Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge

IntuitiveExpertiseandIntuitionsAboutKnowledge
JoachimHorvath&AlexWiegmann
December30,2015
ForthcominginPhilosophicalStudies*
Abstract
Experimentalrestrictionistshavechallengedphilosophers’relianceon
intuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentcasesbasedonexperimentalfindings.Accordingto
theexpertisedefense,onlytheintuitionsofphilosophicalexpertscount—yetthebulkof
experimentalphilosophyconsistsinstudieswithlaypeople.Inthispaper,wearguethat
direct(experimental)strategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefensearepreferableto
indirect(inductive)strategies.Adirectargumentinsupportoftheexpertisedefense
wouldhavetoshow:first,thatthereisasignificantdifferencebetweenexpertandlay
intuitions;second,thatexpertintuitionsaresuperiortolayintuitions;andthird,that
expertintuitionsaccordwiththerelevantphilosophicalconsensus.Atpresent,thereis
onlylittleexperimentalevidencethatbearsontheseissues.Toadvancethedebate,we
conductedtwonewexperimentsonintuitionsaboutknowledgewithexpertsandlay
people.Ourresultssuggestthattheintuitionsofepistemologicalexpertsaresuperiorin
somerespects,buttheyalsoposeanunexpectedchallengetotheexpertisedefense.
Moststrikingly,wefoundthatevenepistemologicalexpertstendtoascribeknowledge
infake-barn-stylecases.Thissuggeststhatphilosophy,asadiscipline,mightfailto
adequatelymaptheintuitionsofitsexpertpractitionersontoadisciplinaryconsensus.
Keywords
intuitions,thoughtexperiments,knowledge,expertisedefense,intuitive
expertise,experimentalphilosophy,experimentalrestrictionism
*ThefinalpublicationisavailableatSpringerviahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0627-1
1
1
Introduction
Findingsfromexperimentalphilosophysuggestthatlaypeople’sintuitionsabout
philosophicalthoughtexperimentsvarywithanumberofseeminglyirrelevantfactors,
suchasculturalbackground(Machery,Mallon,Nichols,&Stich,2004),orderof
presentation(Liao,Wiegmann,Alexander,&Vong,2012;Swain,Alexander,&Weinberg,
2008;Wiegmann&Waldmann,2014),affectivecontent(Nichols&Knobe,2007),or
heritablepersonalitytraits(Cokely&Feltz,2009;Feltz&Cokely,2009).Basedonthese
findings,experimentalphilosophersofa‘restrictionist’benthavechallengedthe
trustworthinessofthoughtexperimentintuitions(Alexander,Mallon,&Weinberg,2009;
Alexander&Weinberg,2007;Feltz&Cokely,2012;Macheryetal.,2004;Weinberg,
2007;Weinberg,Nichols,&Stich,2001).Otherphilosophershaverespondedina
numberofwaystotheexperimentalrestrictionistchallenge(Bengson,2013;Cappelen,
2012;Deutsch,2009,2010;Grundmann,2010;Horvath,2010;Kauppinen,2007;
Ludwig,2007,2010;Nagel,2012;Sosa,2007,2009,2010)—somemorepromising,
somelesspromising(Alexander,2012;Alexander&Weinberg,2007;Deutsch,2015;
Horvath,2010;Mizrahi,2015;Nado,2014,2015b;Weinberg,Alexander,Gonnerman,&
Reuter,2012;Weinberg,Gonnerman,Buckner,&Alexander,2010).1
Theso-called‘expertisedefense’emergedasoneofthemostfruitfulandhotly
debatedreactionstotheexperimentalrestrictionists’challenge(seeNado,2014fora
recentsurvey).Proponentsoftheexpertisedefensehavevariouslyarguedthat
professionalphilosophersaretherelevantexpertswithrespecttotheintuitive
evaluationofthoughtexperiments,whocanthusbeexpectedtobelargelyresistantto
theinfluenceofirrelevantfactors(Devitt,2006,2011;Grundmann,2010;Hales,2006;
Hofmann,2010;Horvath,2010;Kipper,2010;Ludwig,2007;Turri,2013;Williamson,
1Weusetheterm‘intuition’fairlybroadlyinthispaper,i.e.,aspotentiallycoveringawiderangeof
spontaneouscognitiveresponsestothoughtexperimentcases(see,e.g.,Pust,2012foranoverview).This
broaduseisopentotheobjectionthatonlyintuitionsofaspecifickindmatterforphilosophical
methodologyandthuscountasgenuineintuitions(see,e.g.,Bengson,2013;Ludwig,2007).Wedonot
havethespacetodiscussthisobjectioninmoredetailhere.However,wewouldliketonotethatweare
skepticalaboutthemethodologicalsignificanceofthe‘genuineintuitionsobjection’,sinceitisnotclear
whetherevenprofessionalphilosopherstypicallyrespondtothoughtexperimentcaseswith“genuine
intuitions”intheireverydaypractice(fordiscussion,see,e.g.,Alexander,2012,Chapter5;Alexander&
Weinberg,2007;Horvath,2010;Weinberg&Alexander,2014).
2
2005,2007,2011;Wright,2010).2Sincemostfindingsfromexperimentalphilosophy
concernonlylayintuitions,thesefindingscanaccordinglybeignoredasirrelevantto
philosophicalpractice,whichmainlyreliesontheintuitionsofwell-trainedprofessional
philosophers.3
Therearedirectandindirectstrategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefense
(Schulz,Cokely,&Feltz,2011,p.1724).TheseminalrestrictionistresponsebyWeinberg
etal.(2010)pursuesanindirectstrategy.Basedonasurveyofthepsychological
literatureonexpertise,Weinbergetal.arguethattheintuitiveabilitiesofprofessional
philosopherslacksomeofthefeaturesthatconstitutegenuineexpertiseinother
domains.Incontrast,proponentsofdirectstrategiesinvestigatetheintuitionsofthe
allegedphilosophicalexpertsmoredirectly,thatis,byperformingsuitableexperiments
withthoseexpertsubjects.
Inthispaper,wefirstargueinfavorofdirectstrategiesforassessingthe
expertisedefense,bothfordialecticalandsubstantivereasons(directandindirect
strategiesneednotbeinconflict,however,andcansometimesevenbemutually
reinforcing).
Toadvancethedebateaboutdirectstrategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefense,
wethenpresenttheresultsoftwonewexperimentsonexpertintuitionsabout
knowledge.Despitethefactthat“NormativityandEpistemicIntuitions”(Weinbergetal.,
2001)—arguablythe“foundingdocument”ofexperimentalphilosophy—reportsa
numberoffindingsaboutknowledge-relatedintuitions,therehasbeennoattemptsofar
toinvestigatetheknowledgeintuitionsofphilosophicalexpertsmoredirectly.4Thisisa
failurethatwewanttorectifyinthispaper.Ourexperimentswereguidedbythree
ideas:(1)tocompareexpertintuitionsaboutknowledgewithlayintuitions,(2)to
2Foraqualifiedempiricaldefenseofphilosophers’intuitiveexpertise,seeDeCruz(2015)onthebasisof
dualprocesspsychology,andBuckwalter(2014)onthebasisofthepsychologyofexpertbiasesand
limitations.SeealsoNado(2015a)foraqualifiedendorsementofphilosophicalexpertisethatdoesnot,
however,aimtorebuttheexperimentalrestrictionistchallenge.
3Somephilosophershavearguedthatthefindingsofexperimentalphilosophyaremethodologically
irrelevantbecauseintuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentcasesdonot,oncloserinspection,playany
significantmethodologicalroleinphilosophicalpractice(Cappelen,2012,2014;Deutsch,2009,2010,
2015).Inthiscase,theexpertisedefensemightbeobsoletesimplybecausetherewouldbenochallenge
fromexperimentalphilosophyinthefirstplace.Thecontroversyoverthisimportantissueisstillongoing,
however,andanumberofphilosophershaveofferedforcefulrepliestovariousargumentsforthe
methodologicalirrelevanceofintuitions(see,e.g.,Bengson,2014;Boghossian,2014;Brogaard,2014;
Chalmers,2014;Ichikawa,2014;Nado,2015b;Weinberg,2014).Forthepurposesofthispaper,wewill
thereforesimplyassumethatintuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentcases,broadlyunderstood,doplaya
significantmethodologicalroleinphilosophicalpractice.
4OnereasonmightbethattheresultsofWeinberg,Nichols,andStichfailedtoreplicate(Macheryetal.,
2015;Nagel,2012;Nagel,Mar,&SanJuan,2013;Nagel,SanJuan,&Mar,2013;Seyedsayamdost,2015).
3
measuretheirqualityagainsttherelevantepistemologicalconsensus,and(3)tocheck
whethertheexperts’intuitionsareinlinewiththeconsensusoftheirowndiscipline.
Incontrasttomostotherstudiesonphilosophicalexpertintuitions,ourresults
offersomedegreeofsupportfortheexpertisedefense.Forexample,wefoundthatthe
knowledge-relatedintuitionsofepistemologicalexpertsdiffersystematicallyfromthose
oflaypeopleinanumberofcriticalcases,andthattheydifferinawaythatonewould
expectonthebasisoftherelevantliterature.Ontheotherhand,ourresultshavea
puzzlingaspectaswell,forourexpertsubjectstendedtoascribeknowledgeevenin
caseswhereepistemologicalorthodoxywoulddenyknowledge,suchasfake-barn-style
cases.Thus,ourfindingsalsoraisethetroublingnewquestionwhetherepistemologists
havebeencollectivelyunawareofwhattheirownintuitiveexpertisereallytellsthem
aboutcertainkeythoughtexperimentsaboutknowledge.
2
WaysofAssessingtheExpertiseDefense
2.1
IndirectandDirectStrategiesforAssessingtheExpertiseDefense
Letusfirstconsiderthemeritsofindirectanddirectstrategiesforsupportingor
challengingtheexpertisedefense.Asmentionedabove,theearlyrestrictionistresponse
byWeinbergetal.(2010)pursuesanindirectstrategy.Weinbergetal.extractcertain
findingsaboutgenuineexpertisefromtherelevantpsychologicalliteratureandthen
suggestanampliativeinferencefromthesefindingstotheallegedexpertintuitersin
philosophy.Oneoftheirkeypointsisthat,inawiderangeofdomains,thedevelopment
ofgenuineexpertiserequiresclear,timely,andreliablefeedbackduringtheprocessof
traininginalargenumberoftrainingsituations(seealsoClarke,2013).Weinbergetal.
thenarguethatthetrainingofprofessionalphilosophersintheintuitiveevaluationof
thoughtexperimentsfallsconsiderablyshortofsatisfyingtheserequirementsonthe
developmentofgenuineexpertise,andtheyconcludethatprofessionalphilosophers’
intuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentsareunlikelytoresultfromgenuineintuitive
expertise.Thecruxintheirinductiveargumentistheassumptionthatintuitiveexpertise
withrespecttothoughtexperimentsisrelevantlysimilartointuitiveexpertiseinother
domains,becauseotherwisefindingsaboutthelatterwouldnotbeprojectibletothe
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former.Buttherearereasonstobeskepticalaboutthisassumptionofprojectibility(see
alsoAndow,2015).
Forexample,paradigmaticcasesofintuitiveexpertiseinthepsychological
literature,suchasfiregroundcommanders(G.Klein,Calderwood,&Clinton-Cirocco,
1986)ornursesinneonatalintensivecareunits(Crandall&Getchell-Reiter,1993),are
primafaciequitedisanalogoustophilosophicalthoughtexperimenters.Whilethe
intuitivejudgmentsoftheformerareinthebusinessofmakingcausalpredictionsin
highlycomplex,uncertainsituations,intuitivejudgmentsaboutthoughtexperiments
typicallydonotconcerncausalrelationsoruncertainoutcomes.Rather,inatypical
philosophicalthoughtexperiment,allrelevantfeaturesoftheintendedscenarioare
eitherexplicitlystipulatedorotherwiseimplicitlyassumedbythethought
experimenter.Ifimportantfactsaboutthescenariostillremainopenorunclear,thenthe
thoughtexperimentinquestionissimplynotagoodone.Thus,thethought
experimenter’smainjobistoevaluateascenariothatalreadycontainsenough
informationtoforecloseanyuncertaintywithrespecttothetargetquestion,e.g.,
whetherSmithknowsthatsomeoneinhisofficeownsaFord(Lehrer,1965).Thisis
quitedisanalogoustotheinformationalsituationofafirefighterinaburningbuilding,
oraneonatalnursewhocaresforprematureinfants.
Whetheronesharesourreservationsaboutindirectstrategiesornot,theycan
hardlyprovidethemostcompellingwayofassessingtheexpertisedefense.Onereason
isthattherelevantinductiveargumentsarealmostalwaysepistemicallyriskierthana
moredirectinvestigationofprofessionalphilosophers’intuitiveexpertise.5Direct
strategiesarealsodialecticallymoreeffective,forinthefaceofindirectargumentsonly,
manyprofessionalphilosopherswillsurelycontinuetothinkthattheysimplymustbe
betterandlessbiasedintheirintuitiveevaluationsofthoughtexperimentsthanlay
people.Thisexpectationisactuallysupportedbypsychologicalresearchonthebias
blindspot,i.e.,bythefindingthatalmosteveryonetakesher-orhimselftobelessbiased
thanotherpeople(Armor,1998;Pronin,2007;Pronin,Gilovich,&Ross,2004)—a
tendencythatmanyexpertsexhibitintheirownareaofexpertiseaswell(Chi,1978;
Glenberg&Epstein,1987).Directstrategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefenseshould
thustakepriorityoverindirectstrategiesatthepresentstageofthedebate.
5Itshouldbenoted,however,that—duetothemediatingroleofoperationalization—eventhemostdirect
psychologicalinvestigationofphilosophicaljudgmentsandintuitionswillstillbeindirectincomparison
to,e.g.,theobservationofoverthumanbehaviororbodilymovements.Forthisreason,oneshouldthink
ofthedistinctionbetweendirectandindirectstrategiesmoreasacontinuumthanasastrictdichotomy.
5
2.2
TheTaskforDirectStrategies
Whatneedstobeshownbydirectstrategiesforsupportingtheexpertisedefense?
First,thereneedstobeasignificantdifferencebetweentherelevantintuitionsof
professionalphilosophersandlaypeople.Intheabsenceofsuchadifference,the
questionwhetherprofessionalphilosophershavebetterintuitionsthanlaypeoplewill
typicallybemoot.Ofcourse,wideintuitiveagreementbetweenallegedexpertsandlay
peopleisnotsufficienttoruleoutintuitiveexpertise,nordoessubstantialintuitive
disagreementbetweenexpertsandlaypeoplealreadyestablishintuitiveexpertise(both
expertsandlaypeoplemightarriveattheirintuitiveverdictsinepistemicallydubious
ways).Butontheassumptionthatphilosophicalexpertspossessgenuineintuitive
expertise,somesignificantdifferencebetweenexpertandlayintuitionsissurelythe
mostnaturalexpectation,anditsabsencewouldseemtoconstitutestrongprimafacie
evidenceagainsttheexpertisedefense.6
Onedirectstrategyforchallengingtheexpertisedefensewouldthereforebeto
showthatlaypeopleandprofessionalphilosophershavemoreorlessthesame
intuitionsinagivendomain.Extantstudiesthatrevealasignificantdifferencebetween
laypeopleandprofessionalphilosophersareSytsmaandMachery(2010)onintuitions
aboutphenomenalconsciousness,Schulz,Cokely,andFeltz(2011)onincompatibilist
intuitionsaboutfreewill,andMachery(2012)onexpertintuitionsaboutreference.7
Otherpertinentstudies(Hitchcock&Knobe,2009;Schwitzgebel&Cushman,2012,
2015;Tobia,Buckwalter,&Stich,2013;Tobia,Chapman,&Stich,2013;Vaesen,
Peterson,&VanBezooijen,2013)didnotreportanysignificantdifferencebetween
philosophersandlaypeople.Ourownexperimentalresultsindicatethatthereisindeed
asignificantdifferencebetweenprofessionalepistemologistsandlaypeopleconcerning
intuitionsaboutknowledge(seebelow).
Second,asignificantdifferencebetweenexpertsandlaypeoplebyitselfisnot
enoughtosupporttheexpertisedefense,ofcourse.Therelevantdifferencemustalso
involveasignificantimprovementofexpertintuitionsoverlayintuitions,forexample,by
6Thankstoananonymousreviewerforpromptingtheseclarifications.
7Afterthispaperwasacceptedforpublication,welearnedaboutarecentstudybyJ.AdamCarter,Martin
Peterson,andBartvanBezooijen(2015)thatinteraliasuggeststhatphilosophicalexpertsarelesswilling
thanlaypeopletoself-ascribeknowledgeofsimpleanalytictruthsversusknowledgeofwidelyaccepted
empiricaltruths(thankstoMartinPetersonforthepointer).
6
revealingthatexpertintuitionsarelesssusceptibletotheinfluenceofsomeofthe
irrelevantfactorsthatexperimentalphilosophershaveidentified.Sofar,thereisonly
littleexperimentalevidencethatthismightbethecase.WhiletheresultsofSytsmaand
Machery(2010)areatleastconsistentwithexpertsuperiority,thefindingsofSchulz,
Cokely,andFeltz(2011)indicatethatphilosophers’compatibilistintuitionsaboutfree
willareequallyaffectedbytheinnatepersonalitytraitofextraversionasthoseoflay
people.AndMachery(2012)presentsevidencethatthereferentialintuitionsinvarious
subgroupsoflinguisticexpertspointinratherdifferentdirections.Turri(2013)offersat
leastsomeindirectsupportforanimprovementofintuitionsaboutknowledgethrough
expertise,sincehefoundthatlaypeople’sjudgmentsaboutGettiercasescanbebrought
inlinewiththeepistemologicalconsensusbyamoreperspicuouspresentationoftheir
structure.Ourownresultsalsosuggestthatvariousknowledge-relatedintuitionsof
professionalepistemologistsmightbebetterthanthoseoflaypeopleinsofarasthey
comesignificantlyclosertothetextbookconsensusoncasesoftherelevanttype(see
below).Aswewillsee,however,theymightstillnotcomecloseenough.
Third,adirectstrategyinsupportoftheexpertisedefensewouldideallyshow
thattheexpertintuitionsareinlinewiththetextbookconsensusontheintuitive
evaluationofthoughtexperimentsoftherelevanttype.Iftheintuitionsofprofessional
philosophersturnedouttobesignificantlydifferentfromtherelevantconsensusinthe
literature,thiswouldseemtobeaconsiderableembarrassment,becauseitwould
indicatethatphilosophy,asadiscipline,mightbedeludedaboutwhattheintuitionsof
itsexpertpractitionersactuallysay.Forexample,eveniftheintuitionsofprofessional
epistemologiststurnedouttobefreeofallknownbiases,butalsocameoutinfavorof
ascribingknowledgeinGettiersituations,thiswouldstillbeatroublingresultfor
epistemologyasadiscipline.Forsucharesultwouldsuggestthatthedisciplineof
epistemologyisdysfunctionalinsofarasitfailstomaptheintuitionsofitsexpert
practitionersontoadisciplinaryconsensusintherightkindofway.Ourownresults
indicatethatsomethinglikethismightinfactbethecase(seebelow).
Inconclusion,itmustbeconcededthatthepresentlyavailableexperimental
evidencedoesnotsubstantiatedirectstrategiesforsupportingtheexpertisedefense.
Andwhileourownexperiments—tobereportedbelow—offersomesupportforthe
superiorityofexpertintuitionsaboutknowledge,theyalsosuggestthatsomeofthese
intuitionsdeviatefromthetextbookconsensusinunexpectedandtroublesomeways.
7
3
Experiments
3.1
Experiment1
3.1.1 RationaleandMaterial
Afirstideabehindourexperimentissimplytocomparetheintuitionsofexpert
epistemologistsandlaypeopleconcerninganumberofsystematicallyimportanttypes
ofthoughtexperimentsaboutknowledge.
Asecondideaistomeasurethequalityoflaypeople’sandexpertepistemologists’
intuitionsagainsthowclosetheycometotherelevanttextbookconsensusonthought
experimentsofthesamekind.Wethereforeapproachtheissueofintuitiveexpertise
fromaslightlydifferentanglethanusual.Thestandardprocedurewouldbetocheck
whetherprofessionalphilosophersarelesssusceptibletosomephilosophically
irrelevantfactorthatwasfoundtoinfluencelaypeople’sintuitions(see,e.g.,
Schwitzgebel&Cushman,2012,2015).Incontrast,weaimforapositiveevaluationof
thequalityofexpertintuitionsaboutknowledgefromtheviewpointofthepresent
epistemologicalconsensus.Experimentsthat“only”testforthesusceptibilityofexpert
intuitionstophilosophicallyirrelevantfactorscan“atbest”establishapurelynegative
result,i.e.,thatprofessionalphilosophersarenotsusceptibletotheinfluenceofsuch
factors.Ourexperimentsthusbearontheexpertisedefenseinwaysthatdifferfrom
experimentsthatfollowthestandardprocedureand,asaconsequence,leadto
interestinglydifferentresults,aswewillarguebelow.8
Itmightbeobjectedthatregardingthetextbookconsensusasanadequate
standardforevaluatingintuitionsaboutknowledgebegsthequestioninfavorof
intuitionsthatsupportthetextbookconsensus.Inthiscase,however,wefacethe
unusuallydifficulttaskofassessingthequalityofintuitionsaboutknowledgeinthe
absenceofsomeindependentstandard.Moreover,theinsistencethatwehaveto
bracketeventhosecaseswherewedofindarobustepistemologicalconsensusis
arguablyanundulyskepticalmaneuver(Sosa,2007;Williamson,2004,2011).Forthese
reasons,theassumptionthatthetextbookconsensusprovidesatleastadefeasibleor
8Thankstoananonymousreviewerforencouragingustomakeourproceduremoreexplicit.
8
primafaciestandardforassessingthequalityofintuitionsaboutknowledgedoesnot
seemespeciallyproblematicorquestionbegging.
Evenifoneshouldrejecttheideathatthetextbookconsensuscanbeusedasan
adequatestandardofcorrectnessforintuitionsaboutknowledge,onecanstill
acknowledgeathirdideabehindourexperiment,namely,totestwhethertheintuitions
ofexpertepistemologistsareinlinewiththerelevanttextbookconsensusoftheirown
discipline.
Inordertotrulyengagetheexpertiseofourepistemologicalexperts,we
confrontedthemwithunfamiliarvariationsofthoughtexperimentsthatalreadyfigure
intheepistemologicalliterature,althoughlessprominentlythan,e.g.,Gettier’soriginal
cases(1963)orthefake-barncase(Goldman,1976).Usingsuchwell-knowncasesmight
havetheunwantedeffectthatepistemologistsmerelyrecalltheirearlierintuitive
verdictsfrommemory,orthattheysimplyreproducethetextbookconsensus(seealso
Rini,2015,sec.5.1).Ofcourse,someonewhoknowstheepistemologicalliteraturereally
wellwillprobablybeabletoidentifythecasesthatinspiredourvignettes.Butusingnew
variationsoffamiliarcasesshouldatleastraisethechancethatevenprofessional
epistemologiststrulyengagetheirintuitiveabilities.
Letusnowintroducethevignettesthatweusedinourfirstexperiment.Ineach
case,wewillfirstreproducethevignettesinexactlytheformthatweusedinthe
experiment,alongsidewiththetargetquestionthattheparticipantswereaskedto
answer.Afterthat,wedescribethepointofthevignetteinamoreabstractway,and
thencitethecasesonwhichitwasmodeled,aswellastheconsensusontheevaluation
ofcasesofthiskindaccordingtotheepistemologicalliterature.
Asecurityguardmonitorsanumberofvideoscreensthatshowwhatisgoingoninan
officebuildingacrossthestreet.Atmidnight,theguardcheckshervideoscreensand
sees,onfivedifferentscreensthatshowfivedifferentoffices,thatpeoplearestill
workingintheiroffices.Shethinkstoherself:“Thereisstillsomeoneinthebuilding.”
Fourofthefivescreensareinfactworkingproperly.Butduetosomeunusual
malfunction,oneofthefivescreensactuallyshowsavideotapefromthenightbefore,
andtodaythisparticularofficeisalreadyempty.
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
Theguardknowsthatthereisstillsomeoneinthebuilding.
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Monitorisacasewherethesubjecthasmultiplepiecesofevidenceforthetarget
proposition,eachofwhichwouldbesufficientforknowledge.Inaddition,thesubject
alsohasonefaultypieceofevidenceforthetargetproposition,inthiscase:theone
malfunctioningvideoscreen.Intheepistemologicalliterature,casesofthiskindare
regardedasclearcasesofknowledgethatrefutetheearlyno-false-assumptionsolution
(Clark,1963)toGettier’s(1963)originalcounterexamplestothestandardanalysisof
knowledgeasjustifiedtruebelief(cf.Lehrer,1965).Suchcasesthengaverisetothenoessential-false-assumptionsolution(see,e.g.,Harman,1973;Lehrer,1974;Lycan,2006).
InMonitor,forexample,thesecurityguard’sjustificationdoesnotessentiallydependon
themalfunctioningvideoscreen,sincesheequallyreliesonthefourscreensthat
functionproperly.
ACEOhasownedafamouspaintingforalongtime.Justthismorning,sheshowedittoa
colleagueinherofficewhereshecanwatchthepaintingeveryday.Intheevening,the
CEOreturnshomefromworkandisabouttocheckheremail.Whatshewillfindthereis
anurgentnotebyhersecretarythatsaysthatherpaintingwasstolenshortlyaftershe
hadleftheroffice.Infact,theCEO’scolleaguemerelywantedtoplayatrickonher,and
soitwasactuallyhimwhousedthesecretary’semailaccounttosendherthisnote.The
paintingitselfisstillontheCEO’sofficewall,justasitalwayswas.
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
AtthetimewhentheCEOreturnshome,butbeforesheactuallychecksheremail,she
knowsthatthepaintingisstillonherofficewall.
Paintingisacasewhereevidencethatthesubjectdoesnot(yet)possess—here,an
unreademail—threatenstounderminethesubject’sjustificationforbelievingthetarget
propositionthatthepaintingisstillonherofficewall.GilbertHarman,whointroduced
casesofthiskindintotheepistemologicalliterature,regardedthemasintuitivecasesof
non-knowledge(Harman,1968,p.172,1973,pp.144–145).Paintingismodeledafter
thecaseofDonaldandtheunopenedletter(Harman,1973,p.143),whichisless
discussedtodaythanthemorefamiliarassassinationcase(Harman,1968,p.172,1973,
pp.143–144).Itisfairtosay,however,thatmanyepistemologistsdidnotfollow
Harman’sintuitiveassessmentofsuchcases,atleastnotwithoutqualifications(see,e.g.,
P.Klein,1981;Lycan,1977;Pritchard,2005).Accordingly,thepresentconsensusisthat
casesofthiskindareintuitivelyunclear(Shope,2002,p.32).
10
Thedirectorofasculpturemuseumissoimpressedwithrecentimprovementsof
hologramimagesthatshedecidestoperformasecrettestonthevisitorsofhermuseum.
Tothisend,sheordershologramimagesthatevenartexpertscannotvisuallydistinguish
fromtherealsculpturesinhermuseum,andshereplacesallbutoneofthesculpturesby
theirhologramimage.Asthedirectorhadexpected,noonerealizesanydifference
betweenthehologramimagesandtherealsculptures.Oneday,theworld’sgreatest
Rodinexpertisvisitinghermuseum.Theexpertisstandinginfrontofafamousmarble
sculpturebyRodin,whichistheonlyrealsculpturethatispresentlyondisplayinthe
museum,andshethinkstoherself:“I’mfacingoneofRodin’sfamousmarblesculptures
now.”
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
TheRodinexpertknowsthatthesculptureinfrontofherisoneofRodin’sfamous
marblesculptures.
InSculpture,thesubjecthasatruebeliefaboutamarblesculptureonthebasisofvisual
perception.However,themarblesculptureissurroundedbyvisuallyindistinguishable
hologramimagesofsculpturesinthesamemuseum.Inasense,then,itisamatterof
luckthatthesubjecthasacquiredatruebeliefinthissituation,forshecouldhaveeasily
lookedatanothersculptureandtherebyacquiredafalsebelief.Thiscaseispartly
inspiredbyLehrerandPaxson’s(1969,pp.234–235)caseofMr.Promoter,whichthey
presentasacounterexampletoUnger’s(1968)earlyanti-luckanalysisofknowledge,
andmainlybyCarlGinet’sfamousfake-barncase(Goldman,1976,pp.772–773),which
Goldmanusesasacounterexampletohisearliercausalanalysisof(perceptual)
knowledge(Goldman,1967).Thefake-barncasewasoriginallypresentedasaclearnoninstanceofknowledge,andthisintuitiveverdictiswidelyacceptedinthe
epistemologicalliterature(see,e.g.,EngelJr.,2015;Hetherington,2015;Ichikawa&
Steup,2014;Shope,2004;Steup,2014),withonlyveryfewexceptions(see,e.g.,Gendler
&Hawthorne,2005;Heathcote,2006;Hetherington,1999;Lycan,1977,2006).9
Alittlegirllikestoplayagamewithflippingacoin.Shesometimesgetsa“special
feeling”thatthenextflipwillcomeoutheads.Whenshegetsthis“specialfeeling”,sheis
9Steup,forexample,explicitlynotesthatthereis“…broadagreementamongepistemologiststhatHenry’s
belief[inthefake-barncase]doesnotqualifyasknowledge”(Steup,2014,sec.1.2).
11
rightabouthalfthetime,andwrongabouthalfthetime.Justbeforethenextflip,the
littlegirlgetsthat“specialfeeling”,andthefeelingleadshertobelievethatthecoinwill
landheads.Sheflipsthecoin,anditdoeslandheads.
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
Thelittlegirlknewthatthecoinwasgoingtolandheads.
Thisclearcaseofanon-instanceofknowledge,ClearNon-Knowledge1,wasalready
usedseveraltimesinexperimentalstudies(see,e.g.,Nichols,Stich,&Weinberg,2003;
Swainetal.,2008;Weinbergetal.,2001).Ineachcase,thevastmajorityofthetestedlay
subjectsclassifieditasacaseofnon-knowledge.Asignificantdifferencebetweenexpert
intuitionsandlayintuitionsconcerningthiscasewouldthusbestrongevidenceforthe
superiority(orinferiority)ofexpertintuitions.
Beforeleavingthehouse,awomanwantstocheckwhetherthelightinherbathroomis
off.Sheopensthebathroomdoor,anditiscompletelydarkinside.Shethinkstoherself:
“Alright,thelightinmybathroomisoff.”
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
Thewomanknowsthatthelightinherbathroomisoff.
Thisnewlydevisedcase,ClearKnowledge1,isintendedasaclear,everydaycaseof
knowledgeonthebasisofvisualperception.AsinthecaseofClearNon-Knowledge1,a
significantdifferencebetweenexpertandlayintuitionsaboutthiscasewouldbestrong
evidenceforthesuperiority(orinferiority)ofexpertintuitions.
3.1.2 Subjects
Overall,thedataof224subjectswereincludedinourmainanalysis.82wereidentified
asexpertsubjects(meanagewas38years;82%male)and142aslaysubjects(mean
agewas39years;37%male).
Theexpertsubjectswererecruitedviaacallforparticipationonanelectronic
mailinglistforphilosophers(PHILOS-L)andontheExperimentalPhilosophyblog
(http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/)thatcontainedalinkthatdirected
subjectstotheexperiment.Inordertobeincludedasexpertsubjects,participantshad
toindicatethat,firstly,theyhaveaPhDinphilosophyand,secondly,epistemologyisone
12
oftheirareasofspecializationorcompetence.Furthermore,weexcludedthedataof
subjectswhodidnotcompletethesurveyorcompleteditinlessthanoneminute.Outof
initially421people,82metthesecriteria,whichwerenotannouncedinthecallfor
participationorduringthesurvey.Tomotivatepeopletotakepartinourstudywe
announcedthatabookaboutexperimentalphilosophywouldberaffledamongall
participants.Toenterthisoptionalraffle,subjectswereaskedtoprovidetheiremail
addressattheendofthesurvey.
LaysubjectswererecruitedviaadatabaselocatedintheUK.Theywereinvited
viaanemailthatcontainedalinkthatdirectedsubjectstotheexperiment.Eachsubject
received£0.50.Weincludedthedataofsubjectswhoindicatedthattheyhavenoprior
experiencewithphilosophyandthattheyarenativespeakersofEnglish.Moreover,we
excludedthedataofsubjectswhodidnotcompletethesurveyorcompleteditinless
thanoneminute.Outofinitially284people,142metthesecriteria,whichwereagain
notannouncedinthecallforparticipationorduringthesurvey.
3.1.3 DesignandProcedure
TheexperimentwasconductedontheInternet.Uponclickingonalinkwhichsubjects
receivedviaemailorontheblogpost,theywereredirectedtoawebsitecontainingthe
experiment.Subjectsfirstreadgeneralinstructions.Thesefamiliarizedthemwiththe6pointLikertscalerangingfrom1(‘stronglydisagree’)to6(‘stronglyagree’),askedthem
toreadthesubsequentdescriptionsofscenarioscarefully,andappealedtothemtotake
thetaskseriously.Afterthat,thethreecasesMonitor,Painting,andSculpturewere
presentedinarandomizedorder.TheClearNon-Knowledge1caseandtheClear
Knowledge1casewerealwayspresentedonfourthandfifthposition,respectively.We
presentedtherelativelyclearcasesafterthelessclearcasesinordertoavoidcontrast
effectsasfoundinotherstudies(cf.Swainetal.,2008).Onthefinalpage,weaskeda
numberofdemographicquestionsandassessedtheparticipants’levelofphilosophical
educationandexpertise.
3.1.4 Results
TheresultsofourfirstexperimentaresummarizedinFigure1.AmixedANOVA
(betweensubjects:laysubjectsvs.expertsubjects;withinsubject:thefivecases)
showedaverysignificantinteractionofsubjectsandcases,indicatingthattheresponse
patternoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedstronglyoverthefivecases,F(4,
13
888)=20.58,p<.001,η2=.08.Theaveragetimespenttocompletethesurveydidnot
differsignificantlybetweenlaypeople(322seconds)andexperts(353seconds),F(1,
220)=.77287,p=.38.10
Level of Agreement
6,0
5,0
Lay Subjects
Expert Subjects
4,0
3,0
2,0
1,0
Figure1.Meanratingsforthefivecasesdividedinlayandexpertjudgments.Thescaleranged
from1(‘stronglydisagree’withtheclaimthattheagentknewtherelevantproposition)to6
(‘stronglyagree’).Errorbarsrepresent95%confidenceintervals.
Amorefine-grainedanalysisrevealedthatforthreeofthefivecasesthe
judgmentsoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedsignificantly,withtheexperts’
judgmentsbeingclosertotheevaluationofcorrespondingcasesintheepistemological
literature.ForMonitor,laysubjects(M=4.72,SD=1.51)andexpertsubjects(M=5.10,
SD=1.11)bothtendedtoagreewiththeclaimthattheguardknowsthatthereisstill
someoneinthebuilding.Thelevelofagreementforthiscase,whichcorrespondsto
casesthatareregardedasacasesofknowledgeintheepistemologicalliterature,was
significantlyhigherforexpertsubjects,F(1,222)=3.93,p<.05,η2=.02.11ForSculpture,
laysubjects’(M=4.79,SD=1.20)agreedsignificantlystrongerwiththeclaimthatthe
RodinexpertknowsthatthesculptureinfrontofherisoneofRodin’sfamousmarble
10Twosubjects(oneexpertsubject,onelaysubject)wereexcludedfromthisanalysisbecausetheyspent
over10,000secondslongerthanallothersubjects.
11Wecalculatedallcomparisonsassumingequalandunequalvariances.Sincetheresultsdifferedonly
marginally(itwasneverthecasethatacertaindifferencewassignificantusingoneassumptionbutnot
significantwhentheotherassumptionwasused)wechosetoreportourfindingsinthemostcommon
form,i.e.,withoutadjustingthedegreesoffreedom.
14
sculpturesthanexpertsubjects(M=3.77,SD=1.67),F(1,222)=28.06,p<.001,η2=
.11.12Althoughexpertsweremoreskepticalthanlaysubjectsabouttheclaimthatthis
caseconstitutesacaseofknowledge,theywerealsomoreinclinedtoagreewiththis
claimthanonewouldexpectfromtheconsensusintheepistemologicalliterature(see
Figure2forthedistributionofexpertjudgmentsforSculpture).13ForClearNonKnowledge1,expertsubjects(M=1.41,SD=0.74)disagreedsignificantlystrongerthan
laysubjects(M=2.64,SD=1.44)withtheclaimthatthelittlegirlknewthatthecoin
wasgoingtolandheads,F(1,222)=51.55,p<.001,η2=.19.14Afurtherinteresting
differencebetweenlaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsisthatlaysubjects’evaluationsfor
thefirstthreecases(Monitor,Painting,andSculpture)didnotdiffersignificantly,F(2,
282)=2.00,p=.14,whiletheevaluationsofexpertsubjectsdifferedstrongly,F(2,
162)=27.32,p<.001,η2=.25andinlinewiththerelevantconsensusinthe
epistemologicalliterature.ForthePaintingcaseandClearKnowledge1,nosignificant
differencebetweenlaysubjectsandexpertsubjectswasfound(p=.52andp=.09,
respectively).
12SinceSculptureismodeledafterfake-barncases(seeabove),ourfindingthatlaypeopletendtoascribe
knowledgeinthiscasebasicallyconfirmsakeyresultofthepioneeringstudyonfake-barncasesbyColaço
etal.(2014).
13Afterthispaperwasacceptedforpublication,welearnedaboutanunpublishedstudybyJ.AdamCarter,
DuncanPritchard,andJoshuaSheperd(ms)thatinteraliacomparesexpertandlayintuitionsconcerning
fake-barn-stylecases,andthatmostlyconfirmsourownfindings.Forexample,Carter,Pritchard,and
Sheperdalsofoundthat,onaverage,laypeopleandexpertsdoascribeknowledgeinsuchcases,even
thoughexpertsarelessinclinedtoascribeknowledgethanlaypeople(thankstoJoshuaShepherdforthe
pointer).
14Sincetheratingsof3and4werelabeledwith‘mildlydisagree’and‘mildlyagree’,respectively,one
mightinterpretratingsof3orbelowascasesofdisagreementandratingsof4oraboveascasesof
agreement.Applyingthisclassification,only3.8%oftheexpertsubjectsagreedwiththeclaimthatthe
littlegirlknewtheoutcomeofthecoinflip,while33.8%ofthelaysubjectsagreedwiththisclaim.
15
Number of responses
Expertra)ngsforScuplture
25
20
15
10
5
0
Level of (dis)agreement
Figure2.DistributionofexpertratingsforSculpture.
Moreover,theresultpatternofexpertswhoindicatedthatepistemologyisoneof
theirareasofspecializationversusexpertswhomerelyindicatedthatepistemologyis
oneoftheirareasofcompetencedidnotdiffersignificantly,F(4,320)=1.67,p=.16(for
theinteractionoflevelofcompetence*cases).Inordertoseewhetherthereisa
significantdifferencebetweenourexpertsubjectsandthosesubjectswho“merely”hold
aPhDinphilosophy,yetwithouthavingepistemologyasoneoftheirareasof
specializationorcompetence,wecomparedtheratingsofthelatter(N=74,not
includedinpreviousanalyses)withtheratingsofourexpertssubjects.Theresponse
patternofthesetwogroupsdifferedsignificantly,F(4,468)=4.51,p=.001,η2=.04(for
theinteractionofepistemologicalexpertise*cases).15Atthelevelofindividualcases,
however,thedifferencebetweenexpertsubjects(M=3.77,SD=1.67)and“mere”
philosophyPhDs(M=4.54,SD=1.32)wasonlyclearlysignificantforSculpture,F(1,
117)=15.20,p=.01,η2=.05,anditwentinthedirectionthatonewouldexpectonthe
basisoftheepistemologicalliterature.Thisdifferencebetweenexpertepistemologists
and“mere”philosophyPhDslendssomesupporttothedomain-specificityofintuitive
expertiseinepistemology,whichisawell-establishedfeatureofexpertisemore
generally(cf.Ericsson&Lehmann,1996;Gobet&Simon,1996;Vicente&Wang,1998).
15ThankstoShen-yiLiaoandHannesRuschforpressingthispointonindependentoccasions.
16
3.2
Experiment2
3.2.1 RationaleandMaterial
Themainideabehindoursecondexperimentwastoreplicateandcorroboratetwo
strikingresultsofourfirstexperiment.
Ontheonehand,thiswasthefindingthateventheepistemologicalexperts
classifiedSculptureasacaseofknowledge(incontrasttohowcasesofthiskindare
commonlyassessedintheepistemologicalliterature).Tothisend,werepeated
Sculptureinthesecondexperimentandaddedtwonewcases,ExamandDollar,that
shouldalsoberegardedasnon-instancesofknowledgeaccordingtotheepistemological
literature(seebelow).
Ontheotherhand,wetriedtoexplainthesignificantdifferencebetween
epistemologicalexpertsandlaypeopleintheirintuitiveevaluationofClearNonKnowledge1.Wespeculatedthatthissurprisingdifferencemightresultfromthefact
thattheagentseestheresult,i.e.,thattheagentcomestoknowthatshewasrightabout
theoutcomeofhercoinflip(labeledas“successbias”inthefollowing—seebelow).
Therefore,wereplacedClearNon-Knowledge1byananalogouscase,ClearNonKnowledge2,whichonlydiffersinsofarastheagentdoesnotcometoknowthather
predictionabouttheoutcomeofthecoinflipwascorrect.
Letusnowintroduceandexplaintheadditionalvignettesthatweusedinour
secondexperiment,followingthesameschemaasabove(cf.section3.1.1).
Aprofessorofmedicinelearnsthatoneinabillionstudentsdiewhiletakingtheirfinal
exam.Inaboutfiveminutes,theprofessorissettosubstituteforasickcolleaguein
conductingafinalexamofastudentthatshehadnevermetbefore.Theprofessorthinks
toherself:“Thestudentwillsurviveherfinalexam.”Andinfact,thestudentdoessurvive
herfinalexam.
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
Beforetheexambegan,theprofessorknewthatthestudentwouldsurviveherfinal
exam.
17
InExam,aprofessoracquiresabeliefaboutthesurvivalofastudentonthesolebasisof
overwhelmingstatisticalevidence.Thiscaseismodeledafteralotterycase,whereone
acquiresthebeliefthatone’slotteryticketwilllosemerelyonthebasisofknowingthe
extremelyhighoddsforwinningthelottery(Harman,1968,p.166,1973,p.118).Such
casesaretypicallytreatedasclearnon-instancesofknowledgeintheepistemological
literature(see,e.g.,DeRose,1996;Hawthorne,2004;Pritchard,2005;Williamson,
2000).16
Awaiterwasrecentlyhiredbyarestaurantinaremotepartofthecountrywhere,
unbeknownsttoeveryone,mostofthecirculatingdollarbillsarefake.Therestaurant
managerowesthewaitertendollarsforanextrahourthatheworked.Shetakesaten
dollarbillfromthecashregisterandhandsitovertothewaiter,andthisleadsthewaiter
tobelievethattherestaurantmanagerhasjustgivenhimtendollars.Infact,this
particulartendollarbillhappenstobeoneofthefewgenuinedollarbillsinthearea.17
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
Thewaiterknowsthattherestaurantmanagerhasgivenhimtendollars.
Dollarisavariationonthefake-barncasethatisusedlessfrequentlythantheoriginal
fake-barncase(seeabove).Justlikethefake-barncase,itistreatedasaclearnoninstanceofknowledgeintheepistemologicalliterature(see,e.g.,Littlejohn,2012,p.
193;Sutton,2005,p.360).
16ThereisadisanalogybetweenExamandstandardlotterycasesthatmightberelevanttotheir
knowledge-relatedassessment,however.Foronthenaturalassumptionthatthestudentisinnormal
physicalcondition,theremightbenoclosepossibleworldwherethisparticularstudentdiesduringher
finalexam.Andinthatcase,theprofessor’sbeliefthatthestudentwillsurviveherfinalexamcouldnot
easilyhavebeenfalse,i.e.,theprofessor’sbeliefissafe.Forthisreason,onemightcountcaseslikeExamas
bonafidecasesofknowledge—unlikestandardlotterycases,whereweassumethateverylotteryticket
winsinsomeclosepossibleworld(see,e.g.,Pritchard,2005).Amoresystematicinvestigationof(expert)
intuitionsaboutlottery-stylecaseswouldthushavetocomparecaseslikeExamwithcasesthataremore
closelyanalogoustostandardlotterycases(thankstoJensKipperforpressingthispoint).
17Afterthispaperwasacceptedforpublication,AaronMeskinpointedouttousthatthephrase‘dollar
bills’—withoutthequalifier‘ten’—isnaturallytakentorefertoonedollarbillsonly.Sotakenliterally,our
vignettewouldtriggerareadingaccordingtowhichonlytheonedollarbills—butnotthetendollar
bills—arefakeinthescenariodescribed,andthiswouldweakentheanalogywiththeoriginalfake-barn
case.However,noneofthepeoplewhotookthestudy,orwhosawthevignetteinconference
presentations—andnoteventhenativespeakersamongourproof-readers—seemtohavenoticedthe
mistake(or,morecautiously,noneofthemfelttheneedtopointitouttous).Moreover,ourresultsfor
Dollararealmostidenticaltootherresultsforfake-barnstylecases(seeaboveandbelow).Therefore,it
seemsreasonabletoassumethattheparticipantsinourexperimentsimplyaccommodatedthemistakein
linewiththeintendedreadingofthecasedescription,whichisclearlysuggestedbythefinalsentenceof
ourvignette—asentencethatmakeslittlesenseontheassumptionthatonlytheonedollarbillsinthe
scenarioarefake.Inallfairness,however,itwouldbeusefultohaveafollow-upstudythatconfirmsthe
insignificanceofourmistakenphrasing(thankstoJoshuaAlexanderandAaronMeskinfordiscussion).
18
Alittlegirllikestoplayagamewithflippingacoin.Shesometimesgetsa“special
feeling”thatthenextflipwillcomeoutheads.Whenshegetsthis“specialfeeling”,sheis
rightabouthalfthetime,andwrongabouthalfthetime.Justbeforethenextflip,the
littlegirlgetsthis“specialfeeling”,andthefeelingleadshertobelievethatthecoinwill
landheads.Sheflipsthecoin,anditdoeslandheads.Butshehasinadvertentlyflipped
thecoinoutofthewindow,andthereforeshecannot—andwillnot—seetheresult.
Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:
Thelittlegirlknewthatthecoinwasgoingtolandheads.
ThemainpointofClearNon-Knowledge2wastotestastrikingresultconcerninglay
people’sintuitionsaboutClearNon-Knowledge1fromourfirstexperiment,namely,that
asignificantnumberoflaysubjects(33,8%)didinfactascribeknowledgeinthiscase.
Ourmainhypothesisforexplainingthisfindingwasthatlaypeoplemightbesusceptible
tosomethinglikea“successbias”,i.e.,thattheymightbeinfluencedbythefactthat,
afterflippingthecoin,thelittlegirllearnsthather“specialfeeling”abouttheoutcomeof
thecoinflipturnedouttobecorrect(see,e.g.,Baron&Hershey,1988).Arelated
phenomenonthatmightexplainwhyathirdofalllaysubjectsascribedknowledgetothe
littlegirliscalled“protagonistprojection”anddescribespeople’stendencytoproject
themselvesintothepointofviewoftheprotagonist(see,e.g.,Holton,1997;Nagel,San
Juan,&Mar,2013).Totestthesehypotheses,wereplacedtheclearcaseofnonknowledgefromexperiment1withacasewheretheagentdoesnotand,infact,cannot
seetheresult.
3.2.2 Subjects
Overall,thedataof227subjectswereincludedinouranalysis.50wereidentifiedas
expertsubjects(meanagewas33years;76%weremale)and177aslaysubjects(mean
agewas46years;53%weremale).
Therecruitingandclassificationprocedureforexpertsubjectswasthesameasin
experiment1,withthefollowingexceptions.Inordertogainenoughexpertsubjects,we
includednotonlyparticipantswhoindicatedthattheyhaveaPhDinphilosophy,but
alsothoseparticipantswhoindicatedthattheyhaveanMAinphilosophy(inadditionto
havingepistemologyasoneoftheirareasofspecializationorcompetence).Subjects
19
whoindicatedthattheyhadparticipatedinourfirstexperimentwereexcluded.Outof
initially186people,50metthesecriteria.
Apartfromthefactthatweonlyinvitedsubjectswhodidnotparticipateinour
firstexperiment,therecruitingandclassificationprocedureforlaysubjectswasthe
sameasinexperiment1.Outofinitially293people,177mettherelevantcriteria.
3.2.3 DesignandProcedure
Thedesignandprocedurewasthesameasinexperiment1,i.e.,participantssawthefirst
threecases(Exam,Sculpture,andDollar)inarandomizedorderwhilethecasesClear
Non-Knowledge2(seeabove)andClearKnowledge1(sameasinexperiment1)were
alwayspresentedinfourthandfifthposition,respectively.
3.2.4 Results
TheresultsofoursecondexperimentaresummarizedinFigure3.AmixedANOVA
(betweensubjects:laysubjectsvs.expertsubjects;withinsubject:thefivecases)
showedaverysignificantinteractionofsubjectsandcases,indicatingagainthatthe
responsepatternoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedstronglyoverthefivecases,
F(4,900)=13.80,p<.001,η2=.06.Therewasasignificantdifferenceintheaverage
timespenttocompletethesurveybetweenlaypeople(267seconds)andexperts(370
seconds),F(1,224)=7.54,p>.01,η2=.03.18
Level of Agreement
6,0
5,0
Lay Subjects
4,0
Expert Subjects
3,0
2,0
1,0
18Oneexpertsubjectwasexcludedfromthisanalysisbecausesheorhespentover1,000secondslonger
(2,554seconds)thanallothersubjects.
20
Figure3.Meanratingsforthefivecasesdividedinlayandexpertjudgments.Thescaleranged
from1(‘stronglydisagree’withtheclaimthattheagentknewtherelevantproposition)to6
(‘stronglyagree’).Errorbarsrepresent95%confidenceintervals.
Amorefine-grainedanalysisrevealedthat,asinexperiment1,thejudgmentsof
laysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedsignificantlyforthreeofthefivecases,withthe
experts’judgmentsbeingclosertotheevaluationofcorrespondingcasesinthe
epistemologicalliterature.IncaseofDollar,laysubjects(M=5.10,SD=1.31)andexpert
subjects(M=3.84,SD=1.73)bothtendedtoagreewiththeclaimthatthewaiterknows
thattherestaurantmanagerhasgivenhimtendollars.Thelevelofagreementforthis
case,whichcorrespondstocasesthatareregardedascasesofnon-knowledgeinthe
epistemologicalliterature,wassignificantlylowerforexpertsubjects,F(1,225)=28.97,
p<.001,η2=.11.Interestingly,andincontrasttothetextbookconsensus,themajority
ofexpertsubjects(60%,cf.footnote9)evaluatedDollarasacaseofknowledge.For
Sculpture,weobtainedthesameresultpatternasinourfirstexperiment.Laysubjects’
(M=4.94,SD=1.35)agreedsignificantlystrongerwiththeclaimthattheRodinexpert
knowsthatthesculptureinfrontofherisoneofRodin’sfamousmarblesculpturesthan
expertsubjects(M=3.72,SD=1.86),F(1,225)=26.83,p<.001,η2=.11.Again,expert
subjectsweremoreinclinedtoagree(56%)withthisclaimthanonewouldexpectfrom
theconsensusintheepistemologicalliterature,whichisanalmostexactreplicationof
thesurprisingresultfromourfirstexperiment.ForClearNon-Knowledge2,theresult
patternwassimilartotheoneobtainedforthecorrespondingcaseinourfirst
experiment.Expertsubjects(M=1.40,SD=0.67)disagreedsignificantlystrongerthan
laysubjects(M=2.94,SD=1.63)withtheclaimthatthelittlegirlknewthatthecoin
wasgoingtolandheads,F(1,225)=42.52,p<.001,η2=.16.Again,asurprisinglyhigh
numberoflaysubjects(40%)agreedwiththisclaim.Theresultspeaksagainstour
hypothesisthatthehighnumberofagreeinglaysubjectsinourfirstexperimentwasdue
tothefactthattheprotagonistofthecasecomestoknowtheoutcomeofhercoinflip.
Wediscussthissurprisingfindingbelow(seeDiscussion).
ForthecasesExamandClearKnowledge1,therewasnosignificantdifference
betweenlaysubjectsandexpertsubjects(p=.73andp=.19,respectively).Interestingly
andagainintensionwiththetextbookconsensus,themajorityofexpertsubjects(68%)
consideredExamasacaseofknowledge.
21
Moreover,theresultpatternofthoseexpertswhoindicatedthattheyhaveaPhD
versusthoseexpertswhoindicatedthattheirhighestdegreeinphilosophywasanMA
didnotdiffersignificantly,F(4,192)=1.00,p=.40(fortheinteractionofdegree*
cases).Inaddition,wecomparedourexpertsubjectswiththosesubjectswhoholdat
leastanMAinphilosophybutindicatedthattheyhavenocompetenceinepistemology
(N=32,notincludedinpreviousanalyses).Theresponsepatternofthesetwogroups
differedsignificantly,F(4,320)=3.18,p=.01,η2=.04(fortheinteractionof
epistemologicalexpertise*cases).Atthelevelofindividualcases,however,the
differencebetweenthesetwogroupsdidnotturnouttobesignificant.
4
Discussion
Whatistheupshotofourexperimentswithrespecttothethreemotivatingideas
explainedabove,i.e.,(1)tocompareexpertwithlayintuitions,(2)tomeasuretheir
qualityagainsttherelevanttextbookconsensus,and(3)tocheckwhetherexpert
intuitionsareinlinewiththetextbookconsensus?
First,thereisindeedasignificantexpert-laydifferenceinthemajorityofthe
testedcases.ThisconcernsthecasesMonitor,Sculpture,andClearNon-Knowledge1in
experiment1,andthecasesDollar,Sculpture,andClearNon-Knowledge2inexperiment
2.Incontrast,wefoundnosignificantexpert-laydifferenceforPainting(experiment1),
Exam(experiment2),andbothinstancesofClearKnowledge1.Inthelattercase,expertlayagreementmaynotcomeasabigsurprise,butexpert-layagreementonthemore
probingcasesPaintingandExamsuggeststhatthereisnostraightforwardgeneral
patternofexpert-layagreementordisagreement.Overall,however,theexpert-lay
differencesthatwefoundareprimafacieencouragingforproponentsoftheexpertise
defense.
Second,whenthequalityofexpertandlayintuitionsismeasuredagainstthe
relevanttextbookconsensus,theresultsareagainprimafaciefavorableforthe
expertisedefense.Inallcaseswherewefoundasignificantexpert-laydifferencethe
meanexpertratingswereclosertotherelevantconsensusintheepistemological
literature.IncaseofSculpture,forexample,onewouldexpectthatthemeanexpert
ratingissignificantlyclosertothe‘disagree’-endofthescalethanthatoflaypeople,
giventhatSculptureisinspiredbyfake-barncases,whicharewidelyconsideredascases
22
ofnon-knowledgeintheepistemologicalliterature(seeabove).Andindeed,thatiswhat
wefoundinbothofourexperiments.
Oncloserinspection,however,thedistributionpatternofexpertresponsesover
theratingscaleraisescertaindoubtsabouttheirintuitiveexpertise,inparticularwith
respecttothefake-barn-stylecasesSculptureandDollar.19Inbothcases,wefoundthe
samestrikingpatternofexpertresponses.First,theslightmajorityofexpertratingsfall
intothe‘agree’-halfofthescale.Second,thetwomiddleoptions(‘mildlydisagree’and
‘mildlydisagree’)werenotthefavoriteoptions,indicatingthatmostofourexpert
participantswereprettyconfidentintheirjudgments(seeFigure2foratypical
distributionpatternofexpertjudgmentsaboutthesecases).Thefactthatmostofour
expertparticipantstendedtoclassifythesecasesasinstancesofknowledgeraises
questionsofitsown,whichwillbediscussedbelow.Butevenapartfromthissurprising
finding,thefactthattheexperts’intuitionsaredividedinthewaydescribeddoesnot
reallycountinfavoroftheirintuitiveexpertise,atleastwhenweconsiderthemasa
group.Thus,whenonetakesdistributionpatternsintoaccount,theinitialimpression
thatourexperimentsfavortheexpertisedefensealreadybeginstofade.
Afurtherstrikingresultwasthehighlysignificantexpert-laydifferenceincaseof
ClearNon-Knowledge1,whichwasusedasacontrolcaseinearlierstudies,withthe
explicitpurposeofweedingoutparticipantswhodidnotunderstandtheprobes
correctly(see,e.g.,Swainetal.,2008).Thedegreeofexpert-laydifferencesforthiscase,
bothinmeanratingsandabsolutenumbers,isaboutthestrongestevidenceforthe
superiorityofexpertintuitionsthatonecangetfromourexperiments.Giventhatthe
caseofsomeonewhocorrectlyguessestheoutcomeofarandomcoinflipissuchaclear
non-instanceofknowledge,thehighnumberoflaypeoplewhotendtoascribe
knowledgeinthiscasecallsforanexplanation.
Thefirsthypothesisthatwetestedinexperiment2wasthepresenceofa“success
bias”inlaypeople,i.e.,thetendencytoascribeknowledgetosomeonewholearns,on
independentgrounds,thathertargetbeliefistrue—irrespectiveofhowproblematically
herbeliefwasinitiallyacquired.Inordertosuppressthistendency,weaddedthe
followingsentencetoourfollow-upvignetteClearNon-Knowledge2:‘Butshehas
inadvertentlyflippedthecoinoutofthewindow,andthereforeshecannot—andwill
not—seetheresult.’Sincewefoundthesameexpertlay-differenceasinexperiment1,
19ThankstoShen-yiLiaoandHannesRuschforpressingtheimportanceofdistributionpatterns.
23
ourhypothesisofa“successbias”inlaypeoplewasclearlydisconfirmed.Thesame
holdsforthehypothesisof“protagonistprojection”inlaypeople,i.e.,thetendencyto
projectoneselfintothepointofviewoftheprotagonist,becauseinClearNon-Knowledge
2theoutcomeofthecoinflipisnotaccessiblefromthepointofviewofthelittlegirl.
Thesecondhypothesis,whichwetestedinanadditionalfollow-upexperiment
withlayparticipants,turnsonasubtledifferencebetweenourversionofthecoinflip
caseandthestandardformulationthatwasusedinearlierstudies.InourvignettesClear
Non-Knowledge1and2,wereferredtotheprotagonistofthecaseas‘alittlegirl’,while
inearlierstudiestheprotagonistwassimplycalled‘Dave’,andonemightspeculatethat
laypeoplearemorewillingtoascribeknowledgetolittlechildrenthantonormalhuman
adults.20Totestthishypothesis,weconfrontedlaypeoplewithsixversionsofthecoin
flipcase,wheretheonlydifferencewasthat—inthefiveadditionalcases—thephrase‘a
littlegirl’wasreplacedwith‘alittleboy’,‘awoman’,‘aman’,‘anoldwoman’,and‘anold
man’,respectively(pronounswereadjustedaccordingly).Wefoundnosignificant
differenceinlayresponsestothosecases,butwecouldagainreplicatethehighlevelof
layagreementforthisclearnon-instanceofknowledge.21
AthirdhypothesistradesonAlvinGoldman’sclaimthattheEnglishword‘know’
isambiguousbetweenaweakandastrongreading(Goldman,1999,2001).Accordingto
Goldman,‘know’intheweaksenseismoreorlesssynonymouswith‘truebelief’,while
‘know’inthestrongsensealsoentailsjustificationorotherepistemicproperties(see
alsoHawthorne,2002).InlightofGoldman’sclaimaboutthemeaningof‘know’,one
mighthypothesizethatasignificantnumberoflaypeopleinterpretoccurrencesof
‘know’inthecoinflipcaseintheweaksenseof‘truebelief’,giventhattheywerenotin
anywaypromptedtofocusonthestrongsenseof‘know’.Epistemologicalexperts,on
theotherhand,aretrainedtointerpret‘know’inthestrongsenseinthecontextof
philosophicalthoughtexperimentsaboutknowledge,andsotheyshouldnotbeinclined
totheweakreadingof‘know’insuchcontexts.Ourfindingsarehighlyconsistentwith
thishypothesis.Moreover,ifoneconsidersthedistributionoflayresponsesinallofour
20ThankstoJonathanWeinbergforthesuggestion.
21Thelayparticipantsforthisadditionalexperimentwereselectedinthesamewayasinourtwomain
experiments(seeabove).178laysubjectswereincludedinouranalysis.Themaindifferenceinthedesign
oftheexperimentwasthateachparticipantonlyrespondedtoonerandomlyselectedversionofthesix
versionsofthecoinflipcase,whichhelpedtopreventordereffects(thankstoShen-yiLiaoforsuggesting
thatouroriginalfindingsmightinvolveordereffects).Themeanratingsforthesixcasesdidnotdiffer
significantly,F(5,172)=.41,p=.84,withmeansvaryingbetween2.45and2.92(overall=2.74)and
percentagesofagreementbetween24%and46%(overall=36%).Sotheadditionalexperimentclearly
disconfirmsoursecondhypothesis.
24
experimentswithcoinflipcases,onefindsthatthereisapeakatthe‘stronglydisagree’endofthescale,andanotherpeakaround‘mildlyagree’.Itseemsnaturaltoassumethat
theparticipantsintheformerpeakread‘know’inthestrongsense,whileparticipantsin
thesecondpeakread‘know’intheweaksense,althoughwithsomehesitation(maybe
becausethecoinflipcaseissuchaclearnon-instanceof‘know’inthestrongsense).
Nevertheless,confirmingtheambiguityhypothesiswouldrequireadditional
experimentsthattargettheideaofanambiguitybetweenaweakandastrongsenseof
‘know’moredirectly.Inthemeantime,itseemsadvisabletosuspendtheuseofcoinflip
casesascontrolcasesinexperimentswithlaypeople.
Irrespectiveofwhatthebestexplanationforthestrikingratesoflayagreement
forClearNon-Knowledge1and2andotherversionsofthecoinflipcasemightbe,it
shouldbepointedoutthatallconsideredhypothesesfavorexpertoverlayjudgments
withrespecttosuchcases.
Third,areexpertintuitionsinlinewiththeconsensusintheepistemological
literature?Inexperiment1,meanexpertratingswereinlinewiththerelevantconsensus
forMonitor,andforClearNon-Knowledge1andClearKnowledge1(theresultsforthose
clearcaseswerealsoreplicatedinexperiment2).Withrespecttotheremainingcases,
Painting,Sculpture,Exam,andDollar,ourtwoexperimentssuggest,however,thatthe
intuitionsofexpertepistemologistsarenotinlinewiththeconsensusintheliterature.
EvenifweputPaintingaside,whichtheliteraturewouldclassifyasanunclearcase,we
stillgetthestrikingresultthatthreecasesthattheepistemologicalliteraturewould
regardasnon-instancesofknowledgeareneverthelessclassifiedasknowledgebyour
experts.Whatmightexplainthisstrikingmismatchbetweentheintuitionsofindividual
expertepistemologistsandthecorrespondingdisciplinaryconsensus?
Afirstandsomewhatfriendlysuggestionwouldbethatonlytheintuitionsof
epistemological“super-experts”reallycount,whomightroughlybeunderstoodasthose
philosopherswhopublishpapersonknowledgeinphilosophicaltop-journals—anditis
arguablythose“super-experts”whoshapetherelevantdisciplinaryconsensus.22This
hypothesisistentativelydisconfirmedbythefactthatwefoundnosignificantdifference
betweenvariousgroupsof“first-rate”vs.“second-rate”experts(e.g.,epistemologyas
areaofspecializationvs.areaofcompetence,orPhDvs.MAinphilosophy—seeabove).
So,unlessthedevelopmentofintuitiveexpertiseishighlydiscontinuous,thehypothesis
22ThankstoEddyNahmiasforthissuggestion(inacommentonourpost“ExpertIntuitionsAbout
Knowledge”ontheExperimentalPhilosophyblog;cf.Horvath&Wiegmann(2013)).
25
ofintuitive“super-expertise”inepistemologyisrenderedprimafacieimplausiblebyour
results.Yeteveniftrue,thisrelativelyfriendlyhypothesiswouldstillrequirefarreachingmodificationsofouractualphilosophicalpractice,becauseitsuggeststhat
everyoneshoulddefertoareallysmallgroupof“eliteintuiters”whenitcomesto
intuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentsonknowledge.
Asecondandlessfriendlysuggestionmightbethatcontemporaryepistemology
fallssquarelywithinthe“puzzle-solving”paradigmofphilosophy,likemostanalytic
philosophyingeneral,accordingtosomeauthors(cf.Rorty,2007).Andofcourse,the
moredifficulttherelevantpuzzlesare,themoreinterestingtheactivityofpuzzlesolvingbecomes.Therefore,onemighthypothesizethatepistemologistsareoverly
liberalinacceptingfake-barn-styleorlotterycasesasnon-instancesofknowledge—
despitetheirintuitivetendencytothecontrary—becausethismakesthepuzzleof
analyzingknowledgealotharderandthusalotmoreinterestingtosolve.Itgoes
withoutsayingthatthishypothesis,ifcorrect,wouldsignificantlyunderminethecurrent
practiceofprofessionalepistemology.
Athirdandevenlessfriendlysuggestionmightbethatthedisciplinaryconsensus
inepistemologywithrespectto,e.g.,fake-barnorlotterycasesissimplytheresultof
somekindofsocialconformity.Maybecertainepistemological“opinionleaders”,suchas
AlvinGoldmanincaseoffake-barncases,initiallyclassifytherelevantcasesasnoninstancesofknowledge.Thebulkofepistemologiststhensimplyfollowtheintuitive
evaluationsofsuchauthorities,forexample,inordertobetakenseriouslyin
professionaldiscussions,ortogettheirpaperspublishedinleadingjournals(cf.Turri,
forthcoming;Weinberg,2007,p.337).
Ourresultsdonotactuallytelluswhichofthesehypotheses,ifany,providesthe
bestexplanationforthemismatchbetweenexpertintuitionsandthedisciplinary
consensusthatwefoundinexperiments1and2.However,noneoftheseexplanations
wouldprovideavindicationforouractualdisciplinarypractice,forbothexplanations
appealtoirrelevantfactorsintheexperimentalrestrictionistsense,thatis,tofactors
thatareirrelevanttothetruthoftherelevantfirst-orderclaimsaboutknowledge.Our
experimentsthereforerevealasurprisingproblemwithexpertintuitionsabout
knowledgethatisdifficulttoexplainwithoutunsettlingtheexpertisedefense.Despite
thefactthatourexperimentsprovidesomeevidencethatfavorstheexpertisedefense,
theyalsogiverisetoachallengingnewproblem—andultimatelyraisemorequestions
thantheyanswer.
26
5
Conclusion
Inthispaper,wefirstdistinguisheddirectandindirectstrategiesforassessingtheclaim
thatprofessionalphilosophersareintuitiveexpertsforevaluatingphilosophicalthought
experimentcases.Aproblemforindirectstrategiesisthattheparadigmsofempirical
researchonintuitiveexpertiseareveryunlikethought-experimentingphilosophers,
becausetheformer,unlikethelatter,primarilyengageincausalpredictions.Incontrast,
directstrategiesthatarebasedonexperimentaldataaboutphilosophers’intuitionsare
epistemicallylessriskyanddialecticallymoreeffective.Inordertoadvancethedebate
aboutdirectargumentsforassessingtheexpertisedefense,weconductedtwonew
experimentswithexpertepistemologistsandlaypeople.
Inthefirstexperiment,wetestedanumberofunfamiliarthoughtexperiment
casesaboutknowledgewithexpertepistemologistsandlaypeople.Inthemajorityof
thetestedcases,theexperts’intuitionswereindeedsignificantlydifferentfromthoseof
laypeople,andthedifferencewasalwaysinthedirectionthatonewouldexpectonthe
basisoftherelevanttextbookconsensus.However,concerningthefake-barn-style
vignetteSculpturewefoundtwothingsthatchallengetheintuitiveexpertiseofour
epistemologicalexperts:first,onaverage,theytendedtoascribeknowledgeinthiscase,
andsecond,theiroverallresponsepatternexhibitstwoopposingpeaks.Wealsofounda
strikingdifferencebetweenexpertandlayintuitionsconcerningthecoinflipcaseClear
Non-Knowledge1.Asignificantnumberoflaypeople—unliketheexperts—tendedto
ascribeknowledgeinthiscase.
Thepointofoursecondexperimentwastotestandcorroboratethemore
surprisingresultsofourfirstexperiment.Tothisend,wetestedtwofurthernoninstancesofknowledge:Dollar,anotherfake-barn-stylecase,andExam,acasethatis
inspiredbylotterycases.Onaverage,theepistemologicalexpertsagainascribed
knowledgeinthesecases,andagainwiththesamepolarizeddistributionpattern.
Toexplainthehighrateoflayknowledgeascriptionsinthecoinflipcase,wealso
testedthehypothesisofa“successbias”inlaypeople,whichwasnotconfirmedbyour
secondexperiment.Inanadditionalexperimentwithlaypeople,wetestedthefurther
hypothesisthatlaypeoplemightbemorewillingtoascribeknowledgetolittlechildren
thantoadults,whichwasdisconfirmedaswell.Thehighrateoflayapprovalincoinflip
27
casesthereforeremainspuzzling.Themostpromisingexplanationmightbeintermsof
anambiguitybetweenaweakandastrongsenseof‘know’.
Ourmosttroublingresultfromtheviewpointoftheexpertisedefenseisthe
strikingmismatchbetweentheintuitionsofourexpertsubjectsandtherelevant
consensusintheepistemologicalliterature.Thisfindingsuggeststhattheremightbe
somethingwrongwithphilosophyasadiscipline,giventhatitapparentlyfailstomap
theintuitionsofitsexpertpractitionersontoadisciplinaryconsensusintherightkindof
way.Friendlyexplanationsofthismismatcharehardtocomeby,andsoour
experimentsindicateaproblemthathasnotbeenacknowledgedsofar—andthat
challengestheexpertisedefenseinunexpectedandtroublesomeways.
Acknowledgments
WewouldliketothankJoshuaAlexander,JamesAndow,SteveClark,JensKipper,
Shen-yiLiao,AaronMeskin,JonasNagel,EddyNahmias,JenniferNado,MartinPeterson,HannesRusch,
JoshuaSheperd,JonathanWeinberg,andthreeanonymousreviewersforveryhelpfulcommentsand
discussions.ThanksalsotoouraudiencesatthelectureseriesGedankenexperimente—Kannmanausdem
LehnstuhldieWelterforschen?atUniversitätZürichinMay2014,theX-PhiWorkshopViennaat
UniversitätWieninJune2014,theconferenceMöglichkeitenundGrenzenderExperimentellenPhilosophie
atPhilippsUniversitätMarburginJune2014,andtheconferenceInvestigatingtheNatureandour
UnderstandingofCausality,Morality,Language,Mind,andAesthetics—theinauguralmeetingofthe
ExperimentalPhilosophyGroupGermany—atRuhr-UniversitätBochuminNovember2015.
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