1.4. A European Army: An illusion or a vision!

1.4. A European Army: An illusion or a vision!
Hans-Georg Ehrhart
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union is
in bad shape. The keywords are: falling defense expenditures, balanced-budget
rules, lack of military capability, fragmentation of the European defense market, a shrinking base of weapons technology, uncoordinated defense planning
and rising costs for high-tech products. Everything would look different if
member states were as unified on defense-related issues as they are in customs and monetary policy. So wouldn’t an integrated European Army be the
solution? Wouldn’t that make the defense sector more efficient, more forwardlooking in terms of integration, more effective in the international arena and
more useful regarding security policy? For instance, the European Parliament
published a report last year which estimated the cost of the fragmentation of
the EU defense policy at upwards of ¤ 136 billion per year. 1 Egon Bahr stated
that the formation of a European Army would lead to Europe transcending its
role as a security-policy protectorate of America. 2
Supporters of a more powerful CSDP had high hopes for the summit of
heads of state or government last December, which, for the first time since
2008, was once again exclusively focused on security and defense. It is true that
the European Army was not a major issue there. The summit was concerned,
above all, with closer cooperation in security and defense policy and the
strengthening of military capability. In addition, the political leaders adopted
a timetable for further action, the implementation of which they would assess
at the next “defense summit.” It is open to debate not only whether the measures announced will be implemented, but also whether they are adequate. The
answer to the first question depends on political will, and the answer to the second on the political goals being pursued. Linked to this, in the final analysis,
is the classical question of the ultimate position (finalité) regarding integration
policy.
1
2
European Parliament: Cost of Non-Europe Report, CoNE 4/2013, Brussels 2013, p. 75.
Egon Bahr: Braucht die Europäische Union eine eigenständige Sicherheitspolitik?, in:
Michael Staack/Dan Krause (Eds.): Europa als sicherheitspolitischer Akteur, Opladen
2014, p. 18.
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Schools of thought and models
Looked at in a simplified manner, there are three schools of thought in politics.
One calls for more integration in defense policy, with the goal of a European
Army, the second would be satisfied with more cooperation, while the third is
more concerned with special relationships based on the persistence of nation
states. In recent years the third school of thought has been enjoying an upswing
in popularity. After all, it took five years for the European Council of Heads of
State or Government to turn its focus once again to defense policy. Since this
event, more cooperation in defense policy has been given a green light because
of the realization that only in this way can they maintain the ability to act to
some extent.
It is true that the goal of a European Army is not mentioned at all in official
EU documents, but in 2012 eleven EU Foreign Ministers proposed an initiative which, among other things, called for the long-term goal of a European
defense policy, with the addition: “For some members of the group this could
ultimately involve a European Army.” 3
The major German political parties have come out in favor of this as well.
For example, in their government program, the CDU/CSU states: “We are
striving towards a European Army in the long term,” 4 whereas the SPD states
that: “Our long-term goal is the formation of a joint European Army, whose deployment must be legitimized by parliament.” 5 How does this goal go together
with the Treaty of Lisbon?
On the one hand, the Treaty of Lisbon specifies in Article 4 that “national
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” Conversely,
the treaty is flexible: in the preamble it states the goal of an “ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe.” Article 42 states the goal of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as “the progressive framing of a common
defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.” What this means in
concrete integration policy terms remains to be seen, for common defense is
conceivable with or without a European Army. Equally open is the political
form the EU is to take.
Three models are generally available: 1. The United States of Europe, i.e.,
3
4
5
46
Final report of the Group on the Future of Europe for the Foreign Ministers of
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria,
Poland, September 17, 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/
626324/publicationFile/171784/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe-Deutsch.pdf.
CDU/CSU: Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Europa. Regierungsprogramm 2013 – 2017, Berlin
2013, p. 73.
SPD: Das Wir entscheidet. Das Regierungsprogramm 2013 – 2017, Berlin 2013, p. 112.
A E UROPEAN A RMY: A N
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a federal state including a unified security and defense policy. According to
this model, the pathway to a supranational Europe will involve either a constitutional act of the members or a process of integration. 2. A Europe consisting
of fatherlands with a common internal market whose security is guaranteed
by member states and by alliances. In this model, permanent integration is not
possible because of the anarchical structure of the international systems and
thus a European Army is also ruled out. 3. A Europe with an ever closer union
of the peoples as a structure sui generis, which builds up a CFSP/CSDP that
could lead to joint defense “when the European Council, acting unanimously,
so decides” (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42). In this model, a Europe that is
more strongly integrated through increasing interdependency is possible, but
reversible. Thus, a European Army is possible with models 1 and 3, the first
seeking an end-state, the third, by contrast, retaining the right of recourse of the
states. However, there are strong arguments against a European Army. Before
I go into these, however, I will start by presenting a brief historical review.
Historical review
The project of a European Army today, recommended as a long-term goal
by the German governing parties in particular, was also close to being implemented between 1950 and 1954. At that time, France was the driving force
in both its initiation and its failure. Shortly after the end of the Second World
War, the Cold War led to a changed threat pattern, with the Soviet Union increasingly at the center and Germany moving away from it. The 1948 Treaty
of Brussels, including France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries, was
still concerned with aggression from the Soviet Union and Germany. In 1949
France became a founding member of NATO. Because of American pressure
to establish Western Europe as a “continental sword” against the Soviet Union,
starting in 1950 Paris pursued a policy on Germany and security that was based
on the formula “security and control through integration.” 6
The first step was the foundation in 1952 of the European Community for
Coal and Steel through which France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy
and the Benelux states placed these sectors, at that time of significance economically and to defense policy, under a single major government agency. It
is true that all participating states signed the proposal for a European defense
community in 1952. But after tough international negotiations, it foundered
6
Hans-Georg Ehrhart: Die “deutsche Frage” aus französischer Sicht (1981 – 1987), Munich
1988, p. 93. The procedure only sketched out here is presented there in more detail.
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on the negative attitude of the French National Assembly in 1954. As a result, the draft constitution for a European Political Community put forward in
1953, which had strong supranational elements, was rendered obsolete. The
end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin, as well as the outcome of
the Geneva Indochina Conference and the shrinking prospect of German reunification had all altered the security situation for Paris. As a “substitute solution,” the German Federal Republic became a member of NATO and the
Western European Union (WEU), which emerged from the Modified Brussels
Treaty. While NATO became responsible for future external military security,
the WEU was primarily responsible for arms control vis-à-vis Germany. This
meant that the only experiment establishing a European Army through an act
of foundation failed. In addition to the causes already cited in an international
context, in the final analysis, the decisive factor was that France, where the
parliamentary majority had changed, was no longer willing to accept a significant reduction in national sovereignty in this vital policy area. Considering
that even in a historically favorable constellation, as was the case at that time,
a European Army was not acceptable, this does not bode well for succeeding
today.
The attempt in the 1980s to reform the WEU after it had been dormant
for 30 years and use it as an institutional framework for developing European
defense capabilities also came to nothing. The starting point for this process
was the abolition of all unilateral restrictions on conventional arms involving
Germany still in existence. A few bilateral and multilateral steps in military
cooperation followed, as well as an agreement to consult on all military issues.
Still conceived of as the military arm of the EU in the Treaty of Maastricht and
the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, ultimately
the WEU had to give way to the proposal, agreed upon in 1999, to expand the
CSDP within the framework of the EU. However, its main purpose is not to
form a European Army, but to improve civilian and military capabilities for
international crisis management.
Against a European Army
What arguments are there against developing a European Army based on this,
and why don’t we need it? Against, there are pragmatic and sociological reasons, which are framed in central normative arguments.
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Almost impossible from the point of view of constitutional law
There is an inalienable set of core responsibilities which define the sovereignty
of the state. Questions of war and peace are among these. In its decision of June
30, 2009 on the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Constitutional Court confirmed
the authority contained in Article 23 of the Basic Law to participate in and
develop a European Union conceived as an association of states. In contrast, it
made clear that the Basic Law does not empower institutions acting on behalf
of Germany “to surrender the right of self-determination of the German people
in the form of the sovereignty of Germany according to constitutional law by
becoming an [EU] federal state.” Relinquishing such a right is “reserved solely
for the specifically declared will of the German people.” 7
The classic ultimate question regarding the European Union – is the EU
to lead to a federal state (including an integrated European Army) and lead
to a United States of Europe, or will it remain a structure sui generis in the
form of an alliance of states – has in fact been decided in favor of the second
goal. It is true that the decision does not entirely eliminate the possibility of
giving up German statehood for a European Federation. But Karlsruhe has
erected an extremely high hurdle: It would require a new constitution, which
explicitly contained a willingness to give up state sovereignty, to which the
German people would have to expressly agree. This hurdle would probably be
impossible to overcome, even in less euro-skeptical times.
An additional contention in constitutional law argues against a European
Army: The German Constitutional Court already handed down a verdict in
1994 that the Bundestag must issue authorization prior to any deployment of
the German Army. For good reason, the German Army is a parliamentary army.
In its Lisbon decision, the court ruled “the provisions of the Basic Law relating to the armed forces have the purpose of avoiding putting the army at the
disposal of the executive alone as an instrument of power, but of incorporating
it into a democratic and constitutional order based on the rule of law.” 8 Even
if the EU were to develop into a regional system of mutual collective security, according to the German Constitutional Court, a supranationalization of
decision-making on concrete deployment of the armed forces would be “inadmissible” because of the peace and democracy requirement of the Basic Law.
Applied in a normative way, this means: We do not want an excessively strong
executive branch of government, because it could adopt a different logic of ac7
8
Decision of the German Constitutional Court on June 30, 2009, Paragraph 228, http://www.
bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html.
Ibid., paragraph 382.
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tion than the parliament, that branch of government more suitable for dealing
with decisions on deployment of the armed forces.
At the same time, the decision states that all the same, “no insuperable
barrier to a technical integration of European armed forces has been raised.” 9
It refers to joint general staffs and the formation of joint military means as
examples. It is true that the EU has planning and command and control structures for civil and military crisis management, and since 2003 has been active
worldwide in more than 30 missions, of which eight were of a military nature.
It can also – subject to the agreement of member states – make use of joint
units, but may not have its own armed forces. The armed forces are provided
by the member states and decisions on their deployment are made on a consensus basis founded on their respective constitutions. That is the way it should
remain.
Germany lacks the political will for good reason
The governing parties speak of the goal of a European Army, it is true. However, they do not really want this, at least not as an element of a European
federal state. Previously, this federal goal was definitely en vogue. For example, in 1978 the CDU was still declaring in its basic program: “Our goal is
the formation of a democratic European Federal State.” 10 In the basic program
from 2007, however, only the EU working according to federal state principles 11 is mentioned, and in its program for the European elections in 2009
the concept of “federal state” is not even mentioned any more. 12 Whereas in
1998, the SPD was still referring to the goal of a United States of Europe, 13 a
year later it emphasized: “The European Union is not a super state and should
not become one either.” 14 In the Hamburg Program only a “federal Europe” is
mentioned. 15
9 Ibid., paragraph 255.
10 The Party Platform of the CDU as passed by resolution at the 26th party conference in
Ludwigshafen, October 23 – 25, 1978, p. 57.
11 CDU: The Party Platform. Resolution passed at 21st party conference in Hanover, December 3 – 4, 2007, p. 99.
12 “Starkes Europa – Sichere Zukunft.” Program of the German CDU for the European Election 2009, Berlin 2009.
13 The Party Platform of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) as passed by
resolution on December 20,1989 in Berlin, amended at the Leipzig party conference on
April 17, 1998, p. 16.
14 “SPD: In Verantwortung für Deutschland: Europa einigen, Aufruf der SPD zur Europawahl
am 13.06.1999,” Bonn 1999, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netzquelle/01722.pdf.
15 “SPD: Hamburger Programm,” the SPD party platform, passed by resolution at the Hamburg party conference on October 28, 2007, p. 27.
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Nonetheless, both parties continue to call for a European Army. For example, in March 2007 in the Bild-Zeitung, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated:
“We must get used to the idea of a European Army.” 16 Analogous to the last
coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP, 17 the government programs
of the CDU 18 and the SPD 19 contain the long-term goal of a European Army,
whereas this formulation does not appear in the coalition agreement.
Apart from the fact that a European Army worthy of the name presupposes a federal state constitutional form – no longer preferred by any party –
the desired military integration raises questions that German politicians would
rather gloss over or avoid answering. Where would a “more strongly unified”
CFSP lead? 20 Unification could mean a leading role of the Commission as
a European government, majority decisions made within the framework of a
bicameral system, and a voice in decisions for the European Parliament, but
does not necessarily mean this. If a European federal state is no longer the
goal, how will the European Army be led politically and what would the military structures look like specifically? What would the consequences be for
a relationship with NATO? Will there be an EU group (“European caucus”)
within NATO, which the US and Great Britain have always rejected? Would
the army be capable of being deployed at all, in view of the lack of a European consensus on the issue of using military force? Would it make any sense
without the participation of Great Britain? The problems associated with these
questions are themselves sufficient grounds for not wanting a European Army.
The lack of answers suggests that the calls for it only involve a catchphrase,
which is mostly directed at supporters of integration at home. If they were really serious, the governing parties would have to provide concrete answers to
the questions raised above and start initiatives with appropriate goals.
The EU partners do not want a European Army
Even if the German government were seriously pursuing the goal of a European Army, the proposal would remain an illusion due to the resistance of the
allies. This path would remain unviable for neutral EU Member States for reasons of constitutional law. Although they participate in the CFSP without any
16 Cited from Spiegel online, March 23, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
eupolitik-merkel-fordert-europa-armee-a-473435.html.
17 Coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP, 17th legislative period, Berlin 2009,
p. 118.
18 “CDU: Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland,” Government Program 2013 – 2017, p. 73.
19 “SPD: Das Wir entscheidet.” The Government Program 2013 – 2017, p. 112.
20 Ibid. p. 109.
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problem, they do not want to give up their neutrality. In particular, they do not
want to be absorbed into a European federal state. Great Britain and France are
also not pursuing this and neither are the Central European EU members. In
addition, none of the allies want to place NATO in doubt. They know: NATO
and a European Army are mutually exclusive.
The summit of EU heads of state and government last December confirmed
London’s general integration phobia. This is partly based on conviction, domestic policy and showing consideration to strong anti-European sentiment in
the country. This attitude was revealed after the last EU summit, for example,
in the way Prime Minister Cameron announced that he had blocked an EU plan
to have its own armed forces. Actually, he had had the “Europe’s armed forces”
concept removed from the draft communiqué and rejected a suggestion from
the European Commission to examine which civilian-military capabilities the
Union could directly acquire. 21 It was left to President François Hollande to
explain that this statement was not quite correct, for “nobody envisages the
creation of a European Army.” 22
This applies in particular to France itself. In official government statements
it is true that the necessity of “European defense” is a favorite topic, but not in
the sense of an integrated European Army. The only integrated military unit,
the German-French Brigade, was dismissed by then Minister of Defense, JeanPierre Chevènement, as an “instrument for learning languages.” 23 The main
motivation for the Anglo–French declaration of Saint-Malo, which paved the
way for the CSDP, was the desire for improved military capabilities. Up until
now, this process has not really made progress, as the last “defense summit”
demonstrates. Having first emerged due to the financial crisis of 2010, the idea
of making a cooperative virtue of pooling and sharing capacities and capabilities based on defense-policy necessity has only been marginally implemented
so far. Nonetheless, this modest approach illustrates the correct path: “yes” to
more cooperation but “no” to integration into a European Army.
21 Bruno Waterfield: David Cameron fights off EU army plan, in: Telegraph, December 19,
2013; European Commission, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector, COM (2013) 542 final, Brussels, July 24, 2013, p. 12.
22 Cited from Andrew Rettman: France, Germany and U.K. show discord on EU defence, in:
EUobserver December 20, 2013, http://euobserver.com/defence/122570.
23 Cited from Hans-Georg Ehrhart: Die europäische Herausforderung. Frankreich und die
Sicherheit in Europa an der Jahrhundertwende, Baden-Baden 1990, p. 45.
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The defense policy cultures are too different
The lack of will among the partners involved to form a European defense is
not merely a question of political volunteerism. Rather, its origins are deeply
rooted in differing security policy cultures. Whereas, for historical reasons,
the German population is very skeptical about interventions, and the relevant
scope of action afforded the executive is limited by parliamentary oversight,
the situation is different in France and Great Britain: The populations are less
skeptical about interventions, and the government’s scope to act is wider in the
area of security policy. Added to this is a different self-image for the foreign
policy elites. There are five main reasons for this: First, it involves states that
ruled the world for a long time. They achieved this position not least through
military strength, which they surrendered only by overextending themselves
as a result of two world wars. Nonetheless, it took years before – sometimes
only after bloody wars – political consequences came about. However, this
happened with no break in historical continuity.
Second: Status as a world power was based on a colonial empire, which
could no longer be held onto, since the 1960s at the latest. However, special
political links were retained, which manifest themselves in the Francophone
world and the Commonwealth, and in overseas regions.
Third, Great Britain and France belong to the victorious powers of World
War II. In this capacity, they are both founding members of the United Nations
and permanent members of the Security Council. This gives rise to special
political responsibility, which expresses itself, among other things, in a willingness to intervene. The debate on reform of the Security Council, which has
been faltering for many years, has many causes. One of them is certainly that
France and Britain have an interest in retaining their special status and not
allowing it to devolve into a seat for the EU.
Fourth, this special status is also given expression by the fact that both belong to the official nuclear powers. The decision on the use of nuclear weapons
cannot be shared with other states. It is unimaginable that they will surrender
the sole right to make decisions or even transfer it to the EU. In addition, it is
not desirable for Germany to become a nuclear power in this way.
Fifth, the basic political orientations of the two states have long been incompatible. Despite its return to military integration into NATO, in the final
analysis, Paris is concerned with national and European autonomy, whereas
London still stubbornly clings to its historically developed special relationship
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with the US, because this “represents the least bad of a series of unattractive
options.” 24
In the long term, convergence of security policy cultures may be imaginable, but not necessarily desirable.
Corporate resistance is too strong
The corporate special interests of many actors in the EU states also argue
against the formation of a European Army. For instance, national ministries
of defense would suffer a drastic loss of significance or even disappear completely. That could certainly save money, but the political costs would be high.
The same is true for substantial portions of the armed forces. The difficulty in
changing the role of separate branches of the armed forces in a given country in favor of superordinate and integrated structures (“jointness”), which has
been observable for many years, shows on its own that corporate resistance is
quite substantial. Actors from the defense industry are also reluctant to share
the shrinking national pie with others, to say nothing about employee representatives of defense areas that have been protected until now. This corporate
resistance exists in all EU countries having relevant structures. Even in the US,
attempts to achieve more jointness within the armed forces and more closely
linked state actors runs into sustained bureaucratic resistance again and again.
How difficult merging into a combined army can be is illustrated by the
history of the armed forces in the Second German Reich. It took more than 40
years after the founding of the Reich before a unified German Army emerged.
Until then, the national fighting force of the Kaiser’s Reich consisted of “four
armies: The Royal Prussian army, including all federal contingents belonging
to it, the Royal Saxon and the Royal Württembergian, with their own military
administration, and, finally, the Bavarian army as a separate unit under the military command of its own king. Corresponding to this, there were four equal
ministers of war.” 25 Apparently more integration was not possible even in this
unified culture and linguistic region. The unity of the army only became possible through Prussian dominance, World War I and the power of the Third
Supreme Army Command, which adopted a culture verging on the dictatorial.
Now it was possible to say, integration has finally been achieved after all. But
at what price?
24 David Chuter: France, Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy, in: The European Security and Defence Union (2013): Vol. 17, p. 27.
25 Siegfried Fiedler: Taktik und Strategie der Millionenheere 1871 – 1914, Bonn 1993, p. 28.
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Not something to be desired
Even if the counter-arguments presented until now were obsolete, weighty normative reasons would speak against a European Army, all the same. 26 Wouldn’t
an EU with joint armed forces be a classic great power, only in European guise?
The peace-promoting effects of an integrated Europe are at least doubtful. As
David Mitrany does, it might even be possible to refer to a federal fallacy, 27
because the conflict-laden nature of the international system, or the security
dilemma contained in its anarchic structure could sometimes be made even
worse. For the stronger the capacity of the CSDP to intervene and the greater
the will as a world order power to intervene militarily, the more likely there
will be counter-reactions. Even if there are no hegemonic intentions today,
that could change with the passage of time.
A further question is which security policy concept would ultimately prevail: an interventionist one oriented to self-help, or one relying on cooperative security? In the first case, the attractiveness and role as mediator of the
EU would certainly be restricted. Wouldn’t a European Army favor short-term
military concepts over sustainable civilian concepts for solving problems? The
added value of the EU dealing with crises lies precisely in its civilian capabilities. What role would deployment of special forces and covert operations
occasionally carried out by Great Britain and France play? The trend to a new
kind of “unconventional” war, carried out mainly by the US thus far, would be
reinforced.
Against this background, parliamentary control is of vital significance.
How would democratic control of the military by the European Parliament
be guaranteed? Certainly parliamentary scrutiny would not be applied as comprehensively as it is today in Germany and Sweden. But even then, the EU
could decide to carry out a military operation opposed by a majority in Germany, which would be unacceptable for reasons of democratic theory. After
all, in making decisions on operations, it is a matter of life and death. Thus,
a democratic procedure is needed which makes critical public debate possible
and flawed decisions more unlikely.
It is also to be feared that the specifically German concept of internal leadership, which governs the integration of the armed forces into democratic society, and its system of values centered on freedom, would be buried. Today
this concept is already under stress in view of the supposed pressure of operational reality. But internal leadership with its guiding principle of the citizen in
26 See Bernhard Rinke: Die beiden großen deutschen Volksparteien und das “Friedensprojekt” Europa: Weltmacht, Zivilmacht, Friedensmacht?, Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 291 – 293.
27 Cited from op. cit. p. 292.
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uniform, and the parliamentary ombudsman for the armed forces whose role
would be superfluous in a European Army, form two indispensable elements
of German democracy.
We do not need a European Army!
The call for a European Army is unrealistic, deceptive and provincial. Although once again it is in the SPD and CDU programs for the 2014 European elections, it is empty of content. Where would its added value lie, in the
sense of peace policy? Considerations of effectiveness, efficiency and usefulness are not value-free after all. The counter-arguments presented above do not
speak against more European cooperation in the field of security and defense.
The EU needs its own independent foreign and security policy. The President
of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, rightly complained that the EU
states had 19 different troop transporters and 14 kinds of battle tanks, compared with only one American kind in each case. 28 Most notably, the EU states
have weaknesses in the structure of their armed forces, in certain capabilities and in the coordination, cooperation and integration of relevant areas. But
these weaknesses could also be remedied without a European Army. Furthermore, complaints about inadequate military capacity are on the nitpicky side.
All the same, according to the EU Institute for Security Studies, “the European Union as a whole is de facto still the second strongest military power in
the world.” 29 But the crucial question is: What political goals would military
capability serve? The call for a European Army puts the cart before the horse.
It describes an illusion, not a vision. Better cooperation on foreign, security
and defense policy should not aim at building an integrated military and world
power, but Europe as a force for peace, 30 which leaves decisions on participation in military interventions to Member States and national parliaments. We
do not need a European Army!
28 Address to the European Council by the President of the European Parliament Martin
Schulz, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en-en/press/press_release_speeches/
speeches/sp-2013/sp-2013-december/html/address-to-the-european-council-bythepresident-of-the-european-parliament-martin-schulz.
29 Antonio Missiroli (ed.): Enabling the future. European military capabilities 2013 – 2025:
challenges and avenues, Report No. 16, Paris May 2013, p. 9.
30 See Hans-Georg Ehrhart: Quo vadis EU: Friedensmacht oder Militärmacht?, in: Margret
Johannsen/Bruno Schoch/Corinna Hauswedell/Tobias Debiel/Christiane Fröhlich (eds.):
Friedensgutachten 2011, Münster 2011, pp. 179 – 192.
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