Embedded Interests and the Managerial Local State

Transcription

Frankfurt School – Working Paper Series
No. 152
Embedded Interests and the
Managerial Local State:
the political economy of methanol
fuel-switching in China
by Genia Kostka and William Hobbs
Updated Version: February 2011
Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of government support for development of methanol
automobile fuel in China. At the national level, a preference for low carbon alternatives, the
existence of ongoing bureaucratic restructuring, and the national oil companies’ (NOCs) profitability concerns help to explain the lack of government support for methanol fuel. At the
local level, a more short-term and localized view of fuel industry development explains why
some sub-national governments actively encourage the use of methanol fuel through local
standardization, subsidies, and managing opposition from NOCs. The case of methanol fuel
development illustrates how local governments with strong, embedded interests used ad-hoc
strategies to fill in the vacuum of national-level leadership on this issue. These findings underscoring the importance of local leadership in promoting methanol fuel-switching in China
hold lessons for efforts to adopt alternative fuels and energies underway in many parts of the
world.
Key words: China, local state, policy implementation, energy policy, governance, alternative
fuel
JEL classification: D73, D78, O18, R58, Q48, Q58, Q42
ISSN: 14369753
Contact:
Prof. Dr. Genia Kostka
Dr. Werner Jackstädt Assistant Professor
for Chinese Business Studies
East-West Centre of Business Studies
and Cultural Science
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Sonnemannstraße 9-11,
60314 Frankfurt am Main
Tel.: +49 (0)69 154008- 845
Fax.: +49 (0)69 154008-4845
E-Mail: [email protected]
William Hobbs
26 Olympic Lane
Siler City, NC 27344
US
Tel: +001 919 5484485
The authors are thankful for receiving funding from the Developmental Leadership Program
(www.dlprog.org) and Dr.Werner Jackstädt Stiftung. The authors also thank Shi Xiangying
for her research assistance and Sarah Eaton and Christine Polzin for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
2
Working Paper No. 152
Content
1 Introduction............................................................................................................................4
2 Context: the development of methanol fuel and automobiles in China.................................7
2.1
Explaining governments’ diverging interests ...........................................................10
2.2
National level: experimentation with pilots, long-term strategy, bureaucratic
restructuring, and NOC interests .............................................................................10
2.2.1 Long-term view and low-carbon energy development plans ...........................11
2.2.2 Frequent restructuring of China’s energy bureaucracy ....................................11
2.2.3 The roles of NOCs............................................................................................12
2.3
Provincial level: embedded economic interests, short-term strategies, and pollution
considerations ..........................................................................................................13
2.3.1 Economic interests and a localized view of energy development ....................13
2.3.2 Pollution considerations ...................................................................................14
2.4
Municipal level: local economic interests, government-business coalitions, and ‘pet
projects’ ...................................................................................................................14
3 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................16
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................17
3
1
Introduction
In the coming decades, China will look to a number of alternative fuel and energy options to
address national energy security concerns, stem local pollution, and reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Since there is no magic bullet which could provide simple, easy solutions
to all of these problems as a whole, adopting alternative fuels and energies is likely to be a
complex process involving combinations of fuel and energy choices and difficult tradeoffs.
While it is possible that markets themselves will help to address the emerging energy crisis in
China and elsewhere, the actions of governments will be decisive when energy issues are
fused with political economy questions, as they are in matters of energy security and GHG
emissions.
Many studies and news reports have examined China’s efforts to develop alternative energy sources and boost energy efficiency.1 However, there is a lack of scholarship on subnational energy policy and the politics behind varying degrees of government support within
China for alternative fuels and energy sources. This study begins to explore this complex terrain and argues that sub-national governments have a key role to play in shaping China’s ability to craft innovative solutions to energy dilemmas of the present and future. The question we
consider is: how do the currents of local politics channel sub-national governments’ efforts to
promote alternative fuels and energy sources? To address this question, this paper analyzes
recent developments in Chinese government support for the methanol fuel and automobile
industry. The analysis examines actors and interests at the national, provincial and municipal
levels and seeks to explain the varying levels of support for coal-based methanol business
development at these different levels.
This paper focuses on methanol fuel-switching because methanol is a promising alternative fuel in China given the domestic natural resources and industrial structure. Methanol can
be derived from coal, which China possesses in abundance, as well as natural gas. However,
the potential benefits and costs of widespread methanol fuel are arrayed differently across
localities and between different levels of government.2 This paper argues that the disparate
cost-benefit weightings of methanol fuel replacement partly account for wide divergence in
policy outcomes within the Chinese polity. At the national level, factors that help to explain
the recent withdrawal of government support for methanol fuel replacement include a preference for low carbon fuels; the existence of ongoing bureaucratic restructuring, and; profitability concerns of China’s national oil companies (NOCs). At the local level, a more short-term
1
For examples of academic research, see: Bo Kong, ‘China’s Energy Decision-Making: becoming more like the
United States?’, Journal of Contemporary China, 18 (62), (2009), pp. 789–812; Nan Zhou, Mark D. Levine,
and Lynn Price, ‘Overview of Current Energy-Efficiency Policies in China’, Energy Policy 38 (11), (2010),
pp.1-37.
2
Potential benefits: while not as clean as automobile fuel-switching options like electric, hydrogen, or dimethyl
leter, pure methanol fuel (M100) is still cleaner than diesel or gasoline with respect to carbon monoxide and
nitrous oxide emissions. Also, emissions from the use of methanol fuel have around half the atmospheric reactivity of those from gasoline which results in less smog (Gregory Dolan, ‘Methanol Fuels: The Time Has Come’, in paper presented at the 2009 Chinese Methanol Fuels and Methanol Automobile Industry Summit,
available at http://www.methanol.org/pdfFrame.cfm?pdf=DolanISAF.pdf, last accessed on October 20th,
2010). Also, the potential for methanol to be produced from a number of energy sources, including coal, make
it a versatile option for improving energy security. The main disadvantages: although the use of coal-based
methanol fuel reduces local air pollution by lowering carbon monoxide and nitrous oxide emissions, blended
methanol fuel produces overall greenhouse gas emissions that are twice that of gasoline (ibid.). This is in conflict with China’s national goal to reduce the CO2 emitted per unit GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020 compared to its 2005 levels. Also, coal-based methanol is neither as cheap nor as clean as natural gas or natural
gas-based methanol.
4
and localized view of energy development may explain why some sub-national governments
actively encourage methanol fuel development through local standardization, subsidies, and
managing NOC opposition.3
The findings presented here also contribute to the ongoing debate on the evolving centrallocal relations in China’s post-reform area. One school argues that a steady downward shift of
economic power has empowered local governments at the expense of Beijing.4 Others counter
that central political and economic strength remains resilient through a unitary system that is
ruled by one nationally integrated party wielding coercive institutional tools and an effective
cadre management system.5 In the case of methanol, local government actions are not necessarily at odds with the interests of the center, a finding that stands in contrast to the oft-made
assumption that central-local relations tend to be zero-sum. We argue that local governments’
divergent responses to energy dilemmas are a result of the absence of well-defined central
directives. Guidance from above is lacking at times because of limited state capacity to micromanage processes; insufficient resource provisions; large policy time lags caused by China’s
long chain of governmental hierarchy, and; ongoing bureaucratic reforms at the national level.
Local officials are well-positioned to step in to this ‘vacuum’ and craft policies tailored to the
realities of local industry. In doing so, local government agents act in an ad-hoc managerial
and problem-solving capacity, handling competing local demands and interests. Using the
example of methanol business development, this paper shows how local governments act as
strategists and entrepreneurs, forming and maintaining local linkages with businesses to accomplish short-term objectives.
The analysis is based on 55 interviews conducted with government officials and business
managers at the national level in Beijing and at the provincial, municipal, and county levels in
Shanxi during a four-month long period of fieldwork in 2010. The research concentrates primarily on Shanxi Province, which is currently China’s second largest coal producer and has
been the base for national, provincial, and municipal methanol programs for over ten years.
Other provinces such as Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Zhejiang also have locally-driven methanol
initiatives, but Shanxi has the largest-scale programs as well as the longest history, making it
the most suitable candidate for exploring this issue. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from the National China Association of Alcohol and Ether Clean Fuel
and Automobiles, provincial and municipal methanol offices, local Economic Commissions,
Environmental Protection Bureaus, and Development and Reform Commissions, as well as
fertilizer companies and fuel distributors. The analysis also draws from government policy
3
Coal-based blended methanol is created and distributed as follows: first, fertilizer enterprises produce methanol
in the process of making fertilizer; this is followed by specialized enterprises mixing methanol with gasoline,
followed by distribution at specialized gasoline stations. Methanol automobile fuel can be used as pure methanol (M100) or as mixes of gasoline, additives, and methanol from 5 percent methanol (M5) up to 85 percent
(M85). M5 through M30 are more common as they can be used as fuel in automobiles without significant engine conversions. Both local companies producing and mixing fuel and NOCs are capable of supplying mixed
methanol fuel to the public, however, given the supply infrastructure and market dominance of NOC’s, oil majors are often the only players which can distribute the fuel on a large scale.
4
See for example: Shaoguang Wang, ‘The rise of the regions: fiscal reform and the decline of central state capacity in China’, in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 87–113.
5
See for example: Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John P. Burns,
‘Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura’, China Quarterly, no. 138
(1994), pp. 458–491; Yumin Sheng, ‘Central–Provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees: Institutions, Measurement and Empirical Trends, 1978–2002’, China Quarterly, no. 182 (2005) pp. 338-355. For an
excellent literature review, see Jae Ho Chung, ‘Studies of central–provincial relations in the People’s Republic
of China: a mid-term appraisal’, China Quarterly, no. 142 (1995), pp. 487–508.
5
documents, statistical yearbook data, internal enterprise reports, and company visits. The following section provides a historical overview of the methanol automobiles and fuel market in
China. The subsequent section analyzes the recent developments in government policies toward the methanol industry and develops the argument about the determinants of policy decisions or indecision. The final section summarizes the key findings and places the analysis in
the larger context of general fuel-switching and alternative energy adoption initiatives.
6
2
Context: the development of methanol fuel and automobiles in China
This section aims to place the analysis into a historical context by highlighting the evolving
roles of different levels of the Chinese government since the emergence of the methanol automobile fuel industry in China in the 1980s. Three phases of methanol fuel development in
China are identified: the first phase began with foreign joint ventures which facilitated technology transfer; during the second phase, methanol fuel development moved to nationallysupported pilots; and in the third phase sub-national governments supported and experimented
with local pilots.
Phase 1: 1980 – 2002 – Early Development and Sino-American cooperation
The first phase of government support is characterized by nationally coordinated domestic
research and international cooperation. Methanol automobile fuel first received Chinese national attention in the early 1980s when the Chinese National Transport Ministry listed M15
(gasoline blended with 15 percent methanol) research as a national research project and the
Chinese Academy of Sciences subsequently listed M85 (gasoline blended with 85 percent
methanol) research in their key projects for the 7th Five Year Plan (1986-1990). In 1996, the
Chinese Ministry of Technology and Science initiated a cooperative international research
project on methanol fuel, partnering with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
Ford, Volkswagen, the Tsinghua University Department of Chemical Engineering, and the
Chinese Academy of Sciences. As a result of this cooperation, the Shanxi Datong Automobile
Factory produced China’s first methanol automobile, leading to a series of national methanol
automobile projects beginning in 1998 and continuing through 2010.
Phase 2: 1998 – 2008 – National project emphasis
During the second phase, national ministries conducted methanol automobile pilots in selected areas in China and created incentives for using methanol fuels through toll fee reductions and tax allowances. The national emphasis spurred automobile development in several
provinces. This was followed by the national government’s near disappearance from methanol
fuel development beginning in 2008.
The first methanol fuel pilot was launched in 1998 in Yuci, Shanxi, a province chosen due
to its richness in coal resources. The Shanxi Provincial Economic Commission coordinated
the national level project and contracted a local enterprise to convert engines of 50 city minibuses to use M85. As reimbursement for joining the pilot, participating buses were exempted
from road tolls and received subsidies for each engine conversion. In 2005, the national government approved an ‘863’ project which involved the engine conversions of an additional
100 buses and 200 taxis.6 Like the previous pilot project, bus and taxi drivers were exempted
from road tolls and subsidized for engine conversions. During early 2000, large automobile
manufacturers responded to these test projects and the national emphasis behind them and
produced several models of flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs). These automobile manufacturers
included large players like Shanghai Automobile Industry, Anhui Province’s Chery, and
Chongqing’s Chang’an Motors.
In addition to these national-level pilot programs, national leaders pushed forward China’s
overall methanol fuel development agenda. One deputy prime minister, Zeng Peiyan, espe-
6
China’s National 863 Program offers financial support to foster technology innovation in China.
7
cially emphasized the necessity of developing methanol fuel.7 Another minister, the former
head of the Ministry of Machinery and Industry, He Guangyuan, was so out-spoken in his
support that the Chinese media dubbed him the ‘minister of methanol’ (jiachun buzhang
甲甲甲长). He Guangyuan recommended the advancement of methanol fuel projects to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao after their taking office in 2003.
Methanol fuel development has received steadily decreasing national emphasis since
2008. In 2008, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) discontinued national financial subsidies for
engine conversions, and, with the exception of the 863 project which came to an end in 2010,
the methanol car pilots became provincial projects. The road toll exemptions were also eliminated after many drivers received exemptions without actually using methanol fuel. In 2010,
the Ministry of Industry and Information (MII) announced its position that electric automobiles should be the main direction of the Chinese automobile industry and excluding methanol
automobiles from its development plan.8 Another key shift was a speech of the chairman of
Sinopec, Wang Tianpu, in August 2010, announcing that Sinopec would not expand M15
sales to the rest of the Chinese automobile fuel market. Official reasons cited by Sinopec include toxicity concerns and methanol fuel’s potential to disrupt Sinopec’s stable and profitable gasoline business,9 though those in the methanol industry believed that the latter reason
was of particular importance.10 The withdrawal of support from major oil companies may
ultimately affect China’s ability to promote methanol fuel on a large scale, given the NOC’s
supply infrastructures and market dominance. One week after Sinopec’s announcement,
neighboring Shaanxi Province postponed its plans to launch its methanol fuel strategy in October 2010.
Phase 3: Since 2006 –Sub-national promotion
In the third phase, some local governments began to actively create and manage local methanol programs at the provincial and municipal level. Despite the national de-emphasis of methanol automobiles in 2010 and the absence of subsidies or a national M15 regulatory standard, provinces in Guizhou, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Zhejiang set up provincial methanol offices
to plan and promote methanol. Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Ningxia, Shandong, and Xinjiang were
also in the process of setting up offices and expressed great interest in the development of
methanol fuel.11 The majority of these provinces entering the methanol fuel business such as
Shaanxi, Shanxi have locally based coal production, but others, such as Zhejiang do not.
Among the different provincial governments, Shanxi has shown the greatest interest in
methanol fuel business development. Shanxi’s provincial support began tentatively in 2002
when the Shanxi Economic Commission expanded methanol fuel pilot projects beyond the
nationally-led pilot, adding projects in four additional municipalities in the province. The
7
Zhigui Peng, ‘The new definition, development, and rethinking of methanol fuel industry in China’, presented
at the 17th International Symposium on Alcohol Fuels, 2008.
8
Zhongguo Huagong Wang [ChemNet], ‘Jiachun Qiche: Zai Zhengce De Miwu Zhong Qianxing’ [‘Methanol
Automobiles: moving forward within the policies’ fog’], http://news.chemnet.com/item/2010-0817/1400688.html, (17 August 2010).
9
Qijue Chen. ‘Zhongshihua Cheng Bu Xiwang Jiachun Qiyou Rushi Jiachun Qiye Zaoyu Jiaji’ [‘Sinopec states
that it does not wish for methanol fuels to enter the market, methanol enterprises encounter attacks from two
sides’], Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai Securities News], (2 August 2010).
10
Interview 25, July 2010, Shanxi Transportation Methanol Project Office; Interview 70, September 2010, China
Association of Alcohol and Ether Clean Fuels and Automobiles.
11
Interview 70, China Association of Alcohol and Ether Clean Fuels and Automobiles, September 2010; Zhongguo Huagong Wang [ChemNet], ‘Jiachun Qiche: Zai Zhengce De Miwu Zhong Qianxing’ [‘Methanol Automobiles: moving forward within the policies’ fog’], (http://news.chemnet.com/item/2010-0817/1400688.html, 2010).
8
government then negotiated with Sinopec to provide low-level methanol blends, M15, on a
large scale. The government won Sinopec’s provincial branch as a partner in 2006 after local
officials threatened to offer sales rights for methanol fuel directly to local stations and agreeing to condone Sinopec’s initial practice of selling cheaper blended methanol fuel as normal
‘No. 93’ gasoline. The Shanxi provincial government also created various methanol promoting incentives. Most importantly, the government offered engine conversion subsidies in 2008
and 2009, giving 5000 Yuan, or 50 percent of cost, for bus conversions and 1000 Yuan, or 20
percent of cost, for taxi conversions. After the national road toll exemptions were eliminated
in 2008, the Shanxi government continued exempting tax levies on M85 and M100.
In addition to nationally and provincially-supported methanol programs, municipal governments also fostered the development of home-grown engine conversion companies. One
municipality in Shanxi in particular, Yuncheng, gave strong support to a small, privatelyowned engine conversion enterprise in order to promote M85 and M100 compatible automobiles. The municipal government regularly stepped in during crisis situations, serving as a gobetween for the enterprise and its suppliers, and also helped during negotiations with methanol production companies and the provincial government. For example, during 2006, after
Sinopec’s entry into the market and unrelated international market disturbances, methanol
fuel prices briefly rose to the point that methanol fuel became more expensive than gasoline.
In Yuncheng, the municipal Economic Commission convinced a local methanol producer to
temporarily supply local methanol stations at reduced, but still profitable prices to maintain
methanol fuel’s price advantage over gasoline, thus protecting the local market development.12 In contrast, during the brief price peak drivers in other municipalities reverted their
engines to their original settings and refused to try the fuel again, even after prices returned to
normal levels.13
The three phases illustrate the trend that China’s national support for blended methanol
fuel waned and some local states step in to actively manage methanol fuel market development themselves. The next section summarizes the behaviors and embedded interests of government actors since the mid-2000s.
The assumption is often made that in China a strong central state provides clear directives and
mandates to local governments. The problem only lies in the unwillingness or inability of local governments to implementing upper government mandates. This, however, is not always
the case, as argued in this paper. A debate has emerged about the unfolding nature of state
capitalism in China and recent evidence suggests that further economic reforms become increasingly difficult as the profitability and economic clout of the largest SOEs has grown
markedly in recent years. As a growing number of scholars note (Pei, 2006, Downs, 2008a,
Eaton, forthcoming in 2011), the SOEs’ burgeoning wealth has itself brought a number of
new policy challenges. As a powerful interest group, the SOE executive class exerts an increasing measure of control and independence over the policy agenda in many areas and, in
some eyes, their influence threatens to freeze China in a partial reform equilibrium. Major
state oil majors such as Sinopec and Petrochina have inserted major influence in decisionmaking practices at the central level, lobbying for their interests and protection of markets. In
other words, in the last decade, economic (and political) reforms were shaped in large measure by government leaders hopefuls’ interests in cementing their patronage ties to the state
sector (Eaton, forthcoming in 2011).
12
13
Interview 43, July 2010, Methanol Engine Conversion Company
Interview 38 and 39, July 2010, Yuncheng Economic Commission; Interview 43, July 2010, Methanol Engine
Conversion Company
9
2.1 Explaining governments’ diverging interests
As described above, the national, provincial, and municipal governments managed regulation
and support for methanol fuels differently. Table 1 summarizes the national, provincial, and
municipal governments’ perspectives on methanol, each of which will be examined in the
next three sections of this paper.
Table 1. National and sub-national governments’ perspectives on methanol
Perspectives on methanol
Advantages
National: deemphasis of
methanol fuel
• Energy security
• Short-term NOC profits (when selling
methanol as normal
fuel)
• Long-term potential to
be ‘clean’ when made
from CO2 or biomass
Provincial:
variation
selective
support
• Market expansion and
diversification for coal
and fertilizer enterprises, improved air
visibility, less local air
pollution
• Market expansion for
local fertilizer enterprises, improved air
visibility and less local
air pollution
Municipal
variation
–
selective
support
Disadvantages
• High GHG emissions
raise carbon intensity
• Market destabilization
and lower profitability
for NOCs, toxicity
• Low acceptance
among automobile
owners, price fluctuations
• Toxicity, low acceptance, price fluctuation
• Toxicity, low acceptance among automobile owners, price fluctuation
Other factors influencing
methanol policy outcomes
• Reform and bureaucratic restructuring
• Preference for longterm, experimental energy development such
as electric cars
• Pre-existing government-enterprise partnerships
• Leadership emphasis on
‘pet projects’, government-enterprise partnerships, ensuring social
stability (avoiding or
addressing protests)
Source: The authors, based on interviews 25, 43, 51, 51, 53, and 70 with the China National Association of Alcohol and Ether Clean Fuels and Automobiles, provincial and municipal methanol or transportation government
offices, Beston Automobile Conversion Company, Jinzhong Jiaxin Automobile Conversion Company, and Huadun Methanol Production Company during July to October 2010.
2.2 National level: experimentation with pilots, long-term strategy, bureaucratic restructuring, and NOC interests
Methanol fuel received strong national support from the 1980s through 2008. The central
government emphasized the early research and development of methanol fuel and automobiles, and set up pilot projects to test their use. National ministries and universities cooperated
with foreign partners, facilitating technology transfer and domestic production. Also, the government, with the help of the oil majors, created standards for high level blend M85 and
M100 methanol fuels. Yet, since 2008, the support for blended methanol has waned. National
10
engine conversion subsidies, pilot projects, and road toll exemptions were discontinued or
passed to provincial governments. Sinopec, which realized significant profits from M15 sales,
withdrew from the market in 2010 and delayed the formulation of M15 fuel standards. Also in
2010, methanol fuel was excluded from the development plan of the Ministry of Industry and
Information. These actions could be considered a natural and calculated pulling out, given that
young industries must at some point prove their competitiveness and ability to survive without government support, but the abrupt and unexpected withdrawals over the past two years
seem to contradict this, reflecting a sudden shift in policy focus as opposed to a more gradual
withdrawal.
This study argues that the national government’s benefits from promoting methanol fuel,
including energy security and the long-term potential from clean forms of methanol, were not
enough to overcome (a) national preferences for long-term viable and low carbon energy development plans, including those related to reducing carbon emissions, (b) the mismanagement and emerging policy gap during bureaucratic restructuring, and (c) the opposition of
state oil majors due to low-level blend methanol’s potential to lower gasoline profitability and
market share.
2.2.1 Long-term view and low-carbon energy development plans
The central government’s withdrawal from the methanol fuel market corresponds with increasing promotion of electric cars and other long-term, non-fossil fuel options. This trend
indicates a more long-term view of energy development, under the premise that enduring energy security and climate change mitigation efforts depend on decreased use of fossil fuels.
This long-term approach to energy development is underscored by the central government’s
strengthened commitment to ambitious carbon intensity reductions by 2020, aiming to reduce
carbon intensity by 40-45 percent based on 2005 levels. This in particular has important implications for methanol fuel because one of the most attractive aspects of methanol is that it
can be produced from China’s abundant coal resources, yet GHG emissions from coal-based
methanol are twice those of gasoline. Although methanol fuel has many benefits, including
low cost and lower emissions of some local air pollutants than gasoline, it does not have the
many clear potential advantages for emissions and energy security that electric cars would
possess.
2.2.2 Frequent restructuring of China’s energy bureaucracy
Throughout the 2000s, frequent reforms of China’s energy bureaucracy resulted in bureaucratic turmoil and turf fights at the national level. Agencies in charge of methanol were not
clearly appointed or lacked the authority, autonomy, and tools to govern the energy and fuel
markets. As a result of the ongoing bureaucratic restructuring, a significant methanol policy
gap emerged that deprived the methanol fuel market of central government management and
coordination.
For example, prior to the major energy bureaucracy reforms in 2008, the NDRC drafted a
policy file on methanol fuel and gathered opinions from different government departments
and market actors, but this policy failed when bureaucratic responsibilities for the fuel were
reassigned from the NDRC’s Energy Bureau to the newly formed National Energy Administration (NEA). The failure of the initial draft policy was in part caused by an ongoing transition period during which new policy managers adapted to their responsibilities.14 Beyond this,
14
Interview 70, September 2010, China Association of Alcohol and Ether Clean Fuels and Automobiles
11
although the NEA was better staffed than the NDRC Energy Bureau, there were only 112
employees working at the national level, far fewer than needed. By comparison, the United
States Department of Energy has around 4,000 employees working on energy issues.15 Also,
the NEA was intended to resolve planning and coordination issues, yet it lacked the power to
carry out many of its assigned tasks, including the authority to effectively coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions, and state-owned energy companies.16 To improve coordination, a National Energy Commission (NEC) was set up with more than 21 members that
ranked at a higher level than both NDRC and the NEA in the hierarchy of power, but there
was a considerable time lag before the new ministry started to operate. Throughout 2009, negotiations among key department leaders took place to agree on the so-called ‘super ministry’s’ core leadership and tasks. Official NEC appointments were made only in January
201017 and following up to the creation of ‘super ministry’ for energy, power struggles among
different departments resulted in no clear lines of responsibilities and accountabilities. While
in some areas there was significant double work among agencies to fight for territory, in other
areas issues simply fell ‘fell through the grid’. Methanol fuels were one example of the latter.
2.2.3 The roles of NOCs
Sinopec was asked by the central officials to take the lead in methanol fuel development and
methanol standard creation. Sinopec created standards for high-blend methanol fuels such as
M100 and M85 that do not threaten Sinopec’s gasoline business because using such high
blended fuels requires engine conversions. However, the NOC delayed the development of
M15 fuel standards and M15 fueling stations. As low blended fuels can be used with existing
engines and methanol fuel would stand in direct competition to Sinopec’s and Petrochina gasoline sales, this was arguably a wise business decision if deliberate. Domestic producers have
a large methanol production capacity, and given that private gasoline stations could establish
a sufficient supply network, Sinopec and Petrochina would experience strong domestic competition. On the other hand, if Sinopec had expanded its own sales of M15 fuel, the methanol
market may have destabilized Sinopec’s and Petrochina’s relatively stable gasoline market. In
addition, although Sinopec was able to sell the M15 fuel as normal No. 93 gasoline for several
years and achieved large profit margins, it was eventually forced to correctly label the fuel
after complaints from the public. Sinopec’s M15 fuel prices subsequently reflected the addition of cheaper methanol fuel, lowering profit margins and partially removing one of the primary incentives for the NOC to sell methanol.
Given China’s politically powerful and relatively autonomous state-owned oil companies,
combined with the existence of inter-departmental fragmentation in energy, it is difficult for
the national bureaucracy to micro-manage policies which involve redistribution and drawbacks or do not impact core interests. According to Kong18, adopting and implementing redistributive policies at the national level in China is becoming increasingly difficult. National
level decision-making on methanol fuel promotion is no exception, especially during institutional reform and transition. Without NOCs' support for methanol fuel switching, and as the
15
Erica S. Downs. ‘China’s ‘New’ Energy Administration - China’s National Energy Administration Will
Struggle to Manage the Energy Sector Effectively’, China Business Review, November-December, (2008),
pp. 42-45.
16
Ibid.
17
Zhihong Wan. ‘Wen Heads 'Super Ministry' for Energy’, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2010-01/28/content_9388039.htm, (28 January 2010), last accessed on February 4, 2011.
18
Bo Kong. "China’s Energy Decision-Making: Becoming More Like the United States?" Journal of Contemporary China 18(62), (2009): 789 - 812.
12
central government’s stand towards methanol business development gradually shifted from
coordinated national support towards no direct policy, management of methanol automobile
fuel development was left to the provinces.
2.3 Provincial level: embedded economic interests, short-term strategies,
and pollution considerations
Several provincial governments, including Shanxi Province, have continued to support methanol fuel, despite the recent national level withdrawal. Significantly and in contrast to government inaction at the national level, provincial officials took aggressive steps to promote
methanol, employing methods outside of the formal bureaucracy. For example, provincial
leaders in Shanxi and Guizhou actively managed opposition from oil majors.19 Opposition
from Sinopec in Shanxi was countered by threats and unofficial deals sidestepping other local
suppliers, thus allowing Sinopec to reap significant profits from methanol sales. Shanxi officials also created methanol promotion offices, planned the methanol engine conversion pilots,
and formed closed alliances with local companies, negotiating pilot expansions and distribution rights with them. As pilots expanded, establishing a M15 standard became increasingly
necessary with many small producers entering the market, but there was no national action.
Shanxi, like eight other provinces, responded by developing its own provincial standard. In
addition to planning, coordinating, and forming alliances, government officials also sought to
persuade stakeholders and decision-makers to buy in to methanol fuel through framing the
coal-based methanol fuel as a clean, cheap, and locally beneficial alternative to imported gasoline.20 This is despite the fact that Sinopec was allowed to sell M15 fuel at the same cost as
gasoline, taking away the cost advantage for consumers, and also that methanol fuel is ‘clean’
in terms of local pollutants but ‘dirty’ with respect to GHG emissions.
Two explanations help to explain provincial government’s aggressive, managerial support
of methanol fuel: (a) a more short-term and localized view of energy development prioritizing
economic benefits for local coal and fertilizer enterprises, and (b) local, visible pollution reduction benefits from the use of methanol which was especially important to provinces with
national government and international media pressure to reduce air pollutants. Both economic
interests and environmental concerns at the local level in some provinces outweighed the difficulties of promoting the fuel. Hence, provincial governments were especially willing to continue support despite the shuffling of responsibilities which occurred during the bureaucratic
restructuring and reform.
2.3.1 Economic interests and a localized view of energy development
In terms of local economic interests in Shanxi, methanol fuel potentially benefits primarily
local coal and fertilizer industries, and methanol promotion policies do not negatively influence core business interests. For example, Shanxi as the second largest coal producer in Chi19
20
Interview 70, September 2010, China Association of Alcohol and Ether Clean Fuels and Automobiles
The concept of ‘framing’ originates from sociological research Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1974). Frame analysis has been applied to the politics of environmental, energy, and
climate change discourse and describes the effectiveness of linguistic ‘reframing’ of policies in dominating
public perceptions of issues Maarten Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), J. Ivan Scrase and David Ockwell, ‘The
Role of Discourse and Linguistic Framing Effects in Sustaining High Carbon Energy Policy: An Accessible
Introduction’, Energy Policy 38(5), (2010).
13
na, favors the development and diversification of coal markets. Especially with new demands
beginning in 2006 to increase GDP per unit of standard coal equivalent, Shanxi’s provincial
government faces pressure to increase the value-added of products manufactured from coal in
the province. Methanol fuel’s profit margins are high and through the use of coal-based methanol fuel, Shanxi can keep more profits within its borders. Also, the expansion of the methanol market has significant benefits for fertilizer companies as methanol fuel diversifies
their product base and grants them greater market stability. In addition to embedded business
interests, a thriving local methanol fuel business helps provincial government officials to meet
their economic growth and employment targets. Although cadre evaluations include environmental and energy targets, economic growth is still one of the safest bets for government officials chasing career promotions.
Provincial economic interests are substantial and lead to a support of methanol in the
short-term. Unlike the long-term development of electric cars supported by the national level,
methanol fuel is technologically nearly within China’s grasp, and promotion of the fuel results
in relatively immediate results for businesses and the economy. The national level has few of
these short-term incentives because of the many different provinces, most of which do not
have the significant economic interests in methanol in comparison to major coal-producing
provinces.
2.3.2 Pollution considerations
Beginning in 2006 and continuing through the present, Shanxi has faced national and international media scrutiny on its air pollution. In 2006, the World Bank listed one of its municipalities as the world’s most polluted city.21 Methanol fuel may produce greenhouse gas emissions
far greater than gasoline, but at the local level, it improves air quality and can result in less
smog because of its emissions’ relatively low atmospheric reactivity. For Shanxi and other
provincial leaders, there is perhaps a slight preference for air quality improvement programs
with greater visibility to the general public, including the smog factor, especially as local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) keep track of ‘blue sky’ days.22 It is more obvious to
the public that the government is addressing pollution concerns, which is may be of paramount importance to a government facing local, national, and international media pressure.
2.4 Municipal level: local economic interests, government-business coalitions, and ‘pet projects’
As at the provincial level, municipal government behavior on methanol promotion can be
aggressive and managerial. The case study on Shanxi’s Yuncheng municipality illustrates a
municipal government’s intervention and negotiation to protect the development of the methanol fuel market. The managerial behavior of local government actors can be explained by
embedded economics interests and the personal involvement of individual leaders who took
on methanol promotion as a ‘pet project’.
In Yuncheng municipality, the local privately-owned Beston Company was originally an
automobile repair shop, and in 2005 was working on engine conversions for liquefied oil gas
21
Emily Chang, ‘Choking in China’s Polluted City’, CNN, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-1215/world/china.pollution_1_coal-mines-polluted-factories?_s=PM:WORLD, (15 December 2009), accessed on
October 31, 2010.
22
Interview 7, July 2010, Shanxi Province Environmental Protection Bureau
14
at the time. Its entrance into the methanol engine conversion market was a combination of two
distinct events. The first event was that in 2005 and 2006 the provincially supported Jiaxin
Company had just undertaken the widespread promotion of its engine conversions, yet had
run into serious technology issues. Beston saw the difficulties as an opportunity to enter the
market. The second event was an alliance between the repair shop manager and an official in
Yuncheng’s Municipal Economic Commission. The two men were introduced through a
classmate of the repair shop manager who had heard that the government official was interested in supporting the development of methanol fuel usage in the municipality. They developed a strong partnership and repeatedly petitioned the provincial government for financial
support, eventually receiving an Environmental Protection Fund grant amounting to 200000
RMB.23
Over time, the enterprise and the economic commission, through the government official,
developed a strong partnership. For example, while petitioning for subsidies, the official’s
support made it clear that Beston Company was not to be considered ‘outside’ the government, but in partnership with it. However, not all companies had this support from a ‘managerial’ local government, and in one locality this had a significant impact on the outcome of
petitioning and protest there. One enterprise manager protested when his company did not
received promised subsidies. The result was that he was jailed for several days as he petitioned as an ‘outsider’ without government endorsement. He eventually gave up his petition.
The Yuncheng Economic Commission support, in the form of a personal commitment
from one of its high-ranking officials, also included negotiation and intervention during one
major methanol price fluctuation. In 2006, after Sinopec’s entrance into the market and international market disturbances, methanol fuel prices rose to the point that the fuel became more
expensive than ordinary gasoline, eliminating incentives for consumers to switch to methanol
fuel. Taxi drivers protested, believing that they had been cheated. In response, and to protect
the methanol automobile industry and Beston Company, who was taking the brunt of the public anger, the official from the economic commission negotiated a deal with a local fertilizer
plant, under which the fertilizer plant supplied methanol at a reduced price to methanol gas
stations. The drivers were placated and kept methanol engine conversions. This was essential
to the successful promotion of methanol in Yuncheng because local car drivers new to the fuel
had been uneasy about using a gasoline alternative. 24 In other localities, the price rises resulted in drivers switching back to normal gasoline and being unwilling try the fuel again.
In Shanxi, municipal embedded economic interests that support methanol fuel are in line
with those at the provincial level. Almost all municipalities have significant coal resources
and fertilizer enterprises. Because of this, many municipalities have incentives to promote
methanol similar to provincial incentives. Yuncheng does not have coal resources, but has
many large fertilizer enterprises due to its proximity to coal-producing locations, and its importance as a provincial agricultural base. This is significant as the fertilizer enterprises benefit the most, more than coal interests, from methanol promotion in the short-term since they
sell methanol directly to the market and diversify their consumer markets. These short-term
benefits, or the short-term economic consequences of market stability once promotion of methanol has achieved a degree of success, create additional pressure to find short-term, reactive
solutions to pressing market development issues.
23
24
Interview 38, July 2010, Yuncheng Economic Commission.
Methanol is acidic, wearing away the fuel lines of cars without appropriate equipment to handle the fuel, and
many consumers believe it to be highly toxic. It is also sometimes hard to start a car running on the mixed
methanol fuel in cold conditions.
15
Also, at the municipal level, government support for methanol can be tied to individual
preferences of leaders than at either the national or provincial level. This leads to large variations in support for methanol fuel among municipals. For example, promotion in Yuncheng
was especially interventionist, aggressive, and, ultimately, successful. The deciding factor in
this was the government-business coalition and the enthusiasm of the economic commission
official who took promotion and protection of the methanol industry on as a ‘pet project’.
This official had existing close connections to a large, profitable fertilizer enterprise and good
relationships with provincial government officials. In addition, the existence of a independently successful local engine conversion company capable of competing with the dominant,
provincially-supported Jiaxin made it easier to justify support. The company was able to provide high quality engine conversion products while Jiaxin correct product malfunctions in
2005. In this way, the municipal level government support and the local enterprise complemented provincial efforts and created increased market competition.
3
Conclusion
This paper has examined the politics of methanol fuel-switching in China and uncovered determinants of policy variation within the Chinese government. It argued that embedded interests of local governments help to account for the pro-active, managerial support of methanol
business development in many locales in spite of the central government’s ambivalence toward this fuel. In locales with high levels of coal and fertilizer production and local pollution
concerns, the embedded interests of local governments were strong motivators for subnational governments to develop local methanol standards, create subsidy programs, and establish formal and informal incentives for businesses to join pilot programs. These pro-active
responses occurred in parallel to the emergence of a yawning policy vacuum at the national
level which was the combined result of bureaucratic restructuring, national oil companies’
foot-dragging in government-organized regulation and planning, and a preference for longterm energy strategies. In contrast to the oft-made assumption that central-local relations tend
to be zero-sum, local government actions in this case did not defy national-level directives
and instead filled this ‘vacuum’. To summarize, while the national government concentrated
on pursuing experimental, long-term strategies to ensure energy security, at the sub-national
level government agents created short-term, ad-hoc solutions to the pressing issues surrounding strategic markets, which in this case were those for methanol fuel and engine conversions.
These findings on the politics of methanol fuel-switching in China are highly relevant to
fuel-switching and alternative energy adoption efforts of increasing importance to other local
and national governments. It is true that many energy issues such as energy security and emissions concerns may be of primary concern to national and international actors and not local
governments with limited influence over the outcomes of efforts requiring national or worldwide coordination. However, as illustrated by this study, local governments may have strong
local interests which influence their behaviors in promoting specific alternative fuel and energy options. This research outlines some specific practices and methods that local governments in China use to address barriers to entry and distributional difficulties that may derail
alternative fuel and energy initiatives. The case study describes and accounts for local governments’ roles in both supporting methanol blend suppliers, and also creating and nurturing
local markets for methanol fuel. While Shanxi’s long-term experimentation with methanol
fuel policy makes it somewhat unique among China’s provinces, it stands to reason that the
actions of other provincial or sub-national governments are also shaped by the contours of
local, embedded interests.
16
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No.
Author/Title
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151.
Kostka, Genia / Hobbs, William
Energy Efficiency in China: The Local Bundling of Interests and Policies
2010
150.
Umber, Marc P. / Grote, Michael H. / Frey, Rainer
Europe Integrates Less Than You Think. Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control in Europe and the US
2010
149.
Vogel, Ursula / Winkler, Adalbert
Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis
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148.
Libman, Alexander
Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Decentralization in Russian Security Agencies
2010
147.
Kostka, Genia / Zhou, Jianghua
Chinese firms entering China's low-income market: Gaining competitive advantage by partnering governments
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146.
Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten
Rethinking Evolution, Entropy and Economics: A triadic conceptual framework for the Maximum Entropy Principle as
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2010
145.
Heidorn, Thomas / Kahlert, Dennis
Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches during the Financial Crisis
2010
144
Fritz-Morgenthal, Sebastian G. / Hach, Sebastian T. / Schalast, Christoph
M&A im Bereich Erneuerbarer Energien
2010
143.
Birkmeyer, Jörg / Heidorn, Thomas / Rogalski, André
Determinanten von Banken-Spreads während der Finanzmarktkrise
2010
Bannier, Christina E. / Metz, Sabrina
Are SMEs large firms en miniature? Evidence from a growth analysis
2010
Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Voinea, André
The Value-Added of Investable Hedge Fund Indices
2010
142.
141.
140.
139.
The Evolutionary Approach to Entropy: Reconciling Georgescu-Roegen’s Natural Philosophy with the Maximum
Entropy Framework
2010
Heidorn, Thomas / Löw, Christian / Winker, Michael
Funktionsweise und Replikationstil europäischer Exchange Traded Funds auf Aktienindices
2010
Libman, Alexander
Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization
2010
137.
Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Libman, Alexander / Yu, Xiaofan
State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’
2010
136.
Lang, Michael / Cremers, Heinz / Hentze, Rainald
Ratingmodell zur Quantifizierung des Ausfallrisikos von LBO-Finanzierungen
2010
135.
Bannier, Christina / Feess, Eberhard
When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: Choking under pressure as a screening device
2010
134.
Entropy, Function and Evolution: Naturalizing Peircian Semiosis
2010
Bannier, Christina E. / Behr, Patrick / Güttler, Andre
Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?
2009
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133.
132.
131.
130.
129.
128.
127.
Social Capital, Chinese Style: Individualism, Relational Collectivism and the Cultural Embeddedness of the Institutions-Performance Link
Schäffler, Christian / Schmaltz, Christian
Market Liquidity: An Introduction for Practitioners
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Dimensionen des Wissens: Ein kognitiv-evolutionärer Ansatz auf der Grundlage von F.A. von Hayeks Theorie der
„Sensory Order“
2009
Hankir, Yassin / Rauch, Christian / Umber, Marc
It’s the Market Power, Stupid! – Stock Return Patterns in International Bank M&A
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Outline of a Darwinian Theory of Money
2009
Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens
Modellierung des Kreditrisikos im Portfoliofall
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Modellierung des Kreditrisikos im Einwertpapierfall
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125.
Heidorn, Thomas / Schmaltz, Christian
Interne Transferpreise für Liquidität
2009
124.
Bannier, Christina E. / Hirsch, Christian
The economic function of credit rating agencies - What does the watchlist tell us?
2009
A Neurolinguistic Approach to Performativity in Economics
2009
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Winkler, Adalbert / Vogel, Ursula
Finanzierungsstrukturen und makroökonomische Stabilität in den Ländern Südosteuropas, der Türkei und in den GUSStaaten
2009
Heidorn, Thomas / Rupprecht, Stephan
Einführung in das Kapitalstrukturmanagement bei Banken
2009
Rossbach, Peter
Die Rolle des Internets als Informationsbeschaffungsmedium in Banken
2009
Diversity Management und diversi-tätsbasiertes Controlling: Von der „Diversity Scorecard“ zur „Open Balanced
Scorecard
2009
Hölscher, Luise / Clasen, Sven
Erfolgsfaktoren von Private Equity Fonds
2009
Bannier, Christina E.
Is there a hold-up benefit in heterogeneous multiple bank financing?
2009
116.
Roßbach, Peter / Gießamer, Dirk
Ein eLearning-System zur Unterstützung der Wissensvermittlung von Web-Entwicklern in Sicherheitsthemen
2009
115.
Kulturelle Hybridisierung und Wirtschaftstransformation in China
2009
114.
Schalast, Christoph:
Staatsfonds – „neue“ Akteure an den Finanzmärkten?
2009
113.
Schalast, Christoph / Alram, Johannes
Konstruktion einer Anleihe mit hypothekarischer Besicherung
2009
Schalast, Christoph / Bolder, Markus / Radünz, Claus / Siepmann, Stephanie / Weber, Thorsten
Transaktionen und Servicing in der Finanzkrise: Berichte und Referate des Frankfurt School NPL Forums 2008
2009
Werner, Karl / Moormann, Jürgen
Efficiency and Profitability of European Banks – How Important Is Operational Efficiency?
2009
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112.
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106.
Moralische Gefühle als Grundlage einer wohlstandschaffenden Wettbewerbsordnung:
Ein neuer Ansatz zur erforschung von Sozialkapital und seine Anwendung auf China
2009
Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Roder, Christoph
Empirische Analyse der Drawdowns von Dach-Hedgefonds
2009
Neuroeconomics, Naturalism and Language
2008
Schalast, Christoph / Benita, Barten
Private Equity und Familienunternehmen – eine Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung deutscher
Maschinen- und Anlagenbauunternehmen
2008
Bannier, Christina E. / Grote, Michael H.
Equity Gap? – Which Equity Gap? On the Financing Structure of Germany’s Mittelstand
2008
105.
The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance
2008
104.
Schalast, Christoph (Hrgs.) / Schanz, Kay-Michael / Scholl, Wolfgang
Aktionärsschutz in der AG falsch verstanden? Die Leica-Entscheidung des LG Frankfurt am Main
2008
103.
Bannier, Christina E./ Müsch, Stefan
Die Auswirkungen der Subprime-Krise auf den deutschen LBO-Markt für Small- und MidCaps
2008
102.
Cremers, Heinz / Vetter, Michael
Das IRB-Modell des Kreditrisikos im Vergleich zum Modell einer logarithmisch normalverteilten Verlustfunktion
2008
101.
Heidorn, Thomas / Pleißner, Mathias
Determinanten Europäischer CMBS Spreads. Ein empirisches Modell zur Bestimmung der Risikoaufschläge von
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS)
2008
100.
Schalast, Christoph (Hrsg.) / Schanz, Kay-Michael
Schaeffler KG/Continental AG im Lichte der CSX Corp.-Entscheidung des US District Court for the Southern District
of New York
2008
20
Working Paper No.
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Hölscher, Luise / Haug, Michael / Schweinberger, Andreas
Analyse von Steueramnestiedaten
2008
98.
Heimer, Thomas / Arend, Sebastian
The Genesis of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Formula
2008
97.
Heimer, Thomas / Hölscher, Luise / Werner, Matthias Ralf
Access to Finance and Venture Capital for Industrial SMEs
2008
Böttger, Marc / Guthoff, Anja / Heidorn, Thomas
Loss Given Default Modelle zur Schätzung von Recovery Rates
2008
Almer, Thomas / Heidorn, Thomas / Schmaltz, Christian
The Dynamics of Short- and Long-Term CDS-spreads of Banks
2008
Barthel, Erich / Wollersheim, Jutta
Kulturunterschiede bei Mergers & Acquisitions: Entwicklung eines Konzeptes zur Durchführung einer Cultural Due
Diligence
2008
Heidorn, Thomas / Kunze, Wolfgang / Schmaltz, Christian
Liquiditätsmodellierung von Kreditzusagen (Term Facilities and Revolver)
2008
Burger, Andreas
Produktivität und Effizienz in Banken – Terminologie, Methoden und Status quo
2008
91.
Löchel, Horst / Pecher, Florian
The Strategic Value of Investments in Chinese Banks by Foreign Financial Insitutions
2008
90.
Schalast, Christoph / Morgenschweis, Bernd / Sprengetter, Hans Otto / Ockens, Klaas / Stachuletz, Rainer /
Safran, Robert
Der deutsche NPL Markt 2007: Aktuelle Entwicklungen, Verkauf und Bewertung – Berichte und Referate des NPL
Forums 2007
2008
Schalast, Christoph / Stralkowski, Ingo
10 Jahre deutsche Buyouts
2008
Bannier, Christina E./ Hirsch, Christian
The Economics of Rating Watchlists: Evidence from Rating Changes
2007
87.
Demidova-Menzel, Nadeshda / Heidorn, Thomas
Gold in the Investment Portfolio
2007
86.
Hölscher, Luise / Rosenthal, Johannes
Leistungsmessung der Internen Revision
2007
85.
Bannier, Christina / Hänsel, Dennis
Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization
2007
84.
Bannier, Christina
“Smoothing“ versus “Timeliness“ - Wann sind stabile Ratings optimal und welche Anforderungen sind an optimale
Berichtsregeln zu stellen?
96.
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83.
Bannier, Christina E.
Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing: Does it Reduce Inefficient Credit-Renegotiation Incidences?
2007
82.
Cremers, Heinz / Löhr, Andreas
Deskription und Bewertung strukturierter Produkte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung verschiedener Marktszenarien
2007
Demidova-Menzel, Nadeshda / Heidorn, Thomas
Commodities in Asset Management
2007
Risikosteuerung mit Kreditderivaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Credit Default Swaps
2007
Cremers, Heinz / Traughber, Patrick
Handlungsalternativen einer Genossenschaftsbank im Investmentprozess unter Berücksichtigung der Risikotragfähigkeit
2007
Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Roffia, Barbara
Monetary Analysis: A VAR Perspective
2007
Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Muschiol, Andrea
Portfoliooptimierung mit Hedgefonds unter Berücksichtigung höherer Momente der Verteilung
2007
76.
Jobe, Clemens J. / Ockens, Klaas / Safran, Robert / Schalast, Christoph
Work-Out und Servicing von notleidenden Krediten – Berichte und Referate des HfB-NPL Servicing Forums 2006
2006
75.
Abrar, Kamyar / Schalast, Christoph
Fusionskontrolle in dynamischen Netzsektoren am Beispiel des Breitbandkabelsektors
2006
74.
Schalast, Christoph / Schanz, Kay-Michael
Wertpapierprospekte: Markteinführungspublizität nach EU-Prospektverordnung und Wertpapierprospektgesetz 2005
2006
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Dickler, Robert A. / Schalast, Christoph
Distressed Debt in Germany: What´s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies
2006
81.
80.
79.
78.
77.
21
72.
Belke, Ansgar / Polleit, Thorsten
How the ECB and the US Fed set interest rates
2006
71.
Heidorn, Thomas / Hoppe, Christian / Kaiser, Dieter G.
Heterogenität von Hedgefondsindizes
2006
70.
Baumann, Stefan / Löchel, Horst
The Endogeneity Approach of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas - What does it mean for ASEAN + 3?
2006
Heidorn, Thomas / Trautmann, Alexandra
Niederschlagsderivate
2005
Heidorn, Thomas / Hoppe, Christian / Kaiser, Dieter G.
Möglichkeiten der Strukturierung von Hedgefondsportfolios
2005
Belke, Ansgar / Polleit, Thorsten
(How) Do Stock Market Returns React to Monetary Policy ? An ARDL Cointegration Analysis for Germany
2005
66.
Daynes, Christian / Schalast, Christoph
Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Bank- und Kapitalmarktsrechts II: Distressed Debt - Investing in Deutschland
2005
65.
Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Polleit, Thorsten
Measures of excess liquidity
2005
64.
Becker, Gernot M. / Harding, Perham / Hölscher, Luise
Financing the Embedded Value of Life Insurance Portfolios
2005
63.
Schalast, Christoph
Modernisierung der Wasserwirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb – Braucht Deutschland
eine Rechtsgrundlage für die Vergabe von Wasserversorgungskonzessionen? –
69.
68.
67.
2005
62.
Bayer, Marcus / Cremers, Heinz / Kluß, Norbert
Wertsicherungsstrategien für das Asset Management
2005
61.
Löchel, Horst / Polleit, Thorsten
A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
2005
Richard, Jörg / Schalast, Christoph / Schanz, Kay-Michael
Unternehmen im Prime Standard - „Staying Public“ oder „Going Private“? - Nutzenanalyse der Börsennotiz -
2004
Heun, Michael / Schlink, Torsten
Early Warning Systems of Financial Crises - Implementation of a currency crisis model for Uganda
2004
Heimer, Thomas / Köhler, Thomas
Auswirkungen des Basel II Akkords auf österreichische KMU
2004
57.
Heidorn, Thomas / Meyer, Bernd / Pietrowiak, Alexander
Performanceeffekte nach Directors´Dealings in Deutschland, Italien und den Niederlanden
2004
56.
Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Roffia, Barbara
The Relevance of real-time data in estimating reaction functions for the euro area
2004
55.
Barthel, Erich / Gierig, Rauno / Kühn, Ilmhart-Wolfram
Unterschiedliche Ansätze zur Messung des Humankapitals
2004
54.
Anders, Dietmar / Binder, Andreas / Hesdahl, Ralf / Schalast, Christoph / Thöne, Thomas
Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Bank- und Kapitalmarktrechts I :
Non-Performing-Loans / Faule Kredite - Handel, Work-Out, Outsourcing und Securitisation
2004
53.
Polleit, Thorsten
The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
2004
52.
Heidorn, Thomas / Siragusano, Tindaro
Die Anwendbarkeit der Behavioral Finance im Devisenmarkt
2004
Schütze, Daniel / Schalast, Christoph (Hrsg.)
Wider die Verschleuderung von Unternehmen durch Pfandversteigerung
2004
Gerhold, Mirko / Heidorn, Thomas
Investitionen und Emissionen von Convertible Bonds (Wandelanleihen)
2004
49.
Chevalier, Pierre / Heidorn, Thomas / Krieger, Christian
Temperaturderivate zur strategischen Absicherung von Beschaffungs- und Absatzrisiken
2003
48.
Becker, Gernot M. / Seeger, Norbert
Internationale Cash Flow-Rechnungen aus Eigner- und Gläubigersicht
2003
47.
Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M.
Notes on convexity and quanto adjustments for interest rates and related options
2003
46.
Hess, Dieter
Determinants of the relative price impact of unanticipated Information in
U.S. macroeconomic releases
60.
59.
58.
51.
50.
45.
22
Cremers, Heinz / Kluß, Norbert / König, Markus
Incentive Fees. Erfolgsabhängige Vergütungsmodelle deutscher Publikumsfonds
Working Paper No.
2003
2003
44.
Heidorn, Thomas / König, Lars
Investitionen in Collateralized Debt Obligations
2003
43.
Kahlert, Holger / Seeger, Norbert
Bilanzierung von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen nach US-GAAP
2003
42.
Beiträge von Studierenden des Studiengangs BBA 012 unter Begleitung von Prof. Dr. Norbert Seeger
Rechnungslegung im Umbruch - HGB-Bilanzierung im Wettbewerb mit den internationalen
Standards nach IAS und US-GAAP
2003
41.
Overbeck, Ludger / Schmidt, Wolfgang
Modeling Default Dependence with Threshold Models
2003
40.
Balthasar, Daniel / Cremers, Heinz / Schmidt, Michael
Portfoliooptimierung mit Hedge Fonds unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Risikokomponente
2002
39.
Heidorn, Thomas / Kantwill, Jens
Eine empirische Analyse der Spreadunterschiede von Festsatzanleihen zu Floatern im Euroraum
und deren Zusammenhang zum Preis eines Credit Default Swaps
2002
38.
Böttcher, Henner / Seeger, Norbert
Bilanzierung von Finanzderivaten nach HGB, EstG, IAS und US-GAAP
2003
Moormann, Jürgen
Terminologie und Glossar der Bankinformatik
2002
Heidorn, Thomas
Bewertung von Kreditprodukten und Credit Default Swaps
2001
Heidorn, Thomas / Weier, Sven
Einführung in die fundamentale Aktienanalyse
2001
34.
Seeger, Norbert
International Accounting Standards (IAS)
2001
33.
Moormann, Jürgen / Stehling, Frank
Strategic Positioning of E-Commerce Business Models in the Portfolio of Corporate Banking
2001
32.
Sokolovsky, Zbynek / Strohhecker, Jürgen
Fit für den Euro, Simulationsbasierte Euro-Maßnahmenplanung für Dresdner-Bank-Geschäftsstellen
2001
31.
Roßbach, Peter
Behavioral Finance - Eine Alternative zur vorherrschenden Kapitalmarkttheorie?
2001
Heidorn, Thomas / Jaster, Oliver / Willeitner, Ulrich
Event Risk Covenants
2001
Biswas, Rita / Löchel, Horst
Recent Trends in U.S. and German Banking: Convergence or Divergence?
2001
Eberle, Günter Georg / Löchel, Horst
Die Auswirkungen des Übergangs zum Kapitaldeckungsverfahren in der Rentenversicherung auf die Kapitalmärkte
2001
27.
Heidorn, Thomas / Klein, Hans-Dieter / Siebrecht, Frank
Economic Value Added zur Prognose der Performance europäischer Aktien
2000
26.
Cremers, Heinz
Konvergenz der binomialen Optionspreismodelle gegen das Modell von Black/Scholes/Merton
2000
25.
Löchel, Horst
Die ökonomischen Dimensionen der ‚New Economy‘
2000
24.
Frank, Axel / Moormann, Jürgen
Grenzen des Outsourcing: Eine Exploration am Beispiel von Direktbanken
2000
Heidorn, Thomas / Schmidt, Peter / Seiler, Stefan
Neue Möglichkeiten durch die Namensaktie
2000
Böger, Andreas / Heidorn, Thomas / Graf Waldstein, Philipp
Hybrides Kernkapital für Kreditinstitute
2000
21.
Heidorn, Thomas
Entscheidungsorientierte Mindestmargenkalkulation
2000
20.
Wolf, Birgit
Die Eigenmittelkonzeption des § 10 KWG
2000
19.
Cremers, Heinz / Robé, Sophie / Thiele, Dirk
Beta als Risikomaß - Eine Untersuchung am europäischen Aktienmarkt
2000
18.
Cremers, Heinz
Optionspreisbestimmung
1999
Cremers, Heinz
Value at Risk-Konzepte für Marktrisiken
1999
37.
36.
35.
30.
29.
28.
23.
22.
17.
23
16.
Chevalier, Pierre / Heidorn, Thomas / Rütze, Merle
Gründung einer deutschen Strombörse für Elektrizitätsderivate
1999
15.
Deister, Daniel / Ehrlicher, Sven / Heidorn, Thomas
CatBonds
1999
14.
Jochum, Eduard
Hoshin Kanri / Management by Policy (MbP)
1999
Heidorn, Thomas
Kreditderivate
1999
Heidorn, Thomas
Kreditrisiko (CreditMetrics)
1999
Moormann, Jürgen
Terminologie und Glossar der Bankinformatik
1999
10.
Löchel, Horst
The EMU and the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
1998
09.
Löchel, Horst
Die Geldpolitik im Währungsraum des Euro
1998
08.
Heidorn, Thomas / Hund, Jürgen
Die Umstellung auf die Stückaktie für deutsche Aktiengesellschaften
1998
07.
Moormann, Jürgen
Stand und Perspektiven der Informationsverarbeitung in Banken
1998
Heidorn, Thomas / Schmidt, Wolfgang
LIBOR in Arrears
1998
05.
Jahresbericht 1997
1998
04.
Ecker, Thomas / Moormann, Jürgen
Die Bank als Betreiberin einer elektronischen Shopping-Mall
1997
03.
Jahresbericht 1996
1997
02.
Cremers, Heinz / Schwarz, Willi
Interpolation of Discount Factors
1996
Moormann, Jürgen
Lean Reporting und Führungsinformationssysteme bei deutschen Finanzdienstleistern
1995
13.
12.
11.
06.
01.
FRANKFURT SCHOOL / HFB – WORKING PAPER SERIES
CENTRE FOR PRACTICAL QUANTITATIVE FINANCE
No.
Author/Title
Year
25.
Beyna, Ingo / Wystup, Uwe
On the Calibration of the Cheyette. Interest Rate Model
2010
24.
Scholz, Peter / Walther, Ursula
Investment Certificates under German Taxation. Benefit or Burden for Structured Products’ Performance
2010
23.
Esquível, Manuel L. / Veiga, Carlos / Wystup, Uwe
Unifying Exotic Option Closed Formulas
2010
22.
Packham, Natalie / Schlögl, Lutz / Schmidt, Wolfgang M.
Credit gap risk in a first passage time model with jumps
2009
Packham, Natalie / Schlögl, Lutz / Schmidt, Wolfgang M.
Credit dynamics in a first passage time model with jumps
2009
Reiswich, Dimitri / Wystup, Uwe
FX Volatility Smile Construction
2009
19.
Reiswich, Dimitri / Tompkins, Robert
Potential PCA Interpretation Problems for Volatility Smile Dynamics
2009
18.
Keller-Ressel, Martin / Kilin, Fiodar
Forward-Start Options in the Barndorff-Nielsen-Shephard Model
2008
17.
Griebsch, Susanne / Wystup, Uwe
On the Valuation of Fader and Discrete Barrier Options in Heston’s Stochastic Volatility Model
2008
16.
Veiga, Carlos / Wystup, Uwe
Closed Formula for Options with Discrete Dividends and its Derivatives
2008
21.
20.
24
Working Paper No.
15.
Packham, Natalie / Schmidt, Wolfgang
Latin hypercube sampling with dependence and applications in finance
2008
14.
Hakala, Jürgen / Wystup, Uwe
FX Basket Options
2008
13.
Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe
Vergleich von Anlagestrategien bei Riesterrenten ohne Berücksichtigung von Gebühren. Eine Simulationsstudie zur
Verteilung der Renditen
2008
12.
Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe
Riesterrente im Vergleich. Eine Simulationsstudie zur Verteilung der Renditen
2008
11.
Wystup, Uwe
Vanna-Volga Pricing
2008
Wystup, Uwe
Foreign Exchange Quanto Options
2008
Wystup, Uwe
Foreign Exchange Symmetries
2008
Becker, Christoph / Wystup, Uwe
Was kostet eine Garantie? Ein statistischer Vergleich der Rendite von langfristigen Anlagen
2008
07.
Schmidt, Wolfgang
Default Swaps and Hedging Credit Baskets
2007
06.
Kilin, Fiodar
Accelerating the Calibration of Stochastic Volatility Models
2007
05.
Griebsch, Susanne/ Kühn, Christoph / Wystup, Uwe
Instalment Options: A Closed-Form Solution and the Limiting Case
2007
04.
Interest Rate Convexity and the Volatility Smile
2006
Becker, Christoph/ Wystup, Uwe
On the Cost of Delayed Currency Fixing Announcements
2005
Cross currency swap valuation
2004
Wallner, Christian / Wystup, Uwe
Efficient Computation of Option Price Sensitivities for Options of American Style
2004
10.
09.
08.
03.
02.
01.
HFB – SONDERARBEITSBERICHTE DER HFB - BUSINESS SCHOOL OF FINANCE & MANAGEMENT
No.
Author/Title
Year
01.
Nicole Kahmer / Jürgen Moormann
Studie zur Ausrichtung von Banken an Kundenprozessen am Beispiel des Internet
(Preis: € 120,--)
2003
25
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Working Paper No.

Embedded Interests and the Managerial Local State

Transcription

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