- Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland

Issued by the Church Office
of the Evangelical Church
in Germany (EKD)
Herrenhäuser Straße 12
30419 Hannover
TEXTE
78
Freedom of Religion under Threat
--Experiences of Christians in Different Countries
A practical resource
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This collection of texts was compiled at the request of the Evangelical Church in
Germany (EKD) by:
Karin Bräuer, Education Officer in the Association of Protestant Churches and
Missions in Germany (EMW), Hamburg
Warner Conring, former Director of the Churches' Development Service (KED),
Hanover
Dr. Andreas Selmeci, Human Rights Officer in the Service Agency of the EKD /
Bread for the World, Stuttgart
Thomas Sandner, Public Relations Officer, United Evangelical Mission, Wuppertal
Corinna Schellenberg, Human Rights Officer in the EKD Church Office, Hanover
(editor)
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Contents
Foreword........................................................................................................................ 4
Introduction................................................................................................................... 6
I
Perspectives
Religion and Freedom – a Historically Tense Relationship
(Robert Leicht) ....................................................................................................... 9
The Evolution of Ecumenical Thought on Religious Freedom
(Dwain C. Epps)................................................................................................... 13
Persecution of Christians – a Challenge for German Policy-makers
(Hermann Gröhe)................................................................................................. 19
The Struggle for Religious Freedom in International Law
(Gerhard Robbers) ............................................................................................... 22
II Examples from selected countries
Christians and Muslims in Egypt
(Cornelis Hulsman).............................................................................................. 29
Policy on religions in China
(Monika Gaenssbauer)......................................................................................... 33
India's Christians under Pressure
(Klaus Schäfer)..................................................................................................... 37
Religious Freedom in Indonesia
(Olaf Schumann) .................................................................................................. 40
Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria
(Frieder Ludwig).................................................................................................. 44
Democracy or Theocracy? Pakistan at the Crossroads
(Clement John) ..................................................................................................... 47
Religious Freedom in Russia?
(Gerd Stricker) ..................................................................................................... 51
Torn between Politics and Religion – the Example of the Sudan
(Marina Peter) ..................................................................................................... 54
The Situation of the Christian Minorities in Turkey
(Gerhard Duncker)............................................................................................... 58
III Practical tips
What can we do? .................................................................................................. 62
Dates for special action ........................................................................................ 65
Church statements ................................................................................................ 65
Extracts from international instruments............................................................... 66
Literature .............................................................................................................. 70
Websites ............................................................................................................... 72
Addresses ............................................................................................................. 73
3
Foreword
Historically speaking, working for freedom of religion has been a priority in the
churches’ commitment to human rights. This commitment is important. On the one
hand, it can contribute to establishing freedom of religion as a central demand in the
documents on fundamental human rights. The inclusion of freedom of religion in the
Charta of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union and its probable
inclusion in the future Constitutional Treaty is due to a joint commitment of churches.
On the other hand, subscribing to a universal freedom of religion that applies to all
religious communities alike is the precondition for a peaceful coexistence of religious
communities and confessions. This fundamental right, if taken seriously, will also
require a critical engagement with our own role in religious conflicts.
Churches have many different ways of contributing to the realisation of religious
freedom. Through their ecumenical contacts they are particularly familiar with inroads
into religious freedom where these occur. They publicise this information and pass it
on to those with responsibility in political and public life. To that end, churches use
their contacts to governments and international organisations like the United Nations,
the Council of Europe or the OSCE. Taking up the topic in ecumenical contacts and
interreligious dialogue leads to a greater awareness of the significance of universal
freedom of religion. Ecumenical cooperation offers many points of entry for a
strengthening of religious freedom because – e.g. in the context of the World Council
of Churches (WCC) or the Conference of European Churches (CEC) - it promotes an
exchange between majority and minority churches and thereby contributes to settling
disagreements and conflicts that could threaten religious freedom.
It was in order to assume this common responsibility that CEC and the Council of
European Episcopal Councils (CCEE) adopted the Charta Oecumenica in 2001. In
adopting it, the churches commit themselves "to defend the rights of minorities and to
help reduce misunderstandings and prejudices between majority and minority churches
in our countries." When encountering other religions and world views, they further
commit themselves "to recognise the freedom of religion and conscience of these
individuals and communities and to defend their right to practise their faith or
convictions, whether singly or in groups, in the context of rights applicable to all."
The churches' organisations involved in international development cooperation offer
additional scope for action. In this context, projects have been mounted to initiate and
support dialogues between Christians and members of other religious communities in
order to overcome common problems. That is an important contribution to reducing
prejudices and enemy stereotypes and, in repressive societies, sends signals of hope for
reconciliation.
The topic of religious freedom was focused on more sharply in June 1999 when the
issue of "persecution of Christians the world over" was raised in the Bundestag,
Germany’s federal parliament. The subsequent parliamentary debate brought the issue
to the attention of a wider public. This awareness is necessary in order to protect and
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strengthen those who cannot live and practise their faith in freedom. So I welcome the
appearance of the present collection of articles, hoping that they will stimulate a closer
engagement with the topic. All those who are threatened, maltreated, imprisoned,
tortured or killed for their faith, deserve our prayers and support. May their call not go
unheard and their sufferings prompt us to take action.
The EKD Council received the present collection of texts with gratitude at its meeting
of 27 June 2003, and decided to produce this publication. The Evangelical Church in
Germany will not tire in its endeavours to promote religious freedom.
Hanover, 27 June 2003
Manfred Kock
Chairman of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany
5
Introduction
In the global society of our day, people of different religions and denominations live
close together. Looking around us, we will see that this conviviality conceals a
potential for conflict. In Germany the building of mosques has sometimes encountered
resistance from the population. Parents have taken offence at the sight of crosses on
classroom walls. There is discussion as to whether Muslim teachers should be allowed
to wear headscarves at school. Our German reality allows for the expression of
interests and for disputes to be settled in court, if necessary.
Religious conflicts have far more serious repercussions when they encounter serious
political, social and cultural conflicts and when there is no effective state action to
settle them. In many places people suffer serious political or economic disadvantages
due to their faith or fall victim to violent attacks.
Where people cannot practise their religion freely this impinges on their innermost
freedom, namely the freedom to recognise the meaning of their lives and to live in
accordance with this recognition. A society respecting the dignity and value of
individuals is inconceivable without religious freedom. In addition, as stated at the first
assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948, religious freedom is an
”essential element of a good international order”.
The Christian community is called upon to work for religious freedom. Not for the
sake of their own freedom but for a universal freedom of religion applying to all
people and religious communities. For, as stated by the 1961 WCC Assembly, "the
freedom with which Christ has set us free calls forth responsibility for the rights of
others". Churches and religious communities therefore bear such a great responsibility
for this because religious feelings have a particularly mobilising effect and have
repeatedly contributed to intolerance, the oppression of those of other faiths and the
escalation of conflicts between religious communities.
The Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) issued a statement in 1998
to mark the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. "The Council of the EKD speaks up on behalf of people who are persecuted
for their Christian faith; believing, moreover, in freedom of religion for all people it
also stands up for the rights of the members of other religious communities, in
dialogue with its ecumenical partners."
It is in this spirit that this collection of texts is intended to focus on the situation of
oppressed Christians and to express solidarity with people who are deprived of
freedom of religion. It is therefore intended to contribute to the realisation of the
human right to religious freedom.
A further concern of this publication is to raise awareness for the complexity of the
issue of religious freedom and to bring to light the motives underlying conflicts
between religious communities and believers. After all, universal religious freedom
presupposes that the expressions of religious life of a religious community are seen in
their interaction with the interests and rights of all human beings. The terror attacks in
New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and their aftermath have intensified
the polarisation between the Western and the Muslim world. At the same time they
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have heightened awareness for the paramount significance of a peaceful coexistence of
religions. Religious conflicts have moved into the purview of a wider public. Reports
of violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria or of attacks
on Christian institutions in Pakistan have shocked the international community.
However, the underlying causes and repercussions of such events often receive very
little public attention. They are often presented in overly simple terms. Yet it is
important to examine the grounds for conflict, however uncomfortable that may be for
us. A one-sided view, ignoring the motives, needs and wounds of one party is a barrier
to reconciliation and peace. It is the task of churches and Christians to seek mutual
understanding and respect, to counter overdrawn enemy stereotypes and misleading
generalisations and thus to contribute to understanding and peaceful coexistence.
This publication can only pick out a few aspects of the complex issue. In Part I Robert
Leicht raises some fundamental points; Dwain Epps approaches the topic from the
angle of ecumenical history; Hermann Gröhe and Gerhard Robbers shed light on the
political and international law context. Part II outlines different situations of Christian
minorities and the reasons behind them, on the basis of selected examples. The articles
were written by people who know the situation in the respective country from long
years of personal experience. They go beyond a description of symptoms and call to
mind causes of conflicts that in some cases can be traced back over centuries. They
present the different views of the parties to the conflict and show differences in
understanding religious freedom and human rights, plus the mixing of religious, social
and political interests. Although causes and effects are frequently similar, the country
articles make it clear how complex and diverse the different environments are and how
superficial we often are when looking in from outside. The articles encourage us to
question generalisations and enemy stereotypes. In the small space available they can,
of course, only mirror a small section of reality. Notes for further reading at the end of
each article, plus a practical part, will enable us to explore the issues further.
Many regions and conflict situations have unfortunately had to be left out - for
example, the fate of those in Latin America who are threatened, driven out of their
communities or arbitrarily detained because they have been working actively for fairer
living conditions as a result of their religious belief. Countless violent conflicts that
have been waged for many years along religious lines and have cost countless lives, as
in Ireland or between Israel and Palestine, have not been included among the
examples. The aim was to present a many-faceted picture of different regional and
religious contexts. Ultimately, no strict ranking was made according to the gravity of
the threat, particularly as the regional situations are hard to compare due to their
diversity. The selection was also mindful of the countries that are of particular
importance for practical work in church offices and congregations, due to the
closeness of existing contacts. This publication is designed to assist Protestant
churches, their parishes, special agencies and committed Christians in handling cries
for help. Part III contains practical advice in this regard.
The reader will naturally want to define the substance of the human right to religious
freedom. For although the core meaning of religious freedom is largely clear, opinions
differ about what the concept of ”religion” actually covers and what tangible
behaviours are to be protected by the right to religious freedom. Responses to this
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from ecumenical bodies and international law are indicated by Dwain Epps and
Gerhard Robbers in Part I. Part III quotes fundamental WCC declarations and relevant
extracts from international treaties.
The Evangelical Church in Germany thanks the Desk Officer for Human Rights
Questions, Corinna Schellenberg, and the members of the working group. It hopes that
the articles will contribute to defining positions within the church and offer assistance
to leaders in political and social life in their work for the realisation of religious
freedom worldwide.
Bishop Dr. h.c. Rolf Koppe
Head of the Department for Ecumenical Relations and Ministries Abroad
Church Office of the Evangelical Church in Germany
8
I. Perspectives
1.1 Religion and Freedom – a Historically Tense Relationship
(Robert Leicht)
Not to put too fine a point on it, and thus to be clear about the whole topic right away:
freedom of religion is, firstly, not a condition for the existence of religions – but it is
definitely one of the conditions of freedom. Secondly, and put even more bluntly:
freedom cannot oppress religion – but religion can certainly restrict freedom, at least in
some variations of religion.
The truth of the first proposition is self-evident in our immediate present; we only need
to look at the Christians in Iraq, in Turkey or in the People’s Republic of China. The
truth of this first proposition is evidenced from our recent German past – both with
respect to the Nazi period and in looking back at the dictatorship in East Germany.
And this first proposition could – hypothetically – also catch up with us and our
children’s children again: are we only Christians on condition that we are free
citizens? Religion is therefore not a consequence of political freedom. The question,
rather, is whether freedom is a consequence of religion rightly understood – or has
freedom won through in history without - indeed, against - religion, even
notwithstanding the Christian religion?
The observation that religion can certainly oppress freedom has been frequently
confirmed throughout history, even throughout church history. The Christian churches
have not always been heralds of political freedom, let alone champions of religious
freedom. Today, in fact – and that only recently, compared to the length of history –
the churches do stand up for freedom of religion. It would be justified to ask, why only
now? The much more important question is simply, why now? It could be due to their
loss of importance – they have been edged out of their dominant sociological position
and co-governing political role into the defensive. That could be why the churches
have only recently recognised how very much they themselves rely on a freedom that
benefits them as much as their religious competitors, their agnostic critics and atheistic
opponents.
And even in the defensive there are still great strategic differences. The differences:
the protection of individual religious freedom (i.e., the freedom of the individual to
choose religion as a – supposedly – ”private” matter) may be shaped in such a way that
the collective freedom of religion (i.e., the freedom of the churches to engage in
institutional activity in the public sphere) is here gradually edged out of the picture. By
no means all European states recognise collective freedom of religion alongside
individual religious freedom, as Germany does. It is not at all clear whether, at the end
of the road to a European constitution, collective religious freedom will become a
European common good or whether it will remain only a moderately protected special
good of individual states, so to speak in the sense of a (weak) clause protecting the
status quo. Freedom as such cannot oppress religion - that is still the case. Yet a
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freedom wrongly understood – this warning correction of that second proposition is
called for – can endanger a rightly understood freedom of religion. And therefore both
have to be clarified: the question as to how state freedom of religion is to be properly
understood and also the question of why and for what reasons the churches have to
stand up for a comprehensive freedom of religion – pragmatically also in their own
interest, but theologically going far beyond that.
The emergence of religious freedom in Germany
First a swift glance back to developments in Germany leading up to religious freedom.
The history of the relationship between state and church in Central Europe was
constantly in dispute up to the Reformation. This was at most connected with
conflicting (power) claims on the part of the two institutions, but by no means with
any kind of freedom of religion, let alone with a religious freedom of the subjects; not
even the secular rulers critical of the church would ever have envisaged a life outside
the corpus christianum. The problem was the polemics within Christianity, which
were not against it, let alone in favour of other religions. Only with the postReformation situation of confessions existing side by side and in opposition to each
other did the question arise of – no: not the (Christian) religion, but – the confessions
within the State. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555, cuius regio, eius religio, established
the coexistence of regimes with differing confession while calling for the subjects to
have the same confession as their ruler; ”deviants” were allowed a limited period in
which to emigrate. If the ruler changed confession the subject had to change with him
– so to speak: freedom of confession for rulers, freedom of religion for no one. The
Peace of Westphalia of 1648 decoupled the change of confession of the ruler from the
confession of his subjects; they now had the right to remain true to their confession.
The age of enlightened absolutism – and the consolidation of different confessional
areas under one ruler, even the denominationalism of Protestantism within one and the
same territory – led to a certain easing of restrictions and a certain plurality of
confessions within a given State. "The religions must all be tolerated and the state
must only keep a lookout to see that none of them hurts another, because here [in
Prussia] everyone must find their own salvation," to quote Frederick the Great. But if
this suffices to show that this "tolerance" follows state interest, not church inspiration,
it becomes even clearer in another saying of 'Old Fritz': "Regarding the hymn books,
everyone is free to sing 'Now the woods are resting' or any other such twaddle. But the
priests must not forget tolerance for they will not be allowed to persecute anyone."
That means: the cradle of religious freedom and tolerance was first rocked by religious
cynicism, not the religious freedom of those of other beliefs. And even in this Prussia
members of non-established Christian communities were excluded by right from
public worship and reduced to practising their faith in their own homes. It took until
the reign of the third successor of Frederick the Great, the Prussian King Frederick
William IV, to allow a personal "change of confession" to lead to no confession. Up
until then people were not conceivable in any other way than as both state and church
citizens. Jews did not enjoy this identity at all, unless in individual cases they had been
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"appointed" as Jews with (limited) privileges, and even then they were still not "fully
fledged" state citizens.
The 1849 constitution adopted in St. Paul’s Church, Frankfurt, although never valid
and enforced, did grant "full freedom of faith and conscience" and abolished all limits
on the "common domestic and public exercise of religion". It gives the churches the
right to the autonomous order and administration of its own affairs, permits the
forming of new religious societies and notes: "Further, there shall be no State Church".
Yet only with the Weimar Reich constitution did all that become applicable
constitutional law. Certainly, the essence of religious freedom in the Weimar
constitution became a regulating element of the relationship between church and state.
It was not until the Basic Law of 1949 that freedom of religion moved away from this
"corporatist relationship" and become an immediately applicable basic right of
individuals, alongside which, in a strange, conceptually not entirely harmonious
historical compromise, the "church-state law" articles from the Weimar Constitution
continue to apply.
This broad-brush picture of a period of history was necessary because it showed one
thing: nowhere in this process were the churches as institutions in the vanguard,
certainly not their governing bodies. The Roman-Catholic Church did not even
approve the freedom of religion and conscience until the Second Vatican Council in
1965. In established German Protestantism, that in its primary territories remained
represented and domesticated according to its regional lord until 1919, the corporatist
level of church-state law was more important for the protection of its interests than the
individual freedom of religion of every Christian and the enemies of the church. A
certainly isolated example of this after-effect: as late as in 1961 the representative,
completely Protestant reference book Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart
(Religion in history and the present) offered a very summary article on religious
freedom, without any historical information, and stating the legal situation according
to the German constitution (Basic Law, GG) in almost distanced, minimal terms, with
phrases like the following: "Modern constitutions often grant religious freedom as a
general freedom of philosophical creed that protects not just Christian belief but also
even anti-religious worldviews (e.g., Art. 4 I GG)." The ecumenical movement has
tended to be more proactive in its statements on freedom of religion, such as that
adopted at the World Council of Churches Assembly in Uppsala in 1968: "The full
application of religious liberty to individuals and organisations and the free right of
expression of conscience for all persons, whatever their beliefs, (...) is fundamentally
important for all human freedoms." Of course, the problem of freedom of religion
arises more clearly in the broader context of the church worldwide.
Bent faith is non-faith
The question to the churches now, beyond historical criticism, is not so much "Where
do you stand on religious freedom?" as "What are the reasons for your seemingly
unconditional affirmation of it?" First, one will be able to say that the churches have
finally made their peace with individualism interpreted seriously. The term
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individualism may recall – with a certain anti-liberal overtone – polemical
confrontations of the past, but the term "human dignity" basically says the same, more
positively, somewhat more solemnly – and also, when intoned with pathos, somewhat
less clearly. In this concept insights from political and theological anthropology
converge: every individual has a core of inviolable dignity that can be physically
desecrated but not essentially destroyed. This core of human dignity is simply there in
every single person, before all else – not just before any state (and church!) regulation,
even before the need or even possibility of the person concerned to earn this dignity
through their own effort. This human dignity includes, first and foremost, freedom of
conscience – not because the individual conscience is infallible but because precisely
the ability of the conscience to err is an unavoidable expression of the person’s
freedom. Only if one is free to decide can a conscience develop and afterwards make a
right, but also a wrong decision. And only a free decision for what is right is a right
decision. Freedom of conscience is also the precondition for real religion. Only a
perfectly free answer to God’s love and claims on us is a true answer. The freedom of
this response can certainly be politically curtailed, even oppressed – but whoever
keeps to their religion, despite state persecution, demonstrates that they have given
their response freely, in opposition to a manifest lack of freedom. State pressure, also
religious repression can only bend the conscience away from true religion, never
towards it. For bent faith is non-faith.
That is the last unavoidable reason why the churches must unconditionally affirm the
positive religious freedom of those of other faith, and also the negative religious
freedom of non-believers, and – wherever possible – actively stand up for them. By
contrast, it would be far too little if the churches advocated religious freedom only for
the purpose of a do ut des, as it were on the basis of mutuality: "I will grant you
religious freedom so that (and if) you do the same to me." Consequently the churches
in Germany cannot but stand up for the religious freedom of Muslims, even if, in
practice, Islamic states do not allow religious freedom for Christians. This asymmetry
also legitimises their defence of religious freedom everywhere – not, as we have said,
as a pragmatic move in their own interest but as a fundamental principle.
Certainly, there are also limits to religious freedom, where the practice of a certain
"religion" on its part is at the expense of the freedom of others and of the human
dignity of its adherents; these limits can, however, only come from the human and
fundamental rights of the people concerned. Above all, however, these limits then
apply without distinction to all religions. So there can be no privileges for certain
religions – neither positively in their practice, nor negatively regarding the limits to
religious freedom enshrined the constitution.
Once again, and to conclude: the churches now – finally and for all time to come –
have not just good but irrevocable grounds for advocating freedom of religion. But
should a historical disaster decide otherwise and religious freedom either not be
granted or be revoked, the Christian community will still have grounds that are just as
strong and irrevocable for remaining loyal to its faith. Martyrdom, although one should
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not induce it wantonly, is a sign of freedom – against non-freedom to which, the
martyr will say – and only a martyr can – it is certainly to be preferred.
Robert Leicht is a member of Synod and the Council of the Evangelical Church in
Germany. He is the president of the Berlin Protestant Academy and a political
correspondent of the weekly "Die Zeit".
1.2 The Evolution of Ecumenical Thought on Religious Freedom
(Dwain C. Epps)
The often bitter experiences of European Protestants during the time of the
Reformation period and wars of religion in Europe profoundly influenced those who
first articulated the right to freedom of religion and conscience.
Whole communities were forced out of their homelands by persecution, and many of
them emigrated to North America in search of religious, political, social, cultural and
economic freedom. Recalling "the circumstances of our emigration and settlement
here", the 1776 American Declaration of Independence told the British Crown, "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." The first Amendment to the US constitution,
adopted in 1791, specified that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." This natural law
approach to human rights, and the notion that there should be, as Thomas Jefferson put
it, "a wall of separation" between religion and the state established the basis for
thinking on religious freedom and human rights.
The Protestant missionary movement
The 19th century period of major Protestant mission expansion, often closely linked the
spread of European empires during the age of colonisation, led inevitably to
confrontations with dominant indigenous religions, and with Christian churches –
especially Orthodox and Roman Catholic – already established in many of the lands
conquered. Thus it was not surprising that the first ecumenical formulations of the
right to religious freedom came in the context of mission stream of the movement.
The matter was discussed at the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference in 1910, and
the 1928 Jerusalem meeting of the International Missionary Council issued the first
substantial statement on freedom of conscience and religion. In a remarkably inclusive
way (given the historical context) it addressed followers of non-Christian religions,
urging them and the churches "to hold fast to faith in the unseen and eternal in the face
of the growing materialism of the world; to cooperate with us against all the evils of
secularism; to respect freedom of conscience so that men may confess Christ without
separation from home and friends; and to discern that all the good of which men have
conceived is fulfilled and secured in Jesus Christ."
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The captivation or persecution of religion by totalitarian regimes
Less than a decade later, the landmark ecumenical Conference on Church, State and
Community was organised by the Life and Work Movement in Oxford in 1937. With
the situation of the churches in Germany (and in the Soviet Union) very much in mind,
Oxford issued the oft-repeated call: "Let the Church be the Church!" It elaborated on
the 1928 statement, citing several freedoms as necessary conditions for the Church’s
fulfilment of its obligations to society:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
the right of public and private worship, preaching and teaching;
freedom from imposition by the State of religious ceremonies and forms of
worship;
freedom to determine the nature of its government and the qualifications of its
ministers and members;
freedom of the individual to join the Church;
the right to control over the education of ministers and the right to provide
religious instruction to youth;
freedom of Christian service and missionary activity, both home and foreign;
freedom to cooperate with other churches; and
freedom to use public facilities available to all citizens or associations as will make
it possible to accomplish these ends.
The establishment of religious liberty as a fundamental right under international
law
After Oxford, Joint Committees on Religious Liberty were formed by churches in
Great Britain and the USA, who assumed on behalf of the wider ecumenical
movement the task of developing proposals on religious freedom for submission to
governments for inclusion in the UN Charter in the months leading up to the 1945 San
Francisco Conference on International Organisation. They built not only on the
Oxford principles but also on Franklin Roosevelt’s famous 'Four Freedoms' enunciated
in 1941 that included "the freedom of every person to worship God in his own way –
everywhere in the world".
The US Federal Council of Churches' also formed a Commission to Study the Bases of
a Just and Durable Peace in 1942 "to clarify the mind of our churches regarding the
moral, political and economic foundations of an enduring peace", and "to prepare the
people of our churches and of our nation for assuming their appropriate responsibility
for the establishment of such a peace." The document it elaborated (Six Pillars of
Peace) helped shape Christian attitudes on the requirements of a just peace and greatly
influenced political thinking among the allied powers on how to build solid
foundations for post-war institutions. For the peace to be durable, they said, it must be
based on an agreed framework of universal human rights, including "the right of
individuals everywhere to religious and intellectual liberty."
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Dr. O. Frederick Nolde attended the San Francisco Conference as consultant to the US
delegation and very largely due to his effective advocacy the churches’
recommendations for improvement of the draft Charter were virtually all accepted: a
Preamble was added that expresses the determination of the "peoples of the United
Nations (to) reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small," and a new article was added stating that one of the chief aims of the
Organisation shall be "to achieve international cooperation...in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
Another significant improvement in the Charter advocated by the churches was the
addition of a provision for the creation of a permanent mechanism of consultation
between the UN and non-governmental organisations. Taking advantage of this
opportunity, the International Missionary Council and the Provisional Committee of
the WCC formed a joint permanent Commission of the Churches on International
Affairs (CCIA), with Dr. Nolde as its Director, to represent the churches in the new
United Nations Organisation. Among its first priorities was to promote the elaboration
and adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights that would include the right
to religious liberty.
On the CCIA's recommendation, the First WCC Assembly (Amsterdam, 1948),
adopted a Declaration on Religious Liberty which articulated the emerging broad
consensus among WCC member churches as follows:
•
•
•
•
Every person has the right to determine his own faith and creed.
Every person has the right to express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching and
practice, and to proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social
or political community.
Every person has the right to associate with others and to organise with them for
religious purposes.
Every religious organisation, formed or maintained by action in accordance with
the rights of individual persons, has the right to determine its policies and practices
for the accomplishment of its chosen purposes.
This Declaration proved to be remarkably influential. Dr. Nolde took it directly to
Paris where the UN General Assembly was considering the draft of a Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. It was his draft of the article on religious liberty, based
on the Amsterdam declaration, that was adopted and remains today the fundamental
basis of this right in international law and practice: article 18.
The end of colonialism and the assertion of religious freedom as a collective right
During this whole period, human rights were consistently approached from the
philosophical – and ideological – perspective of the West, derived from the American
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of Human and Citizens'
15
Rights. However, the adoption in 1966 by the UN General Assembly of the
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights – designed to give legal force to the Universal Declaration – opened a
wide breach between those who gave primacy to the rights of individuals, and those
who took collective rights as their point of departure. The gap between 'West' and
'East' grew, making human rights a minefield of Cold War ideological battle.
That same year, at the WCC Conference on Church and Society in Geneva,
representatives of churches in Third World countries insisted on radical changes in the
WCC's predominantly North Atlantic approach and that it move into the 'post-colonial'
world and reflect the new, truly global character of its membership. The Uppsala
Assembly (1968) responded to this demand in ways that opened the door to radical
changes in the ecumenical understandings of human rights and religious liberty. "The
full application of religious liberty to individuals and organisations and the free rights
of expression of conscience for all peoples is fundamentally important for all human
freedoms," the Assembly said, urging the churches to "strive to make their
congregations feel that in the modern worldwide community the rights of the
individual are inevitably bound up with the struggle for a better standard of living for
the underprivileged of all nations."
These ideas were further developed at the consultation on "Human Rights and
Christian Responsibility" in St. Pölten, Austria (1974), that laid the foundations for the
substantially new ecumenical approach to human rights adopted by the WCC Fifth
Assembly (Nairobi, 1975).
"(The) gospel leads us to become ever more active in identifying and rectifying
violations of human rights in our own societies, and to enter into new forms of
ecumenical solidarity with Christians elsewhere who are similarly engaged. It leads us
into the struggle of the poor and the oppressed both within and outside the church as
they seek to achieve their full human rights, and presses us to work together with
people of other faiths or ideologies who share with us a common concern for human
dignity."
"The right to religious freedom has been and continues to be a major concern of
member churches and the World Council of Churches. However this right should not
be seen as belonging exclusively to the church. The exercise of religious freedom has
not always reflected the great diversity of convictions that exist in the world. This right
is inseparable from other fundamental human rights. No religious community should
plead for its own religious liberty without active respect and reverence for the faith and
basic human rights of others."
"Religious liberty should never be used to claim privileges. For the church this right is
essential so that it can fulfil its responsibilities which arise out of the Christian faith.
Central to these responsibilities is the obligation to serve the whole community."
16
"The right to religious freedom has been enshrined in most constitutions as a basic
human right. By religious freedom we mean the freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of one’s choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching. Religious freedom should also include the right and duty of
religious bodies to criticise the ruling powers when necessary, on the basis of their
religious convictions. In this context, it was noted that many Christians in different
parts of the world are in prison for reasons of conscience or for political reasons as a
result of their seeking to respond to the total demands of the gospel."
The resurgence of religion as a political force
Picking up this challenge, churches around the world developed new bonds of
solidarity with Christians and others boldly engaged in struggles for human rights. Not
all the manifestations of resurgent involvement of religion in the social and political
spheres took the form of actions for justice, peace and tolerance. The Sixth Assembly
(Vancouver, 1983) expressed concern about a "growing climate of religious fanaticism
and the rise of political fundamentalism (that) have seriously threatened the rights of
churches and other religious communities to manifest their faith in worship,
observance, practice and teaching."
The precipitate downfall of the communist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe a
few years later and the collapse of official atheism and rigid control over religion in
the public sphere gave rise to widespread violent outbreaks of religious fervour. In
short order conflicts arose throughout the former Soviet Union and in the Balkans,
laying bare the astonishing degree to which religion, ethnocentrism and resurgent
nationalism had been smouldering under the surface for decades. The decade of the
1990s witnessed the spread of this phenomenon through much of the world.
Reflecting on the reemergence of religion as a major factor in conflicts, Harvard
professor of strategic studies Samuel Huntington published an article in 1993 in the
influential journal Foreign Affairs entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?" It and his
1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, set off a
fiery international debate, echoes of which are still heard. "The dangerous clashes of
the future," he wrote, "are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance,
Islamic intolerance and Sinic [Chinese] assertiveness."
Huntington's analysis was often vastly oversimplified in the public debate. Unable to
cope with the extreme complexities of the conflictive post-Cold War world, some
filled in "Islamic fundamentalism" in the blanks left when "Communism" was
removed from the standard formulas of "Cold War" logic. The identification of a new
"global enemy" made it possible to cling to that simplistic logic of "good versus evil".
In the war against an (Islamic-inspired) terrorism, religious and political passions are
often confused and manipulated. They further enflame religio-ethnic conflicts around
the globe.
17
In some of these conflicts Christian minorities have been the primary victims of
attacks by militant Islamic or other radical religious forces. Believers were killed and
churches burned. Sometimes Christians responded in kind and appealed for global
Christian solidarity with them in their "religious" struggles. The "religious right" in the
USA and its allies in some parts of Europe encouraged this confrontational approach,
reconverting its earlier anti-Communist organisations into "persecuted Christian"
movements and issuing its own ringing calls to arms against ”Islam."
Religious freedom in a globalising world
Global opposition to US-led globalisation that seeks to impose of its own economic
system, culture and notions of freedom on the rest of the world has taken various
forms. One of the first signs of resistance to such policies were seen at the 1993 UN
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, where many influential voices
from the ”Global South” insisted that human rights (including religious liberty) were a
culture-bound set of Western Christian ideas reflecting a particular ideology and
therefore could not be considered universally binding or even appropriate.
The last WCC Assembly (Harare, 1998) was in fact sensitive to this argument, yet
solidly reaffirmed the ecumenical movement’s commitments to peace and justice
based on the international rule of law, strong international institutions to enforce it,
and the centrality of human rights as universal and indivisible standards applicable to
all nations and peoples. It also reaffirmed religious freedom as a central concern of the
WCC in both affirmation and practice.
Looking back over our history we must be grateful for the insights of those who
struggled so effectively to make human rights a cornerstone of international law. This
was achieved through careful thinking, effective diplomacy and consistent dialogue,
including respectful interfaith dialogue. It would be a great tragedy if the tendencies
during the Cold War to wield human rights as a weapon in global ideological war.
The ecumenical movement has a proud record of resisting that tendency, and must
now clearly oppose efforts to make religious freedom a part of the arsenal of the forces
of globalisation. The guidelines set forward by the Nairobi Assembly cited above
equip us well for this new struggle for peace, justice and against a culture of violence
and retribution. The three basic ideas contained there are fundamental to authentic
Christian witness in a conflictive, multi-religious world:
• Religious liberty is central to, but inseparable from the full range of human rights.
Approached in this way it reinforces and gives deep meaning to the whole. Taken
alone it becomes a contributing factor to division and conflict.
• The promotion of religious freedom must be approached with great humility and in
dialogue with others. This right cannot legitimately be claimed as an exclusive
right for oneself, one’s nation, one’s ethnic group or one’s own church or faith, but
it is essential for believers, their churches or other religious communities to fulfil
their responsibilities to serve the whole community as agents of peace and
reconciliation.
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• The biblical injunction that Christians remove the log from our own eyes before
seeking to take the splinter out of the eye of our neighbour implies that
responsibility for human rights and religious liberty always begins at home. To be
credible advocates and engage in solidarity with others in pursuit of the universal
application of these standards we must first look self-critically at ourselves and
assure that they are fully respected in our own churches and nations.
Dwain C. Epps is the former Director of the Commission of the Churches on
International Affairs of the World Council of Churches.
1.3 Persecution of Christians – a Challenge for German Policy-making
(Hermann Gröhe)
When the agenda item "Persecution of Christians the World Over" was debated in the
Bundestag on 24 February 2000 this was a first: this topic, frequently repressed in
churches, political circles and the general public, had never previously been the subject
of debate in the German parliament. The reason was the need for the federal
government to respond to a "major parliamentary question" put by the opposition
CDU/CSU parliamentary party. In the debate itself, but also with the whole process of
producing the reply, the authors of this question had achieved an important goal: to
raise awareness of this topic in parliament and the public at large, not least at the many
desks in the government and the large number of embassies and consulates who were
compelled to address this topic in order to help to answer the question.
The basis of the "major question" and further parliamentary initiatives taken since
then, e.g. on the situation in India, Vietnam or the Sudan, was the understanding of
work for persecuted Christians as being part of the effort to bring about religious
freedom in general. The question included the following remark: "In view of the
Christian character of our political culture we feel particularly committed to show
solidarity with persecuted Christians". The authors of the question were accused by
some other parliamentary groups of engaging in questionable positive discrimination
regarding Christian victims of persecution. However, the federal government
emphasised in its reply that it was "challenged in a special way through the many close
contacts between German civil society and persecuted Christians all over the world to
intervene precisely on their behalf". This statement particularly deserves to be
underlined, indicating as it does that the many activities of churches, mission
associations and relief agencies indirectly have an impact on politics.
Basis of religious freedom
The fundamental right to religious freedom is enshrined in Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
19
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance."
Without wanting to attempt a possible rank order of human rights and human rights
violations, one can rightly say about the right to religious freedom: wherever a regime
wants to dominate the life of believers and tries to control their worship, community
life, or the religious instruction of children, the totality of its claim to dominance
becomes particularly clear. Yet it is a coincidence that totalitarian regimes are often
"provoked" by religious beliefs. Where people feel responsible to a transcendental
power, a creator, legislator, judge or merciful father, the claim to dominance of the
"rulers of this world" proves to have limits. This may disturb despots. In reality it is an
extremely human thing, and can preserve human effort from over-estimation of itself
and the idolisation of earthly power. And thus such beliefs have contributed
substantially to an understanding of human rights as the birthright of all human beings,
prior to all power of the state.
Threats to religious freedom in previously communist countries
The situation of harassed or persecuted Christians may differ greatly within different
countries, indeed, within the same country. For example, the ideologically motivated
state persecution of Christians in a number of countries has come to an end as a result
of the collapse of communism in the former eastern bloc. However, it is still apparent
that the "policy on religion" e.g. in the most populous country on earth, the People’s
Republic of China, and also in Vietnam and North Korea still frequently understands
religion as "opium of the people". Persecution in China is certainly far from taking
place on the scale of the Cultural Revolution. But Catholics loyal to Rome and
Protestant "house churches" are still under considerable pressure from the state, given
the great regional differences. Christian, particularly house church teachers, priests and
evangelists are often arbitrarily detained and sent to re-education camps. "Policy on
religion" also includes the massive pressure applied to members of the Falun Gong
meditation movement, which has even taken the form of brutal persecution. By
contrast, the destruction of the religious culture of Tibet or the pressure put on the
Muslims in Xinjiang takes place on the pretext of having to counter separatist
tendencies and often under the guise of combating terrorism.
Discrimination against Christians in Islamic States
In a number of Islamic states Christians are being increasingly discriminated against
and persecuted, and this is a matter of great concern. Naturally one must beware of
questionable generalisations. But the fear of being charged with creating "new enemy
stereotypes" must not prevent us from clearly naming the considerable wrongs taking
place e.g. in Pakistan or in Saudi Arabia. It seems as though further political
clarification is required in Germany as well. I consider it particularly problematic
when the federal government, in its response on the situation of Christians in Islamic
countries, states: "It is merely missionary activities that are consistently suppressed in
most Islamic countries." After all, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
20
Rights expressly stipulates that the public manifestation of belief and the freedom to
change religion are part of religious freedom. So anyone who recommends to
Christians that they conduct worship quietly and on private premises, in order not to
"provoke" anyone through noisy mission activity misses the point of the missionary
dimension of Christian faith and also of an essential aspect of the basic right to
religious freedom.
In a number of Islamic countries a strengthening of Islamist currents is doubtless part
of a post-colonial quest for identity. This applies, for example, to the most populous
Islamic country, Indonesia, in which there have been increasing tendencies to link
national identity with Islam since the end of the secular Suharto dictatorship.
In India, too, the most populous democracy, a persistent quest for identity is
increasingly linked with a fundamentalist Hindu nationalism, under which those of
other faiths are having to suffer more and more. In the last few years Christian
buildings have repeatedly been the target of acts of violence. And in individual states
of India it requires state recognition for someone to change his or her religious
adherence.
Tendencies in the former eastern bloc are also cause for increasing concern, indicating
that certain ideas within the Orthodox churches and authoritarian political ideas are
being linked in a way that is against "western influence" and thereby ultimately against
smaller Christian churches.
Political possibilities
Politicians can counter these developments in different ways. Parliamentary initiatives
can call upon the federal government to give the topic of religious freedom a particular
importance in its talks with representatives of certain governments, in order to improve
the situation of Christians who are harassed or even persecuted. A series of such
initiatives, not least the above mentioned "major question" in parliament, have already
led to greater attention for the topic in German foreign policy. The Sixth Report of the
Federal Government on its Human Rights Policy in Foreign Relations and in Other
Areas of Policy of 6 June 2002 gave a lot of space to the topic "Protection of religious
freedom". Furthermore, a heightened awareness of the topic may be noted in German
diplomatic missions. Committed parliamentarians from different countries are
increasingly networking on their activities, exchanging information e.g. on individual
countries, and coordinating their efforts. The "major question" of the CDU/CSU also
led to a similar question being asked in the Swiss parliament.
Individual parliamentarians often use the opportunity of talks with ambassadors or
with parliamentary and governmental representatives of other states to raise the
situation of harassed or persecuted Christians and speak out for religious freedom.
Some governments will not reply to such queries or accusations but note very carefully
that the fate of harassed and persecuted Christians in their country has not gone
unnoticed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Regular letters to embassies or
21
government offices can achieve a great deal, as shown by the experience of Amnesty
International. Every so often a prisoner is released, sentences are reduced or converted
into house arrest, and prison conditions are eased as a result of international protests
and petitions. Anyone can get involved in advocating for harassed and persecuted
people in this way. When political or church bodies raise public attention to the
situation of harassed or persecuted Christians, states come under pressure. And they
are mostly very interested in keeping a good international reputation.
With respect to the situation in Turkey, in which Christian minorities are still exposed
to multiple harassment despite assertions to the contrary, the process of rapprochement
to the European Union offers an opportunity to clearly address the rights of religious and also ethnic - minorities and to press for change. With talks in Brussels and a joint
letter to Commissioner Günther Verheugen German churches succeeded in getting the
latest EU Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession to devote more space to the
situation of the Christian minority than earlier reports. On foreign trips governmental
or parliamentary representatives can make important points when, e.g. in the People’s
Republic of China, they ask to visit a church or church institution as part of their
programme. Questions to the foreign ministry may lead to German embassies
becoming active in order to follow up individual reports on restrictions on religious
freedom. That may include monitoring hearings and trials.
Finally, the different international forums, e.g. the conference of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission in Geneva, offer a good opportunity to make clear the
importance Germany and the western states attach to the fundamental right to religious
freedom. Just as it has become a central element of German human rights policy to
press for the worldwide abolition of the death penalty, working for religious freedom
should become a trademark of German and European foreign policy.
Every one of us can contribute towards that. If it is possible for a small group of
German Falun Gong supporters to visit numerous members of the Bundestag
personally, in order to ask them to support persecuted Falun Gong members in China,
it should be possible for many Christians in our country to confront politicians in
Germany repeatedly with the question of what they are doing to ease the lives of
Christians from many parts of the world who are harassed and persecuted.
Hermann Gröhe is a lawyer, member of Synod and the Council of the Evangelical
Church in Germany, and spokesman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group on human
rights and aid. He is also a board member of the German Institute for Human Rights.
1.4 The Struggle for Freedom of Religion in International Law
(Gerhard Robbers)
The growing significance of religion worldwide raises new challenges for international
law. Its primary task of regulating the relationship of the states to one another has long
been supplemented by the intensive effort to protect human rights. Religious freedom
22
plays a central role here. At the same time, the growing relevance of religion also
involves threats that international law must counter. The peaceful coexistence of
nations must not be put at risk by the abuse of religious beliefs.
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by many treaties
The importance of religious freedom in international law is shown by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) on 10
December 1948. Its Preamble states that the "highest aspiration of the common
people" is to create a world "in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want". Certainly, there is often a big gap between the
ideal and the reality. However, the de facto significance of the UDHR extends far
beyond its restricted legal relevance. Even if it is only soft law, proclaimed according
to the Preamble as an ideal to be achieved by all peoples and nations, it forms a core
that is elaborated in numerous other, binding covenants and declarations of
international law. That particularly applies to the guarantee of religious freedom.
Article 18 of the UDHR runs: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." This is
to be found in different wordings in many international instruments as a binding norm.
It also appears as Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), adopted on 19 December 1966. This covenant makes fundamental
human rights legally binding; 148 states have undertaken to respect them.
There is one essential difference, however, in the wording of the guarantees of
religious freedom between the UDHR and the ICCPR. While the former guarantees
the right to change one’s religion, the Covenant of 1966 merely speaks of having or
adopting a religion of one’s choice. This change came at the request of Muslim states,
where religion prohibits a change from Islam to another religion and in some extreme
forms threatens this with the death penalty. This shows that the international
significance of religious freedom goes far beyond what international law can achieve.
International law can only give assistance and support. It is much more urgent to get
the religions themselves to understand that true, genuine faith can only grow and exist
as an act of free will.
The universal guarantee of religious freedom is elaborated, developed and reinforced
in respect of specific areas in many UN treaties. The UDHR itself introduces the ban
on discrimination: every person has a right to the proclaimed rights and freedoms
without any distinction on grounds of his or her religion. This thought is repeated
many times, e.g. in the ICCPR. Even if human rights are suspended in an emergency
this must not entail any discrimination on religious grounds alone. Without restriction
by religion, men and women have the right to marry and found a family. Without any
discrimination on religious grounds, all children have the right to those protective
measures through their family, society and the State that are required by their legal
situation as minors.
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The Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 expects
contracting states not to treat refugees worse than their own nationals regarding the
practice of their religion and the freedom of religious instruction for their children. It
prohibits the expulsion of refugees to territories in which their life or freedom would
be threatened on account of their religion. Strongly developed, but always threatened,
is the protection of religion for minorities: in states with religious minorities the
members of such minorities must not be deprived of the right to cultivate their own
cultural life with other members of their group or to confess and practise their own
religion. The Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at
The Hague on 18 October 1907, and international law with regard to war take account
of religious needs in many provisions: prisoners of war are to be allowed full freedom
in the exercise of their religion including attending worship on condition that they
submit to the general and police regulations of the military authority.
According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) of 19 December 1966 the States Parties recognise the right of each
individual to education and expressly agree that education has to promote
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all peoples and all racial, ethnic and
religious groups. They undertake to respect the freedom of parents to guarantee the
religious and ethical education of their children in agreement with their own beliefs.
The rights of children, indicated here, are expanded upon in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, adopted on 20 November 1989. It expressly guarantees children
"freedom of thought, conscience and religion". It further respects "the rights and duties
of parents" to guide children in exercising this right in a manner appropriate to their
development.
If adoption, placement in a foster family or a similar intervention is necessary the
decision must take sufficient account of the religious background of the child. The
contracting states agree that the education of the child must aim to prepare him or her
for "a responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance,
equality of sexes and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious
groups and persons of indigenous origin". In addition there is a right to the
preservation of cultural identity. In states with religious minorities a child belonging to
such a minority must not be deprived of the right "to confess and practise his or her
own religion" in community with other members of his or her group.
Here we see that the UN has increasingly recognised the significance of education for
a religiously tolerant, understanding and peaceful coexistence. Long-term, patient
thinking wins the day. For example, a UN conference in Madrid in 2001 adopted
recommendations to deepen the understanding of religious freedom through school
lessons.
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The institutions to protect religious freedom must be reinforced
There are many kinds of institutions that have been established to guarantee and
monitor protection by international law for religious freedom at the UN level. The UN
Human Rights Commission has particular weight here, developing as it is into a
central, political organ for the worldwide promotion of human rights. To protect the
rights of children a committee has been created that can foster the implementation of
the convention, conduct investigations, and make proposals and recommendations.
Under the ICCPR regime there is a Human Rights Committee that can call for, and
receive, reports from States Parties about human rights developments, check on human
rights violations, contribute to settling such quarrels and report in the form of General
Comments. The Economic and Social Council of the UN can present reports and
recommendations to the General Assembly on progress with the respect for rights laid
down in the ICESCR.
Specifically for the protection of religious freedom, the UN created the office of the
Special Rapporteur for freedom of religion or belief, located in Geneva. Since its
inception in 1986 this office has developed broad-based review and reporting
activities. With great empathy for the particularities of individual cultures the Special
Rapporteur has, for example, pointed out that respect for cultures and traditions must
go hand in hand with the rights of women, who are often attributed a lower and clearly
second-class status, often not so much for religious or traditional reasons, but in order
to exploit women. He has stressed the need for studies on religious extremism, on the
consequences of the events of 11 September 2001 and on sects. In addition,
international law has increasingly recognised the activity of NGOs and used their
experience, contacts and sources of information. Many religious communities
themselves make a major contribution to the internal strengthening of religious
freedom under international law.
This look at international law reveals a clear awareness of the importance of religious
freedom. Religious freedom numbers among the rights protected by international law
that are a matter of course. It could almost be said that there is little more to be added
to the proclamation of religious freedom, its variations and needs for protection. The
problems are not at the declaratory level, they lie in the practical execution, the
supervision, the implementation and, above all, in the closer definition of the limits of
religious freedom. At the level of international law in general, the powers of the
oversight bodies that are supposed to monitor the observance of human rights need to
be intensified. Presenting reports is not enough, however important this power is and
however much the states concerned may thereby feel under pressure to observe
religious freedom. Frequently this public pressure proves to have little effect. There is
still no possibility of individual complaint. Above all, there is a lack of a legal
authority to sanction the violations of religious freedom and other human rights.
25
Understanding for one another must grow
However much the belief in religious freedom is shared by practically all states there is
still great disunity on details. No freedom exists without limits, however. Religious
freedom too must put up with restrictions. The rights of third parties call for
consideration along with the needs of national security at home and abroad. There is a
broad variety of beliefs about how such rights and needs should be properly allocated
to one another. This is largely dependent on culture and tradition. The historical
experiences of China with religious secret societies differ from the flowering of
religious diversity in the United States. Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India consider
different priorities to be legitimate. Mostly religious aspects are mixed with ethnic,
economic, social, political or other problems determining the relationships of peoples,
majorities and minorities, individuals and communities to one another. When e.g.
American missionaries from young religious communities with the experience of
individual freedom in their home country operate in countries in which the importance
of the family and the social group characterises the social conditions, this necessarily
leads to frictions. What some feel to be the natural enjoyment of individual freedom is
considered by others to be sheer betrayal of their group. Understanding on all sides is
then particularly necessary and often particularly difficult. Long-term educational
programmes could help but they need to be patient and persevering.
Religious freedom is growing in regional international law
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) may be regarded as a model of
international protection of religious freedom. With its institutions, particularly the
effective European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it has made an intensive
contribution to the protection of religious freedom. Inherent in this is also the growing
importance of religious questions. After many years of almost total inactivity in this
regard the European Court of Human Rights has taken a large number of decisions on
religious freedom in the last few years. This case law allows us to see structures of
intensive protection of religious freedom, and at the same time it clarifies the issues
raised in similar fashion the world over.
The text guaranteeing religious freedom in the ECHR follows that of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the restrictions having been adopted by the ICCPR.
Article 9 ECHR begins: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."
It continues: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others." The ECHR guarantees, in addition,
non-discrimination on religious grounds and, in its first additional protocol, the right to
religious education.
26
The legislation of the European Court of Human Rights in one of its emphases points
to one of the main areas of friction for religious freedom that exist far beyond the
European sphere: proselytism and mission. Small religious communities, often newly
introduced from the US, feel their hands tied in their global outreach for new
members. Precisely regarding Greece, where proselytism meets with considerable
penalties, the European Court of Human Rights has found solutions that could serve as
a model. The Court distinguishes between appropriate and inappropriate proselytism.
The former must not be hampered: advertising one’s own faith through conversation
and conviction must not be impeded. But where there is pressure, e.g. from people
using their position as superior officers in the army or in other situations of social
power, states can take counter-action. Currently one of the main fields of argument
regarding religious freedom is about defining the boundaries between appropriate and
inappropriate proselytism.
Many states have passed special laws on religion and religious communities in the last
few years. Often they have introduced registers for religious communities. If special
rights are connected to the registration, like a special situation in tax law, involvement
in state religious instruction or in private schools there are no objections. This applies
even if the registration is made dependent on having a considerable number of
members. However, having to meet special prerequisites for registration like the
number of members or length of existence on the national territory can also involve
discrimination. All religious communities that keep the law must have the right to
exist, and must be legally able to run places for worship. They must not be deprived of
legal personality only because they are religious communities.
The European Convention on Human Rights is not the only instrument to promote
religious freedom. Also adopted by the Council of Europe, the Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities protects religious identity and religious freedom,
guarantees religious education and commits signatories to foster tolerance. An
important contribution towards religious freedom is likewise made by the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE has long recognised how the
security between the nations and peoples depends on religious freedom and mutual
tolerance. Many other regions of the world have seen the conclusion of human rights
conventions that also protect religious freedom. That is true for the African Charter of
Human and Peoples' Rights and also for the American Convention on Human Rights.
The former avoids a detailed guarantee, thereby evading the problem of free change of
religion. The latter has various bodies for enforcing human rights protection, including
a court. The Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted by the Council of the League of
Arab States on 15 September 1994, is also interesting: from the preamble on, it is
deeply rooted in religious beliefs. "Everyone has a guaranteed right to freedom of
belief, thought and opinion" (Art. 26). "Adherents of every religion have the right to
practise their religious observances and to manifest their views through expression,
practice or teaching, without prejudice to the rights of others. No restrictions shall be
imposed on the exercise of freedom of belief, thought and opinion except as provided
by law" (Art. 27).
27
Religious freedom fosters tolerance, energy and modesty
There should be a greater realisation that human rights contain obligations on the
states to create the preconditions for the fullest possible development of these rights. It
is not enough for the states and government to refrain themselves from persecuting
religious minorities, they must actively oppose such persecution by third parties. There
is growing awareness of the need for preventive protection, the promotion of tolerance
through education, in the media and in the teachings of the religions themselves. Interreligious dialogue is of crucial importance for the development of religious freedom. It
is the only way to truly foster mutual respect and understanding. Bodies created by
international law can offer forums to promote inter-religious dialogue. This must be
conducted by the religious communities themselves. It will involve many
disappointments, cutting personal ambitions down to size, and learning to see your
ideals in relation to those of others.
Prof. Dr. Gerhard Robbers teaches Public Law, Church Law, Philosophy of the State
and Constitutional History at the University of Trier and is a member of the EKD
Synod.
28
II. Examples from selected countries
2.1 Freedom of religion in Egypt
(Cornelis Hulsman)
One of the most beautiful biblical stories is that of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10).
The neighbour in this parable is not the priest but a person of a despised and
distrusted group, the Samaritans. The story teaches us that stereotypes about
people from other groups are false and misleading.
I used this story when I was asked to speak in a church in Ishneen el-Nasara, 180
km south of Cairo. I read the Bible text but replaced the Good Samaritan with
‘Good Muslim.’ People in the village knew very well what I meant. The way
Christians in Egypt think about Muslims is often not different from the way Jews
in the days of Jesus thought about Samaritans. Of course that is mutual but Jesus
made an effort to break mutual stereotypes and showed that we should approach
one another with humility because no person is beyond the reach of God's love.
And when we do this, persons from groups we dislike may turn out to be conduits
of his grace in time of need.
Tense - the relation between Muslims and Christians
Relations between Jews and Samaritans may have been marred but this is far
more so between Muslims and Christians. There is a mutual mistrust that has been
reinforced by centuries of conflict; (but moments of cooperation have been there!)
Crusades, Western colonialism in the 19th and 20th century, Western self-interest
in relating to the Arab world, biased standards in dealing with Israel and the
Palestinians, a long history of anti-Islamic statements by Western leaders and
authors, and most recently the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. Being in Egypt,
one is continuously reminded of this history and Western biases. This has resulted
in a widespread conviction that the West has targeted Islam, that Western
Christians are making an effort to destroy Islam and that; in fact, we are
witnessing a new Western crusade against Islam.
This is the context Christians in Egypt live in. Because they are Christians they
are often associated with the West. Doesn’t the West show more interest in their
well being than that of Muslims? Don't they both use the same Bible? US
President George Bush has done a lot to make the West appear Christian. Plans of
US organisations to send missionaries to Iraq reinforce the belief that the West
does target Islam. Millions of Christians disagree and do not want to attack Islam.
But the statements of Bush and some Christian leaders in the US have become so
strong and have been so often repeated in Arab media that one wonders how long
it takes before the bomb bursts. The terrible attack of September 11 led to attacks
on Muslims in the US and Europe. That resulted in counter attacks on Christians
in some Muslim countries but not Egypt. Christians in Egypt are well aware of the
29
tense situation at this moment. Many Christians rushed to the Egyptian press with
comments that Bush is not a true Christian. They needed to do this in selfdefence.
The discussion about freedom of religion is very different in Egypt from that in
the West. Westerners are focused on the freedom of individuals. Egyptians,
Muslims and Christians, are focused on what they believe is good for their
community; the protection of their traditions and faith. Both Muslims and
Christians make all efforts to have the government on their side. Christians need
to protect their community from, for example the preaching of Jehovah's
Witnesses and Muslims to prevent, for example, the Baha'is from being
recognised.
Both Christians and Muslims do not hesitate to manipulate facts whenever they
believe this is needed to serve one’s community, preserve one’s (collective)
honour or to deliberately harm the other in moments of tension and conflict.
These manipulations can be very refined and are often not seen by foreigners who
are relatively new to the country. Many journalists are guilty of focusing attention
on what has happened but not on the underlying causes of events. In this way
media reporting can act as a boomerang and reinforce Arab-West polarisation.
Facts are often distorted because the average Muslim generally believe they are
better than Christians and the average Christian believe they are better than
Muslims. Doesn’t this look similar to the way Jews and Samaritans saw each
other in Jesus' day?
The Christian percentage of the population is diminishing
Numbers are a generally a problem. Some Coptic activists, but also some clergy,
claim with the greatest of ease that 20% of the Egyptian population is Christian.
The US Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2002 puts the number at
8-10% but Western research shows that the number of Christians is probably no
more than 5% of the total population. 95% of those belong to the Coptic
[Egyptian] Orthodox Church. It is certain that the percentage of Christians is
rapidly decreasing. Around 1925 80% of the Copts lived in Upper Egypt as
opposed to perhaps 50% today. Many have migrated to Cairo, Alexandria and
countries abroad. It is estimated that 70% of all Egyptian emigrants to the West
are Christian. Many thousands of Christians convert yearly to Islam and Christian
families tend to be smaller than Muslim families. These factors explain the steady
decrease in the percentage of Christians in Egypt.
Despite their declining numbers Christians have experienced an unprecedented
renaissance in the past 50 years. They have been able to build more churches and
monasteries than ever before in any other half century since the Arab conquest of
Egypt. Monasticism flourishes. The number of priests has strongly increased and
church activities strongly expanded.
30
Most conflicts in Egyptian society take place in poor neighbourhoods where
people struggle for their daily survival in harsh circumstances. When people fight,
they try to get support from family and friends and often do this through calling
upon religious values. When conflicts take place they are often reported in the
West as a conflict of Islam versus Christians but the fact that such conflicts hardly
occur in wealthier neighbourhoods show the strong relation between conflicts and
poor living conditions and not the relation between conflicts and religious
convictions.
Between law and practice
The Egyptian government subscribes to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights that recognises that "everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. This right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and
observance". But in the Egyptian interpretation greater value is given to the
protection of values in society over individual freedoms. Egypt's state policy is de
facto secular. Article 2 of the Constitution stipulates, "the principles of the Shari'a
[Islamic law] are the principle source of legislation." This means that laws should
not be in violation with the Shari'a.
The Egyptian constitution guarantees the freedom of belief and religious practice.
It speaks about ‘citizens’ without making a distinction based on faith. However,
Egyptian law distinguishes between officially recognised religious communities,
Islam, Christianity and Judaism who can present requests, complaints, etc. on
behalf of their community, and non-recognised religious communities who are not
able to do this. The officially recognised religions and denominations can present
their faith to a wider public through TV, radio, religious publications and other
activities that are considered to be non-offensive for the other. Naturally Islam is
much bigger than Christianity in Egypt and religious oriented presentations have
been dominated by Islam. Religious communities that are not officially
recognised by the Egyptian authorities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baha'is
do have the right to practice their religion, but their practice should not be
offensive to one of the officially recognised communities. This means in practice
that they hardly can go public with their activities. Christians and Muslims are
practically equal before the law. Christians are free to assemble in their houses of
worship whenever they want but Muslims cannot do this outside the five times per
day permitted for prayer. This is the result of a government policy to prevent
radical groups from meeting in mosques.
Egypt is a religious country. People attach great importance to the values of their
respective religions. Both Muslims and Christians adhere to many of the same
values such as honour and the strong desire to protect one’s own traditions.
Article 98f of the Penal Code prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting one of
31
the officially recognised religions or inciting sectarian strife. This law has been
used by both Muslims and Christians to punish those who offended their faith.
Egyptian law does not prevent a Christian from becoming Muslim or a Muslim to
become Christian but there are nevertheless legal barriers for those wishing to
leave Islam. One’s religion is mentioned on one’s identity papers. While it is easy
to change one’s identity papers from Christian to Muslim it is practically
impossible to change one’s identity papers from Islam to any other religion. That
can create numerous problems, especially if one is young and plans to marry,
since mixed religious marriages are taboo. Prominent Muslim leaders say
Muslims are allowed to leave Islam but should not attack Islam once they have
left but many others believe such apostasy is in violation with Islam and should
be punishable by death. Former Muslims have been punished according to Article
98f but have never been sentenced to death in the modern history of Egypt. There
are no statistics published about conversions in either direction but certain is that
the conversion of Christians to Islam is hundreds of times larger than the
conversion Muslims to Christianity. Some Christians have claimed that these
conversions were the result of physical force but research showed a total lack of
evidence for such claims. The main factors for conversion are a whole range of
social problems often in combination with nominal Christianity.
The official position of the Egyptian government is that there are no prohibitions
against the construction and maintenance of places of worship. President Mubarak
delegated the right to issue permits for repairs of churches to the governors in
Presidential Decree 13 of 1998. This resulted in a sharp increase in permits but it
seems permits are more easily obtained when church leaders and local authorities
have good relations rather than the contrary.
Discrimination but no Persecution
Discrimination against Christians is often reported but is rarely related to the law but
to a poisoned social climate that is related to strong feelings of superiority and strong
Muslim feelings that injustice has been done to them by the West. There have been
violent attacks on Christians committed by extremist Muslim groups in the 80s end
90s as the attack that killed 58 foreign tourists in Luxor in 1997. Since 1997, the
Egyptian government has done a lot to prevent further killings. address extremism.
The violence that has been reported since 1997 was not related to extremist groups but
to mobs or sentiments of mobs, often around church buildings.
It would be incorrect to speak about persecution in Egypt in sense of something
organised, planned by a government or, at the very least, something that is part of
a deliberate, planned program of neglect by a government in protecting a
particular religious group. This does not exist in Egypt, which does not mean that
neglect could not happen in particular regions.
32
[This text is a brief summary of a recent Arab-West Report on freedom of religion
written in consultation with Egyptian church leaders, scholars and other experts.
Free copies of this report can be obtained through Arab-West Report:
[email protected]]
Dr. Cornelis Hulsman is editor-in-chief of Arab-West Report and former affiliate
associate professor of mass communication at the American University in Cairo,
Egypt.
Further reading:
y "Muslim Perceptions of Christianity", Hugh Goddard, Grey Seal, London, 1996.
y "Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity", O.F.A. Meinardus, The
American University in Cairo Press, 1999.
y "Among the Copts", John H. Watson, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton,
Portland, 2000.
y "Conversions of Christians to Islam", Rodolph Yanney, RNSAW, 2001, week
01, art. 4.
y "Christians in Egypt: the impact of Islamic resurgence" (covering developments
until 1998), Cornelis Hulsman and Chawkat Moucary, RNSAW, 2002, week 50-2.
y "Religious Freedom and Civil Society in Egypt", Cornelis Hulsman, RNSAW,
2002, week 50, art. 31.
More documentation can be found with the Religious News Service from the Arab
World (RNSAW) that changed on January 1, 2003 into Arab-West Report. The
Centre for the Study of Christianity in Islamic Lands (CSCIL) in London, UK, has
an important archive.
2.2 Religious Policy in China
(Monika Gaenssbauer)
"Never has there been more freedom of religion in China than today," says Rev. Bao
Jiayuan, one of the deputy general secretaries of the China Christian Council (CCC).
He compares the present here with times like the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), in
which Bibles were burnt and believers driven underground because all religion was
regarded as a remnant of feudalism and opium for the people. Fortunately, the times
when all religious life in China was persecuted are really over. The diaconal
foundation Amity, founded in 1985, is active all over the country in social welfare,
health care and rural village development. In 2002 it celebrated the printing of 30
million Bibles. Every year one million people profess their belief in Christianity, and
that only on the Protestant side. The established Protestant church today has, at a
conservative estimate, 16 million members.
33
A document of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 2002 speaks of 25 million
Protestants and thereby recognises the existence of Protestant parishes operating
outside the CCC. It is hardly possible, however, to come up with reliable figures for
the Christians organised in house churches. In all, the CCP document gives the figure
of about 220 million religious adherents in China: 150 million Buddhists, 11 million
Muslims, 5.5 million Daoists and 3.2 million Catholics. The China Centre in St.
Augustin, Germany speaks of about 12 million Catholics, half belonging to the official
church and half to the "underground" church. From the start, the "underground" church
openly opposed the government demand that it cut links with Rome. The official
church has more scope for its work thanks to state recognition. However, the
government has banned any connection with the Vatican.
Situation of the non-registered churches
In order to be state-registered, the religious communities in China must fulfil certain
conditions regarding their headquarters, number of members and source of income.
The non-registered Protestant "house churches" probably have at least as many
members than those of the registered churches. Their registration is sometimes
hampered by the above conditions or their interpretation by the authorities. Sometimes
the groups themselves decide against registration.
Many non-registered groups are tolerated, above all as long as they are small and
inconspicuous. However, different sources report regular state repression against
members of non-registered groups. The sixth report of the German government on its
human rights policy in external relations states: "Worship services of the nonrecognised Protestant 'house churches' and the Catholic underground church loyal to
Rome are continually broken up by use of force. Church buildings are destroyed and
believers imprisoned, sometimes being put in penal camps. In individual cases, court
hearings that do not meet the criteria of a fair trial may lead to the imposing of the
death penalty."
Amnesty International writes in its annual reports of harassment, detention and
judgement of Christians without a fair trial, e.g. in connection with the "Campaign
against Superstition" that started in 1998. In autumn 2001 Amnesty International
reported in several Urgent Actions that supporters of the South Chinese Church,
classed as a sect, had been detained, tortured in detention and sentenced to long terms
of imprisonment or to death. According to Human Rights Watch, hundreds of "illegal"
churches were destroyed in Wenzhou in December 2002.
Corinna Schellenberg
The constitution
The constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted on 4 December 1982 and
still valid, states in Article 36: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy
freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organisation, or individual may
compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion, nor may they
discriminate against those citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.
34
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of a religion to
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere
with the educational system of the state. The religious bodies and religious affairs are
not subject to any foreign domination."
This article of the Chinese constitution is couched in very general terms and does not
provide a sufficient basis for dealing with religion, e.g. there is no legal definition of
the concept of "normal religious activities". The power of definition for this phrase is
still in the hands of party and state representatives, who opt for different interpretations
as it suits them and are not willing to hand over this instrument of power in favour of
greater regulation in the field of religion.
Document No. 19
Document No. 19, adopted on 31 March 1982 by the Central Committee of the CCP, is
still the most important policy document of the party on religious questions, and is
applied in dealing with all recognised religions in China. It names as recognised
religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam. In the document
religion is regarded as a historical phenomenon, that will "ultimately disappear from
human history", yet first only "subject to a long-term development from socialism to
communism and when all objective conditions for that are given".
Document No. 19 sees the implementation of a policy of religious freedom as a
priority in the "new historical age". The "patriotic political bond also needs to be
consolidated and expanded in each ethnic religious group". International contacts with
Chinese religious representatives are permitted, but care is required because there are
"reactionary and imperialist groups abroad", who use every opportunity, "to return to
the Chinese mainland and infiltrate China". The one-party state expects religious
leaders to be "patriots"; they constantly have to prove their loyalty to the socialist state
and the Communist Party.
Document No. 19 has at least opened up avenues for a pragmatic cooperation between
religions and the one-party state in China since the 1980s. When studying religious
policy in present day China it is, moreover, important to constantly remember that
religion in China has never constituted an autonomous power. In China there have
never been equal rights in church-state relations as developed in Europe.
The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and China Christian Council
After the radical change of system in 1949 and the expulsion of all foreign
missionaries the Protestant church representatives of China founded a Three-Self
Patriotic Movement in the 1950s. This organisation of political unity founded by
Protestant churches advocates being self-supporting, self-governing and selfpropagating. Its task is, according to its statutes, "to unite Christians all over China
under the leadership of the Communist Party and the people's government". The 2002
constitution of the China Christian Council (CCC), founded in 1980 for the purposes
of internal organisation, expresses the same aim: "to unite and lead all patriotic and
35
church-loving Christians in China who believe in and serve God and who
acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord in glorifying God and benefiting people; to abide by
the national Constitution, laws, regulations and policies, and to observe social mores;
under the leading of the Holy Spirit, with one heart and unity of purpose, in obedience
to the truth of Scripture, to uphold the truth of Scripture, to uphold the Three-Self
patriotic principles, to formulate and perfect the rules and regulations of the Chinese
Church, to make our Chinese Church an independent, self-run and well run Church
and to enable Chinese Christianity to adapt to socialist society." Since 1991 the CCC
has been a member of the World Council of Churches (WCC). Meanwhile foreign
churches have again been permitted to give financial support for the theological and
social work of the CCC, which the latter accepts as long as it is not accompanied by
preconditions that would restrict the autonomy of the Chinese church.
CCC and TSPM have often been compared in China with the two arms of one body
and they were supposed to live side-by-side on an equal basis. Back in the 1980s,
however, it became clear that there could be no talk of equal cooperation between the
two organisations. The Three-Self Movement functions as a political mass
organisation in the one-party state. In 1988 Bishop K. H. Ting made a very frank
statement about existing disarray in the distribution of powers, stating that the
responsibilities of the Movement did not extend to taking on church leadership. Ting
justified this with the special nature of the church: "The church is a social group but it
also has a holy dimension." The bishop expressed the expectation of a greater
separation between church and state in future.
The violent crushing of the democracy movement in 1989 provisionally concluded the
discussion abut a re-ordering of the functions of the Chinese church. Only eleven years
later, Wang Aiming, vice-director of Union Theological Seminary in Nanjing, sparked
the discussion again. He criticised the fact that Chinese Christianity – with the
simultaneous modernising of all areas of life in China – was still "under political care"
and socially marginalised. Wang found that the principle of self-government had long
been realised regarding the independence of the Chinese church from overseas
influence. He argued for a different understanding of the principle of self-government.
According to his observation, the Christian Councils at the different levels in the
church often still act according to rules laid down by Religious Affairs Bureaux. Strict
limits are still put on leadership responsibility and self-organisation of the Christian
Councils and Three-Self Patriotic Movement. The supervision by the one-party state
hampers the development of churches into groups with relevance in civil society.
Falun Gong
In April 1999 about 10,000 supporters of the Falung Gong Movement, that has existed
since 1992, held a silent, disciplined demonstration lasting 13 hours in front of the
Zhongnanhai District, the centre of power, for recognition as an official association. In
October 1999 the National People's Congress passed a resolution against "heretical
cults". Leading religious representatives in China publicly declared their rejection of
"heretical cults" like the Falun Gong movement. However, when restrictions were
applied against Falun Gong such as detentions, forced labour and re-education this
36
brought tighter controls on all religious communities and the detaining of supporters of
non-registered religious groups. After the acts of terror against the United States on 11
September 2001 the Falun Gong movement – along with groups in the Xinjiang region
and Tibet striving for autonomy – were officially declared to be potentially "terrorist
forces".
A group like Falun Gong, that in 1999 gave its membership as 70 million, is probably
persecuted by the Chinese state for two reasons: first, because of its potential for
opposition, that is hard to control, and second – and here all religious groupings in
China are eyed with suspicion by the one-party state – because of its potential for
expectation, hope and action, that is attractive to people in China and constitutes a real
rival to Marxism, still declared to be the ruling ideology.
Dr. Monika Gaenssbauer, a sinologist and political scientist, has since 1996 headed
the China Study Project on Christianity in China, which is supported by protestant
churches and mission agencies in Germany. Since 1999 she has also been East Asia
Secretary of the North Elbian Mission Centre (NMZ) in Hamburg.
Further reading:
y "Christentum chinesisch – in Theorie und Praxis", Monika Gänßbauer, Breklum
2003 // available at: China InfoStelle c/o NMZ, Agathe-Lasch-Weg 16, 22605
Hamburg, Tel. (040) 881 81-313, Fax (040) 881 81-210
y "Religion in China Today: Policy and Practice", Donald MacInnis, Maryknoll, New
York: Orbis Books 1989
y "Zur Lage der Menschenrechte in der VR China − Religionsfreiheit", Georg Evers,
missio Aachen, Reihe Menschenrechte No. 1/2001 // available at: missio Aachen,
Postfach 10 12 48, 52012 Aachen, Tel. (0241) 7507-00, Fax (0241) 7507-61-253,
Email: [email protected]
2.3 India's Christians under Pressure
(Klaus Schäfer)
For many people in the West, India represents a fantastic example of religious
tolerance. This impression, essentially inspired by Mahatma Ghandi, is also confirmed
by the Indian constitution, that states in Article 25 on religious freedom: "Subject to
public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part [of the
constitution], all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess, practise and propagate religion."
The principle of secularity anchored in the constitution is – at least according to most
Indians – not just an expression of the neutrality of the state towards the different
religions, but is also linked to a positive appreciation and respect for religions.
Different other articles state that religious minorities are to be granted special
protection. India has a commission for minorities, in which the different religions are
37
represented and in which the problems of religious minorities can be dealt with. It has
also passed different civil laws for Hindus, Muslims and Christians. That reflects the
constitutional principles seeking to protect the multicultural and multi-faith character
of the country.
On the other hand, these principles, which were not entirely uncontroversial in India,
have recently again become the object of heated debates. Under the heading Hindutva,
Hinduism, and with the slogan "One nation, one people, one culture" a large number
of recent and older Hindu Nationalist groups are pursuing a relatively aggressive
policy of "Hinduisation" of the Indian nation, that seeks to exclude religious
minorities. These groups also include the Baratiya Janata Party (BJP), which has ruled
in coalition with other parties since 1998. The hardest hit are the Muslim and Christian
minorities – radical Hindu groups contest their right to be in India due to their origin
outside the Indian mother country, or at least call for a recognition of the
predominance of an Indian culture characterised by Hinduism.
"Anti-conversion laws"
Back in the 1960s and 1970s laws were passed in three Indian states – Orissa, Madhya
Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh – massively limiting freedom of religion. These laws
were officially introduced for the protection of religious freedom. Yet from the view of
the Indian churches these are nothing less than "anti-conversion laws" that make the
change from one religion to another extraordinarily difficult. It is not conversion itself
that is penalised here – i.e. the free decision of a person to espouse another religion –
but an activity aimed at "conversion", using unfair means and operating with "force",
"allurement" or "fraudulent means". Similar laws were passed in Tamil Nadu and in
March 2003 in Gujarat. In the first case, such an activity can be punished by a prison
sentence of up to three years and a fine. Any change of one person from one religion to
another must be reported to the district magistrate before the official ceremony – e.g.
Christian baptism. The governing BJP in Delhi would like to introduce such a law for
the whole of India.
The problem with these laws is not so much that they are intended to prevent abuse –
conversion activity as attacked here is indeed invidious – but that the vague wording of
the legislative texts opens the doors to arbitrary interpretation by state authorities and
agitation by non-state actors. Because any kind of public commitment of Christians in
society, e.g. in establishing schools, providing medical care, working in development
projects, even holding services of worship, can be discredited as an inappropriate
pressure to convert, a great sense of uncertainty is spreading among Christians. This is
further compounded by the experience of massive intimidation and violent attacks on
Christians and their church institutions and symbols from Hindu Nationalist quarters.
In addition, a striking point and one that is degrading in the eyes of the victims – e.g.
the Adivasis, the members of the indigenous population, but women are also
victimised – is the fact that the conscientious decision of the individuals is entirely
disregarded. People are treated as though they could not decide for themselves. The
criticism of this law, not expressed by Christians and Muslims alone, for these and
38
other reasons rightly stresses the fact that such laws do not just mean a massive
restriction of religious freedom; they also constitute an attempt to contain critical
social movements whose social protest against the stigma of "untouchability" (a
concept deriving from Hinduism) and the Brahman caste system is frequently
expressed in conversion movements.
Religious discrimination against Indian Dalits
Religious discrimination is also shown with respect to the treatment of those people
previously called "untouchables", the extremely marginalised Indian population group
of those outside the caste system, who today call themselves Dalits - the crushed, the
trampled on, the oppressed. The Indian constitution proclaims the abolition of
"untouchability" in Article 17. Linked with this statement is, in Articles 15-17, a
general ban on discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
(Art. 15). Article 15(3) states that the state can make special provision for "the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes, [Dalits], and the Scheduled Tribes [Adivasi or tribals]".
In practice, this "positive discrimination" means the promotion of disadvantaged
population groups by the Indian government. For example, there are quotas for
disadvantaged groups when it comes to granting positions in state facilities and
training places, and financial support in the form of scholarships. However, these
supportive measures at first only applied to Hindus; in 1956 they were extended to
Sikhs and in 1990 to Buddhists. Christians and Muslims, who are socially just as
disadvantaged as Dalits by the Hindu religion, are not eligible for such support. And
Dalits who become Christians or Muslims lose the support that still goes to their Hindu
neighbours.
Religious discrimination in Indian civil legislation
A third area in which religious discrimination by legislation is massively effective is
Indian civil law. In the 1950s a number of civil laws were passed that led to a lasting
reform of the personal laws applicable to Hindus. It is generally recognised that these
new laws meant a genuine modernisation and democratisation of the civil code – e.g.
regarding the role of women. On the other hand, many of these laws have had negative
consequences for religious freedom. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 says, for
example, that a spouse who leaves the Hindu community through changing to another
religion thereby provides grounds for divorce. Hindu parental law of 1956 disqualifies
a male convert from being the guardian of his own child or even of his wife if she is
still a minor. And the adoption law of 1956 provides that a convert can do nothing if
his or her partner would like to adopt a child and that one parent can offer the child for
adoption without the consent of the other parent, who has changed to another religion.
The future question: secular state or Hindutva nation
All three areas named indicate the trend to protect and defend the Hindu community
and the policy of Hinduisation of Indian society. Not all laws are shaped by the spirit –
or non-spirit – of Hindutva ideology, but they do reflect a profound resentment
39
regarding the idea of a free choice of religion. Most of the Hindus, and in particular the
representatives of the currently so powerful Hindutva ideology, believe that, first, a
person should stay with the religion they were born with. Moreover, every nation
possesses its own specific cultural and religious character. It is typical of India, they
argue, that culture is determined by Hinduism, which while accepting a broad
spectrum of faiths – the Sikh and Buddhist religion that arose in India are subsumed
under the cultural concept of Hindutva – is clearly distinct from religions that did not
arise in India.
Freedom of religion is a very complex matter in India involving the clash of differing
views on religion: on the one hand, there is an understanding of religion in which
territory plays a key role because India is defined as the country of the "Hindus" and,
on the other, a universal religion that stresses freedom of conscience. If legal and
political disadvantage is compounded by the experience of massive violence from
Hindu Nationalist quarters in the form of attacks on mosques and churches, if Bibles
are burnt and human life is threatened and this violence is covered politically, one
must be concerned about the future of the religious minorities in India. In a situation in
which the question of India's national identity has also been revived and there is an
argument about whether India is still to be a secular state or, instead, a largely Hindu
community, religious minorities will find it hard to gain a hearing for their concerns, to
live their faith and stand up for it in public.
Rev. Dr. Klaus Schäfer is director of the Studies and Outreach Department of the
Association of Churches and Missions in Germany (EMW), Hamburg.
Further reading:
y "Indien – Diskussion um Minderheiten-Schutz in Indien anlässlich der
Übergriffe auf die christliche Minderheit", ems-Informationsbrief 1/1999 //
available at: Evangelisches Missionswerk in Südwestdeutschland e.V.,
Vogelsangstr. 62, 70197 Stuttgart, Tel. (0711) 636 78-71, Fax (0711) 636 78-55
y "Theologie der Religionen – Frieden, Vergebung und Versöhnung im Islam,
Hinduismus und Christentum", ems-Dokumentationsbrief 1/2002 // See above to
order.
2.4 Religious Freedom in Indonesia
(Olaf Schumann)
What relationship the different religious communities in an independent Indonesia
should have with one another was one of the most sensitive questions facing the
national movement from the 1920s right up to the declaration of independence in
1945. Some of their leaders held European theories of a secular state to be suitable for
Indonesia. That was the view of those striving for a separation of religion and state,
and a legal equality of all citizens. Islamic nationalists opposed that approach. In
accordance with a trend in the international Islamic modernisation movement, they
could only imagine a counter-model to the European form of state, discredited by
40
colonialism and imperialism. Accordingly they called for an "Islamic state" and the
Sharia, the Islamic legal system, as the basis for their constitution,
Pancasila – an opportunity for a peaceful coexistence of the religions
The way out of this dilemma was found by the later first state president of Indonesia,
President Achmed Sukarno. In 1945 he devised Pancasila, the ideology according to
which state order was to be based on five ideological principles. One of them was the
faith in one, all-embracing God. The state has the task of protecting the religions and
their space, while the faith communities decide on the manner of their participation in
the life of society and how they express their beliefs. Yet they also bear responsibility
for the harmonious life of society. In the constitution of 1945 each citizen was
guaranteed the free choice of religion.
Before the adoption of the constitution with Pancasila in the preamble in 1945, a small
commission was charged with defining its content in greater detail. Under pressure
from a few Islamic members, it added the "religious" principle, obliging (Muslims) to
uphold the Sharia. This amendment, later known as the Jakarta Charter, was rejected
when the constitution came to be adopted, as it would have meant state supervision of
the internal affairs of a religious community and would have contradicted the national
principle of equal treatment before the law of all citizens. Different attempts on the
part of Islamic politicians to put the Jakarta Charter back into force have since failed.
From the national legislation there is currently no fundamental danger for religious
freedom in Indonesia. The vast majority of Muslim politicians are behind the national
programme of "national unity". The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), with about 40 million
members the largest Islamic social organisation worldwide, is largely for a secular
state and a pluralist society. The "modernist", more urban Muhammadiyah, the second
largest Islamic social organisation with around 25 million believers has, since the
middle of the 1990s, advocated democracy and pluralism, above all under its present
chairman Syafi’i Ma’arif. In 2002, along with the NU and smaller groups, it
definitively rejected any efforts to include the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. The
inclusion was primarily supported by the representatives of Islamic parties with no
more than about 16 percent of the votes, and individual politicians from other parties.
Some small Islamist groups like Laskar Jihad are actively and violently for a
repression of Christianity and possess considerable financial and military resources.
However, they receive their support mainly from abroad and have relatively few, albeit
violent, supporters in Indonesia.
Attacks on religious freedom
In the era of President Mohamed Suharto (1966 - 1998) there were more efforts to
exert state influence on the self-understanding of religious communities. This was
prompted by such religious activities as affected other religious communities and
could thus disturb social harmony. The focus was on Christian mission and Islamic
Da'wa, which means call or invitation. Accordingly, Suharto, when trying to win the
support of the religions for his development policy in 1967, suggested to Christians
that they desist from mission among people "who already adhere to a religion"; that
41
primarily meant the Muslims. The Christians refused to formally refrain from mission
as no reference had been made to the Da'wa among Christians and Christians
considered mission to be an internal religious matter to which the state could not
object. They were blamed for the failure of this first "inter-religious consultation". A
further attack on the freedom of Christian mission was undertaken in 1977 by the then
minister of religious affairs. He issued two decrees calling diakonia an instrument of
proselytism. In addition, any church development assistance was to be channelled via
the ministry of religious affairs. Again, no reference was made to Islamic Da'wa. The
Christian churches – both Protestant and Catholic – rejected these decrees as well.
Churches continue to face a number of further difficulties, e.g. when applying for
official permits to build churches. A hindrance here is an ordinance according to which
every building of a religious place of worship has to have the approval of the
immediate residents. Christians live as a minority almost everywhere. The fact that
they obtain the permit in many cases is evidenced by the large number of existing
church buildings. However, occasionally there are rejections. The host of different
denominations leads to a host of applications. For non-Christians it is not always easy
to understand why one group has to build its own church a few yards away from the
church of another group. For some years there has also been a conspicuous taste for
showy church buildings particularly in charismatic congregations. This phenomenon is
not just a provocation - it is also theologically dubious and raises questions about the
sense of social responsibility.
The communal violence during the last few years in Ambon, North Moluccas, Aceh,
West und Central Kalimantan, Papua and Poso (Central Sulawesi) have brought
further difficulties for the churches. Many thousands of people have been killed,
hundreds of thousands forced to flee and hundreds of churches and several mosques
destroyed, with the violence frequently breaking out along religious or ethnic lines.
This is a very complicated issue and thus encourages stereotyping to simplify matters
for the observer. As long as there can be no open and unrestricted discussion about the
involvement of special military units that have always shown close solidarity with
former President Suharto, all analyses can only apply to parts of the whole problem. In
general it may be said that groups and persons classed as potentially critical by the
Suharto regime, regardless of their religious affiliation, have been the target of attacks
that seemed to be religious in origin. Since discussion about social, religious, racial or
intercommunal violence was prohibited there were never any reliable investigations
about their actual root causes. The victims were mostly Christians, Chinese or
supporters of the NU.
When seeking the causes of religious conflicts we must take account of transmigration
programmes with which inhabitants of the densely populated core area of Java and
Bali have been resettled since colonial times to other islands of present-day Indonesia.
Advertised with the motto of the common mother country, the programmes received
broad approval, but frequently led to tensions between settlers and the local
population. They came to suspect they were being misused to redistribute political
power when, in areas with a Christian majority, the religious proportions of the
42
population changed with the arrival of "transmigrants". This was particularly so when
"proportional democracy" was introduced at the beginning of the 1990s, reflecting the
proportions of the various religions when replacing government officials or
functionaries. The original population was thus drastically marginalised in political,
economic and legal terms.
Aspiring for regional autonomy – an real threat to religious freedom
A more urgent threat to religious freedom in Indonesia at present is the striving for
autonomy in the regions and provinces. These efforts have hitherto been perceived to
be a counter-movement to the centralisation policy in the economic field. At present
there is a strong trend in most provinces towards reviving local culture, which is
strongly bound up with religion. This applies, in particular, to some ethnically and
religiously relatively homogeneous areas like the strongly Islamic area of Aceh, in the
northern tip of Sumatra, West Java, South Sulawesi or largely Hindu Bali. Since the
introduction of the Islamic Sharia is still blocked at the national level, a few regional
politicians are trying to push through at least parts of Sharia law or of Hindu law in
their regions, on the pretext of strengthening cultural identity. For example, Aceh
recently got its first Sharia court. The oft-expressed assurance that non-Muslims would
be exempt from the Sharia regulations is pure theory. If, for example, food regulations
have to be observed in groceries and restaurants, non-Muslims are also affected. The
same applies to personal civil status. It has until recently been very difficult to enter
into mixed marriages between Indonesian citizens; in future they will be practically
impossible. In Bali all inhabitants in some Bandjar communes, including non-Hindus,
are forced to make contributions for the maintenance and cultic care of local Hindu
temples. Many non-Hindus only have the option of moving to villages or
neighbourhoods with a mixed population. That does not just impair their free choice of
residence, a right guaranteed in the constitution. It is also a serious threat to religious
freedom. In addition, such moves seem to be effectively undermining the probably
serious efforts being undertaken by the government to achieve a national law that
applies equally to all citizens.
Prof. Dr. Olaf Schumann studied Theology and Islamic Studies. From 1970-1981
he worked for the Council of Churches in Indonesia in Jakarta. In 1981 he was
called to the University of Hamburg and from 1989 to 1992 was visiting professor
at the Theological College of Jakarta.
Further reading:
y "Politik der Gewalt – Gewalt in der Politik: Indonesien", Peter Kreuzer, Hessische
Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK), HSFK-Report 4/2000 // available
at: HSFK, Leimenrode 29, 60322 Frankfurt, Tel. (069) 959104-0, Fax (069) 558481,
Email: [email protected]
y "Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia", ed. by Murni Djamal and
Klaus Pähler. Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Jakarta and the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 2002; 272 pp.
43
2.5 Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria
(Frieder Ludwig)
Nigeria has about 130 million inhabitants and is by far the most populous state in
Africa. More Christians and more Muslims live here than in any other African country.
The two religions have high growth rates. According to the latest estimates between 40
and 45% of Nigerians are Christians and between 40 and 45 % are Muslims. Conflicts
have flared up in the last few years about the introduction of Islamic law, the Sharia, in
twelve northern states. These conflicts have been closely monitored by the
international public since the long phase of military rule was replaced by a
democratically elected civilian government in 1999. While present conflicts of this
kind are new they cannot be understood without their historical roots, since both
Muslims and Christians refer their present positions back to past oppression.
The development of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria
Islam penetrated into Nigeria from the North as of the 11th century. In following
centuries the dominant class of North Nigerian Haussa people became Muslim. The
majority of the population was only islamised with the "holy war" (Jihad) of Usman
dan Fodio at the beginning of the 19th century. The caliphate he founded, with its
capital Sokoto, was the largest of the West African empires in the 19th century. Islam
also grew in influence outside of the emirates under Sokoto. The subjugation of
northern Nigeria by the British Crown reinforced this tendency, since it extended the
area of influence of the emirs – on the principle of "indirect rule". While the Muslim
rulers had to recognise British supremacy Islamic law subsisted with individual
modifications. Only certain "offensive penalties" like stoning, crucifixion and
amputation were banned.
Jihad
The Koran uses the term Jihad to designate unlimited efforts to spread Islam.
They include the struggle against personal passions and the personal use of
physical and material resources for the faith. War and fighting are designated by
other terms. Nevertheless, extremist forces still use the term in the sense of "holy
war". This expression has its roots in Old Testament traditions and was coined by
the crusaders in the 11th century. Source: EMW
After the first (Catholic) missionary efforts in the 16th century Christianity became
firmly established in the 19th century. Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian
missionaries worked from 1842 in southern Nigeria. The Anglican Niger Mission was
entrusted exclusively to Africans into the 1880s and was led by a former slave, Samuel
Ajayi Crowther. The Catholic missionary work continuing from 1865 was also
supported by former slaves from Brazil. From the second decade of the 20th century,
independent African churches became an important factor in the spreading of
Christianity in southern Nigeria. In the Muslim areas of northern Nigeria missionary
work during British rule – with exceptions – was banned, but new "pacified" areas
now became accessible to mission. In 1904 and 1906 mission stations were opened in
the central plateau. Danish Lutherans conducted mission activity from 1913 in Adamawa.
44
Conflicts between Christians and Muslims
Since independence in 1960 there have been repeated conflicts between Christians and
Muslims. The Biafra war (1967-70) had a religious component in that the mainly
Christian Ibos in the Southeast feared a dominance from the Muslim North and wanted
to split into the independent republic of Biafra. After the end of the civil war a policy
of reconciliation was pursued, but the long phase of military rule led to new conflicts.
With mostly northern leaders it lasted to 1999, except for a respite from 1979 to 1983.
On the one hand, more radical Muslim groups set themselves apart from the
Establishment, newly rich due to oil revenues. On the other, the Christians felt
overridden in central questions such as the accession of Nigeria to the Organisation of
Islamic Conferences. Sporadic unrest broke out in the northern Nigerian cities, e.g. in
1991 in Kano – a reaction to a planned mass rally with the German evangelist
Reinhard Bonnke. The conflict in Kaduna in 1987 and in Kafanchan in 1996 was also
connected with evangelistic activities.
May 1999 saw the transition to a democratically elected civilian government under
Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian from the Southwest. Tensions heightened. First in
Zamfara and then in twelve other states, the "whole Sharia" was introduced, i.e.
Islamic law in all fields (civil and penal) and with the traditional Muslim punishments.
While many commentators in southern Nigerian newspapers regarded the event as an
attempt to weaken the central government with its Christian president, the
democratically elected governors justified their action with the "wish of the people", or
at least of the Muslim majority in their states, to shake off colonial or western
domination and counteract the decline in the Nigerian legal system reflected in a high
crime rate and the frequent high-handedness of the police. Among Christian Nigerians,
too, there is a widespread belief that it takes too long to go through all the possible
court proceedings and that criminals should be given short shrift.
The northern Nigerian governors see the introduction of the Islamic legal system as
not being in contradiction with the federal constitution and point to the scope accorded
the individual states. On individual matters, stated Governor Zamfaras A. Sani in
2000, they had given in, e.g. they had not imposed the death penalty for Muslims who
turned to another faith, as this would clash with the freedom of religion promised in
the Nigerian constitution. It is repeatedly stressed that the Sharia is only supposed to
apply to Muslims, which de facto means that there is a two-track legal system with
both magistrates' and Sharia courts. The introduction of the Sharia is therefore,
Muslims like Governor Sani further argue, not to be equated with an islamisation
policy. In fact, there are attempts to involve Christians. In Gombe, for example, an
Anglican bishop is a member of the Customary Courts Committee, set up by the
government with the Sharia Committee. In Bauchi Christians are in leading positions
in the ministry of justice. Organised in the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), an
umbrella organisation founded in 1976 in which Protestant, Catholic and independent
African churches work together, church representatives have easy access to the
governor in Zamfara. In Sokoto, leading representatives of CAN stated that Christians
had no problem with banning adultery, prostitution and excessive alcohol
consumption. In Katsina and Zamfara, Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem are supported
45
as well as Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. Christian students are also admitted to newly
founded universities like the State Islamic University of Katsina
The introduction of the Sharia is problematic for Christians because in cases of dispute
before a Sharia court the testimony of Muslim witnesses is more highly regarded than
that of Christians - and that of men more highly than that of women. In addition,
precisely the founding of Islamic universities and schools shows that the measures go
beyond a reform of the legal system. Matters concerning giving alms, Zakat, are now
centrally settled in Zamfara, Jigawa, Niger and Yobe, in order to guarantee regular
payment and just distribution. Many Christians recognise in these events a tendency to
fundamentally rearrange the relationship between state and religion. They fear that
public resources could primarily go to Muslims. This is confirmed through the
experience that, in general, it is very difficult to acquire land to build new churches.
The five pillars of Islam:
1. Faith (Shahada)
2. Performing ritual prayers five times a day (Salat)
3. Charity through self-taxation (Zakat)
4. Fasting for self-purification (Siyam)
5. The pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj)
Source: www.poblo.org/islam-5pillars.htm
At the same time, the introduction of the Sharia is connected to the imposing of
Islamic values in everyday life, which also affects Christians. The separation of the
sexes in public transport also limits the mobility of Christian women. Muslim dress
codes also have repercussions, although attempts to force non-Muslim girls to wear the
veil, the hijab, are the exception and have been dropped. In the first phase, the Hisbah
militia founded to enforce the Sharia prevented Christians, too, from going out after 9
pm. The spokespersons of Christian organisations like CAN and the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of Nigeria made public statements condemning the measures and in March
2001 the Catholic Church considered taking legal steps.
Violent excesses and their causes
The tensions came to a head particularly in the large cities in northern Nigeria, which
contain considerable potential for conflict owing to their strong growth and the great
social problems. These were first felt in Kaduna. A protest march of Christians on 20
February 2000 led to violent clashes. A little later, in September 2001, unrest broke
out in Jos, in the central Nigerian state of Plateau. The region had hitherto claimed to
be a "home of peace and tourism". Further conflicts broke out in Kaduna in
conjunction with the planned Miss World contest in November 2002. According to
reports, over a thousand people died in the clashes, both Christians and Muslims.
Many churches and mosques were destroyed. The clashes by no means always ran
along clearly defined "religious" lines. They also expressed social tensions and ethnic
conflicts between the ethnic groups of the Haussa and the largely christianised Kajes
and Katafs, who had been integrated against their will into the Islamic region by the
46
British. In Jos Muslims from the south were threatened both by Muslim Haussas and
by Christians.
On the other hand, Christians and Muslims in some districts joined forces against
troublemakers and plunderers. CAN called for investigations of the role of the police
during the conflicts. At the same time talks also intensified between the representatives
of religious communities. For example, the Catholic archbishop of Jos, Ignatius Ayan
Kagama, invited all leaders of religious communities, Christians and Muslims, to joint
consultations. Christian-Muslim talks were initiated in different parts of the city.
Even if they by no means condone the unrest, many Christians recognise that the
Muslims felt offended by the holding of a beauty contest in a northern Nigerian state
during the fasting month of Ramadan. CAN, or at least some of its leaders, tend to
think that the Sharia can be accepted on condition that it only applies to Muslims and
is only applied under specific conditions. They will continue to protest with reason
against discrimination and human rights violations, e.g. the stoning of the
"adultresses". It is to be hoped that these distinctions, that are also to be perceived on
the Muslim side, may enable a peaceful coexistence of the religious communities.
Dr. Frieder Ludwig studied theology, mission studies and history, and now works at
the Luther Seminary in St. Paul, USA. He taught at the University of Jos, Nigeria, in
1999-2000, and is now working on an international study project "The Sharia debate
and the shaping of Muslim and Christian identities in Northern Nigeria".
2.6 Religious Freedom and Liberty – Christians in Pakistan
(Clement John)
Pakistan became an independent country in 1947, when it won its freedom from the
British colonialist. At the time of partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan,
the founder of the Muslim movement for Independence Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a
secular liberal lawyer promised that Pakistan would be a democratic state where
people belonging to different religions would be free to practice their religion and have
equal rights. The leaders of the Islamic parties on the other hand wanted Pakistan to be
a theocratic state based on Islamic tenets.
The differences among various Islamic parties on the interpretation vis-à-vis the
nature and character of the state, the extent to which Islamic principles should be
made applicable to civil and political life lies at the root of Pakistan’s problem.
The question whether Pakistan should be a progressive democratic state or a
theocratic state has never been full resolved. Consequently, since independence
military and political leaders have used Islam to manipulate the people for
personal power and political gains. Some of these actions have adversely effected
the rights of religious minorities.
47
The first incident of religious manipulation and violence that shook the country
took place in 1954. It was directed against the minority Ahmadiya community (a
Muslim group that does not subscribe to the finality of the Holy Prophet
Mohammed). Hundreds of Ahmadis were massacred and their places of worship
ransacked. The Public Court of enquiry that was appointed to investigate the
"causes of the anti-Ahmadi disturbances" in the aftermath of the massacre came
up with some interesting conclusions. One was lack of unanimity amongst Islamic
scholars on the definition of a 'Muslim person'. The following findings of the
court speaks for itself: "The result of this part of the enquiry, however, has been
anything but satisfactory and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our
Ulema (Islamic scholars) on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what
the differences on more complicated matters will be".
Exploitation of religious symbols and idioms
Attempts by successive governments to islamise Pakistan society have therefore
taken the form of placing emphasis on demonstrative rituals; every possible
means of displaying the state's religious character has been used. For instance
Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, a liberal democrat, 1976 banned alcohol, horse racing,
gambling and changed the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday. However, the
main culprit responsible for poisoning Pakistan’s body politic through
manipulation of religion and religious symbols was General Zia-ul-Haq who was
in power from 1977 till 1988. Zia introduced changes in the Evidence Law –
where testimony of a woman and a non-Muslim was considered half that of a
man; stoning to death for adultery, separate electorates for religious minorities;
amended the Penal Code to incorporate mandatory death sentence for blasphemy;
established a parallel judicial system of 'Shariat Courts' and started the practice of
flogging in public. To fight the Russian infidels in Afghanistan he encouraged
Islamic militant groups to recruit volunteers for 'Jihad'.
The system of separate electorate mentioned above is discriminatory in nature, it
was introduced by General Zia as a measure to Islamise Pakistan society. The
system is based on the Islamic concept that all non-Muslims are dhimmis or
second class citizens in an Islamic state. Under this system a non-Muslim cannot
hold a key position in the government and armed forces or be a appointed a judge
of the Superior Court. In the General Election non-Muslims can only vote for
non-Muslim candidates for the reserved seats. This system effectively cuts off the
religious minorities from mainstream of national and political life. The minorities
in the country have to thank President Musharraf who has recently restored joint
electorates, thus doing away with the system of separate electorates.
Just before his government was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf, in
October 1999, Nawaz Sharif the then Prime Minister (now in exile in Saudi
Arabia) was on the verge of introducing the 15th Amendment in parliament that
would have given him the power, amongst other things, to: declare Quran and
Sunnah to be the constitution and nominate a body of "pious Muslims" to interpret
it; abolish Parliament and nominate a Shoora (Islamic Parliament) of "pious
Muslims"; declare public offices to be restricted to "pious Muslims"; declare that
48
minorities have no rights other than practice of their religion, of their personal
laws, tradition and customs, thus depriving them of their right to vote and other
fundamental rights; introduce flogging, amputation and public execution for
major and minor offences.
Fortunately with the seizure of power by the military the Parliament was
dissolved and the bill lapsed and could not become law. Needless to say all these
actions have had an adverse effect on religious minorities, including Christians.
Since the government is unable to decide on the issue of the State ideology in
clear terms, the political and legal status of minorities remains uncertain. As a
result they live in an environment of insecurity and fear about the future.
Increase in incidents of intolerance
The increase in discriminatory practices and policies particularly in the rural areas
began with General Zia's campaign to introduce Nizam-e-Mustafa (Rule of the
Prophet). The Imams of local mosques openly promoted hatred and violence against
Christians, labelling them collaborators of the West and thus contributing to the
climate of intolerance. The discrimination against Christians increased with the
assertion of Islamic identity by the Pakistan society in the 1970s from which time
onwards it has become increasingly intolerant of other religions.
According to the 1999 government census, Christians in Pakistan constitute the
largest religious minority around 2.5% of the total population, out of which 51%
belong to the Roman Catholic Church. The vast majority of Christians live in
Punjab and are descendants of the depressed Hindu caste who became Christians
between 1880 and 1930. Though it is said Christianity has existed in the Indian
sub-continent since AD 525, it spread in a systematic manner with the coming of
the Church Missionary Society to North India including Peshawar in 1855. The
Christians and Churches in Pakistan have a history of engagement in the field of
education, health care and social welfare. This has been a major contribution of
the community to national life. Nevertheless, the US led war in Afghanistan
resulted in a series of attacks on Christians and churches as well as other
foreigners and religious minorities in Pakistan, including an attack in September
2002 that killed eight members of the Christian peace and human rights
organisation Idara-E-Amn-O-Insaf, for many years partner of the German
Catholic agency Misereor and the Church Development Service (EED), an
organisation of the Protestant Churches in Germany (EKD). In these attacks,
coordinated and carried out by internal groups, over 40 people lost their lives and
scores of others were injured. A number of massacres in mosques, churches and
Christian organisations, brought into question the Government’s ability to prevent
sectarian and religious violence. Unfortunately, none of the culprits responsible
for these attacks have been brought before the courts of law for trial.
The growing environment of hatred and intolerance has impacted on the lives
especially of the poor Christians in the rural areas. They experience exploitation
and oppression as a matter of every day reality. Poverty and lack of education
have instilled in the people a sense of fait accompli. They attribute their suffering
49
and pain to kismet (destiny) and survive in a culture of silence. The situation of
Hindus is no better. Most members of the Hindu community live in the rural areas
of Sindh and belong to the low caste. Many of them are landless peasants, others
engage in menial work. They are largely uneducated and are doubly oppressed by
the society in general as well as being at the mercy of the feudal lords of the area.
There are increasing number of reports of young Christian and Hindu girls being
kidnapped and then being forced to embrace Islam. Once they are converted it is
extremely difficult for the families to get them back through the legal system. The
other factors that affects the Hindu minority is the general hatred in the country
against India, seen as Pakistan’s enemy number one. Hindus continue to be
identified with India and like Christians their loyalties are suspect.
Tensions exist as well between the two main streams of Muslimism. Pakistan is
predominantly a Sunni society. The Shiite community is around 35% of the total
population. Since the country’s inception tension has existed between the two,
they were however intensified during the period of General Zia who introduced
Islamic Laws according to the Sunni school. As a result there has been an
escalation of killings between the two communities. Both communities have their
militant wings, though Shiites have suffered more at the hands of Sunnis. Two
years ago there was spate of killings of Shiite doctors in the Province of Sindh
and Punjab. At the beginning of 2003 at an Imambaragh (Shiite’s worship place)
twelve Shiites were gunned down while praying.
Military hand in glove with Islamic militants
The Constitution and the laws in Pakistan are targets of repeated military
interventions that have left the judicial system including law enforcement in
shambles. It has become increasingly difficult for an average citizen to get relief
from the courts. While the subordinate judiciary is corrupt and inefficient, the
Superior Judiciary has lost much of its independence at the hands of the
Executive. With little or no accountability and lack of good governance it is not
surprising that the culture of impunity is becoming all-pervasive in Pakistan
society. There is indiscriminate use of blasphemy law for personal vendetta. Many
innocent Christians charged under the notorious blasphemy laws continue to
languish in jails for long periods. The courts are unable to provide a fair trial as
judges are intimidated and are afraid of Islamic groups. In few cases where the
accused have been found to be innocent and released by the Superior Court they
had to flee the country for safety of life. The government under threats from
Islamic groups is unwilling to amend even the procedural part of blasphemy law
to prevent its abuse.
The military establishment in pursuit of its defence, foreign policy objectives and
dreams of Pan-Islamism have during the last two decades encouraged and
nurtured an assortment of Islamic militant groups for purposes of Jihad in
Afghanistan, Kashmir and for pedalling influence and power in Central Asian
Republics. The events of September 11th and consequent reversal of Pakistan
government’s policy in Afghanistan, coupled with the international censure for its
50
support of its Islamic militants, was a major setback to the military establishment.
It was forced to lessen its support for militant groups. Despite the fact that efforts
to disarm them were half hearted these created restlessness and anger amongst the
groups. Islamic militant groups are eager to project the war in Afghanistan and
Iraq as a ”clash of civilisations”. They see it as an onslaught on Islam by the
Christian West. Even moderate Muslims complain about West’s double standards
in international relations and point to the way no notice is taken of Israel’s
defiance of the UN resolutions. These developments have weakened the hands of
the moderate forces and have also resulted in fear and apprehensions amongst the
religious minorities.
Today Pakistan stands at the crossroads of its history. Its people must decide once
and for all whether they want it to be a progressive democratic state or an Islamic
theocratic state. The military establishment must take the responsibility to reverse
the trend of Islamic militancy that it has nurtured and encouraged over the years
and now find it difficult to control. Islamic militancy has only brought blood and
tears to the country and is largely responsible for the present environment of
intolerance and violence. The military leadership must allow restoration of full
democracy based on principles of tolerance and pluralism.
Clement John is Desk Officer for Human Rights of the World Council of
Churches.
Further reading:
y "State of Human Rights 2002 – Annual Report of Human Rights Commission in
Pakistan (HRCP) 2002" //available at: HRCP, Aiwan-i-Jahmoor, 107-Tipu Block,
New Garden Town, Lahore-54600, Pakistan, Telefax (0092) (0) (42) 5883582, EMail: [email protected], Internet: www.hrcp-web.org/h-publications.htm
2.7 Religious freedom in Russia?
(Gerd Stricker)
State persecution of religion, such as characterised the former Soviet Union up to
1991, no longer exists in today's Russia or, rather, the Russian Federation. Under the
previous president Mikhail Gorbachev a religious law was passed in 1990 that largely
corresponded to Western ideas of religious freedom. It ended the state intervention in
internal church affairs that had practically made the religious communities captives of
the Soviet regime, and promised equal rights for all denominations. At first the new
law was met with scepticism. Would its provisions ever be put into practice? But in the
crumbling Soviet Union and even more visibly in the Russian Federation its central
provisions, at least, came into force: the authorities gradually began to regard religious
communities as autonomous bodies.
It is impossible to draw up statistics for religions in the Russian Federation. Given a
population of about 150 million, the Russian Orthodox Church is, however, clearly the
51
strongest faith community. The Moscow Patriarchate numbers 70 to 110 million,
followed by Islam with 15 million (including perhaps ten million practising) Muslims.
Jews and Buddhists are probably around the million line: how many of them practise
their faith is not known. The Old Rite Orthodox (with or without a priest) are
estimated to account for a few million. Catholics and Lutherans, i.e. the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Russia and Other States (ELCROS), the Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Ingria and other groups, probably have half a million members each.
Estimating the neo-Protestant churches is difficult. Back in the Soviet Union there was
a division into "registered" and "non-registered" Evangelical Christians-Baptists,
Adventists and Pentecostals, and since 1991 the fragmentation has proceeded apace.
Competing - in some cases hostile - groups dominate the scene. Pentecostals, featuring
charismatic groups, are regarded as the fastest growing denomination. Methodists,
Reformed, and the Salvation Army are present in very small numbers, as are Jehovah's
Witnesses, Hare Krishna and others.
Against equal treatment of all religions
The young Russian Federation gradually began to treat all religious communities
equally (in some areas well, in others badly). It soon became clear that foreign
evangelical groups, e.g. from the United States or South Korea were moving in to
conduct evangelistic campaigns, in some cases with aggressive methods and much
money. Others include sects like Scientology, the Moonies, neo-Christian and also
neo-pagan groups. The Orthodox Church, despite low financial resources compelled to
re-establish its infrastructure and train a new generation of priests, regarded this as a
threat to its existence. Recalling its identity as the former national and state church that
had left its mark on the history and culture of the Russian people, it tried to get
different groups in Parliament to bring in bills to confer primacy over the other
religious communities on the Moscow Patriarchate.
To justify this, the Russian Orthodox Church cites its huge membership. In the early
1990s a "religious boom" brought many millions of people to Orthodoxy. Every day
priests with scant theological training baptised hundreds of Russians, mostly without
any preparatory catechism classes. Polls agree that only three percent of those who
today call themselves Orthodox are "practising Christians" in the sense that they attend
Sunday liturgy at least once a month. Cultural, historical and national considerations
determine the church affiliation of the majority, rather than religious motivation. Be
this as it may, the Russian Orthodox Church is today a force to be reckoned with for
every politician in the country. Orthodoxy has moved to the core of a national Russian
ideology and even many newly founded nationalist groups and organisations claim to
be Orthodox.
The law on religions of 1997
The Moscow Patriarchate, thus strengthened, strove for a new version of the law on
religions. After a few false starts, in 1997 it succeeded. President Boris Yelzin signed a
new law that, in the preamble, conferred a leading role on the Russian Orthodox
52
Church: "The federation assembly … recognises the special contribution of Orthodoxy
in the history of Russia, in the emergence and development of its culture and spiritual
world." International protest had been sparked even in the preparatory stages of this
legislation.
The law of 1997 restricts the scope of non-Orthodox religious communities. New
religious groups and congregations may only acquire the rights of a legal entity 15
years after being established in Russia. This "registration" requires a lengthy process
of investigations. Regional or pan-Russian religious associations such as churches or
congregations are only granted legal status if they can show that their organisations
have existed on Russian soil for more than 50 years – like the Moscow Patriarchate,
the Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist communities, the Lutheran and Roman Catholic
Churches or the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists.
The new law on religions also requires the re-registration of all long since recognised
religious institutions such as congregations, church governing bodies, theological
institutions and monasteries. The registration process is very complicated. Elastic
clauses and gaps in the law open the doors wide to bureaucratic arbitrariness. Of
course there have been cases in which Orthodox institutions were treated brusquely by
Soviet-minded officials. But it has mostly been non-Orthodox congregations and
groups that have had to bear the brunt, and whose applications have been rejected due
to "formal" errors or a lack of documents, e.g. the documents on the founding of the
Roman Catholic or Lutheran Church. New Orthodox groups or the Greek-Catholic
Church, that could constitute competition for the Patriarchate by causing schisms, also
hardly stand a chance of obtaining a suitable legal status. All of that has resulted in a
very complicated situation for the individual religious communities, which takes a
different form in every administrative area – even extending to regions enacting laws
on religion that exceed that of the federation in their severity.
The argument of "canonical territory"
To justify the civil law discrimination against non-Orthodox religious communities the
Russian Orthodox Church puts forward the theological argument that the whole of the
former Soviet Union is "canonical territory" of the Russian Orthodox Church – with
the exception of Georgia with its national Orthodox church, but including the province
of Kaliningrad, the northern part of former German East Prussia and now an enclave.
Here it refers to an early church principle according to which there should be only one
bishop in one place.
On this "canonical territory" each mission by non-Orthodox, even to non-believers, is
understood by Orthodoxy as poaching ("proselytism"). After the raising of the four
Apostolic Administrations in Russia (Moscow, Saratow, Nowosibirsk, Irkutsk) to
become fully fledged Roman Catholic Dioceses there has been a cooling off of
relations between the Russian Church and the Vatican. State authorities have expelled
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Irkutsk, Jerzy Mazur (a Polish national), and other
clergy who were not citizens of the Russian Federation.
53
Other churches which could likewise be accused of proselytism are treated better. This
applies, for example, to ELCROS. Owing to inter-confessional marriages and the
admission of non-Germans there are now Russians in the congregations as well.
Nevertheless ELCROS has not been nearly as harassed as the Roman Catholic Church.
There are certainly different reasons for that. One may be that ELCROS is still not
very consolidated and is relatively small in size. On the other hand, its long and
acknowledged history links it closely with the "German Lutherans" in Russia.
ELCROS sees itself committed to this history and is striving for considerable
ecumenical nearness to Orthodoxy.
The Russian Orthodox Church is also set limits. While President Putin publicly acts
like a practising Orthodox he cannot raise the Moscow Patriarchate to a state church.
For the sake of the Muslims he, moreover, propagates the idea of 'Eurasianism', which
gives equal stress to the European and Asian roots of Russia, along with its Orthodox
and Islamic origins.
Dr. Gerd Stricker is deputy editor-in-chief of the Zurich magazine "G2W - Glaube in
der 2. Welt. Ökumenisches Forum für Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West"
(www.kirchen.ch/g2w/).
Further reading:
y "Die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche: Segen für die 'neuen Zaren'? – Religion und
Politik im postsowjetischen Russland (1991-2000)", Kathrin Behrens, Schöningh,
Paderborn 2002
y "Die Zeit des Enthusiasmus ist vorbei – Fragen zum Verständnis des Begriffes
'orthodox' in Russland", Andrej Danilov in: Glaube in der 2. Welt (G2W) 5/1997 //
available at: G2W, Birmensdorferstr. 52, CH-8004 Zürich, Tel. 0041 (0)43 3222244,
Fax 0041 (0)43 322 240, Email: [email protected], www.kirchen.ch/g2w/
y "Die Zusammenarbeit trägt gute Früchte – Staat und Russische Orthodoxe Kirche
unter Jelzin und Putin", Gerd Stricker in: Osteuropa – Zeitschrift für
Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens 11/2002, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde //
available at: Verlegerdienst München, Dennis Haarmann, Postfach 12 80, 82197
Gilching, Tel. (08105) 388-212, Fax (08105) 388-180
2.8 Torn between Politics and Religion – the Example of the Sudan
(Marina Peter)
Islam is practically the state religion in Sudan, even if the constitution of 1998
guarantees freedom of religion. Sudan has for many years had an Islamist government
that is not democratically legitimised. The whole of public life is determined by
Sharia, the Islamic legal system that was officially introduced there in 1983. That is
triggering many forms of conflict.
54
Christian South, Muslim North?
Most people see the country as divided into a Christian South and a Muslim North.
This perception is not correct, however. There are a considerable number of Christians
in the North – and not just refugees from the South due to the civil war – and there are
Muslims in the South. In both parts of the country many adherents of traditional
religions have hitherto withstood all missionary attempts from both sides and continue
to observe their age-old faith privately – something that has often been forced on them
or been the most expedient solution. They account for a quarter of the whole
population.
The civil war in Sudan, that has been bitterly waged for almost 50 years – with an
interruption only between 1972 and 1983 – is mostly called a war of religion between
the Christian South and the Islamic North. But this simple description does not strike
at the heart of the conflicts, essentially due to unequal development, unjust distribution
of power and resources and also to racism. For the people, however, who are exposed
to persecution, slavery, torture bombing, evictions and starvation, it makes little
difference whether this is happening for religious, racist, economic or political reasons
– they are still victims. Often it is hard for them to analyse more exactly whether they
are persecuted for being Christians or because of their ethnic or political background.
For outsiders the whole situation is so complex and unclear that they, too, cannot
always give a clear answer to the simple question: are Christians persecuted in Sudan?
The religious diversity in Sudan is for historical and geographical reasons. The first
traces of Christian mission in the northern Sudan may be traced back to the 6th century.
With the final collapse of the Christian empires of the Nubians at the start of the 16th
century, however, Christianity came almost to a complete end in northern Sudan. Islam established itself initially in the coastal areas and at some places in the hinterland
with the desert peoples. In isolated cases, it was taken to other parts of the country by
traders, warriors and wandering preachers, where it frequently mingled with existing
religions. The Turkish conquests beginning in northern Sudan in the 16th century saw
the final establishment of an Islamic order. In 1822 the whole of northern Sudan
became part of the Egyptian-Turkish Empire. The South remained fairly inaccessible
and almost untouched. British influence prevailed from the end of the 19th century. In
1956 Sudan became independent.
Islam in Sudan belongs to the Sunni school, and is broken down into many different
currents. They include very moderate groups like the Republican Brothers, who are
open to dialogue, and whose leaders were executed when the Sharia was introduced in
1983. The religious movements Kaddmiya and Maddiya and their corresponding
parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Umma Party, have for
many years provided governments at the national level and governors in the regions. In
the 1970s, the National Islamic Front became a strong political and religious force in
the country. It has a strict fundamentalist orientation and is patterned on the Muslim
Brotherhood.
55
The different Islamic expressions have frequently developed along ethnic lines, which
is also true for Christianity. The number of Muslims is currently given at over 50
percent of the total population, with at least 70 percent in the North. Only a very small
share is to be attributed to radical Islamist groupings that support the current
government. There are no exact figures on the share of Christians in the whole
population: probably it is 14 percent on average, with great regional differences. At the
moment the churches are thriving in the southern areas not controlled by the
government, while many of the Christians stemming from southern Sudan are
confronted with attempts to islamise them when living as internal refugees in the
North.
The Roman Catholic Church is the largest in Sudan with dioceses all over the country,
followed by the Episcopal Church with its origins in West Equatoria. The Presbyterian
Church is primarily to be found in the Nuer people on the upper Nile. The Copts have
traditionally lived in the North, their members being mainly Sudanese of Egyptian
origin, as are the members of the Evangelical Church. Up until 1989 there were
relatively strong missionary efforts in the North by Pentecostal groups from America
that are increasingly trying to gain an influence in the South.
Relations between Christians and Muslims
Relations between Muslims and Christians are very tense due to the current wave of
islamisation and the ongoing civil war. The Christians feel persecuted and now hardly
distinguish between state repression and the traditional, more moderate Muslim
groups. The churches constantly repeat that Christians and Muslims used to live
together fairly well up until the early 1980s, despite certain state reprisals, and had
celebrated their respective festivals together like good neighbours. Since the
introduction of the Sharia this has changed.
Almost all political forces are complex in composition. In the leadership of the
liberation movements of the South there are also Muslims. In the biggest opposition
movements, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), some Christians are also linked
to Islamic religiously defined traditional parties. One of the main demands of the NDA
is for a secular state constitution.
Under pressure: the churches
The present situation of the Christian churches is strongly marked by the civil war.
Many church workers, bishops, priests, pastors and catechists have gone into exile or
been expelled. Under such pressure, the churches have sought to work together more
closely. The majority of churches in Sudan, including the Roman Catholic Church,
have been working together since 1967 in the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC).
Since 1989 there has been a federation of churches in the southern, non-government
controlled areas, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC).
The work of the churches up until 1994 was strongly restricted by the Missionary
Societies Act, passed in 1961, that made missionary activity subject to government
approval and allowed for the expulsion of missionaries, which was also rigorously
56
practised. The act prohibited missionary activity among non-Christians, work with
orphans and social and charitable service. In 1972 it was revoked for the South but
continued to apply for the North. An initially provisional law entitled Miscellaneous
Amendment has since October 1994 provided a new basis for the work of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in Sudan. This law was also meant to apply to the
churches whose work is subject to NGO legislation. They have to register as NGOs.
That has met with resistance, particularly from the Roman Catholic Church. Talks with
the government have not led to any final outcome.
A political opening in the late 1990s led to a new constitution guaranteeing free
exercise of religion. That eased the tension somewhat for the churches, particularly in
the capital. Church services and Christian festivals can now be held in relative
freedom.
However, the churches are subject to further restrictions regarding church buildings,
the purchase of land and all types of social work, particularly in the camps for the
refugees from the South in and around Khartoum. School curricula have been
completely islamised. Foreign church staff still often have difficulties obtaining visas
and residence permits – they are either not granted or not extended. Sudanese church
workers frequently do not receive exit permits to attend international conferences.
Most church workers are in fact southern Sudanese and therefore from the start
suspected of sympathising with the opposition movements or even supporting them. It
is difficult to distinguish whether reprisals are due to religious or political motives.
One thing is certain: many Christians feel they suffer double discrimination, as
Christians and as southern Sudanese.
Whatever a future government in Sudan might look like: the Sharia question will
remain critical. The most important opposition parties also define themselves as
Islamic, if not as Islamist. Churches therefore have joined the demand for a right of
self-determination for the southern regions including the option of separation of the
South from the North.
Marina Peter, a graduate in Intercultural Relations, has since 1997 managed the
European office of Sudan Focal Point, an international association of churches and
NGOs with the aim of awareness-raising and advocacy for peace and human rights in
Sudan.
Further reading:
y "Länderheft Sudan", Evangelisches Missionswerk in Deutschland (EMW),
Breklum 1995 // available at: EMW, Normannenweg 17-21, 20537 Hamburg, Tel.
(040) 25456-148, Fax (040) 25456-448, Email: [email protected]
57
2.9 The situation of Christian minorities in Turkey
(Gerhard Duncker)
Modern Turkey regards itself as a secular state. The consistent separation of religion
and politics intended by its founder, Kemal Atatürk, entails strict restrictions of
religious practice. This also affects the Muslim majority which, according to official
figures, accounts for 99 percent of the population. Hence there is a ban on wearing
headscarves in state institutions like government departments, schools or universities.
Public service employees are not allowed to say prayers during working hours.
Secularism in Turkey does not mean, however, that the state keeps an equal distance
from the different religious communities. Rather, its relations with the tiny religious
communities seem to be extremely fraught.
Law and practice
The international law underlying the position of non-Muslim minorities is primarily
the Lausanne Treaty, signed by the young Turkish Republic on 24 July 1923. Article
40 says: "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same
legal and de facto treatment and security as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they
shall have the same right to set up, run and supervise charitable, religious and social
institutions, schools and other educational and training places, including the right to
use their own language in these institutions and to practise their religion." The nonMuslim minorities were not listed in detail in the Lausanne Treaty. According to the
traditional state interpretation only the Greeks, Armenians and Jews were recognised
as such. Other religious minorities, e.g. the Syrian-Orthodox Church, different
Catholic denominations, the foreign congregations or the young Turkish Protestant
community were refused this status.
What is the legal situation for Christians really like in Turkey, where they number
about 150,000 and account for 0.3 percent of the population? First, it is noteworthy
that the Turkish constitution contains the right to free exercise of religion. This is an
individual right, meaning that the individual Muslim Turks can, for example, be
baptised. By contrast, there is no religious freedom for churches as constituted
communities or congregations. They have no legal personality and are thus not able to
take legal action. The entire property of the church has to be administered through
church foundations. They are supervised according to Article 136 of the Turkish
constitution of 1982 by a special ministry, the Presidium of Religious Affairs. De jure
this presidium has the responsibility of protecting constitutional secularism. De facto it
gives preference to Islam, and particularly to the Sunni form, accounting for over 70
percent of the population. The religious minorities that are thereby disadvantaged also
include the Alewites, a current in Shi'ite Islam, constituting between 15 and 25 percent
of the population.
Besides the Presidium for Religious Affairs, an important role in policy regarding
religions in the Turkish Republic is played by the state committee for minorities. This
committee, that is to be concerned with the problems of minorities, is made up of a
58
member of the National Security Council, the national intelligence service, the
ministries of internal and external affairs and the state ministry for foundations. The
minorities themselves are not represented in this body, nor may they appeal to it. Its
decisions are final and cannot be challenged in court.
Under state oversight
The religious foundations of Christians may neither buy nor sell pieces of land.
Neither they nor individual church congregations may employ church workers at will,
particularly not if they come from other countries. For seventy years there has been a
law banning foreign clergy from working in Turkey in any capacity. All foreign
clergy, including the two Germans working in Turkey, thereby belong officially to
their respective diplomatic representations.
In August 2002 the strict law prohibiting Christian foundations from acquiring real
estate, or selling or buying landed property was eased by a new law. This law provides
that the churches may acquire property through their foundations, but only on
condition that all property is reported to the government in advance. Now, in the last
few years the congregations have frequently acquired buildings and also properties in
order to be ready for the unknown day on which religious freedom would be fully
restored. The purchases have been in the name of community members. Most churches
did not report these purchases after August 2002 for fear of opening the door to future
expropriations.
The churches that are growing smaller in Turkey also need places for worship, parish
centres and schools, in order to be able to practise their faith. The official reaction has
always been that there are, at least in Istanbul, enough churches for the Christians.
This is true, statistically speaking, but not in practice. Most churches in the city belong
to Greeks. However, their small community has long not been able to use all their
churches. They could hand over some of them to the Syrian Orthodox Church, which
has no church building of its own in Istanbul but about 12,000 parish members.
According to present laws, however, this is prohibited.
The Protestant Turkish communities consisting of baptised Muslims have a
particularly hard time. Owing to their short history they do not have any property and,
having no legal capacity, are not allowed to buy any. Hence they have to trust one of
their members to buy an apartment in his own name and with the money of the others.
If it is then used for worship all the other residents in the building have to agree. But
that is a rare exception.
Lack of trained clergy
A further urgent problem for the minority churches in Turkey is the ban on training
priests and religion teachers. In 1972 the state ordered the closure of all theological
colleges, including the Islamic ones. Shortly afterwards, the latter were reopened. The
church training institutions have, however, remained closed. The training of
theological students has thereby practically come to a halt. Churches are not allowed to
call pastors and teachers from abroad. The only possibility is that young Armenians
59
and Greeks are sent abroad to study. But once there, they often do not return. Just
recently the Turkish state offered the Greek Orthodox Church the possibility of
training young theologians on the German pattern, at state universities. But while in
Germany the theology professors have to be Christians, it would be Muslim professors
who would train future Armenian and Greek Orthodox clergy. So the Christian side
firmly refused this offer.
The ban on training theologians hits not just the congregations but also the few
remaining church schools. It is getting harder and harder to teach religion with a
dwindling band of teachers. Clergymen are not allowed to teach in schools, not even in
church schools. The schools also suffer under having to admit only pupils from their
own denomination. If e.g. an Armenian child attends an Armenian school there is no
guarantee that he or she will be able to complete secondary school. If the father is
Armenian and the mother Muslim, and the father dies, the child will no longer be
regarded as Armenian: he or she can therefore no longer attend the church school and
will have to change to a state school.
In Tur Abdin, their traditional settlement area in northern Mesapotamia, live about
2,000 Aramaic (Assyrian) Christians, most of whom belong to the Syrian Orthodox
church. The Syrian Orthodox monasteries of Mar Gabriel and Deyr-ul-Zafaran were in
1997 forbidden to give religious instruction in Aramaic, the language of their liturgy
and their rich written tradition. Aramaic is also the language spoken by Jesus of
Nazareth.
The shadows of the past
The Christian faith originally came from Palestine and Asia Minor and then spread
into all parts of the world. Today the Christians in Turkey are only a tiny minority.
They are not persecuted but are severely restricted in the free practice of their faith.
Tracing back the causes of this discrimination one concludes that Turkey is still in the
grip of its past. In the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic religious minorities
have always been ethnic or national minorities, who were always considered "unsafe"
citizens. Many Muslim Turks feel threatened by these reportedly hostile groups, even
fearing a "Balkanisation" of Turkey. Such fear cannot easily be countered with rational
arguments. To this day Turkey denies and represses the genocide of the Young Turks
against the Armenians and Aramaeans in the 1920s and 1930s and also the expulsion
of the Pontic and Asia Minor Greeks during the First World War.
Does Christianity have a future in Turkey? When Turkey joins the European Union, if
not before, Christians in Istanbul and Ankara must be given the same rights and
freedoms as Christians and Muslims in Berlin or Copenhagen. One hopes that by then
it will not be too late.
Gerhard Duncker was pastor of the German-speaking Protestant congregation in
Turkey from 1993 to 2002 and representative of the Council of the Evangelical
Church in Germany at the seat of the Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchate in
Istanbul / Constantinople. Since September 2002 he has been responsible for
60
Central and Eastern Europe and for Basic Questions in the Christian-Islamic
Dialogue in the office of the Protestant Church of Westphalia.
Further reading:
y ""Human Rights in Turkey – Secularism = Religious Freedom?", Otmar
Oehring, No. 5/2001, Order No. 600 215 // available at: missio Aachen, Postfach
10 12 48, 52012 Aachen, Tel. (0241) 7507-00, Fax (0241) 7507-61-253, Internet:
www.missio-aachen.de
61
III. Practical tips
What can we do?
Almost every day church offices, parishes and individuals receive reports of attacks on
Christians. Anyone who does not want to accept the fact that in many places Christians
are not able to freely exercise their religion and are exposed to threats and violence,
faces the question of how to react appropriately to these reports. Experience has shown
that the most effective means to use against human rights violations is the public
denouncing of abuses. No one wants to be considered an oppressor. That is why it is
important to stand up publicly on behalf of the victims.
Letters can be sent to local or national offices, including the foreign embassies and
consulates in Germany, non-state offices in the country itself or directly to the
suspected perpetrator(s). International organisations like the United Nations, the
Council of Europe or the OSCE, government departments, politicians or church offices
in Germany can be asked to intervene in support. They have a broad range of
instruments ranging from an informal inquiry to the sending of a delegation or an
appeal e.g. in the form of a resolution or declaration. In order to reinforce the effect of
letters or actions they may be sent to newspapers, magazines or broadcasting stations
and thus made public. Readers' letters are another possibility. Press work is all the
more effective if it is based on regular, reliable contacts with the respective
newsrooms.
The effect of these ploys may vary and be hard to foresee. In individual cases they
may even have undesired consequences. The situation in the countries affected is hard
to estimate from a distance. As described in the country articles in the second part of
this collection of texts, attacks that restrict religious freedom or at first sight even seem
to be persecution of Christians are often complex social, ethical and/or political
conflicts, in which victims and perpetrators are frequently on both sides. If such
situations are interpreted one-sidedly as persecution of a religious community, and
other factors are omitted, a well-meaning reaction can even lead to a worsening of the
situation. Often infringements of religious freedom are an expression of a generally
bad human rights situation under which other disadvantaged groups also suffer. Here
an intervention taking account of the situation of non-Christian minorities as well can
often be more credible and effective than siding with Christians. Often the affected
Christians desire as little publicity as possible for their problems because they want to
avoid confrontations or because they notice that interpreting an existing conflict on a
religious pattern and thereby also emotionalising the conflict is reinforced if the
religious affiliation of one party to the conflict is strongly emphasised. But often they
are also greatly intimidated.
The following thoughts may be helpful in the search for suitable ways of reacting.
62
What has happened – evaluation of the information
Action should only take place on the basis of precise knowledge of the situation. It is
important to know where the information about the case comes from and how reliable
it is. The organisations that pass on reports about attacks on Christians process
information in very different ways. Specific criteria can help in assessing the
information source: to what extent is information confirmed through reports from
other reliable organisations? Is the information balanced or were facts passed on
selectively? It is always advisable to have information confirmed or supplemented by
another knowledgeable source. Often church bodies with partner contacts in the
affected area can give information and advice. The Information and Contact unit of the
Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) has listed church twinnings with individual
countries in Central and Eastern Europe in its country information. The Association of
Churches and Missions in Germany (EMW) has drawn up a list of existing church
commissions, working groups and cooperation links in Germany. Amnesty
International has many well-informed country coordination groups. An inquiry to the
authorities in the relevant country may prove useful, e.g. when someone has been
detained or 'disappeared'. Even if you do not obtain any additional information at least
this shows an interest in the case and improves the chances of a cessation of
harassment.
A look at the context may give clues as to how promising a certain type of reaction is.
What interests are in place and how can they be used? Who has particular access to the
situation? Are there possibilities of cooperation? Can the media be brought in? Or are
there institutions, bodies or persons who bear responsibility for the rights of persons
and in practical cases take action or can give assistance in assessing the possibilities of
support?
Who can take action?
Governing bodies or representatives of churches, their agencies, congregations or
church groups can take action. The EKD rarely intervenes in individual cases and for
that reason its interventions often have special weight. Those who can intervene
include human rights organisations or other social actors such as parties, associations,
clubs, politicians or other well-known public figures. The effect of their intervention
will also depend on the extent to which their addressee is interested in the case and
considers it relevant and credible. Last but not least, anyone and everyone can get
involved. Successes of letter-writing campaigns constantly show that letters from
individuals are certainly noted, above all if particular many people express their
position with their letters.
There are cases in which a non-church intervention is to be preferred That can, in
particular, apply when a church office is identified with a party to the conflict or if
local churches stand under great pressure and this pressure could be strengthened by
ecumenical commitment from abroad. So sometimes a secular human rights
organisation may have better chances of influence than a western church, however
strong. Often it is promising to work with Muslim organisations or to suggest the
issuing of a joint statement.
63
What do our actions achieve?
We should consider both the effect of action and the effect of inaction. In general it
helps the oppressors when we remain inactive because they want to avoid international
attention. Only in justified cases of exception must the decision be for inactivity so
that the victims' situation is not worsened. The latter must also be carefully examined
if the victim has fallen into the hands of extremist groups or if promising contacts have
been taken up from another side that should not be disturbed. Fundamentally, the
reaction should be geared to finding out how best and most lastingly to improve the
situation of the victims. They may mean that ideological beliefs or political sympathies
will take a back seat. In principle, political intervention should also not be without the
consent of the victims.
In some cases the victim can no longer be personally assisted because the situation of
threat is over, the worst case has already happened or a final judgement has been
spoken. And yet an action can show an effect in that the family, church or organisation
of the victim is given consolation and strength or people are made aware of the case
and inspired to rethink their position.
Changing the general conditions
In view of the numerous attacks that become known through ecumenical contact and
international human rights organisations it is impossible to respond appropriately to
each individual case. That compels us to remain selective in individual case work and
to set priorities. At the same time this shows that it is more important to change the
context in which the human rights isolation takes place than to deal with individual
cases. In order to improve the conditions we must use the many and varied instruments
of human rights work and civilian conflict management.
Both individuals and churches can make a major contribution to peaceful cooperation
between the religions by recognising and using the potential for peace of their faith,
emphasising common ground in peace-building, countering the forming of enemy
stereotypes and extremist positions in their own ranks and refraining from putting
down other religions. This begins in our personal lives. Only when we apply human
rights in dealing with people in our own immediate environment can we call for them
on the part of others.
Corinna Schellenberg
64
Dates for Activities
World Refugee Day (20 June)
International Day for the Victims of Torture (26 June)
International Day of Peace (September 21)
World Human Rights Day (December 10)
Universal Children's Day (date differs from state to state)
Church Statements
Statement on Religious Liberty of the General Assembly of the World Council of
Churches, New Delhi 1961, The New Delhi Report - The Third Assembly of the
World Council of Churches 1961, Editor: W.A. Visser't Hooft, SCM Press Ltd London
"Human Rights and Religious Liberty", Report of the Committee on the Commission
of the Churches on International Affairs, The New Delhi Report - The Third Assembly
of the World Council of Churches 1961, Editor: W.A. Visser't Hooft, SCM Press Ltd
London
"Protection of Individuals and Groups in The Political World", Towards Justice and
Peace in International Affairs, Report adopted by the Fourth Assembly of the World
Council of Churches, Uppsala, 1968, Official Report of the Fourth Assembly of the
World Council of Churches, Uppsala July 4 - 10, 1968, Editor: Norman Goodall,
World Council of Churches, Geneva 1968
"Human Rights and Christian Responsibility", Text from the International
Consultation on Human Rights and Christian Responsibility organised by the CCIA at
St. Pölten in Austria in 1974, Geneva 1975
"Structures of Injustice and Struggles for Liberation", Section Report at the Fifth
General Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Nairobi 1975, Breaking
Barriers, Nairobi 1975
The official Report of the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Editor:
David M. Paton, SPCK London / W.M. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids 1976
Human Rights and the Churches: New Challenges, A Statement by the International
Ecumenical Consultation, Morges, Switzerland, 23-27 June 1998, http://www.wcccoe.org/wcc/what/international/hrchall.html
Stellungnahme des Rates der EKD zur CCIA-Konsultation über Fragen der KSZESchlussakte, der Menschenrechte und der Religionsfreiheit vom 10. Juli 1976, in: Die
Denkschriften der EKD, Band 1 / 2, GTB Siebenstern 414, Gütersloh 1978
"Religionsfreiheit als Menschenrecht", in: "Die Menschenrechte im Ökumenischen
Gespräch - Beiträge der Kammer der EKD für öffentliche Verantwortung",
Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, Gütersloh 1997
Erklärung des Rates der EKD zum 50. Jahrestag der Verabschiedung der Allgemeinen
Erklärung der Menschenrechte am 8. Dezember 1998, on the internet under
www.ekd.de/menschenrechte (press releases) and available from: Menschenrechtsreferat im Kirchenamt der EKD, Herrenhäuser Straße 12, 30419 Hannover, Tel.
(0511) 2796-427, Fax (0511) 2796-717, E-Mail: [email protected]
65
Extracts from International Instruments
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as (...) religion (...).
Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as (...) religion (...).
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as (...) religion (...).
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language.
66
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989
Article 2
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention
to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective
of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's (...) religion (...).
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected
against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the (...) beliefs of the
child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Article 14
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable,
legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others
Article 30
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of
indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall
not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy
his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or
her own language.
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief
Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1
Article 1
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a
religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Article 6
In accordance with article I of the present Declaration, and subject to the provisions of
article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms:
67
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and
maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials
related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by
the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance
with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in
matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms
As amended by Protocol No. 11, Rome, 4.XI.1950
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
American Convention on Human Rights
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force on July 18, 1978
Article 1
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and
full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of
(...) religion (...).
Article 12
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes
freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or
disseminate one's religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in
public or in private.
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain or
to change his religion or beliefs.
68
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limitations
prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals,
or the rights or freedoms of others.
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious
and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own
convictions.
Article 13
(...) 5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action
against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of (...) religion
(...) shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.
Arab Charter on Human Rights
Council of the League of Arab States, adopted on 15 September 1994
Article 26
Everyone has a guaranteed right to freedom of belief, thought and opinion
Article 27
Adherents of every religion have the right to practise their religious observances and to
manifest their views through expression, practice or teaching, without prejudice to the
rights of others. No restrictions shall be imposed on the exercise of freedom of belief,
thought and opinion except as provided by law.
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
Adopted by the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on 5 August 1990
Article 10
Islam is the religion of true unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of
pressure on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to force him to change
his religion to another religion or to atheism.
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
Adopted on June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
Article 8
Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be
guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting
the exercise of these freedoms.
69
Literature
Regarding the legal Framework
y "U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary", M. Nowak,
N.P. Engel, Kehl 1993
y "Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights",
Carolyn Evans, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001
y "Lexikon für Kirchen- und Staatskirchenrecht", ed. Axel Frhr. von
Campenhausen, Verlag Schöningh, Paderborn, Band 1: 2000, Band 2: 2002
y "Religionsfreiheit zwischen individueller Selbstbestimmung, Minderheitenschutz
und Staatskirchenrecht – Völker- und verfassungsrechtliche Perspektiven", ed. R.
Grote/Th. Marauhn, 2001
Country Information
y "Christen Asiens: zwischen Gewalterfahrung und Sendungsauftrag", EMWInformationen No. 124 (Okt 2000) //available at: Evangelisches Missionswerk in
Deutschland e.V., Normannenweg 17-21, 20537 Hamburg, Tel. (040) 25 45 60,
Telefax (040) 25 42 987
y "Geschwister im Glauben: Christen im Mittleren Osten", eds EMW and Ev.
Mittelostkommission //available at: Evangelisches Missionswerk in Deutschland
e.V., Normannenweg 17-21, 20537 Hamburg, Tel. (040) 25 45 60, Telefax (040)
25 42 987
y "Länderinformationen der 'Informations- und Kontaktstelle Osteuropa' der EKD",
verfügbar zu: Albanien/Bulgarien, Baltikum, ehem. Jugoslawien, Polen, Rumänien,
Slowakische Republik, Tschechische Republik, Ukraine, Ungarn, Weißrussland,
Russische Föderation, (Kaukasus und Mittelasien sind in Bearbeitung) // available at:
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Informations- und Kontaktstelle Osteuropa,
Herrenhäuser Straße 12, 30419 Hannover, Germany, Tel. (0511) 2796-136, Telefax
(0511) 2796-725, E-Mail: [email protected]
y "Protestanten im Nahen Osten", EMS-Dokumentationsbrief 7/2001 // available
at: Evangelisches Missionswerk in Südwestdeutschland e.V., Vogelsangstr. 62,
70197 Stuttgart, Tel: (0711) 636 78-71, Telefax (0711) 636 78-55
y "Problems of Religious Freedom and Tolerance in Selected OSCE States,
Report to the OSCE Supplementary Meeting on Freedom of Religion or Belief,
Vienna, July 17 - 18, 2003", available at International Helsinki Federation for
Human Rights, Wickenburggasse 14/7, A-1080 Wien, Austria, Tel: +43 (1) 408
88 22, Telefax +43 (1) 408 88 22-50, Internet: www.ihf-hr.org
y "Vietnam", Informationsbroschüre zur Initiative "Solidarität mit verfolgten und
bedrängten Christen in unserer Zeit" des Sekretariates der Deutschen
Bischofskonferenz // available at: Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz,
Bonner Talweg 177, 53129 Bonn, Tel. (0228) 103-290, Telefax (0228) 103-299,
Internet: www.dbk.de/initiativen/Verfolgte-Christen2002-Vietnam.pdf
70
Human Rights Series of the Human Rights Office of Missio Aachen
y "Human Rights. Religious Freedom in the People’s Republic of China", Order No.
600 211, available at missio, Postfach 10 12 48, 52012 Aachen, Tel. (0241) 7507-00,
Telefax (0241) 7507-61-253, download as pdf-file at http://www.missioaachen.de/menschen-kulturen/themen/menschenrechte/downloaduebersicht.asp
y "Human Rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam – Religious Freedom",
Georg Evers, No. 9/2001, Order No. 600231 // available: see above
y "Human Rights in Indonesia. Religious Freedom and Violence", Theodor
Kampschulte, No. 3/2001, Order No. 600213 // available: see above
y "Human Rights in Turkey – Secularism = Religious Freedom?", Otmar Oehring, No.
5/2001, Order No. 600 215 // available: see above
Idea-Dokumentationen
(Containing information on organisations and institutions dedicated to helping
persecuted Christians)
y "Märtyrer heute – Eine Dokumentation zur weltweiten Diskriminierung und
Verfolgung von Christen", No. 13/2000 // available at: Idea e.V., Postfach 1820,
35528 Wetzlar, Tel. (06441) 915-122, Telefax (06441) 915-148, www.idea.de
y "Märtyrer 2001 – Christenverfolgung – vor allem in islamischen Ländern", No.
14/2001 // available at: see above
y "Märtyrer 2002 – Das Jahrbuch zur Christenverfolgung heute", No. 7/2002 //
available at: see above
y "Im Kerker für Christus", No. 5/2003 // available at: see above
Other
y "Evangelisches Staatslexikon", ed. Roman Herzog, 3rd ed., Kreuz Verlag,
Stuttgart 1987
y "Freiheit der Religion – Christentum und Islam unter dem Anspruch der
Menschenrechte", Johannes Schwartländer, Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, Mainz
1993
y "The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity", Tariq Ali,
April 2002
y "Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart", ed. Hans Dieter Betz, 4th ed., Verlag
J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 1998
y Guide our feet into the way of peace. Violent Conflicts and Civil Intervention with
Examples from Africa. EKD-Text 72, available at Evangelische Kirche in
Deutschland, Herrenhäuser Straße 12, 30419 Hannover, Tel. (0511) 2796-0, Telefax
(0511) 2796-707
71
y "Salz der Erde – Licht der Welt – Glaubenszeugnis und Christenverfolgung im 20.
Jahrhundert", Andrea Riccardi, Verlag Herder, Freiburg 2002
y "Unsere Solidarität ist gefordert, Verfolgung von Christen in aller Welt",
Hermann Gröhe, Evangelische Verantwortung 3/2000:1-3, available at
Evangelischer Arbeitskreis der CDU/CSU, Klingelhöferstr. 8, 10785 Berlin, Tel.
(030) 22070-432, Telefax (030) 22070-436
y "Verfolgte Christen heute" – Dokumentation der Internationalen Konferenz
1999 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, available at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,
Tiergartenstr. 35, 10785 Berlin, Tel. (030) 26996-0, Telefax (030) 26996-275
y "Zur Verfolgung von Christen in aller Welt – Bundesregierung beantwortet
Anfrage – Bundestagsabgeordnete diskutieren", epd-Dokumentation No. 14/00,
available at GEP-Vertrieb, Postfach 500550, 60394 Frankfurt am Main, Tel. (069)
58098-189, Telefax (069) 58098-226, E-Mail: [email protected], www.epd.de
Websites
y World Council of Churches: www.wcc-coe.org/
y Conference of European Churches: www.cec-kek.org/; Working Group on
Human Rights and Religious Freedom: www.cec-kek.org/English/cshumanrights1.htm
y Links to Human Rights Instruments of the United Nations: www.unhchr.ch/
html/intlinst.htm
y Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief of the Commission on
Human Rights of the United Nations: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/mrei.htm
y Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): www.osce.org ;
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Website on Freedom
of Religion or Belief: www.osce.org/odihr/ human_rights/religion/
y Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or Belief: www.oslocoalition.org
y amnesty international: www.amnesty.org
y Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org
y University of Minnesota Human Rights Library Search Engine: www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/google/localsearch.ht
y Forum 18 News Service: www.forum18.org/
y U.S. State Department's Reports on Religious Freedom in the World:
www.state.gov/ g/drl/irf/
y U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom: www.uscirf.gov/
y International Association of Religious Freedom: www.iarf.net
y World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty Commission:
www.worldevangelical.org/rlc.html
72
Addresses
Brot für die Welt, Stafflenbergstraße 76, 70184 Stuttgart, Tel. (0711) 2159-0,
Telefax (0711) 2159-368, Internet: www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de
Diakonisches Werk der EKD, Stafflenbergstraße 76, 70184 Stuttgart, Tel. (0711)
2159-0, Telefax (0711) 2159-288, Internet: www.diakonie.de
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Herrenhäuser Straße 12, 30419 Hannover,
Tel. (0511) 2796-0, Telefax (0511) 2796-707, Internet: www.ekd.de
Evangelisches Missionswerk in Deutschland e.V., Normannenweg 17-21, 20537
Hamburg, Tel. (040) 25 45 60, Telefax (040) 25 42 987, Internet: www.emw-d.de
Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst e.V., Ulrich-von-Hassell-Straße 76, 53123
Bonn, Tel. (0228) 8101-0, Telefax (0228) 8101-160, Internet: www.eed.de
Informations- und Kontaktstelle Osteuropa der EKD (IKOE), Kirchenamt der
EKD, Herrenhäuser Straße 12, 30419 Hannover, Tel. (0511) 2796-136, Telefax
(0511) 2796-725, E-Mail: [email protected]
Vereinte Evangelische Mission, Rudolfstraße 137, 42285 Wuppertal, Tel. (0202)
89004-0, Telefax (0202) 89004-79, Internet: www.vemission.org
73