Annuaire 1995_IV

AIPPI
Association Internationale
pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle
L A. A.
AIIII
MONTRÉAL 1995
Annuaire 199511V
xxxv,e Congrès de Montréal 1995
(25-30 juin 1995)
Rapports des Groupes Q 127
Appréciation de la confusion
en droit des marques
Dans le cas normal, les rapports et les résumés des groupes nationaux sont publiés sans
correction du contenu, du style et de I'ortographie.
The reports and the summaries from the National Groups are normally reproduced without
alteration n content, style and spelling.
Die Berichte und Zusammenfassungen der Landesgruppen werden im Normalfall ohne
Korrekturen von Inhalt, Stil und Orthographie wiedergegeben.
L'Editeur
© AIPPI Zurich 1995
ISBN No. 3.9050.2862.X
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Question Q 127 - Question Q 127 - Frage 0 127
Appréciation de la confusion
en droit des marques
Evaluation of confusion
in trademark law
Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit
im Markenrecht
Rapports des Groupes
Groups Reports
Berichte der Landesgruppen
Ill
Question Q 127
Appréciation de la confusion en droit des marques
Introduction
En relation avec la question Q 115 Protection effective contre la concurrence déloyale
selon l'article 10bjs de la Convention de Paris de 1883', l'AIPPI étudie la notion de la
confusion'. Ce thème a figuré au programme de la rencontre du Comité exécutif du 13
au 17juin 1994 à Copenhague.
L'article 10b1s interdit, entre autres, tous les actes de nature à créer une confusion, en
ce qui concerne l'établissement, les produits, ou les activités industrielles ou commer-
ciales d'un concurrent'. Dans la présente question Q 127, il s'agit de confusion dans
un contexte plus restreint, à savoir uniquement dans celui de la Loi sur les marques de
commerce. Même si une certaine redondance existe entre la matière de Q 115 et celle
de Q 127, il est certainement justifié que l'AIPPI effectue une étude séparée et plus
approfondie concernant l'appréciation de la confusion dans la Loi sur les marques de
commerce, étant donné que dans ce domaine juridique le risque de confusion est un
critère de contrefaçon universel.
Dans le droit des marques de commerce des différents pays, la notion de la confusion
est traitée de différentes manières. Dans quelques lois, la confusion représente une
partie des notions juridiques qui définissent la contrefaçon des marques, tandis que
dans d'autres lois, la confusion joue son rôle dans le contexte d'un autre critère, par
ex. celui de l"association' dans le droit du Benelux. La loi sur les marques de
commerce de l'Union Européenne (art. 9 du règlement des marques de commerce et
l'art. 5 des premières directives indicatives) considère que la probabilité d'une
confusion inclut celle de l'association.
On propose que, dans le cadre de la présente Q 127, l'AIPPI ne discute pas la relation
entre les notions de confusion et d'association.
Bien que la confusion puisse également participer à la dilution d'une marque de commerce, on propose néanmoins que l'AIPPI ne traite pas ici la dilution des marques de
commerce.
II ressort déjà des rapports des groupes nationaux au sujet de Q 115 que les types de
confusion généralement acceptés sont les suivants: confusion entre les marques,
confusion au sujet de l'origine des produits et confusion concernant l'existence d'une
certaine relation entre les entreprises des parties dans une procédure de marques de
commerce.
V
Ces rapports montrent en outre qu'on reconnaît généralement que le cas normal n'est
pas la confusion effective, mais la possibilité de confusion.
La question de savoir si une confusion se produira probablement ou non est souvent
fortement subjective, mais certaines normes légales peuvent servir de directives pour les
tribunaux.
I. Règles générales pour la comparaison
Dans la plupart des pays, on a développé les règles générales suivantes pour la constatation de confusion entre les marques:
dans la comparaison à considérer, il ne s'agit pas d'une comparaison directe entre les
marques effectivement en présence, mais de la comparaison de la marque plus récente avec l'image de la marque plus ancienne dans la mémoire du consommateur;
cette image est souvent vague et se limite donc aux composants principaux de la marque;
l'impression générale de la marque est décisive;
les similitudes générales sont plus importantes que les différences, mais le risque de
confusion ne devrait être reconnu que si ce sont les éléments communs qui confèrent
la distinction à la marque plus ancienne.
II. Critères de comparaison
D'abord les critères à appliquer pour la comparaison des marques doivent être établis.
Importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection
Des marques dites "fortes, c'est-à-dire des marques dotées d'un fort caractère distinctif
(qui provient de leur originalité ou de leur usage intensif) jouissent normalement d'une
protection plus vaste que les marques normales. C'est ainsi qu'une marque très connue
jouit d'une protection selon l'art. 6bis (1) de la Convention de Paris, même sans être enregistrée.
La probabilité d'une confusion avec une marque forte est-elle acceptée plus aisément
qu'avec une marque normale, ou en d'autres termes, le caractère distinctif de la marque
est-il déterminant pour la protection contre la confusion?
Similitude sonore, visuelle et sémantique
Une confusion peut résulter d'une similitude phonétique, visuelle ou sémantique. Une similitude en relation avec l'un de ces trois aspects peut impliquer une probabilité de confusion, mais en cas de ressemblance avec l'un de ces trois aspects et de non-ressemblance
avec les deux autres, on doit procéder à une pondération. Existe-t-il des normes pour le
résultat de cette pondération? Par exemple, une signification similaire ou une association
VI
de mots de la marque a-t-elle un plus grand poids qu'une différence phonétique ou visuelle
(par exemple TORNADE, CYCLONE et TYPHON)?
3. Traductions
Des marques renommées jouissent de la protection de l'art. 6
(1) de la Convention de
Paris, même sans être enregistrées, non seulement contre la reproduction et l'imitation,
mais également contre les traductions "sesceptibles de créer une confusion.
Les lois nationales protègent-elles une marque pas très connue contre les traductions?
Les lois de pays avec plus d'une langue (officielle) ont-elles des clauses spécifiques
concernant la traduction de l'une de ces langues dans une autre?
4. Familles de marques
Parfois, le propriétaire de marques de commerce possède plusieurs marques présentant
un caractère commun et qui peuvent donc être considérées comme une série ou une
'famille'. Les marques de ce genre jouissent-elles d'une protection particulière? Et sous
quelles conditions?
5. Conditions sous lesquelles une marque plus ancienne a été utilisée
Il est généralement admis que les tribunaux doivent tenir compte de toutes les circonstances lors de l'appréciation de la probabilité de confusion entre une marque plus
ancienne et une marque plus récente.
La question se pose donc de savoir si cela est également applicable aux conditions
sous lesquelles la marque plus ancienne a été utilisée et si l'utilisateur s'en est servi
avec des éléments particuliers ajoutés à la marque déposée.
Doit-on comparer uniquement la marque déposée et la marque utilisée par le contrefacteur présumé? Ou doit-on au contraire considérer également les éléments particuliers ajoutés, qui ne sont pas des composants de la marque déposée, mais qui ont été
utilisés habituellement par le détenteur de la marque? Doit-on comparer la marque utilisée de cette façon avec la marque plus récente?
Cette question se pose dans le contexte du droit des marques de commerce.
S'il n'est pas possible de se référer au droit des marques de commerce, peut-on trouver la solution en appliquant les règles concernant la concurrence déloyale?
VII
Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation
Confusion de qui?
En général, on devra déterminer si le risque de confusion existe auprès du 'consommateur
normal moyen" qui ne voit pas les marques en même temps.
Les acheteurs et les consommateurs ne sont pas toujours identiques; la confusion du
consommateur joue-t-elle donc un rôle?
Quelle partie du public?
La probabilité de confusion de l'ensemble du public n'est certainement pas nécessaire.
Quel est le critère applicable? La probabilité de confusion de quelques acheteurs ou d'une
petite partie du public est-elle suffisante? Ou doit-il s'agir d'une partie non négligeable,
appréciable ou considérable? Le problème doit-il être résolu par une estimation calculée
ou doit-on se servir d'une méthode plus précise, en fixant un certain pourcentage?
Importance du type de produits, médicaments
Les acheteurs de produits de masse et de bas prix sont moins attentifs que ceux de produits chers ou exclusifs et que les acheteurs professionnels de domaines spéciaux. Par
conséquent, la probabilité d'une confusion peut différer pour différents types de produits.
Dans le droit coutumier, d'autres considérations sont applicables lorsqu'il s'agit de produits pharmaceutiques. Doit-on admettre un risque de confusion plus faible, parce que le
médecin qui prescrit un médicament et parce que le pharmacien qui le vend sont des spécialistes? Ou doit-on au contraire demander un seuil de possibilité de confusion plus élevé
parce que la confusion de médicaments peuvent compromettre la sécurité des patients?
Moment décisif de la confusion
Les circonstances en relation avec la question de la confusion peuvent évoluer au cours
du temps, de sorte que la question du moment décisif se présente. Les autorités
d'enregistrement et les tribunaux devraient-ils décider selon l'instant de leur décision? Ou
devait-on considérer d'autres moments, par exemple la date de l'enregistrement ou du
premier usage de la marque la plus récente, ou celle de la plainte, ou un autre moment
quelconque? Quelle est la date décisive pour la force de distinction de la marque plus ancienne?
Intention frauduleuse
Il ressort déjà du Rapport des Groupes Q 115 que l'intention de fraude n'est pas requise,
mais la question encore ouverte est de savoir si l'intention frauduleuse fonde la présomption d'une fraude effective.
Vil I
IV. Autres critères
Quels sont les critères imaginables possibles autres que ceux mentionnés ci-dessus qui
sont déterminants pour l'appréciation de la confusion? Par exemple, les tribunaux qui
apprécient la confusion peuvent-ils tenir compte d'actes parallèles de concurrence déloyale, par exemple l'utilisation d'une marque similaire par un ancien employé?
Conclusion
Les Groupes sont invités:
-
d'une part à élaborer un rapport sur la situation dans leurs lois nationales et leur jurisprudence, en ce qui concerne les points ci-dessus des chapitres l-IV (les groupes
sont expressément invités à illustrer leurs commentaires par des exemples);
-
d'autre part, à exprimer toutes les solutions qu'ils considèrent comme étant souhaitables et acceptables de manière générale.
lx
Question 0 127
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Introduction
AIPPI is studying the concept of confusion in the context of Q 115 Effective Protection against Unfair Competition under Article 10bis Paris Convention of 1883" which
was on the program of the Executive Committee meeting in Copenhagen on 13-17
June, 1994.
Article 10b1s prohibits, inter alia, all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any
means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial ac-
tivities, of a competitor. The present Q 127 deals with confusion in a narrower context,
namely only in trademark law. Though some overlap between the subject matters of Q
115 and Q 127 may exist, it is certainly justifiable that AIPPI makes a separate, detailed
and in-depth study of the evaluation of confusion in trademark law, since in trademark
law confusion is a universal infringement criterion.
The wording of national trademark laws deals with confusion in different ways. In some
laws the confusion is part of the statutory language defining the trademark infringement
criteria, in other laws confusion plays its part in the context of another criterion, e.g.
"association in Benelux law. The trademark law of the European Community
(Community Trade Mark Regulation Art. 9 and First Approximative Directive Art. 5) considers likelihood of confusion to include" likelihood of association.
lt is proposed that, in the framework of the present Q 127, AIPPI will not discuss the relationship between the concepts of confusion and association.
Though confusion may also play a part in establishing dilution of a trademark, it is
furthermore proposed that AIPPI will not deal here with the dilution of a trademark.
lt has already appeared from the Group reports for Q 115 that the generally accepted
types of confusion are: confusion between marks, confusion concerning the origin of
the products, and confusion concerning the existence of some relationship between
the undertaking of the parties in a trademark action.
lt appeared furthermore from those reports that it is generally accepted that the standard is not actual confusion but likelihood of confusion.
Though the decision as to whether confusion is likely to arise is often to a great extent
subjective, certain legal standards can guide the Courts in their decision making.
X
I. General rules for comparison
In most countries, the following general rules have been developed for a comparison between marks when establishing the existence of confusion:
the comparison to be made is not a direct comparison between the actual marks but a
comparison between the younger mark and the image of the older mark which exists in
the memory of the consumer when he sees or hears the younger mark; that image is
often vague and therefore limited only to the main components of the mark;
the total, overall impression of the marks is decisive;
generally similarities are more important than differences, but likelihood of confusion
should only be accepted if it is indeed the common elements which gives the older
mark its distinctiveness.
II. Criteria for comparison
First of all the criteria to be applied in the comparison of the marks will have to be established.
Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
So-called strong marks, i.e. marks with great distinctiveness (accruing from their originality
or obtained by intensive use), generally enjoy a broader protection than normal marks. For
instance, a well-known mark enjoys protection under Art. 6biS (1) of the Paris Convention
protection even without being registered.
Should likelihood of confusion with a strong mark be more readily accepted than with a
normal mark, in other words: does the distinctiveness of the mark determine the scope of
its protection against confusion?
Sound, sight and meaning
Confusion may arise from phonetic similarity, visual similarity and similarity of meaning.
Similarity as to one of these three aspects may lead to likelihood of confusion, but in case
of similarities as to one of these aspects and dissimilarities as to one or both of the other
aspects, a balance must be struck. Are there any standards which decide the outcome of
such balancing; for instance: does similar meaning or connotation of word marks outweigh
dissimilarity of sound and sight (take for instance: TORNADO, CYKLONE and TYPHOON)?
Translations
Well-known marks are protected by Art. 6bis (1) of the Paris Convention, even if they are
not registered, not only against reproduction or imitation but also against translation liable
to create confusion.
a) Do the national laws protect against translation a mark which is not well-known?
Xl
b) Do the laws of countries with more than one (official) language have specific provisions
as to translations from one into another of such languages?
Family marks
Sometimes a trademark owner owns several marks which have a common element and
which therefore can be considered to belong to a series or a family. Do such marks enjoy
special protection? Under which circumstances?
Conditions under which the older mark has been used
lt is generally accepted that the Courts must take into account all circumstances in
evaluating the likelihood of confusion between an older mark and a younger mark.
So the question arises as to whether this also applies to the conditions under which the
older mark has been used if the owner has used it with extra elements added to the
registered mark.
Does one have only to compare the mark as registered with the mark used by the alleged infringer? Or does one have to take into account the additional elements which are
not part of the registered mark but which have been habitually used by the owner of the
mark and must one compare the so-used mark with the later mark?
The question is asked within the frame of trademark law.
If the trademark law cannot be invoked, can the solution be found by application of the
rules of unfair competition?
Ill. Others elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
In general, it will have to be established whether the average, ordinary purchaser, who is
not seeing both marks together, is likely to be confused.
Purchaser and user are not always the same: is confusion of the user also relevant?
Which part of the public?
Likelihood of confusion of the whole public is certainly not necessary. What then should
the criterion be: does even likelihood of confusion of a few purchasers or a small part of
the public suffice, or should it be a non-negligible or appreciable or considerable part?
Should the problem be solved with a calculated guess or should it be dealt with in a more
exact way, setting a certain percentage?
XII
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
Purchasers of mass-products and low-priced products are less attentive than purchasers
of expensive or exclusive products and professional purchasers in specialised fields. The
likelihood of confusion may therefore be different for different kinds of products.
In case law, different approaches are taken if trademarks for medicinal products are invol-
ved. Should likelihood of confusion be less easily accepted because the doctor, who
prescribes the medicine, and the pharmacist, who is the deliverer of the medicine, are spe-
cialists? On the other hand, is a higher treshold against confusion called for, since confusion of medicines can compromise the safety of patients?
Decisive moment of confusion
Circumstances relevant to the issue of confusion may change in time, so the question arises as to which time is decisive. Should the Registration Authorities and the Courts decide
as to the time of their decision? Or should other times apply, e.g. the date of the registration of first use of the younger mark, or the date of the writ of summons, or any other time?
Which time is decisive for the degree of distinctiveness of the older mark?
Fraudulent intent
lt has appeared already from the Group reports on Q 115 that fraudulent intent is not required, but the remaining question is: does intent to deceive give rise to a presumption of
successful deception?
IV. Other criteria
Which possible criteria other than the ones dealt with hereinbefore are relevant to the
evaluation of confusion? For instance: can the Courts which evaluate confusion take into
account parallel acts of unfair competition, e.g. the use of a similar mark by a former employee?
Conclusion
The Groups are invited:
-
on the one hand, to report all the situations in their national statutes and case law in
respect of all the above points under each of the chapters I - IV (and they are emphatically asked to illustrate their comments with examples);
-
on the other hand, to express all solutions which they think desirable and uniformly acceptable.
XIII
Frage 0 127
Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit im Markenrecht
Einleitung
Die lVfgR untersucht im Zusammenhang mit Frage Q 115 (Wirksamer Schutz gegen
den unlauteren Wettbewerb nach Artikel 10b1s der Pariser Verbandsübereinkunft von
1883) den Begriff der "Verwechslung. Dieser Gegenstand figurierte auf dem Programm des Treffens des Exekutivausschusses vom 13. bis 17. Juni 1994 in Kopenhagen.
Artikel 10b1s verbietet, unter anderem, alle Handlungen, die geeignet sind, auf irgendeine Weise eine Verwechslung mit der Niederlassung, den Erzeugnissen oder der gewerblichen oder kaufmännischen Tätigkeit eines Wettbewerbers hervorzurufen. Bei
der vorliegenden Frage Q 127 geht es um die Verwechslungsgefahr in einem engeren
Kontext, nämlich ausschliesslich im Markenrecht. Wenn auch gewisse Uberlappungen
des Gegenstands von Q 115 und Q 127 bestehen können, hat es zweifelsohne seine
Berechtigung, wenn die lVfgR eine besondere, vertiefte Untersuchung der Beurteilung
des Verwechslungsbegriffs im Markenrecht anstellt, da es sich bei der Verwechslungsgefahr um ein universelles Verletzungskriterium handelt.
Im Markenrecht der einzelnen Länder wird der Verwechslungsbegriff in den Gesetzestexten in unterschiedlicher Weise behandelt. In einigen Rechtssystemen stellt er einen
Teil des Textes dar, der die Kriterien der Markenverletzungen enthält, in andern taucht
er
im Zusammenhang mit einem andern Kriterium auf, so beispielsweise der
Assoziation im Recht der Benelux-Staaten. Für das Markenrecht der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft (Artikel 9 der Gemeinschaftsmarkenverordnung und Artikel 5 der Ersten
Harmonisierungsrichtlinie) "beinhaltet die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung die
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Assoziation.
Es wird vorgeschlagen, die lVfgR möge sich im Rahmen der vorliegenden Q 127 nicht
mit der Beziehung der Begriffe Verwechslung" und "Assoziation" befassen.
Die Verwechslung kann zwar bei der Verwässerung einer Marke eine Rolle spielen,
doch wird zusätzlich vorgeschlagen, die lVfgR möge sich hier nicht mit der Verwâsserung einer Marke befassen.
Bereits aus den Ländergruppenberichten zu Q 115 ging hervor, dass es sich bei den
allgemein anerkannten Verwechslungsarten um folgendes handelt: Verwechslungen
von Marken, Verwechslungen bezüglich der Herkunft der Produkte, sowie Verwechslungen bezüglich des Vorhandenseins einer Beziehung zwischen dem Unternehmen
der Parteien in einer Markenauseinandersetzung.
XIV
Aus diesen Berichten war zudem ersichtlich, dass allgemein anerkannt wird, dass nicht
eine tatsächliche Verwechslung, sondern die Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit den
Standard darstellt.
Die Entscheidung darüber, ob die Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, dass es zu einer Verwechslung kommt, ist zwar oft in grossem Masse subjektiver Art, doch können gewisse
gesetzliche Standards den Gerichten als Richtschnur bei der Entscheidungsfindung
dienen.
I. Allgemeine Vergleichsregeln
In den meisten Ländern sind für den Vergleich der Marken bei der Feststellung der Verwechslung die folgenden allgemeinen Regeln entwickelt worden:
bei dem anzustellenden Vergleich handelt es sich nicht um einen direkten Vergleich der
tatsächlichen Marken, sondern um einen Vergleich der jüngeren Marke und des Bildes
der älteren Marke, welches der Konsument in seiner Erinnerung hat, wenn er die jüngere Marke sieht oder hört; dies ist oft ein vages Bild und deshalb beschränkt auf die
Hauptkomponenten der Marke;
entscheidend ist der Gesamteindruck der Marken;
im allgemeinen sind Ähnlichkeiten von grösserer Bedeutung als Unterschiede, doch
sollte eine Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit nur dann angenommen werden, wenn die
gemeinsamen Elemente die Unterscheidungskraft der älteren Marke begründen.
II. Vergleichskriterien
Zunächst sind die Kriterien aufzustellen, die beim Vergleich der Marken zur Anwendung
gelangen sollen.
1. Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungskraft für den Umfang des Schutzes
Sogenannt starke Marken, das heisst, Marken mit einer grossen Unterscheidungskraft
(die sich aus ihrer Eigenständigkeit ergibt, oder welche die Marke durch intensiven Gebrauch erlangt hat) geniessen in der Regel einen grösseren Schutz als 'normale" Marken.
So geniesst eine sehr bekannte Marke gemäss Artikel 6bis (1) der Pariser Verbandsübereinkunft Schutz, auch ohne eingetragen zu sein.
Ist tatsächlich die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung mit einer starken Marke eher anzunehmen als diejenige mit einer normalen Marke, oder, anders formuliert: ist die Unterscheidungskraft der Marke massgeblich für den Umfang ihres Schutzes vor Verwechslungen?
xv
2. Phonetische, visuelle und bedeutungsmässige Ähnlichkeit
Eine Verwechslung kann sich aus phonetischer, visueller und bedeutungsmässiger Ähnlichkeit ergeben. Eine Ähnlichkeit bezüglich eines dieser drei Aspekte kann eine Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit bewirken, aber im Fall der Ähnlichkeit bezüglich eines dieser Elemente und der Nichtähnlichkeit bezüglich beider oder eines der andern Elemente
muss eine Abwägung vorgenommen werden. Gibt es Standards, die für das Ergebnis dieser Abwägung in entscheidender Weise massgeblich sind? Kommt beispielsweise einer
gleichartigen Bedeutung oder Assoziation von Wortmarken ein grösseres Gewicht zu als
der Nichtähnlichkeit in phonetischer und visueller Hinsicht (z.B. TORNADO, ZYKLON und
TAIFUN)?
3. Übersetzungen
Sehr bekannte Marken geniessen den Schutz von Artikel 6bis (1) der Pariser Verbandsübereinkunft, auch wenn sie nicht eingetragen sind, und zwar nicht nur vor der Wiedergabe von Nachahmungen, sondern auch vor leicht zu Verwechslungen führenden'
Übersetzungen.
Gewähren die Rechtssysteme der einzelnen Länder einer Marke, die nicht sehr bekannt ist, Schutz vor Übersetzungen?
Haben die Rechtssysteme von Ländern mit mehr als einer (Amts-) Sprache besondere
Bestimmungen bezüglich Übersetzungen von der einen in eine andere dieser Sprachen?
4. Familienmarken
Bisweilen ist der Inhaber einer Handelsmarke Eigentümer mehrerer Marken, die ein gemeinsames Element aufweisen und deshalb als einer Serie oder 'Familie' zugehörig betrachtet werden können. Geniessen solche Marken einen besonderen Schutz? Unter welchen Umständen?
5. Bedingungen, unter denen die ältere Marke benutzt worden Ist
a) Es ist allgemein anerkannt, dass die Gerichte bei der Beurteilung der Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung zwischen einer älteren und einer jüngeren Marke allen Umständen Rechnung zu tragen haben.
So stellt sich denn die Frage, ob dies auch für die Bedingungen gilt, unter denen die
ältere Marke benutzt worden ist, wenn der Inhaber sie mit besonderen Elementen zusammen, zusätzlich zu denjenigen der eingetragenen Marke, verwendet hat.
Hat man nur die eingetragene Marke mit der durch den mutmasslichen Verletzer verwendeten Marke zu vergleichen, oder muss man den zusätzlichen Elementen Rechnung tragen, die zwar nicht Bestandteile der eingetragenen Marke darstellen, aber üblicherweise durch den Eigentümer dieser Marke verwendet worden sind, und muss man
die auf diese Weise benutzte Marke mit der jüngeren Marke vergleichen?
XVI
Die Frage stellt sich im Rahmen des Markenrechts.
b) Falls es nicht möglich ist, sich auf das Markenrecht zu berufen: Kann die Lösung
mittels Anwendung der Bestimmungen betreftend unlauteren Wettbewerb gefunden
werden?
III. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
Bei wem wird die Verwechslung bewirkt?
In der Regel wird festzustellen sein, ob die Verwechslung beim "normalen Durchschnittskäufer bewirkt werden kann, der nicht beide Marken nebeneinander sieht.
Käufer und Konsument sind nicht immer dieselben Personen; Ist somit auch die Verwechslung beim Konsumenten von Bedeutung?
Wie gross ist der betroflene Publikumsbereich?
Bestimmt ist keine Verwechslungsgefahr beim gesamten Publikum notwendig. Welches
Kriterium gilt? Genügt die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung bei einigen Käufern oder
einem kleinen Teil des Publikums, oder muss es sich dabei um einen nicht unerheblichen
oder um einen ansehnlichen oder bedeutenden Teil handeln? Ist das Problem mit einer berechneten Annahme gelöst oder auf genauere Weise anzugehen, indem ein gewisser Prozentsatz festgelegt wird?
Bedeutung der Produkteart; Medikamente
Käufer von Massenartikeln und Niedrigpreis-Produkten zeigen eine geringere Aufmerksamkeit als Käufer teurer oder exklusiver Produkte und professionelle Käufer in Spezialbereichen. So kann die Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit für unterschiedliche Produktearten
unterschiedlich gross sein.
Nach Richterrecht gelten andere Betrachtungsweisen, wenn es um Handelsmarken für
Medizinaiprodukte geht. Soll eine Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit weniger rasch anzunehmen sein, weil der Arzt, der das Medikament verschreibt, und der Apotheker, der es
abgibt, Spezialisten sind? Oder ist im Gegenteil ein höherer Damm gegen die Verwechslungsgefahr zu fordern, weil Verwechslungen bei Medikamenten die Sicherheit der Patienten gefährden können?
Der entscheidende Verwechslungszeitpunkt
Die Umstände bezüglich des Problems der Verwechslung können sich im Verlauf der Zeit
ändern; es stellt sich Somit die Frage, welches der entscheidende Zeitpunkt Ist. Sollen die
Eintragungsbehörden und die Gerichte dafür den Moment ihres Entscheids als massgeblich betrachten, oder sollen andere Elemente zum Zug kommen, wie beispielsweise das
Datum der Eintragung der ersten Verwendung der jüngeren Marke oder das Datum des
XVII
Prozesseröffnungsbeschlusses oder irgendein sonstiger Zeitpunkt? Welcher Zeitpunkt ist
für den Grad der Unterscheidungskraft der älteren Marke massgeblich?
5. Täuschungsabsicht
Bereits aus den Ländergruppenberichten zu Q 115 war ersichtlich, dass Täuschungsabsicht nicht erforderlich Ist, doch Ist die folgende Frage noch offen: Begründet die Absicht
zu täuschen die Vermutung einer eingetretenen Täuschung?
iV. Weitere Kriterien
Welche weiteren Kriterien, die zusätzlich zu denjenigen denkbar sind, welche im Voranstehenden dargestellt wurden, sind für die Bewertung der Verwechslung massgeblich? Können die mit der Beurteilung der Verwechslung betrauten Gerichte beispielsweise parallele
Handlungen unlauteren Wettbewerbs berücksichtigen, z.B. die Verwendung einer ähnlichen Marke durch einen früheren Angestellten?
Schlussfolgerung
Die Ländergruppen werden gebeten:
einerseits Bericht zu erstatten über die Situation nach ihren gesetzlichen Grundlagen
und dem Richterrecht, und dies bezüglich aller im Voranstehenden unter den Ziffern I
bis IV angegebenen Punkte (und sie werden ausdrücklich ersucht, ihre Bemerkungen
mit Beispielen zu illustrieren);
-
andererseits alle Lösungen anzugeben, die sie als wünschenswert und in einheitlicher
Form annehmbar ansehen.
XVIII
Allemagne
Germany
Deutschland
Bericht 0 127
im Namen der Deutschen Landesgruppe
von Gerhard HEIL und Hans Peter KUNZ-HALLSTEJN
Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr im Markenrecht
I.Vorbemerkung
Das deutsche Markenrecht befindet sich im Umbruch. Mit Beginn des Jahres 1995 tritt
ein neues, gegenüber dem bisher geltenden Warenzeichengesetz wesentlich geändertes Markengesetz in Kraft, das insbesondere der Umsetzung der Ersten Richtlinie
89/104/EWG des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften vom 21. Dezember 1988
zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über die Marken dient. Das
Gesetz ist daher auch, soweit die Vorgaben der Richtlinie gehen, anhand der Bestimmungen dieser Markenrechtsrichtlinie auszulegen.
Die Verwechslungsgefahr ist ein von der Richtlinie geprägter Rechtsbegriff, der sowohl
nach dem bisher geltenden als auch nach dem neuen deutschen Markenrecht selbständiger Überprüfung durch den Bundesgerichtshof unterliegt. Unter der Geltung der
Richtlinie entscheidet letztlich der Europäische Gerichtshof, ob eine von den deutschen
Gerichten gefundene Auslegung mit der Richtlinie in Einklang steht. Die Kriterien des
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für die Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr werden erst
zu entwickeln sein. Dabei wird der Europäische Gerichtshof die Bestimmungen des
EWG-Vertrages über den freien Warenverkehr berücksichtigen (EuGH, Rs. C-315/92,
Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb ./. Clinique Laboratoires SNC und Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH, Tz. 12).
Nach der Gesetzesbegründung zum neuen deutschen Markengesetz soll der Rechtsbegriff der Verwechslungsgefahr uneingeschränkt alle Fälle der Gefahr einer Verwechslung einschliessen, also auch solche, bei denen nicht ein Irrtum über die betriebliche Herkunft vorliegt. Nach den Erwägungsgründen der Markenrichtlinie hängt das
Vorliegen der Verwechslungsgefahr von einer Vielzahl von Umständen ab. Daher lassen sich auch nach neuem Recht keine feste Regeln aufstellen, die von vornherein eine
sichere Beurteilung gestatten, ob zwischen zwei Zeichen eine markenrechtlich relevante Verwechslungsgefahr besteht. Die deutsche Rechtsprechung hat aber im Laufe
vieler Jahrzehnte Beurteilungsgrundsätze entwickelt, die für die Richter Entscheidungskriterien darstellen und den beteiligten Verkehrskreisen Orientierung geben.
1
Diese Grundsätze werden nachfolgend dargestellt, soweit sie für eine Anwendung auf die
neue Rechtslage geeignet erscheinen.
II. Allgemeine Vergleichsregeln
Kein direkter Vergleich der Marken
Die deutsche Rechtsprechung geht von dem Erfahrungssatz aus, dass der Hörer oder Beschauer einander ähnlicher Zeichen diese fast nie gleichzeitig nebeneinander wahrnimmt
und miteinander vergleicht. Dem Verkehr prägt sich daher auch nur selten ein scharf umrissenes Bild ein. Meist behält er nur einzelne, als eigentümlich empfundene Bestandteile
oder Wesenszüge im Gedächtnis, und auch diese oft ungenau. Letztlich entscheidet daher
über die Verwechslung ein undeutliches Erinnerungsbild (BGH GRUR 1993, 972, 974 Sana/Schosana; Baumbach/Hefermehi, Warenzeichengesetz, 12. Aufl., 31 Rdn 29).
Entscheidend ist der Gesamteindruck der Marken
Bei der Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr ist grundsätzlich vom Gesamteindruck der
miteinander zu vergleichenden Zeichen auszugehen. Dies ist ein zentrales Beurteilungskriterium. Der Gesamteindruck bestimmt sich nach den Merkmalen, welche den Charakter
einer Marken prägen oder wesentlich mitbestimmen. Da es auf den Gesamteindruck ankommt, ist es grundsätzlich falsch, sich in eine zergliedernde Beurteilung der Einzelheiten
eines Zeichens zu verlieren. Denn tatsächlich nimmt der flüchtige Hörer oder Betrachter
eine solche Aufteilung nicht vor. Freilich hindert dies nicht, die einzelnen Teile eines Zei-
chens gesondert zu werten, soweit von ihnen die Gesamtwirkung eines Zeichens
abhängig ist. Diese Teilwertung darf deshalb nur den Zweck haben, den Gesamteindruck
des Zeichens zu ermitteln. Nur unter diesem Gesichtspunkt ist die Zerlegung eines
Zeichens zulässig und geboten.
Von weittragender Bedeutung ist die Beurteilung des Gesamteindrucks bei Marken, die
aus zwei und mehr Bestandteilen zusammengesetzt sind. Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung
kann bei älteren zusammengesetzten Marken einem Zeichenteil nur dann ein selbständiger Schutz zugebilligt werden, wenn er den Gesamteindruck des Zeichens prägt oder
doch wesentlich mitbestimmt (BGH GRUR 1976, 353 - COLORBOY). Für diese Wirkung
genügt es nicht, wenn die Bestandteile des Zeichens gleichwertig nebeneinander stehen.
Die Rechtsprechung geht davon aus, dass bei Gleichwertigkeit der Zeichenbestandteile
keiner dieser Teile für sich allein den Gesamteindruck prägt oder doch wesentlich mitbestimmt (BGH GRUR 1991, 319 - Cliff Hurrican/HURRICANE). Es fehlt dann an der
Hervorhebung, die notwendig ist, damit sich der Verkehr daran vorrangig orientiert und im
Gedächtnis behält. Für diese Beurteilung spricht, dass es der Markeninhaber in der Hand
hat, kennzeichnende Bestandteile, welche er isoliert verteidigen möchte, selbständig als
Marken anzumelden.
Die Rechtsprechung hat in den letzten Jahren den Beurteilungsgrundsatz, dass einem Zeichenbestandteil nur dann selbständiger Schutz zugebilligt werden kann, wenn er den Ge2
samteindruck des Zeichens prägt oder doch wesentlich mitbestimmt, auch auf jüngere
Zeichen angewandt, die aus zwei oder mehreren Bestandteilen zusammengesetzt sind
(BGH GRUR 1986, 72 - Tabac/Tabacco d'I-larar). Eine solche Rechtsprechung begründet
die Gefahr, dass eine aus einem Wort bestehende ältere Marke gegen aus mehreren
Bestandteilen bestehende jüngere Marken nicht mehr wirksam verteidigt werden kann.
Anders ausgedrückt: Ein Mitbewerber könnte die Marke des Konkurrenten ungehindert
verwenden, wenn er sie nur mit anderen Bestandteilen kombiniert, die für den Gesamteindruck des jüngeren Zeichens prägend sind oder diesen jedenfalls wesentlich mitbestimmen. Es kommt in diesen Fällen aber jedenfalls dann zu Täuschungen des Verkehrs, wenn
dieser die ältere Marke auch als untergeordneter Bestandteil in der jüngeren Marke erkennt und die gleiche Herkunft der Ware oder sonstige wirtschaftliche Zusammenhänge
vermutet, die gerade nicht bestehen.
Diese Rechtsprechung beruht auf einer Überbetonung des Gesamteindrucks als Beurteilungskriterium der Verwechslungsgefahr; sie bedarf unter der Geltung des neuen Markenrechts einer Überprüfung.
3. Ähnlichkeiten sind von grösserer Bedeutung als Unterschiede
Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs und die Kommentare wiederholen immer
wieder, dass für die Verwechslungsgefahr die Ähnlichkeiten der zu vergleichenden
Zeichen von grösserer Bedeutung seien als die Unterschiede (BGH GRUR 1993, 118 Corvaton/Corvasal). Dieser Beurteilungsgrundsatz will besagen, dass in der Eile des
täglichen Verkehrs der Durchschnittsbetrachter oder -hörer aufgrund seiner unsicheren
Erinnerung dazu neigt, in einer Marke, die den Grundzügen einer anderen angenähert ist,
diese wiederzufinden. Es kommt also für das Entstehen von Verwechslungsgefahr auf die
angenäherten Grundzüge an und nicht auf die Abweichungen in den Einzelheiten. Für die
Entscheidung über die Verwechslungsgefahr genügt daher die an sich selbstverständliche
Feststellung, dass die Grundzüge der sich gegenüberstehenden Marken übereinstimmen.
Einschränkungen dieser Regel ergeben sich aus dem weiteren Grundsatz, dass aus nicht
schutzfähigen Zeichenbestandteilen keine Verbietungsrechte hergeleitet werden können.
Daher begründet die Übereinstimmung von Zeichen in schutzunfähigen Teilen oder Begriffen die Verwechslungsgefahr nicht (BGH GRUR 1965, 183, 185 - derma; GRUR 1990,
453 - L-Thyroxin). Hierzu sind weitere Abstufungen zu berücksichtigen. Ist etwa das gemeinsame Element im älteren Zeichen nur von geringer Kennzeichnungskraft
(Unterscheidungskraft), muss zur Bejahung der Verwechslungsgefahr entweder die
Übereinstimmung sehr intensiv sein oder aber die Abweichung in Einzelteilen besonders
gering.
Ill. Vergleichskriterien
1. Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungskraft für den Schutzumfang
a) Nicht alle Marken können denselben Schutzumfang in Anspruch nehmen. In der bisherigen Praxis wurde den einzelnen Marken ein nach dem Grad ihrer Unterscheidungs3
kraft - nach bisheriger Terminologie 'Kennzeichnungskraft" - unterschiedlich grösserer
oder kleinerer Verteidigungs- bzw. Verbietungsbereich, ein unterschiedlicher
'Schutzumfang, eingeräumt. Der Bundesgerichtshof hat dies mit der Argumentation
begründet, je bekannter eine Marke sei, desto grösser sei auch die Gefahr, dass der
Verkehr die seinem Erinnerungsbild verbliebene Vorstellung von der Marke mit einem
ähnlichen jüngeren Zeichen in Verbindung bringe und in diesem die ältere Marke wieder zu erkennen glaube. Die Gewöhnung des Verkehrs an eine Marke führe dazu, dass
Unterschiede zu anderen Marken weniger beachtet werden und demzufolge eine erhöhte Verwechslungsgefahr bestehe (BGH GRUR 1988, 635, 636 -Grundcommerz).
Auch für das neue Markenrecht ist daran festzuhalten, dass Marken von bedeutender
Unterscheidungskraft, insbesondere bekannte Marken, einen erweiterten Schutzumfang in Anspruch nehmen können. Dies ergibt sich nicht zuletzt aus den
Bestimmungen des § 8 Abs.
1
Ziff. 3 MarkenG und Art. 4 Abs. 3 und 4 der
Markenrichtlinie. Die Annahme, dass bei bekannten Marken eine erhöhte Gefahr von
Verwechslungen bestehe, bedarf jedoch einer Präzisierung. Tatsächlich ist es wohl
eher so, dass die Verwechslungsgefahr im eigentlichen und engeren Sinne umso
geringer ist, desto deutlicher die Marke infolge ihres hohen Bekanntheitsgrades im
Erinnerungsbild des Verkehrs verhaftet ist. Für die Anwendung des neuen
Markengesetzes liegt hier möglicherweise die Bedeutung der gesetzlichen Definition
der Verwechslungsgefahr, wonach diese die Gefahr einschliesst, dass das (jüngere)
Zeichen mit der Marke gedanklich in Verbindung gebracht wird" ( 8 Abs. 2 Ziff. 2
MarkenG und Art. 3 Abs. 1 lit, b der Markenrichtlinie).
b) Nicht zu übersehen ist freilich, dass in Deutschland die weit überwiegende Anzahl markenrechtlicher Kollisionen im registerrechtlichen Widerspruchsverfahren zu entscheiden sind und dass dort der Schutz bekannter Marken nur selten eine Rolle spielt. Hier
ist bei der Prüfung auf Vorliegen einer Verwechslungsgefahr zumeist von unterdurchschnittlich schwachen älteren Marken auszugehen. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind
dabei die Marken, die von vornherein nur einen geringen Schutzumfang haben, weil sie
sich an freihaltungsbedürftige Angaben anlehnen. Hierzu gibt es auch eine umfangreiche neuere höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung (vergl. BGH GRUR 1989, 349, 350 ROTH-HANDLE-KENTUCKY/Cenduggy). Der Bundesgerichtshof hat in solchen Fallen
die Verwechslungsgefahr verneint mit der Begründung, der Schutzbereich solcher, an
freizuhaltende Angaben angelehnter Marken sei eng zu bemessen und beschränke
sich auf den Gesamteindruck in der den Schutz der Marke begründenden Gestaltung.
Ein hiervon losgelöster Schutz für die zugrundliegende beschreibende Angabe könne
nicht beansprucht werden.
2. Kiangliche, bildliche und begriffliche Ähnlichkeit
Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung kann eine rechtlich relevante Verwechslungsgefahr von
Marken in klanglicher (phonetischer), bildlicher (visueller) oder begrifflicher
(bedeutungsmâssiger) Hinsicht gegeben sein. Zur Bejahung der Verwechslungsgefahr im
Einzelfall genügt die Übereinstimmung in einer der drei Richtungen (BGH GRUR 1959, 183
4
- Quick/Glück). In ihrer rechtlichen Gewichtung stehen die drei Erscheinungsformen der
Verwechslungsgefahr grundsätzlich gleichwertig nebeneinander. In der Mehrzahl der Kollisionsfälle Ist nur eine der drei möglichen Übereinstimmungen gegeben. Die Entscheidungen der Gerichte und des Patentamts enthalten dann zumeist keine Ausführungen zu den
weiteren Gesichtspunkten.
Liegt ledoch bei zwei sich gegenüberstehenden Marken die Annahme der Verwechslungs-
gefahr aus dem einen Gesichtspunkt auf der Grenze, so können Ansätze für eine
Verwechslungsgefhr aus dem zweiten oder dritten Gesichtspunkt in der Gesamtschau
letztlich zur Bejahung der Verwechslungsgefahr führen oder diese auch ausschliessen.
Insbesondere können Annäherungen im Sinngehalt die gegebene kiangliche oder schriftbildliche Verwechslungsgefahr vergrössern. Umgekehrt können aber auch Abweichungen
im begrifflichen Inhalt zur Verneinung der Verwechslungsgefahr führen. Für den letzten Fall
nimmt die Rechtsprechung an, dass Abweichungen der Zeichen im Begrifflichen es dem
Verkehr erleichtern, verbleibende klangliche Unterschiede schneller zu erfassen (BGH
GRUR 1992, 130, 132 - Bally/Ball). Davon abgesehen gibt es in der deutschen Praxis keinen Beurteilungsgrundsatz, dass der begrifflichen Verwechslungsgefahr qualitativ eine
grössere Bedeutung zukäme als der klanglicheri oder bildlichen Verwechslungsgefahr.
Zu erwähnen ist, dass quantitativ die Annahme einer ausschliesslich begrifflichen Verwechslungsgefahr sehr selten vorkommt. Die Rechtsprechung lehnt sie in allen Fällen aus
Rechtsgründen ab, in denen der gemeinsame Begriffsinhalt beschreibend und damit nicht
kennzeichnender Natur ist. Im übrigen erscheinen begriffliche Verwechslungen geradezu
atypisch. Sie setzen voraus, dass sich der einschlägige Verkehrskreis den Begriffsinhalt
der Zeichen bewusst macht. Das aber wird regelmässig nicht der Fall sein. Der Bundesge-
richtshof hat, soweit er sich in der Vergangenheit überhaupt mit der begrifflichen
Verwechslungsgefahr befasst hat, diese zumeist abgelehnt (BGH GRUR 1963, 622 - Sunkist; GRUR 1975, 487 - WMF-Mondmännchen; GRUR, 1976, 143 - Biovital; GRUR 1979,
853 - LILA).
3. Übersetzungen
Die deutsche Spruchpraxis gewährt eingetragenen Marken grundsätzlich Schutz vor der
Benutzung von Ubersetzungen durch Mitbewerber, und dies auch, wenn die ältere Marke
nicht sehr bekannt ist und damit nur über einen normalen Schutzumfang verfügt. Diese
Fälle werden unter den Bereich der begriffliche Verwechslungsgefahr subsumiert. Wie vorstehend ausgeführt, ist jedoch die Rechtsprechung bei der Anwendung dieses Beurteilungskriteriums zurückhaltend. Voraussetzung der begrifflichen Gleichsetzung von zwei
Marken verschiedener Sprachen ist die naheliegende Möglichkeit, dass die Zeichen zu
Abnehmern gelangen, denen beide Sprachen, mindestens aber die beiden gegenüberstehenden Begriffe geläufig sind und bei diesen dieselbe oder zumindest eine nahe ver-
wandte Vorstellung hervorrufen. Doch kommt es auch hier auf den Einzelfall und die
Kennzeichnungskraft des älteren Zeichens an. Das Deutsche Patentamt und das Bundespatentgerichts haben in den folgenden Fällen die begriffliche Verwechslungsgefahr
bejaht: Lion = Löwe; Spring Garden = Frühlingsgarten; Ranger = Farmer; Botschafter =
Ambassadeur.
5
4. Markenfamilien (mittelbare Verwechslungsgefahr)
Auch wenn nach dem klanglichen, bildlichen oder begriff-lichen Gesamteindruck der Zeichen keine Verwechslungsgefahr besteht, kann es bei den einschlägigen Verkehrskreisen
dennoch zu Irrtümern kommen, wenn wegen einer Übereinstimmung in charakteristischen
Zeichenbestandteilen angenommen wird, die Waren stammten aus demselben Unternehmen und dienten lediglich der Kennzeichnung verschiedener Warenarten oder Warensorten. Solche Irrtümer gehören zur sogenannten mittelbaren Verwechslungsgefahr.
Fälle mittelbarer Verwechslungsgefahr sind in der Praxis häufig bei der Verwendung sogenannter Serienzeichens.
Der Schutz von Serienzeichen trägt der Übung der Industrie Rechnung, ein Stammzeichen
zu führen und dieses in Form von Abwandlungen zur Kennzeichnung verschiedener Warenarten und Warensorten zu verwenden.
Nach bisheriger Rechtsprechung kommt diese Art der Verwechslungsgefahr im allgemeinen nur unter der doppelten Voraussetzung in Betracht, dass die Vergleichszeichen den
gleichen oder zumindest "wesensgleichen" Wortstamm aufweisen und dass dieser
Stammbestandteil für das Unternehmen des rangbesseren Benutzers kennzeichnenden
Hinweischarakter besitzt.
Die höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung bezeichnet die mittelbare Verwechslungsgefahr als
einen Ausnahmetatbestand, bei dessen Anwendung Zurückhaltung geboten sei (BGH
GRUR 1969, 40,41 - Pentavenon). Dem kann insoweit zugestimmt werden als es eines
komplizierten Denkvorganges bedarf, um eine Marke wegen ihrer Übereinstimmung im
Stammbestandteil einem andere Unternehmen zuzurechnen. Das aber setzt eine sorgfältige Prüfung der Marken und eine gewisse Vertrautheit mit der verletzten Markenserie voraussetzt, was beides regelmässig nicht unterstellt werden kann. Andererseits ist für das
neue Markenrecht davon auszugehen, dass unter dem erweiterten Begriff der Verwechslungsgefahr des neuen Markenrechts Verwechslungen über unternehmerische Zusammenhänge typische Erscheinungsformen der Verwechslungsgefahr darstellen.
Ein instruktiver Fall aus der Rechtsprechung der jüngeren Zeit, in dem das Bestehen mittelbarer Verwechslungsgefahr bejaht wurde, ist folgender:
Die Kläger verfügen auf dem Gebiet der Medizin und Pharmazie über eine Reihe von ein-
getragenen und benutzten Marken mit dem Stammbestandteil "Abbo-" ("Abbott",
"Abboject", "Abboven", "Abbogent", 'Abbonutril', "Abbocath", "Abbovil' und "Abbokinase').
Sie wenden sich mit ihrer Klage gegen eine Serie jüngerer Marken auf dem ähnlichen
Warengebiet, welche den Anfangsbestandteil "Abo" enthalten ("Abodor", "Abofix",
'Abofungin', "Aboquat'). Die Entscheidung bejaht das Bestehen einer Verwechslungsgefahr unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Serienzeichens (BGH GRUR 1989, 350 - Abbo/Abo).
6
5. Bedingungen, unter denen die ältere Marke benutzt worden Ist
Wenn die ältere Marke bei der tatsächlichen Verwendung mit zusätzlichen anderen Elementen verbunden wird, stellt sich die Frage, ob dieses Gesamtgebilde aus Marke und
zusätzlichen Elementen der Entscheidung über die Verwechslungsgefahr zugrunde zulegen ist oder ob allein von der eingetragenen Marke ausgegangen werden kann. Es ist unstreitig, dass nur die eingetragene Form der Marken gegenüber jüngeren Zeichen Dritter
geschützt ist. Dies gebietet bereits der Grundsatz der Rechtssicherheit. Ohnehin hat es der
Markeninhaber in der Hand, durch Anmeldung und Eintragung des von ihm verwendeten
Gesamtbildes Markenschutz für die Kombination der Marken Marke mit weiteren Elementen zu erlangen. Auf folgende drei Abgrenzungen ist jedoch hinzuweisen:
Die bei der tatsächlichen Verwendung einer Marke hinzugesetzten Elemente können
zwar für sich keinen markenrechtlichen Schutz in Anspruch nehmen. Sie können aber
einen gewissen Einfluss auf die rechtliche Bewertung der so verwendeten registrierten
Marke ausüben. Uegt etwa innerhalb des Gesamtgebildes die Betonung auf den nicht
geschützten Elementen und wird dadurch die registrierte Marke in der Erkennbarkeit
und damit in ihrer optischen Bedeutung zurückgedrängt, so kann sich dadurch auch
ihre tatsächliche Kennzeichnungskraft verringern. Andererseits können die zusätzlichen
Elemente einen Hinweis auf den begrifflichen Inhalt der eingetragenen Marke geben
und damit die begriffliche Bewertung der Marke beeinflussen. Solche Wechselwirkungen können vielfältigster Art sein. Ihre Bedeutung liegt in Verletzungsprozessen.
Die zusätzlichen nicht eingetragenen Elemente können durch intensive Benutzung im
einschlägigen Verkehr als Kennzeichen des Inhabers der älteren eingetragenen Marke
isoliert oder in der Gesamtheit Verkehrsgeltung erworben haben ( 4 Nr. 2 MarkenG).
Dann haben wiederum die zusätzlichen Elemente im Verletzungsprozess vollen Anteil
am Schutz.
Werden Zeichenwörtern beim Kauf oder der Bestellung einer Ware üblicherweise bestimmte Zusätze hinzugesetzt, wie z.B. der Name der Warengattung, für die die Marke
verwendet werden soll, so kann dies bei der Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr berücksichtigt werden. Hierzu gibt es eine vereinzelte Rechtsprechung.
IV. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
1. Bei wem wird die Verwechslung bewirkt?
Die Entscheidung der Frage, ob zwischen zwei Marken eine Verwechslungsgefahr
besteht, hängt von den Verkehrskreisen ab, die mit der Ware in Berührung kommen.
Wenngleich grundsätzlich davon auszugehen ist, dass das Publikum die Marken in der
Regel nur flüchtig wahrnimmt, bestehen. gleichwohl Unterschiede in der Aufmerksamkeit,
mit der sie beachtet werden. So begegnen Fachleute neuen Kennzeichnungen erfahrungsgemâss mit grösserer Aufmerksamkeit als das breite Publikum.
7
Bei der Prüfung, welche Verkehrskreise beteiligt sind, müssen alle Personen berücksichtigt
werden, an die sich das Zeichen im geschäftlichen Verkehr bei Bestellung, Einkauf, Verkauf, Empfehlung usw. wendet. Die Rechtsprechung bezieht für die Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr bei Lebensmitteln auch die Personen ein, die an den Waren nicht
interessiert sind, aber zukünftig potentiell als Käufer oder Besteller in Frage kommen (BGH
GRUR 1971, 305 - Konservenzeichen Il). Konsumenten, die selbst nicht als Käufer in Betracht kommen, werden berücksichtigt, soweit sie jedenfalls einen Kaufentschluss beeinflussen können, zum Beispiel durch Empfehlung.
Wie gross Ist der betroffene Personenkreis?
Verwechslungsgefahr besteht, wenn ein nicht unerheblicher Teil der beteiligten Verkehrskreise der Gefahr eines Irrtums unterliegt (zuletzt BGH GRUR 1992, 110. 111 - dipa/dib).
Eine weitere Präzisierung gibt es in der deutschen Rechtsprechung nicht. Wegen der von
Fall zu Fall jeweils sehr unterschiedlichen Situation lässt sich auch kaum ein Prozentsatz
für die erforderliche Grösse des betroffenen Personenkreises festlegen.
Da der Markenschutz letztlich einen wirksamen Wettbewerbsschutz für den Inhaber der
älteren Marke bewirken soll, kann sich die erforderliche Grösse des betroffenen Personenkreises daran orientieren, welcher Personenkreis für den Markeninhaber unter objektiven
Gesichtspunkten wirtschaftlich bedeutsam ist.
Bedeutung der Produktart; Medikamente
Die Verwechslungsgefahr kann für unterschiedliche Produkte unterschiedlich gross
sein. Dies ergibt sich bereits daraus, dass die Verwechslunggefahr von den mit der
Waren in Berührung kommenden Verkehrskreisen abhängt.
Für Medikamente ist von den Endverbrauchern auszugehen, soweit es sich um Medikamente handelt, die nicht einer Rezeptpflicht unterliegen. Bei rezeptpflichtigen
Arzneimitteln kommt es überwiegend auf die Verwechslungsgefahr in Kreisen der Ärzte
und Apotheker an, weil bei ihnen die Entscheidung über die Abgaben des Medikaments liegt. Gleichwohl findet die Gefahr von Irrtümern beim kaufenden Publikum eine
gewisse, wenn auch nachrangige Berücksichtigung. Dabei wird angenommen, dass
die Rezeptpflicht die Zahl der mündlichen Benennungen deutlich vermindere, weil der
Patient das Rezept in der Apotheke im Regelfall lediglich überreicht, ohne dabei das
Präparat zu benennen (BGH RUR 1993, 118, 119 - Corvaton/Corvasal mit weiteren
Hinweisen).
Nicht zu übersehen ist allerdings, dass die deutsche Rechtsprechung eine gewisse
Tendenz erkennen lässt, auf dem Gebiet der Marken für pharmazeutische Erzeugnisse
besondere Regeln anzuwenden, die im Ergebnis zu vergleichsweise engeren Schutzbereichen vn Arzneimittelmarken führen. So lautet ein Grundsatz, dass der Käufer von
der Gesundheitspflege dienenden Erzeugnissen deren Bezeichnung besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenke, um mit Sicherheit das Richtige zu erhalten (BGH GRUR 1958,
81, 83 - Thymopect). Andere Entscheidungen berücksichtigen bei der Beurteilung der
8
Verwechslungsgefahr den "Warenabstand" zwischen den zu kennzeichnenden Arzneimitteln (BGH GRUR 1968, 550 - Poropan) oder gar eine etwa bestehende
Indikationsverschiedenheit (BPatG Mitt. 1988, 177 - Portasan/Tobasan). Im Grunde be-
ruhen solche Tendenzen auf der Tatsache, dass die sehr grosse Zahl der für Arznei-
mittel eingetragenen Marken zu einer verhältnismässig engen Betrachtung ihres
Schutzumfanges zwingt, um Neuanmeldern überhaupt den Erwerb von Arzneimittelmarken zu ermöglichen.
Der entscheIdende Verwechslungszeitpunkt
Massgebender Zeitpunkt für die Prüfung der Verwechslungsgefahr der Marken Ist im
Widerspruchsvertahren der Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung, bei der Verletzungsklage die
letzte Tatsachenverhandlung. Beruft sich jedoch der Inhaber der älteren Marke auf eine
gesteigerte Verkehrsgeltung, so muss diese bereits im Zeitpunkt der Anmeldung der jüngeren Marke bestanden haben und im Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung noch fortbestehen
(BGH GRUR 1960, 130, 134 - Sunpearl II). Soweit jedoch eine Schwächung der Kennzeichnungskraft eines Widerspruchs-zeichens geltend gemacht wird, ist wiederum auf den
Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung abzustellen (BGH GRUR 1963, 626 - Sunsweet).
Täuschungsabsicht
Eine etwaige Täuschungabsicht des Benutzers des jüngeren Zeichens begründet noch
nicht eine Vermutung dafür, dass es tatsächlich zu Täuschungen kommt. Der Begriff der
Verwechslungsgefahr ist ein objektiver Rechtsbegriff, so dass es auf die Tendenz, Verwechslungen herbeizuführen, nicht ankommt (BGH GRUR 1952, 35 - Ardia/Widia). Die
Rechtsprechung betrachtet aber eine nachgewiesene Verwechslungsabsicht als Indiz für
eine bestehende Verwechslungsgefahr. Dies gibt Anlass zu einer strengeren Prüfung, da
die Beteiligten selbst die Auffassung des Verkehrs in ihrem Wirtschaftsgebiet am besten
kennen. Sie wissen aus Erfahrung, worauf der Verkehr achtet und was bei ihm zu Irrtümern führen kann.
V. Weitere Kriterien
Der Begriff der Verwechslungsgefahr ist von der deutschen Rechtsprechung in einer unvon
Löschungsverfahren
und
übersehbaren
Vielzahl
Verletzungsprozessen,
Widerspruchsverfahren ausgefüllt und auf den Einzelfall angewandt werden. Hieraus lassen sich zahlreiche weitere Kriterien entnehmen, die im Einzelfall entscheidungserheblich
sein können. Beispielhaft sind folgende Themen zu nennen:
-
Bedeutung nichtschutzfähiger Bestandteile in der älteren und in der jüngeren Marke;
-
Verteidigungsmöglichkeit einzelner Bestandteile;
-
Grenze zwischen begrifflicher Verwechslungsgefahr und Motivschutz;
-
Wechselwirkung zwischen der Ähnlichkeit der Waren und Dienstleistungen mit der
Ähnlichkeit der Marken;
9
-
Einfluss benutzter und nicht benutzter Drittzeichen;
-
Kriterien, welche die Stärke und die Schwäche einer Marke begründen;
-
Markenrechtliche Bedeutung von Unterschieden in der Farbe der zu vergleichenden
Marken.
Zusammenfassung
Die Verwechslungsgefahr ist in Deutschland ein Rechtsbegriff, dessen Auslegung und An-
wendung im Einzelfall einer Überprüfung durch den Bundesgerichtshof unterliegt. Die
deutsche Rechtsprechung hat in der Vergangenheit sehr eingehende und differenzierte
Regeln und Massstäbe zur Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr im Markenrecht entwickelt. Zur Zeit befindet sich das deutsche Markenrecht im Umbruch. Am 1. Januar 1995
wird das bisher geltende Warenzeichengesetz abgelöst durch das neue Markengesetz,
welches das deutsche Markenrecht an die Erste Markenrechtsrichtlinie der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft anpasst.
Das neue Markengesetz ist im Hinblick auf die Richtlinie auszulegen; auch der Begriff der
Verwechslungsgefahr ist nunmehr ein europäisch geprägter Rechtsbegriff, dessen Auslegung und Anwendung im Einzelfall künftig einer Kontrolle durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof unterliegt. Aus diesem Grunde kann für die Anwendung des Rechtsbegriffs der
Verwechslungsgefahr nicht mehr unbesehen an die frühere Rechtsprechung angeknüpft
werden.
Gleichwohl lässt sich eine Reihe klassischer Kriterien der Beurteilung der Verwechslungs-
gefahr von Marken nennen, die für eine Anwendung auf neue Rechtslage geeignet erscheinen. Der Bericht stellt die wichtigsten dieser Kriterien zusammen.
Résumé
La confusion en droit de marques est un terme juridique dont l'interprétation et
l'application dans un cas d'espèce peuvent être examinées par la Cour Suprême. La
jurisprudence allemande a développé dans le passé des règles détaillées et des critères
subtiles pour apprécier la confusion en droit de marques.
En ce moment le droit allemand de marques subit un change profond. Le 1er janvier 1995
la nouvelle loi sur les marques, le "Markengesetz', entre en vigueur pour remplacer
l'ancien "Warenzeichengesetz'. Le Markengesetz adapte le droit allemand sur les marques
à la Directive des Communauté Européennes. La nouvelle loi sur les marques doit être interprétée en vue de la Directive. Aussi la notion de la confusion sera désormais un terme
10
juridique européen. Son interprétation et son application dans un cas d'espèce pourra
donc être examiné dans l'avenir par la Cour de justice européenne. Pour cette raison les
règles traditionnelles pour l'appréciation de la confusion doivent être évincées à fin de savoir si elles peuvent être encore utilisées sous le nouveau régime européen.
Tout de même on peut individualiser un nombre de critères classiques qui se prètent à
l'application sous la nouvelle loi. Le rapport mentionne les plus importants de ces critères.
Summary
The concept of "confusion" is understood in Germany as a legal concept the interpretation
and the application of which in a given case may be examined by the Supreme Court.
German jurisprudence has developed in the past very detailed rules and criteria for
evaluating confusion in trade mark law. Presently German trade mark law is changing. On
January 1995 a new "Markengesetz" will enter into force and replace the former
"Warenzeichengesetz". The new Act adapts German trade mark law to the First Trade
1
Mark Directive of the European Communities.
The new trade mark Act has to be interpreted and to be applied in view of the European
Trade Mark Directive. As a consequence, the term and concept of "confusion" of the Markengesetz is to be understood as a European legal term and concept whose interpretation
and application in a given case may be in the future subject to control by the European
Court of Justice. For this reason the traditional rules and criteria for evaluating confusion
must be examined to ascertain whether they may be applied under the new Act.
Nevertheless a number of traditional rules and criteria can be found which seem to comply
with the new European regime. The report lists the most important of these rules and
criteria.
11
Australle
Australia
Australien
Report Q 127
in the name of the Australian Group
by Michael DOWLING, Peter ARMITAGE, Michael HUDSON and Susan STOROR
Evaluation of contusion in trademark law
Introduction
The Australian Regime
Australian trade mark law has sources in statutes and common law. Registered trade
marks are mainly based on the Trade Marks Act 1955 ("the Act"). Trade marks which are
not registered are based on the common law relating to the protection of business reputation, that is, the law on passing off. Both registered and unregistered trade marks are affected by statute based trade practices laws. In the context of the trade practices laws,
perhaps the most significant factor is the law proscribing misleading and deceptive conduct in trade. In this Report, we mainly concentrate on the concept and role of confusion in
relation to the Act. We refer to 'confusion" at the stages of application, opposition and infringement.
The Act refers directly to 'confusion" in some cases and indirectly in others. "Confusion" is
expressly referred to in sections 28(a) (scandalous or improper marks), 26(1) (associated
marks) and 118 (effect of changing use by proprietors deemed to cause confusion) of the
Act. The indirect reference to "confusion" comes about, for example, by invoking the issue
whether a mark is "deceptively similar to" a registered mark. This is part of the test of infringement (section 62(1)). Section 6(3) of the Act provides that "a trade mark shall be
deemed to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other
trade mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion". The issue whether a mark is deceptively similar to another also arises in sections 33(1) (registrability), 34(1) (honest concurrent user), 58(3) (concurrent registration) and 68 (passing off) of the Act.
At the Application and Registration Stage
Section 33(1) of the Act provides that a mark shall not be registered if it is substantially
identical with or deceptively similar to a trade mark which is already registered. The test
applies where the mark under application relates to goods or services of the same description as apply to the registered mark.
12
Where such marks do not relate to goods or services of the same description, the application may nevertheless be refused under section 28(a) which provides, among other
things, that a mark the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, shall
not be registered.
Hence, where the marks are not identical, by this slightly indirect approach, assessment of
the likelihood of confusion is the criterion by which applications and registered marks,
whether in related or disparate classes, are compared.
Depending on the section of the Act under consideration, different factors will apply in determining the meaning of "deceptively similar'. In the context of sections 28 (scandalous
and improper marks) and 33 (registrability), public policy considerations arise which are
not relevant to section 62 (infringement). In relation to applications, there will frequently be
no use of the mark applied for and therefore no extraneous circumstances to assist a court
to assess whether the mark is confusing.
Registration of associated marks under sub-section 36(1) is considered below.
After Registration
The normal consequence of infringement involving confusion (i.e. where the issue of deceptive similarity is invoked) would be liability for damages. In the peculiar circumstances
of a registered mark being found to be passing off an unregistered trade mark, section 68
exempts the defendant from liability for damages (i.e. the consequence of the likely confusion so caused), in particular circumstances. The success of the defence under section
28 depends on showing that the defendant's use of the mark was in ignorance of the reputation built up in the plaintiff's deceptively similar mark and that the defendant's use
ceased upon discovery of the conflict.
The changing use of a registered trade mark by successive proprietors of a trade mark
could be a source of confusion tending to invalidate the registration of the mark. The potential for de-registration of such a mark is to some extent limited by section 118. This provides in effect that the fact of changed use as to goods or services between the proprietor
and a predecessor in title shall not be deemed to be likely to cause confusion, by that fact
alone.
Infringement - the different qualities of the rights granted by registration
The main parts of the Australian Register of trade marks are Parts A and B. Part A provides
for distinctive marks and Part B for marks capable of becoming distinctive. Registration in
Part A confers a higher level of protection than that under Part B by the availability of a defence to infringement of Part B registration which does not apply to Part A. That defence
enables the defendant to avoid infringement if notwithstanding prima fade infringement,
the defendant satisfies the court that the particular use of the trade mark is not likely to deceive or cause confusion. Thus registration in Part A entitles the registered proprietor to a
13
remedy in respect of use of a mark which, on its face, infringes; whereas it is a defence to
actions brought by proprietors of Part B marks to show that the use was not likely to deceive or cause confusion.
Section 62 of the Act, provides (our emphasis) as follows:
"621)
A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being the registered
proprietor of the trade mark or a registered user of the trade mark using by way
of permitted use, uses a mark which is substantially identical with, or deceptively
similar to, the trade mark, in the course of trade, in relation to goods or services
in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
2)
In an action for infringement of a trade mark registered in Part B of the Register,
an injunction or other relief shall not be granted to the plaintiff if the defendant
establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the use of the mark of which the
plaintiff complains is not likely to dece/ve or cause confusion or to be taken as
indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods or services in
respect of which the trade mark is registered and a person having the right, either as registered proprietor or as registered user, to use the trade mark."
I. General Rules for Comparison
1. "Substantial Identity "and "Deceptive Similarity" Distinguished
The test of infringement on the grounds of 'substantial identity" proceeds on the assumption that a mark which is found to be 'substantially identical" to a registered trade mark will
give rise to confusion in market use. Infringement on the grounds of "deceptive similarity"
requires the court to assess the likelihood of confusion.
Whether a trade mark is substantially identical to another necessitates a side by side comparison of the two marks. The similarities and differences are identified and assessed in
light of the overall impression - The Shell Company of Australia Limited y Esso Standard Oil
(Australia) Limited (1963)109 CLR 407 ("the Oil Drop Man case").
Infringement on the basis of deceptive similarity is not to be determined by reference to
abstract similarity, nor by a side-by-side comparison. As explained by Windeyer J. in the
Oil Drop Man case (at p415), the comparison:
"is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff's
mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other
hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant's [mark]".
Latham C.J. in Jaffer/ee y Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 at p 122 ("Jafferjee's case"), acknowledged that the test reflects the reality of purchasers faced with conflicting marks in the
market:
14
"... it is very important to remember that the purchasers in that market will not ordinarily
have an opportunity of comparing the two marks side by side. They will compare the
actual mark which they see upon goods which are offered to them with the memory of
the other mark, which they will retain in a more or less distinct form.
The circumstances in which the one test or the other might be applied, can be quite close e.g. "Solaroid" in relation to "Polaroid. In Polaroid Corporation y Sole N. P4' Ltd [1981] 1
NSWLR 491, Kearney J. found that "Solaroid" was not substantially identical to "Polaroid
but that it was deceptively similar.
2. Elements of the Comparison
The comparison to be made in assessing deceptive similarity is, unlike the assessment of
substantial identity, a notional exercise. The court must compare the alleged infringing
mark with what it perceives to be the memory of consumers of the registered mark:
"It depends on a combination of visual impression and judicial estimation of the effect
likely to be produced in the course of the ordinary conduct of affairs". Australian Woollen Mills Ltd y FS Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641 at p 659 (the Australian Woollen
Mills case").
Historically, there has been some divergence of authority as to whether extraneous
circumstances should be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not the alleged
infringing mark is deceptively similar.
The existence of Part B marks and the qualification on the test for infringement in section
62(2) which allows examination of market practice in relation to Part B marks, support the
view that the test in section 62(1) is to be made without reference to extraneous circumstances. On the other hand, the definition of "deceptively similar" as "likely to deceive or
cause confusion" in section 6(3) suggests the need to take into account the use of the
mark and its perception by consumers.
The Full Federal Court decision in Wingate Marketing P4' Ltd y Levi Strauss & Co (1994)
121 ALR 191 (the "Levi's case) contains the clearest recent statement of the approach to
be taken on the question of deceptive similarity. In that case, Levi Strauss, owner of the
mark "Levi's, complained of the use of the mark "Revise" on second-hand Levi's jeans
which were supplied to shops and sold in conjunction with new jeans bearing the "Levi's"
mark. Levi Strauss did not actually market second-hand jeans. lt marketed new jeans designed to look worn.
Sheppard J. emphasised that section 62(1) of the Act does not call for a consideration of
extraneous factors and that, on a true construction, it is the mark as it is used by the defendant which must be examined, not the use of the registered mark. This is an important
distinction. The consequences are, for example, that where a mark is itself deceptively similar but has had additions to it, possibly including disclaimers, it will still infringe notwith15
standing that the additions negate the risk of actual confusion in the market place. Such
additions would be relevant in assessing passing off and misleading and deceptive conduct proscribed by restrictive trade practices laws.
Gummow J., in discussing the comparison to be made between the "infringing" mark and
the Levi's mark, put the point (at p 229) as follows:
"The comparison is between any normal use of the plaintiff's mark comprised within the
registration and that which the defendant actually does in the advertisements or on the
goods in respect of which there is the alleged infringement, but ignoring any matter added to the allegedly infringing trade mark ... However, evidence of trade usage ... is
admissible but not so as to cut across the central importance of [the first proposition]."
Earlier he stated (at p 228):
the primary comparison must be between the registered mark on the one hand and
the mark as used by the defendant on the other. The comparison differs from that in a
passing off action where the plaintiff points to the goodwill built up around the mark by
reason of prior use and then points to the conduct of the defendant as leading to deception (or perhaps merely confusion).
Gummow J. went on to explain that, in making an aural comparison of the marks, one is
ordinarily concerned with the natural and ordinary pronunciation but evidence is admissible to show that those in the trade pronounce the defendant's mark in a different manner.
In the Levi's case, evidence showed that the mark 'Revise" was commonly pronounced,
contrary to its natural pronunciation, to rhyme with "Levi's" with emphasis on the first syllable. This was important to the finding on infringement.
In summary, the law in Australia does not allow, for the purpose of deciding whether a
trade mark is deceptively similar (or likely to deceive or cause confusion), a consideration
of factors extraneous to the mark as registered. In particular, the court will not consider the
circumstances of its use in trade.
3. MakIng the Comparison
The court does not undertake a side-by-side analysis of competing marks for the purpose
of assessing deceptive similarity. As stated above in relation to the Oil Drop Man case, the
comparison is based on the imperfect recollection of a notional consumer.
In applying this test, courts have been mindful, as was stated in de Cordova y Vick Chemical Co. (1951) 68 RPC 103 at p 106, that:
"in most persons the eye is not an accurate recorder of visual detail, and that marks are
remembered by general impressions or by some significant detail than by any photographic recollection of the whole".
16
Essential features of the trade mark as well as strong images or ideas which are conveyed
by the mark will be crucial in assessing the potential for deception posed by the allegedly
infringing mark.
Actual evidence of confusion of relevant consumers in the trade or public will also be treated by the court as compelling (the Australian Woollen Mills case), although it must be
shown to be induced in a "substantial portion of the public" or in a "not inconsiderable
number of cases" - Southern Cross Refrigerating Company y Toowoomba Foundiy P4' Ltd
(1954) 91 CLR 592 (the "Southern Cross case').
In the Australian Woollen Mills case, a comparison was made between two device marks
which featured a man on a horse. They also featured the product names "Crusader" and
"Caesar" respectively. Dixon and McTiernan JJ regarded actual evidence of confusion to
be potentially "of great weight" but found the evidence of a few people who mistook a
newspaper advertisement of the respondent for an advertisement of the applicant as
amounting to very little.
In the Southern Cross case, in the judgment of Kitto J., which was upheld on appeal, the
Judge dealt substantially with evidence of those who were confused about the use of the
relevant trade mark. The case involved an application to register "Southern Cross" for refrigeration equipment. This was opposed by Toowoomba Foundry on the basis of its substantial reputation in the supply of farm equipment under the name "Southern Cross". Notwithstanding that the goods were of different descriptions, it was held that there was a
probability of confusion. This decision was influenced by the evidence of more than 12 witnesses who gave accounts of their own confusion over the existing and proposed uses of
"Southern Cross".
In the Levi's case, evidence of actual confusion was led from sales assistants and retail
shop managers to show that the trade perception was that the Revise jeans were the product of Levi Strauss and that customers tended to request second-hand Levis jeans rather
than Revise jeans.
Evidence need not establish conclusively that the notional purchaser would be confused
as to the origin of the goods or services. The test applied in the Southern Cross case was
that it is sufficient if the result of the use of the mark will be that a number of persons will be
caused to wonder if it might not be the case that the two products come from the same
source. lt is enough if the ordinary person retains a reasonable doubt.
The test of deceptive similarity was stated in a different way in Re William Bailey
(Birmingham) Ltd's Application (1935) 52 RPC 136 that a mere possibility of confusion is
not enough; there must be a real tangible danger of confusion.
17
II. Criteria for Comparison
DIstinctiveness of the Mark
Should likelihood of confusion with a strong mark be more readily accepted than with a
normal marlç in other words: does the distinctiveness of the mark determine the scope of
its protection against confusion?
Where a mark is strongly distinctive, this will be a factor to be considered in deciding whether the competing mark is likely to confuse. While a court may be prepared to infer that
consumers are more likely to recognise distinctive marks, the important issue is what impression they have in their minds when confronted by a similar mark. The court assesses
whether the quality of the impression borne by consumers of the distinctive registered
mark makes it more likely that the similar mark will be differentiated or more likely that it will
attract consumers' attention and, because the recollection of the distinctive mark is imperfect, be more likely to cause confusion.
No presumption is called for either way. That is the law in Australia. The authors do not
consider that there should be any presumption. There needs to be flexibility for the court to
determine the likelihood of confusion on the merits of each case. As the test of infringement involves the court in determining what impression consumers have of the registered
mark, the history of its use and its reputation will be assessed and inevitably the court will
decide what effect those factors have in the particular case.
Accordingly, in answer to the questions raised by the Reporter-General, the authors views
are as follows.
The likelihood of confusion with a strong mark will not necessarily be any greater than with
a normal mark. There is no jurisprudential need to make any distinction between strong
and normal marks. It would be dangerous to do so by some a priori rule because it is impossible to know in advance that it will be fair to apply such a rule.
In Australia, the level of distinctiveness of a mark can affect the likelihood of confusion positively or negatively depending on the circumstances. Thus, it may be said that the level of
distinctiveness of the mark will, in particular circumstances, determine the scope of its
protection against use of another mark likely to cause confusion but that is an indirect effect arising from decisions made on infringement in the particular circumstances of each
case.
Sound, Sight and Meaning
Confusion may arise from phonetic similarity, visual similarity and similarity of meaning.
Similarity as to one of these three aspects may lead to likelihood of confusion, but in case
of similarities as to one of these aspects and dissimilarities as to one or both of the other
aspects, a balance must be struck Are there any standards which decide the outcome of
such balancing; for instance: does similar meaning or connotation of word marks outweigh
18
dissimilariP/ of sound and sight (take for instance: TORNADO, CYKLONE, and
TYPHOON)?
Evidence of the aural and visual qualities of trade marks is relevant in relation to registrability and infringement in Australia, but meaning is not a relevant issue. The authors consider
that that is because trade marks do not have meaning in the sense of words as used in ordinary language.
On the issue whether similarity of sound would be given more weight than similarity of
sight, that would depend upon the circumstances. The one may be given more weight than
the other depending upon how the trade mark has been used. For example, in the case of
services offered over the telephone, aural similarity would have more weight. However,
where the goods are selected by the customers with little intervention by sales staff, visual
differences would carry more weight - Deeko Australia Pty Ltd y The Decor Corporation Ply
Ltd (1988) AIPC 90-479.
3. Translations
Do the national laws protect against translation a mark which is not well-known?
Do the laws of countries with more than one (official) language have specific provisions
as to translations from one into another of such languages?
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention requires countries to invalidate registered trade marks
which may be confused with well-known foreign trade marks or translations of them. No
specific prohibition on such marks has been incorporated into the Act to enforce this rule.
As stated above in relation to scope of protection, it is not in point in Australia whether a
mark is well-known or not and the same applies to translation of marks not well-known.
As to the issue of a mark which is a translation being invalidated, that will only come about
if the registration breaches the ordinary rules as to registrability - e.g. section 33(1) whether
the mark is deceptively similar to a trade mark which is registered, or as to impropriety section 28(a) (which has particular effect in the context of translations) whether the use of
the mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
The law of passing off may also assist a foreign trade mark owner whose mark has been
translated and the resultant mark is likely to cause confusion. Where it can be shown that
some reputation has been established in Australia in a foreign trade mark, an applicant
may be entitled to prevent the user of a confusingly similar mark from using that mark.
4. FamIly Marks (Series Marks and Associations)
Sometimes a trademark owner owns several marks which have a common element and
which therefore can be considered to belong to a sei'ies ara 1amily. Do such marks enjoy
special protection? Under which circumstances?
19
There are two systems under the Act which allow for the affiliation of trade marks which are
similar. °Series marks" are defined in section 39 (1) and consist of multiple trade marks for
goods or services of the same description but which differ in respects which do not materially affect the overall identity of the marks. Such a group of marks may be registered
under one registration and are deemed to be, and are subject to, the laws which govern
the second type of related trade marks, that is, associated marks.
Where registered trade marks or trade mark applications of the same owner are substantially identical or so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, under section
36 of the Act, the Registrar may at any time require that they be entered on the register as
associated marks. In general, there will be a greater degree of similarity between marks
contained within a series than associated marks though the major difference between the
two groups is that associated marks need not be registered in respect of goods or services of equivalent description.
The only differences between associated trade marks and those that are not associated
are that they may not be assigned separately and, where it is necessary to defend the registration by showing that the mark has been used, use of an associated mark may be substituted. This recognises the fact that allowing dealings with these marks by different owners is likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers as to the origin of the goods or
services in relation to which the marks are used.
5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
Does one have only to compare the mark as registered with the mark used by the aileged infringer? Or does one have to take into account the additional elements which are
not part of the registered mark but which have been habitvally used by the owner o(the
mark and must one compare the so-used mark with the later mark?
If the trademark law cannot be invoked, can the solution be found by application of the
rules of unfair competition?
The Australian position under this heading has largely been addressed in "Elements of the
Comparison" in part I. 2 above. In infringement actions, courts are not concerned to examine all the circumstances surrounding the use of a newer mark or all the circumstances
surrounding the use of the older mark. In determining whether or not the registrations are
likely to give rise to confusion, the court considers any normal use of the older mark and
actual use of the newer one but without regard to any matter added (such as disclaimers)
to the newer one.
The comparison will necessarily involve a consideration of some of the elements associated with the use of the older mark. In the past, cases have considered the circumstances in which the mark is used, the circumstances in which the goods are bought and
sold and the character of the probable purchasers of the goods (see the Southern Cross
case). More recently, a more direct, limited assessment of the scope of the older mark has
been favoured - this was the approach in the Levi's case.
20
lt is important, however, to bear in mind that it is the overall impression left in the mind of
the consumer by the older mark which forms the basis for assessing the effect of the newer mark. A meticulous or careful analysis of the individual similarities or differences of the
marks is not warranted except to determine what will be the consumer's recollection.
As to question (b), the question assumes that the trade mark law cannot be invoked i.e.
that it is inadequate in some way to protect the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner. We doubt that assumption to be correct in our case but one cannot have an absolute
view because each case will be decided in its own circumstances.
Assuming for the purposes of the exercise that the assumption is correct, in Australia, the
law of passing off and restrictive trade practices laws provide additional protection fcr trade
mark owners and particularly so, for those who own strongly distinctive marks. However,
Australia does not have an independent tort of unfair competition - Moorgate Tobacco y
Philip Morris (1984) 156 CUR 414.
Ill. Other Elements of Evaluation
Confusion of whom?
Purchaser and user are not always the same: is confusion of the user also relevant?
In Australian trade mark law, the relevant person to consider in testing registrability and infringement (and thus the potential for confusion) is the purchaser of the goods or services.
Trade practices law provides protection to consumers. The authors consider that the
combination of trade mark and trade practices laws provide appropriate protection to trade
mark owners and consumers, taken overall.
The authors consider it unlikely that the trade mark law in Australia will be extended to
protect users who are not purchasers of the goods or services involved because the putative need is met by other law. However, assuming that the trade mark law were to be so
extended, it is unlikely that the manner in which the effect of confusion would be assessed
in relation to a user of the goods or services, would be any different to the way in which it is
now assessed in relation to purchasers of the goods or services.
Which part of the Public?
Likelihood of confusion of the whole public is certainly not necessaiy. What then should
the criterion be: does even likelihood of confusion of a few purchasers or a small part of
the public suffice, or should it be a non-negligible or appreciable or considerable part?
Should the problem be soWed with a calculated guess or should it be deaft with in a more
exact way, setting a certain percentage?
21
The question asks what the criterion for confusion should be in terms of its impact on
numbers of persons. In Australia, the numbers of persons who might be confused is not a
threshold issue.
In Australia, we start by identifying the relevant class of person which might be deceived or
confused. This is usually straightforward. Generally, it is that class of person which provides the potential source of income for the trader through supply of goods or services to
which the trade mark is affixed. It is the confusion in the minds of persons in this class
which could result in diverting that income to a rival trader and which would form the
source of complaint.
Next, the state of mind of persons in that class is determined using objective criteria. In the
Australian Woollen Mills case, Dixon and McTiernan JJ said (at p 658):
Potential buyers of goods are not to be credited with any high perception or habitual
caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded."
Further, in Jafferjee's case, it was noted that the probable purchaser should not be assumed to be a specially stupid man or someone who will consider the two marks with
particularity" and in the Oil Drop Man case, the standard which was adopted was that of
persons of "ordinary intelligence and memory.
The process of analysing the effect of confusion does not rely on assessing the number of
persons in the relevant class being, or likely to be, confused as to the origin of the trade
marked goods but makes a qualitative assessment of the state of the mind of a notional
member of that class in the circumstances of the case. While application of this test is a
matter for the court, cases have shown, in particular the Levi's case, that actual evidence
of confusion or evidence to the contrary can be highly persuasive as to the proper state of
mind to be attributed to the notional purchaser - Rheumaton Trade Mark [1978] RPC 406
(the Rheumaton case).
However, if there were an issue of fact that in the circumstances of the case for some reason very few people would be likely to be confused, there would be a legal issue as to
whether infringement had occurred because the law requires that the confusion be likely to
occur in "a substantial portion of the public or "in a not inconsiderable number of cases" the Southern Cross case.
3. Relevance of kind of products; medicines
In case law, different approaches are taken if trademarks for medicinal products are invol-
ved. Should likelihood of confusion be less easily accepted because the doctor, who
prescribes the medicine, and the pharmacist, who is the delWerer of the medicine, are
specialists? On the other hand, is a higher threshold against confusion called for, since
confusion of medicines can compromise the safety of patients?
22
The kind of product to which the relevant mark or marks is attached is a relevant consideration in assessing the likelihood of confusion among consumers. Cases have frequently recognised that purchasers of goods of a large, durable, expensive or technical
nature, will generally not act in a hurry and are likely to subject the goods and their marks
to more careful scrutiny.
The Australian approach to the sale of medicine and equivalent products to the health industry does not differ from the principles applied to any other specialised field. The limited
market, the existence of common and descriptive prefixes or suffixes in products supplied
to that market and the educated nature of its participants, all contribute to a higher threshold before confusion is established and greater tolerance to the co-existence of trade
marks which are similar - The Rheumaton case.
These factors may raise the threshold of confusion but should not lead to the compromise
of the safety of the patient. Trade marks are intended as a badge of origin to indicate the
supplier/manufacturer of the product. They indicate quality only to the extent that the relevant trader has established a reputation in the field for his or her product. In any case, the
quality of such products and their fitness for use in the industry is generally governed by
other statutory requirements.
Health industry workers are still likely to pay attention to the type of product (generic name)
and dose etc, so that confusion as to origin should not pose a risk to patients. Accordingly,
is submitted that it is unnecessary to impose a more stringent requirement as to the
mutual distinctiveness of products in this industry than that already applied under general
it
trade mark law.
4. Decisive Moment of Confusion
Should the Registration Authorities and the Courts decide as to the time of their decision?
Or should other times apply, e.g. the date of the registration of first use of the younger
mark, or the date of the writ of summons, or any other time? Which time is decisive for the
degree of distinctiveness of the older mark?
The date at which the existence of a possibility of confusion is to be assessed will vary depending upon whether registrability or infringement is in issue. If confusion is being asses-
sed for the purposes of an application for registration, the date is the date of the application for registration.
In relation to infringement, the time at which the issue of confusion will be assessed will be
the time at which the infringement cited in the action is alleged to have occurred. In all
cases, the specified acts and their timing which give rise to the cause of action must be
specified in the originating documents. Specific instances of infringement and the relevant
dates must be cited. lt will be these examples by which a court must judge whether or not
the later mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
23
The authors assume the question to be whether the relevant authorities should decide that
the relevant time for assessing confusion should be when those authorities make their decision. That is not appropriate in our view for reasons including the fact that the decision
may occur long after the hearing when the evidence is assessed.
We consider that the date of application (for registrability) and the date of alleged infringement (in infringement cases) are appropriate times, respectively. They are certain. They
are fair because they are relevant to the issue to be decided in each case.
5. Fraudulent Intent
lt has appeared already from the Group reports on Q 115 that fraudulent intent is not required, but the remaining question is: does intent to deceive give rise to a presumption of
successful deception?
Intent to deceive, and thereby acquire the benefit of the reputation attaching to another's
trade mark, is not necessary for there to be infringement. The Levi's case indicates that the
intent to deceive may be relevant to the question of whether there is deception. There is no
established rule in Australian trade mark law that the existence of an intention to deceive
gives rise to a presumption of deception.
Sheppard J. in the Levi's case found that the Revise' mark was deceptively similar without
reference to intent but went on to ask rhetorically (at p 207):
"In accordance with well-known principle, why should [the existence of intent] not give
rise to the drawing of an inference that she had indeed succeeded in her object?"
The judicial attitude to which Sheppard J. refers is stated in the English case of Claudius
Ash, Sons y Company Ld y Invicta Manufacturing Company Ld (1912) 29 RPC 465 by Lord
Loreburn. The case concerned actions for both trade mark infringement and for passing
off. Neither action was established on the facts though it was stated in relation to passing
off that an intention to deceive operates just short of a presumption of deception (at p 475):
"When once you establish the intent to deceive, it is only a short step to proving that the
intent has been successful, but still it is a step even though it be a short step."
Gummow J. in the Levi's case also referred to the finding of fact by the primary judge that
there was an intent to deceive and held that this was one of three factors which particularly
contributed to his finding of deceptive similarity. The other two factors were the findings as
to pronunciation of "Revise" and the evidence of confusion in the trade.
Fraudulent intention is therefore accepted by courts as a strong indicator of actual deception but, in Australian trade mark law at least, it does not invoke a presumption: it
merely contributes to the weight of the case on deceptive similarity. Difficulties involved in
proving the existence of fraudulent intention have no doubt contributed to judges avoiding
adopting fraudulent intention to determine liability.
24
IV. Other Criteria
Which possible criteria other than the ones dealt with hereinbefore are relevant to the
evaluation of confusion? For instance: can the Coulis which evaluate confusion take into
account parallel acts of unfair competition, e.g. the use of a similar mark by a former employee?
Under Australian law, other criteria such as the behaviour of the defendant in relation to the
alleged infringement, might be persuasive on credibility. Certainly, the courts will consider
such factors in trying to determine whom to believe if that is in issue.
However, generally speaking, the behaviour of the defendant in relation to such matters as
parallel acts of unfair competition (not being directly related to the infringement in issue)
would be irrelevant. The particular example cited in the question of the use of a similar
mark by a former employee would, of course, be relevant if that use were the very one in
issue. The fact that the alleged infringement had occurred by the conduct of a former employee who dealt in the goods of his former employer marked with the trade mark which is
the subject of the action, would be a relevant consideration both to persuade the court that
there has been infringement (if that is borderline) and to obtain interlocutory equitable relief
(such as an interlocutory injunction) if that be in issue.
Summary
The role and effect of confusion in Australian trade mark law is well established. Confusion
is assessed mainly in relation to registrability and infringement. The likelihood of confusion
is assessed as part of the question whether the one mark is deceptively similar to another
or other marks. The protection of registered trade marks and persons who are relevant to
consider as being confused, are narrowly defined. This does not produce the need for
amelioration because other law (particularly passing off and restrictive trade practices laws
proscribing misleading and deceptive conduct) provide appropriate additional protection.
Résumé
La fonction et les effets de la confusion en droit des marques australiennes sont bien
établis. La confusion joue un rôle notamment relative au dépôt de la marque et en matière
de contrefaçon. Afin de savoir si une marque risque de prêter à confusion il faut déterminer
si la marque ressemble d'une manière trompeuse à une ou plusieurs autres marques. Le
champ de la protection accordée par le dépôt et la classe de personnes prises en compte
pour déterminer s'il existe un risque de confusion se définissent d'une manière étroite.
Cela n'entraîne pour autant aucun besoin de réforme juridique car la loi dans d'autres domaines (notamment la contrefaçon et le droit de la concurrence, qui interdit tout compor-
25
tement susceptible d'enduire en erreur ou de tromper le consommateur) créent une protection supplémentaire suffisante.
Zusammenfassung
Die Rolle und die Folgen von Verwechslung sind im Australischen Warenzeichengesetz gut
festgelegt. Von Verwechslung wird hauptsächlich in Verbindung mit Eintragungsfähigkeit
und Verletzung gesprochen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung wird als ein Teil der
Frage behandelt, ob ein Zeichen einem anderen oder anderen Zeichen täuschend ähnlich
ist. Der Schutz für eingetragene Warenzeichen und für Personen, die von der Verwechslung betroffen sein könnten, ist nur sehr beschränkt festgelegt. Dies bedarf jedoch
keiner Verbesserung, da weitere Gesetze (inbesondere in bezug auf Geschäfts- und Rufschädigung, sowie einschränkende Gesetze über Handelspraktiken, die irreführendes und
täuschendes Verhalten untersagen) zusätzlich entsprechenden Schutz bieten.
26
Autriche
Austria
Österreich
Bericht Q 127
im Namen der österreichischen Landesgruppe
von dipl. Ing. Helmuth SONN
Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit Im Markenrecht
I. Allgemeine Vergleichsregeln
Die dargestellten allgemeinen Vergleichsregeln treffen für Österreich im allgemeinen zu.
Die gesetzliche Grundlage in Österreich bildet primär der § 14 MSchG:
Ahnlich im Sinne dieses Bundesgesetzes sind Zeichen, wenn die Gefahr besteht, daß
sie im geschäftlichen Verkehr verwechselt werden. Daß ein Zeichen aus Worten, das
andere aus bildlichen Darstellungen besteht, schließt für sich allein die Ähnlichkeit nicht
aus.
Die Verwechselbarkeit spielt eine wesentliche Rolle in den § 30, 30a, 31 und 32 MSchG
sowie den 1 und 9 UWG.
Für die Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr ist grundsätzlich die Vorstellung, die sich
das Publikum bei flüchtiger Betrachtung in der Eile des Geschäftsverkehrs bildet, maßgeblich. Der Durchschriittsinteressent wird fast immer nur einzelne charakteristische
und daher auffällige Bestandteile der älteren Marke im Gedächtnis behalten (OPM 11.
11. 1992, BPI 1993, 206, 'Ergospace" = "Ethospace)
Bei einem aus mehreren Wörtern zusammengesetzten Zeichen tritt gewöhnlich ein
Wort beherrschend hervor und bestimmt den Gesamteindruck (OPM 11. 12. 1991, BPI
1992, 206 "W Linea Wally's" = Bally)
Tatsächlich sind im allgemeinen Ähnlichkeiten von größerer Bedeutung als Unterschiede. Eine Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit kann jedoch nur dann angenommen
werden, wenn die gemeinsamen Elemente die Unterscheidungskraft der älteren Marke
begründen.
So wird beim Zusammentreffen identischer Familiennamen verwechslungsfâhige Ähnlichkeit angenommen (PGH 5. 7. 1961, PBI 1962, 78 "Marcel Guerlain maison fondée
27
en 1923 Paris" = "Guerlain'), nicht jedoch beim Zusammentreffen gleicher Vornamen
(NA 5. 9. 1984, PBI 1986, 147, Jean Pascal < "Jean Patou'), hier kommt also den
Unterschieden die größere Bedeutung zu.
Auch tragen schutzunfähige oder schwache" Teile im allgemeinen, wenn überhaupt,
nur wenig zum Gesamteindruck des Zeichens bei, weshalb hier schon relativ geringe
Abweichungen bei den übrigen Bestandteilen in der Regel ausreichen, um die Gefahr
von Verwechslungen zu beseitigen (OGH 15. 12. 1987, OBI 1988, 41, "Easy Rider" <
"Easy Walker"; OPM 21. 6. 1989, PBI 1990, 88, "Supersan" < "Sanco" und "Sosanco").
Werden die Bestandteile des Zeichens von den beteiligten Verkehrskreisen jedoch zusammen gelesen und in ihrem fantasiehaft angedeuteten Sinn verstanden, haben die
Grundsätze, daß das charakteristische Merkmal grundsätzlich nicht auf einem schutzunfähigen oder nur schwachen Bestandteil liegt, jedoch keine Geltung (OPM 28. 10.
1992 PBJ 1993, S 145, "natur well <Wella").
Il. Vergleichskriterlen
1. Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungskraft für den Umfang des Schutzes
Das österreichische Recht kennt keinen Schutz notorisch bekannter Marken, der über den
Schutz hinausgeht, den die PVü vorsieht. Der Schutz ist somit grundsätzlich auf verwechslungsfähige Zeichen und Warengleichartigkeit beschränkt (OGH 27. 3. 1957 OBI 74,
"Solodent' <Solo').
So ist der Gebrauch eines von einem anderen verwendeten Zeichens für einen andersartigen Betrieb, sofern keine Verwechslungsgefahr vorliegt, in der Regel gestattet. Nur das
Hinzutreten eines besonderen Umstandes - etwa, daß dieser Gebrauch geeignet wäre,
das Zeichen des anderen herabzusetzen oder lächerlich zu machen könnte eine Sittenwidrigkeit ( 1 UWG) begründen (OGH 23. 11. 1955, 3 Ob 564, OBI 1956, 17; "Nimm
DARMOL du fühlst dich wohl" Täglich UNDERBERG und du fühlst dich wohl" - Magenbitter).
Man kann niemanden hindern, seine Strümpfe als Opel oder Mercedes zu bezeichnen,
weil Opel und Mercedes notorische Automobilmarken sind, und ebenso steht es frei,
Arzneimarken für alkoholische Getränke zu verwenden. Das folgt aus dem Mangel eines
allgemeinen Schutzes notorisch bekannter Marken und der grundsätzlichen Beschränkung des Schutzes auf ähnliche, verwechslungsfâhige Zeichen (OGH 23. 11. 1955,
OBI 1956, 17).
Nichtsdestoweniger wurde, unabhängig von der markenrechtlichen Seite, die Verwendung
einer Bezeichnung von Weltgeltung (Coca Cola) für Bonbons als Verstoß gegen § 1 und 9
UWG gewertet (Handelsgericht Wien 13. 6. 1953, 4 Cg 357/53, OBI 1953, 52), was aber
bislang als Ausnahme anzusehen ist.
28
Grundsätzlich genießen nicht eingetragene sehr bekannte Marken zunächst nur dann
Schutz, wenn sie Verkehrsgeltung in Österreich haben.
Wenn einer Marke der Vorgebrauch des gleichen Zeichens zur Kennzeichnung von Waren
oder Dienstleistungen entgegengehalten wird, muß, wie sich u.a. aus § 31 MSchG ergibt,
die Durchsetzung des Kennzeichens für das betreffende Unternehmen im Verkehr, also
seine Verkehrsgeltung, hinzukommen (OBI 1993, 246).
Gleichheit oder Ähnlichkeit der Waren (Dienstleistungen) muß auch bei sehr bekannten
Marken, wie Firmenzeichen, zur Bejahung der Verwechslungsgefahr gegeben sein. Der
Schutz nach § 9 UWG setzt jedoch keine völlige Warengleichheit voraus (OGH 6. 4. 1993,
4 Ob 128/92 Corso").
Nichtsdestoweniger genießen sogenannte starke" Marken bei Vorliegen von Warengleichartigkeit einen größeren Schutz als "schwache" Marken. So wurde, obgleich "ALFA"
als Bezeichnung des ersten Buchstaben des griechischen Alphabets aufgefaßt werden
und man dem Zeichen deshalb Unterscheidungsfähigkeit absprechen könnte, das
gerichtsbekannt hohe Maß der Verkehrsgeltung zugunsten der Alfa Romeo GmbH anerkannt (OGH 14. 6. 1994 4 Ob 61/94, 12 - V - Alpha Motor" = ALFA).
Der Schutz eines Wortes oder einer Wortverbindung mit nur geringer Kennzeichnungskraft
ist nach der jüngeren ständigen Judikatur einschränkend zu beurteilen; schon geringe
Abweichungen können die Gefahr der Verwechslung mit anderen Zeichen beseitigen
(OPM 21. 6. 1989, PBI 1990, 88, "Supersan < Sanco" und Sosanco"). Dies gilt vor allem
für schwache ganz kurze Zeichen mit wenigen Buchstaben (OGH 14. 6. 1977, 4 Ob
330/77, OBI 1977, 126, his und h.i.s." weder optisch noch akustisch verwechselbar ähnlich). Ein nicht-unterscheidungskräftiges Zeichen kann mit einem unterscheidungskräftigen nicht verwechselt werden (NA 16. 1. 1977 PBI 1978, 183, Neooptik" nicht verwechselbar ähnlich mit Jenoptik und Neophot).
2. Phonetische, visuelle und bedeutungsmäßige Ähnlichkeit
Entsprechend der Rechtsprechung und Lehre ist verwechselbare Ähnlichkeit unter dem
Gesichtspunkt der drei Kriterien Wortbild, Wortklang und Wortbedeutung zu beurteilen,
wobei allerdings das Vorliegen bereits eines dieser Gesichtspunkte als ausreichend für die
Annahme der verwechselbaren Ähnlichkeit anzusehen ist.
Liegt jedoch einer der Vergleichsmarken ein Wortsinn zugrunde, so genießt dieses Kriterium Vorrang gegenüber der Beurteilung hinsichtlich Akustik und Optik (NA 20. 1. 1981,
Nm 4/79, P811981, 118, "Panda < Pansan; OPM 9.2.1983, PBI 168 "Mary's" < 'Mars";
OPM 12.1. 1994, 0m 9/93 'IMMUNINE" < IMUKIN, da das Wort "IMMUN einen Sinngehalt hat, der die Marke prägt und auch in Beziehung zu den Waren des Warenverzeichnisses dieser Marke steht, während die Marke 'IMUKIN' keinen Sinngehalt vermimelt und
eine absolute Fantasiebezeichnung darstellt).
29
In der Regel sind verschiedene Bezeichnungen für denselben Begriff vom Standpunkt des
Verkehrs einander gleich. Daher sind sie verwechselbar (NA 12. 6. 1953, PBI 1954, 144,
"Reiter's Haisreiniger" = "Rachenputzer" und "Halsfeger"; OGH 18. 1. 1983, OBI 8 5,
"Bergkraxler" = "Bergsteiger" für Dauerwurst; NA 12. 9. 1980, PBI 1982, 18 "Lady Cat" =
"Miß Cat').
Doch ist die Frage nach dem Wortsinn erst dann zu stellen, wenn sich eine solche Bedeutung geradezu aufdrängt (OPM 27. 4. 1988, PBI 1989, 22, Taffeta" < "Taft").
Interessant im Zusammenhang mit der bedeutungsmäßigen Ähnlichkeit ist noch der Vergleich von Wortmarken mit Bild- und Wortbildmarken (NA 17. 2. 1977, Nm 9/76, PBI 1977,
150, Wortmarke 'Teppichanker" = "Anker" -Bild- und Wortbildmarken oder OGH 8. 3.1994
40b 13/94 Wortmarke "Ritter" = Bild eines Ritters).
Übersetzungen
Ein Schutz vor Übersetzungen besteht nur dann, wenn die Kenntnis der Übersetzung bei
den österreichischen Durchschnittskonsumenten vorausgesetzt werden kann. (OPM 27. 4.
1988, PBI 1989, 22 'Taffeta" <Taft: das Markenwort "Taffeta" ist größeren Käuferschichten
auch dann nicht geläufig, wenn sie der englischen oder der französischen Sprache im
allgemeinen mächtig sind, wobei davon ausgegangen werden muß, daß das Wort "taffeta"
sicherlich nicht zu den Wörtern der englischen Alltagssprache gehört; und OGH 5. 10.
1976, 4 Ob 364/76, OBI 199, 40, "Grotta Azzurra" = "Blaue Grotte" für Restaurants).
Demgegenüber wurde 'Knight" als nicht verwechselbar ähnlich mit "Ritter" für Erzeugnisse,
die sich in erster Linie an Zahnärzte richten, beurteilt, mit der Begründung, daß Zahnärzte
zwar in der Regel über Englischkenntnisse verfügen, welche jedoch nur im medizinischen
Bereich fundiert sein werden, wobei" Knight" ein Betriff ist, der weder der medizinischen
Fachsprache noch jenem Wortschatz angehört, den jemand mit durchschnittlichen
Englischkenntnissen üblicherweise hat (OGH 8. März 1944, 4 Ob 13/94).
Markenfamilien
Verwechslungsgefahr unter dem Aspekt des Serienzeichens setzt voraus, daß der gemeinsame Wortstamm für sich allein geeignet ist, auf ein bestimmtes Unternehmen derart
hinzudeuten, daß die angesprochenen Verkehrskreise den Wortstamm auch im Rahmen
eines Gesamtzeichens als Stammzeichen eines Unternehmens für alle seine Waren und
die Abwandlung des als solches erkennbaren Stammzeichens als Kennzeichnung einzelner Warenarten oder Warensorten werten. Der Hinweischarakter eines Wort- oder Bildstammes als Stammzeichen für eine Serie von Marken kann auch darauf beruhen, daß der
Verkehr sich an mehrere Zeichen mit dem gleichen Wortstamm gewöhnt hat und der Gedanke an das Vorliegen einer Abwandlung dadurch gefördert wird, daß der zusätzliche
Bestandteil eines jüngeren Zeichens warenbeschreibend ist (OPM 10. 2. 1993, OBI 1994,
27, Wort-Bildmarke "McChinese" verwechslungsfähig ähnlich mit Marken, bei denen das
30
Stammzeichen aus der Buchstabengruppe Mc" oder "Mac" besteht (z.B. "McPIZZA",
"McCHICKEN', BIG MAC', etc.))
Anders ausgedrückt, werden Marken dann als einer Familie" zugehörig betrachtet, wenn
die Stammbestandteile zweier Zeichen identisch oder zumindest wesensgleich sind (OPM
27. 6. 1990, PBI 1991,119, "Lady-Boss = "Boss'; OPM 24. 4. 1991, PBI 1991, 193, "Alpo'
ist in diversen zusammengesetzten Marken bzw. Bezeichnungen, wie "Alpo Chrom",
"Aipocryl', "Aipofiex" etc. eindeutig das die Herkunft aus einem bestimmten Unternehmen
kennzeichnende Element).
Nur wenn der gemeinsame Wortbestandteil einen wenig kennzeichnungskräftigen, beschreibenden Hinweis enthält, scheidet die Annahme mittelbarer Verwechslungsgefahr
unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Zeichenabwandlung (Serienzeichen') aus (OPM 13. 1. 1993,
PBI 1993, 218, "Raffael Grey' = "raphael').
Bei einem beschreibenden Stammwort scheidet die Annahme einer Verwechslungsgefahr
unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Zeichenabwandlung ("Serienzeichen") von vornherein aus
(OGH 15. 12. 1987, OBI 1988, 41; "Easy Rider" < "Easy Walker").
Ebensowenig darf der hier hereinspielende Grundsatz, dal3 die Aufnahme der älteren
Marke in die jüngere Marke zur Ähnlichkeit führt, nicht völlig schematisch angewendet
werden (NA 6. 11. 1984, PBI 1985, 176, 'Betonol" < "Onol"; OPM 13. 1. 1993 PBI 1993,
215, "Fantasy' < Fanta').
5. Bedingungen, unter denen die ältere Marke benutzt worden Ist
Nach dem Markenrecht ist für den Ähnlichkeitsvergleich von Marken die registrierte
Form maßgebend (PGH 21. 11. 1962, PBI 1963, 128; NA 9. 11. 1966, PBI 1967, 101).
Wie die Marken im Verkehr tatsächlich verwendet werden, ist unbeachtlich (NA 20. 3.
1961, PBI 1962, 24). Daher ist auf Zusätze, die auf der Verpackung ûblicherweise zusammen mit dem Markenwort angebracht werden, kein Bedacht zu nehmen (NA 9. 11.
1966, PBI 1967, 101).
Der Schutzbereich einer eingetragenen älteren Marke kann nie dadurch vielleicht verringert werden, daß er sie regelmäßig nur zusammen mit weiteren Elementen benutzt.
Insoweit gilt immer die Registereintragung.
Ill. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
1. Bel wem wird die Verwechslung bewirkt?
Die in Betracht kommenden Verkehrskreise sind nach dem Warenverzeichnis zu beurteilen
(NA 4. 12. 1935, PBI 1936, 35). Es ist der Gesamteindruck entscheidend, den die Marke
auf den "gewöhnlichen Käufer' macht (OGH 1. 3. 1909 PBI 1028). "Gewöhnliche Käufer"
bzw. "Durchschnittskäufer" sind die ständigen Abnehmer (OGH 3. 10. 1904, PBI 1905, 28)
31
bzw. diejenigen, zu deren unmittelbarem Gebrauch die Ware bestimmt ist (OPM 10. 6.
1970, PBI 113).
Inwieweit die Verwechslung auch beim Konsumenten (und nicht nur beim Händler) von
Bedeutung Ist, richtet sich nach der Produktart (vgl. 3).
Wie groß Ist der betroffene Publikumsbereich?
Verwechslungsfähige Ähnlichkeit Ist schon dann anzunehmen, wenn die Verwechslungsgefahr für einen nicht unbeachtlichen Teil der Käufer gegeben ist (NA 11. 6. 1964, PBI
1965, 81, Lincoln).
Die Warengleichartigkeit, die den betroffenen Publikumsbereich ja wesentlich mitbestimmt,
wird dann angenommen, wenn der regelmäßige Geschäftsverkehr die Waren als zusammengehörig betrachtet und infolgedessen der Meinung sein kann, daß beide Waren aus
demselben Betrieb stammen. Im Zweifelsfall ist Warengleichartikgeit anzunehmen (NA 30.
10. 1991, PBI 1992, 16; "Gewürzmischungen" gleichartig mit "Backmitteln").
Bedeutung der Produkteart; Medikamente
Gemäß ständiger Rechtsprechung wird bei Abnehmern von pharmazeutischen Produkten
größere Aufmerksamkeit vorausgesetzt als bei Massenartikeln, weil bei Verwechslungen
eine Gesundheitsschädigung nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann und diese Gefahr zu
größerer Vorsicht zwingt (OPM 10. 6. 1970, PB! 113; 'Provascul" < "Proscalun"; NA 22. 2.
1990 PBI 1991, 60, "Bramyc" <"Bromuk").
Artikel für die Körper- und Schönheitspflege genießen die erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit der
Konsumenten, vielleicht nicht so wie Arzneimittel, aber doch mehr als Artikel des täglichen
Gebrauchs (OPM 12. 12. 1990, PBI 1991, 169, "Schick Confort Plus" < "Contour Plus" für
Rasierapparate).
Champagnerweine und Schaumweine werden von der Mehrzahl der österreichischen
Konsumenten besonders kritisch gekauft, sodaß gerade in diesem Bereich mit einer über
dem Durchschnitt liegenden erhöhten Aufmerksamkeit des !nteressierten Publikums gerechnet werden kann (OPM 11. 9. 1985, PBI 1986, 28 "Pummerin" < "Pommery").
Bei Massenartikeln, bei denen eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit der Käuferschaft nicht vorausgesetzt werden kann, Ist die Verwechslungsgefahr als größer anzunehmen (OPM 22. 2.
1989, PBI 1989, 133, "Schloßherr" < 'Schloßperle" für Bier).
Der entscheidende Verwechslungszeitpunkt
Für die Verwechselbarkeit und die Unterscheidungskraft kommt es grundsätzlich auf den
Prioritätszeitpunkt an (PGH 5. 7. 1961, PBI 1962, 78; OPM 10. 4. 1974, P81 1974,154,
"Vita").
32
Allerdings hat die Judikatur in anderem Zusammenhang (Warengleichartigkeit) anerkannt,
daß die Auffassung des Verkehrs nicht unveränderlich feststeht, sondern sich wandeln
kann. Daher ist auch eine ständige Spruchpraxis aufzugeben, wenn ihre Anwendung mit
der Verkehrsauffassung unvereinbar geworden ist und ihre Anwendung zu untragbaren
Ergebnissen führt. Hiernach wäre für die Beurteilung der Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung maßgeblich (NA 30. 10. 1991, PBI 1992, 160, "Winzer).
5. Täuschungsabsicht
§ 9 UWG setzt die Absicht, Verwechslungen herbeizuführen, nicht voraus, sie begründet
allerdings eine (widerlegbare) Vermutung für das Bestehen der Verwechslungsgefahr (26.
9. 28 ZBI 29/40).
IV. Weitere Kriterien
Es fällt unter § 9 UWG, wenn ein ehemaliger Angestellter als späterer Unternehmer diejenige Bezeichnung für eine Ware wählt, unter der sie sein früherer Dienstgeber mit seinem
Wissen in den Verkehr eingeführt hat (Wien 11. 4. 1927, GRUR 828).
§ 9 UWG setzt weder ein Wettbewerbsverhältnis noch sittenwidriges Handeln in
Wettbewerbsabsicht voraus. Bei Fehlen eines der Tatbestandsmerkmale des § 9
(Verkehrsgeltung), kann daher ohne weiteres auf § 1 UWG zurückgegriffen werden, wenn
die Zeichenverletzung zugleich eine sittenwidrige, zu Wettbewerbszwecken gesetzte
Handlung ist, insbesondere wenn eine ähnliche Bezeichnung gewählt wurde, um Verwechslungen herbeizuführen (70 OBI 122, "Polyper Spritzspachtel" - 'Polytect Spritzfüller"
in ähnlichen Dosen).
Schlußfolgerung
Im allgemeinen sind die gesetzlichen Grundlagen und die bestehende Judikatur durchaus
akzeptabel.
Doch sollte der Schutz der berühmten Marke erweitert werden.
Überlegenswert wäre ferner, einen größeren Schutz vor Übersetzungen zu bieten. So
sollten in ganz allgemeinen Wörterbüchern vorkommende Begriffe, insbesondere der englischen Sprache, wie 'knight', doch jenem Wortschatz zugerechnet werden, den jemand
mit durchschnittlichen Sprach(Englisch)-Kenntnissen überlicherweise hat.
Auch sollten Änderungen in der Verkehrsauffassung in höherem Maße berücksichtigt werden, beispielsweise für den Verwechslungszeitpunkt den Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung gelten zu lassen.
33
Zusammenfassung
Es gelten die allgemeinen Vergleichsregeln; einige interessante Aspekte werden hervorgehoben (z. B. "naturwell" < "WELLA); bei kombinierten Marken, insbesondere
Wortkombinationen, kommt es darauf an, ob die jeweils den Gesamteindruck prägenden Bestandteile ähnlich sind.
1.
Kein allgemeiner Schutz notorisch bekannter Marken; Warengleichartigkeit auch
beistarken Zeichen ertorderlich. Schwache Marken haben einen eingeschränkten Schutzbereich, jedoch ist die Warengleichartigkeit normal zu beurteilen.
Der Wortsinn genießt Vorrang.
Schutz vor Übersetzungen nur in eingeschränktem Maße gegeben (abhängig
von den Sprachkenntnissen der Verkehrskreise).
Serienzeichenbildung führt zur Bejahung der Verwechslungsgefahr. So begründet z.B. das Stammzeichen "Mac" Verwechslungsgefahr für Nahrungsmittel. Für
beschreibende Stammwörter gilt jedoch Serienzeichenabwandlung nicht. Auch
dart dieser Grundsatz nicht schematisch angewendet werden.
Grundsätzlich gilt für den Âhnlichkeitsvergleich die Registereintragung und der
Prioritätszeitpunkt, während die Umstände der Benutzung der älteren Marke
keine Rolle spielen.
Ill. Der betroffene Publikumsbereich richtet sich nach der Produktart. Bei pharmazeutischen Produkten wird die größte Aufmerksamkeit vorausgesetzt; auch bei Kosmetika
und Schaumweinen wurde eine etwas höhere Aufmerksamkeit anerkannt.
Résumé
Les règles générales pour la comparaison sont valables; en outre des aspects interes-
sants (par exemple 'naturwell < WELLA") sont montrés; pour des marques combinées, notamment des combinaisons de mots, il est déterminant, si les composants décisifs pour l'impression générale sont similairs.
1.
Pas de protection générale pour des marques très connues; même pour des
marques dites "fortes" il faut une similitude de produits. Des marques dites
'aibles' ont seulement une portée de protection limitée, cependant la similitude
de produits est considerée normalement.
2.
La signification des mots a le plus grand poids.
34
Seulement de la protection limitée contre les traductions (dépend de la connaissance de langue du public concerné).
Formation d'une serie de marques signifie un risque de confusion. Le composant principal "Mac" par exemple provoque le risque de confusion pour les aliments. Cependant ce principe de famille" n'est pas à appliquer pour des composants descriptifs. Aussi il ne faut pas appliquer ce principe schématiquement.
Par principe la marque comme enregistrée et la priorité sont des aspects déterminants et le moment décisif pour ta comparaison de similitude, les circonstances d'usage de ta marque plus ancienne ne jouissent pas un rôle.
Ill. La partie du public à considerer depend du type de produits. L'attention est le plus
grande lorsqu'il s'agit des produits pharmaceutiques; aussi pour des cosmétiques et
des vins mousseux on accepte une attention un peu élévée.
Summary
I.
The general rules for comparison hold; some interesting aspects are emphasized (e.g.
"naturwell" < "WELLA); with combined marks, in particular word combinations, it is essential whether the components decisive for the overall impression are similar.
II.
1.
No general protection for well-known marks; similarity of goods also required for
"strong marks. Weak marks have a limited scope of protection, similarity of
goods, however, is to be considered in the normal way.
The meaning of a word takes precedence.
Protection of translations only to a limited extent (depending on the knowledge
of language on the part of the circles concerned).
Formation of series trademarks means risk of confusion. Thus, e.g. the main
component "Mac" causes risk of confusion for foodstuff. However, for stems
consisting of a descriptive word the series principle will not hold. Nor should this
principle be applied schematically.
In principle, the registry entry and the time of priority are decisive for the comparison as to similarity, while conditions under which the older mark has been
used play no part.
III. The public concerned will depend upon the kind of product. The highest degree of attention is expected in the case of pharmaceuticals; a somewhat higher attention has
also been acknowledged in the case of cosmetics and sparkling wines.
35
Belgique
Belgium
Belgien
Rapport Q 127
au nom du Groupe belge
par Louis VAN BUNNEN (président), Liliane MEYERS, Yves ROLAND
et Bernard VAN REEPINGHEN
Appréciation de la confusion en droit des marques
Préambule: sur les notions de "confusion' et d'association":
Le rapport d'orientation propose (introduction, point 2) de ne pas instituer de discussion
sur la relation entre les notions de confusion et d'association, ce dernier critère étant propre au droit Benelux et résultant de l'arrêt interprétatif de la Cour de Justice Benelux du 20
mai1983, ci-après reproduit:
«Le mot ressemblant dans les art. 3, 13A et 14.B. doit être interprété en ce sens qu'il y
a ressemblance entre une marque et un signe lorsque, compte tenu des particularités
de l'espèce, notamment du pouvoir distinctif de la marque, la marque et le signe
considérés en soi et dans leurs rapports mutuels, présentent sur le plan auditif, visuel
ou conceptuel, une similitude de nature à établir une association entre Je signe et la
marque»
La Cour Benelux s'en tient donc au terme "association" et ne se réfère pas au mot confusion.
On peut donc discuter du point de savoir si la notion d'association englobe la notion de
confusion ou si, au contraire, te risque de confusion comprend le risque d'association.
On peut également s'interroger sur le point de savoir si l'association un nouveau critère
complémentaire, s'ajoutant au critère classique de la possibilité de confusion.
Mais, comme nous y invite le rapport d'orientation, le groupe belge s'abstiendra de prendre parti dans cette discussion doctrinale.
36
I.
Règles générales de comparaison entre marques adverses
Remarque liminaire: il faut d'abord vérifier avant de procéder à la comparaison des marques, l'existence d'une similitude entre les produits respectifs ou entre produits et services,
l'art. 39 de la loi Benelux rappelant, à propos des marques de services qu'une similitude
peut exister également, non seulement entre les services, entre eux, mais aussi entre produits et services.
L'art. 13.A. 1° de la lei uniforme Benelux énonce que:
,oLe droit exclusif à la marque permet au titulaire de s'opposer à:
10
tout emploi qui serait fait de la marque ou d'un signe ressemblant pour les
produits pour lesquels la marque est enregistrée...»
Le texte distingue donc la reproduction d'une marque "à l'identique" («tout emploi qui
serait fait de la marque») et l'imitation («tout emploi qui sera it fait... d'un signe ressemblant»).
La reproduction servile ou à l'identique est condamnée dans ce texte, indépendamment de
tout danger de confusion, tandis que le caractère 'ressemblant" du signe, qui constitue la
pierre de touche de l'imitation suppose la démonstration de la possibilité d'une confusion,
ou d'une association, avec la marque authentique, en tout cas auprès d'une partie du
public.
En cas de reproduction totale de la marque d'autrui, l'atteinte se trouve réalisée même si
en raison des circonstances il n'y a pas de confusion à craindre, par exemple en cas
d'adjonction correctrice du type "système, imitation de". Malgré ces ajouts, il y a empiétement et usurpation de la notoriété de la marque authentique.
De même, s'il y a identité des signes, peu importe qu'en raison d'éléments de présentation
(caractères, typographie, couleur de l'emballage) le danger de confusion soit
pratiquement nul.
En cas de simple imitation - on cherche à maintenir une ressemblance avec la marque
authentique pour que l'impression générale soit la même, tout en s'efforçant de la modifier
ou de la combiner avec d'autres signes pour échapper aux poursuites - se posent des
problèmes d'appréciation.
Le juge aura égard davantage aux ressemblances qu'aux différences, pour la raison que
l'acheteur retient d'abord une impression d'ensemble et néglige les différences de détails.
37
Il. Critères de comparaison
Importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection
La Cour Benelux1 a souligné que la ressemblance dépend du pouvoir d'un signe d'éveiller,
dans l'esprit du public, une "association avec la marque" et qu'à mesure que ce pouvoir
distinctif s'affaiblit, il doit exister une ressemblance plus grande entre la marque et ce signe
pour pouvoir qualifier ce signe de ressemblant au sens de l'art. 13.A.
Cette position de la Cour Benelux a été, il est vrai, critiquée par la doctrine, car on peut
mettre en doute que le danger d'association soit fonction du caractère fort ou faible du
signe.
En réalité, si la faiblesse du signe influe sur l'appréciation de l'étendue de la protection
conférée, c'est en raison de la nécessité de respecter la liberté de choix des concurrents
qui serait mise à mal si le titulaire d'une marque relativement descriptive pouvait être aussi
exigeant que celui qui se sert d'une dénomination vraiment originale.
Similitudes visuelle, sonore ou sémantique
Selon la Cour Benelux2, entrent en ligne de compte aussi bien la ressemblance phonétique
(par imitation des sonorités) que la ressemblance visuelle, ou que la ressemblance conceptuelle (en néerlandais "begripsmatig") visant l'imitation par association d'idées.
La présence d'une similitude sur un seul des plans (auditif, visuel ou conceptuel) peut impliquer le risque d'association. Ces similitudes ne doivent donc pas se cumuler.
La pondération respective de ces critères dépendra des "particularités de l'espèce" selon
la formule de la Cour Benelux dans l'arrêt Union précité.
1. Traductions
La traduction est une forme d'imitation par ressemblance intellectuelle.
La loi Benelux contient un texte (art.13.C.) précisant que 'le droit exclusif à une marque,
rédigée dans / 'une des langues nationales ou régionales du territoire Benelux s'étend de
plein droit aux traductions dans l'autre de ces langues'.
Pour les autres langues, la loi laisse au tribunal le soin d'apprécier s'il y a ressemblance
effective, par exemple, si celle-ci existe entre le mot anglais "Saturn" et sa traduction en
espagnol "Saturno". Le fait que la langue étrangère concernée serve couramment pour
commercialiser les produits - c'est le cas de l'anglais - influencera l'étendue de la protec-
arrêt Juicy Fruit, 5 oct. 1982, Ing. cons., 1982, 221.
pIus spécialement l'arrêt Union, 20mai1983, Ing. cong., 1983.91; R.C.J.B, 1987, p.51.
38
tion3. "She" a été jugé comme contrefaçon de la marque "Zij" (traduction en néerlandais de
"She4).
FamIlles de marques
Selon la doctrine, l'existence de marques en série (ayant par exemple le même radical), est
une circonstance qui doit être prise en considération dans l'appréciation du risque de
confusion, car elle augmente ce risque5.
ConditIons d'utilIsation de la marque plus ancienne et de la marque ImitanteQuid, en cas d'adjonction d'autres mots ou d'autres signes?
En règle générale, lorsqu'un vocable donné se retrouve littéralement, et de façon reconnaissable, dans une autre marque, il y a atteinte au droit de marque, malgré l'adjonction du
terme supplémentaire.
Ainsi, est répréhensible la dénomination "Osram Bi-A.rlita", alors qu'existe déjà une marque
"Philips Bi-Arlita'6 et ce bien qu'aucune confusion ne soit probable. De même, la marque
'Anti-Monopoly' a été condamnée pour atteinte à la marque "Monopoly"7. En effet, dans
les deux marques "Monopoly" est l'élément caractéristique, et 'Anti" indique seulement
l'opposition de tendance entre les jeux adverses qui, au surplus, couvraient des produits
similaires, c'est-à-dire des jeux de société.
Il y a cependant une limite à l'admission de l'imitation: les tribunaux n'admettront pas la
ressemblance si la marque reproduite est englobée dans un nouvel ensemble, au point d'y
perdre son individualité. La ressemblance est écartée lorsque l'adjonction supprime le caractère prédominant, frappant, du vocable intégré (à rapprocher de la théorie française du
'tout indivisible').
Dans l'arrêt Union8, la Cour Benelux a pris en compte les deux règles:
«... Il ne suffit pas qu'une marque verbale distinctive soit combinée avec un mot, une figure ou un graphisme, pour qu'il n 'y ait plus ressemblance entre les deux...»,
mais:
arrêt Juicy Fruit, 5 oct. 1983, Ing. cons., 1982, 221.
La Haye. 28juin 1973, B.I.E., 1974, 163; Prés. Comm. Bux., 26sept. 1975, Ing. cons., 1975,254.
voy. à cet égard,
elen-Wichers Hoeth, n" 1125 et jurisprudence citée.
Trib. Breda, 3 mars 1936, B.I.E., 1937, 67.
Hoge Raad, 24juin 1977, B.I.E., 1978, p. 39.
20 mai 1983, déjà cité.
39
«le juge doit écarter la ressemblance s'il estime que, par leur combinaison, les signes
ne présentent pas une similitude de nature à établir une association avec ladite
marque».
-
Doit-on, dans la comparaison, considérer les éléments particuliers ajoutés qui
n'ont pas été déposés, mais qui sont utilisés habituellement par le titulaire de la
marque?
Tout dépend de savoir si ces éléments non déposés étaient ou non distinctifs.
Les éléments qui n'ont pas été déposés parce qu'ils n'étaient pas distinctifs doivent être
pris en considération dans l'appréciation du risque de confusion car ils constituent une
"particularité de la cause".
En revanche, les éléments non déposés et qui sont tenus pour distinctifs ne seront pas
pris en considération, en application de l'art. 12 de la loi qui prévoit que nul ne peut revendiquer en justice un signe considéré comme marque au sens de l'art. 1er, s'il n'en a pas
effectué le dépôt régulier.
On ne peut invoquer les principes de la concurrence déloyale en faveur d'éléments
distinctifs déposables, mais non déposés. Par contre, s'il s'agit d'un élément non déposable, son imitation pourra éventuellement constituer une circonstance aggravante.
Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation
Confusion de qui?
En droit Benelux, il n'est évidemment pas nécessaire que la probabilité de confusion ou
d'association concerne l'ensemble du public.
La règle est que le juge doit se mettre à la place d'un acheteur d'attention moyenne, car le
contrefacteur vise à tromper le public ordinaire, et non un public d'experts.
Il est admis, en droit Benelux, que cet acheteur d'attention moyenne n'ayant jamais simultanément les deux marques sous les yeux, le juge examinera celles-ci successivement, de
telle façon qu'il puisse se demander si l'impression laissée par la première est semblable à
celle produite par la seconde.
En effet, il est bien connu que la clientèle se décide à l'aide de son souvenir et n'a généralement pas l'occasion de se livrer à un examen comparatif direct.
Quelle est la fraction du public susceptible d'être induite en confusion?
La question du pourcentage du public qui doit avoir été induit en erreur n'est pas fixée en
droit. La Cour Benelux, dans l'arrêt Juicy Fruit déjà cité, s'est bornée à insister sur le fait
40
qu'il faut tenir compte de toutes les particularités de l'espèce, l'ampleur du public trompé
n'étant qu'une circonstance parmi d'autres.
Le juge ne doit donc pas rechercher si, en fait, la confusion s'est produite et combien de
personnes ont pu être trompées: il suffit qu'elle soit possible et l'imitation existe dès que la
simple comparaison des deux marques, envisagée abstraitement - c'est-à-dire avant
toute apposition sur les produits - est de nature à susciter confusion ou association. On
compare normalement les deux dépôts qui se sont succédé et si le signe adverse n'a pas
été déposé, on comparera avec le dépôt, le signe adverse effectivement utilisé.
Tant en Belgique qu'aux Pays-Bas, les tribunaux ne se livrent généralement pas à des
enquêtes d'opinion (à la différence de ce qui se passe en Allemagne). Au Benelux, les
juges préfèrent s'en tenir à leur impression propre.
3. Importance du type de produits médicaments?
Le fait qu'un produit de luxe soit imité par un produit médiocre, qui s'adresse à une clientèle très différente, ne doit pas entrer en ligne de compte pour l'appréciation de l'atteinte à
la marque.
En ce qui concerne les médicaments, la jurisprudence du Benelux est divisée9.
Un courant de jurisprudence plus laxiste admet que le risque de confusion est faible en
matière pharmaceutique, parce que le médecin qui prescrit le médicament, et le pharmacien qui le vend, sont des spécialistes. D'autres décisions, au contraire, considèrent qu'en
raison des possibilités d'intoxication des médicaments, et eu égard à la mauvaise écriture
des médecins, il faut être sévère en matière de possibilité de confusion.
Moment décisif de la contusion
Il est admis par la Cour de justice Benelux que, pour mesurer l'étendue de la protection
d'une marque, il faut se placer non au moment de la naissance du droit, mais au moment
de l'emploi du signe incriminé10.
Autres critères
Il est certain que dans l'appréciation de la ressemblance, toutes les circonstances de fait
entrent en ligne de compte et, notamment la notoriété de la marque, l'intention de confusion, la similitude plus ou moins grande des produits ou services couverts par les deux
marques, les faits de concurrence illicite accompagnant accessoirement l'imitation, etc.
voy. Gielen 'Merkenrecht, n° 1083.
arrêt Juicy Fruit précité; voy. aussi arrêt Burberry's II, 16 déc. 1991, cité par MM. Braun et Van
reepinghen, J.T., 1992, p. 535.
41
La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice Benelux a d'ailleurs fréquemment fait référence aux
"particularités de l'espèce" en tant qu'éléments d'appréciation d'une possibilité de confusion ou d'association.
Résumé
Le présent rapport permet de vérifier qu'en droit Benelux, les règles et critères permettant
d'apprécier s' il y a ressemblance entre marques sont tout à fait classiques et vraisemblablement identiques à celles des pays voisins.
L'originalité la plus marquante du droit Benelux, et qui paraît souhaitable et acceptable de
manière générale, est l'adoption du critère d'association, qui n'a cependant pas été ici développé, selon le voeu du rapport d'orientation.
Summary
The present report allows to understand that the rules and criteria which are applied in the
Benelux to verify whether similarity exists between trademarks are the classic ones and
probably identical to those applied in other countries.
The most important originality of the Benelux law is the application of the test of
association, which seems to be acceptable and wishful in a general manner. However, as
it was requested in the orientation report, this issue has not been developed here.
Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Bericht führt zum Beschluss, dass die in der Benelux angewendeten
Regeln und Kriterien zur Beurteilung der Ähnlichkeit unterschiedlicher Warenzeichen sehr
üblich sind und wahrscheinlich völlig übereinstimmen mit denen der Nachbarländern.
Die originellste Regel in der Benelux ist die Anwendung des 'Assoziationskriterium", welches übrigens generell erwünscht und vertretbar scheint, aber hier, wie im Orientierungsbericht gefragt, nicht behandelt wurde.
42
Brésil
Brazil
Brasilien
Report Q 127
by the Brazilian Group
Evaluation of confusion In trademark law
I. General rules for comparison
The rules for comparison established in item I, conform with the interpretation of the
trademark legislation regularly applied by Brazilian Courts.
Il. Criteria for comparison
1.
Yes. Depending on the degree of distinctiveness of thetrademark, the Brazilian law
grants by means of specific articles, broader protection to the stronger trademarks.
Article 67 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Code, reads:
A mark considered well-known in Brazil that is registered in accordance with the conditions and purposes of this Code shall be given special protection in all classes and be
kept on a special register so as to prevent the registration of another mark reproducing
or imitating it in a whole or in part, where confusion may arise as to the origin of the
goods or services or the reputation of the well known mark is damaged.
Sole paragraph: The unlawful use of a mark reproducing or imitating a well-known
mark registered in Brazil shall constitute an aggravation of the offense defined under
the relevant law.
Besides, the Patent Office has been applying a contrario sensu article 160, item I of
the Brazilian Civil Code where the undue capitalization of a well known mark's goodwill
by a non competitor (concurrence parasitaire) is verified and the mark has not been
granted the special registration provided for in article 67 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Code. Article 160, item I of the Civil Code reads:
"Art. 160:
-
The following acts shall not be considered unlawful:
Those carried out in legitimate defense or in the normal exercise of
a recognized right."
43
However, up to the present, the Courts' decisions have always applied the unfair competition statutes in these cases.
No. Neither the law nor the regulations establish standards for the valuation of the three
2.
items. Nevertheless, case-law when weighing these aspects take into account the
nature of the product, consumer level and the degree of knowledge of the mark.
3.a)
b)
Brazilian Law, provides in its article 65 item 17, a safeguard to translations not
explored in Brazil. Nonetheless, the demonstration of confusion in a real case,
which will take into consideration the aspects mentioned in item 2, would disregard this safeguard.
Even though this is not the case in Brazil, the Commission understands that in
countries with more than one official language, it is justifiable that translations
from one language to the other should be considered conflicting.
Neither the law nor the regulations consider family marks a determining factor to the
appreciation of the degree of similarity. Besides, the criteria depends on the nature of
the product, on the consumer level and on the degree of knowledge of the group of
marks.
5.a)
b)
In principle, only a trademark as registered will be evaluated. Nonetheless, if it is
proven that the extra elements serve to show that the younger mark has been
constituted with the purpose of causing deception, these aspects may be considered.
Depending on the relevance of the extra elements for the evaluation of likelihood
of confusion, the question may not be framed by the trademark legislation but by
the unfair competition provisions.
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
lt becomes irrelevant if the susceptibility of confusion reaches the consumer or the
user, as in both cases, it is prejudicial to the rightful owner. Brazilian Trademark Legislation does not make a distinction between consumers and users.
These aspects are not relevant for the Brazilian Trademark Law which examines only
likelihood of confusion to the average consumer.
Brazilian Legislation foresees a different treatment according to article 80 and 81 of the
Industrial Property Code, which read:
"80- Denominations similar to marks may bee registered as marks when thèy are
intended to distinguish pharmaceutical or veterinary products with identical
44
therapeutical purposes, except where there is a clear likelihood of error, doubt
or confusion in the mind of the consumer.
81. A mark intended to distinguish pharmaceutical or veterinary products may
only be used together with a collective mark referred to in section 61 of this
code, the two marks being given the same emphasis.
ifl view of the exception provided for in the end of article 80, it applies less to the case
of medicines 6f different origin, than to prevent a single manufacturer to register the
same mark for products with different therapeutical applications.
In Brazil, the decisive date to evaluate the degree of distinctiveness of the older mark is
the date the action is started.
Fraudulent intent does not give rise to a presumption of successful deception.
IV. Other Criteria
Circumstantial facts in general should be taken into consideration, but a circumstantial fact
cannot be considered by itself to be a determining element in the evaluation of the possibility of confusion.
45
Canada
Canada
Kanada
Report Q 127
in the name of the Canadian Group
by. J.G. Fogo, P.L. Herbert, J.D. Miller and R-M. Perry, Q.C.
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Introduction
The Canadian Trade-marks Act, a federal enactment, provides for the registration of trademarks as a supplement to the common law protection against misrepresentation. A valid
registration of a trade-mark gives to the owner a statutory exclusive right to the use of the
trade-mark throughout Canada in respect of defined wares or services. To qualify for registration, the applicant's trade-mark must not be confusing with any prior registered mark
nor confusing with any trade-mark or trade-name that has been previously used or made
known in Canada or that is the subject of a prior application with an earlier priority. Once
acquired, registered mark will be deemed to be infringed by the unauthorized use or advertisement of a confusing trade-mark or trade-name.
By definition in the statute, a confusing trade-mark is one, the use of which would cause
confusion with another trade-mark, this state being in turn defined in the following manner:
Section 6(2):
The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of
both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that
the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured,
sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares
or services are of the same general class.
lt is to be noted that the test is one of confusion as to origin of goods or services. The
marks compared need not have been in fact used in the same geographical area of the
country, nor is a finding of confusion dependent on whether the goods or services to
which the respective marks are applied fall into the same general class. The Canadian
trade-mark register is not divided into classes of wares or services, but is a unitary register.
46
In determining whether two trade-marks are confusing, the Registrar or the Court, as the
case may be, is required by Section 6(5) of the statute to have regard to all the surrounding circumstances, including the following specific factors:
the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to
which they have become known;
the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use;
the nature of wares, services or business;
the nature of the trade; and
the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.
Unregistered marks are protected at common law through a passing off action. The Trademarks Act also includes provisions generally parallelling the common law. In each of these
cases, the concern is with misrepresentation and deception rather than any right of exclusivity. Section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act provides that no person shall direct public atten-
tion to his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause
confusion in Canada, at the time he commenced to direct attention to them, between his
wares, services or business and the wares, services or business of another. Judicial decisions have held that the provisions of Sections 6(2) and (5) relating to confusion do not
directly apply to the consideration of passing off under Section 7(b). However, it has also
been said that the factors listed in Section 6(5) are often relevant in passing off actions involving two trade-marks.
I. General rules of comparison
The general rules set out in Section I of the question as found in Annuaire 1994/Ill in
Canadian law.
The likelihood of confusion between a mark in issue and an earlier mark is considered as a
matter of first impression from the perspective of an average consumer having an imperfect recollection of the earlier mark. Each case will be judged on its own facts and the surrounding circumstances will be taken into consideration. lt is also recognized that consumers have a tendency to slur words when speaking, particularly the latter syllables of a
word.
lt has repeatedly been held that one should not dissect the two marks into their elements
and subject each part to a detailed comparison or analysis but rather, the two marks
should be compared as a whole.
That having been said, the Canadian Registrar or court will look at any elements common
to the two marks under consideration. If a common element is particularly distinctive to the
47
earlier mark, the differences in the two marks are likely to be given less emphasis; on the
other hand, if the common element is also common to many competing marks of third parties, small differences between the marks will often lead to a finding that confusion is unlikely.
II. Criteria for comparison
As noted above, the statute itself provides guidelines requiring consideration of at least five
factors in the comparison of two marks. These are not all of equal weight, nor are the five
necessarily exhaustive, for the section requires the consideration of all surrounding circumstances. lt should be noted that the basic test of Section 6(2) requires one to compare
only the marks in issue, assuming their use in the same area and considering the full
scope of the definition of wares or services of any relevant registration or application. Thus
to some degree, the consideration of what rights should be accorded to a prior registration
involves a hypothetical consideration, one which should not be influenced by the manner
of the registrant's actual use of the mark.
Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
The statutory test requires not only a consideration of the inherent distinctiveness of the
relative trade-marks, but also the extent to which each has become known and the length
of time each mark has been in use. Clearly the stronger the mark, the broader the protection. Thus the owner of the mark CUTTY SARK, long and widely used on whiskey, was
able to restrain the use by another of CUTTY SARK on tobacco. Similarly, the owner of the
mark CARTIER, well-known in Canada for jewellery, was able to restrain use of CARTIER
on eyeglasses and Sun Life Assurance Company, having almost twenty years use of the
mark SUNLIFE in Canada, successfully prevented the use of the mark SUNLIFE on fruit
juice.
Sound, sight and meaning
While the degree of resemblance of the two marks under consideration has been said by
judges to be the most important of the five statutory factors, there does not appear to be
any judicial statement that rates or gives preference in weight as between similarity in
sound, or sight or connotation in an assessment of the likelihood of confusion. There are
instances where similarity of sound has been the determining factor. For example, the
mark CASARECCIO was refused registration in Canada because when sounded, it was
considered to be confusing with the prior mark CASTEL VECCHIO though the two marks
were considered readily distinguishable visually and in meaning. Visual similarity is of
greater significance in the case of pure design marks where the marks cannot be easily
verbalized. However cases where a finding of confusion was based solely on the similarity
of meaning are rare. Similar connotation, or the lack of it, is usually advanced as a supporting argument. Uttle weight is given to the similarity of clearly descriptive ideas.
48
Translations
The Canadian trade-mark statute does not contain any specific provision directed to confusion occasioned by the translation of marks. Both English and French are considered
official languages in Canada. There have been a number of cases dealing with the issue of
the likelihood of confusion between a mark comprised of English words and another comprising a French equivalent, or the reverse. The decisions are not entirely consistent but
they suggest that a registration of a mark in one of the official languages will be considered
confusing with a mark in the other official language when the latter represents the direct
translation or where there is only one obvious equivalent. Thus the mark ROUGE ROYALE
& Design has been held confusing with ROYAL RED for similar wares; MOUTON NOIR &
Design has been refused registration over BLACK SHEEP & Design, both for clothing; and
LEFT BANK & Design has been found confusing with RIVE GAUCHE. However, the Federal Court of Appeal, in confirming a decision holding that the average person would not
look on the mark NOIXELLE, a coined word, as the French translation of NUTELLA,
warned against undue preoccupation with safeguarding the status of both official languages to the extent that this factor obliterates the other testsmentioned in Section 6(5) of the
Act.
There is no general rule whereby foreign words may not be registered as a trade-mark if
the English or French language equivalent has been previously registered in association
with products which might be assumed to come from the same source. The Paris Convention to which Canada is a signatory is not automatically adopted as the law of Canada and
may be used only as an interpretive aid in circumstances where an ambiguity exists in the
wording of the statute. Accordingly, the Federal Court has held that the mark KOLA LOKA
applied to an adhesive is not confusing with the prior mark CRAZY GLUE registered in
Canada for adhesives, notwithstanding the fact that KOLA LOKA is the phonetic equivalent
of the Spanish words 'cola loca which translate as 'crazy glue". The Court found that only
a minimal proportion of Canadians would mentally make the translation and that to the
average customer, the marks would not be confusing having regard to their visual and
aural dissimilarity. The test for confusion was not considered to be ambiguous and Article
6bis was held not to be applicable nor to be used as an interpretive aid.
Family of marks
The statute contains no provision or direction regarding confusion between one trademark and a family of trade-marks owned by another. Initially, in cases where a family of
marks was relied on by an opponent, it was considered that the issue of confusion should
be addressed by considering the applicant's mark individually against each mark in the
opponent's family. The existence of a family of marks was considered to be merely a surrounding circumstance that might increase the likelihood that confusion would occur.
However, in a Federal Court decision involving McDonald's family of marks commencing
with the prefixes MC and MAC, it was held that when a series of marks having a common
characteristic are registered in the name of one owner and are by evidence shown to be in
use, the series of registrations is tantamount to a single fictional registration representing
49
the family of marks. Thus the mark sought to be registered might not be confusing with any
of the individual marks but nevertheless might be rejected.
In subsequent decisions, the Opposition Board has not embraced this concept of a fictional super registration. lt appears to continue to rest its decisions on an individual mark to
mark comparison, even where it finds the existence of a family of marks to be established.
The principle of the McDonald's case may be confined to instances where the family of
marks has an overwhelming position in the market, and where detailed evidence of the
extent of sales of products under each of the marks making up the family has been adduced. Any presumption of the existence of a family of marks is rebuttable if the applicant can
establish the registration or use by third parties of other marks sharing the common element relied on by the opponent.
5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
When the comparison is being made between a mark sought to be registered (or a
mark said to infringe), and a prior registered mark, it is the prior mark as registered that
must be considered, and not the registered mark as it may infact be used in the
marketplace. The scope of the registration is to be determined by taking into account
all wares or services defined in the registration whether or not the registrant is in fact
operating in every aspect of trade in such wares. Nor will it matter that the registrant
may have used his mark only in an area of Canada geographically remote from the location of the applicant's sales. Similarly courts have declined to limit the scope of a registration on the basis of evidence that the registrant only in fact used its marks in a
particular form of lettering or with additional elements, different from those used by the
owner of the second mark.
However, circumstances as to how the two trade-mark users present their wares or
services in the market are relevant in a common law action for the may well indicate
that additional distinctive matter will avoid deception and make it clear that the second
trade-mark owner's goods or services are not associated with the prior owner, i.e.
there is no misrepresentation as to source.
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
1. Contusion ot whom?
As noted above, Canadian courts have held that the likelihood of confusion must be consi-
dered from the perspective of a member of the ordinary public - an average consumer
having an imperfect recollection of the first trade-mark.
In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in a passing off case relating to prescription
drugs, it has been made clear that the final consumer, the patient, must be protected from
misrepresentation and deception, as well as the more direct customers of the manufacturer, i.e. the pharmacists and physicians.
50
Which part of the public?
The legal standard for confusion is met if a "substantial number" of persons are confused.
What is a substantial number is a question of fact to be decided on the basis of the available evidence. lt has been said that a substantial number does not mean a majority but a
sufficient number to avoid a de minimus finding. While the Court may receive survey evidence as well as the testimony of individuals who have been confused, ultimately it is for
the judge to decide whether the ordinary consumer would be confused under typical trading conditions.
We do not believe that this consideration can be reduced to a formula or to a set percentage. Each case may be different. in practice, many decisions, particularly at the administrative level, will have to be reached without survey evidence to provide a numerical figure.
Relevancy of the kind of products
The factors set out in Section 6(5) of the Act permit the Registrar or a Court to consider the
nature of the trade and therefore the nature of the products and their likely purchasers.
Where the prospective purchasers are professionals who are shown to be knowledgable
as to the choice of goods and careful in their selection, or where the goods are very expensive, a lesser likelihood of confusion has been found. In contrast, similar marks applied
to goods purchased at the supermarket check-out counter on impulse are considered to
be prone to confusion.
There have been Canadian decisions in which it has been accepted that in the field of medicine, great care should be taken to prevent confusion of trade-marks. Physicians are not
immune from mistakes and frequently communicate prescriptions by telephone or in
handwriting that is not unmistakably legible. However, this view has not been uniformly accepted.
Decisive moment of confusion
The Canadian Trade-marks Act does not fix the relevant date for every issue involving
confusion that may arise. This has led to a number of conflicting decisions and the law may
still be in a state of development.
In considering whether a trade-mark is registrable over a prior used trade-mark or tradename of another, i.e. the issue of which of two unregistered parties is entitled to registration, the relevant date for the consideration of confusion is prescribed by Section 16 of the
Act, as:
the date of first use or making known of the mark under consideration in
Canada, in the case where use or making known is alleged; or
the effective filing date in Canada, where the application is based on proposed
use, or use and registration abroad.
51
The Act is silent on the question of what date is relevant when a mark sought to be registered is compared with a prior registered trade-mark. However, the Federal Court of
Appeal has recently held that in such a case, the relevant date for considering contusion is
the date when the decision is reached. This is controversial because the state of the register and the surrounding circumstances can change during the course of a lengthy opposition.
In an expungement proceeding, a registered mark will be held invalid, if at the date that registration was granted, the mark was not registrable.
In infringement proceedings, the plaintiff must have been able to allege contusion at the
date of commencement of the action, although evidence of public confusion gathered after
the date of commencement of the action is likely to be received at trial.
When distinctiveness of the earlier mark is considered as an element in weighing the
strength or scope of a mark, the relevant time is likely the date considered to be decisive
for the issue of contusion. However, if in litigation an attack is made on the distinctiveness
of a registered mark, the Act provides that distinctiveness is to be considered at the time
proceedings bringing the validity of the registration into question are commenced. This
date is most frequently the date when the defence is filed or a counterclaim is first asserted.
5. Fraudulent intent
Under Canadian law of infringement confusion does not depend on any showing of fraudulent intent. Evidence of an intention to deceive will not be conclusive on the issue of
confusion. Nor will an innocent intention avoid the grant of an injunction where contusion is
found. Intention may have a bearing on the question of damages.
In the common law action for passing off, or in an action for passing off under Section 7(b)
of the Act, a probability of deception is an element to be proven. If evidence of an intention
to deceive can be shown, the court is more likely to conclude that the defendant has succeeded in carrying out his wrongful intention and more likely to grant relief to the plaintiff.
IV. Other criteria
-
Evidence that the two marks co-exist in a foreign jurisdiction without contusion has usually
been rejected as a significant factor in deciding whether the marks should be considered
confusing in Canada.
Conclusion
The present Canadian statutory provisions for determining when marks are confusing have
been in force and applied by the courts and the Registrar for the past forty years. They are
52
generally well regarded by those concerned with trade-marks, particularly in their flexibiUty
to meet various fact situations encountered in the marketplace. They are thought to be
preferable to a system which confines infringement or a finding of confusion to goods falling in the same classification.
Summary
The Canadian trade-mark statute contains both a definition of the term confusion and a direction as to the factors to be considered by the Registrar or a Court in weighing confusion. The definition of confusion assumes the use of the marks in the same geographic
area and requires a decision as to whether the goods or services of the two parties are
likely to be inferred to come from the same source, whether or not the wares or services
fall into the same general class. All surrounding circumstances must be considered including the inherent distinctiveness of the marks, their extent of use in terms of time and area,
the nature of the trade and the degree of resemblance of the two marks in appearance,
sound or meaning. Confusion is considered as a matter of first impression from the per-
spective of an average consumer having an imperfect recollection of the earlier mark.
Confusion will be found if a substantial number of persons are confused and a showing of
fraudulent intent is not an essential element. Distinctiveness is an important factor. The
statute gives no guidance on confusion occasioned by the translation of marks but judicial
decisions in French/English comparisons suggest that confusion will be found where the
mark in issue is a direct translation or there is only one obvious equivalent. Some weight is
given to a family of marks having a common element, only to the extent that actual use of
the family members in Canada is established. The statute does not fix a universal relevant
date at which confusion is to be judged and the case law in this area is still in a state of development.
Résumé
La loi canadienne sur les marques de commerce comprend une définition de la confusion
et une énumération des facteurs qui doivent être considérés par le registraire ou le tribunal
afin de déterminer s'il y a confusion. La définition de confusion présume l'emploi de la
marque dans la même région géographique et requiert une détermination à savoir si
l'emploi des deux marques de commerce serait susceptible de mener à la conclusion que
les marchandises et services des deux parties émanent de la même source, que les marchandises et services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale. Afin de déterminer s'il
y a confusion, toutes les circonstances de l'espèce doivent être considérées, y compris, le
caractère distinctif inhérent des marques, la période pendant laquelle les marques ont été
utilisées et la région géographique où elles ont été en usage, la nature du commerce et le
degré de ressemblance entre les deux marques dans la présentation, le son ou dans les
idées qu'elles suggèrent. La confusion se juge du point de vue de la perspective du consommateur moyen ayant un souvenir imparfait de la première marque. Il y a confusion si
53
un nombre substantiel de personnes sont confondues. Il n'est pas nécessaire de démontrer une intention frauduleuse. Le caractère distinctif inhérent est un facteur important. La
loi n'offre aucune direction quant à la confusion occasionnée par la traduction d'une marque. Toutefois, les décisions semblent indiquer qu'il y aura confusion lorsque la marque en
cause est une traduction littérale ou qu'il n'y a qu'un seul équivalent évident. Une certaine
importance est accordée aux families de marques partageant un élément commun mais
seulement dans la mesure où l'emploi de la famille au Canada est établi. La loi ne prévoit
pas une date à laquelle le registraire ou le tribunal doit avoir égard afin de déterminer s'il y
a confusion. La jurisprudence dans ce domaine est en développement.
Zusammenfassung
Das kanadische Warenzeichengesetz enthält sowohl eine Definition des Begriffes
"Verwechslung" als auch Richtlinien bzgl. der Umstände, die bei der Erwägung von Verwechslung vom Markenamt oder einem Gericht mit in Betracht gezogen werden müssen.
Die Definierung von Verwechslung nimmt an, dass die Zeichen in demselben geographischen Gebiet benutzt werden und fordert eine Entscheidung, ob daraus zu schliessen ist,
dass die Waren oder Dienstleistungen der beiden Parteien denselben Ursprung haben,
ganz gleich ob die Waren oder Dienstleistungen derselben allgemeinen Klasse angehören.
Alle äusseren Umstände müssen mit in Betracht gezogen werden, einschliesslich der
inhärenten Unterscheidungskraft der Zeichen, des Gebrauchsumfanges bzgl. Zeitspanne
und Gebiet, der Handelsart und des Ähnlichkeitsgrades der beiden Zeichen in Hinsicht auf
äussere Erscheinung, Klangwirkung oder Bedeutung. Verwechslung soll als erster Eindruck vom Gesichtspunkt eines Durchschnittsverbrauchers betrachtet werden, der sich
schwach an das frühere Zeichen erinnert. Verwechslung wird festgestellt, wenn eine wesentliche Anzahl von Menschen verwirrt ist und betrügerische Absicht nicht in Betracht
kommt. Unterscheidungskraft ist ein wichtiger Faktor. Das Gesetz bietet keine Anleitung
bzgl. einer Verwechslung, die durch die Uebersetzung von Zeichen verursacht wurde, gerichtliche Entscheidungen bei Vergleichungen von Englisch/Französisch haben jedoch zu
verstehen gegeben, dass Verwechslung dort festgestellt wird, wo das Zeichen eine direkte
Uebersetzung ist, oder es nur ein offensichtliches Aequivalent ist. Etwas Bedeutung wird
einer ein gemeinsames Element enthaltenen Zeichenfamilie zugeschrieben, aber nur zu
dem Grade, dass tatsächlicher Gebrauch der einzelnen Familienzeichen in Kanada fest
begründet ist. Das Gesetz setzt keine allgemein relevante Zeit fest, in der Verwechslung als
solche von dem Markenamt oder dem Gericht anzusehen sei und das Fallrecht auf diesem
Gebiet ist immer noch im Entwicklungsstadium.
54
Danemark
Denmark
Dänemark
Report Q 127
in the name of the Danish Group
by Christian Levin NIELSEN
Evaluation of confusion in trade mark law
I. General Rules for Comparison
In Denmark the general rules apply, i.e. the effaced memory, the general impression and
the principle of similarity when evaluating the risk of confusion between trade marks.
Throughout the: ears the problem of confusion has been the crucial one in trade mark law,
and therefore, certain guide-lines have gradually evolved in the older legislation, the two
criteria of confusion: similarity of trade marks and similarity of goods being mentioned explicitly. The Trade Marks Act of 1959 took it for granted that there was similarity of marks; it
merely emphasized that trade marks were considered to be confusingly similar when they
covered goods of an identical orsimilar kind. The criterion of the previous Trade Marks Act
regarding the evaluation of confusion, namely that the marks are easily confused in their
entirety, notwithstanding differences in detail, in the course of trade' was not included. lt
was not included in the most recent Danish Trade Marks Act dating from 1991 whose section 4 merely states that the owner of a trade mark right can prohibit others from making
commercial use of signs identical or similar to the trade mark which are used for identical
or similar goods or services if there is risk of confusion.
lt appears from the comments to the Act that no change was intended and therefore, the
criteria for the evaluation of confusion will still be the same and will be a result of the criteria
laid down by years of legal precedent. A study of this caselaw show that it is difficult to
establish any hard and fast rules. lt is a mixture based on significant factors in each case
depending on the line of business, the legal content of the marks and the tendencies of the
times. The comments to the 1959 Trade Marks Act explicitly state that an extraordinarily
accurate judgement is required from the authorities who make decisions on confusing similarity, and that they must attach particular weight to the often superficial general impresSian which the mark must be expected to leave in the mind of an unsuspecting purchaser
at the moment of decision when he has only one mark before his eyes. This basic principle
is not mentioned explicitly in the Danish Trade Marks Act at all. lt seems to be mentioned
only in an old court decision which states that the question of the risk of confusion between
the marks merely depends on whether "the part of the mark which catches the attention is
55
so similar as to deceive a customer who does not see the two marks at the same time", cf.
Law Reports 1916/226H.
There is no doubt that in evaluating the risk of confusion Danish case law takes into account the overall impression. Probably it is, in general, a mixture of t he general impression
and the general similarities whereas i n this country we talk about the basic principle of similarity. It is the similarity of the marks and not the difference which i s crucial to the
evaluation of confusion.
II. Criteria for Comparison
1. Importance of Distinctiveness for Scope of Protection
The question of whether a strong mark enjoys a larger degree of legal protection than a
normal mark, must be answered affirmatively, considering the legal developments of
recent years.
Without confronting the question of the importance of distinctiveness for the confusing similarity it should be noted that in principle it is unimportant in a specific situation whether a
mark be strong or weak. The legal basis remains the criterion of confusion laid down in
section 4 of the Trade Marks Act. However, in recent years there has been a tendency
away from the relatively strict requirements for protection of strong marks towards a more
liberal evaluation. Formerly, whether a trade mark was wellestablished was not very important for the evaluation of confusing similarity, unless it was a Kodak mark. Cases regarding this were relatively rare. The current legislation has extended the legal protection of
well-known marks, even though the mark does not have to be a Kodak mark, cf. s. 4, subsection 2 of the Trade Marks Act. Now the legislators have reduced the requirements regarding similarity of goods The mark simply has to be well-known in this country and use
of it must constitute an unwarrantable exploitation of the value (goodwill) of the mark.
Legal developments have clearly illustrated this tendency.
In 1950 LUCKY STRIKE did not succeed in preventing the use of the identical mark in
respect of chewing gum, cf. Law Reports 1950/ 525H. It should be remembered that there
were strict requirements for claiming notoriety, I. e. the mark should be particularly
well-established and furthermore it should be so well-known in this country that the use by
another party of a similar mark would constitute an unwarrantable exploitation of the value
of the mark. In this country few trade marks possess such strength. Due to the increase in
international trade a situation like the one described concerning the mark LUCKY STRIKE
would probably not have arisen today. In 1967 the mark DANFOSS, which is well-known
in Denmark, succeeded in obtaining a positive judicial decision (Law Reports
1967/371VL). The term DANFOSS is also a very well-known company name in Denmark
The company, which manufactures valves, succeeded in preventing a well borer from
using the term VANFOSS since the mark was deemed to be well-established. The
difference between the goods or services mentioned here is not great. However, the
56
difference was considerable between the goods/services in question in the Shit & Chanel
case of 1981, in which Chanel S.A. successfully prevented a Danish music and song group
called Shit & Chanel - a Danish pun: skidt & kanel = neither fish, flesh nor good red
herring - from using this term, cf. Law Reports 1981/1024. The sentence stated that the
mark CHANEL was so well-established and well-known that it met the requirements for
possessing Kodak-protection. Since the term Shit & Chanel must be considered tc be a
similar mark and since it was also a case of unwarrantable exploitation of the name of
Chanel, the court found that the law had indeed been infringed. The judgment is
particularly interesting because the criteria of the Trade Marks Act were mentioned
explicitly. When keeping in mind the above decision regarding LUCKY STRIKE we may
deduct that case law has changed quite considerably, as Chanel S.A. was doing business
in the field of fashion clothing and perfumery and the infringer in music records.
There is a negative sentence from 1982 in which International Computers Limited A/S did
not succeed in preventing the use of the term ICL in respect of machines for use in the
wood industry. The courts did not consider it to be proved that ICL was so well-known a
mark that its notoriety could be invoked against a businessman who did not produce
goods identical or similar to those of the trade mark owner. This is parallel to the traditional
interpretation of the Kodak protection in Denmark, which can only be applied to a very limited number of trade marks.
This, however, was the case when the mark COCA-COLA was able to prevent the use
and registration of the term COCA LINE, in respect of shoes, cf. Law Reports 1991 /691H.
Moreover, well-known marks must be said to possess a wider scope of protection, also
with respect to marks consisting of other elements which are not confusingly similar at first
sight. As an example could be mentioned the decision according to which a distributor of
wood products had the mark IPALCO registered. However, this mark was found to be
confusingly similar to the more well-known mark ICOPAL, which was registered in respect
of building materials and which was furthermore a particularly wellestablished mark. The
mark IPALCO was limited so as to cover oods not confusingly similar with building materials (Law Reports 1970/69H). This tendency has been confirmed by later decisions, most
recently by a decision rendered by the Patent Appeal Board in which the mark LEGO -
world-famous mark for toys - was able to prevent registration of the mark LOGOS for
which an application had been filed in respect of several other kinds of goods, including
stationery.
On the basis of the above outline of the developments in case law, the question of whether
the distinctiveness determines the scope of its protection against confusion must be
answered affirmatively. lt must be pointed out, however, that we are talking about very
specific court decisions from case to case.
57
Sound, Sight and Meaning
As for the question of confusing similarity arising from phonetic similarity, visual similarity or
similarity of meaning, there is no standard in Danish law which can be used as a
guide-line, e.g. concerning similarity of meaning in a question of confusing similarity.
There are numerous examples of marks being registered which have the same meaning
but which are visually and phonetically different. There can hardly be any doubt that the visual similarity between the marks is decisive for the general evaluation of confusion. There
is probably no doubt either that in their attempts to influence the consumers the trade mark
owners first and foremost attach importance to the visual representation of the marks, bearing in mind the importance of advertising in society. That a mark may have a different
meaning is of no significance, however, be it in different languages or in the specific design
of a device mark. The meaning does not have much weight in the evaluation of confusion;
thus, the marks CROWN and CORONA have not been deemed confusingly similar, cf.
Law Reports 1941/258H. The fact that the words have the same meaning in different languages does not indicate that they are necessarily considered confusingly similar.
Thus, the Patent Office has found the term LUI not to be confusingly similar to the term
H.I.S. In its decision the Patent Office states that the term LUI is sufficiently different from
the other word, both visually and auditively. A similar example is the English equivalent of
the Danish word DERES, namely the word YOURS. In this case the Patent Office also
stated in its decision that the words are both visually and auditively sufficiently different as
to justify the meaning not being taken into consideration. However, differences in meaning
can be crucial. Thus the terms BABYLAND and HAPPYLAND have been deemed not to
be confusingly similar, as they are not only visually different but also different in meaning,
also for goods of the same kind.
That meaning is of less importance for a word mark which is represented visually is shown
in the decision concerning the department store IKEA which was able to prevent the term
IDEA from being registered. The decision expressly states that the term IDEA must be
considered tc be an artificial word without any other term to support the meaning of the
word. However, the conceptual meaning of words should not be neglected. Thus, the term
DREAM ROMANTIC has been denied registration in Denmark due to the documented
use of the term ROMANTICA. The dominant word in the trade marks covered the same
conceptual meaning. To summarize, it should be remembered that the visual meaning is,
after all, the decisive moment; this is illustrated by a case in which the Danish term Den lilie
Havfrue, from Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale, was deemed not to be neither visually
nor auditively similar to the English equivalent The Little Mermaid.
Translations
a) Do the national laws protect against translation of a mark which is not well-known?
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This question of whether national laws protect against translations must be answered negatively, even if the mark is well-known. A distinction must be made, however, between
easily translated marks and marks which are more difficult to translate into Danish.
The two marks CROWN and CORONA mentioned in a previous example have earlier
been deemed confusingly similar to the Danish word KRONE (= crown), cf. U1929-716H.
However, the visual representations were also similar, visible to be consumer. It cannot be
expected that the courts will establish confusing similarity when it is merely a case of translation as the marks may have a completely different visual representation. Most recently
the mark MARS GOLD has been found not to be confusingly similar to the mark GULDBARRE, which is very well-known in Denmark, the element GULD- being equivalent to the
English word gold, cf. U1993-158H.
b) do the laws of countries with more than one (official) language have specific provisions
as to translations from one into another of such languages?
This is not relevant for Denmark. However, it should be noted that the Danish Trade Marks
Act is valid both in the Faeroe Islands and in Greenland, and that in these areas a Danish
word may have the same conceptual meaning in Faeroese or Greenlandic. There have
been no court decisions in this respect.
Family Marks
Whether marks containing a common element may be considered to belong to a series or
a family depends entirely on the specific evaluation of confusion in each case. The marks
as such do not enjoy any special protection. lt does carry some weight that a trade mark
owner uses a mark consistently in connection with a series of products. Until now, however, a company like McDonald's has been unsuccessful in its attempt to restrict the use of
marks containing Mc/Mac, cf. the 1976 court decision in which BURGERMAC was ac-
cepted for registration nothwithstanding the existence of the mark BIG MAC and
McDonald's (device mark). The decision stated that the marks could not be considered to
be confusingly similar in their entirety even though both consist of two words of which the
last one is identical. In the field of confectionery the word CAT has been used consistently,
as in marks like KIT KAT and ROWNTREES BIG CAT (device mark), but this was not sufficient to prevent the mark HOT CAT from being registered, as HOT was an unusual element in the entire mark.
lt must be presumed that an element contained in a series of marks must be very firmly
established before it can obtain any independent value as a trade mark.
Conditions under which the Older Mark has been Used
a) As for the first part of the question, the courts would probably uphold the trade mark
right in the older mark even if it has been used in connection with other elements, provided that these elements are not distinctive. If the additional elements are distinctive,
5g
the general impression of the entire mark changes, and the marks will therefore not be
deemed confusingly similar.
For example the mark AMO was not deemed confusingly similar to the mark FAMOUS
AMOS even though the words AMO and AMOS, when seen separately, are confusingly similar. In line with this decision, marks containing the element UP and used in
respect of soft drinks have not been considered to be confusingly similar to the word
STRIKE-UP, as there is no risk of confusion with the general impression of the marks
in question, 7 UP, SEVEN UP and UP.
As for the last question, whether one only has the possibility to compare the marks
when registered, this is indeed the case.
However, the courts will always take into consideration the specific use of the marks. In
this connection it should be remembered that the grace period for registered marks is
still valid, and therefore, it is the registered mark as such which can and ought to be
used as the basis for the evaluation of confusion.
The actual use has always been of interest to the courts, and it cannot be ruled out that
this factor will play a decisive role in the final decision.
b) In principle, section 5 of the Marketing Practices Act can be invoked. This legal provision is interpreted in line with the basic principles of the Trade Marks Act.
III. Other Elements of Evaluation
Confusion of whom?
lt must be assumed that Danish law does not want to make a distinction between the
purchaser and the user. Considering the extent of international trade and the increased
importance of advertising in all fields of the market it cannot be ruled out that a distinction
can be made between the different product areas, in which the products are offered for
sale and the use made of them by subsequent consumers.
Which Part of the Public?
There is confusing similarity when it must be assumed that there is a risk of confusion. This
is the case even if there is only a small number of purchasers or a small part of the public.
According to current law it is not possible to establish a rule of how large or wide the circle
of consumers must be. This issue has not been import in Danish law to any extent, since
there has been no user requirement for trade marks.
lt does not seem fair to set a any particular percentage as the calculation of such percentages must necessarily be very uncertain. The fact that it will always be a subjective evaluation is sufficient reason for not setting such a percentage.
60
Relevancy of Kind of Products; Medicines
It has always been assumed that the circle of customers had a significant impact on the
evaluation of confusion in Danish law. The main principle was that the more expert the circle of customers, the lower the requirements concerning the degree of difference between
the marks. The traditional example, showing how lower requirements are set for the separating elements of pharmaceutical trade marks assuming that doctors and pharmacists
have a thorough knowledge of the language and its meaning, including knowledge of the
structure of trade marks, is often mentioned, but there seems to be no indication that any
importance is attached to it. Rather, there seems to be a tendency towards the marking of
pharmaceutical products being evaluated according to the same criteria as other products,
the reason being that the sale of medicine today takes place in the same way as the sale of
other products and is no longer based on prescriptions to the same extent as previously.
The marks MULTI-TABS and MULTIMAX were not found confusingly similar, among
other reasons because MULTI-TABS is sold through pharmacies, whereas MULTIMAX is
sold in one specific chain shop. There seem to be no examples of products for which a
prescription is required.
Decisive Moment of Confusion
The circumstances which decide the evaluation of confusion by the registration authorities
and the courts undoubtedly change form time to time. This also becomes evident when
studying the way in which the registration authorities judge distinctiveness, but this goes
beyond the scope of this report. There is no doubt, however, that an evaluation of confusion within certain ranges of products will be less strict if the registration authorities or the
courts find that the younger mark does not infringe upon the goodwill of the older mark.
Any exact date of when the existence of the trade mark right is established is probably insignificant. The decisive factor is when the risk of the actual confusing arises.
Fraudulent intent
The question of whether an intent to deceive gives rise to a presumption of successful deception must be answered negatively. According to the Current Trade Marks Act a trade
mark is excluded from registration if it is identical or similar to an older trade mark registered or used in this country. The previous rule that a mark was excluded from trade mark
registration if it was confusingly similar to a trade mark which had been taken into use abroad prior to the filing of the application for registration in this country, which had been
used consistently there and where the applicant knew or ought have known the existence
of the mark, has been omitted. In the opinion of the legislators it constituted a too
far-reaching protection of foreign marks. Conflicts concerning registration of agent marks
now have to be solved by an agreement between the parties and in accordance with the
usual basic principles of competition, including article 6g of the Paris Convention.
IV. Other Criteria
As for other criteria for the evaluation of confusion we would merely point out that the
courts must take any circumstance into consideration. Each case has its own particularities. Subjective circumstances are often mentioned in the various sentences and are
61
naturally important to the case. Of prime importance, however, is it that the marks and the
goods are sufficiently similar.
Conclusion
The Danish law on evaluation of confusion is based on a estimate laid down by legal precedent. The result of the actual evaluation differs from one case to another, depending on
the relationship between the marks and how they came into being. The case law seems to
be a good and consistent one.
Summary
II. Criteria for Comparison
Importance of Distinctiveness for Scope of Protection
The question of whether a strong mark enjoys a larger degree of legal protection than a
normal mark, must be answered affirmatively, considering the legal developments in recent
years.
The current legislation has extended the legal protection of well-known marks, even
though the mark does not have to be a Kodak mark, cf. s. 4, subsection 2 of the Trade
Marks Act. Now the legislators have reduced the requirements regarding similarity of
goods. The mark simply has to be well-known in this country and use of it must constitute
an unwarrantable exploitation of the value (goodwill) of the mark.
Sound, Sight and Meaning
There is no reason to believe that there are any changes in the evaluation of confusion.
According to Danish law it is still the visual impression which is most important, the second
most important factor being the auditive impression. The meaning is definitely less important for the evaluation of confusion.
Translations
As for translations, the national legislation does not protect translations of a mark, at least
not if the translation is less than straightforward.
Family Marks
Family marks do not enjoy any protection in Denmark unless they are very firmly
established.
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it must be assumed that the courts will uphold the trade mark right in older marks even if
these are used in combination with non-distinctive elements. This is not the case if the older mark is used in combination with other distinctive elements.
Ill. Other Elements of Evaluation
Confusion of whom?
lt does not matter if the consumer is a purchaser or a user. In Denmark the term circle of
distribution is used.
Which Part of the Public
A grouping of the consumers in terms of percentages with regard to evaluation of confusion is not used in Denmark.
Relevancy of Kind of Products; Medicines
There seems to be a tendency that pharmaceutical products do not receive special treatment in the evaluation of confusion. Indeed the tendency seems to be that these products
are judged along the same criteria of confusion as other products.
Decisive Moment of Confusion
There can hardly be any doubt that it is the moment of the actual evaluation of confusion
which is decisive for the circumstances of an evaluation.
Fraudulent Intent
There seems to be no reason to believe that a different view is adopted than the one already mentioned under Q 115. However, it is obvious that the intent to deceive influences
the question of evidence in each individual case, but there seems to be no change in the
legislation at the moment.
Résumé
Il. Criteria for Comparison
1. Importance of Distinctiveness for Scope of Protection
La question si une marque forte possède une plus grande protection légale qu'une marque normale doit être répondue affirmativement, tenant compte du développement légale
des dernières années.
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Maintenant, la législation a épandu la protection légale des marques bien connues sans
qu'il s'agisse necéssairement d'une marque dite KODAK, cf. paragraphe 2e del'art. 4 de la
Loi de Marques. Maintenant, le Législateur a relâché l'exigence de similarité de produits. Il
suffit que la marque soit notoire dans ce pays et que son utilisation représente une exploitation inadmissible de la valeur (goodwill) de la marque du propriétaire.
Sound, Sight and Meaning
Il n'y a pas de raison pour considérer qu'il y ait des modifications en ce qui concerne
l'évaluation de confusion. Selon le droit danois c'est toujours l'impression visuelle qui est la
plus importante, puis l'impression auditive. Les acceptions conceptuelles ont décidément
moins d'importance pour l'évaluation de confusion entre des marques.
Translations
En ce qui concerne les traductions, la législation ne protège pas les traductions d'une
marque; en tout cas elle ne les protège pas si la traduction est difficilement accessible.
Family Marks
Les marques de famille ne jouissent pas de protection au Danemark si elles ne sont pas
très fortement établies.
Il est de supposer que les tribunaux maintiendront les droits des marques antérieures,
mêmes si elles sont utilisées avec des éléments non distinctifs. Cependant, la situation
change si la marque antérieure s'utilise avec d'autres éléments distinctifs.
Ill. Other Elements of Evaluation
Confusion of Whom?
Ce n'est pas important si le cercle de consommateurs consiste d'un purchaser ou d'un
user. Au Danemark on parle du cercle de commercialisation.
Which Part of the Public?
Une division des consommateurs par rapport à des pourcentages en ce qui concerne
l'évaluation de confusion n'a pas d'importance au Danemark.
Relevancy of Kind of Products; Medicines
Apparemment, les produits pharmaceutiques ne tendent pas à recevoir un traitement spécial à l'heure d'évaluer le risque de confusion. Au contraire, il semble que ces produits tendent à être évalués selon les mêmes critères de confusion que d'autres marques.
Decisive Moment of Confusion
Il n'y a guère de doute que ce soit le moment de l'evaluation de confusion actuelle qui est
décisif pour les circonstances d'une évaluation.
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Fraudulent Intent
II ne semble pas d'avoir pourquoi croire qu'il y ait ici une autre interprétation que la mentionnée sous Q 115. Cependant, il est évident que l'intent to deceive" fait parti d'une question de preuve dans le cas concret. Ainsi, à présent il ne semble pas avoir eu de modifications de la législation.
Zusammenfassung
Il. Criteria for Comparison
Importance of Distinctiveness for Scope of Protection
Die Frage, ob ein starkes Warenzeichen einen größeren Grad von Rechtsschutz besitzt als
ein normales Zeichen, muß bejahend beantwortet werden, wenn man die Rechtsentwicklung der letzten Jahre in Betracht zieht.
Die Gesetzgebung hat jetzt den Rechtsschutz der wohlbekannten Marken erweitert, ohne
daß es sich jedoch um eine eigentliche KODAK-Marke handeln muß, vgl. Warenzeichengesetz 4, Absatz 2. Der Gesetzgeber hat jetzt die Forderung auf Warengleichartigkeit gelockert. Jetzt muß die Marke bloß in diesem Lande wohlbekannt sein, und der Gebrauch
eine ungebührliche Ausnützung des Wertes der Marke (goodwill) ausmachen.
Sound, Sight and Meaning
Es gibt keinen Grund dazu anzunehmen, daß es Änderungen in der Verwechslungsbewertung gibt. Gemäß dänischem Recht ist es fortfahrend der visuelle Eindruck, der am
wichtigsten ist, und danach der auditive Eindruck. Inhaltliche Bedeutungen haben unbedingt einen kleineren Einfluß auf die Verwechslungsbewertung der Marken.
Translations
Was Übersetzungen betriffi, schützt die nationale Gesetzgebung nicht die Übersetzungen
einer Marke, jedenfalls nicht wenn die Übersetzung schwer zugänglich ist.
Family Marks
Familienmarken genießen keinen Schutz in Dänemark, es sei denn sie besitzen eine sehr
starke Verkehrsgeltung.
Es ist anzunehmen, daß die Gerichte das Warenzeichenrecht auf ältere Marken aufrechterhalten werden, obwohl diese mit nichtdistinktiven Elementen benutzt werden. Dies
ändert sich, wenn die ältere Marke mit anderen distinktiven Elementen benutzt wird.
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Ill. Other Elements of Evaluation
Confusion of whom?
Es hat keine Bedeutung, ob der Verbraucherkreis aus einem Purchaser oder einem User
besteht. In Dänemark spricht man vom Umsatzkreis.
Which part of the Public?
Eine Aufteilung der Verbraucher in Prozentsätze im Hinblick auf die Verwechslungsbewertung hat in Dänemark keine Bedeutung.
Relevancy of Kind of Products; Medicines
Es scheint eine Tendenz zu geben, daß medizinische Erzeugnisse keine Sonderbehandlung mit Bezug auf die Verwechslungsbewertung bekommen. Es scheint im Gegenteil eine
Tendenz zu geben, dass diese Waren gemäß denselben Verwechslungskriterien wie an-J
dere Warenzeichen bewertet werden.
DecIsive Moment of Confusion
Es gibt wohl keinen Zweifel, daß es die Zeitpunkt der aktuellen Verwechslungsbewertung
ist, die für die Umstände einer Bewertung entscheidend ist.
Fraudulent intent
Es scheint nicht, als ob es dazu Grund gibt, anzunehmen, daß eine andere Auffassung gilt
als schon unter Q 115 erwähnt. Es ist jedoch klar, daß der uintent to deceive" ein Teil der
Beweisfrage im konkreten Fall ist. Es scheint nicht, daß es in der Gesetzgebung im Augenblick eine Änderung gibt.
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Egypte
Egypt
Ägypten
Rapport Q 127
par le Groupe égyptien
Appreciation de la confusion en droit des marques
Comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué dans notre étude sur la Q 115, la Loi sur les Marques
de fabrique et de commerce et les désignations industrielles et commerciales (Loi
No. 57/1939) ainsi que la Loi sur la Répression des fraudes et falsifications (Loi No.
48/1941) en Egypte pénalisent toute tentative d'induire le consommateur en erreur quant à
l'origine ou l'appartenance d'un produit. Il en est de même de la contre-façon ou l'imitation
de la marque de commerce d'autrui ou toute recherche de similitude dans l'intention de
créer une confusion chez le consommateur. [Chap. I, Art. 5 et Chap. VI, Art. 33-(1), Loi
des Marques, No. 57/1939]
I. Règles générales pour la comparaison
Dans la pratique, l'appréciation de la possibilité de confusion peut varier d'une personne à
l'autre, mais en général elle se base sur la comparaison avec les éléments distinctifs de la
marque plus ancienne.
Il. Critères de comparaison
Importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection:
Les marques "fortes" sont celles qui sont bien connues du consommateur à cause de
leur usage intensif et de leurs éléments distinctifs. Le caractère distinctif de la marque
est donc déterminant pour la protection contre la confusion.
Similitude sonore, visuelle et sémantique:
Les similitudes visuelles et phonétiques sont les plus importantes en Egypte parce
qu'un grand nombre de consommateurs étant illettrés, l'attrait visuel et/ou la familiarité
phonétique jouent un grand rôle dans la mémoire. Les couleurs, la calligraphie des
lettres, l'impression générale sont des facteurs déterminants dans l'appréciation de la
confusion selon les décisions de la Cour de Cassation.
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Traductions:
Les lois nationales ne protègent pas les marques contre la traduction mais plutôt
contre la translitération (obligatoire dans la demande d'enregistrement de la marque)
et cela à cause de la grande différence entre les langues pour la prononciation des
mots.
lI faut noter ici certaines particularités qui viennent des différents phonèmes dans les
langues arabe et latine. Par exemple, en arabe, on ne peut pas différencier entre (p) et
(b) ou entre (y) et (f). Des mots tels que COMBAT et COMPACT ou FALCON et
VOLCAN peuvent être considérés similaires une fois traduits et refusés par
l'examinateur pour risque de confusion.
FamilIes de marque:
Non, sauf si elles sont célèbres et c'est donc la notoriété et l'usage qui comptent.
Conditions sous lesquelles une marque plus ancienne a été utilisée:
On peut se référer à la marque ancienne déposée ainsi qu'aux éléments particuliers qui lui sont ajoutés habituellement dans l'usage, même s'ils ne sont pas des
composants de la marque déposée. Parce que c'est l'impression générale qui
existe dans la mémoire du consommateur et c'est cette image que le contrefacteur vise le plus souvent à imiter. Ceci se base sur les décisions de la jurisprudence égyptienne et la Cour de Cassation.
On peut appliquer ici les règles concernant la concurrence déloyale.
Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation
S'il s'agit de produits d'usage domestique ils sont d'habitude placés à proximité les uns
des autres dans les supermarchés, les pharmacies, etc... donc le risque de confusion
est important pour le consommateur, dans ce cas l'acheteur.
On ne peut pas fixer de pourcentage car il s'agit du consommateur moyen.
Pour les médicaments, le risque de confusion n'existe pas peut-être au niveau du
médecin ou du pharmacien qui sont des spécialistes mais au niveau des patients et
des garde-malades, là, le risque de confusion devient grave.
Le moment décisif est celui de la date de l'enregistrement de la marque la plus récente
qui est renforcée par la date de son premier usage.
L'intention frauduleuse fonde la présomption d'une fraude effective, au moins du point
de vue du droit criminel.
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Espagne
Spain
Spanien
Report 0 127
by the Spanish Group
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
A. Report on the situation in Spain
1. Introduction
a) As it is known, Spain changed its Trademark Law through the enactment of the Act
32/1988 of 10th November that came into force on 12th May, 1989.
This circumstance implies that the majority of the caselaw that study the problem of the
risk of confusion among Spanish Trademarks is referred to the former Trademark Act
and, therefore, the majority of the discussions relating to the risk of confusion under the
new Act are still pending of decision by the Courts.
The amendment of the Spanish rules concerning the risk of confusion in the new
Spanish Act has been very important and it merits a short reference to which have been
these changes, in order to be able to understand that the caselaw applied in the cases
decided under the former law, are not necessarily applicable to the cases that should
be decided under the new Act.
In fact, the former Law (Statute on Industrial Property) provided in paragraph 1 of article
124:
They will not be admitted to registration as trademarks:
1 The distinctives that because of its phonetic or graphic similarity with others already
registered may induce to mistake or confusion in the market.
It will be understood that there is phonetical similarity when the vowel or tonic syllable
will be so dominant that will absorb the protonic and the pos-tonic, so that it will only be
heard the tonic characteristic of the registered word.
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This article, that was basic to examine the risk of confusion under the former Law, obliged
that the analysis of the risk of confusion should be made:
(j)
Analyzing solely the risk of confusion in connection with the similarity of the confronted distinctive signs, not having into account the identity or similarity of the
respective goods or services, i.e., without applying the so-called principle of the
speciality, that by the contrary is recognized by the new Trademark Act. However, there is substantial caselaw corresponding to the former Law, in which it
was granted a subsidiary value to the question of similarity between the goods
and services corresponding to the confronted trademarks, and in one case the
Supreme Court stated that the affinity or similarity of goods covered by the
trademarks constituted a strange element to the rule of article 124-1 of the
Statute (on Industrial Property) and, therefore, only would serve to fix a better
criterion concerning the graphic or phonetic similarity or difference by not to
supplant it.
The trademark comparison was only focused in the phonetic and graphic
aspect, without having into account the meaning or evocative character. In this
connection, The Supreme Court stated that the meaning or semantic element
constituted a complementary factor, never decisive, to increase or diminish the
phonetic or graphic strict similarity, with exceptional and accessory character.
The second part of article 124-1g established a specific rule relating to the analysis of the phonetic similarity that restricted the application of other complemen-
tary criteria. The new Act does not make reference to this comparison
mechanism.
Finally, article 124, paragraph 11 prohibited the registration as trademarks of
words already registered deleting or adding any word, and establishing under
the former Law another comparative mechanism that sometimes was not properly used in order to analyze the risk of confusion between trademarks.
b) Although the new criteria established by the Spanish Trademark Act concerning the
risk of confusion have not been interpreted by the Courts, the Supreme Court has
established in some decision the possibility of relying expressly in the new Act even in
cases started under the former Trademark Law. In this connections it is illustrative the
decision taken on December 21, 1992 by the Supreme Court.
2. Rules contained In the 32/1 988 act of 10th November
The new Spanish Trademark Act includes an article 12 in Chapter II of its Title II entitled
Relative prohibitions', in which there are established the rules that will have to be applied
for deciding when a new trademark application will not be registered because it is considered that violates prior registered rights.
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This article 12 provides the following:
1. The following signs or elements may not be registered as trademarks:
those that, because they are identical or phonetically, visually or conceptually
similar to an older trademark application or registration designating identical or
similar goods or services, may lead to confusion in the marketplace or give rise
to a risk of association with the older trademark;
those that may lead to confusion in the marketplace because they are identical
or phonetically, visually or conceptually similar to an older trade name applicatian or registration designating activities related to the goods or services for
which the trademark is filed;
those that are identical to an older establishment name applied far or registered
to designate the same activities as the goads or services for which the trademark is filed.
2.
However, a trademark that is similar to an alder trademark or trade name application or
registration for identical or similar goods, services or activities may be registered where
the applicant submits authentic written consent from the proprietor of the older registration and, if necessary, the appropriate steps are taken to prevent the risk of confu-
sion.
For those of the readers that would not be familiar with the Spanish modalities of registration, we can say that the Spanish Law provides three kinds of registrations:
Marks for products or services.
Trade names, destinated to protect the name of an enterprise, either a natural or
juridical person, in connection with its activities.
Establishment names destinated to protect the name of an establishment open
to the public, in relation with the activities carried out in the same, with the peculiarity that the scope of protection of this establishment name is restricted to the
town in which the establishment is located or to those other towns designated in
the application. However, the scope of protection of trademarks and trade
names it is extended to all the Spanish territory.
From an analysis of the above mentioned article 12 they can be made the following considerations:
a) That, contrary to what was established in the former Law, in order to analyze the risk of
confusion, they are taken into consideration the goods and services covered by the
trademark and the activities of the trade name and establishment name.
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That, as comparison criterion,
it
is established the phonetic, graphic or conceptual
identity or similarity.
That, in the case of establishment names, the risk of confusion with a trademark is restricted to the case of identity, excluding the criterion of "similarity'.
That, in the case of trade names, the risk of confusion does not include the generation
of a risk of association as it is the case with trademarks.
That, in the case of trademarks, paragraph 1 .a) of article 12 does not clarify whether
the risk of association with a prior trademark constitutes a particular case of the general
risk of confusion as it is established in article 4.1 b) of the Directive 89/104 (EEC) for
approximation of the Trademark Laws of the countries of the European Union of 21st
December, 1988. In this connection, even the Spanish doctrine has stated its doubts
whether the risk of association is disconnected with the concept of similarity or identity
between goods and services, favouring the establishment of an independent criteria of
this circumstance. In this connection, it is to be expected that when the Spanish
Trademark Act will be amended for its adaptation, in some of its discrepant aspects,
with the Community Directive, this question should be harmonised with the Directive.
We must call the attention of the danger - obvious by anotherhand - of exaggerating the
principle of the speciality in order to determine the risk of confusion between distinctive
signs. A wide and flexible interpretation of article 12 (in particular as far as the "risk of
association" is concerned), and of article 13 c) (the prohibition of registration of signs or
media that should imply an undue profit of the reputation of other registered signs or
elements) both of the current Trademark Act should serve as a basis for establishing
the non application of the principle of the speciality in some cases (identity of trademarks, well-known trademark).
I. General rules for comparison
In the working guidelines it is asked to the National Groups on the general rules for comparison that have been developed in the different countries. Due to the above mentioned
circumstances of change of Trademark Act, it is to be pointed out that only general rules
for comparison existing in Spain are grounded in those foreseen in the Trademark Act and,
in particular, in those included in the above mentioned article 12. However, in the following
they are considered the different points listed in the working guidelines:
a) In this paragraph it is asked whether in order to make the comparison between two
trademarks one must proceed to a direct comparison between the actual marks or a
comparison between the younger mark and the image of the older mark which exists in
the memory of the consumer, being the latter often vague and limited to the main components of the mark. The Spanish Act, in paragraph 1 a) of article 12, establishes that
the comparison must be made in respect of the older mark as filed or registered, and,
therefore, it should be understood that the comparison should be carried out between
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the marks and not between the younger mark and image that the public consumer has
of the older mark.
Even the Supreme Court has confirmed this thesis, establishing the doctrine that the
comparison must be carried out between the distinctives as they are registered and not
as they are used in the market.
lt must be added that, according to large number of caselaw of the Supreme Court, the
similarity between distinctives and, therefore, the risk of confusion, constitutes an
indetermined legal concept, whose fixation has to be made "in each specific case,
taking into account the circumstances of the facts of the case at the light of the cases
that the Law establishes as reasons for non registrability of a trademark" (decision of
February 14, 1994).
lt is also asked in the working guidelines whether, as a general rule for comparison, it
must be considered as decisive the total, overall impression of the mark. Eventhough
this criteria is not specifically reflected in the current Spanish Act, it can be said that, in
the caselaw of the Courts in relation with the comparison criterion of marks under the
former Law, the overall impression that produces a trademark is considered in majority
as a decisive criterion. This point of view is also followed, in most of the cases, by the
Board of Appeals of the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office, when deciding administrative appeals against decisions of trademark cases. In these decisions, it is very
usual to find statements as the following: Considering, that the balanced application to
this case of the above mentioned legal rules (those of article 12.1) leads to the conclusion that they do not concur in it the applicative presumptions of the prohibitions for registration included in the above mentioned article 12.1, because they exist, between the
confronted distinctives, sufficient overall disparities both phonetic as well as graphic
and conceptual, that guaranties its reciprocal differentiation , excluding any risk of
mistake or confusion in the market.
The caselaw in this connection is overwhelming. As an example it can be mentioned
the decision of January 27, 1994 according to which the determination of the phonetic
similarity of words has to be made taking into account, in overall, the perception that
through the audition reaches its addressees, without making etymologic or scientific
disquisitions that are not at the reach of the majority.
The working guidelines also ask to consider wether generally, similarities are more important than differences, and that if the likelihood of confusion should only be accepted
if they are indeed the common elements which give the older mark its distinctiveness.
Even if this rule is not especifically considered by the Spanish Act, in practice, particularly in the decisions of the Board of Appeals of the Spanish Patent and Trademark
Office, this is a criterion generally applied. It is very usual to find in decisions of this
Board of Appeals arguments as the following: Considering: that the application to this
case of the legal rules (article 12-1) leads to the conclusion that they concur in it the
applicative motives of the prohibitions of registration foreseen in the above mentioned
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article 12.1, because it exists between the confronted distinctives, 'A + B' and its
opponent 'A", and obvious similarity, as well as a manifest relation between the commercial areas in which they are applied, since the older denomination is fully included in
the younger one, in which it has only been added the particle "B" of poor distinctive
character, therefore, if it would be admitted its coexistence, the consumer may confuse
them or mistake its business origin, and all that having into account a similar applicability'.
Together with this general criterion of overall comparison, it has been also established
by the Supreme Court the so-called criterion of "principle distinctive", according to
which in the comparison of the words "in addition to consider in the overall of the words
that form the trademark, it has to be considered the phonetic perception of those that
call the attention of the receipter of the sounds of these words" (decision of 29th April,
1993); or as it is declared in the decision of 8th July, 1993, it has to be taken into
account "the greater expressive force of the confronted words or graphics and, that
within the referred ensemble constitutes its essential, principal and determinant core of
the distinction or confusion foreseen in the rule and, therefore, they have to be excluded in the apprizal the elements that imply a genericity that can not be monopolized
in exclusivity".
Il. Criteria for comparison.
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection.
In this paragraph, the working guidelines raise the question whether the so-called strong'
marks, i.e., marks with great distinctiveness, generally enjoy a broader protection than
normal marks. The strength of the trademarks is determined, according to the working
guidelines, either from the originality, or obtained by their intensive use. As far as strong
marks derived by their originality, nothing is said in the Spanish Act, however, it is established a distinction between strong marks as a consequence of their intensive use, since in
paragraph c) of article 13 of the Spanish Act it is established that they will not be registered
as trademarks those signs or elements that may imply an undue profit of the reputation of
other registered signs or elements. This points out that the Spanish legislator grants to
these marks a greater protective character, independently of the originality of the same.
As far as the general question of the marks that have a strong distinctive character is concerned, either by one reason or by the other, it has to be pointed out that the meaning of
the words used "risk of confusion", implies necessarily this condition, since, according to
one of the meanings foreseen by the Official Dictionary on Spanish Language, the word
"confusing" means what it is difficult to distinguish. Therefore, the concept of confusion is
closely related with the distinctive character of the sign, and, hence, the more distinctive is
a trademark the easier will be that the marks that will be close to it will be confusing with it.
In the same direction, the Spanish Court has established the criterion, according to which,
the comparative rigour diminishes when the marks concur in initials, prefixes or suffixes
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that are generic, technic or adopted by the use that can not be monopolized by the owner
of the older mark. The poor distinctive capacity of the mark, as a consequence of the use
of generic expressions, is therefore important at the time of objecting the registrations of
other similar marks. As an example, we can mention the decision of February 26, 1993.
Sound, sight and meaning
The working guidelines raise in this paragraph the question whether there are rules to
make a balance of the three standards of phonetic, graphic and meaning similarity, when
only exists some of these similarities and not the others. Paragraph 1. a) of article 12 of the
Spanish Act establishes the above mentioned three standards of similarity, phonetic, graphic and in meaning with disjunctive character and, therefore, in principle, may be sufficient
only the existence of similarity under one of these standards to consider that there is a risk
of confusion. However, there is no doubt that when there is only a partial similarity under
some of them, the balance of these standards of similarity will be determinant to reach the
conclusion concerning the risk of confusion. In this connection, several decisions of the
Boards of Appeals of the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office foresee this balanced
application using expressions as the following: "considering: that a balanced application to
this case of the above mentioned legal rules leads to the conclusion that they do not concur in it the applicative presumptions of prohibition of registration of the above mentioned
article 12.1 .....
Even if there is no caselaw of the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation that must
be made to the consideration of this question under the new Trademark Act, there is many
caselaw from the former Statute on Industrial Property, that only considered the standards
of phonetical and graphical similarity. The caselaw in this connection is contradictory.
Among the caselaw that considered that the phonetic similarity had more weight than the
graphic one in complex marks, it may be mentioned decisions of 22nd June, 1977, 23rd
June, 1977, 10th October, 1977, 3rd January, 1979 and 31st March, 1979. Among the decisions that established that the criterion that the graphic had more weight in complex
marks, they may be cited, as an example, those of 28th October, 1976 and 28th June,
1977.
Translations
The working guidelines consider in this paragraph the question of translations and, by assimilation to what is provided in article 6bis (1) of the Paris Convention that provides the
compulsory protection in the member countries of the well-known trademarks, including its
translation, raises the following questions:
a) Whether national laws protect a mark which is not well-known against translations. In
this connection, they have to be made the following considerations:
(i)
Under the former Law, it was a general and usual practice of the Spanish Patent
and Trademark Office and of the Courts to consider foreign words as fancy expressions and, therefore, accepting the registration of marks that, being phone75
tically or graphically different from former marks, may corresponding in meaning
with the translation of this mark to a foreign language.
(ii)
This criteria should change since the coming into force of the new Trademark
Act in Spain in which, among other criterias of similarity, it is the conceptual one.
Furthermore, the coming into force of the EEC Community Directive will probably have some influence in respect of the treatment of the translations due to
the linguistic plurality of the different countries that form the European Union.
b) The working guidelines also raise the question, to those countries with more than one
official language, whether they have specific provisions as to translations of a trademark from one official language to the others. Spain, as it is known, has different official
languages in different parts of the territory. In fact, together with the Castilian, they are
considered co-official the Catalan, the Galician, and the Vasque.
Precisely for this reason, during the prosecution in the Spanish Parliament of the
Trademark Act, it was suggested an amendment, so that it would exist an article that
would establish the following: 'when a trademark will include a word that would have a
meaning in some of the official languages of the Spanish State, it will be able to incorporate to the distinctive applied for its translations or translations of this word into one
or several languages of the Spanish State. Each version of the distinctive will be examined by itself and, should protection be obtained for several versions, the protection
will rely on each of the them as such, without considering that the protection is referred
to all of them in overall".
This amendment was rejected because the majority understood that this implied an excessive complexity for the combined prosecution of the different forms of expression of
a word translated into different languages. However, this rejection does not imply
necessarily that it should be understood that it is not produced a conceptual identity or
similarity when it is wanted to register a trademark that is coincident with the translation
to other of the official languages of an older one.
There is also caselaw that takes into account the pronunciation of the different co-official languages of the words and letters that conform a distinctive, to the effects of determining the degree of similarity.
4. Family of marks
This question deals with a group of marks that have a common character that allows to
consider them as belonging to a series or a family of marks, and it is requested whether
they enjoy of special protection. The Spanish Law does not establish anything to this
respect, nor at our knowledge, the caselaw.
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5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
In this part, the working guidelines ask whether the comparison of a younger mark
applied for should be made with the older mark as it is registered or as it is used by its
owner. The Spanish Law does not make any consideration on this subject matter, but
in principle it should be considered that a comparison must be made in connection with
the form as the mark is registered, and in this connection it has been pronounced the
caselaw.
In this paragraph it is raised the question whether, assuming that they could not be invoked arguments related with the conditions under which the older mark has been
used, if they could be invoked the rules of Unfair Competition.
lt must be said that in Spain, the Unfair Competition Law, is conceived as a residual re-
gulation, whose application is possible in front of the lack of other express rule and
provided that the facts could be included among the acts of Unfair Competition specified by the Act 3/1991 of January 10. In this connection, it can be mentioned, as of
special relevance the question of confusion, the acts of confusion (art. 6), the acts of
imitation (art. 11) or the acts of exploitation of a third party reputation (art. 12). The
general criterion that is established in the field of confusion is also the risk of associa-
tion.
The acts of Unfair Competition can be considered, by one hand, as a possible reason
for rejection of new applications for registration of trademarks, and by the other, under
the point of view of a possible invocation of the existence of Unfair Competition in front
of acts that may jeopardize the rights derived of older distinctive signs.
In connection with the first of the two above mentioned perspectives, it can be found in
the current Spanish Trademark Act some prohibitions of registration that might be considered fall under this problem, in some cases, because the pretensions of registration
affect the general rights of the collectivity and, in others, because they imply an infringement of the specific rights of third parties.
As acts of Unfair Competition - as far as the grant of exclusive rights may imply eliminat-
ing the rights of third parties because they belong to the collectivity -, they may be
included the prohibitions of exclusivity of generic signs, those that have become
costumary or usual, those composed exclusively by signs that make reference to the
kind, quality, quantity, geographic origin, etc., prohibitions that are included in paragraphs a), b) and C) of Art. 11 of the current Trademark Act.
As acts that may be considered that hide facts considered of Unfair Competition in
damage of older rights of third parties, they can be cited the prohibitions of registrations of signs or means that imply an undue profit of the reputation of other registered
signs or elements, as well as those that are a reproduction or imitation of creations
protected by a right of Intellectual or Industrial Property in the terms of paragraphs C)
and d) of Art. 13 of the same Act.
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The circumstances described in the above paragraphs, might be invoked in the proceedings foreseen for the grant of the registration of marks before the Spanish Patent
and Trademark Office. However, in addition, it may be mentioned the possibility established in paragraph 2 of Art. 3 of the Trademark Act, in the sense that the user of an older mark well-known in Spain may claim, in front of the Courts, the cancellation of a registered trademark that may cause confusion with the well-known mark, in the conditions that are foreseen in this article.
lt is, accordingly, an open door to the possibility of a legal action, addressed to the
cancellation by the Courts of the registration of a trademark that is not compatible with
an older non-registered mark, but well-known within the interested circles. However,
recently, the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office, at least in one occasion (resolution
of the Board of Appeals of 11th August, 1994 of an administrative appeal), it has declared itself competent for revocation of the decision of grant of a trademark registration,
in application of the provisions of paragraph c) of Art. 13 of the Trademark Act, related
with what is foreseen in Art. 6bis of the Paris Convention, once proved the well-known
and prior use of the older mark of the appellant.
In connection with the Unfair Competition, "strictu sensu, it can be mentioned the current Law on Unfair Competition of 10th January, 1991, according to which they are
considered unfair any activities that might seem appropriate to create confusion with
the commercial activities of a third party (Art. 6), pointing out specifically that they are
acts of Unfair Competition, among others, the use of distinctive signs of third parties, as
well as the undue profit of the advantages of the industrial reputation acquired by
others in the market (Art. 12).
This Act does not regulate, therefore, questions of registral character, nor makes direct
reference to them, but tries to pursue unfair acts that might be made between natural
or juridical persons in the market.
In conclusion, although the Spanish Law does not provide any rule specifically referred
to the possible invocation of specific dispositions on Unfair Competition in the field of
the likelihood of confusion in Trademark Law to which this questions refers, it might be
understood that the Unfair Competition may constitute a ground to avoid the registration of sometrademark applications, in the terms and with the provisions and peculiarities that have been pointed out.
III. Others elements of evaluation
1. Confusion of whom?
The working guidelines raise the question whether the risk of confusion has to be established in respect of the average, ordinary purchaser. When the purchaser and the user are
not the same, is confusion of the user also relevant?. The Spanish Law when considering
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the likelihood of confusion speaks of confusion in the market and, therefore, it should be
understood that the risk of confusion must be referred to the risk of confusion that might
be produced by the coexistence of both goods in the market, and this risk should be referred of course to the consumers of these goods be them either purchasers or users. If the
product in question is a product addressed to a very specialized public consumer it should
be this public consumer the one of reference, but, by the contrary, when the good is a
good of large consumer, the public consumer should be the average ordinary consumer of
this good.
The Supreme Court has in several occasions established that in the process of consideration of whether the similarity between signs may produce a mistake or confusion lt is not
necessary to go for deep scientific studies or to assayed and sophisticated reasonings
that, in most of the cases, are not attainable to be carried out by the addressees that only
have a general medium education (decision of 5th March, 1993). Therefore, the likelihood
of confusion - adds the decision of 8th July, 1993- "it is in function of the collective behaviour and the educational reality of the generality of the persons to which the word is
addressed according to the common sense of the same in an specific moment of history.
Furthermore, the decision of 28th January, 1994 establishes that "the likelihood of confusion has to be made starting from the impression that in the ears or vision are produced by
the words or signs in question to the addressees of a general level of education.
Which part of the public?
This question is addressed to determine if the risk of confusion between the consumers
must be referred to a small part of the public or to a considerable part of the same. In this
connection, there are no rules in the Spanish legislation, nor in the caselaw.
By anotherhand, the above mentioned Court decisions in the former paragraph refer to the
fact that the decision on likelihood of confusion has to be made in accordance with the
overall impression that the signs receive the average consumer, the generality of the persons, without looking, therefore, to quantitative or percentual questions of likelihood of
confusion.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
Under the former Law, there have been contradictory decisions of the Courts, some of
them stating that in the case of products of a great degree of specialization, as it is the
case in pharmaceutical products, the risk of confusion was lower due to the fact that these
products are sold under prescription by specialized personnel (by doctors and pharmacists respectively).
However, other decisions went in an opposite direction, stating precisely that, due to the
speciality of the product and the serious consequences that might have a confusion in this
kind of products, the differences between the trademarks should be greater than in other
products in order to avoid the smallest risk of confusion.
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As an example, it can mentioned the decision of 21st December, 1992, according to which,
when we are in front of pharmaceutical products they must be applied criteria of greater
comparative rigour due to the influence that might have in the human health, and this Department has also into consideration that this greater rigour must be harmonised in all with
the fact these products are manufactured, commercialized and authorized in laboratories,
hospitals, clinics and establishments, through the use of written prescriptions that, in any
case, avoid the risk of confusion and, in part, this is due to the technical and practical preparation of the personnel that is entrusted with the manufacture and sale of these substan-
ces.
Decisive moment of confusion
lt is raised the question whether the risk of confusion should be referred to the date of filing
of the application or the date where a decision is taken. A literal interpretation of article 12
of the Spanish Law seems to refer that the date at which the facts should be determined is
the filing date of the trademark, although it is also true that since the decision must be
taken at a later date, it would be very difficult by one hand to determine which were the
facts in the filing date, and by the other, if one wishes to use experimental evidences as for
instance market inquiries, this will be referred to the date at which they have been made.
Fraudulent intent
The Spanish caselaw has been avowing that the purpose of a trademark is to protect the
general interest of the consumers as far as a trademark informs of the origin, making pos-
sible the differentiation of the goods and services that distinguishes (decision of 18th
January, 1993 and in similar terms, decisions of 5th and 20th February, 1993 and 5th
March, 1993).
Being an essential obligation of commerce, the competition on grounds of each one efforts
(the decision of 21st June, 1975 stated that the signs must not take profit of the reputation
of others) the Spanish Law prohibits the registration of signs of elements that imply and
undue profit of the reputation of third parties registered rights (article 13 c) of the Spanish
Trademark Act). In fact, the Spanish Trademark Act grants in any case to the owner of a
sign or element that has been registered by a third party the possibility to claim the ownership of the trademark that will include his mark and this could be done within five years
after registration (article 3.3. L M.).
One could raise the question whether the undue profit of unregistered signs or elements
has a similar protection. The answer must be affirmative since if we will be in front of an
undue appropriation of a res aliena (property of a third party), or if it would be raised the
possibility of confusion, these conducts could be reputed as of bad faith. This is considered as an unfair conduct in the sense of the general rule of article 5 of the Unfair Competition Act of 10th January, 1991, and it would be an act "contra legem that could be
associated within the contents of trademarks in the provision of article 11. 1 e) of the
Trademark Act.
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In this context they must be also considered the reproductions or imitations of intellectual
or industrial property rights that would constitute also fraudulent acts and, therefore, unfair
at the light of articles 6 and 11 of the Unfair Competition Act and hence unregistrable
according to article 13 d) of the same Act.
The Spanish Patent and Trademark Office, in accordance with article 11.1 e) of the
Spanish Trademark Act may reject the registration of signs or elements that will be
contrary to the Law. Trademark applications that will imply or that will be a consequence of
an unfair competition act will be open to nullity since the Unfair Competition Act prohibits
under his article 1 expressly the unfair competition acts in Spain. Hence, any other sign or
element that will constitute an act of unfair competition will be unregistrable according to
article 11.1 e) of the Spanish Trademark Act.
In consequence, it must be concluded that the fraudulent intent in the Spanish Law is a
reason to object the registration of a trademark or a reason for seeking its nullity to the registered ones.
IV. Other criteria
Finally in the working guidelines it is asked the existence of other additional criteria to the
above mentioned ones for the evaluation of confusion as, for instance, acts of unfair competition in which case we should refer to the above paragraph Ill. 5, where reference has
been made to the protection in front of fraudulent acts generally related with the Unfair
Competition Act.
Contractual and legal infringements. - The Spanish Trademark Act has into consideration also the fact that a trademark may be registered infringing a legal or contractual
right or with fraud of the rights of a third party by providing the right to recover the
trademark taken off by a third party (art. 3.3 Spanish Trademark Act). The recovery actian can be exercised both while the trademark application is being prosecuted as well
as five years after its registration. These are not actions allowing the rejection of a
trademark but they are related with the ownership rights through an action for recovery
that permits to recover the infringed rights.
Interference of the rights of a person with registered rights.- Other criteria of similarity that have produced caselaw in different directions have been the confrontation of
the inherent rights to the personality reflected in the use, as a trademark, of surnames
and previous trademarks. The case under the former Trademark Law has been to
attenuate the comparative rigour, favouring the grant in cases of doubt (decisions of
11th April, 1977, 11th July, 1980 and 30th April, 1993) pointing out that the criterion
should be permissive to the use, provided that it would be made in combination with
other differing elements of older marks (decision of 2nd April, 1993). The opposite point
of view of this permissive approach was established by the decision of 31st March,
1989, followed by another of 16th October, 1991.
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The problem is nowadays solved by article 13 a) of the Spanish Trademark Act that
prohibits the registration of the name, surnames, pseudonym or any other mean of
identification of the applicant of the registration of a trademark, always that it would be
falling in any of the cases of article 12 of the Trademark Act, i.e., in the cases of identity
or similarity with an older mark.
They cannot neither be registered the names and surnames that would identify a different person to the applicant, unless an authorization of the respective person is submitted, being subjected these signs to all the other prohibition criteria because of identity or similarity with older marks.
C. General law on advertising (Arts. 4 and 6).- The subject matter of the risk of confusion
is also considered in this Spanish Act that governs advertising. In article 4 of this Act it
is defined the misleading advertising as the one that, in any way, induces or may induce to mistake to its addressees.
By anotherhand, article 6 of the same Act, mentions the confusion when defining the
unfair advertising as the one that induces to confusion with the enterprises, activities,
products, names, trademarks or other distinctive signs of competitors, as well as the
one that makes an unjustified use of the denomination, capitals, marks or distinctives of
other enterprises or institutions.
Therefore, according to this Act, independently that there would be or not a risk of
confusion between the trademarks, whenever the advertising carried out by a certain
enterprise induces to confusions with the activity of a third party, it could be pursued on
grounds of the above mentioned articles.
B. Proposals for a uniform regulation
I. General rules for comparison
The working guidelines focus its attention in the following three rules:
a) What must be compared, the younger trademark with the older trademark or with
the image that of the latter has the consumer?
The general principle that should be ruling is the one of the comparison between the
younger mark with the older mark, since what is registered is the trademark and not the
image that would exist of that trademark in the market. However, in special circumstances, i.e. very well-known trademarks, they could be taken into account the special cir-
cumstances derived from the use of the trademark and of the image that the public
consumer will have of this trademark. Hence, for instance, when it is considered the
risk of association between two trademarks, it is unquestionable that this risk would be
greater if the older mark is very well-known in the market than if the older trademark is
very little known and, therefore, it could even be considered that there is the risk of
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association in those cases even when the distinguished products of the younger mark
would be different from those covered by the older mark.
b) Decisive character of the overall impression of the mark
This criteria in fundamental and is the one that should orientate all the general rules of
comparison. lt should not be forgotten that the distinctive that is being applied as a
trademark is the one that Will be later on used by its owner in the way as it has been
filed. The impact that in the public may cause the older registered mark and, therefore,
any possibility of confusion or association of the same with other marks, will derive from
this general impression.
C) More importance of the general similarities than the differences. Distinctive
character of the common elements
This question is very much related with the former one since, if it must prevail the overall impression, it will be the balance of similarities and differences what will determine
this overall impression and the possibility of confusion or association with both marks.
As far as the distinctive character of the common elements is concerned, it is evident
that if the coincidence between two trademarks is based on the generic or descriptive
elements, where it does not turn upon the distinctive force of the trademark, the possibility of confusion or association will not exist or it will be in the same degree that it will
be produced with other registered trademarks that will include the same non-distinctive
elements.
However, it is risky to establish the general principle that general similarities are more
important than differences because the general rule should be the one of the overall
impression.
The rule to grant the distinctive character of the trademark only in connection with its
distinctive elements seem very appropriate.
Il. Criteria for comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
We absolutely agree with the criterion that the distinctive character of a trademark is decisive for determining its scope of protection and that, as far as the trademark will present a
strong distinctive character, its scope of protection would be greater. In fact, it would be
unjust to apply a very permissive attitude when accepting the registration of a trademark
and, by the contrary, once registered, to grant to the trademark a large scope of protection
and reject the registration or use of new marks whose similarity with this registered trademark would be of similar degree to the one that the latter had in front of older trademarks
when it was applied for.
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Is what could be called the comparative distinctivity of the trademark, i.e. the selfdistinctivity of each trademark in relation to other registered signs either older or younger.
Sound, sight and meaning similarity
The three aspects in consideration should be balanced, in its just degree, in the moment of
comparison of the likelihood of confusion of two trademarks.
However, the definitive criteria must be determined in relation with the influence that these
three characteristics will have in the overall impression that will produce the two compared
trademarks. We believe that it will be dangerous to establish fixed rules for the balance of
these three elements, since it should be made depending of the circumstances of each
case.
Nevertheless, we wish to remark the increasing importance that the sight similarity is acquiring in the current market economy and that, perhaps in the past, was not properly consi-
dered of it did not exist. In fact, the increasing use of the audio-visual media, the use of
new ways of sale as for instance mail sales, sales through big shopping centres, etc., has
increased enormously the number of sales that are being produced without that the consumer needs to ask for the product by its denominative mark, and has made to increase
the number of sales carried out through election by the consumer of the product by its
visual aspect, either selecting a product from shelves in a big shopping center without requesting for it, be it by stating a reference number in a brochure, etc.
Furthermore, the increasing use of television as an advertising media implies that the
public consumer receives each time in a greater degree the influence of the appearance of
the product in its visual form, what influences decisively its election capacity.
These circumstances should be taken into account when carrying out the balance of the
three aspects of the trademark sound, sight and meaning in relation with the circumstances of each case.
Translations
This question is considered by the working guidelines under two different points of view,
that we are going to consider also separately:
a) The protection of a trademark in front of translations of the same to languages
different from the official languages of the country where it Is applied for
This question presents a great importance due to the increasing growth of the commerce at world scale impelled by agreements as GATI, and particularly in countries
belonging to economic groups of countries, as it is the case of the countries of the
European Union. In the past, it has been traditional to consider that a mark with a
specific meaning protected its expression having no influence its translation to other
languages, unknown by the great majority of the public in that country. However, the
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group of countries in economic areas where it is allowed the free circulation of goods
might question this criterion. Furthermore, the increasing growth of the number of
people that travel from one country to the other and that, therefore, has access to
goods in different countries, is another circumstance to be taken into account.
These economical and social changes might lead to believe that the right thing would
be that a trademark with a specific meaning should, automatically, be protected ri its
translated version to any language, at the latest to the languages of the countries of the
economic group in question, for instance, the countries of the European Union. However, the big number of languages of these countries, that it is expected that will increase with new incorporations, will create a great degree of difficulty for obtaining new
registrations, since automatically each trademark would give raise to a great number of
translations. By anotherhand, it is also true that there are many of these languages that
are very little known in other countries, even, in the case of languages known by a large
number of persons, there are many words that are hardly recognized in its translated
version by the great majority of the consumers.
By anotherhand, in the case of national trademarks, and therefore, when the protection
granted by a trademark is restricted to one country, the issue of the translation of the
trademark to other non official languages only should be taken into account when the
majority of the public consumer, of the country in question, will recognize the translation of the trademark and when it will exist the risk of confusion or association that require the Trademark laws.
Therefore, the criterion that we believe should be adopted will be flexible, granting protection to translated words only in those case where, due to the similarity of the protected or translated version, or because of the average knowledge of that language
that will exist in a certain country for the majority of the public consumer, the use of the
trademark in its translated version may originate a risk of confusion or of association in
the market with the trademark without being translated.
Of course, this criteria might be different in the case of multinational registrations as it is
the case of the community trademark. In fact, in the case of the community trademark,
as far as the same will grant an exclusive right to its owner simultaneously in all the
countries of the European Union, in order to consider whether it is granted a new
community trademark registration, it should be taken into account, not only the older
trademarks and rights, both nationals or community wide, but also their translation to
the different official languages of the countries of the European Union.
b) Translation of a trademark to the different official languages of a country
In this case, the protection granted by the national trademark grants an exclusive right
for the use of the same in all the country, and therefore, its use may originate a risk of
confusion or association with older marks in its original or translated version.
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Therefore, the protection granted by a trademark in one of these languages should
grant protection also in front of the use of the same translated to the different official
languages of that country.
However, even if the trademark in its protected version will grant protection in front of
the reproduction of the same in front of identical or similar forms in this language, the
protection of the translation should be restricted to the translation itself and could not
be considered extended to expressions similar, but not identical to the translated version. A wider protection of the translations, could be obtained by the registration, of the
mark as a trademark, for each translated version.
4. Family marks
In relation with this question, we consider that they could be given two circumstances:
A plurality of trademarks that will present a common element 'X" in all of them. If this
common element has been protected individually as a trademark, probably it would not
be necessary to use the argument of the family of trademarks to obtain a suitable protection in front of other marks, filed afterwards, including this common element. If the
protection of this common element in isolated form does not exist, then the argument
of the family of trademarks may be of use as far as it could demonstrated that the new
trademark, including this common element in combination with other elements, intends
to take profit of the existence of the older trademarks, creating a risk of confusion or
association with these older marks belonging to the same family.
It may be given also the case in which, without that necessarily there will exist a common element, it could be considered that it exists a family of trademarks. This will be
the case, for instance, of a certain applicant that would be the owner of several marks
that will create in the market an idea of family of marks because of its own character
and that therefore, the use of a mark belonging to the same family by a third party may
generate a risk of confusion or association. For instance, if we imagine that a certain
company registers the majority of the names of the Zodiac to distinguish footwear. In
the case that one of these signs of the Zodiac would have not be registered, it could be
understood that the use or registration of this sign by a third party may generate a risk
of confusion or association in the market with the owner of the older marks.
5. ConditIons under which the older mark has been used
As it has been stated in paragraph I, the registration of a mark grants protection to the sign
as it has been registered. However, there is no doubt that the circumstances of use might
be taken into consideration in special cases to the effect to balance the risk of confusion.
Anyhow, the general criterion should be to consider the trademark, as it has been registered, since the owner has always the option to register associated or derivated trademarks
with the first one to protect its specific ways of presentation.
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Ill. Öther elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom1
We consider that the general criterion should be that the risk of confusion or association
should be studied in comparison with the natural consumer of the product. In this connection, if it is the case of a product acquired by the general public, this natural consumer will
be any consumer, however, when it is the case of specialized products or destinated to a
very specialized field, this natural consumer will be the one that will acquire, in general, that
product.
Which part of the public?
We consider that the own meaning of the words used risk of confusion, implies that it is
not necessary that the confusion would in fact be produced, in greater or smaller degree,
in a certain percentage of the public, it is sufficient that it will exist a 'risk" of confusion, in
order that the registration of a younger mark should not be registered in front of the existence of an older mark.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
The criteria of differentiation used in the past in relation with the kind of products have lead
to divergent conclusions, as it is recognized in the working guidelines. Therefore, the special circumstances of the products in question should be taken into consideration, in special cases, by the Courts or the administrative bodies in question, but it could not be given
a general rule in connection with the kind of products. For instance, nowadays, except in
the case of pharmaceutical products sold under prescription, it is a general tendency that
many products, including the pharmaceutical ones, as sold in shops of self-service, where
it is the consumer who elects the product without intervention of specialized personnel.
Therefore, we believe that it would be dangerous to establish discriminatory criteria in relation with the kind of products.
Decisive moment of confusion
The decisive moment to analyze whether there is a risk of confusion, for the registration or
refusal of a trademark, it is the date when the new trademark was applied for, since it is
from that date where they are born the priority rights in front of third parties and, therefore,
when the facts should be determined. However, the facts happened after this date will
serve many times to confirm or not the risk of confusion that, in the filing date of the mark,
would exist or could be foreseen.
Fraudulent intent
Even if it is probable that the fraudulent intent in many cases may originate an effective
fraud, if the intention turns not into a reality, it would be unjust to make presumptions of incompatibility that may prejudice a decision that, in case of absence of intention, may be
different.
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However, it is evident that these arguments should be taken into consideration, together
with other circumstances, when deciding the possibility of confusion or of association.
IV. Other criteria
To study the possibility of confusion, they may be argued, and should be taken into consideration, all the specific circumstances of each case since they may be very different and
have a different influence.
The possibility of confusion, and in a greater degree, the risk of association may be influenced many times by some of these circumstances, for instance, the one mentioned in the
working guidelines in connection with the unfair competition, links between the owners of
the trademarks, etc. In fact, the case of a former employee of a company is very illustrative,
as far as, the synergic combination of a similar mark with a specific association by the
public consumer between the former employee and its former company, may increase the
risk of confusion and of association of the goods served by one and other owners among
the public consumer.
Résumé
A. Rapport sur la situation en Espagne
Introduction
L'Espagne a modifié sa législation en matière de Marques moyennant la promulgation de
la Loi 32/1988 du 10 novembre qui est entrée en vigueur le 12 mai 1989; par conséquent,
il n'existe pas de jurisprudence suffisante qui permette d'évaluer l'appréciation de la confusion sous la nouvelle Loi.
Règles comprises dans la loi 32/1 988 du 10 novembre
La nouvelle Loi espagnole de Marques comprend un article 12 dans le Chapitre Il de son
Titre Il nommé Prohibitions relatives', dans lequel on a établi les règles à appliquer afin de
déterminer quelles sont les nouvelles marques qui ne pourront pas être enregistrées en
vue de leur infraction de droits antérieurs.
D'après l'analyse du précité article
12, il
y a lieu d'extraire les considérations suivantes:
Contrairement à ce qui était établi sous la législation antérieure, afin d'analyser le risque
de confusion, on prend en considération les produits ou services distingués par la
marque et les activités du nom commercial et du nom d'établissement.
Comme critère de comparaison, il est établi celui de l'identité ou similitude phonétique,
graphique ou conceptuelle.
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Dans le cas des noms d'établissement, le risque de confusion avec une marque est limité aux cas d'identité, le critère de la "similitude' étant exclu.
Dans le cas des noms commerciaux, le risque de confusion n'inclut pas celui de générer un risque d'association comme dans le cas des marques.
Dans les cas des marques, l'alinéa a) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 12 ne clarifie pas si le
risque d'association avec une marque antérieure constitue un cas particulier du risque
général de confusion comme il est établi par l'article 4.1 de la Directive Communautaire.
Nous devons signaler le danger - d'ailleurs évident d'une excessive sacralisation du
principe de spécialité aux effets de déterminer la susceptibilité de confusion entre des
signes distinctifs.
I. Règles générales pour la comparaison
La loi espagnole, dans l'alinéa a) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 12, établit que la comparaison doit être réalisée entre la nouvelle marque et la marque antérieurement déposée
ou enregistrée.
La jurisprudence des Tribunaux concernant les critères de comparaison de marques
sous l'ancienne législation établissait majoritairement comme critère décisif celui de
l'impression générale produite par la marque.
Aussi bien que le critère général de la comparaison dans l'ensemble, le Tribunal
Suprême établit celui de 'l'élément distinctif principal, en vertu duquel la comparaison
entre dénominations doit être réalisée "outre en les appréciant dans les ensembles des
vocables qui les forment, en prenant en considération "la plus grande force expressive
du vocable ou du graphisme en conflit qui, dans le précité ensemble, constitue son
noyau essentiel, et qui est le déterminant principal de la distinction ou la confusion prévues sous la norme, de sorte que l'on doit exclure de l'appréciation les éléments qui
comportent un caractère générique non susceptible d'appropriation exclusive".
Il. Critères de comparaison
1. Importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection
En ce qui concerne la question générale des marques dotées d'un fort caractère distinctif,
il y a lieu de signaler que la propre nomenclature utilisée, "risque de confusion", comporte
forcément ladite condition car, d'après une des acceptions du mot 'confus" prévues dans
le Dictionnaire de la Langue Espagnole, ce mot fait référence à ce qui est difficile à distinguer. Par conséquent, le concept de la confusion est étroitement lié à celui du caractère
distinctif du signe et, donc, plus une marque sera dotée de force distinctive, plus il sera
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probable que les marques qui lui ressemblent résultent susceptibles de confusion avec la
même.
Similitude sonore, visuelle et sémantique
L'article 12, paragraphe 1, alinéa a) de la Loi de Marques établit les trois critères de similitude - phonétique, graphique ou conceptuelle - avec caractère disjonctif, de sorte que, en
principe, il suffirait avec l'existence de similitude sous un seul de ces critères pour qu'il
existe un risque de confusion. A cet égard, plusieurs décisions du Département de Recours de l'Office Espagnol de Brevets et Marques font référence à une application pondérée desdites similitudes.
Traductions
Sous la législation antérieure, il a été une pratique générale et habituelle de l'Office
Espagnol de Brevets et Marques et des Tribunaux de considérer les dénominations en
langue étrangère comme expressions de fantaisie.
Ce critère devrait changer après l'entrée en vigueur de la nouvelle Loi de Marques en
Espagne dans laquelle, en dehors d'autres critères, il existe celui de la similitude sémantique.
En Espagne, il existe plusieurs langues officielles et le problème se pose de déterminer la
protection des marques ayant une signification propre dans leurs diverses traductions. En
application du critère de la similitude sémantique, il faudrait considérer que la marque
accorde protection face aux traductions dans ledites autres langues.
Il existe aussi un courant de Jurisprudence qui prend en considération la prononciation
des différentes vocables et lettres qui forment un signe distinctif dans les plusieurs langues
officielles, afin de déterminer le dégrée de similitude.
FamIlles de Marques
Ni la Loi espagnole, ni la Jurisprudence ont rien établi à cet égard.
Conditions sous lesquelles une marque plus ancienne a été utilisée
La loi espagnole ne fait aucune référence à cette question, mais, en principe, il faudrait
penser que toute comparaison doit être réalisée par rapport à la façon dont la marque
se trouve enregistrée.
Il faudrait préciser que, en Espagne, la régulation en matière de Concurrence Déloyale
est conçue comme résiduelle, dont l'application est uniquement possible en cas de
manque de toute autre régulation expresse, et pourvu que les faits en questions soient
compris sous les actes de concurrence déloyale décrits par la Loi 3/1991 du 10janvier.
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Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation
Confusion de qui?
La Loi espagnole fait référence à la confusion dans le marché au moment d'analyser le
risque de confusion.
Le Tribunal Suprême a réitéré que, dans le processus d'appréciation de la possibilité que
la similitude entre signes puisse induire en erreur ou confusion "il n'est pas nécessaire de
recourir à des études scientifiques approfondies, ni à des raisonnements éprouvés et
sophistiqués".
Quelle partie du public?
La jurisprudence établit que le jugement de susceptibilité de confusion doit être réalisé en
fonction de l'impression générale qu'un consommateur moyen reçoit des signes.
Importance du type de produits médicaments
Sous l'ancienne législation il y avait eu des jugements de sens contraire; les uns indiquaient qu'en cas de produits de haute spécialisation, à savoir les produits pharmaceutiques,
le risque de confusion était mineur étant donné que ces produits étaient prescrits et
vendus par un personnel spécialisé (médecins et pharmaciens respectivement). Cependant, d'autres jugements étaient rendus dans le sens contraire.
Moment décisif de la confusion
D'après une interprétation littérale de l'article 12 de la Loi espagnole, or dirait que le
moment dans lequel les faits devraient être déterminés est la date de dépôt de la marque.
Intention frauduleuse
L'intention frauduleuse est en droit espagnol un motif qui peut empêcher l'enregistrement
d'une marque et qui peut comporter la sanction de nullité pour celles qui auraient été enregistrées.
IV. Autres Critères
Infractions contractuelles et légales.- La Loi de Marques prend pareillement en
considération le fait qu'une marque accède au registre avec infractions légales ou
contractuelles ou en fraude des droits d'un tiers afin d'établir le droit de récupérer ce
qui a été illicitement obtenu par d'autres.
CollisIon des droits de la personne avec des droits enregistrés.- Un autre des
critères de similitude qui ont donné lieu à des critères jurisprudentiels différents a été
l'usage comme marque de noms de famille et les marques préalables. Le critère
jurisprudentiel antérieur à la Loi de Marques en vigueur avait été d'atténuer la rigueur
comparative.
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Le problème est actuellement résolu par l'article 13 a) de la Loi de Marques qui interdit
l'enregistrement du nom, noms de famille, pseudonyme et tout autre moyen qui identifie le déposant de l'enregistrement de marque dans les cas d'identité ou similitude avec
des signes antérieurement inscrits ou déposés.
Les noms et noms de famille qui identifient une personne autre que le déposant ne
peuvent non plus être enregistrés, sauf que l'autorisation opportune soit apportée.
B. Propositions pour une régulation générale
I. Règles générales pour la comparaison
Qu'est-ce-que l'on doit comparer: la marque la plus nouvelle avec la marque
antérieure, ou avec l'image que les consommateurs ont de ladite marque antérieure?
Le principe général qui doit être appliqué est celui de la comparaison entre la marque
nouvelle et la marque antérieure.
Caractère décisif de l'impression générale de la marque
Ce critère est essentiel et doit orienter toutes les normes générales de comparaison.
C) Plus grand importance des similitudes générales que des différences. Caractère
distinctif des éléments communs
Si l'impression de l'ensemble doit prévaloir, c'est la pondération des similitudes et des
différences qui déterminéra ladite impression de l'ensemble et la possibilité de confusion ou association entre les marques.
La norme d'accorder le caractère de différenciation à la marque uniquement en ce qui
concerne ses éléments distinctifs, nous semble correcte.
Il. Critères de comparaison
1. Importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection
Nous partageons complètement le critère selon lequel le caractère distinctif d'une marque
est décisif pour déterminer la portée de sa protection et selon lequel, dans la mesure où
une marque sera dotée d'un fort caractère distinctif, la portée de sa protection sera plus
large.
C'est ce que l'on pourrait appeler la distinctivité comparative de la marque, c'est à dire, la
distinctivité propre de chaque marque en rapport avec d'autres signes enregistrés antérieurs et postérieurs.
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2. Similitude sonore, visuelle et sémantique
Les trois aspects en question doivent être pondérés dans leur juste mesure au moment de
comparer la susceptibilité de confusion entre deux marques.
Cependant, nous souhaitons signaler l'importance croissante que la similitude visuelle est
en train d'acquérir dans l'actuelle économie de marché et qui, auparavant, était inférieure
ou n'était pas prise en considération.
3. Traductions
La protection d'une marque face à ses traductions dans des langues autres que
celles officielles du pays où la marque est déposée
Nous pensons que le critère à appliquer devrait être un critère flexible, de sorte que l'on
accorde protection au mot traduit uniquement dans le cas où, soit à cause de la similitude entre la version protégée et sa traduction, ou soit à cause de la connaissance
moyenne d'une langue dans un pays par la généralité du public, l'utilisation de la marque dans sa version traduite pourrait créer un risque de confusion ou d'association
avec la marque sans traduire dans le marché.
Ce critère pourrait être différent auprès de Registres plurinationaux.
Traduction d'une marque dans les autres langues officielles du pays où la marque est déposée
La protection accordée par la marque en une de ces langues devrait accorder protection pareillement face à son utilisation traduite dans les autres langues officielles dudit
pays.
4. Familles de marques
Nous considérons que les situations suivantes peuvent avoir lieu:
Une pluralité de marques qui présentent un élément commun "X'. Si la protection de
cet élément commun de façon isolée n'existe pas, l'argument de la famIlle de marques
peut aider à agir contre l'usage ou l'enregistrement d'autres marques similaires qui
présentent cet élément commun.
Il peut y avoir d'autres cas de familles de marques.
5. Conditions d'utilisatIon d'une marque plus ancienne
L'enregistrement d'une marque accorde protection au signe tel qu'il est enregistré. Les
circonstances de son utilisation peuvent servir à pondérer le risque de confusion.
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Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation
Confusion de qui?
Le critère général doit être celui selon lequel le risque de confusion ou association doivent
être étudiés par rapport au consommateur naturel du produit.
Quelle partie du public?
il suffit qu'il existe un risque" de confusion pour que l'enregistrement d'une marque postérieure ne doive pas être admis devant l'existence d'une marque antérieure.
Importance du type de produits médicaments
Il peut être dangereux d'établir des critères discriminatoires en fonction du type de produits.
Moment décisif de la confusion
La date de dépôt de la nouvelle marque.
Intention frauduleuse
Quoiqu'il soit probable que l'intention frauduleuse origine très souvent une fraude effective,
si l'intention ne se traduit pas dans une réalité, il serait injuste de faire des présomptions
d'incompatibilité qui déterminent des décisions qui, dans le cas de manque d'intention
frauduleuse pourraient être différentes.
IV. Autres critères
Afin d'étudier la possibilité de confusion, on pourrait alléguer et on devrait prendre en considération toutes les circonstances spéciales de chaque cas, car celles-ci peuvent être
très différentes et agir de façon très différente.
Zusammenfassung
A. Bericht zur Situation in Spanien
1. Einleitung
Spanien modifizierte seine Gesetzgebung auf dem Gebiet der Marken mittels der Verkün-
digung des Gesetzes 32/ 10. November 1988, welches am 12. März 1989 in Kraft trat,
womit keine ausreichende Rechtspraxis existiert, welche die Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit unter dem neuen Gesetz zu bewerten erlaubt.
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2. Im Gesetz 32/ 10. November 1988 enthaltene Normen
Das neue spanische Markenrecht enthält einen Artikel 12 in dem Kapitel II seines Il. Bandes mit dem Titel Bedingte Verbote, in welchem jene Normen festgelegt werden, die angewandt werden müssen, um zu bestimmen, welche neuen Marken nicht registriert werden können, da davon ausgegangen wird, daß sie gegen Rechte anderer, zuvor registrierter Marken verstoßen.
Aus der Analyse des zuvor genannten Artikels 12 sind die folgenden Betrachtungen hervorzuheben:
Gegensatz zur vorherigen Gesetzgebung, werden zur Analyse der
Verwechslungsgefahr die Produkte oder Dienstleistungen in Betracht gezogen, welche
Im
die Marke kennzeichnen, sowie die Tätigkeit des kommerziellen Namens und des
Firmenschilds des Unternehmens.
Als Vergleichskriterium wird die phonetische, graphische oder begriffliche Identität bzw.
Ähnlichkeit festgelegt.
Bei Firmenschildern eines Unternehmens beschränkt sich die Verwechslungsgefahr mit
einer Marke auf den Fall der Identität und das Kriterium der 'Ähnlichkeit" wird ausgeschlossen.
Bei kommerziellen Namen schließt die Verwechslungsgefahr keine Gefahr der Assoziierung mit ein, wie es bei den Marken der Fall ist.
Im Falle der Marken klärt der Absatz a) des Paragraphen 1 des Artikels 12 nicht ab, ob
die Gefahr der Assoziierung mit einer früheren Marke einen partikulären Fall der Verwechslungsgefahr darstellt, wie es der Artikel 4.1 b) der Gemeinschaftsrichtlinie festlegt.
Wir müssen auf die - andererseits offensichtliche Gefahr hinweisen, daß das Prinzip der
Spezialität zum Zweck der Bestimmung der Verwechslungsgefahr zwischen Erkennungszeichen zu sehr 'geheiligt" wird.
I. Allgemeine Vergleichsregeln
Im Abschnitt a) des Paragraphen 1 des Artikels 12 erläutert das spanische Gesetz, daß
ein Vergleich zwischen der neuen Marke und der zuvor beantragten oder bereits registrierten Marke erfolgen muß.
In der Rechtsprechung der Gerichte wird bezüglich der Vergleichskriterien für Marken
unter der alten Gesetzgebung der Gesamteindruck, den die Marke verursacht, mehrheitlich als Entscheidungskriterium betrachtet.
95
c) Gemeinsam mit dem allgemeinen Kriterium des Gesamtvergleichs ist ein ebenfalls vom
Obersten Gerichtshof festgelegtes Kriterium das genannte "Hauptmerkmal, laut welchem beim Vergleich der Benennungen neben der Beurteilung der Gesamtheit der
Wörter, aus denen sie gebildet wird" auch die "Bedeutung der Ausdruckskraft der zu
vergleichenden Worte bzw. ihrer Schreibung' in Betracht gezogen werden muß; "diese
Ausdruckskraft bildet innerhalb der erwähnten Gesamtheit den essentiellen Kern und
ist in der Norm vorgesehener Hauptbestimmungsfaktor für die Unterscheidung oder
Verwechslung, so daß in der Beurteilung jene Elemente ausgeschlossen werden müssen, welche eine nicht ausschließlich anzueignende Gattungseigenständigkeit in sich
bergen.
il. Vergleichskriterien
Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungskraft für den Umfang des Schutzes
Hinsichtlich der allgemeinen Frage der Marken mit starker Unterscheidungskraft muß gesagt werden, daß die benutzte Nomenklatur selbst, also der Begriff "Ver-wechs-lungs-gefahr", notwendigerweise diese Bedingung impliziert, da laut einer der im Wörterbuch der
Spanischen Sprache enthaltenen Einzelbedeutungen des Wortes "confuso" das ist, was
schwer zu unterscheiden ist. Daher ist das Konzept der Verwechselbarkeit eng verbunden
mit dem der Unterscheidungskraft des Zeichens, und infolgedessen werden Marken häufiger mit einer Marke, die sich mehr unterscheidet als andere, verwechselt.
Phonetische visuelle und bedeutungsmäßige Ähnlichkeit
Der Artikel 12, Paragraph 1, Abschnitt a) des Markengesetzes legt die drei Kriterien der
phonetischen, graphischen und begrifflichen Ähnlichkeit mit ausschließlichem Charakter
fest, demzufolge es im Prinzip ausreichte, wenn Ähnlichkeit in nur einem der genannten
Aspekte existiert, um davon auszugehen, daß eine Verwechslungsgefahr besteht. In diesem Sinne sprechen verschiedene Entscheidungen der Rekursstelle des spanischen
Patent- und Markenamtes von der überlegten Anwendung dieser Ähnlichkeiten.
Übersetzungen
Unter der alten Gesetzgebung war es generelle und übliche Praxis des spanischen Patentund Markenamtes und der Gerichte, die ausländischen Bezeichnungen als Fantasieausdrücke zu betrachten.
Dieses Kriterium müßte ab dem Inkrafttreten des neuen Markengesetzes in Spanien, bei
dem neben anderen Kriterien der Ähnlichkeit das Kriterium des Begriffes existiert, geändert
werden.
In Spanien existieren verschiedene offizielle Sprachen, und es stellt sich das Problem des
Schutzes von Marken mit eigener Bedeutung in ihren verschiedenen Übersetzungen. Un-
96
ter Anwendung des Kriteriums der semantischen Ähnlichkeit müßte verstanden werden,
daß die Marke Schutz gegenüber den Übersetzungen in diese Sprachen gewährt.
Es gibt ebenfalls eine Richtlinie der Rechtsprechung, welche die Aussprache in den verschiedenen offiziellen Sprachen der Wörter und Buchstaben, aus denen sich ein Erkennungszeichen zusammensetzt, in Betracht zieht, um den Âhnlichkeitsgrad zu bestimmen.
Familienmarken
Weder das spanische Gesetz noch die Rechtsprechung legen hinsichtlich dieses Gesichtspunkts irgendetwas fest.
Bedingungen unter denen die ältere Marke benutzt worden Ist
Das spanische Gesetz enthält keine Betrachtung dieser Frage; es sei jedoch prinzipiell
anzunehmen, daß man den Vergleich hinsichtlich der Form, in welcher die Marke registriert ist, vornehmen sollte.
Es muß präzisiert werden, daß in Spanien der unlautere Wettbewerb als eine Nebendisziplin verstanden wird, deren Anwendung möglich ist, da eine andere, ausdrückliche
Regelung fehlt; dabei muß jedoch die Voraussetzung bestehen, daß die Vorkommnisse
innerhalb des Sachverhalts des unlauteren Wettbewerbs erfaßt werden können, welche
im Gesetz 3/10. Januar 1991 subsumiert sind.
Ill. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
Bei wem wird die Verwechslung bewirkt?
Bei der Analyse der Verwechslungsgefahr spricht das spanische Recht von Verwechslung
innerhalb des Marktes.
Der Oberste Gerichtshof legt fest, daß bei dem Vorgang der Beurteilung darüber, ob eine
Ähnlichkeit zwischen Zeichen zu Irrtum oder Verwechslung führen kann, 'es nicht notwendig ist, auf tiefgreifende wissenschaftliche Studien oder Prüfungen und komplizierte Überlegungen zurückzugreifen".
Wie groß ist der betroffene Publikumsbereich?
Die Rechtsprechung legt fest, daß das Urteil der Verwechselbarkeit kraft des Gesamtemdrucks, welche die Zeichen bei einem Durchschnittsverbraucher erwecken, erhoben werden muß.
Bedeutung der Produkteart; Medikamente
Bei der vorherigen Gesetzgebung wurden widersprüchliche Urteile erteilt, darunter einige,
die festlegten, daß bei Produkten besonderer Spezialisierung - wie im Falle von pharmazeutischen Produkten - die Verwechslungsgefahr kleiner sei, da diese Produkte von spe-
97
zialisiertem Personal verschrieben und verkauft werden (Ärzte bzw. Apotheker). Andere
Urteile erklärten jedoch das Gegenteil.
Der entscheidende Verwechslungszeitpunkt
Eine wörtliche Interpretation des Artikels 12 des spanischen Gesetzes läßt darauf schließen, daß das Datum, zu welchem die Tatsachen bestimmt werden müssen, jenes der Beantragung der Marke ist.
Täuschungsabsicht
Die Täuschungsabsicht ist im spanischen Recht ein Grund zur Nichtzulassung einer Marke
zur Registrierung oder zur Bestrafung bereits registrierter Marken durch Aufhebung der
Registrierung.
IV. Weitere Kriterien
Vertragliche und rechtliche Verstösse. - Das Markenrecht zieht auch den Fall in Betracht, daß eine Marke die Zulassung zur Registrierung trotz vertraglicher oder rechtlicher Verstöße gegen Rechte von Dritten erlangt, um ein Zulassungsrecht zur Wiedererlangung des durch andere Personen Entwendeten festzulegen.
Kollision von Personenrechten mit eingeschriebenen Rechten.- Ein weiteres Kriterium der Ähnlichkeit, welches zu unterschiedlichen Urteilen der Rechtsprechung geführt hat, ist die Markennutzung von Familiennamen und früheren Marken. Das vor
dem jetzt gültigen Markengesetz bestehende Kriterium bestand in der Milderung der
Strenge des Vergleichs.
Das Problem wird heute durch den Artikel 13 a) des Markengesetzes gelöst, welcher
verbietet, Vornamen, Familiennamen, Pseudonyme oder jedwedes andere Mittel der
Identifizierung des Antragstellers zur Registrierung der Marke einzutragen, wenn Identität oder Ähnlichkeit mit bereits registrierten Zeichen besteht.
Es dürfen auch keine Vor- und Nachnamen registriert werden, die eine andere als die
antragstellende Person identifizieren, sofern nicht eine Bevollmächtigung beigebracht
wird.
B. Vorschläge für eine allgemeine Regelung
I. Allgemeine Vergleichsregeln
a) Muß die modernere Marke mit der älteren verglichen werden oder mit der Vorstellung, welche der Verbraucher von letzterer hat?
Das allgemeine Prinzip, welches vorherrschen muß, ist das des Vergleichs zwischen
der modernen Marke und der älteren Marke.
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b) Unterscheldungskraft des Gesamteindrucks der Marke
Dieses Kriterium ist fundamental und muß als allgemeine Vergleichsnorm gelten.
C) Größere Bedeutung der allgemeinen Ähnlichkeiten als der Unterschiede. Unterscheidungskraft der gemeinsamen Elemente
Muß der Gesamteindruck vorherrschen, so ist die Abwägung der Ahnlichkeiten und der
Unterschiede das, was den genannten Gesamteindruck bestimmt, sowie die Möglichkeit der Verwechslung der beiden Marken bzw. ihrer Assoziierung.
Die Norm, die besagt, daß der unterscheidende Charakter einer Marke der ist, der sich
auf die in ihr enthalteten, unterscheidenden Elemente bezieht, erscheint uns angemessen.
Il. Vergleichskriterien
Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungskraft für den Umfang des Schutzes
Wir teilen vollständig die Meinung, daß die Unterscheidungskraft einer Marke entscheidend
ist, um den Umfang ihres Schutzes zu bestimmen, und daß der Umfang ihres Schutzes
größer ist, je stärker ihre Unterscheidungskraft ist.
Dabei handelt es sich um das, was als die VergleichsVerschiedenheit der Marke bezeichnet werden könnte, das heißt, die jeder Marke eigene Verschiedenheit in Beziehung zu anderen, zuvor oder später registrierten Marken.
Phonetische visuelle und bedeutungsmäßige Ähnlichkeit
Die drei in Frage kommenden Aspekte müssen in angemessenem Maße in dem Augenblick des Vergleichs der Verwechselbarkeit zwischen zwei Marken abgewogen werden.
Wir möchten jedoch dennoch auf die wachsende Bedeutung hinweisen, die die visuelle
Ähnlichkeit in der aktuellen Marktwirtschaft erlangt, und welche möglicherweise in der Vergangenheit nicht bestand bzw. ihr nicht zugeschrieben wurde.
Übersetzungen
a) Schutz einer Marke gegenüber Übersetzungen In andere Sprachen als die offiziellen des Landes in der die Marke beantragt wird
Das Kriterium, welches unserer Meinung nach vorherrschen sollte, müßte ein flexibles
Kriterium sein, wobei ein Schutz des übersetzten Wortes nur in den Fällen gewährt
werden sollte, in denen - sei es aufgrund der Ähnlichkeit zwischen der geschützten
Version und der Übersetzungen oder aufgrund der durchschnittlichen Kenntnisse, wel-
che von dieser Sprache in einem bestimmten Land unter der gesamten Verbrau99
cheröffentlichkeit bestehen - die Nutzung der Marke in der übersetzten Version eine
Verwechslungs- oder Assoziierungsgefahr innerhalb des Marktes mit der nicht übersetzten Marke hervorrufen könnte.
Dieses Kriterium könnte in den mehrstaatlichen Registern unterschiedlich sein.
b) Übersetzung einer Marke in die verschiedenen offiziellen Sprachen des Landes,
in dem die Marke beantragt wird
Mit dem erteilten Schutz einer Marke in einer der genannten Sprachen müßte auch
Schutz gegenüber der Nutzung derselben bestehen, wenn sie in die verschiedenen
offiziellen Sprachen dieses Landes übersetzt wird.
4. Familienmarken
Wir meinen, daß zwei Umstände auftreten können:
Eine Vielzahl von Marken, welche ein gemeinsames Element "X" aufweisen. Wenn ein
Schutz dieses gemeinsamen, isolierten Elements nicht besteht, so kann das Argument
der Markenfamilie helfen, um den Gebrauch oder die Registrierung anderer, ähnlicher
Marken zu bekämpfen, die das genannte gemeinsame Element aufweisen.
Es können sich andere Fälle von Markenfamilien ergeben.
5. Bedingungen, unter denen die ältere Marke benutzt worden ist
Die Registrierung einer Marke schùtzt ein Zeichen in der Form, in der es registriert ist. Die
Umstände der Benutzung können dazu dienen, die Verwechlungsgefahr abzuwägen.
Ill. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
Bei wem wird die Verwechslung bewirkt?
Das allgemeine Kriterium muß sein, die Verwechslungs- oder Assoziierungsgefahr im Hinblick auf den natürlichen Verbraucher des Produkts zu untersuchen.
Wie groß ist der betroffene Pubiikumsbereich?
Es ist ausreichend, daß eine "Gefahr" der Verwechslung existiert, damit die Registrierung
einer späteren Marke gegenüber einer zuvor existierenden Marke nicht möglich ist.
Bedeutung der Produkteart; Medikamente
Es kann gefährlich sein, diskriminierende Kriterien bezüglich der Art von Produkten festzulegen.
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Der entscheidende Verwechslungszeitpunkt
Das Datum, zu dem die neue Marke beantragt wurde.
Täuschungsabsicht
Auch wenn es wahrscheinlich ist, daß die Täuschungsabsicht in vielen Fällen zu einer
tatsächlichen Täuschung führt, so wäre es im Falle, daß die Absicht nicht zu einer Realität
wird, ungerecht, Mutmaßungen über die Unvereinbarkeit anzustellen, welche womöglich
zu Entscheidungen führen, die dann in Fällen der nicht vorhandenen Absicht anders ausfallen würden.
IV. Weitere Kriterien
Um die Möglichkeit der Verwechslung zu untersuchen, können alle besonderen Umstände
eines jeden Falles geltend gemacht werde und müssen weiterhin berücksichtigt werden,
da diese Umstände sehr unterschiedlich ausfallen und in ganz anderer Form wirken können.
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Etats-Unis d'Amérique
United States of America
Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika
Report Q 127
in the name of the American Group
by Arch M. AHERN, Esq., Dolores K. HANNA, Esq., Jeremiah D. McAUliffe, Esq., Mark
V.B. Partridge, Esq., Beverly W. PATTISHALL Esq.,Robert W. SACOFF, Esq. (Chair)
Evaluation of confusion In trademark law
Introduction
The U.S. Group submits the following report and recommendations in response to
Question Q 127.
As commercial enterprises now routinely distribute their products in many national markets, they need to select, register and use their trademarks uniformly throughout those
markets. However, national trademark laws display inconsistencies in legal standards and
analytical approaches to the evaluation of confusion and conflict between marks. These inconsistencies present difficulties in achieving the goals of uniformity in clearance procedures and consistency in the outcomes of conflict adjudications. The U.S. Group proposes
harmonization of the legal standards for evaluating confusion as a solution to this problem,
provided that those standards take a subjective approach emphasizing purchaser perceptions in the marketplace, rather than an objective, side-by side comparison of the marks in
the abstract.
I. General rules for comparison
U.S. trademark law recognizes that products are usually purchased - either consciously or
unconsciously - with an antecedent point of reference, such as habit, prior purchases,
product enjoyment, recommendations or advertising. Trademarks bridge the mental gap
from past experience to present selection, and similar marks carry the potential for
mistake. Accordingly, confusion and conflict between marks should be evaluated in terms
of purchaser experience, and not as an academic exercise.
Under the U.S. Trademark Act and the common law, the test for trademark conflict is
whether the use of younger mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive, as
to the source or origin of the goods or services sold under that mark. Trademark rights
arise from use of the mark, not from registration, and protect against the junior use of
confusing marks on similar, as well as related, goods. Therefore, the express inclusion or
102
exclusion of the junior user's goods within the specification of goods in the senior mark's
registration (if one exists) is not automatically determinative.
Marks are not to be compared in the abstract, but rather considered as applied to actual
goods or services and encountered by purchasers or users in the marketplace. The class
in which a mark is registered, and the inclusion of other products in that class, are irrelevant to the likelihood of confusion. Classification, a matter of administrative convenience, is
unknown to purchasers and irrelevant to the issue of their confusion.
The younger mark should be considered against the background of the imperfect mental
image of the older mark residing in the average consumer's memory. The courts and registration authorities recognize that purchasers usually do not conduct a conscious comparison of marks they encounter, and that their mistaken associations are often unconscious or subconscious.
The frailties of human attentiveness, perception and memory are all taken into account. In
phonetic similarity cases, for example, the courts recognize that the public often uses
'incorrect" pronunciations that can lead to confusion (JOJO for women's clothing enjoined
based on JOUJOU for ladies' sportswear). Side-by-side comparison of marks is not
allowed, unless the respective products are actually sold side-by-side.
Marks are not to be dissected, nor are differences and similarities to be mechanically
tabulated. Marks are considered in their entireties, including elements disclaimed in the registration certificate (which purchasers do not know or care about). The general recollections and perceptions of the marks by the purchasing public are decisive. The Supreme
Court observed in this regard, "It is a fallacy to break the fagot stick by stick."
The U.S. courts and registration authorities consider the following factors in evaluating likelihood of confusion:
Similarity of the marks, each taken as a whole, in sound, appearance, connotation and
commercial impression;
Whether the goods or services are similar or so related that the public expects them to
emanate from the same or associated sources (e.g., AUNT JEMIMA pancake flour and
AUNT JEMIMA pancake syrup); and if the goods are different, the likelihood that the
senior user will "bridge the gap" between them;
Similarity of advertising media, and channels of distribution and sale of the respective
goods or services;
Degree of care, discrimination and attentiveness likely to be exercised by purchasers in
view of the products' prices, their normal marketing environment and the conditions of
purchase;
103
Fame of the senior mark, through advertising, promotion, sales, geographical extent
and duration of use (the more people that know the senior mark, the more that are
likely to be confused if deceptive similarity exists);
Number and magnitude of third party uses of similar marks on similar goods or services;
Actual confusion;
Intent of the junior user;
Duration of concurrent use without confusion;
Variety of goods and services on which the older mark is used or licensed, i.e., whether
it is a single product mark, a house' mark, or a member of a family of marks;
Duration of known and tolerated use of the younger mark without objection; the existence and terms of any consent or restriction agreements (consents are given "great
weight" by the registration authorities, but are not always regarded as determinative).
Whether the potential confusion (either the number of people likely to be confused or
the magnitude of the likelihood of confusion) is substantial or de minimis.
II. Criteria for comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
A trademark's distinctiveness strongly influences the scope of its protectability against
others. Arbitrary marks and marks intensively use and advertised tend to have a more
lasting impression in the public's consciousness, and thus more readily associated with
similar junior marks, even for more distant goods or services. Thus, famous marks are often enforced against junior marks even despite large differences in the goods or the marks
(JOHNNY WALKER motel enjoined based on JOHNNY WALKER Scotch Whisky; HALLMARK Dodge auto dealership held to infringe HALLMARK greeting cards).
When the senior mark is descriptive, however, likelihood of confusion is often avoided by
small differences in the marks or goods (COLD AIR for automotive air conditioning not enjoined based on ICE COLD AUTO AIR).
The same is true when the senior mark is narrowed and weakened by third-party uses
(TM MAHAL mark for restaurants held not infringed by TRUMP TAJ MAHAL casino and
hotel; LITTLE DEBBIE snacks not infringed by LITTLE DOLLIES).
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Sound, sight and meaning
Visual similarity is the most frequent basis for finding likelihood of confusion (QUIRST held
to infringe SQUIRT for soft drinks; CATTIER held to infringe CARTIER for cosmetics).
Confusing similarity can arise from common prefixes (ARM & HAMMER baking soda and
ARM IN ARM deodorant; ULTRA BRITE and ULTRA-DENT toothpaste), or common suffixes (MAGNAVOX and MULTIVOX consumer electronic products; Q-TIPS and COTTON
TIPS swabs). Usually, prefixes are more potent sources of confusion.
Alternatively, a finding of likely confusion can be predicated solely on similarity in sound
(BONAMINE enjoined based on DRAMAMINE; DOUGIES enjoined based on HUGGIES,
both for baby diapers; and CYGON successfully opposed based on PHYGON, both for
agricultural pesticides).
Likelihood of confusion can also flow from similar meaning (TORNADO for wire fencing
successfully opposed based on CYCLONE; PLEDGE furniture polish held infringed by
PROMISE) or mental association (LONDON FOG infringed by SMOG for raincoats). Designs or drawings which convey the same mental association as their verbal equivalents
can also create confusion (label depicting stein of beer against a package of nuts enjoined
based on BEER NUTS trademark).
When marks are similar in one respect, but dissimilar in others, the balance is often influenced by how the goods are sold. If customers are solicited by telephone to buy annuities,
or order soft drinks verbally from a soda fountain vendor, phonetic similarity is more meaningful and significant (CUP-O-COLA held to infringe COCA COLA). But if phonetically similar marks differ visually, and appear on labelled products that are selected by customers
from a shelf, the visual comparison will be more significant (no likelihood of confusion held
to exist between V-8 vegetable juice and VA tomato juice).
Translations
Equivalent terms in different languages obviously convey significantly different impressions
to purchasers. Nonetheless, the registration authorities and, to a lesser extent, the courts
recognize that translations might confuse multilingual purchasers, and therefore treat
translations as equivalents in evaluating the likelihood of confusion.
This rule applies even if the senior mark is not well-known, but only if the foreign language
in question is known by an appreciable segment of the American public (GOOD MORNING
shaving cream held confusingly similar to BUENOS DIAS for soap; TACO UNO for
Mexican restaurants held confusingly similar to PIZZERIA UNO for pizza restaurants).
However, if the equivalency is doubtful, there is no likelihood of confusion (REPECHAGE,
which has several meanings in French, including "make up examination,' held not
confusingly similar to SECOND CHANCE).
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Family marks
A "family of marks" often enjoys heightened protection. Such marks share a common nondescriptive prefix, suffix or other element, and are used and advertised as a group. Family
marks are protected against junior marks which contain the common element (MCSLEEP
for motels enjoined based on McDonald's Restaurants' family of "MC-" prefixed marks,
such as MCMUFFIN and CHICKEN MCNUGGETS; PHONES-R-US for telephones enjoined based on family of marks exemplified by TOYS "R" US and KIDS "R" US).
ConditIons under which the older mark has been used
lt is common for registered marks to be used with additional source-indicating elements
not shown in the registration, sch as house marks or distinctive packaging. Likelihood of
confusion increases when these elements are copied, but sometimes decreases when the
accused mark is used with its owner's company name, house mark or distinctive packaging (although adding the junior user's trade name or house mark can also create reverse
confusion; e.g., MENNEN SKIN SAVER held to conflict with SKIN SAVER). Junior users
sometimes include disclaimers of affiliation with the senior mark, but the courts are sceptical of their distinguishing effect because purchasers often ignore or misinterpret them.
The courts and registration authorities take divergent approaches as to whether such
extra-registration facts are to be considered.
The courts in infringement cases have jurisdiction to enjoin the use of infringing marks, and
therefore should consider all facts and circumstances of actual use in the marketplace.
They should not restrict the comparison to the marks, goods or services as set forth in the
vacuum of a registration or application.
The registration authorities, in contrast, have jurisdiction only over registration. As the
statutory benefits of registration attach only to the mark as registered, the authorities tend
to consider only the marks, goods and services as set forth in the competing registrations
and applications. In the event the marks have not been used yet (as in intent-based applications, for example), reasonable projections are made as to the usual marketing environment, price, purchaser attentiveness, and other marketplace factors customary for
the subject goods or services.
There is some movement in recent years toward greater consideration of marketplace realities even in Trademark Office opposition and cancellation proceedings. In several cases,
extra-registration evidence has been considered with the consent of both parties. Also,
actual trademark use always has an indirect bearing, as a registration will be cancelled for
abandonment if the mark is not used substantially as registered.
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III. Other elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
Ukelihood of confusion of the product's ultimate purchasers, potential purchasers, users,
retailers, distributors, and even post-sale observers in some cases, is all actionable. The
Trademark Act of 1946 required that a mark be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services." However, in
1962 Congress expanded the categories of people whose confusion is actionable by deleting the word "purchasers" from the statute.
Post-sale confusion of non-purchaser users, and even viewers, is actionable because the
presence of counterfeits in the marketplace can tarnish the trademark owner's goodwill (as
in the case of counterfeit ROLEX watches).
Which part of the public
An appreciable or non-negligible part of the relevant public must be likely to be confused.
In accordance with the general principle that courts do not concern themselves with de
minimis torts, de minimis likelihood of confusion is not actionable. Quantitative measurement of the portion of the public likely to be confused is not ordinarily required as an element of the plaintiff's proof.
However, some quantitative norms can be inferred from the reported cases, which now
often discuss the results of evidentiary surveys. Confusion by 15% of survey respondents
has been held sufficient to find infringement (of BEEFEATER gin by SIGN OF THE
BEEFEATER restaurants), and one court regarded confusion by 7.6% of survey as insufficient (MIRACLE WHIP held not infringed by YOGOWHIP). Percentages considered in a
vacuum can be misleading, however, and the projected number of deceived people at
large should also be considered (e.g., if the relevant purchasing public comprises a million
people, 7.6% confusion would mean 76,000 deceived consumers).
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
The measure of purchaser attentiveness and discrimination associated with the nature and
price of the goods is highly relevant to the likelihood confusion. Mass-produced, lowpriced and "impulse purchase" items such as candy or disposable razors receive less
scrutiny and consideration than expensive products, and accordingly it is easier for
purchasers to make mistakes with such goods.
In cases involving medicines and medical products, less similarity between marks is required to establish likelihood of confusion because a mistake can be hazardous to health
and human safety.
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Decisive moment of confusion
Both the courts and the registration authorities generally accept evidence of confusion
occurring at any time up to the close of the record established at the trial of the case.
In cases based on descriptive marks which have acquired distinctiveness through use and
advertising, the trademark owner must prove such distinctiveness had been successfully
acquired by the time of the first use of the accused mark.
Fraudulent intent
Proof of intent to deceive is not required, but when submitted, is given great weight and
creates a presumption that the intended deceit will succeed (VALCREAM initially held not
confusingly similar to BRYLCREAM, but reversed on ground that insufficient weight had
been accorded evidence of intentional copying).
IV. Other criteria
Judicial listings of confusion factors are not exclusive, and other factors may apply or carry
greater weight in a particular case. For example:
Proof of actual confusion, like fraudulent intent, is notoriously difficult to obtain, and is
not indispensable to establishing a likelihood of confusion. However, when mistaken
purchases, misdirected inquiries or warranty claims, or other types of actual confusion
are proved, they are given great weight.
Prior litigation, unfair competition or business relationships between the parties may re-
quire the defendant to maintain greater distance than a stranger from the plaintiff's
mark (expelled member of METRO BROKERS, INC. group enjoined from using
METPRO BROKER, with an inference of intentional copying).
Conclusion
The U.S. Group recommends that the standards for determining confusion be harmonized,
subject to the following principles:
The ultimate issue is likelihood of confusion among ordinary members of the relevant
purchasing public.
Ukelihood of confusion should be evaluated by considering the marks as they actually
appear (or normally would appear) on goods and advertising in the marketplace, rather
than by an abstract, side-by-side comparison of the marks as registered.
Ukelihood of confusion also should be evaluated by considering the similarity or relatedness of the respective goods as viewed by the relevant public, rather than the
inclusion or exclusion of the goods in the same classification (which the public neither
108
knows nor cares about) or in a registration certificate (which ordinary purchasers never
see).
4. The courts and registration authorities should consider all relevant marketplace and
state-of-mind facts and circumstances, even if this requires going beyond technical
statutory criteria of similarity. Cases involving marks not yet in use should be decided
with reference to reasonable projections of human perceptions, based on the nature of
the goods, their normal marketing environment, and ordinary human experience.
109
Finlande
Finland
Finnland
Report Q 127
in the name of the Finnish Group
by Björn KOLSTER, Peter BACKSTRÖM, Stig HENRIKSSON, Pirjo LAHTELA, Sirkka-Liisa
LAHTINEN, Seija SAARISTO
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Finland has revised the Finnish Trade Marks Act of 1964 to conform to the mandatory provisions of the EC Harmonization Directive on Trade Marks.
I. General rules for comparison
The total overall impression of the marks to be compared is the most important basis for a
comparison of confusion.
The comparison to be carried out is not only a direct comparison between the actual
marks, but the image of the older mark which exists in the memory of the consumer is also
taken into account. Consequently, the comparison is made mainly regarding the main
elements of the marks.
When comparison is made, the common elements of the marks are regarded as being
more important than the differences, provided that the common elements of the marks are
distinctive.
Il. Criteria for comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
According to the Finnish Trade Marks Act, marks which have become well known through
intensive use obtain a broader protection than normal marks according to internationally
accepted standards as mentioned above in the general remarks concerning the question.
According to the Finnish Trade Marks Act, marks acquiring distinctiveness from their originality obtain no broader protection than normal marks. In practice, however, clearly distinctive marks enjoy a broader protection than weak marks.
110
The Finnish Group does not find any reason to alter this practice.
2. Sound, sight and meaning
In evaluating confusion, phonetic and visual aspects are mainly taken into account, and
the overall evaluation is based on these elements. In addition, the meaning of the mark can
be taken into account as a supplementary aspect in borderline cases, e.g. MASCOT was
not regarded as being confusingly similar with ASCOT (cl 34). As a general rule, according
to the Finnish practice synonyms like TORNADO, CYKLONE and TYPHOON would not be
regarded as being confusingly similar. Where well known and famous marks are concerned, the meaning of the mark may obtain a broader protection.
3. Translations
The Finnish Trade Marks Act does not provide protection for translations as such. In
practice, however, a translation can acquire protection in borderline cases along the lines set forth above regarding the meaning of the mark.
The official languages in Finland are Finnish and Swedish, but the law does not include
any specific provisions as to translations between these languages.
4. Family marks
Protection can be acquired, provided that the common element of a family mark is distinctive.
For example, in a decision issued by the Supreme Administrative Court, the mark TOPILAR
(cl 5) was deemed to be confusingly similar to the family mark registrations TOPIPAN,
TOPICIN and TOPISEPT (cl 5). In another decision, the Supreme Administrative Court
considered that the mark OCUDOSE on which registration was applied for (cl 5) was not
confusingly similar to the family mark registrations (cl 5) OCU, OCU-Dexa, OCUBLOC,
OCU-Atro, OCU-IDU, OCU-MC, OCU-Adre, OCU-Chloro, OCU-Pilo, OCU-Pilo-Adre, OCUScopo, OCU-Flavum, OCU-Zinc and OCU-Dexa-Chloro.
5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
a) There are no decisions by the Supreme Court regarding this question. Where such a
case arises, reference could be made to Article 5, C-Para, Subsection 2 of the Paris
Convention and to Section 23 of the Finnish Trade Marks Act, allowing minor amendments to a registered mark.
Speaking generally, it may be stated that if the differences between the mark as used
and the mark as registered are so insignificant that these differences do not apply to
the distinctive elements it should be considered that the registered mark was used in
accordance with the requirements of the Finnish Trade Marks Act.
111
b) In a case where the Trade Marks Act cannot be applied, it may be possible to obtain
protection on the basis of the Act on Unfair Business Practices. Cases based on this
Act are handled by the Market Court.
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
Traditionally, it has been provided that likelihood of confusion exists, providing that confusion takes place in the memory of the purchaser. The user aspect is becoming stronger
and there are indications that an end user will be taken into account to a greater extent
than hitherto.
Which part of the public?
The Trade Marks Act has no specific provisions. In practice, in evaluating the likelihood of
confusion the question as to which part of the public would confuse the marks is irrelevant
owing to the fact that even a theoretical likelihood of confusion is sufficient to establish
confusion.
The Finnish Group regards this practice as appropriate, and any system requiring specific
percentages is considered inferior, since such a system may be unreliable.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
The general statements given in the question are in accordance with Finnish practice.
According to the practice of the Finnish Trade Marks Office, likelihood of confusion has
been interpreted more liberally between marks for medicines than between, for example,
marks for consumer goods. lt has been regarded that doctors and pharmacists are
specialists, so that confusion is less likely in this area. As it is not the Trade Marks Authority's duty to examine whether a medicine on prescription or an over-the-counter drug is
concerned and as confusion may be extremely disastrous to the end user, the basis for
evaluation should not be prima facie whether a specialist would confuse marks, but the
end user should be taken into account to a greater extent.
Decisive moment of confusion
In the registration of a mark the decisive moment is the moment of the decision. This has
also been the practice of the Finnish Trade Marks Office.
In a case where the proprietor of an older mark that is unregistered but established
through use lodges an opposition against registration of a younger mark, the older unregistered trade mark must have acquired a sole right through use by the time, at the latest, when the application for registration of the younger mark was filed.
112
In court proceedings, however, the decisive moment is the moment when the younger
mark was taken into use, i.e. the moment when the infringement took place. If the case in-
volves cancellation of a registered trade mark on the grounds that the older registered
mark has lost its sole distinctive power, the date of the writ of summons should be the decisive moment.
5. Fraudulent intent
Even the intent to deceive gives a presumption of mala fide, and provided mala tide has
been proved in the case, this leads to a presumption of an intent to deceive.
IV. Other criteria
According to the Finnish legal system, disputes regarding confusion are handled by the
Helsinki District Court in cases based on the Finnish Trade Marks Act and by the Market
Court in cases based on the Act on Unfair Business Practices. Basically, the courts have to
evaluate confusion on the basis of the Act in question, i.e. Trade Marks Act or Act on
Unfair Business Practices. Nevertheless, it may be stated that in practice the courts tend to
evaluate confusion more broadly.
Summary
I. General rules for comparison
Finland applies the general rules for comparison mentioned.
lI.Crlterla for comparison
Strong marks can in practice obtain a more extensive protection than weak marks,
irrespective of whether the mark is used or not.
Sound and sight are noted in the first place in judging confusing similarity. Meaning
acquires importance in borderline cases and when well known or famous marks are
concerned.
Translations are not considered in respect of not well-known marks. The law does not
mention translations.
Family marks can be considered if the common part is distinctive.
Use with minor additions to the mark, which do not alter the total impression, can be
accepted. it is the registered mark that is compared.
113
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
User and consumer acquire more and more importance.
Even a theoretical likelihood of confusion is sufficient to establish confusion. No percentage thinking.
The kind of goods is of importance. Stricter rules for pharmaceutical marks are wanted,
e.g. by the pharmaceutical industry.
The decisive moment of confusion may differ depending on the circumstances.
Résumé
I. Règles générales pour ta comparaison
La Finlande applique les règles générales citées pour la comparaison.
II. Critères de comparaison
En fait, les marques fortes peuvent jouir d'une protection plus vaste que les marques
faibles sans tenir compte du fait si la marque est utilisée ou pas.
Ce sont les aspects sonore et visuel qui sont pris en considération en première vue en
jugeant la similitude prêtant à confusion. L'aspect sémantique prend de l'importance
dans les cas limites et en ce qui concerne les marques rénommées ou célèbres.
Les traductions ne sont pas prises en compte par rapport aux marques pas très connues. La législation ne mentionne pas les traductions.
Les familles de marques peuvent être prises en considération si leur caractère commun
est distinctif.
L'utilisation des éléments secondaires ajoutés à ta marque qui ne modifient pas
l'impression générale peut être acceptée. C'est la marque déposée qui est comparée.
III. Autres éléments d'appréciation
L'utilisateur et le consommateur prennent de plus en plus de l'importance.
Même une probabilité théorique de confusion suffit pour établir ta confusion. On ne
pense pas en pourcentages.
114
Le type de produits est important. Des règles plus strictes sont exigées pour des produits pharmaceutiques, par ex. par l'industrie pharmaceutique.
Le moment décisif de la confusion peut varier selon les circonstances.
Zusammenfassung
Allgemeine Verglelchsregeln
In Finnland werden die genannten allgemeinen Vergleichsregeln angewendet.
Verglelchskriterien
Starke Marken können in der Praxis einen größeren Schutz als schwache Marken genießen, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob die Marke benutzt wird oder nicht.
Phonetische und visuelle Ähnlichkeit sind die wichtigsten Kriterien bei der Beurteilung
der Verwechselbarkeit. Bedeutungsmäßige Ähnlichkeit ist wichtig in Grenzfällen und
wenn es sich um sehr bekannte oder berühmte Marken handelt.
Übersetzungen werden nicht betrachtet in Bezug auf Marken, die nicht sehr bekannt
sind. Übersetzungen sind im Gesetz nicht erwähnt.
Familienmarken können betrachtet werden, wenn das gemeinsame Element Unterscheidungskraft hat.
Die Benutzung mit geringen zusätzlichen Elementen, die nicht den Gesamteindruck
ändern, kann angenommen werden. Es ist die eingetragene Marke, die verglichen
wird.
Ill. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
Benutzer und Konsumenten gewinnen mehr und mehr an Bedeutung.
Schon eine theoretische Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung genügt, um Verwechslung zu bewirken. Keine Prozentsätze sind festgelegt.
Die Produkteart ist von Bedeutung. Strengere Vorschriften für pharmazeutische Marken wünscht u.a. die pharmazeutische Industrie.
Der entscheidende Verwechslungszeitpunkt kann je nach den Umständen verschieden
sein.
115
France
France
Frankreich
Rapport Q 127
par le Groupe français
Appréciation de la confusion en droit des marques
Le Groupe de Travail a pris note de ce que la question posée:
etait strictement limitée à l'appréciation de la confusion (du risque de) dans le domaine des marques;
qu'il ne devait traiter:
ni du risque d'association: signes que le public (consommateur d'attention
moyenne) ne confondra pas (ne prendra pas l'un pour l'autre) mais qu'il attribuera néanmoins à une même origine (notion prise dans un sens large);
ni du risque de dilution: emploi d'un signe identique (à) ou prêtant à confusion
avec une marque mais pour désigner des produits ou des services différents de
ceux que celle-ci protège (produits identiques et similaires, services identiques
et complémentaires). Cette exclusion fait écarter de la discussion la question de
la protection élargie des marques de renommée.
L'appréciation du risque de confusion entre les marques suppose, certes, une analyse du
risque de confusion entre les signes comme nous y invite essentiellement le rapport
d'orientation mais aussi et nécessairement, du fait du caractère 'spécial" de la protection
conférée par l'enregistrement, une analyse du risque de confusion entre les produits et
services désignés.
Le droit des marques protège non pas un signe pris en tant que tel mais un signe appliqué
à des produits ou des seriices déterminés.
Il sera, en conséquence, traité de la confusion entre marques résultant d'une Identité
ou d'une similitude de signes (I, li, Ill) et d'une Identité ou d'une similitude de produits ou de services (IV).
116
I. Règles générales de comparaison des signes
Le rapport d'orientation indique que, dans la plupart des pays, se sont développées certaines règles générales permettant de constater l'existence d'une confusion entre signes
(et non entre marques, cette notion étant réservée à l'association dun signe et de produits ou de services).
En droit français:
la comparaison doit se faire entre le signe le plus récent (enregistré ou utilisé) et le
signe le plus ancien (nécessairement enregistré en dehors du cas particulier de la marque notoirement connue au sens de l'article 6bis de la Convention d'Union de Paris). Il
est constant que le risque de confusion doit exister dans l'esprit d'un consommateur d'attention moyenne n'ayant pas les deux marques simultanément sous
les yeux (Cour de Paris 24 mars 1973, Ann. 1973, p. 37; Cour de Paris 14 juin 1974,
Ann. 1974, p. 259; Cour de Paris 31 mai 1978, Ann. 1980, p. 90; Cour de Paris 5 février
1985, Ann. 1986, p. 26).
Les signes à comparer sont:
les signes enregistrés (s'ils le sont l'un et l'autre),
le signe antérieur enregistré et le signe le plus récent utilisé (Cour de Paris 8 décembre
1962, Ann. 1963, p 147; TGI Paris 10 mars 1993, RIPIA, n° 172, p. 107),
et non pas les signes tels qu'ils sont utilisés (sauf pour le signe le plus récent ou le
signe le plus ancien s'il est notoirement connu au sens de l'article 6bis de la Convention
d'Union de Paris).
Le risque de confusion doit être apprécié en tenant compte de
l'impression
d'ensemble produite par les deux marques (Cour de Paris 22 octobre 1964, Ann. 1965,
p.204; Cour de Paris 11décembre1975, Ann. 1976, p. 161; Cour de Nimes 12octobre
1982, Ann. 1983, p. 106; Cour de Cassation 15 avril 1986, Ann. 1987, p. 60).
Dans cette appréciation, les ressemblances doivent l'emporter sur les différences
(Cour de Paris 17décembre1951, Ann. 1952, p.7; Cour de Paris 13juillet 1974, Ann.
1974, p. 129; Cour de Paris 5juillet 1983, Ann. 1983, p. 150).
Il. Critères de comparaison des signes
1. Importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection
Contrairement à certains pays (de moins en moins nombreux) qui tiennent un double registre - l'un consacré aux marques propres à distinguer un produit ou un service, l'autre aux
marques susceptibles de distinguer de tels objets - définissant un statut juridique particu-
117
lier, le système français connaît un registre unique (Cour de Paris 5 février 1985, Ann.
1986, P. 26; Cour de Paris 29 mai 1986, Ann. 1987, P. 143).
On peut donc considérer que toute marque enregistrée, en France, bénéficie d'un
même niveau de protection.
Cependant, certains auteurs parlent de marques fortes et de marques faibles.
Ce critère n'est pas reconnu par la jurisprudence française (Cour de Paris 6 juillet 1971,
Ann. 1972, p. 34; TGI Paris 20 décembre 1982, PIBD 1983, n° 318, lii, 53; TG1 Paris 28
février 1994, PIBD 1994, n° 568, Ill, 330).
Néanmoins, le Juge examine l'existence du caractère distinctif du signe le plus
ancien pris en lui-même ou dans un de ses éléments pour apprécier souverainement la portée de la protection accordée à la marque et par vole de conséquence la
contrefaçon. il en est ainsi lorsque la partie du signe reproduite ou imitée est dépourvue
de caractère distinctif ou est banal (TGI Paris 1er décembre 1969, PIBD 1970, n° 38, Ill,
123; TGI Paris 16 décembre 1971, PIBD 1972, n° 83, III, 153; Cour de Paris 20 mai 1986,
Ann. 1987, p. 45; Cour d'Orléans 13 septembre 1988, Ann. 1990, p. 18; TGI Paris 9
novembre 1988, RDPI n° 22, p. 73).
Mais en aucune manière le degré de distinctivité du signe ne doit (sauf le cas de mar-
que renommée) entrer en ligne de compte dans l'appréciation de la similitude des
produits ou de la complémentarité des services.
En fait, il n'est pas exact de dire qu'une marque dite forte jouirait d'une protection plus
vaste qu'une marque normale (Cour d'Orléans 25 avril 1978, Ann. 1980, P. 370).
Ce sont, en fait, les marques "dites faibles (faiblement distinctives) qui se voient reconnaître une protection plus limitée qu'une marque normale.
La référence à la protection accordée par l'article 6bls de la Convention d'Union de Paris à
une marque notoirement connue ne parait pas ici appropriée dans la mesure où, d'une
part, une marque notoirement connue n'est pas nécessairement une marque de forte valeur intrinsèque, d'autre part, que sa protection est assurée dans les mêmes conditions
que celles d'une "marque normale.
Indépendamment du fait que la notion de marque forte n'est pas officiellement connue du
droit français, il n'apparait pas que le risque de confusion avec une marque de forte valeur
intrinsèque Soit plus facilement admis au stade de l'analyse des signes.
Par contre, la renommée d'une marque conduit parfois les tribunaux à élargir expressément ou implicitement la notion de produits similaires (Cour de Cassation 16 janvier 1989,
Ann. 1990, p. 5).
118
Certaines décisions n'ont pas hésité, alors que la loi ne les autorisait pas à le faire (avant
l'entrée en vigueur de la loi du 4 janvier 1991), à consacrer l'indisponibilité d'un signe très
largement connu. Mais il s'agit là d'une question volontairement exclue par le rapport
d'orientation (cf. point 3).
2. Similitude sonore, visuelle et sémantique
L'atteinte à Un signe protégé peut effectivement résulter de l'existence d'un risque de
confusion graphique, phonétique ou sémantique:
Phonétique:
JAZ / MAZ (Cour d'Aix-en-Provence 1er mars 1974, Ann. 1974, p. 264)
SKIP / KEEP 3000 (Cour de Paris 28juin 1978, Ann. 1979, p. 336)
T.E.A. / TESA (Cour de Paris 6 décembre 1988, Ann. 1990, p. 18)
MILLEMONT / RICHEMONT (TGI Paris 25 octobre 1991, PIBO 1992, n° 517, III,
147).
En présence de termes étrangers, les tribunaux ont tendance à appliquer les règles de
phonétique française si le mot dispose d'un équivalent phonétique en français (LOAS déposé sans le tréma sur le I équivalent du mot LOIS et prononcé comme tel, Cour de Paris
22février 1983, Ann. 1983, p. 64).
Visuelle:
BRIG / BRIO (Cour de Paris 7 mars 1975, Ann. 1975, p. 247)
ALAGAN / ALLERGAN ÇGl Paris 6novembre 1991, PIBD 1992, n0 517, III, 153)
Sémantique qui peut revêtir divers aspects:
la marque contestée peut constituer le synonyme de la marque invoquée:
LES CRADINGUES / LA BANDE DES CRADOS (TGI Paris 19 janvier 1990, PIBD
1990, n0 479, III 3,'3);
COUP DE COEUR / COUP DE FOUDRE (TGI Paris 10 juillet 1986, PIBD 1986,
III, 396);
-
la marque contestée peut, sans constituer un synonyme, renvoyer à Ia même Idée que
la marque invoquée.
119
Ce risque de rapprochement existe entre des dénominations:
SUBITO / PRONTO (Cour de Paris 9 mars 1955, Ann. 1955, p. 160)
DIABLE / INFERNAL (Cour de Paris 30 octobre 1971, Ann. 1972, P. 57).
Le risque de confusion peut aussi résulter d'une transposition graphique d'un élément
verbal ou réciproquement.
Ainsi, l'imitation a été reconnue dans des cas de transposition verbale d'un élément figuratif (représentation d'un aigle imitée par la dénomination AIGLE - Cour d'Aix-en-Provence
20 mai 1935, Ann. 1936, p. 14 -) ou de transposition graphique d'un élément verbal
(dénomination TOUR EIFFEL imitée par une représentation de la TOUR EIFFEL - Cour de
Paris 19 mai 1993, PIBD 1993, n°551, 111, 553 -).
Les motifs de confusion peuvent du reste être combinés.
Les Tribunaux peuvent retenir l'existence d'une ressemblance phonétique et visuelle:
SYNTON / SYNTHOL (TGI Paris 17décembre 1975, PIBD 1976, n° 173, III, 315)
FRUTSI / FRUCCI (Cour de Paris 26février 1985, Ann. 1986, P. 35)
MOD'IN / MODINE (TGI Reims 22octobre 1991, PIBD 1992, n°516, III, 122).
lIs peuvent aussi considérer que la marque contestée comporte une ressemblance phoné-
tique et/ou visuelle et/ou sémantique avec la marque invoquée. Ainsi, il a été jugé qu'il
existait:
une ressemblance phonétique et sémantique entre
AIRLAQUE et AEROLAK (Trib. Civil de la Seine 25 mars 1958, Ann. 1961, P.
304),
-
une ressemblance visuelle et sémantique entre
COUP DE FOUDRE et COUP DE COEUR (déjà cité),
-
une ressemblance phonétique, visuelle et sémantique entre
BISCUIT et BISCOTTE (TGI Paris 16 septembre 1988, PIBD 1989, n0 449, Ill, 92).
Toutefois, la signification particulière de l'un ou des signes en présence peut conduire le
juge à ne pas s'arrêter à des ressemblances graphiques ou phonétiques. II faut alors que
l'une des marques en présence (ou les deux marques) ait une signification qui s'impose
120
aux consommateurs au point de supplanter dans leur esprit les ressemblances graphiques
ou phonétiques:
LE TRAPPEUR / LE TANNEUR (Cour de Paris 27juin 1968, Ann. 1968, p. 165)
ZOOM / BOOM (Cour de Paris 11 décembre 1975, Ann. 1976, p. 161)
DESCENTE / DETENTE TGl Lilie 15octobre 1976, Ann. 1978, p. 58)
ADIS / JADIS (TGI Paris 6juillet 1977, PIBD 1978, n°214, III, 205)
INFINI / INFINITIF (Cour de Paris 18 novembre 1986, Ann. 1987, p. 186).
A l'inverse, des ressemblances graphiques ou phonétiques peuvent l'emporter sur des
significations différentes:
TILL / TILT (Cour de Paris 13juin 1970, Ann. 1970, p. 138)
BI-MINI / BIKINI (Cour de Paris 22janvier 1974, Ann. 1974, p. 256)
PTIPOT / PIPO (TGI Paris 2' septembre 1975, PIBD 1976, n° 171, III, 264)
SHERMAN / CHAIRMAN (Cour de Paris 17mars 1981, Ann. 1982, p. 132).
S'il n'existe pas, en droit français, de hiérarchie entre les divers motifs de confusion, il résulte de la jurisprudence citée que le critère sémantique peut faire écarter de possibles
rapprochements aux plans graphique ou phonétique.
3. Traductions
a) La loi française sur les marques ne protège pas automatiquement une marque
enregistrée contre l'utilisation ou le dépôt par un tiers de sa traduction dans une
langue étrangère.
Il en va de même de l'appréciation du risque de confusion entre les signes.
SI la traduction d'un mot français dans une langue étrangère ne présente pas de
similitude graphique ou phonétique avec la marque protégée, le risque de confusion ne sera pas retenu:
RIZ FLASH / RIZ ECLAIR (Cour de Paris 3 novembre 1959, Ann. 1960, p. 194)
En effet, la signification d'un terme emprunté à une langue étrangère est en générai considérée comme n'étant pas perçue par la clientèle française (LE PARRAIN / GODFATHER TGI Paris 20 mai 1975, Ann. 76, p. 55) sauf si la traduction laisse transparailre aisément la
dénomination traduite:
121
MASTERVOICE / LA VOIX DE SON MAITRE (IGI Paris, 9 mai 1990, P160 1990,
n°487,111, 623).
La traduction d'un signe protégé a parfois été considéré comme constitutif d'un acte de
concurrence déloyale:
SCARLETT WATER / EAU ECARLATE (Trib. de Commerce 30 mai 1862, Ann.
1862, p. 239).
b) La question ne se pose pas pour la France.
Familles de marques
Ce cas parait illustrer le risque de confusion par association que le rapport d'orientation
nous invitait à écarter de I étude.
Conditions sous lesquelles une marque plus ancienne a été utilisée
a) Lorsque les deux marques, objets d'une procédure en contrefaçon, sont enregistrées,
le risque de confusion doit être apprécié en comparant les marques telles
qu'elles sont déposées (Cour de Paris 12 mars 1984, Ann. 1984, p. 202).
Lorsque ta marque la plus récente est simplement utilisée, la comparaison doit se faire
entre la marque la plus ancienne telle qu'elle a été déposée et la marque la plus récente telle qu'elle est utilisée (Cour de Paris 10janvier1984, Ann. 1984, p. 43).
Si certaines juridictions sont parfois tentées de comparer les marques telles qu'elles
sont utilisées, elles commettent une erreur d'appréciation et sont généralement censurées par les juridictions de l'ordre supérieur.
La méthode se comprend aisément puisque le droit naît de l'enregistrement.
Ainsi les tribunaux doivent comparer les marques en cause sans tenir compte:
de la composition, de la nature ou de la présentation des produits (Cour de Paris 16
février 1972, Ann. 1972, p. 156 et 19 décembre 1979, Ann. 1980, p. 238; Cour de Dijon
9juin 1982, Ann. 1982, p. 180; TGI Paris 23juin 1988, Ann. 1990, p. 301);
de la différence de prix ou de qualité des produits ou services en cause (Trib. Civil de la
Seine 6 octobre 1958, Ann. 1960, p. 174; Cour de Paris 7décembre 1981, Ann. 1982,
p. 176 et 10janvier 1984, Ann. 1984, p.43);
de la réglementation qui leur est applicable (Cour de Paris 19 septembre 1978, Ann.
1980, p. 74);
122
-
des circonstances de commercialisation (Cour de Paris 9 février 1983, Ann. 1983, p.
109; TGI Paris 7mars 1991, PIBD 1991, n° 504, III, 459);
-
de la différence de graphisme lorsque deux dénominations sont en cause (Cour de
Paris 15 juin 1976, Ann. 1971, p. 145 et 19septembre 1979, Ann. 1981, p. 58);
-
de Ia clientèle respective de chacune des parties (Cour de Cassation, Chambre Commerciale 7juin 1988, Ann. 1989, p. 27).
b) Cela dit, tous les faits distincts des actes de contrefaçon susceptibles d'augmenter le
risque de confusion peuvent être sanctionnés au titre de la concurrence déloyale (Cour
de Paris 13mars 1971, Ann. 1971, p. 75; Cour de Chambéry 3janvier 1972, Ann. 1972,
p. 41; ICI Paris 17octobre 1983, RIPIA 1984, p. 21).
Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation de la confusion entre les signes
Confusion de qui?
La règle communément admise et appliquée par les juridictions françaises est que le ris-
que de confusion doit être apprécié par référence à un consommateur d'attention
moyenne n'ayant pas en même temps les marques sous les yeux et non par référence à Un "consommateur normal moyen".
Si
la jurisprudence française se réfère presqu'exclusivement au consommateur, elle
l'entend apparemment dans le sens d'acheteur du produit considéré.
Quelle partie du public?
Il n'est pas nécessaire que la confusion se soit produite. Un risque de confusion est suf-
fisant. L'appréciation de la confusion n'est donc pas quantitative (Cour d'Orléans 23
novembre 1972, Ann. 1973, p. 353).
Il n'y a pas à identifier le consommateur susceptible d'être induit en erreur.
Cela dit, il est clair que le risque de confusion est retenu en France sans qu'il soit général
ou même étendu.
En droit français, la méthode des enquêtes et sondages n'est que rarement utilisée par les
plaideurs.
Les Tribunaux ont déjà eu l'occasion d'admettre la possibilité d'une confusion en se référant aux résultats d'un sondage opéré par le titulaire de la marque (Cour de Paris 28 juin
1978, Ann. 1979, p. 336, 6 mar; 1986, PIBD 1986, Ill, 294). Encore faut-il que le sondage
présente "toutes garanties d'objectivité" (Arrêt du 6 mars 1986 cité). En effet, un Tribunal
ne saurait tenir compte d'un sondage "dans lequel les questions posées apparaissent tendancieuses" (ICI Paris 26janvier 1984, PIBD 1984, n°350, III, 173).
123
Dans une décision plus récente (TGI Paris 25 janvier 1990, PIBD 1990, n° 480, III, 402), un
Tribunal a rejeté le moyen de défense constitué par un sondage effectué par un huissier
auprès des consommateurs au motif que les personnes interrogées réfléchissent avant
de répondre et deviennent plus attentives, tandis que le consommateur qui se servira sur
les rayons d'une grande surface agira spontanément et pourra commettre une confusion".
Il existe, par contre, des études visant à objectiver l'appréciation du risque de confusion.
II s'agit, pour l'essentiel, de:
LES CONSOMMATEURS FACE A LA COPIE, Messieurs Jean-Noël KAPFERER et
Jean-Claude THOENIG (étude effectuée sous l'égide de PRODIMARQUES). Cette
étude visait à analyser la réaction des consommateurs auxquels étaient présentées des
photographies d'un produit authentique ou de sa copie une fraction de seconde,
c'est-à-dire dans des conditions proches de celles d'un achat précipité en supermarché.
3. Importance du type de produits, médicaments
Les tribunaux ont statué dans certaines espèces en considérant qu'il fallait tenir compte de
la vigilance particulière que l'on était en droit d'attendre des professionnels du secteur
concerné.
Cette jurisprudence s'est surtout développée dans le domaine des marques pharmaceu-
tiques.
Compte tenu de la nature de ces produits, les tribunaux statuaient en prêtant un niveau de
vigilance plus élevé aux professionnel de la santé (Cour de Paris 5janvier 1971, Ann. 1971,
p. 79) ou aux patients eux-mêmes (Cour de Paris 20 décembre 1974, Ann. 75, p. 90; Cour
de Paris 14 juin 1974, Ann. 1974, p. 259; Cour de Paris 21 décembre 1978, Ann. 1980, p.
136).
Mais cette jurisprudence s'est inversée et les Tribunaux sont revenus à la règle classique
en reconnaissant que même si l'on était en droit d'attendre une plus grande attention de la
part des médecins ou pharmaciens, ceux-ci n'étaient pas à l'abri d'une erreur et que, par
ailleurs, il ne fallait pas exclure la possibilité d'une erreur du patient (Cour de Paris 25 janvier 1977, Ann. 1978, p. 20; Cour de Paris 19 décembre 1979, Ann. 1980, p. 238).
Cette jurisprudence a maintenant été confirmée à de nombreuses reprises au cours des
dernières années (notamment TGI Paris 23juin 1988, Ann. 1990, p. 301).
124
Moment décisif de la confusion
Le caractère distinctif de la marque imitée s'apprécie au jour du dépôt (Cour de Paris
20 décembre 1973, Ann. 1974, p 238; Cour de Paris 8 janvier 1979, Ann. 1981, P. 56; TGI
Paris 27avril1994, PIBD 1994, n° 571, III, 410).
S'agissant du risque de confusion, il doit être apprécié:
-
au jour du dépôt de la marque présumée imitante lorsqu'un dépôt a été effectué,
-
au jour où les actes d'usage incriminés ont été accomplis.
Intention frauduleuse
Devant les juridictions civiles, la bonne ou la mauvaise toi du présumé contrefacteur
est Inopérante (Cour de Paris 18 avril 1985, Ann. 1986, p. 155; Cour de Paris 7 mars
1988, PIBD 1988, n°438, III, 344; Cour de Paris 29 octobre 1989, Ann. 1989, p. 126).
IV. Autres critères
Pourrait-il exister d'autres critères d'appréciation de la confusion que la similitude
sonore, visuelle ou sémantique?
Dans la mesure où il parait difficile de considérer la confusion par contraste comme
couverte par le critère de similitude sémantique (il ne s'agit pas de similitude mais de
dissemblance), peut-être pourrait-on lui faire une place particulière?
Mais le problème ne parait pas devoir être ici traité dans ta mesure où il concerne plus
le risque d'association que le risque de confusion au sens strict.
Il faut, par contre, signaler l'existence d'un risque de confusion olfactif dans les rares
régimes juridiques qui assurent une protection aux marques olfactives.
Signalons, enfin, que certains aspects tridimensionnels peuvent conférer un effet tactile
indépendant de l'aspect visuel. Mais il s'agit là apparemment de cas très
exceptionnels.
Le Groupe estime que la question du risque de confusion, considéré dans le cadre du
droit des marques, doit également rappeler brièvement comment est opérée
l'appréciation de la similitude entre produits et services, d'une part, et de la
complémentarité entre produits et services, d'autre part.
Le Groupe rappelle que, si/es pièces du dépôt définissent les produits et les services
auxquels la marque s'applique (Ait. L. 712-2 du Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle), la
protection accordée porte sur les produits ainsi désignés et sur les produits qui leur
sont similaires. II existe donc une distinction entre l'objet protégé et l'étendue de la
protection conférée à la marque (An. L. 713-3 du Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle).
125
C'est pourquoi il rappelle:
que 'la protection d'une marque s'étend non seulement aux produits et services
énumérés dans le dépôt mais encore à ceux qui leur sont similaires,
c'est-à-dire ceux qui, en raison de leur nature ou de leur destination
peuvent être attribués par les acheteurs à la même origine" (Cour de Paris
13 septembre 1990, RIPIA 1990, p. 123);
que "la similarité peut tenir à la nature ou à la destination des objets tout comme
aux circuits ou aux habitudes de distribution" (Cour de Paris 20 décembre 1990,
Revue de Jurisprudence du Droit des Affaires n°2/91, n° 179);
que "les objets correspondants ou complémentaires ont le caractère de similarité lorsqu'ils peuvent être attribués à la même origine" (TGI Paris 15 janvier
1985, RIPIA 1985, p. 46);
qu'un risque d'association" existe entre des services et des produits
lorsque les services sont fournis dans un domaine commercial voisin ou complémentaire du domaine couvert par la marque de produits, et dans des conditions telles que l'usager des services, objets de la marque déposée, est normalement amené à les rattacher à la même origine que les produits couverts par une
marque identique ou semblable" (Cour de Paris 30 mai 1969, Ann. 1970, p. 118).
Les tribunaux appliquent les critères suivants:
Nature des produits
Des produits ou des services sont de même nature s'ils appartiennent à la même catégorie
ou ont la même composition (Ex.: COGNAC / ARMAGNAC, Cour de Paris 29 mars 1979,
Ann. 1980, p. 382).
Origine des produits
Il y a confusion sur l'origine des produits si le consommateur peut raisonnablement être
amené à penser que deux produits qui proviennent de la même industrie soient comparables ou substituables (Ex.: pains d'épices, biscottes / biscuits, Cour de Paris 3 novembre 1958, Ann. 1959, p. 24).
Destination des produits ou services
Des produits ou services ayant la même finalité sont reconnus comme similaires (Ex.:
sutures chirurgicales / pansements qui ont tous les deux un rôle occlusif et servent au
traitement des plaies, Cour de Paris 19 septembre 1978, Ann. 1980, p. 74).
126
Même point de vente
Le fait que les deux produits soient vendus dans les mêmes points de vente constituent Un
facteur de confusion. Il peut s'agir de points de vente spécialisés (Ex.: lubrifiants I essence, Cour de Lyon 19 novembre 1936, Ann. 1938, p. 153).
Dans le cas de produits de grande consommation vendus en grande surface, on ne peut
pas se limiter au fait que les produits sont vendus dans le même magasin. Il est nécessaire
que les produits soient vendus dans le même rayon ou des rayons voisins (produits alimentaires, bricolage, habillement, ...).
Ex.:
vidéocassettes vierges / vidéocassettes enregistrées (Cour de Paris, 12 mars
1987, Ann. 1988, p. 231);
jus de fruits / bière (Cour de Nimes, RIPIA 1990, p. 8).
Clientèle commune
L'identité de clientèle n'est pas un facteur déterminant car le fait que deux produits visent
la même clientèle n'est pas en soi une raison suffisante pour confondre les produits ou les
rattacher à une origine commune (Ex.: une cravate et une caisse à outils qui sont potentiellement destinés à une même clientèle masculine).
L'identité de clientèle ne peut donc être utilement invoquée qu'en combinaison avec
d'autres critères (Ex.: produits diététiques / produits pharmaceutiques, Cour de Paris 30
septembre 1970 (inédit), présentation similaire, mêmes points de vente et clientèle commune).
ComplémentarIté des produits ou services
Cette complémentarité peut résulter de la fonction intrinsèque des produits.
Les produits en cause Sont faits pour fonctionner l'un avec l'autre (Ex.: logiciels / ordinateurs, Cour de Paris 30 octobre 1986, Ann. 1987, p. 192).
La complémentarité peut aussi résulter des habitudes de consommation, les consommateurs étant susceptibles d'utiliser à la même occasion des produits qui peuvent être utilisés
séparément (Ex.: fruits secs ou grillés / produits de biscuiterie, ces produits étant susceptibles d'être consommés à l'apéritif, Cour de Lyon, 30 mai 1978, Ann. 1980, p. 81).
Présentation
Il s'agit non pas de relever les points de ressemblance existant sur la couleur et/ou la
forme des emballages des produits mais de vérifier si l'aspect ou la texture des produits en
cause présente des similitudes (Ex.: vins de Champagne / vins mousseux, TGI Carcassonne, 20 novembre 1987, PIBD 1988, n° 432, III, 197).
127
Le risque de rattachement déjà évoqué ci-dessus à propos du risque de confusion entre
signes se retrouve également à propos de l'appréciation de la similitude ou de la complémentarité entre produits et services.
Pour déterminer l'étendue de la protection accordée à une marque, /es Tribunaux français
sont progressivement passés d'une notion de similitude objective à une notion de similitude subjective.
En effet, une jurisprudence ancienne ne considérait comme similaires que des produits
ayant une nature identique.
Ainsi, des produits aussi voisins que le champagne et le vin mousseux (Cour de Paris 30
décembre 1929, Ann. 1932, p. 231) ou le thé et le café (Trib. civil de la Seine 30 avril 1936,
Ann. 1939, p. 61) n'étaient pas reconnus comme similaires.
L'appréciation de la similarité a heureusement connu une évolution qui s'est concrétisée
par la mise en oeuvre de critères moins strictes d'appréciation.
L'expression 'produits similaires" est aujourd'hui utilisée dans le droit des marques dans
une acception très particulière, souvent sans lien direct avec la nature ou la fonction des
produits, mais uniquement comme constat d'une possible confusion sur leur origine. C'est
alors l'appréciation d'un risque de confusion qui conduit le juge à affirmer la similarité et
non l'analyse inverse.
De ce fait, et pour la seule détermination de l'étendue de la protection d'une marque, la
formule selon laquelle une marque est protégée pour les produits désignés dans l'acte de
dépôt et pour les produits similaires pourrait sans dommage être remplacée par la formule:
"Une marque est protégée pour les produits et services désignés dans l'acte de
dépôt et pour les produits et services pour lesquels le dépôt ou l'emploi par un
tiers non autorisé d'une marque identique ou similaire ferait croire à une même
origine.
Les deux formules permettent d'aboutir au même résultat mais la seconde évite au juge de
donner fréquemment à l'adjectif "similaire" un sens tout-à-fait inhabituel et inattendu.
128
Grande-Bretagne
Great Britain
Grossbritannien
Report 0 127
by the British Group
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
1.
In the UK confusion falls to be considered in relation to:
Registered Trade Marks
Passing-Off'.
1.1 Registered Trade Marks - Confusion needs to be evaluated in relation to Registered
Trade Marks on examination in the Official Registry, and on infringement in the Courts.
In the Registry, confusion is usually evaluated in vacuo without much regard to how the
marks are actually used. In an infringement action, one of the marks will be registered,
and the registration will be compared with use by the infringer.
At the date of writing this report, the 1938 Trade Marks Act remains in force. The
Trade Marks Act 1994, which implements the First Approximation Directive, is
effective from 31st October 1994. The only practical experience we have comes
from practice under the old law. Under the old law, the test for confusion in the
Registry was:
'so nearly resembles such a mark as to be likely to deceive or cause
confusion.
In practice the test applied was "likelihood of confusion. In infringement
proceedings the Court has also paraphrased the obscure statutory test which
then applies as likelihood of confusion.
1.1.2
The 1994 Act in substance uses the English words of the Directive, in relation
both to official examination and infringement:
because it is similar
there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part
of the public, which includes the likelihood of association of the trade
mark".
129
The operative part of this test also reduces to likelihood of confusion
(supplemented by the reference to "likelihood of association) and thus we believe that there has been no major change in the law so far as this aspect of the
test is concerned.
1.1.3
Very few infringement cases have come before the U.K. Courts. We believe that
this arises in part because of the good examination conducted in our Registry,
and also because hitherto it has only been an infringement to use the same or
similar mark on the precise goods defined in the registration. Most precedents
arise from ex parte examination or inter partes opposition in the Registry.
1.2 Passing-Off - In passing-off actions, the plaintiff must establish a reputation, a misrepresentation, and damage. The misrepresentation here referred to requires that it produces the effect of 'deception', but is in practice frequently not significantly different
from the "likelihood of confusion recognised in registered trade mark law. (If a customer is confused into thinking that manufacture B's product came from manufacturer A,
then B has implicitly misrepresented the source of the product, and thus deceived the
customer.)
1.2.1
There have been many cases of passing-off brought before the Courts where
confusion is an issue. Although reputation is often an issue, and damage can be
an issue occasionally, the cases can be and have been used to clarify what is or
is
not confusion in the sense used in registered trade mark law. Again,
likelihood of confusion is the effective test.
1.3 Proving likelihood of confusion" is not easy. Instances of actual confusion create a
very strong presumption of likelihood of confusion! Otherwise, survey evidence may
help. In general, however, the tribunal (Court or Registry) uses its own judgement in
comparing marks.
1.4 Association - The British Group does not believe that confusion can be considered independently of association (Para. 2 of the Introduction in the Guidelines). The British
Courts have in the past subsumed such considerations into the general umbrella of
confusion. Equally, the Directive (quoted above in 1.1.2) makes it clear that the expression likelihood of confusion includes likelihood of association. Association is but
one form of confusion. How the Courts of a given state evaluates confusion cannot,
therefore, be properly understood without discovering whether or not it gives separate
treatment to association. Similar comments can be said to apply to "dilution".
I.
General rules for comparison
2.1 The situation as propounded at (a) in the guidelines is true in the U.K. in passing-off
only. lt does not apply to registered trade marks. In registered trade mark infringement
the comparison is between the trade mark as registered and the infringing mark as
used (see para. 3.5 below). In examination in the Registry, the comparison is between
a registered mark and an applied-for mark. In the Registry it will be assumed that
130
"normal and fair use is to be made of the registered and applied-for marks, across the
full widths of their protection. The way a mark is actually used may be employed to illustrate the way it might be used.
2.2 Instead of the test as propounded at (a) in the guidelines ('image of the older mark)
the British Courts have developed a doctrine of "imperfect recollection'.
In 1943, Luxmore L.J. said "It is the person who only knows the one word, and has per-
haps an imperfect recollection of it, who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little
assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous comparison of the two words,
letter by letter and syllable by syllable pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a
teacher of elocution. The court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation and speech on the part not only of
the person seeking to buy under the trade description but also of the shop assistant
ministering to that person's wants."
That is, one must consider the situation of a purchaser who in one place, at one time
has bought one of the products, and then at another place, at a later time, is faced with
the other product. (They could be either way round; it does not have to be the older
mark first and the younger mark second.) First impressions are important, and not too
close a comparison should be made.
2.3 A classic judgement from 1906, in which confusion was considered between PIANOLA
and NEOLA, is still the corner-stone of British law:
"You must take the two words. You must judge of them, both by their look and
by their sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be applied.
You must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be likely to buy
those goods. In fact, you must consider all the surrounding circumstances; and
you must further consider what is likely to happen if each of those trade marks is
used in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the respective owners of
the marks. If, considering all those circumstances, you come to the conclusion
that there will be a confusion - that is to say, not necessarily that one man will be
injured and the other will gain illicit benefit, but that there will be a confusion in
the mind of the public which will lead to confusion in the goods - then you may
refuse the registration, or rather you must refuse the registration in that case."
Similar reasoning applies to device marks.
2.4 Classically in the U.K. the test is broken into two inter-related parts:
are the marks similar?
are the goods similar?
The results of these tests are considered together. In the past, a YES/NO answer has
been given to each of (a) and (b). More recently, and we anticipate in the future, we expect the two tests to be considered together. Thus where the goods or services are not
close a greater degree of similarity can be tolerated in the marks.
131
II. Criteria for Comparison
3.1 Importance of Distinctiveness for Scope of Protection - Putting aside the question
of famous or well-known marks, or marks of repute, (see Resolution on Q 100, Barcelona 1990, Yearbook 1991/I, pp 295-7), the British Courts have not greatly discussed
this criterion in the past, but are expected to do so much more in the future. Indeed
there has been a danger that a very well-known mark might not be so easily confused
because the public knows it so well and so accurately; thus a slight alteration might
avoid confusion (e.g. KODIAK). Hence the need to consider "association" as within the
context of this question. In practice the Courts have tended to give highly distinctive
marks with protection, and are expected to do so even more in the future.
3.1.1
In the past distinctive trade marks that were formed of invented words could be
registered outside the goods on which they were used ("defensive registrations), thus permitting a degree of protection for marks of particular distinctiveness and notoriety. This provision, which was little used, is repealed by the
1994 Act, and existing defensive registrations will effectively be phased out.
3.2 Sound, sight and meaning - Most cases of confusion in practice involve phonetic
similarity. The Courts have developed no rules for balancing, sound sight and meaning,
because confusion under any one of these headings is sufficient and cannot be negated by lack of confusion in other areas. Possible telephone use is frequently taken into
consideration. As an example of meaning, a recent case found confusion between
OCEAN PEARL and SEA PEARL
3.2.1
If the mark is capable of being pronounced in more than one way, the Court will
consider all likely pronunciations (e.g. confusion between RYSTA and ARISTOC
was based on pronunciations RY-STA and A-RY-STOC).
3.3 Translations - Some protection is provided against translations and transliterations,
because the Registry invariably endorses a registration of a foreign word with its English translation and/or transliteration, and uses these when searching. There are few
decided cases in this area; real commercial problems seem to arise only infrequently.
3.3.1
Although Welsh is an official language within Wales, there are rio specific provisions in the U.K. trade mark law relating to this.
3.4 Family marks - Families of marks with distinctive common elements are given stronger
protection. Particularly, if a trader owns several marks with a common prefix or suffix,
and no other trader owns a mark of this type for the goods in question, then he probably has exclusive rights in that prefix or suffix. Conversely, if two traders have co-existing marks with the same prefix or suffix, then a subsequent applicant can argue that
neither has exclusive rights, and may be able to obtain registration for a third mark with
that same prefix or suffix.
132
3.5 Conditions under which the older mark has been used - Within the framework of
registered trade mark law, the comparison is between the mark as registered with the
mark used by the alleged infringer (see para. 2.1 above).
3.5.1
3.5.2
If the mark as registered has not been used as a trade mark, it may be open to
revocation for non-use. However, the addition of extra elements will not normally
alter the mark to the extent that it is regarded as not having been used.
In a passing-off action, the comparison is made between the two marks as
actually used.
III. Other Elements of Evaluation
4.1 Confusion of whom? - Normally the average, ordinary purchaser' is the
relevant person. That could be a trade purchaser, or a member of the public, or both. The
main situation where this causes problems is with medicines obtained on prescription
under the National Health Service. Here the Courts have had difficulties and have not
been consistent in their approach. Usually it has been a doctor or pharmacist but it
could be the patient. However, the purchaser and user may be divorced in other areas,
e.g. whenever there is central ordering, and in many service industries.
4.1.1.
lt should be noted that in passing-off law, the confusion must lead to damage.
This was not the case when a nightclub (STRINGFELLOWS) sued the makers of
frozen potato chips, which were advertised using a nightclub theme.
4.1.2
In practice the Court makes up its own mind. Evidence put to the Court will frequently include survey evidence, and oral evidence from actual witnesses in the
form of typical purchasers. All witnesses, including the compiler of the survey
evidence, will be cross-examined on oath.
4.2 Which part of the public - Under U.K. law it must be a significant part of the public, but
no fixed percentage has been set. lt might, for example, be speakers of a certain
foreign language only. However, the Courts will ignore confusion by 'a moron in a
hurry".
4.3 Relevancy of kind of products; medicines - The law recognises that great care is
taken when selecting goods of high value, as against a "bag of sweets" (candies) case
where confusion is more likely.
4.3.1
Because of the consequences of a mistake, a higher threshold has been required in the case of medicines. Even when the parties agree, under the 1938
Act the Registry frequently still refused marks. Under the 1994 Act, the Registry
will not have the power to refuse a mark if the consent of the owner of an earlier
mark is provided.
133
4.4 Decisive moment of Confusion - The relevant time is usually the time of purchase; if
the mark is only seen after purchase has been completed, then no relevant confusion
has taken place. Examples: stripes on toothpaste only apparent in use, the blue colour
of an adhesive product (BLU-TAC).
4.4.1
In law the relevant dates are:
application or opposition - the date of the application.
invalidity or infringement - the date of the commencement of proceedings.
In practice at the hearing the Registry has sometimes taken into account the
situation at the time of the evidence, if the public interest requires them to do so.
4.5 Fraudulent intent - It is never necessary to prove fraudulent intent. However, if it is
shown that an infringer intended to deceive, the Court will usually assume that he was
successful. The Court will sometimes ask why the defendant chose the mark in the first
place. Innocence on behalf of a defendant is no defence to a claim to damages.
IV. Other Criteria
5.1 The British Courts tend to look at all the surrounding circumstances, and to have regard to the public interest generally. For example, improper conduct or excessive delay
by the Plaintiff will count against him. The manner of use may be relevant, for example if
the Plaintiff's colour scheme is taken as well as his mark.
5.2 If the owner of a mark in use can show that his mark and a similar registered mark have
co-existed in use without confusion for, e.g. seven years, he may claim a right to regi-
stration. The law assumes that the public has become educated as to the difference
between the marks, and thus there is no longer a likelihood of confusion despite the
similarity in the marks.
Desirable Solutions
6.1 The British Group believes that a test that conforms as closely as reasonably practicable to what happens in the market place is what is most likely to be accepted by industry and commerce, which the trade mark system seeks to serve.
6.2 Tests used in the past in other jurisdictions which involve a highly linguistic and semantic comparison of the marks have not endeared themselves to British industry and have
tended to bring the trade mark system into unnecessary disrepute.
134
Hongrie
Hungary
Ungarn
Report Q 127
in the name of the Hungarian Group
by Dr. Vilmos BACHER (Head of the Working Group), Dr. Gábor FALUDI, Béla
KARACSONYI, György KOVARI and Dr. Eva SOMFAI
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
I.
General rules for comparison
Concerning the likelihood of confusion related to the comparison between trademarks the
general notions of the Hungarian trademark law apply as follows:
Pursuant to the Hungarian Trademark Act (Statute No. IX. of 1969, hereinafter TA) "all
marks shall be granted trademark protection which are appropriate to distinguish goods
and services from other goods and services, the protection of which is not excluded by
law" [Q 1, (a) (b)].
According to the TA "with respect to identical or similar goods a mark shall not be granted
trademark protection if it is identical or similar, to a degree liable to create confusion, to a
third party's trademark registered with an earlier priority date or to a trademark effectively
used but not registered" [TA 3, 3(c)].
The TA further states that 'any party who uses another party's trademark or any confusingly similar mark, for goods on the list of goods, or for similar goods, commits trademark
infringement" [TAQ 13, (1)].
Thus, the requirement is that the relevant mark may not be similar to a degree liable to
create confusion, to an earlier trademark.
The degree of similarity creating confusion is scrutinized
when the protection of trademark is granted,
when the trademark protection is to be cancelled because its registration should have
been denied on the grounds that the registration requirements were not satisfied, e.g.
due to likelihood of confusion,
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in cases of trademark infringement.
In deciding upon the likelihood of confusion the court considers dominant elements of the
trademark used or protected earlier, analyzing how deeply they are rooted by image or
sound in the mind of consumers.
Case law:
The plaintiff was the owner of a trademark consisting of horizontal stripes and graphic
elements presenting the letters DHL.
After this trademark had been registered, the defendant firm with similar activities used
its firm name describing its activities and containing the letters DLH.
The dominant elements of both plaintiff's trademark and defendant's name are the
combination of letters DHL and DLH. The remaining elements, such as the graphic
parts and further elements of defendant firm's name, have negligible effect on the perception of consumers. The two combinations of letters, however, may well be confused
even according to their pronunciations (Supreme Court decision, Pf.IV. 20,532/1992).
In a lawsuit of a trademark infringement mentioned below it is the overall visual impression of the mark on consumers' minds that counts.
In the trademark Nivea registered on behalf of plaintiff, the word Nivea is printed with
white on a blue field under which it is written with small letters whether it is cream, body
milk or lotion and decorated with symbolized flowers.
The defendant has developed various cosmetic products under the name Timea. Its
mark is written also with white capital letters on blue field with white description whether
it is cream, body milk or lotion and also decorated with symbolized flowers.
The Court stated that in deciding about trademark infringement the compared marks
have to be studied according to their overall impression on consumers, thus beside the
comparison of the very words the typography of the various elements of the words and
the decorations of the flowers ought to be taken into account as well.
Albeit the words Nivea and Timea are similar due to the notoriety of the word Nivea
and the different meaning of the word Timea (given name of women) the degree of
similarity does not reach the test of likelihood of confusion.
The different typographical elements of the words and the different positions of the
symbolized flowers are sufficient for distinction between the two marks. Thus, the likelihood of confusion may not be perceived neither by a superficial overlook nor by a detailed analysis. This is true even though both marks use white letters for the words in a
field with different shades of blue (Supreme Court, Pf.IV. 21,865/1993).
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lt should be noted that in this case the court of first instance concluded that, because
both marks have the same characteristic blue field with white letters of the wordings
and the position of the other elements and the symbolized patterns of the flower are
similar, the entire effect of the marks is confusingly similar, therefore defendant's mark
infringes plaintiff's trademark (Metropolitan Court, 3.P. 620/1993).
The diverging decisions in this case demonstrate how differently the courts may apply
the test of overall impression of the patterns in deciding on confusing degree of similarity.
c) Confusion of similarity may only be established according to the Hungarian case law if
the confusion emerged from such a common element which attributes a distinctive
character to the earlier trademark.
Case law:
The plaintiff had several registered trademarks which all have one common element. Beside the use of different words or eventually graphics every one of them included the word
Pilsner. Defendant's mark contained the word Pilsener.
Certain similarity in the elements of the words does not necessarily lead to likelihood of
confusion. The words in concern (Pilsner, Pilsener) are so popular and widespread that
they refer to the generic name of the goods, so their occurrence in marks has no significance when similarity of the trademarks are being compared. Plaintiff's trademarks as well
as defendant's labels are full with other sort of elements of words which do exclude the
likelihood of confusion.
So the question remained whether or not the word Pilsener together with certain graphics
and in certain context may still cause some confusion with plaintiff's trademark. Infringement could not be established because defendant's mark comprised a drawing of a horse
rider as well which made the entire mark remarkably different from plaintiff's trademark
(Supreme Court, Pf. IV. 20,661/1991).
In order to draw a whole picture about this case, another aspect of this court decision
should also be referred to. The mark Pilsener provides protection as an appellation of origin registered on behalf of plaintiff both in its country of origin and in the international register. Thus, in his motion the plaintiff also requested - beyond the claim of trademark infringement - that defendant be refrained from the use of the word PILSENER. The Court sustained plaintiff's claim stating that - taking into account the protected appellation of origin Pilsener is not merely the generic name of Pilsener. The court also pointed out that even
though defendants used the generic name with other graphics and words as well beside
the indication of the true origin of the product, the word Pilsener is not allowed to be used
by defendant any longer (Supreme Court, Pf.IV. 21 405/1993).
137
We have presented the trademark cases exclusively regarding trademarks combined with
logo in order to show their frequent occurrence in the Hungarian jurisdiction.
Il. Criteria of comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
The following definition was concluded by the AIPPI in paragraph 8 of the joint resolution of
092 and 096 in consideration with the distinctive character of trademark protection: "a
trademark which has little distinctive character enjoys a narrower scope of protection than
a trademark which has a strong distinctive character (Annuaire 1989/li, p. 310).
Distinctibility is a crucial definitive requirement of trademark.
Referring to the above mentioned provision of TA, under the Hungarian laws all marks shall
be granted trademark protection which are appropriate to distinguish goods and services
from other goods or services and the protection of which is not excluded by law [TA t,
(a), (b)].
The cancellation of a trademark due to lack of distinctive character may be petitioned by
anyone in a motion (TA 19, (1) and Q 35, (1)1.
The degree of distinctive character of the trademark may vary, as it was stated in paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned AIPPI joint resolution on 092 and 096: "The distinctive
character may evolve and, consequently, by taking appropriate measures it can be acquired or increased and by inappropriate conduct it can diminish and possibly disappear."
Since the distinctive character is a precondition per se of the trademark protection, we
cannot say that it is a determining element of the scope of protection. However, the degree
of distinctiveness may have an influence on the scope of the trademark protection.
Hence, it may be concluded that the degree of distinctive character, at the time of judgement concerning the occurrence of likelihood of confusion, shall have vital effect on the
scope of protection.
A well-known strong trademark, be visual or sound, would be more vivid in the mind of
consumers. This circumstance shall be taken into consideration in deciding about degree
of confusion.
Case law:
The plaintiff is a licensee of the Dior trademark. The defendant, Dioro Fashion Studio, is
involved in education business of models, fashion and cosmetics matters.
138
The Court sustained the petition and ruled for infringement of the trademark. According to
the decision the use of the word Dioro, even if its writing is different, refers to plaintiff's
trademark.
Despite of the argument that Dioro in Italian may have a distinct sense, it is more likely that
most people in Hungary would associate the word Dioro immediately and with no doubts
with the world-famous trademark of plaintiff. The differences of defendant's mark in special
writing and form as demonstrated at the Court do not preclude the likelihood of confusion
even though Dioro was combined with other words, especially with references to defendant's activities (Supreme Court, Pf.1V. 21 302/1993).
2. Sound, sight and meaning
There are no special standards in the case of likelihood of confusion due to phonetic or
visual similarity, or similarity of meaning. These standards would not be reliable for this
purpose and could not replace a detailed case by case analysis in a decision whether or
not the similarity or dissimilarity is more dominant in a special case.
Case law:
Plaintiff's colour, graphic registered trademarks for chewing gums are as follows:
Wrigley's Spearmint
Wrigley's Doublemint
Juicy Fruit.
Marks used by defendant are the following:
Koloy's Spearmint
Koloy's Mentamint
Koloy's Banana.
The defendant used these words on identical products, chewing gums, with identical
measures, on identical packages, with identical shades of colours, with identical shapes,
measures and positions of letters.
Defendant's mark used on Koloy's Banana, is basically identical to the colours, positions of
the words and shapes of letters of plaintiff's trademark of Juicy Fruit. Therefore the Court
ruled for plaintiff in all these three cases (Supreme Court, Pf.IV. 21,006/1991).
139
As can be seen from the above cases, the Court closely examined the similarities and dissimilarities of the marks in comparison and established which elements were dominant for
the overall impression of consumers.
Translations
The TA does not provide specific protection for translations of not well-known trademarks.
Pursuant to the TA ua mark shall not be granted trademark protection if it is liable to create
confusion [Q 3, (1) (a)]. The similarity of a mark containing a translation of an earlier trademark shall be decided upon accordingly.
Family marks
There is no special regulation in this field, nevertheless there are family marks in Hungary,
so the protection of such trademarks may well be distinguished.
The crucial question is how the lack of use of trademark would be treated with respect to
every trademark belonging to a family. According to the TA "trademark protection shall
expire if the trademark has not been used in the country for five years" [TA Q 16, (c)].
The five-year period provides protection for all members of the family mark. After expiry of
the five-year period, provided that there are no activities for the continuance of the right
(i.e. advertisement, etc), the protection of the not used members of the family mark may
become questionable. However, even after five years the protection of the "head mark"
actually used may radiate to all those member marks which are similar to the "head
mark', so there may be a protection against an outsider mark on the ground of likelihood
of confusion.
There is no case law in this area.
ConditIons under which the older mark has been used
In compliance with the TA only the registered trademarks have to be taken into account in
the comparison with the alleged infringer. Should the owner of the older trademark use
other elements beside the trademark, the protection of the trademark does not include
these extra elements when compared with the allegedly infringing trademark. In such
cases the rules of unfair competition apply.
We refer to paragraph 6.8 of the AIPPI resolution in 0115 according to which "when considering trade dress imitations, all factors should be taken into account, and in particular
the similarity in the overall appearance arising from the use of similar sizes and shapes,
colours and graphic elements and from any other aspects, such as similar illustrations, the
use of descriptive text in a similar presentation, and similar logo design."
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Case law:
In Nivea y. Timea described above the plaintiff also claimed that defendant traded its products in similarly shaped bottles. The Court ruled that the shape of the bottles is not protected by the Nlvea trademark, but it may be protected by design rights. Any actual infringement of the shape of the product falls outside the umbrella of the protection of the
Nivea trademark and either the rules of design rights or those of unfair competition law
apply (Supreme Court, Pf.iV. 21,865/1993).
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
Contusion of whom?
According to paragraph 6.5 of the AIPPI resolution in 0115 the relevant definition of unfair
competition is: 'In general the likelihood of confusion is to be examined in relation to a
reasonable consumer, having normal attentiveness with regard to the nature of the
product or service or the place where it is offered."
We believe that as long as one searches for a standard to decide on subjective matters it is
prudent to define similar events in a similar way even though they occur in various areas of
the intellectual property, i.e. trademarks or competition law.
Hence, it is obvious that not only the deception of the purchaser is a relevant factor in the
decision but that of anyone else in the sales chain as well, so is that of the end consumer.
The resolution on 068 of AIPPI has already stated that 'the trademark is of economic
importance not only to the manufacturer and the merchant but also to the consumer'
(Annuaire 1978/2, p. 157). The Hungarian jurisdiction does stress and try to balance the
interest of the consumer both in the registration and the cancellation proceedings.
Which part of the public?
Should the reasonable person be the standard as the average consumer with normal and
sufficient observing capacity, our stance is that there is no need to determine a general
rate of percentage.
Should the judge be unable to decide on the likelihood of confusion in the comparison of
the trademark by applying the above mentioned standard, then a public poll may serve to
determine the average rate of confusion.
We believe that the requirements do differ as to proportions depending on the sort of the
goods and services. In the case of an expensive article where one faces less consumers
but more informed ones, it is likely that lower percentage is relevant enough since the
higher concentration of attention may lead to confusion.
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Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
Case law:
In a trademark application case relating to medicines the Court did not share applicant's
submission that consumers of medicines are doctors and pharmacists. The fact that the
order for medicines are mostly the task of doctors and that of the pharmacists and that
they are liable for the proper deliver of the medicines does not effect the reality that the end
consumer - from a trading point of view as well - is the patient, except for medicines which
may be rendered exclusively to the hands of doctors (Supreme Court, Pf.IV. 20,373/1992).
Decisive moment of confusion
The time when the likelihood of confusion occurs is the time which counts. This may
change according to the change of circumstances.
Should the likelihood of confusion occur during the registration process, the court shall
take into account the time of filing of the older trademark too since the actual registration
has a retroactive effect, unless with respect to identical or similar goods, the mark is identical or similar to a degree liable to create confusion to a trademark effectively used but not
registered, - in which case the date of commencement of the effective use of the mark shall
apply [TAQ3, (3) (c)].
Should the court, by judicial review, decide on an appeal against a decision of the trademark registration authority, the same time considerations ought to be applied.
This is true for the cancellation process of a trademark as well.
In case of infringement the time when the alleged infringer used the confusingly similar
trademark illegally is the time that counts. The TA defines the use of a trademark and
states that "a trademark is used on goods and wrappers and in business correspondence
and advertising" as well [TA Q 18, (1)].
Fraudulent intent
According to paragraph 6.2 of the resolution of AIPPI in Q115 'in general under civil law no
fraudulent intent is required for protection against confusion". The same requirements
should apply to the likelihood of confusion in trademarks, too.
Thus, we hold that, in compliance with the Hungarian case law, merely the problem of
likelihood of confusion needs to be clarified, i.e. the question whether or not the
infringement of trademark could be established on objective grounds. Should these
objective criteria prove the infringement of the trademark, the accountability of the infringer
would no longer remain a question to be considered further (Metropolitan Court, 3.P.
25,858/1992).
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As to the question whether or not fraudulent intent gives rise to a presumption of successful deception we would respond the following:
Provided that there was a fraudulent intent or it was successful, such a fact could be significant from the aspect of compensation of damages, which would nevertheless depend on
the evidences, so the conception of presumption is out of question in these cases.
IV. Other criteria
In case of likelihood of confusion the courts could take into account parallel claims based
on the rules of unfair competition as well, provided that the confusion infringes further
legally protected interests beyond those of the trademark.
Summary
Evaluation of likelihood of confusion between trademarks becomes relevant in the registration, cancellation and infringement processes.
In deciding upon the likelihood of confusion the Court considers dominant elements of the
trademark used or protected earlier, analyzing how deeply they are rooted by image or
sound in the mind of consumers.
The dominant element is the overall impression of the mark generated in the consumers.
Confusion of similarity may only be established if the confusion emerged from such a
common element which attributes a distinctive character to the earlier trademark.
The degree of distinctive character in the very moment of determining the degree of confusion has vital effect on the scope of protection. A well-known strong trademark, be visual
or sound, would be impressed more vividly on the mind of consumers, and in deciding on
the degree of confusion the degree of distinctive character should be considered.
In compliance with the Hungarian trademark laws only trademarks as registered have to
be taken into account in the comparison with the trademark of the alleged infringer. Should
the owner of the older trademark use other elements beside the trademark, the protection
of the trademark does not include these extra elements when compared with the allegedly
infringing mark. In such cases the rules of unfair competition apply. Thus, any possible infringement of the shape of the product falls outside the umbrella of the trademark protectian and either the rules of design rights or those of unfair competition law apply.
In general the likelihood of confusion is to be examined in relation to a reasonable consumer, having normal attentiveness with regard to the nature of the product or service or the
place where it is offered.
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We believe that as long as one searches for a standard to decide on subjective matters it is
prudent to define similar events in a similar way even though they occur in various areas of
the intellectual property, i.e. trademarks or competition law.
Thus, we hold that, in compliance with the Hungarian case law, merely the problem of
likelihood of confusion needs to be clarified, i.e. the question whether or not the
infringement of trademark could be established on objective grounds. Should these
objective criteria prove the infringement of the trademark, the accountability of the infringer
would no longer remain a question to be considered.
Résumé
La probabilité d'une confusion est évaluée pendant le délivrance de la protection de
marque de commerce, dans les procédures de radiation de marque et dans les affaires de
contrefaçon.
Pour juger de l'existence d'une ressemblance proche de la confusion, une importance
extraordinaire est attribuée par la jurisprudence aux éléments dominants d'une marque
enregistrée ou d'une désignation appliquée plus tôt, en vue d'analyser à quel point ceux-ci
sont imprégnés dans la mémoire des consommateurs, phonétiquement ou visuellement.
C'est la totalité de l'image de la marque, c'est-à-dire l'impression d'ensemble donnée aux
acheteurs qui est déterminante.
La probabilité de confusion ne peut être établie qu'au cas où elle existe en relation d'un
élément commun par lequel la probabilité de distinction est donnée à la marque ancienne.
La mesure de la protection est sensiblement influencée par la mesure de la probabilité de
distinction existant à la date de l'appréciation de la probabilité de confusion. Une marque
bien connue dite forte' est imprimée plus fortement dans la conscience du consommateur
visuellement ainsi que phonétiquement, circonstance qui doit donc être une question de
fond quand la mesure de la probabilité de confusion est appréciée.
Selon le droit des marques, c'est seulement la marque enregistrée qui doit être comparée
à la désignation utilisée par le contre-facteur présumé. Si le propriétaire de la marque
ancienne a utilisé, outre la marque même, aussi d'autres éléments, le droit des marques
ne peut pas être appliqué par rapport à ces derniers lors de la comparaison, la solution
étant donnée par les règles de la concurrence déloyale. Par exemple, une violation de droit
concernant la forme du produit dépasse le domaine de la protection de marque et, le cas
échéant, ce sont les règles des dessins ou celles de la conduite malhonnête sue le marché
qui sont appliquées.
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La probabilité de confusion doit, en général, être examinée au point de vue du
"consommateur normal moyen' qui possède la disponibilité d'attention en tenant compte
du caractère du produit et du service, mais aussi du lien de prestation de service.
Si l'on cherche les points standards du jugement d'une question comprenant des éléments subjectifs, il paraît être indiqué de préciser, si possible, également les phénomènes
analogues, à condition qu'ils apparaissent dans des domaines différents de la protection
de la propriété industrielle, p.e. dans celui du droit des marques ou de Ia concurrence.
Par rapport à l'appréciation de l'existence de la probabilité de confusion c'est uniquement
de critères objectifs qu'il faut partir, et la survenance d'une violation de droit est indépendente de l'imputabilité du contrevenant.
Zusammenfassung
Die Bewertung der Verwechselbarkeit von Warenzeichen kommt im Laufe der Erteilung
des Warenzeichenschutzes, in Warenzeichenlöschungsverfahren und in Fällen von Markenverletzungen zum Zug.
Während Beurteilung des Bestehens einer an Verwechselbarkeit grenzenden Ähnlichkeit
wird in der Gerichtspraxis besondere Bedeutung den dominierenden Elementen des früher
registrierten Warenzeichens oder der früher angewandten Bezeichnung beigemessen,
analysierend, in welcher Weise jene entweder visuell oder phonetisch in der Erinnerung
der Konsumenten verwurzelt sind.
Entscheidend ist das Gesamtbild, der auf die Käufer gemachte Gesamteindruck.
Verwechselbarkeit kann lediglich dann festgestellt werden, wenn diese in Hinsicht eines
solchen gemeinsamen Elementes besteht, durch welches die Unterscheidungsfähigkeit
des früheren Warenzeichens gegeben ist.
Das zum Zeitpunkt der Verwechselbarkeitsbeurteilung bestehende Ausmass der Unterscheidungsfähigkeit beeinflusst bedeutenderweise das Ausmass des Warenzeichenschutzes. Ein wohlbekanntes 'starkes' Warenzeichen hat sich sowohl visuell als auch
phonetisch mehr in die Erinnerung der Konsumenten eingeprägt, dies muss also bei Beurteilung des Ausmasses der Verwechselbarkeit als grundlegender Umstand bewertet
werden.
Laut Markenrecht soll ausschliesslich das registrierte Warenzeichen mit dem vom angeblichen Markenverletzer benutzten Zeichen verglichen werden. Hat der Inhaber des frûheren
Warenzeichens ausser der Marke auch andere Elemente benutzt, kann in deren Hinsicht
das Markenrecht im Laufe des Vergleiches mit dem früheren Warenzeichen nicht angewendet werden, die Möglichkeit der Lösung ist in den Vorschriften des unlauteren Wettbewerbes enthalten. So z.B. fällt die Form des Produkts betreffende eventuelle Rechtsver145
letzung ausser den Bereich der Markenverletzung und kann sich gegebenenfalls als Geschmacksmusterverletzung oder unehrliches Marktverhalten verwirklichen.
Die Möglichkeit der Verwechselbarkeit kann im allgemeinen von dem Gesichtspunkt des
rationellen Durchschnittkonsumenten aus geprüft werden, der über entsprechende Aufmerksamkeit verfügt und Rücksicht auf den Charakter des Produkts oder der Dienstleistung sowie deren Beziehungsstelle nimmt.
Haben wir also die Absicht, die Standardpunkte der Beurteilung einer Frage mit
subjektiven Elementen zu finden, so wäre es unseres Erachtens zweckmässig, die
identischen Erscheinungen möglichst in gleicher Weise zu bestimmen, sofern diese auf
verschiedenen Gebieten des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes, so z.B. auf dem Gebiet von
Markenrecht oder Wettbewerbsrecht, erscheinen.
Bei Beurteilung der Frage des Bestehens von Verwechselbarkeit muss ausschliesslich aus
objektiven Kriterien ausgegangen werden, und eine erfolgte Rechtsverletzung ist unabhängig von dem Umstand, ob das Verhaften angerechnet werden kann oder nicht.
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Irlande
Ireland
Irland
Report Q 127
by the Irish Group
Evaluation of confusion In trademark law
Introduction
The response to the above question is made at a time when Ireland has yet to approximate
its Trade Mark law with the rest of the European Union in accordance with the provisions of
the Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC. The Irish Government has indicated its intention of
introducing a new Trade Marks Bill to comply with the requirements of the EC Directive as
soon as possible. lt is almost certain that the new measure will in addition give effect to the
Madrid Protocol relating to the International Registration of Marks of 27th June, 1989. It will
also make provisions in connection with the Council Regulation (EEC) on the Community
Trade Mark. Finally, when enacted, the new law will allow for the registration of trade marks
in relation to services.
The new law will more than likely follow closely along the lines of the recently enacted UK
Trade Marks Act, 1994 in including as a relative ground for refusal the fact that a mark propounded for registration is identical with or similar to an earlier mark where there exists a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of associa-
tion with the earlier mark where both cover identical or similar goods or services.
Moreover, it seems probable that registration will be refused even where there is a dissimilarity between the respective goods and services in circumstances where use of the later
mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark. In the examination of
applications for registration it is likely that the Controller (Registrar) will retain the right of ex
officio search and refusal in cases where relative grounds arise as aforesaid.
Finally it is certain that the criteria for the evaluation of confusion will be the same in both
the registration procedure and the trial of trade mark infringement.
The following response to Q 127 is made in the light of the anticipated above changes in
Irish Trade Mark law.
147
I. General rules for comparison
It is not anticipated that there will be any significant change in the jurisprudence where the
comparison between marks is made for establishing the existence of confusion:
allegedly confusing marks will continue to be compared not only as to the form in which
they are registered but also as to the circumstances in which they would be presented
in the market-place when fairly and honestly used. Use in this context means not only
contemporaneous but also non-synchronous use. Irish courts would follow the dicta of
Sargant J. in Sandow (1914) 31 R.P.C. 196 AT 205 where he stated:
'The question is not whether if a person is looking at two trade marks side by
side there would be a possibility of confusion; the question is whether the person
who sees the proposed trade mark in the absence of the other trade mark, and in
view only of his general recollection of what the nature of the other trade mark
was, would be liable to be deceived and to think that the trade mark before him
is the same as the other, of which he has a general recollection"
Dissimilarity in part or parts of the comparative marks is not sufficient to lead to a finding of confusion: the comparison of the marks overall alone is decisive.
Where the dominant features common to both marks are in general use in trade in the
goods and services concerned the Courts will be less willing to find confusion. See
Coca-Cola y. F. Cade & Sons Ltd (1957] l.R. 196.
Il. Criteria for comparison
Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
It is submitted that the jurisprudence supports the proposition that the distinctiveness of
the mark determines the scope of its protection against confusion. Reference is made to
the English judgment of Astbury J. in Imperial Tobacco y. De Pasquali (1918) 35 R.P.C.
185 at 195 in which he stated "...it is of first importance to have regard to the nature of the
word said to have been infringed. A distinctive invented or fancy word has a much wider
scope for colourable imitation than a word prinarlly descriptive, especially if the latter be
one in common use'. lt is, moreover, submitted that the relaxation of the criteria for registrability under the new legislation will ensure an enhanced support for the proposition.
Sound, sight and meaning
The classic test for comparison between marks in English and Irish jurisprudence was that
laid down by Parker J. in the Pianotist case 23 R.P.C. 774 at 777 in which he stated:
You must take the two words. You must judge of them, both by their look and by their
sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be applied. You must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be likely to buy those goods, In fact,
you must consider all the surrounding circumstances; and you must further consider
148
what is likely to happen if each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as a trade
mark for the goods of the respective owners of the marks."
To this may be added the long established principle that the idea of the respective marks
must be considered. Thus word trade marks conveying meanings represented by trade
marks consisting only of figurative elements have been held to be confusingly similar and
so-called rebus type marks may also conflict.
3. Translations
Irish law is fairly specific as regards trade marks consisting of foreign dictionary words
which have been propounded for registration and objected to on what may now be
termed absolute grounds. In KIKU TM [1978] F.S.R. 246 the Irish Supreme Court ruled
that the word KIKU being a transliteration for the Japanese word meaning
chrysanthemum would be meaningless as far as the average Irish person was concerned. lt would seem to follow that the Courts would be slow to find confusion arising
solely from the fact that the infringing mark was a translation of the mark being infrin-
ged. Much would depend on the currency in Ireland of the foreign language concerned. Thus the more widely spoken languages of the European Community might
receive a wider ambit of protection not least because of the extensive number of
tourists from the countries concerned who annually visit Ireland and who could easily
be confused into believing that there was some nexus between goods or services
offered under an English name which was a translation of, say, a corresponding protected, French, German, Italian or Spanish term.
Under the Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na h-Eireann) Irish and English are declared to
be the official languages of the State with primacy being given to the former where conflict in legal meaning may arise. It would follow that use of a dictionary word in the English language would infringe the comparable protected Irish word or vice versa.
4. Family marks
In finding that the trade mark PHILCO was not likely to be confused with a family of previously registered trade marks each prefixed PHIL- used for the same description of
goods, the Irish Supreme Court warned against the length to which the idea of a family of
marks had been carried. See Philadelphia Storage Battety Co. y. The Controller and
N.V.Phiips Gloellampen-Fabrieken [1935] l.R. 575. The Court found that to grant such
protection would give the owner of the family of marks power to impose undue limitations
on others with a legitimate claim to the use of the familial element.
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5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
lt is submitted that Irish courts would only compare the mark as registered with the mark
used by the alleged infringer and would not take into account the additional elements
which are not part of the registered mark even where these have been habitually used by
the owner of the mark. Under the existing Trade Marks Act, 1963 it is possible to alter a registered trade mark only where the alteration or addition concerned does not substantially
alter the identity of the existing mark. lt is anticipated that the new law will be even more
rigid in disallowing any alteration other than the change of the proprietor's name where this
is part of the original registration. Even then the change must not alter the identity of the
original registration.
b) A solution may be found as regards non-registered elements which have nonetheless
been habitually used by the owner in conjunction with the registered mark by suing at
common law for passing-off. In this connection it is permissible to join the two types of
action in the one proceeding since in Ireland an action for trade mark infringement and
passing-off are not mutually exclusive. This situation will continue under the anticipated
new legislation. See United Biscuits Ltd. y. Irish Biscuits Ltd (1971] 16.
III. Other elements of evaluation
Contusion of whom?
It is a long established principle of Irish law that the persons to be considered in assessing
a likelihood of confusion are all those who are likely to become purchasers of the goods
and who despite their using ordinary care and intelligence are likely to be deceived.
Which pari of the public?
lt is also well established that a substantial number of such purchasers must be or be likely
to be confused. See Coca-Cola Co. y. F. Cade & Sons Ltd. (1957] l.A. 196. It is unlikely that
the new legislation will alter the position.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
Given that all the circumstances surrounding the use of the respective trade marks will be
taken into account as well as the usages of the trade, the Irish courts would normally
accept that confusion is more likely where the so-call "bag of sweets type of goods are
concerned as compared with technical types of goods whose sale depends as much upon
their specification as the particular trade mark used thereon. Where hazardous goods
such as medicines are involved the courts would undoubtedly take into account the
deleterious consequences which are likely to arise where confusion over a trade mark
arises. It must be remembered, however, that prescription medicines are also subject to a
separate legal regime. This requires the prescribing of medicines under non-proprietary
names which of itself obviates the possibility of danger arising from conflicting trade marks
used by different proprietors for incompatible or contra-indicated medicines.
150
DecIsive moment of confusion
If one has understood the purport of this question, it is most likely that the proposed new
law will provide that the rights of the proprietor of a registered trade mark shall have full
effect from the date of publication of the registration and that the proprietor shall be entitled
to reasonable compensation in respect of acts done after the publication for registration
which if so done would amount to infringement of the rights of the proprietor.
Fraudulent Intent
lt is not anticipated under Irish law that intent to deceive gives rise to a presumption of successful deception?
151
Israel
Israel
Israel
Report Q 127
in the name of the Israeli Group
by Aman GABRIELI
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Il.
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
In as much as registered trademarks are concerned, there is no distinction in the law between a "strong" mark and other marks. The degree of distinctiveness is important when
the registration of the mark is considered, but in as much as confusion for the purpose of
finding whether there was an infringement is concerned, the law does not distinguish between a strong mark or a weak mark. Furthermore, Israeli statutory law does not recognize
a well-known" mark and treats all registered trademarks on exactly the same footing.
The matter is different where the protection of unregistered marks is considered. The law
grants such protection and in order to enforce it, the owner has to prove that the mark has
acquired such a reputation that if a similar mark is put on the market, the ordinary
purchaser may be misled into thinking that the latter's goods are the former's. Here the
stronger the mark is and the more important the reputation it has, the better are the chances of enforcing the protection.
The mere fact that a mark was registered signifies that the Registrar found that it is a
distinctive mark and therefore there can be no distinction in enforcing a registered trademark in accordance with the question of whether ft is stronger or weaker than other marks.
The matter may be different when the validity of a registered trademark is challenged, but
this is outside the scope of this question.
152
Sound, sight and meaning
There are no standards which decide the outcome of the balancing between the various
criteria for examining similarity between trademarks. The question is finally decided by the
general impression of the tribunal from the comparison between the marks.
While the tests of sight and sound are comparatively simple, the test which involves the
idea of the mark is more complicated. While it was recognized by the courts in Israel that
an identity in the ideas of two rival trademarks may cause confusion, it was stressed that if
only this test exists, while there is no similarity in sight and sound, the matter should be decided in accordance with all the other circumstances of the case, such as the manner in
which each of the trademarks is used etc.
Translation
As already said above, Israeli law does not specifically recognize the well-known mark. A
registered trademark is protected also against a translation thereof into another language.
The tribunal in such a case, as mentioned above, will take into account all the circumstances of the case.
Thus, in a case where the question was whether the trademark ACCENT would create
confusion in view of the prior registration of the trademark DAGESH, which is the Hebrew
equivalent of the word accent, the tribunal decided that there is no risk of confusion, in
view of the manner in which both parties use their trademarks and further in view of the fact
that most of the consumers of the products involved (pre-cooked soups) would not know
that accent is the English equivalent of the Hebrew "dagesh.
There are no specific provisions in Israeli law concerning translation from one official language to another, in spite of the fact that both Hebrew and Arabic are official languages
here.
Family marks
Marks which belong to a family of marks do not enjoy special protection, but are treated
exactly on the same footing as any other mark.
Thus, in a case where the owner of the trademark ROKAL lodged an opposition to the registration of the trademark LAROCAL, both for pharmaceutical preparations, the opposition was accepted because of the similarity between the two trademarks and the contention that the owner of LAROCAL had some six or seven trademarks, all with the prefix
LARO, was not accepted as a ground for dismissing the opposition. The tribunal said that
the existence of a family of trademarks is not a good answer where there is a risk of confusion.
Conditions under which the older mark has been used
Where risk of confusion with a registered trademark is concerned, the court usually would
compare the two trademarks side by side. However, the court will not ignore all the other
153
circumstances of the case. Such circumstances will include the manner of the use of the
trademark by both parties.
Israel has no general rule against unfair competition. As mentioned above, an unregistered
trademark may be protected under the tort of passing-off, in which case the circumstances surrounding the use of the trademarks involved are much more important in deciding
whether or not there exists a risk of confusion than where registered trademarks are concerned.
Confusion of whom?
The courts have never distinguished between 'consumer" and user". Legally speaking, the
confusion is of those persons before whom the goods or the services which bear the
trademark are presented, whetner for the purpose of consuming or for the purpose of
using.
Which Part of the public?
Neither standards, nor certainly any percentages, have ever been fixed by any court in this
respect. The question whether there exists a risk of confusion is a legal question which is
decided by the court in view of the evidence presented by both parties.
lt seems that the matter should be solved with a calculated guess, rather than by setting
certain percentages.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
Of course the kind of products involved is a very important and relevant question in deciding whether a risk of confusion exists. Where the products concerned are sold, for instance, to children, the risk of confusion as a result of similarity in sight and sound will be
much more relevant than where such risk is a result of identity of ideas.
Where the products involved are consumed or used by professionals, the risk of confusion
is of course less than where the general population is the consumer of the product.
The rule that a human being has imperfect recollection and that in the comparison one
should-take into consideration the fact that the purchaser will not see the two trademarks
side by side, but rather each of them separately at different times, applies to all kinds of
consumers in respect of all kinds of goods.
Concerning medicines, in a case where the risk of confusion between the mark CELECAIN
and XYLOCAIN, both in respect of anaesthesia, was tried, the Supreme Court of Israel
stressed the risk which may result from the similarity in sound and in spite of the fact that
the users of the relevant products were physicians and nurses, the Court was of the
154
opinion that the risk is too great and decided to refuse the registration of CELECAIN side
by side with XYLOCAIN, which was already on the Register.
DecIsive moment of confusion
The decisive moment is the date on which the legal proceeding is filed with the tribunal.
Fraudulent intent
Intent to deceive, if proved, will help the owner of the mark in enforcing his rights, since the
ability of the defendant to argue and prove that there is no risk of confusion is diminished
by the fact that the imitation was intended to deceive.
IV. Other criteria
As a rule, a tribunal will take into consideration all the circumstances of the case. No specific criteria may be mentioned in this respect.
Summary
Where a registered trademark is concerned and the question is whether there exists a
risk of confusion between this mark and another, the law does not distinguish between
a strong mark or a weak mark.
Israeli statutory law does not recognize a well-known mark.
Where the mark is unregistered, the stronger it is and the more important the reputation
it has, the better are the chances of enforcing the protection.
There is no difference between a stronger mark and a weaker one, in as much as the
question of enforcing the rights is concerning.
There are no standards which decide the outcome of the balancing between the
various criteria for examining similarity between trademarks. An identity in the ideas of
two rival trademarks may cause confusion, but if this is the only similarity between the
marks, all the other circumstances of the case should be taken into account.
A registered trademark is protected also against its translation into another language.
There are no specific provisions in Israeli law concerning translation from one official
language to another.
Marks which belong to a family of marks do not enjoy special protection.
Israel has no general rule against unfair competition.
155
The persons who may be confused by the similarity between trademarks are those
before whom the pertinent goods or services are presented.
The question of confusion is a legal question to be decided by the court in view of the
evidence and as a calculated guess, rather than by setting certain percentages.
The risk of confusion where medicines are concerned is considered as a serious one
by the courts.
The decisive moment for the confusion question is the date on which the legal proceeding was instituted.
Intent to deceive, if proved, will help the owner of a mark in enforcing his rights.
Résumé
Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une marque déposée et que la question se pose de savoir s'il existe
un risque de confusion entre la marque en question et une autre marque, la loi n'opère
pas de distinction entre une marque "forte et une marque "faible". La législation statutaire israélienne ne reconnaît pas la notion de marque unotoire (bien connue).
Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une marque qui n'est pas déposée, plus la marque est forte et plus sa
réputations est grande et donc plus grandes sont les chances de faire valoir sa protection.
II n'existe pas de différence entre une marque plus forte et une marque plus faible pour
autant que la question de faire valoir les droits se pose.
II n'existe pas de standards qui définissent la pondération des différents critères utilisés pour examiner la similarité existant entre deux marques commerciales rivales peut
prêter à confusion, cependant si
il
s'agit de l'unique similitude entre les marques,
toutes les autres circonstances de l'affaire seront prises en compte.
Une marque commerciale déposée est également protégée en ce qui concerne sa traduction en une autre langue.
La loi israélienne ne comprend pas de dispositions spécifiques concernant la traduction d'une langue officielle dans une autre langue.
Les marques qui appartiennent à une famille de marques ne bénéficient pas d'une
protection spéciale.
Israel ne possède pas de réglementation générale sur la concurrence déloyale.
156
Les Personnes qui risquent d'être confondues par la similarité entre marques commerciales sont celles auxquelles les marchandises ou les services concernés sont présentés.
La question de la confusion est une question juridique qui doit être décidée par le tribunal sur la base de preuves et comme estimation calculée, plutôt que par la définition de
pourcentages donnés.
Lorsque des produits pharmaceutiques sont concernés, le risque de confusion est
considéré comme un risque sérieux par les tribunaux.
La date décisive en ce qui concerne la question de la confusion est la date à laquelle la
procédure légale a été établie.
L'intention de tromper, si elle est prouvée, aidera le propriétaire de la marque à faire
valoir ses droits.
Zusammenfassung
Soweit ein eingetragenes Warenzeichen betroffen ist und sich die Frage stellt, ob die
Gefahr der Verwechslung einer Marke mit anderen besteht, unterscheidet das Gesetz
nicht zwischen einer starken und einer schwachen Marke.
Das israelische Gesetzesrecht kennt keine "gut bekannte' Marke.
Soweit die Marke nicht eingetragen Ist, gilt die allgemeine Regel, daß die Chancen der
Durchsetzung eines Schutzes steigen, je stärker die Marke ist und welchen Bekanntheitsgrad sie genießt.
Es wird kein Unterschied gemacht zwischen einer stärkeren und einer schwächeren
Marke, was die Frage der Durchsetzung von Rechten anbelangt.
Es bestehen keine Normen hinsichtlich der Entscheidung des Ausgangs eines Ausgleichs zwischen den verschiedenen Kriterien zur Prüfung von Ähnlichkeiten zwischen
Warenzeichen. Die Identität hinsichtlich des Konzeptes zwei rivalisierender Warenzeichen kann zu Verwechslung führen. Ist dies jedoch die einzige Ähnlichkeit zwischen
den Marken, sollten alle übrigen Umstände des Falles in Betracht gezogen werden.
Ein eingetragenes Warenzeichen Ist auch gegen Übersetzung in andere Sprachen geschützt.
Das israelische Gesetz umfaßt keine spezifischen Bestimmungen hinsichtlich der Übersetzung von einer offiziellen Sprache in eine andere.
157
Marken, die zu einer Markenfamilie gehören, genießen keinen besonderen Schutz.
Israel hat keine allgemeine Regel gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb.
Die Personen, die Warenzeichen aufgrund ihrer Ähnlichkeit verwechseln kônnen, sind
jene, denen die betreffenden Waren oder Dienstleistungen präsentiert werden.
Die Frage der Verwechslung ist eine rechtliche Frage, die auf der Grundlage der Be-
weismittel und als berechnete Mutmaßung, nicht durch Aufstellung bestimmter
Prozentsätze, vom Gericht entschieden werden muß.
Das Risiko der Verwechslung in Bezug auf Medikamente gilt bei den Gerichten als
schwerwiegendes Risiko.
Der entscheidende Moment bei der Frage einer Verwechslung ist das Datum, an dem
das Rechtsverfahren eröffnet wurde.
Eine nachgewiesene Täuschungsabsicht hilft dem Eigentümer einer Marke bei der
Durchsetzung seiner Rechte.
158
Itatle
Italy
Italien
Report Q 127
in the name of the Italian Group
by S. SANDRI (Chairman), B. BELLOMO, F. CAVATTONI, D. DE SIMONE, C.
FIAMMENGHI, A. GELSOMINI, F. GIAMBROCONO, L. LUPPI, M. RUBEN
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
I.
General rules for comparison
The rules developed by Italian case-law presuppose that comparison is not effected on
identical marks for identical products or services. These rules therefore rely on objective
parameters for judging whether or not there is a possibility of confusion, in order to avoid
arbitrariness. The commonly accepted rules are the following:
the comparison must be made taking due account of the degree of attention paid and
the average cultural level of the consumer;
the mark must be appraised in terms of its general impression, with the synthetic method prevailing over the analytical method when appraising any individual elements (in
other words, the number of identical letters is totally irrelevant, but not their overall phonetic effect; e.g., RAve" and Ape, "Oranzeta Lemonzeda" and Oranso Lemonsoda");
there must be more significant similarities than differences;
in complex marks comprising several elements, those which have an individualising
power are the relevant ones;
the comparison must be made between the present mark and the memory of the previous mark;
consideration must be given to the form and the context in which the products bearing
the mark are offered and acquired by the consumers.
II. Criteria for comparison
The most commonly accepted opinion in the literature and the latest case-law emphasise
the fact that the power of the distinctive character of a mark must be set on a scale of
159
values in relation to its actual context. This can range from a void mark, because it is generic or merely descriptive of a product or its characteristics, to a mark which has the maximum protection because it uses words of common language to denote a product which
has nothing to do with that meaning. For a long time a distinction has been drawn between
"strong" marks and "weak' marks. The strong" marks are those that are "without any
meaningful connection with the products or services that they distinguish" (Vanzetti-Di
Cataldo, "Manuale", 1993, for example the reproduction of the head of a cat in order to
distinguish yarns and fabrics) or "marks which do not reveal anything about the type of
product they distinguish" (Cass. 2/8/1990, no. 7768, for example the "Seven Up" mark).
Generally speaking these are "words, figures or other signs which are purely the fruit of the
imagination (for example the "Koleston" for shampoos, "Kodak" for films) or a metaphorical
transposition (for example the "Domino' mark for electric switches, "Fruit of the Loom" for
garments, "BuondI" for snacks) or otherwise contrived (for example the "Laphroaig" mark
for a Scotch whisky linked to a production zone with a Gaelic name) "in that there is no
conceptual linkage to the producr (Cass. 11/5/1982, no. 2929).
The "weak" marks are those which "consist in signs that are conceptually linked to the pro-
duct in some way (or to the features, type, quality, quantity, destination, value, geographical origin of the product) because they express or consist of indications or descriptive figures, or are in some way endowed with a poor distinctive capacity' (Di Cataldo segni distintivi, 1993; for example the mark "Playboy" for the magazine of that name,
"Fluimucil" for medicines against catarrh, "Amplifon" for hearing aids) or "a mark which,
while not being identified with the generic name, nevertheless easily suggests what product it distinguishes" (Cass. 2/8/1990, no. 7768, for example the mark "Color ton" for hair
dyes, "Baby parking" for a children's nursery service").
This difference is important with regard to the scope of protection. A strong mark
(according to legal writers and well-established case law) enjoys particularly strong protection because it extends to the type, the core of meaning, the concept which the mark
expresses. lt is therefore an infringement to adopt variants or modifications, even substantial ones, of a strong mark when they leave "the essential identity of the type" intact (for
example, the courts have declared the following marks to be apt to cause confusion:
"FAUST' and "FAUSTFAM", for insecticides; "LUX" and "LUXUS", for soaps; "ETHICON"
and 'TICRON", for medical products, "ROCHAS" and SIMON ROCHAS", for perfumes;
"INVER" and "INVERCOLOR", for paints).
However with a weak trademark only slight changes are needed to prevent infringement,
and the expressive element which constitutes the core must be at the disposal of everyone
(for example, the courts have ruled that the following do not create confusion, "Donna" and
"Donna più" for women's magazines; "Sint" and "Synt" for lubricants, "Puma" and
"Piumotto" for fabrics, "Dermax" and "Dermadex" for specific medicines for dermatitis).
2. Sound, Sight and Meaning
lt is established case-law that the judgement regarding possible confusion between marks
must be made "comprehensively and synthetically, with a unitary and overall examination
160
and appreciation of all the salient features of the mark; phonetic, visual and graphic"
(Modena Court 8/11/1985). However, in order to establish which of these features prevails, it is necessary to refer to the type of consumer in question, and the ways in which the
consumer compares the two marks in actual practice. There are therefore no fixed rules as
to whether the phonetic or the figurative or the verbal element must prevail, since this
varies from case to case.
For the verbal element, and particularly its meaning, the principles referred to when
discussing strong and weak marks apply (for example the Court held that the trademark
"Cassera' was likely to be confused with "Carrera" not because the concept was similar, or
the type - since both were surnames - but because they was a strong similarity in both
graphic and phonetic terms).
The figurative element may have more distinctive effectiveness than the verbal element (for
example the figurative and complex mark "Chicco" was considered not to be likely to
create confusion in terms of the figure and the with the figurative and complex mark
"Chico" for distinguishing baby products, despite the similarity of the verbal and phonetic
elements). On other occasions, particularly when the verbal element is also a surname, the
contrary may apply (one only has to think of the "Benetton" mark or such labels as
"Missoni", "Armani" and "Gucci" with regard to their logo and graphic symbols; in one case,
the "Krizia" mark was considered protected in terms of its phonetic and verbal aspect
despite the very strong graphic difference in the infringer's trademark).
The phonetic element may also be considered particularly important if the product bearing
the mark is ordered by a consumer verbally in actual practice (for example, in Italy, ciga-
rettes are mostly requested by smokers verbally to the tobacconist: "may
I
have
MARLBORO please").
Conversely, the same element may be completely irrelevant (as was decided in a case of
trademark infringement for products for deaf people or those with poor hearing when
"Amplifon" was deemed to have been infringed by "Udifon").
Translations
There are no specific provisions regarding translations. However, it has always been the
practice of the Italian courts, applying the principle of territoriality, to consider that the mark
must be judged in terms of its originality and novelty taking account of the linguistic and
cultural levels of the Italian consumer (for example, the following marks were considered
valid and hence protected: "Cow Milk" for animal feed; "National Burner" for boiler burners;
and "Bund" for bandages, while "Scotchdrink" was ruled null and void for wines and liquors
because it was descriptive and generic.
Family marks
No specific legal protection is provided. The so-called "family marks" enjoy in effect more
effective protection both because the continual, widespread and repeated use of them
161
reinforces their distinguishing capacity, and also because they are so strong that their
power extends by a locomotive effect and rubs off on secondary marks or elements
accompanying them (for example "Montedison, "Montefibre', Montefluos', "Monteshell"
for chemicals, the marks used on products to extend a particular line such as the "Gente
Viaggi", "Gente Motori", "Gente Money, for periodicals and magazines).
5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
The possibility of confusion must be appraised in terms of the actual use of the mark on
the market. lt an earlier mark has been accompanied by elements other than those present
in the registration, according to Italian case law that mark will be protected de facto and
can therefore be protected both under the law against unfair competition and under the
Trade Marks Act.
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
The evaluation criteria and the method for ascertaining whether it is possible to confuse
trade marks have been developed by Italian case-law in relation to the purchaser with an
average experience, and to his range of choice of purchase, but not in relation to the consumer.
Which part of the public?
Isolated episodes of confusion that have actually occurred may not be sufficient to
conclude positively that confusion is likely to be caused. However it is sufficient that confusion is probable, and not actual. In order to ascertain whether marks might be confused,
the type of purchaser with average attention, culture and intelligence belonging to that
public or that part of the public in general to which the product bearing the mark is targeted
must be identified.
It is generally the judge who decides at his discretion whether there is a danger of confusion. In more doubtful cases, however, the courts are now beginning to admit that this
judgement might be helped by marketing surveys and market research. But it is always for
the judge to see whether the market surveys and research are reliable, and what percentage may be considered important and significant.
Relevance of kinds of products; medicines
As far as medicines are concerned Italian case law has laid down the following principles:
a) "With regard to marks relating to medicinal specialities, what is relevant is that the products are to be used by persons with a strong capacity to choose" (Cass. 13/2/1980,
no. 1043);
162
b) however "it cannot be said that doctors' memoiy and attention is above average, because they also are subject to the risk that if they are uncertain whether the sound of
the mark actually matches the written wording they maybe induced not to prescribe the
speciality in order to avoid falling into error" (Milan Appeal Court 221 9/1972);
C) the current tendency seems to be to draw a distinction between two levels of public:
the specialists (doctors, wholesalers and pharmacists) who are considered to have a
high capacity for distinguishing, and others (patients and end consumers) whose level
of skill and capacity to distinguish is lower. When "drugs that can be sold exclusively on
prescription, and only drugs which are actually sold on prescription" are involved the
interested level of public is the higher one (Milan Court 17/4/1986).
DecisIve moment of confusion
For procedural reasons the relevant time for judging whether a trade mark creates confusion is the date on which the summons was served. However, there are some cases in
which account must also be taken of developments and modifications of some situations
during the course of the proceedings (which may last years) which may concern the
trademark, especially its useln fcat, the trademark may strenghten its distinctive capability
(for instance through an intense advertising use) as opposed to the initial one, or may become subject to lapse for non-use. In these cases, the relevant time to be brought into
consideration is that of the decision, and not that when the summons is served (Rome
Court of Appeal, 27/911993, Philip Morris/Marlboro Sound).
Fraudulent Intent
Fraudulent intent is relevant for the purposes of calculating damages and ascertaining the
validity of the deposit of the trade mark. It is irrelevant for the purposes of ascertaining the
likelihood of confusion.
IV. Other criteria
The Civil Code considers the mark to be one of the "distinctive signs of a firm" together
with the company name and the company logo. When the mark is identical to and coincides with the other signs, there is a situation of interference or accumulation for the purposes of the protection expressly governed by the Trade Marks Act. These situations can
be considered by the judge in order to strengthen his conviction when assessing the possibility of confusion arising between the marks, considering the principle of the equivalence
between distinctive signs of firms, according to which the protection of one sign has the
tendency to extend to the other. lt remains true that firm names/styles, signboards and
trademark have different nature and aims, and accordingly a specific individual protection.
163
Résumé
La jurisprudence a défini et renforcé depuis longtemps des principes objectifs selon lesquels on doit conduire le jugement sur la confusion .entre les marques. Ces principes se
réfèrent au consommateur, au marché et à la façon selon laquelle la marque est utilisée.
Dans le jugement de confusion on prend en considération la force distinctive de la marque.
Il n'y a pas de règles ou de normes légales spéciales, en ce qui concerne les marques
phonétiques, figuratives, verbales, de langue étrangère ou les "family marks". Pour les
produits médicamenteux on distingue le niveau des spécialistes de celui de l'acheteur final.
En général, le moment pour constater la possibilité de confusion est celui de la citation de-
vant le Tribunal. Des autres signes distinctifs, comme la raison sociale et l'enseigne
peuvent concourir pour compléter le judice sur la confusion.
Zusammenfassung
Die italienische Rechtsprechung hat schon lange objektive Richtlinien definiert und festgesetzt, wonach die Verwechsetbarkeit der Warenzeichen beurteilt werden soll. Diese Richtlinien nehmen Bezug auf den Verbraucher, den Markt sowie die Weise der tatsächlichen
Benutzung der Warenzeichen. Bei der Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit derselben wird
die Unterscheidungskraft in Betracht gezogen. Es gibt keine Regel oder gesetzliche Bestimmung bezüglich der phonetischen Zeichen, der Bildzeichen, der Wortzeichen sowie
der Zeichen ausländischer Herkunft oder der "family marks". Was die Arzneimittel betrifft,
unterscheidet man zwischen dem Niveau der Fachmänner und demjenigen des
Schlusskâufers. Der Zeitpunkt der Bestimmung der Verwechselbarkeit entspricht im allgemeinen demjenigen der Ladung vor Gericht. Weitere Unterscheidungszeichen, wie die
Firma und das Schild können beitragen, die Verwechselbarkeitsbeurteilung zu ergânzen.
164
Japon
Japan
Japan
Report 0 127
by the Japanese Group
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
1. General rules for comparison
One must compare two trademarks from the point of view of whether confusion is likely
if both trademarks are used on same or similar goods at a different time and place, because consumers see and hear trademarks at different times and places. Therefore,
comparison must not be direct comparison, but should be made on an impression
between both marks which exist in the memory of customers.
There are numerous legal precedents on this point in Japan.
Trademarks should be compared preliminary in their entirety, because a commercial
impression of a trademark on an ordinary purchaser is created by the trademark as a
whole.
There are also numerous legal precedents.
C) While the basic rule is that trademarks must be compared in their entireties as stated
above, comparison may also be made on dominant parts of trademarks, because the
image of both marks in the memory of customers is often vague and limited only to the
dominant parts of the trademarks. In most composite trademarks, some parts of the
trademarks are dominant in total impact upon the ordinary purchaser, and if the dominant parts of both marks are the same, then confusion may be likely.
There are also numerous legal precedents in Japan.
Il. Criteria for comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
Scope of protection of so-called strong marks are broader than normal marks. The
more distinctive, unique and well known marks are, the deeper in the impression they
create upon the public consciousness, and the greater the scope of protection to which
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they are entitled. Therefore, a purely fanciful coined mark or well known mark is given a
broader protection, and a highly suggestive mark is given a narrower scope of protection.
Sound, sight and meaning
The Japanese court has consistently held that similarity of trademarks should be
judged from the point of view of whether confusion is likely in a case where both marks
are used on the same or similar goods. And, it is practically agreed that similarity in any
one of the elements of sound, sight and meaning is basically sufficient to prove likelihood of confusion.
However, similarity as to one aspect of the sound, sight and meaning does not automatically result in finding of a likelihood of confusion. Even if marks are phonetically
similar, confusion is sometimes prevented by the different suggestive connotations of
marks.
In some situations» where a word has different meanings in different context, even the
use of the phonetically same words will not be likely to cause confusion. Particularly in
Japan we have kanji characters (Chinese characters) a lot of which have same sound
but different intonation and meanings, and we use words comprising these characters
every day in a different context without confusion. Therefore, there is a higher possibility in Japan more than in other countries that phonetically similar or even phonetically
the same marks can be distinguished by the different meanings thereof.
In determining whether confusion is likely based on similarity of sound and meaning, it
should be noted that there are different cultures, customs and languages in the world,
and consequently sound and meaning are sometimes different in different geographical
areas. lt is absolutely impossible to control the pronunciation of the mark and sometimes difficult to assume in which sound and meaning customers use a word. Therefore, the above must be taken into account in judging whether confusion is likely.
"Tornado' "Cyklone" and 'Typhoon could be distinguished among some type of
purchasers in some geographical areas, but not among different purchasers due to
different cultures, customs and level of intelligence.
TranslatIons
a) Generally, if trademarks comprising some languages are protected, translations thereof
are also protected, provided that the meanings of translations are known among average customers. Therefore, translations are protected on a case-by-case basis in different geographical areas in different countries which have different cultures, customs,
languages, etc.
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In Japan, if foreign words are difficult to understand for average customers, ft is not
considered that the trademarks comprising such words cause confusion with translations thereof.
b) Japan is a single language country.
Family marks
Family marks can be defined as a plurality of trademarks having a common prefix,
suffix or syllables which is recognized by customers as an identifying trademark in and
of itself when it appears in a composite.
In Japan there is no highly important precedent on Family marks'. Generally speaking,
if 'family surname', that is the common prefix, etc. is well known among customers like
"Koda' of Eastman Kodak Co., or "Mc' of McDonald's, Corp., such family marks
should be protected.
Conditions under which the older mark has been used
a) There is a tendency for the court to take into account actual circumstances as much as
possible, particularly in an infringement Suit in Japan.
All circumstances are not taken into account under the trademark law. lt is generally
accepted that the following circumstances can be taken into account.
The fact that the trademark is well known
The actual sound of the trademark used in commerce
Method of trade (telephone, direct mail, etc.)
The fact that slightly similar trademarks are concurrently used in commerce.
y)
The channel of trade of actual goods
vi)
Average customers of goods
In citing registered trademarks in a registration procedure or in an infringement action,
the trademark in actual use will not be compared, but the registered trademark itself
shall be compared. Therefore, if the registered trademark is used with extra elements,
the extra elements shall be excluded in comparing marks, if the extra elements have an
effect on identification of the mark.
b) On the other hand, all circumstances can be taken into account in unfair competition
cases.
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Ill. Others elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
'Average, ordinary purchaser principle has been consistently adopted in trademark
practices in Japan. Purchasers can be consumers, professional purchasers or wholesalers, or retailers.
Which part of the public?
Likelihood of confusion among a few purchasers or a small part of the public should
not be taken into consideration. As stated above, the test of likelihood of confusion
should be made by the average, ordinary purchaser" principle.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
In Japan, the court has consistently held that a judgement on a likelihood of confusion
should be made by caution or intelligence of average customers of the goods. Therefore, the test of confusingly similarity is modified according to goods. For instance if the
goods are pharmaceuticals, their customers purchase after careful consideration. The
same applies in purchasing expensive goods.
Decisive moment of confusion
In registration procedure in the Patent Office, circumstances relevant to the issue of
confusion should be those at the time when the Patent Office renders a decision. In an
infringement case, the circumstances should be those at the time of termination of an
oral hearing.
Fraudulent intent
Neither fraudulent intent nor intent to deceive is required. The problem is just whether
"confusion is likely'.
IV. Other criteria
The circumstances such as the example given in the text should not be taken into consideration. However, courts could take such circumstances into consideration on a
caseby.case basis under the Unfair Competition Law.
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Mexique
Mexico
Mexiko
Report 0 127
in the name of the Mexican Group
by Roberto AROCHI
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
I. General rules for comparison
From a careful analysis of the different cases resolved in Mexico from 1917 through 1985,
and thereafter from 1985 through 1993, regarding confusion, the Mexican jurisprudence
adopted, as of 1985, the general rules that are hereinbelow described. Unfortunately, such
jurisprudence has not been consistent because the authorities or Mexican Courts who
have been deciding on the issue of confusion, have been passing the matter back and
forth:
The analysis of a mark must be meticulous, but it must consider essentially the effect
which it might produce among consumers at first sight, or when it is pronounced
rapidly. In other words, the confusion refers to the first impression thata mark produces
in the public.
First Circuit Court on Administrative Matters of the First Circuit.
Cases:
A.R. 527/74 and A.R.487/74 Henkel & Oie. GMBH;
A.R. 204/77 Industrias Valvet de México, S.A.;
A.R. 861 /79 Brs. Inc.; and
A.R. 527/81 Aqua Mex, S.A.
When the older mark is well-known, even if it is formed by two words, and there is a
younger mark that contains the distinctive or well-known element of the older mark,
confusion must be declared.
First Circuit Court on Administrative Matters of the First Circuit.
Cases:
A.R. 401 /76 Christian Dior, S. de R. L.
A.R. 710/76 Ragu Foods, Inc.
A.R. 461 /77 Haw Par Brothers International, Ltd.
A.R. 924/80 Avon Products, Inc.
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The marks must be different, specially for them not to get confused due to its nature,
with another trademark previously registered.
Cases:
A.R. 2733/71 La Nueva Medalla, S.A.
A.R. 710/76 Ragu Foods, Inc.
A.R. 461/77 Haw Par Brothers International Ltd.
A.R. 844/77 American Motors Corporation
A.R. 924/80 Avon Products, Inc.
Consumers, who deserve protection to avoid being misled and to prevent them from
falling in error with regard to the nature and origin of the different products existing in
the market, and in order to guarantee the integrity and good reputation of the
distinctive sign adopted by the seller, to secure the identification of the product. In other
words, the trademark has to be peculiar enough to be clearly distinctive among other
marks placed in commerce or which are already registered, and the protection of the
Law has to be complete so that its attractiveness and distinctive quality suffers no
damage at all.
Third Circuit Court on Administrative Matters.
Cases:
A.R. 748/81 Intercontinental Hotels Corporation
A.R. 146/81 Laboratorios Miles de México, S.A.
A.R. 60/82 Banco of California
A.R. 1459/79 Kern Foods, Inc.
A.R. 1829/81 Hardy Spicer Limited.
The overall or as whole impression of the marks.
Cases:
A.R. 1829/81 Hardy Spicer Limited
A.R. 60/82 Banco of California
A.R. 1459/79 Kern Foods, Inc.
A.R. 146/81 Laboratorios Miles de México, S.A.
A.R. 746/81 Intercontinental Hotels Corporation
Other cases related to this issue are hereinafter described:
Supreme court - Second Court - Administrative Amparo proceeding no. 2794/40
- Fifth Season - Plaintiff: CIa. Nacional de Clavos, S.A. - September 30, 1943 Minister: Manuel Bartlett - Dispute: Confusion between "Electra"vs. "Electrico'.
Supreme court - Second Court - Administrative Amparo proceeding no. 7429/42
- Fifth Season - Plaintiff: D.S. Spaulding Sucesora, S.A. - January 31, 1994 Minister: Atfonso Francisco RamIrez - Dispute: 'Spalding" vs.'Spaulding" registration denied regarding the latter.
170
Second Court on Administrative Matters of the First Circuit - Administrative
Amparo proceeding no. R.A.1 100/70 - Plaintiff: R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. February 4, 1971
Magister: Jesûs Toral Moreno.
First Court on Administrative Matters of First Circuit - Administrative Amparo
proceeding no. RA-1923-69 - Plaintiff: Anderson Clayton & Co., S.A. de C.V. February 15, 1972- Magister: Abelardo Vázquez Cruz.
The general rules described in subsections a) and b) of Section I of this report, are reflected in the Mexican jurisprudence. Although sub'section c) is not reflected in the
Mexican jurisprudence, the Mexican Federal Courts have consistently applied this criterion. Some examples are described as follows:
I)
Supreme Court of Justice - Second Circuit Court - Administrative Amparo proceeding no. 6245/36 - Plaintiff: Laboratorios Pharmakon, S.A. - August 18, 1938
Minister
Aguirre Garza - Fifth Season - Dispute: Confusion between Triangulitos Cefalina
vs. Cafelina.
Supreme Court of Justice - Second Court - Administrative Amparo Proceeding
no. 10592/42 - Plaintiff: R. Fernández y CIa. - June 29, 1943 - Fifth Season -
Minister: Manuel Bartlett - Dispute: Confusion between the label of Tequila
Cuervo, S.A., that includes trademarks 'La Rojena"; and "La "Iberia"; and the
words José Cuervo vs. the label of R. Fernández y CIa., that includes trademark
'La Iberia - Confusion declared.
Supreme Court of Justice - Second Court - Administrative Amparo proceeding
no. 7397/44 - Plaintiff: Sanfeliz Hermanos - April 11, 1945 - Minister: Octavio
Mendoza Gonzalez Dispute: Confusion between 'La Parroquia" vs."Iglesias".
II. Criteria for comparison
Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection.
Under Mexican jurisprudence (A.R. 401/76 Christian Dior, S. de R. L. and others) the
distinctiveness of mark is proved as an stronger element to determine the scope of its
protection against confusion. For example, Christian Dior was the basis to reject the registration based on confusion of "Miss Dior"; "Diorette"; and 'Dior Boutique", because such
marks contain the distinctive or well-known element of the older mark, i.e., 'Christian Dior".
Sound, sight and meaning.
In accordance with Mexican Law (i.e. Law on Industrial Property ("LIP") similarity of meaning or connotation of word marks is not recognized or included in the LIP, it is limited to
phonetic and visual similarity regarding registrability of a mark. However, regarding the use
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of marks that have similarity of meaning without a registration, the owner of the older mark
has legal basis under Mexican Law to start unfair competition action by proving confusion
or consumers deceit.
Translations
Our LIP does not distinguish whether the mark must be well-known. In other words, the UP
forbids the registration as a mark of identical or confusingly similar marks that refer to the
translation of other languages.
Mexico has only one official language (i.e. Spanish), and therefore has no specific provisions as to translations from one into another of any other languages which might be used in
the country.
Family marks
No. First of all the LIP does not recognize the Family marks, but jurisprudence related to
Christian Dior mark (e.g. A.R. 401/76 Christian Dior, S.A. de C.V. and others) could be
applied where such jurisprudence provides that the confusion must be declared when the
distinctive element of the older mark is well-known.
Conditions under which the other mark has been used
No regarding registrability. The LIP is silent to regulate this issue.
Yes. The courts have stated that if the mark includes extra elements, such as
logos, the administrative authority must analyze first the words in dispute, and
then, as a second aspect, the extra elements (First Circuit Court on Administrative Matters - Administrative Amparo 831/69 - Plaintiff: Atoyac Textil, S.A. Magister: Guillermina Guzmàn).
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
1.
Confusion of whom?
The LIP does not clarify whether the owner of a mark must prove the confusion or deceit of the purchaser and user or whether the confusion of the user is also relevant.
a)
The inattentiveness of the "average ordinary purchaser" cannot be considered
as an additional element of evaluation. The Mexican Courts have stated that the
consumers are generally inattentive (Third Circuit Court on Administrative Matters - Administrative Amparo 1829/81 - Plaintiff: Hardy Spicer Limited - Magister:
Genaro David Góngora Pimentel), so this cannot be considered as effective evidence.
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b)
The LIP is silent to identify purchaser or user, the spirit of the Law is that the products or services under the younger mark should be declared as confusing regarding the products or services covered by the oldermark.
Which part of the public?
The LIP does not refer to this issue, nor is it included in the Mexican jurisprudence.
From my perspective, this element of evaluation cannot be considered, because it IS
extremely subjective.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
The LIP does not refer to this issue, nor is it included in the Mexican jurisprudence.
From my perspective, the elements of evaluation should not be subject to any exception.
Decisive moment of a confusion
The LIP does not refer to this issue, nor is it included in the Mexican jurisprudence.
From my perspective, the degree ofdistinctiveness of the other mark must be proved at
the time the complaint is filed to argue this legal point.
Fraudulent intent
Regarding the registrability of a mark, the LIP does not contemplate fraudulent intent as
an element to prove confusion. Notwithstanding the above, unfair competition actions
request fraudulent intent.
Other criteria
There exists the principle in México supported by Mexican jurisprudence that the authority
can only carry out acts as permitted by the law itself. Therefore, additional elements of
evaluation must be recognized by law.
Summary
The general rules developed in most countries regarding confusion, have been used by
Mexican Courts to declare confusion since long time ago. Unfortunately, Mexican jurisprudence regarding confusion still tolerates the subjective application of confusion, and I believe authorities and courts must remove the current criteria to establish parameters which
could help to identify clear rules of confusion. Subjectiveness must be limited to the authorities or courts.
173
The criteria for comparison is in general terms well regulated by Mexican Law and through
Mexican jurisprudence, or if by neither of them, by isolated court cases.
With respect to other elements of evaluation, I found them impractical, and it appears that
such other elements of evaluation must be supported by our Mexican laws.
174
Norvège
Norway
Norwegen
Report Q 127
in the name of the Norwegian Group
by Per V. BERGHEIM, Anne W. HOOT, Per A. MARTINSEN,
Nikolai NORMAN and Elfrid WAHL
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
General rules for comparison
The general rules expressed in points a) - C) in AIPPI's Working Guidelines must also be
considered applicable in Norway. This applies also to the second part of point C), i.e., that
it is the case in Norway, too, that likelihood of confusion shall be accepted only if ft is precisely the common elements that make the older mark distinctive.
Criteria for comparison
Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
In Norwegian law, also, it is recognized that distinctive marks must be allowed to be surrounded by a greater sphere of similarity' than less distinctive marks. From practice, we
can mention that the Patent Office's Second Oivision has deemed E)(XODOR as likely to
be confused with E)(XON (for the same goods in classes 3 and 5), while the Supreme
Court has not considered VITABORG likely to be confused with VITA (both for margarine).
It is obvious that the word EXXON, a foreign-sounding fantasy word according to Norwegian language customs, has been regarded as a considerably more distinctive (strong)
mark than VITA, which in connection with margarine alludes to vitaminizing. NIA has no
significant objections to this state of the law, its implication being that competitors must
stay further away from strong marks than from weaker ones.
Sound, sight and meaning. What Is most Important?
lt may be safely said that, according to Norwegian law, there are no rules or norms to indicate which of these factors is the decisive one. Any one of these factors could have a critical significance for the overall impression. In practice, sight and sound are the decisive
factors more often than meaning. The meaning would usually be more likely to have significance in the opposite direction; i.e., a difference in meaning could be the deciding factor
in determining that the marks are not likely to be confused when there is some doubt as to
whether the visual and/or phonetic similarity is too great.
175
Actual examples of this are closely tied to the Norwegian language, and it is therefore of
little merit to cite these in a report to AIPPI.
With respect to the suggested example mentioned in AIPPI's Guidelines (TORNADO,
CYKLONE and TYPHOON), NIR assumes that the similarity in meaning does not imply that
the marks must be deemed likely to be confused.
3. Translations
Are these covered by the protection even If the mark Is not well known?
Words which, in a language that is well known in Norway, have a descriptive meaning must
be considered to lack distinctiveness. lt is not certain, however, that two words in different
languages must be considered likely to be confused because they have the same
meaning. In this regard, both the English and the Swedish word for "lion" are registered
alongside each other for the same goods. Just as registrations of device marks do not
provide a general protection for the motif in the device, words that have a definite meaning
in one language do not give protection for this meaning in other languages.
Are there special rules for translation from one official language to another?
The two official languages in Norway are sufficiently close to each other that they do not
require translation. We do not know of any specific provisions for the translation of trade
marks to and from Lappish.
4. Marks in a family. Do these have special protection?
The point of departure in previous practice is that a totally regular evaluation of the likelihood of confusion must be undertaken with each individual mark in a trade mark family. A
decision by the Second Division of the Patent Office may be interpreted as holding open
the possibility of attaching importance to the "family" element. Nevertheless, this cannot be
considered to be established practice, and the answer to the question as to whether marks
in a family enjoy special protection must therefore, for the present time, be no.
5. ConditIons surrounding the use of the older mark. May one draw In extra elements that have habitually been used together with the older mark?
a) Within the frame of trade mark law
The point of departure for comparison with an older registered mark is the older mark as it
is registered.
However, one must be aware that the usage of the registered mark may have resulted in
establishment of additional elements, possibly in combination with the registered mark.
According to Norwegian law, the establishment of a mark means that protection has been
attained in accordance with the Trade Marks Act. But with regard to likelihood of confusion
176
with the registered mark, it is only the mark as it is registered that has significance for the
determination of the risk of confusion.
b) When applying the rules relating to unfair competition
The provisions of the Trade Marks Act may be supplemented by the provisions of the Marketing Control Act. The manner in which a trade mark has been used can have significance
for the decision as to whether there exist conditions which are counter to good business
practice, in accordance with the general clause ( 1) of the Marketing Control Act, or which
involve an unreasonable exploitation of the efforts of another person, in accordance with §
9 of the Marketing Control Act.
Ill. Other criteria for evaluation
Confusion for whom?
The point of departure in Norwegian trade mark law is that the risk of confusion shall be
appraised in relation to the relevant circle of trade. The rule appears in the Trade Marks Act
§ 4, first paragraph. Confusion which might occur among pure users (who are not themselves purchasers of the goods) falls outside the risk of confusion that is directly regulated
by the Trade Marks Act.
An independent evaluation of the risk of confusion is carried out by the Norwegian Medici-
nes Control Authority [Statens legemiddelkontroll], which also can appraise pure user
interests. Here, the requirements for distinctiveness are considered to be higher than those
according to the system provided by the Trade Marks Act.
Risk of confusion among pure users may fall under the general prohibition in the Marketing
Control Act § 1 - if there is demonstrated an unreasonableness in relation to consumers.
To which part of the public must the confusion be tied?
In Norwegian legal practice a basic principle is that the potential for confusion must be tied
to "a not insignificant portion of the relevant circle of trade." No guideline in percentages is
given as to where this boundary line should be drawn.
The Adidas decision in Gulating circuit court, cited in Rettens Gang 1986, page 1010 and
following, illustrates to some degree where the boundary line for "an insignificant portion of
the market" should be drawn. Substantial quality and price differences between the shoe
product offered by Adidas and that marketed by the defendant made it probable, in the
opinion of the court, that only "an insignificant portion of the market" could be expected to
confuse the products with each other. The criterion is tied to a purely subjective evaluation.
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The nature of the products as a basis for the evaluation of a likelihood of confusion - medicines
In Norway it has not been found justifiable to establish special standards of evaluation for
the area of medicinal products in general, or for prescription products specifically. The current prescription requirements and the other regulations pertaining to sale of medicines
may be subject to change, and all medicinal products shall, in accordance with Norwegian
trade mark practice, be evaluated as though they do not require a prescription.
Nor, on the other hand, have there been established any stricter requirements for distinctiveness for medicinal preparations based on the safety implications that product confusion
could have for the patients; cf. however, the Norwegian Medicines Control Authority Ill, no.
1, above.
The decisive moment for determining the risk of confusion
The Patent Office has, through its registration practice, applied the basic principle that a
trade mark which is to be registered must be suitable for distinguishing the goods of the
applicant from those of others, both on the date of the application and on the date of registration.
There is no legally binding Norwegian decision that addresses this question. However, an
approach to the problem is indirectly touched upon in the decision of April 11, 1994, in Eidsivating circuit court pertaining to Deutscher Weinfond's oppositions to the registration by
Ringnes AS of the trade mark Mozell. The invalidity case relates to the registration of the
word mark Mozell filed in 1986. The opposition is based on § 14, first paragraph, no. 2 prohibiting registration of a misleading trade mark. The City Court decision for invalidity
made on April 10, 1992, was amended by the circuit court, which acquitted Ringnes in April
1994.
In the grounds for its decision, the circuit court has not made further comment on the
establishment of distinctiveness that was achieved through the sales and marketing during
the period of time after the application for registration was filed.
The Mozell case has been appealed to the Supreme Court.
Fraudulent intent
As a point of departure, objective criteria must be used as a basis for determining whether
or not à danger of confusion exists.
1f there are strong indications that the younger trade mark is seeking to exploit associations in the direction of the earlier established trade mark, then such subjective factors will
be given weight in the consideration of the question of a likelihood of confusion when there
is some doubt associated with the objective evaluation.
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A more critical assessment of the likelihood of confusion may be expected in cases where
there has previously existed a cooperative relationship between the parties.
The trade mark Prestcold" was declared invalid by Oslo City Court in accordance with an
action brought by the proprietor of the older trade mark Prestone" - both marks being
used for anti-freeze solutions. The defendant had attemped to obtain representation for
Prestone without succeeding in this. He then registered "Prestcold himself, and began to
use the mark for a competing product.
IV. Other criteria
Use of colors
Distinctiveness alone through the use of colors cannot be attained in Norway. The state of
law on this point was confirmed most recently in the Supreme Court decision of August 28,
1992, where Spendrup's device mark Premium Beer was declared invalid due to the risk
of confusion with the previously registered trade mark for the champagne products
"Cordon Vert and Cordon Rouge. "Premium Beer" was registered in colors, while the two
champagne products were registered only in black/white. A Norwegian registered mark in
black/white shall be considered to be protected unconditionally for any colour combination.
The most important supplementary rules for the evaluation of likelihood of confusion are
found in the Marketing Control Act. Therein, § 1 and 9 set requirements that are designed
to avert unfair conduct/competition between business enterprises.
Appeals in accordance with these provisions may be subjected to separate examination by
the Council Dealing With Unfair Marketing Practices [Konkurranseutvalget] or the Market
Council [Markedsrâdet]. The decisions made by Konkurranseutvalget are not legally binding, but are attributed considerable weight in the event of subsequent court prosecution.
The decisions by Markedsrâdet are binding and cannot be appealed further.
179
Pays-Bas
Netherlands
Niederlande
Reporta 127
in the name of the Dutch Group
by Charles GIELEN, CHAIR, Frans PANNEKOEK and Koen LIMPERG
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
I.
Introduction remarks
The Dutch Group would like to make the following introductory remarks before answering the specific questions in the questionnaire.
Some of the questions aim at getting information with respect to the state of the law. In
this respect the Dutch Group remarks that trademark laws in the three countries
belonging to the Benelux Economic Union were unified with effect from January 1,
1971. Because of the entry into force of the so-called First Trademark Harmonization
Directive, Benelux trademark law has to be changed. The three governments of the
Benelux member states agreed on a protocol changing the text of the law. Due to longlasting ratification procedures the change did not yet come into effect. lt is expected
that the protocol will enter into force in the course of 1995.
on the basis of the text of the Benelux Trademark Act the trademark owner can oppose
any use of his mark or a similar sign for the same or similar goods or services as those
for which he deposited his mark. (Article 13, paragraph A, section 1.) lt is to be noted
that this infringement criterion does not mention the criterion
risk of confusion'.
'Similarity" is the only valid criterion for assessing infringement in the case of the same
or similar goods or services. In a landmark decision the Benelux Court of Justice deci-
ded (decision of May 20, 1983, case nr. A82/5, Henri Julién B.V. vs. Norbert Verschuere - also known as "UNION") that there is similarity between a mark and a sign
when, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, such as the distinctive power of the mark, the mark and the sign, each looked at as a whole and in correlation, show such a resemblance phonetically, visually or conceptually, that by this resemblance alone, associations between the sign and the mark are evoked. This risk of
association criterion which, as the Questionnaire rightly points out in paragraph 2, is
developed in Benelux law, has been widely applied in infringement cases dealt with by
Courts in the Benelux.
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The infringement criterion in the Harmonization Directive was made after long debate. it
lays down, inter alia, that the trademark owner can oppose any use of his mark or a similar sign in connection with the same or similar goods if likelihood of confusion oc-
curs, which includes likelihood of association. This text should be considered as a
compromise between the states belonging to the Benelux and other member states of
the European Union. The member states of the Benelux wanted to avoid that by adopting likelihood of confusion alone the trademarks in the Benelux would get lesser protection than under the broad risk of association criterion. Although not formulated in a
clear way it follows amongst other things from the minutes of the Council adopting the
Trademark Harmonization Directive that "likelihood of association" is a concept developed in Benelux law.
The likelihood of association concept is a wide criterion for assessing trademark
infringement, much wider than the classical notion of likelihood of confusion. Ukelihood
of association encompasses all forms of confusion (direct confusion, indirect confu-
sion, confusion as to sponsorship, confusion as to any other legal or other relationships).
The Questionnaire proposes that in the framework of Q 127 AIPP1 will not discuss the
relationship between the concepts of confusion and association nor the concept of
dilution. The Dutch Group is of the opinion that a mere evaluation of the notion of confusion in trademark law is a too restricted exercise. One of the reasons of the Dutch
Group to propose at least to include the relationship between confusion and association is that given modern approaches of the function of a trademark it will be necessary
to evaluate whether the classical notion of confusion still stands. Experience in marketing sciences as well as psychology learns that a trademark today is more than simply
a sign to identify the origin of products and services. A trademark also functions as a
means of communication. The trademark enables the communication with the market
place and allows the sending out of messages to consumers and competitors. These
modern functions of a trademark should be protected and there is a relation between
the functions of a trademark at the one hand and the infringement criterion at the other
hand.
Some of the questions in the Questionnaire aim at getting information as to the state of
the law. Other questions, however, are meant to evoke opinions of the national group
as to how the law should be. The Dutch Group will try to make a distinction between the
two in answering the questions.
ii. Criteria for comparison
Q:
Should likelihood of confusion with a strong mark be more readily accepted than with a normal mark In other words: does the distinctiveness of the
mark determine the scope of its protection against confusion?
Yes. The Benelux Court of Justice decided in its decision re. Juicy Fruit (decision
of October 5, 1982) that a mark and a similar sign will more readily be associated
181
if the mark has much distinctive power. The Dutch Group is of the opinion that
indeed the distinctiveness of the mark determines the scope of protection.
Q:
Are there any standards which decide the outcome of such balancing; for
instance: does similar meaning or connotation of word marks outweigh
dissimilarity of sound and sight (take for instance: TORNADO. CYKLONE
and TYP- HOON)?
As appears from the decision of the Benelux Court re. Union, risk of association
will be accepted if there is either visual, phonetical or conceptual similarity. There
are no other standards.
Q:
a)
Do the national laws protect against translation of a mark which Is
not well-known;
b)
Do the laws of countries with more than one (ofticial) language have
specific provisions as to translations from one into another of such
languages?
Article 13, paragraph C, provides that the exclusive right to a mark worded in
one of the national or regional languages of the Benelux territory shall extend as
of right to its translation into any other of the said languages (in the Benelux:
French, Dutch and German). The protocol changing the Benelux Trademark Act
does no longer contain this paragraph. lt is up to the Courts to decide whether a
translation of a trademark in an other language will be associated by the public
with the mark as registered. In the opinion of the Dutch Group, Benelux trademark law does not require a trademark to be well-known in order to enjoy protection against (infringement by) translation; risk of association is the only yardstick.
Q:
Sometimes a trademark owner owns several marks which have a common
element and which therefore can be considered to belong to a series or a
'tamil. Do marks belonging to a family enjoy specIal protection? Under
which circumstances?
Indeed in case of trademarks belonging to a series or a family infringement will
be sooner accepted under Benelux trademark law. For example: the trademarks
McDonald's and other trademarks of the same owner using elements Mac and
Mc were protected against the trademark McMussel for fastfood services (Court
of Appeal Den Bosch 23 May 1989). The trademarks Maaslander, Zaanlander,
Rijnlander and lJssellander were protected against the trademarks Texellander
and Zuivellander because of the impression the latter marks give that they belong to a series of marks consisting of the element "lander" (Decisions by the
District Court of Almelo, not yet reported).
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Q:
Does one only have to compare the mark as registered with the mark used
by the alleged infringer? Or does one have to take Into account the additional elements which are not part of the registered mark but which have
been habitually used by the owner of the mark and must one compare the
so-used mark with the later mark?
Under Benelux trademark law the Courts basically have to compare the mark as
registered with the mark as used by the alleged infringer. As follows from the infringement criterion given by the Benelux Court of Justice re. Union the Courts
are invited to take into account all particular circumstances of the case. lt is argued that in applying this rule the Courts may take into account additional elements which are not part of the registered mark. However, Benelux trademark
law provides that no one may claim protection for a sign which is considered a
mark within the meaning of Article 1 of the Trademark Act unless he has deposited it in due form. Therefore if additional elements having distinctive power or
adding distinctiveness to a registered sign have not been registered, they may
not be taken into account without deposit (such deposit can of course always be
made even in the course of or at the occasion of instituting legal proceedings).
In proceedings before the Dutch Supreme Court, a question arose with respect
to the use of the trademark Michelin in relation to the way in which this mark was
registered. Reference was made to Article 12 of the BTA which prohibits protection of a distinctive sign as a mark if such has not been deposited. The Court
of Appeal had held that the word Michelin was used in a distinctive graphic sty-
ling differing from the registration of the mark which was in normal lettering.
Therefore, in its judgment of 4 November 1993, the Supreme Court put the following prejudical question to the Benelux Court of Justice: if the owner of a mark
is using the mark in a distinctive graphic styling which has not been deposited
(assuming that the mark has been deposited in a normal lettering), would Article
12 prevent him from opposing the use of a mark similar to the distinctive styling?
The judgment is expected in the course of 1995.
Q:
If the trademark law cannot be Invoked can the solution be found by application of the rules of unfair competition?
Under Benelux trademark law the principles of unfair competition will not be of
help if protection is sought for a distinctive sign that is not registered as a trademark. This follows from Article 12 of the Benelux Trademark Act.
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
12)0:
Purchaser and user are not always the same: Is confusion of the user also
relevant?
The consequence of applying the broad criterium of risk of association is that
there is no particular relevance in making distiction between purchasers and
users. The Courts will in most cases look to the public at large. Not only
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confusion amongst purchasers but also amongst users of the products or services may be relevant (as LEGO rightly points out in some brochures: its products
are bought by parents but used by children).
13)0:
What should the criterion be: does even likelihood of confusion of a few
purchasers or a small part of the public suffice, or should It be a non-ne-
gligible or appreciable or considerable part? Should the problem be
solved with a calculated guess or should It be dealt with In a more exact
way, setting a certain percentage?
The Dutch Group is of the opinion that if it appears that only a very small number
of people would get confused on the basis of certain similarity between a trademark and the sign no infringement should be accepted. The Dutch Group is of
the opinion that if an non-negligible part of the public could associate a trademark and a sign infringement should be accepted. The Dutch Group would not
be in favour of using certain percentages.
14)0:
Should likelihood of confusion be less easily accepted because the
doctor, who prescribes the medicine, and the pharmacist, who Is the deli-
verer of the medicine, are specialists? On the other hand Is a hIgher
treshold against confusion called for, since confusion of medicines can
compromise the safety of patients?
Since risk of association could be assessed taking into consideration the public
at large the Dutch Group is of the opinion that the fact that certain customers are
socalled experts should not play an important role. Also in case of medical preparations of pharmaceutical products the public at large should be taken into
consideration. One should not underestimate the chance that also socalled experts will associate certain marks.
15)0:
Should the Registration Authorities and the Courts decide the Issue of
confusion as to the time of their decision? Or should other times apply,
e.g. the date of the registration of first use of the younger mark. or the date
of the writ of summons or any other time?
The Dutch Group is of the opinion that the risk of association should be
considered at the moment the Registration Authorities or the Courts are requested to give a decision.
16)0:
Which time Is decisive for the degree of distinctiveness of the older mark?
The Benelux Court of Justice decided in re. Juicy Fruit that the distinctiveness of
a mark in the context of infringement proceedings should be considered at the
moment of the use of the younger mark attacked in such proceedings.
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17)0:
Does Intent to deceive give rise to a presumption of successful deception?
The Dutch Group notes that in the English text one speaks of deception. This is
rather confusing. lt should probably read "confusion" instead of "deception". If
the question should be understood in this way the Dutch Group is of the opinion
that intent to confuse gives rise to presumption of confusion. It will in most cases
not be easy to show intent to confuse. Under Dutch law the basic principle is
that has the right to copy (even with intent) unless it amounts to infringement of
lP (such as trademark) rights.
18)0:
WhIch possible criteria other than the ones dealt with herelnbefore are relevant to the evaluation of confusion?
As outlined above the Benelux Court of Justice ruled that all particular circumstances of a case could be taken into consideration in assessing risk of association. The Benelux Court gave as an example the distinctiveness or renown of a
trademark. Other circumstances can certainly play a role in assessing whether
there is risk of association. The fact that a trademark belongs to a family or series or that a mark or similar sign is used by a former employee can be a circumstance which would give rise to association sooner. The fact that it concerns
very expensive products which are only bought after careful selection could be a
circumstance which avoids risk of association.
Résumé
De l'avis du groupe néerlandais, cette question ne saurait être dissociée du critère du
risque d'association, qui, au lieu du risque de confusion, est le critère d'infraction à une
marque, selon le droit du Benelux. Le critère du risque d'association apparaît tant dans la
première Directive d'Harmonisation des Marques que dans le Règlement sur la Marque
communautaire, et il faut donc l'étudier pour pouvoir apprécier le risque de confusion en
droit des marques Le droit du Benelux dispose d'une large jurisprudence sur ce critère.
Pour apprécier le risque de confusion, il faut prendre en considération ce qui suit. Lors de
la comparaison entre deux marques, il s'applique que plus le caractère distinctif est grand,
plus vite on considère qu'il y a infraction. En outre, une similitude, soit auditive soit visuelle
soit conceptuelle, est suffisante pour faire conclure au risque d'association. Dans le cas
d'une traduction, c'est l'opinion du public qui déterminera dans quelle mesure il y a risque
d'association. Il n'est pas nécessaire que la marque à protéger soit renommée ou très re-
nommée pour jouir d'une protection contre une traduction. Le risque de confusion ou
d'association peut dépendre de certaines circonstances qui sont extérieures à la marque
et au signe devant lui être assimilé. C'est ainsi que le fait qu'une marque appartienne à une
série ou qu'elle soit utilisée par un ancien employé du titulaire de la marque amènera à
constater plus rapidement un risque d'association, alors que, lorsqu'il s'agit de produits
185
très coûteux et dont l'achat sera précédé d'une sélection rigoureuse, on ne constatera
peut-être aucun risque d'association.
Le fait qu'il s'agisse de produits qui ne sont pas destinés au grand public peut également
jouer un rôle, mais on ne doit pas considérer trop vite qu'il est question d'une soi-disant
compétence du public, lI peut y avoir confusion même pour les médecins ou autres spécialistes. Lorsque l'on compare deux marques, on doit en principe être attentif à la marque
telle qu'elle est enregistrée et au signe tel qu'il est utilisé. Des signes extérieurs à la marque
peuvent intervenir dans l'appréciation. Lorsqu'ils ont un caractère distinctif, ils devront
avoir été enregistrés. Pour le groupe néerlandais, le risque d'association ou le risque de
confusion devra se faire dans l'esprit d'une partie non négligeable du public. On ne doit
pas établir de pourcentages fixes.
Zusammenfassung
Die niederländische Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass diese Frage nicht ohne das Kriterium
der Assoziationsgefahr behandelt werden kann, die anstelle der Verwechselbarkeit das
Kriterium für Markenverletzung nach dem Benelux-Recht ist. Das Kriterium der Assoziationsgefahr kommt in der ersten Harmonisierungsrichtlinie Marken wie auch in der Verordnung über die Gemeinschaftsmarke vor und muss deshalb bei der Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit im Markenrecht untersucht werden. Das Benelux-Recht hat eine umfangreiche Rechtsprechung über dieses Kriterium.
Bei der Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit ist noch folgendes zu beachten. Bei einem Vergleich zwischen zwei Marken gilt, dass je grösser die Unterscheidungskraft ist desto eher
eine Verletzung angenommen werden muss. Ferner reicht Ahnlichkeit im entweder
auditiven oder visuellen oder begrifflichen Sinne aus, um auf Assoziationsgefahr zu
schliessen. Im Falle einer Übersetzung hängt es von den Auffassungen der Öffentlichkeit
ab, inwieweit die Rede von Assoziationsgefahr ist. Es ist nicht erforderlich, dass die zu
schützende Marke bekannt oder sehr bekannt Ist, um einen Schutz gegen eine Übersetzung zu erhalten. Bestimmte Umstände, die ausserhalb der Marke und dem mit dieser zu
vergleichenden Zeichen liegen, können Einfluss auf die Annahme oder Nichtannahme von
Verwechselbarkeit oder Assoziationsgefahr haben. So wird der Umstand, dass die Marke
zu einer Serie gehört oder von einem ehemaligen Arbeitnehmer des Markeninhabers benutzt wird, Anlass sein, eher Assoziationsgefahr anzunehmen als bei Produkten, die sehr
teuer sind und nur nach sorgfältiger Auswahl gekauft werden. Bei diesen wird vielleicht
keine Assoziationsgefahr angenommen.
Der Umstand, dass es sich um Produkte handelt, die nicht für die grosse Öffentlichkeit
bestimmt sind, kann ebenfalls eine Rolle spielen, jedoch sollte man nicht so schnell
annehmen, dass die Rede von einer sogenannten Sachverstândigkeit der Offentlichkeit ist.
Auch Aerzte u.d. können in Verwirrung gebracht werden. Bei dem Vergleich zwischen zwei
Marken hat man im Prinzip die Marke in hinterlegter Form und das Zeichen in der
benutzten Form zu beurteilen. Ausserhalb der Marke liegende Zeichen kônnen bei der
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Beurteilung einbezogen werden. Wenn sie Unterscheidungskraft haben, müssen sie
hinterlegt
worden
sein.
Die
niederländische
Gruppe
ist
der
Meinung,
dass
Assoziationsgefahr oder Verwechselbarkeit bei einem nicht unerheblichen Teil der
Öffentlichkeit aufzutreten hat. Feste Prozentsâtze sollten nicht festgelegt werden.
187
République Tchèque
Czech Republic
Tschechische Republik
Report Q 127
in the name of the Czech Group
by JUDr. Jarmila TRAP LOVA
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Introduction
The confusion of trademarks is at present solved in the Czech legislation by provisions of
the Law on trademarks (No. 174/1988), as well as by provisions of the Commercial Code
(law No. 513/1991), in the later case namely by provisions regulating economic competition ( 41-55 of the Commercial Code). The considerations stated underneath are based
on the mentioned provisions.
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
One of the principle functions to be covered by a trademark is its ability to distinguish. The
ability to distinguish applies both to verbal expressions and pictorial representations. It
means that under the Czech legislation cannot be registered as trademarks denominations
denoting the nature of goods, denominations having no distinctive nature, descriptive and
laudatory denominations. Such denominations however are excluded from registration
only conditionally, i.e. the lack of distinctiveness can be remedied by proving that they
have become characteristic on the market for the goods or services of their owner. This
can be proved by dated authentic documents. Documents of such type (orders, delivery
notes, invoices, etc.) referring to the direct use on goods or services themselves, must
bear a date that precedes by at least one year the filing of application for registration of the
trademark, other documents (advertising material) referring only indirectly to the use of the
mark must bear a date that precedes by at least two years the filing of the application for
registration.
The mentioned requirement of distinctiveness as expressed by legislation and as requested by the Czech Industrial Property Office (hereinafter called only Office) is not an aimless
one. Competition must be taken into consideration as well as the fact that a product is
produced by several producers and it would be difficult to require from the consumer to
bear in his mind that e.g. a certain representation of a shoe belong to one producer and
another representation e.g. of a boot to another one. Hence it holds good that the higher
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the degree of phantasy vested in a trademark, the more a possibility of confusion with
another mark is excluded.
Sound, sight and meaning
The extent of similarity and the possibility of confusion is always the result of subjective
evaluation. A trademark is confusingly similar, if created by elements that are identical with
those of another trademark to an extend enabling confusion. Another criterion of evaluating confusion is to find out whether between the registered trademark and that to be registered there exist identity of goods and or services to covered by such marks.
Under the Czech legislation it is left to the owner of the older right to consider whether a
certain trademark or the tenor of an application for registration of a trademark is or is not
confusingly similar with his own registered trademark and whether it is necessary to exercise his right. The way how to exercise one's right consists either in filing a request for
cancellation of the younger trademark or in raising objections in the course of the registration procedure. The evaluation of the confusing similarity may vary from case to case and
both identical and differing elements must be taken into consideration. The prevailing elements are of decisive importance for the final judgement. Anyhow the distinguishing capacity of the trademark must be maintained. Hence the mentioned examples e.g. TORNADO,
CYKLONE and TYPHOON most likely would not be considered as confusing denominations, owing to the fact that sound and sight which prevail in these examples are quite different, whereas meaning is of lesser importance.
Translations
Although the present Czech legislation does not expressly foresee protection of literary
translations of verbal trademarks, it does not mean that confusing similarity could not be
objected under the rules mentioned above. Moreover provisions concerning the fight
against unfair competition could be invoked too by the owner of the trademark imitated by
such translation. The trademark owner would have to prove that confusion really arised.
Family marks
Are meant under this notion trademarks constituted by adding additional denominations,
prefixes, endings, type designations etc. to one chosen by its owner as his fundamental
trademark. Family trademarks are used by manufacturers whose production involves a variety of products, so that family marks make it possible for such producers to inform in a
conspicuous manner their clients about the relationship between such products and at the
same time to draw attention to the fact that these products originate from one and the
same manufacturer. This type of trademarks does not enjoy special protection, but they
undoubtedly contribute towards creating a situation of making certain trademarks better
known to the public, to the notoriety of such marks and towards acting as prevention
against confusion.
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5. Conditions under which the older mark has been used
An older mark, the validity term of which has expired, may be used by another person for
marking that person's products only after lapse of a certain period calculated from the date
of expiry. Under the Czech trademark Law this period makes 2 years. During this period
the Office is not allowed to register a trademark identical with that the validity term of
which has expired, for goods and services of the same kind, if registration is applied for by
a person different from that in whose name the trademark was registered at moment of expiry. The aim is not to allow misleading of the customer on who is at the given moment the
owner of the trademark and from whom originate the goods marked by such trademark.
Hence the aim is to built up an obstacle against abusing the goodwill created by some
else.
If a new trademark is created, while exploiting some elements only of an older trademark,
the question to be solved is whether such elements were creatively processed and to what
extend as to meet the requirement to avoid confusion with such an older trademark. lt was
already mentioned above that the Office does not evaluate ex officio in the course of procedure the possibility of confusion, laeving the question of raising or not raising objections
to the cosideration of the older trademark's owner.
Other elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
For the evaluation of the existence or not-existence of confusion, even a very small likelihood of collision on the market, should be sufficient. Confusion may be caused both by the
owner and by the user of the trademark.
Which part of public?
A trademark either is able to lead to confusion or not. To prove the possibility of leading to
confusion in respect of the whole public is not necessary. The fact that only a smaller part
of the public is getting into contact with a trademark does not mean that such trademark
may not lead to confusion. In view of the fact that evaluation of the likelihood of confusion
always depends upon individual judgement and that, consequently, the decision on the
matter is a result of subjective considerations, it is possible to resort, e.g. in the hearing on
evidence, to the results of sociological examination which may indicate to extend the public
is aware of the existence of confusion.
The knowledge of the number of people that have got into touch with a confusing mark
may be of importance for fixing the amount of damage or satisfaction in case of an action
for unfair competition.
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Relevancy of kind of Products; medicines
In case of medicines the practice of the Czech Registration Office is rather benevolent. In
these cases it is tacitly allowed to use certain prefixes and suffixes, which otherwise would
be objected on account of the possibility of confusion. However, in the field of medicines it
is necessary to respect names considered to be generic by the World Health Organization.
Decisive moment of confusion
For judging when such decisive moment arises, it is necessary to distinguish between nonregistered and registered denominations. In case of non-registered denominations used
for marking products or services of the same kind, such moment is the first use of the
confusing denomination. In case that registration preceded the use, such moment is the
date of filing the application for registration. The defense against the infringer of rights consists in case of a non-registered denomination in instituting an action for unfair competition.
The same legal remedy may be applied also in the case that an application for registration
was filed. In this case however it is more suitable to warn at first the Office in writing and to
draw its attention to the danger of collision.
In the case of an already registered trademark a request for cancellation filed with the Office is however quicker and cheaper than an action.
Fraudulent Intent
For judging the likelihood of confusion the question of whether the creation of a confusing
denomination was intentional or unintentional is not a decisive one. The fact of being guilty
is even meaningful for the evaluation of compensation in case of an action for unfair competition. The responsibility for damage, under the Commercial Code, is objective responsibility, i.e. irrespective of the guilt.
Résumé
L'autrice de l'article prend position au nom du Groupe tchèque de l'AIPPI sur la question
de l'évaluation de la confusion des marques et sort de la législation tchèque, en particulier
des dispositions en question de la Loi tchèque sur les marques et des dispositions sur la
concurrence déloyale comprises dans le Code de Commerce.
Zusammenfassung
Die Autorin des Artikels nimmt im Namen der tschechischen Gruppe der AIPPI Stellung zu
der Frage der Einschätzung der Irreführung in Warenzeichen; sie geht aus der geltenden
tschechischen Gesetzgebung aus, insbesonders aus dem Warenzeichengesetz, sowie
auch aus den Bestimmungen des Handelsgesetzbuches, die den unlauteren Wettbewerb
betreffen.
191
Suède
Sweden
Schweden
Report Q 127
on behalf of the Swedish National Group
by Fredrik GRANSTROM, Annika RYBERG and Örjan GRUNDÉN
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
I. General rules for comparison
In Sweden a modern Trade Marks Act (hereinafter referred to as the TMA) came into effect
in 1961. As a consequence of the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, the TMA was
amended in 1992 to correspond to the 1988 Council Directive of the European Communities to approximate the laws of the Member states relating to trademarks (hereinafter referred to as the Directive).
The Swedish system for trademark protection is based on a registration procedure which
includes an administrative examination of prior rights. Evaluation of the likelihood of confusion is much more frequently made by the Swedish PTO and, on appeal, by the Court of
Patent Appeals than by the civil courts. The nature of the administrative examination requires clear legal standards for the evaluation of likelihood of confusion.
Such clear standards are also essential in order to allow good predictability in the evaluation of potential conflicts. For trademark owners and their advisers such predictability is
very important in view of the high costs and long uncertainty usually involved in litigation.
From this viewpoint, a rather strict application of well developed standards is preferable to
a more subjective appreciation of all the circumstances of the case'. The establishing of
such standards and in particular standards having international acceptance is highly
desirable in the opinion of the Swedish group.
a)
In the present context, the TMA has always been based on the notion of likelihood of
confusion and the principle that this likelihood of confusion is depending on a combination of the degree of similarity between the trademarks and the degree of similarity
between the goods or services identified by them. Thus, a more strict standard of comparison is to be applied when the goods or services are identical than when they are
only similar.
lt is accepted as a general rule under the TMA that the likelihood of confusion shall be
ascertained bearing in mind that a purchaser does not usually have an opportunity to
192
make an actual comparison of the trademark which he has in front of him and the
trademark which he has in mind.
b) lt is further accepted as a general rule that the comparison to be made shall include the
comparison of the respective overall impressions. lt has been held that it should as far
as possible be avoided to differentiate between more or less distinctive parts in comparing two trade marks. However, it has been taken in this respect that a gradation the
scope of protection may be unavoidable, in particular when there exist already side by
side several trade marks built around the same descriptive or suggestive element.
Hence, it is normally not possible in Sweden to discard an overall similarity between
two trade marks because it is due to a common part which is not in itself distinctive.
C) The view that similarities are generally more important than differences is reflected in
the fact that it is accepted as a general rule that trademarks are confusingly similar
when one consists only of a characteristic part of the other as well as when one consists of the other with some addition. However, exceptions from this general rule have
been made in some particular cases.
Il. Criteria for comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
This question addresses two issues. Whether (a) marks with a reputation and (b) distinctive trade marks or so called strong marks are granted a broader protection than ordinary
trademarks.
a) The rule of marks with a reputation under the TMA has been amended in accordance
with Article 5 of the Directive. (Well-known marks protected under Article 6bIs of Paris
Convention are not dealt with here.)
The general rule under the TMA is that a trade mark shall be deemed to be confusingly
similar only if it relates to goods or services of the same or similar kind. Nevertheless,
the possibility of confusion may also be pleaded in favour of trademarks with a reputation in Sweden.
In accordance to the Directive a holder of a trade mark with a reputation may prevent
third parties from using any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in
relation to goods or services which are not of the same or similar kind. However, in order for the rule to apply, the younger sign must also take unfair advantage of the older
mark, or its use must be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the older mark.
Due to the recent amendment of the rule the case law in this particular area is scarce.
The old rule was more narrow in scope and did only offer protection to trademarks
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which had become exceedingly well established on the market and was publicly known
in Sweden. The courts established that a trade mark had to be known by at least 80%
of the relevant market of the product or service in order to qualify for the broader protection.
b) It has been argued that inherently distinctive trade marks shall be granted a broader
protection. Thus, it may be correct to say that the scope of a trademark's protection
against confusion is in this respect determined by the distinctiveness of the mark.
Sound, sight and meaning
When deciding whether likelihood of confusion is at hand the general rule is that one shall
compare the respective overall impressions of the trademarks, which includes an evaluation of phonetic similarity, visual similarity and similarity of meaning. Regarding the balance of the three, modern case law in this area has determined that sight dissimilarities
usually outweigh dissimilarity of sound and meaning. For instance the Supreme Court held
that the trade marks Bi and BiC were confusingly similar. The Court argued that the additional C does not sufficiently differentiate the two marks even though the sounds of Bi
and BiC are not confusingly similar. The Court of Patent Appeals came to the same
conclusion when comparing Tenderelle and TEND. In another case the Supreme Administrative Court held that Beacon were likely to be confused with the trade mark Bison,
which is an example of phonetic similarity. Similarity of meaning does only lead to likelihood of confusion in exceptional cases. A symbol of a cock (a devise mark) and the word
cock is mentioned in the TMA's legal history to be one example that could constitute likelihood of confusion.
Translations
a) Swedish case law has developed the general rule that the mere translation of a trademark is not enough to avoid likelihood of confusion. For instance the Swedish word
solstrâle which is an exact translation of the trade mark Sunbeam has been found to
be confusingly similar with the latter.
Family marks
There is no special protection for family marks under Swedish trademark law. Protection
can only be obtained by registration of a trademark or by establishing non-registered
trademark on the relevant market. However, it could be added that if marks with a reputation or distinctive trademarks are included in a new trademark, it will more easily obtain a
broader protection than a new trademark.
Conditions under which the older mark has been used
The rules regarding the use of the old mark under the TMA has been amended in accordance with Articles 10-13 of the Directive.
194
The owner of the old mark has to put the trade mark to genuine use in Sweden within
five years from the date of registration. The use of the trade mark must be in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered.
If the owner has used the older mark with extra elements added it could still constitute
"genuine use" in the above mentioned context as long as the differing form does not
alter the distinctive character of the registered mark. For instance the Supreme Court
held that the use of the trade mark BIG MAC (two words) constituted genuine use of
the older registered mark BIGMAC.
As long as the trademark has been used within the meaning of the TMA the owner of
the trademark can always rely on the registered form of the mark in a potential infringement action. Whether one should, or may, take into account the additional elements
which has been used by the owner of the mark has not been decided by the Swedish
courts. However, the mark with the additional elements is granted protection if it is
established on the market. A trademark is considered to be established on the market if
it is generally known to those to whom it is addressed.
If the trademark law cannot be invoked the solution could be found in the Marketing
Practices Act under the rules of unfair competition. Please see the Swedish submission
to the AIPPI Report Q 115 regarding slavish copying.
Moreover, the Marketing Practices Act could apply in a situation where the use of the
younger mark constitutes parasitic conduct of the older unprotected mark's reputation.
III. Other elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
Whether likelihood of confusion of the user is relevant when the purchaser and the user
are not the same is an intricate question that has never been tried by the Swedish courts.
The problem could neither be solved by simply dismissing the likelihood of confusion of the
user, nor by setting a general standard that the likelihood of confusion of the user is always
relevant. Why should the likelihood of the user be relevant? Take the situation where the
doctor prescribes a certain medicine for his/her patient. The medicine turns out to have
unexpected side effects which the patient announces to the public. When doing so the patient confuses two trademarks. The result could of course have disastrous effects on the
goodwill of the relevant trademark. In this respect the Group believes that it is of utmost
importance to look at the goodwill of the trademark in a long term perspective.
WhIch part of the public?
When deciding whether likelihood of confusion is at hand the Court will in an infringement
case compare the two marks in the way described under section I and Il. The fact that a
purchasers in a concrete case have confused the two marks may be used as evidence.
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Any actual confusion within a part of the public which is not insignificant should then be
relevant.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
There is no general rule under the TMA that differentiate between low priced products and
expensive products or products purchased by professional purchasers in specialised fields
when determining likelihood of confusion. The Courts, however, have repeatedly emphasised that one can not use the same standard on all trademarks. Therefore, in practice the
likelihood of confusion may be judged differently for different kinds of products and different kinds of purchasers. For example the Supreme Administrative Court held that the
trade mark Valentine for wine was not confusingly similar with Ballantine's whisky. One
argument put forward by the Court was that purchasers of wine and whisky are experienced purchasers and thus conscious of the various trademarks on the relevant market.
Moreover, one could expect that a purchaser of a car is more attentive than a purchaser of
toothpaste.
Regarding prescribed medicinal products, in practice the traditional view has been that a
higher threshold against confusion shall apply when confusion of medicines could compro-
mise the safety of the patient. This standard has been developed in case law in accordance with a recommendation found in the TMA's legal history. For instance, the Court of
Patent Appeal found Maxomat to be confusingly similar with Maxamid.
Lately, the practice of the Swedish PTO shows a slight tendency of lowering the threshold
when evaluating the likelihood of confusion. This is shown in the Digibind .1. Digitrin-case
where the Court of Patent Appeal held that the two marks were not confusingly similar.
Moreover, some authors in the legal doctrine even argues that the opposite standard
should apply since the doctor, who prescribes the medicine, and the pharmacist, who deliverers the medicine, are specialists. Also, one shall point out that consent between the
companies within the pharmaceutical industry is very common.
Fraudulent intent
Intent to deceive does not give rise to a presumption of successful deception.
Summary
The Swedish trademark rules for the evaluation of the likelihood of confusion have been
amended in accordance to the Directive. The evaluation of the likelihood of confusion is
made during the registration procedure by the PTO and the Court of Patent Appeal and
also during an infringement action by the civil courts.
The likelihood of confusion is depending on a combination of the degree of similarity between the trademarks and the degree of similarity between the goods or services identified
196
by them. Accepted general rules are that the likelihood of confusion shall be ascertained
bearing in mind that a purchaser does not usually have an opportunity to make an actual
comparison of the trademark which he has in front of him and the trademark which he has
in mind. The comparison shall also include the comparison of the respective overall impressions.
The Group is of the opinion that evaluation of likelihood of confusion requires a rather strict
application of well developed standards as opposed to a more general and subjective appreciation of "all the circumstances of the case'.
Résumé
Le droit des marques de la Suède pour l'appréciation de la possiblité de confusion a été
changé conformément à la Directive. L'appréciation de la possibilité de confusion est effectuée pendant le procès de l'enregistrement de l'office de la propriété industrielle et aussi
pendant une action de contrefaçon des Tribunaux Civils.
La possiblilité de confusion dépend d'une combinaison de degré de similitude entre les
marques et de degré de similitude entre les marchandises ou les services identifiés par
eux. Des règles généralement acceptées sont que la possiblilité de confusion doit être
constatée en constatée qu'un acheteur en général n'a pas d'occasion de faire une comparaison réelle entre la marque devant lui et l'image de la marque dans sa mémoire. La comparaison devrait aussi comprendre la comparaison des impression d'ensemble.
Le Groupe est d'avis que l'appréciation de la possibilité de confusion exige une application
assez forte des normes bien etablies contrairement à une appréciation générale et subjective de "toutes les circonstances dans le cas actuel".
Zusammenfassung
Die Vorschriften in dem Schwedischen Markenrecht betreffend die Beurteilung von der
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung sind gemäss der Direktive geändert worden.
Die Beurteilung von der Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung wird während dem
Eintragungsverfahren von dem Patent- und Warenzeichenamt vorgenommen, und bei einem Täuschungsprozess auch von den zivilen Gerichten.
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechslung beruht auf einer Kombination von dem Ähnlichkeitsgrad der Marken und der Ähnlichkeitsgrad der Waren oder Diensten, die von den
Marken identifiziert werden. Eine allgemein anerkannte Regel ist, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Verwechslung mit Rücksicht darauf beurteilt werden muss, dass ein Konsument
meistens keine faktische Möglichkeit hat die Marke, die er vor den Augen hat, mit der
197
Marke die er im Gedächtnis hat, zu vergleichen. Der Vergleich soll auch einen Vergleich
der Gesamteindrücke in sich schliessen.
Die Gruppe Ist der Auffassung, dass eine Beurteilung von der Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwechselbarkeit eine ziemlich strenge Anwendung von wohl entwickeften Normen fordert im
Gegensatz zu einer mehr allgemeinen Schätzung von 'allen Umständen des Falles'.
198
Suisse
Switzerland
Schweiz
Rapport Q 127
au nom du Groupe suisse
par Martin W. METZ, lic. en droit
Appréciation de la confusion en droit des marques
Introduction
La nouvelle loi fédérale sur la protection des marques et des indications de provenance est
entrée en vigueur le 1 avril 1993. La jurisprudence à son sujet est encore peu abondante. Il
n'existe cependant aucun indice qui permette de penser que Ia jurisprudence concernant
l'appréciation de la possibilité de confusion de marques différera de manière décisive de
celle sous l'ancienne loi. Pour cette raison il est fait référence ci-après à des jugements qui
ont été prononcés sous l'ancienne loi.
Sauf remarque contraire, le groupe suisse estime que les principes développés dans la
jurisprudence peuvent être recommandés comme critères d'appréciation.
I. Règles générales de comparaison
Image mémorisée
La jurisprudence a constamment mis l'accent sur le fait qu'il fallait tenir compte, lors de
l'appréciation du risque de confusion, du caractère flou conditionné par le temps
écoulé de l'image mémorisée, étant donné que le plus souvent l'acheteur n'a pas les
deux marques simultanément devant les yeux. Pour cette raison la comparaison prend
en considération le décalage possible et normal de l'image mémorisée (ATF1 93 II 265
(1967) BRISEMARINE / BLUE MARINE - possibilité de confusion reconnue; ATF 95 II
194 (1969) TOBLER MINT / POLAR MENTHE - possibilité de confusion niée).
Impression générale
La jurisprudence a toujours considéré que la possibilité de confusion devait être apprécié selon l'impression d'ensemble que les marques en présence laissent subsister.
1.
ATF
arrêts du Tribunal fédéral recueil officiel
199
C) Concordance d'éléments particuliers
Conformément à la jurisprudence, le risque de confusion avec la marque déposée peut
déjà naître quand seulement un de ses éléments caractéristiques est repris, dans la
mesure où celui-ci est distinctif et déterminant pour l'impression générale (RSPI2
1987/2 p. 235 s. THERMA / THERMATIC - possibilité de confusion reconnue; ATF 84 II
445-448 (1958) XYLOCAIN / CELECAIN - possibilité de confusion niée).
Dans le cas TOBLER-O-RUM / TORERO-RUM (les marques étaient toutes deux destinées pour du chocolat au rhum), le Tribunal fédéral constata que des éléments non
susceptibles d'une protection légale concurraient également à la détermination de
l'impression générale. Pour cette raison la possibilité de confusion fut reconnue (ATF
88 II 381 (1962)).
Il. Critères de comparaison
L'importance du caractère distinctif pour la portée de la protection
Le Tribunal fédéral suisse tient compte, lors de l'appréciation du risque de confusion, du
caractère distinctif d'éléments concordants, et nie le risque de confusion dans le cas où de
tels éléments sont proches d'indications appartenant au domaine public. Dans I' AlF 80 II
174 (1954) il fut déclaré à ce sujet:
"Celui qui choisit une marque qui rappelle une désignation de choses appartenant au domaine public et qui constitue de ce fait une marque dite faible, doit
en supporter les conséquences'.
Pour cette raison le risque de confusion entre les marques CLIX et CLIP pour des fermetures à glissière fut nié.
Dans I'ATF 73 11188 (1947) il fut par contre déclaré que le mot ALPINA avait été à l'origine
faible, mais qu'il s'était après un usage de plus de quarante années imposé comme signe
distinctif; c'est pourquoi, malgré la faiblesse distinctive originale, le risque de confusion
avec Ia marque ALPS fut reconnu.
Dans I'ATF 79 II 99 s. (1953) SOLIS / SOLLUX, le Tribunal fédéral constata que, lors d'une
concordance concernant seulement des éléments faiblement distinctifs, il n'existait pas de
risque de confusion. La faiblesse distinctive fut motivée par l'emploi usuel de l'élément "sol
pour toute sorte de produits. La possibilité de confusion fut niée.
Le groupe suisse est d'avis que le caractère disctinctif original ou acquis d'un mot influence l'impression générale de manière décisive, et doit pour cette raison être pris en considération pour l'appréciation du risque de confusion.
RSPI
Revue suisse de la propriété intellectuelle
200
La question de la prise en considération de marques avec des composants descriptifs ou
allusifs, et donc faiblement distinctifs, est à distinguer de la question de savoir si des mar-
ques, qui étaient déjà à l'origine distinctives, doivent jouir en raison d'une renommée
accrue d'une protection plus vaste. Il ne s'agit pas là du cas de la marque de haute renommée, à laquelle la loi en vigueur accorde une protection allant au-delà du domaine de
la similarité des produits. Ceci soulève plutôt la question de savoir si, dans le domaine de
la similarité des produits, la similitude des signes doit être appréciée plus strictement lorsque la marque du plaignant jouit d'une renommé accrue.
Le Tribunal fédéral suisse a, jusqu'à l'époque la plus récente, pour partie expressément
refusé une protection accrue de telles marques et pour partie laissé la question en suspens. Dans le cas QUICK / BLICK, il fut expressément mis l'accent sur le fait que seul importait le caractère distinctif des deux mots en tant que tels, et non le degré de valeur que
la marque QUICK avait acquis par l'usage (pour des périodiques). La possibilité de confusion fut nié (ATF 87 II 44 (1961)). Dans le cas LEGO / LOGI la référence faite par la
plaignante au degré de renommée de sa marque ne conduisit pas à la reconnaissance
d'une portée de la protection plus vaste. Le Tribunal constata qu'un traitement de faveur
proportionné au degré de renommée ne pouvait en effet pas être exclu dès l'abord, mais
remarqua cependant également que la renommée de la marque LEGO pouvait aussi faciliter sa différenciation dans la mémoire (Arrêt du 1F du 4 avril 1984, publié dans le RSPI I
1985, p. 71). Dans une décision de décembre 1993, deux marques pour des lessives se
trouvèrent en présence. Le Tribunal fédéral supposa de la part de la consommatrice
moyenne suisse une fort bonne capacité de mémorisation, et constata que celle-ci pouvait
très bien distinguer entre le produit "radion" connu depuis longtemps et la nouvelle marque
RADOMAT (ATF 119 II 477 (1993)). Le Tribunal fédéral tend donc à accorder à des marques ayant une renommée accrue non une portée de la protection plus vaste mais plus
restreinte.
Dans la doctrine et dans des arrêts de tribunaux d'instance inférieure est défendue
l'opinion qu'une marque avec un degré de renommée accru devrait jouir en tant que signe
d'une portée de la protection plus vaste, Il s'agit de tenir compte du fait qu'à côté d'un cercle plus restreint de derniers consommateurs, qui connaissent la marque et commettent
moins de confusions, il existe toujours encore un cercle plus étendu de derniers consommateurs, qui connaissent la marque plus ou moins bien et qui sont de ce fait exposés au
risque de confusion. Le groupe suisse est pour cette raison d'avis que le degré de renommée accru ne doit en tout cas pas conduire à ce que le risque de confusion soit plutôt
nié que reconnu.
2. SimilItude phonétique, visuelle et sémantique
La jurisprudence des tribunaux suisses considère que l'impression générale de deux marques doit être appréciée sur base de la similitude phonétique, visuelle et sémantique. Pour
les marques sonores, il faut naturellement de manière nouvelle tenir aussi compte du son.
Néanmoins aucune décision ayant eu à juger de l'effet sonore de telles marques n'est encore connue.
201
Lorsque deux marques verbales sont en présence, le Tribunal fédéral se détermine en
première ligne par rapport à l'effet auditif. Des arrêts, dans lesquels des marques verbales
auraient été jugées similaires à cause de leur concordance dans le graphisme seul, sont
pratiquement introuvables. Dans l'arrêt LEGO / LOGI déjà cité, le Tribunal fédéral déclara
qu'il n'y avait pas de violation de la loi sur la protection des marques dans la mesure où la
concordance dans le graphisme seul n'était pas considérée comme suffisante. Le Tribunal
déclara en outre que l'impression générale, qui est constituée par le son, l'image et la
signification, devait être prise en considération dans son ensemble, la signification des
mots et le son des mots restant davantage fixés dans la mémoire du consommateur (ASPI
11985, p. 70).
Aucune règle sûre permettant de dire quand, en cas de prononciation concordante, le
contenu significatif d'un mot élimine la possibilité de confusion n'a pu être établie. Dans le
cas ALPS / ALPINA le contenu, sémantique concordant fut déterminant pour la confirmation de la possibilité de confusion (ATF 73 11186 s. (1947)). Dans le cas déjà cité QUICK /
BLICK, la différence de la signification des mots fut déterminante pour la négation de la
possibilité de confusion.
Des problèmes particuliers se posent, lorsque des marques en présence sont composées
d'éléments verbaux et d'élément figuratifs. Conformément à la jurisprudence du Tribunal
fédéral, une importance prépondérante revient d'ordinaire à l'élément figuratif, puisque
l'élément figuratif reste mieux fixé dans la mémoire qu'un mot, en particulier le nom du
titulaire de la marque (ATF 62 II 333 (1936) drapeau / HOFSTETTER FRERES SPORT avec
drapeau - possibilité de confusion reconnue). Il faut toutefois pour de telles marques
également évaluer quels sont les éléments qui forgent l'impression générale. C'est pourquoi, lors d'une concordance d'éléments figuratifs similaires, la possibilité de confusion
peut aussi être inexistante (ATF 95 11194 s. (1969) TOBLER MINT / POLAR MENTHE avec
représentations de cubes de glace et emploi de couleurs partiellement identiques - possibilité de confusion niée; BGE 95 II 465 s. (1969) emballages de cigarettes PARISIENNES /
STELLA avec des éléments de conditionnement de couleurs analogues - possibilité de
confusion niée).
Selon la jurisprudence une marque verbale pure peut être également lésée par une marque qui est constituée par un mot et une figure, dans la mesure où le mot similaire prêtant
à confusion apparaît comme composant principal (ATF 96 II 248 (1970) BLAUER BOCK /
GOLD BOCK avec représentation d'une tête de bélier - possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Des marques composées chacune d'éléments verbaux et d'éléments figuratifs peuvent
également être similaires et prêter à confusion (ATF 63 II 284 s. (1937) BLAUSTERN /
STAR - possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Le groupe suisse estime qu'il n'est pas possible d'établir des règles généralement applicables permettant de dire auquel des éléments à apprécier (effet auditif, effet visuel, signification) il faut attacher l'importance la plus grande. Si l'impression générale respectivement
son image mémorisée concordent, la possibilité de confusion doit être reconnue et sinon
202
elle doit être nié, les trois éléments pouvant selon les données propres à chaque cas particulier avoir une pondération différente.
TraductIons
La loi sur la protection des marques ne contient pas de clauses protégeant les marques
contre des traductions. Néanmoins le contenu sémantique est précisément Un des éléments de l'impression générale. S'il est transposé par un mot d'une autre langue, la possibilité de confusion existe, dans la mesure où le contenu sémantique est perceptible (ATF
63 II 285 (1937) marque verbale et figurative BLAUSTERN / STAR - possibilité de confusion reconnue). La possibilité de confusion de marques verbales uniquement dans une
région linguistique suffit aussi pour rendre la marque postérieure inacceptable pour
l'ensemble du territoire de la Suisse (ATF 84 II 317 (1958) COMPACT / COMPACTUS possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Familles de marques
L'élément commun de marques d'une famille de marques bénéficie d'une protection particulière (ATF 87 Il 38 (1961) BIC-poche, BIC-cristal, BIC-IMAC, BIC-Clic / BIG-PEN - possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Même lorsque le plaignant dispose seulement d'une marque unique, la possibilité de confusion est reconnue si la marque du défendeur produit l'impression qu'il s'agit d'une marque d'une famille de marques du plaignant. Ceci peut être le cas lorsque la racine du mot
est reprise (ATF 102 11126 (1976) ANNABELLE / ANNETTE - possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Conditions sous lesquelles une marque plus ancienne a été utilisée
Conformément à la jurisprudence constante du Tribunal fédéral, deux marques doivent
être comparées telles qu'elles figurent au registre (ATF 100 II 416 (1974) WELLA et image
d'une tête / IBSA et image d'une tête - possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Il existe néanmoins aussi des exceptions. Le Tribunal fédéral a nié la possibilité de confusion de la marque AQUA avec entre autre les marques NIVADA AQUAMATICA et NIVADA
AQUAMEDICO avec le motif que les mots NIVADA et CROTON apparaissaient en beaucoup plus grand sur le cadran des montres, les mots AQUAMATICA et AQUAMEDICO ne
désignant que le type (ATF 82 II 236 s. (1956)).
Ill. Autres éléments d'appréciation
1. Confusion de qui
Le Tribunal fédéral détermine
le
risque de confusion
consommateur.
203
par rapport au dernier
Quelle partie du public
En règle générale, c'est le dernier consommateur moyen qui est visé, le juge faisant à ce
sujet une supposition sans qu'un certain pourcentage du public concerné ne soit fixé.
Comme d'ordinaire le juge en raison de ses connaissances professionnelles n'est pas un
consommateur moyen impartial, le groupe suisse défend l'opinion que la fixation d'un
pourcentage du public induit en erreur pourrait être prise en considération.
Importance du type de produit; médicaments
Il a déjà été exposé que pour l'appréciation du risque de confusion c'est l'appréciation du
dernier consommateur moyen qui est décisive. Dans le cas de produits de masse de consommation journalière, une attention moins grande est présumée que dans le cas de produits destinés au professionnel (ATF 92 Il 276 (1966) SIHL / COSIL tissus d'emballage
pour gros consommateur - possibilité de confusion niée).
En application des mêmes règles, il faut se déterminer dans le cas de médicaments
soumis à prescription par rapport à une attention accrue de la part de professionnels (AlF
84 II 445 (1958) XYLOCAIN / CELECAIN pour produits d'injection soumis à prescription possibilité de confusion niée). Par contre l'appréciation du dernier consommateur fut
déclaré décisive lorsqu'il s'agissait de préparations en principe soumises à prescription
mais pouvant dans la pratique être acquises par le consommateur sans difficultés extraordinaires (AlF 101 Il 291 (1975) STUGERON / UGARON - possibilité de confusion reconnue).
Un critère plus stricte de l'appréciation du risque de confusion de marques pour médicaments n'est pas exigé. Selon l'avis du groupe suisse, une manière plus stricte d'apprécier
ce risque n'est pas non plus nécessaire, étant donné que le consommateur moyen de
médicaments fera preuve de davantage d'attention que pour d'autres produits.
Moment décisif de la confusion
Le Tribunal fédéral se détermine en règle générale par rapport à l'appréciation du consommateur moyen respectivement du public acheteur, et par là par rapport à l'instant
hypothétique de l'achat. Il dépend du droit de procédure cantonal applicable si c'est
l'appréciation à l'instant de l'introduction de la plainte ou l'appréciation à l'instant du prononcé du jugement qui est décisive.
Le groupe suisse estime que le critère d'appréciation du risque de confusion à l'instant de
l'achat est en principe le plus approprié, même si des exceptions sont envisageables.
intention frauduleuse
Le Tribunal fédéral ne prend pas en considération lors de l'appréciation du risque de confusion en droit des marques l'intention de contrefaçon.
204
Suisse
Switzerland
Schweiz
Report Q 127
in the name of the Swiss Group
by Martin W. METZ, lic.iur.
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Introduction
The revised trademark law came into force on April 1, 1993. Jurisdiction on this new law is
sparse. However, there is no indication that it will essentially differ in the question of likelihood of confusion of marks from the jurisdiction under the old Act. Therefore, this report
refers to decisions made under the former Act.
As far as no other remarks are made, the Swiss Group is of the opinion that the rules
developed in the jurisdiction may be recommended in the evaluation of confusion in
trademark law.
I. General rules for comparison
Memorized Image
Jurisdiction has stressed time and again that for an evaluation of the danger of confusion it has to be considered that the memorized image is vague due to the course of
time, since the consumer mostly does not have both signs before his eyes at the same
time (BGE' 93 lI 265 (1967) BRISEMARINE / BLUE MARINE - likelihood of confusion
affirmed; BGE 95 11194 (1969) TOBLER MINT / POLAR MENTHE - likelihood of confusion denied).
Overall Impression
The courts have always taken as a starting point, that the likelihood of confusion has to
be judged by the impression two opposite marks leave as a whole.
C) Coincidence In single elements
According to the practice, a danger of confusion with the registered mark may already
be created if only one element is copied, as far as such element is distinctive and deci1.
Decision of the Swiss Federal Court of Justice, official digest
205
sive for the overall impression (SMI2 1987/2 S. 235 f. THERMA / THERMATIC - likelihood of confusion affirmed; BGE 84 Il 445-448 (1958) XYLOCAIN / CELECAIN - likelihood of confusion denied).
In the TOBLER-O-RUM / TORERO-RUM case (both trademarks were used for rum
chocolate) the Federal Court hold, that also non-distinctive elements have an influence
on the overall impression. Therefore, likelihood of confusion was affirmed (BGE 88 II
381 (1962)).
II. Criteria for comparison
Importance of distinctiveness for scope of protection
To evaluate the danger of confusion, the Swiss Federal Court considers the distinctiveness
of common elements and denies the danger of confusion if such elements are close to indications belonging to the public domain. In BGE 80 11174 (1954) it was explained:
Whoever adopts a mark, which is close to a generic indication of the public domain and which represents therefore a so-called weak mark has to take the consequences thereof.
As a result, the danger of confusion between the marks CLIX and CLIP for zippers was
denied.
On the other hand, in BGE 73 11188 (1947) it was stated that the word ALPINA was at first a
weak sign but had acquired distinctiveness by use of more than 40 years. For that reason
likelihood of confusion with the trademark ALPS was affirmed.
In BGE 79 II 99 f. (1953) SOLIS / SOLLUX, the Federal Court stated that a coincidence in
weak elements only does not create a danger of confusion. The lack of distinctiveness was
founded on the fact that the element sol" was very usual as a part of marks for goods of all
kind. Likelihood of confusion was denied.
The Swiss Group is of the opinion that the original or acquired distinctiveness of a word
has decisive influence on the overall impression and should therefore be considered when
evaluating the danger of confusion.
The qüestion of consideration of trademarks with descriptive or allusive and therefore non-
distinctive elements has to be answered separately from the question whether marks
which were distinctive from the beginning should receive a wider scope of protection due
to their increased renown. This is not the matter of a famous trademark which is awarded
by the present law with a protection beyond the scope of similarity of goods. It is rather the
question whether similarity of marks in the scope of similarity of goods should be considered more strict if the plaintiff's mark enjoys increased renown.
Swiss informations on Intellectual property, Zurich
206
The Swiss Federal Court has partly denied an increased protection for such marks and
partly left the question open. In the QUICK / BLICK case it was emphasized that only the
distinctiveness of both words were decisive and not the degree of importance the mark
QUICK could have gained by use (for magazines). The likelihood of confusion was denied
(BGE 87 II 44 (1961)). In the LEGO / LOGI case the plaintiff's claim regarding the degree of
his mark's renown did not lead to an increased scope of protection. The Court held that a
specia' treatment due to the renown could not be excluded from the beginning, but mentioned as well that the renown of the mark LEGO could also make easier the distinction n
the memory (decision of the Federal Court of April 4, 1984, published in SMI 11985, S. 71).
In a decision of December 1993 regarding two marks for detergents, the Federal Court
supposed that the Swiss average consumer had quite a good memory and stated that he
could very well distinguish Radion" which was known for a long time from the new trademark RADOMAT (BGE 119 II 477 (1993)). As a matter of fact the Federal Court tends not
to accept a wider scope of protection for marks with an increased degree of renown but to
attribute them a smaller scope.
In the doctrine and in decisions of Courts of First Instance the opinion is held, that a mark
with a higher degree of renown should have a wider scope of trademark protection. lt has
to be considered that besides a narrower group of final purchasers who know the mark
and therefore confuse it less with other marks, there is always a wider group of final
purchasers who only know the mark more or less and therefore are subject to a danger of
confusion. As a result, the Swiss Group is of the opinion that a higher degree of renown
should not lead at any rate to deny the danger of confusion more easily.
2. Sound, sIght and meaning
The jurisdiction of Swiss Courts takes as their starting point, that the overall impression of
two marks has to be judged in consideration of the similarity of sound, sight and meaning.
For acoustic marks, evidently the tone has to be regarded as well. However, there are no
reports on decisions yet where the tone of such marks had to be judged.
In the case of two wordmarks, the Federal Court primarily examines the sound of the
words. Decisions where the likelihood of confusion was only affirmed based on the fact
that the wordmarks had a similar visual appearance, can hardly be found. In the aforementioned decision LEGO / LOGI the Federal Court explained that it was no violation of
the trademark Act to hold that the coincidence only in the visual appearance was not sufficient to create a danger of confusion. The Court also stated that the overall impression
consisting of sound, sight and meaning had to be regarded as a whole but that the consumer kept the sound and the meaning more easily in mind (SMI 11985, S.70).
No reliable rules have been developed up to the present to decide when the meaning of a
word in case of similar pronounciation may eliminate the likelihood of confusion. In the
ALPS / ALPINA case the coinciding meaning was decisive for the affirmation of the likelihood of confusion (BGE 73 11186 f. (1947)). In the afore-mentioned QUICK / BUCK case
207
the different meaning of the words was the crucial factor for the denial of the likelihood of
confusion.
Particular problems arise when the opposite trademarks consist of word and image elements. According to the Federal Court's decisions, the image element as a rule has predominant importance, since the image element can be kept in mind more easily than a
word, particularily if it is the family name of the trademark holder (BGE 62 Il 333 (1936) Flag
/ HOFSTETTER FRERES SPORTS with flag - likelihood of confusion affirmed). Even here it
has to be evaluated by which elements the overall impression is shaped. As a result, even
when similar image elements may coincide, the likelihood of confusion may not exist (BGE
95 11194 f. (1969) TOBLER MINT / POLAR MENTHE with images of ice-cubes and use of
partly identical colors - likelihood of confusion denied; BGE 95 Il 465 f. (1969) cigarette
boxes PARISIENNES / STELLA with identically colored fitting-out elements - likelihood of
confusion denied).
According to jurisprudence, a pure wordmark may also be infringed by a mark combining
word and image if the confusingly similar words appear as the principal element (BGE 96 II
248 (1970) BLAUER BOCK (meaning blue ram) / GOLD-BOCK (meaning golden ram) with
image of the head of a ram - likelihood of confusion affirmed).
If both of two marks combine elements of word and image, they may also be confusingly
similar (BGE 63 II 284 f. (1937) BLAUSTERN (meaning blue star) / STAR - likelihood of
confusion affirmed).
lt is the opinion of the Swiss Group that no universally binding rules can be set to decide
which of the elements that have to be examined in case of likelihood of confusion (sound,
sight and meaning) may be considered as predominant. If the overall impression or its
memorized image respectively coincide, likelihood of confusion has to be affirmed; if not, it
has to be denied. Under the particular circumstances of every single case, the three elements may have different importance.
Translations
The Trademark Act has no particular regulations which would protect marks from translations. However, the meaning is an element of the overall impression. If a word in another
language has the same meaning and this meaning is recognizable for the consumers, likelihood of confusion exists (BGE 63 II 285 (1937) word and device mark BLAUSTERN
(meaning blue star) / STAR - likelihood of confusion affirmed). The likelihood of confusion
of wordmarks in only one of the four Swiss national languages is sufficient to render the
younger mark inadmissible for the whole country (BGE 84 II 317 (1958) COMPACT /
COMPACTUS - likelihood of confusion affirmed.)
Family marks
The common elements of serial marks enjoy particular protection (BGE 87 II 38 (1961)
BIC-poche, BIC-cristal, BIC-IMAC, BIC-Clic / BIG-PEN - likelihood of confusion affirmed).
208
Even if the plaintiff only owns one single mark, likelihood of confusion is affirmed if the defendant's mark creates the impression that it is a family mark of the plaintiff. This may be
the case if the same root is used (BGE 102 11126 (1976) ANNABELLE / ANNETTE - likelihood of confusion affirmed).
5, CondItions under which the older mark has been used
According to longstanding practice of the Federal Court, two marks have to be compared
under the Trademark Act exactly in the way they are registered (BGE 100 II 416 (1974)
WELLA and head device / IBSA and head device - likelihood of confusion affirmed).
However, there are exceptions. The Federal Court denied the likelihood of confusion of the
mark AQUA with among others the marks NIVADA AQUAMATICA and NIVADA AQUAMEDICO because the words NIVADA and CROTON appeared in a much larger scale on
the dials of the watches. lt was also held that the words AQUAMATICA and AQUAMEDICO
were only descriptions for the models (BGE 82 II 236 f. (1956)).
Ill. Other elements of evaluations
ConfusIon of whom?
According to the Federal Court, the danger to deceive the final purchaser is decisive.
WhIch part of the public?
The judge always decides on the hypothesis of the average final purchaser's impression
without fixing a percentage of the involved public.
Since the judge, due to his specific knowledge, normally does not decide as an impartial
average consumer, the Swiss Group is of the opinion that the determination of a percentage of misled public could be considered.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
It has already been explained that for the evaluation of a danger of confusion the average
final purchaser's opinion is relevant. In the case of mass products for daily use, a lower
attention is required than in the case of goods for specialists (BGE 92 II 276 (1966) SIHL /
COSIL packaging materials for bulk purchasers - likelihood of confusion denied).
According to this rule, in the case of medicine obtainable only on prescription the higher
attention of specialists has to be regarded (BGE 84 II 445 (1958) XYLOCAIN / CELECAIN
for injection products only obtainable on prescription - likelihood of confusion denied).
However, the opinion of the final purchaser was regarded as decisive in a case where the
goods were fundamentally only obtainable on prescription, but in practice could be
209
purchased by the consumer without prescription (BGE 101 lI 291 (1975) STUGERON /
UGARON - likelihood of confusion affirmed).
As a result, for the evaluation of the likelihood of confusion of marks for medicine a more
strict standard is not required. lt is the opinion of the Swiss Group that a more strict evaluation is not necessary since the average purchaser of medicine will pay a higher degree of
attention than when buying other goods.
Decisive moment of confusion
The decisions of the Federal Court of Justice are always based on the opinion of the average purchaser or the buying public respectively and therefore, the hypothetical moment of
completion of a purchase is decisive. According to the different cantonal rules of procedures, the evaluation takes place at the moment of filing a law suit or at the moment of passing the decision.
The Swiss Group is of the opinion that the criterion of evaluation of the danger of confusion
at the moment of purchase is generally appropriate, even though exceptions are possible.
Fraudulent intent
For the evaluation of the danger of confusion of trademarks, the Federal Court does not
consider the intention of imitation.
210
Suisse
Switzerland
Schweiz
Bericht Q 127
im Namen der Schweizer Landesgruppe von lic.iur. Martin W. METZ
Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit im Markenrecht
Vorbemerkung
Das geltende Bundesgesetz über den Schutz von Marken und Herkunftsangaben wurde
am 1. April 1993 in Kraft gesetzt. Die Rechtsprechung dazu ist noch spärlich. Es besteht
indessen kein Anhaltspunkt dafür, dass die Rechtsprechung zur Beurteilung der
Verwechselbarkeit von Marken entscheidend von derjenigen unter dem alten Gesetz abweichen wird. Es wird deshalb nachstehend auf Urteile zurückgegriffen, die unter dem früheren Gesetz gefällt worden sind.
Soweit nichts anderes bemerkt wird, ist die Landesgruppe der Auffassung, dass die in der
Rechtsprechung entwickelten Grundsätze als Beurteilungskriterien empfohlen werden
können.
I. Allgemeine Vergleichsregeln
a) Massgeblichkeit des Erinnerungsbildes
Es wurde in der Rechtsprechung immer wieder betont, dass bei der Beurteilung der
Verwechslungsgefahr die zeitbedingte Verschwommenheit des Erinnerungsbildes zu
berücksichtigen ist, da der Käufer die beiden Zeichen meist nicht gleichzeitig vor Augen
hat. Die mögliche und normale Verschiebung des Erinnerungsbildes wird deshalb in
die Vergleichung einbezogen (BGE15 93 Il 265 (1967) BRISEMARINE / BLUE MARINE
- Verwechselbarkeit bejaht; BGE 95 11194 (1969) TOBLER MINT / POLAR MENTHE Verwechselbarkeit verneint).
15. BGE
Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung
211
b) Gesamteindruck
Die Rechtsprechung ist immer davon ausgegangen, dass sich die Verwechselbarkeit
nach dem Eindruck beurteilt, den die sich gegenüberstehenden Marken als Ganzes
hinterlassen.
C) Übereinstimmung in einzelnen Elementen
Gemäss der Rechtsprechung kann die Gefahr von Verwechslungen mit der hinterlegten Marke schon entstehen, wenn nur eines ihrer Merkmale übernommen wird soweit dieses unterscheidungskrâftig und für den Gesamteindruck bestimmend ist (SMI'6
1987/2 S. 235 f. THERMA / THERMATIC - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht; BGE 84 II 445448 (1958) XYLOCAIN / CELECAIN - Verwechselbarkeit verneint).
Im Fall TQBLER-Q-RUM / TORERO-RUM (beide Marken waren für Rumschokolade
bestimmt) hielt das Bundesgericht fest, dass auch nicht schutzfähige Bestandteile für
den Gesamteindruck mitbestimmend sind. Die Verwechselbarkeit wurde deshalb
bejaht (BGE 88 II 381 (1962)).
II. Vergleichskriterien
1. Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungskraft für den Umfang des Schutzes
Das Schweizerische Bundesgericht berücksichtigt bei der Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr die Kennzeichnungskraft von übereinstimmenden Bestandteilen und verneint die
Verwechslungsgefahr dann, wenn solche Bestandteile nahe an gemeinfreien Bezeichnungen liegen. In BGE 80 11174 (1954) wurde dazu ausgeführt:
'Wer eine Marke wählt, die an eine gemein freie Sachbezeichnung anklingt und darum ein
sog. schwaches Warenzeichen darstellt, hat die Folgen daraus hinzunehmen".
Die Verwechslungsgefahr zwischen den Marken CLIX und CLIP für Reissverschlûsse
wurde aus diesem Grunde verneint.
In BGE 73 11188 (1947) wurde hingegen ausgeführt, das Wort ALPINA sei ursprünglich
schwach, habe sich aber nach mehr als 40-jähriger Benutzung als Kennzeichen durchgesetzt, weshalb trotz der ursprünglichen Kennzeichnungsschwäche die Verwechselbarkeit mit der Marke ALPS bejaht wurde.
In BGE 79 lI 99 f. (1953) SOLIS / SOLLUX legte das Bundesgericht fest, dass bei Übereinstimmung nur in kennzeichnungsschwachen Elementen keine Verwechslungsgefahr
besteht. Die Kennzeichnungsschwäche wurde mit der Gebräuchlichkeit des Elementes
"sol" für Erzeugnisse aller Art begründet. Die Verwechselbarkeit wurde verneint.
16. SMI
Schweizerische Mitteilungen über Immaterialgüterrecht, Zürich
212
Landesgruppe ist der Meinung, dass die ursprüngliche oder erworbene
Kennzeichnungskraft eines Wortes den Gesamteindruck entscheidend beeinflusst und
Die
deshalb bei der Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr mitberücksichtigt werden sollte.
Von der Frage der Berûcksichtigung von Marken mit beschreibenden oder allusiven, also
kennzeichnungsschwachen Bestandteilen ist die Frage zu unterscheiden, ob Marken, die
schon ursprünglich kennzeichnungskraftig waren, aufgrund einer erhöhten Bekanntheit
einen weiteren Schutzumfang geniessen sollen. Dabei ist nicht der Fall der berühmten
Marke gemeint, welcher das geltende Gesetz einen Schutz über den Bereich der Warengleichartigkeit hinaus zuspricht. Vielmehr ist hier die Frage angesprochen, ob die Zeichenähnlichkeit im Warengleichartigkeitsbereich strenger zu beurteilen ist, wenn die Marke des
Klägers eine erhöhte Bekanntheit geniesst.
Das Schweizerische Bundesgericht hat bis in die jüngste Zeit einen erhöhten Schutz solcher Marken zum Teil ausdrücklich abgelehnt und zum Teil offengelassen. Im Fall QUICK /
BLICK wurde ausdrücklich betont, es komme nur auf die Unterscheidungskraft der beiden
Wörter als solche an, und nicht auf den Grad der Geltung, den die Marke QUICK im Verkehr (für Zeitschriften) erlangt habe. Die Verwechselbarkeit wurde verneint (BGE 87 II 44
(1961)). Im Fall LEGO / LOGI führte der Hinweis der Klägerin auf den Bekanntheitsgrad ihrer Marke nicht zu einem erhöhten Schutzumfang. Das Gericht hielt fest, dass zwar eine
entsprechende Sonderbehandlung nicht von vornherein ausgeschlossen werden dürfe,
bemerkte indessen auch, dass die Bekanntheit der Marke LEGO die Abgrenzung in der
Erinnerung auch erleichtern konne (Urteil des BGer vom 4. April 1984, publ. in SMI 11985,
5. 71). In einer Entscheidung vom Dezember 1993 standen sich zwei Marken fUr Waschmittel gegenüber. Das Bundesgericht ging von einem recht guten Erinnerungsvermögen
der schweizerischen Durchschnittskäuferin aus und hielt fest, diese könne zwischen dem
seit langem bekannten Radion" und der neuen Marke RADOMAT sehr wohl unterscheiden
(BGE 119 II 477 (1993)). Das Bundesgericht neigt also dazu, Marken mit einem erhöhten
Bekanntheitsgrad nicht einen grösseren Schutzumfang, sondern einen geringeren zu
erteilen.
In der Literatur und in Entscheiden unterer Gerichtsinstanzen wird die Meinung vertreten,
eine Marke mit erhöhtem Bekanntheitsgrad müsse zeichenmässig einen weiteren Schutzumfang geniessen. Zu berücksichtigen gilt, dass es neben einem engeren Kreis von Letztabnehmern, welche die Marke kennen und damit weniger verwechseln immer noch einen
weiteren Kreis von Letztabnehmern gibt, welche die Marke mehr oder weniger kennen und
damit der Gefahr von Verwechslung unterliegen. Die Landesgruppe ist deshalb der Meinung, dass der erhöhte Bekanntheitsgrad jedenfalls nicht dazu führen darf, dass die Verwechslungsgefahr eher verneint wird.
2. Phonetische, visuelle und bedeutungsmässige Ähnlichkeit
Die Rechtsprechung der schweizerischen Gerichte geht davon aus, dass der Gesamteindruck von zwei Marken aufgrund der phonetischen, visuellen und bedeutungsmâssigen
213
Ähnlichkeit zu beurteilen ist. Bei den akustischen Marken Ist selbstverständlich neu auch
der Klang zu berücksichtigen. Es sind indessen noch keine Entscheide bekannt, bei denen
die Klangwirkung von solchen Marken zu beurteilen war.
Stehen sich zwei Wortzeichen gegenüber, stellt das Bundesgericht in erster Linie auf den
Wortklang ab. Entscheide, bei denen Wortzeichen wegen Übereinstimmung im Schriftbild
allein als verwechselbar ähnlich beurteilt worden wären, sind kaum zu finden. Im bereits
erwähnten Entscheid LEGO / LOGI führte das Bundesgericht aus, es stelle keine Verletzung des Markenschutzgesetzes dar, wenn davon ausgegangen wird, dass die Übereinstimmung im Schriftbild allein nicht genüge. Das Gericht führte weiter aus, der Gesamteindruck, der durch Klang, Bild und Bedeutung gebildet wird, müsse gesamthaft berücksichtigt werden. Dabei würden im Erinnerungsvermögen der Abnehmer Wortklang und
Wortsinn eher haften bleiben (SMI 11985, S.70).
Keine verlässllchen Regeln sind bis jetzt dafür entwickelt worden, wann der Sinngehalt eines Wortes bei übereinstimmender Aussprache die Verwechselbarkeit beseitigt. Im Fall
ALPS / ALPINA war der übereinstimmende Bedeutungsinhalt für die Bejahung der Verwechselbarkeit ausschlaggebend (BGE 73 11186 f. (1947)). Im bereits erwähnten Fall
QUICK / BLICK war die unterschiedliche Wortbedeutung für die Verneinung der Verwechselbarkeit ausschlaggebend.
Besondere Probleme stellen sich dann, wenn sich Marken gegenüberstehen, die aus
Wort- und Bildbestandteilen zusammengesetzt sind. Nach der Rechtsprechung des
Bundesgerichtes kommt dem Bildbestandteil in der Regel eine überwiegende Bedeutung
zu, da der Bildbestandteil besser im Gedächtnis haften bleibe, als ein Wort, insbesondere
der Name des Markeninhabers (BGE 62 II 333 (1936) Flagge / HOFSTETTER FRERES
SPORTS mit Flagge - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht). Auch bei solchen Marken muss indessen
abgewogen werden, welche Bestandteile den Gesamteindruck prägen. Deshalb kann
auch bei Übereinstimmung von ähnlichen Bildbestandteilen, die Verwechselbarkeit fehlen
(BGE 95 11194f. (1969) TOBLER MINT / POLAR MENTHE mit Abbildungen von Eiswürfeln
und Verwendung von teilweise gleichen Farben - Verwechselbarkeit verneint; BGE 95 II
465 f. (1969) Zigarettenverpackungen PARISIENNES / STELLA mit analogen farblichen
Ausstattungselementên - Verwechselbarkeit verneint).
Eine reine Wortmarke kann nach der Rechtsprechung auch durch eine Marke verletzt werden, die aus Wort und Bild besteht, sofern das verwechselbar ähnliche Wort als Hauptbestandteil erscheint (BGE 96 Il 248 (1970) BLAUER BOCK / GOLD-BOCK mit Abbildung
eines Widderkoptes - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
Auch je aus Wort- und Bildelementen zusammengesetzte Marken können verwechselbar
ähnlich sein (BGE 63 II 284 f. (1937) BLAUSTERN / STAR - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
Nach Auffassung der Landesgruppe lassen sich keine allgemeinverbindlichen Regeln
dafür aufstellen, welchem der bei der Verwechselbarkeit zu prüfenden Elemente
(Wortklang, visueller Eindruck, Bedeutung) das grösste Gewicht beizumessen ist. Stimmt
214
der
Gesamteindruck
beziehungsweise
dessen
Erinnerungsbild
überein,
ist
die
Verwechselbarkeit zu bejahen und sonst zu verneinen. Dabei können, je nach den
Gegebenheiten des einzelnen Falles die drei Elemente ein unterschiedliches Gewicht
haben.
Übersetzungen
Das Markenschutzgesetz enthält keine Bestimmungen, wonach Marken gegen Übersetzungen geschützt sind. Indessen Ist eben der Bedeutungsinhalt ein Element des
Gesamteindruckes. Wird er durch ein Wort in einer anderen Sprache wiedergegeben, be-
steht Verwechselbarkeit, sofern der Bedeutungsinhalt erkennbar wird (BGE 63 II 285
(1937) Wort- und Bildmarke BLAUSTERN / STAR - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht). Verwechselbarkeit von Wortmarken auch nur in einem Sprachgebiet genügt, um die jüngere
Marke für das ganze Gebiet der Schweiz unzulässig zu machen. (BGE 84 II 317 (1958)
COMPACT / COMPACTUS - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
Famlllenmarken (Serlenmarken)
Dem gemeinsamen Element von Serienmarken kommt besonderer Schutz zu (BGE 87 II
38 (1961) BIC-poche, BIC-cristal, BIC-IMAC, BIC-Clic / BIG-PEN - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
Selbst wenn der Kläger lediglich über eine einzelne Marke verfügt, wird die Verwechselbarkeit bejaht, wenn die Marke des Beklagten den Eindruck erweckt, es handle sich um ein
Serienzeichen des Klãgers. Dies kann dann der Fall sein, wenn der Wortstamm übernommen wird (BGE 102 11126 (1976) ANNABELLE / ANNETTE - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
BedIngungen, unter denen die ältere Marke benutzt worden Ist
Gemäss ständiger Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtes sind zwei Marken unter dem
Markenschutzgesetz genau so zu vergleichen, wie sie eingetragen sind (BGE 100 II 416
(1974) WELLA / IBSA - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
Es gibt indessen auch Ausnahmen. Das Bundesgericht verneinte die Verwechselbarkeit
der Marke AQUA mit u.a. den Marken NIVADA AQUAMATICA und NIVADA
AQUAMEDICO mit der Begründung, die Wörter NIVADA und CROTON erschienen auf
dem Zifferblatt der Uhren viel grösser. Bei den Worten AQUAMATICA und AQUAMEDICO
handle es sich nur um Typenbezeichnungen (BGE 82 II 236 f. (1956)).
III. Weitere Beurteilungselemente
1. Bel wem wird die Verwechslung bewirkt?
Das Bundesgericht stellt auf die Verwechslungsgefahr beim Letztabnehmer ab.
215
Wie gross ist der bétroffene Publikumsberelch?
Abgestellt wird durchwegs auf den durchschnittlichen Letztabnehmer, wobei der Richter
eine Annahme trifft, ohne dass ein gewisser Prozentsatz der betroffenen Verkehrskreise
ermittelt wird.
Da der Richter wegen seiner Fachkenntnisse in der Regel kein unvoreingenommener
durchschnittlicher Abnehmer ist, vertritt die Landesgruppe die Meinung, dass die Ermittlung einer Prozentzahl des irregeführten Publikums mitberücksichtigt werden könnte.
Bedeutung der Produkteart; Medikamente
Es wurde bereits dargelegt, dass zur Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr die Auffassung
des durchschnittlichen Letztabnehmers massgeblich ist. Bei Massenartikeln des täglichen
Verkehrs wird eine geringere Aufmerksamkeit unterstellt als bei Waren für den Fachmann
(BGE 92 U 276 (1966) SIHL / COSIL Verpackungsstoffe für Grossverbraucher - Verwechselbarkeit verneint).
In Anwendung derselben Regeln ist bei rezeptpflichtigen Medikamenten auf die erhöhte
Aufmerksamkeit bei Fachleuten abzustellen (BGE 84 II 445 (1958) XYLOCAIN / CELECAIN
für rezeptpflichtige lnjektionsmittel - Verwechselbarkeit verneint). Dagegen wurde die Auffassung des Letztabnehmers als massgeblich erklärt, wenn es um zwar grundsätzlich rezeptpflichtige, aber vom Konsumenten in der Praxis ohne ausserordentliche Schwierigkeiten zu erwerbende Präparate ging (BGE 101 lI 291 (1975) STUGERON / UGARON - Verwechselbarkeit bejaht).
Ein strengerer Massstab der Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit von Marken für Medikamente wird nicht verlangt. Nach Auffassung der Landesgruppe ist eine strengere Beurteilungsweise auch nicht erforderlich, weil der durchschnittliche Abnehmer von Medikamenten entsprechend grössere Aufmerksamkeit aufwenden wird als bei anderen Waren.
Der entscheidende Verwechslungszeitpunkt
Das Schweizerische Bundesgericht stellt durchwegs auf die Auffassung des durchschnittlichen Abnehmers beziehungsweise des kaufenden Publikums und damit auf den hypothetischen Zeitpunkt des Kaufs ab. Massgeblich ist, je nach dem kantonalen Verfahrensrecht die Beurteilung zum Zeitpunkt der Klageeinleitung oder der Urteilsfällung.
Die Landesgruppe ist der Auffassung, dass das Kriterium der Beurteilung der Verwechslungsgefahr zum Zeitpunkt des Kaufes grundsätzlich zweckmässig ist, auch wenn
Ausnahmen denkbar sind.
Täuschungsabsicht
Das Bundesgericht berücksichtigt bei der Beurteilung der markenrechtlichen Verwechslungsgefahr die Nachahmungsabsicht nicht.
216
Yougoslavie
Yugoslavia
Jugoslawien
Report 0 127
in the name of the Yugoslavian Group
by Dr. Slobodan A. POPOVIC and Milena S. POPOVIC
Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
Introduction
The concept of "confusion" in the Yugoslav Law is applied and worked out - as in many
other countries - within the fields of unfair competition and trade marks and, of course,
in line with its definition in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention of 1883, which is directly
applied by the Yugoslav Courts pursuant to Article 16 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as in line with national laws on suppression of unfair
competition and protection of trade marks. Since the concept of "confusion" within unfair competition is elaborated in the Report on Q 115, this report is dealing only with
confusion' in trademark law.
The Yugoslav statutory language (Law on Protection of Inventions Technical Improvements and Distinctive Signs, of June 9, 1981, as amended by the Laws of January
17 and April 11, 1990 - see INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY July-August 1990) deals with
confusion" firstly when prescribes legal grounds for refusal of application or invalidity of
registration (Article 30) and, secondly when defines the concept of infringement of a
trade mark (Article 118 but in this case in an indirect way.
According to the firstly mentioned legal rule,
No sign shall be protected as a trade mark:
(5)
which may, by its form and content, create confusion in the market and, in particular, mislead an average consumer with regard to the origin, kind, quality or
other properties of the goods or services;
217
(8)
which is similar to an already protected sign belonging to another person and
relating to the same or similar kinds of goods or services, if the similarity could
confuse an average consumer;
lt should be noted also that, according to the case law, a confusion exists as soon as a
likelihood of confusion exists, which means that the actual confusion in the market is
not required (in the matter of Skanel - Chanel, decision of the Supreme Economic
Court, Si .318/60 of April22, 1960).
.General rules for comparison
An average consumer is not required to analyze and directly compare the younger
mark with the older mark. lt is the established practice that if the younger mark "at first
sight misleads the consumer as to the origin of the goods then the required degree of
similarity exists and, consequently, the older mark must be given the court protection
(decision of the Supreme Economic Court, S1.311/67 of April 10, 1967).
The total, overall impression of the marks is decisive, but the case law has established
additional requirements that it is impression of an average consumer or an ordinary
purchaser" and that this impression must be "at the first sight" (decision of the Supreme
Economic Court, Si. 103/66, of January 31, 1966).
For the evaluation of similarities between two trade marks, their differences are not
essential; likelihood of confusion is to be examined on the basis of similarities of their
distinctive components.
II. Criteria for comparison
1. Importance of distinctiveness, for scope of protection
Trade marks with great distinctiveness (so-called strong marks) enjoy in Yugoslavia the
protection broader than ordinary, normal trade marks. First of all, a well-known mark enjoys protection under Article 6 of the Paris Convention even without being registered.
Contrary to the previous practice, when the Patent Office was not refusing any applications
on the ground that there existed an earlier well-known but not registered mark of another
person for the same or similar goods or services, the new practice has been introduced
and the Patent Office now has refused certain trademark applications for registration in
Yugoslavia of other person's well-known mark in order to prevent likelihood of confusion
in the market. In other words, the scope of protection against confusion is now broadened,
which protection is not established only in favour of an interested party, but for the benefit
of the public as well.
218
Sound sight and meaning
According to the prevailing practice of the Patent Office, as well as according to the case
law, all the criteria for comparison - visual, auditive and semantic - have been applied
more or less on an equal footing so that the rule has been established: as soon as the
similarity under one of said criterions exists - there exists similarity of compared marks.
However, an exception is made in case of word-marks which are incontestably similar in
sight and sound, but have different meanings (e.g. according to the Patent Office decision
No. 24318/78-Z-199/74 of February 12, 1979, marks "LARK" and "LARA" have been
found not similar, because "... word "LARA designates a woman ' s name .....).
In a similar case
- SEVEN UP (word mark) against stylized mark "UP - No.
19512/80-Z-312/75 of December 1, 1982, - the Patent Office has decided that there is no
similarity, because '.. .the opposer's mark is known to the wide circles of consumers... and
it is also the abbreviation of the well-known brewery "Union Pivo, so the rule that taking of
one part (UP) of the trade mark (SEVEN UP) is a trademark infringement - could not be
applied.
Translations
Yugoslav Law contains the rule (in Article 118 of the Law mentioned in the INTRODUCTION, point 2) that the imitation of a trade mark exists . ..if the trade mark of sign represents a translation or transcription of a mark, which means that legal protection against
translation is given even to marks which a re not well-known. In this text, it could be mentioned that The High Economic Court of Belgrade, established similarity between marks
VICTORIA and VICTOIRE" because of the same meaning (decision No. P-1574/71 of
October 23, 1973), while The Supreme Economic Court established similarity between
marks 'COCTA" and "KOKIA because the second mark represents transcription of the
first one (1965). In other words, all cases of translation and transliteration fall within the
concept of imitation which is considered as an infringement of trademark rights.
Family marks
The Yugoslav laws are silent on this question, but the National Group is of the opinion that
serial marks should be given a special protection against creation of confusion within the
rules of the trademark law as well as the law on repression of unfair competition. The case
law does not exist, too.
Conditions under which the older mark has been used
According to the Yugoslav trademark law, the registered trade mark should be compared
with the mark used by the alleged infringer in the form as registered. The sole exception
would be in case of well-known mark or mark with high reputation.
The solution can be found by application of the rules of unfair competition.
219
Ill. Other elements of evaluation
Confusion of whom?
In the Yugoslav law, both in the jurisprudence and in the case law, the confusion is to be
evaluated on the part of an average, ordinary purchaser" who is not seeing both conflicting marks together. In a few court decisions it is pointed out that as an average purchaser
is to be considered "...a direct consumer rather than an intermediary in buying and selling
(e.g. pharmacist, if it is a question of medicine)" - decision of The Supreme Economic
Court, S1.228/63 of February 26, 1963.
Which part of the public?
Since the basic criterion for evaluation of the likelihood of confusion is reaction and behaviour of an "average consumer" or, as some say, an "ordinary purchaser" and, since there
is no statutory regulations or case law on the question which part of the public is relevant
for establishing the likelihood of confusion, the Yugoslav courts apply the rule i.e. legal
standard that the judge, facing this difficult problem, has the task to put himself in a position of the said average consumer and to make decision as if he were that average consumer.
Therefore, instead of setting a certain percentage or other similar rule, it seems that this
questio facti should be solved with a calculated guess.
Relevancy of kind of products; medicines
It is generally accepted that the likelihood of confusion depends on the kind of products
and purchasers, because the everyday, mass and low priced articles are bought by the
"casual', average purchaser without great care, while the expensive and valuable articles
are normally bought "... after deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation".
So-called professional or expert buyers, like dealers in relation to the products they deal
with, highly skilled purchasing agents or doctors, who prescribe the medicine, and pharmacists, who dispense the medicine, cannot be as - easily deceived as the inexperienced
public.
In the Yugoslav case law before the Trademark Law of 1961 it was established that, in case
of trade marks for medicines, sold only on prescription, the danger of confusion was considerably reduced because experts (doctors and pharmacists) were "interpolated" between
products and consumers. In the matter of conflicting trade marks EPHETUSSIN and
EPHEDROTUSSIN the Patent Office established confusing similarity but, since it was
proved that the said medicines were sold on prescription only, The Federal Supreme Court
ruled that danger of confusion did not exist, so the action for invalidation of the younger
trade mark was refused (U-925/55 of December 30, 1953). On the other hand, when the
medicines were available without prescription, it was decided that THYMOTUSSAN and
THYMOSAN are confusingly similar and the use of the latter was prohibited (Gs-781/54 of
July 1, 1954).
220
The said practice was criticized in the jurisprudence, because likelihood of confusion of
medicines can jeopardize the safety of patients who were the ultimate consumers of medicinal remedies. The law-maker accepted this standpoint and in the new Law of 1961 it was
said that the confusing similarity exists if an average consumer, "... irrespective of the kind
of goods.....can distinguish between the goods only by paying special attention. Consequently, the Patent Office and the courts - from 1961 on - apply the same criteria for collisions of pharmaceutical trade marks as for all other trade marks.
Decisive moment of confusion
Since the circumstances relevant to the issue of confusion change in time, and in the absence of respective case law, the Yugoslav Group is in favour of solution that the registration authorities and the courts should decide as to the critical time. Generally, the date of
first use of the younger mark could be considered as relevant for evaluation of distinctiveness of the older trade mark.
Fraudulent intent
lt is an objective fact which does not depend on the state of mind of an infringer i.e. defendant whether the trade marks are confusingly similar. However, defendant's good or bad
faith may influence the measure of damages.
IV. Other criteria
For the time being, there is no other criteria in the Yugoslav case law which could be used
for the evaluation of confusion but, in case of parallel acts of unfair competition, e.g. the
use of a similar mark by a former employee, these facts should be taken into consideration
in connection with the questions who shall be comprised by the court action and whether
the claim for damages will include both actual loss and lost profits or only simple i.e. actual
loss.
Zusammenfassung
Der Begriff 'der Verwechslung ist immerhin universelles Kriterium im Falle einer Warenzeichenverletzung, aber auch wenn die Rede von den Gründen für die Zurückweisung der
Warenzeichenanmeldung ist, bzw. für die Nichtigerklärung des eingetragenen Zeichens.
Der rechtliche Standard, der weltweit und so auch im jugoslawischen Recht und
Rechtsprechung anerkannt ist, besteht darin, dass keine aktuelle Verwirrung vorhanden
sein muss, sondern reicht allein die Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit bzw. Irreführung
aus.
Der festgelegten jugoslawischen Gerichtspraxis nach, bei dem Vergleich der Zeichen, ent-
scheidend ist der Gesamteindruck und zwar des "gewöhnlichen Käufers" oder des
"Durchschnittsverbrauchers", wobei der Gesamteindruck "auf den ersten Blick" gewonnen
221
werden soll, und nicht durch den unmittelbaren und gleichzeitigen Vergleich der Zeichen
(eines neben dem anderen). Dementsprechend besteht die Verwechslungsgefahr, wenn
das jüngere Zeichen "... den Verbraucher schon auf den ersten Blick, hinsichtlich der Herkunft der Ware irreführt...' und deswegen wird dem älteren Zeichen gerichtlicher Schutz
gewährt.
Sogenannt starke Zeichen, das heisst, Zeichen, die grosse Unterscheidungskraft besitzen,
geniessen generell einen breiteren Schutz als die normalen Zeichen, und die "notorischen
Marken" geniessen den Schutz auf Grund des Art. 6bis der Pariser Verbandsübereinkunft
sogar auch wenn sie nicht eingetragen sind.
Die Zeichen werden nach Bildeindruck, Klangwirkung und Bedeutung kompariert und in
der Praxis ist die Regel entwickelt worden, dass die Ähnlichkeit genügt, wenn sie auf Grund
nur eines der drei angeführten Kriterien vorhanden ist. Sogar ist die Regel festgelegt worden, dass die Verletzung des Warenzeichens vorhanden ist, auch im Falle seiner Übersetzung oder Transliteration/Transkription.
Als 'Durchschnittsverbraucher' wird betrachtet "...der unmittelbare Verbraucher und nicht
irgendein Vermittler im Einkauf und Verkauf (z.B. der Apotheker, wenn von Medikamenten
die Rede ist). Die Gerichte wenden die Regel an, dass sich der Richter in die Lage eines
solchen Durchschnittsverbrauchers versetzen und den Entschluss fassen solle, als wenn
er dieser Durchschnittsverbraucher wäre. Demzufolge, dem gegenwärtigen jugoslawischen Recht nach, Art der Ware (z.B. die Medikamente, die ausschliesslich nach den ärztlichen Rezepten ausgegeben werden) hat keinen Einfluss auf die allgemeinen Kriterien für
die Feststellung der Ähnlichkeit bzw. Verwechslungswahrscheinlichkeit auf dem Markt.
Ob die Zeichen verwechselbar sind, ist objektive Tatsache und eine faktische Frage und
sie hängt nicht von der Absicht desjenigen ab, der das fremde, ältere Zeichen verletzt. Das
Vorhandensein des guten bzw. schlechten Glaubens, kann den Einfluss auf die Schadenersatzpflicht ausüben und diese Frage wird auf Grund der allgemeinen Grundprinzipien
des Zivilrechts abgeschätzt.
222
Table des matières
Q 127 - Appréciation de la confusion en droit des marques
page
Rapports des Groupes de
Ailemagne
1
Australie
12
Autriche
27
Belgique
36
Brésil
43
Canada
46
Danemark
55
Egypte
67
Espagne
69
Etats-Unis d'Amérique
102
Finlande
110
France
116
Grande-Bretagne
129
Hongrie
135
Irlande
147
lsraêl
152
Italie
159
Japon
165
Mexique
169
Norvège
175
Pays-Bas
180
République Tchèque
188
Suède
192
Sutsse
199
Yougoslavie
217
223
Table of contents
0 127 - Evaluation of confusion in trademark law
page
Reports of the Groups form
Australia
12
Austria
27
Belgium
36
Brazil
46
Canada
46
188
Czech Republic
Denmark
67
Egypt
Finland
110
France
116
Germany
1
Great Britain
129
Hungary
135
Ireland
147
Israel
152
Italy
159
Japan
165
Mexico
169
Netherlands
180
Norway
175
69
Spain
Sweden
192
Switzerland
205
United States of America
102
Yugoslavia
217
224
Inhaltsverzeichnis
0 127 - Beurteilung der Verwechselbarkeit im Markenrecht
Berichte der Landesgruppen
Seite
Ägypten
67
Australien
12
Belgien
36
Brasilien
43
Dänemark
55
Deutschland
1
Finnland
110
Frankreich
116
Grossbritannien
129
Irland
147
Israel
152
Italien
159
Japan
165
Jugoslavien
217
Kanada
46
Mexiko
169
Niederlande
180
Norwegen
175
Oesterreich
27
Schweden
192
Schweiz
211
Spanien
69
Tschechische Republik
188
Ungarn
135
Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika
102
225