only affects the core federal power, but
does so in a way that seriously or significantly trammels the federal power”. This high threshold
ensures that interjurisdictional immunity is restricted to appropriate circumstances and does not
exceed its bounds to frustrate co-operative, flexible federalism.
COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at para. 45; see also paras. 42-44.
15
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at paras. 54, 56, 60, 64.
40.
Even if this Court were to accept the argument of the appellant banks that the protected
“core” of banking includes bank “lending”, bank “lending” is simply not impaired by the
Consumer Protection Act provisions. In particular, the requirement that banks disclose currency
conversion and other fees does not impair “lending”. Banks are simply required to disclose
certain information. This may affect the way banks market credit cards to consumers, but it does
not impair the act of lending. Similarly, the 21 day statutory grace period does not “seriously or
significantly trammel” any (hypothetical) core of bank “lending”. This is particularly so given
that the grace period falls within the industry standard of 18 to 26 days, provided by banks
voluntarily in their credit card agreements.
Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 757-760, 875.
41.
Furthermore, the profitability of bank credit cards is an insufficient basis for a finding of
“impairment”. In Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, the Privy Council held that taxation of banks under
provincial law is constitutionally permissible – although taxation clearly affects the profits of
banks. More recently, this Court recognized in Canadian Western Bank that provincial
legislation relating to insurance, which could have economic consequences for banks, was also
constitutionally sound:
Of course, profits from the promotion of insurance support the bottom line of banks just as
advertising dollars support broadcasters, yet the Court has found a provincial law regulating
advertising applicable to a company seeking to advertise on a federal broadcast undertaking
in Attorney-General of Quebec v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 211.
Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.) [BOA Tab 5] at paras. 15-16.
42.
In addition, contrary to the submissions of the appellant banks, the considerations
referred to by this Court in Ryan Estate also demonstrate that the CPA provisions do not impair
the core of banking. In Ryan Estate, LeBel and Karakatsanis JJ. concluded that the provincial
law at issue did not impair the federal core competence, by considering: (i) “the breadth of the
federal power”; (ii) the “impact on the uniformity of [federal] law”; and (iii) “the historical
application” of provincial law in the relevant context. These considerations were not presented as
16
a test or a list of factors. Nonetheless, these considerations further support the conclusion that
there is no impairment in the present case.
Factum of the Appellant Banks at paras. 63-68.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 64; see also paras. 61-63.
43.
First, “the breadth of the federal power” over banking is extensive (as was the navigation
and shipping power at issue in Ryan Estate). For over a century, it has been recognized that the
full scope of the banking power (as distinguished from the “core”) has a “broad sweep”.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 61.
Hall [BOA Tab 3], supra at para. 15.
44.
The banking power is much broader than the federal power over aeronautics considered
in COPA, the limits of which are more easily identified. Federal powers concerning works,
undertakings, things and people are more readily defined than federal powers with a wider scope,
such as banking. When a sweeping federal power, such as banking, is at issue, the Court will
exercise much more caution in invoking interjurisdictional immunity.
PHS [BOA Tab 9], supra at para. 60:
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has been applied to circumscribed areas of
activity referred to in the cases as undertakings. These include aviation, ports,
interprovincial rail and federal communications works. The doctrine has also been applied
to federal things like Aboriginal land, and federally regulated persons such as Aboriginal
peoples. It has never been applied to a broad and amorphous area of jurisdiction
[emphasis added; references omitted].
COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 33-34.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 41-42.
45.
Second, with respect to the “impact on the uniformity of Canadian [banking] law”, the
principle of federalism requires banks and other entities to adapt to variation in provincial
regulation where such variation does not seriously or significantly trammel the core of the
federal power. Binnie and LeBel JJ. observed in Canadian Western Bank that federalism allows
courts to strike a balance between “reconcil[ing] unity with diversity”. The application of
interjurisdictional immunity should be informed by the federalism principle, which facilitates the
legitimate diversity of provincial law and promotes co-operation between Parliament and the
17
provincial legislatures. Federal government, as described by K.C. Wheare, accommodates the
desire of communities to both unite and to remain separate.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 64; see also para. 62.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 22; see also paras. 21, 23-24, 36-37,
42.
Securities Reference [BOA TAB 24], supra at para. 73.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [BOA Tab 23] at paras. 57-58.
K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963)
[BOA Tab 37] at 36.
Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 554-557, 812, 821-826.
46.
In addition, the evidence in this case is that the appellant banks have adapted to
provincial variation in consumer protection legislation. Banks modify their credit card contracts
to take into account differences in provincial law with respect to interest rate calculation, grace
period, prescription period of remedies, the cost of balance protection insurance and language
requirements. This further supports the position that the core of the banking power has not been
seriously or significantly trammelled.
47.
Under these circumstances, promoting uniformity within each province is the most
important concern. In Canadian Western Bank, this Court opined that “the concern for
uniformity favours the provincial law so that all promoters of insurance within the province are
subject to uniform standards of marketing behaviour and fair practices.” This statement applies
with equal force in the present context. The argument of the banks would instead lead to a lack
of uniformity, and regulatory disharmony for consumers and issuers of credit cards. By invoking
interjurisdictional immunity, the banks claim a special regime of uniformity available only to
them. The banks would enjoy a privileged exemption from provincial regulation, leaving
competing sellers to contend with a different regime, and consumers subjected to a patchwork of
protection depending on whether their credit card issuers are banks.
48.
Third, with respect to “the historical application” of provincial law, the jurisprudence
shows that consumer protection law has been applied to banks. Consumers and banks alike rely
18
on provincial consumer protection provisions in a variety of situations where the contractual
rights of the consumer are at issue.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 64; see also para. 63.
Royal Bank of Canada v. Klassen, [2013] B.C.J. No. 725 [BOA Tab 27] (S.C.) [Klassen].
Royal Bank of Canada v. Lau [2008] O.J. No. 5007 [BOA Tab 28] (S.C.J.) [Lau].
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Siver, [2001] O.J. No. 2021 (S.C.J.) [BOA Tab 4] [Siver].
Boissonneault c. Banque de Montréal, [1988] R.J.Q. 2622 (C.A.) (Q.L.) [BOA Tab 7]
[Boissonneault].
See also: Chartrand v. CIBC and Hirst Enterprises Ltd (1982), 17 Man.R. (2d) 57 (Q.B.)
[BOA Tab 12]; Gravino c. Banque de Montréal, J.E. 99-724 (Que. S.C.) [BOA Tab 15].
49.
In Boissoneault, LeBel J.A. (as he then was) referred to provisions of the Quebec
Consumer Protection Act in a claim against a bank. While constitutional issues were not raised in
that case, and while the plaintiff was unable to make out his claim against the bank on the facts
of that case, the court appeared to accept that the act would apply to a bank. Similar decisions
have been rendered in common law jurisdictions. In Klassen, the British Columbia Supreme
Court applied to a bank the section of the British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer
Protection Act governing the disclosure of the cost of consumer credit and credit cards. In Lau, a
bank succeeded in having the Ontario Superior Court apply Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act
to its transaction with a consumer, requiring the consumer to pay debts arising from the use of
her credit card. In Siver, a bank again successfully invoked the Ontario Consumer Protection
Act, in order to repossess and sell an automobile.
Boissoneault [BOA Tab 7], supra at 4-8.
Klassen [BOA Tab 27], supra at paras. 10-16, 19.
Lau [BOA Tab 28], supra at paras. 11-12.
Siver [BOA Tab 4], supra at paras. 1-6.
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 97(4).
Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, s. 68.
50.
The banks’ assertion that “there are no reported instances of provincial regulators taking
enforcement action involving bank-issued credit cards” is beside the point. Consumer protection
law is primarily enforced by individual consumers enforcing their rights. The effectiveness of
state regulators is limited by budgetary constraints. Indeed, this case is a perfect illustration of
the way in which consumers themselves can make use of and enforce consumer protection law.
19
Factum of the Appellant Banks at para. 68.
J. Ziegel, “Class Actions to Remedy Mass Consumer Wrongs: Repugnant Solution or
Controllable Genie? The Canadian Experience” (2008-09), 27 Penn. St. Int. L.R. 879
[BOA Tab 38] at 879-880: “Various government agencies – federal, provincial, municipal
– may have the power to intervene but, for the most part, their resources, too, are very
limited and rarely extend to ensuring mass relief for consumers adversely affected by
wrongful conduct.”
G. Borrie, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy – Bold Spirits and Timorous
Souls, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1984) [BOA Tab 30] at 36: “To some extent the new
[consumer protection] laws are self-enforcing – they give the consumer a better basis for
asserting his claim for redress.”
3.
The Preamble to the Bank Act Alone Cannot Trigger the Paramountcy Doctrine
51.
The Attorney General of Ontario asserts that any conflict should be resolved using the
“supple” doctrine of paramountcy rather than interjurisdictional immunity. Although Ontario
takes no position on whether a conflict is demonstrated on the facts of this case, Ontario supports
the submissions of the Attorney General of Quebec regarding the preamble to the Bank Act.
Mangat [BOA Tab 17], supra at para. 54; see also para. 52.
Factum of Respondent Attorney General of Quebec at paras. 74-79.
52.
In this case, the preamble to the Bank Act is worded generally and applies to a complex
statute regulating a wide range of banking issues. The preamble does not refer to the regulation
of credit card contracts. Its wording does not clearly or precisely evince an intention for Bank Act
provisions to supersede provincial law. The wording of the preamble (which refers to the
desirability of “clear, comprehensive, exclusive, national standards”) can be contrasted with the
wording employed in provisions of the federal Carriage of Air Act and Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act. The latter statutes expressly assert that specific provisions of federal law shall be
“in substitution for […] any law in force in Canada” (Carriage of Air Act), or shall apply
“despite anything in federal or provincial law” or “notwithstanding anything in federal or
provincial law” (Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act). Nor is there any authority for rendering a
provincial law inoperative on the basis of the preamble to an enactment, rather than a legislative
provision.
Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, s. 2(5):
20
Any liability imposed by Article 17 of Schedule I or Article 17 of Schedule VI on a carrier
in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability of the carrier
in respect of the death of that passenger under any law in force in Canada, and the
provisions set out in Schedule II shall have effect with respect to the persons by whom and
for whose benefit the liability so imposed is enforceable and with respect to the manner in
which it may be enforced.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 14.06(1.2),(2),(4),(7); s. 65.13(1),
67(2), 81.1(6), 81.2(1).
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 [BOA Tab 26]
at para. 21.
Mangat [BOA Tab 17], supra at para. 55.
Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 915-921, 926.
53.
Finally, even if a federal provision had been formulated so that it expressed a clear
intention for Bank Act provisions to supersede provincial law, the provincial law must also, in
fact, frustrate the purpose of the federal law. A purpose provision in a federal enactment is
relevant to this Court’s assessment of whether the federal legislative purpose is frustrated by a
provision of provincial law. However, Ontario respectfully submits that the expression of
purpose or intention in a federal enactment is not, in and of itself, determinative. As with the
assessment of the “pith and substance” of legislation, the judiciary ultimately determines the
purpose of federal legislation. As such, if a provincial law is consistent with or advances the
purpose of the federal law, as determined by this Honourable Court, then there can be no
frustration of federal purpose.
COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 62, 66-70.
Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 4, 73-75, 103.
Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at paras. 69, 84.
R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 [BOA Tab 20] at paras. 47-48.
Hogg [BOA Tab 34], supra at 15-14.
Factum of the Respondent Attorney General of Quebec at paras. 74-79.
PART IV – COSTS
54.
The Attorney General of Ontario makes no submissions as to costs.
PART V – ORDER SOUGHT
55.
Ontario requests that the first constitutional question be answered in the negative.
21
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
January 23, 2014
______________________________
Janet Minor
______________________________
Robert Donato
Counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario
22
PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Paragraph
Reference in
Factum
Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1947] A.C.
503 (P.C.)
29
Bank of Montreal v. Demakos, [1996] O.J. No. 4667 (Gen. Div.)
34
Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121
16, 22, 43
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Siver, [2001] O.J. No. 2021 (S.C.J.)
48, 49
Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.)
41
Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749
23
Boissonneault c. Banque de Montréal, [1988] R.J.Q. 2622 (C.A.)
48, 49
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] 2
S.C.R. 86
11, 23
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134
9, 11, 16, 35,
44
Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Labour
Relations Board), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433
24, 25, 31
23
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3
3, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 15,
16, 17, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 28,
29, 32, 35, 36,
39, 41, 43, 44,
45, 47, 51, 53
Chartrand v. CIBC and Hirst Enterprises Limited (1982), 17
Man.R. (2d) 57 (Q.B.)
48
Chatterjee v. Ontario Attorney General, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624
8
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd.,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 641
14
Gravino c. Banque de Montréal, J.E. 99-724 (Que. S.C.)
48
Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453
22
Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113
3, 51, 52
Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44
7, 9, 15, 16,
39, 42, 43, 45,
48, 53
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots
Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536
9, 11, 15, 16,
23, 38, 39, 44,
53
R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463
53
Reference re: An Act respecting the Taxation of Banks, [1939]
A.C. 117 (P.C.)
29
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
457
13, 17
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217
45
24
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837
Richard v. Time Inc., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 265
9, 17, 45
19, 34
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 188.
52
Royal Bank of Canada v. Klassen, [2013] B.C.J. No. 725 (S.C.)
48, 49
Royal Bank of Canada v. Lau [2008] O.J. No. 5007 (S.C.J.)
48, 49
Articles and Texts
E.S. Binavince and H.S. Fairley, “Banking and the Constitution:
Untested Limits of Federal Jurisdiction” (1986) 65 Can. Bar.
Rev. 328 at 336-337.
30, 31
G. Borrie, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy – Bold
Spirits and Timorous Souls (London: Stevens & Sons, 1984).
50
H. Brun, G. Tremblay & E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5e
ed. (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2008)
20
C.W. Calomiris & S.H. Haber, “Why Banking Systems Succeed
– and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions”(2013), 92
Foreign Aff 97
29
C. Masse, “Fondement historique de l’évolution du droit
québécois de la consommation”, in P-C Lafond, ed., Mélanges
Claude Masse : En quête de justice et d’équité (Cowansville:
Editions Yvon Blais, 2003).
33
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (looseleaf) (Toronto: Carswell, 2007)
20, 53
P. McDonald, “The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case
Study in Federalism” (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 155 at 156, 186, 217.
30, 31
S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada
Law Book, 2010).
33
25
K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1963)
45
J. Ziegel, “Class Actions to Remedy Mass Consumer Wrongs:
Repugnant Solution or Controllable Genie? The Canadian
Experience” (2008-2009), 27 Penn. St. Int. L.R. 879
50
26
PART VII – LEGISLATION
Legislation
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985,
14.06(1.2),(2),(4),(7); s. 65.13(1), 67(2), 81.1(6), 81.2(1)
Paragraph
Reference
in Factum
c.
B-3,
ss.
52
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 97.
49
Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, s. 2(5).
52
Civil Code of Québec, 1385, 1401.
34
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 91(15), 92(13),
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III, No. 5.
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, s. 12, 126-127.
Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, s. 68.
1, 8, 31
1, 18
49
27
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT
R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3
PART I
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
[…]
No personal liability in respect of matters before appointment
14.06 (1.2) Despite anything in federal or provincial law, if a trustee, in that position, carries on
the business of a debtor or continues the employment of a debtor’s employees, the trustee is not
by reason of that fact personally liable in respect of a liability, including one as a successor
employer,
(a) that is in respect of the employees or former employees of the debtor or a predecessor
of the debtor or in respect of a pension plan for the benefit of those employees; and
(b) that exists before the trustee is appointed or that is calculated by reference to a period
before the appointment.
[…]
Liability in respect of environmental matters
(2) Notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law, a trustee is not personally liable in
that position for any environmental condition that arose or environmental damage that occurred
(a) before the trustee’s appointment; or
(b) after the trustee’s appointment unless it is established that the condition arose or the
damage occurred as a result of the trustee’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in
the Province of Quebec, the trustee’s gross or intentional fault.
[…]
Non-liability re certain orders
(4) Notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law but subject to subsection (2),
where an order is made which has the effect of requiring a trustee to remedy any environmental
condition or environmental damage affecting property involved in a bankruptcy, proposal or
receivership, the trustee is not personally liable for failure to comply with the order, and is not
personally liable for any costs that are or would be incurred by any person in carrying out the
terms of the order,
28
(a) if, within such time as is specified in the order, within ten days after the order is made if
no time is so specified, within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in
effect when the trustee is appointed, or during the period of the stay referred to in paragraph
(b), the trustee
(i) complies with the order, or
(ii) on notice to the person who issued the order, abandons, disposes of or otherwise
releases any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the
condition or damage;
(b) during the period of a stay of the order granted, on application made within the time
specified in the order referred to in paragraph (a), within ten days after the order is made or
within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee
is appointed, by
(i) the court or body having jurisdiction under the law pursuant to which the order was
made to enable the trustee to contest the order, or
(ii) the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy for the purposes of assessing the economic
viability of complying with the order; or
(c) if the trustee had, before the order was made, abandoned or renounced or been divested of
any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or
damage.
[…]
Priority of claims
(7) Any claim by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province against the debtor in a
bankruptcy, proposal or receivership for costs of remedying any environmental condition or
environmental damage affecting real property or an immovable of the debtor is secured by
security on the real property or immovable affected by the environmental condition or
environmental damage and on any other real property or immovable of the debtor that is
contiguous with that real property or immovable and that is related to the activity that caused the
environmental condition or environmental damage, and the security
(a) is enforceable in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the real property
or immovable is located, in the same way as a mortgage, hypothec or other security on
real property or immovables; and
(b) ranks above any other claim, right, charge or security against the property, despite any
other provision of this Act or anything in any other federal or provincial law.
[…]
29
PART III
PROPOSALS
DIVISION I
GENERAL SCHEME FOR PROPOSALS
[...]
Restriction on disposition of assets
65.13 (1) An insolvent person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4
or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside
the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement
for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize
the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.
[…]
PART IV
PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPT
[…]
Deemed trusts
67. (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial
legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of
a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph
(1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.
[…]
Ranks above other claims
81.1 (6) Notwithstanding any other federal or provincial Act or law, a supplier’s right to
repossess goods pursuant to this section ranks above every other claim or right against the
purchaser in respect of those goods, other than the right of a bona fide subsequent purchaser of
the goods for value without notice that the supplier had demanded repossession of the goods.
[…]
Special right for farmers, fishermen and aquaculturists
81.2 (1) Where
(a) a farmer has sold and delivered products of agriculture, a fisherman has sold
and delivered products of the sea, lakes and rivers, or an aquaculturist has sold
30
and delivered products of aquaculture, to another person (in this section referred
to as the “purchaser”) for use in relation to the purchaser’s business,
(b) the products were delivered to the purchaser within the fifteen day period
preceding
(i) the day on which the purchaser became bankrupt, or
(ii) the first day on which there was a receiver, within the meaning of
subsection 243(2), in relation to the purchaser,
(c) as of the day referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii), the farmer, fisherman or
aquaculturist has not been fully paid for the products, and
(d) the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist files a proof of claim in the prescribed
form in respect of the unpaid amount with the trustee or receiver, as the case may
be, within thirty days after the day referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii),
the claim of the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist for the unpaid amount in respect of the
products is secured by security on all the inventory of or held by the purchaser as of the
day referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii), and the security ranks above every other
claim, right, charge or security against that inventory, regardless of when that other
claim, right, charge or security arose, except a supplier’s right, under section 81.1, to
repossess goods, despite any other federal or provincial Act or law; and if the trustee or
receiver, as the case may be, takes possession or in any way disposes of inventory
covered by the security, the trustee or receiver is liable for the claim of the farmer,
fisherman or aquaculturist to the extent of the net amount realized on the disposition of
that inventory, after deducting the cost of realization, and is subrogated in and to all
rights of the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist to the extent of the amounts paid to them
by the trustee or receiver.
PARTI E I
FONCTI ONNAI RES ADM I NI STRATI FS
SURI NTENDANT
[…]
I mmunité
14.06 (1.2) Par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, le syndic qui, en cette qualité, continue
l’ exploitation de l’ entreprise du débiteur ou lui succède comme employeur est dégagé de toute
responsabilité personnelle découlant de quelque obligation du débiteur, notamment à titre
d’ employeur successeur, si celle-ci, à la fois :
31
a) l’ oblige envers des employés ou anciens employés du débiteur, ou de l’ un de ses
prédécesseurs, ou découle d’ un régime de pension pour le bénéfice de ces employés;
b) existait avant sa nomination ou est calculée sur la base d’ une période la précédant.
[…]
Responsabilité en matière d’environnement
(2) Par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute
responsabilité personnelle découlant de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’ environnement survenu
avant ou après sa nomination, sauf celui causé par sa négligence grave ou son inconduite
délibérée ou, dans la province de Québec, par sa faute lourde ou intentionnelle.
[…]
I mmunité — ordonnances
(4) Par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, mais sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le syndic
est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant du non-respect de toute
ordonnance de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’ environnement et touchant un bien visé
par une faillite, une proposition ou une mise sous séquestre administrée par un séquestre, et de
toute responsabilité personnelle relativement aux frais engagés par toute personne exécutant
l’ ordonnance :
a) si, dans les dix jours suivant l’ ordonnance ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, dans les dix
jours suivant sa nomination si l’ ordonnance est alors en vigueur ou pendant la durée de la
suspension visée à l’ alinéa b) :
(i) il s’ y conforme,
(ii) il abandonne, après avis à la personne ayant rendu l’ ordonnance, tout droit sur
l’ immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose ou s’ en dessaisit;
b) pendant la durée de la suspension de l’ ordonnance qui est accordée, sur demande présentée
dans les dix jours suivant l’ ordonnance visée à l’ alinéa a) ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, ou
dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ ordonnance est alors en vigueur :
(i) soit par le tribunal ou l’ autorité qui a compétence relativement à l’ ordonnance, en vue
de permettre au syndic de la contester,
(ii) soit par le tribunal qui a compétence en matière de faillite, en vue d’ évaluer les
conséquences économiques du respect de l’ ordonnance;
c) si, avant que l’ ordonnance ne soit rendue, il avait abandonné tout droit sur l’ immeuble en
cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause ou y avait renoncé, ou s’ en était dessaisi.
[…]
32
Priorité des réclamations
(7) En cas de faillite, de proposition ou de mise sous séquestre administrée par un séquestre,
toute réclamation de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d’ une province contre le débiteur pour les
frais de réparation du fait ou dommage lié à l’ environnement et touchant un de ses immeubles ou
biens réels est garantie par une sûreté sur le bien en cause et sur ceux qui sont contigus à celui où
le dommage est survenu et qui sont liés à l’ activité ayant causé le fait ou le dommage; la sûreté
peut être exécutée selon le droit du lieu où est situé le bien comme s’ il s’ agissait d’ une
hypothèque ou autre garantie sur celui-ci et, par dérogation aux autres dispositions de la présente
loi et à toute règle de droit fédéral et provincial, a priorité sur tout autre droit, charge, sûreté ou
réclamation visant le bien.
[…]
PARTI E I I I
PROPOSI TI ONS CONCORDATAI RES
SECTI ON I
DI SPOSI TI ONS D’APPLI CATI ON GÉNÉRALE
[…]
Restriction à la disposition d’actifs
65.13 (1) Il est interdit à la personne insolvable à l’égard de laquelle a été déposé un avis
d’ intention aux termes de l’ article 50.4 ou une proposition aux termes du paragraphe 62(1) de
disposer, notamment par vente, d’ actifs hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires sans l’ autorisation
du tribunal. Le tribunal peut accorder l’ autorisation sans qu’ il soit nécessaire d’ obtenir
l’ acquiescement des actionnaires, et ce malgré toute exigence à cet effet, notamment en vertu
d’ une règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale.
[…]
PARTI E I V
BI ENS DU FAI LLI
[…]
Fiducies présumées
67 (2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou
provinciale ayant pour effet d’ assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa
Majesté, aucun des biens du failli ne peut, pour l’ application de l’ alinéa (1)a), être considéré
comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l’absence de la disposition législative en
question, il ne le serait pas.
[…]
Rang
33
81.1 (6) Par dérogation à toute autre loi fédérale, à toute loi provinciale ou à toute règle de droit,
le droit de reprise de possession a préséance sur tout autre droit ou réclamation qu’ on pourrait
faire valoir contre l’ acheteur en rapport avec les marchandises en cause, à l’exception du droit
d’ un acheteur qui a subséquemment acquis les biens de bonne foi et pour valeur, ignorant que le
fournisseur avait demandé d’ en reprendre possession.
[…]
Cas des agriculteurs, des pêcheurs et des aquiculteurs
81.2 (1) Par dérogation à toute autre loi ou règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale, la
réclamation de l’ agriculteur, du pêcheur ou de l’ aquiculteur qui a vendu et livré à un acheteur des
produits agricoles, aquatiques ou aquicoles destinés à être utilisés dans le cadre des affaires de
celui-ci est garantie, à compter de la date visée aux sous-alinéas a)(i) ou (ii), par une sûreté
portant sur la totalité du stock appartenant à l’ acheteur ou détenu par lui à la même date; la sûreté
a priorité sur tout autre droit, sûreté, charge ou réclamation — peu importe sa date de naissance
— relatif au stock de l’ acheteur, sauf sur le droit du fournisseur à la reprise de possession de
marchandises aux termes de l’ article 81.1; la garantie reconnue par le présent article n’ est valable
que si, à la fois :
a) les produits en question ont été livrés à l’ acheteur dans les quinze jours précédant :
(i) soit la date à laquelle l’ acheteur est devenu un failli,
(ii) soit la date à laquelle une personne a commencé à agir, à l’ égard de l’ acheteur, à titre
de séquestre au sens du paragraphe 243(2);
b) les produits en question n’ ont pas, à la date visée aux sous-alinéas a)(i) ou (ii), été payés
au complet;
c) l’ agriculteur, le pêcheur ou l’ aquiculteur a déposé une preuve de réclamation en la forme
prescrite pour le solde impayé auprès du syndic ou du séquestre dans les trente jours suivant
la date visée aux sous-alinéas a)(i) ou (ii).
Le syndic ou le séquestre qui prend possession ou dispose des stocks grevés par la sûreté est
responsable de la réclamation de l’ agriculteur, du pêcheur ou de l’ aquiculteur jusqu’ à
concurrence du produit net de la réalisation, déduction faite des frais de réalisation, et est subrogé
dans tous leurs droits jusqu’ à concurrence des sommes ainsi payées.
34
BUSINESS PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
S.B.C. 2004, CHAPTER 2
Division 8 — Credit Cards
[…]
Applications for credit cards
97 (1) A credit card issuer who has entered into, or who is negotiating to enter into, a credit
agreement for a credit card must ensure that the application form for that credit card
discloses the following information or complies with subsection (2):
(a) if the interest rate payable under the credit agreement is a fixed rate of
interest, that interest rate expressed as an annual interest rate;
(b) if the interest rate payable under the credit agreement is a floating rate, the
index rate and the manner by which that rate is to be modified to obtain the
interest rate payable under the credit agreement;
(c) the grace period, if any;
(d) the nature and amount of any non-interest finance charges that are payable
or may become payable by the cardholder;
(e) the date as of which the information referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d) is in
effect.
(2) Instead of disclosing the information required by subsection (1), the credit card issuer
(a) may disclose in the application form a telephone number that the
cardholder can use, at no charge, to obtain that information during the credit
card issuer's ordinary business hours, and
(b) must ensure that the information is available at the number during those
hours.
(3) Despite subsection (2), if an individual applies for a credit card in person, by telephone
or by any electronic means, the credit card issuer must disclose the information referred to in
subsection (1) when the individual makes the application.
(4) An individual who applies for a credit card without signing an application form is
deemed, on using the credit card for the first time, to have entered into a credit agreement in
relation to that card in the terms of the disclosure statement referred to in subsection (5).
(5) Nothing in this section relieves the credit card issuer from the requirement to give a
disclosure statement in accordance with sections 66 [disclosure statements must be given]
and 91 [contents of initial disclosure statement for open credit].
35
Carriage by Air Act
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26
Liability under Convention for death of passenger
2. (5) Any liability imposed by Article 17 of Schedule I or Article 17 of Schedule VI on a carrier
in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability of the carrier in
respect of the death of that passenger under any law in force in Canada, and the provisions set
out in Schedule II shall have effect with respect to the persons by whom and for whose benefit
the liability so imposed is enforceable and with respect to the manner in which it may be
enforced.
Responsabilité en cas de décès d’un passager
2. (5) L'article 17 de l'annexe I et l'article 17 de l'annexe VI, qui fixent la responsabilité d'un
transporteur en cas de décès d'un passager, se substituent aux règles de droit pertinentes en
vigueur au Canada. Les dispositions énoncées à l'annexe II sont exécutoires en ce qui concerne
tant les personnes par qui et pour le compte desquelles réparation peut être obtenue au titre de la
responsabilité ainsi imposée que les modalités de mise en oeuvre de celle-ci.
36
CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC
DIVISION III
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
§ 1. — Conditions of formation of contracts
I. — General provision
1385. A contract is formed by the sole exchange of consents between persons having capacity to
contract, unless, in addition, the law requires a particular form to be respected as a necessary
condition of its formation, or unless the parties require the contract to take the form of a solemn
agreement.
It is also of the essence of a contract that it have a cause and an object.
[…]
II. — Consent
[…]
3—
QUALITIES AND DEFECTS OF CONSENT
[…]
1401. Error on the part of one party induced by fraud committed by the other party or with his
knowledge vitiates consent whenever, but for that error, the party would not have contracted, or
would have contracted on different terms.
Fraud may result from silence or concealment.
SECTI ON I I I
DE LA FORMATION DU CONTRAT
§ 1. — Des conditions de formation du contrat
I. — Disposition générale
1385. Le contrat se forme par le seul échange de consentement entre des personnes capables de
contracter, à moins que la loi n'exige, en outre, le respect d'une forme particulière comme
condition nécessaire à sa formation, ou que les parties n'assujettissent la formation du contrat à
une forme solennelle.
37
Il est aussi de son essence qu'il ait une cause et un objet.
[…]
3—
DES QUALITÉS ET DES VICES DU CONSENTEMENT
[...]
1401. L'erreur d'une partie, provoquée par le dol de l'autre partie ou à la connaissance de celle-ci,
vicie le consentement dans tous les cas où, sans cela, la partie n'aurait pas contracté ou aurait
contracté à des conditions différentes.
Le dol peut résulter du silence ou d'une réticence.
38
CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867
30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III, No. 5.
VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
POWERS OF THE PARLIAMENT
Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and
House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in
relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the
Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding
anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to
all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
[…]
15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money.
[…]
EXCLUSIVE POWERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES
Subjects of exclusive Provincial Legislation
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming
within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
[…]
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province;
39
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
R.S.Q., CHAPTER P-40.1
TI TLE I
CONTRACTS REGARDI NG GOODS AND SERVI CES
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVI SI ONS
[…]
12. No costs may be claimed from a consumer unless the amount thereof is precisely indicated in
the contract.
[…]
CHAPTER I I I
PROVI SI ONS RELATI NG TO CERTAI N CONTRACTS
[…]
DI VI SI ON I I I
CONTRACTS OF CREDI T
[…]
126. At the end of each period, the merchant must furnish the consumer who owes him a debt
with a statement of account, mailed not less than 21 days before the date on which the creditor
may impose credit charges, if the consumer does not discharge his obligation in full; in the case
of an advance of money, these charges may accrue from the date of that advance until the date of
payment.
The statement of account must indicate:
(a) the date of the end of the period;
(b) the balance of the account at the end of the preceding period, specifying the portion
of the balance which is represented by moneys advanced;
(c) the date, description and value of each transaction debited to the consumer's account
during the period unless the merchant appends a copy of the vouchers to the statement of
account;
(d) the date and amount of each payment made or sum credited during the period;
(e) the credit charges required during the period;
40
(f) the balance of the account at the end of the period;
(g) the minimum payment required for such period; and
(h) the time during which the consumer may discharge his obligation without being
required to pay credit charges except on advances of money.
The consumer may require the merchant to send to him without charge a copy of the vouchers
for each of the transactions debited to the consumer's account during the period.
127. Until the consumer receives a statement of account at his address, the merchant shall not
exact credit charges on the unpaid balance except on advances of money.
Provided that the consumer has so requested expressly in writing, the address of the consumer
includes, for the purposes of the first paragraph, the address where the consumer accepts the
receipt of technology-based documents within the meaning of section 3 of the Act to establish a
legal framework for information technology (chapter C-1.1).
TI TRE I
CONTRATS RELATI FS AUX BI ENS ET AUX SERVI CES
CHAPI TRE I
DI SPOSI TI ONS GÉNÉRALES
12. Aucuns frais ne peuvent être réclamés d'un consommateur, à moins que le contrat n'en
mentionne de façon précise le montant.
[…]
CHAPI TRE I I I
DI SPOSI TI ONS RELATI VES À CERTAI NS CONTRATS
[…]
SECTI ON I I I
CONTRATS DE CRÉDI T
[…]
126. À la fin de chaque période, le commerçant, s'il a une créance à l'égard d'un consommateur,
doit lui fournir un état de compte, posté au moins vingt et un jours avant la date à laquelle le
créancier peut exiger des frais de crédit si le consommateur n'acquitte pas la totalité de son
41
obligation; dans le cas d'une avance en argent, ces frais peuvent courir à compter de la date de
cette avance jusqu'à la date du paiement.
L'état de compte doit mentionner:
(a) la date de la fin de la période;
(b) le solde du compte à la fin de la période précédente en spécifiant la partie de ce solde
que représentent les avances en argent consenties;
(c) la date, la description et la valeur de chaque transaction portée au débit du compte au
cours de la période, sauf si le commerçant annexe à l'état de compte une copie des pièces
justificatives;
(d) la date et le montant de chaque paiement effectué ou de chaque somme créditée au
cours de la période;
(e) les frais de crédit exigés pendant la période;
(f) le solde du compte à la fin de la période;
(g) le paiement minimum requis pour cette période; et
(h) le délai pendant lequel le consommateur peut acquitter son obligation sans être tenu
de payer des frais de crédit sauf sur les avances en argent.
Le consommateur peut exiger du commerçant qu'il lui fasse parvenir sans frais une copie des
pièces justificatives de chacune des transactions portées au débit de son compte au cours de la
période.
127. Tant que le consommateur n'a pas reçu à son adresse un état de compte, le commerçant ne
peut exiger de frais de crédit sur le solde impayé, sauf sur les avances en argent.
Pourvu que le consommateur en ait expressément fait la demande par écrit, son adresse
comprend, aux fins du premier alinéa, celle où il accepte de recevoir des documents
technologiques au sens de l'article 3 de la Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de
l'information (chapitre C-1.1).
42
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
S.O. 2002, CHAPTER 30.
PART VII
CREDIT AGREEMENTS
GENERAL
[…]
Agreement for credit card
68. (1) Despite section 13, a consumer who applies for a credit card without
signing an application form or who receives a credit card from a credit card issuer
without applying for it shall be deemed to have entered into a credit agreement with the
issuer with respect to the card on first using the card. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A, s. 68 (1).
Liability
(2) A consumer described in subsection (1) is not liable to pay the lender any
amount in respect of the credit card received in the circumstances described in that
subsection until the consumer uses the card. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A, s. 68 (2).
PARTIE VII
CONVENTIONS DE CRÉDIT
DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES
[…]
Convention relative à une carte de crédit
68. (1) Malgré l’article 13, le consommateur qui demande une carte de crédit sans
avoir signé de formulaire de demande ou qui reçoit une carte de crédit d’un émetteur de
carte de crédit sans en avoir fait la demande est réputé avoir conclu une convention de
crédit avec l’émetteur à l’égard de la carte lorsqu’il l’utilise pour la première fois.
Responsabilité
(2) Le consommateur visé au paragraphe (1) n’est redevable au prêteur d’aucune
somme à l’égard de la carte de crédit reçue dans les circonstances énoncées à ce
paragraphe avant de l’avoir utilisée.

Intervener Attorney-General-of-Ontario

Transcription

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Staying relevant in supply chain finance

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On non german/english/french systems it will occur

2008 6 20 EBIC self-regulation on bank account switching

27 44 YEARS IN BANKING